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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16 dated 22nd August, 2012

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Foreign Direct Investment by citizen/entity incorporated in Pakistan. Press Note No.3 (2012 Series) Press Note No.3 (2012 Series) dated: 1st August, 2012.

Presently, a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan, is not allowed to purchase shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company under Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Scheme.

This circular permits, under the Approval Route, a person who is a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan to purchase shares and convertible debentures of an Indian company under FDI Scheme. However, the Indian company in which FDI is received must not be engaged/must not engage in sectors/activities pertaining to defense, space and atomic energy and sectors/activities prohibited for foreign investment.

RBI HAS ISSUED NEW MASTER CIRCULARS ON 2nd JULY, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 21st August, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments – Rationalisation of Form ODI

The circular has amended Part E & Part F of Form ODI by adding new items to the same. The amended new Form ODI is annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12 dated 31st July, 2012

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Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account, Diamond Dollar Account (DDA) & Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Account – Review of Guidelines.

This circular permits EEFC/DDA/RFC account holders to credit 100% of their foreign exchange earnings to the respective accounts. However, the sum total of the accruals in the account during a calendar month will have to be converted into Rupees on or before the last day of the succeeding calendar month after adjusting for utilization of the balances for approved purposes or forward commitments.

As a result, balances outstanding in the said accounts as on 31st July, 2012 together with balances accruing on and from 1st August, 2012 to 31st August, 2012, will have to be converted into Rupee balances on or before close of business on 30th September, 2012. Similar procedure will have to be followed for accruals to the respective accounts in subsequent months.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated 31st July, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA)- Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999.

This circular clarifies that, whenever a contravention is identified by RBI or brought to its notice the entity concerned by way of a reference other than through the prescribed application for compounding, RBI will continue to decide: –

(i) Whether a contravention is technical and/or minor in nature and, as such, can be dealt with by way of an administrative/cautionary advice;

(ii) Whether it is material and, hence, is required to be compounded, for which the necessary compounding procedure has to be followed; or

(iii) Whether the issues involved are sensitive/serious in nature and, therefore, need to be referred to the Directorate of Enforcement (DOE).

However, once a suo moto compounding application is filed, by the entity concerned, admitting the contravention, the same will not be considered as ‘technical’ or ‘minor’ in nature and the compounding process will be initiated.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 8 dated 18th July, 2012

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Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account

This circular states that the provisions of A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 124 dated May 10, 2012 will not apply to the Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Accounts. As a result, the RFC account holder can now retain 100% of his/her foreign exchange earnings in the said account.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 7 dated 16th July, 2012

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Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors (QFIs) in Indian corporate debt securities.

Presently, QFI are permitted to invest only in rupee denominated units of domestic Mutual Funds and listed equity shares.

This circular has revised the definition of QFI and permitted them to also invest on repatriation basis debt securities subject to certain terms and conditions. QFI can now invest up to $ 1 billion in corporate debt securities (without any lock-in or residual maturity clause) and Mutual Fund debt schemes. This limit shall be over and above $ 20 billion for FII investment in corporate debt. For this purpose, QFI must open a single non-interest bearing Rupee Account with a bank in India for investment in all ‘eligible securities for QFI’. As per the revised definition, QFI shall mean a person who fulfills the following criteria:

(a) Resident in a country that is a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or a member of a group which is a member of FATF; and
(b) Resident in a country that is a signatory to IOSCO’s MMoU (Appendix A Signatories) or a signatory of a bilateral MoU with SEBI.

PROVIDED that the person is not resident in a country listed in the public statements issued by FATF, from time to time, on jurisdictions having a strategic AML/ CFT deficiencies to which counter measures apply or that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies;

PROVIDED that such person is not resident in India;

PROVIDED FURTHER that such person is not registered with SEBI as a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or Sub-Account of an FII or Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI).

Explanation – For the purposes of this clause:

(1) “Bilateral MoU with SEBI” shall mean a bilateral MoU between SEBI and the overseas regulator that, inter alia, provides for information sharing arrangements.
(2) Member of FATF shall not mean an associate member of FATF.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 12th July, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Submission of Revised A-2 Form.

RBI has revised the purpose codes for submitting R-Returns by Banks. As a consequence of this revision, purpose codes in Form A-2 have also been revised. Annexed to this circular is the revised list of purpose codes along with Form A-2.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 5th July, 2012

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Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs). This circular states that RBI will permit buyback of FCCB under the approval route upto 31st March, 2013, subject to: –

a) The buyback value of the FCCB must be at a minimum discount of 5% on the accreted value.

b) In case the buyback is to be financed by foreign currency borrowing, all FEMA rules/regulations relating to foreign currency borrowing shall be complied with.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 137 dated 28th June, 2012

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Foreign Investment in India – Sector Specific conditions.

Annexed to this circular is the revised Annex A and Annex B of Schedule 1 to Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000. The revision has been made to bring uniformity in the sectoral classification position for FDI as notified under the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 1 of 2012 dated April 10, 2012 and FEMA Regulations.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 136 dated 26th June, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Rationalisation of Form-83.

Attached to this circular is the new Form 83. This new Form 83 has to be submitted to RBI from 1st July, 2012 for obtaining Loan Registration Number (LRN).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 135 dated 25th June, 2012

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Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered FIIs in Government securities and SEBI registered FIIs and QFIs in infrastructure debt.

This circular has increased the present limits for investment by FII and other foreign investors (Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Multilateral agencies, endowment funds, insurance funds, pension funds and foreign Central Banks) in Government Securities from $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion.
Conditions for investment in Infrastructure Debt Funds (IDF), within the overall limit of $ 25 billion, have been changed as under: –

  • The lock-in period for investments has been uniformly reduced to one year; and
  • The residual maturity of the instrument at the time of first purchase by an FII/eligible IDF investor must be at least fifteen months.

QFI can now invest in MF schemes that hold at least 25% of their assets (either in debt or equity or both) in the infrastructure sector, under the current $ 3 billion sub-limit for investment in mutual funds related to infrastructure.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 134 dated 25th June, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Repayment of Rupee loans.

This circular permits Indian companies in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector who have consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years to avail, under Approval Route, ECB for repayment of Rupee loan(s) availed of from the domestic banking system and/or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure, provided the companies are not in the default list/caution list of the Reserve Bank of India.

The overall ceiling for such ECB will be US $ 10 (ten) billion and the maximum permissible ECB that can be availed of by an individual company, based on its foreign exchange earnings and its ability to service, is limited to 50% of the average annual export earnings realized during the past three financial years. Draw down of the entire facility must be undertaken within a month after taking the Loan Registration Number (LRN) from RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 133 dated 20th June, 2012

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Annual return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets Reporting by Indian Companies – Revised format.

This circular contains the new format of the annual return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets that is required to be submitted by all the Indian companies which have received FDI and/or made FDI abroad (i.e. overseas investment) in the previous year(s) including the current year. This annual return has to be submitted every year on or before 15th July, 2012, directly by Indian companies to the Director, External Liabilities and Assets Statistics Division, Department of Statistics and Information Management (DSIM), Reserve Bank of India, C-8, 3rd floor, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (E), Mumbai – 400 051. The new form can be duly filled-in, validated and sent by e-mail to RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 132 dated 8th June, 2012 Money Transfer Service Scheme

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Presently, a single individual beneficiary can receive for personal use upto 12 remittances not exceeding US $ 2,500 each in a calendar year.

This circular has increased the number of remittances that an individual can receive from 12 to 30. Thus, an individual can now receive for personal use upto 30 remittances each not exceeding $ 2,500 in a calendar year.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 131 dated 31st May, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party – Online Reporting of Overseas Direct Investment in Form ODI.

Presently, although banks can generate the UIN online for overseas investments under the Automatic Route, reporting of subsequent remittances for overseas investments under the Automatic Route as well as the Approval Route, could be done online in Part II of Form ODI only after receipt of the letter from RBI confirming the UIN.

This circular states that, in the case of overseas investments under the Automatic Route, UIN will be communicated through an auto generated e-mail sent to the email-id made available by the Authorized Dealer/Indian Party. This auto generated e-mail giving the details of UIN allotted to the JV/WOS will be treated as confirmation of allotment of UIN, and no separate letter will be issued with effect from 1st June, 2012 by RBI either to the Indian party or to the Authorized Dealer. Subsequent remittances are to be reported online in Part II of form ODI, only after receipt of the e-mail communication/ confirmation conveying the UIN.

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AN ARBITRARY DECISION OF SEBI/SAT – overturns its own consistent interpretation and levies penalty

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A recent strange decision of SEBI, upheld by the Securities Appellate Tribunal leaves companies and others puzzled as to how at all securities laws should be interpreted and applied. Should, for example, a particular interpretation which is not only followed by SEBI, which itself confirms in writing as correct and is otherwise widely applied in practice without objection by SEBI, be overturned? And if such an interpretation which is almost certainly not harming any public interest and is well within the spirit and perhaps even the letter, should be so overturned and, moreover, a person severely penalised for it?

This is exactly what SEBI has done recently and the SAT has upheld such a decision (Order of SAT in matter of Hanumesh Realtors Private Limited v. SEBI dated 25th July 2012).

What was the issue?
The broad issue and background is explained as follows:

SEBI Takeover Regulations 1997 (“the Regulations”) require that a person who acquires substantial shares in a listed company or acquires control over it, should make an open offer to acquire shares from the public shareholders. A person already holding substantial shares can increase his holding without having to make an open offer by a small percentage only every year – normally upto 5%. This is called “creeping acquisition” in common parlance. For the purposes of the 5% limit holding not only the acquirer himself is considered but that of persons acting in concert with him is aggregated. To ensure that there is no misuse of the provisions, inter se transfer of shares amongst the persons acting in concert is allowed with certain safeguards.

In case of acquisition of shares by way of a fresh issue, a slightly peculiar situation arises on account of a calculation/mathematical issue. Take a situation where a person holds 40% of equity share capital of Rs. 10 crore. If he seeks to acquire another 5% in accordance with creeping acquisition provisions, and if he is accordingly allotted Rs. 50 lakh worth of equity shares, then his holding will increase only by 2.86% to 42.86%. The reason is that as his holding increases by Rs. 50 lakh, the equity share capital also increases by Rs. 50 lakh. Thus, his increased holding of Rs. 4.50 crore is calculated with reference to the equity share capital that has also increased to Rs. 10.50 crore. To enable him to increase his holding by 5%, he would have to be allotted equity shares of about Rs. 91 lakh, i.e., almost double.

Now, a further peculiar situation may arise when the acquirer group consists of more than one person. Unless shares are acquired by all the persons in the group in proportion of shares already held by them, there could be increase of holding of more than 5% by the acquirer and dilution of holding by those who do not acquire.

To continue the above example, let us say that the 40% or Rs. 4 crores was held by two persons – one holding Rs. 1.50 crores and another holding Rs. 2.50 crores. If shares are acquired by the person holding Rs. 1.50 crores, then his percentage holding increases from 15% to 22.09%, i.e., by 7.09%. However, the holding of the other person gets reduced by way of dilution from 25% to 22.91%. The overall holding of the two persons taken together, of course, increases to 45%, i.e., within the prescribed limits.

The question is whether the holding and the increase is to be considered individually or as a group. If it is considered individually, then the first holder may be deemed to have exceeded the limit of 5%.

Facts of the present case
The Promoter Group held 49.62% in the share capital of the Company. Further shares were allotted to a particular person in the Promoter Group. The overall holding of the Promoter Group consequent to such allotment increased from 49.62% to 54.59%, i.e., by 4.97% i.e., well within the prescribed limits. However, the individual holding of the person who was allotted shares increased from 36.62% to 42.87%, i.e., by 6.25% which is more than 5%. Needless to add, the holding of the other persons in the Promoter Group decreased by way of dilution. The question is whether such increase is to be considered on a stand alone basis or on a group basis.

SEBI had issued an interpretive letter in 2009 where SEBI had opined that if overall holding did not increase by more than 5%, there would not be any violation of the limits. To be fair, firstly, the facts in that letter were not identical to the present facts, since there was nothing on record to show that one individual’s holding increased more than 5% but was balanced by another person’s dilution of holding. However, the interpretation given was broad enough. Secondly, interpretive letters, in law, do have limited application and are even officially termed as “informal guidance”. Thus, one may not want to apply analogy of other laws such as tax laws where circulars of CBDT are given considerable weight. Still, in securities laws, a certain level of sanctity is to be given to such interpretive letters and SEBI ought to take a consistent view on the issue.

In another case, as explained in the SAT Order, SEBI even passed an adjudication order on similar principles. In that case, the holding of one acquirer increased from 0.43% to 28.22% ! In other words, he even crossed the 15% threshhold which would require an open offer to be made. However, because of non-acquisitions by other persons in the group, their holding decreased from 40.13% to 16.79%, thus the overall increase being from 40.56% to 45.01% which was within 5% limit. SEBI held that this was in consonance with law since the net increase was within 5%. Admittedly, the acquisition in that case was under the rights issue route, but the findings of SEBI were categorical enough to mean that such acquisitions through issue of new shares will be counted as a group.

However, in this particular case, SEBI took a stand and relied on a much earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Swedish Match AB’s case (Appeal No. 2361 dated 25th August 2004). In that case, there were two Promoters – an incoming foreign promoter who already held a substantial quantity of shares and the existing promoter. The incoming promoter acquired most of the remaining shares of the existing promoter and such shares were substantial in number. While deciding on the issue whether this resulted in an open offer or not, the Supreme Court analysed the provisions of Regulations 11 of the 1997 Regulations and held that the increase in holding can take place in three ways only. The acquirer may himself acquire or he may acquire through some other person or he may acquire alongwith other persons.

SEBI took a stand that this principle will have to be applied in the present case in the manner explained as follows. As soon as a person within a group acquires more than 5% shares, he will have to make an open offer even if the holding of the other person, solely on account of this mathematical peculiarity reduces and overall increase in holding remains within the limits. SEBI not only discarded its own decision and interpretation which were much later in date and consistent too, but also applied the above decision of the Supreme Court in perhaps what were different facts at least to a degree and peculiarity. SEBI levied a huge penalty of Rs. 1.87 crores on the party.

Aggrieved, the party appealed to SAT. Strangely, SAT focussed only on the decision of the Supreme Court and applying it, held that the legal position as now canvassed by SEBI was correct. It did not criticise SEBI’s stand of arbitrarily reversing its stand and then – to top it – levying severe penalty. However, SAT did reduce the penalty and while reducing it, it did take into account as part of the consideration, though not sole one, the mitigating factor being SEBI’s earlier decisions and stand. Though the penalty was reduced substantially to Rs. 10 lakhs, it is submitted that it sounds low only in comparison to the original amount. Otherwise, it still remains a substantial penalty considering, in my submission, the blameless act of the acquirer.

This decision and stand of SEBI places persons concerned with applying securities laws in a dilemma particularly since securities laws are often interpreted consistent with SEBI’s stand in practice. If SEBI takes a particular stand and also gives an interpretive circular in writing, it ought to honour it in future cases. And if it wishes to change the stand, a better view may be to give a clarification and in cases where other parties have followed the earlier stand, no action ought to have been taken. This is more so when no harm whatsoever could conceivably have been caused in the present facts.

The author has also observed in numerous other cases of acquisitions by way of issue of new shares, a similar position has existed though none of these cases were acted against. This would show that a particular practice was widely followed and the appellant had every reason to adopt it and could not be faulted particularly since no harm whatsoever could have conceivably been caused to any person.

It is also submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court could have been distinguished. That was a case of inter se transfer of shares between two distinct groups and the holding of acquirer as well as of the acquirer group both increased substantially and by more than 5%. Even the control of the company changed hands from joint control to sole control. The present case was not a case of inter se transfer of shares even if in theory one person in the group increased his holding and holding of the remaining, purely on account of dilution, decreased.

It may be mentioned that this decision is in respect of the earlier law, viz., the 1997 Regulations. Recently, the new Takeover Regulations, 2011 have been notified. Under the 2011 Regulations, it is now expressly stated that the increase in individual shareholding shall also be considered and even if the holding of the remaining shareholders in the group decreases, still, if the limits are exceeded qua a single shareholder, the open offer requirements would apply. However, it is submitted that this in fact would go to show that earlier this was not the case since otherwise, such an express provision was not required.

All in all, this represents an unhealthy trend by SEBI where persons concerned with compliance will always remain on edge as to whether SEBI would change its stand. The importance of interpretive letters – which officially of course is limited to the facts of the case and not binding interpretation of law – will further get diluted. SEBI’s stand appears almost vindictive and arbitrary, since this was a case where even if the matter was taken up for consideration, it was a fit case of not levying any penalty whatsoever while at same time laying down the law for guidance in the future for other persons. Let us hope that this decision is an exceptional decision influenced solely by the binding precedent of the Supreme Court and such arbitrary stand is not repeated in the future.

Avshesh Mercantile P. Ltd. and 15 others v. Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “F” Bench: Mumbai Before P.M. Jagtap (A. M.) and R.S. Padvekar (J. M.) ITA Nos. 5779, 5780, 5821, 6032, 6033, 6194, 6196, 6198, 6266 & 6611/Mum/2006, ITA Nos. 1427, 6742 & 7318 /Mum/2008 and ITA No.208, 210 & 1748/Mum/2009 Assessment Years: 2003-04 & 2004-05. Decided on 13.06.2012 Counsel for Assessees/Revenue: J.D. Mistry/ Subacham Ram

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Section 14A – No disallowance can be made (i) in the absence of any exempt income earned during the year; or (ii) if investment is also capable of generating taxable income.

Facts:
All the assessees in the present case were investment and trading companies. They issued unsecured optionally convertible premium notes of Rs. 1 lakh each. As per the terms of the said issue, the premium note holders could convert the said premium notes into equity shares of the company at the end of maturity period or redeem the same at any time after the end of three years from the date of allotment. In case of early redemption, the premium note holders were entitled to a proportionate premium. During the year under consideration, the premium so paid was claimed by the assessee as deduction being allowable as business expenditure.

The AO found that the amount received by the assessee on issue of premium notes was utilised for making investment in the purchase of shares of Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (‘RUPL’) the income arising there from was exempt u/s 10(23G). As the expenditure incurred was for the purpose of earning exempt income, the AO held that the premium paid on redemption of premium notes was liable to be disallowed u/s 14A. He further held that the fact that no exempt income in the form of dividend was actually earned by the assessee in the year under consideration was not relevant. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Rajendra Prasad Moody 115 ITR 519. As regards the assessee’s contention that the premium paid on redemption of premium notes was the expenditure incurred for the purpose of its business which should be allowed u/s 36(1)(iii), the AO observed that even though making of investment in shares was the object contained in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the assessee companies, the same alone was not a conclusive yardstick to ascertain the nature of business activity carried on by the assessee in the year under consideration. Further, he noted that there was no cogent material to support and substantiate the case of the assessees that making of investments in the shares of RUPL was a part of their business activities.

On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the disallowance made by the AO. He noted that the entire income credited to Profit and Loss account was assessable to tax under the head “Income from other sources” by virtue of section 56(2)(i). Accordingly, he held that the investments in securities made by the assessees were held by them as investment and not as a trading asset. Hence, the expenditure incurred on payment of premium on redemption was not the expenditure incurred for the purpose of business. He held that the premium paid on redemption of premium notes, which had been utilised by the assessee for making investment in shares/ debentures of RUPL was allowable as deduction only against interest/dividend income received from RUPL and such income being totally exempt from tax u/s 10(23G), the premium paid was rightly disallowed u/s 14A by the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and contended that the assessee was not in the business of investment and the investment made in RUPL was only to earn dividend and for no other consideration. It was further contended that even otherwise, it makes no difference as far as disallowance of redemption premium u/s 14A was concerned, as the same was the expenditure incurred in relation to earning of exempt income. As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee that the investment in shares had the potential of earning taxable income also, it was submitted that this aspect will not preclude the applicability of law u/s 14A as has been held by the Mumbai tribunal in the case of ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd. (2008) 119 TTJ (Mum) (SB) 289. Regarding the argument of assessee that there being no exempt income earned by the assessees in the year under consideration, no disallowance of expenditure u/s 14A could be made, the revenue contended that it was wrong to claim that there should be tax free income in the same year for invoking the provisions of section 14A. In support of this contention, it placed reliance on the following decisions :

1. Everplus Securities & Finance Ltd. v. DCIT 102 TTJ (Del) 120.

2. Harsh Krishnakant Bhatt v. ITO 85 TTJ (Ahd.) 872.

3. ITO v. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. 117 ITD 169.

4. M/s Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO and Others ITA No.87/ Del/2008 & ITA No.4788/Del/2007.

5. Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT 328 ITR 81(Bom.).

Held:
The tribunal noted that the proceeds of premium notes on which the impugned redemption premium was paid by the assessee had been invested in the shares/debentures of RUPL and although the dividend income and income from long term capital gain from the said investment was exempt from tax u/s 10(23G), perusal of the Notification issued u/s 10(23G) showed that such exemption was initially granted only for the specific period i.e. assessment year 1999-2000 to 2001-2002 which was further extended upto assessment year 2004-05 subject to satisfaction of certain conditions. Keeping in view all these uncertainties and contingencies, the tribunal agreed with the contention of the assessee that the premium paid by the assessee on redemption of premium notes utilised for making investment in the shares/debentures of RUPL cannot be regarded as expenditure incurred, exclusively in relation to earning of exempt income so as to invoke the provisions of section 14A. It further noted that the said investment had the potential of generating taxable income also in the form of short term capital gains etc.

As the issue involved in the present cases as well as all the material facts relevant thereto were similar to that of the case of Delite Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. ((ITA No.2983/M/2005)), which was confirmed by the Bombay high court, the tribunal followed the said decision and deleted the disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the learned CIT(A). As regards the case laws cited by the revenue, it observed that in none of those cases, the facts involved were similar to the case of the present assessees in as much as the investment made therein was not found to be capable of earning taxable as well as exempt income which was actually not earned by the assessee in the relevant period as were the facts of the case of the assessees.

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Global PE biggies put India story on hold

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“We stay away from places that have impossible governments and impossible tax regimes, which means S ayo n a r ato India,” TPG Capital founder-partner David Bonderman said recently, tearing into the country’s investment attractiveness. Bonderman, among the most influential private equity (PE) investors, said publicly what his peers quipped behind the scenes: India is possibly the least attractive of the emerging markets for PE, right now.

“Global investor confidence has been shaken badly even as India vies with not China, but Indonesia, Vietnam and South Africa for capital”, said Wilfried Aulbur, managing partner, Roland Berger, a global management consulting firm. “Private equity mostly made growth capital investments for minority stakes in Indian companies. They have had little influence on the strong promoter-driven businesses, and hardly managed what they usually do in western markets to improve return on investments,” he added.

(Source: Times of India dated 26-07-2012)

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HDFC Bank is now one of the most valuable in the world

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For most banks across the globe, the past five years have been a battle for survival with many falling by the wayside and others becoming wards of the state. In late 2008, India was also not immune with ICICI Bank, the nation’s second largest, experiencing some jitters. But one lender which has remained immune to the troubles swirling around the sector is HDFC Bank.

With a market capitalisation of Rs 1,38,469 crore (or $24.88 billion), HDFC Bank has surpassed the biggest lender in the nation – State Bank of India – which has deposits that are almost six times that of the private lender.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 01-08-2012)

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Larsen & Toubro Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Operating Cycle for current and non-current classification

Operating Cycle for the business activities of the company covers the duration of the specific project/contract/product line/service including the defect liability period, wherever applicable and extends upto the realization of receivables (including retention monies) within the agreed credit period normally applicable to the respective lines of business.

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Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Basis for Preparation of Accounts

All assets & liabilities have been classified as current & non – current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of services and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as 12 months for the purpose of current and non-current classification of assets & liabilities.

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Hindustan Unilever Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Basis for preparation of accounts

All assets and liabilities have been classified as current or non-current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of products and the time between acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as 12 months for the purpose of current/non-current classification of assets and liabilities

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GRASIM Industries Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Classification of Assets and Liabilities as Current and Non-Current

All assets and liabilities are classified as current or non-current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of products and the time between the acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, 12 months has been considered by the Company for the purpose of current – noncurrent classification of assets and liabilities.

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Bajaj Electricals Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Basis of Preparation
All assets and liabilities have been classified as current or non-current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of products and the time between the acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as 12 months for the purpose of current or noncurrent classification of assets and liabilities.
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GAPS in GAAP – Borrowing costs – PAra 4(e) of as 16

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The Genesis
Paragraph 4(e) of AS-16 Borrowing Costs has caused a lot of agony to Indian entities and is a highly debated and contentious issue, as exchange volatility shows no sign of cooling in India. In this article, we will try and understand the genesis of the problem, the theory of Interest Rate Parity (IRP), global interpretation on 4(e), linkage with paragraph 46 and 46A and analyse issues and provide author’s view on those issues. This article deliberately avoids the issue of derivatives which are used as hedges against the foreign currency (FC) borrowings, because it would have made the article unduly long and complex.

AS 16 requires borrowing costs incurred on construction of qualifying assets to be capitalised. Paragraph 4 of AS 16 contains an inclusive list of what borrowing costs may include. Sub-clause (e) of Paragraph 4 states: “exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs”. This requirement is explained in the Standard with the help of an illustration which is also reproduced below.

Illustration in AS-16 on exchange differences that are regarded as an adjustment to interest cost

XYZ Ltd. has taken a loan of $ 10,000 on 1st April, 20X3, for a specific project at an interest rate of 5% p.a., payable annually. On 1st April, 20X3, the exchange rate between the currencies was Rs. 45 per $. The exchange rate, as at 31st March, 20X4, is Rs 48 per $. The corresponding amount could have been borrowed by XYZ Ltd. in local currency at an interest rate of 11 % per annum as on 1st April, 20X3.

The following computation would be made, to determine the amount of borrowing costs for the purposes of paragraph 4(e) of AS 16:

i. Interest for the period = $ 10,000 × 5% × Rs. 48 $= Rs. 24,000.
ii. Increase in the liability towards the principal amount = $ 10,000 × (48-45) = Rs. 30,000.
iii. Interest that would have resulted if the loan was taken in Indian currency = $ 10000 × 45 × 11% = Rs. 49,500
iv. Difference between interest on local currency borrowing and foreign currency borrowing = Rs. 49,500 – Rs. 24,000 = Rs. 25,500

Therefore, out of Rs. 30,000 increase in the liability towards principal amount, only Rs. 25,500 will be considered as the borrowing cost. Thus, total borrowing cost would be Rs. 49,500 being the aggregate of interest of Rs. 24,000 on foreign currency borrowings [covered by paragraph 4(a) of AS 16] plus the exchange difference to the extent of difference between interest on local currency borrowing and interest on foreign currency borrowing of Rs. 25,500. Thus, Rs.49,500 would be considered as the borrowing cost to be accounted for as per AS 16 and the remaining Rs. 4,500 would be considered as the exchange difference to be accounted for as per Accounting Standard (AS) 11, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates.

In the above example, if the interest rate on local currency borrowings is assumed to be 13% instead of 11%, the entire exchange difference of Rs. 30,000 would be considered as borrowing costs, since in that case the difference between the interest on local currency borrowings and foreign currency borrowings [i.e., Rs. 34,500 (Rs. 58,500 – Rs. 24,000)] is more than the exchange difference of Rs. 30,000. Therefore, in such a case, the total borrowing cost would be Rs. 54,000 (Rs. 24,000 + Rs. 30,000) which would be accounted for under AS 16 and there would be no exchange difference to be accounted for under AS 11.

Author’s Note: As can be seen, the illustration is oversimplified and does not provide adequate guidance; for example, there is no guidance with respect to:

1. Whether an entity has a choice to assess the interest rate differential when the loan is drawn or at each reporting date? From the illustration, it appears that the interest rate differential is based on the date when the loan is drawn and not at each reporting date.
2. How is interest rate differential determined in the case of a floating rate loan?
3. Are exchange gains required to be considered as an adjustment to borrowing costs?
4. How to deal with exchange gains that follow a period of exchange losses? In such cases, should the exchange gains be treated as an adjustment to exchange losses or should it be fully recognised in the P&L?
5. Consider an example, where the interest rate differential at inception of borrowing is Rs. 1,000 and at the end of the reporting period there is exchange gain of Rs. 5,000. In this scenario, the author believes that it would be appropriate to conclude that there is no interest rate differential; rather than considering borrowing cost of Rs. 1,000 and notionally increasing the exchange gain by Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 6,000.

Why is para 4(e) a problem?
The idea of including paragraph 4(e) in AS-16 was a simple one. Indian companies borrowing in $ borrow at a much lower interest rate than borrowing in Indian Rupee. However, correspondingly because of the exchange rate movement, the $ loan liability increases, and results in the savings on account of low $ interest rates, being eroded. In a very simple world, and if IRP theory worked perfectly, then there would be a 100% offset. In other words, it is logical to see the exchange difference, as an interest cost to borrow the funds. Such 4(e) interest costs are allowed to be capitalised if they were incurred on the construction of a qualifying asset. 4(e) interest costs that are not incurred for the purposes of constructing a qualifying asset are to be charged off to the P&L account.

Companies that were constructing a qualifying asset and had borrowed in foreign currency are required to determine the 4(e) component, so that the same can be capitalised in accordance with AS 16 (4(e) component is capitalised only during the period of construction of a qualifying asset). Computing 4(e) was a problem, but was limited to situations where a qualifying asset was being constructed for which a foreign currency borrowing was used. 4(e) is now a much bigger problem, for two additional reasons.

