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Ramakrishna Vedanta Math v. Income Tax Officer In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata ‘C’ Bench, Kolkata Before Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and Mahavir Singh ( J. M. ) I.T.A. No.: 477,478 and 479/Kol/2012 Assessment year: 2005-06, 2006-07, 2008-09. Decided on July 31 , 2012 C ounsel for Assessee/Revenue : Miraj D Shah/ Amitava Ray

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Section 201(1) and 201(1A) r.w.s. 194C – Default
in recovery and payment of TDS – Appellant treated as Assessee in
default for failure to deduct tax at source u/s 194C – Whether the
appellant is justified in its contention that if the recipient has paid
taxes then no action against it under the provisions be taken – Held,
yes.

Facts:
The issue before the tribunal was whether a
demand under section 201(1) and section 201(1A) r.w.s. 194C can be
enforced even in a situation in which, the recipient of income embedded
in the payments has paid due taxes thereon, and, if not, who has the
onus to demonstrate that status about payment of such taxes.

During
the relevant period, the assessee had made several payments, in respect
of book binding charges, printing charges, advertisement and publicity
and bus hire charges etc, but had not deducted tax at source from the
payments made. According to the assessee the recipients have paid tax on
income embedded in those payments, and in the light of Supreme Court’s
decision in the case of Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v CIT
(293 ITR 226), the taxes cannot once again be recovered from the
assessee. This contention was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that the assessee was not able to prove that taxes on income
embedded in those payments have been duly been paid by the recipients.
Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any
success.

Held:
The tribunal referred to the
observations of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jagran Prakashan
Ltd. v DCIT [ (2012) 21 taxmann.com 489 All], viz. that “tax deductor
cannot be treated an assessee in default till it is found that assessee
has also failed to pay such tax directly”. According to it, once this
finding about the non payment of taxes by the recipient was held to be a
condition precedent to invoking section 201(1), the onus was on the
Assessing Officer to demonstrate that the condition was satisfied. It
further noted that the Act provides for three different consequences for
lapse on account of non-deduction of tax at source viz., penal
provisions (section 271C), and interest provisions (section 201 (1A) and
recovery provisions section 201(1). As far as the matter under the
later two provisions were concerned, the former provides for levy of
interest in case of any delay in recovery of such taxes and the later
provisions seek to make good any loss to revenue on account of lapse by
the assessee tax deductor. The Tribunal further added that the question
of making good the loss of revenue arises only when there is indeed a
loss of revenue and the loss of revenue can be there only when recipient
of income has not paid tax. Therefore, it held that recovery provisions
under section 201(1) can be invoked only when loss to revenue is
established, and that can only be established when it is demonstrated
that the recipient of income has not paid due taxes thereon.

Accordingly,
the Assessing Officer was directed to verify the related facts about
payment of taxes on income of the recipient directly from the recipients
of income before invoking provisions of section 201(1).

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(2012) 146 TTJ 543 (Mumbai) Pranit Shipping & Services Ltd. v. Asst.CIT ITA No.5962 (Mum.) of 2009 A.Y.2005-06. Dated 25.01.2012.

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Sections 36(1)(iii), 40(a)(ia) and 194A of the Income Tax Act 1961 – Assessee having neither credited the interest in the books of account under any account nor paid such interest in the year, but claimed deduction on the basis of mercantile system of accounting straightaway in the computation of income without routing it through books of account, mandate of section 194A is not attracted and, consequently, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are not attracted.

Facts
For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) Rs. 336.49 lacs towards accrued interest payable by the assessee-company to Sahara India Financial Corporation Ltd. (SIFC) for which no entry was passed in the books of account.Deduction was claimed directly in the Computation of Total Income. The CIT (A) confirmed the disallowance.

For earlier A.Y.2003-04, the assessee claimed deduction for similar interest payable on term loan to SIFC to the tune of Rs. 2.51 crore which was allowed by the Assessing Officer in the assessment framed u/s 143(3). Subsequently, the learned CIT, taking recourse of the provisions of section 263, held that the amount of interest was not deductible. ”

Held:
The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 40(a) (ia) are not attracted in the assessee’s case. The Tribunal noted as under:

In the mercantile system of accounting, deduction is allowed on accrual of liability. It is not material whether the amount is paid or not, or whether or not it is recorded in the books of account. Therefore, the deduction of interest payable to SIFC cannot be denied.

On a conjoint reading of sub section (1) with Explanation to section 194A, it is amply borne out that the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier.

Even if the amount is not credited to the account of payee but shown under the head `Interest payable 20 account’ or `suspense account’, etc. it shall still be deemed as credit to the account of payee.

Thus, the essential requirement is that the amount must be credited in the books of account either in the account of payee or interest payable account or any other account by whatever name called such as suspense account. Once an amount is credited in the books of account, the liability to deduct tax at source arises if the payment of such interest is made after the date of crediting.

Since the assessee has not credited the amount of such interest in its books of account and, further, such interest has not been paid in this year, the mandate of section 194A cannot be attracted. This provision comes into play only when either the amount is credited in the books of account or interest is paid, whichever is earlier.

Once there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

Probably, this lacuna was not noticed by the legislature while enacting the relevant provisions, which has been exploited by the assessee as a measure of tax planning. In this year the deduction has to be allowed. It will be open to the Assessing Officer to consider the later development of actual payment or non-payment of interest to SIFC and deal with it as per law in such later years.

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(2011) 132 ITD 34 (Allahabad) Asst. CIT v. A.H.Wheelers & Co. (P) Ltd. A.Y. 2004-05 Dated. 18-05-2011

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Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty cannot be levied in respect of wrong figures claimed by the assessee by mistake.

FACTS:
The assessee, who was engaged in the business of trading of books and periodicals, declared certain loss in its return of income for the relevant assessment year which was filed by a tax consultant on the basis of audit report u/s 44AB. The said loss included brought forward losses of earlier years. The Assessing officer, on going through past records, noticed that the assessee had wrongly claimed the brought forward loss in excess of the actual amount.

The assessee rectified the discrepancy before the completion of assessment. However, the Assessing Officer held that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income and imposed a penalty u/s 271(1) (c).

The CIT(A) deleted the penalty. On revenue’s appeal to the Tribunal, it was held:

HELD:
The details of brought forward losses are within the knowledge of the Assessing Officer in the form of return of income of earlier years filed by the assessee.

The mistake by the assessee was bonafide as it was based on the advice of the Tax Consultant.

It is the duty of the Assessing Officer to apply the relevant provisions of the Act for the purpose of determining the taxable income of the assessee and the consequential tax liability, even if the assessee failed to provide accurate figures relating to set-off of loss of earlier years already determined by the department.

Further, the mistake was inadvertent and was rectified before finalisation of assessment.

Merely because the assessee claimed the wrong amount of set-off, the Assessing Officer cannot reject the claim and consequentially levy the penalty considering wrong claim as concealment of income.

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(2011) 131 ITD 471 (Mum.) Chika Overseas (P) Ltd. v. ITO A.Y. 2000-01 Dated: 25-02-2010

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Section 147 – During the original assessment, facts placed before AO and detailed explanation given – AO discussed issue and then allowed deduction u/s 80HHC – hence there was application of mind by AO – matter carried to Tribunal – during pendency of appeal, AO initiated proceedings u/s 147 – while issue was subject matter of appeal, initiation of reassessment proceedings was bad in law – As AO applied his mind earlier, subsequent belief can only be considered as change of opinion on same set of facts-reopening not sustained.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in business of export of leather goods and textile dyes. It had filed return of income declaring total income at NIL after availing at a deduction u/s 80HHC. Assessment u/s 143(3) was completed and the Ld. AO had adjusted the trading losses against the profits of business and had then arrived at deduction u/s 80HHC. On certain other issues relating to section 80HHC, the matter was carried to the Tribunal.

While the appeal was still pending before the Tribunal, the AO had initiated reassessment proceedings u/s 147. The reason for reopening given by the AO was that his predecessor had allowed the losses in trading of goods to be set off against profit on incentives and hence erred in allowing excess deduction u/s 80HHC.

Held:
As the issue was subject matter of appeal during the pendency of appeal, issuance of notice of reassessment is bad in law.

During the original assessment, all the facts were placed before the AO and detailed explanation was given to the AO. The ld. AO had also considered certain judicial decisions while allowing set off of losses. This indicates that the AO had applied his mind at the time of original assessment. Hence, subsequent belief of AO can only be considered as change of opinion on same set of facts. Thus, reopening cannot be sustained.

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(2011) 131 ITD 396 (Mum.) Capgemini Business Services (India) Ltd. v. DCIT (ITAT, Mumbai) A.Y. 2006-07 Dated: 26-11-2010

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Section 246A – where the credit of foreign taxes
paid is not given by the assessing officer, appeal against the same to
the CIT(A) is maintainable.

Facts:
The assessee
filed IT return of income electronically, claiming tax credit u/s 90 and
91 to the extent of Rs. 8,38,764. While passing the assessment order
and determining the tax liability, the AO ignored this tax credit and
determined the amount to be refunded to the assessee. Aggrieved by this,
the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) did not accept
the appeal on the ground that section 246A did not permit such issues
within its ambit. He observed that the provisions of cl. (B) of s/s (1)
of section 246A refer to “tax” only for calculation of tax on total
income and not beyond that. According to him, the definition of “tax” in
section 2(43) refers to only income chargeable under the provisions of
this Act and hence, the question of tax is to be restricted only to tax
on total income. As the assessee was not challenging the calculation of
tax on total income, the CIT(A) held the appeal was not maintainable.

Held:
On
going through the mandate of clause (a) of section 246(1), it is clear
that an assessee has the right to appeal to the CIT(A) against inter
alia, “any order of assessment under s/s (3) of section1 43”, income
assessed, or to the amount of tax determined etc.

When we see
the expression “amount of tax determined” in juxtaposition to any “order
u/s 143(3)”, it becomes approved that the reference in the provision is
to the determination of the final amount of tax, which is distinct from
income assessed or the amount of loss computed or the status under
which the assessee is assessed.

Considering the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.Chockalingam & M. Meyyappan v. CIT (48
ITR 34) (SC) it appears that the same expression, viz., “amount of tax
determined” as employed in section 246(1) (a), encompasses not only the
determination of the amount of tax on the total income but also any
other act of omission which has the effect of reducing or enhancing the
total amount payable by the assessee. As the question of not allowing
relief in respect of withholding tax under section 90/91 has the effect
of reducing the refund or enhancing the amount of tax payable, such an
issue is squarely covered within the ambit of section246(1)(a).

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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 226 (Mum) DCIT v Ranjit Vithaldas ITA No. 7443/Mum/2002 Assessment Year: 1998-99. Date of Order: 22.06.2012

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Section 54 – Exemption u/s 54 would be available in respect of long term capital gain arising on sale of two flats, in two different years, invested in one residential house. Capital gain arising on sale of more than one residential house can be invested in one residential house. One of the requirements for claiming exemption u/s 54 is that the income of the residential house which has been sold, should be chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’ and not that income should have actually been so charged.

Facts:
The assessee alongwith his three brothers had purchased two residential houses situated in two separate buildings viz. R and V. The assessee had 25% share in each of these two flats. Flat in R was sold on 4.10.1996 for Rs. 1,77,00,000 and flat in V was sold on 8.10.1997 for Rs. 3,30,00,000. The assessee had invested the capital gain arising on sale of two flats in construction of a residential house by purchasing a plot on 25.4.1996 at Bangalore from M/s Adarsh Builders and vide another agreement, had engaged the same builder for construction of a house on the said land. The assessee computed his share of capital gain and therefrom claimed exemption u/s 54 in respect of amount spent on construction of a new residential house and the balance was offered for tax. In response to the AO’s contention that exemption u/s 54 can be claimed only with reference to capital gain arising on transfer of one residential house, the assessee submitted that both R and V need to be regarded as one residential house on the ground that they were proximately located and in the earlier years in wealth-tax returns they were regarded as one residential house and this contention was accepted.

The AO noted that in AY 1997-98 the assessee had claimed exemption in respect of capital gain arising on sale of flat R meaning thereby that it was treated as its SOP and therefore the annual value of flat V was chargeable to tax but the assessee had not included its annual value in returned income and the AO concluded that the only reason it could be excluded was that the flat was used for the purposes of the business by the assessee. The AO concluded that the flat V was used for the purposes of the business and also that in AY 1997-98 capital gain arising on sale of flat R was claimed to be exempt with reference to new house constructed. He therefore, denied claim for exemption u/s 54.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the two flats sold were located in two different buildings on two different roads and were acquired in two different years. There was no common approach road to the buildings. Hence, it held that the two flats sold could not be regarded as one residential house as was held by CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that there is no restriction placed in section 54 that exemption is allowable only in respect of sale of one residential house. Even if assessee sells more than one residential houses in the same year and capital gain is invested in a new residential house, the claim for exemption cannot be denied if other conditions of section 54 are fulfilled. It noted that the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Rajesh Keshav Pillai has held that exemption u/s 54 will be available in respect of transfer of any number of long term capital assets being residential houses if other conditions are fulfilled. The only restriction is that the capital gain arising from sale of one residential house must be invested in one residential house and not in two residential houses.

There is an inbuilt restriction that capital gain arising from sale of one residential house cannot be invested in more than one residential house. However, there is no restriction that capital gain arising from sale of more than one residential houses cannot be invested in one residential house. Therefore, even if two flats are sold in two different years, and capital gain of both the flats is invested in one residential house, exemption u/s 54 will be available in case of sale of each flat provided the time limit of construction or purchase of the new residential house is fulfilled in case of each flat sold.

As regards the finding of the AO that flat V was used for the purposes of the business, the Tribunal noted that this conclusion was based only on the finding that the asssessee had not returned any income in respect of this flat under the head `Income from House Property’. The Tribunal held that only on the ground that the assessee had not shown any income from the property, it cannot be concluded that the flat had been used for the purposes of business when there is no material to support the said conclusion. It held that the only requirement of section 54 is that the income should be chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’ and it is not necessary that income should have been actually charged.

The appeal filed by the revenue was partly allowed.

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New form 24 aaa and modification to form 21 and 23:

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Forms 21 and 23 have been modified to include the SRN of the new Form 24 AAA pertaining to Form for filing petitions to Central Government (Regional Director) Pursuant to sections 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act.
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Form 5 INV – Returns of unclaimed amounts filed prior to 1st August 2012 should be filed again in a consolidated manner

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Form 5 INV is required to be filed by all companies annually giving complete information on unpaid/ unclaimed amounts lying with companies as on the date of the AGM of that year, pursuant to the Investor Education and Protection Fund (uploading of information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with companies) Rules 2012, published vide Notification GSR 352(E) dated 10th May 2012. However, as some companies are filing multiple Form 5 INV, the ministry requires that if multiple form 5 INV have been uploaded for the year 2010-11 on or before the date of this circular i.e. 1st August 2012, the Company should again file Form 5 INV(single) giving details in excel template by 31st August 2012. Further Companies that have not filed their Form 5 INV are required to do so by 31st August 2012.
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JCIT v American Express Bank Ltd (2012) 24 taxmann.com 50 (Mum) Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA; Section 44C of I T Act Asst Year: 1997-98 Decided on: 08 August 2012 Before R S Syal (AM) & I P Bansal (JM)

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Restriction under Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA on allowability of expenses applies to all the expenses covered in various sections dealing with deductions and allowances and not only to the expenses covered by section 44C.

Facts
The taxpayer was a banking company incorporated in USA. It was carrying on banking operations in India through its branches in India. In terms of Article 7 of India-USA DTAA, the taxpayer had PE in India. Article 7(3) of DTAA provided that while certain expenses which are allocated to the PE will be allowed as deduction, such deduction will be in accordance with the provisions of and subject to the limitations of the taxation laws of that states.

The taxpayer claimed deduction of certain head office expenditure and marketing expenditure and contended that these were direct expenses exclusively incurred for the Indian Branch and hence, question of applicability of the restriction on allowability u/s 44C of I T Act did not arise. According to the taxpayer, the restriction in Article 7(3) applied only to the latter part starting with ” … a reasonable allocation of executive and general administrative expenses … ” and accordingly, only the expenses included within the ambit of section 44C would be subject to the restriction of domestic tax law while other expenses should be fully allowable.

Held
Rejecting taxpayer’s contention, the Tribunal held as follows.

  • Language of Article 7(3) indicates that deductibility of all the expenses is subject to the restrictions set out under various sections in Chapter IV-D and such restriction is not confined only to section 44C.
  • Further, the limiting provision in Article 7(3) is set out at end of the sentence. Thus, it is evident that limitation is applicable to all the expenses.
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Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Ltd v ADIT (IT) (2012) 23 taxman.com 359 (Mum) Article 7(3) of India-UAE DTAA; Section 44C of I T Act Asst Year: 1995-1960 To 2000-2001 Decided on: 20 July 2012 Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)

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Amendment to Article 7(3) of India-UAE DTAA from 1st April, 2008, restricting allowance of head office expenditure, has only prospective effect and does not apply to periods prior to that date.

Facts
The taxpayer was a banking company incorporated in UAE. It was carrying on banking operations in India through two branches. In terms of Article 7 of India-UAE DTAA, the taxpayer had PE in India.

Based on Article 7(3) (prior to its amendment from 1st April, 2008, pursuant to Protocol dated 3rd October, 2007), the taxpayer claimed deduction of all the expenses relating to the PE and contented that the restriction u/s 44C of I T Act on allowability of head office expenditure did not apply to it .

Relying on CBDT Circular No. 202 dated 5th July, 1976, the tax authority observed that the intention behind Article 7 is to ensure that correct profit is brought to tax and accordingly, it restricted the head office expenditure up to the limit prescribed in section 44C. The tax authority further contended that the amendment to Article 7(3) was merely clarificatory and hence, had retrospective operation.

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the amendment provision could apply to the period prior to the amendment.

Before the Tribunal, the taxpayer relied on the decision of ITAT Special Bench in Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corpn v Dy Director of IT [2012] 145 TTJ 649 (Mum) (SB) and Dalma Energy LLC [2012] 136 ITD 208 (Ahd). As against that, the tax authority relied on the decision in Mashreqbank Psc v Dy Director of IT [2007] 108 TTJ 554 (Mum).

Held
The Tribunal accepted taxpayer’s contentions and held as follows.

(i) Prior to April 1, 2008, Article 7(3) did not restrict allowance of head office and other expenditure attributable to PE. When particular provision in a DTAA is brought in from a particular date, Prima facie, it should be considered prospective unless expressly or impliedly it is provided to have retrospective operation. The parties interpreting a DTAA get vested right under such existing DTAA and any interpretation giving retrospective effect not only impairs the vested rights, but attracts new disability in respect of executed transaction.

(ii) In the present case, interpretation of retrospective operation of Article 7(3) would create new obligation and disturb assessability of the profit of PE.

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Digest of Recent Important Global Tax Decisions

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1. United States: US taxpayers sentenced to prison for hiding assets offshore

A US District Court chief judge sentenced US taxpayers to 12 months and 1 day in prison for hiding assets in secret offshore bank accounts. The US taxpayers were also ordered to pay restitution to the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to pay a civil penalty for failing to file Form TD-F 90-22.1 (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, FBAR).

The sentencing was announced in a Press Release dated 30th July 2012, issued by the US Department of Justice.

The Press Release states that the US taxpayers failed to report their financial accounts at UBS (a Swiss bank) and several other foreign accounts in the Isle of Man, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and South Africa. The Press Release further states that the US taxpayers failed to report any income earned on the foreign accounts and that they also under-reported their income by using their Swiss bank accounts.

UBS AG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice on 19th February 2009 on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States in the ascertainment, computation, assessment, and collection of US federal income taxes. As part of the agreement, UBS AG provided the United States with the identities of, and account information of certain US clients.

An FBAR is a form separate from an income tax return that a taxpayer is required to file with the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) every June, to disclose information about foreign financial accounts over which the taxpayer has signature authority or other control, and which have an aggregate value exceeding $10,000 at any time during the year.

2 Netherlands : Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch decides that sportsman is entitled to avoidance of double taxation for foreign employment income attributable to a test match

On 29th July 2012, the Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch (Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch) gave its decision in X. v. the Tax Administration (Case No. 12.0024, BX 0587) on the avoidance of double taxation for a sportsman, who derived foreign employment income from playing test matches in Spain and Thailand. Details of the case are summarised below.

(a) Facts:
The Taxpayer was a Dutch resident who played as a sportsman for a Dutch club. In 2002, he played test matches with his club in Spain and Thailand. He claimed avoidance of double taxation for the part of his employment income attributable to the days spent in Spain and Thailand, based on article 25 of the Netherlands – Spain Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1971) and article 23 of the Netherlands – Thailand Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1975) (the Treaties). The tax inspector refused to grant avoidance of double taxation for those days arguing that the test matches did not constitute a public performance.

(b) Legal Background:
Article 18 of the Treaty with Spain and article 17 of the Treaty with Thailand provide that income derived by sportsmen from their personal activities may be taxed in the state where those activities are exercised. Based on article 25 and 23 of those Treaties, the Netherlands applies an exemption with progression method for foreign employment income.

(c) Decision
Contrary to the Lower Court of Breda, the Court decided that avoidance of double taxation must also be granted with respect to the foreign employment income attributable to test matches played in Spain and Thailand. The Court held decisive that the test matches were open for the public, which meant that the sportsman was carrying out personal activities. Therefore, the Court decided that the sportsman was entitled to avoidance of double taxation for the days spent in Spain and Thailand.

Note: For the attribution of the employment income, reference can be made to a Decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 7th February 2007 , in which it was held that the part of the basic salary of a sportsman, which can be classified as income from personal activities, depends on the intention of the contracting parties as expressed in the employment contract. If that contract obliges a sportsman to participate in games and races in foreign countries, the basic salary, generally, has to be allocated to his income from personal activities in the state of performance on a pro-rata basis, unless the employment contract indicates otherwise.

In addition, the Supreme Court indicated that the term “personal activities” covers the performance aimed at an audience and time spent for activities related to such performance as training, availability services, travels and a necessary stay in the country of performance. Due to the fact that the test matches were open for the public, this requirement seems to be met in the case at hand.

3 Treaty between Spain and Ireland – Spanish Administrative Tribunal considers commission agent acting in his own name as PE

Spain’s Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central gave its resolution on 15th March 2012 (No. 00/2107/2007), published in June 2012, in a case relating to a multinational group involved in the design, development and manufacture of computer products which are commercialised through entities of the group. Details of the resolution are summarised below.

(a) Facts :
An Irish company, without human or material resources, commercialises computer products in Spain (as in other several countries) through a commission agent, a Spanish affiliate company, acting on behalf of the Irish enterprise but in its own name, with the support of foreign entities that provide after-sales services as technical assistance or repair. The commercialisation in the Spanish market was formerly realised directly by the Spanish affiliate. However, a group reorganisation took place under which the customer’s profile was transferred to the Irish company. For commercialisation purposes, the Spanish market was segmented into two areas:

– large customers who require personalised and customised attention so they were addressed to the Spanish commission agent; and

– retail customers with whom contact is made through foreign call-centres or on-line through a web page registered under a “.es” domain, hosted in server located outside Spain.

(b) Issue :
The tax authorities considered that the Irish company deemed to have a permanent establishment (PE) in Spain because the Irish company had in this country:

(i) a fixed place of business or, alternatively,
(ii) a dependent agent.

(i) Fixed place of business: Contrary to the taxpayer ´s argument that having an affiliate was insufficient to give rise to a PE, the Tribunal held that the Irish company had a PE in Spain. To support its consideration, the Tribunal held that the Irish company did not merely realise auxiliary or preparatory activities through a steady business framework in Spain.

(ii) Dependent agent: Alternatively, the Tribunal maintained that in case no fixed place of business was found to exist, the Irish company could be deemed to have a PE in Spain as a dependent agent. It based this result on the grounds that the Spanish company was sufficiently empowered to bind the Irish company, which was its sole client, and had to follow its instructions, provide reporting, request its authorisation before setting prices or delivery, allow record inspections as well as copyright control.

In addition, the tax authorities considered that income derived from all sales in Spain of the Irish company should be allocated to its Spanish affiliate, including those made through the web page, although the server was outside the Spanish territory (reference is made to the Spanish reservation included in the OECD Model (2005) and OECD Model (2003) versions in this respect). Only part of the Irish costs was directly allocated to the Spanish PE.

(c)    Decision:
The Spanish Tribunal resolution, following the Supreme Court decision of 12th January 2012, confirmed the existence of a PE based on the facts that demonstrate the substance of the activities and the operational reality of the Spanish company as well as the opinion of the tax authorities in respect of the attribution of income to the PE.

4    Treaty between Singapore and Japan : Unutilised losses of de-registered branch allowed for offset against profits of re-registered branch of a foreign company

The Income Tax Board of Review gave its decision recently in the case of AYN v. The Comptroller of Income Tax [2012] SGITBR1 on the availability of unutilised tax losses for offset against the profits of a foreign branch in Singapore. Details of the decision are summarised below.

(a)    Facts :
In 1992, a Japanese company called AYN Corporation (the Appellant) registered a branch in Singapore (the “old branch”) to carry on business there. The old branch was de-registered in 2004, at which time it had accumulated unutilised losses amounting to SGD 30 million. In 2006, the Appellant re-registered itself in Singapore and carried on business activities through a newly-registered branch (the “new branch”).

The Appellant sought to deduct the unabsorbed losses of the old branch against the business profits of the new branch for the year of assessment 2008. However, the claim was disallowed by the Comptroller of Income Tax, on the basis that pursuant to article 7 of the Japan – Singapore Income Tax Treaty (1994) (the Treaty), a branch is treated as a distinct and separate entity from the enterprise of which it is a part for income tax purposes. As such, the losses incurred by the old branch cannot be utilised against profits earned by the new branch.

The Appellant argued that a branch is from a legal perspective, an extension of the head office, and that section 37(3)(a) of the Income Tax Act (ITA) dealing with unabsorbed losses refers to the amount of loss incurred by a “person”, which refers to the legal entity, i.e. AYN Corporation and not the Singapore branch.

(b)    Issue :
The issue was whether the unabsorbed tax losses of the de -registered branch could be utilised against the profits earned by the new branch of the same company, i.e. whether they were the same “person”, as required by the ITA.

(c)    Decision:
The Board of Review held that the unutilised losses of the old branch could be used to offset the profits of the new branch, on the following grounds:

  •     Section 37(1) of the ITA provides that “the assessable income of any person…shall be the remainder of his statutory income for that year after the deductions in this Part have been made”. Section 37(3)(a) allows the deduction of “the amount of loss incurred by that person in any trade, business, profession or vocation”.

  •     The term “person” is defined in the ITA to include a company. The Appellant was a company incorporated under the laws in Japan, and was in the Board’s view, a “person” as covered by section 37 of the ITA. On the other hand, a branch is an extension or arm of the foreign company in Singapore and exists to carry on the business of the foreign company in Singapore. It has no separate legal status, and is for all intents and purposes the same legal person as the parent company formed outside Singapore.

  •     Article 7 of the Treaty deals with the allocation of profits to a permanent establishment and does not modify the provisions of section 37.

The Board concluded that the unabsorbed tax losses belonged to the Appellant and therefore were available for offset, provided that there was no substantial change (more than 50%) in the shareholders and their shareholdings of the Appellant.

Extension of Due date for filing return for the period ending 30th June, 2012-Trade Circular No.15T of 2012 dated 13.08.2012

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For monthly or quarterly return period ending 30th June, 2012, due date for uploading of return was 31.07.2012 which is extended upto 17.08.2012. If the said return filed before 17.08.2012, but after 31.07.2012 have to be filed along with late fee of Rs. 5000/- and the late fees so paid will be entitled for adjustment as credit for the immediately succeeding return period.

