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Practical aspects of acceptance of deposits by Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies

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This article is divided into two Parts. This Part deals with conditions and restrictions on Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies while accepting deposits from its Members. The subsequent later part will deal in acceptance of deposits by “Eligible Companies” compliance thereof and peculiar cases.

Background:
Every business requires funds, and all funds cannot be owned funds. Borrowing is an essential aspect of any business and debt servicing cost is a very common factor in any Company’s financial statements. A Company which is able to borrow, and is regular in servicing its debt with residual profits in its hand, can be said to be in good financial health. All forms of businesses, whether a Proprietorship or Partnership, borrow money, but the quantum of borrowing will always depend on the ability of the business to provide security for the money borrowed. In a corporate form of organisation, a deposit2 accepted by the Company is a way of borrowing money which is basically unsecured in nature. It is also an area where most violations, technical or otherwise, occur. In the following paragraphs, we have tried to answer questions pertaining to regulations on acceptance of deposits and related compliance.

1) What is a Deposit?

Section 73 of the Companies Act 2013 (Referred to hereinafter as the “Act”) has used the word Deposit but the same has been explained in Rule 2 (1) (c) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014. (Referred hereinafter to as the “Rules”). According to the definition in the said Rule, “Deposits” includes any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan, or in any other form by a Company. From this inclusive definition it appears that, to tag any receipt of money as “deposit” the real intention of parties, the Company and person making deposit has to be ascertained. For better clarity, it is always advisable to have this understanding documented and signed as this will provide strong defence in case of objections or doubts raised in respect of such transactions. This is so because the definition in Rule 2 (1) (c) specifically excludes certain transactions described therein from the purview of deposits and thus they do not require compliance with the provisions of the Act3.

2) What are the specific pre-conditions applicable to Private Limited Companies pertaining to acceptance of Deposits:

In terms of provisions of section 73 of the Act, a Company, whether private or public, can accept deposits from its members only subject to compliance of the Rules. Deposits from persons other than members can now be accepted by “Eligible Companies” only. In terms of provisions of section 76 read with definition of an Eligible Company (Rule 2 (1) (e)), only a Public Company with net worth of Rs.100 crore or more or turnover of Rs.500 crore or more, and which has passed a Special Resolution at a meeting of its members, and has filed the same with the Registrar, may accept deposits from the public, these Companies are referred to as the Eligible Companies. Thus Private Companies and “Non-Eligible Companies” can accept deposits from members only. Pre-conditions for accepting deposits from members:

a) Amount as deposit can be accepted from person whose name appears on the Register of Members (RoM) of the Company, if a person whose name appears on RoM has transferred his shares but the transfer is pending registration, then the Company should take steps to re-pay deposits which it has accepted from such members;

b) Company must pass an ordinary resolution at a meeting of its members seeking authorisation for acceptance of deposits and should file the same with the Registrar. It is advisable that the Company should pass the res olution at every Annual General Meeting instead of a blanket resolution without any defined validity.

3) What is the quantum of amount that can be accepted as a Deposit by Private Companies and Non-Eligible Companies?

Non-Eligible Company
In terms of Rule 3 (1) (a) of the Rules, following are the limits for Companies for acceptance of deposits:

(a) D eposits which are secured or unsecured but amount accepted, is not payable on demand or is not payable before 6 months from the date of acceptance or after 36 months thereof including renewal, an amount not exceeding 10 % of the aggregate of paid up share capital and free reserves,

Provided that such deposits are not payable within 3 months of acceptance or renewal

In terms of Rule 3 (3) of the Rules, following are the limits on Companies for acceptance of deposits:

(b) Total deposits including other deposits and renewed deposits from members only shall not exceed 25% of the aggregate of the paid-up share capital and free reserves of the company;

Private Company:
(c) In terms of specific exemption vide Notification MCA GSR 464 (E) dated June 05, 2015, a Private Company can accept deposits ONLY from its Members upto 100% of its Paid up Capital and Free Reserves provided it files with the Registrar information about such acceptance.

Note: The above limit of 25% or 100% as the case may be should be reckoned on the basis of last audited Financial Statements adopted by the members

4) What are the Procedural aspects for Private Companies/ Non-Eligible Companies in the course of acceptance of Deposits?

Following are the Procedural requirements to be complied with:

(i) Hold a Board meeting for proposing acceptance of deposit and issue of notice for holding general meeting for obtaining approval of the shareholders for the proposal;

(ii) Hold general meeting and seek approval of the shareholders by means of a special or ordinary resolution for authorising the Board to accept deposits and file a copy of such resolution within 30 days of date of passing with RoC in e-Form MGT 14;

(iii) Hold the Board meeting to obtain the approval for the draft Circular in Form DPT-1 of the Rules and the get the draft Circular signed by majority of the directors of the Company, and file a copy of such signed circular with the Registrar of Companies in Form GNL-2 for registration; ensure that the circular issued for acceptance of deposits is sent by electronic mail or registered post A.D or speed post to Members only;

(iv) Appoint Deposit Trustees for creating security for the secured deposits by executing a deposit trust deed in Form DPT-2 at least seven days before issuing the circular;

(v) Enter into contract with Deposit Insurance services providers at least thirty days before the issue of the circular;

(vi) Issue deposit receipts in the prescribed format and under the signature of an officer duly authorised by the Board, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of money or realisation of the cheque.

(vii) Make entries in the Register of deposits accepted rules within seven days from the date of issuance of the deposit receipt and arrange to get such entries authenticated by a director or secretary of the Company or by any other officer authorised by the Board.

(viii) File deposit return in Form DPT-3 by furnishing information contained therein as on the 31st day of March, duly audited by the auditors before 30th June every year.

5) Following question was posed to us by parents of a young IIT graduate which will highlight the problem that the provision creates.

Q : My Son is an IIT graduate from IIT Powai and he has a girl friend who happens to be his classmate. They have incorporated a new private limited company in which both of them are directors. They do not have their own funds. Since it is a start-up company with a new idea, banks are not willing to finance them within their norm. Contrary to PM Modi’s pronouncement of “Make in India,” the Companies Act, 2013 is creating a hurdle because loan from either members or outsiders is not possible. What should we do to help him while ensuring that he remains within the framework of law?

Ans. : It is unfortunate that the law does not recognise the Indian tradition of family business although it is sometimes envied world over. In the circumstances of the case, both the parents, that is, yourself and your wife and the parents of your son’s girlfriend can give a loan to your son’s company as a deposit. In our opinion, in terms of banking terminology, this could be treated as “Quasi Equity” and not refundable until the repayment of loan of banks and financial institutions. You may need to obtain such a letter from the Bank as a precondition for considering their loan proposal, which in our opinion will not be difficult for the bank to issue. They would avoid possible classification of NPA in respect of the advances given by them. Please advise your son to follow this route as a matter of least resistance, precaution and still it could be argued that it is within the framework of the law and ..

Editors Note: A Company is a very important form of business organisation. Despite the advent of Limited Liability Partnerships, this form is still the most accepted one by most stakeholders. The coming into force of the Companies Act, 2013 has created a large number of problems. In this feature commencing from this issue, the authors will address them. Initially, the focus will be on problems faced by small and medium sized private limited Companies, for it is these bodies and their advisors/ consultants that need the maximum support. As the feature develops, other issues could be taken up. We welcome your suggestions.

Transactions of tax avoidance/evasion on the stock exchange and Securities Laws

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Introduction
Do transactions on stock exchange undertaken with the objective of tax avoidance/evasion violate Securities Laws? If such transactions are otherwise not in violation of Securities Laws, can SEBI attempt to ascertain the motive of such transactions and punish persons who undertake transactions that are for such purposes? As more and more Orders are passed where SEBI has, inter alia, alleged that there is tax avoidance/evasion, this question needs consideration.

It is common to hear that people transact on the stock exchange for tax avoidance. At times the sole purpose of entering into the transaction may be for avoiding tax and there may be no other commercial motive or implication. In other cases, while there may be a motive of tax avoidance, there are other commercial motives and/or implications. For example, a person may have short term capital gains during the year. He may transfer shares through the stock exchange whose price has fallen and thus book short term capital loss thereby avoiding tax on the short term capital gains. He may or may not reverse the transaction thereafter. Then there may be transactions of tax evasion where profits or losses may be “transferred” from one person to another.

The implications of such transactions under income-tax is an interesting, but a separate issue. But, for the purposes of this column, there are two questions to be answered . Are such transactions in violation of Securities Laws? If not, can SEBI still take action against them based on their ostensible motive? The question for the purposes here is limited to the provisions in Securities Laws relating to frauds, manipulative practices, etc. under the Act/Regulations. There is of course the general issue as to whether a transaction that involves an offence or violation of other laws would have implication under other laws. That, however, requires separate consideration.

These questions becomes even more relevant in the context of recent interim orders passed by SEBI in context of alleged massive tax evasion as also discussed in earlier columns (see February and June 2015 issues of the BCAJ). As discussed in those articles, it was allegedly found that bogus long term capital gains was made through increase of price of shares of defunct companies. Shares were allotted/ transferred to “investors” at a low price and the prices were considerably increased by manipulation. On sale at such high prices, the investors made huge long term capital gains which are said to be exempt as long term capital gains for income-tax. SEBI has held such transactions to be in violation of Securities Laws and debarred the parties involved.

Jurisdiction of SEBI
Securities Laws generally frown at transactions that interfere with the normal price discovery mechanism of stock exchanges. This is usually done through provisions prohibiting fraudulent trades and manipulative/unfair trade practices. Thus, a transaction that does not transfer beneficial interest of shares is generally not permitted. Transactions that are carried out not for bonafide purchase/sale are also generally not permitted. This is because they result in false or misleading appearance of trading in shares. The other reason is because price at which such transactions are undertaken also not being a result of normal price discovery process. The question is whether transactions undertaken wholly or partly with the objective of tax avoidance would fall foul of such provisions.

SAT View
The Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT ”) had several occasions to examine this issue. It appears that, generally, a benevolent view has been taken in such matters as far as tax avoidance is concerned. SEBI had raised objections to such transactions on grounds that they were fixed in advance, that they were synchronized trades, that they interfered with the normal price discovery mechanism of stock exchanges, etc. SAT has generally rejected such arguments.

In Viram Investment Private Limited vs. SEBI (order of SAT dated 11th February 2005), SEBI had debarred the appellants for six months on the allegations that they carried synchronized/matched deals on the stock exchange. The appellants claimed that the transactions were between related parties for the purpose of tax planning. SAT noted the facts and did not find anything wrong such as price manipulation, etc. by the appellants. It also noted that synchronized transactions by themselves were not barred nor illegal. On the issue that the transactions were for tax planning, the SAT observed as follows (emphasis supplied):-

“Even if we consider transactions undertaken for tax planning as being non genuine trades, such trades in order to be held objectionable, must result in influencing the market one way or the other. We do not find any evidence of that either in the investigation conducted by the Bombay Stock Exchange, copy of which has been annexed to the memorandum of appeal or in the impugned order that there was any manipulation. It is also seen that the impugned transactions have taken place at the prevailing market price. Trading in securities can take place for any number of reasons and the authorities enquire into such transactions which artificially influence the market and induce the investors to buy or sell on the basis of such artificial transactions. This is not even the case of the respondent, therefore it is not possible for us to sustain the impugned order.”

In another case of Rakhi Trading Private Limited vs. SEBI [(2010) 104 SCL 493 (SAT)], there were allegations of synchronized trading in Futures and Options segment of the stock exchange. The suspicion was that such trades were for shifting losses/profits for the purpose of “tax planning”. The SEBI whole-time member in his order had observed that “The range and scope with which such transactions have been carried out seems to suggest that there is a thriving market for such transfer of profits/losses providing the opportunity to avail of favourable tax assessments”. A penalty was levied. In its detailed order, SAT analysed the nature of transactions in Futures and Options and the implications of synchronised trades. Generally, the SAT did not find the appellants guilty of wrongs of price manipulation, etc. On the issue whether transactions carried out for tax planning purposes were in violation of the PFUTP Regulations, SAT observed (emphasis supplied):-

“When we analyse the nature of the trades executed by the appellant, we find that it played in the derivative market neither as a hedger nor as a speculator and not even as an arbitrageur. The question that now arises is why did the appellant execute such trades with the counter party in which it continuously made profits and the other party booked continuous losses. All these trades were transacted in March 2007 at the end of the financial year 2006-07. It is obvious and, this fact was not seriously disputed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, that the impugned trades were executed for the purpose of tax planning. The arrangement between the parties was that profits and losses would be booked by each of them for effective tax planning to ease the burden of tax liability and it is for this reason that they synchronized the trades and reversed them. They have played in the market without violating any rule of the game.

    We hold that the impugned transactions in the case before us do not become illegal merely because they were executed for tax planning as they did not influence the market. The learned counsel for the respondent Board drew our attention to Regulation 3(a), (b) & (c) and Regulation 4(1) and 4(2)(a) & (b) of the Regulations to contend that the trades of the appellant were in violation of these provisions. We cannot agree with him. Regulation 3 of the Regulations prohibits a person from buying, selling or otherwise dealing in securities in a fraudulent manner or using or employing in connection with purchase or sale of any security any manipulative or deceptive device in contravention of the Act, Rules or Regulations. Similarly, Regulation 4 prohibits persons from indulging in fraudulent or any unfair trade practices in securities which include creation of false or misleading appearance of trading in the securities market or dealing in a security not intended to effect transfer of beneficial ownership. Having carefully considered these provisions, we are of the view that market manipulation of whatever kind, must be in evidence before any charge of violating these Regulations could be upheld. We see no trace of any such evidence in the instant case. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the charge against the appellant for violating Regulations 3 and 4 must also fail.”

However, such cases must be distinguished from cases where price of the securities are manipulated and profits or gains are literally created for tax purposes. As discussed earlier, recently, SEBI has alleged in five recent cases that
the prices of the shares were manipulated for tax purposes. The following observations in the matter of Pine Animation Limited (SEBI Order dated 8th May 2015) highlight the findings, concern and allegations of SEBI (emphasis supplied):-

“31. Since prior to the trading in its scrip during the Examination Period, Pine did not have any business or financial standing in the securities market, in my view, the only way it could have increased its share value is by way of market manipulation. In this case, it is noted that the traded volume and price of the scrip increased substantially only after the Exit Providers, preferential allotees and Promoter related entities started trading in the scrip. The average volume increased by 4433 times during the Examination Period i.e. from 62 shares per day to 2,74,922 shares per day. It is further noted that on the days when Pine Group was not trading, the traded volumes in the scrip were very low and the substantial increase in traded volumes as observed in this case was mainly due to their trading. I further note that Exit Providers, Preferential Allottees and Promoter related entities traded amongst themselves as substantiated by their matching contribution to net buy and net sell in Patch 3. There was no change in the beneficial ownership of the substantial number of traded shares as the buyers and sellers both were part of the common group and were acting in concert to provide LTCG benefits to the Preferential

Allottees    and    Promoter    related    entities.    In view of the above, I prima facie find that Exit Providers, Preferential Allottees and Promoter related entities used securities market system to artificially increase volume and price of the scrip for creating bogus non taxable profits (i.e. LTCG).

    In addition to the above, it is noted that after the preferential allotment and transfer of shares by the promoters to the Promoter related entities, about 92.52% of the share capital of Pine was with the Promoter related entities and Preferential Allottees. During the period from Mary 22, 2013 to June 19, 2013, the price of the scrip increased from Rs. 472 (unadjusted and Rs. 47.2 adjusted to share split) to Rs. 1006 (unadjusted and Rs. 100.6 adjusted to share split) in a matter of 19 trading days, with the trading volume as meager as 62 shares per day. The trading volume suddenly increased to 2,74,922 shares per day during the period from December 17, 2013 to January 30, 2015, when Exit Providers, Preferential Allottees and Promoter related entities started trading in the scrip. The prima facie modus operandi appears to be same as that used in the matter of Radford Global Limited where the stock exchange mechanism was used for the purpose of availing LTCG tax benefit and Pine was found actively involved in the whole design to misuse stock exchange mechanism to generate bogus LTCG. ?


    I am of the considered view that the scheme, plan, device and artifice employed in this case, apart from being a possible case of money laundering or tax evasion which could be seen by the concerned law enforcement agencies separately, is prima facie also a fraud in the securities market in as much as it involves manipulative transactions in securities and misuse of the securities market. The manipulation in the traded volume and price of the scrip by a group of connected entities has the potential to induce gullible and genuine investors to trade in the scrip and harm them.

As such the acts and omissions of Exit Providers, Preferential Allottees and Promoter related entities are ‘fraudulent’ as defined under regulation 2(1)(c) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (‘PFUTP Regulations’) and are in contravention of the provisions of Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1), 4(2)(a), (b), (e) and (g) thereof and section 12A(a), (b) and (c) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.

…In my view, the stock exchange system cannot be permitted to be used for any unlawful/forbidden activities.”

    Conclusion

The SAT has thus held that transactions in securities on stock exchange that have avoidance of tax as its objectives may not by themselves be in violation of Securities Laws. However, transactions that involve price manipulation, false dealing in shares, etc., would generally be in violation of Securities Laws. SEBI also seems to have taken a view that transactions for tax evasion, for such reason itself, are in violation of such laws. It is very likely that these recent Orders of SEBI will see appeals. Thus, courts may consider and rule on whether and under what circumstances would transactions of tax avoidance/evasion be deemed to be a violation of Securities Laws.

Will Your Will Live On?

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Introduction
Consider this. A person makes a Will thinking he
has done all that is necessary for ensuring smooth succession of his
assets to his near and dear ones. Unfortunately, he dies. But even more
unfortunately, his Will is held to be invalid! Result – he is rendered
an intestate, i.e. one who died without making a valid Will and
accordingly, the law decides who gets what after his death. This could
have some unintended and unpleasant consequences. Through this Article,
let us, through Questions and Answers, consider some of those scenarios
when a deceased’s Will can and cannot be held to be invalid. The Indian
Succession Act, 1925 governs the law relating to the making and proving
of Wills.

Can a Person with Alzheimer’s disease make a Will?
Alzheimer’s
disease affects the mental capacity of a person. It is a degeneration
of the mental faculties and leads to memory loss, inability to think,
etc. In an advanced stage of the disease, it is highly doubtful whether a
person has control over his mental faculties in order to make a Will.
However, if a person suffering from Alzheimer’s disease is in a position
to make a Will, then it would be advisable to have a neurologist (and
not any doctor) who has been treating the person to certify the
testator’s mental state of mind to execute the Will. He could act as the
witness to the Will. This would add credence to the Will and the doctor
could even be examined before a Probate Court.

Similarly, in
the case of a schizophrenic, it may be advisable to have the consulting
psychiatrist certify the ability of the testator to prepare a Will at
the time of execution of the Will.

Can a Person suffering from Parkinson’s disease make a Will?
Parkinson’s
disease is also a degeneration of the brain but it affects the
movements of a person. Hence, the mental faculties of such a person may
remain intact as compared to a person suffering from Alzheimer’s
disease. Nevertheless, even in the case of such a person, it may be a
good idea to have a neurologist to certify the testator’s mental state
of mind to execute the Will, since it may be challenged in the Probate
Court whether such a person had control over his thinking ability? In
Maki Sorabji Commissariat vs. Homi Sorabji Commissariat, TS No. 60/2011
Order dated 30th April, 2014, the Bombay High Court was faced with the
very same issue as to whether the testator who was suffering from
Parkinson’s disease could make a Will? The Court held that even if the
deceased was suffering from Parkinson’s disease, the question that arose
was whether such disease could have affected sound and disposing mind
of the deceased at the time of execution of the Will? The Court held
that facts clearly indicated that he was active in various activities
including taking decisions in property matters. Thus, the Court held
that merely because he suffered from Parkinson’s disease, it would not
indicate or prove that it had affected his sound and disposing mind or
capacity to execute a Will. Unless the disease was of such a nature that
it would affect the sound and disposing mind of the testator, such
disease cannot be a ground to refuse a Probate.

Can a very old person make a Will?
Unlike
the Companies Act, 2013 which raises a question mark on a person over
the age of 70 to become a Managing Director, a Will of a very old person
is valid, provided he knows what he is doing. However, if the old age
has rendered him senile or forgetful or mentally feeble, then the Will
would be held to be invalid on account of the testator’s mental
capacity. As suggested before, a neurologist should certify the
testator’s mental state of mind which should specifically refer to his
extreme old age.

Can a person suffering from terminal illness make a Will?
In
Pratap Singh vs. State, 157 (2009) DLT 731, the Delhi High Court held
that the fact that a person was suffering from a very painful form of
terminal cancer of the mouth which prevented him from speaking and that
he succumbed to it within 2 weeks of executing a Will showed that he may
not have prepared the Will. Hence, in cases of terminal illness, it
becomes very important to prove how the testator could have prepared the
Will. The role of the witnesses in such cases also becomes very
important.

What if all pages of a Will are not signed?
The
Indian Succession Act, 1925 requires that a testator shall so sign a
Will that it appears that he intended to execute it. Thus, it need not
necessarily be at the end of the Will, it can also be at the beginning
of the Will. The key is that it should appear that he intended to give
effect to the Will. There is no requirement that each and every page
must be signed or initialled – Ammu Balachandran vs. Mrs. O.T. Joseph
(Died) AIR 1996 Mad 442 which was followed again in Janaki Devi vs. R.
Vasanthi (2005) 1 MLJ 357. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that for
personal safety, the testator must sign each and every page so that
there is no risk of pages being replaced.

Can a witness to a Will also be a Beneficiary under the Will?
Generally,
no. The Indian Succession Act states that any bequest (gift) to a
witness of a Will is void. However, the Will is not deemed to be
insufficiently attested for this reason alone. Thus, he who certifies
the signing of the Will should not be getting a bequest from the
testator. However, there is a twist to this section.

This
section does not apply to Wills made by Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and
Buddhists and hence, bequests made under their Wills to attesting
witnesses would be valid! Wills by Muslims are governed by their
Shariyat Law. Thus, the prohibition on gifts to witnesses applies only
to Wills made by Christians, Parsis, Jews, etc.

Does a witness need to know the contents of the Will?
This
is one of the biggest fears and myths in selecting a witness. A witness
only witnesses the signing of the Will by the testator and nothing
more! He or she need not know what is inside the Will and the contents
can very well be kept a secret till when it is opened after the death of
the testator. By signing as a witness, he only states that the testator
has actually signed the Will in his presence.

Can an executor be a beneficiary under the Will?
Yes,
he can, subject to certain conditions. He must either prove the Will or
at least manifest an intention to act as the executor. Thus, he must do
some act which would demonstrate his intention to act as the executor.
These acts could include, arranging for the funeral of the testator,
taking stock of his estate, writing letters to the other legatees,
arranging for religious rites, etc.

Can an executor be a witness under the Will?
Yes,
he can. An executor is the person who sets the Will in motion. It is
the executor through whom the deceased’s Will works. Just as a company
operates through its Board of Directors, the estate of a deceased
operates through its executors. There is no bar for a person to be both
an executor of a Will and a witness of the very same Will. In fact, the
Indian Succession Act, 1925 expressly provides for the same.

Does a bachelor/spinster need to make a new Will once he/she marries?
Yes, he can. An executor is the person who sets the Will in motion. It is the executor through whom the deceased’s Will works. Just as a company operates through its Board of Directors, the estate of a deceased operates through its executors. There is no bar for a person to be both an executor of a Will and a witness of the very same Will. In fact, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 expressly provides for the same.

    Does a bachelor/spinster need to make a new Will once he/she marries?

Yes. The law considers marriage as a major event in a person’s life and one which requires him/her to rethink the succession plan. Thus, any Will made prior to marriage is automatically revoked by law, on the marriage of a person. If a person dies without making a fresh Will after marriage, then he/she would be treated as dying intestate and the provisions of the relevant succession law, e.g., the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for Hindus, would apply.

    Can a Will have a generic bequest?

Bequests can be general or specific. However, they cannot be so generic that the meaning itself is unascertainable. For instance, a Will may state “I leave all my money to my wife”. This is a generic bequest which is valid since it is possible to quantify what is bequeathed. However, if the same Will states “I leave money to my wife”, then it is not possible to ascertain how much money is bequeathed. In such an event, the entire Will is void.

    What happens if the shares bequeathed undergo a merger/ demerger?

Say a Will bequeaths 1,000 shares of ABC Ltd. After the Will is prepared and before the shares are bequeathed, ABC. Ltd undergoes a scheme of arrangement pursuant to which ABC Ltd is merged with XYZ Ltd and one division of the erstwhile ABC Ltd is hived off into PQR Ltd. The original ABC shares are replaced with shares of XYZ and PQR. Would the legacy survive such a change?

The Indian Succession Act provides that where a thing specifically bequeathed undergoes a change between the date of the Will and the testator’s death and the change occurs by operation of law/in the course of execution of the provisions of any legal instrument under which the thing bequeathed was held, the legacy is not adeemed (cancelled) by reason of such a change.

The position in this respect is not explicitly clear. However, one may refer to some English and American judgments on this issue. The judgments tend to suggest that whenever a specific item bequeathed has ceased to belong to the testator, the legacy is adeemed – Bridle 4 CPD 336. A legacy is not adeemed if the alteration/change is only formal or nominal – such as a name change/sub-division of shares – Oakes vs. Oakes 9 Hare 666/Clifford (1912) 1 Ch 29. Even in a case where the reorganised company was materially the same as the old one, there was no ademption – Leeming (1912) 1 Ch 828. However, where the gift is substantially altered, there is an ademption. The testator must have at the time of his death the same thing existing; it may be in a different shape, yet it must substantially be the same thing – Slater (1907) 1 Ch 665 / Gray 36 Ch D 205.

Hence, in the example given above, it may be possible to contend, relying upon Slater’s decision, that the gift has been substantially altered on account of the reorganisation and hence, a view may be taken that the legacy adeems. However, as mentioned earlier, this is an issue which is not free from doubt. It may be noted that on ademption of a legacy, the entire Will may or may not become void. For instance, if a legacy adeems and there is an alternative beneficiary, then it would go to him. However, if there is only one beneficiary to whom the entire estate goes without any alternative beneficiary, then on ademption of the legacy, the Will may itself fail. Hence, this is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

    Would a bequest to children of the testator include his adopted children, if not so specified?

Section 99 of the Indian Succession Act defines certain terms used in a Will. The words children means only the lineal descendants in the first degree of the testator. Thus, according to this section, adopted children would not be included in the definition of the term ‘children’ if so used in a Will. Similarly, a step-child would also not be included since that would not constitute a lineal descendant. However, it should be noted that this section does not apply to Wills made by Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists and hence, if a Will made by them uses the term “children,” then it would include their adopted children also. Similarly, their step-children may also be included.

    Conclusion

While the above are just some of the scenarios when a Will may be held to be invalid, one must bear in mind that a little care and caution and at times, sound legal advice, would go a long way in perfecting a Will. Act in haste and repent in leisure is often the case with several testamentary documents. Always remember:

“Where there’s an invalid Will, there’s a Dispute Where there’s an invalid Will, there’s a Lawsuit!!”

Professional scepticism – continued

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(Professional scepticism – continued)

Arjun (A) — Hey Bhagwan,
in our last meeting, you were telling me about professional scepticism.
You mean, we need to always proceed with suspicion?

Shrikrishna
(S) —No, my dear! Scepticism does not mean suspicion always. It only
means, you should not accept anything at its face value blindly.
Howsoever clean a thing may appear, you cannot rule out a possibility of
something wrong or foul.

A — I understood. We were taught in
the very first year of B. Com that merely because a trial balance is
tallied, it does not mean that all accounts are right and flawless.

S
— Exactly. After all, you are supposed to be the financial police. A
policeman need not consider every man to be a thief; but at the same
time, he cannot close his eyes merely because a person appears to be a
gentleman.

A — But we were taught that an auditor is a watchdog and not a bloodhound.

S
— Agreed! But even a watch dog constantly smells something and barks
when a stranger comes. He promptly wakes up even if there is a soft
sound around.

A — And he stares at us!

S — Even the
presence of a dog puts one on one’s guard. It acts as a deterrent. That
kind of an image an auditor should develop. He should not be taken for
granted.

A — I see your point.

S — Moreover, the times
have changed. The concept of watchdog and bloodhound is also getting
diluted. In the good old days, manipulation in accounts used to be
apparent if there were scratches, erasures or shabbiness in manual
records.

A — Yes; now in a computerised set-up, everything appears to be clean!

S
— If you start signing the accounts on oral or even written assurances
of a client, then the very purpose of audit is defeated! You should
never sign without proper verification. And you should not be shy of
asking questions.

A — Agreed. But the records are so voluminous and time is so short, we cannot verify everything. The work is endless.

S
— That calls for experience and insight. You should know your client –
by KYC! You should have properly trained assistants. You should devote
adequate time to satisfy yourself as to the veracity of financials. And
you should always be updating your knowledge and not merely gathering
CPE hours!

A — I remember, one CA signed the tax audit of
another CA firm, his close friends, and it transpired that there was a
negative cash balance of a few hundred rupees on one particular day!

S — See! You have all technology at your command. Even a cursory glance at accounts would have revealed this discrepancy.

A
— Poor fellow! That other firm’s accounts were verified in a scrutiny
assessment. The Assessing Officer noticed this error and informed it to
the Institute! He had to face the music for four years!

S — Many
times, your people sign the accounts ‘at a previous date’. Quite often,
there is contrary evidence that you have sent queries even after that
‘back date’. One needs to be very vigilant.

A — You had told me
the case that an auditor signed the accounts when only one director of a
private limited company had put his signature. And later on, the other
director refused to sign and filed a complaint on a technical ground!

S
— Many times, the client or his accountant avoids to produce bank
statement of a particular account. They say, the account is either
inoperative; or the statement is not traceable. In one case, they told
the auditor that a bank account was used only for paying Government dues
like PF, ESI, TDS and so on; and there were only contra entries!

A — Then what happened?

S
— Later on, it was revealed that the Government dues were not paid at
all. There were bogus stamps on challans; and money was fraudulently
withdrawn. So, if somebody is avoiding giving details, it triggers
suspicion.

A — The best example is non-verification of bank
fixed deposits! An independent verification of debtors, creditors and
even bank balances. We simply write year after year that the balances
are subject to confirmation.

S — While in reality, you do not even attempt to get a third party confirmation.

A
— Now, the scepticism is getting clearer! Good faith is dangerous. S — T
here are many such instances that call for scepticism. We will discuss
them next time. But I suggest, you inculcate this attitude right now!
You are supposed to sign many balance sheets in the coming weeks.

A — Yes, My Lord!

Note: This dialogue is based on the same simple but basic principles which we professionals should religiously follow.

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Nominee – Insurance claim – Nominee is only custodian of amount – Insurance Act, 1938 section 39(6):

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Sailabala Barik & Anr vs. Divisional Manager LIC of India and Ors. AIR 2015 Orissa 102

The petitioner No. 1 got married to one Nimai Charan Barik on 10th March, 1996. Her husband died on 11th July, 2007 while in service of the Government. It was alleged that the petitioner No. 1’s husband during his life time had three different policies with opposite party No. 1 and opposite party No. 1 being Head of the Organisation was accountable for release of the amount involved in all the above three polices. The case of the petitioner No. 1 was that after the death of her husband she came to know that all the policies bore the name of the opposite party No. 4 as the nominee. Petitioner alleged that even though the opposite party No. 4 was a nominee, he was not entitled to the amount involved in the said policies. She alleged that even though opposite party No. 4 was not the successor to the policy holder, yet as a nominee, he was attempting to grab the amount involved in all the three above policies. The petitioner disclosed that the opposite party No. 4 happened to be the elder brother of petitioner No. 1’s husband.

After coming to know that opposite party No. 4 was attempting to usurp the proceeds of the policies, the petitioner No. 1 submitted a representation before the opposite party No. 1 on 24.09.2007. The opposite party No. 3 vide letter dated 29.09.2007 intimated her that the policy had a valid nomination in favour of opposite party No. 4 and as a consequence of which the amount involved in the policy following the conditions therein could not be released in their favour. The opposite parties relied on section 39(6) of the Insurance Act 1938. The Hon’ble Court observed that there was no doubt that the amount involved in the policies could be released in favour of the nominee. Question involved in the present case is whether nominee was entitled to the money involved in the policies? There was no denying the fact that the opposite party No. 4 was the nominee in all the policies and as nominee he would be the custodian of the amount involved. Question as to successors in interest would be entitled to such amount has been tested in the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court in deciding such a dispute in case of Smt. Sarbati Devi and another vs. Smt. Usha Devi, : A.I.R. 1984 Supreme Court 346. Wherein it was held that.

It is only successors of the deceased entitled to the amount involved in the Insurance Policy. The nominee is only the custodian of the amount and that does not mean the amount belonged to the nominee or nominees.

Thus, in view of the provision as contained in sub-section (6) of section 39 of The Insurance Act, 1938, and the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court, law is settled that the nominee is only the custodian of the amount involved in the Insurance Policies and the successors of the policy holder would be the persons entitled to the amount involved in the policies. The petitioners were directed to appear before the Insurance Company with their identification and the amount would be released by the Insurance Company in favour of the petitioners in the presence of the nominee.

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Income from house property – Annual letting value – Section 23 – A. Y. 1986-87 – Annual value is lesser of fair rent and standard rent

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Vimal R. Ambani vs. Dy. CIT; 375 ITR 66 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 1986-87, the Assessing Officer determined the annual value on the basis of the standard rent and not on the basis of the rateable value as determined by the municipal corporation. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the following question was raised before the Bombay High Court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that in computing the property income u/s. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the annual letting value of the self-occupied property has to be the sum equivalent to the standard rent under the Rent Control Act and not the municipal rateable value.”

The Bombay High Court held as under:

“(i) While determining the annual letting value in respect of properties which are subject to rent control legislation and in cases where the standard rent has not been fixed, the Assessing Officer shall determine the annual letting value in accordance with the relevant rent control legislation. If the fair rent is less than the standard rent, then, it is the fair rent which shall be taken as annual letting value and not the standard rent. This will apply to both self-acquired properties and general cases where the property is let out.

(ii) The order of the Tribunal had to be set aside. Matter stands remanded for consideration in accordance with the aforesaid norms.”

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Deemed dividend – Section 2(22)(e) – A. Y. 2009- 10 – Loan to shareholder – Amounts taken as loan from company and payments also made to company – AO directed to verify each debit entry and treat only excess as deemed dividend

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Sunil Kapoor vs. CIT; 375 ITR 1 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2009-10,
the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 76,86,829/- as deemed
dividend u/s. 2(22) (e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, being the loan
received from KIPL of which the assessee was a shareholder. The
Assessing Officer noted that there were certain payments as on
31/03/2009 and the balance due to the company was Rs.39,32,345/-. The
assessee pointed out that there was credit balance in favour of the
assessee in a sum of Rs.45,44,303/- while there was debit balance of
Rs.39,32,345/-, and accordingly, the company itself had to pay
Rs.6,11,957/-. CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer
had erred in not taking into consideration the amount that has been
repaid by the assessee to KIPL. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was
directed to verify each and every transaction and, accordingly, to
determine the dividend amount.

On appeal, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
Any amount paid to the assessee by the company during the relevant
year, less the amount repaid by the assessee in the same year, should be
deemed to be construed as “dividend” for all purposes. However, the
Assessing Officer had taken the entire amount of Rs.76,86,829/- received
by the assessee from the company as dividend, while computing the
income but had lost sight of the payments made.

ii) In such
circumstances, the Commissioner(Appeals) had rightly come to the
conclusion that the position as regards each debit would have to be
individually considered because it may or may not be a loan. The
Assessing Officer, was, therefore, directed to verify each debit entry
on the aforesaid line and treat only excess amount as deemed dividend
u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act.”

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Charitable Institution – Exemption u/s. 11 – A. Y. 2006-07 – Where the objects of the trust include “(2)Devising means for imparting education in and improving the Ayurvedic system of Medicine and preaching the same. In order to gain objects No. 2, it is not prohibited to take help from the English or Yunani or any other system of medicine and according to need one or more than one Ayurvedic Hospital may be opened.”, it cannot be held that running an allopathic hospital is ultra vires to the ob<

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Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust vs. DIT; [2015] 59 taxmann.com 398 (Delhi)

The Assessee was a charitable institution engaged in running a hospital (both Allopathic and Ayurvedic). For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer had denied the exemption claimed by the Assessee u/ss. 11 and 12 of the Act as the Assessing Officer was of the view that the activities of the Assessee were not in accordance with its objects. In addition, the Assessing Officer also denied the Assessee’s claim for depreciation on assets purchased by the Assessee by application of its income that was exempt u/s. 11 of the Act. The CIT (Appeals) allowed the Assessee’s claim and also held that the Assessee was entitled for depreciation on the assets purchased by application of its income, which was exempt u/s. 11 of the Act.

The Tribunal accepted the Revenue’s contention that the properties of the Assessee had not been applied towards its objects. The Tribunal held that the Assessee’s activities relating to Allopathic system of medicine had more or less supplanted the activities relating to Ayurvedic system of medicine and concluded that predominant part of the Assessee’s activities exceeded the powers conferred on the trustees and the objects of the Assessee Trust were not being followed. The Tribunal held that whilst the activities of the Assessee relating to providing medical relief by the Ayurvedic system of medicine were intra vires its objects, the activities of providing medical reliefs through Allopathic system of medicine was ultra vires its objects. Consequently, the Assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s. 11 of the Act in respect of income from the hospital run by the Assessee, which offered medical relief through Allopathic system of medicine. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed that the income and expenditure of the Assessee from the activities relating to the two disciplines of medicine, namely Ayurveda and Allopathy, be segregated. Insofar as the Assessee’s claim for depreciation was concerned, the Tribunal held that deprecation on assets, used for providing relief through Ayurvedic system of medicine or used in education and research relating to Ayurvedic system of medicine, was allowable notwithstanding that the expenditure on purchase of the assets was exempted u/s. 11(1)(a) of the Act. However, insofar as the assets purchased for providing medical relief through Allopathic system of medicine was concerned, the Tribunal held that depreciation would not be available if the expenditure incurred on purchase of the assets had been exempted u/s. 11(1)(a) of the Act.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) In our view, the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal erred in concluding that the Assessee’s activities were in excess of its objects. Running an integrated hospital would clearly be conducive to the objects of the Assessee. The trustees have carried out the activities of the trust bonafide and in a manner, which according to them best subserved the charitable objects and the intent of the Settlor. Thus the activities of the Assessee cannot be held to be ultra vires its objects. The Assessing Officer and the Tribunal were unduly influenced by the proportion of the receipts pertaining to the Ayurvedic Research Institute and the hospital. In our view, the fact that the proportion of receipts pertaining to the Ayurvedic Research Institute is significantly lower than that pertaining to the hospital would, in the facts of the present case, not be material. Undisputedly, significant activities are carried out by the Assessee for advancement and improvement of the Ayurvedic system of medicine in the institution established by the Assessee and though the receipts from the Allopathic treatment are larger, the same does not militate against the object for which the institution has been set up and run.

ii) Insofar as the issue regarding depreciation on assets used for providing Allopathic systems of medicine is concerned, the learned counsel for the Revenue did not dispute that the depreciation would be allowable if the activities of the Assessee were considered to be within the scope of its objects. The Tribunal had denied the claim of depreciation, in respect of assets used for providing medical relief through Allopathic system of medicine, only on the basis that the Assessee’s activity for running the hospital was ultra vires its objects. In the circumstances, the third question is to be answered in the negative and in favour of the Assessee.”