1. AS-11 was amended to include paragraph 46 and 46A, which allowed an option of not charging foreign exchange differences on long term borrowings to the P&L a/c. The exchange differences could be amortised over the loan period, and if related to a loan for acquiring a capital asset, then the same should be capitalised as cost of the capital asset, even after the asset was put to use. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India issued “Frequently Asked Questions on AS 11 notification – Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules, 2009 (G.S.R. 225 (E) dt. 31.3.09) issued by Ministry of Corporate Affairs”. In the said guidance, it was clarified that 4(e) interest should not be treated as foreign exchange difference. Consequently, 4(e) component is to be (a) capitalised only during the period of construction of a qualifying asset in accordance with AS-16 (b) charged to the P&L in all other cases.

2. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs issued circular no 25/2012 dated 9th August, 2012 clarifying that paragraph 4(e) of AS-16 shall not apply to a company which is applying paragraph 46A of AS-11. The circular has withdrawn 4(e) with respect to paragraph 46A, but not with respect to paragraph 46 of AS-11. There are a number of questions with respect to the circular. For example, does it have a prospective or retrospective application? Is it a clarification or a substantive amendment? Will 4(e) continue to apply to companies that were in paragraph 46?

3. Revised Schedule VI requires 4(e) component to the extent not capitalised to be separately disclosed in the P&L a/c as part of borrowing costs.

IRP Theory

The IRP theory states that interest rate differentials between two different currencies will be reflected in the premium or discount for the forward exchange rate on the foreign currency if there is no arbitrage. The theory further that states the size of the forward premium or discount on a foreign currency should be equal to the interest rate differentials between the countries in comparison. This is explained with the help of an illustration below.

How well does IRP predict Exchange Rate Movements in India?

Not so well, is the short answer. Menzie Chinn says, “Uncovered interest parity (UIP) has been almost universally rejected in studies of exchange rate movements.” Paul Krugman says, “Like stock prices, exchange rates respond strongly to ‘news’, that is to unexpected economic and political events, and like stock prices, they therefore are very difficult to forecast.”

As per the IRP theory, in countries which have higher interest rates, their currencies should depreciate. If this does not happen, there will be cases for arbitrage for foreign investors till the arbitrage opportunity disappears from the market. The reality is sometimes exactly the opposite; as higher interest rates could actually bring in higher capital inflows further appreciating the currency. In such a scenario, foreign investors earn both higher interest rates and also gain on the appreciating currency.

In reality, predicting currency movement is crystal gazing as it is affected by numerous variables, other than interest rate differential. These variables are discussed below.

Balance of Payments (BOP): BOP play’s a critical role in determining the movement of the currency. It is the aggregate of current account and capital account of a country like an external account of a country with other countries. Current account surplus means exports are more than imports and current account deficit means imports are more than exports. Eventually, import/export prices find equilibrium. Hence, the currency of a current account surplus country should appreciate. Likewise for current account deficit countries, the currency should depreciate. Growing Indian economy has led to widening of current account deficit, as imports of both oil and non-oil have risen. Gold imports have also added to the problem in India. Capital flows also play a crucial role in the BOP situation of India. Currency appreciates when there are huge capital inflows and depreciates when the capital inflows dry up and the current account deficit is also high. During the Lehman crisis, capital flows shrunk sharply from a high of $106.6 billion in 2007-8 to just $6.8 billion in 2008-09 and led to sharp depreciation of the rupee from around Rs. 39.9 per $ to Rs. 51.9 per $.

Inflation: Higher inflation leads to central banks keeping interest rates high, which invites foreign capital on account of interest rate arbitrages. This could lead to further appreciation of the currency. However, one needs to make a distinction between high inflation over a short term versus a long term. If inflation is short-term, foreign investors see inflation as a temporary problem and continue to invest in that economy. If inflation is sticky, it leads to overall worsening of the economy, capital flows and exchange rate. For almost two years now, inflation in India has been very high and persistent, resulting in a highly depreciating rupee. The present situation is different from the situation in 2007-08 when despite high inflation and high interest rates, capital inflows were abundant. This was because markets believed that inflation was not a structural problem.

Fiscal Deficit: Fiscal deficits play a key role in the determination of exchange rates. Higher deficits imply that government might resort to using foreign exchange reserves to fund its deficit. This leads to lowering of the reserves followed by speculation on the currency. If the government does not have adequate reserves, fall in the currency is imminent. In India, higher fiscal deficits have also played a role in shaping expectations over the currency rate. When the fiscal deficits are high, investors become nervous, reducing the capital inflows into the country.

Global economic conditions: In times of high uncertainty as seen lately, most currencies usually depreciate against US Dollar as it is seen as a safe haven currency. The South East Asian crisis and the recent Euro crisis stand evidence to that. Currently, the markets believe that the dollar is safer than the euro, given the economic problems of the euro zone. Global economic conditions have significantly impacted exchange rates in India.

Lack of reforms: This has further made investors negative over the Indian economy and coupled with global uncertainty, has put pressure on the Indian Rupee.

Speculation: There has been a fall of 22.7 % (in value of rupee against dollar) in four months – from Rs. 44.35 in end July 2011 to Rs. 54.4 on 31st December, 2011. Importers, having been lulled into complacency by the rupee’s appreciation earlier, rush to cover their exposures, thus driving up dollar demand. Exporters hold on to their earnings in foreign currency in the hope of a further fall in the rupee.

Measures by RBI : They have also made marginal impact in terms of arresting a downslide on the rupee. However, this is a short term measure.

Hence, even over a longer term, multiple factors determine an exchange rate with each one playing an important role over time. In a calm and stable world, IRP theory may work. Unfortunately, this is never the case. Exchanges rates behave erratically, and are caused by numerous factors other than interest rate differentials. Consequentially, exchange losses may represent more or less matching interest rate differential in a few cases only. In India, experience is that, exchange losses may be far more than the interest rate differential when rupee is sliding down and in other cases, there may be a huge exchange gain in which case, the interest rate differential would have had little or no impact on the exchange rate. Much would depend on when the borrowings took place and the exchange rate movement from thereon till redemption of the loan.

Author Sarbapriya Ray in the paper “Testing the Validity of Uncovered IRP in India” concludes as follows – “One vital potential issue determining the exchange rate is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is a typical subject of international finance, a critical building block of most theoretical models, and a miserable empirical failure. Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) states that the nominal interest rate differential between two countries must be equal to expected change in the exchange rate. In other words, if UIP condition holds, then high yield currencies should be expected to depreciate. The article attempts to test the validity of uncovered interest rate parity based on a theoretical formulation in line with economic theory. Although KPSS test suggests that excess return series are in stationary process, excess return curve shows erratic behaviour during some months of our study period (showing negative trend) which automatically excludes the possibility for the UIP to hold. The UIP regression estimate indicates that there is no statistically significant evidence that suggests the uncovered interest rate parity to hold during January, 2006 –July, 2010 for domestic interest rate (weighted average call money rate).This indicates that interest rate spread is a very poor predictor of exchange rate yields. Thus, the UIP hypothesis fails in India.”

Position on para 4(e) under IFRS taken by global firms

Under IFRS, paragraph 6(e) of IAS 23 Borrowing Costs, has the same requirement as 4(e) of AS-16. However, the illustration contained in 4(e) and reproduced in this article is not contained in IAS 23. The global big accounting firms have different interpretation on 6(e). Interestingly, the IASB is seized of this matter but has decided not to provide guidance. The International Financial Reporting Interpretation Committee (IFRIC) acknowledges that judgment will be required in its application.

Ernst & Young1

Borrowings in one currency may have been used to finance a development the costs of which are incurred primarily in another currency, e.g. a US dollar loan financing a Russian rouble development. This may have been done on the basis that, over the period of the development, the cost, after allowing for exchange differences, was expected to be less than the interest cost of an equivalent rouble loan.

We, however, consider that, as exchange rate movements are largely a function of differential interest rates, in most circumstances, the foreign exchange differences on directly attributable borrowings will be an adjustment to interest costs that can meet the definition of borrowing costs. Care will have to be taken if there is a sudden fluctuation in exchange rates that cannot be attributed to changes in interest rates. In such cases we believe that a practical approach is to cap the exchange differences taken as borrowing costs at the amount of borrowing costs on functional currency equivalent borrowings.

In theory, foreign exchange rates and interest rates are related and, as such, it is fair to assume that any changes in foreign exchange rates reflect changes in the interest rate. On this basis, all of the foreign exchange gain or loss on foreign currency borrowings would be considered as part of the borrowing costs on the borrowing. But recently, this argument has not been holding true, with many other factors impacting the relationship between foreign exchange rates and interest rates. Accordingly, it is not necessarily safe to assume that all of the foreign exchange gains or losses on foreign currency borrowings are an adjustment to income. Take the following two examples Entity A’s functional currency is euro, and it borrows £1,000 on 1st January 2009 for one year at a fixed interest rate of 5% to fund the construction of an asset. The spot exchange rate at this date is € 1.5:£1. At 31st December 2009, the exchange rate is €1.1:£1. The entity has incurred a foreign currency gain of €400, while interest costs (assuming they were paid throughout the year at the then spot rate) amount to €65. How much of the foreign exchange gain is included in the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation?

Entity B’s functional currency is euro, and it borrows US$1,000 on 1st January 2009 for one year at a fixed interest rate of 3% to fund the construction of an asset. The spot exchange rate at this date is €1: US£1. On 31st December 2009, the exchange rate is €1.4: US$1. The entity has incurred a foreign currency loss of €400, while interest costs (assuming they were paid throughout the year at the then spot rate) amount to €36. How much of the foreign exchange loss is included in the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation?

A number of possible approaches exist:

1.    Determine, at the date of entering into the loan, the equivalent interest rate on a local currency borrowing and use this as the borrowing cost to be capitalised. Let’s assume that, for both of the above examples, the interest rate on a €1,500 borrowing on 1st January 2009 is 7% (entity A), and the interest rate on a € 1,000 borrowing on 1st January 2009 is 4% (entity B). The amount of borrowing costs eligible to be capitalised by entity A would be €105, regardless of the movement in the foreign exchange rate. Entity B would be eligible to capitalise € 40 as borrowing costs. However, this ignores the reason for entities borrowing in a foreign currency i.e., that they expect it to be less expensive. In this case, the movement in the exchange rates has effectively generated an additional gain for entity A, which is also counter-intuitive.

2.    Establish a ‘cap and floor’ for the amount of foreign exchange gains or losses to be included in borrowing costs. The floor may be up to the amount that reduces the borrowing cost to nil. We do not believe that a net gain can be capitalised. In the above example, entity A would include €65 of foreign currency gains as an element of borrowing costs, resulting in a net nil borrowing cost. The cap may be the interest on a local currency borrowing at inception, as this reflects the relationship between foreign currency and interest at that time. In the above example, entity B would therefore include € 4 of the foreign currency losses as borrowing costs, resulting in a net borrowing cost of € 40.

3.    Determine a forward foreign exchange rate at the date of entering into the borrowing and use this to determine the amount of foreign exchange gains or losses that are eligible for capitalisation. Let’s assume in the above examples, the one year forward foreign exchange rates as on 1st January 2009 are €1.4:£1 and €1.1:US$1. The amount of foreign currency gains on the borrowing that entity A includes as borrowing costs is €10, regardless of the movement in the foreign exchange rate. Entity B includes €10 of foreign currency losses on the borrowings as borrowing costs. While this approach provides a consistent assessment of the relationship between foreign exchange rates and interest rates, it is by no means a perfect approach. There are many factors affecting the relationship between foreign exchanges rates and interest rates that cannot be adequately measured.

Management will need to carefully consider which approach they apply, to best reflect the relationship between foreign exchange rates and interest rates. However, the approach selected needs to be applied consistently and disclosed within the financial statements. Each approach also requires an appropriate information system to be in place to collect the relevant information.

PWC2

16.96 Capitalisation of borrowing costs includes capitalising foreign exchange differences relating to borrowings to the extent, that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs. The gains and losses that are an adjustment to interest costs include the interest rate differential between borrowing costs that would be incurred if the entity borrowed funds in its functional currency, and borrowing costs actually incurred on foreign currency borrowings. Other differences that are not adjustments to interest cost may include, for example, changes in foreign currency rates as a result of changes in other economic indicators, such as employment or productivity, or a change in government.

16.97 IAS 23 does not prescribe which method should be used to estimate the amount of foreign exchange differences that may be included in borrowing costs. IFRIC has considered this issue, but has not issued any guidance. There were two methods considered by the IFRIC:

  •     The portion of the foreign exchange movement may be estimated based on forward currency rates at the inception of the loan.

  •     The portion of the foreign exchange movement may be estimated based on interest rates on similar borrowings in the entity’s functional currency.

Other methods might be possible. Management has to use judgment to assess which foreign exchange differences can be capitalised. The method used to determine the amount that is an adjustment to borrowings costs is an accounting policy choice. The method should be applied consistently to foreign exchange differences whether they are gains or losses.

Deloitte3

2.1    Exchange differences to be included in borrowing costs.

IAS 23 includes no further clarification as to what is meant by the inclusion of exchange differences ‘to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs’.

It is clear that, not all exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings can be regarded as an adjustment to interest costs; otherwise, there would be no requirement for the qualifying terminology used in IAS 23:6(e). The extent to which exchange differences can be so considered depends on the terms and conditions of the foreign currency borrowing.

Qualifying interest costs denominated in the foreign currency, translated at the actual exchange rate on the date on which the expense is incurred, should be classified as borrowing costs. Although exchange rate fluctuations may mean that this amount is substantially higher or lower than the interest costs contemplated when the original financing decision was made, the full amount is appropriately treated as borrowing costs.

Some exchange differences relating to the principal may be regarded as an adjustment to interest costs (and, therefore, taken into account in determining the amount of borrowing costs capitalised) but only to the extent that the adjustment does not decrease or increase the interest costs to an amount below or above a notional borrowing cost, based on commercial interest rates prevailing in the functional currency at the date of initial recognition of the borrowing. In other words, the amount of borrowing costs that may be capitalised should lie between the following two amounts:

(1)    actual interest costs denominated in the foreign currency, translated at the actual exchange rate on the date on which the expense is incurred; and

(2)    notional borrowing costs based on commercial interest rates prevailing in the functional currency at the date of initial recognition of the borrowing.

Whether any adjustments for exchange differences are made to the amount determined under (1) above is an accounting policy choice and should be applied consistently.

KPMG4

4.6.420 Foreign exchange difference.

4.6.420.10 Borrowing costs may include foreign exchange differences to the extent that these differences are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs. There is no further guidance on the conditions under which foreign exchange difference may be capitalised and in practice, there are different views about what is acceptable.

4.6.420.20 In our view, foreign exchange differences on borrowings can be regarded as an adjustment to interest costs only in very limited circumstances. Exchange differences should not be capitalised, if a borrowing in a foreign currency is entered into to offset another currency exposure. Interest determined in a foreign currency already reflects the exposure to that currency. Therefore, the foreign exchange differences to be capitalised should be limited to the difference between interest accrued at the contractual rate and the interest that would apply to borrowing with identical terms in the entity’s functional currency. Any foreign exchange differences arising from the notional amount of the loan should be recognised in profit or loss.

4.6.420.30 When exchange differences qualify for capitalisation, in our view both exchange gains and losses should be considered in determining the amount to capitalise.

GT5

Exchange differences.
If an entity has foreign currency borrowings, to what extent are foreign exchange gains and losses eligible for capitalisation?

IAS 23.6(e) states that borrowing costs may include exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs. The standard offers no detailed guidance on how to interpret this. Accordingly, entities should develop their own detailed policy. As with any other accounting policy, the chosen method should be applied consistently and disclosed if significant.

Is it appropriate to treat all exchange differences on foreign currency borrowings as an adjustment to interest costs?

No. In our view, not all such exchange differences are adjustments to interest costs. Exchange rate movements depend in part on current and expected differences in local currency and foreign currency interest rates (the interest rate differential). However, other factors also contribute to exchange rate changes: a currency will tend to lose value relative to other currencies if a country’s level of inflation is higher, or if the country’s level of output is expected to decline or if a country is troubled by political uncertainty (for example).

Moreover, although exchange gains and losses relate to an entity’s foreign currency borrowings, such gains and losses are different in character to interest costs on those borrowings. In particular, it is difficult to argue that exchange gains and losses on the principal amount of a loan is an adjustment to interest costs. Exchange gains and losses on the accrued interest portion of the loan’s carrying value may more readily be considered an adjustment to interest costs (see below).

What is an appropriate accounting policy for exchange differences?

One acceptable and straightforward approach is not to include any exchange differences as adjustments to interest costs. IAS 23.6(e) states that borrowing costs may include exchange differences to the extent they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs – it does not therefore require such an adjustment. Applying this approach, interest costs on foreign currency borrowings include only the foreign currency interest expense converted into the entity’s functional currency in accordance with IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Currency Exchange Rates.

Should an entity wish to take account of exchange differences, the challenge is to identify the portion of overall exchange differences that are adjustments to interest costs. A reasonable and practical approach is to treat only exchange differences arising on current period accrued interest as an adjustment to interest costs. This approach considers the adjustment to interest costs as the difference between:

  •     the amount of interest cost initially recognised in the entity’s functional currency using the spot exchange rate at the date of the transaction; and

  •     the amount the entity has to pay on settlement translated into the entity’s functional currency using the spot exchange rate at the date of payment.

Using this approach, exchange differences on the principal amount of the loan are not included in the calculation of borrowing costs to capitalise.

Are any other methods available?
Yes, an entity might develop other models and techniques to determine the exchange differences to include in the calculation of borrowing costs to capitalise. However, in our view any such method should:

•    be consistent with the objective of IAS 23 to include borrowing costs that are directly attributable to a qualifying asset. Borrowing costs are considered to be directly attributable, if they would have been avoided had the expenditure on the qualifying asset not been made (IAS 23.10);

•    not result in negative interest costs; and

•    be consistently applied.

In our view it is not acceptable to:

•    include exchange gains in excess of the interest expenses incurred (i.e. to capitalise a negative amount); or

•    Capitalise only exchange losses, but credit all exchange gains to the income statement.

One alternative approach is to determine a notional borrowing cost based on the interest cost that would have been incurred, had the entity borrowed an equivalent amount in its functional currency. In effect, this approach treats a foreign currency loan as a functional currency loan with an embedded foreign currency exchange contract. The IAS 23 calculation is based on the notional functional currency loan.

Applicability of para 4(e) in different scenarios under AS 16

It would be fair to comment that the global practices being followed with respect to 4(e) are disparate. Even the guidance provided by the large firms is not consistent. A few of the large firms have debunked the theory of IRP, but most others show sympathy towards the determination of 4(e) component. Though sometimes the same terminology used by the large firms such as a “cap” and “floor”, have been used in different contexts and can be confusing. Fortunately or unfortunately, a large part of the debate in the large firms may be purely academic under AS-16, since unlike IAS-23 an illustration is included in AS-16. This resolves a lot of issues. Nonetheless, the illustration in paragraph 4(e) of AS 16 deals with computation of 4(e) adjustment in a scenario where the company takes foreign currency (FC) loan at a lower interest rate and incurs exchange loss on the FC borrowing. However, it does not deal with many other scenarios which the author has described in the foot note under the illustration.

Consider the following example. The company takes a FC loan at a lower interest rate and has exchange gain on restatement on FC loan. In this scenario, theoretically there should have been an exchange loss, but because the IRP theory does not work because of unusual factors, there is an exchange gain in certain periods. The question is whether one would notionally increase exchange gain so that a 4(e) component can be artificially determined. In this situation, the author believes that it may not be appropriate to further increase the exchange gain to consider a notional 4(e) charge. This is explained in the illustration below.

Entity A’s reporting currency is rupees, and it borrows US$100 million on 16th December 2011 for one year at a fixed interest rate of 2% to fund the construction of an asset. The spot exchange rate at this date is $1: Rs. 53.65. On 31st March 2012, the exchange rate is $1: Rs. 50.87. The entity has incurred a foreign currency gain of Rs. 278 million, while interest costs (translated using the average rate) amount to Rs. 30.48 million (Rs. 100 million

*    2% * 52.26 * 3.5/ 12). How much of the foreign exchange gain is included in the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation?

A number of possible approaches exist:
1.    Determine, at the date of entering into the loan, the equivalent interest rate on a local currency borrowing and use this as the borrowing cost to be capitalised, regardless of the movement in the foreign exchange rate. Let’s assume that, the interest rate on a Rs. 5,365 million borrowing on 16th December 2011 is 9%. Hence, the amount of borrowing costs eligible to be capitalised by entity A would be Rs. 140.83 million (Rs. 5,365 million * 9% * 3.5/ 12). In this approach, the movement in the exchange rates has effectively generated an additional exchange gain of Rs. 110.35 million (i.e., interest capitalised of Rs. 140.83 million minus actual interest of Rs. 30.48 million) for entity A, which is counter-intuitive.

2.    To recognise interest cost of Rs. 30.48 million and FC gain of Rs. 278 million. The FC gain is not notionally increased by Rs. 110.35 million to determine the 4(e) component.

3.    Establish a ‘cap and floor’ for the amount of foreign exchange gains or losses to be included in borrowing costs. The floor may be up to the amount that reduces the borrowing cost to nil because borrowing costs cannot be negative. It may not be appropriate to capitalise a net gain. In the above example, entity A would include Rs. 30.48 million of foreign currency gains as an element of borrowing costs, resulting in a net nil borrowing cost. The FC gain would be Rs. 247.52 million (Rs. 278 million – Rs. 30.48 million).

4.    There are other acceptable methods which are not discussed here.

The conclusion on the above illustration can be summarised as below.

 

 

 

Rs million

 

 

 

 

Method

Actual

4(e)

Exchange

Interest

component

gain

 

 

 

 

 

1

30.48

110.35

388.35

 

 

 

 

2

30.48

278.00

 

 

 

 

3

247.52

 

 

 

 


Discrete vs. Cumulative Approach

Paragraph 4(e) of AS 16 and explanation thereto explains computation of 4(e) adjustment for one year. However, it does not deal with a scenario where FC loan extends for more than one year and there is loss/gain in one accounting period and gain/ loss in the subsequent periods. Two methods seem possible for dealing with this issue.

Method A – The discrete period approach

4(e) adjustment is determined for each period separately. FC gains/losses that did not meet the criteria for treatment as borrowing cost in the previous year cannot be treated as 4(e) adjustment in the subsequent years and vice versa.

Method B – The cumulative approach
4(e) adjustment are assessed/identified on a cumulative basis, after considering the cumulative amount of interest expense that is likely to have been incurred, had the company borrowed in local currency. The amount of 4(e) adjustment cannot exceed the amount of FC losses incurred on a cumulative basis at the end of the reporting period. The cumulative approach looks at the project as a whole as the unit of account, ignoring the occurrence of reporting dates. Consequently, the amount of the FC differences eligible for identification as 4(e) adjustment in the period is an estimate, which can change as the exchange rates changes over periods.

Example
An illustrative calculation of the amount of FC differences that may be regarded as borrowing cost under method A and method B is set out below.

Particulars

Year
1

Year
2

Total

 

 

 

 

Interest expense in FC (A)

25,000

25,000

50,000

 

 

 

 

Hypothetical interest in

30,000

30,000

60,000

LC (B)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FC loss (C)

6,000

3,000

9,000

 

 

 

 

Method
A – Discrete Approach

Particulars

Year
1

Year
2

Total

 

 

 

 

4(e) adjustment – lower

5,000

3,000

8,000

of C and (B minus A)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FC loss (net)

1,000

Nil

1,000

 

 

 

 

FC loss (C)

6,000

3,000

9,000

 

 

 

 


Method
B – Cumulative Approach

Particulars

Year 1

Year
2

Total

 

 

 

 

4(e) adjustment

5,0006

4,0007

9,000

 

 

 

 

Foreign exchange loss

1,000

(1,000)

Nil

(net)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If a company is also preparing quarterly financial information, a related issue will arise regarding the approach that should be adopted while preparing quarterly financial statements.

Ind-AS 23 provides additional guidance on this subject as follows.

“6A. With regard to exchange difference required to be treated as borrowing costs in accordance with paragraph 6(e), the manner of arriving at the adjustments stated therein shall be as follows:

(i)    the adjustment should be of an amount which is equivalent to the extent to which the exchange loss does not exceed the difference between the cost of borrowing in functional currency when compared to the cost of borrowing in a foreign currency.

(ii)    where there is an unrealised exchange loss which is treated as an adjustment to interest and subsequently there is a realised or unrealised gain in respect of the settlement or translation of the same borrowing, the gain to the extent of the loss previously recognised as an adjustment should also be recognised as an adjustment to interest.”

Ind-AS seems to be taking a cumulative approach when exchange gain follows exchange loss that were treated as an adjustment to interest cost. However, Ind-AS provides no guidance when there is a reverse situation, ie exchange gains precede exchange losses. In the latter situation, it is possible to recognise the exchange gain in the P&L account and the exchange loss could be split into a 4(e) component; the remaining being accounted as a pure exchange loss. It may be noted that, Ind-AS cannot be applied mandatorily with respect to interpreting Indian GAAP, though in the author’s view it could be applied voluntarily.

To cut the long story short

•    The present AS-16 standard includes a clear illustration of how the interest rate differential will be determined. Therefore, entities will need to follow the same. However, as discussed in this article, the illustration does not deal with numerous situations, which are causing the problem.

•    Consider an example, where the interest rate differential at inception of borrowing is Rs. 1,000 and the exchange loss in scenario 1 is Rs. 5,000 and in scenario 2 is Rs. 800. There should not be a debate that interest rate differential in scenario 1 is Rs. 1,000 and in scenario 2 is Rs. 800. Given that 4(e) is clearly explained in the standard by way of an illustration, it seems highly inappropriate not to consider Rs. 1,000 in scenario 1 and Rs. 800 in scenario 2 as interest rate differential (4(e) component).

•    Consider a third scenario where at the first year end after taking the FC loan there is exchange gain of Rs. 5,000 (but the interest rate differential at inception of borrowing is Rs. 1,000). In this scenario, the author believes that it would be appropriate to conclude that there is no interest rate differential; rather than considering an interest rate differential of Rs. 1,000 and notionally increasing the exchange gain by Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 6,000.

•    In the reporting period after the first reporting period, there seems to be a choice of either using the discrete approach or the cumulative approach. For example, the exchange loss in one period is followed by exchange gain in the following period. In the absence of any guidance under AS-16, either the discrete or cumulative approach is valid. Ind-AS seems to be suggesting a cumulative approach in some situations. That guidance is not mandatory with respect to interpretation of 4(e), but could be applied voluntarily.

•    All companies should disclose in the financial statements the policy followed to determine the 4(e) component, and this policy should be applied consistently.

Should para 4(e) under Indian GAAP be withdrawn because IRP theory does not hold good?

•    Para 4(e) is an issue of significance to India because of large volume of FC borrowings and high exchange rate volatility.

•    It is quite clear from the many research papers that the uncovered IRP theory does not hold good.

•    The global guidance and practices followed are inconsistent and disparate and many have debunked the IRP theory. IFRIC has refused to provide any guidance, citing that it is a judgmental matter.

•    Capitalisation of borrowing cost on qualifying asset itself is not a good idea, because it is a consequence of how the asset is funded (whether from equity or borrowing?) and therefore provides an unnecessary arbitrage.
By adding 4(e) component to the definition of borrowing cost, is like adding one disputed theory on top of another disputed theory. That makes matters worse.

•    Paragraph 46 and 46A of AS-11 were founded on the belief that exchange rates will either revert back to the original or will, in the medium to long term, reflect interest rate differential (stable forward points reflecting interest differences between two countries). By allowing amortisation of exchange differences, what is achieved is a smoothing of the exchange differences that would be similar to recognising interest rate differentials over the period of the FC loan.

•    On account of various arguments made in this paper, the author believes that 4(e) should be withdrawn. Along with 4(e); paragraph 46 & 46A of AS-11 should also be withdrawn, as they are founded on similar belief. The belief that exchange rates will either revert back to the original or will reflect the interest rate differential for the medium to long term, is a preposterous assumption and unproven by empirical evidence. If one were to do a backward testing, the assumption may hold good in a few cases, as a matter of co-incidence, rather than on the basis of a proven theory. The world nor India, is or ever will be calm and stable. If we agree to this then we should withdraw 4(e) and paragraph 46 and 46A of AS-11.

•    The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued has Circular No 25/2012 dated 9th August 2012 with-drawing 4(e) with respect to paragraph 46A, but not with respect to paragraph 46. The author’s suggestion is that 4(e) should be fully withdrawn along with paragraph 46 and 46A of AS-11.

Armayesh Global v ACIT(2012) 21 taxmann.com 130 (Mum) Articles 7, 13 of India-UK DTAA; Sections 5, 9, 40(a)(i), 195 of I T Act Asst Year: 2007-08 Decided on: 4 May 2012 Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) & V. Durga Rao (JM)

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(i) Since the services were rendered outside India, section 5 could not be applied to commission and further, section 9(1)(vii)(b) excluded fee payable for making or earning income from any source outside India and therefore, commission did not accrue or arise in India.
(ii) Since definition of ‘fees for technical services’ in Article 13 of India-UK DTAA did not include managerial services, the commission should be considered as business income and as the nonresident did not have a PE in India, in terms of Article 7 of DTAA, the commission could not be taxed in India.
(iii) As commission did not accrue or arise in India, tax was not required to be withheld and consequently, commission could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) of I T Act.

Facts
The taxpayer was engaged in the business of manufacture and export of hand embroidery and handicraft items. The taxpayer had exported certain items to several countries. The orders in respect of these exports were secured through, or pursuant to information received from, a non-resident commission agent. The agent was entitled to the commission upon execution of the export order.

CBDT Circular No. 23 dated 23rd July 1969, clarified that no tax was deductible on export commission payable to a non-resident for services rendered outside India. Relying on the said Circular, the taxpayer did not withhold tax on the commission paid to the non-resident agent.