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Grant of Registration and Administrative Relief to Developers – Trade Circular No.14T of 2012 dated 06.08.2012

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Vide this Circular, the Commissioner has announced a grant of administrative relief to builders and developers. If the builders and developers are not registered under the VAT Act, then they were required to apply for VAT TIN on or before 16.8.2012 to get benefit of this circular. Further, they are also required to pay all taxes and upload all the returns from 20.6.2006 till date and apply for administrative relief on or before 31.8.2012.

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Amendments to certain laws administered by the Sales Tax Department – Trade Circular No.13T of 2012 dated 06.08.2012

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In this Circular, the Commissioner has explained the amendments carried out under different Acts administered by the sales tax department through the Finance Act of the State.

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Automatic cancellation of unilateral assessment order – Trade Circular No. 12T of 2012 dated 01.08.2012

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In the present procedure, in the event of failure to file return, assessing authority undertakes the assessment in respect of the period under default. The assessment order is passed in Form-303 known as “unilateral assessment order” and the dealer after filing return or making payment of tax due, applies in Form 304 for cancellation of such UAO.

WEF 01.08.2012, there is no need to file Form 304 for cancellation of UAO. MAHAVIKAS system automatically ascertains the return filing status for a particular period and if filed then the system shall cancel the UAO and will inform the dealer by email. The dealer may also access his e-mail at <Your mail> menu at department’s web-site.

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Security Services & Services provided by Directors under partial reverse charge mechanism – Notification No. 45/2012-ST & 46/2012 – ST both dtd. 07.08.20112

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Notification no. 45/2012-ST has amended Notification No. 30/2012-ST dtd. 20-06-2012, by adding the following two more services under partial reverse charge mechanism:

(a) Services provided or agreed to be provided by director of a company to the said company: 100% of the service tax payable by the person receiving services;
(b) Security services provided or agreed to be provided by an Individual, HUF, partnership firm or association of persons to a business entity registered as a body corporate : 25% of the service tax payable by person providing service & 75% of service tax payable by person receiving service.

The term “Security Services” has been defined vide Notification No. 46/2012 as services relating to the security of any property, whether movable or immovable, or of any person, in any manner and includes the services of investigation, detection or verification, of any fact or activity.

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Reg. Bovine Animals Notification No. 44/2012 – ST – dtd. 07.08.2012

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By this Notification Mega Exemption Notification
No. 25/2012 dtd. 20-06-2012 has been amended by omitting word “bovine”
in entry no. 33 which reads as “Services by way of slaughtering of
bovine animals”.

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V. Win Garments v. Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tirupur, [2011] 42 VST 330 (Mad).

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Central Sales Tax – Sales to the exporter –
Against Form H – Production of agreement with foreign buyer – Not
mandatory – Section 5 (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts
The
dealer claimed exemption from payment of tax u/s 5(3) of the CST Act in
respect of sale of goods to the exporter against Form H and produced
the Form H and copy of bill of lading before the assessing authorities.
The assessing authorities denied the exemption claimed by the dealer for
want of production of agreement of export with the foreign buyer. The
dealer filed writ petition before the Madras High Court against such
order passed by the lower authorities.

Held
In order
to claim exemption from payment of tax u/s 5(3) of the CST Act, what is
required by the dealer to prove the factum of the transaction and once
he is able to do so with sufficient and satisfactory documents, the
value of the same is exempted from tax liability. No rule lays it
mandatory to produce the agreement with foreign buyers. The High Court
accordingly allowed the writ petition filed by the dealer and remanded
back the matter to assessing authority to decide the matter afresh in
the light of form H and other documents already available on record and
fresh document, if any, produced by the petitioner and after giving him
the opportunity of being heard.

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Quality Water Management Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 42 VST 308 (Mad).

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Sales Tax – Rate of Tax – Machinery used for manufacture to produce water – Which is used for dyeing fabrics – Is machinery used for manufacture of goods – Subject to concessional rate of tax – Section 3 and Entry 3 of Schedule VIII of Tamilnadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts
The dealer sold water treatment plant and claimed concessional rate of tax u/s 3(5) of the Act being sale of plant and machinery used for manufacture of goods duly covered by Entry 3 of Schedule VIII of the Act. The Department including Tribunal did not accept claim of the dealer on the ground that the water treatment plant is not used for manufacturing any goods and as such not eligible for concessional rate of tax u/s 3(5) of the Act. The dealer filed revision petition before the Madras High Court against such decision of the Tribunal.

Held
In order to prove the claim of the concessional rate of tax u/s 3(5) of the Act, the dealer has to satisfy three conditions namely;-

i) The goods sold must be one enumerated in Schedule VIII,
ii) The goods must be used in factory site within the State, and
iii) It should be used for manufacturing of any goods.

Entry 3 of Schedule VIII covers machineries of all kinds other than those mentioned in First Schedule. There is no dispute that machinery sold by the dealer is not covered by Entry 3 of schedule VIII. The first condition is satisfied and the second condition is also satisfied as the machinery is used in factory site within the State.

The dispute is with regard to third condition of use in manufacturing any goods. The use of machinery may be direct or in aid in the manufacture. It is not in dispute that the plant is used by the customer for treating the effluent which resulted in purified water and the same is used for manufacturing fabrics. The words” used in factory site within the State for manufacture of goods “cannot be construed narrowly so as to confine it to direct use only. The use may be direct or indirect.

It is a well settled principle that a provision which is a taxing statute, granting concessional and incentives for promoting growth and development, should be construed liberally.

The High Court accordingly, allowed the revision petition filed by the dealer and held that the dealer is entitled to the concessional rate of tax and set aside the order passed by the lower authorities.

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2012-TIOL-848-CESTAT-MUM MIRC Electronic Ltd. v. CCE, Thane – I.

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CENVAT Credit taken of Rs 2.59 crore against service tax paid for providing after sales service during warranty period – Appellants under contractual obligation to provide after sales service during the warranty period without any consideration – strong prima facie case in favour – pre-deposit waived and stay granted.

Facts:
The applicant contented that the service of providing after sales service during the warranty period without any consideration is in relation to business and, therefore, covered by the definition of input service. The applicant submitted that the decision of the tribunal in the case of Mercantile & Indus. Developers Co. Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai-III reported in 2011 (21) STR 564, to make pre-deposit of part amount for hearing of the appeal was set aside by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court vide order dated 3.3.2011, after taking into consideration the judgement of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of CCE, Nagpur v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom.), and directed the Tribunal to hear the appeal on merits without insisting on pre-deposit. The applicant also relied upon the stay order in the case of Samsung India Electronics P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Noida 2009 (126) STR 570, waiving the pre-deposit of dues on the same grounds. The revenue on the other end contended that activity for which service tax was paid was conducted after clearing manufactured TVC and therefore the same could not be treated as input service.

Held:
After referring to the definition of ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules, it was held that since the applicant was under the contractual obligation of providing after sales service during the warranty period and as they are recipients of taxable service, prima facie their case is strong. Thus, the pre-deposit of the duty, interest and penalty was waived granting the stay.

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2012-TIOL-808-CESTAT-AHM Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise and Customs Ahmedabad v. M/s GE Nuova Pignone.

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The respondent paid service tax for maintenance services – deducted value of spare parts under Notification No.12/2003-ST – Revenue contended, exemption not available for the value of spare parts – Commissioner (A) set-aside the order taking a view that the said service related to immovable property and during the period 01/07/2003 to 09/09/2004, the activity was not liable – Held, no merit in the appeal filed by the revenue as no evidence was adduced to support the view that turbine is a movable property and benefit of Notification No.12/2003 also available.

Facts:
The respondent was engaged in providing maintenance and repair services under the contract for the maintenance of the Gas Turbines and related ancillaries which form integral part of the power plant. The respondent paid service tax in respect of the maintenance fees after deducting the value of spare parts supplied by them under Notification No.12/2003-ST. Revenue took a view that respondent was not eligible for exemption under the said notification. The respondent also argued that gas turbines are huge and embedded to earth and thus an immovable property. The respondent relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of TTG Industries Ltd. (Madras) Manu/ SC/0459/2004, where the Apex Court observed that mudguns and drilling machines cannot be shifted from one place to another and assembled or erected and are to be operated from that place till they are worn out or discarded, and thus had held that mudguns and drilling machines erected at sites on specially made platform are immovable property.

Held:
The decisions cited by the respondent and the photographs submitted, made it clear that turbines are nothing but immovable property. The Revenue’s stand was merely based on the ground that the assessee himself has used the word ‘equipment’. However, substance of the contract indicated that turbine formed part of immovable property. Since the Revenue was not able to produce any evidence to support the view that turbine is movable property, the Commissioner (Appeals)’s decision was found correct and as such, during the period from 01/07/2003 till 09/09/2004, the service was not taxable. As regards the eligibility of deduction of value of goods, it was observed that the very fact of existence of transaction value at the time of import and issue of invoice by a local party to the recipient of service, would go to show that there was a sale of spare parts in the course of international deal and therefore, no VAT was chargeable. Just because the contract provided that replacement of parts was free of charge would not mean there was no sale. The value of spare parts formed a part of contract for maintenance and repair and therefore exemption under the Notification No.12/2003-ST was available and thus Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

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2012 (27) STR 48 (Tri-Mumbai) Enpee Earthmovers v. CC & CE, Goa.

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Scope of Show Cause Notice-the demand of service tax under category of “Business auxiliary services” – However, the demand confirmed under “cargo handling service”- Demand set aside as the authorities travelled beyond show cause notice.

Facts:
The appellant entered into an agreement with their client to provide excavation of mines, drilling, levelling, etc. The show cause notice proposed to levy demand on such activities considering the same as ‘Business auxiliary services’ which finally culminated in a demand order. However, in the order, the demand was confirmed under the category of ‘cargo handling services’. The order got affirmed by the CCE – Appeals. The appellant challenged the order on the ground that the adjudicating authorities travelled beyond the scope of show cause notice.

Held:
The Tribunal, agreeing to the appellant’s argument, set aside the order. While allowing the appeal, the Tribunal relied on Delhi Tribunal’s decision in case of Joginder Pal vs. Commissioner – 2011 (21) STR 666 (Tri-Del).

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2012 (27) STR 99 (Tri-Del) Havells India Ltd. v. CCE, Jaipur-I.

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CENVAT credit taken on the basis of invoices of an importer – Importer stated in his Statement that most of the goods were actually not supplied – He issued only invoices without actual supply of goods – Appellant provided evidences like transport company’s GRs, Dharmakanta receipts, bank statements indicating payment to the supplier – Held, the importer made a statement which was not retracted by him – Credit cannot be allowed.

Facts:
The appellant was a manufacturer and availed credit on the basis of invoices issued by Shulabh Impex Incorporation supplier-importer having Dealer’s registration (supplier). The Revenue gathered intelligence that the said supplier is issuing fake invoices. On being raided, the proprietor of the supplying firm made a statement that he was not in a capacity to import goods therefore, some other people have imported goods using his IEC code and that he has issued only invoices in most of the cases without actual supply of goods. Therefore, CENVAT credit claimed by the appellant was disallowed by the Revenue. The appellant argued that as per the statement of the supplier, not all the invoices were fake. Moreover, other evidences like GRs issued by transport companies, the receipts issued by Dharmakanta (weigh bridge) and the entries in the bank statement showing payments made to such supplier proved that the appellant actually purchased goods from the supplier and therefore entitled to take the credit in respect of invoices of such supplier.

Held:
Since the statement made by the supplier was not retracted by him, the same needed to be accepted as the truth and therefore, it was held that the CENVAT credit cannot be availed by the appellant on the basis of such fake invoices.

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2012 (27) STR 94 (P & H) V.G. Steel Industry v. Commissioner of Central Excise.

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CENVAT credit – taken in respect of duty which had been paid in excess – Can credit be denied to the person who availed? – Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant paid duty on goods purchased in excess of the duty payable on such purchases. The supplier had paid such duty to the Government and raised the invoices for such duty. Moreover, no refund was granted to anyone in respect of such duty. Department denied the credit in the hands of the appellant, arguing that duty paid more than due can be available as refund, but not as credit. The order was confirmed by the First and the Second appellate authorities. The appellant preferred appeal before the High Court and relied upon the following judgments of the same Court as well as other Courts:
• Commissioner vs. CEGAT 202 ELT 753 (Mad)
• Commissioner vs. Guwahati Carbons Ltd. Appeal no. 42/2012 (P & H)
• Commissioner vs. Ranbaxy Labs Ltd. 203 ELT 213 (P & H)
• Commissioner vs. Swaraj Automotives Ltd. 139 ELT 504 (P & H)

Held:
The Court held that the counsel of the respondent was unable to distinguish the applicability of the above judgments and therefore, ordered in favour of the appellant.

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2012 (27) STR 97 (P & H) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana v. Best Dyeing.

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Condonation of delay 190 days – Service of order by improper mode Speed post – Revenue did not have any evidence of having served the order – Tribunal order condoning delay upheld.

Facts:
The order was dispatched by Speed Post which was not returned. However, the respondent did not receive the same. Therefore, respondent preferred an appeal after a delay of 190 days before CESTAT. The Tribunal condoned the delay and the same was challenged by the Revenue before the Honourable High Court.

Held:
The mode of serving order has been prescribed by Section 37C which does not contemplate serving order by speed post. The order passed must be served by registered post with an acknowledgement due. Moreover, the Tribunal had already held that the Revenue has no evidence of having served the order. In view of the same, it was held by the Court that delay of 190 days had rightly been condoned by the Tribunal. Moreover, the Court viewed department’s approach seriously and also ordered for a cost of Rs. 5,000 and the same was ordered to be deducted from the salary of the employee who had advised for filing the appeal.

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2012 (27) STR 5 (Kar.) Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. LSG Sky Chef Pvt. Ltd.

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Outdoor catering services – Whether value of goods can be deducted from the gross consideration charged for the purposes of calculating service tax liability – Notification No.12/2003 STHeld, similar facts were covered by judgment in case of Sky Gourmet Catering – Yes

Facts:
The respondent was engaged in providing catering services falling under “outdoor catering services”. The respondent paid service tax after deducting value of food and beverages and thus availing benefit under Notification No.12/2003, instead of availing abatement. The department denied the same on the ground that service tax needs to be paid on the gross amount collected and Notification No.12/2003 is not available to the respondent. The respondent argued on the basis of the judgment of the Apex Court in case of BSNL 2 STR 161 (SC) and relying upon the same, the Tribunal passed order in their favour. However, the Revenue filed appeal against the said order.

Held:
Referring to respondent’s own case, i.e. Sky Gourmet Catering Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner in writ Appeal no. 671-726 dated 18/04/2011 on the identical issue the appeal was disposed off. The Court held that the respondent is eligible to claim deduction in respect of goods portion while discharging the service tax liability as in the said writ, the case was examined with detailed consideration and relying on various Supreme Court judgments, the Division Bench concluded that outdoor catering contract has to be treated as composite contract under Article 366 – Clause 20A(f) of the Constitution of India and the State legislature is competent to levy sales tax on the sale aspect only i.e. the value of food. The remaining aspect including transportation is to be treated as service and service tax accordingly would be levied on service aspect and sales tax is payable on deemed sale aspect. Consequently, the substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.

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2012 (27) STR 4 (Bom) Fidelity Magnetics v. Commissioner of Central Excise.

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Pre-deposit cannot be demanded by Tribunal when matter is remanded.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of recorded audio cassettes. Aggrieved by an adverse order from the adjudicating authorities, the appellant preferred an appeal before CCE-Appeals which got dismissed on technical ground of non deposit of pre-deposit. The appellant approached CESTAT to waive the pre-deposit order. The Tribunal waived the pre-deposit. However, subsequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CCE-Appeals and restored the matter to the CCE-Appeals with a direction to the appellant to deposit 50% of the amount involved.

Held:
Having granted full waiver of pre-deposit, the Tribunal in the absence of any special circumstances ought not to have passed an order of pre-deposit. The order of the Tribunal as well as CCE-Appeals asking for pre-deposit was set aside by the Honourable High Court and CCE-Appeal was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits without insisting on pre-deposit.

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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 93 (Del) ACIT v Result Services (P) Ltd. ITA No. 2846/Del/2011 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Date of Order: 28.06.2012

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Section 194I – Reimbursement by the assessee to its holding company of amount of rent for a portion of premises being used by the assessee company, which premises were taken on lease by the holding company from the landlord and the lease deed provided for use of part of the premises by the subsidiary company, do not qualify for TDS u/s 194I since there was no lessor and lessee relationship between the holding company and the assessee.

Facts:
M, a holding company of the assessee, had taken certain premises on lease/leave and license basis. The lease/leave and license agreements was for the premises to be used by M, its subsidiaries, affiliates, group entities and associates. However, the obligation to pay rent was of the lessee i.e. M. The amount of rent paid by M under these agreements was paid after deduction of TDS u/s 194I.

Part of the premises taken on lease/leave and license were used by the assessee. The assessee reimbursed to M certain amounts towards such user. However, these amounts were paid without deduction of TDS u/s 194I. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the assessee, disallowed a sum of Rs. 56,23,456 paid by the assessee to M u/s 40(a) (ia) on the ground that tax was not deducted at source u/s 194I.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was paying rent to the holding company as reimbursement since many years. This position was accepted by the department all through and it was never disputed even when the provisions of section 194I were introduced on the statute w.e.f. 1.6.1994. It also noted that even after amendment to section 40(a) (ia) w.e.f. 1.4.2006, this position was not disputed. It noted that there is no material change in the facts and law during the year under consideration. It also noted that the lease deed provided for use of the premises by the subsidiary companies. Tax was deducted at source from the actual payments made by the holding company to the lessor and holding company had not debited the whole of rent to its P& L account but had only debited rent pertaining to the part of the premises occupied by it. Considering these facts, the Tribunal held that there was no lessor and lessee relationship between the holding company and the assessee which could attract the provisions of section 194I. The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A).

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account by Companies in Non-XBRL for accounting year commencing on or after 01.04.2011

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Vide Circular No. 21/2012 dated 2nd August 2012,
the Ministry of Corporate affairs has informed that the Forms 23 AC and
23 ACA are under finalization, as they are being revised as per the
Revised Schedule VI.

All companies who required to file Non-
XBRL e-form 23 AC and 23 ACA as per Revised Schedule VI will be allowed
to file their financial statements without any additional fees/penalty
upto 15th September 2012 or within 30 days from the date of their AGM,
whichever is later.

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[2012] 23 taxmann.com 347 (Mum) Ashok C. Pratap v Addl CIT ITA No. 4615/Mum/2011 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Date of Order: 18.07.2012

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Section 56(2)(vi) – Amount received by a Trusteecum- Beneficiary of a discretionary trust, on dissolution of a trust, is not chargeable to tax u/s 56(2)(vi).

Facts:
The mother of the assessee was settlor of a private discretionary trust, created vide trust deed dated 19th January, 1978, wherein the assessee and his wife were the trustees and the two daughters of the assessee (viz. grand daughters of the settlor) were the beneficiaries. By letter dated 15th January, 2001, the assessee and his wife were added as beneficiaries to the said trust. On 30th March, 2001, two daughters of the assessee, both being major, signed the document of release whereby they relinquished their right, title, interest, share and benefits in and from the property and assets of the said trust including accumulated income. On 27th February, 2007, the said trust was dissolved and the assets were equally distributed amongst the two beneficiaries viz. the assessee and his wife. The assessee received Rs. 1,36,00,595. This sum of Rs. 1,36,00,595 was not included by the assessee in his returned income.

While assessing the total income of the assessee for AY 2007-08, the AO noticed that the trust was never registered u/s 12AA of the Act. He held that if the assessee claims to be a trustee, then his status will always be of a trustee and if he claims to be one of the beneficiaries, then he has no right to dissolve the trust. Accordingly, he held that, applying the provisions of section 77(b) of the Indian Trust Act, he included the said sum of Rs. 1,36,00,595 in the total income u/s 56(2)(vi).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the addition on the ground that the trust is not a relative of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that it is an un controverted fact that the trust had borne tax at maximum marginal rate on its income and also that the assessee had received the amount in the capacity of beneficiary. It held that amount received being in pursuance of dissolution of the trust cannot be termed to be an amount received by the beneficiaries “without consideration”. The addition made by the AO and upheld by CIT(A) was deleted.

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(2012) 72 DTR (Mum)(Trib) 175 Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. JCIT A.Y.: 1994-95 Dated: 29-11-2011

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Section 40(a)(i) – No disallowance of incremental amount due to foreign exchange rate fluctuation on account of non-deduction of TDS u/s 195 if the TDS is already deducted earlier at the time of credit.

Facts:
The assessee had entered into a research and know-how agreement with A.B. Sandvik Coromant, Sweden during AY 1991-92 in terms of which the assessee was liable to pay Swiss Kroner 38,58,000. In the assessment order for AY 1991-92, the AO held that since the duration of the agreement was five years, the appellant was entitled to deduction of 1/5th of the amount payable under the agreement (Swiss Kroner 7,71,600) in each assessment year for five years. However, the assessee had deducted TDS also and remitted the same to the exchequer, on the entire amount of fees payable as the assessee had credited the entire amount in the account books. Accordingly, in the year under consideration, assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 42,89,872 as fourth instalment of fee in its return of income. While remitting the instalment during the year, it suffered foreign exchange fluctuation loss of Rs. 8,82,234 which was comprised in its claim of Rs. 42,85,872. The CIT (A) noticed that deduction of earlier instalments have been allowed on actual payment basis and, hence, directed that even in this year deduction for exchange loss should be allowed. However, he directed the AO to check whether remittances are actually made subject to appropriate deduction of tax at source as per section 40(a)(i) of the Act.

Thereafter, AO passed an order denying the claim of deduction of foreign exchange fluctuation loss amounting to Rs. 8,82,234 on the ground that TDS was deducted in the initial year only with respect to the amount (Rs. 34,07,638) corresponding to Sw. Kr 7,71,600 (i.e. 1/5 of the amount payable) and not on the additional sum of Rs. 8,82,234 (foreign exchange loss) and was to be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

Held:
Section 195(1) of the Act requires TDS either “at the time of credit” or “at the time of payment” of an income, whichever is earlier. When the assessee credited the income payable to the foreign concern as research and technical know-how in the earlier year, the provision so made on the basis of the exchange rate then existing was subjected to TDS u/s 195(1). Notably, section 195(1) of the Act prescribes TDS on a sum payable to non-resident either at time of credit or at the time of payment, whichever is earlier. Quite clearly, section 195(1) does not envisage TDS at both instances, i.e. at the time of credit as well as at the time of payment thereof.

Also, as per agreement, the assessee is to make a total payment of Swiss Kroner 38,58,000 and out of which, it was required to remit Swiss Kroner 7,71,600 during the year under consideration. In this year, the cost of remitting the amount to foreign concern has increased due to foreign exchange fluctuation and there is no additional amount payable to foreign concern. The transaction remained of Swiss Kroner 38,58,000 and the same having been subjected to TDS earlier at the time of credit, it would not again call for deduction of tax at source per section 195(1) of the Act.

Alternatively, out of the total claim of Rs. 42,89,872 as fourth instalment of research and know-how fee in this year, tax has been deducted in relation to a sum of Rs. 34,07,638 and, therefore, it is merely a case involving short deduction of tax at source and not a case for failure to deduct tax at source. In decisions of Chandabhoy & Jassobhoy [ITA No. 20/Mum/2010] and S.K. Tekriwal [ITA No. 1135/ Kol/2010], which have been rendered in the context of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, it has been held that the disallowance envisaged in section40(a)(ia) can be invoked only in the event of non-deduction of tax, but not in cases involving short deduction of tax at source. The ratio of the decisions is squarely applicable in the present case also, inasmuch as the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are akin to those of section 40(a)(i). On this count also, the sum of Rs. 8,82,234 cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).

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(2012) 72 DTR (Mum)(Trib) 167 ITO v. Yasin Moosa Godil A.Y.: 2006-07 Dated: 13-04-2012

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Section 50C does not apply to transfer of booking right in a flat.

Facts:
During the course of assessment proceedings the AO noticed that in the preceding assessment year, the assessee had booked a flat with a builder which was under construction. Out of the agreed aggregate consideration of Rs. 16,12,000, an amount of Rs.1,00,000 was kept outstanding, since the builder had failed to give the possession of the flat in time and also failed to allot the promised parking place. As the entire amount was not paid by the assessee, the builder had neither handed over the possession of the flat to the assessee nor had executed any registered sale deed in favour of the assessee. In the current assessment year, the assessee requested the builder to cancel the booking of the flat and return the booking amount as paid by him towards the said flat. Upon such request, a tri-party registered sale agreement for transfer of said flat was executed between the assessee, the builder and the new buyer wherein the assessee was to transfer all his rights, title and interest in the said flat to the buyer and the builder was to give the possession of the said flat to the buyer and was also to allot the said flat to the buyer which was originally to be allotted to the assessee. Accordingly, during the year under consideration, the appellant received back the booking amount paid by him to the builder from the buyer.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO observed that the Jt. Sub-Registrar’s Office had considered the value of the said flat at Rs.57,57,255 for registration of flat as against the total value of Rs.16,12,000. Accordingly, on the basis of information received from the Jt. Registrar’s Office, the AO treated the difference amount of Rs.41,45,255 (i.e. Rs. 57,57,255 – Rs. 16,12,000) as the unexplained income of the appellant and made addition thereof to the total income of the assessee.

The CIT(A) deleted the addition on the ground that such addition can only be made u/s 50C and in the present case provisions of section 50C do not apply since what is transferred is only booking rights in the flat.

Held:
It is an undisputed fact that prior to the execution of the tripartite agreement the assessee had neither paid full consideration of the flat nor had the assessee acquired the possession of the flat from builder. From the agreement it is evident that it is the builder who is transferring the capital asset i.e. the flat to the new buyer, by handing over the possession of the flat as also the legal ownership thereof to the new buyer and the assessee only received back the booking advance paid by him to the builder, by relinquishing his booking right on the said flat.

It is settled legal proposition that deeming provision can be applied only in respect of the situation specifically given and one cannot go beyond the explicit mandate of the section. It is essential that for application of section 50C, the transfer must be of a capital asset, being land or building or both. If the capital asset under transfer cannot be described as “land or building or both” then section 50C will not apply. From the facts of the case narrated above, it is seen that the assessee has transferred booking rights and received back the booking advance. Booking advance cannot be equated with land or building and therefore section 50C cannot be invoked.

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Wealth Tax: Valuation of land in excess of ULC limit: Section 7 of W. T. Act, 1957: A. Y. 1991-92: Land in excess of limit permitted by ULC Act to be valued taking restriction into account and not at market value.

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[Aims Oxygen Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT; 345 ITR 456 (Guj.) (FB):]

The assessee owned certain open land which was the subject of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. For the A. Ys. 1988-89 to 1990-91, the Tribunal had held that for the purposes of wealth tax, the valuation of the land in excess of the limit laid down under the 1976 Act had to be made on the basis of the compensation which the assessee would be entitled to receive under the 1976 Act. For the A. Y. 1991-92, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to value the light in the light of the above decisions for the earlier years. The Assessing Officer valued the land at market value on the basis of the report of the Departmental Valuation Officer. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The land of the assessee was acquired as early as in 1960. The land in question was declared surplus land under the 1976 Act, which had a depressing effect on the value of the asset. The valuation has to be made on the basis of the assumption that the purchaser would be able to enjoy the property as the holder, but with restrictions and prohibitions contained in the 1976 Act and in such case value of the property or land would be reduced.

ii) The Department, having already accepted the depressed valuation for the A. Ys. 1988-89 to 1990-91 and then for the A. Y. 1991-92, it was not open to the department to assess the property on the basis of the market value, without any restriction or prohibition.

iii) The Tribunal is incorrect in holding that the land should be valued in accordance with the open market rate, without any restriction and prohibition.

iv) Whenever there is any restriction on transfer of any land, the value of the property or land, as the case may be, would be normally reduced and the valuation is to be ascertained, taking note of the restrictions and prohibitions contained in the Ceiling Act as if the land is notified as excess land.

v) Once the competent authority issues any notification u/s. 10(1) or (3) of the Land Ceiling Act, the land has to be deemed to have been acquired by the Government and what the assessee owned was the right to compensation and in such case, the compensation amount would only be the maximum compensation as provided under the Ceiling Act which is to be taken into consideration.”