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Business income or short term capital gain – A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07 – Transaction in shares NBFC – Whether business transactions or investment – Frequency of transactions is not conclusive test – Concurrent finding that transactions not business activity – Upheld

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CIT vs. Merlin Holdings P. Ltd.; 375 ITR 118 (Cal):

The assessee was a certified NBFC. Its main activities were giving loans and taking loans and investing in shares and securities. For the A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer opined that the activity which, according to the assessee was on investment account amounted business activity and, therefore, he treated the short term capital gains of Rs.1,01,00,000 as business income. The Commissioner (Appeal) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that it is short term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The frequency of transactions in shares alone cannot show that the intention of the investor was not to make investment. The Legislature has not made any distinction on the basis of frequency of the transactions. The benefit of short term capital gains can be availed of, for any period of retention of shares upto 12 months. Although a ceiling has been provided, there is no indication as regards the floor, which can be as little as one day. The question essentially is a question of fact.

ii) The assessee had adduced proof to show that some transactions were intended to be by way of investment and some transactions were by way of speculation. The revenue had not been able to find fault from the evidence adduced. The mere fact that there were 1,000 transactions in a year or mere fact that the majority of the income was from the share dealings or that the managing director of the assessee was also the managing director of a firm of share brokers could not have any decisive value.

iii) The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal have concurrently held against the views of the Assessing Officer. On the basis of the submissions made on behalf of the Revenue, it was not possible to say that the view entertained by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal was not a possible view. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal could not be said to be perverse. No fruitful purpose was likely to be served by remanding the matter.”

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Business expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 2005- 06 – Assessee running hospital – Daughter of MD working in hospital as doctor – Expenditure on her higher studies incurred by assessee – She comes back to work in hospital – Expenditure had nexus with business of assessee – Expenditure allowable as deduction

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Mallige Medical Centre P. Ltd. vs. JCIT; 375 ITR 522 (Karn):

The assessee company was running a hospital. In the A. Y. 2005-06, it had claimed deduction of Rs.5 lakh spent for the higher education of the daughter of the managing director of the company who was working in the assessee’s hospital as a doctor. The deduction was claimed on the ground that the daughter was committed to work for the assessee after successful completion of studies. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Karnataka High court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Before the expenditure was incurred, the daughter had acquired a degree in medicine. She was employed by the assessee. She was sent outside the country for acquiring higher educational qualification, which would improve the services, which the assessee was giving to its patients. It was in this context, that the sum of Rs.5 lakh was spent. That was not in dispute. After acquiring the degree she had come back and she was working with the assessee.

ii) Therefore, there was a direct nexus between the expenses incurred towards the education, with the business, which the assessee was carrying on. In that view of the matter, the expenditure was deductible.”

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 194 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Rathi Daga vs. CCE, Nashik

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If assessee providing taxable and exempted services and not maintaining separate records under Rule 6(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 and also fails to follow procedure under Rule 6(3A) of the said rules, it would not mean that department is justified in invoking Rule 6(3) (i) in all cases. Procedure under Rule 6(3A) needs to be followed, but disallowance should be determined rationally avoiding undue hardship to assessee.

Facts:
The appellant paid service tax under chartered accountants service and his services also included certain exempt services. It was detected by the audit team of the department that it did not maintain separate accounts for services used in providing taxable and exempted services as required under Rule 6(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Before issue of Show Cause Notice, the appellant however paid an amount equivalent to CENVAT credit based on proportionate reversal method under Rule 6(3) (ii). However, the department issued Show Cause Notice, demanding payment of CENVAT credit under Rule 6(3) (i) being an amount equal to 8% / 6% of the value of exempted services, as the conditions of Rule 6(3A) were not followed.

Held:
The Tribunal after going through Rule 6(3A) of CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 observed that submission of details to department as prescribed in the said rule such as name, address and registration number etc. are mostly factual details which are available from record. It also noted that the department has not disputed the amount paid by the assessee before issue of notice as per Rule 6(3)(ii). In such circumstances, having regard to disparity of amount of CENVAT credit under both the options, it was held that It would be too harsh to enforce payment as per Rule 6(3)(i) only because of non-payment of the due amount on time as per procedure prescribed in Rule 6(3A). The Tribunal however further held that the conditions do require that option should be exercised in writing to avail the facility and amount of CENVAT credit attributable to exempted goods must be paid provisionally for every month.

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2015 (39) STR 350 (Tri.-Bang.) CCE, Cus. & S. T., Visakhapatnam – I vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd.

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When completion of provision of services, payment thereof and CENVAT
credit availment is prior to the date of amendment, law prior to the
date of amendment is applicable.

Facts:
The
respondents availed health insurance services in March, 2011, payment
for which was made in March, 2011. However, the insurance was for the
period from April, 2011 to September, 2011. CENVAT credit on such
services was availed in March, 2011. Definition of input services was
substantially amended with effect from 1st April, 2011 with specific
exclusions. One such exclusion was in relation to insurance services,
when such services are used primarily for personal use or consumption of
employees. Accordingly, the department denied CENVAT credit since the
period of insurance was effective from 1st April, 2011. Commissioner
(Appeals) referred to Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 and also the
definition of Point of Taxation and concluded that CENVAT credit was
allowable to the extent of completion of provision of services prior to
1st April, 2011.

Held:
It is an undisputed fact that
services were availed prior to amendment, payment was made prior to
amendment and even CENVAT credit was taken prior to amendment.
Accordingly, provisions post amendment would not be applicable to the
activities completed prior to the date of amendment. As per the
definition, “Point of Taxation” means the point in time when a service
shall be deemed to have been provided. Accordingly, since everything was
completed in March, 2011, CENVAT credit was available.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 13 (New Delhi – CESTAT) R.B. Steel Services vs. CCE & ST.

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The CENVAT credit on inputs used for manufacture of final product can be used for payment of duty erroneously charged on such exempted final product.

Facts:
The adjudicating authority held that converting black rods/ bars into bright bars did not amount to manufacture during the relevant period and therefore the CENVAT credit taken on capital goods/black rods/bars used for making bright bars was not admissible. The appellant paid duty on their product, namely bright bars and the total duty paid by them was more than the amount of credit taken.

Held:
The Tribunal held that, converting black rods/bars into bright bars do not amount to manufacture as the said issue is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court against the assessee. However, relying upon various judicial pronouncements including decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Ajinkya Enterprises vs. CCE 2013 (288) ELT 247 (Tri. – Mum) which has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, it held that CENVAT credit is allowed.

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2015 (39) STR 331 (Tri.-Ahmd) Memories Photography Studio vs. Commr. of C. Ex. & S. T., Vadodara

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If service recipient was unaware of nonpayment of service tax by service provider before taking CENVAT credit, the same shall be allowed.

Facts:
The limited question for consideration in the present case was whether CENVAT credit can be denied to the recipient of input services if service tax is not paid by service provider. The department contended that the appellants should have taken precaution to verify the fact of discharge of service tax liability by service provider. Since service provider had not paid service tax liability, CENVAT credit was not admissible to service recipient.

Held:
Revenue could not provide any evidence on record to prove that the appellants were aware of non-payment of service tax by service provider before taking CENVAT credit. Service recipient would only see CENVATA BLE document. It was not the case of non-existence of service provider. Therefore, CENVAT credit was correctly availed.

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2015 (39) STR 256 (Tri.-Del.) Shree Tirupati Balajee Agro vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Indore

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If the assessee is registered under service tax law even though under a different category, penalty u/s. 77 is not warranted.

Facts:
The
appellants had got service tax registration under a different category.
Department sought to levy penalty u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 for
failure to take registration.

Held:
Even though the
appellants were registered under a different category of service, they
were recognised under service tax law. Therefore, penalty under section
77 was not warranted.

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2015 (39) STR 252 (Tri.-Del.) Bharat Electronics Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Ghaziabad

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Central Excise duty cannot be levied on services taxable under Service tax laws.

Facts:
The appellant manufactured a minor part which was supplied to its clients with other imported goods under two divisible contracts. Excise duty was paid on the minor part, however, department demanded excise duty on services forming part of these contracts. It was argued that service component was already under adjudication under Finance Act, 1994 and the services should be automatically excluded from Central Excise laws in the present adjudication, specifically when the items were outside the purview of Central Excise. Since, Central Excise department was not aware of adjudication proceedings initiated by service tax authorities, they had requested for extension of time to verify the fact. However, even after a long time span, department did not provide any reply to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal examined appellant’s submissions and observed that the divisible contracts were executed specifically demarcating provision of services. In view of separate contracts for supply and service and laws relating to taxation of goods and services, it was held that services cannot be taxed under Central Excise laws.

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2015 (39) STR 235 (Tri.-Mum.) CCE, Pune – III vs. Maharashtra State Bureau of Text Books Production & Curriculum Research

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Communication, determining the right of the party or likely to affect the rights, is appealable even though it may not be in the nature of an ‘order’.

Facts:
In view of centralised accounting system, the appellate authority allowed facility of centralised registration at the head office of the respondents, being the recipient of Goods Transport Agency services. Revenue argued that the rejection of centralised registration was through a letter, which cannot be appealed against and only service providers can be granted with centralised registration.

Held:
It is a well-settled law that a letter, conveying grounds of rejection and also the rejection, is an appealable order. The argument, that only service providers are eligible to obtain centralised registration, is meaningless and would defeat the objective of such registration. In Indirect tax laws, registration is linked with taxpayer, which is service recipient in the present case. Since respondents satisfied the conditions for centralised registration, centralised registration was rightly allowed.

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2015 (38) STR 143 (Tri.-Bang.) Commr. of C.Ex. & ST., Tirupati. vs. Gimpex Ltd

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The date of filing refund claim even though filed before wrong authority would be taken as date of filing for determining period of limitation.

Facts:
The Assessee filed refund claim of input service before the Assistant Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai. The claim however was returned stating that the application was to be filed with the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner of service tax. Consequently, the Assessee filed the claim accordingly. Thereafter, the claim was rejected on ground of time-bar. The first appellate authority granted relief by holding that the refund claim cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation when the claim was originally filed in time but before wrong authority, relying on the Tribunal’s decision in case of Gujarat Tea Processors and Packers Ltd [2010 (17) STR 489 (Tri-Ahmd)]. Hence, the revenue filed the appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the decision of the first appellate authority was appropriate and took the view that the date of filing of refund claim before the wrong authority to be taken as the date of filing for determining limitation and rejected the department’s appeal.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 402 (Madras) V.N.K. Menon & Co vs. CEST

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There cannot be said to be any suppression after the activity comes to the knowledge of the department. Hence, demand of service tax under extended period of limitation is held invalid to the extent it related to the period after statements of appellant company’s officials were recorded.

Facts:
The assessee was manufacturing on job-work basis for his principal and also collected a fixed amount as service charges towards certain services provided to the principal. The department was of the view that these expenses incurred for providing the services were in the nature of overheads essential for manufacturing activity and therefore were required to be reckoned while the assessable value of the finished goods was calculated for payment of duty. In August 1996, the department recorded statement from the officials of the assessee-company. A show cause notice was issued in October 1998 for the period 1995-96 to November 1997. The Tribunal upheld the intention of evasion for the receipt of service charges from their principal as the activities of the assessee came to light subsequent to an investigation by the department. However, it also held that, as the department was aware of the activities of the assessee after recording the statement, demand under extended period is valid only to the extent it pertains to the period prior to August 1996. Before the High Court, assessee contended that if there is no suppression post August, 1996, no extended period could be invoked post August, 1996 and, therefore, the same analogy will have to be applied for the period prior to August, 1996 as well.

Held:
The High Court affirmed the order of the Tribunal on the ground that, findings recorded by the Tribunal in so far as the period prior to August, 1996 and post August, 1996 stems from strong judicial reasoning and there is no error on record warranting interference with the well considered finding of the Tribunal.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 252 (Andhra Pradesh) K.V. Narayana Reddy vs. Addl. Commissioner.

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Where appeals filed against the order-inoriginal are rejected by lower appellate authorities as barred by limitation, the said order cannot be entertained by the Court under writ jurisdiction.

Facts:
The assessee filed writ petition before the High Court as both the lower appellate authorities did not entertain the appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground that it was time barred and beyond permissible period for condonation. The contention of the petitioner was that attempt to prefer appeal unsuccessfully before the appellate authority does not preclude him from maintaining the writ as at present he is remediless.

Held:
Relying upon decision of the Court in the case of Resolute Electronics (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India [WP No.1409 of 2015] and quoting judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Singh Enterprises vs. CCE [2008] 12 STT 21 (SC), the Court held that it is not legally permissible to accept the challenge to the order in writ jurisdiction when Appellant has unsuccessfully pursued other remedies for if it is done, the writ Court will unsettle a legally settled position. Thus, where appellate authority has already decided the matter against the petitioner, the writ Court is debarred from doing so as the same binds the writ Court applying the principle of res judicata, particularly, when the appellate authority’s orders are not challenged in the writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 195 (Madras) – CCE vs. Integral Coach Factory

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Even if assessee pays duty on clearance of final products which are exempted under Exemption Notification, goods continue to remain “exempted goods” and do not become “other than exempted goods” for the purpose of Notification No.89/95-CE dated 18/05/1995.

Facts:
The assessee manufactures excisable goods falling under Chapter 86. During the disputed period, though it was entitled for exemption under Notification No.62/95- CE dated 16/03/1995, it cleared the exempted goods on payment of duty. It however did not pay duty on ferrous and non-ferrous scrap since as per Notification No.89/95- CE dated 18/05/1995, waste parings and scrap arising in the course of manufacture of exempted goods and falling within the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, were exempted from the whole of excise duty. Department issued show cause notice demanding duty on the ground that as per the proviso to the said notification, such exemption would not be applicable if waste parings and scrap cleared from a factory in which any other excisable goods other than exempted goods are also manufactured. The case of the department was that since assessee cleared the goods after payment of duty and did not avail benefit of exemption notification No.62/95- CE, the goods cleared from factory cease to be exempted goods and hence benefit of notification No.89/95-CE is also not allowed to assessee. The Tribunal decided in favour of assessee

Held:
The High Court observed that erroneous payment of duty caused the department to hold that the goods are other than exempted goods and therefore demand was made. Affirming the Tribunal’s order it was held that proviso to this Notification would not apply to the facts of the case and the erroneous payment of duty would not render the goods other than exempted goods. Hence, so long as the goods manufactured are exempted goods, waste parings, scrap arising in the course of the manufacture of exempted goods would be entitled for the exemption.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 196 (Karnataka) – CCE vs. Federal Mogul TPR India Ltd.

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Notification No.8/2005-ST dated 01/03/2005 is not an absolute exemption notification. Further, unlike section 5A of Central Excise Act, 1944 exemption notifications u/s. 93 of the Act are optional.

Facts:
The assessee manufacturer sent goods to their sister concern for Chrome Plating on job work basis. After completion of the process of chrome plating, the sister concern returned the said goods to the assessee under cover of an invoice on payment of service tax on the value of job work charges and subsequently on receipt of such job worked goods, the assessee availed CENVAT credit of service tax so passed on by its sister concern. The job worked goods thereafter passed through various manufacturing processes at the assessee’s factory and then were cleared on payment of duty. As per department’s contention, the process of chrome plating does not amount to manufacture in terms of section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 but is a “business auxiliary service” liable for payment of service tax. However an exemption is granted under Notification No. 8/2005- ST dated 01/03/2005 to taxable service of production of goods on behalf of the client on which appropriate duty is paid by the principal manufacturer. According to the department the said exemption notification is an unconditional notification and section 5A(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which mandates the assessee to avail the exemption notification is applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, service tax has been charged wrongly in order to pass on service tax credit to assessee. The Tribunal decided in favour of assessee and the revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The High Court observed that, the said Exemption Notification applies only in cases where such goods are produced using raw materials or semi-finished goods supplied by the client i.e. the principal manufacturer and goods so produced are returned to the said client for use in or in relation to the manufacture of the goods on which appropriate duty of excise is paid.

Therefore the High Court held that the conditions stipulated in the notification establish that it is a conditional notification. As regards applicability of section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 it was held that the mandatory requirement on the manufacturer of such excisable goods of not to pay the duty of excise on such goods in respect of which an exemption u/s 5A(1A) has been granted absolutely is not found in section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, absence of section 5A of Central Excise Act, in section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, which provides for application of certain provisions of the Central Excise Act,1944 in relation to service tax, indicates that the provisions of section 5A of Central Excise Act, are not applicable to the Finance Act, 1994. Accordingly, the Tribunal order was upheld and CENVAT credit of the service tax paid by the job worker was allowed to the assessee.

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2015 (39) STR 24 (Mad.) V. Sathyamoorthy & Co. vs. CESTAT Chennai.

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A Tribunal can grant three adjournments in an appeal and if Tribunal decides the stay application ex-parte before granting three adjournments on the ground that Appellants have adopted dilatory tactics by not appearing and thereby abusing the law, the action of the Tribunal would be too harsh.

Facts:
The department during the adjudication passed an ex-parte order confirming the demand on Appellants. Appellants filed appeal and stay petition before Tribunal. Before the date of hearing on stay application, Appellants sought adjournment by filing request letter. Tribunal granted an adjournment without even taking into account the said request letter on record. Before the next date, Advocate of Appellant requested an adjournment vide a request letter. Tribunal on that occasion overlooked the letter and passed an ex-parte stay order stating that since no plea of financial hardship was taken, Appellant was directed to pre-deposit Rs.4 crore and also recorded that the Appellants had not cooperated during the adjudication process and also in the present appeal proceedings which amounted to abuse of the process of law.

Held:
Appellants challenged the said ex-parte order before the High Court stating that the Tribunal is entitled to grant three adjournments to a particular party as per proviso to section 35C of the Central Excise Act. The High Court observed that the Tribunal’s action of deciding the stay petition ex-parte on second adjournment and that too ignoring the Appellants request for an adjournment terming non-appearance as abuse to process of law is too harsh. Accordingly, the case was remanded to Tribunal for reconsideration and directed Appellants not to seek adjournment on the next date.

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2015 (39) STR 22 (Kar.) Atharva Associates vs. Union of India

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If the appeal has been filed along with stay application and neither stay application nor appeal has been disposed of, then recovery cannot be initiated.

Facts:
An Order was passed confirming demand proposed in the Show Cause Notice. Appellants preferred an appeal before first appellate authority along with stay application which was not disposed of. Meantime, the department initiated recovery proceedings by issuing notice for recovery. Appellants filed writ petition challenging the said recovery notice.

Held:
The High Court held that since the right of appeal has been exercised by the Appellants as per applicable provisions and since first appellate authority has yet to decide the stay application, the recovery notices though executable, could not be enforced or else the appeal will be infructuous or lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Enforcement of recovery was thus stayed till disposal of the stay petition by the first appellate authority.

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Free supply vis-a-vis Sale and Sale Price

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Under the Sales Tax Law, transaction of sale can be taxed as per sale price of that transaction.

A ‘sale’ can take place if the transaction fulfills certain criteria. The term ‘sale’ is defined in Sales Tax Laws and it has also been defined in (MVAT Act,2002). The said definition is given in section 2(24) of MVAT Act,2002 and it is reproduced below for ready reference.

“(24) “sale” means a sale of goods made within the State for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration hut does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; and the words “sell”, “buy” and “purchase”, with all their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly;…”

The transaction, to be ‘sale’, should be for consideration.

The above term ‘sale’ has also been subject matter of interpretation by various courts. A reference can be made to the landmark judgment in case of Gannon Dunkerly and Co.(9 STC 353)(SC). In this judgment about ‘sale’, it is observed as under:

“Thus, according to the law both of England and of India, in order to constitute a sale it is necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods, which of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it must be supported by money consideration, and that as a result of the transaction property must actually pass in the goods ……”

From the above passage, it is clear that to be a ‘sale’ following criteria should be fulfilled.

(i) There should be two parties to contract i.e. seller/ purchaser,
(ii) The subject matter of sale is moveable goods,
(iii) There must be money consideration and
(iv) Transfer of property i.e. transfer of ownership from seller to purchaser.

Thus, to consider the transaction as ‘sale’, consideration in money terms is necessary. Without consideration, no sale can take place.

In number of cases, the customer i.e. buyer may supply certain goods to its vendor which are to be incorporated in the finished goods to be supplied by vendor to the said buyer. Similarly there may be cases, where contractee may be supplying some goods to be used in contract to be executed for it by contractor appointed by it. Both above issues are common and the tax position of same can be analysed as under:

The supply of such goods by buyer to the vendor will be free supply, as it is to be incorporated in goods to be supplied to it. It is also possible that for the purpose of Excise etc. the vendor may be required to include value of such goods in its sale price and after calculating Excise on such total value, the value of free supply by buyer will be deducted again and in fact the net amount is only charged to the buyer.

The issue arises whether such value of free supply is part of sale price of vendor for which it will be required to discharge sales tax on the same.

There is a be possibility of considering above value as sale price, if, first there is sale by buyer of said goods to the vendor and thereafter vendor again selling the said goods along with its finished goods to the buyer. Therefore, it will be required to be seen whether there is sale by buyer of the free supply made by it to the vendor.

There are instances where supply made by customer to supplier has been considered as sale and accordingly liable to tax in the hands of customer as well as supplier. Reference can be made to the judgment of Supreme Court in case of M/s. N. M. Goel (72 STC 368)(SC). In this case, the facts were that the contractee has given certain materials to contractor for use in the contract executed for the said contractee. As per terms in contract the goods to be supplied were to be valued as per the prices mentioned in the contract. It is under the above circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the transaction of supply of goods by contractee fulfills the requirements of a transaction being ‘sale’. There are two parties i.e. contractee and contractor, supply of moveable goods and consideration. The Supreme Court also held that when the possession of the goods is given to the contractor there is transfer of property and hence, the sale transaction from contractee to contractor gets complete. The Supreme Court further held that when contractor uses these goods in the contract for contractee, there is again fresh transfer of property from contractor to contractee and hence one more sale transaction from contractor to contractee. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted facts of case as under.

“The appellant, a dealer registered under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, made an item rate tender to the PWD for construction of food grain godowns and ancillary buildings. In that tender, prices of the materials used for the construction including cost of iron, steel and cement were included. The PWD had, however, agreed to supply from its stores the iron, steel and cement and to deduct the prices of the materials so supplied and consumed in the construction, from the final bill of the appellant. Clause (10) of the contract provided: “. . . . . if it is required that the contractor shall use certain stores to be provided by the Engineer-in-Charge as shown in the Schedule of materials hereto annexed, the contractor shall be bound to procure and shall be supplied such material and stores as are from time to time required to be used by him for the purposes of the contract only, and the value of the full quantity of materials and stores supplied at the rates specified in the said Schedule of materials may be set-off or deducted from any sums then due or thereafter to become due to the contractor under the contract or otherwise, or against or from the security deposit, or the proceeds or sale thereof if the same is held in Government securities, the same or a sufficient portion thereof being in this case sold for the purpose. All the materials so supplied to the contractor shall remain the absolute property of the Government and shall not be removed on any account from the site of the work, and shall be at all times open to inspection by the Engineer-in- Charge.” For the construction, the appellant was supplied iron, steel and cement by the PWD and the appellant purchased other materials from the market. The prices of iron, steel and cement supplied to the appellant for the work were deducted from its final bill. The Sales Tax Officer assessed the appellant to entry tax for iron, steel and cement u/s. 6(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976, on the ground that their entry had been effected by the PWD, which was not a registered dealer, at the instance of the appellant, because the appellant had ultimately used the materials for the construction work; and the Deputy Commissioner affirmed the assessments on revision. A writ petition filed by the appellant challenging the assessments to entry tax was dismissed by the High Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court:

Based on the above, the Supreme Court has held as under:

“On these set of facts, while dismissing the appeal, (i) that since the PWD was not a registered dealer the presumption u/s. 6(c) applied, that the entry of the goods had been effected by the appellant into the local area before they were purchased by the appellant; that in order to attract entry tax not only the property in the goods had to pass from the PWD to the appellant but there had to be an independent contract-separate and distinct-apart from the mere passing of the property: mere passing of property from the PWD to the appellant would not suffice; that, in this case, for the performance of the contract, the appellant was bound to procure the materials; but in order to ensure that quality materials were procured, the PWD undertook to supply such materials and stores as from time to time were required by the appellant to be used for the purpose of performing the contract only. The value of such quantity of materials and stores so supplied was specified at a rate and got set-off or deducted from any sum due or to become due thereafter to the appellant. Clause (10) of the contract read in proper light indicated that a sale inhered from the transaction. By the use or consumption of materials in the work of construction, there was passing of the property in the goods to the appellant from the PWD. By appropriation and by the agreement, there was a sale from the PWD to the appellant as envisaged in terms of clause (10); and that, therefore, the appellant was liable to pay entry tax on the materials supplied by the PWD.”

Based on above judgment of Supreme Court there are number of other judgments where the supply of goods by contractee to contractor has been held as ‘sale’, if such supply is against pre agreed price. In such cases, normally the contractor bills for gross value and gives deduction for the material value as arrived at as per the prices agreed and claims net amount from the contractee. Thus, if such is the mode of billing by the contractor it gives sufficient indication that the supply by the contractee is as per agreed price and hence will be considered to be ‘sale’. In such cases, even if, the supply is referred to as free supply, it will be a misnomer and in reality it will be a ‘sale’ from contractee to contractor and again from contractor to contractee.

However, if there is no such situation i.e. no prices are given for the materials supplied by contractee/buyer as well as no deduction for any value for same is made in the bills of contractor, then there is no sale/purchase of such materials. This position is also clear from judgment of the Hon. Tribunal in case of CIDCO Ltd. (M.A. No.122 of 2005 in S.A. no. 1707 of 1999 DT.6.10.2007).

In this case, the appellant has purchased cement from other state and given free to contractor. In assessment, tax was levied but in first appeal the same was deleted. When the appellant was in second appeal, the Department filed Misc. Application for levy of the tax on cement. The Hon. Tribunal held that when the supply is free of cost there is no question of levy and the Misc. Appl. was rejected. This covers up the legal position. The net result is that if in the contract there are no terms giving price to the goods to be supplied to contractor, and accordingly the same is also not considered in the bills prepared by the contractor, there is no question of any sale transaction involved in such supply. In other words, there is no question of attraction of any tax under Sales Tax Laws on such free supply on either side.

The other situation is consideration of value of such supply for Excise purpose.

For purpose of paying Excise duty the vendor may consider the value of goods supplied by buyer and may be mentioned on the invoice also.

However mentioning the value of goods for payment of Excise duty cannot amount to sale/purchase and cannot bring it in fold of sale price/purchase price.

This position is clear from judgment of the Hon. Tribunal in case of Ghadge Patil Ind. Ltd. & others (S. A. 320 to 327 of 2002 dt.30.3.2007). The short gist of judgment is as under:

The facts of the case relating to year 1994-95 and others are that appellant received an order for supply of certain manufactured parts. The buyer gave certain parts as free issue to be incorporated in the manufactured goods. In purchase order there was no term about creditor particular price to be considered for the said free issues. In its sale bill appellant added the cost of such free issues in his price to calculate excise duty. The cost so added was then given deduction. On above facts lower authorities considered the cost of such supplies as part of sale price and levied tax on the same. Before the Tribunal, appellant explained the facts. The Tribunal observed that in this case the supplies are not made with any particular consideration. There was no intention on part of buyer or seller to sale/ purchase above goods nor agreed for any consideration. Therefore, there cannot be sale from appellant to buyer. The addition in price was with sole purpose of calculating duty, as it was attracted even on free supply cost, as per Excise laws. The Tribunal distinguished the judgment in case of N. M. Goyal (72 STC 368) on above facts. The Tribunal made reference to judgment in case of Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (9 STC 353), Indian Coffee & Tea Distributors Co. (6 STC 47), Indian Alluminium Cables (115 STC 161), Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. (55 STC 314) and Auto Comp Corpn. (S.A.1083 of 99 dt.26.9.2003). The Tribunal directed to delete the addition.

Thus, it is held that for considering the free supply value as sale/purchase there should be conscious decision on the same which can be ascertained from the fact of giving prices for such supply and billing mode by supplier. Simply mentioning value for Excise duty calculation cannot make it sale/purchase, and cannot be part of price of transaction, nor can it be included in sale price.

Conclusion

Whether free supply by buyer/contractee to the vendor/ contractor will amount to sale/purchase depends upon intention of the parties coupled with underlying documents. To make the intention clear, in documents it should be specifically mentioned that the supply is free to the vendor but the value may be considered for excise payment. If the documents are not clear, then the dispute may arise and the sales tax department will certainly try to claim tax on the same.

RECENT AMENDMENTS: INTEREST ON CENVA T CREDIT WRONGLY TAKEN

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Preliminary
The issue whether interest is leviable at the point of time when CENVAT credit is wrongly taken or at the point of utilization has been a matter of extensive judicial examination. An important amendment was made in Rule 14 of CENVAT Rules through Notification dated 17/03/2012 and further a significant amendment has been made vide Notification dated. 01/3/2015. Hence, the implication of the latest amendment in the backdrop of the earlier judicial controversies, are discussed hereafter.

Background
Relevant Statutory Provisions – [Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (“CCR”)]

“Where CENVAT credit has been taken or utilized wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”

[Note – The words “taken or utilized wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilized wrongly” vide Notification No. 18/2012 – CE(NT) dated 17/03/2012].

Supreme Court Ruling overruling High Court Ruling

Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. vs. UOI (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H) (which was subsequently set aside by the Supreme Court), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference :

Para 9

“The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of final products or a provider of taxable service to take CENVAT credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing CENVAT credit are contained in Rule 4 of the Credit Rules contemplating that CENVAT credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT credit can be utilized in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules for payment of any duty of excise on any final product and as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermediate products etc. In other words, it is a credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Under section 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is chargeable separately.”

Para 10

“In Pratibha Processors vs. Union of India, 1996 (88) ELT 12 (SC) = (1996) 11 SCC 101, it was held that interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. Similarly, in Commissioner of Customs vs. Jayathi Krishna & Co. – 2000 (119) ELT 4(SC) (2000) 9 SCC 402, it was held that interest on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal and if principal is not payable, so is it for interest on it. In view of the aforesaid principle, we are of the opinion that no liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the petitioner availed CENVAT credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilization. Even if CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of CENVAT credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on the amount of CENVAT credit availed of and not utilized.”

Para 11

“Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest under section 11AB of the Act is payable even if CENVAT credit has been taken. In our view, said clause has to be read down to mean that where CENVAT credit taken and utilized wrongly, interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit. The interest shall be payable from the date CENVAT credit is wrongly utilized.”

In an important ruling the Supreme Court, in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (S.C.)], set aside the order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H)] on the question of charging interest on CENVAT credit wrongly taken but not utilised. By interpreting the expressions and words used in the provisions of Rule 14 of CCR, the Supreme Court concluded that interest is payable on CENVAT credit wrongly taken even if such credit has not been utilised.

The issue for consideration was whether an assessee can be made liable to pay interest for taking wrong credit if such credit has not been utilised in as much as he has not derived any benefit out of his wrong action.

The more important observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

Para 17

“…………….. In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterprets the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared unconstitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where CENVAT credit has been taken or utilized would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service. The issue is as to whether the aforesaid word “OR” appearing in Rule 14, twice, could be read as “AND” by way of reading it down as has been done by the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read as a whole we find no reason to read the word ‘OR’ in between the expression ‘taken’ or “utilized wrongly” or has been erroneously refunded’ as the word ‘AND’. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.”

Para 18

“We do not feel that any other harmonious construction is required to be given to the aforesaid expression / provision which is clear and unambiguous as it exists all by itself. So far as section 11AB is concerned, the same becomes relevant and applicable for the purpose of making recovery of the amount due and payable. Therefore, the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit and that it should only be payable from the date when CENVAT credit is wrongly utilized. Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilized to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This Court has repeatedly laid down that in the garb of reading down a provision it is not open to read words and expressions not found in the provision statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.”

The interpretation made by the Honorable Supreme Court considering the specific circumstances of a case involving evasion of duty, has been a matter of extensive deliberation by experts and rightly so in as much as if the same is applied generally, it would mean unsettling the settled law.

Important Ruling of Karnataka High Court in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR) [Bill Forge Case]

    The observations of the Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case are very important, in as much as not only has it distinguished facts of the case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (SC) but it has made fine distinction between making an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to drive home the point that interest is payable only from the date when duty is legally payable to the Government and the Government would sustain loss to that extent.

“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or “utilized wrongly”. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of sections 11A and 11B of the Act………”

Para 20

“From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry. It might be utilized later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product………Before utilization of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”

Para 22

“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue is not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words, he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT credit or utilized the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances the Tribunal was justified in holding that when the assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT credit, there is no liability to pay interest. Before it can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court has no application to the facts of this case. It is only when the assessee had taken the credit, in other words, by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises under section 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty on the date it became due.”

  •     The ruling in Bill Forge case has been followed in a large number of subsequently decided cases. For example:

    CCE vs. Pearl Insulation Ltd. (2012) 27 STR 337 (KAR)

    CCE vs. Gokuldas Images (P) Ltd (2012) 28 STR 214 (KAR)

    CCE vs. Strategic Engineering (P) Ltd (2014) 45 GST 662 (MAD)

    Sharvathy Conductors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 31 STR 47 (Tri – Bang)

    CCE vs. Sharda Energy & Minerals Ltd. (2013) 291 ELT 404 (Tri – Del)

    Gary Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 297 ELT 391 (Tri – Del)

    CCE vs. Balrampur Chinni Mills Ltd (2014) 300 ELT 449 (Tri – Del)

    Gurmehar Construction vs. CCE (2014) 36 STR 545 (Tri – Del)

  •     However, in many cases, Bill Forge case has not been followed and instead the position held by the Supreme Court in the Ind Swift case has been followed. For example:

    Dr Reddy Laboratories Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 293 ELT 89 (Tri)

    Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd vs. CC & CCE (2014) 303 ELT 139 (Tri – Bang)

    CCE vs. Sundaram Fasteners Limited (2014) 304 ELT 7 (MAD)

    Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd vs. CCE (2014) 301 ELT 573 (Tri – Mumbai)

Important amendment in Rule 14 of CCR

In a very significant amendment in Rule 14 of CCR, with effect from 17/03/2012, the words CENVAT credit has been “taken or utilized wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilized wrongly”.

This amendment strongly reinforces the interpretation placed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Maruti Udyog Ind Swift Laboratories and Karnataka High Court in Bill Forge case to the effect that, no interest can be recovered in cases where CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken but not utilized by an assessee.

    Recent Amendment: Analysis

In the recent Budget, Rule 14 of CCR has been amended vide Notification No. 6/2015-Central Excise (NT) dated 01/03/2015. The amended Rule 14 reads as under:

“14. Recovery of CENVAT credit wrongly taken or erroneously refunded. –

“(1) (i) Where the CENVAT credit has been taken wrongly but not utilized, the same shall be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of output service, as the case may be and the provisions of section 11A of the Excise Act or section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), as the case may be, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries;

(ii) Where the CENVAT credit has been taken and utilized wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same shall be recovered along with interest from the manufacturer or the provider of output service, as the case may be and the provisions of sections 11A and 11AA of the Excise Act or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, 1994, as the case may be, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.

    For the purposes of sub-rule (1), all credits taken during a month shall be deemed to have been taken on the last day of the month and the utilization thereof shall be deemed to have occurred in the following manner, namely: –

    i)the opening balance of the month has been utilized first;
    ii)credit admissible in terms of these rules taken during the month has been utilized next;
    iii)credit inadmissible in terms of these rules taken during the month has been utilized thereafter.”
The amended Rule 14(1) of CCR deals with two distinct situations viz.

  •     one where credit has been wrongly taken but not utilised and
  •     the other where credit has been wrongly taken and also utilised.

Further, to deal with a scenario, where credit has been utilised, a deeming provision has been brought in through new sub-rule 14(2), to lay down the manner in which the utilisation shall be deemed to have occurred.

  •     Prior to the introduction of this sub-rule, the assessee used to avail CENVAT credit even where the eligibility of CENVAT credit was in dispute. As long as the balance of CENVAT credit in the books of the assessee was more than the amount of the disputed CENVAT credit, it was construed that the disputed amount of CENVAT credit availed by the assessee had not been utilised and consequently, the proceedings under Rule 14 of CCR for recovery of credit and interest thereon could not be initiated against it.

However, after the above amendment, the manner prescribed therein will have to be applied to determine the utilisation of ineligible credit or otherwise.

  •     The larger view of trade & industry and tax payers generally is that the amended Rule 14 of CCR continues to be in line with Government’s consistent view to the effect that:

  •     recovery of interest along with CENVAT credit would be applicable only in those situations where the assessee takes credit and also utilises the same; and

  •     in those cases, where the assessee takes CENVAT credit but does not utilise such credit for specified reasons, recovery would be only of credit wrongly taken and the question of any recovery towards interest does not arise at all.

  •     A better view which may be adopted while interpreting Rule 14(2) of CCR is that the opening balance of CENVAT credit should only include the admissible amount of CENVAT credit and the inadmissible amount of CENVAT credit should be recorded separately. In such a case, while computing the amount of CENVAT credit utilized in a particular month, the total admissible amount of CENVAT credit available with the assessee will have to be taken into account first and the inadmissible amount of CENVAT credit will be said to be utilised only after the admissible CENVAT credit is exhausted. In such a case, an assessee will become liable to pay interest only in those cases where the balance of inadmissible CENVAT credit available with it is less than the credit utilised in a month.

This view can be supported by the following reasons :

  •     the earlier rule was silent regarding manner of utilisation, the amendment in the said rule has been made as a matter of trade facilitation exercise.
  •     it is consistent with the leniency shown in the past when the provision of Rule 14 was amended to overcome the adverse impact of Supreme Court decision in case of Ind-Swift.