The AO noted that as per the decision of the Supreme Court in R.Dalmia v. CIT [1977] 106 ITR 895, management includes the act of managing by direction, or regulation or superintendence. Since the non-resident agent involved himself in the broad gamut of services pertaining to client identification, soliciting, constant feedback and ensuring timely payments, the payments made to him were towards managerial services and not commission simpliciter. The AO also noted that Circular No. 23 relied upon by the taxpayer had been withdrawn by CBDT vide Circular No. 7 of 2009 dated 22nd October 2009. The AO thus concluded that such payments were ‘fees for technical services’ covered u/s 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 thereto and since the assessee had not deducted tax at source on the payments, they were disallowable u/s 40(a)(i) of IT Act.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows:

  • As regards taxability under I T Act

As per the agreement, the non-resident was only acting as an agent on commission basis and had not provided any managerial/technical services nor was there any evidence of its having provided any technical/managerial services. The agent was responsible for the timely payment from the customers and the commission was payable only after receipt of the payment from the customers. Since the services were rendered outside India, provisions of section 5 cannot be applied to the commission paid.

In terms of section 9(1)(vii)(b) of I T Act, fee payable for making or earning income from any source outside India is excluded and hence, it should be considered as business income. Since the services were rendered outside India, the amount paid is not taxable, as it did not accrue or arise in India.

  • As regards taxability under India-UK DTAA

The definition of ‘fees for technical services’ in Article 13 of India-UK DTAA did not include managerial services. Hence, the commission paid should be considered as business income. Since the non-resident did not have a PE in India, in terms of Article 7 of DTAA, the commission could not be taxed in India.

  • As regards disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) of I T Act

As the commission did not accrue or arise in India, tax was not required to be withheld and consequently, commission could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) of I T Act.

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SKF Boilers and Driers(P.) Ltd., In re (2012) 18 taxmann.com 325 (AAR) Sections 5, 9 of I T Act Decided on: 22 February 2012 Before P.K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) & V.K.Shridhar (Member)

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Commission payable to non-resident agent on export of goods is taxable in India in terms of section 5(2)(b), read with section 9(1)(i), of I T Act since right to receive the commission arose in India upon execution of the export order.

Facts
The Applicant payer of commission was an Indian company engaged in manufacture and supply of Rice, Par Boiling and Dryer Plants. Through two agents situated in Pakistan, the applicant received order for supply of plant to a Pakistani company. The Applicant exported the plant and, as per the agreement, the commission became payables to the non-resident agents.

The issue before AAR was: whether the income of non-resident agent can be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

According to the Applicant, though CBDT had withdrawn Circular No 786 dated 2nd February 2007, Section 5(2) and Section 9 of I T Act had not undergone any change and accordingly, the commission on exports did not accrue or arise in India. Hence, there was no tax liability in India.

According to the tax authority, income had accrued in India when the right to receive income became vested and hence, it was covered within the ambit of section 5(2)(b) of I T Act.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

Sections 5 and 9 of the Act thus proceed on the assumption that income has a situs and the situs has to be determined according to the general principles of law.
The terms ‘accrue’ or ‘arise’ in section 5 have more or less a synonymous sense and income is said to accrue or arise when the right to receive it comes into existence. What matters is the source of income of two non-resident agents. Though the agents rendered services abroad, right to receive commission arose in India when the order was executed by the applicant in India and hence, the place of performance of service was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining the situs of their income.
Following ruling of AAR in Rajive Malhotra, In re [2006] 284 ITR 564 (Delhi), in view of the specific provision of Section 5(2)(b) read with section 9(1)(i) of I T Act, the commission income arising to the two non-resident agents was deemed to accrue and arise, and was taxable in India.

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John Wyeth & Brother Limited v ACIT (ITA No 6772 & 6773/Mum/2002) Section 44C of I T Act Asst Year: 1981-82 and 1982-83 Decided on: 25 July 2012 Before P Jagtap(AM) & Dinesh Kumar Agrawal (JM)

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Laboratory expenditure incurred by the HO for R&D, which was attributable to the Indian branch was fully allowable and was not subject to the restriction in section 44C.

Facts
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in the UK, which was engaged in manufacturing pharmaceutical products. The taxpayer had a separate and independent research laboratory in India and the head office of the taxpayer had research laboratory in the UK.

While computing its income, the taxpayer claimed deduction in respect of laboratory expenditure incurred by the HO for R&D in UK, which was attributable to Indian Branch.

According to the AO, the R&D was centralised in UK and further, the R&D was connected with executive and general administration. Therefore, as it was merely general administrative and executive expenditure, it was subject to restriction u/s 44C of I T Act .

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the laboratory expenditure incurred by the HO for R&D in UK, which was attributable to India Branch was in nature of general administrative expenditure mentioned in section 44C of I T Act.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

  • The financial statements filed by the taxpayer show that the HO has separately shown executive or general administration expenditure and thus, the taxpayer has proved beyond doubt that the expenditure claimed did not include any executive or general administrative expenditure.
  • Though the taxpayer filled all the details, without examining the same or without pointing out any item of disallowable nature, the tax authority disallowed the said expenditure on the ground that it was in the nature of general administration and executive expenditure mentioned in section 44C.
  • In the absence of any contrary material brought on record by the tax authority, the laboratory expenditure could not be disallowed.
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Oberoi Realty Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Other Notes

The Company’s normal operating cycle in respect of operations relating to under-construction real estate projects may vary from project to project depending upon the size of the project, type of development, project complexities and related approvals. Operating cycle for all completed projects and hospitality business is based on 12 months period. Assets and liabilities have been classified into current and non-current, based on the operating cycle of respective businesses.

Mahindra Lifespace Developers Ltd (31-3-2012)

Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Statements

During the year ended 31st March, 2012, the Revised Schedule VI notified under the Companies Act, 1956 has become applicable to the company, for preparation and presentation of its financial statements. The adoption of Revised Schedule VI does not impact recognition and measurement principles followed for preparation of financial statements. However, it has significant impact on presentation and disclosures made in the financial statements. Assets & liabilities have been classified as Current & Non – Current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of activity carried out by the company and the period between the procurement and realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as five years for the purpose of Current and Non-Current classification of assets & liabilities.

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Justice below poverty line – The Supreme Court laments that large sections of people do not have access to legal remedies

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Some appeals that reach the Supreme Court unravel such grim stories that judges find it difficult to write a decent finale.

The first one, New India Assurance vs Gopali, showed how insurance firms not only deny just compensation while raising technical objections but also tire dependents out through endless litigation. The road death in this case occurred in 1992. The victim’s aged parents, wife and five children had been seeking the insured amount since then. Looking into the case’s history, in which courts below had applied wrong formulae, the Supreme Court exercised its inherent, discretionary powers under Article 142 to award Rs 15 lakh. The tribunal had granted only Rs 2.55 lakh.

What is significant in this judgment is the insight into the judicial system through the eyes of the judges themselves. “If the claimants had been members of economically affluent sections of society,” the judges wrote, “they would have engaged an eminent advocate and taken steps for hearing of the matter at an early date, but they do not have the financial capacity and resources and energy to engage any advocate.”

How the cases of corporations and businessmen get priority over those of ordinary people is still a mystery to court watchers. Some time ago, there was a furore over bail granted to a renowned businessman late night on a Supreme Court holiday from a judge’s residence. In one instance, the then Chief Justice, who was in Argentina to attend a conference, constituted a bench to hear the bail application of a noted film star.

This is not the first time the judges wrote such jeremiad. In one judgment, D Navinchandra vs Union of India (1987), the then Chief Justice wrote: “My conscience protests to me that when thousands of remediless wrongs await in the queue for this court’s intervention and solution for justice, petitions at the behest of diamond and dry fruit exporters where large sums are involved should be admitted and disposed of by this court at such quick speed.”

The Supreme Court faces a dilemma. Though it has declared speedy trial as a fundamental right of every person under the Constitution, it has not quashed any trial on this ground. In an earlier judgment, it expressed its apprehension that if prolonged prosecution is made a ground for quashing the trial itself, many unscrupulous people might engineer delays to take advantage of this escape window.

The central government has argued that the court has no power to set a time limit for completion of criminal trials. This can be done only through legislation. The arguments are currently going on, and the court’s decision will affect thousands of people who are on bail or in jail awaiting trial. Though it is apparent that there is violation of a precious fundamental right, no clear remedy is in sight. Imagine, one of the first maxims taught in law colleges is: “Where there is a right, there is a remedy.”

(Source: Extracts from MJ Antony’s Column “Out of Court” in Business Standard dated 01-08-2012)

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Attacking tax havens – Instead of retreating, India needs to do more

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The era of bank secrecy is over,” declared a 2009 G20 communique — except it isn’t, apparently. While black money worldwide has likely decreased following amnesty schemes and stepped-up enforcement in the last three years, it is clear that it has not gone far enough. A just-released report from the non-governmental organisation Tax Justice Network, written by a former chief economist for McKinsey and Company, has used an innovative method to document the size of flows to tax havens from a set of developing and emerging economies. Unlike previous estimates, which relied on data surrounding “trade mis-invoicing” and were open to question, these estimates use Bank of International Settlements and IMF data, along with details available from source countries. The numbers, however, are staggering: anything between $21 and $32 trillion is stashed away.

What, therefore, has been the progress in closing these gaps in the global tax net — and has India contributed what it should have to the effort? It appears that the central problem has been a lack of co-ordination. Although the G20 spoke out on the issue after the global financial crisis, it then left individual countries to their own devices. What this meant was that countries like the United States could renegotiate treaties in their favour with much greater ease than could most other jurisdictions. The US, for example, has succeeded in getting Switzerland to hand over even the names of tax dodgers not covered by treaty, through threats to launch criminal charges against their banks. Other European countries have agreed to provide the details of all accounts held by American citizens to the US. Germany and Britain similarly pushed Switzerland into a treaty by which the latter will tax Swiss bank accounts for them, and introduce a withholding tax on future interest earned. India, while it has been renegotiating treaties, has simply not been that tough or threatening when it comes to forcing tax havens like Switzerland, Leichtenstein or the UK-owned Cayman Islands into giving it similar deals. This must change. At a minimum, the onus of demonstrating bona fides should be shifted to the depositor, as with depositors of other nationalities — instead of on to Indian tax investigators. Nor is it sensible to allow legal protection of the identities of tax evaders.

(Source: The Business Standard dated 25-07-2012)

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Communication with previous auditor

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We are trying to understand the principles of our Code of Ethics through the dialogue between Bhagwan Shrikrishna and Arjuna.

Shrikrishna (S) – Dear Arjuna, how was your vacation? Did you enjoy your outing?

Arjuna (A) – Yes, it was fine. But the last time you told me about the disciplinary action; and whenever I thought of it, my mood used to go off!

S – Why? Was it so frightening? I told you only broad principles. And if you are awake and alert, there is nothing to worry about.

A – When I was away, my manager informed me that we got a new audit and it was to be done urgently. I instructed him to start working on it.

S – Good. But did you write to the previous auditor?

A – Actually, I was at the hill station and was not getting the range on my cell. Still, I managed to speak to the previous auditor. He said, ‘Don’t worry; go ahead’. I have to sign the audit next week. Most of it is already done. I will ask the client himself to obtain his NOC.

S – Oh dear! Don’t take it so lightly. You cannot shift the responsibility to the client or anyone else. You and you alone have to write to him.

A – But the client has promised me. If you say, I have to write, I will give my letter to the client who will deliver it to the previous auditor

S – Hey Partha, never commit such a mistake. And remember, you have to do this before accepting the audit and not before signing it.

A – But we have already commenced the audit. It was urgent. Why waste time in such useless formality?

S – You are mistaken. It is not a meaningless formality. It is extremely valuable.

A – What purpose will it serve? It is the client’s prerogative to change the auditor. Why should anybody object?

S – Arjuna, you belong to a graceful profession – a learned profession. You are not a shopkeeper or a mere businessman. All professionals need to be united. Otherwise, client will take advantage and bring both of you in trouble.

A – How? Each year’s audit is a separate contract. What role has the previous auditor to play?

S – It is possible that the client’s dealings are not proper; or he may be lacking discipline. His records may not be straight. Previous auditor may be reluctant to sign.

A – So what? I will take every care and qualify the audit if I feel it necessary.

S – Precisely for this reason the client may have left the previous auditor. You will come to know from him as to whether one would be professionally comfortable signing this audit.

A – But if he objects to my accepting the audit, the client will suffer.

S – Why are you so much worried about the client who approaches you at the eleventh hour? There must be some hitch that the client may be hiding from you. Just ask whether he has paid the fees of previous auditor?

A – How will it matter? I will secure my fees and I know how to recover it.

S – Let me tell you that if you accept the audit when the previous audit fees are unpaid, that in itself is a misconduct. Let alone the other objections.

A – But the previous auditor may have charged exorbitant fees!

S – Remember, it is only the audit fees and not fees for any other services. The Guidelines from Council refers to undisputed audit fees.

A – How can one know whether it is disputed or otherwise?

S – It defines the undisputed audit fees. It means the fees appearing in the balance sheet signed by the auditor. Once it is so, it is deemed to be undisputed.

A – But what if there is cash method of accounting? Nothing will be there in the balance sheet.

S – Then you have to be extra careful. Check the records, write to the client, and write to the previous auditor.

A – What if the previous auditor objects? Or does not issue NOC for a long time?

S – Firstly, remove the wrong notion from your mind that you have to obtain an NOC. The relevant clause nowhere requires that. It only says, you have to communicate with him in writing; before accepting the audit.

A – Can I fax or e-mail? S – Not advisable. Council prefers and recommends a registered post acknowledgment due. RPAD! A – I will hand deliver to him.

S – Then you have to have a proof of delivery. I suggest, even avoid a courier. If RPAD is such a simple thing to do, why do you avoid it? This is typical of you CAs.

A – Wait. I will speak with my audit manager. (Speaks on cell phone). Good Lord! My manager informs me that the previous auditor has already mentioned in his resignation letter that he has no objection to anyone else taking up the audit! Moreover, it is only an internal audit and not statutory audit! I am saved!

S – Blissful ignorance! Mere mention in resignation letter is ‘not sufficient’. There is no substitute to your writing to him. There is no other way.

A – But what about internal audit?

S – Again a wrong notion. The rule applies to all types of audits be it statutory audit, tax audit, VAT audit, Concurrent, Internal, Revenue or Stock audit!

A – That is irritating. That is why our code is a burden.

S – No dear! Why don’t you take it positively? Perhaps, you will get valuable tips; or some advice of caution. Your efforts may be saved if the audit is risky. Or even client will dodge your fees as well! Don’t treat the previous auditor as your enemy.

A – Sometimes, I am confused as to who is a ‘previous auditor’. What if there was no tax audit for last two-three years?

S – Previous auditor does not mean the auditor for the immediately preceding year. It means the auditor who last held the same or similar assignment immediately prior to your appointment. Thus, it could be auditor appointed two-three years ago also.

A – Now that you are telling me all this, tell me, what if the audit is allotted by the Government? By CAG; or by Co-operative Department; or By RBI?

S – Still you are supposed to write. And who told you, you have to actually obtain NOC? You have to simply communicate, wait for a reasonable time.

A – But what if he objects?

S – You have to weigh the objections. If they are valid, you may consider whether or not to accept the audit. Or you may take them into consideration while reporting. But if the objection is regarding non-payment of undisputed audit fees, you are helpless. Otherwise, you will invite trouble for yourself.

A – Why does the Council not compel the auditor to respond quickly?

S – It has! In fact, the Council has advised all the members to respond to such communications quickly.

A – But previous auditor is closely known to me. I don’t think he will take it seriously for such a small fee.

S – I will tell you a real life incident. In one case, both husband and wife were CAs. The wife did the audit of a small housing society for two years. Thereafter the husband signed it. After a couple of years, there was a divorce proceedings between the two and the wife complained to the Council that the husband accepted the audit without communicating with her!

A – Ohh! This is alarming. Good that my Draupadi is not a CA!

S – Therefore, I am telling you, don’t take it lightly; and take it positively. It is in the interest of your profession.

A – Does it apply to tax assignments or certification work as well?

S – Legally speaking, ‘No’. But the Council recommends it as healthy practice.

A – Once a client came to me for advice through another CA. Thereafter, the client approached me directly. What should one do in such a situation?

S – Council recommends that you should ask the client to come through that CA; or at least inform that CA about it. That is a dignified behaviour.

A –   I am slowly getting what you are saying. If we ourselves do not respect our profession, who else will respect it? They will take us for a ride.

S –   Right. Communication with previous auditor indicates unity among professional brothers. You are well aware of what happens when brothers and cousins are not united.

Note :
The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 8 of the First Schedule which reads as under:

Clause (8):  accepts a position as auditor previously held by another chartered accountant or a certified auditor who has been issued certificate under the Restricted Certificate Rules, 1932 without first communicating with him in writing;

Further, readers may also refer to the Chapter VII of Council General Guidelines, 2008 dated 8th August, 2008 for guidelines on undisputed fees (refer page nos. 313  – 323 of the Code of Ethics publication January 2009 edition or the official website of ICAI).

Amendment to companies (fees on applications) rules 1999:

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Fee PAYABLE FOR DELAY IN FILING APPLICATIONS under s/s (2) of Section 233B of Companies Act i.e. pertaining to Appointment of Cost Auditor u/s 224 (1B) for Audit of Cost Accounts.
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Product or activity groups classification:

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has, vide notification dated 7th August 2012, listed the product of Activity Groups to be used in the cost Audit Reports and the in Compliance Report to be filed with the Central Government in compliance of the Companies Cost Accounting Record Rules and Cost Accounting Report Rules and other as listed in the Notification.
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PART A : Orders of CIC

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Information: Section 2(f) of the RTI Act

Information is defined u/s 2(f) as under:

“Information” means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.

Four orders on various points connected with “Information” are briefly reproduced hereunder:

The applicant in most of his queries, wanted to know about the reasons why the Central Vigilance Officers (CVOs) of a number of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) are not working/ functioning – he has assumed that the CVOs of PSUs are not functioning properly and wants the CPIO of the CVC to provide the reasons – the Commission held that the right to information cannot be used to seek either confirmation or rebuttal of one’s personal assumption, as in this case. Information has been defined in section 2(f) to mean any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars etc. Wherever a citizen seeks any information, it must be contained in some records or file or documents in the possession of the public authority concerned. Therefore, the response of the CPIO of the CVC and other CPIOs, as well as that of the Appellate Authority appears to be absolutely in order.

[Omprakash Kashiram vs CPIO, Central Vigilance Commission – Order dated 12.03.2012 Citation: RTI III (2012) 140 (CIC)] l

Appellant submitted RTI application dated 14th August 2010 before the CPIO, Prime Minister’s Office, New Delhi, seeking the details of functioning of Punjab and Sindh Bank through 44 points.

Decision Notice
The Commission notices that the Appellant has not asked for any specific information in his RTI Application and/or second appeal to the Commission, to be given by the Respondent Public Authority.

The Appellant was given an opportunity to explain the precise information sought, but has chosen not to attend the hearing. Also, the Appellant has not provided a copy of the Second appeal to the Respondents as per the RTI Act.

Thus, based on the submissions of the Respondents, the Commission is satisfied that information as held by the Respondents has been provided to the Appellant.

The Commission through this Order would also like to highlight the abuse of Transparency Act by the Appellant in asking voluminous questions under the Act (44 questions in this case) from the Public Authority and thereby dissipating the scarce resources of the Public Authority without meeting any larger public interest objective.

The Supreme Court in the case Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr v Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors/ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6454 OF 2011 [RTIR II (2011) 242 (SC)], has stated:

“Indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under RTI Act for disclosure of all and sundry information (unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities and eradication of corruption) would be counter-productive, as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of collection and furnishing information. The Act should not be allowed to be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquility and harmony among its citizens. Nor should it be converted into a tool of oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty. The nation does not want a scenario where 75% of the staff of public authorities spends 75% of their time in collecting and furnishing information to applicants, instead of discharging their regular duties. The threat of penalties under the RTI act and the pressure of the authorities under the RTI act should not lead to employees of a public authorities prioritizing ‘information furnishing’, at the cost of their normal and regular duties”.

The Commission, in the light of the above observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would like to inform the Appellant to ask a specific and limited question under the RTI Act, 2005 in the future and to use his cherished right given under the Transparency Act with greater responsibility.

[Kundan Kumar Sinha vs Department of Financial Services, New Delhi – Order dated 26.04.2012: Citation: RTIR II (2012) 185 (CIC)]

Briefly, the fact that emerged during the hearing is that the appellant was in the post of Sr. Assistant in the pay-scale of Rs. 6,300/-. The post of Jr. Engineer was advertised in the scale of Rs. 8,000/-. The appellant was selected for the post of Sr. Assistant. Before he joined, the post was down-graded to the scale of Rs. 6,300/-. The appellant after having joined the new post, has certain issues regarding promotion in that cadre.

Having heard the submissions of the parties, the Commission observes that the appellant has grievances regarding the pay scale. The RTI is not the forum for redressal of grievances. The appellant, in case he so desires, may file his grievance petition before the competent authority. As far as providing information under the RTI Act is concerned, requisite information as per record and permissible under the RTI Act has been provided to the appellant by the respondent.

[Vipin Prakash vs Airports Authority of India – Order dated 23.03.2012: Citation: RTIR II (2012) 150(CIC)]

 Background
The Applicant filed his RTI application on 24.12.2010 with the PIO Railway Board stating that his pay fixation has been done incorrectly and requesting the PIO to rectify the same. He also sought a copy of the pay fixation chart of his Junior, one Mr Ram, who is drawing a higher salary than him. The PIO provided some information, dissatisfied with which the Applicant filed his first appeal seeking the rule based on which his salary was fixed. The Appellate Authority disposed off the appeal on 6.09.2011 holding that information provided is complete and as available in the records. The Applicant thereafter filed his second appeal stating that he is not satisfied with the information.

Decision
The Appellant requested the Commission during the hearing to direct the public Authorities to fix his pay correctly. The Commission, however, holds that the Appellant is not seeking any information as available in the records and therefore the relief being sought by him cannot be granted. It is however, recommended that the PIO clarify to the Appellant about how his pay has been fixed based on the 6th Pay Commission recommendations and also to provide him with a copy of his pay fixation chart preferably by 15th May 2012.

The appeal is disposed of with the above recommendation and the case is closed.

[Rajendra Singh vs Bhavan, New Delhi-Order dated 11.04.2012:Citation: RTIR II (2012) 177 (CIC)]

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Bombay Money-Lenders Act

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Introduction
When one hears the term “money-lenders” what is the first image which comes to mind? In most cases, one would associate them with rural moneylenders giving loans at exorbitant rates of interest to poor farmers. While this is one important facet of the term, it would come as a surprise to many that even someone advancing interest-bearing loans to friends and relatives may come within the purview of this term under various State Money-lending laws, if it is the business of the lender to lend on interest. For instance, the State of Maharashtra has enacted the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946 for the regulation and control of transactions of moneylending within the State. Let us consider some of the important aspects of this Act.

Applicability
Section 5 is the main operative section of the Act. It provides that no money-lender can carry out the business of money-lending without a licence for the same. Further, the business must only be carried out in the area for which he has been granted a licence and in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence. Thus, any business of money-lending without a licence is prohibited by the Act. In order to constitute an offence under the Act, the money-lender must carry on business in an area outside of what has been permitted by his licence – Bhavarlal Pruthviraj Jain v State of Maharashtra, 191 Bom CR 878.

A money lender has been defined to mean any individual, HUF, company, AOP, etc., who carries on the business of money-lending in the State of Maharashtra. However, banks, any financial/other institution notified by the State Government are excluded from the definition of a money-lender.

One of the important restrictions under the Act is the maximum rate of interest which a lender is entitled to charge. This rate is notified from time to time by the State Government. Currently, the maximum rate of interest for loans to any person other than an agriculturist is 18% p.a. in case of secured loans, whereas it is 20% in the case of unsecured loans.

Business of Money-lending
The next question which becomes relevant is that what constitutes a business of money-lending under the Act? The Act defines it to mean the business of advancing loans whether in cash or in kind and whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business. Thus, two important facets are relevant – (a) there must be advancing of loans; and (b) such advancing must constitute a business.

What constitutes a business has not been defined and hence, useful reference may be made to various decisions under the Income-tax on what constitutes a business. The Supreme Court in the case of Distributors Baroda P. Ltd., 83 ITR 237 (SC) has held that when the Legislature speaks of the business of holding of investments, it refers to a real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity of investment carried on by the assessee for a set purpose, such as earning profits. If the investments are only made for a collateral purpose, then it cannot be considered as the business of the assessee. A similar reasoning may be applied to the activity of giving loans. Of course, it goes without saying that whether or not a lending constitutes a business, would be driven more by the facts and circumstances of each case. However, some of the relevant factors would be the quantum of loans, frequency and number of transactions, type of borrowers, rate of interest charged, security demanded, organisational set-up of lender, etc.

In the case of Gajanan v. Seth Brindaban AIR 1970 SC 2007, the Apex Court considered as to when could a person be considered to be a money-lender:

“The word ‘regular’ shows that the plaintiff must have been in the habit of advancing loans to persons as a matter of regular business. If only an isolated act of money-lending is shown to the court it is impossible to state that it constitutes a regular course of business. It is an act of business, but not necessarily an act done in the regular course of business……….

………….on its plain reading only prohibits the carrying on of the business of money-lending in any district without holding a valid registration certificate in respect of that district. It does not prohibit and, therefore, does not invalidate an isolated transaction of lending money. Such an isolated transaction seems to us to be outside the rigour of the prohibition.”

What is a Loan?
Advancing of a loan is the prime requirement for a money-lender. Hence, let us examine what constitutes a loan? The Act defines it to mean an advance at interest.

The term interest has been defined under the Act to include, any sum, in excess of the principal paid or payable by a money-lender in consideration of or otherwise in respect of a loan. However, interest does not include any sum lawfully charged by a money-lender for or on account of costs, charges, expenses under this Act / any other Law.

The following transactions are excluded from the definition of the term loan and hence, dealing in them would not constitute a business of moneylending for the lender:

(a) A deposit of money in any Bank or in a Company or a Co-operative Society. Thus, a Company accepting Public Deposits under s.58A of the Companies Act or under the NBFC Directions for Public Deposits would not be covered by the definition of loan.
(b) A loan to or by or a deposit with a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act
(c) Loan advanced by Government or by any local authority
(d) A loan advanced to a Government servant from a fund
(e) A loan advanced by a co-operative society
(f) Advance made to a subscriber or a depositor in a Provident Fund from the amount standing to his credit in the fund
(g) A loan to or by an Insurance Company
(h) A loan to or by or deposit with anybody incorporated by any law for the time being in force in the State
(i) An advance of a sum exceeding Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a hundi
(j) An advance made bonafide by any person carrying on any business not having the primary object of lending money. However, such an advance must be made in the regular course of his business. Whether or not an advance has been made bonafide in the regular course of business is a question of fact. (k) An advance of more than Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a negotiable instrument other than a Promissory Note. This is the most important exception.

Hence, every loan is not covered by the provisions of the Act, since an advance of more than Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a negotiable instrument other than a Promissory Note is excluded – Rajesh Varma v Aminexs Holdings, 2008 (3) Mah. L.J. 460. A negotiable instrument means one defined under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This Act defines a negotiable instrument to mean “a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer.” However, a Promissory Note is expressly excluded. Hence, only if the loan is given on the basis of a cheque or a bill of exchange it would be out of the purview of the Act.

Accordingly, any advance of more than Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a post-dated cheque as a security is out of the purview of this Act – Nandram Kaniram v N.B. Raahtekar, 1994 (1) Bom CR 28; Sitaram Laxminarayan Rathi v Sitaram Kashiram Koli, 1984 (2) Bom CR 92.

Consequences of Not Holding Licence

One of the important consequences of carrying on the business of money-lending without a valid licence is laid down in section 10. According to this section, no Court would pass a decree in favour of a person not holding a valid licence for any suit under this Act. Thus, a suit for recovery of dues by such a person is liable to be dismissed. Even a suit for winding up of a borrower company u/s. 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 would be barred in case the lender is in violation of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act. This principle has been laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of Marine Container Services (India) P Ltd v Rushabh Precision Bearings Ltd., 106 Comp. Cases 108 (Bom) which held as follows:

“I find no difficulty in so also construing section 434(1)(c) to hold that a petition for winding up u/s 433(e), r.w.s. 434(1)(a), would lie only if the debt was legally recoverable. The fact that the present is a company petition and under the Bombay Money-Lenders’ Act, no relief will be granted if the suit is filed would also make the debt unenforceable under the Act. It is no doubt true that a company petition is not a petition for recovery of dues from a company. Nevertheless, to wind up a company u/s 434(1) (a), the amount must be a debt which is legally recoverable. If the recovery itself is barred u/s 10 of the Bombay Money-Lenders’, Act, I am of the opinion, therefore, that in such a case the petition filed on the ground that the company is unable to pay such a debt, would also not be maintainable.”

If a money-lender who does not have a valid licence is in possession of the property of a loan debtor as a security, then the same can be requisitioned and delivered to the loan-debtor.

Several decisions have held that if a valid licence is not held by the money-lender, then the loan ceases to be a legally enforceable debt u/s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence, if the debtor pays a cheque to such a lender which subsequently bounces, then the lender is not entitled to file a criminal suit for the cheque bouncing u/s 138 – Mulchand Ramji Saiya v Premji Ratanshi Gangar, Cr. A. No. 5397 of 2010 (Bom); Nanda Dharam Nandanwar v Nandkishor Talakram Thaokar, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 733; Anil Baburao Kataria v Pursuhottam Prabhakar Kawane, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 802.