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TDS: S/s 194H, Expl (i), 201(1A): A. Ys. 2009- 10 and 2010-11: (i) Trade discount is not a discount, commission or brokerage: Tax not deductible at source: (ii) Failure to deduct tax at source: When payer deemed in default: Only if payee fails to pay tax directly: Tax not to be recovered from payer if payee pays directly : Liability of payer only for interest and penalty:

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[Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. Dy. CIT; 345 ITR 288 (All): 251 CTR 65 (All.)]

The petitioner is a publisher of a hindi daily newspaper. The petitioner had granted trade discount of 10% to 15% to the advertising agencies in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Indian Newspaper Society of which the petitioner was a member. For the A. Ys. 2009-10 and 2010-11, the Assessing Officer treated the petitioner as an assessee in default on the ground that the petitioner has failed to deduct tax at source u/s 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the trade discount and also passed orders u/s 201(1A) levying interest. The case of the Department was that allowing trade discount to the advertising agencies by the petitioner is nothing but payment of commission within the meaning of section 194H Explanation (i) and the petitioner was liable to deduct tax at source.

The petitioner preferred a writ petition challenging the order. The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The proceedings u/s 201/201(1A) of the Act were clearly not permissible because the two fundamental facts did not exist: (a) the relationship between the petitioner and the advertising agency was not that of principal and agent; and (b) advertising agencies rendered service to advertisers and were accredited by the society not as an agent of the newspaper agency. The observation of the Assessing Officer that advertising agencies rendered service to the petitioner was without any basis and foundation. No fundamental facts existed on the basis of which any inference could be drawn that advertising agencies were agents of the petitioner and further that advertising agencies rendered any services to the newspaper.

ii) The authorities had not adverted to the Explanation to section 194H nor had applied their mind to whether the assessee had also failed to pay such tax directly. Directing recovery of interest from the petitioner and recovery of tax alleged to be short deducted, was beyond the scope of section 201 and without jurisdiction.”

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Penalty: S/s 269T, 271E and 273B A. Y. 2003-04: Repayment of loan or deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque or draft: Provision mandatory: Repayment by debit of accounts through journal entries is in contravention of the provision: Assessee becoming liable to repay loan and receive similar sum towards sale price of shares sold to creditor: Account settled by journal entries: No finding that repayment not bonafide or attempt at evasion of tax: Reasonable cause shown: Penalty not leviable<

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[CIT v. Triumph International Finance (I) Ltd.; 345 ITR 270 (Bom.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of share trading. The assessee had accepted a sum of Rs. 4,29,04,722/- as loan from I which was repayable during the A. Y. 2003-04. In that year the assessee sold 1,99,300 shares to I for an aggregate consideration of 4,28,99,325/-. The parties set off that amount in the respective books of account by making journal entries and the balance amount of Rs. 5,397/- was paid by the assessee by a crossed cheque. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s 271E on the ground that the assessee had repaid the loan to the extent of Rs,4,28,99,325/- in contravention of the provisions of section 269T of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the payment through journal entries did not fall within the ambit of sections 269SS or 269T and consequently no penalty could be levied u/ss. 271D or 271E.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court held as under:

“i) The Tribunal was not justified in holding that repayment of loan or deposit through journal entries did not violate the provisions of section 269T of the Act.

ii) It would have been an empty formality to repay the loan or deposit amount by account-payee cheque or draft and receive back almost the same amount towards the sale price of the shares. Neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan or deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business had been doubted in the regular assessment.

iii) There was nothing on record to suggest that the amounts advanced by I to the assessee represented money of I or the assessee. The fact that the assessee company belonged to a group involved in the security scam could not be a ground for sustaining penalty.

iv) Settling claims by making journal entries in the respective books is also one of the recognised methods for repaying loan or deposit. Therefore, on the facts, in the absence of any finding recorded in the assessment order or in the penalty order to the effect that the repayment of loan or deposit was not a bona fide transaction and was made with a view to evade tax, the cause shown by the assessee was a reasonable cause and in view of s. 273B of the Act, no penalty u/s 271E could be imposed for contravening the provisions of s. 269T of the Act.”

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Capital gains: Exemption u/s 54F: A. Y. 2006- 07: Sale of shares and part of net consideration paid to developer for construction of a residential house: Construction almost complete in three years: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s 54F.

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[CIT v. Sambandam Udaykumar; 345 ITR 389 (Kar.)]

In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee sold certain shares and invested a part of the net consideration in purchase of house property and paid the said amount to the developer. The assessee claimed exemption u/s 54F in respect of the said investment. The Assessing Officer found that the flooring work, electrical work, fitting of door shutters and window shutters were still pending. Therefore, the Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that the construction was not complete even after the lapse of three years of time from the date of transfer of the shares and hence the exemption u/s 54F of the Act, is not allowable. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The assessee had invested Rs. 2,16,61,670/- as on October 31, 2006, within 12 months from the date of realisation of sale proceeds of the shares. Assessee had produced before the authorities the registered sale deed dated 07/11/2009, showing the transfer of the property in his favour. The assessee had been put in possession of the property and he was in occupation. The assessee had invested the sale consideration in acquiring residential premises and had taken possession of the residential building and was living in the premises.

ii) Section 54F of the Act is a beneficial provision of promoting the construction of residential house. Therefore, the provision has to be construed liberally for achieving the purpose for which it was incorporated in the statute. The intention of the legislature was to encourage investments in the acquisition of a residential house and completion of construction or occupation is not the requirement of law. The words used in the section are ”purchased’ or “constructed”. For such purpose, the capital gain realised should have been invested in a residential house. The condition precedent for claiming the benefit under the provision is that capital gains realised from sale of capital asset should have been invested either in purchasing a residential house or in constructing a residential house. If after making the entire payment, merely because a registered sale deed had not been executed and registered in favour of the assessee before the period stipulated, he cannot be denied the benefit of section 54F of the Act.

iii) Similarly, if he has invested the money in construction of a residential house, merely because the construction was not complete in all respects and it was not in a fit condition to be occupied within the period stipulated, that would not disentitle the assessee from claiming the benefit u/s 54F of the Act. Once it is demonstrated that the consideration received on transfer has been invested either in purchasing a residential house or in construction of a residential house, even though the transactions are not complete in all respects as required under the law, would not disentitle the assessee from the benefit.

iv) The Tribunal was justified in extending the benefit of section 54F of the Act to the assessee.”

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Capital gains: Long term/short term: S/s 2(42A), 10(38) and 54EC: A. Y. 2006-07: Period of holding : If an assessee acquires an asset on 2nd January in the preceding year, the period of 12 months would be complete on 1st January, next year and not on 2nd January: If it is sold on 2nd January and if the proviso to section 2(42A) applies, it would be treated as a long term capital gain.

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[Bharti Gupta Ramola v. CIT; 252 CTR 139 (Del.)]
The assessee had sold two mutual fund instruments on 29/09/2005 and 14/10/2005 which were purchased on 29/09/2004 and 14/10/2004 respectively. In the return of income for the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee claimed that the capital gain on such sales were long term capital gains and had claimed exemption u/s 10(38) and section 54EC as the case may be. The Assessing Officer treated the two capital gains as short term capital gains on the ground that the instruments had not been held for a period of more than 12 months immediately preceding the date of transfer and accordingly disallowed the claim for exemption. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“If an assessee acquires an asset on 2nd January in a preceding year, the period of 12 months would be complete on 1st January, next year and not on 2nd January. If it is sold on 2nd January and if the proviso to section 2(42A) applies, it would be treated as long term capital gain.”

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Business loss: Section 28: A. Y. 2004-05: Real estate business: Amount advanced for purchase of property: Property not transferred and amount not repaid: Loss is business loss, deductible.

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[CIT v. New Delhi Hotels Ltd; 345 ITR 1 (Del.)]

Assessee
was carrying on business in construction and real estate. The assessee
had paid an amount of Rs. 44,28,000/- to M/s Gulmohar Estate for
purchase of property/plot. The property/plot was neither
transferred/sold nor the amount was refunded. The assessee claimed the
said amount as bad debt/business loss in the A. Y. 2004-05. The
Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the provisions
of section 36(1)(vii) r.w.s. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are not
satisfied. The Tribunal found that the assessee treated immovable
properties as stock in trade and allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
The assessee also had rental income but this factum alone did not show
and establish that the properties which were being purchased from
Gulmohar Estate were to be treated as investment and not for the purpose
of stockin- trade.

ii) In view of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal, the loss was deductible.”

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Assessment: Notice: Section 143(2) A. Y. 2006- 07: Notice not served on correct address mentioned in return.

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[CIT Vs. Mascomptel India Ltd.; 345 ITR 58 (Del.)]
For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The notice could not be served and was received back with the remark that no such person existed at the address mentioned. An inspector was deputed to serve the notice personally, but he also reported that the company was not available at the address. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, served the notice by affixture. The assessment was made ex parte and a best judgment assessment order was passed. The Tribunal found that the assessee had mentioned a different address in the return of income filed for the A. Y. 2006-07 and held that the service by affixture was not valid and accordingly the assessment order was invalid.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) No attempt was made to serve the assessee at the correct address which was available with the Department and in fact stated in the return of income for the A. Y. 2006-07.

ii) Subsequent attempt to serve another notice long after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by the proviso, could not help the Revenue.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s 54EC: A. Y. 2006- 07: Section 54EC bonds not available in the last period of limitation: Investment in bonds as soon as available: Assessee entitled to exemption.

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[CIT Vs. Cello Plast (Bom); ITA No. 3731 of 2010 dated 27/07/2012:]

The assessee sold factory building on 22/03/2006 and earned long term capital gain of Rs. 49.36 lakhs. The last date for investment in section 54EC bonds was 21/09/2006. The assessee invested the capital gain in section 54EC bonds of Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) bonds on 31/01/2007. The assessee claimed that from 04/08/2006 to 22/01/2007, the bonds were not available and the investment was made immediately on the bonds being available. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for exemption on the ground that the investment was beyond the period of limitation. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue argued that (i) even if the bonds were not available for part of the period, they were available for some time in the period after the transfer (01/07/2006 to 03/08/2006) and the assessee ought to have invested then & (ii) the section 54EC bonds issued by National Highway Authority (NHAI) were available and the assessee could have invested in them.

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Department’s contention that the assessee ought to have invested in the period that the section 54EC bonds were available (01/07/2006 to 03/08/2006) after the transfer is not well founded. The assessee was entitled to wait till the last date (21/09/2006) to invest in the bonds. As of that date the bonds were not available. The fact that they were available in an earlier period after the transfer makes no difference, because the assessee’s right to buy the bonds up to the last date cannot be prejudiced.

ii) Lex not cogit impossibila (law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform) and i (law does not expect the party to do the impossible) are well known maxims in law and would squarely apply to the present case.

iii) The Department’s contention that the assessee ought to have purchased the alternative section 54EC NHAI bonds is also not well founded, because if section 54EC confers a choice of investing either in the REC bonds or the NHAI bonds, the Revenue cannot insist that the assessee ought to have invested in the NHAI bonds.”

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Authority of Advance Ruling – Advance Ruling of the Authority could be challenged before the appropriate High Court under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and is to be heard by the Division Bench hearing income tax matters expeditiously.

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[Columbia Sportswear Co. v. DIT, Bangalore (2012) 346 ITR 161 (SC)]

The Petitioner, a company incorporated in the United States of America (for short ‘the USA’) was engaged in the business of designing, developing, marketing and distributing outdoor apparel. For making purchases for its business, the petitioner established a liaison office in Chennai with the permission of the Reserve Bank of India (for short “the RBI”) in 1995. The RBI granted the permission in its letter dated 01.03.1995 subject to the conditions stipulated therein. The permission letter dated 01.03.1995 of the RBI stated that the liaison office of the petitioner was for the purpose of undertaking purely liaison activities viz. to inspect the quality, to ensure shipments and to act as a communication channel between head office and parties in India and except such liaison work, the liaison office will not undertake any other activity of a trading, commercial or industrial nature nor shall it enter into any business contracts in its own name without the prior permission of the RBI. The petitioner also obtained permission on 19.06.2000 from the RBI for opening an additional liaison office in Bangalore on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in the letter dated 01.03.1995 of the RBI.

On 10.12.2009, the petitioner filed an application before the Authority for Advance Rulings (for short ‘the Authority’) on the questions relating to its transactions in its liaison office in India.

The Authority heard the petitioner and the respondent and passed the order dated 08.08.2011. In para 34 of the said order, the Authority gave its ruling on the six questions raised before it as follows:

(1) A portion of the income of the business of designing, manufacturing and sale of the products imported by the applicant from India accrued to the applicant in India.

(2) The applicant had a business connection in India being its liaison office located in India.

(3) The activities of the Liaison Office in India were not confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

(4) The income taxable in India would be only that part of the income that could be attributed to the operations carried out in India. This was a matter of computation.

(5) The Indian Liaison Office involved a ‘Permanent Establishment’ for the applicant under Article 5.1 of the DTAA.

(6) In terms of Article 7 of the DTAA only the income attributable to the Liaison Office of the applicant was taxable in India.

Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the said order of the Authority on various grounds mentioned in special leave petition, before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the Authority is a body exercising judicial power conferred on it by Chapter XIX-B of the Act and is a tribunal within the meaning of the expression in Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution. The fact that subsection (1) of Section 245S makes the advance ruling pronounced by the Authority binding on the applicant, in respect of the transaction and on the Commissioner and the income tax authorities subordinate to him in respect of the applicant, would not affect the jurisdiction of either the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution or of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to entertain a challenge to the advance ruling pronounced by the Authority. The reason for this view is that Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution are constitutional provisions vesting jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and the High Courts and a provision of an Act of legislature making the decision of the Authority final or binding could not come in the way of this Court or the High Courts to exercise jurisdiction vested under the Constitution.

The Supreme Court noted that in a recent advance ruling in Groupe Industrial Marcel Dassault, In re [2012] 340 ITR 353 (AAR), the Authority had, observed as under:

“But permitting a challenge in the High Court would become counter productive since writ petitions are likely to be pending in High Courts for years and in the case of some High Courts, even in Letters Patent Appeals and then again in the Supreme Court. It appears to be appropriate to point out that considering the object of giving an advance ruling expeditiously, it would be consistent with the object sought to be achieved, if the Supreme Court were to entertain an application for Special Leave to appeal directly from a ruling of this Authority, preliminary or final, and tender a decision thereon rather than leaving the parties to approach the High Courts for such a challenge.”

The Supreme Court after considering the aforesaid observation of the Authority, felt that it could not hold that an advance ruling of the Authority can only be challenged under Article 136 of the Constitution before this Court and not under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others [(1997) 3 SCC 261], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions was part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, to hold that an advance ruling of the authority should not be permitted to be challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution would be to negate a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court appreciated the apprehension of the Authority that a writ petition may remain pending in the High Court for years, first before a learned Single Judge and thereafter in Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench and as a result the object of Chapter XIX-B of the Act which is to enable an applicant to get an advance ruling in respect of a transaction expeditiously would be defeated. The Supreme Court, therefore, opined that when an advance ruling of the Authority is challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution, the same should be heard directly by a Division Bench of the High Court and decided as expeditiously as possible.

The Supreme Court accordingly disposed of the Special Leave Petition granting liberty to the petitioner to move the appropriate High Court under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court requested the concerned High Court to ensure that the Writ Petition, if filed, is heard by the Division Bench hearing income-tax matters and further requested the Division Bench to hear and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible.

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Company Law Settlement Scheme, (Jammu & Kashmir) 2012

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has launched the Company Law Settlement Scheme for the state of Jammu & Kashmir, as the non compliance of filing Balance Sheets and Annual returns is more critical there. The scheme condones the delay in filing of documents with the Registrar, grants immunity from prosecution and charges additional fee of 25% of the actual additional fee payable for filing belated documents under the Companies Act and Rules made there under. The scheme shall remain in force from 15.08.2012 to 14.12.2012. It applies to only Companies registered in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and foreign companies falling under section 591 of the act having their liaison office in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Applicability of Service Tax on commission payable to Non- Whole Time Directors of a Company u/s 309(4) of the Companies Act, 1956

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has decided that any increase in remuneration of Non Whole Time Director(s) of a company, solely on account of payment of Service Tax on commission payable by the Company shall not require approval of the Central Govt. u/s 309 & 310 of the Companies Act, even if it exceeds the limit of 1% or 3% of the profit u/s 309(4) of the Company, as the case may be, in the financial year 2012-13.
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Clarification on Para 46A of Notification No. GSR 914(E) dated 29.12.2011 on AS 11 relating to “ Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates”

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In view of the several representations from industry associations, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide Circular No 25/2012 dated 9th August 2012, clarified that Para 6 of of AS 11 relating to “Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates” and Para 4(e) of AS 16 relating to borrowing costs, shall not apply to a company which is applying clause 46A of AS 11.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16 dated 22nd August, 2012

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Foreign Direct Investment by citizen/entity incorporated in Pakistan. Press Note No.3 (2012 Series) Press Note No.3 (2012 Series) dated: 1st August, 2012.

Presently, a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan, is not allowed to purchase shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company under Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Scheme.

This circular permits, under the Approval Route, a person who is a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan to purchase shares and convertible debentures of an Indian company under FDI Scheme. However, the Indian company in which FDI is received must not be engaged/must not engage in sectors/activities pertaining to defense, space and atomic energy and sectors/activities prohibited for foreign investment.

RBI HAS ISSUED NEW MASTER CIRCULARS ON 2nd JULY, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 21st August, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments – Rationalisation of Form ODI

The circular has amended Part E & Part F of Form ODI by adding new items to the same. The amended new Form ODI is annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12 dated 31st July, 2012

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Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account, Diamond Dollar Account (DDA) & Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Account – Review of Guidelines.

This circular permits EEFC/DDA/RFC account holders to credit 100% of their foreign exchange earnings to the respective accounts. However, the sum total of the accruals in the account during a calendar month will have to be converted into Rupees on or before the last day of the succeeding calendar month after adjusting for utilization of the balances for approved purposes or forward commitments.

As a result, balances outstanding in the said accounts as on 31st July, 2012 together with balances accruing on and from 1st August, 2012 to 31st August, 2012, will have to be converted into Rupee balances on or before close of business on 30th September, 2012. Similar procedure will have to be followed for accruals to the respective accounts in subsequent months.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated 31st July, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA)- Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999.

This circular clarifies that, whenever a contravention is identified by RBI or brought to its notice the entity concerned by way of a reference other than through the prescribed application for compounding, RBI will continue to decide: –

(i) Whether a contravention is technical and/or minor in nature and, as such, can be dealt with by way of an administrative/cautionary advice;

(ii) Whether it is material and, hence, is required to be compounded, for which the necessary compounding procedure has to be followed; or

(iii) Whether the issues involved are sensitive/serious in nature and, therefore, need to be referred to the Directorate of Enforcement (DOE).

However, once a suo moto compounding application is filed, by the entity concerned, admitting the contravention, the same will not be considered as ‘technical’ or ‘minor’ in nature and the compounding process will be initiated.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 8 dated 18th July, 2012

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Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account

This circular states that the provisions of A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 124 dated May 10, 2012 will not apply to the Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Accounts. As a result, the RFC account holder can now retain 100% of his/her foreign exchange earnings in the said account.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 7 dated 16th July, 2012

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Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors (QFIs) in Indian corporate debt securities.

Presently, QFI are permitted to invest only in rupee denominated units of domestic Mutual Funds and listed equity shares.

This circular has revised the definition of QFI and permitted them to also invest on repatriation basis debt securities subject to certain terms and conditions. QFI can now invest up to $ 1 billion in corporate debt securities (without any lock-in or residual maturity clause) and Mutual Fund debt schemes. This limit shall be over and above $ 20 billion for FII investment in corporate debt. For this purpose, QFI must open a single non-interest bearing Rupee Account with a bank in India for investment in all ‘eligible securities for QFI’. As per the revised definition, QFI shall mean a person who fulfills the following criteria:

(a) Resident in a country that is a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or a member of a group which is a member of FATF; and
(b) Resident in a country that is a signatory to IOSCO’s MMoU (Appendix A Signatories) or a signatory of a bilateral MoU with SEBI.

PROVIDED that the person is not resident in a country listed in the public statements issued by FATF, from time to time, on jurisdictions having a strategic AML/ CFT deficiencies to which counter measures apply or that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies;

PROVIDED that such person is not resident in India;

PROVIDED FURTHER that such person is not registered with SEBI as a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or Sub-Account of an FII or Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI).

Explanation – For the purposes of this clause:

(1) “Bilateral MoU with SEBI” shall mean a bilateral MoU between SEBI and the overseas regulator that, inter alia, provides for information sharing arrangements.
(2) Member of FATF shall not mean an associate member of FATF.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 12th July, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Submission of Revised A-2 Form.

RBI has revised the purpose codes for submitting R-Returns by Banks. As a consequence of this revision, purpose codes in Form A-2 have also been revised. Annexed to this circular is the revised list of purpose codes along with Form A-2.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 5th July, 2012

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Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs). This circular states that RBI will permit buyback of FCCB under the approval route upto 31st March, 2013, subject to: –

a) The buyback value of the FCCB must be at a minimum discount of 5% on the accreted value.

b) In case the buyback is to be financed by foreign currency borrowing, all FEMA rules/regulations relating to foreign currency borrowing shall be complied with.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 137 dated 28th June, 2012

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Foreign Investment in India – Sector Specific conditions.

Annexed to this circular is the revised Annex A and Annex B of Schedule 1 to Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000. The revision has been made to bring uniformity in the sectoral classification position for FDI as notified under the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 1 of 2012 dated April 10, 2012 and FEMA Regulations.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 136 dated 26th June, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Rationalisation of Form-83.

Attached to this circular is the new Form 83. This new Form 83 has to be submitted to RBI from 1st July, 2012 for obtaining Loan Registration Number (LRN).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 135 dated 25th June, 2012

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Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered FIIs in Government securities and SEBI registered FIIs and QFIs in infrastructure debt.

This circular has increased the present limits for investment by FII and other foreign investors (Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Multilateral agencies, endowment funds, insurance funds, pension funds and foreign Central Banks) in Government Securities from $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion.
Conditions for investment in Infrastructure Debt Funds (IDF), within the overall limit of $ 25 billion, have been changed as under: –

  • The lock-in period for investments has been uniformly reduced to one year; and
  • The residual maturity of the instrument at the time of first purchase by an FII/eligible IDF investor must be at least fifteen months.

QFI can now invest in MF schemes that hold at least 25% of their assets (either in debt or equity or both) in the infrastructure sector, under the current $ 3 billion sub-limit for investment in mutual funds related to infrastructure.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 134 dated 25th June, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Repayment of Rupee loans.

This circular permits Indian companies in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector who have consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years to avail, under Approval Route, ECB for repayment of Rupee loan(s) availed of from the domestic banking system and/or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure, provided the companies are not in the default list/caution list of the Reserve Bank of India.

The overall ceiling for such ECB will be US $ 10 (ten) billion and the maximum permissible ECB that can be availed of by an individual company, based on its foreign exchange earnings and its ability to service, is limited to 50% of the average annual export earnings realized during the past three financial years. Draw down of the entire facility must be undertaken within a month after taking the Loan Registration Number (LRN) from RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 133 dated 20th June, 2012

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Annual return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets Reporting by Indian Companies – Revised format.

This circular contains the new format of the annual return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets that is required to be submitted by all the Indian companies which have received FDI and/or made FDI abroad (i.e. overseas investment) in the previous year(s) including the current year. This annual return has to be submitted every year on or before 15th July, 2012, directly by Indian companies to the Director, External Liabilities and Assets Statistics Division, Department of Statistics and Information Management (DSIM), Reserve Bank of India, C-8, 3rd floor, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (E), Mumbai – 400 051. The new form can be duly filled-in, validated and sent by e-mail to RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 132 dated 8th June, 2012 Money Transfer Service Scheme

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Presently, a single individual beneficiary can receive for personal use upto 12 remittances not exceeding US $ 2,500 each in a calendar year.

This circular has increased the number of remittances that an individual can receive from 12 to 30. Thus, an individual can now receive for personal use upto 30 remittances each not exceeding $ 2,500 in a calendar year.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 131 dated 31st May, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party – Online Reporting of Overseas Direct Investment in Form ODI.

Presently, although banks can generate the UIN online for overseas investments under the Automatic Route, reporting of subsequent remittances for overseas investments under the Automatic Route as well as the Approval Route, could be done online in Part II of Form ODI only after receipt of the letter from RBI confirming the UIN.

This circular states that, in the case of overseas investments under the Automatic Route, UIN will be communicated through an auto generated e-mail sent to the email-id made available by the Authorized Dealer/Indian Party. This auto generated e-mail giving the details of UIN allotted to the JV/WOS will be treated as confirmation of allotment of UIN, and no separate letter will be issued with effect from 1st June, 2012 by RBI either to the Indian party or to the Authorized Dealer. Subsequent remittances are to be reported online in Part II of form ODI, only after receipt of the e-mail communication/ confirmation conveying the UIN.

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AN ARBITRARY DECISION OF SEBI/SAT – overturns its own consistent interpretation and levies penalty

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A recent strange decision of SEBI, upheld by the Securities Appellate Tribunal leaves companies and others puzzled as to how at all securities laws should be interpreted and applied. Should, for example, a particular interpretation which is not only followed by SEBI, which itself confirms in writing as correct and is otherwise widely applied in practice without objection by SEBI, be overturned? And if such an interpretation which is almost certainly not harming any public interest and is well within the spirit and perhaps even the letter, should be so overturned and, moreover, a person severely penalised for it?

This is exactly what SEBI has done recently and the SAT has upheld such a decision (Order of SAT in matter of Hanumesh Realtors Private Limited v. SEBI dated 25th July 2012).

What was the issue?
The broad issue and background is explained as follows:

SEBI Takeover Regulations 1997 (“the Regulations”) require that a person who acquires substantial shares in a listed company or acquires control over it, should make an open offer to acquire shares from the public shareholders. A person already holding substantial shares can increase his holding without having to make an open offer by a small percentage only every year – normally upto 5%. This is called “creeping acquisition” in common parlance. For the purposes of the 5% limit holding not only the acquirer himself is considered but that of persons acting in concert with him is aggregated. To ensure that there is no misuse of the provisions, inter se transfer of shares amongst the persons acting in concert is allowed with certain safeguards.

In case of acquisition of shares by way of a fresh issue, a slightly peculiar situation arises on account of a calculation/mathematical issue. Take a situation where a person holds 40% of equity share capital of Rs. 10 crore. If he seeks to acquire another 5% in accordance with creeping acquisition provisions, and if he is accordingly allotted Rs. 50 lakh worth of equity shares, then his holding will increase only by 2.86% to 42.86%. The reason is that as his holding increases by Rs. 50 lakh, the equity share capital also increases by Rs. 50 lakh. Thus, his increased holding of Rs. 4.50 crore is calculated with reference to the equity share capital that has also increased to Rs. 10.50 crore. To enable him to increase his holding by 5%, he would have to be allotted equity shares of about Rs. 91 lakh, i.e., almost double.

Now, a further peculiar situation may arise when the acquirer group consists of more than one person. Unless shares are acquired by all the persons in the group in proportion of shares already held by them, there could be increase of holding of more than 5% by the acquirer and dilution of holding by those who do not acquire.