It is a need of every business and tax payer to keep some amount of CENVAT credit on hold without utilizing the same for excise duty payment or payment of service tax.

Eligibility to CENVAT credit is prone to extensive litigations. Hence, in many cases where credit eligibility is of a doubtful and disputable nature and could often involve substantially high amount, tax payers often opt to avail credits to protect their rights but choose not to utilize the credits pending clarity & judicial evolvement, so as to avoid any interest liability in case the matter is decided adversely.

However, in the amended Rule 14 (2) of CCR, due to employment of the words “For the purposes of sub-rule
(1)”, there is an apprehension that the field formations may erroneously interpret that the deeming provisions laid down in Rule 14(2) would also apply to the cases covered under Rule 14 (1) (i).

Further, to arrive at the due date for interest payable the Rule 14(2) is creating a deeming fiction that all the credits taken during a month shall be deemed to have been taken on the last day of the month and the utilisation thereof shall be deemed to have occurred in the following manner, namely:-

    the opening balance of the month has been utilised first;
    ………………..

    ………………..
It is apprehended by trade and industry that credits kept on hold during any month form part of the opening balance of the next month, the field formations may interpret the same to be deemed utilised and thus liable for interest. This could result in unnecessary litigations and hardships to trade and industry and tax payers generally.

Conclusion:

The amendment in Rule 14 of CCR vide Notification dated 01/03/2015 needs to be understood, in the backdrop of introduction of time limits for availment of credit under CCR, for the first time with effect from 01/09/2014. In cases where availment of CENVAT credits was of a doubtful nature/under litigations, substantial amounts of credits were availed by tax payers prior to 01/09/2014 (but kept unutilised) in order to protect their interest in a scenario where matter gets decided in their favour at a future point of time and at the same time, avoiding any interest liability in case the matter is decided against them.

Further, in the absence of specific provisions under CCR or clarification by CBEC, in practice, no systematic records are maintained by assessees with regard to CENVAT credits utilised but not availed. This would create practical difficulties for the audit team/field formations to ascertain correctness of credit utilisation and interest liability on wrong utilisation. It appears that though legislative intent behind the amendment is laudable, there is a clear disconnect in the fine print that has emerged. This leaves room for doubts and possible hardships to trade and industry and tax payers from the field formations.

Suggestions:

Appropriate amendment should be made in Rule 14(2) of CCR to avoid unnecessary litigations.

Alternatively, CBEC should issue suitable clarifications / instructions to the effect that :

the deeming provisions in Rule 14(2) would apply only in those cases where inadmissible credit has been taken and also utilised; and

On lines with Instructions under erstwhile MODVAT Rules, [Ref – Circular No. 4/91 – Cx 8 dated 14/02/91 (File No. 263/5/91-CX – 8)] lay down detailed procedure to be followed by assessees who desire not to utilise the credit taken by them in order to ensure that they are covered under Rule 14(1)(i) of CCR.

Rollatainers Ltd. vs. ACIT ITAT Delhi `F’ Bench Before R. S. Syal (AM) and C. M. Garg (JM) ITA No. 3134 /Del/2010 Assessment Year: 2003-04. Decided on: 6th August, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue : Gaurav Jain / Vikram Sahay

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Section 147 – Internal audit cannot perform functions of judicial supervision. Initiation of re-assessment on the basis of an interpretation of the provisions of law by the audit party is forbidden, the communication of law or the factual inconsistencies by the internal audit party, do not operate as a hindrance in the initiation of re-assessment proceedings.

Facts:
The assessee filed its return of income declaring a loss of Rs.12,48,92,067. The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act determining the loss at Rs.11,32,76,728. While assessing the total income the AO allowed deduction of Rs.3,61,75,597 out of unpaid interest of earlier year amounting to Rs.5,01,38,035 u/s. 43B on the basis of the claim of the assessee that it was discharged / paid.

The audit scrutiny of the assessment records revealed that out of the amount of Rs.3,61,75,597 which was allowed by the AO as a deduction, a sum of Rs.2,45,01,117 was transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary company. The audit party pointed out to the AO that this sum of Rs. 2,45,01,117 was not actually paid but only transferred to subsidiary company and consequently it ought to have been disallowed.

The AO, after recording reasons, issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act. In the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.ws. 147 of the Act, the AO disallowed the claim of Rs.2,45,01,117.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO in reopening the assessment and also on merits.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where interalia, it challenged the re-opening on the ground that in view of the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society vs. CIT 119 ITR 996 (SC) initiation of reassessment on the basis of internal audit report was not sustainable.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that it had to examine whether the assessee’s case fell within the ratio laid down in the case of CIT vs. PVS Beedis Pvt. Ltd. 237 ITR 13 (SC) in which the initiation of reassessment proceedings on the basis of audit objection has been held to be valid or in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society (supra) and further CIT vs. Lucas T.V.S. Ltd. 249 ITR 306 (SC).

The logic in not sustaining the initiation of reassessment on the basis of interpretation of law by the audit party is that the internal auditor cannot be allowed to perform the functions of judicial supervision over the Income-tax authorities by suggesting to the AO about how a provision should be interpreted and whether the interpretation so given by the AO to a particular provision of the Act is right or wrong. An interpretation to a provision given by the audit party cannot be construed as a declaration of law binding on the AO.When an internal audit party objects to the interpretation given by the AO to a provision and proposes substitution of such interpretation with the one it feels right, it crosses its jurisdiction and enters into the realm of judicial supervision, which it is not authorised to do. In such circumstances, the initiation of reassessment, based on the substituted interpretation of a provision by the internal audit party, cannot be sustained.

The Tribunal noted that the Madras High Court has in the case of CIT vs. First Leasing Co. of India Ltd. 241 ITR 248 (Mad) aptly explained the position that although, the audit party is not entitled to judicially interpret a provision, but at the same time, it can communicate the law to the AO, which he omitted to consider. It also noted that the Madras High Court has observed that the Supreme Court has made a distinction between the communication of law and interpretation of law.

Where the audit party interprets the provision of law in a manner contrary to what the AO had done, it does not lay down a valid foundation for the initiation of reassessment proceedings. If however, the audit party does not offer its own interpretation to the provisions and simply communicates the existence of law to the AO or any other factual inaccuracy, then the initiation of reassessment proceedings on such basis cannot be faulted with.

In a nutshell, whereas the initiation of reassessment proceedings on the basis of an interpretation to the provisions of law by the audit party is forbidden, the communication of law or the factual inconsistencies by the internal audit party, do not operate as a hindrance in the initiation of reassessment proceedings.

The Tribunal noted the audit objection, in this case, divulged that the audit party simply suggested that the interest of Rs.2.45 crore was not actually paid, but, only transferred to a subsidiary company and the same should have been disallowed and this omission on the part of the AO resulted in over assessment of loss of Rs.2.45 crore. This, according to the Tribunal, showed that the AO was simply informed of the fact which had escaped his attention during the course of assessment proceedings to the effect that the sum of Rs.2.45 crore was not allowable u/s. 43B of the Act which is nothing, but a communication of law to the AO. The Tribunal observed that it was not confronted with a situation in which the AO, after due consideration of the matter in the original assessment proceedings interpreted 43B as allowing deduction for a sum of Rs.2.45 crore in respect of interest not paid to financial institutions, but, transferred to assessee’s wholly owned subsidiary company, but, the audit party interpreted this provision in a different manner from the way in which it was interpreted by the AO and then suggested that the amount ought to have been charged to tax. According to the Tribunal, the instant case is fully covered by the decision in the case of PVS Beedis Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and consequently the audit objection in the instant case constituted an `information’ about the escapement of income to the AO, thereby justifying the initiation of reassessment.

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Malineni Babulu (HUF) vs. Income Tax Officer ITAT “A” Bench, Hyderabad P. Madhavi Devi (J.M.) and Inturi Rama Rao (A. M.) I.T.A. No.: 1326/HYD/2014 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 07-08-2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: S. Rama Rao/ D. Srinivas

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Non deduction of tax at source on interest paid as payees furnished Form 15H – Mere non-filing of Form 15H would not entail disallowance of interest paid.

Facts:
One of the issues before the Tribunal was regarding addition of Rs.0.98 lakh made under the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia). During the year, the appellant had made interest payment of Rs.0.98 lakh to the coparceners of the appellant. It was claimed that the taxable income of the payees was below the taxable limit hence Form 15H were obtained from them and it was claimed to have been submitted to the CIT, Guntur by post, but no proof in support of the dispatch by post was furnished before the CIT. However, copies of Form 15H were filed before the AO. The CIT acting u/s. 263 directed the AO to disallow the same for failure to adduce evidence in support of dispatch of Form 15H by post.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, mere non-filing of Form 15H with the CIT does not entail disallowance of expenditure. It is only a technical breach of law and the Act provides for separate penal provisions for such default. Thus, according to the Tribunal, where the taxable income of the payees is below the taxable limit and Form 15H is obtained from them no disallowance under the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) can be made. Further, relying on the decision of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vijaya Bank vs. ITO [2014] [49 Taxmann.com 533, the tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Smt. Rekha Rani vs. DCIT ITAT Delhi `F’ Bench Before G. C. Gupta (VP) and Inturi Rama Rao (AM) ITA No. 6131 /Del/2013 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 6th May, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue : None / Vikram Sahay

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Section 271(1)(b) – The provision of section 271(1)(b) is of
deterrent nature and not for earning revenue. Penalty u/s. 271(1)(b)
could not be imposed for each and every notice issued u/s. 143(2) of the
Act, which remains not complied with on the part of the assessee.

Facts:
The
Assessing Officer (AO) issued notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act on five
different dates and the assessee failed to comply with the same. The AO
invoked the provisions of section 271(1)(b) of the Act and imposed
penalty of Rs. 10,000 for each default on the ground that the assessee
had no reasonable cause for not appearing on the date fixed for hearing.
Thus, he levied a total penalty of Rs.50,000. Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal before CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The
Tribunal observed that there was no reasonable cause on the part of the
assessee for not appearing on the different dates of hearing before the
AO in response to the notices issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act. The
Tribunal found that the default was the same in all the five cases and
therefore, it held, that penalty of Rs.10,000 could be imposed for the
first default made by the assessee in this regard. It held that the
penalty u/s. 271(1)(b) could not be imposed for each and every notice
issued under section 143(2), which remained not complied with on the
part of the assessee. It observed that the provision of section 271(1)
(b) is of deterrent nature and not for earning revenue. It held that any
other view taken shall lead to imposition of penalty for any number of
times (without limits) for the same default of not appearing in response
to the notice u/s.143(2) of the Act. This, according to the Tribunal,
does not seem to be the intention of the legislature in enacting the
provisions of section 271(1)(b) of the Act. It observed that in case of
failure on the part of the assessee to comply with the notice u/s.143(2)
of the Act, the remedy with the AO lies in framing “best judgement
assessment” under the provisions of section 144 of the Act and not to
impose penalty u/s. 271(1)(b) of the Act again and again.

The
Tribunal restricted the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(b) of the Act to the
first default of the assessee in not complying with the notice issued
u/s. 143(2) of the Act.

The appeal filed by assessee was partly allowed.

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Hindu Law – Partition – Doctrine of throwing Property in common hotchpot – Assessment under the Wealth tax Act would be evidence : Hindu Succession Act section 23

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Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. AIR 2015 (NOC) 895 (Del)

The
plaintiff had filed a suit for partition against her brothers and
mother in respect of constructed premises. The undisputed facts were
that the suit premises were purchased and constructed by the plaintiff’s
father, wherein he along with his family stayed for some time and also
let out a portion thereof to the tenants. The plaintiff’s case was that
since her father and brother died intestate, she was entitled to
one-fourth share in the suit premises. She stated that whenever she
visited her paternal home, she stayed in the suit premises. The
plaintiff averred that the suit premises were never treated as HUF
property and no Will was ever executed by their father.

The
defendants No. 1 and 2 (sons) contested the suit. Their case was that
the plaintiff being the married daughter, had only restricted rights in
the suit premises and could not seek its partition. They averred that
the plaintiff was also not entitled to any share, as the suit premises
was a HUF property, and was so assessed by the Income Tax Department as
also the Wealth Tax Authorities.

The plaintiff deposed that her
father acquired the suit premises from his own earnings, savings and
loans and had constructed the same in March, 1966, when all the
defendants were studying and they could not have contributed to the
construction expenses.

On the other hand, the defendants stated
that their father had abandoned his individual rights in the suit
premises by making a declaration on affidavit dated 23.05.1966,
submitted by him with the Income Tax Department, and which was accepted
as HUF property vide Assessment Order dated 31.03.1976 for the
Assessment Year 1972- 73. They stated that from the Assessment Year
1972-73 to 1988-90 and until the demise of their father, the premises
had been assessed to Income-tax as well as Wealth-tax, as HUF under the
provisions of Income-tax Act as well as Wealth-tax Act.

The
Hon’ble Court observed that as per the plaintiff, the suit premises was
self-acquired property of their father, whereas as per defendants No. 1
and 2, though, it was the self-acquired property of their father, he had
thrown it in the hotchpot of HUF.

The law relating to blending
of separate property with joint family property is well settled.
Property, separate or self-acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family
may be impressed with the character of joint family property, if it was
voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention
of abandoning his separate claim therein, but to establish such
abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be
established.

The separate property of a Hindu ceases to be
separate property and acquires the characteristics of a joint family or
ancestral property not by any physical mixing with his joint family or
his ancestral property but by his own volition and intention, by his
waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as a separate
property. The act by which the coparcener throws his separate property
in the common stock is a unilateral act. There is no question of either
the family rejecting or accepting it. By his individual volition, he
renounces his individual right in that property and treats it as a
property of the family. No sooner than he declares his intention to
treat his self-acquired property as that of the joint family property,
the property assumes the character of joint family property. The
doctrine of throwing into the common stock is a doctrine peculiar to the
Mitakshara school of Hindu law.

The Hon’ble Court observed that
from the Assessment Order dated 31.03.1972 of the Assessment Year 1972-
73, it is seen that the plaintiff’s father had declared some income
from the suit premises in the status of HUF. It is also seen therefrom
that the HUF came into existence under the assessee’s declaration made
on 23.05.1966 on an affidavit. The Income Tax record of the subsequent
year upto the Assessment Year 1999-2000 would evidence that the
plaintiff’s father had been filing Income Tax Returns and been assessed
to Income Tax as Karta of HUF. The incomes received from the suit
premises was being declared by the plaintiff’s father as of HUF and was
assessed as such during all these years. The Assessment Order under the
Wealth Tax Act of the years 1977-78 onward would also evidence the suit
premises having been assessed as HUF for the purpose of Wealth Tax. From
all this record, it was concluded that the plaintiff’s father, for all
purposes, had consciously abandoned his individual rights in the suit
premises to HUF with effect from 23.05.1966. The affidavit filed by the
plaintiff’s father with Income Tax Department declaring the suit
premises as HUF on 23.05.1966 was not the solitary step taken by him,
but, he continued to maintain the HUF status of the suit premises till
he died. In view of all this, even the payment of property tax by the
plaintiff’s father in his name and not that of HUF or even for that
matter, filing of eviction case against the tenant Bank of Baroda in his
own name than that of HUF would not make any difference. There is no
dispute that the suit premises was initially acquired by the plaintiff’s
father in his own name and it was in those circumstances that the suit
premises continued to be assessed to property tax in his individual name
rather than that of HUF. The payment of property tax by any means does
not create any right or title in the name of the assessee. Filing an
eviction case by the plaintiff’s father in his own name instead of the
HUF, can also be said to be only for the convenience. In any case, the
partition could only be filed by him in his name, being the Karta of
HUF. Thus it was held that the suit premises was of the HUF property of
the plaintiff’s father, with he being the Karta thereof till his death.

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Foreign Judgement – Enforceable before Court in India – Civil Procedure Code, section 13(b)

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Masterbaker Marketing Ltd vs. Noshir Moshin Chinwalla, AIR 2015 (NOC) 771 (Bom.)

A foreign Court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter and passes a decree, the same is conclusive u/s. 13 of the CPC. The plea of the defendant that judgement was obtained by playing fraud hence could not be conclusive could not be considered as it had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the competent Court in a foreign country. The defendant would not be allowed to raise up his hands after the plaintiff has gone through the process of trial and undertaken the execution by applying to the executing Court to retry the issue.

The plaintiff had filed his plaint. The defendant was given notice of the action. He was served a summon. He was called upon to answer the plaintiff’s claim. The trial Court was bound to hear the defendant and to dismiss the plaintiffs claim if it was fraudulent or perjurial. It was, therefore, not only the defendant’s right to get the action of the plaintiff dismissed if it was perjurial or fraudulent, but also its duty to bring perjurial act constituting fraud to the notice of the Court if it was known to the defendant at the time of the trial. If that was not done at the time of trial then and was sought to be done later after the judgment was passed, it would constitute a retrial issue. That retrial is forbidden by the salutary principle of resjudicata. If permitted, it would allow all defendants not to defend the claim and allow any decree to be passed which would then be challenged whilst being executed. That would be an abuse of the Court process.

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Territorial Jurisdiction – Infringement of Copyright and/or Trademark

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Introduction
A question that arises in almost every matter
pertaining to violation of intellectual property rights is – Which Court
would have the necessary territorial jurisdiction to try, entertain and
dispose of the present proceedings? By this article, an endeavour shall
be made to explain which Court/Courts would have territorial
jurisdiction in respect of matters of infringement of copyright and/or
trademark.

The determination of territorial jurisdiction of a
civil court is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure,1908(“CPC”)1
Section 20 of the CPC which would be the relevant Section with respect
to cases of infringement of copyright and/or trademark provides that a
Suit may be filed, inter alia, either where the Defendant actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business or works for gain or where
the cause of action arises wholly or in part. An explanation appended to
the said Section provides that a Corporation is deemed to carry on
business at its sole or principal office in India or at a place, where
in respect of any cause of action arising at such place it has a
subordinate office.

Hence, under these provisions, a Plaintiff
would be obliged to travel to where the Defendant actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business or works for gain or where
the cause of action has arisen, wholly or in part. To illustrate this
point, consider a a case where an owner of copyright in a musical work
resides in Delhi, however, his musical work is being infringed by a
Defendant in Chennai by causing unauthorised communication thereof in a
bar in Chennai itself and nowhere else. In such a case, the Plaintiff
copyright owner would be constrained to travel to Chennai to file a
proceeding to restrain the acts of infringement of copyright since both
the Defendant is residing in Chennai as also the cause of action has
arisen in Chennai. Such acts of infringement often take place in remoter
parts of the country, making it even more cumbersome for a Plaintiff to
travel to every nook and corner of the country to protect his
intellectual property rights.

These difficulties were noted by
the Joint Committee that was constituted prior to the passing of the
Copyright Act, 1957 (“CA”) in as much as it was observed that many
authors are deterred from instituting infringement proceedings because
the court in which the proceedings are to be instituted are at a
considerable distance from the place of their ordinary residence. The
Joint Committee recommended that such impediments should be removed and
the proceedings should be allowed to be instituted in the local court
where the person instituting the proceedings ordinarily resides, carries
on business etc2.

Hence, it was in this background that an
additional forum was provided for by Legislature in section 62 of the CA
to enable authors to file a suit for infringement of copyright where
they reside or they carry on business or work for gain3. Subsequently,
section 134 was also brought into effect in the Trade Marks Act, 1999
(“TMA”) to provide an additional forum even in case of infringement of
trademark at a place where the Plaintiff resides or carries on business
or works for gain.

It is the scope and purview of both these
provisions that is sought to be explained and commented upon in this
Article. In fact, the Supreme Court has in a recent judgment dated 1st
July, 2015 in the case of IPRS vs. Sanjay Dalia4 dealt extensively with
the ambit and scope of the said provisions. My effort shall be to
explain the ratio decidendi of the Apex Court and thereafter highlight
certain issues which may still need to answered by the Hon’ble Courts to
afford complete clarity on these provisions.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Before
adverting to the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in the case of
IPRS vs. Sanjay Dalia5, it would be helpful to consider the actual text
of the relevant provisions which provide, inter alia, as under :-

CA
“Section
62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under this Chapter. —
(1) Every suit or other civil proceeding arising under this Chapter in
respect of the infringement of copyright in any work or the infringement
of any other right conferred by this Act shall be instituted in the
district court having jurisdiction.

(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a “district court having jurisdiction” shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, include a
district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the
time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person
instituting the suit or other proceeding or, where there are more than
one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business or personally works for gain.”

TMA
“134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted before District Court. —
(1) No suit– (a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or
(b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or (c) for passing
off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which is
identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s trade mark,
whether registered or unregistered, shall be instituted in any court
inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.

(2) For the purpose of cls. (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a “District Court having jurisdiction” shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a
District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the
time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person
instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one
such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain…”

It may be noted
that though the current TMA contains Section 134 which provides an
additional forum to a Plaintiff, the earlier Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act, 1958 contained no such provision. Under the Trade and Merchandise
Marks Act, 1958, a Plaintiff was constrained to follow the Defendant
and/or the cause of action for vindication of his rights as u/s. 20 of
the CPC. This position has, however, now changed u/s. 134 of the TMA. A
bare perusal of both section 62(2) of the CA and section 134(2) of the
TMA which are pari materia6 in nature would show that they make a
significant departure from the provisions of the CPC and provide for the
existence of an additional forum in a Suit relating to infringement of
copyright and/or trademark, before a Court, where the Plaintiff actually
and voluntarily resides or carries on business or works for gain.

Both section 62(2) of the CA and section 134(2) of the TMA are additional forums and do not take away or abridge the right of a Plaintiff, if he so chooses to follow the Defendant and/or the cause of action u/s. 20 of the CPC. Hence, a Plaintiff in a suit for infringement of copyright and/or trademark would be entitled to approach the appropriate Court either u/s. 20 of the CPC or u/s. 62(2) of the CA or u/s. 134(2) of the TMA, as the case may be. It is possible, in a given case, that the appropriate Court could be the same Court whether section 20 of CPC is applied or the provisions of the CA or TMA are applied. An illustration would be that, take a case where an owner of copyright in a musical work resides in Delhi. The Defendant is also residing in Delhi and is infringing the musical work by causing unauthorised communication thereof in a bar in Delhi itself and nowhere else. In such a case, the Courts at Delhi would have the necessary territorial jurisdiction to entertain such a Suit for infringement of copyright since firstly, as u/s. 62 of CA, the Plaintiff resides in Delhi. Secondly, u/s. 20 of CPC, the Defendant also resides in Delhi and thirdly, even the cause of action is arising in Delhi. Hence, in such a case, it would only be the Courts at Delhi which would have the necessary territorial jurisdiction.

The question however, is of cases where only section 62 of the CA and/or section 134 of the TMA are invoked as conferring territorial jurisdiction on the Court.

    IPRS VS. SANJAY DALIA7

The Apex Court was dealing with two appeals from the Delhi High Court in this case. In the first Appeal, the facts were that the the Plaintiff was carrying on business through a Branch Office situate at Delhi and it was on this basis that the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court had been invoked. In the second Appeal, also the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was invoked on the basis that the Plaintiff had a branch office at Delhi. In both these matters, the admitted position was that the registered office of the Plaintiffs was not in Delhi nor had any cause of action arisen in Delhi at the time of filing the suits but only the Branch Offices were in Delhi. Proceedings had been filed on the basis, as a suit could be filed wherever the Plaintiff was carrying on business and since these Plaintiffs had a branch office in Delhi, they must be deemed to carry on business in Delhi thereby, rendering the Delhi High Court as the Court having the necessary territorial jurisdiction. Objections were however, raised by the Defendants to the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, on the basis that in both these matters the Plaintiff had a registered office in Bombay where the cause of action had also arisen and hence, it should be the Courts at Bombay which would have the necessary territorial jurisdiction. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court upheld the objection of the Defendant in the first matter whilst in the second matter, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, allowed an amendment to be made to the Plaint to add averments to the effect that the infringing magazines were being circulated in Delhi as well thereby showing that cause of action had arisen in Delhi, and on this basis rejected the plea of the Defendant of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was against these two Orders of the Delhi High Court, that appeals were preferred before the Apex Court.

The Supreme Court was thus called upon to answer whether in light of section 62 of CA and section 134 of TMA could a Plaintiff Corporation file a Suit anywhere it chose to, based on the existence of a branch office or must the Plaintiff Corporation be constrained to file proceedings at a place where either its registered office is situated or at a place where it has a branch office and where the cause of action has also arisen akin to the Explanation to section 20 of the CPC. The Explanation to section 20 of the CPC as mentioned earlier provides that a Corporation is deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or at a place, where in respect of any cause of action arising at such place it has a subordinate office.

The Supreme Court after considering the legislative history and the purpose for which the provisions had been brought onto the statute book observed that if the provisions are not interpreted purposively, as is being suggested by the Supreme Court, it could lead to abuse of the provisions, in as much as the Plaintiff will institute a suit in a wholly unconnected jurisdiction based solely on the existence of a branch office. The Supreme Court illustrated the possible abuse and observed, inter alia, that “There may be a case where plaintiff is carrying on the business at Mumbai and cause of action has

arisen in Mumbai. Plaintiff is having branch offices at Kanyakumari and also at Port Blair, if interpretation suggested by appellants is acceptable, mischief may be caused by such plaintiff to drag a defendant to Port Blair or Kanyakumari. The provisions cannot be interpreted in the said manner devoid of the object of the Act.” It has also been observed that such a counter mischief to the defendant was unforeseen by Parliament and it is the court’s duty to mitigate the counter mischief.

Hence, the Supreme Court has held that the additional right to institute a suit at a place where the Plaintiff resides or carries on business has to be read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in part, plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying on business at other far flung places also. The very intendment of the insertion of provisions in the CA and TMA is the convenience of the plaintiff. The interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief of causing inconvenience to parties. The Supreme Court whilst interpreting these provisions was also of the view that the issue raised before it had not been raised in any of the earlier cases cited before it

It was in light of these findings that the Supreme Court was pleased to dismiss both the appeals by holding that the provisions of section 62 of the CA and section 134 of the TMA have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. There is no doubt about it that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing or carrying on business or personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has to file a suit at that place.

Whilst this judgment, brings much required clarity to the issue as to the interpretation of these provisions of the CA and TMA, in my opinion, these findings of the Supreme Court amount to introducing an Explanation or a Sub-section (3) to both section 62 of the CA and section 134 of the TMA, which explanation or sub-section had not been provided even by the Legislature whilst passing the said statutes.

The effect of this judgment would be to limit the scope and effect of these provisions. Plaintiffs would now be obliged to file proceedings in accordance with these principles laid down by the Apex Court. The effect of this judgment will, in fact, be felt in several pending proceedings, which proceedings may have been initiated prior to this judgment at a place where the Plaintiff had only a branch office but no cause of action, based on the bare language of these provisions. Already in several proceedings in different High Courts, to my knowledge, applications have been moved for rejection/return of plaint on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction of that Court based on this judgment.

    CONCLUSION

Even though this judgment does bring forth a fair amount of clarity on the issue of territorial jurisdiction in cases of infringement of copyright and/or trademark, in my opinion, certain important issues still remain to be answered in connection with the interpretation of these provisions.

To illustrate an issue which still needs to be addressed and has not been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court, consider a situation, where the Plaintiff is having a branch office in Delhi and the cause of action has also arisen there whilst its registered office is at Bombay. In such a case, can it be said that the Plaintiff is precluded from approaching the Courts at Bombay and must only file his case in the Courts at Delhi or is it still his option to choose the forum of his convenience between these two forums.

It may be noted that the Supreme Court in the IPRS judgment, was dealing with two cases where factually this position did not arise and in both cases, jurisdiction had been invoked only on the existence of a branch office and not on the basis of a combination of branch office plus cause of action. It is trite law that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides8 and hence, considering the nature of the facts involved, it would be difficult to assert that this issue has been conclusively adjudicated upon.

In my opinion, however, in the IPRS case itself, the Supreme Court had referred to its earlier judgment in Patel Roadways vs. Prasad Trading Co.9 wherein the Court whilst explaining the provisions of Section 20 of the CPC had observed, inter alia, that “The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place.”

Thus, from the perspective of the convenience of the Defendant and not the Plaintiff, the Supreme Court has already opined that it is the location of the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause of action arises, which is to be the relevant place for the filing of a suit and not the principal place of business.

On an analogy of this principle of convenience of parties as explained by the Supreme Court, in my opinion, it could be urged that a Plaintiff corporation which has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, ought not to be heard to say that it will not sue there since it would like to sue at a place where it has its registered office. The obvious convenience involved of both parties would have to be considered as has been explained by the Supreme Court. Considering that the Plaintiff has a branch office at that place he can hardly be heard to complain that the place is not convenient and also from the perspective of the Defendant, considering cause of action is arising at that place, it would mean that the Defendant and/or its products and/or services are to be found at that place thereby indicating that such a place would be convenient to the Defendant also. Hence, on the basis of convenience of both parties, it ought to be held that it is only the Court where the cause of action has arisen and where the Plaintiff also has a branch office which is the Court having the necessary territorial jurisdiction.

Another issue which has remained unanswered is the effect of this judgment on the Chartered High Courts i.e. the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Chennai. As explained herein above, the Supreme Court has in a sense incorporated the Explanation to section 20 of CPC into the provisions of the CA and the TMA, however, by virtue of section 120 of CPC, section 20 of CPC itself does not apply to the Chartered High Courts. The territorial jurisdiction of the Chartered High Courts is governed by their respective Letters Patent and not by section 20 of CPC10. Hence, in such a situation can it be said that this interpretation would apply to these Chartered High Courts or would these Courts be able to exercise a more unrestricted jurisdiction than the other High Courts.

Whilst in my opinion, the judgment in IPRS does leave door ajar for several new issues to be resolved upon to bring forth complete clarity on the subject, the judgment is an important step forward towards interpreting and laying down the contours of the territorial jurisdiction of a Court in respect of proceedings initiated u/s. 62 of the CA or section 134 of the TMA.

SA 250: Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements

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Laws and regulations form the substratum of any economy to ensure the
forbearance of any acts, deeds or inaction by the regulated which may be
detrimental to the interest of the economy or part thereof. Compliance
with laws and regulations by corporates is imperative, both on the
frontiers of survival and continuance. In present times, given the
multifold increase in the complexity of applicable laws and regulations,
enterprises are finding it extremely difficult to keep pace with the
plethora of changes in regulatory landscape and effective implementation
and compliance.

SA 250 Consideration of Laws and Regulations in
an Audit of Financial Statements requires auditors to ensure compliance
with the applicable framework of laws and regulations by the audited.
However, as is time and again proclaimed, auditors are watchdogs and not
bloodhounds. The responsibilities advocated by this Standard are a
direct function of ‘ifs and buts’. The auditor is not responsible for
preventing non-compliance and cannot be expected to deter non-compliance
with all laws and regulations that apply to an enterprise.

Specific
attention must be paid to the fact that compliance or non-compliance
with all laws and regulations applicable to an enterprise does not find
an immediate reflection in the financial statements. For example, while
the contribution made by an employer to Employees’ Provident Fund is
reflected in the financial statements, but say for instance,
non-compliance with the requirements of filing of returns for effluent
disposal with the Pollution Control board by a chemical manufacturing
company need not necessarily find a mention in the financial statements.

SA 250 draws a thin line between those laws and regulations
which have and which do not have a direct effect on the determination of
material amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.
Accordingly, depending on which category these laws fall under, the
auditor’s responsibilities stand differentiated. For the former, the
auditor’s responsibility is to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence
about compliance with the provisions of those laws and regulations. For
the latter category, the auditor’s responsibility is limited to
undertaking specified audit procedures to help identify non-compliance
with those laws and regulations that have a material effect on the
financial statements. However, when the line between the black and white
is grey, the auditor is supposed to exercise his professional judgment
while determining the umbrella the law falls under.

Just like
every other SA, SA 250 cannot be applied in complete isolation. As
required by SA 200, professional skepticism needs to be maintained in
the backdrop of applicable laws and regulations applicable on the
entity. While adhering to SA 250, the auditor has to also bear in mind
SA 315, which requires the auditor to obtain a general understanding of
legal and regulatory framework applicable to the industry where the
entity operates. At times, when the outcome of non-compliance is severe,
questions get raised on the validity of the growing concern assumption,
in which case, the auditor would need to consider the requirements of
SA 570. The auditor can seek written representations from the management
in terms of SA 580 about management’s knowledge of identified or
suspected non-compliance with applicable laws. However, receipt of
written representations must not affect the nature and extent of other
evidence to be obtained by the auditor in this regard.

Further,
audit procedures applied to form an opinion on the financial statements
may bring instances of noncompliance or suspected non-compliance with
laws and regulations to the auditor’s attention. Such audit procedures
may include reading of minutes, inquiring of the entity’s management and
in-house legal counsel or external legal counsel concerning litigation,
claims and assessments; and performing substantive tests of details of
classes of transactions, account balances or disclosures – for e.g.,
scrutiny of payments made to government authorities towards
fines/penalties, scrutiny of legal and professional expenses to
understand whether unusual payments have been made for
legal/retainership fees as also to seek evidence of legal cases pending
against the company etc.

The next obvious question which arises
is – What is the auditor supposed to do in case of identified or
suspected non-compliance? Firstly, the auditor must have a discussion
with the management or where appropriate, with those charged with
governance, and if sufficient information is not obtained, the auditor
may evaluate the need of obtaining legal advice. If satisfactory
information is still not obtained, the auditor shall consider its effect
on the audit opinion.

A non-compliance with applicable law or
regulation does not merely impact the financial statements.
Noncompliance can also impact the level of reliance that the auditor
places on the integrity of the management or employees. It can also
cause the auditor to reassess the possibility of material misstatements
in other areas, as also the faith the auditor places in the management’s
Written Representations.

However, if the auditor suspects that
the management is involved in non-compliance, the auditor can escalate
the issue to those charged with governance and also consider the impact
of such non-compliance on the audit opinion. If the auditor concludes
that the non-compliance has a material effect on the financial
statements, and has not been adequately reflected in the financial
statements, the auditor may express a qualified or adverse opinion on
the financial statements. This standard also provides for the scenario
that if the auditor has identified or suspects noncompliance with laws
and regulations, the auditor shall determine whether he has a
responsibility to report the same to parties outside the entity, for
instance – regulatory and enforcement authorities.

Let us now examine certain case studies.

Case Study I
ABC
Limited (‘ABC’) is engaged in the manufacturing of pharmaceutical
products, having operations in many countries across the globe. During
the year, a manufacturing unit of ABC, which accounted for over 60% of
the company’s production, received notices from the Food and Drug
Administration Authority of the United States of America and regulators
in other countries, stating that pursuant to the inspection of the
manufacturing processes at the said unit, violations of Good Medical
Practices (GMP) were observed. Several prohibitions were imposed on the
functioning of the said unit, including a prohibition to sell the
products manufactured by the unit to US regulated markets. ABC decided
to voluntarily shut down its operations in this unit on a temporary
basis to examine ‘what went wrong’. ABC however is in dialogue with
regulatory authorities to assuage the restrictions. What would be the
auditor’s responsibility in such a scenario?

Analysis

The auditor must discuss with the management the severity of the case, and the company’s current standing in this regard. The auditor has also to bear in mind that the plant accounted for over 60% of the company’s production and also the fact that other markets may also raise questions on the acceptability of products manufactured in this plant. The auditor would also need to consider whether there is a need for reduction in the carrying value of inventories, whether any provisions are required for fines/penalties, accounting for possible sales returns and if such provisions are required to be made, then the basis used by the management for arriving at such estimates. Further, in such cases, there are inherent uncertainties regarding the future actions of the regulators, the impact of which may not be ascertainable and therefore, the actual amounts incurred may eventually differ from the estimates made. If the auditor concludes that this is a significant matter, he should also consider highlighting the same as a Matter of Emphasis (MOE) in the audit report.

    Case Study II

PQR Limited (‘PQR’) is a company engaged in production of steel. During the year, the company and some of its competitors received notices from Competition Commission of India (CCI) for alleged cartelization by certain steel manufacturing companies. CCI imposed a penalty of Rs. 100 Crores on PQR against which PQR has filed an appeal before Competition Appellate Tribunal. The Company has not made any provision in this regard. What would be the auditor’s responsibility in this case?

    Analysis

The auditor must assess the facts and circumstances, and must have a detailed discussion with the management on the Company’s standing in the case. The auditor, if he deems necessary, must also take an independent legal opinion to deduce whether the company has a fit case or whether there is a need for making provision on a best estimate basis of the likely penalty that may be levied. The auditor should also have a joint discussion with the company’s legal counsel in this regard. Depending on the significance of the matter, the auditors may consider including a ‘Matter of Emphasis’ in the audit opinion.

    Case Study III

LMN Limited is a public listed company engaged in the manufacture of automobiles. During the year ended 31 March 20X0, LMN has incurred loss of Rs.120 crore. LMN has paid to its Managing director Mr.DEF (‘DEF’) (who is also the promoter shareholder holding 51% of the paid up capital of LMN) managerial remuneration exceeding the limits set out by the Companies Act, 2013.

As LMN has incurred losses for the year, LMN was required to obtain approval from the shareholders as well as the Central Government for payment of remuneration to DEF as the same exceeded the limits set out in the Companies Act, 2013. LMN management contends that seeking approval of the shareholders was only a compliance formality as the Managing Director himself holds more than 51% of the paid up capital of LMN. What are the duties of the auditor in this regard?

    Analysis

Since LMN Limited had no profits for the year, it was required to comply with the requirements of Schedule V to the Companies Act, 2013 which sets out the limits for maximum managerial remuneration payable to managerial personnel for public listed entities in the event of a loss or inadequate profits. The auditor would need to explain the management the legal position and advise the client to seek approvals of the shareholders and the Central Government or alternatively recover the remuneration paid in excess of the prescribed limits from DEF. In the event DEF chooses not to return the excess payment, the auditor would need to qualify the audit opinion for non-compliance with the requirements of the Companies Act, 2013.

    Case Study IV

STU Limited (‘STU’) is engaged in the business of providing mobile telecommunication services. As per TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) regulations, a prescribed percentage of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) earned by a telecom operator is payable to the department of telecommunications as license fees. STU has been paying license fees on revenue earned from providing telecom services to its customers. According to TRAI, license fees are also payable on non-telecom revenues like profit on sale of fixed assets, rent, dividend and treasury income. TRAI has accordingly raised a demand of Rs.500 crore as license fees payable on non-telecom revenue earned by STU from inception till date. The definition of AGR is currently being challenged by all telecom operators including STU. The telecom operators have contested this interpretation of TRAI and have filed a petition before the appellate tribunal seeking injunction against TRAI demands. What would be the auditor’s responsibilities in such a case?