Further, the Act prescribes  a penalty for carrying on the business of money-lending without a valid licence. For the first offence, the punishment is a term of up to one year and/or a fine of Rs. 1,500. For every subsequent offence, the penalty is a term of at least two years.

Does the Law apply to NBFCs?

Banks have been expressly exempted. However, there is no clarity on whether or not the Act applies to NBFCs. Since money-lending is a State subject, different States and their High Courts have taken divergent views. One of the biggest bones of contention is that the State laws establish maximum rates of interest that can be charged by a money-lender whereas, the RBI has not established a ceiling on the rate of interest that can be charged by an NBFC. Some States such as Karnataka have specifically exempted certain NBFCs from the provisions of the Money Lenders Act, while there is a blanket exemption for all NBFCs in Rajasthan.

In Sundaram Finance Ltd, Special Civil Application No. 13163 of 2008 (Order dated 13th January 2010) and in Radhey Estate Developers v Mehta Integrated Finance Co Ltd, Special Civil Application No. 66 of 2010 (Order dated 26 April 2011) the Gujarat High Court ruled that the Bombay Money Lenders Act, as applicable to the State of Gujarat, does not apply to NBFCs which are regulated by the RBI.

However, the Kerala High Court has consistently been taking a view that even NBFCs are covered by the State money lending Act – Link Hire-Purchase and Leasing Co. (Pvt.) Ltd v State of Kerala, 103 Comp. Cas 941 (Ker).

Muthoot Finance Ltd has filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP. No. 14386/2010 on September 07, 2010) before the Supreme Court challenging the order of the High Court of Kerala approving the Order of the Government of Kerala notifying that provisions of the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958 which regulated and controlled money lending business in the state of Kerala, was applicable to NBFCs. The matter is currently pending before the Supreme Court.

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, whether it has complied with the aforesaid provisions in respect of any money-lending transactions executed into by it. In case the Auditor comes across a transaction which does not comply with any provisions of the above Acts, then he will have to consider whether appropriate disclosures should be made in the Notes to Accounts or whether the non-compliance is so material so as to warrant a qualification in his report.

He may insist upon a legal opinion to support any claim which the auditee is making. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that an audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is to exercise of ‘due care’ and ‘diligence’.

IS IT FAIR TO INVOKE PROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS SO RAMPANTLY?

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Introduction
All of us are aware that under the tax laws, any default or contravention of the provisions attract various types of consequences such as interest, penalty, fee (new section 234E), disallowance and even prosecution. Prosecution implies a criminal offence and may invite punishment of rigorous imprisonment. It is expected that while administering any law, the authorities should use discretion and a sense of proportion. The penal consequence should not be disproportional to the nature of default or offence. This is an elementary principle of jurisprudence. However, of late, there are notices issued rampantly invoking prosecution in terms of section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) even for delays in payment of tax deducted at source. This article proposes to bring out the unfair part of administering this provision.

Text of section 276 B
It is worthwhile examining the wording of the relevant provision closely. The text is as follows:

276B. Failure to pay tax to the credit of Central Government under Chapter XIID or XVIB

“If a person fails to pay to the credit of the Central Government,

(a) the tax deducted at source by him as required by or under the provisions of Chapter XVII B; or

(b) the tax payable by him, as required by or under,

(i) s/s (2) of section 115 – O; or

(ii) the second proviso to section 194B,

he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to seven years and with fine.”

Views:
Firstly, the very heading suggests that there should be a failure to pay the tax. Secondly, the placement of clause (a) in the section, makes it clear that it pertains to the tax deducted as per the provisions of Chapter XVII B – and not the ‘payment as per provisions of Chapter XVII B. Thus, failure to pay is on a different footing. Put differently, payment need not be within the time specified in that Chapter.

In short, the section contemplates total failure and not mere delay. As against this, even if the tax is already paid with interest, the notices for prosecution are being issued. The notices also mention the fact of prior payment! This then, is clearly against the wording and spirit of the provision.

It is pertinent to note that CBDT has issued instruction no. 1335 of CBDT, dated 28-5-1980 to the effect that prosecution should not normally be proposed when the amounts involved are not substantial and the amount in default has also been deposited in the meantime to the credit of the Government.

The Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, taking cognizance of this instruction, has already struck down the prosecution in the case of Bee Gee Motors & Tractors v ITO (1996) 218 ITR 155.

It is necessary to compare the text of section 276B with provisions of section 40(a)(ia). Section 40(a) (ia) contemplates a time limit for the payment of tax as well; and not merely the deduction as per Chapter XVII B. For mere delay, there are already adequate provisions viz. section 40(a) (ia) disallowance; 201(1A) – interest, 271 C and 221 – penalty. Thus, section 276B clearly applies to total failure and not a mere delay.

Incidentally, even under Service Tax, the Central Board of Excise & Customs has issued a circular no. 14/2011 dated 12.05.2011 stating that, “provisions relating to prosecution are to be exercised with due diligence, caution and responsibility after carefully weighing all the facts on record. Prosecution should not be launched merely on matters of technicalities. Evidence regarding the specified offence should be beyond reasonable doubt, to obtain conviction. The sanctioning authority should record detailed reasons for its decision to sanction or not to sanction prosecution, on file.” In its introductory paragraphs, it also mentions the purpose of prosecution stating that, “While minor technical omissions or commissions have been made punishable with simple penal measures, prosecution is meant to contain and tackle certain specified serious violations” It is all the more unfair that in certain jurisdiction, the limit fixed for prosecution is as low as Rs. 25,000/-.

Conclusion:
The harassment by Revenue Authorities has become a rule of the day. Notices contrary to the express provisions of law, spirit behind the law and in disregard of the CBDT instructions are clearly unfair and objectionable. A suitable clarification from CBDT will help avoiding redundant paper work and botheration.

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Unregistered Partition Deed – Is not admissible in evidence for any purpose. Stamp Act, section 35; Registration Act section 17(1)(b) and 49(c):

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[Lakkoji Mohana Rao v. Lakkoji Viswanadham & Ors AIR 2012 AP 110]

The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the elder stepbrother of the first respondentplaintiff. The petitioner herein, his mother and his elder sister filed a suit against the first respondent herein and his elder sister for partition of the family land and the house property, the said suit was decreed. In the Appeal, the District Court allowed the Appeal in part and accordingly final decree was passed and in terms of the said final decree, the properties were partitioned and possession was delivered to each of the parties. Since then, the parties are in possession of their respective allotted shares. The first respondent herein filed a suit alleging that the petitioner herein has been attempting to trespass into the land allotted to him. The petitioner herein has admitted about passing of the decree in earlier suit and also about the execution proceedings, but his main version was that there was no actual delivery of the properties as per the proceedings in execution though it was only a paper delivery. His main case is that after conclusion of the execution proceedings, the parties were not satisfied and the disputes had not ended; hence both the parties approached the elders and as per the advice of the elders, the properties were again partitioned on 14-03-2004 and since then, the petitioner herein is in possession and enjoyment of those properties.

The further case of the petitioner is that, the settlement entered into before the elders was reduced into writing in the month of March, 2004 and signed by both the parties and attested by elders.

The first respondent-plaintiff opposed the marking of the said document. His case is that the parties have partitioned their properties long back and the first respondent-plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties and that the alleged partition deed, dated 14-03-2004 is a forged one and created for the purpose of this case. It is also his case that the said document requires registration and it is not stamped, so it cannot be looked into.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the document sought to be filed was nothing but a partition deed creating right and title in the lands said to have been allotted to the parties. It is settled law that registration of document which is to be required u/s 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act makes the document inadmissible in evidence. U/s 49(c) of the Registration Act, no document required by section 17 to be registered, shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting the said property, unless it has been registered. Of course, the proviso says that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required to be registered, may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purpose of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registration of instrument.

The A.P. Amendment Act 17 of 1986 came into force with effect from 16-08-1986 and definition of ‘instrument of partition’ u/s 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act has been amended. Even a memo recording past partition is also brought within the definition of ‘instrument of partition’ by virtue of the said amendment. Thus, the argument that a document is merely a record of family arrangement, settlement or acknowledgment of prior partition and admissible for collateral purpose is no more available after the above amended provisions of Indian Stamp Act came into force. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is very clear and creates a clear bar and therefore unstamped document is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. Admittedly the alleged document i.e. partition deed is chargeable with duty. In view of the settled legal position i.e. the bar engrafted u/s 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is an absolute bar and therefore the document cannot be used for any purpose unlike the bar contained in section 49 of the Registration Act.

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Right of daughters of coparcener – Amended provision of section 6 came into effect from 9-9-2005 – Said provision does not have retrospective effect: Hindu Succession Act 1956:

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[Ms. Vaishali Satish Ganorkar & Anr v. Satish Keshorao Ganorkar & Ors AIR 2012 Bom 101]

The court was considering the effect of amended provision section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act (HSA), 1956. The Court observed that until a coparcener dies and his succession opens and a succession takes place, there is no devolution of interest and hence no daughter of such coparcener to whom an interest in the coparcenary property would devolve would be entitled to be a coparcener or to have the rights or the liabilities in the coparcenary property alongwith the son of such coparcener.

It may be mentioned, therefore, that ipso facto upon the passing of the Amendment Act, all the daughters of a coparcener in a coparcenary or a joint HUF do not become coparceners. The daughters who are born after such dates would certainly be coparceners by virtue of birth, but a daughter who was born prior to the coming into force of the amendment Act, she would be a coparcener only upon a devolution of interest in coparcenary property taking place.

The section is required to be interpreted to see whether a daughter of a coparcener would have an interest in the coparcenery property by virtue of her birth in her own right, prior to the amendment Act having been brought into effect. It may be mentioned that prior to the amendment Act (aside from the State Amendment Act of 1995 which amended Section 29 of the HSA) indeed the daughter was not a coparcener; she had no interest in a coparcenery property. She had, therefore, no interest by virtue of her birth in such property. This she got only “on and from” the commencement of the amendment Act i.e, on and from 9th September 2005. The basis of the right is, therefore, the commencement of the amendment Act. The daughter acquiring an interest as a coparcener under the section was given the interest which is denoted by the future participle “shall”. What the section lays down is that, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener. It involves no past participle. It involves only the future tense. Consequently, by the legislative amendment contained in the amended Section 6 the daughter shall be a coparcener as much as a son in a coparcenery property. This right as a coparcener would be by birth. This is the natural ingredient of a coparcenery interest since a coparcenery interest is acquired by virtue of birth and from the moment of birth. This acquisition (not devolution) which until the amendment Act was the right and entitlement only of a son in a coparcenary property, was by the amendment conferred also on the daughter by birth. The future tense denoted by the word “shall” shows that the daughters born on and after 9th September 2005 would get that right, entitlement and benefit, together with the liabilities. It may be mentioned that if all the daughters born prior to the amendment were to become coparceners by birth, the word “shall” would be absent and the section would show the past tense denoted by the words “was” or “had been”. The future participle makes the prospectivity of the section clear.

A reading of Section as a whole would, therefore, show that either the devolution of legal rights would accrue by opening of a succession on or after 9th September 2005 in case of daughters born before 9th September 2005 or by birth itself in case of daughters born after 9th September 2005 upon them.

The general scope and purview of the Amendment Act of 2006 is to make all daughters coparceners, so as to devolve upon them the share in coparcenery property along with and as much as all the sons. The remedy that it seeks to apply is to remove gender discrimination in such devolution of interest. Further, it makes every daughter by birth a coparcener. The former law was that the daughter was not by birth a copercener and no interest in a coparcenery devolved upon her by succession, intestate or testamentary. The legislation contemplated that on and from 9th September 2005, the daughter would become a coparcener by birth for the devolution of interest in coparcenery property. The Act of 2006 received the assent of President on 5th September 2005 and was published in the Gazette of India on 6th September 2005. The amended section 6 was to come into effect expressly from 9th September 2005.

In the amended HSA, mere protection is not granted to the daughters; they are given a substantive right to be treated as coparceners upon devolution of interest to them and even otherwise by virtue of their birth. This grant would effect vested rights, as in this case, when alienations and dispositions have been made. Hence, retrospectivity such as to make the Act applicable to all the daughters born even prior to the amendment cannot be granted, when the legislation itself specifies the posterior date from which the Act would come into force unlike the anterior date in the Orissa Tenants Protection Act 1948.

The rights of a daughter such as to effect vested rights would be on a wholly different footing and, therefore, cannot be applied retrospectively

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Oral family arrangement – Registration not necessary – Transfer of property Act section 5, Registration Act section 17(1)(b):

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[Bupuram Bora & Ors v. Anil Bora & Ors AIR 2011 Gauhati 104]

The respondent Nos.1 to 5 as plaintiffs had instituted the suit for declaration of right, title and interest over the land. The case of the plaintiffs was that the property originally belonging to Gura Kalita, alias Bora and Lessa Kalita. After the death of Gura Kalita, his share in the property devolved on his three sons, namely, Teen Bora, Gunaram Bora and Deben Bora and on the death of Lessa Kalita, his share in the property devolved on his only son, namely, Dharani Kalita alias Bora and accordingly, all of them have been jointly enjoying the land. According to the plaintiffs, while they were in joint possession, the proforma defendants, namely, the successor-in-interest of Teen Bora and Deben Bora, who are the brothers of plaintiffs’ father Gunaram Bora and Dharani Kalita, the successor-in-interest of Lessa Kalita, had given up their rights in respect of their shares, which land was under possession of the plaintiffs from before, by virtue of amicable partition amongst the members of the joint family, for which a document dated 14.09.1990 was subsequently executed, which however, was not registered.

It is also the case of the plaintiff that on or about 02.03.1992 the principal defendants/appellants encroached on the land. The Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents declaring the right, title and interest.

The substantial question of law raised which was relevant for the purpose of the appeal, i.e. whether by virtue of unregistered deed, the plaintiffs could acquire the right, title and interest in respect of Schedule land. It has been submitted that since, by the said document, Dharani Kalita alias Bora, son of Lessa Bora apart from Dombaru Bora and Gorsing Bora, both are sons of Bogiram Bora, relinquished their rights in respect of the land measuring 3 kathas 5 lechas in favour of the plaintiffs, who are sons of Gunaram Bora, who is the brother of Teen Bora, Deben Bora, Dharani Kalita alias Bora and Bogiram Bora, the said document cannot confer any right, title and interest on the plaintiffs, as the said document is not registered, though compulsorily registerable u/s 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908. Though the said document is titled as “Abandonment of Sharecum- Sale Deed”, the contents of the same reveals recording in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties in the family arrangement earlier arrived at amongst the heirs so that there is no hazy notions about it in future. It is apparent from the said document that in fact no consideration amount was paid and as such it is not a sale deed requiring compliance of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act r.w.s. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.

The Court held that the family arrangement can be arrived at orally and its terms may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. Such memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose being used as a document on which future title of the parties to be founded and if such memorandum is prepared as record of what had been agreed upon so that there are no hazy notions about it in future, the same is not required to be registered. On the other hand, it is only when the parties reduced the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess. In Kale (AIR 1976 SC 807) the Apex Court following its earlier decision in Tek Bahadur Bhujil (AIR 1966 SC 292) as well as other decisions, has held that a family arrangement may even be oral, in which case there is no requirement of registration of such arrangement. It has also been held that the registration would be necessary, only if the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and as such registration is not necessary, when the document is a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation, as such memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and as such is not required to be compulsorily registerable u/s 17(1) of the Registration Act.

The document as well as the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, reveal that a family arrangement had already been made and the document is nothing but the memorandum prepared after such family arrangement for the purpose of record and for the purpose of mutation of the names of the plaintiffs, who are the legal heirs of Gunaram Bora. Accordingly, the mutation was initially granted in favour of the plaintiffs over the suit land described in Schedule-A. By the said document the family arrangement has not been made. What it has indicated is only the family arrangement which had already been made and as such is not required to be registered under the Registration Act. The contention of the appellants/ defendant Nos.1 to 5 that the document is compulsorily registerable cannot, therefore, be accepted and hence rejected.

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Natural justice – Audi alteram partem – Right to hearing – Constitution of India Article 14:

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[Allied Motors Ltd v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2012) 2 SCC 1]

On 15-5-2000, an unauthorised police officer accompanied by the respondent BPCL’s officials conducted a raid at the appellants petrol pump and collected samples. On the very next day, without even giving a show cause notice and/or giving an opportunity of hearing, BPCL terminated the appellants dealership. The appellant had been operating the petrol pump for the respondent for the past 30 years. During that period, on a number of occasions, samples were tested by the respondent and were found to be as per the specifications. After unsuccessfully challenging the termination of its dealership before the High Court, the appellant filed the appeal by SLP.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that its dealership had been terminated in an arbitrary manner and in violation of the principles of natural justice and also in violation of the Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 1998, section 1(d)(ii) secondly, the search and seizure was by an unauthorised police official.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the haste with which a 30 years old dealership was terminated even without giving a show cause notice and/or giving an opportunity of hearing clearly indicates that the entire exercise was carried out by the respondent corporation on non-existent, irrelevant and on extraneous consideration. There has been a total violation of the provisions of law and the principles of natural justice. Samples were collected in complete violation of the procedural laws and in non-adherence of the guidelines of the respondent Corporation.

The Hon’ble Court quashed and set aside the termination order of the dealership. Consequently, the respondent Corporation was directed to hand over the possession of the petrol pump and restore the dealership of petrol pump to the appellant.

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Alienation of minors property – Suit for setting aside sale – Limitation prescribed is three years from date on which minor attained majority: Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, sec. 8(3):

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[ K.P. Mani & Ors v. Malu Amma & Ors AIR 2012 Kerala 110]

The suit property belonged to one Perachan as per kanam assignment deed No.2636 of 1927. On the death of Perachan, the lease hold right devolved on his sons, Lakshmanan and Raghavan. The said Raghavan died a bachelor. Thus, the entire property belonged to Lakshmanan. On the death of Lakshmanan, plaintiffs and other legal heirs acquired right over the property. Plaintiffs claimed that they have 2/6th shares in the suit property. While so, their sister, Syamala assigned her 1/6th share to Prabhakaran Nair and Sathiyamma. That was followed by the mother of appellants/plaintiffs and 6th defendant executing release deed in favour of Prabhakaran Nair. Appellants/plaintiffs say that at the time release deed was executed, themselves and 6th defendant were minors and that apart, 1st appellant/1st plaintiff was insane. But, it is without getting permission of the court that the mother had executed release deed and hence, it is not valid or binding on plaintiffs and 6th defendant. Defendant contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The Trial Court accepted the plea of the Defendant and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the court held that an alienation of immovable property by the natural guardian without obtaining permission of the Court was only voidable (and not void) and that there should be a prayer to set aside such alienation.

It is not disputed that Meenakshy, mother of appellants 2nd and 3rd was their natural guardian. Hence, assuming that she has alienated the share of appellants 2 and 3/2nd plaintiff and 6th defendant without getting permission of the court, the release deed to the extent it concerned appellants 2 and 3 is only voidable and not void and hence, appellants 2 and 3 were bound to get release deed to the extent it concerned them set aside, for which the period of limitation prescribed is three years from the date on which appellants 2 and 3 attained majority. Admittedly, the suit was filed much beyond the said period of three years in which case Defendant 1 to 5 are justified in their contention that the suit to the extent it concerned appellants 2 and 3 is barred by limitation. The view taken by the first appellate court concerning appellants 2 and 3 was held to be correct.

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Hedge accounting in a volatile environment

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Entities generally enter into certain derivative transactions to protect or hedge themselves from risk of fluctuation in certain key variables (such as currency exchange rates, interest rates or commodity prices) that may have a detrimental impact on their profit and loss accounts. In a hedging transaction, there is usually a hedged item and a hedging instrument such that the hedging instrument protects an entity from fluctuations in the value of the hedged item. In order to reflect the impact of hedging activities in the profit or loss account, an entity may elect to apply the hedge accounting principles under IFRS (or Ind AS). These principles provide guidance on designating hedge relationships by identifying qualifying hedged items, hedging instruments and hedged risks.

Qualifying hedged items can be recognised assets, liabilities, unrecognised firm commitments, highly probable forecast transactions or net investments in foreign operations. In general, only derivative instruments entered into with an external party qualify as hedging instruments. However, for hedges of foreign exchange risk only, non-derivative financial instruments (for example, loans) may qualify as hedging instruments.

Hedge accounting allows an entity to either :
• measure assets, liabilities and firm commitments selectively on a basis different from that otherwise stipulated in IFRS or Ind AS (“fair value hegde accounting model”); or

• defer the recognition in profit or loss of gains or losses on derivatives (“cash flow hedge accounting model” or “net investment hedging”).

Hedge accounting is voluntary; however, it is permitted only when strict documentation and effectiveness requirements, as stated in IAS 39 are met. The Ind AS criteria are similar to the IFRS criteria. These criteria are:

• There is formal designation and written documentation at the inception of the hedge.

• The effectiveness of the hedging relationship can be measured reliably. This requires the fair value of the hedging instrument, and the fair value (or cash flows) of the hedged item with respect to the risk being hedged, to be reliably measurable.

• The hedge is expected to be highly effective in achieving fair value or cash flow offsets in accordance with the original documented risk management strategy.

• The hedge is assessed and determined to be highly effective on an ongoing basis throughout the hedge relationship. A hedge is highly effective if changes in the fair value of the hedging instrument, and changes in the fair value or expected cash flows of the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk, offset within the range of 80-125 percent.

• For a cash flow hedge of a forecast transaction, the transaction is highly probable and creates an exposure to variability in cash flows that ultimately could affect profit or loss.

One of the more common hedging transactions entered into by entities is a hedge of highly probable forecast transactions (purchases or sales), considered a cash flow hedge. A cash flow hedge is a hedge of the exposure to variability in cash flows that is attributable to a particular risk associated with a recognised asset or liability, or a highly probable forecast transaction that could affect profit or loss. In the case of hedges of highly probable forecast purchase or sale transactions in foreign currency, the hedged risk would be currency risk, the hedged items are the forecast purchases/sales and the hedging instruments typically used are currency forwards.

Given below is an example of applying hedge accounting to the cash flow hedge of a highly probable forecast purchase.

Example:
Company R is an Indian company with Indian Rupees (INR) as the functional currency. The reporting dates of Company R are 30th June and 31st December.

On 1st January 20X0, Company R expects to purchase a significant amount of raw materials in future for its production activities. A Company based in the US will supply the raw materials. Company R’s management forecasts 100,000 units of raw material will be received and invoiced on 31st July 20X1 at a price of USD 75 per unit. For convenience, it is assumed that the invoice will also be paid on 31st July 20X1.

The Company’s management decides to hedge the foreign currency risk arising from this highly probable forecast purchase. R enters into a forward contract to buy USD and sell INR. The negotiations with the US Company are in advanced stages and the board of Company R has approved the transaction.

On 1st January 20X0, the Company enters into a US Dollar forward contract, to purchase USD 7,500,000 at a forward rate of INR/USD 46.245, by selling an equivalent INR sum of INR 346,837,500 on 31st July 20X1.

Exchange Rates on various dates are as shown in Table 1 :

Annualised interest rates applicable for discounting cash flows on 31 July 20X1 at various dates of the hedge are as shown in Table 2:


The fair value of the foreign currency forward contract at each measurement date is computed as the present value of the expected settlement amount, which is the difference between the contractually set forward rate and the actual forward rate on the date of measurement, multiplied by the discount factor.

On 1st January 20X0, which is the start date of the forward contract, the fair value of the derivative will be nil, as the difference between the contractually set forward rate and the actual forward rate (7,500,000 * (46.2450 – 46.2450)) is Nil.

On 30th June 20X0, the actual forward rate is 45.9732 and discount factor of 0.9138. Accordingly, the fair value of the currency forward contract is Rs. (1,862,774) i.e. [(7,500,000 * (45.9732 – 46.2450)) * 0.9138].

The fair value of the currency forward contract at each measurement date is computed in the same manner. Accordingly, the fair values at each measurement date are shown in Table 3.

The company designates this hedge relationship on 1st January 20X0.

Hedge effectiveness testing needs to be performed on a prospective as well as on a retrospective basis. A common way to measure hedge effectiveness is the cumulative dollar offset method which is a quantitative method that consists of comparing the change in fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument with the change in fair value or cash flows of the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk.

Prospective testing will consider the expected variability in cash flows based on possible movements in exchange rates using dollar offset/hypothetical derivative method. Retrospective testing will consider actual variability in value/cash flows based on actual changes in forward rates.

In the given case, hedge effectiveness has been assessed prospectively and retrospectively using the cumulative dollar offset method and a hypothetical derivative for the notional amount of hedged purchases to demonstrate a relationship between the change in fair value of the hedging instrument and the change in fair value of the hedged item. The hypothetical derivative method is used to measure hedge effectiveness and ineffectiveness and is based on the comparison of the change in the fair value of the actual contracts designated as the hedging instrument and the change in the fair value of a hypothetical hedging instrument for purchases in the month of payment (considering that payment is the designated hedged item). In the given case, the hypothetical derivative that models the hedged cash flows would be a forward contract to pay $ 7,500,000 in return for INR.

The effectiveness of the relationship will be demonstrated by the following ratio:
Cumulative change in the fair value of the forward contract(s) by designated expiry.

Cumulative change in the fair value of the Hypo-thetical Derivative.

If the ratio of the change is within the range of 80% to 125%, the hedge will be determined to both continue to be, and to have been highly effective.

In this example, using the cumulative dollar offset method and a hypothetical derivative, the hedge effectiveness has been assessed as 100% effective at each measurement date. This is primarily because the date of maturity of the currency forward contract and date of the forecasted purchase payment, and the notional amount being hedged is the same. Hence, the ratio of fair value of the forward contract undertaken (hedging instrument) and the hypothetical derivative is 100% in each case. In practice, ineffectiveness often arises due to any changes in the expected timing of the purchase/ collection and the maturity date of the derivative. For example, though the derivative matures at the end of the month, the payment may occur at any time during the month.

Journal Entries (ignoring the impact of taxes) for the transaction using hedge accounting:

Date

Particulars

Dr/ Cr

Amount

Amount

 

 

 

(INR)

(INR)

 

 

 

 

 

1-Jan-X0

No entry as the fair value of the currency
forward contract is nil

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30-Jun-X0

Hedging reserve (OCI)W

Dr

1,862,774

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Derivative (liability)

Cr

 

1,862,774

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the cur-

 

 

 

 

rency forward
contract)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Dec-X0

Derivative (asset)

Dr

2,141,046

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Derivative (liability)

Dr

1,862,774

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Hedging reserve (OCI)

Cr

 

4,003,820

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the cur-

 

 

 

 

rency forward
contract – difference between the fair value between

 

 

 

 

measurement dates 31
December 20X0 and 30 June 20X0 (-1,862,774

 

 

 

 

– 2,141,046))

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30-Jun-X1

Derivative (asset)

Dr

2,519,448

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Hedging reserve (OCI)

Cr

 

2,519,448

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the currency

 

 

 

 

forward contract –
(4,446,495 – 2,141,046))

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Derivative (asset)

Dr

4,002,005

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Hedging reserve (OCI)

Cr

 

4,002,005

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the cur-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rency forward
contract)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Inventory

Dr

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Trade Payable

Cr

 

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, 
recognition  of  purchase 
of  inventory  at 
spot  rates

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i.e.7,500,000*47.4)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Hedging reserve (OCI)

Dr

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Inventory

Cr

 

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, recognition of gains recognised in
equity into the carrying

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

amount of the
inventory acquired by Company R.  The
net impact

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of this adjustment is
that the inventory is ultimately recognised at

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the forward rate of
46.245; alternatively this could have been carried

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in OCI and released
to the P&L account directly when the inventory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

would have been
booked in the P&L account)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Cash

Dr

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Derivative (asset)

Cr

 

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, settlement of derivative in cash)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Trade Payable

Dr

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Cash

Cr

 

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, settlement of trade payable)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In this example, since the hedge is 100% effective. the fair value of the currency forward contract has been taken to Hedging Reserve at each period end.

Conclusion:

By adopting hedge accounting, a company is able to align its risk management policy with its accounting treatment and better represent the transaction in its financial statements. It also reduces the volatility in the profit and loss account by deferring the unrealised gains or losses on the hedging instruments to other comprehensive income. In the future articles, we shall discuss examples on the other two type of hedges i.e. fair value hedge and hedge of a net investment in a foreign operations.

Interest expenditure – Advances to sister concerns – Commercial expediency – S. A. Builders v. CIT needs reconsideration.

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[Addl. CIT v. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd. (SLP (CC) No.7140 of 2012 dated 30-4-2012)]

The respondent-assessee had borrowed certain funds which were utilised by the assessee to subscribe to the equity capital of the subsidiary company, namely, M/s. Tulip Star Hospitality Services Ltd. This subsidiary company used the said funds for the purpose of acquiring the Centaur Hotel, Juhu Beach, Mumbai, which is now functioning as “The Tulip Star, Mumbai”. The assessee paid interest on the borrowed money. This interest liability incurred by the assessee was claimed by it as deduction on the ground that it was business expenditure. The Assessing Officer refused to allow the expenditure.

However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer and the opinion of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was confirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was in the business of owning, running and managing hotels. For the effective control of new hotels acquired by the assessee under its management, it had invested in a wholly owned subsidiary, namely, M/s. Tulip Star Hospitality Services Ltd. On this ground, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.A. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 288 ITR 1, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction of interest on the borrowed funds.

On an appeal, the Delhi High Court inter alia held that the expenditure incurred under the aforesaid circumstances would be treated as expenditure incurred for business purposes and was thus allowable under section 36 of the Act.