To continue the above example, let us say that the 40% or Rs. 4 crores was held by two persons – one holding Rs. 1.50 crores and another holding Rs. 2.50 crores. If shares are acquired by the person holding Rs. 1.50 crores, then his percentage holding increases from 15% to 22.09%, i.e., by 7.09%. However, the holding of the other person gets reduced by way of dilution from 25% to 22.91%. The overall holding of the two persons taken together, of course, increases to 45%, i.e., within the prescribed limits.

The question is whether the holding and the increase is to be considered individually or as a group. If it is considered individually, then the first holder may be deemed to have exceeded the limit of 5%.

Facts of the present case
The Promoter Group held 49.62% in the share capital of the Company. Further shares were allotted to a particular person in the Promoter Group. The overall holding of the Promoter Group consequent to such allotment increased from 49.62% to 54.59%, i.e., by 4.97% i.e., well within the prescribed limits. However, the individual holding of the person who was allotted shares increased from 36.62% to 42.87%, i.e., by 6.25% which is more than 5%. Needless to add, the holding of the other persons in the Promoter Group decreased by way of dilution. The question is whether such increase is to be considered on a stand alone basis or on a group basis.

SEBI had issued an interpretive letter in 2009 where SEBI had opined that if overall holding did not increase by more than 5%, there would not be any violation of the limits. To be fair, firstly, the facts in that letter were not identical to the present facts, since there was nothing on record to show that one individual’s holding increased more than 5% but was balanced by another person’s dilution of holding. However, the interpretation given was broad enough. Secondly, interpretive letters, in law, do have limited application and are even officially termed as “informal guidance”. Thus, one may not want to apply analogy of other laws such as tax laws where circulars of CBDT are given considerable weight. Still, in securities laws, a certain level of sanctity is to be given to such interpretive letters and SEBI ought to take a consistent view on the issue.

In another case, as explained in the SAT Order, SEBI even passed an adjudication order on similar principles. In that case, the holding of one acquirer increased from 0.43% to 28.22% ! In other words, he even crossed the 15% threshhold which would require an open offer to be made. However, because of non-acquisitions by other persons in the group, their holding decreased from 40.13% to 16.79%, thus the overall increase being from 40.56% to 45.01% which was within 5% limit. SEBI held that this was in consonance with law since the net increase was within 5%. Admittedly, the acquisition in that case was under the rights issue route, but the findings of SEBI were categorical enough to mean that such acquisitions through issue of new shares will be counted as a group.

However, in this particular case, SEBI took a stand and relied on a much earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Swedish Match AB’s case (Appeal No. 2361 dated 25th August 2004). In that case, there were two Promoters – an incoming foreign promoter who already held a substantial quantity of shares and the existing promoter. The incoming promoter acquired most of the remaining shares of the existing promoter and such shares were substantial in number. While deciding on the issue whether this resulted in an open offer or not, the Supreme Court analysed the provisions of Regulations 11 of the 1997 Regulations and held that the increase in holding can take place in three ways only. The acquirer may himself acquire or he may acquire through some other person or he may acquire alongwith other persons.

SEBI took a stand that this principle will have to be applied in the present case in the manner explained as follows. As soon as a person within a group acquires more than 5% shares, he will have to make an open offer even if the holding of the other person, solely on account of this mathematical peculiarity reduces and overall increase in holding remains within the limits. SEBI not only discarded its own decision and interpretation which were much later in date and consistent too, but also applied the above decision of the Supreme Court in perhaps what were different facts at least to a degree and peculiarity. SEBI levied a huge penalty of Rs. 1.87 crores on the party.

Aggrieved, the party appealed to SAT. Strangely, SAT focussed only on the decision of the Supreme Court and applying it, held that the legal position as now canvassed by SEBI was correct. It did not criticise SEBI’s stand of arbitrarily reversing its stand and then – to top it – levying severe penalty. However, SAT did reduce the penalty and while reducing it, it did take into account as part of the consideration, though not sole one, the mitigating factor being SEBI’s earlier decisions and stand. Though the penalty was reduced substantially to Rs. 10 lakhs, it is submitted that it sounds low only in comparison to the original amount. Otherwise, it still remains a substantial penalty considering, in my submission, the blameless act of the acquirer.

This decision and stand of SEBI places persons concerned with applying securities laws in a dilemma particularly since securities laws are often interpreted consistent with SEBI’s stand in practice. If SEBI takes a particular stand and also gives an interpretive circular in writing, it ought to honour it in future cases. And if it wishes to change the stand, a better view may be to give a clarification and in cases where other parties have followed the earlier stand, no action ought to have been taken. This is more so when no harm whatsoever could conceivably have been caused in the present facts.

The author has also observed in numerous other cases of acquisitions by way of issue of new shares, a similar position has existed though none of these cases were acted against. This would show that a particular practice was widely followed and the appellant had every reason to adopt it and could not be faulted particularly since no harm whatsoever could have conceivably been caused to any person.

It is also submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court could have been distinguished. That was a case of inter se transfer of shares between two distinct groups and the holding of acquirer as well as of the acquirer group both increased substantially and by more than 5%. Even the control of the company changed hands from joint control to sole control. The present case was not a case of inter se transfer of shares even if in theory one person in the group increased his holding and holding of the remaining, purely on account of dilution, decreased.

It may be mentioned that this decision is in respect of the earlier law, viz., the 1997 Regulations. Recently, the new Takeover Regulations, 2011 have been notified. Under the 2011 Regulations, it is now expressly stated that the increase in individual shareholding shall also be considered and even if the holding of the remaining shareholders in the group decreases, still, if the limits are exceeded qua a single shareholder, the open offer requirements would apply. However, it is submitted that this in fact would go to show that earlier this was not the case since otherwise, such an express provision was not required.

All in all, this represents an unhealthy trend by SEBI where persons concerned with compliance will always remain on edge as to whether SEBI would change its stand. The importance of interpretive letters – which officially of course is limited to the facts of the case and not binding interpretation of law – will further get diluted. SEBI’s stand appears almost vindictive and arbitrary, since this was a case where even if the matter was taken up for consideration, it was a fit case of not levying any penalty whatsoever while at same time laying down the law for guidance in the future for other persons. Let us hope that this decision is an exceptional decision influenced solely by the binding precedent of the Supreme Court and such arbitrary stand is not repeated in the future.

Avshesh Mercantile P. Ltd. and 15 others v. Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “F” Bench: Mumbai Before P.M. Jagtap (A. M.) and R.S. Padvekar (J. M.) ITA Nos. 5779, 5780, 5821, 6032, 6033, 6194, 6196, 6198, 6266 & 6611/Mum/2006, ITA Nos. 1427, 6742 & 7318 /Mum/2008 and ITA No.208, 210 & 1748/Mum/2009 Assessment Years: 2003-04 & 2004-05. Decided on 13.06.2012 Counsel for Assessees/Revenue: J.D. Mistry/ Subacham Ram

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Section 14A – No disallowance can be made (i) in the absence of any exempt income earned during the year; or (ii) if investment is also capable of generating taxable income.

Facts:
All the assessees in the present case were investment and trading companies. They issued unsecured optionally convertible premium notes of Rs. 1 lakh each. As per the terms of the said issue, the premium note holders could convert the said premium notes into equity shares of the company at the end of maturity period or redeem the same at any time after the end of three years from the date of allotment. In case of early redemption, the premium note holders were entitled to a proportionate premium. During the year under consideration, the premium so paid was claimed by the assessee as deduction being allowable as business expenditure.

The AO found that the amount received by the assessee on issue of premium notes was utilised for making investment in the purchase of shares of Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (‘RUPL’) the income arising there from was exempt u/s 10(23G). As the expenditure incurred was for the purpose of earning exempt income, the AO held that the premium paid on redemption of premium notes was liable to be disallowed u/s 14A. He further held that the fact that no exempt income in the form of dividend was actually earned by the assessee in the year under consideration was not relevant. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Rajendra Prasad Moody 115 ITR 519. As regards the assessee’s contention that the premium paid on redemption of premium notes was the expenditure incurred for the purpose of its business which should be allowed u/s 36(1)(iii), the AO observed that even though making of investment in shares was the object contained in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the assessee companies, the same alone was not a conclusive yardstick to ascertain the nature of business activity carried on by the assessee in the year under consideration. Further, he noted that there was no cogent material to support and substantiate the case of the assessees that making of investments in the shares of RUPL was a part of their business activities.

On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the disallowance made by the AO. He noted that the entire income credited to Profit and Loss account was assessable to tax under the head “Income from other sources” by virtue of section 56(2)(i). Accordingly, he held that the investments in securities made by the assessees were held by them as investment and not as a trading asset. Hence, the expenditure incurred on payment of premium on redemption was not the expenditure incurred for the purpose of business. He held that the premium paid on redemption of premium notes, which had been utilised by the assessee for making investment in shares/ debentures of RUPL was allowable as deduction only against interest/dividend income received from RUPL and such income being totally exempt from tax u/s 10(23G), the premium paid was rightly disallowed u/s 14A by the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and contended that the assessee was not in the business of investment and the investment made in RUPL was only to earn dividend and for no other consideration. It was further contended that even otherwise, it makes no difference as far as disallowance of redemption premium u/s 14A was concerned, as the same was the expenditure incurred in relation to earning of exempt income. As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee that the investment in shares had the potential of earning taxable income also, it was submitted that this aspect will not preclude the applicability of law u/s 14A as has been held by the Mumbai tribunal in the case of ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P) Ltd. (2008) 119 TTJ (Mum) (SB) 289. Regarding the argument of assessee that there being no exempt income earned by the assessees in the year under consideration, no disallowance of expenditure u/s 14A could be made, the revenue contended that it was wrong to claim that there should be tax free income in the same year for invoking the provisions of section 14A. In support of this contention, it placed reliance on the following decisions :

1. Everplus Securities & Finance Ltd. v. DCIT 102 TTJ (Del) 120.

2. Harsh Krishnakant Bhatt v. ITO 85 TTJ (Ahd.) 872.

3. ITO v. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. 117 ITD 169.

4. M/s Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO and Others ITA No.87/ Del/2008 & ITA No.4788/Del/2007.

5. Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT 328 ITR 81(Bom.).

Held:
The tribunal noted that the proceeds of premium notes on which the impugned redemption premium was paid by the assessee had been invested in the shares/debentures of RUPL and although the dividend income and income from long term capital gain from the said investment was exempt from tax u/s 10(23G), perusal of the Notification issued u/s 10(23G) showed that such exemption was initially granted only for the specific period i.e. assessment year 1999-2000 to 2001-2002 which was further extended upto assessment year 2004-05 subject to satisfaction of certain conditions. Keeping in view all these uncertainties and contingencies, the tribunal agreed with the contention of the assessee that the premium paid by the assessee on redemption of premium notes utilised for making investment in the shares/debentures of RUPL cannot be regarded as expenditure incurred, exclusively in relation to earning of exempt income so as to invoke the provisions of section 14A. It further noted that the said investment had the potential of generating taxable income also in the form of short term capital gains etc.

As the issue involved in the present cases as well as all the material facts relevant thereto were similar to that of the case of Delite Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. ((ITA No.2983/M/2005)), which was confirmed by the Bombay high court, the tribunal followed the said decision and deleted the disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the learned CIT(A). As regards the case laws cited by the revenue, it observed that in none of those cases, the facts involved were similar to the case of the present assessees in as much as the investment made therein was not found to be capable of earning taxable as well as exempt income which was actually not earned by the assessee in the relevant period as were the facts of the case of the assessees.

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Global PE biggies put India story on hold

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“We stay away from places that have impossible governments and impossible tax regimes, which means S ayo n a r ato India,” TPG Capital founder-partner David Bonderman said recently, tearing into the country’s investment attractiveness. Bonderman, among the most influential private equity (PE) investors, said publicly what his peers quipped behind the scenes: India is possibly the least attractive of the emerging markets for PE, right now.

“Global investor confidence has been shaken badly even as India vies with not China, but Indonesia, Vietnam and South Africa for capital”, said Wilfried Aulbur, managing partner, Roland Berger, a global management consulting firm. “Private equity mostly made growth capital investments for minority stakes in Indian companies. They have had little influence on the strong promoter-driven businesses, and hardly managed what they usually do in western markets to improve return on investments,” he added.

(Source: Times of India dated 26-07-2012)

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HDFC Bank is now one of the most valuable in the world

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For most banks across the globe, the past five years have been a battle for survival with many falling by the wayside and others becoming wards of the state. In late 2008, India was also not immune with ICICI Bank, the nation’s second largest, experiencing some jitters. But one lender which has remained immune to the troubles swirling around the sector is HDFC Bank.

With a market capitalisation of Rs 1,38,469 crore (or $24.88 billion), HDFC Bank has surpassed the biggest lender in the nation – State Bank of India – which has deposits that are almost six times that of the private lender.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 01-08-2012)

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Larsen & Toubro Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Operating Cycle for current and non-current classification

Operating Cycle for the business activities of the company covers the duration of the specific project/contract/product line/service including the defect liability period, wherever applicable and extends upto the realization of receivables (including retention monies) within the agreed credit period normally applicable to the respective lines of business.

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Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Basis for Preparation of Accounts

All assets & liabilities have been classified as current & non – current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of services and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as 12 months for the purpose of current and non-current classification of assets & liabilities.

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Hindustan Unilever Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Basis for preparation of accounts

All assets and liabilities have been classified as current or non-current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of products and the time between acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as 12 months for the purpose of current/non-current classification of assets and liabilities

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GRASIM Industries Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Classification of Assets and Liabilities as Current and Non-Current

All assets and liabilities are classified as current or non-current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of products and the time between the acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, 12 months has been considered by the Company for the purpose of current – noncurrent classification of assets and liabilities.

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Bajaj Electricals Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Basis of Preparation
All assets and liabilities have been classified as current or non-current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of products and the time between the acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as 12 months for the purpose of current or noncurrent classification of assets and liabilities.
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GAPS in GAAP – Borrowing costs – PAra 4(e) of as 16

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The Genesis
Paragraph 4(e) of AS-16 Borrowing Costs has caused a lot of agony to Indian entities and is a highly debated and contentious issue, as exchange volatility shows no sign of cooling in India. In this article, we will try and understand the genesis of the problem, the theory of Interest Rate Parity (IRP), global interpretation on 4(e), linkage with paragraph 46 and 46A and analyse issues and provide author’s view on those issues. This article deliberately avoids the issue of derivatives which are used as hedges against the foreign currency (FC) borrowings, because it would have made the article unduly long and complex.

AS 16 requires borrowing costs incurred on construction of qualifying assets to be capitalised. Paragraph 4 of AS 16 contains an inclusive list of what borrowing costs may include. Sub-clause (e) of Paragraph 4 states: “exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs”. This requirement is explained in the Standard with the help of an illustration which is also reproduced below.

Illustration in AS-16 on exchange differences that are regarded as an adjustment to interest cost

XYZ Ltd. has taken a loan of $ 10,000 on 1st April, 20X3, for a specific project at an interest rate of 5% p.a., payable annually. On 1st April, 20X3, the exchange rate between the currencies was Rs. 45 per $. The exchange rate, as at 31st March, 20X4, is Rs 48 per $. The corresponding amount could have been borrowed by XYZ Ltd. in local currency at an interest rate of 11 % per annum as on 1st April, 20X3.

The following computation would be made, to determine the amount of borrowing costs for the purposes of paragraph 4(e) of AS 16:

i. Interest for the period = $ 10,000 × 5% × Rs. 48 $= Rs. 24,000.
ii. Increase in the liability towards the principal amount = $ 10,000 × (48-45) = Rs. 30,000.
iii. Interest that would have resulted if the loan was taken in Indian currency = $ 10000 × 45 × 11% = Rs. 49,500
iv. Difference between interest on local currency borrowing and foreign currency borrowing = Rs. 49,500 – Rs. 24,000 = Rs. 25,500

Therefore, out of Rs. 30,000 increase in the liability towards principal amount, only Rs. 25,500 will be considered as the borrowing cost. Thus, total borrowing cost would be Rs. 49,500 being the aggregate of interest of Rs. 24,000 on foreign currency borrowings [covered by paragraph 4(a) of AS 16] plus the exchange difference to the extent of difference between interest on local currency borrowing and interest on foreign currency borrowing of Rs. 25,500. Thus, Rs.49,500 would be considered as the borrowing cost to be accounted for as per AS 16 and the remaining Rs. 4,500 would be considered as the exchange difference to be accounted for as per Accounting Standard (AS) 11, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates.

In the above example, if the interest rate on local currency borrowings is assumed to be 13% instead of 11%, the entire exchange difference of Rs. 30,000 would be considered as borrowing costs, since in that case the difference between the interest on local currency borrowings and foreign currency borrowings [i.e., Rs. 34,500 (Rs. 58,500 – Rs. 24,000)] is more than the exchange difference of Rs. 30,000. Therefore, in such a case, the total borrowing cost would be Rs. 54,000 (Rs. 24,000 + Rs. 30,000) which would be accounted for under AS 16 and there would be no exchange difference to be accounted for under AS 11.

Author’s Note: As can be seen, the illustration is oversimplified and does not provide adequate guidance; for example, there is no guidance with respect to:

1. Whether an entity has a choice to assess the interest rate differential when the loan is drawn or at each reporting date? From the illustration, it appears that the interest rate differential is based on the date when the loan is drawn and not at each reporting date.
2. How is interest rate differential determined in the case of a floating rate loan?
3. Are exchange gains required to be considered as an adjustment to borrowing costs?
4. How to deal with exchange gains that follow a period of exchange losses? In such cases, should the exchange gains be treated as an adjustment to exchange losses or should it be fully recognised in the P&L?
5. Consider an example, where the interest rate differential at inception of borrowing is Rs. 1,000 and at the end of the reporting period there is exchange gain of Rs. 5,000. In this scenario, the author believes that it would be appropriate to conclude that there is no interest rate differential; rather than considering borrowing cost of Rs. 1,000 and notionally increasing the exchange gain by Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 6,000.

Why is para 4(e) a problem?
The idea of including paragraph 4(e) in AS-16 was a simple one. Indian companies borrowing in $ borrow at a much lower interest rate than borrowing in Indian Rupee. However, correspondingly because of the exchange rate movement, the $ loan liability increases, and results in the savings on account of low $ interest rates, being eroded. In a very simple world, and if IRP theory worked perfectly, then there would be a 100% offset. In other words, it is logical to see the exchange difference, as an interest cost to borrow the funds. Such 4(e) interest costs are allowed to be capitalised if they were incurred on the construction of a qualifying asset. 4(e) interest costs that are not incurred for the purposes of constructing a qualifying asset are to be charged off to the P&L account.

Companies that were constructing a qualifying asset and had borrowed in foreign currency are required to determine the 4(e) component, so that the same can be capitalised in accordance with AS 16 (4(e) component is capitalised only during the period of construction of a qualifying asset). Computing 4(e) was a problem, but was limited to situations where a qualifying asset was being constructed for which a foreign currency borrowing was used. 4(e) is now a much bigger problem, for two additional reasons.

1. AS-11 was amended to include paragraph 46 and 46A, which allowed an option of not charging foreign exchange differences on long term borrowings to the P&L a/c. The exchange differences could be amortised over the loan period, and if related to a loan for acquiring a capital asset, then the same should be capitalised as cost of the capital asset, even after the asset was put to use. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India issued “Frequently Asked Questions on AS 11 notification – Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules, 2009 (G.S.R. 225 (E) dt. 31.3.09) issued by Ministry of Corporate Affairs”. In the said guidance, it was clarified that 4(e) interest should not be treated as foreign exchange difference. Consequently, 4(e) component is to be (a) capitalised only during the period of construction of a qualifying asset in accordance with AS-16 (b) charged to the P&L in all other cases.

2. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs issued circular no 25/2012 dated 9th August, 2012 clarifying that paragraph 4(e) of AS-16 shall not apply to a company which is applying paragraph 46A of AS-11. The circular has withdrawn 4(e) with respect to paragraph 46A, but not with respect to paragraph 46 of AS-11. There are a number of questions with respect to the circular. For example, does it have a prospective or retrospective application? Is it a clarification or a substantive amendment? Will 4(e) continue to apply to companies that were in paragraph 46?

3. Revised Schedule VI requires 4(e) component to the extent not capitalised to be separately disclosed in the P&L a/c as part of borrowing costs.

IRP Theory

The IRP theory states that interest rate differentials between two different currencies will be reflected in the premium or discount for the forward exchange rate on the foreign currency if there is no arbitrage. The theory further that states the size of the forward premium or discount on a foreign currency should be equal to the interest rate differentials between the countries in comparison. This is explained with the help of an illustration below.

How well does IRP predict Exchange Rate Movements in India?

Not so well, is the short answer. Menzie Chinn says, “Uncovered interest parity (UIP) has been almost universally rejected in studies of exchange rate movements.” Paul Krugman says, “Like stock prices, exchange rates respond strongly to ‘news’, that is to unexpected economic and political events, and like stock prices, they therefore are very difficult to forecast.”

As per the IRP theory, in countries which have higher interest rates, their currencies should depreciate. If this does not happen, there will be cases for arbitrage for foreign investors till the arbitrage opportunity disappears from the market. The reality is sometimes exactly the opposite; as higher interest rates could actually bring in higher capital inflows further appreciating the currency. In such a scenario, foreign investors earn both higher interest rates and also gain on the appreciating currency.

In reality, predicting currency movement is crystal gazing as it is affected by numerous variables, other than interest rate differential. These variables are discussed below.

Balance of Payments (BOP): BOP play’s a critical role in determining the movement of the currency. It is the aggregate of current account and capital account of a country like an external account of a country with other countries. Current account surplus means exports are more than imports and current account deficit means imports are more than exports. Eventually, import/export prices find equilibrium. Hence, the currency of a current account surplus country should appreciate. Likewise for current account deficit countries, the currency should depreciate. Growing Indian economy has led to widening of current account deficit, as imports of both oil and non-oil have risen. Gold imports have also added to the problem in India. Capital flows also play a crucial role in the BOP situation of India. Currency appreciates when there are huge capital inflows and depreciates when the capital inflows dry up and the current account deficit is also high. During the Lehman crisis, capital flows shrunk sharply from a high of $106.6 billion in 2007-8 to just $6.8 billion in 2008-09 and led to sharp depreciation of the rupee from around Rs. 39.9 per $ to Rs. 51.9 per $.

Inflation: Higher inflation leads to central banks keeping interest rates high, which invites foreign capital on account of interest rate arbitrages. This could lead to further appreciation of the currency. However, one needs to make a distinction between high inflation over a short term versus a long term. If inflation is short-term, foreign investors see inflation as a temporary problem and continue to invest in that economy. If inflation is sticky, it leads to overall worsening of the economy, capital flows and exchange rate. For almost two years now, inflation in India has been very high and persistent, resulting in a highly depreciating rupee. The present situation is different from the situation in 2007-08 when despite high inflation and high interest rates, capital inflows were abundant. This was because markets believed that inflation was not a structural problem.

Fiscal Deficit: Fiscal deficits play a key role in the determination of exchange rates. Higher deficits imply that government might resort to using foreign exchange reserves to fund its deficit. This leads to lowering of the reserves followed by speculation on the currency. If the government does not have adequate reserves, fall in the currency is imminent. In India, higher fiscal deficits have also played a role in shaping expectations over the currency rate. When the fiscal deficits are high, investors become nervous, reducing the capital inflows into the country.

Global economic conditions: In times of high uncertainty as seen lately, most currencies usually depreciate against US Dollar as it is seen as a safe haven currency. The South East Asian crisis and the recent Euro crisis stand evidence to that. Currently, the markets believe that the dollar is safer than the euro, given the economic problems of the euro zone. Global economic conditions have significantly impacted exchange rates in India.

Lack of reforms: This has further made investors negative over the Indian economy and coupled with global uncertainty, has put pressure on the Indian Rupee.

Speculation: There has been a fall of 22.7 % (in value of rupee against dollar) in four months – from Rs. 44.35 in end July 2011 to Rs. 54.4 on 31st December, 2011. Importers, having been lulled into complacency by the rupee’s appreciation earlier, rush to cover their exposures, thus driving up dollar demand. Exporters hold on to their earnings in foreign currency in the hope of a further fall in the rupee.

Measures by RBI : They have also made marginal impact in terms of arresting a downslide on the rupee. However, this is a short term measure.

Hence, even over a longer term, multiple factors determine an exchange rate with each one playing an important role over time. In a calm and stable world, IRP theory may work. Unfortunately, this is never the case. Exchanges rates behave erratically, and are caused by numerous factors other than interest rate differentials. Consequentially, exchange losses may represent more or less matching interest rate differential in a few cases only. In India, experience is that, exchange losses may be far more than the interest rate differential when rupee is sliding down and in other cases, there may be a huge exchange gain in which case, the interest rate differential would have had little or no impact on the exchange rate. Much would depend on when the borrowings took place and the exchange rate movement from thereon till redemption of the loan.

Author Sarbapriya Ray in the paper “Testing the Validity of Uncovered IRP in India” concludes as follows – “One vital potential issue determining the exchange rate is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is a typical subject of international finance, a critical building block of most theoretical models, and a miserable empirical failure. Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) states that the nominal interest rate differential between two countries must be equal to expected change in the exchange rate. In other words, if UIP condition holds, then high yield currencies should be expected to depreciate. The article attempts to test the validity of uncovered interest rate parity based on a theoretical formulation in line with economic theory. Although KPSS test suggests that excess return series are in stationary process, excess return curve shows erratic behaviour during some months of our study period (showing negative trend) which automatically excludes the possibility for the UIP to hold. The UIP regression estimate indicates that there is no statistically significant evidence that suggests the uncovered interest rate parity to hold during January, 2006 –July, 2010 for domestic interest rate (weighted average call money rate).This indicates that interest rate spread is a very poor predictor of exchange rate yields. Thus, the UIP hypothesis fails in India.”

Position on para 4(e) under IFRS taken by global firms

Under IFRS, paragraph 6(e) of IAS 23 Borrowing Costs, has the same requirement as 4(e) of AS-16. However, the illustration contained in 4(e) and reproduced in this article is not contained in IAS 23. The global big accounting firms have different interpretation on 6(e). Interestingly, the IASB is seized of this matter but has decided not to provide guidance. The International Financial Reporting Interpretation Committee (IFRIC) acknowledges that judgment will be required in its application.

Ernst & Young1

Borrowings in one currency may have been used to finance a development the costs of which are incurred primarily in another currency, e.g. a US dollar loan financing a Russian rouble development. This may have been done on the basis that, over the period of the development, the cost, after allowing for exchange differences, was expected to be less than the interest cost of an equivalent rouble loan.

We, however, consider that, as exchange rate movements are largely a function of differential interest rates, in most circumstances, the foreign exchange differences on directly attributable borrowings will be an adjustment to interest costs that can meet the definition of borrowing costs. Care will have to be taken if there is a sudden fluctuation in exchange rates that cannot be attributed to changes in interest rates. In such cases we believe that a practical approach is to cap the exchange differences taken as borrowing costs at the amount of borrowing costs on functional currency equivalent borrowings.

In theory, foreign exchange rates and interest rates are related and, as such, it is fair to assume that any changes in foreign exchange rates reflect changes in the interest rate. On this basis, all of the foreign exchange gain or loss on foreign currency borrowings would be considered as part of the borrowing costs on the borrowing. But recently, this argument has not been holding true, with many other factors impacting the relationship between foreign exchange rates and interest rates. Accordingly, it is not necessarily safe to assume that all of the foreign exchange gains or losses on foreign currency borrowings are an adjustment to income. Take the following two examples Entity A’s functional currency is euro, and it borrows £1,000 on 1st January 2009 for one year at a fixed interest rate of 5% to fund the construction of an asset. The spot exchange rate at this date is € 1.5:£1. At 31st December 2009, the exchange rate is €1.1:£1. The entity has incurred a foreign currency gain of €400, while interest costs (assuming they were paid throughout the year at the then spot rate) amount to €65. How much of the foreign exchange gain is included in the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation?