    Analysis

The issue of payment of license fees on non-telecom revenue seems to be a pan-industry issue as against being specific to STU. The company has contested the demand raised by TRAI. However, the auditor would need to discuss with the Company’s legal counsel the basis of demands raised by TRAI and their tenability. The auditor may consider requesting STU to obtain a formal legal opinion in this regard. It would also help if the auditor were to understand as how this issue has been dealt with by STU’s competitors. Based on this evaluation, the auditor would need to assess whether a provision is warranted or a disclosure as contingent liability would be sufficient compliance.

    Case Study V

HIJ Pharma Limited (HIJ) is a pharmaceutical company engaged in the manufacture of life saving drugs. HIJ is required to adhere to pricing norms as prescribed under Drug Price Control Order (DPCO). During the year ended 31 March 20X1, it was observed that some of the drugs were sold at prices much higher than those prescribed under the DPCO. Under DPCO, companies are liable to deposit the overcharged amount to the Credit of Drug Prices Equalization Account, which was not actioned by HIJ. HIJ received demand for payment of Rs.400 crores to the credit of the Drug Prices Equalisation Account under Drugs (Price Control) Order for few of its products, which was contested by HIJ. Based on its best estimate, HIJ made a provision of Rs.100 crore in its books of accounts towards the potential liability related to principal and interest amount demanded under the aforesaid order and believed that the possibility of any liability that may arise on account of penalty on this demand is remote. What are the Auditor’s duties in this regard?

    Analysis

The management believes that the company would not be liable for any penalties. The auditor must ensure that adequate provisions are made in books to the extent of overcharged amount and interest thereon. Considering the provisions of AS 29 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets – the auditor must also evaluate whether any need arises for disclosure as Contingent Liability of the amount of penalties leviable by DPCO.

    Concluding remarks

The auditor’s responsibilities for reporting compliance with applicable laws and regulations have increased manifold with the increasingly changing regulatory landscape in India. Though the auditor’s professional duty to maintain confidentiality of client information precludes reporting of an identified or suspected non-compliance with laws and regulations to any third party, given the legal framework in India, the confidentiality consideration is overridden by statute, the law or courts of law. For instance, under the present legal and regulatory framework for financial institutions in India, the auditor has a statutory duty to report the occurrence, or suspected occurrence of non-compliance with laws and regulations to the supervisory authorities. The auditor therefore needs to perform his duty with due care and exercise adequate professional skepticism while providing assurance on compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Income Computation and Disclos URE Standards (ICDS) – No Tax Neutrality

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Background
The Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS), the
Indian version of International Financial Reporting Standards, will have
significant impact on financial statements for many entities. Ind AS’s
are meant to primarily serve the needs of investors and hence are not
suitable for the purposes of tax computation. A clear need was felt for
tax accounting standards that would guide the computation of taxable
income.

The Central Government (CG) constituted a Committee in
December 2010, to draft Income Computation and Disclosure Standards
(ICDS). Section 145 of the Indian Income tax Act bestows the power to
the CG to notify ICDS to be followed by specified class of taxpayers or
in respect of specified class of income.

In August 2012, the
Committee provided drafts of 14 standards which were released for public
comments by the CG. After revisions, the CG has notified 10 ICDS
effective from the current tax year itself (viz. tax year 2015- 16) for
compliance by all taxpayers following mercantile system of accounting
for the purposes of computation of income chargeable to income tax under
the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from
other sources”.

Earlier, the CG had notified two standards in
1996 viz., (a.) Accounting Standard I, relating to disclosure of
accounting policies. (b.) Accounting Standard II, relating to disclosure
of prior period and extraordinary items and changes in accounting
policies. They now stand superseded. These standards were largely
comparable to the current AS corresponding to AS 1 & AS 5.

ICDS
are meant for the normal tax computation. Thus, as things stand now,
ICDS has no impact on minimum alternate tax (MAT ) for corporate
taxpayers which will continue to be based on “book profit” determined
under current AS or Ind AS, as the case may be.

ICDS shall apply
to all taxpayers, whether corporate or otherwise. Further, there is no
income or turnover criterion for applicability of ICDS. An entity need
not maintain books of accounts to compute income under ICDS. However, if
the differences between ICDS and Ind AS/current AS as the case may be,
are several, an entity may need to evolve a more sophisticated system of
tracking them as against doing it manually on an excel spreadsheet. It
is possible that the current tax audit requirements will be enhanced to
require auditors to report on the correctness of tax computation under
ICDS. Non-compliance of ICDS gives power to the Tax Authority to assess
income on “best judgement” basis and also levy penalty on additions to
returned income.

List of ICDS
Following is the list of 10 ICDS notified w.e.f. April 1,2015:
1. ICDS I relating to accounting policies
2. ICDS II relating to valuation of inventories
3. ICDS III relating to construction contracts
4. ICDS IV relating to revenue recognition
5. ICDS V relating to tangible fixed assets
6. ICDS VI relating to the effects of changes in foreign exchange rates
7. ICDS VII relating to government grants
8. ICDS VIII relating to securities
9. ICDS IX relating to borrowing costs
10. ICDS X relating to provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets

KEY differences between icds and current as A few key differences between ICDS and current AS are given below:

ICDS I prohibits recognition of expected losses or markto- market losses unless permitted by any other ICDS.

During
the early stages of a contract, where the outcome of the construction
contract cannot be estimated reliably, contract revenue is recognised
only to the extent of costs incurred. This requirement is contained both
in AS 7 and ICDS III. However, unlike AS 7, ICDS III states that the
early stage of a contract shall not extend beyond 25 % of the stage of
completion.

AS 7 requires a provision to be made for the
expected losses on onerous construction contract immediately on signing
the contract. Under ICDS III, losses incurred on a contract shall be
allowed only in proportion to the stage of completion. Future or
anticipated losses shall not be allowed, unless such losses are actually
incurred.

Under AS 9, revenue from service transactions is
recognised by following “percentage completion method” or “completed
contract method”. Under ICDS IV, only percentage of completion method is
permitted.

Under AS 11, all mark-to-market gains or losses on
forward exchange or similar contracts entered into for trading or
speculation contracts shall be recognised in P&L. In contrast, ICDS
VI requires gains or losses to be recognised in income computation only
on settlement.

Under AS 11, exchange differences on a
non-integral foreign operation are not recognised in the P&L, but
accumulated in a foreign currency translation reserve. Such a foreign
currency translation reserve is recycled to the P&L when the
non-integral operation is disposed. Under ICDS VI, exchange differences
on non-integral foreign operations shall also be included in the
computation of income.

Under AS 12, government grants in the
nature of promoter’s contribution are equated to capital and hence are
included in capital reserves in the balance sheet. Under ICDS VII,
government grants should either be treated as revenue receipt or should
be reduced from the cost of fixed assets based on the purpose for which
such grant or subsidy is given.

Under AS 12, recognition of
government grants shall be postponed even beyond the actual date of
receipt when it is probable that conditions attached to the grant may
not be fulfilled and the grant may have to be refunded to the
government. Under ICDS VII, recognition of Government grants shall not
be postponed beyond the date of actual receipt.

Under AS 16, in
the case of borrowings in foreign currency, borrowing costs include
exchange differences to the extent they are treated as an adjustment to
the interest cost. Under ICDS IX, borrowing cost will not include
exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings.

AS
16 requires the fulfilment of the criterion “substantial period of
time” for treating an asset as qualifying asset for the purposes of
capitalisation of borrowing costs. ICDS IX retains substantial period
condition (i.e. 12 months) only for qualifying assets in the nature of
inventory but not for fixed assets and intangible assets. Therefore,
ICDS requires capitalisation of borrowing costs for tangible and
intangible assets even when they are completed in a short period.

Under
ICDS IX, capitalisation of specific borrowing cost shall commence from
the date of borrowing. Under AS 16, borrowing cost is capitalised from
the date of borrowing provided the construction of the asset has
started.

Unlike AS 16, income on temporary investments of
borrowed funds cannot be reduced from borrowing costs eligible for
capitalisation in ICDS IX.

Unlike AS 16, requirement to suspend
capitalisation of borrowing costs during interruption of active
construction of asset is removed in ICDS IX.

Under ICDS X, a
contingent asset is recognized when the realisation of related income is
“reasonably certain”. Under AS 29, the criterion is “virtual
certainty”.

Impact of ICDS
The notification of ICDS was imperative to ensure smooth implementation
of Ind AS, and therefore should have maintained a tax neutral position.
Unfortunately, ICDS are not tax neutral vis-à-vis the current Indian
GAAP and tax practices currently followed and may give rise to
litigation. For example, based on AS 7 Construction Contracts, the
current practice is to recognise any expected loss on a construction
contract as expense immediately. In contrast, ICDS will require expected
losses to be provided for using the percentage of completion method.

ICDS
I lays out the “accrual concept” as a fundamental accounting
assumption. The prohibition on recognising expected or mark-to-market
losses appears to be inconsistent with the accrual concept. Though
mark-tomarket losses are not allowed to be recognised, there is no
express prohibition on recognising mark-to-market gains. The ICDS
therefore appears to be one-sided, determined to maximie tax collection,
rather than routed in sound accounting principles. Matters such as
these are likely to create litigious situations despite the Supreme
Court decision in the Woodword Governor case where the status of ICDS is
upheld.

The preamble of the ICDS states that where there is
conflict between the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and ICDS,
the provisions of the Act shall prevail to that extent. Consider that a
company has claimed markto- market losses on derivatives as deductible
expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act. Can the company argue that
this is a deductible expenditure under the Incometax Act (though the
matter may be sub judice) and hence should prevail over ICDS, which
prohibits mark-to-market losses to be considered as deductible
expenditure?

Under ICDS, exchange differences arising on the
settlement or on conversion of monetary items shall be recognised as
income or as expense. Consider that a company uses foreign currency loan
for procuring fixed asset locally. Now under ICDS, the exchange
difference on the foreign currency loan will be recognised in the
P&L A/c. Now consider the following decision in Sutlej Cotton Mills
Ltd. vs. CIT (116 ITR 1) (SC) “The Law may, therefore, now be taken to
be well settled that where profit or loss arises to an assessee on
account of appreciation or depreciation in the value of foreign currency
held by it, on conversion into another currency, such profit or loss
would ordinarily be trading profit or loss if the foreign currency is
held by the assessee on revenue account or as a trading asset or as part
of circulating capital embarked in the business. But, if on the other
hand, the foreign currency is held as a capital asset or as fixed
capital, such profit or loss would be of capital nature”. As per this
decision the exchange difference in our fact pattern will be
capitalised. However, under ICDS it will be recognised in the P&L
A/c. It is not absolutely clear whether the court decision or ICDS will
prevail in the given instance.

All ICDS (except ICDS VIII
relating to Securities) contain transitional provisions. These
transitional provisions are designed to avoid double jeopardy. For
example, if foreseeable loss on a contract is already recognised on a
contract at 31st March 2015, those losses will not be allowed as a
deduction again on a go forward basis using the percentage of completion
method. On the other hand, if only a portion of the loss was
recognised, the remaining foreseeable loss can be recognised using the
percentage of completion method. The detailed mechanism of how this will
work is not clear from the ICDS.

The transitional provisions
are not always absolutely clear. In the case of non-integral foreign
operations, e.g. non-integral foreign branches, ICDS requires
recognition of gains and losses in the P&L (tax computation), rather
than accumulating them in a foreign currency translation reserve. It is
not absolutely clear from the transitional provision whether the
opening accumulated foreign currency translation reserve, which could be
a gain or loss, will be ignored or recognised in the first transition
year 2015-16. Since the amounts involved will be huge, particularly for
many banks, the interpretation of this transitional provision will have a
huge impact for those who have not already considered the same in their
tax computation in the past years.

Some of the transitional
provisions are also expected to have a material unanticipated effect.
For example, the ICDS requires contingent assets to be recognised based
on reasonable certainty as compared to the existing norm of virtual
certainty. Consider a company has filed several claims, where there is
reasonable certainty that it would be awarded compensation. However, it
has never recognised such claims as income, since it did not meet the
virtual certainty test under AS 29. Under the transitional provision, it
will recognise all such claims in the first transition year 2015-16. If
the amounts involved are material, the tax outflow will be material in
the year 2015- 16. This could negatively impact companies that have
these claims. The interpretation of “reasonable certainty” and “virtual
certainty” would also come under huge stress and debate. This may well
be another potential area of uncertainty and litigation.

Overall,
the CG through CBDT will have to play a highly pro-active role to
provide clarity and minimise the potential areas of litigation. An
amendment of the Incometax Act would have been more appropriate rather
than a notification of the ICDS because the impact is expected to be
very high and all pervasive.

IT A No. 599/LKW/2012 (Unreported) IT O vs. Shri Sharad Mishra A.Y. 2009-10 Order dated: 12-06-2015

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Presence in India for less than three hours on the day of arrival cannot be considered as one complete day in order to compute number of days of stay in India for determining residential status.

Facts:
Taxpayer arrived in India on 25.10.2008 from Hong-Kong by a flight at 9.10 P.M. Relying on Walkie vs. IRC [1952] 1 AER 92, Taxpayer contended that as his presence in India on the day of arrival to India was less than 3 hours, it should not be included in calculating the number of days of stay in India and since his total stay in India is 181 days in the relevant financial year, he qualifies as a nonresident for the relevant financial year. However, the Tax Authority contended that the day of arrival of the Taxpayer in India should be included for calculating the number of days of stay in India. Thus, the Taxpayer would qualify as a resident of India.

Held:
Arrival of the Taxpayer in India at 9.10 P.M and consequent presence in India for less than three hours cannot be treated as his stay for one complete day and should be excluded while computing the number of days of his stay in India.

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TS-336-ITAT-2015(Mum) Flag Telecom Group Limited v DDIT A.Ys: 2001-09 Order dated: 15-06-2015

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Sections 9(1)(i) and 9(1)(vii) – Standby maintenance charges does not amount to Fee for technical services (FTS) under the Act. Restoration services for restoring the telecommunication traffic is in the nature of business income and income would be attributable to the extent of length of cable situated in territorial waters of India.

Facts 1
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Bermuda, was engaged in the business of building high capacity submarine fiber optic telecommunication link cable system. The Taxpayer had built under-sea cable to link between United Kingdom and Japan for providing telecommunication link to various countries. The Taxpayer entered into a Capacity Sales Agreement (CSA) with an Indian Company (I Co). As per CSA, the Taxpayer was required to provide standby maintenance services to I CO.

The Tax Authority contended that the payment for standby maintenance is for rendering technical services and hence it is in the nature of Fee for technical services (FTS) under the Act.

Held 1:
U/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act, FTS is defined to mean any payment in consideration of managerial, technical, or consultancy services.

Payment made for standby maintenance is a fixed annual charge payable for arranging standby maintenance arrangement which is required in a situation when undersea cable is being repaired. It is for keeping facility or infrastructure ready for rendering repair services, when required. Such charges are not for rendering of any services. Thus, receipt on account of standby maintenance charges is not FTS under the Act.

Facts 2:
The Taxpayer had sold certain cable capacity to various parties including I Co. The balance capacity remained with the taxpayer as its stock. The Taxpayer also entered into another agreement with certain telecom cable operators who carried telecommunication traffic for I CO. As per this agreement, the taxpayer was required to restore traffic to telecom cable operators’ customer (I Co) in the event of disruption in the traffic on their cable system by providing an alternative telecommunication link route through its own spare capacity in the cable. For these services, I Co directly made payments to the Taxpayer.

The Tax Authority contended that payment made by ICo to the Taxpayer for restoration services was in the nature of FTS under the Act. On appeal, First Appellate Authority held that income was not in the nature of FTS but it was in the nature of business income and treated 10% of the global receipts of the Taxpayer as income taxable in India. The Taxpayer contended that restoration services were not in the nature of managerial or consultancy services. They merely involved provision of standard facility of carrying telecommunication traffic and accordingly income from such services was in the nature of business income. Further, as no operations were carried on in India except for the fact that small part of the entire cable system, about 12 nautical miles from the shore, was laid down by the Taxpayer in territorial waters of India, the amount of income attributable only to such portion should be taxed in India.

Held 2:
Restoration services does not fall within the ambit of ‘managerial’ or ‘consultancy services’, in the absence of direction, regulation, administration or supervisory or advisory activities by the Taxpayer.

The Taxpayer has a cable system network in which it has spare capacity, which is being provided to I Co on behalf of telecom cable operators in case of disruption in their cable network. This amounts to provision of a standard facility for carrying telecommunication traffic to other telecom service providers. It does not involve transfer of technology or rendering of technical services.

Simple use of sophisticated technical equipment for providing the capacity in the cable to I CO ipso facto does not lead to any inference that any technical service is being provided by the Taxpayer to I Co. The Taxpayer earned business income.

Since part operations are carried on in India, only that income which is reasonably attributable to the proportion of the length of the cable in the territorial waters in India to the segments on which restoration have been provided should be taxed in India.

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TS-430-AAR-2015 Measurement Technology Limited Order dated: 29-06-2015

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Article 13 of India-UK DT AA – Amount received for rendering ‘managerial services’ and ‘procurement service’ not FTS – Routine managerial services cannot be classified as royalty if no intellectual property is created – Service PE not established as period of stay does not exceed the threshold

Facts:
Taxpayer, a company incorporated in the United Kingdom (UK), was engaged in the business of development and supply of intrinsic safety explosion protection devices, field bus and Industrial networks, lightning and surge protection and gas analysis equipment. Taxpayer had a subsidiary in India (I Co) which was engaged in the business of manufacturing industrial control equipment used for process control in hazardous environments.

Taxpayer entered into two service agreements with ICo. Under Agreement 1, Taxpayer was required to provide following services to I Co

  • Strategy and direction of business development of ICo;
  • Attendance in person or by phone at regular operational meetings to discuss progress of activities, both financial and operational;
  • Management of personnel including conducting staff interviews, setting individual targets and carrying out performance appraisals; and
  • Any other services related to the above.

The services under Agreement 1 were to be provided through one of the employees of Taxpayer who was designated as Group Operational Director (GD). GD provided services through telephone calls, e-mails and occasional visits to India. It was not disputed that the total presence of GD in India was less than 30 days. As part of its services GD also monitored financial and operational progress of I Co along with overseeing human resource matters of I Co and also undertook quality and design reviews for I Co.

Under the Agreement 2, the Taxpayer provided procurement services to I Co. The Taxpayer constituted a procurement team in UK to look into the global sourcing requirement of raw materials for all its group entities including I Co to consolidate the group’s purchase requirements resulting in cost savings for the group.

The Taxpayer contended that the services provided did not satisfy the make available condition and hence they did not constitute FTS under India-UK DTAA .

The Tax Authority contended that services rendered by the Taxpayer were in the nature of technical and consultancy services. Further, as the Taxpayer was required to provide report containing the technical details and plans to I Co, it would satisfy the make available condition. Additionally, services of the Taxpayer also partake the character of royalties for the use of plan, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience under India-UK DTAA .

Held:
India-UK DTAA was amended to exclude “managerial services” from the definition of FTS and to include the make available condition in the DTAA for taxation of FTS. Thus post-amendment, managerial services are not covered in the definition of FTS and even the technical or consultancy services cannot be treated as FTS if they do not meet the criteria of ‘make available’.

Services provided under both the agreements are managerial in nature. The activities are routine managerial and procurement activities and cannot be classified as technical or consultancy services. Moreover, by providing such services, taxpayer was not making available any technical knowledge of enduring benefit in nature which would enable employees of ICO to apply them on their own in future.

Further, services provided under both the agreements were general and routine in nature and did not create any intellectual property. Thus payments made to the Taxpayer did not qualify as ‘royalty’ under the India- UK DTAA .

Since visits to India were not for more than 30 days in a year, ‘Service PE’ would not be constituted in India.

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TS-386-ITAT-2015 ABB Inc vs. DDIT(IT) A.Y: 2009-10 Order dated: 30-06-2015

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Article 12 of India-US DT AA – Business development, market services and other support service do not satisfy make available condition and hence, no Fees for Included Services (FIS) under the DT AA. Where a Permanent Establishment (PE) is created in respect of trading transactions only, income from rendition of services cannot be attributed to the PE

Facts
The Taxpayer, a US Company, was engaged in providing business development, marketing services and other support services to its Indian associated enterprise (AE). The Indian AE was also involved in purchase and sale of Taxpayers’ products in India.

Taxpayer claimed that services rendered to its AE do not satisfy “make available” condition and hence it could not be characterised as FIS under the India-USA DTAA . However, Tax Authority contended that technical services rendered by the Taxpayer to its AE satisfy “make available” condition and thus they are taxable in India.

On further appeal before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), it was held that services constituted FIS under India-USA DTAA . Additionally, without prejudice to FIS taxation, DRP held that since the Indian AE to whom services were rendered was also involved in the purchase and sale of Taxpayer’s products in India, such AE’s would constitute a dependent agent Permanent establishment (DAPE) of the Taxpayer in India and the amounts received for services rendered to the AE (which constituted DAPE for the Taxpayer) would be attributable to the DAPE and is to be treated as profits and gains from business.

Held
Relying on the decision of Karnataka HC in the case of De Beers India (P) Ltd. (2012) 346 ITR 467 (Kar), it was held that consideration for services cannot be brought to tax under the India US DTAA as these services do not enable the recipient of the services to utilise the knowledge or know-how on his own in future without the aid of the service provider. Further the services do not involve transfer of technology. Thus the payment received by the Taxpayer from its AE does not constitute FIS under India-USA DTAA .

Under India-USA DTAA business profits are taxable in Source State but only so much of them as are attributable to (a) that PE (b) sales in the Source State of goods or merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through that PE or (c) other business activities carried on in the Source State of the same or similar kind as those effected through that PE. Thus, where a PE is constituted in respect of the trading transactions only, no part of the income earned from rendering of services by the Taxpayer can be attributed to the PE.

Further in the absence of any finding that the Indian AE was paid remuneration less than arm’s length, nothing can be attributed to DAPE of the Taxpayer in India.

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Koyo Tech Electro (P) Ltd, [2013] 60 VST 235 (WBTT)

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Cancellation VAT- Registration of Dealer – Rented Place of Business – Whether Landlord Holds legal Ownership of Building Complete or Incomplete- Not For Department to Consider – Carrying on Business and Filing of Returns and Paying of Tax – Sufficient Enough For Grant of Registration, section 29 of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The dealer company had rented the office premises on monthly rent and had obtained registration certificate under The West Bengal VAT Act, and, filed periodical returns and paid taxes. Subsequently the company received order from VAT department cancelling registration certificate. The company applied to the Joint Commissioner, for restoration of registration which was rejected after taking report from the lower authority who cancelled the registration certificate on the ground of incomplete construction of building, non- confirmation of ownership of the owner, etc. The company filed an application before The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal against the aforesaid cancellation of registration certificate as well as the confirmation thereof by the Joint Commissioner.

HELD
The fact that building in which office of the dealer was situated was in an incomplete stage could not be considered in framing opinion that business could not be carried out from such premises. Business can be carried on from makeshift room. Such office-cum-godown does not require to be housed in a well furnished room. Further, in rejecting the prayer for restoration of certificate of registration, the Joint Commissioner had viewed that the landlord from whom the dealer had claimed tenancy, failed to establish her ownership of the building. In making such observation, the concerned authority sought to assume the role of a civil court. This is totally unwarranted. The landlady in question was not under any obligation to prove her legal ownership in respect of the building at the time of inspection conducted by the respondents. The Tribunal after considering fact of carrying on business, filing of return and payment of tax by the dealer, allowed the application and restored the registration certificate granted to the dealer.

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State of Karnataka vs. Vasavamba Stores, [2013] 60 VST 19 (Karn).

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VAT – Rate of Tax – ‘Fryums’ are “Pappad”- Exempt From Payment of Tax, section 4(1)(b) and Entry 40 of Schedule 1 of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

FACTS
The respondent Company, the manufacturer, sold ‘Fryums’ and claimed exemption from payment of tax under Entry 40 of Schedule 1 of The KVAT Act being covered by the term ‘Pappad’. The respondent company was reassessed and the authority levied tax under residuary entry by treating ‘Fryums’ as Sandige. The VAT Tribunal allowed appeal. VAT department filed revision petition before The Karnataka High Court against the order of the Tribunal. The High Court held in favour of the respondent company.

HELD
The High Court, following judgement of SC in case of Shiv Shakti Gold Finger [1996] 9 SCC544, held that the shape of the “Pappad” is not a relevant consideration when the ingredients are the same. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision Petition filed by the State Government and confirmed the order of Tribunal holding ‘Fryums’ are “Pappad” hence exempt from payment of tax under the KVAT Act.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 128 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Uniworth Ltd vs. CCEST

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100% EOU are entitled to avail and utilise the CENVAT credit in respect of duty paid on inputs, even if other inputs are procured duty free under CT-3 procedure. The assessee can exercise both the options simultaneously.

Facts:
The Appellant is a 100% EOU and procured goods duty free. They also procured furnace oil on payment of duty and took CENVAT credit thereof. The adjudicating authority was of the view that the Appellant is allowed only one of the two options i.e. either to procure goods duty free or to pay duty and avail CENVAT credit. Therefore CENVAT credit taken of duty paid on furnace oil was disallowed.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that as per Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules,2004, 100% EOUs are fully eligible to take CENVAT credit of duty paid on inputs used in or in relation to the manufacture of final products because this rule does not make any exception as regards 100% EOUs. It held that Notification No. 18/2004-C.E. (N.T.) dated 06/09/2004 did not in any way affect the eligibility of the EOU from taking CENVAT credit; it only allowed them the facility to pay duty either by debit to the PLA or by debit to the CENVAT credit account. Reproducing Para 4 of Circular No. 54/2004-Cus., dated 13/10/2004 and decision In the case of Tata Tea Ltd. vs. CCE 2006 taxmann.com 1952 (Bang. – CESTAT), the Tribunal further held that the legal position is clear that the 100% EOUs are eligible to take CENVAT credit of duty paid on the raw material procured by them for use in or in relation to the manufacture of their final product. Accordingly the appeal was allowed.

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[2015] 59 taxmann.com 321 (Mumbai – CESTAT) CESTAT, MUMBAI BENCH-Inox Air Products Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad

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CENVAT credit cannot be denied just because invoices are in the name
of Head Office/ another unit not registered as Input Service Distributor
(ISD).

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the
manufacture of natural gases having units at various places. Assessee’s
one unit took credit of Customs House Agent (CHA) services where invoice
was in the name of Head Office; and also of machine repair services
where invoice was in name of another Unit. The demand of duty was raised
because the invoices under which the credit was availed were in name of
Head Office/other units and assessee was not registered as Input
Service Distributor.

Held:
Tribunal held that since
assessee had nine units manufacturing the same product, the doubt of
nexus of input and output products would never arise. It is quite
natural that the service provided by a CHA would be in the name of the
Head Office as the clearance of goods through customs is centralized.
The only basis for denying credit has been that invoices are either in
the name of another unit of the appellant or in the name of their Head
Office. Since doubt has never been raised regarding actual receipt of
services, credit cannot be denied.

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[2015 (39) STR 210 (Tri.-Mumbai) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-I vs. N.V. Advisory Pvt. Ltd

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Recipient of Services located outside India – Money received in convertible foreign exchange – fact that advice resulted in investment in India not relevant.

Facts:
The Respondent is providing services in the nature of advice on investment opportunities and is also providing back office operation support to the firms situated outside India. The payments are received in convertible foreign exchange. A refund claim was filed in respect of service tax paid on the input services used and consumed by them in the course of providing output services which were exported. The Adjudicating Authority rejected the claim. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the refund claim citing the CBEC Circular No. 111/5/2009-ST dated 24/02/2009 clarifying the term “used outside India” to mean that the benefit of the service accrues outside India. Therefore, revenue has preferred the present Appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal held that Rule 3(i)(iii) and Rule 3(2) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 is satisfied as the recipient is located outside India and the payment is received in convertible foreign exchange. Relying on the Larger Bench decision of Paul Merchants Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh [2013(29) STR 257 (Tri. Del) the Tribunal allowed the refund claim. Accordingly, the plea of the revenue that the services were used for making investment in India and therefore cannot be treated as export, was dismissed. Further in the matter of back office support operations, relying upon the decision of Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad vs. Deloitte Tax Services India Pvt. Ltd [2008 (11) STR 266 (Tri.-Bang)] the Tribunal held that since the client was situated outside India, it is an export of service.

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[2015-TIOL-1719-CESTAT-DEL] Commissioner of Service Tax-Delhi vs. Ishida India Pvt. Ltd.

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Effective use and enjoyment of service of procuring purchase orders is abroad and therefore the services are exported.

Facts:
The Respondent, a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign company is engaged in procuring purchase orders from Indian customers on behalf of the foreign company. Goods are supplied in India and they receive “indent commission” in convertible foreign exchange at a predetermined percentage. A refund claim was filed for the service tax wrongly paid by them on the export of services. Adjudicating authority rejected the claim stating that the condition of export of services was not satisfied. Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the refund, therefore revenue is in Appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that if the respondents did not canvass the purchase orders and sent it to the foreign company, there would be no supply of goods or use of goods in India at all. Therefore the service is definitely utilized/benefited by the foreign company. Merely because the goods supplied were ultimately used in India, cannot be a reason to hold that there was no export of the output service. Accordingly, it was held that the effective use and enjoyment of the service is by the foreign company and therefore refund is allowable as the services were exported.

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[2015-TIOL-1602-CESTAT-MUM] Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs. M/s Shri K. M. Sharma

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Charges levied on the basis of activities and material involved and not on the basis of number/nature or scope of manpower cannot fall under the category of “Manpower Supply and Recruitment Services”.

Facts:
Respondents undertook work as incidental to fabrication of Iron Steel Products supplied by the manufacturer. Department alleged that they provided services of Supply of Manpower. It was argued that the consideration is received and charged on per metric ton of output and is done on a job basis which was supported by the invoices. The First Appellate authority cancelled the demand, against which revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal concurred with the views of the first appellate authority who noted that the charges do not have any nexus with the number/nature/scope of manpower supply and charges pertained to various types of activities and quantity of material involved. Further, the activity was with respect to goods which were still on the production line of the manufacturer, therefore the respondents were entitled to the benefit of exemption notification no. 8/2005-ST which exempts the taxable service of production of goods on behalf of the client. Relying on the decision of M/s. Ritish Enterprises vs. CCE, Bangalore [2010 (18) STR 17 (Tri.-Bang) the order of the first appellate authority was confirmed. A similar decision was also rendered in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs. Shri GM Mate, Shri Babulal Ladse [2015-TIOL-1663- CESTAT-MUM].

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[2015-TIOL-1593-CESTAT-DEL] M/s. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Chandigarh.

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Meals prepared at one’s own premises and simply supplied at pre-determined rates without getting involved in serving of meals in any manner would not be covered by the definition of outdoor caterer.

Facts:
Appellant is an institute providing mid-day meal to the schools under the Government Scheme. The institute prepares food as per the fixed menu and supplies to the schools and is neither supplying any crockery etc. nor is involved in serving the meal at the school. The department sought to levy service tax under outdoor catering service. Besides, the space in the institute was also made available to various persons for their functions. The Commissioner confirmed both the demands under outdoor catering and mandap keeper services respectively. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Appellant was neither preparing the meals at the school nor serving them and the meals were only supplied at pre-determined rates. Accordingly, it was held that the activity was not a taxable service of outdoor catering. Though the Appellant was a ‘caterer’ within the meaning of section 65(24) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Tribunal stated that the service covered u/s 65(105)(zzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 was that of an “outdoor caterer” and not by a ‘caterer’. Further in respect of the second matter, it was confirmed that mandap keeper service was provided by them, however since the turnover was below the threshold limit, they were exempted from the service tax.

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[2015-TIOL-1453-CESTAT-MUM] Larsen and Toubro Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai.

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A works contract can be vivisected prior to 01/06/2007 and be subjected to levy of service tax under “erection, installation and commissioning service”. Also, longer period of limitation invokable.

Facts
The Appellant had entered into six lumpsum turnkey contracts prior to 01/06/2007 each having three parts and a consideration for each of the parts viz. designing, procurement of various capital goods and thereafter installation of such goods was ascertainable. They were discharging service tax in respect of designing under “consulting engineer service”. No service tax was discharged in respect of the third part considering it to be an indivisible works contract comprising of both goods and services on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd vs. CCE, Vadodara [2006(3) STR 124(T)]. Member (Judicial) and member (technical) had divergent views both in respect of taxability as well as invocation of extended period and therefore the matter was placed before the third member.

Held:
The third member distinguished the decision in the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd (supra) by stating that the said decision has not taken into account the 46th constitutional amendment which inserted clause (29A) in Article 366 of the constitution mandating that the indivisible contracts could be split up and a part of it could be subject to tax. The member relying on the decision of the five member Bench reported in 2015-TIOL-527-CESTAT-DEL-LB held that works contract can be vivisected prior to 01/06/2007 and the service portion can be subjected to levy of service tax. In respect of extended period, the member noted that the same is a question of facts and law and stated that if the Appellant had a bonafide belief, they would have reflected the transaction as an exempted service in the service tax return and by not doing so, they had suppressed the material fact from the department. Further, it was also stated that though there are divergent views of various forums, a large number of them are based on Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) which is irrelevant to the issue and the remaining are expressed after 2007. Thus, when tax was rightfully discharged in respect of designing activities it ought to have been discharged on the installation activity being the dominant service in these contracts and accordingly extended period invokable.

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TS-429-AAR-2015 SkillSoft Ireland Limited Order dated: 20.07.2015

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Article 12 of India-Ireland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DT AA) –Payment for E-learning products providing access to E-learning platform and the educational content embedded in the form of computer software is royalty under India-Ireland DT AA

Facts
Taxpayer, a Company resident of Ireland, was engaged in providing on-demand e-learning content, online information resources, online courses, flexible learning technologies and performance support solutions (E-Learning products).

The Taxpayer had entered into a reseller agreement with an Indian Company (I Co) for the sale of E-learning products in India. I Co purchased E-learning products on principal-to-principal basis and sold the product to end users/customers in India in its own name. It also entered into license agreement with end users.

As per the license agreement, end-users were granted non-exclusive, non-transferable license to access E-learning products which enabled the users to access the E-learning platform and the educational content embedded therein.

Taxpayer contended that the payment received by it from ICo was for a copyrighted article and not for the copyright and therefore, it was not royalty under the DTAA . Tax Authority contended that consideration for license to use confidential information embedded in licensed software amounts to royalty under India-Ireland DTAA .

Held
E-learning products of Taxpayer consists of two components. First is the course content and second is the software through which course content is delivered to end-customer who gains access to specially designed software for understanding the content. Such especially designed software was not available in public domain but was licensed to I Co who in turn sub-licensed to endcustomers. Merely because the license had been granted on non-transferable and non-exclusive basis, it did not take away the software out of the definition of copyright. Further, the present case was not similar to an e-library or on-line banking facility provided by a bank.

To constitute ‘royalty’ under DTAA , it is not necessary to transfer any exclusive right. What is necessary is that the consideration should be for the use of or right to use any copyright. Reliance in this regard was placed on Karnataka High Court (HC) decision in the case of Synopsis International Old Ltd (212 Taxman 454).

Reliance was placed on AAR decision in the case of Citrix Systems Asia Pacific (343 ITR 1) to conclude that distinction between copyright vs. copyrighted article is illusory as copyrighted article is nothing but an article which incorporates the copyright of the owner/licensee and the permission for using such an article is also for the copyright embedded therein. Software and computer databases would qualify as “literary work” under the definition of royalty provided under the DTAA.

Thus the right to use confidential information embedded in the form of computer software programme would constitute royalty under the DTAA .

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Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – Deduction of tax under Wrong Section

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Issue for Consideration
Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for disallowance of 30% of any sum payable to a resident on which tax is deductible at source under chapter XVII-B, where such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid on or before the due date specified in section 139(1). Till assessment year 2014-15, the whole of such sum payable was disallowable.

At times, a taxpayer deducts tax at source under a particular section of the Act, while the tax authorities take a view that tax ought to have been deducted under another section of the Act. For example, an assessee while deducting tax on payment deducts tax at 2% u/s. 194C, while the tax authorities take a view that the tax should have been deducted u/s. 194J as in their view the payment represented the payment of fees for the technical services. If the rate at which tax has been actually deducted is lower than the rate at which tax is deductible in the view of the tax authorities, it is usual for them to disallow the claim for deduction on the ground that the tax was not deducted at source leading to a violation of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The question which arises for consideration, under the circumstances, is, whether the tax authorities can disallow the whole or part of the expenditure on the ground that tax has not been deducted at source on such expenditure ignoring altogether the fact that the tax was in fact deducted though under a different provision of the Act .

While the Calcutta High Court has taken the view that no disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) could be made in such cases, the Kerala High Court has taken a contrary view and has held that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) would apply if tax was deducted under a wrong provision of law and the claim for deduction would be disallowed.

S. K. Tekriwal’s case:
The issue first arose for consideration before the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal, 361 ITR 432.

In this case, the assessee had deducted tax at source from payments made to a machinery contractor u/s. 194C as payment to a sub-contractor at the rate of 1%. The assessing officer took a view that the payments were in the nature of machinery hire charges, which amounted to rent under the provisions of section 194-I, and that tax therefore ought to have been deducted u/s. 194-I at the rate of 10%. The assessing officer therefore, disallowed proportionate payments (90%) by invoking section 40(a)(ia).

In the appeal, the Tribunal deleted the disallowance. The Tribunal noted that section 40(a)(ia) had 2 limbs – one requiring deduction of tax, and the second requiring payment of the tax into the government account. There was nothing in that section, treating the assessee as a defaulter where there was a shortfall in deduction. According to the Tribunal, it could not be assumed that on account of the shortfall, there was a default in the deduction. If there was any shortfall due to any difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payments falling under various TDS provisions, the assessee could be declared to be an assessee in default u/s. 201, and no disallowance could be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia).

The Calcutta High Court, on an appeal by the Revenue, after noting the observations of the Tribunal, held that no substantial question of law was involved in the case before it, and therefore refused to admit the appeal.

PVS Memorial Hospital’s case:
The issue again came up before the Kerala High Court recently in the case of CIT vs. PVS Memorial Hospital Ltd, 60 taxmann.com 69. The 2 years involved in this appeal were assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07.

In this case, the assessee was a hospital, which had entered into an agreement with another hospital, where that other hospital had undertaken to perform various professional services in the assessee’s hospital. The assessee, on payment to the other hospital for its services, deducted tax at source at 2% u/s. 194C by treating the payments as the payment for carrying out the work in pursuance of the contract.