On a further appeal, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that S.A. Builders Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 288 ITR 1, needed reconsideration. The Supreme Court therefore issued notice on the SLP.

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DEDUCTIBILITY OF ADVANCE PAYMENTS – Section 43B

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Issue for consideration
Section 43B of the Income Tax Act provides that certain deductions shall be allowed only in that previous year in which the specified sum is actually paid , irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred according to the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. It basically applies to taxes, duties, cess, or fees, contributions to provident funds, superannuation funds, gratuity funds, interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions or banks and leave encashment.

This section, which was inserted with effect from assessment year 1984-85, to the extent relevant for our discussion, reads as under:

43B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of—

(a) any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee, by whatever name called, under any law for the time being in force, or

(b) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any provident fund or superannuation fund or gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of employees, or

(c) any sum referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 36, or

(d) any sum payable by the assessee as interest on any loan or borrowing from any public financial institution or a State financial corporation or a State industrial investment corporation, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement governing such loan or borrowing, or

(e) any sum payable by the assessee as interest on any loan or advances from a scheduled bank in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement governing such loan or advances, or

(f) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee,

shall be allowed (irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him :

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in relation to any sum which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of section 139 in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred as aforesaid and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return.

Explanation 2 to section 43B provides that for the purposes of clause (a), “any sum payable” means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the previous year, even though such sum may not have been payable within that year under the relevant law.

Therefore, in respect of the specified sums , even if the liability has been incurred, but payment has not been made, the deduction would not be allowable in the year in which the liability is incurred, but would be allowable in the year of payment.

The section begins with a non-obstante clause that has the effect of overriding the provisions of the Act . It further states that a deduction otherwise allowable in respect of the specified sums will be allowed in the year of actual payment.

A controversy has arisen in respect of a converse type of situation where the payment has been made, but liability to pay has not yet been incurred, particularly in respect of taxes which are covered by clause (a). While the Kerala High Court has taken the view that the deduction would not be allowable in the year of payment if the liability has not been incurred as per the method of accounting, the Calcutta, Punjab & Haryana and Delhi High Courts have taken a contrary view to the effect that the deduction would be allowable u/s 43B in the year of payment, even if the liability to pay tax or duty was incurred in the next year under the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee. A related controversy has also arisen for allowance of deduction, in the year of payment, though the liability to pay the same may not have arisen under the relevant statute governing the expenditure in the year of payment. The special bench of the ITAT favours the grant of allowance in the year of actual payment.

Kerala solvent extractions’ case
The issue arose before the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. Kerala Solvent Extractions, 306 ITR 54.

In this case, pertaining to assessment year 1994-95, the assessee which was following the mercantile method of accounting, made an additional payment of Rs. 23 lakhs towards sales tax payable for April 1994. This amount was claimed as a deduction for the year ended 31st March 1994. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim u/s 143(1)(a), since it was specifically stated in the accounts accompanying the return that the amount paid was towards sales tax for April 1994.

The assessee’s appeal against the disallowance was allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals), who held that the disallowance of the amount paid towards advance sales tax was a debatable point. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner(Appeals).

Before the Kerala High Court, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that sales tax liability payable in April 1994 was not an allowable deduction u/s 37(1) r.w.s 145. It was argued that the claim was not allowable as the assessee had not incurred expenditure, and that unless the amount paid was the liability of the assessee for the previous year, it could not be allowed, no matter whether the assessee had paid it or not. On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the tax having been paid in the previous year, though not a liability of the year, was an allowable deduction under clause (a) of section 43B read with explanation 2.

The Kerala High Court observed that it was not in dispute that the sales tax liability of the assessee was an allowable deduction in the computation of income from business by virtue of section 29 r.w.s 37(1), that income chargeable under the head “Profits and Gains of Business or Profession” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting and that like any other liability, sales tax liability should be claimed and allowed on mercantile basis. It was also undisputed that the sales tax liability of Rs. 23 lakh pertained to April 1994, which fell in the next financial year, and that u/s 145, the assessee was not entitled to deduction of this amount in the earlier year of payment.

According to the Kerala High Court, the issue was whether section 43B entitled the assessee to deduction of liability of the next financial year merely because the amount was paid by the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year. The Kerala High Court observed that words of section 43B showed that the section dealt with deductions otherwise allowable under the provisions of the Act, and that the section only laid down the conditions for eligibility for deduction of certain al-lowances which were otherwise admissible under the Act. According to the Kerala High Court, the scheme of section 43B was to allow the deductions referred to in clauses (a) to (f) only on payment basis, even though the assessee was following the mercantile method of accounting. In other words, section 43B was an exception to section 145, inas-much as even if the claim was allowable deduction based on the system of accounting, it would still be inadmissible u/s 43B if it was not paid on or before the end of the relevant previous year, or at least before the date of filing of the return. The Kerala High Court therefore held that section 43B was only supplementary to section 145 and was only an additional condition for allowance of deductions otherwise allowable under the other provisions of the Act.

The Kerala High Court, on examination of the scheme of the sales tax, noted that under the scheme, the liability for payment of sales tax arose on the due date of filing of the monthly returns and the final return and the liability therefore arose only on due date of filing of the return. Under this scheme, if the assessee remitted any amount in the financial year towards tax payable for any month of the next financial year, this amount did not constitute tax liability of the assessee for that previous year, but would be carried as an amount of tax paid in advance for the next year, and would be adjusted towards tax liability for that year. If the assessee discontinued business, it was entitled to get refund of the tax paid in the earlier year.

According to the Kerala High Court, explanation 2 to section 43B did not justify the claim of the assessee for deduction because even under that provision, only liability incurred by the assessee during the previous year was allowable on payment basis. What the explanation contemplated was incurring of liability by the assessee in the previous year, though the amount was not payable during the previous year under the relevant law. The Kerala High Court noted that so far as sales tax was concerned, it was a tax on sale or purchase of a commodity. Since the liability arose under the statute and the payment was not towards tax due for the previous year or payable in that year, the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction u/s 29 r.w.s 37(1) and 145.

The Kerala High Court therefore held that the asses-see was not entitled to the deduction in the year of payment, and further confirmed that the payment of sales tax was prima facie disallowable, and hence upheld the disallowance u/s 143(1).

Paharpur cooling towers’ case

The issue again came up recently before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd v. CIT, 244 CTR 502.

In this case, for assessment year 1996 -97, the assessee paid a sum of Rs. 3.22 crore on account of excise duty, the liability for payment of which was incurred in the previous year relevant to assessment year 1997- 98. The assessee claimed deduction in respect of the amount actually paid by it during the previous year ended 31st March 1996 in the assessment for assessment year 1996-97, u/s 43B.

The assessing officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction of the excise duty paid on the ground that the liability for such excise duty was not incurred during the previous year relevant to assessment year 1996-97. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the appellant’s claim for deduction of excise duty. The tribunal allowed the appeal of the revenue against the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), upholding the disallowance of such advanced payment of excise duty.

The Calcutta High Court observed that the requirement of section 43B(a) was that the assessee must have actually paid the amount, as well as incurred liability in the previous year for the payment, even though such sum may not have been payable within that year under the relevant law. The court noted that the assessee had undoubtedly paid the duty in the previous year and such payment was made consequent upon the liability incurred in the very year, but in view of the fact that it followed the mercantile system of accounting, the amount was legally payable in the next year. According to the High Court, the amount therefore was clearly covered by section 43B read with explanation 2.

The High Court further noted that the position would have been different if the amount was not paid in the previous year, in which case the assessee would not have been eligible to get the benefit. The object of the legislature was to give the benefit of deduction of tax, duty, etc. only on payment of such amount, liability of which the assessee had incurred and not otherwise. Even if the tax or duty was payable in the next year in view of the system of accounting followed by the assessee, according to the Calcutta High Court, if the liability was ascertained in the previous year and the tax was also paid in that same year, there was no scope of depriving the assessee of the benefit of deduction of such amount.

The Calcutta High Court, after analysing the reasons for introduction of section 43B, stated that it was never the intention of the legislature to deprive the assessee of the benefit of deduction of tax, duty, etc, actually paid by him during the previous year, although in advance, according to the method of accounting followed by him. The Calcutta High Court observed that, if the reasoning given by the tribunal were accepted, an advance payer of tax, duty, etc payable in accordance with the method of accounting followed by him would not be entitled to get the benefit even in the next year when liability to pay would accrue in accordance with the method of accounting followed by him, because the benefit of section 43B was given on the basis of actual payment made in the previous year.

The Calcutta High Court therefore held that the advance excise duty paid was allowable as a deduction in the year of payment, though the liability to pay such duty arose in the subsequent year as per the method of accounting employed by the assessee.

A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Modipon Ltd (No 2) 334 ITR 106, as well as by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v Raj and San Deeps Ltd 293 ITR 12, again in the context of excise duty paid in advance.

Observations

The dispute is two fold. In claiming deduction based on actual payment while computing the total income of the year payment, whether it is necessary that the liability to pay the specified sum has arisen (a) under the respective statute governing the expenditure and(b) under the method of accounting employed by the assessee. The Revenue’s case is that for an allowance of deduction, it is essential that three conditions are satisfied; liability under the governing statute, liability under the method of accounting and the actual payment. It is only on compliance of all the three conditions that an assessee shall be entitled to a valid claim of deduction. In contrast, the assesses are of the view that the only condition necessary for a valid deduction is the actual payment and once that is proved the claim cannot be frustrated.

The purpose behind the introduction of section 43B, and the reasons for introduction of Explanation 2 are narrated by the Explanatory Memorandum reported in 176 ITR (St) 123. It states that the objective of section 43B is to provide for a tax disincentive by denying deduction in respect of a statutory liability which is not paid in time. The first proviso to section 43B was introduced to rule out the hardship caused to certain taxpayers who had represented that since the sales tax for the last quarter cannot be paid within the previous year, the original provisions of section 43B would unnecessarily involve disallowance of the payment for the last quarter. The Memorandum further states that certain courts had interpreted the words “any sum payable” to the effect that the amount payable in a particular year should also be statutorily payable under the relevant statute in the same year. This was against the legislative intent and it was therefore being proposed, by way of a clarificatory amendment and for removal of doubts, that the words “any sum payable” be defined to mean any sum, liability for which had been incurred by the taxpayer during the previous year, irrespective of the date by which such sum was statutorily payable.

The language of the provision specifically provides for overriding or ignoring the method of accounting. Once that is done, there is no enabling provision found in the section that requires looking back to the method of accounting for ascertaining the eligibility of the deduction, otherwise. The only requirement is to ascertain the fact of the actual payment. If the payment is made , the deduction is allowed and should be allowed instead of denying the same.

The actual payment of the specified sum, under the provision, is the key consideration for allowance of the deduction. It emerges nowhere that a person should satisfy the twin conditions of the liability and of the actual payment as well, before a lawful deduction is claimed and allowed. To read the condition of the incurring of the liability in the section amounts to doing a serious violence to the provision and should be avoided. The use of the words ‘irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred’ clearly puts to rest any doubts about the intention of the legislature, which is to allow the deduction in the year of payment, irrespective of the year in which liability was incurred.

Further, nothing is gained by denying a lawful deduction based on actual payment, as the payment is the conclusive proof of the intention of the payer. It may be that in some stray cases, the person making the payment in advance is refunded the sum paid. In such cases, the law has enough provisions to tax the refund in his hands including under the provisions of s.41(1) of the Act.

It is nobody’s case that a deduction should be allowed on payment in respect of an expenditure that is otherwise not allowable under the Act. The deduction should surely be for an expenditure that is allowable in computing the income under the provisions of the Act. In view of this position, any attempt to frustrate a deduction by relying on the opening part of the section which uses the term ‘a deduction otherwise allowable’ should be nipped in the bud. The said term simply means that the claim should be of an expenditure that is otherwise allowable under the Act and not necessarily w.r.t. the method of accounting. If the intention were to first determine the allowability on the basis of the method of accounting , it would have been provided there and then, by stating that ‘ a deduc-tion otherwise allowable on accrual’ or ‘as per the method of accounting’. On the contrary, the latter part simply advises one to ignore the method of accounting.

The next difficulty is about the need for accrual of liability under the relevant statute that provides for the expenditure and its relation to the Explanation 2. The scope of the said Explanation 2 is restricted to only those payments which are covered by clause(a) of s. 43B of the Act. This again emphasizes the fact that the scheme of the deduction is based on one and only condition and that is that of the actual payment, at least as far as the deduction under clauses(b) to(f) are concerned and if that is so, there is nothing that permits assigning of a different treat-ment for clause(a) payments. With great respect to the Calcutta High Court, it seems that the court’s observation that in order for a valid deduction, it was necessary that the liability for such payment should have been incurred under the relevant law in the same year in which the amount was paid, though it might not have become payable under the method of accounting employed by the assessee, does not seem justified. Kindly note that the said Explanation 2 itself supports the claim for the deduction in the year of payment, irrespective of the liability to pay, when it states ‘even though such sum might not have been payable within that year under that law’. If that is so, undue importance is not required to be given, for the purposes of deduction under the Income tax Act, to accrual of liability and the time thereof, under the relevant laws governing the payment of the expenditure. The Delhi High Court seems to support this position when it stated that the purpose of s. 43B is ‘subserved by the payment of the duty to the Department concerned’.

The Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal also had occasion to consider this issue, though again in the context of excise duty, in the case of DCIT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health-care Limited, 299 ITR (AT) 1 (Chd)(SB). Some of the observations of the members of the special bench are interesting and throw considerable light on how section 43B is to be viewed in the case of advance payments, and are reproduced below:

(i)    There is no reference to any condition to establish “accrual of liability” for the claim of deduction. Only actual payment is insisted upon. The whole idea of enactment of section 43B is to change the system and replace the condition of allowability of deduction from incurring of the liability to actual payment. Having in mind the provision of section 43(2) and the purpose of section 43B, there is no question of asking the assessee to prove actual payment as well as incurring of a liability.

(ii)    It is not necessary that the assessee must prove incurring of a specific liability under any statute referred to in the different clauses of section

43B. It must be an expenditure connected and related to the assessee’s business deductible u/s 28 of the Act. It should not be a prohibited item totally unrelated to the business of the assessee. The expression “a deduction otherwise allowable” only means statutory liabilities mentioned in section 43B. The expression “a deduction otherwise allowable” reflects deduction on account of general liability fastened to the assessee’s business on account of duties, taxes, cess or fees by whatever name called, arising in the course of the carrying on of the business. The expression does not mean any specific liability which is required to be incurred.

(iii)    There is no justification to examine the previous year in which liability to pay the sum was incurred, when the mandate is “irrespective of the previous year in which liability was incurred” and the claim is to be allowed on the basis of actual payment. To do otherwise would be in violation of the words “irrespective of the previous year” in which the liability was incurred and disregard the mandate of the section.

(iv)    Section 43B brought in a change in the normal rule of deduction of expense based on the accounting method followed by an assessee. The rule of deduction u/s 43B is actual payment of the liability. When the payments are understood as actual payments, those payments even if mentioned as advance payments, need to be allowed as deduction u/s 43B.

(v)    Section 43B provides for the deduction of sums payable mentioned in clauses (a) to (f), only if actually paid ; but they shall be allowed irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee. The expression “irrespective of the previous year” means the deduction has to be allowed regardless of the previous year. Any reference to the time of incurring or accruing of the liability is dispensed with by the statute while concentration is made on the point of actual payment of the sum to the Treasury of the Government.

(vi)    It is highly improbable to presume that an assessee would indulge in tax avoidance by actually paying money towards duties and taxes. Any such benefit arising to an assessee is only incidental.

(vii)    The section does not lay down any rule that the liability to pay the duty must be incurred first and only thereafter the payment of such duty made, so as to claim the deduction under section 43B. The expression “otherwise allowable” refers to a declaration that payments which are available as deductions u/s 43B, are those expenses which are usually allowed by the Income-tax Act for the purpose of computing income. The expression “any sum payable” does not mean “payment outstanding”.

On a combined reading of the provisions together with the Explanatory Memorandum and of the intention and the history behind the provisions, amended form time to time, it is clear that section 43B completely overrides the method of accounting and therefore section 145, and that even advance payments of tax are allowable as deduction, in the year of actual payment, even if the liability to pay the tax did not arise during the previous year, but in a subsequent year.

The view taken by the high courts in favour of the allowance of deduction on payment is , in our respectful opinion, a better view of the matter.

Further, the view that the deduction is allowed under the Income tax Act in the year of payment , as held by the special bench of the ITAT, irrespective of its year of accrual under the relevant statute providing for liability to the expenditure, once the actual payment is made, is a far better view.

Coal on Fire

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Few days back, the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of Performance Audit of Allocation of Coal Blocks was tabled in the Parliament. The CAG has reported that the Government ought to have allocated the coal blocks by competitive bidding. The Government followed a method that lacked transparency. CAG estimated the loss to the exchequer to the tune of Rs. 1.86 lakh crore due to the method followed by the Government.

One is not sure whether the action of the Government was the result of any corrupt practice and `mota maal’ received by the ruling party as alleged by the opposition or a mere impropriety or a decision taken with national interests in mind.

Since the Report was tabled in the Parliament, the opposition has not permitted the Parliament to function and has been demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. Not permitting the Parliament to function is becoming a regular affair and does not augur well for the democracy. Both, the opposition and the ruling party members, are airing their views on the electronic media. The debate ought to happen on the floor of the Parliament; that is the right forum. The opposition is being irresponsible. They would be performing their duty better, if they take the Government to task on the floor of the Parliament.

The Government has been defending the allocation of the coal blocks by putting up several arguments, most of them rather illogical and difficult to digest.

The Prime Minister, while accepting the responsibility for the decision, has stated that the conclusions of the CAG are disputable. The Minister of Corporate Affairs (holding additional charge of Ministry of Power) commented that the CAG Report has been made without proper study and that the things that the CAG has come out with are all speculative and presumptive. He mentioned that the Report will precipitate the policy paralysis in the Government.

The Finance Minister reportedly said that there was zero loss due to allocation of the coal blocks (a defence taken even when 2G scam surfaced). The Minister denied having ever said this. Now his view is that, since mining had not started at any of the coal blocks except one and the coal was still buried in the Mother Earth, no loss had occurred. Does the Minister agree that there is loss, but it will start accruing only when the mining of coal starts? Is it his case that there is no issue at this point of time since loss will accrue in future? Will the Minister accept if an assessing officer were to assess a higher loss and argue that question of loss to the revenue will arise, only if and when the assessee makes profit and claims a set off?

The Minister of Coal slammed the CAG Report on various grounds including the methodology of calculating the loss. The spokesperson for the ruling party at one stage even challenged the jurisdiction of the CAG in making the Report. The Minister of Human Resources Development and the Minister of Law have also joined the bandwagon trying to discredit the Report.

While accepting the proposition that every decision, report and the functioning of any constitutional authority should be open for reasonable criticism, the kind of frontal attack from the ruling party on the CAG and his Report is rather unfortunate and uncalled for. The CAG is a constitutional authority (the Supreme Audit Institution of India) with a right and duty to interrogate the Government on its performance as well as compliance. Each report must be given serious consideration and deliberated upon and discussed at appropriate forums. Neither is the main opposition party justified in not letting the Parliament function nor is the ruling party right in rubbishing the Reports of a constitutional authority on flimsy grounds.

The Nation has witnessed in the recent times two instances, where allocation of natural resources made by the Government has come under attack. The Supreme Court, in the proceedings relating to 2G scam, has directed that national natural resources should be allocated based on competitive bidding. While this may be the most transparent method of allocation of the resources, it has many repercussions. In a competitive bidding, the prices of the resources will bring in more revenue to the national exchequer, but it will impact the pricing of the products and services offered to the public using those high-priced resources. Price of coal will directly impact the prices of power, steel and cement. While the rates for the power are fixed by the Regulatory Commissions, prices of steel and cement are not regulated. Are we ready for prices that are fully market-driven in all sectors? These are complex questions, these can be handled if the Government and bureaucrats work with honesty and diligence and develop transparent yet an efficient way in consultation with all stakeholders.

We talk about high growth rate, that the coming decades will be that of India, India will be a superpower. Are we only fooling ourselves? Can India really progress unless the system is cleansed of corruption and inefficiency. Most of us want to be optimistic. But when we look at the situation around us in the present times, pessimism sets in. Unless we change our act quickly as a nation, we will lose the opportunity when there is a turnaround in the world economy.

Sanjeev Pandit
Editor

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Happiness Unlimited

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What is happiness where does it lie?
How does it look like and why is it so shy?
Chase of mankind always kept aloof,
Appearances in roses, hearts filled with gloom.

Life in bigger cities, despite better amenities, has become very hectic and stressful that a news item even reported that sale of anti-depressants in India is growing by 17% annually. If we look around, it is an appalling scenario. People seem or rather pretend to be happy, but in actuality are far from being happy. Why is it so that in this era of technological advancements where almost everything has become possible upon a touch of a button, the mind is far away from serenity?

Life is referred as “anubhav dhara”, stream of experiences. There is life as long as there are experiences. As the experiences cease, life also comes to an end. There are two components of any experience, subject and object. The subjects are we as individuals and the object is the world. As the subject, we individuals deal with the world, we have experiences. As are the experiences, so is the life. If experiences are good, life is good and when there are sorrowful experiences, so is the life. To improve the experience, the options are either to improve the subject or the object. One set of school works for the betterment of the objects to provide greater happiness. The scientific developments play an important role and indeed have made massive contributions. With each passing day, new and new captivating gadgets and equipments are becoming part of our life. The objects are truly facilitating. Nevertheless people continue to be in a state of anguish and pain. No object till date has ever been able to overcome the sufferings and woes of any human being. This is an irony. Another set of thinkers concentrate on the subject. Vedanta provides that if we do not work on the improvement of the subject, we live a life of strain and disarray even in the world of prosperity and plenty.

We as human beings succumb to our desires. Desires of sense objects. The fulfillment of each desire; achievement of sense object, symbolises happiness to us. Each time we get our desire fulfilled we appear to be happy. If we put happiness into an equation, mathematically, it would be:

                     Number of desires fulfilled
Happiness = ————————————–
                      Total number of desires entertained.

Obvious from the above formula, the two ways in which happiness can be increased are:
I) Either increase the numerator or
II) Decrease the denominator.

Getting along with the first option is very easy. We try to increase the numerator by fulfilling our desires and we do have a sense of happiness. For example: If there is a desire to go out for a dinner at a restaurant, then accomplishing the object makes us feel happy. But in the process of increasing the numerator, we find ourselves in a situation where many more desires have crept in. Every time we fulfill our desire, the number of desires in the wait list keeps on rising. Thus, increase in the numerator automatically increases the denominator and in fact manifolds, severely affecting the equation of happiness downwards.

Concentrating on the subject, we achieve strength to raise ourselves. If we are able to control and confine our desires, there is decrease in the denominator. The removal of each desire would give us the power. Happy at all times. Swami Ramatirtha has said “If you are not happy as you are, where you are, you will never be happy.” The day when we bring down the denominator to zero value, imagine the level of happiness, it shall be infinite. “Happiness Unlimited”. It might seem to be a difficult proposition, but we human beings do follow this practice. The question ahead is; are we willing to improve upon? How? Let’s see.

It is a known fact that our composition is of matter and spirit. The body, mind and intellect referred to as the matter and Atman, the spirit. At the gross level it is body, mind being subtle. Intellect is subtler and Atman the subtlest. Eating an imported brand of chocolate and its taste is the cause of happiness to the body. When it comes to the emotional level where mind plays, we rise and we give the chocolate to our child giving us much more joy and in fact for a longer duration. Our intellectual pursuits for study many times make us give up various desires and we happily let go desires for a cause something more important. That brings everlasting happiness. We need to lift ourselves because intellectual persists.

Giving away desires may not be that easy. The higher we move, from body to mind to intellect and there above, it becomes more difficult. The higher is the pain; greater the happiness. The Lord Himself has said in the eighteenth chapter of The Bhagwad Gita: The true happiness is like poison in the beginning but nectar in the end – verse 37. False happiness is like nectar in the beginning but poison in the end – verse 38.

In these times, full of hassle and haste, let us pause for a while; think where true happiness lies and how it can be achieved lies in not letting go the objective of our life and existence.

The way to happiness is on path of attitude,
Where hearts filled with sense of gratitude.
With all one has ever so content,
As divine gifts above from heavens.

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Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

2014 (35) S.T.R. 140 (Tri – Mumbai) Hotel Amarjit Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Service Tax, Nagpur

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Whether supply of food along with provision of Mandap keeper services is liable to service tax under Mandap keeper services?

Facts:
The appellants provided “Mandap Keeper Service” and ‘Catering Services’. Prior to April, 2005, the appellants were charging one lump sum amount and service tax was levied on combined receipt. With effect from April, 2005, the appellants started splitting the bills, one for banquet hall and another for supply of food and discharged service tax only on banquet hall charges considering the same to be Mandap keeper services. Objecting to splitting of bill, the department confirmed demand on food charges collected as well. The appellants contested that food charges were collected separately on which VAT was levied. Since the transaction was of sale of goods, the same was not leviable to service tax. They further contested that Joint Commissioner of Central Excise of their other unit had accepted their contention and service tax was levied only on hall charges. Accordingly, since department had knowledge of the activity undertaken by the appellants, extended period of limitation also was challenged. The appellants further challenged some calculation errors of the department. On the other hand, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 177 (Tri.-Del.), the department contested that catering charges were includible in taxable value of Mandap keeper services and contended that though in another unit, the case was dropped, a wrong decision could be perpetuated.

Held:
Having regard to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (supra) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. (supra), the services rendered by Mandap keepers as caterer were also liable to service tax under the category of Mandap keeper services since price charged for food formed part of consideration of Mandap keeper’s services. Service tax demand beyond 5 years was quashed. Since every registered premise is considered as a separate assessee under service tax law, dropping of demand at one unit was of no relevance to decide whether extended period of limitation may be invoked or not. The appellants cannot take plea of bona fide belief as Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held catering services were liable to service tax. Also, according to the Apex Court’s judgement in the case of Fuljit Kaur and Chandigarh Administration 2010 (262) ELT 40 (SC) if a wrong decision has been passed at a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the superior court for repeating the same irregularity. In the present case, the appellants did not disclose consideration received from catering services in bills and ST3 Returns. Hence, it was a case of mis-statement of fact with intent to evade taxes and extended period of time was justified. In light of the above analysis, the matter was remanded back for re-quantification. Penalty u/s. 76 was held imposable for default in payment of service tax since mens rea was not required to be proved to levy such penalty. In view of contravention of provisions in the present case, penalties u/s. 77 were sustainable. Splitting of bills from April, 2005 was a deliberate act to evade Service tax payments and therefore, penalty u/s. 78 was confirmed.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 88 (Tri.-Mumbai) B4U Television Network (I) P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Can excessive service tax paid be adjusted against future service tax liability or the assessee needs to file a refund claim?

Facts:
The appellants adjusted excess service tax paid earlier was objected by service tax department. Relying on various Tribunal decisions, the appellants contested that service tax was not collected by them from their clients and they had complied with Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 and therefore, such adjustment of excess service tax paid was justified. The Department submitted that the case was not covered by Rule 6(3) and that the appellants should have filed a refund claim for claiming back such excess payment.

Held:
Delhi Tribunal in case of Nirma Architects & Valuers 2006 (1) STR 305 (Tri.) had held that if adjustment of excess Service tax paid would not be allowed against future payments, Rule 6(3) would become redundant. Relying on the said decision, Tribunal allowed such adjustment of undisputed excess Service tax paid.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 220 (Guj.)Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs vs. V.M. Engg. Works

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Whether penalty levied u/s. 76 can be reduced by invoking section 80?

Facts:
Since the respondents delayed the payment of service tax, adjudicating authority levied penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) who reduced the penalty by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. The matter was appealed by revenue before the Tribunal, but they did not succeed. According to the revenue, it was mandatory to impose penalty u/s. 76 and discretionary powers to reduce penalty was not vested with the authority and neither the Commissioner (Appeals) nor the Tribunal were justified in reducing the penalty. Further to support its contestation, Revenue placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer 2010 (19) S.T.R. 641 (Guj.).

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer (supra) it was held that in case it is proved by the assessee that there was reasonable cause for failure, penalties may not be levied vide section 76 read with section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. Accordingly, though discretionary powers are granted, the powers are restricted to waive off the total penalty and penalties cannot be reduced below the minimum limit prescribed u/s. 76. Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal was directed to decide the matter afresh in light of the said decision after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 28 (Uttarakhand) Valley Hotel & Resorts vs. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Dehradun

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Whether VAT is leviable on amount, leviable to service tax, on presumptive basis with respect to restaurant services?

Facts:
The revisionist was engaged in the business of hotel providing lodging, boarding and restaurant services. Food served in the restaurant was liable for VAT vide Uttarakhand VAT Act, 2005 which was duly discharged. From 1st July, 2012, Service tax was leviable on 40% of the bill amount vide Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The revisionist, hence, made an application to VAT authorities requesting not to charge VAT on such 40% of billed amount which would suffer a burden of service tax. However, Commissioner as well as Tribunal of Commercial Tax rejected the application

Held:
Value Added Tax can be imposed on sale of goods and not on service. Union Government, which is the competent authority to impose service tax, has imposed service tax on restaurant services which is not challenged by the State. VAT cannot be imposed on the element of service. Thus, the revision was allowed.

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Extension of Advance Ruling Schemes to certain categories of Residents — Notification No. 27/2009-ST, dated 2-8-2009.

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New Page 1

Part B : Indirect Taxes

 

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Extension of Advance Ruling Schemes to certain categories
    of Residents — Notification No. 27/2009-ST, dated 2-8-2009.