Entity B’s functional currency is euro, and it borrows US$1,000 on 1st January 2009 for one year at a fixed interest rate of 3% to fund the construction of an asset. The spot exchange rate at this date is €1: US£1. On 31st December 2009, the exchange rate is €1.4: US$1. The entity has incurred a foreign currency loss of €400, while interest costs (assuming they were paid throughout the year at the then spot rate) amount to €36. How much of the foreign exchange loss is included in the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation?

A number of possible approaches exist:

1.    Determine, at the date of entering into the loan, the equivalent interest rate on a local currency borrowing and use this as the borrowing cost to be capitalised. Let’s assume that, for both of the above examples, the interest rate on a €1,500 borrowing on 1st January 2009 is 7% (entity A), and the interest rate on a € 1,000 borrowing on 1st January 2009 is 4% (entity B). The amount of borrowing costs eligible to be capitalised by entity A would be €105, regardless of the movement in the foreign exchange rate. Entity B would be eligible to capitalise € 40 as borrowing costs. However, this ignores the reason for entities borrowing in a foreign currency i.e., that they expect it to be less expensive. In this case, the movement in the exchange rates has effectively generated an additional gain for entity A, which is also counter-intuitive.

2.    Establish a ‘cap and floor’ for the amount of foreign exchange gains or losses to be included in borrowing costs. The floor may be up to the amount that reduces the borrowing cost to nil. We do not believe that a net gain can be capitalised. In the above example, entity A would include €65 of foreign currency gains as an element of borrowing costs, resulting in a net nil borrowing cost. The cap may be the interest on a local currency borrowing at inception, as this reflects the relationship between foreign currency and interest at that time. In the above example, entity B would therefore include € 4 of the foreign currency losses as borrowing costs, resulting in a net borrowing cost of € 40.

3.    Determine a forward foreign exchange rate at the date of entering into the borrowing and use this to determine the amount of foreign exchange gains or losses that are eligible for capitalisation. Let’s assume in the above examples, the one year forward foreign exchange rates as on 1st January 2009 are €1.4:£1 and €1.1:US$1. The amount of foreign currency gains on the borrowing that entity A includes as borrowing costs is €10, regardless of the movement in the foreign exchange rate. Entity B includes €10 of foreign currency losses on the borrowings as borrowing costs. While this approach provides a consistent assessment of the relationship between foreign exchange rates and interest rates, it is by no means a perfect approach. There are many factors affecting the relationship between foreign exchanges rates and interest rates that cannot be adequately measured.

Management will need to carefully consider which approach they apply, to best reflect the relationship between foreign exchange rates and interest rates. However, the approach selected needs to be applied consistently and disclosed within the financial statements. Each approach also requires an appropriate information system to be in place to collect the relevant information.

PWC2

16.96 Capitalisation of borrowing costs includes capitalising foreign exchange differences relating to borrowings to the extent, that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs. The gains and losses that are an adjustment to interest costs include the interest rate differential between borrowing costs that would be incurred if the entity borrowed funds in its functional currency, and borrowing costs actually incurred on foreign currency borrowings. Other differences that are not adjustments to interest cost may include, for example, changes in foreign currency rates as a result of changes in other economic indicators, such as employment or productivity, or a change in government.

16.97 IAS 23 does not prescribe which method should be used to estimate the amount of foreign exchange differences that may be included in borrowing costs. IFRIC has considered this issue, but has not issued any guidance. There were two methods considered by the IFRIC:

  •     The portion of the foreign exchange movement may be estimated based on forward currency rates at the inception of the loan.

  •     The portion of the foreign exchange movement may be estimated based on interest rates on similar borrowings in the entity’s functional currency.

Other methods might be possible. Management has to use judgment to assess which foreign exchange differences can be capitalised. The method used to determine the amount that is an adjustment to borrowings costs is an accounting policy choice. The method should be applied consistently to foreign exchange differences whether they are gains or losses.

Deloitte3

2.1    Exchange differences to be included in borrowing costs.

IAS 23 includes no further clarification as to what is meant by the inclusion of exchange differences ‘to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs’.

It is clear that, not all exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings can be regarded as an adjustment to interest costs; otherwise, there would be no requirement for the qualifying terminology used in IAS 23:6(e). The extent to which exchange differences can be so considered depends on the terms and conditions of the foreign currency borrowing.

Qualifying interest costs denominated in the foreign currency, translated at the actual exchange rate on the date on which the expense is incurred, should be classified as borrowing costs. Although exchange rate fluctuations may mean that this amount is substantially higher or lower than the interest costs contemplated when the original financing decision was made, the full amount is appropriately treated as borrowing costs.

Some exchange differences relating to the principal may be regarded as an adjustment to interest costs (and, therefore, taken into account in determining the amount of borrowing costs capitalised) but only to the extent that the adjustment does not decrease or increase the interest costs to an amount below or above a notional borrowing cost, based on commercial interest rates prevailing in the functional currency at the date of initial recognition of the borrowing. In other words, the amount of borrowing costs that may be capitalised should lie between the following two amounts:

(1)    actual interest costs denominated in the foreign currency, translated at the actual exchange rate on the date on which the expense is incurred; and

(2)    notional borrowing costs based on commercial interest rates prevailing in the functional currency at the date of initial recognition of the borrowing.

Whether any adjustments for exchange differences are made to the amount determined under (1) above is an accounting policy choice and should be applied consistently.

KPMG4

4.6.420 Foreign exchange difference.

4.6.420.10 Borrowing costs may include foreign exchange differences to the extent that these differences are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs. There is no further guidance on the conditions under which foreign exchange difference may be capitalised and in practice, there are different views about what is acceptable.

4.6.420.20 In our view, foreign exchange differences on borrowings can be regarded as an adjustment to interest costs only in very limited circumstances. Exchange differences should not be capitalised, if a borrowing in a foreign currency is entered into to offset another currency exposure. Interest determined in a foreign currency already reflects the exposure to that currency. Therefore, the foreign exchange differences to be capitalised should be limited to the difference between interest accrued at the contractual rate and the interest that would apply to borrowing with identical terms in the entity’s functional currency. Any foreign exchange differences arising from the notional amount of the loan should be recognised in profit or loss.

4.6.420.30 When exchange differences qualify for capitalisation, in our view both exchange gains and losses should be considered in determining the amount to capitalise.

GT5

Exchange differences.
If an entity has foreign currency borrowings, to what extent are foreign exchange gains and losses eligible for capitalisation?

IAS 23.6(e) states that borrowing costs may include exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs. The standard offers no detailed guidance on how to interpret this. Accordingly, entities should develop their own detailed policy. As with any other accounting policy, the chosen method should be applied consistently and disclosed if significant.

Is it appropriate to treat all exchange differences on foreign currency borrowings as an adjustment to interest costs?

No. In our view, not all such exchange differences are adjustments to interest costs. Exchange rate movements depend in part on current and expected differences in local currency and foreign currency interest rates (the interest rate differential). However, other factors also contribute to exchange rate changes: a currency will tend to lose value relative to other currencies if a country’s level of inflation is higher, or if the country’s level of output is expected to decline or if a country is troubled by political uncertainty (for example).

Moreover, although exchange gains and losses relate to an entity’s foreign currency borrowings, such gains and losses are different in character to interest costs on those borrowings. In particular, it is difficult to argue that exchange gains and losses on the principal amount of a loan is an adjustment to interest costs. Exchange gains and losses on the accrued interest portion of the loan’s carrying value may more readily be considered an adjustment to interest costs (see below).

What is an appropriate accounting policy for exchange differences?

One acceptable and straightforward approach is not to include any exchange differences as adjustments to interest costs. IAS 23.6(e) states that borrowing costs may include exchange differences to the extent they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs – it does not therefore require such an adjustment. Applying this approach, interest costs on foreign currency borrowings include only the foreign currency interest expense converted into the entity’s functional currency in accordance with IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Currency Exchange Rates.

Should an entity wish to take account of exchange differences, the challenge is to identify the portion of overall exchange differences that are adjustments to interest costs. A reasonable and practical approach is to treat only exchange differences arising on current period accrued interest as an adjustment to interest costs. This approach considers the adjustment to interest costs as the difference between:

  •     the amount of interest cost initially recognised in the entity’s functional currency using the spot exchange rate at the date of the transaction; and

  •     the amount the entity has to pay on settlement translated into the entity’s functional currency using the spot exchange rate at the date of payment.

Using this approach, exchange differences on the principal amount of the loan are not included in the calculation of borrowing costs to capitalise.

Are any other methods available?
Yes, an entity might develop other models and techniques to determine the exchange differences to include in the calculation of borrowing costs to capitalise. However, in our view any such method should:

•    be consistent with the objective of IAS 23 to include borrowing costs that are directly attributable to a qualifying asset. Borrowing costs are considered to be directly attributable, if they would have been avoided had the expenditure on the qualifying asset not been made (IAS 23.10);

•    not result in negative interest costs; and

•    be consistently applied.

In our view it is not acceptable to:

•    include exchange gains in excess of the interest expenses incurred (i.e. to capitalise a negative amount); or

•    Capitalise only exchange losses, but credit all exchange gains to the income statement.

One alternative approach is to determine a notional borrowing cost based on the interest cost that would have been incurred, had the entity borrowed an equivalent amount in its functional currency. In effect, this approach treats a foreign currency loan as a functional currency loan with an embedded foreign currency exchange contract. The IAS 23 calculation is based on the notional functional currency loan.

Applicability of para 4(e) in different scenarios under AS 16

It would be fair to comment that the global practices being followed with respect to 4(e) are disparate. Even the guidance provided by the large firms is not consistent. A few of the large firms have debunked the theory of IRP, but most others show sympathy towards the determination of 4(e) component. Though sometimes the same terminology used by the large firms such as a “cap” and “floor”, have been used in different contexts and can be confusing. Fortunately or unfortunately, a large part of the debate in the large firms may be purely academic under AS-16, since unlike IAS-23 an illustration is included in AS-16. This resolves a lot of issues. Nonetheless, the illustration in paragraph 4(e) of AS 16 deals with computation of 4(e) adjustment in a scenario where the company takes foreign currency (FC) loan at a lower interest rate and incurs exchange loss on the FC borrowing. However, it does not deal with many other scenarios which the author has described in the foot note under the illustration.

Consider the following example. The company takes a FC loan at a lower interest rate and has exchange gain on restatement on FC loan. In this scenario, theoretically there should have been an exchange loss, but because the IRP theory does not work because of unusual factors, there is an exchange gain in certain periods. The question is whether one would notionally increase exchange gain so that a 4(e) component can be artificially determined. In this situation, the author believes that it may not be appropriate to further increase the exchange gain to consider a notional 4(e) charge. This is explained in the illustration below.

Entity A’s reporting currency is rupees, and it borrows US$100 million on 16th December 2011 for one year at a fixed interest rate of 2% to fund the construction of an asset. The spot exchange rate at this date is $1: Rs. 53.65. On 31st March 2012, the exchange rate is $1: Rs. 50.87. The entity has incurred a foreign currency gain of Rs. 278 million, while interest costs (translated using the average rate) amount to Rs. 30.48 million (Rs. 100 million

*    2% * 52.26 * 3.5/ 12). How much of the foreign exchange gain is included in the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation?

A number of possible approaches exist:
1.    Determine, at the date of entering into the loan, the equivalent interest rate on a local currency borrowing and use this as the borrowing cost to be capitalised, regardless of the movement in the foreign exchange rate. Let’s assume that, the interest rate on a Rs. 5,365 million borrowing on 16th December 2011 is 9%. Hence, the amount of borrowing costs eligible to be capitalised by entity A would be Rs. 140.83 million (Rs. 5,365 million * 9% * 3.5/ 12). In this approach, the movement in the exchange rates has effectively generated an additional exchange gain of Rs. 110.35 million (i.e., interest capitalised of Rs. 140.83 million minus actual interest of Rs. 30.48 million) for entity A, which is counter-intuitive.

2.    To recognise interest cost of Rs. 30.48 million and FC gain of Rs. 278 million. The FC gain is not notionally increased by Rs. 110.35 million to determine the 4(e) component.

3.    Establish a ‘cap and floor’ for the amount of foreign exchange gains or losses to be included in borrowing costs. The floor may be up to the amount that reduces the borrowing cost to nil because borrowing costs cannot be negative. It may not be appropriate to capitalise a net gain. In the above example, entity A would include Rs. 30.48 million of foreign currency gains as an element of borrowing costs, resulting in a net nil borrowing cost. The FC gain would be Rs. 247.52 million (Rs. 278 million – Rs. 30.48 million).

4.    There are other acceptable methods which are not discussed here.

The conclusion on the above illustration can be summarised as below.

 

 

 

Rs million

 

 

 

 

Method

Actual

4(e)

Exchange

Interest

component

gain

 

 

 

 

 

1

30.48

110.35

388.35

 

 

 

 

2

30.48

278.00

 

 

 

 

3

247.52

 

 

 

 


Discrete vs. Cumulative Approach

Paragraph 4(e) of AS 16 and explanation thereto explains computation of 4(e) adjustment for one year. However, it does not deal with a scenario where FC loan extends for more than one year and there is loss/gain in one accounting period and gain/ loss in the subsequent periods. Two methods seem possible for dealing with this issue.

Method A – The discrete period approach

4(e) adjustment is determined for each period separately. FC gains/losses that did not meet the criteria for treatment as borrowing cost in the previous year cannot be treated as 4(e) adjustment in the subsequent years and vice versa.

Method B – The cumulative approach
4(e) adjustment are assessed/identified on a cumulative basis, after considering the cumulative amount of interest expense that is likely to have been incurred, had the company borrowed in local currency. The amount of 4(e) adjustment cannot exceed the amount of FC losses incurred on a cumulative basis at the end of the reporting period. The cumulative approach looks at the project as a whole as the unit of account, ignoring the occurrence of reporting dates. Consequently, the amount of the FC differences eligible for identification as 4(e) adjustment in the period is an estimate, which can change as the exchange rates changes over periods.

Example
An illustrative calculation of the amount of FC differences that may be regarded as borrowing cost under method A and method B is set out below.

Particulars

Year
1

Year
2

Total

 

 

 

 

Interest expense in FC (A)

25,000

25,000

50,000

 

 

 

 

Hypothetical interest in

30,000

30,000

60,000

LC (B)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FC loss (C)

6,000

3,000

9,000

 

 

 

 

Method
A – Discrete Approach

Particulars

Year
1

Year
2

Total

 

 

 

 

4(e) adjustment – lower

5,000

3,000

8,000

of C and (B minus A)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FC loss (net)

1,000

Nil

1,000

 

 

 

 

FC loss (C)

6,000

3,000

9,000

 

 

 

 


Method
B – Cumulative Approach

Particulars

Year 1

Year
2

Total

 

 

 

 

4(e) adjustment

5,0006

4,0007

9,000

 

 

 

 

Foreign exchange loss

1,000

(1,000)

Nil

(net)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If a company is also preparing quarterly financial information, a related issue will arise regarding the approach that should be adopted while preparing quarterly financial statements.

Ind-AS 23 provides additional guidance on this subject as follows.

“6A. With regard to exchange difference required to be treated as borrowing costs in accordance with paragraph 6(e), the manner of arriving at the adjustments stated therein shall be as follows:

(i)    the adjustment should be of an amount which is equivalent to the extent to which the exchange loss does not exceed the difference between the cost of borrowing in functional currency when compared to the cost of borrowing in a foreign currency.

(ii)    where there is an unrealised exchange loss which is treated as an adjustment to interest and subsequently there is a realised or unrealised gain in respect of the settlement or translation of the same borrowing, the gain to the extent of the loss previously recognised as an adjustment should also be recognised as an adjustment to interest.”

Ind-AS seems to be taking a cumulative approach when exchange gain follows exchange loss that were treated as an adjustment to interest cost. However, Ind-AS provides no guidance when there is a reverse situation, ie exchange gains precede exchange losses. In the latter situation, it is possible to recognise the exchange gain in the P&L account and the exchange loss could be split into a 4(e) component; the remaining being accounted as a pure exchange loss. It may be noted that, Ind-AS cannot be applied mandatorily with respect to interpreting Indian GAAP, though in the author’s view it could be applied voluntarily.

To cut the long story short

•    The present AS-16 standard includes a clear illustration of how the interest rate differential will be determined. Therefore, entities will need to follow the same. However, as discussed in this article, the illustration does not deal with numerous situations, which are causing the problem.

•    Consider an example, where the interest rate differential at inception of borrowing is Rs. 1,000 and the exchange loss in scenario 1 is Rs. 5,000 and in scenario 2 is Rs. 800. There should not be a debate that interest rate differential in scenario 1 is Rs. 1,000 and in scenario 2 is Rs. 800. Given that 4(e) is clearly explained in the standard by way of an illustration, it seems highly inappropriate not to consider Rs. 1,000 in scenario 1 and Rs. 800 in scenario 2 as interest rate differential (4(e) component).

•    Consider a third scenario where at the first year end after taking the FC loan there is exchange gain of Rs. 5,000 (but the interest rate differential at inception of borrowing is Rs. 1,000). In this scenario, the author believes that it would be appropriate to conclude that there is no interest rate differential; rather than considering an interest rate differential of Rs. 1,000 and notionally increasing the exchange gain by Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 6,000.

•    In the reporting period after the first reporting period, there seems to be a choice of either using the discrete approach or the cumulative approach. For example, the exchange loss in one period is followed by exchange gain in the following period. In the absence of any guidance under AS-16, either the discrete or cumulative approach is valid. Ind-AS seems to be suggesting a cumulative approach in some situations. That guidance is not mandatory with respect to interpretation of 4(e), but could be applied voluntarily.

•    All companies should disclose in the financial statements the policy followed to determine the 4(e) component, and this policy should be applied consistently.

Should para 4(e) under Indian GAAP be withdrawn because IRP theory does not hold good?

•    Para 4(e) is an issue of significance to India because of large volume of FC borrowings and high exchange rate volatility.

•    It is quite clear from the many research papers that the uncovered IRP theory does not hold good.

•    The global guidance and practices followed are inconsistent and disparate and many have debunked the IRP theory. IFRIC has refused to provide any guidance, citing that it is a judgmental matter.

•    Capitalisation of borrowing cost on qualifying asset itself is not a good idea, because it is a consequence of how the asset is funded (whether from equity or borrowing?) and therefore provides an unnecessary arbitrage.
By adding 4(e) component to the definition of borrowing cost, is like adding one disputed theory on top of another disputed theory. That makes matters worse.

•    Paragraph 46 and 46A of AS-11 were founded on the belief that exchange rates will either revert back to the original or will, in the medium to long term, reflect interest rate differential (stable forward points reflecting interest differences between two countries). By allowing amortisation of exchange differences, what is achieved is a smoothing of the exchange differences that would be similar to recognising interest rate differentials over the period of the FC loan.

•    On account of various arguments made in this paper, the author believes that 4(e) should be withdrawn. Along with 4(e); paragraph 46 & 46A of AS-11 should also be withdrawn, as they are founded on similar belief. The belief that exchange rates will either revert back to the original or will reflect the interest rate differential for the medium to long term, is a preposterous assumption and unproven by empirical evidence. If one were to do a backward testing, the assumption may hold good in a few cases, as a matter of co-incidence, rather than on the basis of a proven theory. The world nor India, is or ever will be calm and stable. If we agree to this then we should withdraw 4(e) and paragraph 46 and 46A of AS-11.

•    The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued has Circular No 25/2012 dated 9th August 2012 with-drawing 4(e) with respect to paragraph 46A, but not with respect to paragraph 46. The author’s suggestion is that 4(e) should be fully withdrawn along with paragraph 46 and 46A of AS-11.

Armayesh Global v ACIT(2012) 21 taxmann.com 130 (Mum) Articles 7, 13 of India-UK DTAA; Sections 5, 9, 40(a)(i), 195 of I T Act Asst Year: 2007-08 Decided on: 4 May 2012 Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) & V. Durga Rao (JM)

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(i) Since the services were rendered outside India, section 5 could not be applied to commission and further, section 9(1)(vii)(b) excluded fee payable for making or earning income from any source outside India and therefore, commission did not accrue or arise in India.
(ii) Since definition of ‘fees for technical services’ in Article 13 of India-UK DTAA did not include managerial services, the commission should be considered as business income and as the nonresident did not have a PE in India, in terms of Article 7 of DTAA, the commission could not be taxed in India.
(iii) As commission did not accrue or arise in India, tax was not required to be withheld and consequently, commission could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) of I T Act.

Facts
The taxpayer was engaged in the business of manufacture and export of hand embroidery and handicraft items. The taxpayer had exported certain items to several countries. The orders in respect of these exports were secured through, or pursuant to information received from, a non-resident commission agent. The agent was entitled to the commission upon execution of the export order.

CBDT Circular No. 23 dated 23rd July 1969, clarified that no tax was deductible on export commission payable to a non-resident for services rendered outside India. Relying on the said Circular, the taxpayer did not withhold tax on the commission paid to the non-resident agent.

The AO noted that as per the decision of the Supreme Court in R.Dalmia v. CIT [1977] 106 ITR 895, management includes the act of managing by direction, or regulation or superintendence. Since the non-resident agent involved himself in the broad gamut of services pertaining to client identification, soliciting, constant feedback and ensuring timely payments, the payments made to him were towards managerial services and not commission simpliciter. The AO also noted that Circular No. 23 relied upon by the taxpayer had been withdrawn by CBDT vide Circular No. 7 of 2009 dated 22nd October 2009. The AO thus concluded that such payments were ‘fees for technical services’ covered u/s 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 thereto and since the assessee had not deducted tax at source on the payments, they were disallowable u/s 40(a)(i) of IT Act.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows:

  • As regards taxability under I T Act

As per the agreement, the non-resident was only acting as an agent on commission basis and had not provided any managerial/technical services nor was there any evidence of its having provided any technical/managerial services. The agent was responsible for the timely payment from the customers and the commission was payable only after receipt of the payment from the customers. Since the services were rendered outside India, provisions of section 5 cannot be applied to the commission paid.

In terms of section 9(1)(vii)(b) of I T Act, fee payable for making or earning income from any source outside India is excluded and hence, it should be considered as business income. Since the services were rendered outside India, the amount paid is not taxable, as it did not accrue or arise in India.

  • As regards taxability under India-UK DTAA

The definition of ‘fees for technical services’ in Article 13 of India-UK DTAA did not include managerial services. Hence, the commission paid should be considered as business income. Since the non-resident did not have a PE in India, in terms of Article 7 of DTAA, the commission could not be taxed in India.

  • As regards disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) of I T Act

As the commission did not accrue or arise in India, tax was not required to be withheld and consequently, commission could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) of I T Act.

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SKF Boilers and Driers(P.) Ltd., In re (2012) 18 taxmann.com 325 (AAR) Sections 5, 9 of I T Act Decided on: 22 February 2012 Before P.K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) & V.K.Shridhar (Member)

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Commission payable to non-resident agent on export of goods is taxable in India in terms of section 5(2)(b), read with section 9(1)(i), of I T Act since right to receive the commission arose in India upon execution of the export order.

Facts
The Applicant payer of commission was an Indian company engaged in manufacture and supply of Rice, Par Boiling and Dryer Plants. Through two agents situated in Pakistan, the applicant received order for supply of plant to a Pakistani company. The Applicant exported the plant and, as per the agreement, the commission became payables to the non-resident agents.

The issue before AAR was: whether the income of non-resident agent can be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

According to the Applicant, though CBDT had withdrawn Circular No 786 dated 2nd February 2007, Section 5(2) and Section 9 of I T Act had not undergone any change and accordingly, the commission on exports did not accrue or arise in India. Hence, there was no tax liability in India.

According to the tax authority, income had accrued in India when the right to receive income became vested and hence, it was covered within the ambit of section 5(2)(b) of I T Act.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

Sections 5 and 9 of the Act thus proceed on the assumption that income has a situs and the situs has to be determined according to the general principles of law.
The terms ‘accrue’ or ‘arise’ in section 5 have more or less a synonymous sense and income is said to accrue or arise when the right to receive it comes into existence. What matters is the source of income of two non-resident agents. Though the agents rendered services abroad, right to receive commission arose in India when the order was executed by the applicant in India and hence, the place of performance of service was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining the situs of their income.
Following ruling of AAR in Rajive Malhotra, In re [2006] 284 ITR 564 (Delhi), in view of the specific provision of Section 5(2)(b) read with section 9(1)(i) of I T Act, the commission income arising to the two non-resident agents was deemed to accrue and arise, and was taxable in India.

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John Wyeth & Brother Limited v ACIT (ITA No 6772 & 6773/Mum/2002) Section 44C of I T Act Asst Year: 1981-82 and 1982-83 Decided on: 25 July 2012 Before P Jagtap(AM) & Dinesh Kumar Agrawal (JM)

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Laboratory expenditure incurred by the HO for R&D, which was attributable to the Indian branch was fully allowable and was not subject to the restriction in section 44C.

Facts
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in the UK, which was engaged in manufacturing pharmaceutical products. The taxpayer had a separate and independent research laboratory in India and the head office of the taxpayer had research laboratory in the UK.

While computing its income, the taxpayer claimed deduction in respect of laboratory expenditure incurred by the HO for R&D in UK, which was attributable to Indian Branch.

According to the AO, the R&D was centralised in UK and further, the R&D was connected with executive and general administration. Therefore, as it was merely general administrative and executive expenditure, it was subject to restriction u/s 44C of I T Act .

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the laboratory expenditure incurred by the HO for R&D in UK, which was attributable to India Branch was in nature of general administrative expenditure mentioned in section 44C of I T Act.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

  • The financial statements filed by the taxpayer show that the HO has separately shown executive or general administration expenditure and thus, the taxpayer has proved beyond doubt that the expenditure claimed did not include any executive or general administrative expenditure.
  • Though the taxpayer filled all the details, without examining the same or without pointing out any item of disallowable nature, the tax authority disallowed the said expenditure on the ground that it was in the nature of general administration and executive expenditure mentioned in section 44C.
  • In the absence of any contrary material brought on record by the tax authority, the laboratory expenditure could not be disallowed.
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Oberoi Realty Ltd (31-3-2012)

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Other Notes

The Company’s normal operating cycle in respect of operations relating to under-construction real estate projects may vary from project to project depending upon the size of the project, type of development, project complexities and related approvals. Operating cycle for all completed projects and hospitality business is based on 12 months period. Assets and liabilities have been classified into current and non-current, based on the operating cycle of respective businesses.

Mahindra Lifespace Developers Ltd (31-3-2012)

Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Statements

During the year ended 31st March, 2012, the Revised Schedule VI notified under the Companies Act, 1956 has become applicable to the company, for preparation and presentation of its financial statements. The adoption of Revised Schedule VI does not impact recognition and measurement principles followed for preparation of financial statements. However, it has significant impact on presentation and disclosures made in the financial statements. Assets & liabilities have been classified as Current & Non – Current as per the Company’s normal operating cycle and other criteria set out in the Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. Based on the nature of activity carried out by the company and the period between the procurement and realisation in cash and cash equivalents, the Company has ascertained its operating cycle as five years for the purpose of Current and Non-Current classification of assets & liabilities.

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Justice below poverty line – The Supreme Court laments that large sections of people do not have access to legal remedies

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Some appeals that reach the Supreme Court unravel such grim stories that judges find it difficult to write a decent finale.

The first one, New India Assurance vs Gopali, showed how insurance firms not only deny just compensation while raising technical objections but also tire dependents out through endless litigation. The road death in this case occurred in 1992. The victim’s aged parents, wife and five children had been seeking the insured amount since then. Looking into the case’s history, in which courts below had applied wrong formulae, the Supreme Court exercised its inherent, discretionary powers under Article 142 to award Rs 15 lakh. The tribunal had granted only Rs 2.55 lakh.