The assessing officer took the view that the payment was in the nature of fees for technical services and the tax was deductible at 5% u/s. 194J, and therefore disallowed the entire payment u/s. 40(a)(ia) in both the years. For assessment year 2005-06, the Commissioner(Appeals) as well as the Tribunal confirmed the addition and rejected the appeals.

For assessment year 2006-07, the Tribunal allowed the appeal following the Calcutta High Court’s decision in S. K. Tekriwal’s case(supra). According to the Tribunal, the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) could be made only if both the conditions were satisfied, i.e. tax was deductible at source and such tax had not been deducted. The Tribunal took the view that where tax was deducted by the assessee, even if it was under a wrong provision of law, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) could not be invoked. The Kerala High Court, while examining the issue, noted that in the case before it, tax was deductible u/s. 194J and not u/s. 194C.

The Kerala High Court on examination of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), expressed the view that the section was not a charging section but was a machinery section, and that such a provision should therefore be understood in such a manner that it was made workable. For this proposition, it relied on the Supreme Court observations in the case of Gurusahai Saigal vs. CIT 48 ITR 1, where the Supreme Court had observed that the provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that was to say, in accordance with the clear intention of the Legislature, which was to make effective a charge that was levied .

According to the Kerala High Court, if section 40(a)(ia) was to be understood in the manner as laid down by the Supreme Court, the expression “tax deductible at source under chapter XVII-B” had to be understood as a tax deductible at source under the appropriate provision of chapter XVII-B. Therefore, if tax was deductible u/s. 194J but was deducted u/s. 194C, according to the Kerala High Court, such a deduction did not satisfy the requirements of section 40(a)(ia). The latter part of the section that ‘such tax had not been deducted’, in the view of the Kerala High Court, again referred to the tax deducted under the appropriate provision of chapter XII-B.

The Kerala High Court held that a cumulative reading of the provision showed that deduction under a wrong provision of law would not save an assessee from the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) expressly dissenting from the Calcutta High Court’s decision in S. K. Tekriwal’s case(supra), and confirmed the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia).

Observations
On a bare reading of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), it is gathered
that the said provision requires a disallowance in a case where there
is a failure to deduct tax at source,where it was deductible, or after
deduction the same has not been paid on or before the due date specified
u/s. 139(1). It does not, at least expressly, cover a case of a partial
non-deduction on the lines similar to the one provided u/s. 201 which
provides for the consequences of the failure to deduct tax at source.
Section 201 by express language using the specific terms,“ wholly or
partly” seeks to rope in the cases of partial or a complete failure and
makes an assessee liable for the consequences. The legislature by not
including the above terms “ wholly or partly” in section 40(a)(ia) have
sought to cover the cases of the absolute failure to deduct tax and not
the case of the partial failure to deduct. Importantly section 201, as
it originally stood, did not provide for the cases of partial deduction
and hence did not seek to penalise an assessee in a case where there was
a short deduction of tax by him. Section 201 has since been amended to
rope in the cases of even a partial failure to pay the deducted taxes.

Further,
section 201 of the Income-tax Act clearly brings out that a failure in
whole or in part, would result in an assessee being treated as in
default. Similarly, section 271C clearly specifies that the penalty can
be levied for failure to deduct the whole or any part of the tax as
required by chapter XVII-B. Unlike both the sections, section 40(a)(ia)
uses the term “has not been deducted”, without specifying whether it
applies to deduction in whole or in part.

Secondly, even in
cases of acknowledged failure, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, followed
by many high courts, in the case of P. V. Rajagopal vs. Union of India
99 Taxman 475, held, in the context of the provisions of section 201 as
it then stood [the language of which was similar to the language used in
section 40(a)(ia)], that if there was any shortfall due to any
difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item, the employer
could not be declared to be an assessee in default. The Tribunal in the
cases of DCIT vs. Chandabhoy & Jassobhoy 49 SOT 448 (Bom), Apollo
Tyres vs. DCIT 60 SOT 1 (Coch) and Three Star Granites (P) Ltd vs. ACIT
32 ITR (Trib) 398, held that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) would
be attracted only in the case of total failure to deduct tax at source,
and where tax had partly been deducted at source, it could not be said
that tax had not been deducted at source. In all these cases, the
tribunal noted the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case
of P. V. Rajagopal vs. Union of India(supra) with approval.

The
enormous litigation on the subject of TDS clearly indicate that there
is a lack of clarity on the applicability of the appropriate provision
of chapter XVIIB for deducting tax at source on a particular payment,
which needs to be interpreted and settled by the courts alone. Over a
period of time, certain clarity has emerged on various types of
payments, but there are still various types of payments where the
position is still not so clear, some of which ultimately have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.

In such a situation, where a tax
deductor has taken a bona fide view in respect of tax deductible from a
particular type of payment, adopting one of the two possible views on
the matter, should he be penalised by disallowance of the expenditure,
besides being asked to pay the tax short deducted, as well as interest
on such short deduction? Can a tax deductor be expected to have the same
legal competence in interpreting a legal provision as a High Court or a
Supreme Court?

In the context of penalty for concealment, the
Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd. 322
ITR 58 held that where a taxpayer based on a possible view of a matter,
claimed a deduction, a penalty for concealment could not be levied on
him even where his claim for deduction of such payment was disallowed in
assessment of his total income. The Supreme Court held that if the
contention of the revenue was accepted, then in case of every return
where the claim made was not accepted by the Assessing Officer for any
reason, the assessee would invite penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). That was
clearly not the intendment of the Legislature.

The disallowance
u/s. 40(a)(ia) is a form of penalty on a tax deductor for failing to
perform an onerous duty, and therefore where a taxpayer makes a genuine
mistake, taking a possible interpretation of the provision under which
tax should be deducted, he should not be penalised for it.

Undoubtedly,
the intention was to ensure that a deductor on payment did deduct tax
at source from payments on which tax was deductible at source and in
doing so he should tax at the rate applicable under a specific provision
which in his bona fide belief is the provision that is applicable to
such a payment. The intention of the Legislature certainly could not
have been to penalise actions taken under a bona fide belief of a
deductor, particularly when the view taken by him is a possible one.

The
better view therefore seems to be that taken by the Calcutta High
Court, that no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(ia) where tax has
been deducted at source at a lower rate under a particular section,
though the rate of tax under the correct section under which tax is
deductible at source may be higher, particularly in cases where there is
a genuine dispute as to the appropriate section under which tax is
deductible at source. In our opinion, the mistake if any of deducting
under a wrong provisions of law, if based on a bona fide belief, is a
case of trivial mistake and should not even lead to holding the assessee
as in default as has been held by the apex court in the case of
Hindustan Steels Ltd., 83 ITR 26 (SC). The question of disallowance
should not arise at all.

Cancellation of registration upon violation of section 13(1) – section 12AA(4)

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1. Background

Section 12AA (3) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) deals with cancellation of
registration of a charitable institution in circumstances specified in
the said section. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal [“Tribunal”] has
consistently held in a number of cases that registration of an
institution cannot be cancelled u/s. 12AA (3) merely because section
13(1) of the Act applies to it. [Krupanidhi Educational Trust vs. DIT,
(2012) 27 taxmann.com 11 (Bang); Cancer Aid and Research Foundation vs.
DIT, (2014) 34 ITR (Trib) 56 (Mum); Parkar Medical Foundation vs. DCIT,
(2014) 34 ITR (Trib) 286 (Pune), TS-469-ITAT -2014 (Pune)]. In order to
overcome this position in law, the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 inserted
section 12AA (4) with effect from 1-10-2014 to provide for cancellation
of registration of a charitable institution upon operation of section
13(1). This article attempts to explain and analyse the provisions of
section 12AA(4).

2. Text

Section 12AA(4) reads as follows:

“(4)
Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), where a trust
or any institution has been granted registration under clause (b) of
sub-section (1) or has obtained registration at any time under section
12A [as it stood before its amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1996]
and subsequently it is noticed that the activities of the trust or the
institution are being carried out in a manner that the provisions of
section 11 and 12 do not apply to exclude either whole or any part of
the income such trust or institution due to operation of sub-section (1)
of section 13, then, the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner may
by an order in writing cancel the registration of such trust or
institution:

Provided that the registration shall not be
cancelled under this sub-section, if the trust or institution proves
that there was a reasonable cause for the activities to be carried out
in the said manner.”

3. Summary

Preconditions for applicability of section 12AA(4)

(a) A charitable institution been granted registration u/s. 12AA(1)(b) or section 12A.
(b) After the registration, it is noticed that
(i) section 13(1) applies to the charitable institution;
(ii)
the activities of the charitable institution are being carried out in a
manner that section 11/12 do not apply to whole or any part of the
income due to operation of section 13(1)
(c) The charitable
institution cannot prove that there was reasonable cause for the
activities to be carried out in the said manner.

Consequences of applicability of section 12AA94)

(a) The Principal Commissioner (“PCIT”) or the Commissioner (“CIT”) may cancel the registration of such charitable institution.
(b) Such cancellation shall be done by an order.
(c) Such cancellation order shall be in writing.

4. Rationale/Purpose

4.1 The relevant passage in Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014 reads as follows:

“There
have been cases where trusts, particularly in the year in which they
have substantial income claimed to be exempt under other provisions of
the Act, deliberately violate provisions of section 13 by investing in
prohibited mode etc. Similarly, there have been cases where the income
is not properly applied for charitable purposes or has been diverted for
benefit of certain interested persons. Due to restrictive
interpretation of the powers of the Commissioner under section 12AA,
registration of such trusts or institutions continues to be in force and
these institutions continue to enjoy the beneficial regime of
exemption. …

Therefore, in order to rationalise the provisions
relating to cancellation of registration of a trust, it is proposed to
amend section 12AA of the Act to provide that where a trust or an
institution has been granted registration, and subsequently it is
noticed that its activities are being carried out in such a manner
that,—
(i) its income does not enure for the benefit of general public;
(ii)
it is for benefit of any particular religious community or caste (in
case it is established after commencement of the Act);
(iii) any income or property of the trust is applied for benefit of specified persons like author of trust, trustees etc.; or
(iv)
its funds are invested in prohibited modes, then the Principal
Commissioner or the Commissioner may cancel the registration if such
trust or institution does not prove that there was a reasonable cause
for the activities to be carried out in the above manner.”

4.2 The relevant paragraphs in Circular explaining the provisions of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 read as follows:

“9.2
There have been cases where trusts, particularly in the year in which
they had substantial income claimed to be exempt under other provisions
of the Income-tax Act though they deliberately violated the provisions
of section 13 of the said Act by investing in prohibited modes other
that specified modes, etc. Similarly, there have been cases where the
income is not properly applied for charitable purposes or is diverted
for the benefit of certain interested persons. However, due to
restrictive interpretation of the powers of the Commissioner under the
said section 12AA, registration of such trusts or institutions continued
to be in force and these institutions continued to enjoy the beneficial
regime of exemption.

9.4 Therefore, in order to
rationalise the provisions relating to cancellation of registration of a
trust, section 12AA of the Income-tax Act has been amended to provide
that where a trust or an institution has been granted registration, and
subsequently it is noticed that its activities are being carried out in
such a manner that,—
(i) its income does not enure for the benefit of general public;
(ii)
it is for benefit of any particular religious community or caste (in
case it is established after commencement of the Income-tax Act, 1961);
(iii)
any income or property of the trust is used or applied directly or
indirectly for benefit of specified persons like author of trust,
trustees etc.; or
(iv) its funds are not invested in specified modes,

then
the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner may cancel the
registration, if such trust or institution does not prove that there was
a reasonable cause for the activities to be carried out in the above
manner.”

[CBDT Circular No. 1 / 2015, dated 21.01.2015]

5. Violation of section 13 cannot be used as a ground to deny registration

Courts/Tribunal have held that violation of section 13 is not a ground on which registration can be denied to a charitable institution [see CIT vs. Leuva Patel Seva Samaj Trust, (2014) 42 taxmann.com 181 (Guj), (2014) 221 Taxman 75 (Guj); Malik Hasmullah Islamic Educational and Welfare Society vs. CIT, (2012) 24 (taxmann.com 93 (Luck), (2012) 138 ITD 519 (Luck), (2013) 153 TTJ 635 (Luck); PIMS Medical & Education Charitable Society vs. CIT, (2013) 31 taxmann.com 371 (Chd)(Trib), (2013) 56 SOT 522 (Chad)(Trib), (2012) 150 TTJ 891 (Chd)(Trib); Chaudhary Bishambher Singh Education Society vs. CIT, (2014) 48 taxmann.com 152 (Del)(Trib); Kurni Daivachara Sangham vs. DIT, (2014) 50 taxmann.com 53 (Hyd)(Trib); Modern Defence Shikshan Sanstha vs. CIT, (2008) 26 SOT 21 (Joh)(URO); Ashoka Education Foundation vs. CIT, (2014) 42 CCH 0090 (Pune)(Trib)]. On a plain reading, there is no change in this position even after amendment. This is because section 12AA(4) provides that “where a trust or any institution has been granted registration under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or has obtained registration at any time under section 12A [asit stood before its amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1996] and subsequently it is noticed that …”. Thus, the section is triggered only subsequent to the registration.

6.    Is cancellation independent of assessment? Can CIT suo moto take cognisance of the violation of section 13(1) prior to assessment by AO?

The section states that “if it is noticed that the activities of the trust or the institution are being carried out in a manner …” It does not state that the violation of section 13(1) is noticed only upon assessment. If the CIT can independently come to a conclusion that there has been a default u/s. 13(1) and the provisions of section 11 and 12 do not apply as a result of the default, then, on a literal reading, he can suo moto take cognisance of the violation of section 13(1) prior to assessment by AO. Thus, the action u/s.er section 12AA(4)

     a. could precede the assessment; or

     b. be concurrent with the assessment; or

     c. succeed the assessment.

To illustrate :

Suppose, a search and seizure action u/s. 132 is taken against a charitable institution and during the proceedings, it is found that the Managing Trust has siphoned off certain funds of the institution. In that case, section 13(1)(c) could apply and the PCIT or CIT could initiate proceedings u/s. 12AA(4).

However, it appears that the ultimate outcome of cancellation would, inter alia, depend on the position taken or finally accepted in assessment proceedings vis-à-vis the operation of section 13(1). Hence, if the assessment order is reversed at the appellate stage, then the cancellation order cannot survive.

     7. Cancellation only in respect of operation of section 13(1)

7.1    The provision applies pursuant to operation of section 13(1). Thus, it does not apply pursuant to operation of the following sections :

     Section 13(7) – anonymous donations

     Section 13(8) – exemption not available on account of first proviso to section 2(15) becoming applicable to the institution.
7.2    The position vis-à-vis other sub-sections of sectio     13 is explained in the following paragraphs :

     Section 13(2)

The said sub-section provides for situations when the income or property of an institution is deemed to have been used or applied for the benefit of an interested party. This sub-section is an “extension of section 13(1)(c) / (d)” and hence a violation of section 13(2) could also trigger the proceedings for cancellation of registration u/s. 12AA(4).

     Section 13(4) and 13(6)

Section 13(4) provides that if the investment in a concern in which an interested person referred to in section 13(3) does not exceed 5% of the capital of that concern, then, subject to its provisions, the exemption u/s. 11 or section 12 shall not be denied in relation to any income other than the income arising to the trust or the institution from such investment.

Section 13(6) provides that if a trust has provided educational or medical facilities to an interested person referred to in section 13(3), the exemption u/s. 11 or 12 shall not be denied in relation to any income other than the income referred to in section 12(2).

It appears that the above sections are not independent sections : both are in connection with violation u/s. 13(1)(c) or section 13(1)(d). They merely give a concession and relax the rigors of section 13(1)(c) and section 13(1)(d) apply. Income is not excluded from section 11 by reason of application of section 13(4) or (6), The breach would be only be on account of section 13(1)(c) or (d). Hence, it appears that, on a literal interpretation, the provision covers cases where section 13(4) and section 13(6) are applicable.

     8. General principles for interpretation of section 12AA(4)

Section 186 (1) of the Act, prior to its omission with effect from 01.04.1993, read as follows:
“(1) If, where a firm has been registered or is deemed to have been registered, or its registration has effect under sub-section (7) of section 184 for an assessment year, the Assessing Officer is of opinion that there was during the previous year no genuine firm in existence as registered, he may, after giving the firm a reasonable opportunity of being heard cancel the registration of the firm for that assessment year:”

It is noticed that both, section 186(1) and section 12AA(4), refer to cancellation of registration and both use the term ‘may’, that is, the Assessing Officer (in section 186) and the PCIT or CIT [in section 12AA(4)] may cancel the registration.

Hence, the principles laid down by Courts in section 186 could be applied for interpreting section 12AA(4), to the extent applicable. Now, in the context of section 186, it has been held that withdrawal of the benefit of registration in respect of an assessment year results in serious consequences; it is penal in nature in that the consequences are very serious to the assessee and that is why discretion is conferred on the authority by requiring him to give a second opportunity [CIT vs. Pandurang Engg. Co., (1997) 223 ITR 400 (AP)]. Likewise, it is submitted that section 12AA(4) is also a penal provision and the principles applicable in interpretation of penal proceedings, including the following, could ordinarily apply in interpreting section 12AA(4):

    A penal provision must be interpreted strictly and in favour of the assessee [CIT vs. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons (P) Ltd. (TV), (1975) 101 ITR 764 (SC); Jain (NK) vs. Shah (CK), AIR 1991 SC 1289 and CIT vs. Pandurang Engg. Co., (1997) 223 ITR 400 (AP) (in the context of section 186 of the Act)]

    If two views are possible, the benefit should go to the assessee. [CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC) (in the context of section 271 of the Income-tax Act); CIT vs. Pandurang Engg. Co., (1997) 223 ITR 400 (AP) (in the context of section 186 of the Act)]. In other words if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. A court is not competent to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature. [Associated Tubewells Ltd. vs. Gujarmal Modi (RB), AIR 1957 SC 742]
 

    9. Does a default u/s. 13 automatically lead to cancellation of registration?

For the following reasons, it appears that a mere default u/s. 13(1) would not automatically result in cancellation of registration:

    Section 12AA(4) provides that the PCIT/CIT may by an order in writing cancel the registration. The use of the word “may” shows that it is discretionary, and the PCIT/CIT has a discretion not to cancel registration even in spite of the default of the assessee. [see J. M. Sheth vs. CIT, (1965) 56 ITR 293 (Mad); CIT vs. Standard Mercantile Co., (1986) 157 ITR 139 (Pat), (1985) 49 CTR 139 (Pat), (1985) 23 TAXMAN 452 (Pat) (both in the context of section 186)].

    A similar term is used in section 271(1)(c), where the AO “may” levy penalty on an assessee upon the assessee furnishing inaccurate particulars of income or concealing income. Courts have held that in view of the word “may”, the penalty is not automatic [Dilip N. Shroff vs. JCIT, (2007) 161 Taxman 218 (SC), (2007) 191 ITR 519 (SC)]. Now, section 12AA(4) is also a penal provision. Hence, applying the same principle, the cancellation u/s. 12AA(4) is also not automatic.

    Section 12AA(3) provides that if the Commissioner is satisfied that the activities of trusts are not genuine, he shall pass an order in writing cancelling the registration. The use of the word “may” in section 12AA(4) as against “shall” in section 12AA(3) clearly shows that the power in section 12AA(4) is discretionary.

    The proviso to section 12AA(4) states that the registration shall not be cancelled if the charitable institution proves that there was a reasonable cause for the activities to be carried out in the manner provided in the section. Hence, a mere default does not trigger cancellation, if there is a reasonable cause for the default.

    The relevant passage in section 12AA(4) reads as follows:

“… it is noticed that the activities of the trust or the institution are being carried out in a manner that the provisions of section 11 and 12 do not apply to exclude either whole or any part of the income such trust or institution due to operation of sub-section (1) of section 13, then, the Principle Commissioner or the Commissioner may by an order in writing cancel the registration …”

Suppose the expression “the activities of the trust or the institution are being carried out in a manner” (hereinafter referred to as “the relevant expression”) is removed from the language. In that case, the provision (hereinafter referred to as “modified provision”) would read as follows:

“It is noticed that … the provisions of section 11 and 12 do not apply to exclude either whole or any part of the income such trust or institution due to operation of sub-section (1) of section 13, then, the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner may by an order in writing cancel the registration.”

A plain reading of modified provision shows that if provisions of section 11 and 12 do not apply due to operation of section 13(1), then it could trigger cancellation of registration. Thus, if mere default in section 13(1) triggered cancellation, then the modified provision without the relevant expression would have been sufficient and the relevant expression would be superfluous!

It is now very well settled that redundancy should not be attributed to the legislature and no part of a statute should be read in a manner that it becomes superfluous. [CWT vs. Kripashankar Dayashanker Worah, (1971) 81 ITR 763 (SC)] If a mere default in section 13(1) could result in the CIT exercising his power, then the entire expression “the activities of the trust or the institution are being carried out in a manner ” would not have been required and it would have been sufficient if the section had been worded as “it is noticed that the provisions of section 11 and 12 …”. In view of this, some meaning has to be attributed to the relevant expression. The point for consideration is what meaning should be attributed to the said phrase? It is submitted as follows:

    i)“Activities”

The relevant expression refers to “activities”. Now ordinarily, section 13 of General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that singular includes plural and vice versa, unless the context otherwise requires. It could be argued that in this case, depending on facts, the expression “activities” in plural may not include singular “activity” especially because cancellation of registration is an onerous provision and a single default should not result in such harsh consequences.

    ii)“Are being carried out”

The relevant expression uses the phrase “are being carried out”. The terms ‘is’ (singular of ‘are’) and “being” have been judicially interpreted as follows:

    In F. S. Gandhi vs. CWT, (1990) 51 Taxman 15 (SC), (1990) 184 ITR 34 (SC), (1990) 84 CTR 35 (SC), the Supreme Court had to interpret the expression “any interest in property where the interest is available to an assesssee for a period not exceeding six years…” The Court observed as follows:

The word ‘available’ is preceded by the word ‘is’ and is followed by the words ‘for a period not exceeding six years’. The word ‘is’, although normally referring to the present often has a future meaning. It may also have a past signification as in the sense of ‘has been’ (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edn., p. 745). We are of the view that in view of the words ‘for a period not exceeding six years’ which follow the word ‘available’ the word ‘is’ must be construed as referring to the present and the future. In that sense it would mean that the interest is presently available and is to be available in future for a period not exceeding six years.

    The term “being” has been interpreted as follows:

    “In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (fourth edition) the expression “being” is explained thus at page 267 of volume I:

“Being — ‘Being as used in a sense similar to that of the ablative absolute, has sometimes been translated as, ‘having been’; but it properly denotes a state or condition existent at the time when the conclusion of law or fact has to be ascertained.”

In other words, it is clear that the phrase “the business of such company is not being continued” must be interpreted to mean the company whose business is non-existent at a time when the requisite opinion contemplated by the section is formed by the Central Government and if at such time the business is not continued or has stopped, the case would fall within that phrase.”

[UOI vs. Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd., (1975) 45 Comp. Cas 613 (Bom)] [for the purpose of: section 15A of the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951] In  Harbhajan  Singh  vs.  Press  Council  of India, AIR 2002 SC 135, the Supreme Court observed as follows :

“In Maradana Mosque (Board of Trustees) vs. Badi-ud-Din Mahmud and Anr.- (1966) 1 All ER 545, under the relevant Statute the Minister was empowered to declare that the school should cease to be an unaided school and that the Director should be the Manager of it, if the Minister was satisfied that an unaided school “is being administered” in contravention of any provisions of the Act. Their Lordships opined, “Before the Minister had jurisdiction to make the order he must be satisfied that ‘any school. is being so administered in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act’. The present tense is clear. It would have been easy to say ‘has been administered’ or ‘in the administration of the school any breach of any of the provisions of this Act has been committed’, if such was the intention of the legislature; but for reasons which common sense may easily supply, it was enacted that the Minister should concern himself with the present conduct of the school, not the past, when making the order.

This does not mean, of course, that a school may habitually misconduct itself and yet repeatedly save itself from any order of the Minister by correcting its faults as soon as they are called to its attention. Such behaviour might well bring it within the words ‘is being administered’ but in the present case no such situation arose. There was, therefore, no ground on which the Minister could be

‘satisfied’ at the time of making the order. As appears from the passages of his broadcast statement which are cited above, he failed to consider the right question. He considered
 

only whether a breach had been committed, and not whether the school was at the time of his order being carried on in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. Thus he had no jurisdiction to make the order at the date on which he made it”.

On a combined reading of the term “are” as a plural of “is” and “being”, as interpreted above, it could be argued that the defaulting activities should continue to be carried out or at least they have been carried out in near past. The CIT cannot invoke the provision for a default committed before many years and especially in a re-assessment when the default u/s. 13 was completed much earlier and was not detected or was held as not being applicable in the original assessment.

    10. Proceedings before PCIT/CIT

10.1    Cancellation of the registration should only be after complying with the principles of natural justice, which necessarily implies that –

    if the PCIT/CIT is satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee, he must drop the proposal to cancel the registration. [see CIT vs. Pandurang Engg. Co., (1997) 223 ITR 400 (AP) (in the context of section 185)]

    a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the assessee;
    the PCIT/CIT shall not use any material without giving an opportunity to the assessee to rebut such material.

10.2    The PCIT/CIT should exercise his power not arbitrarily or capriciously but judicially in a manner consistent with judicial standards and after a consideration of all relevant circumstances. [see Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1970) 25 STC 11 (SC), (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC); J.M Sheth vs. CIT, (1965) 56 ITR 293 (Mad) (in the context of section 186)].

10.3    For the purpose of section 271(1) it has been held that the regular assessment order is not the final word upon the pleas which can be taken at the penalty stage. The assessee is entitled to show-cause in penalty proceedings and to establish by the material and relevant facts which may go to affect his liability or the quantum of penalty. He cannot be debarred from taking appropriate pleas simply on the ground that such a plea was not taken in the regular assessment proceedings. [Jaidayal Pyarelal vs. CIT, (1973) Tax LR 880 (All)]

Applying the same principle an assessee cannot be debarred from taking appropriate pleas in the cancellation proceedings simply on the ground that such a plea was not taken in the regular assessment proceedings.

10.4    For the purpose of section 271 it has been held that the findings given in assessment proceedings, though relevant and admissible material in penalty proceedings, cannot operate as res judicata. [CIT vs. Gurudayalram Mukhlal, (1991) 95 CTR 198 (Gau), (1992) 60 Taxman 313 (Gau), (1991) 190 ITR 39 (Gau).] Similarly, the findings in respect of section 13(1) given in assessment proceedings cannot operate as res judicata.

10.5    It has been held that additional evidence is admissible in penalty proceedings and it is possible for the parties to bring on record additional material for determining if the penalty should be imposed. [CIT vs. Babu Ram Chander Bhan, (1973) 90 ITR 230 (All)]. Applying the same principle it appears that additional evidence is admissible in the cancellation proceedings.

    11. Order passed by CIT/PCIT

Section 12AA(4) requires the CIT/PCIT to pass an order ‘in writing’.

It is now well settled that a quasi-judicial order has to be a speaking order containing

    a) submissions of the assessee;

    b) detailed reasons why the submissions are not acceptable. [Associated Tubewells Ltd. vs. Gujarmal Modi (RB), AIR 1957 SC 742; Travancore Rayons vs. UOI, AIR 1971 SC 862; Appropriate Authority  vs.  Hindumal  Balmukand  Investment Co. P. Ltd., (2001) 251 ITR 660 (SC)] or a mere statement that after hearing the assessee and perusing the record, he did not find any substance in the submissions is not enough [see Sanju Prasad Singh vs. Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1970 Pat 288 explaining the meaning of “speaking order”].

    12. Reasonable cause

12.1    Registration cannot be cancelled if the assessee proves that there was reasonable cause for the activities to be carried out in a particular manner.

12.2    Institution to prove reasonable cause

The institution has to prove that a reasonable cause existed for the activities being carried out in the particular manner. The term “proved” is defined in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as follows:

“A fact is said to be ‘proved’ when after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.”

In view of the above, the test of proof is that there is such a high degree of probability that a prudent man would act on the assumption that the thing is true. [Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094, (1963) 1 SCR Supl. 689 (SC)]

12.3    Reasonable cause – meaning

Courts have explained the term “reasonable cause” as follows:

    ‘Reasonable cause’ as applied to human action is that which would constrain a person of average intelligence and ordinary prudence. It can be described as a probable cause. It means an honest belief founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the person concerned, to come to the conclusion that the same was the right thing to do. The cause shown has to be considered and only if it is found to be frivolous, without substance or foundation, the prescribed consequences will follow. [Woodward Governors India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT, (2002) 253 ITR 745 (Del) (For the purpose of section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961)]

    In Oxford English Dictionary (first edn. published in 1933 and reprinted in 1961, Volume VIII), the expression ‘reasonable’ has been defined to mean ‘fair, not absurd, not irrational and not ridiculous’. Likewise, the expression ‘good’ has been defined in the said Dictionary in Volume IV to mean ‘adequate, reliable, sound’. Similarly, the expression ‘sufficient’ has been defined under the same very Dictionary in Volume X to mean ‘substantial, of a good standard’.

From the definitions referred to above, it would appear that reasonable cause or excuse is that which is fair, not absurd, not irrational and not ridiculous … if a reason is good and sufficient, the same would necessarily be a reasonable cause. [Banwarilal Satyanarain vs. State of Bihar, (1989) 46 TAXMAN 289 (Pat), (1989) 179 ITR 387 (Pat), (1989) 80 CTR 31 (Pat) (for the purpose of section 278AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961)]

    Reasonable cause, as correctly observed by the Administrative Tribunal, is a cause that a prudent man accepts as reasonable. The test to assess the reasonableness of the cause for default is, therefore, to find whether in the judgment of a common prudent man the cause is such that any normal man would, in the same or similar circumstances be also a defaulter. [Eknath Kira Akhadkar vs. Administrative Tribunal, AIR 1984 Bom 144 [for the purpose of section 22(2)(a) and section 32(4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease , Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 19968]]

The Bombay High Court has held that the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in section 273B for non-imposition of penalty u/s. 271E would have to be construed liberally depending upon the facts of each case. [CIT vs. Triumph International Finance (India) Ltd., (2012) 22 taxmann. com 138 (Bom), (2012) 208 TAXMAN 299 (Bom), (2012) 345 ITR 270 (Bom), (2012) 251 CTR 253 (Bom)]

12.4    Some illustrations/principles regarding reasonable cause

a)    Ignorance of law

It has been held that ignorance of law can constitute a reasonable cause [see ACIT vs. Vinman Finance & Leasing Ltd., (2008) 115 ITD 115 (Visk)(TM), para 13; Kaushal Diwan vs. ITO (1983) 3 ITD 432 (Del)(TM) (in the context of 285A of the Income-tax Act, 1961)]. Hence, in a given situation, the ignorance of the provisions of section 13(1) may constitute a reasonable cause.
 

    b) Bonafide belief

It has been held that penalty is not justified where the breach flows from a bonafide belief of the offender that he is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. [see

    Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1970) 25 STC 211 (SC), (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC);
    DCIT vs. Dasari Narayana Rao, (2011) 15 taxmann.com 208 (Chennai Trib) (in the context of section 272A of the Income-tax Act, 1971);

    ACIT vs. Dargapandarinath Tuljayya & Co. (1977) 107 ITR 850 (AP) followed in Thomas Muthoot vs. ACIT, (2014) 52 taxmann.com 114 (Coch Trib) (in the context of section 271C of the Income-tax Act, 1961);

    IL & FS Maritime Infrastructure Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT, (2013) 37 taxmann.com 297 (Mum Trib), para 8 (in the context of section 271BA of the Income-tax Act, 1961)].

Applying the aforesaid principle, a mistaken bonafide belief that section 13(1) is not applicable can constitute a reasonable cause.

(c) Expert opinion

It has been held that if a particular action is bonafide taken on the basis of an opinion from a senior counsel, then, it constitutes a reasonable cause and merely because it turns out to be wrong, a penalty cannot be levied on the assessee. [CIT vs. Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd., (2008) 303 ITR 122 (Mad)] Applying the same principle, if a charitable institution has relied upon an expert opinion, then, merely because the expert had held a different view, it does not mean that there is no reasonable cause for the default.

(d) Bonafide mistake

It has been held that registration of an assessee firm cannot be cancelled upon a bonafide mistake which was not intentional.[see CIT vs. Pawan Sut Rice Mill, (2004) 136 Taxman 640 (Pat) (in the context of section 186 of the Act)]. Applying the principle, the registration may not be cancelled if there is unintentional, bonafide mistake as a result of which section 13(1) became applicable to an assessee.

    13. No penalty upon technical or venial
breach

It has been held that the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose the penalty when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act. [Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1970) 25 STC 211 (SC), (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC)]. Applying the same principle, the registration may not be cancelled when there is technical or venial breach upon application of section 13(1).

    14. Whether registration can be cancelled in certain situations involving quantum assessment

For the purpose of section 271(1)(c), it has been held that penalty cannot be levied in the following situations :

    a. the assessee’s appeal against the quantum assessment has been admitted as substantial question of law (because this shows that the issue is debatable) [CIT vs. Liquid Investment and Trading Co., ITA No. 240/Del/2009, dated 05.10.2010].

    b. where two views are possible in respect of a particular addition in the quantum assessment and the issue is debatable.

    c. where the position adopted by the assessee is supported by a Tribunal or High Court judgment in another case.

Likewise, if the applicability of section 13(1) has been admitted by the High Court as a substantial question of law or if two views are possible regarding operation of section 13(1) or there is a case u/s. 13(1) supporting the view adopted by the assessee, it is a point for consideration as to whether the PCIT/CIT should not cancel the registration on the ground that the discretionary power u/s. 12AA(4) entails him to use the discretion in favour of the assessee in such matters and/or their exists a reasonable cause for the activity to be carried out by the assessee in the manner it has done.

    15. Wilful default

The registration can be cancelled if the default is a wilful default. [See CIT vs. Standard Mercantile Co., (1986) 157 ITR 139 (Pat), (1985) 49 CTR 139 (Pat), (1985) 23 TAXMAN 452 (Pat) (in the context of section 186)]
    
16. Cancellation – whether with retrospective effect?

16.2    There are two views on the issue :

    a. Registration cannot be cancelled retrospectively

    b. Registration can be cancelled retrospectively

16.3    Registration cannot be cancelled retrospectively

    For the purpose of section 35CC/CCA, Courts have held that an approval granted could not be withdrawn with retrospective effect.

[see B. P. Agarwalla & Sons Ltd. vs. CIT, (1993) 71 Taxman 361 (Cal), (1994) 208 ITR 863 (Cal)

CIT vs. Bachraj Dugar, (1998) 232 ITR 290 (Gau), (1999) 152 CTR 367 (Gau)

Jai Kumar Kankaria vs. CIT, (2002) 120 Taxman 810 (Cal)]

Applying the aforesaid principle, registration cannot be cancelled with retrospective effect.

    For the purpose of sales tax, it has been held that the registration certificate of a dealer could not be cancelled with retrospective effect. [M. C. Agarwal vs. STO, (1986) 11 TMI 372 (Ori), (1987) 64 STC 298 (Ori)]

    Section 12AA(4) does not refer to cancellation with retrospective effect. In the absence of such specific provision, registration cannot be cancelled with retrospective effect.

16.4    Registration can be cancelled retrospectively

    In Mumbai Cricket Association vs. DIT, (2012) 24 taxmann.com 99 (Mum), the Tribunal held that registration of a charitable institution could be cancelled u/s. 12AA(3) with retrospective effect. Applying the same principle, registration could be cancelled u/s. 12AA(4) with retrospective effect.

    The judgments for section 35C/CCA and under sales tax are distinguishable since a retrospective cancellation in those cases prejudicially affected the counterparty. However, in retrospective cancellation of certificate u/s. 12AA(4), it is primarily the charitable institution which is affected.

16.5    Even if registration can be cancelled retrospectively it can not be before 1st October 2014

Even if registration could be cancelled with retrospective effect, it could not be retrospective before 1st October, 2014 being the date of insertion of section 12AA(4). This is supported by the following arguments:

    In Mumbai Cricket Association vs. DIT, (2012) 24 taxmann.com 99 (Mum), it was held that the registration to a charitable institution could not be cancelled beyond 1st October, 2010, being the date on which the provision became applicable.

    It is now well settled that law that a person, who has complied with the law as it exists, cannot be penalised by reason of the amendment to the law effected subsequently, unless such intention is expressly stated and the imposition of such penalty is not contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution.[CIT vs. Kumudam Endowments, (2001) 117 Taxman 716 (Mad)]

Again, it is now well settled that unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily imply, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. [CED vs. Merchant (MA), (1989) 177 ITR 490 (SC); CWT vs. Hira Lal Mehra, (1994) 205 ITR 122 (P&H); A fiscal statute will not therefore be regarded as retrospective by implication, particularly a penal provision therein. [CWT vs. Ram Narain Agarwal, 1976 TLR 1074 (All); Thangalakshmi vs. ITO, (1994) 205 ITR 176 (Mad)]

16.6    Summary

The matter is not free from doubt. However, even if it is held that the registration can be cancelled with retrospective effect, the retrospectivity cannot be prior to 1.10.2014.

To illustrate, suppose an assessee commits a default in financial year 2013-14; the CIT notices the default in June 2015 and cancels the registration in July 2015. In this case, the cancellation can have effect from 1st October 2014, and not for the period prior to 1st October, 2014.
 


16.7    Impact of cancellation of registration upon past years if registration cannot be cancelled with retrospective effect. (view 1)

Suppose a charitable institution violates section 13(1) during financial year 2015-16 and its registration is cancelled in financial year 2018-19. If there is no default u/s. 13(1) in financial year 2016-17 and 2017-18, can it avail of the benefit of section 11 and 12 during these years?

Section 12A(1)(a)/(aa) provide that the provisions of section 11 and 12 shall not apply in relation to the income of a charitable institution unless such trust is registered u/s. 12AA. Thus, in order to avail of the benefit of exemption, an institution is required to be registered u/s. 12AA. It appears that if the registration is valid throughout the previous year and if it is cancelled after 31st March of the relevant previous year, then, so far as the said previous year is concerned, it ought to be regarded as registered u/s. 12AA for the purposes of aforesaid section 12A(1) (a)/(aa). Thus, in the aforesaid illustration, the institution should be regarded as registered for financial year 2016-17 and financial year 2017-18, that is, assessment years 2017-18 and 2018-19; the registration should be regarded as cancelled only from financial year 2018-19 onwards.