The Advance Ruling Schemes shall be applicable to a public
sector company.

Public sector company shall have the same meaning assigned
to it in Section 2(36A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Effective date for new services — Notification No. 26/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

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New Page 1

Part B : Indirect Taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Effective date for new services — Notification No.
    26/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

The effective date for new services introduced vide the
Finance Act, 2009 shall be 1st September, 2009.

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DTAA between India and Tajikistan notified — Notification No. 58/2009-FT and TR-II [F.No. 503/10/95-FT & TR-II], dated 16-7-2009.

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New Page 1

  1. DTAA between India and Tajikistan notified — Notification
    No. 58/2009-FT and TR-II [F.No. 503/10/95-FT & TR-II], dated 16-7-2009.
     

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Extension of time limit to file ITR V in case E-return filed without digital signature — Press Release, dated 13-8-2009.

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New Page 1

  1. Extension of time limit to file ITR V in case E-return
    filed without digital signature — Press Release, dated 13-8-2009.

In case an E-return has been filed which has not been
digitally signed, the ITR V needs to be sent via Ordinary Post to Bangalore
office within 30 days from the date of uploading such return. This time limit
of 30 days has been extended till 30 September 2009 or within 60 days from the
date of uploading, whichever is later.

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Finance Bill (No. 2) of 2009 gets Presidential Assent on 19 August 2009 — [Act No. 33 of 2009]

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New Page 1

  1. Finance Bill (No. 2) of 2009 gets Presidential Assent on 19
    August 2009 — [Act No. 33 of 2009]

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6, dated August 3, 2009 — Memorandum of Instructions governing money-changing activities

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Spotlight – Part C

Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of RBI Circulars.

  1. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6, dated August 3, 2009 —
    Memorandum of Instructions governing money-changing activities

Presently, Authorised Dealers/FFMC are required to obtain
certain documents, including a conduct certificate from the local police
authorities, while conducting the due diligence of their agents/franchisees.
However, they have been experiencing difficulties in obtaining conduct
certificate from local police authorities in respect of agents/franchisees,
which are incorporated entities.

This Circular has done away with the requirement of
obtaining conduct certificate from local police authorities in respect of
agents/franchisees, which are incorporated entities. Henceforth, Authorised
Dealers/FFMC have been permitted to accept certified copy of the Memorandum
and Articles of Association and Certificate of Incorporation in lieu of
conduct certificate from the local police authorities, in respect of
agents/franchisees, which are incorporated entities.

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Generalia Specialibus non derogant

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The ‘WORD’

Legal disputes generally become entrenched in cases of clash
of provisions in different statutes, or in the same statute when all such
provisions have application to the issues involved. In such situation the
controversy created is resolved by application of the legal maxim ‘generalia
specialibus non derogant’
which means that general things do not derogate
from special things. Conversely, special things derogate from general things. In
law it means that where there are more than one dispensations, the special
dispensation overrules the general one and it is the special one that has
application in resolving the issue.

2. The principle helps in resolving the conflict arising
between two different Acts. In a recent landmark decision relating to the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where there were conflicting provisions
in the A & C Act and in the Limitation Act, 1963 as to the bar of limitation for
commencement of proceedings in a Court, the Supreme Court in Consolidated
Engineering Enterprises v. The Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department) &
Ors.,
(2008) INSC 574 held the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to be
a special law, consolidating and amending the law relating to arbitration and
matters connected therewith overriding the provisions of the Limitation Act. The
A&C Act does not prescribe the period of limitation for starting various
proceedings under the Act, except where it intends to prescribe a period
different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act. There is no express
provision excluding the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to
proceedings under the A&C Act. On the other hand, S. 43 makes the provisions of
the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings under the A&C Act, except in
certain specified areas and insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the A&C Act. When the question arose as to whether the Limitation
Act will apply to proceedings in arbitration which are proceedings before a
Tribunal, an argument was advanced that the Limitation Act has application to
proceedings in Courts only and, therefore, will have no application to
proceedings in arbitration. However, considering the provisions of S. 43 of the
A&C Act, Ss.(1) of which specifically extended application of the Limitation Act
to arbitration as it applies to proceedings in Court, it was held by the Supreme
Court, having regard to the legislative intent and the principle of generalia
specialibus non derogant,
that the Limitation Act will apply with its
extended scope in relation to arbitration proceedings and will have application
to such proceedings whether before the Tribunal or the Courts.

3. The determination as to which of the various statutes is a
special Act is based on the relative evaluation of the two Acts in the context
of the subject-matter in dispute. In relation to the same Act i.e., the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when there was a clash between the
provisions of the A&C Act and the Electricity Act, the Supreme Court in
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.,
(2008) 4 SCC 755, where
the issue was whether the provisions of dispute resolution between the licensees
and generating companies contained in the Electricity Act, 2003 will prevail
over the provision of the A&C Act dealing with appointment of arbitrators,
applied the very same principle of generalia specialibus non derogant and
held that the provisions in the Electricity Act are special and hence will
override the general provisions of the A&C Act, 1996.

4. The maxim applies when there are overlapping provisions in
the same statute not consistent with each other. Issues have arisen in the
interpretation of S. 37 vis-à-vis the provisions of S. 30 to S. 36 of the
Income-tax Act. All these provisions govern admissibility of business expenses.
Whereas S. 37(1) is a general provision laying down the broad yardsticks
applicable to admissibility of expenses, S. 30 to S. 36 are special provisions
providing for the admissibility of specified expenses subject to conditions and
limitations prescribed therein. The issue arose as to whether total amount of
bonus paid to employees governed by the Payment of Bonus Act in excess of the
monetary limit prescribed therein can be allowed deduction in computation of
business income. The argument was that to the extent of amount payable under
that Act, the same should be allowed under the proviso to S. 36(1)(ii) and the
excess amount under the general provision of S. 37(1) being the expenditure laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. The view was
taken that there being a specific provision for such bonus contained in proviso
to S. 36(1) (ii), the general provisions of S. 37(1) had no application and,
therefore, the CBDT vide Circular No. 414, dated 14-3-1985 clarified that the
allowance for bonus to employees governed by the Payment of Bonus Act has to be
restricted to the amount payable under that Act. This view was upheld by the
Bombay High Court in Sabodhchandra Popatlal v. CIT, (1953) 24 ITR 566 and
Madras High Court in N. M. Rayaloo Iyer and Sons v. CIT, 26 ITR 265. The
proviso having been deleted, the overlapping now stands removed.

5. A similar situation arose in relation to the allowability
of expenses on the maintenance of any residential accommodation in the nature of
a guest-house. Whereas S. 30 allows deduction in respect of rent, rates, taxes,
repairs and insurance for premises used for the purposes of business, Ss.(4) of
S. 37 (now stands deleted )denied such guesthouse maintenance expenses. Treating
Section 30 as the special provision not to be overridden by the general
provision of S. 37, the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Chase Bright Steel Ltd.,
177 ITR 124 and in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 189 ITR 660 held
these guesthouse expenses allowable u/s.30 regardless of the provision contained
in S. 37(4). The Supreme Court in Britannia Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 278
ITR 546, however, agreed with the contention of the Revenue that ‘premises used
for purpose of business’ is a broad expression, whereas guesthouse in S. 37(4)
refers to a special category within that broad expression. By the specific
provision in Ss.(4) of S. 37, guesthouse is to be treated differently from the
general category of premises and S. 37(4) brings out clear and unambiguous
intention of the Legislature to make such expenses disallowable.

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Non est factum

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The Word

Non est factum is the stand taken by a party to the suit
when he challenges the enforceability of an agreement or a document on the
ground that even though the document bears his signatures, the same is not his
document as his signatures were obtained by fraud, coercion or misrepresentation
or he signed under misunderstanding of substantial nature. Such pleas generally
do not find acceptance by courts except under special circumstances. On
acceptance of the plea, a document is held void as opposed to voidable as the
element of consent is regarded as totally absent.


2. The term ‘non est factum’ is a latin expression and
is used in legal parlance to mean ‘not his document’. Such a claim is made by
the party signing the document to dispel a general presumption that the person
signing ought to be aware of its meaning, content and character. The law
protects an innocent person raising such plea only when it is diligently proved
that he was swayed into signing the document without knowing the true content
and character as a result of some tricky situation he was placed in.

3. The defence to the plea of non est factum is
basically on facts evidencing that the person arguing non est factum
signed the document with full knowledge and will, or that even if there was some
misunderstanding, the effect thereof is unsubstantial. In Anirudhan v. The
Thomco’s Bank Ltd.,
1963 AIR 746 (SC), the plaintiff stood surety for an
overdraft granted by the respondent bank to the principal debtor. A blank signed
surety bond was given by the appellant-surety to the principal debtor who
submitted the same to the lending bank, after filling in the amount of
Rs.25,000. As the bank was not prepared to grant an overdraft of Rs.25,000, the
figure was changed by the principal debtor to Rs.20,000 without the knowledge of
the surety. When the guarantee was sought to be enforced on the default made by
the principal debtor, the surety on ground of non est factum claimed that
he stands discharged after unilateral alteration. Rejecting the claim, the Court
held that the document was not altered in the possession of the promisee, the
principal debtor was acting as agent of the surety and above all the alteration
has not caused any prejudice to the promisor, the same being unsubstantial.
Quoting with approval the observations of Cotton L. J. in Holme v. Bruskill,
(1877) 3QBD 495, the Court held — “The true rule in my opinion is that, if there
is any agreement between the parties with reference to the contract guaranteed,
the surety ought to be consulted, and that if he has not consented to the
alteration, in cases where it is without enquiry evident that the alteration is
unsubstantial or that it cannot be otherwise than benefit to the surety, the
surety may not be discharged.”

4. The plea of non est factum has greater force when
taken by an illiterate or otherwise deficient person not adequately equipped
with power of proper understanding or a person acting under dominance of others.
This, however, is not a decisive factor. In Smt. Hansraj v. Yasodanand,
1996 AIR 761 (SC), the plaintiff was an illiterate, harijan, childless widow who
was given employment in Railways on the death of her husband on compassionate
ground. She wanted to make a will of her inherited house in favour of her
brother’s son. A person pretending to assist her in preparing the document of
will got her signed some papers and, as claimed by her, prepared a sale deed
instead of the will in favour of the brothers’ son. Having lost in all the
Courts, the lady appealed to the Supreme Court taking additional ground based on
non est factum, alleging that the signatures were never made for the
purpose of sale deed. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
transfer was not vitiated for non est factum. As observed “when it has
been concurrently found by all Courts below on evidence on record that the
document was executed as a sale deed by the appellant, the aforesaid additional
ground pales into insignificance.”

5. Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharamdas (D)
by LRS & Ors.
INSC 303 (19-3-2007) is a case where alienation was questioned
on the ground that it was vitiated by fraud, coercion and undue influences. The
plea was that the executor of the document was under the impression when he
executed the sale deed that he was executing a document to secure repayment of a
loan of Rs.10,000 which he had taken. He had not intended to execute a sale
deed. The document writer had played a fraud on him. He, in other words, pleaded
a case of non est factum. The Courts negatived the claim and dismissed
the suit as the claimant was not able to prove any fraud on the part of the
document writer, which finding was not disturbed by the Supreme Court.

6. The decisions in such matter rest on direct and
circumstantial evidence. The maxim follows the provisions of the Contract Act
which makes the consent actuated by coercion, under influence and
misrepresentation as voidable at the option of the consenting persons. Non
est factum
even defies the maxim ‘ignorantia juris non excusat’ and
even such ignorance can be a valid defence in appropriate cases particularly
involving illiterate persons genuinely but not negligently falling victim to an
unintended action.

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Age restriction in the Service Tax Return Preparer Scheme, 2009 omitted — Notification No. 44/2010-Service Tax, dated 20-7- 2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

101 Age restriction in the
Service Tax Return Preparer Scheme, 2009 omitted — Notification No.
44/2010-Service Tax, dated 20-7- 2010.

By this Notification
restriction regarding age limit of 35 years for the purpose of enrolment,
training and certification to act as Service Tax Return Preparer has been
omitted.

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Processing of returns of A.Y. 2009-10 — Steps to clear backlog —Instruction No. 7/2010 dated 16-8-2010.

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part A : direct taxes


 

100 Processing of returns of
A.Y. 2009-10 — Steps to clear backlog —Instruction No. 7/2010 dated 16-8-2010.

In supersession and
modification of Instruction No. 5/2010 dated 21-7-2010, CBDT has taken the
following decisions :

(i) In all the returns
filed in ITR-1 and ITR-2, for the Asst. Year 2009-10, where the aggregate TDS
claim does not exceed Rs. Three lakh (3 lacs) and where the refund computed
does not exceed Rs.25,000; the TDS claim of the tax payer shall be accepted at
the time of processing of the return provided that the TDS payment reported in
AS-26 is more than Rs. Zero.

(ii) In all the returns
filed in forms other than ITR-1 and ITR-2, for the Asst. Year 2009-10, where
the aggregate TDS claim does not exceed Rs. Three lakh (3 lacs) and the refund
computed does not exceed Rs.25,000 and there is at least 10% matching of TDS
amount claimed, the TDS claim shall be accepted at the time of processing of
the return.

(iii) In all remaining
cases, TDS credit shall be given after due verification.

F. No.225/25/2010-ITA.II (Ajay
Goyal)
Director (ITA.II)

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Slum rehabilitation scheme recognised u/s.80IB — Notification No. 67/2010 dated 3-8-2010.

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part A : direct taxes


 

99 Slum rehabilitation
scheme recognised u/s.80IB — Notification No. 67/2010 dated 3-8-2010.

 

As per proviso to Ss.(a) &
(b) of S. 80IB(10), Slum Rehabilitation Scheme needs to be notified to be
eligible to the benefits of the deduction as stipulated therein. The CBDT issued
this long pending notification under the said Proviso wherein any scheme of Slum
Rehabilitation as contained in Regulation 33(10) of Development Control
Regulation for Greater Mumbai 1991 read with the relevant notifications under
these regulations and stipulated conditions would be eligible for claiming
deductions u/s.80IB of the Act provided all the other conditions are fulfilled.

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Press Release for extension of due date of filing the tax returns of individual taxpayers.

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part A : direct taxes


 

98 Press Release for
extension of due date of filing the tax returns of individual taxpayers.

The Central Board of Direct
Taxes has extended the due date of filing of income tax return from 31st July,
2010 to 4th August, 2010 in view of technical snags in the e-filing computer
systems and inclement weather at various locations causing difficulties in
filing or uploading income tax returns.

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Issue of certificate of lower collection of income-tax at source u/s.206C(9) — regarding — Instruction No. 4/2010, dated 21-7-2010.

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part A : direct taxes


 

97 Issue of certificate of
lower collection of income-tax at source u/s.206C(9) — regarding — Instruction
No. 4/2010, dated 21-7-2010.

I am directed to state that
Instruction No. 8/2006, dated 13-10-2006 was issued by the Board making it
mandatory to get prior administrative approval of the Additional Commissioner of
Income-tax/Joint Commissioner of Income-tax before issue of any certificate of
lower deduction of tax at source u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Further,
Instruction No. 7/2009, dated 23-12-2009 was issued communicating prior
administrative approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS) in the cases
where the cumulative amount of tax foregone by non-deduction/lesser rate of
deduction of tax arising out of certificate u/s.197 during the financial year
for a particular assessee exceeds Rupees fifty lakh in major stations and Rupees
ten lakh for other stations.

2. For effective monitoring
and control of tax foregone through certificate of lower tax collection at
source (TCS), I am directed to communicate that for issue of certificate of
lower collection for tax at source u/s.206C(9), prior administrative approval of
the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax/Joint Commissioner of Income-tax shall
be obtained in each case. Further, prior administrative approval of the
Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS) shall be taken where cumulative amount of tax
foregone by lesser rate of tax collection at source during the financial year
for a particular buyer or licensee or lessee, as the case may be, exceeds Rupees
fifty lakh in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Bangaluru, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad
and Pune Stations and Rupees ten lakh for other stations. Once the Addl. CIT/JCIT
or the CIT(TDS), as the case may be, gives administrative approval of the above,
a copy of it has to be endorsed to the jurisdictional CIT also.

3. In relation to TCS
matters of a buyer or licensee or lessee falling within the jurisdiction of
Directorate of Income-tax (International Taxation), the powers indicated above
shall be vested in the officers concerned i.e., Range Additional DIT/JDIT
(International Taxation) or Director of Income-tax (International Taxation), as
the case may be.

4. ‘Tax foregone’ in case of
a buyer or licensee or lessee, as the case may be, should ordinarily mean
difference between taxes computed at the relevant rate of collection stipulated
and the tax computed on the basis of rate at which the certificate u/s.206C(9)
is sought to be issued.

5. The content of this
instruction may be brought to the notice of all officers working in your charge
for strict compliance.

6. Hindi version will
follow.

F. No. 275/23/2007-IT(B) (Ajay
Kumar)
Director (Budget)

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The interest rate for Employees’ Provident Fund for the financial year 2007-08 has been declared at 8.5% : Notification no. Invst II/(3)(2)133/07-08/ROI/pt, dated 17-7-2008.

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OTHERS

69 The interest rate for Employees’
Provident Fund for the financial year 2007-08 has been declared at 8.5% :
Notification no. Invst II/(3)(2)133/07-08/ROI/pt, dated 17-7-2008.

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S. 43B — The assessee issued Deep Discount Bonds in 2000 — During the relevant assessment year, it claimed deduction of interest accrued on above bonds — AO was of the view that since no interest was paid in the period and eventually, the interest will be

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56 (2010) 126 TTJ (And) 262

Gujarat Toll Road Inv. Co. Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2003/04 Dated : 15-05-2009

S. 43B — The assessee issued Deep Discount Bonds in 2000 —
During the relevant assessment year, it claimed deduction of interest accrued on
above bonds — AO was of the view that since no interest was paid in the period
and eventually, the interest will be paid after maturity of the bonds, no
deduction is permissible — Held, the interest would be still allowable in view
of mercantile system of accounting followed by the assesse.

Facts :

The assessee, an infrastructure company, issued Deep Discount
Bonds worth Rs.30 crore in 2000 to Mutual Funds, Public Financial Institutions
and Scheduled Banks. The assessee claimed deduction of Rs.6,08,03,230 in the A.Y.
2003-04 on account of interest paid. However, the AO was of the view that since
the total interest will be paid at the maturity of the Deep Discount Bonds,
deduction was to be allowed only on actual payment. On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) affirmed the view of the AO on a different ground, i.e., since
interest was to be paid on maturity, there was no question of accrual of
interest for the period.

Held :

As per the mercantile system of accounting employed by the
assessee, though the payment was to be made only at the maturity, it was not
wrong to provide for interest in a pro rata manner as the liability has accrued.
This view was seconded by the Circular No. 2 of 2002, dated 16-2-2002 of the
CBDT.

Thus, the interest which had accrued during the period,
though not paid was still allowable to the assessee. Moreover, it was affirmed
that S. 43B(e) was not applicable to payment of interest to Mutual Funds. Also,
in case of Public Financial Institutions, S. 43B(d) is attracted only on payment
of interest to its loans/borrower. In the given case, interest was paid on Deep
Discount Bonds which are like deposits. So, provisions regarding payment of
interest on loans/by a borrower as per S. 43B(d) and S. 43B(e) were not
applicable. Therefore, the disallowance made for interest in respect of Deep
Discount Bonds was to be deleted.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A — Free trade zone — An assessee need not set off unabsorbed depreciation and brought forward losses of non-STPI unit against profit of STPI unit as there is no deduction u/s.10A for non-STPI unit.

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55 (2010) 125 ITD 101 (Bangalore)

Rely Software (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (Bangalore)

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 16-5-2008

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A — Free trade zone — An assessee
need not set off unabsorbed depreciation and brought forward losses of non-STPI
unit against profit of STPI unit as there is no deduction u/s.10A for non-STPI
unit.

Facts I :

In A.Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer on scrutiny of the
assessee’s case was of the view that unabsorbed depreciation and brought forward
losses of non-STPI unit should be adjusted against the profits of STPI unit
before claiming deduction u/s.10A. The aggrieved assessee appealed to the CIT(A),
who upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

Facts II :

The AO obtained the details of export of incurred in foreign
exchange. The details as given by the assessee included an item ‘allowance paid
to engineers on overseas contract’. The Assessing Officer held that the said
expenditure is for technical services and accordingly excluded the same from
export turnover.

Held I :

The Tribunal relied on the decisions of ACIT v. Yokogawa
India Ltd., (2007) (13 SOT 470) (Bang.) and Huawei Technologies (Ind.) P. Ltd. [ITA
No. 9(B) of 2007, Order dated 8-11-2007] and held that the business loss or
unabsorbed depreciation of non-STPI should not be set off with the STPI unit.
The following observations were also made :

1. The words total income used in S. 10A means total
income as computed under the provisions of the Act. The substituted S. 10A
does not mean that profits as mentioned u/s.10A should not be included in
the total income.

2. The Legislature has used the words ‘profits and gains
as derived by an undertaking’. The assessee may have more than one
undertaking and in that case one has to consider the profits and gains of
that undertaking which qualifies for deduction u/s.10A.

3. S. 10A nowhere mentions that the deduction has to be
restricted to the total income of the assessee as computed as per the
provisions of the Act. The only interpretation which is possible in respect
of S. 10A is that deduction of the unit qualifying for exemption is to be
given to the extent of income computed in respect of that unit as per the
provisions of the Act.


Held II :


1. Payments made to the engineers employed on site are
for the development of software. By such development, the assesse has not
rendered any technical services.

2. The CBDT Circular No. 694, dated 23-11-1994, stated
that computer programs are not physical goods, but are developed as a result
of intellectual analysis of the system. It is often prepared on site with
the software personnel going to the client’s premises.

Hence the expenditure incurred for payments on site
development cannot be excluded from the export turnover by holding it as
technical services.



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S. 43(6), S. 45(1A) and S. 50 — Insurance claim received on damaged tanks and terminals — S. 43(6) does not include the word ‘damage’ — Hence the same should not be reduced from the WDV.

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54 (2010) 124 ITD 493

J. R. Enterprises v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 30-6-2008

S. 43(6), S. 45(1A) and S. 50 — Insurance claim received on
damaged tanks and terminals — S. 43(6) does not include the word ‘damage’ —
Hence the same should not be reduced from the WDV.

Facts :

The assessee’s tanks and terminals were damaged due to an
earthquake during the relevant financial year. The assessee incurred an
expenditure of Rs.3,83,04,364 for repair, reconstruction and refurbishment of
the said tanks and terminals. As against this, the assessee received a total sum
of Rs.1,57,28,124 from the insurance company in two instalments. During the
relevant financial year, the assessee deducted the amount of first instalment
(i.e., Rs.1,25,00,000) received from the insurance company from total
expenditure incurred (i.e., Rs.3,83,04,364). The balance amount was shown as WIP
in the balance sheet. In the next year, the assessee deducted the second
instalment received from the said WIP and included certain other expenses
incurred. The final amount was then capitalised and depreciation u/s.32 was
claimed on the said amount.

The AO pointed out that the provisions of S. 45(1A) r.w. S.
50 should be applied to the assessee’s case. Thus the insurance receipt of
Rs.1,57,28,124 should be deducted from the WDV of the block of plant and
machinery.


Held :


1. S. 50 of the Act deals with transfer of assets or
cessation of existence of the block of assets. In the instant case, there is
neither a transfer, nor has the block ceased to exist. It is a case of
damaged tank and terminals and damage does not involve transfer or cessation
of existence.

2. Further, the words used in S. 45(1A) are ‘profit or
gains’, which imply the excess of the insurance receipts over the
expenditure incurred by the assessee in respect of damaged tanks and
terminals. The total insurance receipts in the present case is much less
than the total expenditure incurred by the assessee. Therefore the
provisions of S. 45(1A) are inapplicable in the present case.

3. S. 43(6)(c)(i)(B) excludes the word ‘damage’.
Therefore the moneys payable in respect of damaged tanks and terminals is
outside the purview of the said Section.

4. There is no provision in the Act to authorise the
Assessing Officer to decrease the WDV involving damaged depreciable assets
as in the case of the assessee. The AO has thus erroneously equated the
insurance receipts in the assessee’s case with ‘moneys payable in respect of
any asset falling in that block which is sold or discarded or demolished or
destroyed’.

5. The AO has erroneously assumed that every insurance
receipt is taxable, ignoring the provisions of the S. 45(1A) which use the
words ‘any profits or gains’ on such insurance receipts.



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S. 10(16) — Scholarship/stipend paid to assessee — Whether can be termed as salary — Held, No. The same is exempt u/s.10(16).

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53 (2010) 124 ITD 480 (Chd.)

Dr. Rahul Tugnait v. ITO

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 30-6-2008


S. 10(16) — Scholarship/stipend paid to assessee — Whether
can be termed as salary — Held, No. The same is exempt u/s.10(16).


Facts :

The assessee completed his MBBS degree and joined a medical
college as a junior resident for post graduation. He received a sum of
Rs.2,65,955 from the college as a scholarship/stipend for higher education. The
assessee claimed the said amount as exempt u/s.10(16) of the Act. The AO
disallowed the claim on the ground that the said amount forms salary income in
the hands of the assessee.


Held :


1. The terms and conditions mentioned in the bond signed
between the assessee and the college clearly use the words ‘scholarship’ and
‘scholarship holder’.

2. The assessee had made an application to the principal
of the medical college. The letter of the Principal clearly states that the
amount is a ‘stipend’ to the post-graduate student.

3. S. 10(16) of the Act speaks about the scholarship
granted to meet the cost of education, therefore, it can be said that even
if it is an income in the hands of recipient, it cannot be taxed, because it
is a scholarship to meet the cost of education.



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Credit for TDS to be allowed even when the income is capitalised and not directly offered to tax.

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52 (2010) 124 ITD 394 (Chennai)

Supreme Renewable Energy Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 14-8-2008

Credit for TDS to be allowed even when the income is
capitalised and not directly offered to tax.

Facts :

The assessee was a domestic company engaged in the business
of co-generation of power. It had earned interest income of Rs. 51,21,287 on
which tax was deducted at source. The said interest income arose out of a
statutory deposit made by the assessee. The said interest income was deducted
from expenditure incurred for the installation of machinery. The Assessing
Officer, however, did not give credit of tax deducted on this interest income on
the ground that the same was not offered to tax but was capitalised.

Held :

Relying on the decisions of Karnal Co-operative Sugar Mills
Ltd. (243 ITR 2) (SC) and Toyo Engg. India Ltd. v. JCIT, (5 SOT 616), the ITAT
held that :

(1) When deposit is linked with the installation of
machinery, income earned on such deposit is incidental to the installation.
Accordingly, the interest is a capital receipt and would go to reduce the
cost of asset. The assessee had rightly deducted the interest income from
the cost of asset and while doing so it has indirectly offered the income to
tax.

(2) When a particular income is received after deduction
of tax, the TDS has been duly deposited with the bank and the assessee has
received the requisite certificate to this effect, then on production of the
said certificate the assessee becomes entitled to the credit of
TDS even if the income is not directly offered for tax.

(3) The assessee should be rightly allowed the credit of
tax deducted. The Government cannot benefit by taking advantage of legal
technicalities.

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S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes

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51 (2010) 124 ITD 353 (Delhi)

Model Footwear (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 22-5-2009


S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included
miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply
because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes

S. 271(1)(c) — Last year for claiming deduction u/s.80I was
A.Y. 1996-97 — Inspite of this, assessee claimed deduction u/s.80I — No
explanation offered by assessee in this regard — Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c)
applicable — Penalty to be levied.

Facts :

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of Rs. 1,52,63,904.
While doing so, the assessee included interest income, miscellaneous income and
excess provision written back in the profit without reducing 90% thereof. The
AO, by applying the Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC, excluded 90% of aforesaid
amounts and worked out deduction u/s.80HHC. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The Assessing Officer further noticed that the assessee had
also claimed deduction u/s.80I. The AO noted that the assessee was entitled to
deduction only up to A.Y. 1996-97. The AO thereafter asked the assessee to give
reasons as to why the claim of deduction u/s.80I should not be disallowed. No
reply in this regard was furnished by the assessee. The AO, therefore, held that
the claim of deduction u/s.80I was incorrect. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) confirmed the above additions. Thereafter, the AO
proceeded with penalty proceedings.

The CIT(A) confirmed that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is leviable
in the assessee’s case.



Held :


(1) The question of excluding interest income and
miscellaneous income is dependent upon the nature of incomes — Whether they
are directly connected to operations of the assessee’s business. Simply
because the assessee had claimed deduction without reducing 90% of aforesaid
incomes, it cannot be said that the assessee has concealed income or has
made incorrect claim. The assessee’s claim was a bona fide one and assessee
has disclosed all material facts. Hence, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is to be
levied.

(2) As far as deduction u/s.80I is concerned, penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) has been correctly levied. No reason or explanation was given
by the assessee as to why it made a claim for deduction u/s.80I when it was
known to the assessee that the deduction is available only up to the A.Y.
1996-97.

The Assessing Officer started making enquiry and on enquiry,
the assessee informed the AO that the first year of deduction was A.Y. 1989-90.
Even, thereafter the assessee did not withdraw the claim made u/s.80I.

Hence the Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c) is squarely
applicable to assessee’s case inasmuch as the assessee failed to offer any
explanation.


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S. 40A(9) — Where the contribution made to any fund is a bona fide one, the same should not be hit by the disallowance of S. 40A(9).

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50 (2010) 124 ITD 332 (Cochin)

ACIT v. State Bank of Travancore

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 8-8-2007

 

S. 40A(9) — Where the contribution made to any fund is a bona
fide one, the same should not be hit by the disallowance of S. 40A(9).