What is significant in this judgment is the insight into the judicial system through the eyes of the judges themselves. “If the claimants had been members of economically affluent sections of society,” the judges wrote, “they would have engaged an eminent advocate and taken steps for hearing of the matter at an early date, but they do not have the financial capacity and resources and energy to engage any advocate.”

How the cases of corporations and businessmen get priority over those of ordinary people is still a mystery to court watchers. Some time ago, there was a furore over bail granted to a renowned businessman late night on a Supreme Court holiday from a judge’s residence. In one instance, the then Chief Justice, who was in Argentina to attend a conference, constituted a bench to hear the bail application of a noted film star.

This is not the first time the judges wrote such jeremiad. In one judgment, D Navinchandra vs Union of India (1987), the then Chief Justice wrote: “My conscience protests to me that when thousands of remediless wrongs await in the queue for this court’s intervention and solution for justice, petitions at the behest of diamond and dry fruit exporters where large sums are involved should be admitted and disposed of by this court at such quick speed.”

The Supreme Court faces a dilemma. Though it has declared speedy trial as a fundamental right of every person under the Constitution, it has not quashed any trial on this ground. In an earlier judgment, it expressed its apprehension that if prolonged prosecution is made a ground for quashing the trial itself, many unscrupulous people might engineer delays to take advantage of this escape window.

The central government has argued that the court has no power to set a time limit for completion of criminal trials. This can be done only through legislation. The arguments are currently going on, and the court’s decision will affect thousands of people who are on bail or in jail awaiting trial. Though it is apparent that there is violation of a precious fundamental right, no clear remedy is in sight. Imagine, one of the first maxims taught in law colleges is: “Where there is a right, there is a remedy.”

(Source: Extracts from MJ Antony’s Column “Out of Court” in Business Standard dated 01-08-2012)

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Attacking tax havens – Instead of retreating, India needs to do more

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The era of bank secrecy is over,” declared a 2009 G20 communique — except it isn’t, apparently. While black money worldwide has likely decreased following amnesty schemes and stepped-up enforcement in the last three years, it is clear that it has not gone far enough. A just-released report from the non-governmental organisation Tax Justice Network, written by a former chief economist for McKinsey and Company, has used an innovative method to document the size of flows to tax havens from a set of developing and emerging economies. Unlike previous estimates, which relied on data surrounding “trade mis-invoicing” and were open to question, these estimates use Bank of International Settlements and IMF data, along with details available from source countries. The numbers, however, are staggering: anything between $21 and $32 trillion is stashed away.

What, therefore, has been the progress in closing these gaps in the global tax net — and has India contributed what it should have to the effort? It appears that the central problem has been a lack of co-ordination. Although the G20 spoke out on the issue after the global financial crisis, it then left individual countries to their own devices. What this meant was that countries like the United States could renegotiate treaties in their favour with much greater ease than could most other jurisdictions. The US, for example, has succeeded in getting Switzerland to hand over even the names of tax dodgers not covered by treaty, through threats to launch criminal charges against their banks. Other European countries have agreed to provide the details of all accounts held by American citizens to the US. Germany and Britain similarly pushed Switzerland into a treaty by which the latter will tax Swiss bank accounts for them, and introduce a withholding tax on future interest earned. India, while it has been renegotiating treaties, has simply not been that tough or threatening when it comes to forcing tax havens like Switzerland, Leichtenstein or the UK-owned Cayman Islands into giving it similar deals. This must change. At a minimum, the onus of demonstrating bona fides should be shifted to the depositor, as with depositors of other nationalities — instead of on to Indian tax investigators. Nor is it sensible to allow legal protection of the identities of tax evaders.

(Source: The Business Standard dated 25-07-2012)

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Communication with previous auditor

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We are trying to understand the principles of our Code of Ethics through the dialogue between Bhagwan Shrikrishna and Arjuna.

Shrikrishna (S) – Dear Arjuna, how was your vacation? Did you enjoy your outing?

Arjuna (A) – Yes, it was fine. But the last time you told me about the disciplinary action; and whenever I thought of it, my mood used to go off!

S – Why? Was it so frightening? I told you only broad principles. And if you are awake and alert, there is nothing to worry about.

A – When I was away, my manager informed me that we got a new audit and it was to be done urgently. I instructed him to start working on it.

S – Good. But did you write to the previous auditor?

A – Actually, I was at the hill station and was not getting the range on my cell. Still, I managed to speak to the previous auditor. He said, ‘Don’t worry; go ahead’. I have to sign the audit next week. Most of it is already done. I will ask the client himself to obtain his NOC.

S – Oh dear! Don’t take it so lightly. You cannot shift the responsibility to the client or anyone else. You and you alone have to write to him.

A – But the client has promised me. If you say, I have to write, I will give my letter to the client who will deliver it to the previous auditor

S – Hey Partha, never commit such a mistake. And remember, you have to do this before accepting the audit and not before signing it.

A – But we have already commenced the audit. It was urgent. Why waste time in such useless formality?

S – You are mistaken. It is not a meaningless formality. It is extremely valuable.

A – What purpose will it serve? It is the client’s prerogative to change the auditor. Why should anybody object?

S – Arjuna, you belong to a graceful profession – a learned profession. You are not a shopkeeper or a mere businessman. All professionals need to be united. Otherwise, client will take advantage and bring both of you in trouble.

A – How? Each year’s audit is a separate contract. What role has the previous auditor to play?

S – It is possible that the client’s dealings are not proper; or he may be lacking discipline. His records may not be straight. Previous auditor may be reluctant to sign.

A – So what? I will take every care and qualify the audit if I feel it necessary.

S – Precisely for this reason the client may have left the previous auditor. You will come to know from him as to whether one would be professionally comfortable signing this audit.

A – But if he objects to my accepting the audit, the client will suffer.

S – Why are you so much worried about the client who approaches you at the eleventh hour? There must be some hitch that the client may be hiding from you. Just ask whether he has paid the fees of previous auditor?

A – How will it matter? I will secure my fees and I know how to recover it.

S – Let me tell you that if you accept the audit when the previous audit fees are unpaid, that in itself is a misconduct. Let alone the other objections.

A – But the previous auditor may have charged exorbitant fees!

S – Remember, it is only the audit fees and not fees for any other services. The Guidelines from Council refers to undisputed audit fees.

A – How can one know whether it is disputed or otherwise?

S – It defines the undisputed audit fees. It means the fees appearing in the balance sheet signed by the auditor. Once it is so, it is deemed to be undisputed.

A – But what if there is cash method of accounting? Nothing will be there in the balance sheet.

S – Then you have to be extra careful. Check the records, write to the client, and write to the previous auditor.

A – What if the previous auditor objects? Or does not issue NOC for a long time?

S – Firstly, remove the wrong notion from your mind that you have to obtain an NOC. The relevant clause nowhere requires that. It only says, you have to communicate with him in writing; before accepting the audit.

A – Can I fax or e-mail? S – Not advisable. Council prefers and recommends a registered post acknowledgment due. RPAD! A – I will hand deliver to him.

S – Then you have to have a proof of delivery. I suggest, even avoid a courier. If RPAD is such a simple thing to do, why do you avoid it? This is typical of you CAs.

A – Wait. I will speak with my audit manager. (Speaks on cell phone). Good Lord! My manager informs me that the previous auditor has already mentioned in his resignation letter that he has no objection to anyone else taking up the audit! Moreover, it is only an internal audit and not statutory audit! I am saved!

S – Blissful ignorance! Mere mention in resignation letter is ‘not sufficient’. There is no substitute to your writing to him. There is no other way.

A – But what about internal audit?

S – Again a wrong notion. The rule applies to all types of audits be it statutory audit, tax audit, VAT audit, Concurrent, Internal, Revenue or Stock audit!

A – That is irritating. That is why our code is a burden.

S – No dear! Why don’t you take it positively? Perhaps, you will get valuable tips; or some advice of caution. Your efforts may be saved if the audit is risky. Or even client will dodge your fees as well! Don’t treat the previous auditor as your enemy.

A – Sometimes, I am confused as to who is a ‘previous auditor’. What if there was no tax audit for last two-three years?

S – Previous auditor does not mean the auditor for the immediately preceding year. It means the auditor who last held the same or similar assignment immediately prior to your appointment. Thus, it could be auditor appointed two-three years ago also.

A – Now that you are telling me all this, tell me, what if the audit is allotted by the Government? By CAG; or by Co-operative Department; or By RBI?

S – Still you are supposed to write. And who told you, you have to actually obtain NOC? You have to simply communicate, wait for a reasonable time.

A – But what if he objects?

S – You have to weigh the objections. If they are valid, you may consider whether or not to accept the audit. Or you may take them into consideration while reporting. But if the objection is regarding non-payment of undisputed audit fees, you are helpless. Otherwise, you will invite trouble for yourself.

A – Why does the Council not compel the auditor to respond quickly?

S – It has! In fact, the Council has advised all the members to respond to such communications quickly.

A – But previous auditor is closely known to me. I don’t think he will take it seriously for such a small fee.

S – I will tell you a real life incident. In one case, both husband and wife were CAs. The wife did the audit of a small housing society for two years. Thereafter the husband signed it. After a couple of years, there was a divorce proceedings between the two and the wife complained to the Council that the husband accepted the audit without communicating with her!

A – Ohh! This is alarming. Good that my Draupadi is not a CA!

S – Therefore, I am telling you, don’t take it lightly; and take it positively. It is in the interest of your profession.

A – Does it apply to tax assignments or certification work as well?

S – Legally speaking, ‘No’. But the Council recommends it as healthy practice.

A – Once a client came to me for advice through another CA. Thereafter, the client approached me directly. What should one do in such a situation?

S – Council recommends that you should ask the client to come through that CA; or at least inform that CA about it. That is a dignified behaviour.

A –   I am slowly getting what you are saying. If we ourselves do not respect our profession, who else will respect it? They will take us for a ride.

S –   Right. Communication with previous auditor indicates unity among professional brothers. You are well aware of what happens when brothers and cousins are not united.

Note :
The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 8 of the First Schedule which reads as under:

Clause (8):  accepts a position as auditor previously held by another chartered accountant or a certified auditor who has been issued certificate under the Restricted Certificate Rules, 1932 without first communicating with him in writing;

Further, readers may also refer to the Chapter VII of Council General Guidelines, 2008 dated 8th August, 2008 for guidelines on undisputed fees (refer page nos. 313  – 323 of the Code of Ethics publication January 2009 edition or the official website of ICAI).

Amendment to companies (fees on applications) rules 1999:

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Fee PAYABLE FOR DELAY IN FILING APPLICATIONS under s/s (2) of Section 233B of Companies Act i.e. pertaining to Appointment of Cost Auditor u/s 224 (1B) for Audit of Cost Accounts.
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Product or activity groups classification:

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has, vide notification dated 7th August 2012, listed the product of Activity Groups to be used in the cost Audit Reports and the in Compliance Report to be filed with the Central Government in compliance of the Companies Cost Accounting Record Rules and Cost Accounting Report Rules and other as listed in the Notification.
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PART A : Orders of CIC

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Information: Section 2(f) of the RTI Act

Information is defined u/s 2(f) as under:

“Information” means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.

Four orders on various points connected with “Information” are briefly reproduced hereunder:

The applicant in most of his queries, wanted to know about the reasons why the Central Vigilance Officers (CVOs) of a number of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) are not working/ functioning – he has assumed that the CVOs of PSUs are not functioning properly and wants the CPIO of the CVC to provide the reasons – the Commission held that the right to information cannot be used to seek either confirmation or rebuttal of one’s personal assumption, as in this case. Information has been defined in section 2(f) to mean any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars etc. Wherever a citizen seeks any information, it must be contained in some records or file or documents in the possession of the public authority concerned. Therefore, the response of the CPIO of the CVC and other CPIOs, as well as that of the Appellate Authority appears to be absolutely in order.

[Omprakash Kashiram vs CPIO, Central Vigilance Commission – Order dated 12.03.2012 Citation: RTI III (2012) 140 (CIC)] l

Appellant submitted RTI application dated 14th August 2010 before the CPIO, Prime Minister’s Office, New Delhi, seeking the details of functioning of Punjab and Sindh Bank through 44 points.

Decision Notice
The Commission notices that the Appellant has not asked for any specific information in his RTI Application and/or second appeal to the Commission, to be given by the Respondent Public Authority.

The Appellant was given an opportunity to explain the precise information sought, but has chosen not to attend the hearing. Also, the Appellant has not provided a copy of the Second appeal to the Respondents as per the RTI Act.

Thus, based on the submissions of the Respondents, the Commission is satisfied that information as held by the Respondents has been provided to the Appellant.

The Commission through this Order would also like to highlight the abuse of Transparency Act by the Appellant in asking voluminous questions under the Act (44 questions in this case) from the Public Authority and thereby dissipating the scarce resources of the Public Authority without meeting any larger public interest objective.

The Supreme Court in the case Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr v Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors/ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6454 OF 2011 [RTIR II (2011) 242 (SC)], has stated:

“Indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under RTI Act for disclosure of all and sundry information (unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities and eradication of corruption) would be counter-productive, as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of collection and furnishing information. The Act should not be allowed to be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquility and harmony among its citizens. Nor should it be converted into a tool of oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty. The nation does not want a scenario where 75% of the staff of public authorities spends 75% of their time in collecting and furnishing information to applicants, instead of discharging their regular duties. The threat of penalties under the RTI act and the pressure of the authorities under the RTI act should not lead to employees of a public authorities prioritizing ‘information furnishing’, at the cost of their normal and regular duties”.

The Commission, in the light of the above observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would like to inform the Appellant to ask a specific and limited question under the RTI Act, 2005 in the future and to use his cherished right given under the Transparency Act with greater responsibility.

[Kundan Kumar Sinha vs Department of Financial Services, New Delhi – Order dated 26.04.2012: Citation: RTIR II (2012) 185 (CIC)]

Briefly, the fact that emerged during the hearing is that the appellant was in the post of Sr. Assistant in the pay-scale of Rs. 6,300/-. The post of Jr. Engineer was advertised in the scale of Rs. 8,000/-. The appellant was selected for the post of Sr. Assistant. Before he joined, the post was down-graded to the scale of Rs. 6,300/-. The appellant after having joined the new post, has certain issues regarding promotion in that cadre.

Having heard the submissions of the parties, the Commission observes that the appellant has grievances regarding the pay scale. The RTI is not the forum for redressal of grievances. The appellant, in case he so desires, may file his grievance petition before the competent authority. As far as providing information under the RTI Act is concerned, requisite information as per record and permissible under the RTI Act has been provided to the appellant by the respondent.

[Vipin Prakash vs Airports Authority of India – Order dated 23.03.2012: Citation: RTIR II (2012) 150(CIC)]

 Background
The Applicant filed his RTI application on 24.12.2010 with the PIO Railway Board stating that his pay fixation has been done incorrectly and requesting the PIO to rectify the same. He also sought a copy of the pay fixation chart of his Junior, one Mr Ram, who is drawing a higher salary than him. The PIO provided some information, dissatisfied with which the Applicant filed his first appeal seeking the rule based on which his salary was fixed. The Appellate Authority disposed off the appeal on 6.09.2011 holding that information provided is complete and as available in the records. The Applicant thereafter filed his second appeal stating that he is not satisfied with the information.

Decision
The Appellant requested the Commission during the hearing to direct the public Authorities to fix his pay correctly. The Commission, however, holds that the Appellant is not seeking any information as available in the records and therefore the relief being sought by him cannot be granted. It is however, recommended that the PIO clarify to the Appellant about how his pay has been fixed based on the 6th Pay Commission recommendations and also to provide him with a copy of his pay fixation chart preferably by 15th May 2012.

The appeal is disposed of with the above recommendation and the case is closed.

[Rajendra Singh vs Bhavan, New Delhi-Order dated 11.04.2012:Citation: RTIR II (2012) 177 (CIC)]

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Bombay Money-Lenders Act

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Introduction
When one hears the term “money-lenders” what is the first image which comes to mind? In most cases, one would associate them with rural moneylenders giving loans at exorbitant rates of interest to poor farmers. While this is one important facet of the term, it would come as a surprise to many that even someone advancing interest-bearing loans to friends and relatives may come within the purview of this term under various State Money-lending laws, if it is the business of the lender to lend on interest. For instance, the State of Maharashtra has enacted the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946 for the regulation and control of transactions of moneylending within the State. Let us consider some of the important aspects of this Act.

Applicability
Section 5 is the main operative section of the Act. It provides that no money-lender can carry out the business of money-lending without a licence for the same. Further, the business must only be carried out in the area for which he has been granted a licence and in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence. Thus, any business of money-lending without a licence is prohibited by the Act. In order to constitute an offence under the Act, the money-lender must carry on business in an area outside of what has been permitted by his licence – Bhavarlal Pruthviraj Jain v State of Maharashtra, 191 Bom CR 878.

A money lender has been defined to mean any individual, HUF, company, AOP, etc., who carries on the business of money-lending in the State of Maharashtra. However, banks, any financial/other institution notified by the State Government are excluded from the definition of a money-lender.

One of the important restrictions under the Act is the maximum rate of interest which a lender is entitled to charge. This rate is notified from time to time by the State Government. Currently, the maximum rate of interest for loans to any person other than an agriculturist is 18% p.a. in case of secured loans, whereas it is 20% in the case of unsecured loans.

Business of Money-lending
The next question which becomes relevant is that what constitutes a business of money-lending under the Act? The Act defines it to mean the business of advancing loans whether in cash or in kind and whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business. Thus, two important facets are relevant – (a) there must be advancing of loans; and (b) such advancing must constitute a business.

What constitutes a business has not been defined and hence, useful reference may be made to various decisions under the Income-tax on what constitutes a business. The Supreme Court in the case of Distributors Baroda P. Ltd., 83 ITR 237 (SC) has held that when the Legislature speaks of the business of holding of investments, it refers to a real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity of investment carried on by the assessee for a set purpose, such as earning profits. If the investments are only made for a collateral purpose, then it cannot be considered as the business of the assessee. A similar reasoning may be applied to the activity of giving loans. Of course, it goes without saying that whether or not a lending constitutes a business, would be driven more by the facts and circumstances of each case. However, some of the relevant factors would be the quantum of loans, frequency and number of transactions, type of borrowers, rate of interest charged, security demanded, organisational set-up of lender, etc.

In the case of Gajanan v. Seth Brindaban AIR 1970 SC 2007, the Apex Court considered as to when could a person be considered to be a money-lender:

“The word ‘regular’ shows that the plaintiff must have been in the habit of advancing loans to persons as a matter of regular business. If only an isolated act of money-lending is shown to the court it is impossible to state that it constitutes a regular course of business. It is an act of business, but not necessarily an act done in the regular course of business……….

………….on its plain reading only prohibits the carrying on of the business of money-lending in any district without holding a valid registration certificate in respect of that district. It does not prohibit and, therefore, does not invalidate an isolated transaction of lending money. Such an isolated transaction seems to us to be outside the rigour of the prohibition.”

What is a Loan?
Advancing of a loan is the prime requirement for a money-lender. Hence, let us examine what constitutes a loan? The Act defines it to mean an advance at interest.

The term interest has been defined under the Act to include, any sum, in excess of the principal paid or payable by a money-lender in consideration of or otherwise in respect of a loan. However, interest does not include any sum lawfully charged by a money-lender for or on account of costs, charges, expenses under this Act / any other Law.

The following transactions are excluded from the definition of the term loan and hence, dealing in them would not constitute a business of moneylending for the lender:

(a) A deposit of money in any Bank or in a Company or a Co-operative Society. Thus, a Company accepting Public Deposits under s.58A of the Companies Act or under the NBFC Directions for Public Deposits would not be covered by the definition of loan.
(b) A loan to or by or a deposit with a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act
(c) Loan advanced by Government or by any local authority
(d) A loan advanced to a Government servant from a fund
(e) A loan advanced by a co-operative society
(f) Advance made to a subscriber or a depositor in a Provident Fund from the amount standing to his credit in the fund
(g) A loan to or by an Insurance Company
(h) A loan to or by or deposit with anybody incorporated by any law for the time being in force in the State
(i) An advance of a sum exceeding Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a hundi
(j) An advance made bonafide by any person carrying on any business not having the primary object of lending money. However, such an advance must be made in the regular course of his business. Whether or not an advance has been made bonafide in the regular course of business is a question of fact. (k) An advance of more than Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a negotiable instrument other than a Promissory Note. This is the most important exception.

Hence, every loan is not covered by the provisions of the Act, since an advance of more than Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a negotiable instrument other than a Promissory Note is excluded – Rajesh Varma v Aminexs Holdings, 2008 (3) Mah. L.J. 460. A negotiable instrument means one defined under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This Act defines a negotiable instrument to mean “a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer.” However, a Promissory Note is expressly excluded. Hence, only if the loan is given on the basis of a cheque or a bill of exchange it would be out of the purview of the Act.

Accordingly, any advance of more than Rs 3,000 made on the basis of a post-dated cheque as a security is out of the purview of this Act – Nandram Kaniram v N.B. Raahtekar, 1994 (1) Bom CR 28; Sitaram Laxminarayan Rathi v Sitaram Kashiram Koli, 1984 (2) Bom CR 92.

Consequences of Not Holding Licence

One of the important consequences of carrying on the business of money-lending without a valid licence is laid down in section 10. According to this section, no Court would pass a decree in favour of a person not holding a valid licence for any suit under this Act. Thus, a suit for recovery of dues by such a person is liable to be dismissed. Even a suit for winding up of a borrower company u/s. 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 would be barred in case the lender is in violation of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act. This principle has been laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of Marine Container Services (India) P Ltd v Rushabh Precision Bearings Ltd., 106 Comp. Cases 108 (Bom) which held as follows:

“I find no difficulty in so also construing section 434(1)(c) to hold that a petition for winding up u/s 433(e), r.w.s. 434(1)(a), would lie only if the debt was legally recoverable. The fact that the present is a company petition and under the Bombay Money-Lenders’ Act, no relief will be granted if the suit is filed would also make the debt unenforceable under the Act. It is no doubt true that a company petition is not a petition for recovery of dues from a company. Nevertheless, to wind up a company u/s 434(1) (a), the amount must be a debt which is legally recoverable. If the recovery itself is barred u/s 10 of the Bombay Money-Lenders’, Act, I am of the opinion, therefore, that in such a case the petition filed on the ground that the company is unable to pay such a debt, would also not be maintainable.”

If a money-lender who does not have a valid licence is in possession of the property of a loan debtor as a security, then the same can be requisitioned and delivered to the loan-debtor.

Several decisions have held that if a valid licence is not held by the money-lender, then the loan ceases to be a legally enforceable debt u/s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence, if the debtor pays a cheque to such a lender which subsequently bounces, then the lender is not entitled to file a criminal suit for the cheque bouncing u/s 138 – Mulchand Ramji Saiya v Premji Ratanshi Gangar, Cr. A. No. 5397 of 2010 (Bom); Nanda Dharam Nandanwar v Nandkishor Talakram Thaokar, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 733; Anil Baburao Kataria v Pursuhottam Prabhakar Kawane, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 802.

Further, the Act prescribes  a penalty for carrying on the business of money-lending without a valid licence. For the first offence, the punishment is a term of up to one year and/or a fine of Rs. 1,500. For every subsequent offence, the penalty is a term of at least two years.

Does the Law apply to NBFCs?

Banks have been expressly exempted. However, there is no clarity on whether or not the Act applies to NBFCs. Since money-lending is a State subject, different States and their High Courts have taken divergent views. One of the biggest bones of contention is that the State laws establish maximum rates of interest that can be charged by a money-lender whereas, the RBI has not established a ceiling on the rate of interest that can be charged by an NBFC. Some States such as Karnataka have specifically exempted certain NBFCs from the provisions of the Money Lenders Act, while there is a blanket exemption for all NBFCs in Rajasthan.

In Sundaram Finance Ltd, Special Civil Application No. 13163 of 2008 (Order dated 13th January 2010) and in Radhey Estate Developers v Mehta Integrated Finance Co Ltd, Special Civil Application No. 66 of 2010 (Order dated 26 April 2011) the Gujarat High Court ruled that the Bombay Money Lenders Act, as applicable to the State of Gujarat, does not apply to NBFCs which are regulated by the RBI.

However, the Kerala High Court has consistently been taking a view that even NBFCs are covered by the State money lending Act – Link Hire-Purchase and Leasing Co. (Pvt.) Ltd v State of Kerala, 103 Comp. Cas 941 (Ker).

Muthoot Finance Ltd has filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP. No. 14386/2010 on September 07, 2010) before the Supreme Court challenging the order of the High Court of Kerala approving the Order of the Government of Kerala notifying that provisions of the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958 which regulated and controlled money lending business in the state of Kerala, was applicable to NBFCs. The matter is currently pending before the Supreme Court.

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, whether it has complied with the aforesaid provisions in respect of any money-lending transactions executed into by it. In case the Auditor comes across a transaction which does not comply with any provisions of the above Acts, then he will have to consider whether appropriate disclosures should be made in the Notes to Accounts or whether the non-compliance is so material so as to warrant a qualification in his report.

He may insist upon a legal opinion to support any claim which the auditee is making. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that an audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is to exercise of ‘due care’ and ‘diligence’.

IS IT FAIR TO INVOKE PROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS SO RAMPANTLY?

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Introduction
All of us are aware that under the tax laws, any default or contravention of the provisions attract various types of consequences such as interest, penalty, fee (new section 234E), disallowance and even prosecution. Prosecution implies a criminal offence and may invite punishment of rigorous imprisonment. It is expected that while administering any law, the authorities should use discretion and a sense of proportion. The penal consequence should not be disproportional to the nature of default or offence. This is an elementary principle of jurisprudence. However, of late, there are notices issued rampantly invoking prosecution in terms of section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) even for delays in payment of tax deducted at source. This article proposes to bring out the unfair part of administering this provision.

Text of section 276 B
It is worthwhile examining the wording of the relevant provision closely. The text is as follows:

276B. Failure to pay tax to the credit of Central Government under Chapter XIID or XVIB

“If a person fails to pay to the credit of the Central Government,

(a) the tax deducted at source by him as required by or under the provisions of Chapter XVII B; or

(b) the tax payable by him, as required by or under,

(i) s/s (2) of section 115 – O; or

(ii) the second proviso to section 194B,

he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to seven years and with fine.”

Views:
Firstly, the very heading suggests that there should be a failure to pay the tax. Secondly, the placement of clause (a) in the section, makes it clear that it pertains to the tax deducted as per the provisions of Chapter XVII B – and not the ‘payment as per provisions of Chapter XVII B. Thus, failure to pay is on a different footing. Put differently, payment need not be within the time specified in that Chapter.

In short, the section contemplates total failure and not mere delay. As against this, even if the tax is already paid with interest, the notices for prosecution are being issued. The notices also mention the fact of prior payment! This then, is clearly against the wording and spirit of the provision.

It is pertinent to note that CBDT has issued instruction no. 1335 of CBDT, dated 28-5-1980 to the effect that prosecution should not normally be proposed when the amounts involved are not substantial and the amount in default has also been deposited in the meantime to the credit of the Government.

The Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, taking cognizance of this instruction, has already struck down the prosecution in the case of Bee Gee Motors & Tractors v ITO (1996) 218 ITR 155.

It is necessary to compare the text of section 276B with provisions of section 40(a)(ia). Section 40(a) (ia) contemplates a time limit for the payment of tax as well; and not merely the deduction as per Chapter XVII B. For mere delay, there are already adequate provisions viz. section 40(a) (ia) disallowance; 201(1A) – interest, 271 C and 221 – penalty. Thus, section 276B clearly applies to total failure and not a mere delay.