17    Writ

Like any other order, in an appropriate case, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie against the cancellation order before the jurisdictional High Court and the Court may stay the operation of the cancellation order; or quash the cancellation order; or set aside the order directing the PCIT/CIT to pass a fresh order after complying with the directions of the Court.

18    Appeal against the cancellation order

An assessee aggrieved by the order passed by PCIT or CIT, may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order. [see section 253(1)(c)]

Dual appeal

An assessee whose registration has cancelled will now have to pursue two appeals, one against the assessment order with the CIT(A) and another against the cancellation order with the Tribunal.
    
19.On cancellation, whether the charitable institution is debarred from making fresh application for registration?

Suppose the registration is cancelled for a default which no longer exists. To illustrate, an institution made an investment contrary to the mode specified in section 11(5). It has liquidated the investment and there is no continuing default u/s. 11(5). In such circumstances, even if the CIT cancels the registration, it appears that the institution can immediately reapply for fresh registration and the CIT has to deal with such application in accordance with the provisions of section 12AA(1).

20. Impact on cancellation order upon deletion of operation of section 13(1) in merits

The Supreme Court has authoritatively laid down that where the additions made in the assessment order, on the basis of which penalty for concealment was levied, are deleted, there remains no basis at all for levying the penalty for concealment and, therefore, in such a case no such penalty can survive and the same is liable to be cancelled. [K. C. Builders vs. ACIT, (2004) 265 ITR 562 (SC)]

Likewise, if it is held in the appellate proceedings that there is no violation of section 13(1) then, the cancellation order cannot survive. Further, such reversal of the cancellation order should be regarded to have retrospective effect ab initio and all the actions taken on the basis of the cancellation order would no longer survive.

21    Implications under other sections

21.2    Section 56(2)(vii)

Section 56(2)(vii) provides that if an individual or HUF receives any sum of money or property without consideration, then, the sum of money so received or the value of property so received shall be regarded as income
of the individual. The proviso to the said section provides that the provision will not apply in respect of any sum of money or property received from a charitable institution registered u/s. 12AA. Hence, if the institution supports any individual after the cancellation of registration, then such donation or contribution/aid would be regarded as income of the individual and shall be taxable beyond the basic exemption of Rs.50,000.

21.3    Section 80G

Section 80G(5)(i) provides that an institution is eligible for approval u/s. 80G if its income is not liable to inclusion in its total income under the provisions of sections 11 and

    Now, if the registration is cancelled, the exemption u/s. 11 and 12 would not be available to the institution and the income would be liable to inclusion in total income. In such circumstances, the institution would not be eligible to obtain an approval u/s. 80G(5) or its existing approval would be liable for cancellation.

21.4    Exemption u/s. 10

Where an institution has been granted registration u/s. 12AA or 12A and the said registration is in force for any previous year, then the assessee is not eligible for exemption u/s. 10 except exemption in respect of agricultural income or u/s. 10(23C) [section 11(7)]. By implication once the registration is cancelled, the assessee would be entitled to claim exemption under section 10 e.g. dividend income u/s. 10(34) or long term gains u/s. 10(38).

22    Conclusion

Section 12AA(4) is another measure by the Government to tighten the law relating with charitable institutions. While the tax department may invoke it in many cases involving operation of section 13(1), it is felt that the ultimate cancellation of registration hinges on fulfilment of many conditions and restrictions and would lead to protracted litigation.

Need for professional institutions to become transparent

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Governance deficit has been a major stumbling block in India’s march to becoming an economic superpower. Transparency in the functioning of the government, its various organs and public institutions, will go a long way in ensuring good governance. However, the powers that be seem to be working in exactly the opposite direction. Two events, which have been reported in the RT I feature in this issue, have been the trigger for this editorial.

The first is the action of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) in refusing to entertain an application requesting for certain information, on the ground that instead of an Indian postal order of Rs.10, the applicant had attached court fee stamps of Rs.10. When the applicant filed an appeal, the administrative authorities of the NGT engaged an advocate paying him fees of Rs.31,000 to defend its order of refusal. It is tragic that a tribunal which is an institution for dispensing justice, should harbour such an attitude and refuse information. The second instance is the decision of the Maharashtra State Cabinet in June proposing an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby a magistrate cannot take cognisance of a complaint against a public servant without the permission of the competent authorities in the government. If this is the attitude of those who are responsible for dispensing justice and governance, then the situation is indeed grim.

While this attitude is indeed a cause for worry, should the educated sections of the public, only voice their concern, criticise or can and should they do something more? I believe that in situations like this, the intelligentsia has a great responsibility to shoulder. Today, the opinion makers in the Society belong to different professions. These professions are regulated by professional bodies, which are by and large autonomous. To illustrate, we have the profession of lawyers regulated by the Bar Councils, the medical profession by the Indian Medical Association (IMA) and our very own profession by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).

If one examines the track record of many such institutions in regard to transparency in the conduct of their own affairs, the results would not be very encouraging. Most of the time the impression in the mind of the common man is that these institutions protect and further only the interests of their members. The impression that the public has is; lawyers go on strike for their own demands obstructing dispensation of justice, doctors in hospitals hold patients to ransom for an increase in remuneration. As far as our own Alma mater is concerned, the impression that the public has, is that we do very little to bring the black sheep among our profession to book.

If we as citizens clamour for transparency from those in authority, then it is the duty of those who run these institutions to set an example by a transparent conduct. The stakeholders in these institutions are primarily three, the members who belong to that particular profession, the users of their service and the government which looks at these institutions for regulation of the profession as well as for proactive participation in regard to the developments in their respective fields.

These bodies are generally run by members elected from among those who belong to the profession. They therefore understand the nuances in various issues that arise in their field. For example, if the medical profession would put in the public domain the problems that are faced by their members while rendering services in public hospitals, the public would be sympathetic to their agitations. The support of the public would then help in putting pressure on the government to resolve those problems. Even if that does not happen, such transparency would increase the faith of the public in these institutions.

In regard to our own profession, there are a number of decisions that the ICAI takes which affect members. In such a situation, the gist of the deliberations that take place or the thought process behind those decisions should be made known to the members. Possibly even prior to this, when the issue is on the agenda of the Council, suggestions from members or interactions with them should be encouraged. This would help acceptance of the decision by those who are affected by them. I am conscious that one needs to tread with care, in this area, as the disclosure of such information would have various implications. But with the collective wisdom of our representatives, modalities can be worked out.

In regard to the interactions of the ICAI with the government authorities, when these authorities take some action by way of enactment of legislation or otherwise, it would be advisable for a summary of those interactions to be made known to all stakeholders. It is quite possible that despite the best efforts by our representatives in putting forth their point of view, the authorities may not react favourably, for they may have their own compulsions and limitations. But once this information is in the public domain, members will be confident that their alma mater has discharged its obligation.

Over the last decade or so, our profession has been facing criticism from the public that the regulatory body tends to unduly protect its members from any disciplinary action. In this aspect as well, the limitations under which the regulatory body acts, the principles of natural justice, and rules of evidence result in processes getting delayed. The regret is that while this is true, by not being transparent enough, the image of the institution is unnecessarily sullied. Transparency, to the extent possible, will mitigate this problem.

Finally, when information is sought from any professional body, it would be appropriate that the information is willingly and expeditiously provided, rather than making an attempt to hide behind technicalities. One fully understands that there would be possibly severe administrative limitations for furnishing this information. The machinery may be inadequate and there may be other hurdles. Every authority that was brought under the RT I had the same argument initially. But with the arsenal of technology at hand, it is not impossible, though difficult. As they say – where there is a will, there is a way.

Once professional institutions set an example of the transparency, it is natural that the government and bureaucracy will follow suit. It is then that democracy will flourish and Peter Finn’s words “A basic tenet of healthy democracy is open dialogue and transparency”, will ring true.

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The Real Maths

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“Who are you?”

“I am Jay Desai,“ said Jay.

“What is the
difference between you the Jay Desai and Jay Desai’s dead body? A dead
body is wearing the same clothes, have the same heart, lungs & liver
etc. But living Jay is able to do all activities including thinkingm
and dead Jay cannot do anything.”

Jay said, “The dead body has
no Soul and that is why it’s dead.” “So, there can be two types of Jay –
1) Living 2) Dead. Body + Soul = Living and Body – Soul is Dead.
Right?” Jay agreed.

“So these are two different separable things: Body & Soul.”

“Well,
Yes.” Jay said and added, “Soul separated from the body is death. So
yes, both are different & separable. Making sense.”

“Therefore, who is Jay? Dead body or a Living body?”

“Both” replied Jay.

“So you mean, (Body + Soul) = (Body – Soul) = (Jay), but just now you agreed, both body and Soul are separable and different.

Now
if the dead body is also Jay, then the living body is = Jay + Soul
& likewise, if the living body is Jay, then the dead body is = Jay –
Soul.

Jay – Soul = Dead body, cannot do anything.

Jay + Soul = Living body, can do all thinking, talking, walking, etc. Everything is put together as Activities.

This
equation proves, that the power of doing activities including talking,
walking, and thinking, rests with the Soul and not with the body.

Therefore, the answer to the first question – Who are you? Is Soul right?

Answer
giving capacity rests with the Soul and not with Jay’s body. So, the
talker is the Soul and not the body as both are different. “

Jay was speechless, but convinced about the difference. “So all of us are Souls with different bodies? Right?”

“Absolutely.”

“But on death, after the departure from one body, where does the Soul go?” Jay asked.

“There
are millions of living beings. Each of these bodies needs one Soul to
remain alive. The soul gets a new body after the death of the previous
body.

If we plant 100 seeds and offer equal growing conditions,
some will grow, some will not grow and some will grow but won’t offer
quality fruits. What could be the reason for these differences?

“Quality of seeds.” Jay was spot on.

“Yes.
The quality of seeds decides the outcome, likewise quality of Soul’s
Karma decides which next body it will get. Don’t we see beggars on the
streets or millionaires in apartments? Don’t we see pet dogs and dogs on
street facing stones? Why there is a difference in everyone’s financial
status or happiness quotient?”

“So you mean Karma, “I” i.e.
Soul does in this birth as a human being will have an impact on my
future bodies and happiness? “ Jay was in sync.

“Yes.”

“Therefore, today also, we are suffering or happy as the result of my past Karmas?” asked Jay.

“Yes, shouldn’t it be?”

“Hmm,
this theory of Karma is making sense, as we see everyone around us is
living a different life. There must be some science behind this.”

“Theory
of Karma applies to every Soul. But the problem is we don’t consider
self as a soul and act as if we are a body. There lies the problem. If
you agree on the above equation and act accordingly, quality of your
journey as a soul will improve.”

That means our belief will make
us decide the journey we are embarking upon.” Jay said and added,” |
Birth — Death | is the body approach and | — Lion–Human– Cat– Elephant–
Cow–| is the Soul approach.

“Absolutely right.”

“Oh. What
a fundamental change it can bring in approach. My bad act in the
present body for limited happiness can attract bad Karma to me, i.e.
Soul and results in misery and pain in my present as well as next body. “

“Yes, it can even influence the new body the Soul gets.”

“Suppose I do more good deeds then will it help me get happiness in future?” Jay asked.

“Yes it does, but your journey as a Soul will continue.”

“Then what should be the ultimate goal of the Soul.” Jay was curious.

“Do
you see anybody permanently happy anywhere? No. Therefore, ending the
cycle of the new body should be the objective of every Soul. All pains
and happiness are suffered by the Soul and not the body. Revisit the
above equation.”

“How is it possible to end the cycle?” Jay was inquisitive.

“By becoming a Karmaless Soul.”

“If
the Soul’s liberation from bodies is the way for permanent happiness
then knowing the laws of Karmas is essential for every Soul.” Jay was
realising the importance of the laws governing every Soul.

“Yes, but we as CAs prefer to know the laws of Income tax and Companies act and even International tax.“

“That is because we Souls have become engrossed with the body and bodily requirements.” Jay reasoned.

“I
am not stating not to know all these laws, but I am indicating about
the priority. The Death of this human body is certain and no one knows
when. It can be even today. All these bodily acts and deeds with one of
the other motives are the source of the dirt for the Soul.”

“Oh,
so I can make my clients happy by advising them about tax avoidance
practices and other ways to wrongfully escape the clutches of laws, but
by doing so I am as a Soul attracting more bad Karmas.” Jay was relating
it.

“Yes, just for the mere temporary benefit of the body and
praise from clients, the Soul is attracting new dirt i.e. Karma which
can make the Soul unhappy and prolong the pain potential for the Soul.”

He
decided to know how to make his Soul completely dirt-free i.e.
Karma-free and that was the first step of his spiritual journey.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 28th July, 2014

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Compilation of R-return: Reporting under FETERS – Discontinuation of ENC and Sch 3 to 6 file

This circular states that with effect from the first fortnight of September, 2014 banks are not required to submit ENC and Sch. 3 to 6 file under FETERS. Banks have to submit only BOP6 file and QE file under FETERS.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14 dated 25th July, 2014

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Issue of Prepaid Forex Cards – Due Diligence and Adherence to KYC norms

This circular states that banks/FFMC selling pre-paid foreign currency cards for travel purposes are required to follow the same rigorous standards of due diligence and KYC that they follow while selling foreign currency notes / travellers cheques to their customers.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated July 22, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 310/2014-RB dated 12th June, 2014

Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

This circular has: –

1. Done away with the requirement of obtaining approval of the Working Group in case of project exports and deferred service exports proposals for contracts exceeding US $ 100 Million. Henceforth, banks/Exim Bank will consider awarding post-award approvals without any monetary limit and permit subsequent changes in the terms of post award approval within the relevant FEMA guidelines/regulations.

2. R emoved the time limit of 30 days for submission of form DPX1/PEX-1/TCS-1 to the Approving Authority (AA) by the exporters. Exporters now have to submit the appropriate form to their banks for approval.

The revised Memorandum of Instructions on Project and Service Exports (PEM) is annexed to this circular.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 13 dated 23rd July, 2014 Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered long-term investors in Government dated Securities

Presently, FII, QFI and long term investors can invest up to US $ 30 billion in Government securities. Out of the above limit, a sub-limit of US $ 10 billion is available for investment by long term investors in Government dated securities.

This circular has, while maintaining the overall limit at US $ 30 billion, made the following changes: –

1. T he limit for investment by FII/QFI/FPI in Government dated securities has been increased by US $ 5 billion to US $ 25 billion.

2. T he limit for investment by long term investors in Government dated securities has been reduced from US $ 10 billion to US $ 5 billion.

FII/QFI/FPI will have to invest the said additional sum of US $ 5 billion in government bonds with a minimum residual maturity of three years. Also, all future investments against the limit vacated when the current investment by an FII/QFI/FPI runs off either through sale or redemption will have to be made in government bonds with a minimum residual maturity of three years. However, there will be no lock-in period and FII/QFI/FPI can freely sell the securities (including that are presently held with less than three years of residual maturity) to the domestic investors.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated 21st July, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) Norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Standards/Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Money Transfer Service Scheme – Recognising E-Aadhaar as an ‘Officially Valid Document’ under PML Rules

This circular states that Indian Agents under MTSS can treat physical Aadhaar card/letter or Aadhaar letter download from the UIDAI under the e-KYC process as ‘Officially Valid Document’ under PML Rules. Further, if the address provided by the customer is same as that on the Aadhaar letter, Aadhaar letter may be accepted as a proof of identity as well as proof of address.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 9 dated 21st July, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) Norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Standards/Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Money Changing Activities – Recognising E-Aadhaar as an ‘Officially Valid Document’ under PML Rules

This circular states that Authorised Persons can treat either physical Aadhaar card/letter or Aadhaar letter download from the UIDAI under the e-KYC process as ‘Officially Valid Document’ under PML Rules. Further, if the address provided by the customer is same as that on the Aadhaar letter, Aadhaar letter may be accepted as a proof of identity as well as proof of address.

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The tightening noose around insider trading – net gets wider, more legal fictions applied to catch offenders

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Synopsis
In this article, the learned author stresses on Insider Trading as a growing phenomenon globally, especially in India and the efforts taken by SEBI to safeguard the investors. The author brings to our attention a new concept ‘Temporary Professional Relationship’ and its coverage with regards to Insider Trading. Importance is also given to various important nuances of Insider Trading and several types of persons who could be termed as ‘Insiders’ with their knowledge of price sensitive information.

INTRODUCTION
The law to define and catch insider trading on unpublished price sensitive information is quite widely worded. Moreover, several terms contain legal fictions/deeming provisions. Appellate authorities too have adopted further legal fictions or rebuttable presumptions. The noose of the law has got one notch tighter with a recent decision (in the matter of KLG Capital Services Limited, order of SEBI dated 24th July, 2014). In this decision, SEBI, perhaps for the first time, applied the concept of “temporary professional relationship” of a person with a company that would make him an insider, and thus, held that his trades with unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI), is insider trading. Whether such trades were with such UPSI was also determined by applying deeming provisions. Moreover, two other deeming principles established by earlier cases have also been applied here. Finally, the case is especially noteworthy for the systematic manner in which information is collected, the relationships determined and the sequence of transactions analysed.

Background of law relating to insider trading
The law relating to insider trading is principally contained in detailed Regulations – the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 (“the Regulations”). The punishable act of insider trading is determined in a fairly complex manner wherein several legal fictions/deeming provisions are applied. Importantly, not all of deeming provisions are rebuttable presumptions, and hence they are presumed to be true with no choice to prove otherwise. Certain persons are deemed to be insiders if have certain specified types of close relationships with the Company. However, several categories of persons are deemed to be connected with the Company and hence insiders.

Insider trading takes place if such insiders trade while in possession of UPSI or if they share such UPSI. However, several types of information are deemed to be UPSI. Then, certain trades by insiders are also deemed to be insider trades in the sense that such trades are simply prohibited. And so on. However, it is ironical that even with such a widely framed law, the cases caught and punished are relatively very few. And even in cases detected and punished, a very detailed investigation is required to establish the violation.

Facts in the present case
In the present case, it was found that a certain company (“Acquirer”) acquired shares of a listed company (“the Company”) that resulted in the Acquirer being required to make an open offer. Certain persons (“the Traders”) were alleged to have acquired shares of the Company while in possession of the UPSI that such open offer would be made. The shares were thereafter sold at a substantially higher price, resulting in a large sum of gains to the Traders.

SEBI alleged that this was in violation of the insider trading Regulations. Let us see how SEBI went about establishing the necessary ingredients of insider trading in the facts of that case using several legal fictions.

Having information of open offer whether UPSI?
Does having information of an impending open offer by itself a UPSI? The answer is yes, though it appears that this was not disputed in this case. Hence, this was not required to be established in detail. A takeover is deemed to be UPSI as per the definition of that term.

Whether the traders in the present case were “insiders”?
The crucial question was whether the Traders were insiders. There were two aspects to this. One was that the fact that the Traders were not connected with the Company but they were connected with the Acquirer. Secondly, even with regard to their connection with the Acquirer, the Traders were not connected in any of the forms specified in the Regulations. The question was whether they could still be deemed to be connected with the Acquirer.

For the first aspect, the issue was whether the Traders need to be connected with the Company whose shares were dealt in, or whether they can be connected to any company. The common understanding is that the inside information usually emanates from the Company whose shares are traded in. A person is closely connected with such company as officer, consultant, director, etc. and becomes aware by virtue of such connection about UPSI. He then trades, based on such UPSI. Thus, a connection with any other company ought not meet the requirement. However, SEBI relied on an earlier decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT ”) which had held that the connection may be with any company. Since the Traders were shown, as is seen later, connected with the Acquirer company, it was held that this was sufficient.

The following words of the SAT in V.K. Kaul vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Appeal No. 55 of 2012) were relied on:-

“Regulation 2(e) defines ‘insider’ to mean any person who, (i) is or was connected with the company or is deemed to have been connected with the company and who is reasonably expected to have access to unpublished price sensitive information in respect of securities of a company or; (ii) has received or has had access to such unpublished price sensitive information. It needs to be appreciated that the clause makes a distinction between ‘the company’ and ‘a company’. When it refers to ‘the company, the references is to the company whose Board of Directors is taking a decision and when it refers to ‘a company’, the reference is to a company to which the decision pertains. This has been explained even by the adjudicating officer by way of an illustration in para 30 of his order dated January 4, 2012, in the case of Mr. V. K. Kaul as under:-

“30. To illustrate, if noticee’s submission is accepted then a situation will arise wherein a Director of the company X cannot be held guilty of insider trading if he trades in the scrip of company Y based on the UPSI, that company X is going to make a strategic investment / placing a huge purchase order for plant and machineries in company Y. Such a scenario will defeat the purpose of PIT Regulations.”

We are, therefore, of the view that the term price sensitive information used in regulation 2(HA) is wide enough to include information relating directly or indirectly to ‘a company.’ The solrex had decided to purchase shares of the target company. Here, solrex is ‘the company’ and target company is ‘a company.’ The decision of solrex to purchase shares of the target company is likely to materially affect the price of securities of the target company. Only the insiders of solrex are aware about this decision of the company. If the insiders of solrex are allowed to trade in the shares of the target company ahead of purchase of shares by solrex, surely the trading will be on the basis of insider information. the decision of solrex to purchase shares of the target company is, therefore, UPSI for the insiders of solrex and they are prohibited from dealing in the shares of the target company till such information becomes public. It is not obligatory under the regulations that the upsi must be in the possession or knowledge of ‘a company’ in whose securities an insider of ‘the company’ deals. As long as, an insider of ‘the company’ deals in the securities of ‘a company’ listed on any stock exchange while in possession of UPSI relating to that company, the provisions of regulation 3(i) of the regulations will get attracted.”

The next aspect was whether the traders were connected with the acquirer. the traders were not directors, advisors, etc. of the acquirer. however, the records showed that they had some connection with either the acquirer or companies connected with it. they were involved directly or indirectly with the acquirer in terms of carrying out of certain acts relating to the takeover or otherwise having other connections. the persons who actually traded in the shares were also shown connected and the flow of the UPSI to them was also shown. Based on such findings, SEBI held that the traders had a “temporary professional connection” with the acquirer and hence, were deemed to be connected.

This is relevant for any person connected with a Company, particularly professionals like Chartered accountants. even if they are not statutory auditors and have a one- time connection of any sort, they could be held to have a “temporary professional connection”, and thus deemed to be insiders.

Reliance on  Phone/sms   records it is interesting to note, how the records of phone/sms between  the  traders  during  the  critical  time  when  the transactions were carried out were obtained and placed on record. This helped support the case of SEBI.

How to Establish that Insiders Traded while in Possession of UPSI
A regular problem faced in cases of insider trading is how to establish that dealings by insiders were so, while being in possession of UPSI. Not all trades of insiders are automatically insider trading. An additional condition required to be proved is that they were, while in actual possession of inside information. An earlier decision of the sat helped introduce yet another fiction. At that time, the law was worded more strictly and it was required to be proved that the person dealt on the basis of UPSI. However, sat held that once an insider deals in securities, it will be presumed that he has done so on the basis of inside information. SEBI relied on the observation of hon’ble sat in the matter of Rajiv B. Gandhi and Others vs. SEBI (appeal no. 50 of 2007) that:

“We are of the considered opinion that if an insider trades or deals in securities of a listed company, it would be presumed that he traded on the basis of the unpublished price sensitive information in his possession unless he establishes to the contrary. Facts necessary to establish the contrary being especially within the knowledge of the insider, the burden of proving those facts is upon him. The presumption that arises is rebuttable and the onus would be on the insider to show that he did not trade on the basis of the unpublished price sensitive information and that he traded on some other basis. He shall have to furnish some reasonable or plausible explanation of the basis on which he traded. If he can do that, the onus shall stand discharged or else the charge shall stand established.”

Relying on this decision, SEBI held that the insider who trades would be presumed to have traded while in possession of UPSI.

This principle is also important for persons close to the Company which would include Chartered accountants acting as auditors, internal auditors, advisors, independent directors, etc. if they deal in the shares of such a Company, it is possible that they would be presumed to have done so while in possession of UPSI. And then it would be upto them to show how they did not. Thus, such persons may consider adopting a policy to never deal in the shares of a Company in which they are regularly or even temporarily connected.

Whether a Person merely Possessing is UPSI Deemed To be an Insider?
The decision of the sat in Dr. Anjali Beke’s case (Dr. An- jali Beke vs. SEBI (appeal no. 148 of 2005)) was relied on to support the argument that even a non-insider who receives UPSI would be deemed to be an insider person who could violate the regulations if he deals, etc. in the securities.  Reliance  on  this  decision  explicitly  was  perhaps necessary since at the time of the alleged acts of insider trading, the law was ambiguous. It was only a few months later that the regulations were amended explicitly and clearly state that a person who merely receives UPSI is an insider.

Reliance on Circumstantial Evidence for Establishing offence of Insider Trading
The next concern arises out of the peculiar nature of insider trading. Many of the ingredients required to prove insider trading are difficult to establish directly. The US Court  in  rajratnam’s  case  had  held  that  circumstantial evidence can be relied on in insider trading cases. This decision was applied on by the sat in V. K. Kaul’s case. SAT had observed:-

“…The adjudicating officer has rightly relied on the observations of u. s. Court in rajaratnam case (supra) on the relevance of circumstantial evidence in para 38 of the impugned order which reads as under :-

38. Regarding the issue of relevance of circumstan- tial evidence, the hon’ble district Court southern district of new york in the matter of united states of america V raj rajaratnam 09 Cr. 1184 (rjh) decided on 11.08.2011 has observed as follows: “…moreover, several other Courts of appeals have sustained insider trading convictions based on circumstantial evidence in considering such factors as “(1) access to information; (2) relationship between the tipper and the tippee; (3) timing of contact between the tipper and the tippee; (4) timing of the trades; (5) pattern of the trades; and (6) attempts to conceal either the trades or the relationship between the tipper and the tippee.” United States vs. Larrabee, 240 f.3d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2001)…”

The above principles are not in conflict with the regulatory framework prescribed by the Board and can be looked into while deciding case of insider trading under the indian regulatory framework.”

SEBI relied on this decision to rely on various circumstantial evidence in the present case.

Disgorgement of Gains with Interest the gains made by the traders were thus worked out. to that, simple interest @ 12% was added for six years. the traders were also debarred from dealing in the securities markets for specified period of time.

Conclusion
This decision reiterates and emphasises several aspects that need consideration by professionals and executives having any connection to the company. The wide definitions and numerous deeming provisions may result in their own trades, or of persons related/connected to them, being held to be insider trading. Apart from suffering disgorgement of the gains with interest, the person may also suffer penalties, prosecution, debarment and of course, loss of reputation.

Precedent – Judicial discipline – Third Member is bound to consider judgement of Division bench – CESTAT order was unsustainable for non consideration of law in favour of assessee:

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Larsen and Toubro Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise; 2014 (306) ELT 27 (Bom.)(HC)

There was a difference of opinion between the Judicial member and the Technical Member. The appeal before the Tribunal was therefore referred to a Third Member. The Third Member held against the appellant/assessee. Prior to the decision of the Third Member, there was a decision of the Tribunal which supported the appellant’s contention before the Tribunal. That decision was brought to the notice of the learned Third Member before passing the order. The Third Member was bound to consider the judgment of the Tribunal. He, however, did not do so.

Prima facie, at least, even before the Tribunal the position for law appears to be in favour of the appellant. Unfortunately, the third member did not consider the judgment of the Tribunal.

The court also observed that the order of Tribunal was referred not because it has any precedent value in this court but is a indication of what the impugned order of the third member may well have been, had the judgement been considered by the learned third member.

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Precedent – Law declared by Supreme Court – Binding on all High Courts – High Court Judge sitting singly bound by Supreme Court decision rather than Division Bench Judgement which is contrary to Supreme Court. (Constitution of India, Article 141)

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Sidramappa and others vs. State of Karnataka and Others; AIR 2014 Karnataka 100 (Karn.)(HC) (FB)

The learned single Judge of Karnataka High Court in a Writ Petition passed an order stating that earlier judgement of a Division Bench of the High Court requires reconsideration and in the absence of any statutory provision empowering him to refer the same to the larger Bench the relevant papers be placed before Chief Justice to examine the question and constitute a larger Bench.

The Hon’ble Court observed that according to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The expression “all courts” means Courts other than the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court is binding on all the High Courts. In other words, the High Court’s cannot hold the law laid down by the Apex Court is not binding on the ground that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court laid down the legal position without considering all the points. The decision of the Apex Court binds as much the pending cases as the future ones. Even the directions issued by the Apex Court in a decision constitute binding law under Article 141. It is pertinent to state that the Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions and may overrule its previous decisions. It is also pertinent to state that the Apex Court may overrule the previous decisions either by expressly saying so or impliedly by not following them in a subsequent case. Thus, in view of Article 141 of Constitution of India, when there is a decision of the Apex Court directly applicable on all fours to the case on hand, the Learned Single Judge could have decided the Writ Petitions following the decision of the Apex Court, holding that the decision of the Division Bench is contrary to the law laid down under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Therefore the learned single Judge could decide the petitions in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court.

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Guarantor – Mortgage by deposit of title deeds – Liability of Guarantor – Loan taken from bank – Deposit of title deeds with Bank. Section 128-Contract Act, Transfer of property section 58(f).

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Allahabad Bank vs. M/s. Shivganga Tube Well and Others; AIR 2014 Bombay 100 (Bom.)(HC)

The original defendant No. 1 had availed a loan of Rs. 10 lakh on for the purposes of purchase of a truck with Bore-Well Rig, Machine, Screw Compressor, Drilling Rig, etc. The original defendant No.1 – the borrower hypothecated the said machinery and its accessories with the plaintiff Bank. At the same time, the defendants No. 2 to 6 i.e., present respondents No. 2 to 6 agreed to stand as continuing guarantors for the original defendant No. 1 in repayment of the loan amount as agreed between the appellant Bank and the defendant No. 1. They agreed to mortgage their respective immovable property. They accordingly delivered their title-deeds. Thus, equitable mortgage by depositing the title-deed was created by these respondents.

All the defendants attended the Himayatnagar branch of appellant Bank and deposited the title-deeds of their respective immovable properties, as detailed in the plaint. They had agreed by executing affidavits regarding the confirmation of the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds and had further agreed that the revival of the loan, if any by the borrower i.e. defendant No. 1 shall bind the mortgagor.

The Appellant Bank filed a suit for recovery of an amount of Rs. 27,76,137/- and for preliminary decree for sale of the mortgaged property for recovery of the said amount was decreed against the borrower-original defendant No. 1, but was dismissed against the guarantors i.e., defendants No. 2 to 6. Hence, the appeal was filed against the guarantors.

The Hon’ble Court noted the difference between “the agreement to mortgage” and “mortgage by deposit of title-deeds”. The mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is defined by section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

It is undisputed that the city of Hyderabad is a notified city where the delivery of the title-deeds of immovable property can be made with the intention to create a security thereon.

It is a settled position of law that the mortgage by deposit of title deeds requires no registration. However, if any document is executed, which would show that the mortgagee has, under the said document, mortgaged the property by deposit of title-deeds, then only the registration of the said document is required. However, the contemporaneous document fortifying the “intention to create the security” is neither an agreement to mortgage or a mortgage. The deposit of title-deeds itself with intention in the mind of the person that the said title-deeds are being deposited with intention to create a security thereon, is sufficient to culminate the transaction into a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. This mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is sometimes called as equitable mortgage, as was prevalent in England. However, the ingredients of the equitable mortgage and the mortgage as defined u/s. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act are not identical.

The documents on record, coupled with the affidavits as admitted by the defendant and positively proved by the relevant witness of the plaintiff would show that the title-deeds were deposited with the plaintiff Bank, with an intention to create the security thereon.

The title-deeds of the respective respondents were admittedly put in the custody of the appellant Bank at that time. None of the relevant respondents at any time asked for return of those title-deeds, nor complained of keeping the same in the custody of the Bank.

The documents on record would show that the respondents No. 2 to 6 had intention to create the security for the repayment of the loan availed by the principal borrower. Therefore, they showed their readiness to deposit the title-deeds by various agreements and affidavits and also by placing all the title verification certificate by the Advocates, etc. and ultimately, they deposited the titledeeds with the appellant Bank at Hyderabad branch.

The above facts is sufficient to hold that the respondents No. 2 to 6 stood as guarantors and created mortgage of their property for repayment of the loan advanced to the principal borrower by depositing their title-deeds.

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Frivolous Litigation – State as a Litigant/party – Expenses to be paid personally by officials concerned.

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Haryana Dairy Development Co-op Federation Ltd. vs. Jagdish Lal; (2014) 3 SCC 156 (SC)

In the instant case, an amount of Rs. 8,724/- was to be paid to the Respondent employee as reimbursement of his medical claim. The Petitioner Haryana Dairy Development Cooperative Federation Limited filed SLP before Supreme Court. The Court frwoned upon such practice of the petitioner corporation as the corporation must have spent the amount already by filing this petition more than the total amount involved herein.

The Law Commission of India in its 155th report has observed that what is distressing is that the number of pending litigations relate to trivial matters or petty claims, some of which have been hanging for more than fifteen years. It hardly needs mention that in many such cases money spent on litigation is far in excess of the stakes involved, besides wasting valuable time and energy of the concerned parties as well as the Court.

The court directed that the expenses of the litigation shall be incurred by the Managing Director personally who has signed affidavit in support of the petition and it shall not be taken from the Federation.

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Deficiency in service – Mental Agony & harassment – Cost of Litigation-Builder. (Consumer Protection Act section 17).

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Col. Sukhawant Singh Saini (Retd.) vs. GBM Builders and Developers P. Ltd.; (State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, UT Chandigarh).

The facts, in brief, are that the complainant booked a 2 BHK flat , the price whereof was Rs. 22,50,000/-. He paid a sum of Rs.1.00 lakh, as booking amount, to the builder. The allotment letter, dated 13-10-2011, was issued in favour of the complainant, in respect of the aforesaid flat. Totally, the complainant paid a sum of Rs. 21,50,000 towards the price of the flat, in question. The remaining amount of Rs.1.00 lakh was to be paid by the complainant, at the time of handing over possession of the flat, by the builder (Opposite Party). The Opposite Party, failed to deliver the possession in time. The complainant wrote a number of letters requesting the Opposite Party, to hand over physical possession of the flat. The opposite Party vide letter dated 06-12-2012 intimated the complainant that possession of the flat shall be delivered on or before 15-01-2013. Even on that date, the possession of the flat was not delivered. It was intended that the complainant suffered a lot of mental agony and physical harassment, on account of non-delivery of possession of the flat, in question, by the stipulated date, or non-refund of the amount deposited by him. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of the Opposite Party, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, as also indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainant was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint u/s. 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was filed claiming from the Opposite Party compensation for mental agony and physical harassment; refund of Rs. 21.50 with interest @18% p.a. from the date of deposit of the said amount; pay interest @10.75% p.a., which was being paid by him (complainant) to the Bank of India, for the loan facility, availed of by him to purchase the flat, in question; etc.

The state commission observed that as per the evidence produced, on record, it is evident that the complainant only booked one flat, bearing No. 498, in the project of the Opposite Party, for a sale consideration of Rs. 22.50 lakh. There is nothing, on record, that the complainant purchased this flat, for commercial purpose with the intention to resell the same as and when there was escalation in prices. Thus the complainant falls within the definition of a consumer, as defined by section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act.

The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to within which period the possession of the flat was to be delivered. It is evident from this document, that the Opposite Party stated therein, that it would try to give possession of the flat by 15-01-2013. It means that possession of the flat was to be delivered, on or before this date. However, there is no document, on record, to prove that either on 15-01-2013 or immediately thereafter offer of possession of the flat, in question was made to the complainant, but he refused to accept the same. Had the construction of the flat, in question, been complete, in all respects, then certainly the Opposite Party would have sent offer of possession of the flat, after 15-01- 2013, to the complainant. Non-sending of such a letter, in itself, indicates that construction of the flat, in question, was not complete, and as such, the question of offer of possession thereof on or after 15-01-2013 did not at all arise. By making a false promise, that the possession shall be offered by 15-01-2013, and failure to abide by the commitment, the Opposite Party was not only deficient in rendering service but also indulged into unfair trade practice.

Even by the time the complaint was filed, the possession of the flat was not offered to the complainant. The Opposite Party utilised the amount, deposited by the complainant, for a sufficient long period. Neither the possession was offered to the complainant, nor refund of the amount, was made to him. Since the Opposite Party failed to deliver possession of the flat by the stipulated date or even by the time the complaint was filed, it was its bounden duty to refund Rs. 21.50 and Rs. 37,028/- (paid as service tax) to the complainant but it failed to do so. It was, therefore, held that the complainant was entitled to the refund of Rs. 21,50,000/- deposited by him towards the price of the flat and Rs. 37,028/- paid by him, towards service tax to the Opposite Party. By not refunding the amount aforesaid, the Opposite Party was deficient, in rendering service.

For the financial loss caused to the complainant on account of non-refund of the amount, deposited by him immediately after the expiry of the stipulated date for delivery of possession of the flat, the complainant was entitled to refund of the aforesaid amounts, with interest @12% interest p.a. from the respective dates of deposits.

As stated above, neither possession of the flat by the stipulated date, was given to the complainant, nor refund of the amounts paid by him, was made. One can really imagine the mental condition of a person, who deposited 95% of the price of the flat, but was neither delivered the possession thereof nor refund of the amounts deposited by him was made. The complainant, thus, suffered a lot of mental agony and physical harassment, on account of the acts of omission and commission of the Opposite Party. Not only this, the complainant shall also not be able to purchase a flat, at the same rate, on account of escalation in prices. Compensation for mental agony and physical harassment and on account of escalation, in prices to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/- was granted Litigation cost of Rs.15,000/- also granted. (Dated 02-07-2014 complaint Case No. 41 of 2014).

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Accounting for cost of test runs

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BACKGROUND
The accounting for cost of test runs raises some very interesting questions both under Indian GAAP and IFRS. Paragraph 16 of IAS 16 states that the cost of an item of plant and equipment includes any costs directly attributable to bringing the asset to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management. Paragraph 17 enumerates examples of directly attributable cost and includes cost of testing whether the asset is functioning properly, after deducting the net proceeds from selling any items produced while bringing the asset to that location and condition; such as samples produced when testing equipment. However, it does not clearly state what the treatment should be when the net proceeds are greater than the cost of testing. Now consider the following two scenarios.

Scenario 1
The cost of test run is Rs. 100. The samples produced are sold at Rs. 80. Theoretically, two answers are possible. The first answer is to capitalise Rs. 100 and consider Rs. 80 as revenue (P&L). The second answer is to capitalise net, i.e., Rs 20. Nothing is taken to P&L.

Scenario 2
The cost of test run is Rs 100. The samples produced are sold at Rs. 130. Theoretically, the following three possibilities exist.