Facts :

The assessee had contributed Rs.50 lakhs to Retired Employees
Medical Benefit Scheme. This was pursuant to the Associate Bank Officers’
Association’s (‘union’) demands from the management of the State Bank of India
and its subsidiaries. After negotiations between the management and the union,
it was agreed to formulate a medical scheme for retired officers. As per terms
of agreement between the management and the union, the assessee paid Rs.50 lakhs
as its contribution towards formulation of the scheme.

On perusal of the tax audit report, the AO disallowed the
said contribution on the ground that the said contribution is subject to the
provisions of S. 40A(9). The CIT(A) held in favour of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on the following
grounds :

(1) The basic intention for inserting Ss.(9) to S. 40A was
to discourage the practice of creating camouflage trust funds, etc. ostensibly
for the welfare of employees and transferring huge funds to such trust as
contribution.

(2) In the given case, there was an agreement signed by the
management and the union and contribution made by the assessee was in
pursuance to this agreement. Hence, it was a contractual obligation of the
assessee and the contribution was a bona fide one. Further, in the case of
assessee the fund is not in the control of the assessee.

The assessee would not be hit by the provisions of S. 40A(9).

51 (2010) 124 ITD 353 (Delhi)

Model Footwear (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 22-5-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included
miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply
because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes

S. 271(1)(c) — Last year for claiming deduction u/s.80I was
A.Y. 1996-97 — Inspite of this, assessee claimed deduction u/s.80I — No
explanation offered by assessee in this regard — Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c)
applicable — Penalty to be levied.

Facts :

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of Rs. 1,52,63,904.
While doing so, the assessee included interest income, miscellaneous income and
excess provision written back in the profit without reducing 90% thereof. The
AO, by applying the Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC, excluded 90% of aforesaid
amounts and worked out deduction u/s.80HHC. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The Assessing Officer further noticed that the assessee had
also claimed deduction u/s.80I. The AO noted that the assessee was entitled to
deduction only up to A.Y. 1996-97. The AO thereafter asked the assessee to give
reasons as to why the claim of deduction u/s.80I should not be disallowed. No
reply in this regard was furnished by the assessee. The AO, therefore, held that
the claim of deduction u/s.80I was incorrect. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) confirmed the above additions. Thereafter, the AO
proceeded with penalty proceedings.

The CIT(A) confirmed that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is leviable
in the assessee’s case.


Held :

(1) The question of excluding interest income and
miscellaneous income is dependent upon the nature of incomes — Whether they
are directly connected to operations of the assessee’s business. Simply
because the assessee had claimed deduction without reducing 90% of aforesaid
incomes, it cannot be said that the assessee has concealed income or has made
incorrect claim. The assessee’s claim was a bona fide one and assessee has
disclosed all material facts. Hence, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is to be levied.

(2) As far as deduction u/s.80I is concerned, penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) has been correctly levied. No reason or explanation was given by
the assessee as to why it made a claim for deduction u/s.80I when it was known
to the assessee that the deduction is available only up to the A.Y. 1996-97.

The Assessing Officer started making enquiry and on enquiry,
the assessee informed the AO that the first year of deduction was A.Y. 1989-90.
Even, thereafter the assessee did not withdraw the claim made u/s.80I.

Hence the Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c) is squarely applicable to assessee’s
case inasmuch as the assessee failed to offer any explanation.

S. 10B — For claiming deduction the assessee need not own the plant and machinery by itself.

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49 (2010) 124 ITD 249 (Delhi)

ITO v. Techdrive (India) (P.) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 27-6-2008

S. 10B — For claiming deduction the assessee need not own the
plant and machinery by itself.

Facts :

The assessee is a private limited company. In its return of
income it claimed a deduction u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) in
respect of export of computer software. During the scrutiny assessment, the AO
found that the assessee did not have any plant and machinery to develop any
computer software on its own. The computer software developing was done in the
premises of Seacom, the subsidiary of the assessee for which the assessee paid
‘software development charges’. According to the AO, one of the basic conditions
for claiming deduction u/s.10B is that the assessee company should have its own
infrastructure. He denied deduction u/s.10B of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled to exemption
u/s.10B.

Held :

On appeal, the ITAT allowed deduction u/s.10B on the
following grounds :

(1) Relying on various judgments, the ITAT held that it is
not required that the assessee company should itself own plant and machinery.
Even if the assessee gets the articles manufactured from some other person but
under the control and supervision of the assessee, it must be taken as if the
assessee is the manufacturer.

(2) Further the development of computer software is a very
specialised field which requires specialised education, skills, etc. It is not
a mechanical job and more than machines, it is human skills that count.

(3) Further, Circular 694, dated 23-11-1994 also supports
the assessee’s case. The Circular accepts that computer programmes are not
physical goods but are developed through a process of intellectual analysis.
It also recognizes that in some cases it is possible for the assessee to
produce software at the client’s premises. In such case, the software
personnel sent by the assessee would obviously use the client’s equipment
only.

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S. 32 r.w. S. 147, S. 133A — Depreciation cannot be denied on asset forming part of block of assets is not used

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



50 (2008) 22 SOT 249 (Mum.)

Unitex Products Ltd. v. ITO

ITA Nos. 153 and 154 (Mum.) of 2003

A.Ys. 1996-97 & 1997-98. Dated : 25-1-2008

S. 32 r.w. S. 147 and S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Once an asset was part of block of assets and depreciation was granted on that
block, it cannot be denied in subsequent year on the ground that one of the
assets was not used by the assessee in that year.

 

The Assessing Officer completed the assessments of the
assessee for the relevant years u/s.143(3). Subsequently, a survey u/s.133A was
carried out at the business premises of the assessee. On the basis of the
statement recorded of the estate manager (R), the Assessing Officer reopened the
assessment for A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98 and disallowed the assessee’s claim for
depreciation and maintenance expenses of one building as R had stated that the
building was under structural renovation during the period and was vacated by
the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the Assessing Officer’s action.

 

The Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) Apart from R’s Statement, the Department had not
brought anything on record for negating the claim of the assessee with regard
to depreciation.

(b) Contrary to the facts possessed by the Assessing
Officer, the assessee had demonstrated that the building, though was under
renovation, yet was not totally abandoned; it had been using this building for
business purposes and it had incurred electricity expenses, telephone expenses
and made sales and purchases from this building. The assessee had also pointed
out that all correspondence was being made in that building only. The demand
notice was also served on these premises. It was also pointed out that
registered office address was also of this building.

(c) If one weighed the material produced by the assessee
vis-à-vis
the solitary statement of R elicited by the authority during the
course of survey, then scale would tilt in favour of the assessee, because the
statement was recorded U/ss.(3)(iii) of S. 133A without administering the oath
to R. This was information which required corroboration for deciding an issue
against the assessee. The Assessing Officer had not brought any corroborative
piece of evidence in support of this information.

(d) It was also submitted by the assessee that the building
was part of its block of assets. The Tribunal in Packwell Printers v. ACIT,
(1996) 58 ITD 340 (Jab.) has considered a similar issue. This order of the
Tribunal was subsequently followed in Natco Exports v. Dy. CIT, (2003)
86 ITD 445 (Hyd.), etc. According to these decisions, once the asset is part
of block of assets and depreciation is granted on that block, it cannot be
denied in the subsequent year on the ground that one of the assets was not
used by the assessee in some of the years. The user of the assets has to apply
upon the block as a whole instead of an individual asset. The Revenue could
not cite any other decision contrary to the said decisions of the Tribunal.

 


Therefore, the assessee was entitled to depreciation and other expenses in
respect of the building.

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(a) S. 23 — Notional interest on interest- free deposit cannot be considered for determining annual letting value. (b) Standard rent under Rent Control Act, can be taken as ALV; in absence of standard rent, municipal rateable value to be taken — If muni

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



49 (2008) 22 SOT 245 (Mum.)

Delite Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v.
ITO

ITA Nos. 433, 2983-4887 and 5708 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Ys. 2001-02 & 2002-03. Dated : 26-2-2008

S. 23 of the Income-tax Act,.1961-




(a) Notional interest on interest-free deposit cannot
be considered for determining the Annual Letting Value (ALV)


(b) When Rent Control Act applies, only standard rent
can be taken as ALV; in the absence of standard rent, municipal rateable value
is to be taken and where municipal rateable value is less than actual rent,
then actual rent shall be the fair market value.


 


During the relevant assessment year, the assessee had let out
a property in New Delhi for an annual rent of Rs.0.60 lacs and took security
deposit of Rs.370.60 lacs. The assessee computed the annual letting value of the
said property u/s.23(1)(b) by taking the rent received at Rs.60,000 and offered
the same to tax in its return of income. It submitted before the Assessing
Officer that the Municipal Rateable Value (MRV) of the said property as per
Delhi Municipal Authority was Rs.22,230 only and, therefore, the higher of the
two had to be taken into consideration while computing the annual letting value
u/s.23(1)(b). The Assessing Officer held that there was an interest-free
security deposit of Rs.370.60 lacs and the interest had to be considered while
arriving at the fair market value of the property. He further held that S.
23(1)(b) was not applicable to the facts of the case and only S. 23(1)(a) had to
be considered. Further, the Assessing Officer relied upon some property
newspaper and computed the annual rent at Rs.14.40 lacs. The CIT(A) upheld the
order.

 

The Tribunal held in the assessee’s favour. The Tribunal
noted as under :

1. Interest on security deposit :



The Assessing Officer cannot consider notional interest on
deposit while arriving at the fair market value u/s.23(1)(b) of the Act. The
judgment of the jurisdictional High Court in case of J. K. Investors (Bombay)
Ltd. (2001) 248 ITR 723/112 Taxman 107 has been approved by the Supreme Court.

 


2. Determination of ALV


(a) A reading of the order of the Tribunal in ITO v.
Makrupa Chemicals (P.) Ltd.,
(2007) 108 ITD 95 (Mum.) shows that the
standard rent is the upper limit. The property in question was situated in
Delhi and was indisputably covered under the Rent Control Act. Hence, the
standard rent had to be arrived at. Further, fair market value should be based
on the facts and circumstances of the case.

(b) The Assessing Officer had not made any attempt
whatsoever to decide the standard rent and, under these circumstances, the
municipal rateable value assumed significance. As the actual rent received was
more than municipal rateable value, the actual rent received should be taken
as municipal rateable value. In any event, as the Rent Control Act applied to
the property in question, only standard rent could be taken as the annual
letting value. In the absence of standard rent, municipal rateable value was
to be taken. As municipal rateable value was less than the actual rent, the
actual rent would be the fair market value of property. Therefore, the
assessee had rightly computed annual letting value of the said property
u/s.23(1)(b) by taking into consideration actual rent received.

 

 

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S. 28(iv) — Gifts received by social reformer and philosopher from followers could not be taxed u/s.28(iv).

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48 (2008) 22 SOT 197 (Mum.)

Nirmala P. Athavale v. ITO

ITA No. 1084 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 29-2-2008

S. 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Gifts received by a
social reformer and philosopher from followers in recognition of personal
qualities and noble thoughts could not be taxed u/s.28(iv).

 

The assessee, husband of the appellant, a well known social
reformer and philosopher and having lakhs of followers spread all over the
world, had established a movement called ‘Swadhyaya’ for the upliftment of the
masses. The assessee had devoted his whole life to the cause of this movement
and had never charged any fee or remuneration from his followers or the persons
who attended his lectures at any point of time. During the relevant previous
year, the assessee had received voluntary gifts of certain sum on his 80th
birthday from his admirers and well-wishers in recognition of his personal
qualities and noble thoughts and claimed the same to be exempt from taxation.
The Assessing Officer held that conducting spiritual discourses amounted to a
vocation and, hence, the provisions of S. 28(iv) were squarely applicable to the
instant case. The Assessing Officer, therefore, treated the amount of gifts
received by the assessee as his income from profession and brought the same to
tax. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer.

 

The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) The work done by the assessee was a mass movement or
campaign and not a vocation. Even if it was treated as vocation, then having
regard to the fact that the assessee had never charged any fee or remuneration
for his imparting of knowledge and practising of values based on ‘Shrimad
Bhagawat Gita’ and also the fact that the assessee did not have any vested
right to receive any kind of payment for these activities from his
disciples/followers, the gift made by the followers, without being under any
contractual or legal or customary obligations to do so, could not be treated
as a consideration arising out of carrying on of vocation.

(b) In Helios Food Improvers (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
(2007) 14 SOT 546 (Mum.) the Tribunal has held that the provisions of S.
28(iv) can be applied in a number of situations, but the bottomline or crucial
fact would always be circumvention of income by taking or receiving income in
other forms. Since, in the instant case, there was no intention of
circumvention of income on the part of the assessee or receiving income in
other forms, provisions of S. 28(iv) could not be applied.

(c) Further, the term ‘perquisite’ as per dictionary
meaning means ‘privilege or benefit given in addition to one’s salary or
regular wages’, which means that it is an additional benefit and not a
complete substitution of one’s income. The assessee had never charged any
consideration from his followers or persons who attended his lectures. Hence,
it could not be termed as ‘benefit’ or ‘perquisite’ within the meaning of S.
28(iv).


 

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(a) S. 69 — Investments not recorded in books of account are covered. 695 (b) S. 28(iv) — Condition that chargeable income should arise from business — Purchase of investment, at lower value not covered

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47 (2008) 22 SOT 174 (Mum.)

Rupee Finance & Management (P.) Ltd. v.
ACIT

ITA Nos. 3264 (Mum.) of 2006 and

2300 & 2881 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2003-04. Dated 05.02.2007




(a) S. 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — U/s.69, only
such investments are covered, which are not recorded in books of account.


(b) S. 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — The
condition for invoking S. 28(iv) is that the chargeable income should arise
from the business/profession — Purchase, by way of an investment, at a lower
value is not covered.


 


Pursuant to an MOU between the assessee-company and the group
of promoters, shares of two group companies were transferred to the assessee at
cost. The Assessing Officer, applying S. 69, made an addition on account of the
difference between the market value and purchase price of the shares. The CIT(A)
held that the benefits derived by the assessee were clearly chargeable to tax
u/s.28(iv) and, accordingly, upheld the addition.

 

The Tribunal held that addition u/s.69 was not sustainable
and there was no income u/s.28(iv). The Tribunal noted as under :

1. S. 69 :


(a) It was not disputed that the investments purchased were
recorded in the books of account.

(b) U/s.69, only such value of the investments may be
deemed to be the income of the assessee for the financial year, if they are
not recorded in the books of account. Thus, S. 69 was not applicable to the
instant case.

(c) The first Appellate Authority possibly realising this
difficulty had chosen to invoke S. 28(iv) and not to give a decisive finding
as to whether S. 69 was applicable or not.

(d) There was no allegation or evidence from the Revenue
that the apparent consideration was not the real consideration. The only
grouse of the Revenue authorities was that the assessee-company had purchased
the shares at a price which was much lesser that the market price.

(e) On these facts, therefore, no addition would be
sustained u/s.69.

 

2. S. 28(iv) :


(a) The condition for invoking S. 28(iv) is that the
chargeable income of the assessee should arise from the business or in the
exercise of profession. There must be a nexus between the business of the
assessee and the benefit the assessee derived.

(b) In the instant case the assessee purchased certain
shares at a certain price and was required to hold these shares for a period
of three years. It was not in dispute that this was an investment made by the
assessee. Hence, irrespective of the fact as to whether these investments were
made in pursuance of the MOU or not, such investments could not be said to be
a benefit arising out of the business of the assessee.

(c) The effect of this Section has been explained by the
CBDT, from which it is clear that when an assessee purchases goods or assets
at a price lower than the market price, under whatever circumstances, the same
cannot be brought to tax u/s.28(iv).

(d) Only if the seller had incurred an expense or a
liability or had provided a facility to the purchaser, then the value in cash
of such expenses or benefit or perquisite shall be treated as income. In the
instant case, the seller had not incurred any expenses or liability, nor had
provided a facility. It sold its shares at a reduced price.

(e) Therefore, the purchase of shares at a particular price
which was below the market price as an investment was not income by any
stretch of imagination. It could not also be deemed as income u/s.28(iv), as
it was neither benefit or perquisite that had arisen to the assessee from the
business or in the exercise of a profession.


 

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Service tax levy on goods transport by road services — Circular No. 104/07/2008-ST, dated 6-8-2008.

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TAXES


Service tax

68 Service tax levy on goods transport by
road services — Circular No. 104/07/2008-ST, dated 6-8-2008.

Certain clarifications have been provided by this Circular as
under :


  • Abatement of 75% would be available to the consolidated amount mentioned in
    the invoice which includes various intermediary and auxiliary services
    provided by GTA and included in the invoice, since these services are not
    provided as independent activities but are the means for successful provision
    of the principal service, namely, the transportation of goods by road.


  • Where service is provided by a person who is registered as GTA service
    provider and issues consignment note for transportation of goods by road in a
    goods carriage and the amount charged for the service provided is inclusive of
    packing, then the service shall be treated as GTA service and not cargo
    handling service.


  • In case of time-sensitive transportation of goods by road carriage, if the
    entire transportation is done by road and the person transporting the goods
    issues a consignment note, then the service would be GTA service and not
    courier services.



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Certain services in connection with sports activities notified u/s.194J : Notification No. 88/2008, dated 21-8-2008 being rendered by the following persons.

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67 Certain services in connection with
sports activities notified u/s.194J : Notification No. 88/2008, dated 21-8-2008
being rendered by the following persons.

The CBDT has notified the following services in relation to
sports activities as ‘Professional Services’ for deduction of tax at source
u/s.194J of the Act  :



  • Sports persons,



  • Umpires and referees,



  • Coaches and trainers,



  • Team physicians and physiotherapists,



  • Event managers,



  • Commentators,



  • Anchors, and

  • Sports columnists.


 


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Certain clarifications have been issued by RBI to all the banks in connection with TDS on 8% Savings (Taxable) Bonds, 2003 : RBI/2008-2009/121 — Ref. DGBA.CDD. No. H — 1311/13.01.299/2008-09, dated 5-8-2008.

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66 Certain clarifications have been issued
by RBI to all the banks in connection with TDS on 8% Savings (Taxable) Bonds,
2003 : RBI/2008-2009/121 — Ref. DGBA.CDD. No. H — 1311/13.01.299/2008-09, dated
5-8-2008.

While referring to the earlier Circular issued by RBI —
DGBA.CDD No. H-3024/13.01.299/2007-08, dated September 19, 2007, RBI has issued
further clarifications on deduction of tax at source on the subject matter based
on clarifications received from the CBDT. The important clarifications in this
matter are as under :



  • The date from which TDS needs to be deducted is 1-6-2007. Accordingly,
    irrespective of the date of investment, if interest is credited to the account
    of any investor after 1-6-2007, TDS needs to be deducted.



  • Forms 15H and 15G (exemption from TDS) need to be accepted if the conditions
    mentioned for the said forms are satisfied.



  • In case of cumulative schemes of investment of bonds, TDS would be deducted as
    and when the interest is credited, irrespective of the fact that the payment
    is made at the end of the tenure of the bonds.



  • Lower deduction/NIL deduction certificate from the tax authorities is required
    in case of charitable institutions, for exemption from deduction of tax at
    source from interest eligible by such institutions.


 


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Clarification issued by CBDT in connection with TDS on service tax u/s.194J of the Act : Letter F.No./275/3/2007-IT(B), dated 30-6-2008.

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65 Clarification issued by CBDT in
connection with TDS on service tax u/s.194J of the Act : Letter F.No./275/3/2007-IT(B),
dated 30-6-2008.

The Board had earlier clarified vide Dir.Tax/761, dated
5-5-2008 that TDS would not be applicable on Service tax element of rental
income u/s.194I of the Act. In this Notification it has been clarified that
u/s.194I, what has been covered is rental income, whereas u/s.194J, what is
covered is any sum paid as professional or technical fees. Hence, for the
purpose of S. 194J, TDS needs to be deducted on the total amount including
Service tax element.

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Relaxation in the rules for mention of PAN in the TDS returns : Internal instructions.

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64 Relaxation in the rules for mention of
PAN in the TDS returns : Internal instructions.

As per the recent Circulars of CBDT, threshold limits were
laid for mentioning of PAN of deductees in the TDS return. However, due to
practical difficulties faced by the assessees, these norms have been relaxed.
Now, if the payment has been made for the total amount of TDS and the
information is available of few deductees, then return can be filed with the PAN
of those deductees. Consequently, the cor-rection return can be filed after
obtaining the PAN of the remaining deductees. Care needs to be taken that the
amount paid as TDS needs to tie up with the total amount mentioned in both the
TDS returns.

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Scrutiny of Tax Audit Report during assessment proceedings : Instruction No. 9/2008, dated 31-7-2008 (reproduced below)

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63 Scrutiny of Tax Audit Report during
assessment proceedings : Instruction No. 9/2008, dated 31-7-2008 (reproduced
below)

Kindly refer to the above.

 

2. C&AG and carried out a systems review of Third Party
certification under the Income-tax Act. This has brought out that in many cases
the information available in the tax audit reports is not being properly
analysed during assessment proceedings, thereby defeating the very purpose of
providing for audit of accounts in the Income-tax Act i.e., to ensure
that correct deductions are claimed by the assessee. It is, therefore,
reiterated that the tax audit reports as well as other statutory audit reports
should be critically examined along with connected records and other available
evidence, and the information as available in these reports should be
effectively utilised while finalising the assessment of cases selected under
scrutiny. In case of e-filed returns as well as annexure-less returns, tax audit
reports and other statutory audit reports should be requisitioned and thoroughly
examined during the assessment proceedings in cases under scrutiny.

 

3. With effect from 10th August 2006, the ‘Accountants’ are
required to indicate in Form 3CD as to whether a certificate has been obtained
from the respective assessees regarding payment relating to any
expenditure/taking or accepting of loans or deposits or repayment of the same
through account-payee cheque/bank draft (refer points 17(h) and 24(c) of Form
No. 3CD).

 

4. Instead of simply relying on the said certificates given
by the assessees, the assessing officers should undertake a test-check of such
transactions while completing the assessments under scrutiny. Results of such
test-check should also be kept on record. In case, any violation is noticed,
follow-up action as per the Income-tax Act including invoking of penal
provisions should be taken.

 

5. In cases where any factual misrepresentation by the
Accountants is observed, suitable action should be taken against them as
provided u/s.288 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

This may be brought to the notice of all concerned for strict
compliance.

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Norms relaxed for the corporate tax returns : Internal instructions.

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62 Norms relaxed for the corporate tax
returns : Internal instructions.




  •  Scrutiny not to be undertaken for top 1000 companies, provided no disputes are
    pending against them.



  • If the Tax Department has not raised a demand for more than 10 lakhs over and
    above the taxes paid by the companies, then those companies’ cases would not
    be picked up for scrutiny.



  • In case the capital infused in the company is more than 50 lakhs, then the
    case may be picked up for scrutiny.



  • In case the company has filed for any tax exemption viz. S. 10A, S.
    80IC etc., then the return may be picked up for scrutiny.


 


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S. 48 r.w. S. 147 — Capital gain to be taxed on basis of provisions of S. 48 and not on basis of fair market value as determined by valuation officer — assessment on the basis of DVO report not permissible.

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46 (2008) 22 SOT 156 (Delhi)

Tej Pratap Singh v. ACIT

ITA No. 4601 (Del.) of 2004

A.Y. 1999-2000. Dated : 31-12-2007

S. 48 read with S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital
gain is to be computed and taxed on the basis of provisions contained u/s.48 and
it cannot be computed on the basis of fair market value of asset as determined
by Valuation Officer. Therefore, assessment cannot be reopened for taxing
capital gain in respect of an asset on basis of market value of asset as
estimated by DVO.

 

The return filed by the assessee was processed u/s.143(1)(a)
by the Assessing Officer. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer reopened the said
assessment of the assessee for the reason that the valuation of the land was
estimated by the DVO at Rs.2,73,281 as against Rs.50,000 shown by the assessee
and, thus, the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the A.Y.
1999-2000.

 

The Assessing Officer completed the reassessment proceedings
by calculating capital gains based on the fair market value as determined by the
DVO. The CIT(A) confirmed the computation done by the Assessing Officer.

 

The Tribunal ruled in the assessee’s favour. The Tribunal
noted as under :

(a) A perusal of the reasons recorded for the reopening
indicates that the belief of the Assessing Officer regarding escapement of the
income of the assessee is based only on the opinion of
the Valuation Officer. It is also found that before making reference no
material was examined by him. He did not see any other material except the
valuation report. Thus, it is clear that the Assessing Officer has not made
any judicial application of mind for reopening the assessment. He made no
enquiry from the assessee or from any other source, nor examined the books of
account of the assessee before doing so.

(b) In view of the above facts, the reference made to the
Valuation Officer was itself illegal and consequently non est. When the
reference itself is illegal and non est in law, the report submitted in such
reference, consequently, cannot be relied upon to initiate reassessment
proceedings. It was so held by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of
Brig. B. Lall v. ITO,
(1981) 127 ITR 308. In the case of Bhagwandas
Jain v. Dy. CIT,
(2000) 246 ITR 632, the M.P. High Court, after following
the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Brig. B. Lall (supra),
held that reopening of the assessment on the basis of valuation report is not
valid.

(c) On examination of S. 48, it is clear that the capital
gain is to be computed by deducting from the ‘full value’ of the consideration
received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset the cost
of acquisition and expenditure incurred in connection with the transfer. The
expression ‘full value of the consideration’ does not mean ‘market value’ or
‘fair market value’ of the asset transferred. Hence, capital gain tax cannot
be computed and levied with reference to the market value determined on the
basis of valuation report.

(d) The Delhi Bench of the ITAT in the case of Ashok
Soni v. ITO,
(2006) 10 SOT 39 (URO), after following the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the cases of K. P. Verghese v. ITO, (1981) 131 ITR 597
and CIT v. George Henderson & Co. Ltd., (1967) 66 ITR 622 (SC) and
various other authorities, has observed as under :

“In the absence of any material with the Assessing Officer
to show that the assessee has received more amount than the consideration
shown in the concerned document, the action of the Assessing Officer in
substituting the full value of consideration by the fair market value as
stated by the Departmental Valuation Officer in his report for computation of
capital gains was not valid.”

(e) The valuation report is an expert opinion at the most.
In relation to the transaction of transfer such report cannot be treated to be
proof of the fact that there is some underhand dealing and consideration has
passed more than what is disclosed.

 

 

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S. 54 — Where several flats in same building and contiguous with each other, treated as one house for purposes of S. 54.

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45 (2008) 22 SOT 58 (Hyd.)

Prabhandam Prakash v. ITO

ITA No. 147 (Hyd.) of 2007

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 25-1-2008

S. 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Where several flats are
purchased in same building and are contiguous with each other, they would be
treated as one house and not several houses for purposes of S. 54.

 

For the relevant A.Y., the assessee claimed exemption
u/s.54/54F in respect of investment in 3 adjoining flats on the same floor and
one flat on another floor. Two of these flats were occupied by the assessee and
the other two flats were let out.

 

The Assessing Officer denied the exemption on the ground that
all the flats were independent, having separate kitchens and with no
inter-connection. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

 

The Tribunal allowed the exemption to the assessee in respect
of the 2 flats occupied by him after considering the decisions in the following
cases :

(a) Shiv Narain Chaudhari v. CWT, (1977) 108 ITR 104
(All.)

(b) B. B. Sarkar v. CIT, (1981) 132 ITR 150 (Cal.)/7
Taxman 239

(c) K. G. Vyas v. Seventh ITO, (1986) 16 ITD 195 (Bom.)

(d) CIT v. Kodandas Chanchlomal, (1985) 155 ITR
273/23 Taxman 579

(e) D. Anand Basappa v. ITO, (2004) 91 ITD 53
(Bang.)

(f) Smt. Hansa Bai Sanghi v. ITO, (2004) 89 ITD 239
(Bang.)

 


The Tribunal noted as under :

1. Where several flats are purchased in the same building
and are contiguous to each other, they would be treated as one house and not
as several houses. Whether one or more municipal numbers are given is of no
consequence. The purpose is to see whether the assessee and his family are
using those several dwelling units for their residence or not.

2. However, where the assessee, after acquiring the new
property has not put it to use for his own residence but has let it out, it
means that it was not meant for immediate residence. In the present case, out
of the four flats acquired, two flats on the first floor were occupied by the
assessee and the remaining two were let out. Therefore, respectfully following
the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kodandas Chanchlomal (supra),
we hold that the assessee be given pro rata exemption in respect of the
two flats occupied by him.


 

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S. 195 — Interest payable for failure to deduct tax at source only on sum not paid and not on sum deductible

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44 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 317 (Bang.)

Mrs. Meena S. Patil v. ACIT (Intl. Taxation)

ITA No. 224 (Bang.) of 2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Dated : 29-3-2007

S. 195, S. 201(1A) — Assessee purchased immovable property
from a non-resident — Failure to deduct tax u/s.195 — Sum deductible calculated
at rates in force much higher than tax actually payable by seller according to
assessment order — Interest payable for failure to deduct tax at source only on
sum not paid and not on sum deductible.