Incidentally, even under Service Tax, the Central Board of Excise & Customs has issued a circular no. 14/2011 dated 12.05.2011 stating that, “provisions relating to prosecution are to be exercised with due diligence, caution and responsibility after carefully weighing all the facts on record. Prosecution should not be launched merely on matters of technicalities. Evidence regarding the specified offence should be beyond reasonable doubt, to obtain conviction. The sanctioning authority should record detailed reasons for its decision to sanction or not to sanction prosecution, on file.” In its introductory paragraphs, it also mentions the purpose of prosecution stating that, “While minor technical omissions or commissions have been made punishable with simple penal measures, prosecution is meant to contain and tackle certain specified serious violations” It is all the more unfair that in certain jurisdiction, the limit fixed for prosecution is as low as Rs. 25,000/-.

Conclusion:
The harassment by Revenue Authorities has become a rule of the day. Notices contrary to the express provisions of law, spirit behind the law and in disregard of the CBDT instructions are clearly unfair and objectionable. A suitable clarification from CBDT will help avoiding redundant paper work and botheration.

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Unregistered Partition Deed – Is not admissible in evidence for any purpose. Stamp Act, section 35; Registration Act section 17(1)(b) and 49(c):

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[Lakkoji Mohana Rao v. Lakkoji Viswanadham & Ors AIR 2012 AP 110]

The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the elder stepbrother of the first respondentplaintiff. The petitioner herein, his mother and his elder sister filed a suit against the first respondent herein and his elder sister for partition of the family land and the house property, the said suit was decreed. In the Appeal, the District Court allowed the Appeal in part and accordingly final decree was passed and in terms of the said final decree, the properties were partitioned and possession was delivered to each of the parties. Since then, the parties are in possession of their respective allotted shares. The first respondent herein filed a suit alleging that the petitioner herein has been attempting to trespass into the land allotted to him. The petitioner herein has admitted about passing of the decree in earlier suit and also about the execution proceedings, but his main version was that there was no actual delivery of the properties as per the proceedings in execution though it was only a paper delivery. His main case is that after conclusion of the execution proceedings, the parties were not satisfied and the disputes had not ended; hence both the parties approached the elders and as per the advice of the elders, the properties were again partitioned on 14-03-2004 and since then, the petitioner herein is in possession and enjoyment of those properties.

The further case of the petitioner is that, the settlement entered into before the elders was reduced into writing in the month of March, 2004 and signed by both the parties and attested by elders.

The first respondent-plaintiff opposed the marking of the said document. His case is that the parties have partitioned their properties long back and the first respondent-plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties and that the alleged partition deed, dated 14-03-2004 is a forged one and created for the purpose of this case. It is also his case that the said document requires registration and it is not stamped, so it cannot be looked into.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the document sought to be filed was nothing but a partition deed creating right and title in the lands said to have been allotted to the parties. It is settled law that registration of document which is to be required u/s 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act makes the document inadmissible in evidence. U/s 49(c) of the Registration Act, no document required by section 17 to be registered, shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting the said property, unless it has been registered. Of course, the proviso says that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required to be registered, may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purpose of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registration of instrument.

The A.P. Amendment Act 17 of 1986 came into force with effect from 16-08-1986 and definition of ‘instrument of partition’ u/s 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act has been amended. Even a memo recording past partition is also brought within the definition of ‘instrument of partition’ by virtue of the said amendment. Thus, the argument that a document is merely a record of family arrangement, settlement or acknowledgment of prior partition and admissible for collateral purpose is no more available after the above amended provisions of Indian Stamp Act came into force. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is very clear and creates a clear bar and therefore unstamped document is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. Admittedly the alleged document i.e. partition deed is chargeable with duty. In view of the settled legal position i.e. the bar engrafted u/s 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is an absolute bar and therefore the document cannot be used for any purpose unlike the bar contained in section 49 of the Registration Act.

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Right of daughters of coparcener – Amended provision of section 6 came into effect from 9-9-2005 – Said provision does not have retrospective effect: Hindu Succession Act 1956:

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[Ms. Vaishali Satish Ganorkar & Anr v. Satish Keshorao Ganorkar & Ors AIR 2012 Bom 101]

The court was considering the effect of amended provision section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act (HSA), 1956. The Court observed that until a coparcener dies and his succession opens and a succession takes place, there is no devolution of interest and hence no daughter of such coparcener to whom an interest in the coparcenary property would devolve would be entitled to be a coparcener or to have the rights or the liabilities in the coparcenary property alongwith the son of such coparcener.

It may be mentioned, therefore, that ipso facto upon the passing of the Amendment Act, all the daughters of a coparcener in a coparcenary or a joint HUF do not become coparceners. The daughters who are born after such dates would certainly be coparceners by virtue of birth, but a daughter who was born prior to the coming into force of the amendment Act, she would be a coparcener only upon a devolution of interest in coparcenary property taking place.

The section is required to be interpreted to see whether a daughter of a coparcener would have an interest in the coparcenery property by virtue of her birth in her own right, prior to the amendment Act having been brought into effect. It may be mentioned that prior to the amendment Act (aside from the State Amendment Act of 1995 which amended Section 29 of the HSA) indeed the daughter was not a coparcener; she had no interest in a coparcenery property. She had, therefore, no interest by virtue of her birth in such property. This she got only “on and from” the commencement of the amendment Act i.e, on and from 9th September 2005. The basis of the right is, therefore, the commencement of the amendment Act. The daughter acquiring an interest as a coparcener under the section was given the interest which is denoted by the future participle “shall”. What the section lays down is that, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener. It involves no past participle. It involves only the future tense. Consequently, by the legislative amendment contained in the amended Section 6 the daughter shall be a coparcener as much as a son in a coparcenery property. This right as a coparcener would be by birth. This is the natural ingredient of a coparcenery interest since a coparcenery interest is acquired by virtue of birth and from the moment of birth. This acquisition (not devolution) which until the amendment Act was the right and entitlement only of a son in a coparcenary property, was by the amendment conferred also on the daughter by birth. The future tense denoted by the word “shall” shows that the daughters born on and after 9th September 2005 would get that right, entitlement and benefit, together with the liabilities. It may be mentioned that if all the daughters born prior to the amendment were to become coparceners by birth, the word “shall” would be absent and the section would show the past tense denoted by the words “was” or “had been”. The future participle makes the prospectivity of the section clear.

A reading of Section as a whole would, therefore, show that either the devolution of legal rights would accrue by opening of a succession on or after 9th September 2005 in case of daughters born before 9th September 2005 or by birth itself in case of daughters born after 9th September 2005 upon them.

The general scope and purview of the Amendment Act of 2006 is to make all daughters coparceners, so as to devolve upon them the share in coparcenery property along with and as much as all the sons. The remedy that it seeks to apply is to remove gender discrimination in such devolution of interest. Further, it makes every daughter by birth a coparcener. The former law was that the daughter was not by birth a copercener and no interest in a coparcenery devolved upon her by succession, intestate or testamentary. The legislation contemplated that on and from 9th September 2005, the daughter would become a coparcener by birth for the devolution of interest in coparcenery property. The Act of 2006 received the assent of President on 5th September 2005 and was published in the Gazette of India on 6th September 2005. The amended section 6 was to come into effect expressly from 9th September 2005.

In the amended HSA, mere protection is not granted to the daughters; they are given a substantive right to be treated as coparceners upon devolution of interest to them and even otherwise by virtue of their birth. This grant would effect vested rights, as in this case, when alienations and dispositions have been made. Hence, retrospectivity such as to make the Act applicable to all the daughters born even prior to the amendment cannot be granted, when the legislation itself specifies the posterior date from which the Act would come into force unlike the anterior date in the Orissa Tenants Protection Act 1948.

The rights of a daughter such as to effect vested rights would be on a wholly different footing and, therefore, cannot be applied retrospectively

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Oral family arrangement – Registration not necessary – Transfer of property Act section 5, Registration Act section 17(1)(b):

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[Bupuram Bora & Ors v. Anil Bora & Ors AIR 2011 Gauhati 104]

The respondent Nos.1 to 5 as plaintiffs had instituted the suit for declaration of right, title and interest over the land. The case of the plaintiffs was that the property originally belonging to Gura Kalita, alias Bora and Lessa Kalita. After the death of Gura Kalita, his share in the property devolved on his three sons, namely, Teen Bora, Gunaram Bora and Deben Bora and on the death of Lessa Kalita, his share in the property devolved on his only son, namely, Dharani Kalita alias Bora and accordingly, all of them have been jointly enjoying the land. According to the plaintiffs, while they were in joint possession, the proforma defendants, namely, the successor-in-interest of Teen Bora and Deben Bora, who are the brothers of plaintiffs’ father Gunaram Bora and Dharani Kalita, the successor-in-interest of Lessa Kalita, had given up their rights in respect of their shares, which land was under possession of the plaintiffs from before, by virtue of amicable partition amongst the members of the joint family, for which a document dated 14.09.1990 was subsequently executed, which however, was not registered.

It is also the case of the plaintiff that on or about 02.03.1992 the principal defendants/appellants encroached on the land. The Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents declaring the right, title and interest.

The substantial question of law raised which was relevant for the purpose of the appeal, i.e. whether by virtue of unregistered deed, the plaintiffs could acquire the right, title and interest in respect of Schedule land. It has been submitted that since, by the said document, Dharani Kalita alias Bora, son of Lessa Bora apart from Dombaru Bora and Gorsing Bora, both are sons of Bogiram Bora, relinquished their rights in respect of the land measuring 3 kathas 5 lechas in favour of the plaintiffs, who are sons of Gunaram Bora, who is the brother of Teen Bora, Deben Bora, Dharani Kalita alias Bora and Bogiram Bora, the said document cannot confer any right, title and interest on the plaintiffs, as the said document is not registered, though compulsorily registerable u/s 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908. Though the said document is titled as “Abandonment of Sharecum- Sale Deed”, the contents of the same reveals recording in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties in the family arrangement earlier arrived at amongst the heirs so that there is no hazy notions about it in future. It is apparent from the said document that in fact no consideration amount was paid and as such it is not a sale deed requiring compliance of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act r.w.s. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.

The Court held that the family arrangement can be arrived at orally and its terms may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. Such memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose being used as a document on which future title of the parties to be founded and if such memorandum is prepared as record of what had been agreed upon so that there are no hazy notions about it in future, the same is not required to be registered. On the other hand, it is only when the parties reduced the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess. In Kale (AIR 1976 SC 807) the Apex Court following its earlier decision in Tek Bahadur Bhujil (AIR 1966 SC 292) as well as other decisions, has held that a family arrangement may even be oral, in which case there is no requirement of registration of such arrangement. It has also been held that the registration would be necessary, only if the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and as such registration is not necessary, when the document is a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation, as such memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and as such is not required to be compulsorily registerable u/s 17(1) of the Registration Act.

The document as well as the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, reveal that a family arrangement had already been made and the document is nothing but the memorandum prepared after such family arrangement for the purpose of record and for the purpose of mutation of the names of the plaintiffs, who are the legal heirs of Gunaram Bora. Accordingly, the mutation was initially granted in favour of the plaintiffs over the suit land described in Schedule-A. By the said document the family arrangement has not been made. What it has indicated is only the family arrangement which had already been made and as such is not required to be registered under the Registration Act. The contention of the appellants/ defendant Nos.1 to 5 that the document is compulsorily registerable cannot, therefore, be accepted and hence rejected.

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Natural justice – Audi alteram partem – Right to hearing – Constitution of India Article 14:

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[Allied Motors Ltd v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2012) 2 SCC 1]

On 15-5-2000, an unauthorised police officer accompanied by the respondent BPCL’s officials conducted a raid at the appellants petrol pump and collected samples. On the very next day, without even giving a show cause notice and/or giving an opportunity of hearing, BPCL terminated the appellants dealership. The appellant had been operating the petrol pump for the respondent for the past 30 years. During that period, on a number of occasions, samples were tested by the respondent and were found to be as per the specifications. After unsuccessfully challenging the termination of its dealership before the High Court, the appellant filed the appeal by SLP.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that its dealership had been terminated in an arbitrary manner and in violation of the principles of natural justice and also in violation of the Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 1998, section 1(d)(ii) secondly, the search and seizure was by an unauthorised police official.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the haste with which a 30 years old dealership was terminated even without giving a show cause notice and/or giving an opportunity of hearing clearly indicates that the entire exercise was carried out by the respondent corporation on non-existent, irrelevant and on extraneous consideration. There has been a total violation of the provisions of law and the principles of natural justice. Samples were collected in complete violation of the procedural laws and in non-adherence of the guidelines of the respondent Corporation.

The Hon’ble Court quashed and set aside the termination order of the dealership. Consequently, the respondent Corporation was directed to hand over the possession of the petrol pump and restore the dealership of petrol pump to the appellant.

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Alienation of minors property – Suit for setting aside sale – Limitation prescribed is three years from date on which minor attained majority: Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, sec. 8(3):

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[ K.P. Mani & Ors v. Malu Amma & Ors AIR 2012 Kerala 110]

The suit property belonged to one Perachan as per kanam assignment deed No.2636 of 1927. On the death of Perachan, the lease hold right devolved on his sons, Lakshmanan and Raghavan. The said Raghavan died a bachelor. Thus, the entire property belonged to Lakshmanan. On the death of Lakshmanan, plaintiffs and other legal heirs acquired right over the property. Plaintiffs claimed that they have 2/6th shares in the suit property. While so, their sister, Syamala assigned her 1/6th share to Prabhakaran Nair and Sathiyamma. That was followed by the mother of appellants/plaintiffs and 6th defendant executing release deed in favour of Prabhakaran Nair. Appellants/plaintiffs say that at the time release deed was executed, themselves and 6th defendant were minors and that apart, 1st appellant/1st plaintiff was insane. But, it is without getting permission of the court that the mother had executed release deed and hence, it is not valid or binding on plaintiffs and 6th defendant. Defendant contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The Trial Court accepted the plea of the Defendant and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the court held that an alienation of immovable property by the natural guardian without obtaining permission of the Court was only voidable (and not void) and that there should be a prayer to set aside such alienation.

It is not disputed that Meenakshy, mother of appellants 2nd and 3rd was their natural guardian. Hence, assuming that she has alienated the share of appellants 2 and 3/2nd plaintiff and 6th defendant without getting permission of the court, the release deed to the extent it concerned appellants 2 and 3 is only voidable and not void and hence, appellants 2 and 3 were bound to get release deed to the extent it concerned them set aside, for which the period of limitation prescribed is three years from the date on which appellants 2 and 3 attained majority. Admittedly, the suit was filed much beyond the said period of three years in which case Defendant 1 to 5 are justified in their contention that the suit to the extent it concerned appellants 2 and 3 is barred by limitation. The view taken by the first appellate court concerning appellants 2 and 3 was held to be correct.

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Hedge accounting in a volatile environment

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Entities generally enter into certain derivative transactions to protect or hedge themselves from risk of fluctuation in certain key variables (such as currency exchange rates, interest rates or commodity prices) that may have a detrimental impact on their profit and loss accounts. In a hedging transaction, there is usually a hedged item and a hedging instrument such that the hedging instrument protects an entity from fluctuations in the value of the hedged item. In order to reflect the impact of hedging activities in the profit or loss account, an entity may elect to apply the hedge accounting principles under IFRS (or Ind AS). These principles provide guidance on designating hedge relationships by identifying qualifying hedged items, hedging instruments and hedged risks.

Qualifying hedged items can be recognised assets, liabilities, unrecognised firm commitments, highly probable forecast transactions or net investments in foreign operations. In general, only derivative instruments entered into with an external party qualify as hedging instruments. However, for hedges of foreign exchange risk only, non-derivative financial instruments (for example, loans) may qualify as hedging instruments.

Hedge accounting allows an entity to either :
• measure assets, liabilities and firm commitments selectively on a basis different from that otherwise stipulated in IFRS or Ind AS (“fair value hegde accounting model”); or

• defer the recognition in profit or loss of gains or losses on derivatives (“cash flow hedge accounting model” or “net investment hedging”).

Hedge accounting is voluntary; however, it is permitted only when strict documentation and effectiveness requirements, as stated in IAS 39 are met. The Ind AS criteria are similar to the IFRS criteria. These criteria are:

• There is formal designation and written documentation at the inception of the hedge.

• The effectiveness of the hedging relationship can be measured reliably. This requires the fair value of the hedging instrument, and the fair value (or cash flows) of the hedged item with respect to the risk being hedged, to be reliably measurable.

• The hedge is expected to be highly effective in achieving fair value or cash flow offsets in accordance with the original documented risk management strategy.

• The hedge is assessed and determined to be highly effective on an ongoing basis throughout the hedge relationship. A hedge is highly effective if changes in the fair value of the hedging instrument, and changes in the fair value or expected cash flows of the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk, offset within the range of 80-125 percent.

• For a cash flow hedge of a forecast transaction, the transaction is highly probable and creates an exposure to variability in cash flows that ultimately could affect profit or loss.

One of the more common hedging transactions entered into by entities is a hedge of highly probable forecast transactions (purchases or sales), considered a cash flow hedge. A cash flow hedge is a hedge of the exposure to variability in cash flows that is attributable to a particular risk associated with a recognised asset or liability, or a highly probable forecast transaction that could affect profit or loss. In the case of hedges of highly probable forecast purchase or sale transactions in foreign currency, the hedged risk would be currency risk, the hedged items are the forecast purchases/sales and the hedging instruments typically used are currency forwards.

Given below is an example of applying hedge accounting to the cash flow hedge of a highly probable forecast purchase.

Example:
Company R is an Indian company with Indian Rupees (INR) as the functional currency. The reporting dates of Company R are 30th June and 31st December.

On 1st January 20X0, Company R expects to purchase a significant amount of raw materials in future for its production activities. A Company based in the US will supply the raw materials. Company R’s management forecasts 100,000 units of raw material will be received and invoiced on 31st July 20X1 at a price of USD 75 per unit. For convenience, it is assumed that the invoice will also be paid on 31st July 20X1.

The Company’s management decides to hedge the foreign currency risk arising from this highly probable forecast purchase. R enters into a forward contract to buy USD and sell INR. The negotiations with the US Company are in advanced stages and the board of Company R has approved the transaction.

On 1st January 20X0, the Company enters into a US Dollar forward contract, to purchase USD 7,500,000 at a forward rate of INR/USD 46.245, by selling an equivalent INR sum of INR 346,837,500 on 31st July 20X1.

Exchange Rates on various dates are as shown in Table 1 :

Annualised interest rates applicable for discounting cash flows on 31 July 20X1 at various dates of the hedge are as shown in Table 2:


The fair value of the foreign currency forward contract at each measurement date is computed as the present value of the expected settlement amount, which is the difference between the contractually set forward rate and the actual forward rate on the date of measurement, multiplied by the discount factor.

On 1st January 20X0, which is the start date of the forward contract, the fair value of the derivative will be nil, as the difference between the contractually set forward rate and the actual forward rate (7,500,000 * (46.2450 – 46.2450)) is Nil.

On 30th June 20X0, the actual forward rate is 45.9732 and discount factor of 0.9138. Accordingly, the fair value of the currency forward contract is Rs. (1,862,774) i.e. [(7,500,000 * (45.9732 – 46.2450)) * 0.9138].

The fair value of the currency forward contract at each measurement date is computed in the same manner. Accordingly, the fair values at each measurement date are shown in Table 3.

The company designates this hedge relationship on 1st January 20X0.

Hedge effectiveness testing needs to be performed on a prospective as well as on a retrospective basis. A common way to measure hedge effectiveness is the cumulative dollar offset method which is a quantitative method that consists of comparing the change in fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument with the change in fair value or cash flows of the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk.

Prospective testing will consider the expected variability in cash flows based on possible movements in exchange rates using dollar offset/hypothetical derivative method. Retrospective testing will consider actual variability in value/cash flows based on actual changes in forward rates.

In the given case, hedge effectiveness has been assessed prospectively and retrospectively using the cumulative dollar offset method and a hypothetical derivative for the notional amount of hedged purchases to demonstrate a relationship between the change in fair value of the hedging instrument and the change in fair value of the hedged item. The hypothetical derivative method is used to measure hedge effectiveness and ineffectiveness and is based on the comparison of the change in the fair value of the actual contracts designated as the hedging instrument and the change in the fair value of a hypothetical hedging instrument for purchases in the month of payment (considering that payment is the designated hedged item). In the given case, the hypothetical derivative that models the hedged cash flows would be a forward contract to pay $ 7,500,000 in return for INR.

The effectiveness of the relationship will be demonstrated by the following ratio:
Cumulative change in the fair value of the forward contract(s) by designated expiry.

Cumulative change in the fair value of the Hypo-thetical Derivative.

If the ratio of the change is within the range of 80% to 125%, the hedge will be determined to both continue to be, and to have been highly effective.

In this example, using the cumulative dollar offset method and a hypothetical derivative, the hedge effectiveness has been assessed as 100% effective at each measurement date. This is primarily because the date of maturity of the currency forward contract and date of the forecasted purchase payment, and the notional amount being hedged is the same. Hence, the ratio of fair value of the forward contract undertaken (hedging instrument) and the hypothetical derivative is 100% in each case. In practice, ineffectiveness often arises due to any changes in the expected timing of the purchase/ collection and the maturity date of the derivative. For example, though the derivative matures at the end of the month, the payment may occur at any time during the month.

Journal Entries (ignoring the impact of taxes) for the transaction using hedge accounting:

Date

Particulars

Dr/ Cr

Amount

Amount

 

 

 

(INR)

(INR)

 

 

 

 

 

1-Jan-X0

No entry as the fair value of the currency
forward contract is nil

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30-Jun-X0

Hedging reserve (OCI)W

Dr

1,862,774

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Derivative (liability)

Cr

 

1,862,774

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the cur-

 

 

 

 

rency forward
contract)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Dec-X0

Derivative (asset)

Dr

2,141,046

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Derivative (liability)

Dr

1,862,774

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Hedging reserve (OCI)

Cr

 

4,003,820

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the cur-

 

 

 

 

rency forward
contract – difference between the fair value between

 

 

 

 

measurement dates 31
December 20X0 and 30 June 20X0 (-1,862,774

 

 

 

 

– 2,141,046))

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30-Jun-X1

Derivative (asset)

Dr

2,519,448

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Hedging reserve (OCI)

Cr

 

2,519,448

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the currency

 

 

 

 

forward contract –
(4,446,495 – 2,141,046))

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Derivative (asset)

Dr

4,002,005

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Hedging reserve (OCI)

Cr

 

4,002,005

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, change in the effective portion of
the fair value of the cur-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rency forward
contract)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Inventory

Dr

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Trade Payable

Cr

 

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, 
recognition  of  purchase 
of  inventory  at 
spot  rates

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i.e.7,500,000*47.4)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Hedging reserve (OCI)

Dr

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Inventory

Cr

 

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, recognition of gains recognised in
equity into the carrying

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

amount of the
inventory acquired by Company R.  The
net impact

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of this adjustment is
that the inventory is ultimately recognised at

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the forward rate of
46.245; alternatively this could have been carried

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in OCI and released
to the P&L account directly when the inventory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

would have been
booked in the P&L account)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Cash

Dr

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Derivative (asset)

Cr

 

8,662,500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, settlement of derivative in cash)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-Jul-X1

 

 

 

Trade Payable

Dr

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Cash

Cr

 

355,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being, settlement of trade payable)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In this example, since the hedge is 100% effective. the fair value of the currency forward contract has been taken to Hedging Reserve at each period end.

Conclusion:

By adopting hedge accounting, a company is able to align its risk management policy with its accounting treatment and better represent the transaction in its financial statements. It also reduces the volatility in the profit and loss account by deferring the unrealised gains or losses on the hedging instruments to other comprehensive income. In the future articles, we shall discuss examples on the other two type of hedges i.e. fair value hedge and hedge of a net investment in a foreign operations.

Interest expenditure – Advances to sister concerns – Commercial expediency – S. A. Builders v. CIT needs reconsideration.

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[Addl. CIT v. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd. (SLP (CC) No.7140 of 2012 dated 30-4-2012)]

The respondent-assessee had borrowed certain funds which were utilised by the assessee to subscribe to the equity capital of the subsidiary company, namely, M/s. Tulip Star Hospitality Services Ltd. This subsidiary company used the said funds for the purpose of acquiring the Centaur Hotel, Juhu Beach, Mumbai, which is now functioning as “The Tulip Star, Mumbai”. The assessee paid interest on the borrowed money. This interest liability incurred by the assessee was claimed by it as deduction on the ground that it was business expenditure. The Assessing Officer refused to allow the expenditure.

However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer and the opinion of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was confirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was in the business of owning, running and managing hotels. For the effective control of new hotels acquired by the assessee under its management, it had invested in a wholly owned subsidiary, namely, M/s. Tulip Star Hospitality Services Ltd. On this ground, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.A. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 288 ITR 1, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction of interest on the borrowed funds.

On an appeal, the Delhi High Court inter alia held that the expenditure incurred under the aforesaid circumstances would be treated as expenditure incurred for business purposes and was thus allowable under section 36 of the Act.

On a further appeal, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that S.A. Builders Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 288 ITR 1, needed reconsideration. The Supreme Court therefore issued notice on the SLP.

levitra

DEDUCTIBILITY OF ADVANCE PAYMENTS – Section 43B

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Issue for consideration
Section 43B of the Income Tax Act provides that certain deductions shall be allowed only in that previous year in which the specified sum is actually paid , irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred according to the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. It basically applies to taxes, duties, cess, or fees, contributions to provident funds, superannuation funds, gratuity funds, interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions or banks and leave encashment.

This section, which was inserted with effect from assessment year 1984-85, to the extent relevant for our discussion, reads as under:

43B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of—

(a) any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee, by whatever name called, under any law for the time being in force, or

(b) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any provident fund or superannuation fund or gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of employees, or

(c) any sum referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 36, or

(d) any sum payable by the assessee as interest on any loan or borrowing from any public financial institution or a State financial corporation or a State industrial investment corporation, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement governing such loan or borrowing, or

(e) any sum payable by the assessee as interest on any loan or advances from a scheduled bank in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement governing such loan or advances, or

(f) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee,

shall be allowed (irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him :

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in relation to any sum which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of section 139 in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred as aforesaid and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return.

Explanation 2 to section 43B provides that for the purposes of clause (a), “any sum payable” means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the previous year, even though such sum may not have been payable within that year under the relevant law.

Therefore, in respect of the specified sums , even if the liability has been incurred, but payment has not been made, the deduction would not be allowable in the year in which the liability is incurred, but would be allowable in the year of payment.

The section begins with a non-obstante clause that has the effect of overriding the provisions of the Act . It further states that a deduction otherwise allowable in respect of the specified sums will be allowed in the year of actual payment.

A controversy has arisen in respect of a converse type of situation where the payment has been made, but liability to pay has not yet been incurred, particularly in respect of taxes which are covered by clause (a). While the Kerala High Court has taken the view that the deduction would not be allowable in the year of payment if the liability has not been incurred as per the method of accounting, the Calcutta, Punjab & Haryana and Delhi High Courts have taken a contrary view to the effect that the deduction would be allowable u/s 43B in the year of payment, even if the liability to pay tax or duty was incurred in the next year under the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee. A related controversy has also arisen for allowance of deduction, in the year of payment, though the liability to pay the same may not have arisen under the relevant statute governing the expenditure in the year of payment. The special bench of the ITAT favours the grant of allowance in the year of actual payment.

Kerala solvent extractions’ case
The issue arose before the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. Kerala Solvent Extractions, 306 ITR 54.

In this case, pertaining to assessment year 1994-95, the assessee which was following the mercantile method of accounting, made an additional payment of Rs. 23 lakhs towards sales tax payable for April 1994. This amount was claimed as a deduction for the year ended 31st March 1994. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim u/s 143(1)(a), since it was specifically stated in the accounts accompanying the return that the amount paid was towards sales tax for April 1994.

The assessee’s appeal against the disallowance was allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals), who held that the disallowance of the amount paid towards advance sales tax was a debatable point. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner(Appeals).