1. Capitalise Rs.100. Take Rs. 130 to revenue (P&L)
2. Capitalise a negative amount of Rs. 30. Nothing is taken to P&L.
3. Capitalise zero amount. Take Rs. 30 to revenue (P&L).

Interpretation under IFRS
This matter was discussed in the IFRS Interpretation committee. They felt that the way paragraph 17 is written, it is only the costs of testing that are permitted to be included in the cost of the plant and equipment. These costs are reduced by the net proceeds from selling items produced during testing. It is self-evident that if the net proceeds exceed the cost of testing, then those excess net proceeds cannot be included in the cost of the asset. Those excess net proceeds must therefore be included in the P&L.

IFRS Interpretation Committee also relied upon paragraph 21 of IAS 16, which indicates that proceeds and related costs arising from an operation, which is not necessary to bring the item to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management, should be recognised in P&L and cannot be capitalised. Paragraph 21 is reproduced below.

“Some operations occur in connection with the construction or development of an item of property, plant and equipment, but are not necessary to bring the item to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management. These incidental operations may occur before or during the construction or development activities. For example, income may be earned through using a building site as a car park until construction starts. Because incidental operations are not necessary to bring an item to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management, the income and related expenses of incidental operations are recognised in profit or loss and included in their respective classifications of income and expense.”

Based on the above discussion, in Scenario 1, a net amount of Rs. 20 is capitalised. In Scenario 2, zero amount is capitalised, and Rs. 30 is taken to revenue (P&L).

Interpretation under Indian GAAP
The following guidance is available in Indian GAAP. It may be noted that the below mentioned Guidance Note on Treatment of Expenditure During Construction Period is withdrawn, but nonetheless relevant for our assessment, since it does not conflict with any accounting standard with respect to the principle that is being debated.

Paragraph 9.1 of AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets

The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price.

Paragraph 9.3 of AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets

The expenditure incurred on start-up and commissioning of the project, including the expenditure incurred on test runs and experimental production, is usually capitalised as an indirect element of the construction cost.

Paragraph 8.1 of Guidance Note on Treatment of Expenditure During Construction Period

It is possible that a new project may earn some income from miscellaneous sources during its construction or preproduction period. Such income may be earned by way of interest from the temporary investment of surplus funds prior to their utilisation for capital or other expenditure or from sale of products manufactured during the period of test runs and experimental production. Such items of income should be disclosed separately either in the profit and loss account, where this account is prepared during construction period, or in the account/statement prepared in lieu of the profit and loss account, i.e., Development Account/Incidental Expenditure During Construction Period Account/Statement on Incidental Expenditure During Construction. The treatment of such incomes for arriving at the amount of expenditure to be capitalised/deferred, has been dealt with in para 15.2.

Paragraph 11.4 of Guidance Note on Treatment of Expenditure During Construction Period

During the period of test runs and experimental production it is quite possible that some income will be earned through the sale of the merchandise produced or manufactured during this period. The sale revenue should be set off against the indirect expenditure incurred during the period of test runs as suggested in para 15.2.

Paragraph 15.2 of Guidance Note on Treatment of Expenditure During Construction Period

From the total of the aforesaid items of indirect expenditure (one of the aforesaid items included expenditure relating to expenditure on test runs) would be deducted the income, if any, earned during the period of construction, provided it can be identified with the project.

Paragraph 14.5 of Guidance Note on Treatment of Expenditure During Construction Period

Income during the construction or pre-production period should be shown separately in the financial statements (see paragraph 8.1 of this Note).

Conclusion
Based upon the above guidance, it is clear in Scenario 1, that a net amount of Rs. 20 is capitalised and nothing is taken to the P&L. However, in the case of Scenario 2, when the corresponding income is greater than the cost of trial run, neither the guidance note nor the standard are absolutely clear on what should be done. However, the author believes that based on similar arguments produced above in the context of IFRS interpretation, a net amount of zero is capitalised and Rs. 30 is taken to revenue (P&L).

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TS-435-ITAT-2014(Mum) Reuters Transaction Services Ltd vs. DDIT A.Ys: 2008-10, Dated: 18.07.2014

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Electronic deal matching services provided through equipment installed at customers’ location would constitute royalty under India-UK DTAA .

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in England and a Tax Resident of UK, is engaged in the business of providing an electronic deal matching systems services which enables authorised dealers in foreign exchange in India (customers), such as banks etc. to effect deals in spot foreign exchange with other foreign exchange dealers. The services are provided against certain monthly charges. Further, the server through which such services are provided is located outside India.

The electronic deal matching system services facilitates the customers to deal in the foreign exchange with the other counterparts who are ready for the transaction of purchase and sale of foreign currency.

In order to avail the above services, the customers entered into two contracts:

• Agreement to provide matching services with the Taxpayer
• Access agreement with an Indian company (I Co), a subsidiary of the Taxpayer, for obtaining equipment in order to avail the above matching services. The customers could avail the services of the Taxpayer only through the equipment and connectivity provided by the Taxpayer through I Co.

Separately, Taxpayer had entered into a marketing agreement with I Co.

The fee for providing the above services would be charged by the Taxpayer from the Indian subscribers and the Taxpayer in turn would remunerate I Co for the marketing and installation services provided by I Co to the customers.

Taxpayer contended that the fee received from its customers in India is in the nature of business profit which is not taxable in India in the absence of a PE as per Article 7 of the India-UK DTAA . Further, such fees did not constitute Royalty or FTS under the India-UK DTAA .

The Tax Authority contended that such fee was Royalty as well as FTS both under the Act as well as the DTAA . Alternatively, I Co constituted an Agency PE for the Taxpayer in India, and the equipment installed by I Co would also constitute a fixed place PE for the taxpayer in India and hence taxable as business profits.

Held:
The nature of service rendered by the Taxpayer includes the information concerning commercial use by the customer. The entire system along with the matching system and connectivity involves processing of customer’s business queries and orders and finding out the matching reply in the shape of counterpart demand or supply for execution of the transaction of purchase and sale of foreign exchange. This system of the Taxpayer is available only to the customers who have been given the access to the information concerning commercial as well as processing the orders placed by the customers.

As per the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement the Indian customers accept the individual non-transferable and non-exclusive license to use the licensed software programme for the purpose of carrying out the purchase and sale of foreign exchange. The facts on hand is not a case of Payment for access to the portal by use of normal computer and internet facility but the access is given only by use of computer system and software system provided by the Taxpayer under license.

Customers make use of the copyright software along with computer system to have access to the requisite information and data available on the server of the Taxpayer.

Accordingly, by allowing the use of software and computer system to have access to the portal of the Taxpayer for finding relevant information and matching their request for purchase and sale of foreign exchange amount to imparting of information concerning technical, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment work and hence the payment made in this respect would constitute royalty.

Delhi HC decision in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd (332 ITR 340) is distinguishable in the facts of this case. The Asia Sat’s case was based on the finding that the transponder capacity has only a media for uplinking and downlinking of signals of the broadcaster and TV operators to be transmitted to their customers without any manipulation for improvement, whereas in the case on hand, the Taxpayer is providing not only media but also allowed to use the information, store the information on server and even to manipulate and drive the data to anyone for their commercial purpose.

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TS-481-ITAT-2014(Mum) Cosmic Global Ltd vs. ACIT A.Y: 2009-2010, Dated: 30.07.2014

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Section 9(1)(vii) – Translation of a text from one language to another is not “technical” in nature, does not fall within the definition of FTS under the Act.

Facts:
The Taxpayer is an India company engaged in the business of providing translation services through the web. For this purpose the Taxpayer availed translation services from translators residing in India as well as outside India.

In respect of fee paid to translators in India, the Taxpayer withheld necessary taxes. However on fee paid to the nonresident (NR) translators the Taxpayer did not withhold tax at source.

The Tax Authority held that the fees paid to the NR translators are technical in nature as per section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and hence was liable to withholding of taxes. Thus the Tax Authority disallowed the payments made to NR translators in computing the business income of the Taxpayer, for failure to withhold the tax at source.

The order of the Tax Authority was upheld by the First appellate Authority. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
Fee for technical services under the Act is defined to mean any consideration for the rendering of any managerial, consultancy or technical services. The term “technical” is defined by dictionary to mean a service relating to a particular subject, art, craft, or its technique requiring special knowledge to be understood or services involving or concerned with applied and industrial sciences.

In the present case, the Taxpayer is getting the translation of the text from one language to another. The only requirement for translation from one language to the other is the proficiency of the translators in both the language.
Apart from the knowledge of the language, the translator is not expected to have the knowledge of applied sciences or the craft or techniques in respect of the text to be translated. The Translator is not required to contribute anything more to the text that is to be translated nor is he required to elaborate the meaning of the text.

A bare perusal of the definition of FTS under the Act and the dictionary meaning of the word “technical” makes it unambiguously clear that the translation services are not technical in nature. Thus fee paid to NR translators is not FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

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TS-418-ITAT-2014(Mum) MISC Berhad vs. ADIT A.Ys: 2004-08 and 2009-2010, Dated: 16.07.2014

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Charter arrangement includes slot charter arrangement and covered within the ambit of Article 8, shipping income, of India-Malaysia DTAA ?Facts: Taxpayer, a tax resident of Malaysia, is engaged in the business of shipping in international traffic. The Taxpayer operates ships that are either owned by it or taken on lease. Insofar as the shipping business from India is concerned, the Taxpayer books cargo from shippers/customers in India up to the final destination port, with all risks and responsibility. The bill of lading is issued for the entire voyage.

The Taxpayer, under a slot charter arrangement, arranges for transport of cargo from the Indian port to the hub port, using the service of feeder vessels which are owned by a third party.

From the hub port, the Taxpayer’s containers are transhipped on the mother vessel, which are owned/ leased by the Taxpayer, and from the hub port it is carried to the final destination port.

The Taxpayer had claimed the benefit of Article 8 of the India-Malaysia DTAA on the entire freight income which comprised two components: (i) Transportation of cargo in international traffic by operating ships owned or pooled by the Taxpayer. (ii) Carriage of goods by feeder vessels belonging to another shipping line wherein the Taxpayer did not have any pool arrangements.

However, the Tax Authority allowed the benefit of Article 8 on the first component and denied the benefit of Article 8 on freight income on the second component. The Tax Authority contended that Article 8 of India-Malaysia DTAA applies only when the taxpayer is the owner, lessee or charterer of a ship.

Held:
Article 8(1) of the India – Malaysia DTAA provides that profits derived by an enterprise of a Contracting State from the operation of ships in international traffic shall be taxable only in the State in which the ships are operated. The activity of “operation of ships” carried on by a person cannot be understood merely as a person who operates the ships. It has to be understood in the broader sense of carrying out shipping activity. Carrying out of shipping activity could be as an owner or as a lessee or as a charterer of a ship. Where the word “owner” has to be inferred as a person who owns a ship and the word “lessee” as one who owns a ship for a given lease period, the word ”charterer” has to be understood as a person who charters/hires a ship for a voyage.

Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on several definitions and Bombay HC decision in the case of Balaji Shipping UK Ltd. [253 CTR 460] to support the following:

• Operation of a ship can be done as a charterer who does not mean to own or control the ship, either as an owner or as a lessee.
• Charterer is a hirer of a ship under an agreement to acquire a right to use a vessel for transportation of goods on a determined voyage, either the whole/part of the ship in a charter party agreement.
• The word “charterer” includes a voyage charter of part of a ship/slot, since it is an arrangement to hire space in a ship owned and leased by other persons.

The concept “charterer of ships” under the Act includes slot charter arrangement. The facility of slot hire arrangement is not merely an auxiliary or incidental activity to the operation of ships, but is inextricably linked to such activity.

The risk under the charter party agreement or arrangement is upon the owner of the ship who generally assumes an operational risk for transporting cargo of a person who has hired the ship. The risk of the Taxpayer is towards its customers with whom it has agreed to transport the cargo.

Transportation of cargo in the container belonging to the Taxpayer from the Indian port i.e., the port of booking to the hub port through feeder vessel by way of space charter/ slot charter arrangement falls within the ambit of the word “charterer”. This component cannot be segregated from the scope of “operation of ships” as defined in Article 8 of India- Malaysia DTAA .

The voyage between the Indian port to the hub port through feeder vessel and from the hub port to the final destination port through mother vessel owned/leased by the Taxpayer are inextricably linked and there is complete linkage of the voyage. Therefore, the entire profits derived from the transportation of goods carried on by the Taxpayer is to be treated as profits from operation of ships and, therefore, the benefit of Article 8 cannot be denied to the Taxpayer on the part of the freight from voyage by the feeder vessels.

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Representation seeking deferment of new Tax Audit Report or extension of time for filing the Return of Income for Assessment Year 2014-15 to 30th November 2014

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25th August 2014

The Chairman
Central Board of Excise & Customs
Government of India,
North Block, Vijay Chowk,
New Delhi 110 001.

Hon’ble Sir,

Re: Representation seeking deferment of new Tax Audit Report or extension of time
for filing the Return of Income for Assessment Year 2014-15 to 30th November 2014

The Central Board of Direct Taxes (“CBDT”) vide Order dated 20th August under section 119 of the Act, has extended the due date for obtaining and furnishing of the report of audit under section 44AB of the Act for Assessment Year 2014-15 in case of assessees who are not required to furnish report under section 92E of the Act from 30th September, 2014 to 30th November, 2014. However the Order is silent on the extension of due date for filing the Return of Income.

The CBDT vide Notification No.33 dated July 25, 2014 has notified new Form No. 3CA, Form No. 3CB and Form No. 3CD for furnishing Audit Report u/s 44AB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [Tax Audit Report]. Various new clauses have been added while many others have been amended. The new clauses and the amended clauses require auditor to certify the correctness of figures having a direct impact on the total income of the assesse.

The Tax Audit report is the basis of computation of income. Various deductions and disallowances are quantified in the Tax Audit Report to be included in the return of income.

It is respectfully submitted that the relief sought to be provided by the CBDT by granting extension of time for filing the Tax Audit Report without a corresponding extension of due date for filing the Return of Income would not serve the desired purpose. It will actually necessitate filing of the Return of Income without audited figures in respect of various deductions and disallowances being available.

Considering the substantial changes made in the new Form 3CD, in principle and to be fair and just, the new requirement should not have been made retrospectively applicable to the Financial Year 2013-2014 [Asst. Year 2014-2015] as that causes severe hardship to the assessees as well as the auditors. Instead of deferring this to Financial Year 2014-2015 [Asst.Year 2015-2016], only the date of obtaining and furnishing Tax Audit Report has been extended and that too, without making consequential extension in the due date of furnishing the Return of Income for the Asst.Year 2014-2015 [Financial Year 2013-2014] and hence, this extension is effectively meaningless.

As such, the extension granted for obtaining and furnishing of the report of audit under section 44AB would not provide relief to the assessees and the hardships faced would continue. In fact, many returns may not have correct figures and the return of income filed without audited figures being available may need to be revised after obtaining the Tax Audit Report, particularly in case of non-corporate assessees. This would lead to avoidable duplication of work as well as additional time and costs to be incurred by assesses as well as the Department (having to process a large number of revised returns).

Hence to provide the desired relief to assessees, it is earnestly requested that either the applicability of new form of Tax Audit Report should be deferred to the next year [Financial Year 2014-2015] to avoid it’s retrospective applicability [which is the just and fair thing to do] or atleast, the due date for filing the return of income for the Assessment Year 2014-15 for all assessees (other than assessees who are required to furnish report under section 92E of the Act) liable to Tax Audit should be extended to 30th November 2014 i.e. the date upto which extension has been granted to obtain and furnish the Tax Audit Report.

We trust you would find merit in our above genuine request and accede to the same.Your early action in the matter will be highly appreciated.

Thanking you.

Yours Sincerely

Bombay Chartered Accountant Society

Nitin Shingala President,

Kishor B. Karia Chairman Taxation Committee

Sanjeev R. Pandit Co-Chairman

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Extension of due date of deposit of Service Tax and TDS in October 2014 due to Public Holidays

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6th August 2014

The Chairman
Central Board of Excise & Customs
North Block,
Rashtrapati Bhavan,
Defence Headquarters.
New Delhi 110 001

The Chairman
Central Board of Direct Taxes
Government of India
North Block
Parliamentary Street
New Delhi 110 001

Respected Sirs,

Sub: Extension of due date of deposit of Service Tax and TDS in October 2014
due to Public Holidays

This is to bring to your notice that there will be a series of public holidays in the first week of October 2014 as mentioned below:

In view thereof, it will be very difficult for the taxpayers to make payment of Service Tax/Excise Duty and TDS by their due dates being the 6th and the 7th of the month respectively. You are therefore requested to consider extension of the due dates for payments of Service Tax/Excise Duty and the TDS from 6th October 2014 and 7th October 2014 respectively to 10th October 2014.

Your early action in this regard will help in easing undue hardships to the taxpayers and will be highly appreciated.

Thanking you.

Yours faithfully

Bombay Chartered Accountant Society

Nitin Shingala President,

Kishor B. Karia Chairman Taxation Committee

Sanjeev R. Pandit Co-Chairman

Govind G. Goyal   Chairman Indirect Taxes & Allied Laws Committee

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India’s antiquated law on contempt of court restricts personal liberty and must be overhauled

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After having raised the issue of whether the clubby and secretive collegium system actually preserves the independence of the judiciary former Supreme Court judge, Justice Markandey Katju, has now trained his guns on India’s antiquated contempt of court law. He has made the valid point, that judicial supremacy cannot be based on the law of kings in a democracy. Is interference or disruption of the due course of judicial proceedings or the administration of justice contempt of court? Or, does criticism of a judgment or a judge constitute sufficient ground for invocation of the dreaded law? While it ought to be the former in India it’s often understood as the latter, as the contempt law has been employed when judges were made targets of personal attacks or to silence criticism of judgments. But criticising a judge or a judgment perceived to be flawed cannot be seen to be an illegitimate act that scandalises the court or seriously undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. In the UK and US, where both civil and criminal contempt laws are in operation, substantial amendments have constrained the powers of judges who might otherwise have acted to vindicate their authority, pomp and majesty which are anathema to a democratic institution.

The Indian contempt Act of 1971 has evolved over time to incorporate amendments that delineated what does not constitute contempt and framed rules to regulate contempt proceedings, yet inconsistencies remain. In 2006, an important amendment to the 1971 Act provided for truth as a valid defence in contempt proceedings, especially because the law was considered a threat to the fundamental rights to personal liberty and freedom of expression. Not just the doctrine of truth but public interest must be the cornerstones on which the law must be based. The judiciary, executive and legislature must ensure there are enough safeguards against arbitrary exercise of the power for contempt of court

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Labour law overhaul must happen at the centre

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Reform of India’s archaic and restrictive labour laws are central to any reform programme. This is a wellunderstood fact now; that the unfortunate stunting of India’s manufacturing sector, particularly in labourintensive industries, can largely be laid at the feet of these statist laws is undeniable. Not only do they provide bureaucrats with a reason to harass entrepreneurs, and place an excessive and unfair burden on small and medium enterprises, but they have signally failed to protect India’s workers. The fact that every employer wishes to avoid the incidence of these laws has led to widespread casualisation of the workforce. As a consequence, over 90 per cent of Indians work in the unorganised sector. Any comprehensive approach to restarting the economy from the new government will need to include a complete overhaul of labour law.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that the new government has shown little interest in pushing the envelope as far as this essential reform is concerned. Instead, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which leads the National Democratic Alliance government, has stressed that the Rajasthan government – which it also runs – is conducting labour law reform. The Rajasthan government will alter the application of related central laws: for example, raising the threshold of the number of employees who can be laid off without government permission from 100 to 300, and applying the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act only to companies with more than 50 workers, compared with 20 now. Similar labour law changes are being contemplated in Madhya Pradesh, also ruled by the BJP, and even Haryana, which is ruled by the Congress. These are certainly welcome developments, indicating that labour law changes as necessary reforms to revive the manufacturing sector have begun to gain wider acceptance in many states.

(Source: Business Standard, dated 23-07-2014)

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Supreme Court feels slighted snaps at Centre on National tax tribunal

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The Supreme Court reacted sharply to the Centre’s stand that the purpose behind creation of National Tax Tribunal (NTT) was to associate domain experts in deciding taxation disputes as it was often felt that judges lacked expertise in specialized fields.

A five-judge constitution bench comprising Chief Justice R M Lodha and Justices J S Khehar, J Chelameswar, A K Sikri and R F Nariman wondered why the government rushed to the judges whenever they faced a problem.

“Judges may not be experts. But whenever there is a problem, they come to the judges by way of courts or commissions,” the bench said before reserving its order on a petition filed by Madras Bar Association challenging the National Tax Tribunal Act.

The petitioner had alleged that these tribunals could not have been empowered to decide questions of law, which exclusively fell within the courts’ domain. It said the government, by constituting NTTs and providing appeal against their orders directly to the Supreme Court, had denuded the jurisdiction of high courts.

The inclusion of chartered accountants and company secretaries on NTTs and allowing them to decide questions of law did not go down well with the apex court. “How can a CA or CS help determine the question of law involved in a taxation dispute,” the bench asked.

Appearing for an association of chartered accountants and company secretaries, senior advocate K V Vishwanathan said the CA and CS courses involved study of taxation laws.

The bench said, “These days, Class VIII and IX students also study about Constitution. That does not mean they have knowledge of law. The taxation experts may be able to help a judicial member understand the complexities involved in a dispute but how will they determine a question of law?”

In a lighter vein it said, “Many clerks and stenographers after long association with lawyers know the provisions of law quite well. Can they be said to have knowledge enough to decide questions of law. A CA or a CS would be studying taxation law from the angle of tax purposes only and not for understanding the questions of law that would arise in a dispute.”

Appearing for the petitioner, senior advocate Arvind Datar said NTT experimentation was dangerous for the judiciary as slowly, the government would take away expert subjects – disputes relating to company law, trademark and intellectual property – from the high court’s jurisdiction by creating separate tribunals in the name of infusing experts into the dispute redressal mechanism.

NTT, instead of supplementing the judiciary, was supplanting the court’s jurisdiction, Datar said.

The bench asked solicitor general Ranjit Kumar whether NTTs enjoyed any autonomy at all. “The NTT chairman does not even have power to set up benches. This power is vested with the central government. What is the autonomy we are talking about,” it asked.

(Source: Times of India, dated 24-07-2014)

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Judicial appointments need transparency

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Amid growing concerns about political pressure on the appointment or extension of judges, the government has indicated that it intends to move quicker on creating a judicial appointments commission. This immediately follows the revelation of a series of events from 2005 which, although the facts continue to be disputed, nevertheless raise serious concerns. Former Supreme Court judge, and current chairman of the Press Council of India, Markandey Katju recently said that a judge of the Madras High Court was granted an extension although a report by the Intelligence Bureau had said that he was corrupt. Mr. Katju said that the collegium that appoints judges, then headed by the erstwhile chief justice of India, R C Lahoti, had given in to pressure from the government. Mr. Katju said that the ex-prime minister, Manmohan Singh, was put under pressure from a coalition partner – who could only be the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham(DMK) from Tamil Nadu – to protect the judge, and a senior minister pressured the collegium on behalf of the government. Then law minister, H R Bhardwaj, subsequently claimed that extensions to the judge were solely the collegium’s decision. It has now emerged, in a report by The Times of India, that the Prime Minister’s Office had, in fact, lobbied in favour of making the judge in question a permanent member of the Madras High Court bench.

On one level, this is a reminder of the bad old days of coalition politics under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The DMK proved itself to be a difficult and bullying ally, and often used its pivotal numbers in the parliamentary coalition to dubious ends. Whether it is in the reported arm-twisting of Ratan Tata by the telecom ministry it controlled; or its insistence that A Raja be retained as a minister in 2009; or in the doubtful Maxis- Aircel deal, the DMK bears a great deal of responsibility for the downfall of the UPA . If these latest allegations are true, however, then it becomes clear that Dr Singh himself had no intention, right from the start, of standing up to this ally. It is no surprise, then, that the UPA failed to manage its coalition.

However, the larger point that must be made is on the nature of judges’ appointments. The incumbent government has already been accused of intervening unduly in judicial appointments, by refraining from returning the nomination of eminent lawyer Gopal Subramanium to the collegium. With each such report, there are more holes in the existing justification for the collegium, that it is immune to political pressure. However, the answer is not to simply replace it with another opaque system. The appointment of judges must be made in the open, and transparently. The executive must be given a greater, but circumscribed, say in the choice of judges, certainly. However, if accusations of corruption or bias are going to be thrown around in this manner, then it is clear that the process requires clarity and light in order to preserve the aura of the judicial system. The proposed judicial appointments commission should, thus, not be a closed and opaque body.

(Source: Business Standard, dated 24-07-2014)

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Another market crash in the offing?

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Reserve Bank of India governor Raghuram Rajan has added his voice to a steadily rising chorus warning of the heightened risks of a global market crash. Specifically, he says there’s a disconnect between the state of the economy and asset prices; that excessively accommodative monetary policy in the developed economies has led to asset bubbles; that competitive monetary easing is leading to beggar-thy-neighbour policies reminiscent of the Great Depression in the 1930s; that the recent low volatility masks many of the risks; and that not enough is being done in terms of improved regulation.

Rajan should know. He was one of those who predicted the financial crisis. At that time, he had said that among the reasons for the crisis were the skewed incentives for fund managers that led to excessive risk-taking. That hasn’t changed. Nor has the pervasive inequality in the US. Several economists have argued that the lack of growth in real wages was the underlying reason for the explosion of private sector debt that led to the financial crisis, as debt was substituted for income. The International Monetary Fund has warned that housing markets are once again getting overheated in several countries.

There have been half-hearted attempts at regulation, but it’s far from enough. The attempt has been to get back to business as usual, by papering over the cracks with money. As the Bank for International Settlements pointed out in its annual report last year, the role of accommodative monetary policy was to buy time to put reforms in place. Instead, it warned, “The time has not been well used, as continued low interest rates and unconventional policies have made it easy for the private sector to postpone deleveraging, easy for the government to finance deficits, and easy for the authorities to delay needed reforms in the real economy and in the financial system. After all, cheap money makes it easier to borrow than to save, easier to spend than to tax, easier to remain the same than to change.”

The worry is the bubbles seem to be getting larger and larger and we are still to recover from the bursting of the last one. And after using up all available ammunition on tackling the current crisis, how will the world deal with another bust?

Will the central banks be able to engineer a soft landing? The history of serial booms and busts casts serious doubts about that. Indeed, if history is any guide, the Chinese Communist Party’s record of steering its economy to a soft landing is much better than that of Western governments and central banks, although whether they will be able to handle their current crisis remains to be seen. The silver lining, if one may call it that, is that there is often a gap between the first warnings and the final bursting of a bubble. For instance, some had cautioned as early as 2004 that a bubble was in the making. And Raghuram Rajan’s famous warning at Jackson Hole was made in August 2005, two years before the crisis hit.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr. Manas Chakravarty in the Mint Newspaper dated 11-08-2014)

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BUSINESS CASE FOR ANTICORRUPTION

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Efforts on anti-corruption has taken a front seat
for the past couple of years. The beginning of 1990s saw several
international organisations introducing anti-corruption instruments to
make the functioning of businesses clean. With globalisation and
business opportunities spread across the globe, companies have to follow
the norms of several countries. Strong anti-corruption rules of USA and
Britain has led many companies to introduce anti-graft initiatives in
their working. However, India still lags behind.

In the recently
published Ease for Business Index (2014) constituted by the World Bank,
India ranked 134 amongst 189 nations in the world (the lower bottom),
indicating that India is an investment / business averse country. Ease
for Business Index takes into account, procedures of obtaining licenses,
permits, tax regulations and infrastructure facilities. Lack of
transparency and accountability shrouds all the above procedures.

Though
India is trying to address the issue of corruption by making
legislative changes, ratifying international conventions and adopting
technology in its administrative functioning, merely rules and
regulations will not address the issue. It is important that the
business stakeholders are committed and come together to participate in
the fight against corruption.

Business Case for Anti-corruption

A
recent report of Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), a leading consultancy
firm, mentions that increasingly companies have recognised “corruption”
as a major threat to their business.

• 63% of the companies indicate that they have experienced corruption.

• 39% of the businesses have lost important bids due to corrupt officers.


Corruption leads to the damage of the brand name. Correspondingly,
companies have reported that having an anti-graft programme has a great
chance of enhancing the brand name.

• The report goes as far as
mentioning that the total money that a company spends on legal,
financial and regulatory suits due to corruption is much less compared
to the reputational damage (brand) which is done to the organisation.

• 43% of the companies do not enter a particular market which is highly vulnerable to corruption.

Risks of not engaging in the anti-corruption initiatives
• Criminal prosecution (heavy cost to the company)
• Exclusion from bidding processes
• No legal remedies in case the company increases the
cost of the materials
• Damage to reputation, brand and share price
• Regulatory censure
• Cost of corrective action
• Demotivated employees
• Uneven market, loss of business opportunities
• Policy-makers responding by adopting tougher and more rigid laws and regulations (domestic, national and international)

Benefits of introducing anti-corruption initiatives in the companies:


With strong anti-corruption mechanism in a company, the organisation
saves on legal suits. Further, it also attracts new companies through
rigorous business integrity policies.
• Business attracts investments from ethically oriented investors.
• Employee retention and morale of the employee increases as hard work will be the key criteria for progress of the employees.
• Increase productivity by means of a motivated workforce.
• Business can obtain a competitive advantage of becoming a preferred choice of customers, through positive branding.
• Together, businesses can create a level playing field.
• Business collaboration on anti-corruption initiatives influences positive rules and regulations.

Global
Compact Network India, is one of the local networks of UN Global
Compact; a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed
to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally
accepted principles in the area of Human Rights, Labour, Environment and
Anti-Corruption. The 10th principle of UNGC is holistically dedicated
to fight against Anti-corruption in all its form. Furthering the 10th
principle Collective Action Project India provided a platform for
anti-corruption dialogue between private and public sector and
incentivise ethical behavior of businesses. The project in a phased out
manner has taken up pressing corruption issues in the Indian context, in
the spheres of public procurement, bribery and fraud, and supply chain
transparency and sustainability in India.

In the past three
years, since Collective Action was launched in India in 2011, one of the
significant achievements of GCNI has been creation of a platform for
dialogue and deliberation; with an equal number of participants from
public sector, private sector, business associations and SMEs. GCNI has
also been successful in making the businesses take notice about the
merits of adoption of international instruments, one of them being
Integrity Pact (to achieve transparency in procurement). From a time
when discussing corruption was a taboo to a time when talking and
tackling corruption is seen as a sign of sustainable business, GCNI, in a
short duration, has achieved much more than its anticipated goal of
creating awareness about graft.

In its first series of pan-India
consultation conducted during 2010-2011 titled Ethical Business for
profitability, GCNI partnered with academicians, civil society, chambers
of commerce, international business councils to share their best
practices which are being followed in various sectors. Mr. J. F. Ribeiro,
former Supercop, speaking at the Seminar in Mumbai pointed out the
importance of the topic and highlighted the need to understand and
analyse the different ethical dilemmas that companies face today,
especially with relation to corruption. Mr. N. Vittal, Former
Central Vigilance Commissioner delivering the keynote address in Chennai
emphasised that policies based on ethics, of any business, would mean
that they are legal, fair and open to public scrutiny. Any company which
does not practice such a policy is most likely to face contempt and
ridicule at some point or the other. Seminar participants in all four
cities (Mumbai, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkatta) unanimously confirmed that
business can attract and retain talent if they are branded as an ethical
business today.

In the second series of pan-India consultation
conducted between 2011-2012 titled Turning Down the Demand and Cutting
off the Supply saw increased participation from private sector and small
and medium sector enterprises (SMEs). The main aim of second series of
consultations was to know about innovated ways in which corruption could
be tackled and some of the ground realities which are not factored in
while constructing Anti-Corruption policies. Corporate Fraud triangle
was explored so that efforts could be made at all levels through
Collective Action.

In
conclusion, ‘Collective Action’ is a collaborative and sustained
process of cooperation among stakeholders. It increases the impact and
credibility of individual action, brings vulnerable individual players
into an alliance of likeminded organisations and levels the playing
field between competitors. Collective action besides representing big
private and public sector organisations also leverage equal
representation to the Medium/Small scale enterprises who despite being
major contributor to the Nation’s income fail to convey the issues and
challenges faced by them and thus become more prone to corrupt
practices.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19 dated 11th August, 2014

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Liberalised Remittance Scheme for resident individuals-clarification

This circular states that banks are no longer required to report remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for acquisition of immovable property outside India because as per A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 17th July, 2014 facility under LRS can be used for acquisition of immovable property outside India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18 dated 30th July, 2014

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Constitution of Special Investigating Team – sharing of information

This circular advices Authorised Persons to ensure that all information/documents as and when required by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) are made available to them.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17 dated 28th July, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Review of all-in-cost ceiling

This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue till 31st December, 2014: –

The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling/processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16 dated 28th July, 2014

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Trade Credits for Imports into India – Review of all-in-cost ceiling

This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for trade credits, as mentioned below, will continue till 31st December, 2014:


The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling/processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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TS-482-ITAT-2014(Mum) GECF Asia Limited vs. DDIT A.Y: 2007-08, Dated: 06.08.2014

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Services such as accounting and legal support, sales and marketing, human resource services etc rendered from own knowledge and experience without imparting the know-how/experience to the other person does not constitute royalty under the India-Thailand Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ).

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a Thailand tax resident, entered into a master agreement with Indian company (I Co) to provide various services such as accounting and finance support, legal and compliance services, sales and marketing services, etc.

The Taxpayer filed NIL return for the relevant assessment year on the ground that the income accrued to him on account of above services qualifies as business income and the same cannot be taxed under Article 7 of India–Thailand DTAA in the absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

The Tax Authority, in its draft order, held that the fee received by the taxpayer from I Co qualifies as fees for technical services (FTS) under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act) and alternatively such fee would also fall within the definition of “royalty” under the India – Thailand DTAA . Thus such income would be taxable in India.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer filed its objections before the Dispute resolution panel (DRP). However, the DRP also concluded that the fee received by the Taxpayer is for providing industrial, commercial or scientific experience and, hence, the fee constituted “Royalty” under the DTAA , and hence it would be taxable in India. Aggrieved the Taxpayer appealed to the Tribunal.

Held:
Royalty is defined under India-Thailand DTAA to include payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. Consideration for information concerning industrial, commercial, scientific experience to be regarded as royalty should allude to the concept of knowhow. There should be an element of imparting of know-how to the other, so that the other person can use or has right to use such knowhow.

If services are being rendered simply as an advisory or consultancy, then it cannot be termed as “royalty”, because the advisor or consultant is not imparting his skill or experience to other, but rendering his services from his own knowhow and experience. All that he imparts is a conclusion or solution that draws from his own experience.

If there is no “alienation” or the “use of” or the “right to use of” any knowhow i.e., there is no imparting or transfer of any knowledge, experience or skill or knowhow, then it cannot be termed as “royalty”.

The services may have been rendered by a person from own knowledge and experience but such knowledge and experience has not been imparted to the other person as the person retains the experience and knowledge or knowhow with himself, which are required to perform the services to its clients. In principle, if the services have been rendered de– hors the imparting of knowhow or transfer of any knowledge, experience or skill, then such services will not fall within the ambit of royalty.

Accordingly, the matter was restored back to Tax Authority to examine the nature of services based on the above principles.

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International Taxation-Recent Developments in USA

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In this Article, we have given information about
the recent significant developments in USA in the sphere of
international taxation. Since many Indian Corporates have substantial
business interests in and dealings with USA, we hope the readers would
find this information useful. This will help to create awareness about
impending important changes in law and practices in USA.

1. IRS issues FATCA guidance and final FFI agreement for foreign financial institutions

The
US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued Revenue Procedure 2014-13
to provide guidance to foreign financial institutions (FFIs) entering
into FFI agreements directly with the IRS to be treated as participating
FFIs under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act(FAT CA). Revenue
Procedure 2014-13 also provides guidance to FFIs and branches of FFIs
treated as reporting financial institutions under an applicable Model 2
inter governmental agreement (IGA) (reportingModel2FFIs) on complying
with the terms of the FFI agreement, as modified by the Model 2 IGA.

Revenue
Procedure 2014-13 includes a final FFI agreement for participating FFIs
and for reporting Model 2 FFIs. The FFI agreement finalises the draft
FFI agreement that was released on 29th October, 2013 as section V of
IRS Notice 2013-69.

Revenue Procedure 2014-13 states that the
FFI agreement generally does not apply to a reporting Model 1 FFI, or
any branch of such an FFI, unless the reporting Model 1 FFI has
registered a branch located outside of a Model 1 IGA jurisdiction so
that such branch may be treated as a participating FFI or reporting
Model 2 FFI. In such a case, the terms of the applicable FFI agreement
apply to the operations of such branch.

Revenue Procedure 2014-13 is effective on 1st January ,2014.

2. Public comments requested on source of income from sales of natural resources and other inventory

The
US IRS and the Treasury Department have issued a notice requesting
comments on the existing regulations (TD8687) that provide rules for
allocating and apportioning income from sales of natural resources or
other inventory produced in the United States and sold outside the
United States or produced outside the United States and sold in the
United States. The regulations were issued u/s. 863 of the US Internal
Revenue Code (IRC).

Under the regulations, gross receipts equal
to fair market value of natural resources at the export terminal are
allocated to the location of the farm, mine, well, deposit, or uncut
timber, with the source of gross receipt from such sales in excess of
the product’s fairmarket value at the export terminal allocated to the
country of sale.

The regulations also provide rules for
allocating and apportioning income from inventory sales other than
natural resources where the taxpayer produces property in the United
States and sells outside the United States, or produces property outside
the United States and sells in the United States. Such income is
treated in part as USsource income and in part as foreign-source income
under one of the three methods described in the regulations: the 50/50
method, the independent factory price method, and the books and records
method.

The information collected under the regulations issued
by the IRS to determine on audit whether the tax payer has properly
determined the source of its income from export sales.

3. Updated IRS Publication 80 issued–Federal Tax Guide for Employers in US possessions

The
US IRS has released the revised IRS Publication 80, Circular SS
(Federal Tax Guide for Employers in US Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands). The
publication is dated 17th December, 2013 and is intended for use in
preparing 2014 tax returns.

Publication 80 provides information
for employers whose principal place of business is US Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI), or who have employees subject to income tax withholding
in these US possessions. Publication 80 notes that employers and
employees in these jurisdictions are generally subject to US social
security and Medicare taxes under the US Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA), and summarises employer responsibilities to collect, pay,
and report these taxes. Additionally, Publication 80 provides employers
in the US Virgin Islands with a summary of the irresponsibilities under
the US Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA ).