 

Facts :

The assessee purchased immovable property in Bangalore,
paying a sum of Rs.25,00,000 on March 05, 2001 and the balance sale
consideration of Rs.75,00,000 at the time of registration of the sale deed,
i.e.,
October 23, 2001, but failed to deduct TDS on such payments made. The
seller paid an advance tax of Rs.4,25,126 and filed a return on July 18, 2002,
in which long-term capital gains of Rs.16,80,782 were disclosed in respect of
the property purchased by the assessee. The seller filed a revised return on
March 23, 2003, declaring an income of Rs.62,28,370 and also paid interest
u/s.234B and u/s.234C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The total amount paid was
Rs.10,30,674. The assessee received an order S. 201(1A), by which liability of
interest of Rs.75,560 was imposed. The assessee filed an appeal and the
Commissioner (Appeals) by order dated March 31, 2004, cancelled the order
u/s.201(1A). The Assessing Officer passed a fresh order u/s.201(1A) on October
20, 2004, by which a demand of Rs.4,78,640 of interest up to October 31, 2004
was raised. The assessee filed an appeal against this order which was dismissed
by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal to the ITAT, the Tribunal held the following on
various grounds of appeal :

Ground no. 1 :

As per the assessee, the AO was not competent to pass an
order u/s.201(1A) in October, 2004, especially when the earlier order was
cancelled by CIT(A) vide order in March, 2004.

 

While placing reliance on Ashok & Co. v. CIT, (1992)
195 ITR 786 (Karn.) and VLS Finance Ltd. v. CIT, (2007) 289 ITR 286
(Del.), it was held that CIT(A), by order dated 31st March 2004, cancelled the
order as according to him the principles of natural justice were not followed
and it was unnecessary to mention that the order may be remanded. Thus, the AO
was competent to pass a fresh order.

 

Ground no. 2 :

The applicability of S. 195 — Held that the agreement of sale
of the property clearly mentioned that the sellers were non-resident as the
address mentioned in the agreement showed that they were residing abroad. There
was no evidence to suggest that the assessee was in a belief that the sellers
were residents. Hence, the assessee was liable to deduct tax u/s.195.

 

Ground no. 3 :

Period for which interest u/s.201(1A) is to be levied and the
amount on which it has to be levied — Held that interest u/s.201(1A) can be
charged only up to the date of payment of tax by payee. Further, the total tax
payable by seller was Rs.12,74,629 of which Rs.4,25,126 was paid in advance, and
hence the tax payable was only 8,49,503. However, the total tax deductible at
the rates in force was 19,38,000.

 

Held that when the Revenue was not paying any interest to the
deductee on the amount so deductible by charging interest from the deductor,
then it was not justifiable to charge interest from the deductor. Interest was
chargeable on the amount of tax actually paid. The wording in S. 201(1A) is that
interest to be charged on such tax which was not paid. Accordingly interest
u/s.201(1A) was chargeable on the sum of Rs.8,49,503 from the date on which the
tax was deductible.

 

Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Adidas India Marketing Pvt. Ltd., (2007)
288 ITR 379 (Delhi) and many others.


 

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II. Travelling expenses incurred by non-employees allowable if for business. 691 IV. Sponsorship, prize money revenue expenditure for business purposes. 691 VI. Repairs of building owned by assessee used by directors for residence, allowable expenditu

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43 (2008) 112 ITD 57 (Kol.) (SB)

JCIT, Special Range 16 Kolkata v. ITC Ltd.

A.Y. 1997-98. Dated : 7-9-2007

 

In the reported case the Tribunal has considered various
grounds which have been described in the case as fact-I, fact-II and so on. Out
of XI grounds, the following grounds appear to be more relevant and important.

 

Fact-II :

Travelling expenses incurred even by non-employees is
allowable if it is for the business.

 

The assessee-company claimed deduction of Rs.40.91 crores
towards travelling expenditure, out of which Rs.58.30 lakhs was incurred in
connection with travelling of auditors, retainers, consultants, etc. The company
disallowed on its own Rs.8.92 lakhs under Rule 6D. The AO disallowed balance
Rs.49.38 lakhs, as it had not been incurred by the employees or executives of
the company. He further disallowed 1% of the claim of Rs.33.72 lakhs over and
above the said disallowance on account of possibility of personal and pleasure
trips. The CIT(A) deleted the addition. On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT upheld the
order of CIT(A) on the following grounds :

(1) The assessee had various factories, godowns, stock
points apart from branches and offices at various locations.

(2) The travelling expenditure was very much incurred for
the business.

(3) It is immaterial whether it is incurred by the employee
or non-employee.

(4) The AO had nowhere brought on record that the
expenditure was not incurred for the business.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) ACIT v. Perfect Project Ltd., (2002) 253 ITR 16
(AT) Calcutta Bench

(ii) Sayaji Iron & Engg. Co. v. CIT, (2002) 253 ITR
749 (Guj.)

(iii) Dinesh Mills Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 254 ITR 673
and a few more.

 


Fact-IV :

Expenditure for sponsorship, prize money, etc. is revenue
expenditure for the purposes of business.

 

Payments made to clubs by the assessee included expenditure
for sponsorship, prize money, etc. The AO disallowed the same, observing that
the same was not incidental to the business. The CIT(A) deleted the addition by
following the earlier appellate order for A.Y. 1994-95. On Departmental appeal,
the ITAT upheld the order of CIT(A) and allowed the expenditure on the following
grounds :

(1) The assessee submitted proper details in respect of the
expenditure which was incurred by it for sponsorship of events.

(2) Nowadays it is very common to sponsor some sports or
events to advertise the products of the company or for the company’s corporate
image.

(3) The AO has not given any congent reason for disallowing
the expenditure.

(4) The said expenditure is very much revenue expenditure
for the purposes of business.

 


Case referred to :



(i) CIT v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co., (1999)
240 ITR 9 (Delhi).

 


Fact-VI :

Repairs to the building owned by the assessee-company used by
its directors for residence is an allowable expenditure. Secondly, expenditure
on reinstallation of machinery from one factory to another factory is not
capital expenditure.

 


(A) The assessee-company incurred expenditure on repairs to
buildings, which included repairs to company flats. The said flats were
exclusively used by the directors and the higher executives of the company.
The AO disallowed 25% of such claim on the ground that the personal element in
the expenditure could not be ruled out.

(B) The assessee-company also incurred expenditure on
repairs to machinery, which included expenditure on reinstallation of Loga
machine at Bangalore factory. The said machine was brought from company’s
Saharanpur factory. The AO disallowed the same as it was a capital
expenditure. The CIT(A) deleted both the additions. On Revenue’s appeal, the
ITAT upheld the CIT(A)’s order and referred to the following :


(A) (1) The flats were owned by the assessee company
and were utilised by the assessee-company’s directors and executives.

(2) Hence, the expenditure incurred on maintenance
cannot be said to be personal nature just because the flats are occupied
by the directors for their residence.

(3) The expenditure incurred by the company for
personal benefit of directors cannot be considered as personal expenditure
of assessee company, since the assessee and the employees are two
different entities.

 




Regarding the installation expenditure of machinery it held
that :



(B) (1) The machinery from Saharanpur has been shifted
to Bangalore unit for its effective utilisation.

(2) This has not resulted into any addition to the
assets of the assessee-company and hence it cannot be considered as
capital expenditure.

 




Cases referred to :



(i) Sitapur Sugar Works Ltd. v. CIT, (1963) 49 ITR
160

(ii) Otis Elavators Co. (India) Ltd. v. CIT, (1992)
195 ITR 682

 


Fact-IX :

S. 36(1)(iii) – The interest on borrowed funds is an allowable expenditure if the assessee has sufficient own funds to justify interest-free advances to sister concerns.

The assessee borrowed money and claimed deduction of interest paid thereon. The assessee had also made interest-free advances to its subsidiaries. The AO disallowed the interest by calculating notional interest @ 18% p.a. on loans to subsidiaries, observing that interest-free advances were made to subsidiaries out of borrowed funds. The CIT(A) deleted the addition. On Departmental appeal, the ITAT upheld the order of CIT(A) and allowed the interest on the following grounds:

  • The AO has not made a case that these advances were not made in the course of business for commercial expediency and for the purpose of business.
  • The assessee is making such interest-free advances to its sister concerns since long, during the regular course of business.
  • The assessee has shown substantial profit to justify the claim of the assessee to have made advances out of own fund.


Cases referred to:
CIT v. Britannia Industries Ltd., (2006) 280 ITR 525 and a few more.

Amendments to Export of Service Rules, 2005 —Notification No. 25/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Amendments to Export of Service Rules, 2005 —Notification
    No. 25/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

Definition of ‘India’ in Explanation to Rule 3 has been
amended to include the installations, structures and vessels in the
continental shelf of India and the exclusive economic zone of India.

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Exemption to management, maintenance or repair of roads services w.r.t. sub-clause (zzg) of clause (105) of S. 65 — Notification No. 24/2009 — Service Tax, dated 27-7-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

 Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Exemption to management, maintenance or repair of roads
    services w.r.t. sub-clause (zzg) of clause (105) of S. 65 — Notification No.
    24/2009 — Service Tax, dated 27-7-2009.

Services in relation to management, maintenance or repairs
of roads have been exempted from Service Tax.

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Service Tax not applicable on commission paid to Managing Director/Director : Circular No. 115/08/2009-ST, dated 31-7-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

 Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Circulars

  1. Service Tax not applicable on commission paid to Managing
    Director/Director : Circular No. 115/08/2009-ST, dated 31-7-2009.

It is clarified that remunerations paid to Managing
Director/Directors of companies, whether whole-time or independent, when being
compensated for their performance as Managing Director/Directors would not be
liable to Service Tax.

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Instruction No. 1829, dated 21st September 1989 laying down guidelines for determining taxability of non-residents from execution of power projects on a turnkey basis stand withdrawn — Instruction No. 5, dated 20-7-2009 (reproduced).

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79. 


Instruction No. 1829, dated 21st September 1989 laying down guidelines for
determining taxability of non-residents from execution of power projects on a
turnkey basis stand withdrawn — Instruction No. 5, dated 20-7-2009 (reproduced).


Instruction No 1829, dated 21-9-1989 (hereinafter called ‘the instruction’)
issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes deals with the taxability of income
arising to non-residents from the execution of power projects on turnkey basis
involving activities to be carried out in India as well as outside India. The
Instruction analyses a hypothetical situation and taxability thereof. The
Instruction lays down the basis of taxation with regard to the four activities
listed therein. With regard to the activity relating to profits from sale of
equipments and materials on FOB basis, delivered at port outside India, where
the payments are also made outside India, it instructs that on the given facts
no part of the income will be deemed to accrue or arise in India.


2. This Instruction was issued in 1989 with regard to execution of power
projects on turnkey basis with certain specified features. Further, the
Instruction quite clearly covers a specific situation in which there is actually
a consortium of foreign companies.


3. In practice, however, the assessees rely on the Instruction for not only the
power projects but other projects as well. Further, a single project is split
into various components like offshore supply of equipments/services, onshore
supply equipments and onshore services. Sometimes, the contract is split even
when only one contractor/supplier bid for the project. In such cases the
contract is split into various components to be executed by the bidder and its
associate concerns. Thus consortium of foreign companies is not in existence,
but is created to take advantage of the Instruction. This is not the same case
as ‘consortium of foreign companies’ envisaged in the Instruction.


4. It is also noticed that most of the profit is loaded in the offshore supply
and the payments for the Indian portion of the contracts barely meet the
expenses resulting into either losses in India or very low profit. The Assessing
Officer’s attempt to apportion profit correctly into various components of the
overall project on the basis of functions, risks and assets is often resisted by
the assessee taking recourse to the Instruction. Further, even if it is proved
that a part of the operations relating to supplies have taken place in India or
the permanent establishment of the assessee had a role in offshore supply, the
profit from offshore supply is claimed to be exempt under the Instruction.


5. Thus the Instruction which was originally intended for only a particular type
of turnkey power project, for a given situation, is being relied upon by
assessees in all cases, in all situations, to align their business operation in
a manner to avoid payment of taxes in India, This was never the purpose of
issuance of this Instruction. Accordingly, the Central Board of Direct Taxes
hereby withdraws the Instruction No. 1829, dated 21-9-1989 with immediate
effect.


6. It is clarified that the withdrawal of Instruction will not in any way
prejudice the plea of the Income-tax Department, in any appeal, reference or
petition, that the Instruction No. 1829 does not apply to a particular case on
the given facts even though it was in force at the time of making the
assessment.


7. This may be brought to the knowledge of all officers within your region.

 

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Social Security Agreement signed with Belgium effective from 1-9-2009

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Spotlight – Part D

Part D :
Miscellaneous





  1. Social Security Agreement signed with Belgium effective
    from 1-9-2009
    .


The Government of India had signed a Social Security
Agreement (‘SSA’) with the Government of Belgium on 3 November 2006 to avoid
the hardship of double payment of the social security contribution by
employees and employers in India and Belgium having cross-border operations in
both countries.

It has now been announced that the SSA shall come into
effect from 1st September 2009. Further, the Government has issued a handbook
and FAQs clarifying a few terms/aspects of the SSA.

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S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 29 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 — Rule 29 of ITAT Rules permits Tribunal to admit additional evidence for any substantial cause and for said purpose there is no requirement therein th

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66 (2010) 37 SOT 202 (Chennai) (TM)

Mascon Global Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 26-8-2009

S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 29 of the
Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 — Rule 29 of ITAT Rules permits
Tribunal to admit additional evidence for any substantial cause and for said
purpose there is no requirement therein that there should be a formal written
application before Tribunal for admission of additional evidence.

On appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee filed some additional
evidence in support of its claim. Although the Accountant Member accepted the
additional evidence, the Judicial Member objected that there was no formal
application u/r.29 of the ITAT Rules for admission of additional evidence.

The Third Member held that on going through the rule, no
requirement was found therein that there should be a formal written application
before the Tribunal for admission of the additional evidence.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) These are rules of procedure and in a fit case and
depending on the circumstances it would be open to the Tribunal to admit
additional evidence when it is produced in the Court and an oral application
is made.

(2) Rule 29 permits the Tribunal to admit the additional
evidence for any substantial cause. The intention behind the rule is that
substantial justice should be done and the interest of justice should be the
overriding consideration.

(3) Therefore, there was no error in the Accountant Member admitting the
additional evidence.

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S. 69 read with S. 5(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — When assessee brings money into India through banking channel, onus on assessee u/s.69 stands discharged and S. 5(2)(b) does not apply.

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65 (2010) 37 SOT 146 (Chennai)

Smt. Sushila Ramasamy v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1995-96. Dated : 2-4-2009

S. 69 read with S. 5(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — When
assessee brings money into India through banking channel, onus on assessee
u/s.69 stands discharged and S. 5(2)(b) does not apply.

The assessee, a non-resident, had made substantial deposits
in non-resident accounts in Indian Bank. She filed her return of income showing
total income as NIL. The Assessing Officer passed assessment order and assessed
the aforesaid deposits as the income of the assessee u/s.69. On appeal, the
CIT(A) confirmed the Assessing Officer’s action.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee had brought the
money into India through banking channel, the onus on the assessee u/s.69 stood
discharged, and, therefore, it was not taxable in India u/s.5(2)(b). The CBDT
Circular No. 5 in F.No.73A/2(69)-IT(A-II), dated 20-2-1969 squarely supports the
case of the assessee.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) It is seen from Ss.(2) of S. 5 that a person, who is
a non-resident, has to pay tax only on that income which is either received
by him in India or is deemed to be received by him in India or accrues to
him in India or arises to him in India or is deemed to accrue to him in
India or is deemed to arise to him in India during the year. The words ‘in
India’ appearing in Ss.(2) of S. 5 are crucial. The principle underlying S.
5 makes the chargeability of income depend upon the ‘locality’ of accrual or
receipt.

(2) A non-resident person, having money in a foreign
country, could not be called upon to pay income-tax on that money in India
because in respect of that money it will not be possible for the Assessing
Officer to say that it was either received by him in India or it was deemed
to be received by him in India or it accrued to him in India or it arose to

him in India or it was deemed to accrue to him in India or it was deemed to
arise to him in India.

(3) If a non-resident person, having money in a foreign
country, brings that money to India, through a banking channel, he cannot be
called upon to pay income-tax on that money in India, firstly for the
reasons stated above and secondly because the remittance of money into India
through banking channel will make the onus on the assessee u/s.69
discharged.

(4) If certain income, profits or gains was ‘received’ by
the assessee outside India, it does not become chargeable to income-tax in
India by reason of that money having been brought into India. This is
because what is chargeable is the first ‘receipt’ of the money and not a
subsequent dealing by the assessee with the said money. In that event, the
money is brought by the assessee as his own money which he had already
‘received’ and had control over it and it does not take the character of
income, profits and gains after being brought in India.

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S. 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If goodwill of business is damaged and later on some compensation is awarded in lieu of that, it would fall in category of loss to source of income and such receipt would be a capital receipt.

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64 (2010) 37 SOT 45 (Mum.)

Inter Gold (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 5-1-2010

S. 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If goodwill of business is
damaged and later on some compensation is awarded in lieu of that, it would fall
in category of loss to source of income and such receipt would be a capital
receipt.

The assessee was importing gold bars from Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS). In one consignment shipped by UBS there was excess supply of
some gold bars. The customs authorities seized the excess quantity and also took
legal action against the assessee-company. UBS accepted its mistake and admitted
the human error at their end. The appellate customs authority absolved and
acquitted the company. The company filed a suit against UBS in the High Court of
London. Finally, an out-of-court settlement was reached between UBS and the
company and UBS paid Rs.41.58 lacs as compensation against loss of reputation
and goodwill and Rs.14.46 lacs towards legal expenses, etc. The assessee offered
the sum of Rs.14.46 lacs for taxation voluntarily by including it in the
miscellaneous income and claimed the amount of Rs.41.58 lacs as capital receipt
not chargeable to tax in the computation of income. The Assessing Officer held
that the amount of Rs.41.58 lacs representing compensation received by the
assessee was a revenue receipt chargeable to tax. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld
the action of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, ruled in favour of the assessee :

(1) CIT v. A.R.J. Security Printers, (2003) 264 ITR
206/131 Taxman 297 (Delhi)

(2) Oberoi Hotel (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 236 ITR 903/103
Taxman 236 (SC)

(3) CIT v. Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn. Ltd., (1986) 161
ITR 386/27 Taxman 314 (SC)

(4) Rohitasava Chand v. CIT, (2008) 306 ITR 242/ 171
Taxman 147 (Delhi)

(5) Serum Institute of India v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 111 ITD
259 (Pune)

While treating the amount of Rs.41.58 lacs as a capital
receipt, the Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The word ‘income’ has to be understood in the generic
sense. If a receipt bears the traits of income as per the plain and natural
meaning, the same will still be included within the scope of S. 2(24) even
if there is no specific mention of such item in the definition clause.

(2) It is trite law that any receipt in the nature of
compensation, costs, damage, etc., by whatever name called, towards loss of
income is a revenue receipt. However, any receipt to compensate for the loss
of source of income is a capital receipt.

(3) Loss of source of income does not necessarily mean
that the source must be absolutely extinguished. If the source of income has
been severely beaten, thereby causing serious damage to the income-earning
apparatus itself, it will also be construed as the loss of source of income.

(4) As in this case, if goodwill of the business is
damaged and later on some compensation is awarded in lieu of that, it will
also fall in the same category of loss to the source of income and,
consequently, such a receipt will also qualify to be characterised as a
capital receipt.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia), S. 44AE. Provisions of S. 44AE will be applicable to a person who has entered into an agreement with truck owner, by virtue of which he became owner of the trucks for the period of contract and his accounts are not aud

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63 (2010) TIOL 420 ITAT (Bang.)

B. V. Prabhu v. ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 29-1-2010


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia), S. 44AE. Provisions of
S. 44AE will be applicable to a person who has entered into an agreement with
truck owner, by virtue of which he became owner of the trucks for the period of
contract and his accounts are not audited. Provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) will not
be applicable in respect of transport contract business when the income is
ascertained as per S. 44AE of the Act and accounts are not audited.

Facts :

The assessee obtained a contract from Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. (IOC) for transportation of LPG cylinders and in turn, such transportation
was being done through another contractor. The balance sheet filed alongwith the
return of income showed amount receivable from IOC and also showed the amount
payable to transport contractor. No profit and loss account was prepared. Fixed
percentage of gross receipts was considered by the assessee to be its income.
The assessee used to retain a percentage of amounts received by IOC and the
balance was paid to truck owners with whom the assessee was having agreements.
The payments were made without deduction of income-tax at source. Credit was
claimed in respect of income-tax deducted at source by IOC. Before the Assessing
Officer (AO), it was contended that the provisions of S. 44AE are applicable and
therefore the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) do not apply. The AO held that the
transport business of the assessee was a contract with IOC and a sub-contract
with the truck owners and therefore, in view of the proviso to S. 194C(2), the
assessee was required to deduct tax at source in respect of payments made to
sub-contractors. Since no tax was deducted at source, he disallowed the
expenditure of Rs.11,26,500 u/s. 40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where it contended that it merely acted on behalf of the truck owners and had
not entered into any sub-contract with the truck owners and also that it had not
debited the amount to profit and loss account and therefore the same cannot be
treated as expenditure to be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A) noted that
the assessee had entered into a contract with IOC and had entered into agreement
with truck owners wherein he was described as transporter and truck owner was
treated as contractors. He held that the payments made to truck owners
constituted sub-contract payments and hence the provisions of S. 194C(2) were
applicable. He also held that the assessee did not own trucks and therefore the
provisions of
S. 44AE are not applicable. He confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal on perusal of the agreement entered into by the
assessee with IOC noted that it mentioned that the contractor (the assessee) was
owner and operator of new/old capacity trucks and had undertaken to maintain the
trucks in good working order for the period of the contract, the agreement inter
alia provided that the contractor had to pay the entire operation cost of the
trucks which include and be deemed always to include the expenses enumerated in
the agreement and the agreement also provided that the contractor shall not be
entitled to assign, subrogate, subject or part with his right under the contract
or change the ownership of the trucks. The contractor (assessee) was also
prohibited from changing constitution of its firm without obtaining prior
written consent of the Corporation.

The Tribunal also noted that in order to comply with the
clauses of the agreement entered into by the assessee with IOC, the assessee had
entered into an MOU with a truck owner wherein the truck owner agreed to act as
a manager of the transport business of the assessee. This MOU also provided that
upon the expiry of the contract the truck will be resold by the assessee to Shri
Athaulla Khan (the truck owner). The assessee under this agreement was entitled
to retain 3% of the commission.

As regards the contention on behalf of the assessee that the
assessee was registered with IOC and the truck owner was not registered with IOC
and therefore the contract was taken for the benefit of the person owning the
truck, the Tribunal observed that this may be de facto relationship. However,
one has to consider the legal agreements between the assessee and the IOC and
also considering the MOU between the assessee and the truck owner and from such
agreements, one has to draw a conclusion that de jure relationship of the
assessee with IOC was in the form of a person who has been awarded the contract.
The assessee was required to abide by the conditions mentioned in the agreement.

The Tribunal held that as per the agreement with the truck
owner, the assessee became the owner of two trucks for the period of contract.
The original truck owner became a manager for the transport business of the
assessee. In respect of contract with IOC, the assessee was owner of two trucks.
Since there was no tax audit report in respect of transport contract business,
therefore the income was to be ascertained as per S. 44AE of the Act. Once
income has been ascertained as per provisions of S. 44AE of the Act, then
provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) will not be applicable.

The Tribunal also upheld the alternative contention on behalf
of the assessee viz. that the AO should have restricted the disallowance to
Rs.5,14,725 being the amount paid by the assessee to the truck owner. From the
gross amount due to the assessee from IOC, deductions were made by IOC towards
diesel and TDS. IOC made deduction towards diesel made available for plying the
truck. The amount deducted by IOC was not paid to the truck owner, but only the
net amount received from IOC was paid to the truck owner and hence the amount on
which tax was deductible at source was the net amount of Rs.5,14,725.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A. Hiving off of a unit which was in the form of a branch office into a subsidiary company does not cause conversion of an existing unit into a new unit so as to disentitle the claim of deduction u/s.10A.

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62 (2010) TIOL 395 ITAT (Bang.)

DCIT v. LG Soft India Pvt. Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2004-05 & 2005-06. Dated : 19-5-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A. Hiving off of a unit which was
in the form of a branch office into a subsidiary company does not cause
conversion of an existing unit into a new unit so as to disentitle the claim of
deduction u/s.10A.

Facts :

The assessee-company had claimed deduction u/s. 10A for both
the assessment years under appeal. The eligible undertaking which was earlier a
branch of a non-resident company/foreign company was hived off as a subsidiary
company. The Assessing Officer held that the new unit stated to be set up by the
assessee was made on reconstructing/splitting up of the existing unit and
pursuant to the provisions of S. 10A(2)(ii), the assessee is not entitled to
deduction u/s.10A. He also held that the plant and machinery in the new unit
have been installed by way of transfer. He denied the claim made by the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

As rightly pointed out by the CIT(A), the asses-see’s
undertaking existed in the same place, form and substance and did carry on the
same business before and after the change in the legal character of the form of
organisation. Formerly, it was a branch establishment of a non-resident
company/foreign company, but later on it was converted into a subsidiary
company. But for the above change of the organisational status, the same unit
continued to function throughout the time. Therefore, it is quite fruitless to
argue that the organisational change has caused conversion of the existing unit
to a new unit. There is no such splitting up or reconstruction of an existing
business in the case of a branch establishment becoming a subsidiary
establishment. The assessee’s unit satisfied all the conditions stipulated in
the Act and was entitled for the benefit. Therefore, as rightly held by the
CIT(A), a mere organisational change is not a ground to hold that the assessee
has violated the conditions stated in S. 10A(2)(ii). It is a case of only change
in the name and style. It is clearly possible to state that there was no
violation of the conditions laid down in S. 10A(2)(iii) as well.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(vii), S. 36(2) — If brokerage is offered to tax, a sharebroker is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w. S. 36(2) in respect of the amount which could not be recovered from its clients in respect of

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61 (2010) TIOL 390 ITAT Mum.-SB

DCIT v. Shreyas S. Morakhia

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 16-7-2010


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(vii), S. 36(2) — If brokerage
is offered to tax, a sharebroker is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts
u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w. S. 36(2) in respect of the amount which could not be
recovered from its clients in respect of transactions effected by him on behalf
of his client, apart from brokerage earned by him.

Facts :

During the assessment years under consideration the assessee
in its return of income claimed deduction of Rs.28,24,296 on account of amount
due to the assessee by his clients on account of transactions of shares effected
by him on their behalf. It was contended that the amount has become
irrecoverable and the same has been claimed as deduction after having written it
off from the books of account. Copies of ledger accounts were filed.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of the
assessee on the ground that there was no other evidence filed by the assessee
except copies of ledger account to show that any action was taken against the
concerned parties to recover the amounts due from them. He also noted that the
Bombay Stock Exchange Card held by the assessee was already sold by him and the
business in respect of which the debt in question had arisen had ceased to exist
in the year under consideration.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
noted that the assessee had carried on business as a sub-broker and there was
hardly any difference between the business of share-broker and sub-broker. He
held that the business of the assessee had not ceased to exist on transfer of
membership card but the same continued during the year under consideration. He
also held that failure on the part of assessee to initiate recovery proceedings
could not be a ground for denying the assessee’s claim for bad debt u/s.
36(1)(vii). Accordingly, he allowed the claim of the assessee for deduction on
account of bad debt.

Aggrieved, the Department preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. In view of the conflicting decisions on the subject, the following
question was sought to be referred by the Division Bench to the Special Bench.
The President constituted a Special Bench to consider the following question :

“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in
law, the assessee, who is a share-broker, is entitled to deduction by way of bad
debts u/s.36(1)(vii) read with S. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect
of the amount which could not be recovered from its clients in respect of
transactions effected by him on behalf of his client, apart from the commission
earned by him.”

Held :

The Special Bench having noted that in order to claim
deduction u/s.36(1)(vii), one of the conditions that is required to be satisfied
as laid down u/s.36(2)(i) is that the debt claimed to be deductible as bad or
part thereof has been taken into account in computing the income of the assessee
of the relevant previous year or of any earlier previous year, observed that the
fundamental question is whether the said condition is satisfied in case of
share-broker where only the brokerage income is credited to the P & L account
and not the value of purchase of shares made on behalf of the clients. The SB
noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of T. Veerabhadra Rao K. Koteshwar
Rao & Co. (155 ITTR 152), in the context of loan given on interest, has held
that the debt was taken into account in computing the income of the assessee
when the interest income accruing thereon was taxed in the hands of the assessee.
It noted that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that in order to satisfy
the condition stipulated in S. 36(2)(i), it is not necessary that the entire
amount of debt has to be taken into account in computing the income of the
assessee and it will be sufficient even if part of such debt is taken into
account in computing the income of the assessee. Applying this principle to the
share-broker, it was held that the amount receivable by the assessee on account
of brokerage is thus a part of debt receivable by the share-broker from his
clients against purchase of shares and once such brokerage is credited to P & L
account of the broker and the same is taken into account in computing his
income, the condition stipulated in S. 36(2)(i) gets satisfied.

The argument that the loss was suffered owing to breach of
SEBI guidelines framed to safeguard the interest of brokers the SB held that
when a share-broker has actually suffered a loss, whether such loss is suffered
by assessee as a result of not following the guidelines or even after following
such guidelines, is not going to change the fact that assessee has suffered such
loss. If the assessee broker has not followed such guidelines in a particular
case, it is a decision taken by him as a businessman taking into consideration
all the relevant facts and circumstances including his business relations with
the concerned clients. Even if it is assumed that such loss has been incurred by
the assessee as a result of not following the rules and regulations and
guidelines issued by the SEBI, the same cannot be equated to expenditure
incurred by the assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is
prohibited by law.

The contention of the Revenue that the sale value of shares
remaining with the assessee should be adjusted against the amount receivable
from the client so as to arrive at the actual amount of bad debt should be
raised, if permissible, before the Division Bench.

The Special Bench held that the assessee, who is a
share-broker, is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts u/s.36(1)(vii) r.w.
S. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the amount which could not be
recovered from its clients in respect of transactions effected by him on behalf
of his client, apart from the commission earned by him.

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