Before the Kerala High Court, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that sales tax liability payable in April 1994 was not an allowable deduction u/s 37(1) r.w.s 145. It was argued that the claim was not allowable as the assessee had not incurred expenditure, and that unless the amount paid was the liability of the assessee for the previous year, it could not be allowed, no matter whether the assessee had paid it or not. On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the tax having been paid in the previous year, though not a liability of the year, was an allowable deduction under clause (a) of section 43B read with explanation 2.

The Kerala High Court observed that it was not in dispute that the sales tax liability of the assessee was an allowable deduction in the computation of income from business by virtue of section 29 r.w.s 37(1), that income chargeable under the head “Profits and Gains of Business or Profession” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting and that like any other liability, sales tax liability should be claimed and allowed on mercantile basis. It was also undisputed that the sales tax liability of Rs. 23 lakh pertained to April 1994, which fell in the next financial year, and that u/s 145, the assessee was not entitled to deduction of this amount in the earlier year of payment.

According to the Kerala High Court, the issue was whether section 43B entitled the assessee to deduction of liability of the next financial year merely because the amount was paid by the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year. The Kerala High Court observed that words of section 43B showed that the section dealt with deductions otherwise allowable under the provisions of the Act, and that the section only laid down the conditions for eligibility for deduction of certain al-lowances which were otherwise admissible under the Act. According to the Kerala High Court, the scheme of section 43B was to allow the deductions referred to in clauses (a) to (f) only on payment basis, even though the assessee was following the mercantile method of accounting. In other words, section 43B was an exception to section 145, inas-much as even if the claim was allowable deduction based on the system of accounting, it would still be inadmissible u/s 43B if it was not paid on or before the end of the relevant previous year, or at least before the date of filing of the return. The Kerala High Court therefore held that section 43B was only supplementary to section 145 and was only an additional condition for allowance of deductions otherwise allowable under the other provisions of the Act.

The Kerala High Court, on examination of the scheme of the sales tax, noted that under the scheme, the liability for payment of sales tax arose on the due date of filing of the monthly returns and the final return and the liability therefore arose only on due date of filing of the return. Under this scheme, if the assessee remitted any amount in the financial year towards tax payable for any month of the next financial year, this amount did not constitute tax liability of the assessee for that previous year, but would be carried as an amount of tax paid in advance for the next year, and would be adjusted towards tax liability for that year. If the assessee discontinued business, it was entitled to get refund of the tax paid in the earlier year.

According to the Kerala High Court, explanation 2 to section 43B did not justify the claim of the assessee for deduction because even under that provision, only liability incurred by the assessee during the previous year was allowable on payment basis. What the explanation contemplated was incurring of liability by the assessee in the previous year, though the amount was not payable during the previous year under the relevant law. The Kerala High Court noted that so far as sales tax was concerned, it was a tax on sale or purchase of a commodity. Since the liability arose under the statute and the payment was not towards tax due for the previous year or payable in that year, the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction u/s 29 r.w.s 37(1) and 145.

The Kerala High Court therefore held that the asses-see was not entitled to the deduction in the year of payment, and further confirmed that the payment of sales tax was prima facie disallowable, and hence upheld the disallowance u/s 143(1).

Paharpur cooling towers’ case

The issue again came up recently before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd v. CIT, 244 CTR 502.

In this case, for assessment year 1996 -97, the assessee paid a sum of Rs. 3.22 crore on account of excise duty, the liability for payment of which was incurred in the previous year relevant to assessment year 1997- 98. The assessee claimed deduction in respect of the amount actually paid by it during the previous year ended 31st March 1996 in the assessment for assessment year 1996-97, u/s 43B.

The assessing officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction of the excise duty paid on the ground that the liability for such excise duty was not incurred during the previous year relevant to assessment year 1996-97. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the appellant’s claim for deduction of excise duty. The tribunal allowed the appeal of the revenue against the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), upholding the disallowance of such advanced payment of excise duty.

The Calcutta High Court observed that the requirement of section 43B(a) was that the assessee must have actually paid the amount, as well as incurred liability in the previous year for the payment, even though such sum may not have been payable within that year under the relevant law. The court noted that the assessee had undoubtedly paid the duty in the previous year and such payment was made consequent upon the liability incurred in the very year, but in view of the fact that it followed the mercantile system of accounting, the amount was legally payable in the next year. According to the High Court, the amount therefore was clearly covered by section 43B read with explanation 2.

The High Court further noted that the position would have been different if the amount was not paid in the previous year, in which case the assessee would not have been eligible to get the benefit. The object of the legislature was to give the benefit of deduction of tax, duty, etc. only on payment of such amount, liability of which the assessee had incurred and not otherwise. Even if the tax or duty was payable in the next year in view of the system of accounting followed by the assessee, according to the Calcutta High Court, if the liability was ascertained in the previous year and the tax was also paid in that same year, there was no scope of depriving the assessee of the benefit of deduction of such amount.

The Calcutta High Court, after analysing the reasons for introduction of section 43B, stated that it was never the intention of the legislature to deprive the assessee of the benefit of deduction of tax, duty, etc, actually paid by him during the previous year, although in advance, according to the method of accounting followed by him. The Calcutta High Court observed that, if the reasoning given by the tribunal were accepted, an advance payer of tax, duty, etc payable in accordance with the method of accounting followed by him would not be entitled to get the benefit even in the next year when liability to pay would accrue in accordance with the method of accounting followed by him, because the benefit of section 43B was given on the basis of actual payment made in the previous year.

The Calcutta High Court therefore held that the advance excise duty paid was allowable as a deduction in the year of payment, though the liability to pay such duty arose in the subsequent year as per the method of accounting employed by the assessee.

A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Modipon Ltd (No 2) 334 ITR 106, as well as by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v Raj and San Deeps Ltd 293 ITR 12, again in the context of excise duty paid in advance.

Observations

The dispute is two fold. In claiming deduction based on actual payment while computing the total income of the year payment, whether it is necessary that the liability to pay the specified sum has arisen (a) under the respective statute governing the expenditure and(b) under the method of accounting employed by the assessee. The Revenue’s case is that for an allowance of deduction, it is essential that three conditions are satisfied; liability under the governing statute, liability under the method of accounting and the actual payment. It is only on compliance of all the three conditions that an assessee shall be entitled to a valid claim of deduction. In contrast, the assesses are of the view that the only condition necessary for a valid deduction is the actual payment and once that is proved the claim cannot be frustrated.

The purpose behind the introduction of section 43B, and the reasons for introduction of Explanation 2 are narrated by the Explanatory Memorandum reported in 176 ITR (St) 123. It states that the objective of section 43B is to provide for a tax disincentive by denying deduction in respect of a statutory liability which is not paid in time. The first proviso to section 43B was introduced to rule out the hardship caused to certain taxpayers who had represented that since the sales tax for the last quarter cannot be paid within the previous year, the original provisions of section 43B would unnecessarily involve disallowance of the payment for the last quarter. The Memorandum further states that certain courts had interpreted the words “any sum payable” to the effect that the amount payable in a particular year should also be statutorily payable under the relevant statute in the same year. This was against the legislative intent and it was therefore being proposed, by way of a clarificatory amendment and for removal of doubts, that the words “any sum payable” be defined to mean any sum, liability for which had been incurred by the taxpayer during the previous year, irrespective of the date by which such sum was statutorily payable.

The language of the provision specifically provides for overriding or ignoring the method of accounting. Once that is done, there is no enabling provision found in the section that requires looking back to the method of accounting for ascertaining the eligibility of the deduction, otherwise. The only requirement is to ascertain the fact of the actual payment. If the payment is made , the deduction is allowed and should be allowed instead of denying the same.

The actual payment of the specified sum, under the provision, is the key consideration for allowance of the deduction. It emerges nowhere that a person should satisfy the twin conditions of the liability and of the actual payment as well, before a lawful deduction is claimed and allowed. To read the condition of the incurring of the liability in the section amounts to doing a serious violence to the provision and should be avoided. The use of the words ‘irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred’ clearly puts to rest any doubts about the intention of the legislature, which is to allow the deduction in the year of payment, irrespective of the year in which liability was incurred.

Further, nothing is gained by denying a lawful deduction based on actual payment, as the payment is the conclusive proof of the intention of the payer. It may be that in some stray cases, the person making the payment in advance is refunded the sum paid. In such cases, the law has enough provisions to tax the refund in his hands including under the provisions of s.41(1) of the Act.

It is nobody’s case that a deduction should be allowed on payment in respect of an expenditure that is otherwise not allowable under the Act. The deduction should surely be for an expenditure that is allowable in computing the income under the provisions of the Act. In view of this position, any attempt to frustrate a deduction by relying on the opening part of the section which uses the term ‘a deduction otherwise allowable’ should be nipped in the bud. The said term simply means that the claim should be of an expenditure that is otherwise allowable under the Act and not necessarily w.r.t. the method of accounting. If the intention were to first determine the allowability on the basis of the method of accounting , it would have been provided there and then, by stating that ‘ a deduc-tion otherwise allowable on accrual’ or ‘as per the method of accounting’. On the contrary, the latter part simply advises one to ignore the method of accounting.

The next difficulty is about the need for accrual of liability under the relevant statute that provides for the expenditure and its relation to the Explanation 2. The scope of the said Explanation 2 is restricted to only those payments which are covered by clause(a) of s. 43B of the Act. This again emphasizes the fact that the scheme of the deduction is based on one and only condition and that is that of the actual payment, at least as far as the deduction under clauses(b) to(f) are concerned and if that is so, there is nothing that permits assigning of a different treat-ment for clause(a) payments. With great respect to the Calcutta High Court, it seems that the court’s observation that in order for a valid deduction, it was necessary that the liability for such payment should have been incurred under the relevant law in the same year in which the amount was paid, though it might not have become payable under the method of accounting employed by the assessee, does not seem justified. Kindly note that the said Explanation 2 itself supports the claim for the deduction in the year of payment, irrespective of the liability to pay, when it states ‘even though such sum might not have been payable within that year under that law’. If that is so, undue importance is not required to be given, for the purposes of deduction under the Income tax Act, to accrual of liability and the time thereof, under the relevant laws governing the payment of the expenditure. The Delhi High Court seems to support this position when it stated that the purpose of s. 43B is ‘subserved by the payment of the duty to the Department concerned’.

The Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal also had occasion to consider this issue, though again in the context of excise duty, in the case of DCIT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health-care Limited, 299 ITR (AT) 1 (Chd)(SB). Some of the observations of the members of the special bench are interesting and throw considerable light on how section 43B is to be viewed in the case of advance payments, and are reproduced below:

(i)    There is no reference to any condition to establish “accrual of liability” for the claim of deduction. Only actual payment is insisted upon. The whole idea of enactment of section 43B is to change the system and replace the condition of allowability of deduction from incurring of the liability to actual payment. Having in mind the provision of section 43(2) and the purpose of section 43B, there is no question of asking the assessee to prove actual payment as well as incurring of a liability.

(ii)    It is not necessary that the assessee must prove incurring of a specific liability under any statute referred to in the different clauses of section

43B. It must be an expenditure connected and related to the assessee’s business deductible u/s 28 of the Act. It should not be a prohibited item totally unrelated to the business of the assessee. The expression “a deduction otherwise allowable” only means statutory liabilities mentioned in section 43B. The expression “a deduction otherwise allowable” reflects deduction on account of general liability fastened to the assessee’s business on account of duties, taxes, cess or fees by whatever name called, arising in the course of the carrying on of the business. The expression does not mean any specific liability which is required to be incurred.

(iii)    There is no justification to examine the previous year in which liability to pay the sum was incurred, when the mandate is “irrespective of the previous year in which liability was incurred” and the claim is to be allowed on the basis of actual payment. To do otherwise would be in violation of the words “irrespective of the previous year” in which the liability was incurred and disregard the mandate of the section.

(iv)    Section 43B brought in a change in the normal rule of deduction of expense based on the accounting method followed by an assessee. The rule of deduction u/s 43B is actual payment of the liability. When the payments are understood as actual payments, those payments even if mentioned as advance payments, need to be allowed as deduction u/s 43B.

(v)    Section 43B provides for the deduction of sums payable mentioned in clauses (a) to (f), only if actually paid ; but they shall be allowed irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee. The expression “irrespective of the previous year” means the deduction has to be allowed regardless of the previous year. Any reference to the time of incurring or accruing of the liability is dispensed with by the statute while concentration is made on the point of actual payment of the sum to the Treasury of the Government.

(vi)    It is highly improbable to presume that an assessee would indulge in tax avoidance by actually paying money towards duties and taxes. Any such benefit arising to an assessee is only incidental.

(vii)    The section does not lay down any rule that the liability to pay the duty must be incurred first and only thereafter the payment of such duty made, so as to claim the deduction under section 43B. The expression “otherwise allowable” refers to a declaration that payments which are available as deductions u/s 43B, are those expenses which are usually allowed by the Income-tax Act for the purpose of computing income. The expression “any sum payable” does not mean “payment outstanding”.

On a combined reading of the provisions together with the Explanatory Memorandum and of the intention and the history behind the provisions, amended form time to time, it is clear that section 43B completely overrides the method of accounting and therefore section 145, and that even advance payments of tax are allowable as deduction, in the year of actual payment, even if the liability to pay the tax did not arise during the previous year, but in a subsequent year.

The view taken by the high courts in favour of the allowance of deduction on payment is , in our respectful opinion, a better view of the matter.

Further, the view that the deduction is allowed under the Income tax Act in the year of payment , as held by the special bench of the ITAT, irrespective of its year of accrual under the relevant statute providing for liability to the expenditure, once the actual payment is made, is a far better view.

Coal on Fire

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Few days back, the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of Performance Audit of Allocation of Coal Blocks was tabled in the Parliament. The CAG has reported that the Government ought to have allocated the coal blocks by competitive bidding. The Government followed a method that lacked transparency. CAG estimated the loss to the exchequer to the tune of Rs. 1.86 lakh crore due to the method followed by the Government.

One is not sure whether the action of the Government was the result of any corrupt practice and `mota maal’ received by the ruling party as alleged by the opposition or a mere impropriety or a decision taken with national interests in mind.

Since the Report was tabled in the Parliament, the opposition has not permitted the Parliament to function and has been demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. Not permitting the Parliament to function is becoming a regular affair and does not augur well for the democracy. Both, the opposition and the ruling party members, are airing their views on the electronic media. The debate ought to happen on the floor of the Parliament; that is the right forum. The opposition is being irresponsible. They would be performing their duty better, if they take the Government to task on the floor of the Parliament.

The Government has been defending the allocation of the coal blocks by putting up several arguments, most of them rather illogical and difficult to digest.

The Prime Minister, while accepting the responsibility for the decision, has stated that the conclusions of the CAG are disputable. The Minister of Corporate Affairs (holding additional charge of Ministry of Power) commented that the CAG Report has been made without proper study and that the things that the CAG has come out with are all speculative and presumptive. He mentioned that the Report will precipitate the policy paralysis in the Government.

The Finance Minister reportedly said that there was zero loss due to allocation of the coal blocks (a defence taken even when 2G scam surfaced). The Minister denied having ever said this. Now his view is that, since mining had not started at any of the coal blocks except one and the coal was still buried in the Mother Earth, no loss had occurred. Does the Minister agree that there is loss, but it will start accruing only when the mining of coal starts? Is it his case that there is no issue at this point of time since loss will accrue in future? Will the Minister accept if an assessing officer were to assess a higher loss and argue that question of loss to the revenue will arise, only if and when the assessee makes profit and claims a set off?

The Minister of Coal slammed the CAG Report on various grounds including the methodology of calculating the loss. The spokesperson for the ruling party at one stage even challenged the jurisdiction of the CAG in making the Report. The Minister of Human Resources Development and the Minister of Law have also joined the bandwagon trying to discredit the Report.

While accepting the proposition that every decision, report and the functioning of any constitutional authority should be open for reasonable criticism, the kind of frontal attack from the ruling party on the CAG and his Report is rather unfortunate and uncalled for. The CAG is a constitutional authority (the Supreme Audit Institution of India) with a right and duty to interrogate the Government on its performance as well as compliance. Each report must be given serious consideration and deliberated upon and discussed at appropriate forums. Neither is the main opposition party justified in not letting the Parliament function nor is the ruling party right in rubbishing the Reports of a constitutional authority on flimsy grounds.

The Nation has witnessed in the recent times two instances, where allocation of natural resources made by the Government has come under attack. The Supreme Court, in the proceedings relating to 2G scam, has directed that national natural resources should be allocated based on competitive bidding. While this may be the most transparent method of allocation of the resources, it has many repercussions. In a competitive bidding, the prices of the resources will bring in more revenue to the national exchequer, but it will impact the pricing of the products and services offered to the public using those high-priced resources. Price of coal will directly impact the prices of power, steel and cement. While the rates for the power are fixed by the Regulatory Commissions, prices of steel and cement are not regulated. Are we ready for prices that are fully market-driven in all sectors? These are complex questions, these can be handled if the Government and bureaucrats work with honesty and diligence and develop transparent yet an efficient way in consultation with all stakeholders.

We talk about high growth rate, that the coming decades will be that of India, India will be a superpower. Are we only fooling ourselves? Can India really progress unless the system is cleansed of corruption and inefficiency. Most of us want to be optimistic. But when we look at the situation around us in the present times, pessimism sets in. Unless we change our act quickly as a nation, we will lose the opportunity when there is a turnaround in the world economy.

Sanjeev Pandit
Editor

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Happiness Unlimited

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What is happiness where does it lie?
How does it look like and why is it so shy?
Chase of mankind always kept aloof,
Appearances in roses, hearts filled with gloom.

Life in bigger cities, despite better amenities, has become very hectic and stressful that a news item even reported that sale of anti-depressants in India is growing by 17% annually. If we look around, it is an appalling scenario. People seem or rather pretend to be happy, but in actuality are far from being happy. Why is it so that in this era of technological advancements where almost everything has become possible upon a touch of a button, the mind is far away from serenity?

Life is referred as “anubhav dhara”, stream of experiences. There is life as long as there are experiences. As the experiences cease, life also comes to an end. There are two components of any experience, subject and object. The subjects are we as individuals and the object is the world. As the subject, we individuals deal with the world, we have experiences. As are the experiences, so is the life. If experiences are good, life is good and when there are sorrowful experiences, so is the life. To improve the experience, the options are either to improve the subject or the object. One set of school works for the betterment of the objects to provide greater happiness. The scientific developments play an important role and indeed have made massive contributions. With each passing day, new and new captivating gadgets and equipments are becoming part of our life. The objects are truly facilitating. Nevertheless people continue to be in a state of anguish and pain. No object till date has ever been able to overcome the sufferings and woes of any human being. This is an irony. Another set of thinkers concentrate on the subject. Vedanta provides that if we do not work on the improvement of the subject, we live a life of strain and disarray even in the world of prosperity and plenty.

We as human beings succumb to our desires. Desires of sense objects. The fulfillment of each desire; achievement of sense object, symbolises happiness to us. Each time we get our desire fulfilled we appear to be happy. If we put happiness into an equation, mathematically, it would be:

                     Number of desires fulfilled
Happiness = ————————————–
                      Total number of desires entertained.

Obvious from the above formula, the two ways in which happiness can be increased are:
I) Either increase the numerator or
II) Decrease the denominator.

Getting along with the first option is very easy. We try to increase the numerator by fulfilling our desires and we do have a sense of happiness. For example: If there is a desire to go out for a dinner at a restaurant, then accomplishing the object makes us feel happy. But in the process of increasing the numerator, we find ourselves in a situation where many more desires have crept in. Every time we fulfill our desire, the number of desires in the wait list keeps on rising. Thus, increase in the numerator automatically increases the denominator and in fact manifolds, severely affecting the equation of happiness downwards.

Concentrating on the subject, we achieve strength to raise ourselves. If we are able to control and confine our desires, there is decrease in the denominator. The removal of each desire would give us the power. Happy at all times. Swami Ramatirtha has said “If you are not happy as you are, where you are, you will never be happy.” The day when we bring down the denominator to zero value, imagine the level of happiness, it shall be infinite. “Happiness Unlimited”. It might seem to be a difficult proposition, but we human beings do follow this practice. The question ahead is; are we willing to improve upon? How? Let’s see.

It is a known fact that our composition is of matter and spirit. The body, mind and intellect referred to as the matter and Atman, the spirit. At the gross level it is body, mind being subtle. Intellect is subtler and Atman the subtlest. Eating an imported brand of chocolate and its taste is the cause of happiness to the body. When it comes to the emotional level where mind plays, we rise and we give the chocolate to our child giving us much more joy and in fact for a longer duration. Our intellectual pursuits for study many times make us give up various desires and we happily let go desires for a cause something more important. That brings everlasting happiness. We need to lift ourselves because intellectual persists.

Giving away desires may not be that easy. The higher we move, from body to mind to intellect and there above, it becomes more difficult. The higher is the pain; greater the happiness. The Lord Himself has said in the eighteenth chapter of The Bhagwad Gita: The true happiness is like poison in the beginning but nectar in the end – verse 37. False happiness is like nectar in the beginning but poison in the end – verse 38.

In these times, full of hassle and haste, let us pause for a while; think where true happiness lies and how it can be achieved lies in not letting go the objective of our life and existence.

The way to happiness is on path of attitude,
Where hearts filled with sense of gratitude.
With all one has ever so content,
As divine gifts above from heavens.

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Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

2014 (35) S.T.R. 140 (Tri – Mumbai) Hotel Amarjit Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Service Tax, Nagpur

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Whether supply of food along with provision of Mandap keeper services is liable to service tax under Mandap keeper services?

Facts:
The appellants provided “Mandap Keeper Service” and ‘Catering Services’. Prior to April, 2005, the appellants were charging one lump sum amount and service tax was levied on combined receipt. With effect from April, 2005, the appellants started splitting the bills, one for banquet hall and another for supply of food and discharged service tax only on banquet hall charges considering the same to be Mandap keeper services. Objecting to splitting of bill, the department confirmed demand on food charges collected as well. The appellants contested that food charges were collected separately on which VAT was levied. Since the transaction was of sale of goods, the same was not leviable to service tax. They further contested that Joint Commissioner of Central Excise of their other unit had accepted their contention and service tax was levied only on hall charges. Accordingly, since department had knowledge of the activity undertaken by the appellants, extended period of limitation also was challenged. The appellants further challenged some calculation errors of the department. On the other hand, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 177 (Tri.-Del.), the department contested that catering charges were includible in taxable value of Mandap keeper services and contended that though in another unit, the case was dropped, a wrong decision could be perpetuated.

Held:
Having regard to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (supra) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. (supra), the services rendered by Mandap keepers as caterer were also liable to service tax under the category of Mandap keeper services since price charged for food formed part of consideration of Mandap keeper’s services. Service tax demand beyond 5 years was quashed. Since every registered premise is considered as a separate assessee under service tax law, dropping of demand at one unit was of no relevance to decide whether extended period of limitation may be invoked or not. The appellants cannot take plea of bona fide belief as Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held catering services were liable to service tax. Also, according to the Apex Court’s judgement in the case of Fuljit Kaur and Chandigarh Administration 2010 (262) ELT 40 (SC) if a wrong decision has been passed at a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the superior court for repeating the same irregularity. In the present case, the appellants did not disclose consideration received from catering services in bills and ST3 Returns. Hence, it was a case of mis-statement of fact with intent to evade taxes and extended period of time was justified. In light of the above analysis, the matter was remanded back for re-quantification. Penalty u/s. 76 was held imposable for default in payment of service tax since mens rea was not required to be proved to levy such penalty. In view of contravention of provisions in the present case, penalties u/s. 77 were sustainable. Splitting of bills from April, 2005 was a deliberate act to evade Service tax payments and therefore, penalty u/s. 78 was confirmed.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 88 (Tri.-Mumbai) B4U Television Network (I) P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Can excessive service tax paid be adjusted against future service tax liability or the assessee needs to file a refund claim?

Facts:
The appellants adjusted excess service tax paid earlier was objected by service tax department. Relying on various Tribunal decisions, the appellants contested that service tax was not collected by them from their clients and they had complied with Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 and therefore, such adjustment of excess service tax paid was justified. The Department submitted that the case was not covered by Rule 6(3) and that the appellants should have filed a refund claim for claiming back such excess payment.

Held:
Delhi Tribunal in case of Nirma Architects & Valuers 2006 (1) STR 305 (Tri.) had held that if adjustment of excess Service tax paid would not be allowed against future payments, Rule 6(3) would become redundant. Relying on the said decision, Tribunal allowed such adjustment of undisputed excess Service tax paid.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 220 (Guj.)Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs vs. V.M. Engg. Works

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Whether penalty levied u/s. 76 can be reduced by invoking section 80?

Facts:
Since the respondents delayed the payment of service tax, adjudicating authority levied penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) who reduced the penalty by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. The matter was appealed by revenue before the Tribunal, but they did not succeed. According to the revenue, it was mandatory to impose penalty u/s. 76 and discretionary powers to reduce penalty was not vested with the authority and neither the Commissioner (Appeals) nor the Tribunal were justified in reducing the penalty. Further to support its contestation, Revenue placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer 2010 (19) S.T.R. 641 (Guj.).

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer (supra) it was held that in case it is proved by the assessee that there was reasonable cause for failure, penalties may not be levied vide section 76 read with section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. Accordingly, though discretionary powers are granted, the powers are restricted to waive off the total penalty and penalties cannot be reduced below the minimum limit prescribed u/s. 76. Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal was directed to decide the matter afresh in light of the said decision after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 28 (Uttarakhand) Valley Hotel & Resorts vs. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Dehradun

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Whether VAT is leviable on amount, leviable to service tax, on presumptive basis with respect to restaurant services?

Facts:
The revisionist was engaged in the business of hotel providing lodging, boarding and restaurant services. Food served in the restaurant was liable for VAT vide Uttarakhand VAT Act, 2005 which was duly discharged. From 1st July, 2012, Service tax was leviable on 40% of the bill amount vide Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The revisionist, hence, made an application to VAT authorities requesting not to charge VAT on such 40% of billed amount which would suffer a burden of service tax. However, Commissioner as well as Tribunal of Commercial Tax rejected the application

Held:
Value Added Tax can be imposed on sale of goods and not on service. Union Government, which is the competent authority to impose service tax, has imposed service tax on restaurant services which is not challenged by the State. VAT cannot be imposed on the element of service. Thus, the revision was allowed.

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Extension of Advance Ruling Schemes to certain categories of Residents — Notification No. 27/2009-ST, dated 2-8-2009.

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New Page 1

Part B : Indirect Taxes

 

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Extension of Advance Ruling Schemes to certain categories
    of Residents — Notification No. 27/2009-ST, dated 2-8-2009.

The Advance Ruling Schemes shall be applicable to a public
sector company.

Public sector company shall have the same meaning assigned
to it in Section 2(36A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Effective date for new services — Notification No. 26/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

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New Page 1

Part B : Indirect Taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Effective date for new services — Notification No.
    26/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

The effective date for new services introduced vide the
Finance Act, 2009 shall be 1st September, 2009.

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DTAA between India and Tajikistan notified — Notification No. 58/2009-FT and TR-II [F.No. 503/10/95-FT & TR-II], dated 16-7-2009.

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  1. DTAA between India and Tajikistan notified — Notification
    No. 58/2009-FT and TR-II [F.No. 503/10/95-FT & TR-II], dated 16-7-2009.
     

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Extension of time limit to file ITR V in case E-return filed without digital signature — Press Release, dated 13-8-2009.

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  1. Extension of time limit to file ITR V in case E-return
    filed without digital signature — Press Release, dated 13-8-2009.

In case an E-return has been filed which has not been
digitally signed, the ITR V needs to be sent via Ordinary Post to Bangalore
office within 30 days from the date of uploading such return. This time limit
of 30 days has been extended till 30 September 2009 or within 60 days from the
date of uploading, whichever is later.

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