Revised Publication 80 provides information on new rules, including:

– The social security wage base limit (ceiling) for 2014 is $117, 000

– The social security tax rate remains 6.2% for each of the employer and employee;

– The Medicare tax rate remains 1.45%for each of the employer and employee;


Beginning 1st January, 2014, any entity assigned an employer
identification number (EIN) must file IRS Form8 822-B (Change of Address
or Responsible Party—Business) to report the change in the identity of
its responsible party; and

– IRS Notice 2013-61 provides special
administrative procedures for claims for refund or adjustments of over
payments of social security and Medicare taxes resulting from
recognition of certain same-sex marriages

Revised Publication 80 also provides reminders, including:


Employers are required to withhold an Additional Medicare tax of 0.9%
from wages paid to an employee in excess of $ 200,000 in a calendar
year;
– The IRS will not assert that an employer has understated
liability for FICA taxes by reason of a failure to treat services
performed before 1st January, 2015 in the CNMI by residents of the
Philippines as “employment” u/s. 3121(b)of the USIRC; and
– CNMI government employees are subject to social security and Medicare taxes beginning in the fourth quarter of 2012.

Publication 80 includes a calendar with the due dates for the IRS filing requirements.
In addition, Publication 80 refers to other IRS publications that are relevant in this context, Including:

– P ublication 15, Circular E (Employer’s Tax Guide) for information on US federal income tax withholding;
– P ublication 509 (Tax Calendars); and

P ublication 570 (Tax Guide for Individuals With Income From US
Possessions) for information on the self-employed tax. Publication 80 is
available on the IRS website.

4. IRS publishes quarterly list of individuals who have expatriated: Q2/2014

The
US IRS published on 7th August, 2014 a quarterly notice with a list of
US citizens and long-term US residents (green cardholders) who have
renounced their citizenship or resident status for tax avoidance
purposes.

The notice is dated 18th July, 2 014, and is based on
information that the US Treasury Department received during the quarter
ending 30th June, 2014.

The notice is required u/s. 6039G of the
USIRC. The list contains the name of each individual losing US
citizenship or long-term resident status within the meaning of IRC
sections 877(a) or 877A, dealing with the tax treatment of individuals
who are deemed to have expatriated from the United States for tax
avoidance purposes.

5 Public comments requested on treatment of compensatory stock options under transfer pricing rules

The us irs and the us treasury department have is- sued a notice requesting comments on information collection requirements imposed by the existing final regulations (td9088) dealing with the treatment of compensatory stock options under the transfer pricing rules of section 482 of the us IRC. the notice was published in the federal register on 7th august, 2014.

The final regulations, which were issued on 26th August, 2003, provide guidance on the treatment of stock-based compensation for purposes of the transfer pricing rules governing qualified cost sharing arrangements and for purposes of the comparability factors to be considered under the comparable profits method.

The final regulations adopted with modifications the proposed regulations (reG-106359-02 ) issued on this subject on 29th july, 2002. the irs requested that comments be submitted no later than 6th october, 2014. The mailing address and other contact information are given in the notice.

6.    IRS updates FAQs on FATCA registration System

The  us  irs  has  released  updated  frequently  asked Questions  (FAQs)  on  the  FATCA under  the  heading  of FATCA registration system. the FAQs indicate a last reviewed or updated date of 1st august, 2014.

The fAQs provide guidance on the following topics:
–    FATCA registration system–overview;
–    registration system resource materials;
–    General system questions;
–    fatCa account creation and access;
–    Registration status and account notifications;
–    Expanded Affiliated Groups (EAG);
–    registration updates;
–    sponsoring entity;
–    ffi list;
–    paper registrations;
–    Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN)–
overview; and
–    GIIN format.
The update is made by adding:
–    Question 1 to the topic, fatCa account creation and access;
–    Questions 6 and 7 to the topic, registration status and account notifications; and
–    Question 7 to the topic, registration updates.

The IRS notes that additional fAQs are available for the FATCa–FAQs General (last reviewed or updated on 29th july, 2014) and fAtCa FFI list (last reviewed or updated on 1st august, 2014).

7.    IRS updates FAQs on FATCa FFI List

The  us  irs  has  released  updated  frequently  asked Questions  (fAQs)  on  the  fatCa under  the  heading  of irs ffi list fAQs. the fAQs indicate a last reviewed or updated date of 1st august, 2014.

The FFI list is a list that is issued by irs and that includes all financial institutions and branches that have submitted a registration and have been assigned a Global interme- diary Identification Number (GIIN).

The fAQs provide guidance on the following topics:
–    FFI list overview;
–    registration deadline;
–    FFI List fields;
–    FFI list;
–    downloading;
–    searching;
–    legal entity name; and
–    XML/CSV files.

Rhe  update  is  made  by  adding  questions  1  and  2  to the  topic,  ffi  list,  and  adding  question  2  to  the  topic, searching.

8.    IRS further updates countries with residence waiver for foreign earned income exclusion for 2013

The  us  irs  released announcement  2014-28  on  30th july, 2014 to update the list of foreign countries for which the residence requirement for the us foreign earned income exclusion u/s. 911 of the us irC can be waived for 2013 due to adverse conditions that prevented the normal conduct of business. the original list for 2013 was provided in revenue procedure 2014-25.

Announcement 2014-28 adds south sudan, effective for departure on or after 17th december, 2013.

IRC section 911 permits qualified individuals to exclude a limited amount of foreign earned income ($97, 600 for 2013, see united states-5, news 23rd october, 2012) from us taxation and to claim an exclusion or deduction for certain foreign housing costs if a foreign residence re- quirement is met.

The  residence  requirement  can  be  waived  for  an  indi- vidual who left the listed countries on or after the stated departure date if:

–    There are adverse conditions, such as war, civil un- rest, or similar conditions, that prevent the normal con- duct of business in the countries; and

–    The individual can establish a reasonable expectation of meeting the residence requirement but for the ad- verse conditions.

9.    IRS issues revised instructions  for  requesters  of withholding certificates (Forms W-8) to implement FATCA

The US IRD has released revised irs instructions for the requester of forms W-8Ben, W-8eCi, W-8eXp, and W- 8imy to implement the fatCa. the instructions are dated 16th july, 2014.

The revised instructions supplement the instructions for the following forms:

–    Form W-8BEN (Certificate of Foreign Status of Ben- eficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding (Indi- viduals));

–    Form W-8BEN-E (Certificate of Status of Beneficial owner for united states tax Withholding and reporting (entities));

–    FormW-8ECI (Certificate of Foreign Person’s Claim that income is effectively Connected With the Conduct of a trade or Business in the united states);

–    FormW-8EXP (Certificate of Foreign Government or other foreign organisation for united states tax Withholding); and

–    Form W-8IMY (Certificate of Foreign Intermediary, foreign flow-through entity, or Certain us Branches for united states tax Withholding).

A withholding agent or a foreign financial institution (FFI) may need to request, and obtain, a withholding certificate (i.e., form W-8series) in order to:

–    establish the status of a payee or an account holder under chapter 4 of the us irC (dealing with the fat- Ca provisions)or the payee’s status under irC chapter 3 (dealing with the regular withholding on us-source income paid to foreign persons); or
–    Validate a payee’s or an account holder’s claim of for- eign status when there are us indicia associated with the payee or the account.

The revised instructions provide, for each form, notes to assist withholding agents and ffis invalidating the forms for chapters 3 and 4 purposes. The revised instructions also outline the due diligence requirements applicable to withholding agents for establishing a beneficial owner’s foreign status and claim for reduced withholding under an income tax treaty.

10.    Guidance issued on FTC limitations for foreign asset acquisitions

The IRS and the us treasury department have issued notice 2014-44 to announce their intention to issue regulations addressing the limitations of foreign tax credits (FTCs) related to certain foreign asset acquisitions u/s. 901(m) of the irC. notice 2014-44 was released on 21st july, 2014.

FTCs may be limited by IRC section 901(M)if the FTCs result from certain foreign asset acquisitions, referred to as “covered asset acquisitions” (Caas), in connec- tion with which taxpayers may elect to claim a higher tax basis in the “relevant foreign assets” (RFAS) for us tax purposes than for foreign tax purposes. as a result of the difference, the amount of taxable gain from the rfas, and potentially the tax, is higher in the foreign jurisdiction than in the united states.

IRC  section  901(m)  disallows  the  portion  of  the  ftC (the”disqualifiedportion”) that is attributable to the tax basis difference in the rfas to the extent the basis dif- ference is allocated to the taxable year. The disqualified portion of any ftC is allowed as a deduction. irC section 901(m)(3)(B)(i) allocates the basis difference to taxable years using the applicable cost recovery method for us income tax purposes.

IRC section 901(m)(3)(B)(ii) provides that, if there is a dis- position of an rfa, the basis difference allocated to the taxable year of the disposition (the “dispositionamount”) is the remaining (i.e., unallocated) basis difference, and no basis difference will be allocated to any subsequent taxable years (the “statutory disposition rule”).

To prevent taxpayers from avoiding the purpose of irC section 901(m) by invoking the statutory disposition rule, notice 2014-44 provides that, for purposes of section 901(m), a disposition means an event (for example, a sale, abandonment, or mark-to-market event) that results in gain or loss being recognised with respect to an rfa for purposes ofus income tax or a foreign income tax, or both. Notice 2014-44 clarifies that a disposition does not occur from a tax-free deemed liquidation that arises when an acquired foreign target corporation makes an entity classification election to become a disregarded entity for us tax purposes under the us check-the-box regulations.

Notice 2014-44 applies two separate rules for determin- ing the disposition amount, depending on whether or not the disposition is fully taxable for both us and foreign income tax purposes. in addition, notice 2014-44 contains special rules with re- gard to a Caa that is an acquisition of an interest in a partnership that has an election in effect under irC section 754, i.e., an election that permits the inside tax basis of partnership assets to be increased under irC section 743 following the acquisition of an interest in the partnership. notice 2014-44 also provides that IRC section 901(m) continues to apply to an rfa until the entire basis difference in the rfa has been taken into account using the applicable cost recovery method or as a disposition amount (or both), regardless of a change in the ownership of an RFA.

The rules provided in notice 2014-44 will generally apply to dispositions occurring on or after 21st july, 2014, subject to exceptions described in section 5 of the notice.

11.    Joint Committee on Taxation issues report on proposal store form taxation of multinational corporations

The  joint  Committee  on  taxation  of  the  us  Congress (JCT) has released a report on recent proposal store form the us taxation of multinational corporations.

The report is entitled present law and Background re- lated to proposals to reform the taxation of income of multinational enterprises. the report is dated 21st july, 2014, and is designated jCX-90-14.

The report includes the following:
–    a description of present us tax law applicable to in- bound investment (the us activities of foreign persons) and outbound investment (the foreign activities of uspersons);
–    a description of current policy concerns related to the taxation of multinational corporations;
–    Background on recent global activity related to the taxation of cross-border income; and
–    descriptions and a comparison of recent proposal store form the us international taxs ystem.

The report was prepared in connection with a public hear- ing that the us senate Committee on finance held on 22nd july, 2014 with regard to the taxation of cross-bor- der income.

12.    Final regulations issued regarding information re- porting by US passport applicants

The us treasury department and the irs have issued final regulations (td9679) to provide guidance on information reporting rules for certain individuals that apply for us passports (including renewals) u/s. 6039e of the us IRC. The final regulations were published in the Federal register on 18th july, 2014.

IRC section 6039e requires individuals applying for permanent residence (i.e., a green card) in the united states or for a us passport to include certain tax information in their applications. the us federal agency, to which the applica- tion is made, must provide such information to the IRS.

On 24th december, 1992, proposed regulations (intl- 978-86,reG-208274-86) were issued with guidance for both passport and permanent residence applicants to comply with information reporting rules under irC section 6039e. the 1992 proposed regulations also indicated the responsibilities of the specified US Federal agencies to provide certain information to the irs.

On 26th january, 2012, new proposed regulations (reG- 208274-86, rin1545-aj93) were issued to withdraw the 1992 proposed regulations and to provide guidance on information  reporting  by  passport  applicants.  the  2012 proposed regulations did not provide rules for information reporting by applicants for permanent residence. The final regulations adopt the 2012 proposed regulations with minor revisions.

The final regulations provide that a passport applicant, other than an applicant for an official passport, diplomatic passport, or passport for use on other official US government business, must provide his or her full name (including previous name, if applicable), permanent address and, if different, mailing address, tax payer identification number (TIN), and date of birth. a penalty of $ 500 may be imposed for non-compliance.

The final regulations further provide that a passport appli- cant who fails to provide the required information has 60 days (90 days for an applicant outside the united states) from the date of the irs’s written notice of the potential penalty assessment to respond to the notice if the appli- cant wishes to avoid the penalty. the applicant must do this by establishing that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.

The final regulations are designated Treasury Regula- tion section 301-6039e-1. they are effective on 18th july, 2014, and apply to passport applications submitted after 18th july, 2014.

13.    Final regulations issued regarding source rules for allocation and apportionment of interest expenses

The us treasury department and the irs have issued final regulations (td9676) to provide guidance on the allocation and apportionment of interest expenses between us and foreign sources u/s. 861 and 864(e) of the us IRC. The final regulations were published in the Federal register on 16th july, 2014.

The final regulations provide guidance on a number of is- sues, including the allocation and apportionment of interest expenses by corporations and individuals that own a 10% or greater interest in a partnership, as well as rules for valuing debt and stock of related persons. The final regulations also update the interest allocation regulations to conform to the statutory amendments regarding the al- location and apportionment of interest expenses by us corporate groups that include certain affiliated foreign cor- porations for purposes of irC section 864(e).

IRC section 864(e) provides that interest expenses of us corporate groups are to be allocated and apportioned between us and foreign sources as if all members of the group were a single corporation, and further that such allocation and apportionment are to be made on the basis of the assets of the corporate group (i.e., us and foreign) rather than on the basis of the gross income of the group. the amended irC section 864(e)(5)(a) treats a qualifying foreign corporation as a member of a US affiliated group for interest allocation purposes, and thus all the assets and interest expenses of the foreign member are taken into account, if specified 80% stock ownership and 50% us gross income/effectively Connected income (ECI) requirements are met.

The final regulations adopt, with no substantive change, the temporary regulations (td9571) issued on 17th january, 2012, as well as the portions of the earlier temporary regulations (td8228), issued on 14th september, 1988, that were not amended by the 2012 temporary regulations.

The final regulations amend provisions within Treasury regulation sections 1.861-9, -9t, -11, and-11t.

The final regulations are effective on 16th July, 2014, and generally apply to taxable years beginning on or after 16th july, 2014.

14.    IRS issues Memorandum on withholding on pay- ments to beneficial owner that fails to file income tax returns

The Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS has issued a memorandum that discusses the us withholding consequences of a beneficial owner’s failure to file US income tax returns after claiming a withholding exemption for us effectively connected income.

In the facts of the Memorandum, a Beneficial Owner (BO) provided a Withholding agent (WA) with irs formW-8eCi (Certificate of Foreign Person’s Claim That Income Is Effectively Connected With the Conduct of a trade or Busi- ness in the united states) to claim an exemption from us withholding tax on payments of income effectively con- nected with the conduct of a us trade or business (eCi). the Wa did not withhold on the payments made to the Bo in reliance on the form W-8eCI.

The BO certified in the FormW-8ECI that the amounts re- lated to the claim of exemption were ECI and were includible in the us gross income. the formW-8eCI includes a note that “Persons submitting this form must file an an- nual us income tax return to report income claimed to be effectively connected with a us trade or business.” the BO, however, did not file a US income tax return for any of the taxable years at issue.

Sections 1441 and 1442 of the irC require a withholding agent to withhold 30% of US-source fixed or determin- able, annual, or periodical (fdap) income paid to a foreign person. irC section 1441(c)(1), however, exempts withholding for eCi that is included in the gross income of the recipient. the consequence of this procedure is that the foreign person reports the eCi on a us income tax return and computes us income tax liability on a net in- come basis (i.e., gross income less allowable deductions) using the regular progressive us income tax rates rather than computing US tax liability at a flat 30% rate (or lower treaty rate) on the gross amount of the payment.

Under treasury regulation (treas. reg.) section 1.1441- 7(b)(1), a withholding agent may rely on a claim of exemption  contained  in formW-8eCi,  but a withholding  agent that receives a valid formW-8eCi must still withhold if it has actual knowledge or reason to know that the claim of exemption is incorrect.

The memorandum concludes that, because the BO made a claim of exemption for ECI and failed to file US tax

Returns including such amounts in gross income, the irs can determine the claim to be “incorrect” and provide direct notification to the WA under Treas. Reg. section 1.1441-7(b)(1) that it cannot rely on the Bo’s claim of exemption. the memorandum further states that the Wa will not be able to rely on the Bo’s claim of exemption beginning on the date that is 30 calendar days after the Wa receives such a notification, as described in Treas. Reg. section 1.1441-7(b)(1).

The  memorandum  is  designated  ilm201428007.  the memorandum is dated 7th may, 2014, and indicates are lease date of 11th july, 2014.

15.    IRS updates FaQs on general FATCA issues

The  us  irs  has  released  updated  frequently  asked Questions  (faQs)  on  the  FATCA  under  the  heading of  FATCA–fAQs  General.  the  fAQs  indicate  a  last reviewed or updated date of 10th july, 2014.

The  updated  fAQs  provide  guidance  on  the  following topics:

–    Qualified Intermediaries (QIs)/Withholding foreign partnerships(Wps)/Withholding foreign trusts (Wts);
–    inter Governmental agreement (iGa) registration;
–    Expanded Affiliated Groups (EAGs);
–    sponsoring/sponsoredentities;
–    Responsible  Officers  (ROs)  and  Points  Of Contact
(POCS);
–    financial institutions (FIS)
–    Exempt beneficial owners;
–    non-financial foreign entities (NFFES);
–    registration updates;
–    Branches/disregarded entities;
–    FFI and AGG changes;
–    General compliance;
–    additional supports; and
–    FATCA registration system technical supports.

The  update  was  made  with  regard  to  NFFES,  FFI  and EAG changes, and registration updates.

16.    IRS issues instructions to withholding certificate for foreign entities (FormW-8BEN-E) for FATCA

The us irs has released irs instructions for irs formW- 8BEN-E (Certificate of Status of Beneficial Owner for united states tax Withholding and reporting (entities)) to implement the fatCa. the instructions are dated 20th june, 2014.
the irs previously issued the new irs form W-8Ben- E (Certificate of Status of Beneficial Owner for United states  tax  Withholding  and  reporting  (entities))  to  be used by entities.

IRS formW-8Ben-e is used by a foreign entity:

–    To certify its status as a beneficial owner or payee of a payment for purposes of chapter 3 of the us irC (dealing with the regular withholding on income paid to foreign persons);

–    To claim income tax treaty benefits, if applicable, for the purpose of IRC chapter 3;

–    to certify its status under irC chapter 4 (dealing with the fatCa provisions); and

–    to submit to a payment settlement entity (pse) re- questing the form if the entity receives payments that would trigger information reporting for the pse under irC section 6050W (i.e., payments made in settlement of payment card transactions and third-party network transactions) unless the payee is a foreign person.

A foreign entity must furnish irs form W-8Ben-e to the withholding agent or payer when:

–    the  foreign  entity  receives  a  withholdable  payment from a withholding agent;
–    the foreign entity receives a payment subject to chap- ter 3 withholding; and
–    a foreign financial institution (ffi) with which the for- eign entity maintains an account requests the form.

IRS form W-8Ben as in use for 2013 and previous years was completed by both individuals and entity beneficial owners of the income to which the form related. the re- vised 2014 IRS FormW-8BEN (Certificate of Foreign Sta- tus of Beneficial Owner or United States Tax Withholding (individuals)) is for use exclusively by and entities should use the new irs form W-8BEN-E.

17.    IRS revises instructions to Form 1042-S for reporting foreign persons’ US source income to include FATCA requirements

The  us  IRS  has  released  revised  irs  instructions  for form   1042-s   (foreign   person’s   us   source   income subject to Withholding). the instructions are dated 24th june, 2014. the irs previously issued revised irs form 1042-s. irs Form 1042-S has been modified to accommodate report- ing of payments and amounts withheld under chapter 4 of the us IRC, commonly known as the fatCa, in addition to those amounts required to be reported under irC chap- ter 3. IRC chapter 3 deals with the regular withholding on US-source income paid to foreign persons, including fixed or determinable annual or periodical (fdap) income.

When a financial institution reports a payment made to its financial account, IRS Form 1042-S also requires the reporting of additional information about a recipient of the payment, such as the recipient’s account number, date of birth, and foreign tax payer identification number, ifany. For withholding agents, intermediaries, flow-through entities, and recipients, irs form 1042-s requires that the chapter 3 status (or classification) and/or the chapter 4 status be reported on the form according to codes provided in the instructions.

In addition, IRS Form 1042-2 must be filed to report specified Federal procurement payments made to foreign persons that are subject to withholding under IRC section 5000C and to report distributions of us effectively Connected income (ECI) by a publicly traded partnership or nominee.

18.    IRS issues instructions for FATCA reporting form

The  us  IRS  has  released  IRS  instructions  for  form 8966  (fatCa report).  the  instructions  are  dated  20th june, 2014.

The irs previously issued new irs form 8966. irs form 8966 is required to be filed under chapter 4 of the US IRC, commonly referred to as the FATCA, to report information with respect to certain us accounts, substantial us owners  of  passive  non-financial  foreign  entities  (nffes), us accounts held by owner-documented foreign financial institutions (FFIS), and certain other accounts as applicable based on the filer’s chapter 4 status.

Filers of irs form 8966 include a participating FFI (PFFI), a us branch of a PFFI that is not treated as a us person, a registered deemed-Compliant (RDC) ffi (including a reporting model 1 FFI), a limited branch or limited ffi, a reporting Model 2 FFI, a Qualified Intermediary (QI), a Withholding foreign partnership (Wp), a Withhold- ing  foreign  trust  (Wt),  a  direct  reporting  nffe,  and  a sponsoring entity. for calendar years 2015 and 2016, irs form 8966 is also filed by PFFIs, RDCFFIs, and reporting Model 2 FFIs to report certain amounts paid to their account holders that are non-participating ffis.

The initial filing of IRS Form 8966 will be required to be made on or before 31st march, 2015 for the 2014 calen- dar year.

19.    IRS releases addendum to user guide for FATCA online registration

The us IRS has released publication 5118a (addendum to the fatCa online registration user Guide). the addendum is dated july, 2014.

The addendum serves as a supplement to, and should be  used  in  conjunction  with,  publication  5118  (FATCA online   registration   user   Guide,   rev.12-2013).   the user  guide  provides  instructions  for  using  the  FATCA registration system to complete the fatCa registration process online.

The  addendum  describes  new  functionality  introduced since the last revision of the use rguide. Specifically, the addendum updates 6.6 appendix e: Country look up table of the user guide (pages 116 through 121) by adding the West Bank and Gaza (numeric Code: 275).

20 IRS announces changes to its offshore voluntary compliance programmes

The us irs has announced major changes in its off shore voluntary compliance programmes that will allow a broader group of us tax payers to participate so that they can come into compliance with their us tax obligations. The announcement was made in an irs news release (IR- 2014-73) dated 18th june, 2014. the irs Commissioner has also issued a statement dated 18th june, 2014.

The  changes  include  an  expansion  of  the  streamlined filing compliance procedures announced in 2012 and modifications to the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure program(oVdp).

Expansion of streamlined filing compliance procedures the expanded streamlined procedures are intended for us tax payers whose failure to disclose their offshore assets was non-wilful.

The changes to the streamlined procedures include:

–    extending eligibility to include us taxpayers residing in the united states, in addition to us taxpayers resid- ing broad;

–    eliminating a requirement that the taxpayer have usd 1,500 or less of unpaid tax per year;

–    eliminating the required risk questionnaire; and

–    requiring the taxpayer to certify that previous failures to comply were due to non-willful conduct.

Modifications to OVDP

The modified OVDP is designed to cover US taxpayers whose failure to comply with reporting requirements is considered willful in nature, and who therefore do not qualify for the streamlined procedures.

The modifications to the 2012 OVDP include:

–    Requiring additional information from taxpayers apply- ing for the programme;

–    Eliminating the reduced 5% and 12.5% penalties for certain non-wilful taxpayers in light of the expansion of the streamlined procedures;

–    Requiring taxpayers to submit all account statements and pay the offshore penalty at the time of the oVdp application;

–    Enabling an electronic submission of records; and

–    Increasing the offshore penalty from 27.5% to 50% if, before the taxpayer’s OVDP pre-clearance request is submitted, it becomes public that a financial institution where the taxpayer holds an account or another party facilitating the taxpayer’s offshore arrangement is under investigation by the irs or the us department of justice.

Related items
The IRS has also released the following related items:

–    a factsheet (fs-2014-6) with highlights of the irs offshore voluntary programmes since 2009;

–    A factsheet (FS-2014-7)with tax filing information for us taxpayers with offshore accounts; and
–    OVDP documents and forms.

Results of offshore evoluntary programmes

The  IRS  notes  that  its  three  voluntary  programmes  in 2009, 2011, and 2012 have resulted in more than 45,000 disclosures and the collection of approximately USD6.5 billion in taxes, interest and penalties.

21.    IRS releases guidance on options for US taxpay- ers with undisclosed foreign financial assets

The us IRS has issued guidance on options for us tax- payers who have previously failed to comply with us tax and information return obligations with respect to their non-us bank accounts and other foreign investments. the guidance indicates a last reviewed or updated date of 18 june 2014.

The guidance includes the following options:

–    the 2012 offshore Voluntary disclosure program (oVdp);

–    streamlined filing compliance procedures;

–    delinquent fBar submission procedures; and

–    delinquent international information return submission procedures.

The OVDP is specifically designed for taxpayers with ex- posure to potential criminal liability and/or substantial civil penalties due to a wilful failure to report foreign financial assets and pay all tax due in respect of those assets. The OVDP is designed to provide such taxpayers with protection from criminal liability and sets out the terms for resolving their civil tax and penalty obligations.
The streamlined filing compliance procedures are available to taxpayers who certify that their failure to report foreign financial assets and pay all tax due in respect of  those  assets  did  not  result  from  wilful  conduct.  the streamlined procedures are designed to provide such tax- payers with a streamlined procedure for filing amended or delinquent returns and set out terms for resolving their tax and penalty obligations.

The   delinquent   FBAR   submission   procedures   are intended for taxpayers who:
–    have not filed a required Report of Foreign Bank and financial accounts (FBAR) (finCen form 114, previously form TD f 90-22.1);
–    are not under a civil examination or a criminal investi- gation by the irs; and
–    have not already been contacted by the irs about the delinquent fBars.

The  delinquent  international  information  return  submis- sion procedures are available to taxpayers who:

–    have not filed one or more required international infor- mation returns;
–    have reasonable cause for not timely filing the infor- mation returns;
–    are not under a civil examination or a criminal investi- gation by the irs; and
–    have not already been contacted by the irs about the delinquent information returns.

For a report on the recent announcement of changes to the 2012 oVdp and the streamlined procedures, see united states-1, news 23rd june, 2014.

22.    Final and proposed regulations issued on IRS Form 5472 reporting requirements

The us treasury department and the irs have issued final regulations (TD9667) and proposed regulations (reG–114942–14) u/s. 6038a and 6038C of the us irC to provide guidance on the requirements to file IRS Form 5472  (information  return  of  a  25%  foreign-owned  us Corporation or a foreign Corporation engaged in a us trade or Business). the form is used by the irs to collect information on transfer pricing transactions between related parties.

IRC section 6038a requires information reporting by a 25% foreignowned domestic corporation  with  respect to certain transactions between such corporation and related parties.

IRC section 6038C imposes a similar reporting requirement on a foreign corporation engaged in a trade or business within the united states.

Final  regulations  (td8353)  were  issued  on  19th  june, 1991 to provide that:
–    a reporting corporation under irC sections 6038a and 6038C is required to file Form 5472 with its US income tax return by the due date of the return with respect to each related party with which the corporation has had any reportable transaction during the taxable year;
–    Such reporting corporation is also required to file a duplicate form 5472 with the irs Centre in philadel- phia, pa (i.e.,the duplicate filing requirement); and
–    if a reporting corporation’s income tax return is not timely filed, Form 5472 nonetheless I required to be filed (with a duplicate to the IRS Centre in Philadel- phia, pa) at the irs Centre where the return is due (i.e.,the untimely filed return provision), and, when the income tax return is ultimately filed, a copy of Form 5472 must be attached to the return.

Temporary  regulations  (TD9529)  were  issued  on  10th June, 2011 to remove the duplicate filing requirement on the ground that advances in electronic processing and data collection in the irs made it no longer necessary.

The new final regulations (TD9667)adopt the 2011 temporary regulations without substantive change as final regulations. The final regulations are designated Treasury regulation (treas.reg.) section 1.6038a-1, and -2. the final regulations are effective on 6th June, 2014.

In addition, the new proposed regulations (reG–114942–14) Eliminate the untimely filed return provision to promote efficient tax administration and consistency with other similar international reporting obligations applicable to us persons. as a result, the proposed regulations require a reporting corporation to file Form 5472 only with its in- come tax return by the duedate (including extensions)of the return.

The  proposed  regulations  are  designated  treas.reg. section 1.6038a-1, -2, and-4. the proposed regulations will apply to taxable years ending on or after the date on which the proposed regulations are published as final.

23.    IRS releases its first list of FATCA compliant financial institutions

The US IRS released the first IRS Foreign Financial Institution (FFI) list. the irs has also issued a related statement dated 2nd june, 2014.

The IRS FFI list is a list of financial institutions (FIS) and other entities (e.g. direct reporting non-financial foreign entities and sponsoring entities) that have completed fatCa registration  with  the  irs  and  obtained  a  Global Intermediary Identification Number(GIIN).

The first FFI List includes FIs in approved status as of 23rd May, 2014. The FFI List is updated on the first day of each month and will only include fis that are approved five business days prior to the first day of the month.

The FFI list search and download tool can be used to look for fis and their branches to determine if they are on the FFI list. the tool can download the entire FFI list or search for a particular fi by its legal name, GIIN,or country. no login or password is required to search or download the ffi list. the results will be displayed on the screen and can be exported in CSV, Xml, or pdf formats.

The IRS previously issued the following related items:

–    publication 5147 (FFI list search and download tool: UserGuide);
–    fatCa FFI  list  resources  and  support  information Webpage; and
–    FFI list frequently asked Questions(fAQs).

24.    Regulations issued to amend FaTCa provisions and coordinate FaTCa regulations with pre-existing tax rules

The  us treasury  department  and  the  IRS  issued  temporary regulations  (TD9657) on 20th february, 2014 to make additions and clarifications to the previously issued regulations on implementation of the FATCA. the treasury department and the irs also issued additional temporary regulations (TD9658) on the same day to provide guidance to coordinate FATCA rules with pre-existing reporting and withholding requirements under other provisions of the us IRC.

The treasury department issued a related press release dated 20th february, 2014, together with a factsheet on the new regulations.

Amendments to prior FATCA regulations

The first regulations (TD9567) contain over 50 amend- ments and clarifications to the previous FATCA regulations that were issued on 17th january, 2013 (TD9610) in response to certain stakeholder comments regarding ways to further reduce compliance burdens. Key changes include those relating to:
–    the  accommodation  of  direct  reporting  to  the  irs, rather than to withholding agents, by certain entities regarding their substantial us owners;
–    the treatment of certain special-purpose debt securi- tisation vehicles;
–    the treatment of disregarded entities as branches of
foreign financial institutions (FFIs); –    The definition of an expanded affiliated group; and
–    transitional rules for collateral arrangements prior to 2017.

Coordination of FATCA with pre-existing reporting and withholding rules

irC chapter 3 contains reporting and withholding rules relating to payments of certain us-source income (e.g. dividends on stock of us corporations) to non-us per- sons. irC chapter 61 and irC section 3406 impose the reporting and withholding requirements for various types of payments made to certain us persons (us non-ex- empt recipients).

the second regulations (td9568) coordinate these pre- fatCa regime with the requirements under fatCa to in- tegrate these rules, reduce burden (including certain du- plicative information reporting obligations), and conform the due diligence, withholding, and reporting rules under these provisions to the extent appropriate. Specifically, the coordinating rules make changes that are intended:

–    to remove inconsistencies in the chapter 3 and fat- Ca documentation requirements relating to the identi- fication of payees (including inconsistencies regarding presumption rules in the absence of valid documenta- tion);
–    to ensure that payments are not subject to withhold- ing under both irC chapter 3 and ftCA, or under both IRC section 3406 and FATCA;
–    to  relieve  non-us  payors  from  chapter  61  report- ing to the extent the non-us payor reports on the account in accordance with the fatCa regulations or an applicable inter governmental agreement (iGa);
–    to provide a limited exception to reporting under irC chapter61 for both us payors and non-us payors that  are  ffis  required  to  report  under  fatCa or  an applicable iGa, with respect to payments that are not subject to withholding under irC chapter 3 or irC section 3406 and that are made to an account holder that is a presumed (but not known) us non-exempt recipient;
–    to  provide  a  limited  exception  from  reporting  under irC chapter 61 for us payors acting as stock transfer agents or paying agents of distributions from certain passive foreign investment companies (PFICS) made to us persons; and
–    to make other conforming changes.
Effective  date:  the  regulations  will  become  effective when published as final

25.    IRS releases Transfer Pricing audit roadmap

The   transfer   pricing   operations   (TPO)of   the   large Business  and  international  (lB  &  I)  division  of  the  us irs  has  released  the  transfer  pricing  audit  roadmap (roadmap)to the public. The irs also issued a statement announcing   the   release   of   the   road   map   on   14th february 2014.

TPO is a dedicated team of transfer pricing specialists that is established by the lB & i of the irs and that encompasses both the advance pricing and mutual agreement program (APMA) and the transfer pricing practice (TTP).

TPO  has  developed  the  road  map  to  provide  the  irs transfer pricing practitioner with audit techniques and tools to assist with the planning, execution, and resolution of transfer pricing examinations. the road map is organised around a notional 24-month audit timeline.
The IRS notes that the road map is not intended as a template, but rather serves as a toolkit that provides recommended audit procedures and links to useful reference material. the road map also provides the public within sight into what to expect during a transfer pricing exami- nation.

The IRS also states that TPO will review the road map and make changes over time as new techniques arise or additional reference materials become available.

[Acknowledgement/Source: We have compiled the above information from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period 01-01-2014 to 09-08-2014]

DCIT vs. Rajeev G. Kalathil ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench Before Rajendra (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM) ITA No. 6727/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 20th August, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: J. K. Garg/Devendra Jain

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Section 28, 37 – Purchases cannot be disallowed, merely because the supplier is treated as a havala dealer by VAT authorities, if receipt of material is substantiated by delivery challan and other evidences and payment is by account payee cheque.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO sent notices u/s. 133(6) to various parties at random. Of these, notices sent to two parties were returned unserved with the remarks not known. The AO asked the assessee to furnish correct address or explain why purchases of Rs. 13,69,417 (Rs. 5,05,259 from NBE and Rs. 8,64,158 from DKE) should not be treated as bogus purchases.

The assessee furnished its reply expressing inability to establish contact with the parties but furnished letter from its banker stating that the payment has been made to the two parties in subsequent year. Sample bills were also filed which had TIN Numbers.

The AO verified the TIN numbers from the official website and found that NBE was specifically mentioned as `Hawala Dealer’ and the search for DKE did not show any result. He, accordingly, added Rs. 13.69 lakh to total income of the assessee on account of bogus purchases.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and contended that suppliers were registered dealers and were carrying proper VAT registration; bills were accounted and payments were made by cheque; certificate from banker giving details of payments made to said parties were furnished; copies of consignment note received from government approved transport contractor showing material was delivered at site were furnished to the AO; some of the items purchased from these parties were reflected in closing stock. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The AO made addition because one of the supplier was declared a havala dealer by VAT Department. According to the Tribunal, this could be a good starting point for making further investigation and to take it to logical end. Suspicion of highest degree cannot take place of evidence. According to the Tribunal, the AO could have called for details of bank accounts of suppliers to find out whether there was any immediate cash withdrawl from their account. It observed that transportation of goods to the site is one of the deciding factors to be considered for resolving the issue. It noted the finding of fact given by CIT(A) that some of the goods received were forming part of closing stock.

The Tribunal held that the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Western Extrusion Industries (ITA /6579/ Mum/2010 dated 13-11-2013) was distinguishable since in that case there was no evidence of movement of goods and also cash was withdrawn by the supplier immediately from the bank.

This ground of appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Raj Kumari Agarwal vs. DCIT ITAT, Agra Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and Joginder Singh (J.M.) I.T.A. No.: 176/Agra/2013 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on July 18th, 2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Arvind Kumar Bansal/S D Sharma

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Section 57(iii) – Interest paid on loan taken against fixed deposit is deductible against interest earned on the fixed deposit.

Facts:
During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the assessee had made a fixed deposit of Rs. 1 crore with abank and earned interest of Rs 11.78 lakh thereon. However, whilecomputing the income from other sources, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 4.37 lakh on account of interest paid on loan of Rs 75 lakh taken on the securityof deposits. When asked to justify this deduction, the assessee submitted that she needed her funds, as she had to give money to her son and with a view toavoid premature encashment of the fixed deposits, which wouldhave resulted in net loss to her, she took a loan against fixed deposit so as to keepthe fixed deposit intact and earn the interest income thereon. It was contended thatthe interest of Rs. 4.37 lakh paid on the borrowings from the Bank against security of fixed deposit, was thus made for the purpose of earning FDR interest. The AO rejected the claim of deduction observing that interest onloan has not been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose ofmaking or earning income from FDR. On appeal the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee also justified her claim with the working showing that she has returned higher interest income of Rs. 7.41 lakh (Rs. 11.78 lakh minus Rs. 4.37 lakh paid) while if she had encashed the FDR then the interest income from FDR would had beenat lower sum of Rs. 5.38 lakh.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the question that needs to be adjudicated was whether interest paid can be said to have been incurred “wholly and exclusively” for the purpose of earning interest income from fixed deposits.For this purpose, it referred to a decision by the coordinate bench of its own Tribunal in the case of AjaySingh Deol vs. JCIT [(91 ITD 196). Relying thereon, it observed that even in a situation in which proximate or immediate cause of an expenditure was an event unconnected to earning of the income, in the sense that the expenditure was not triggered by the objective to earn that income, but the expenditure was, nonetheless, wholly and exclusively to earn or protect that income,it will not cease to be deductible in nature (emphasis supplied). According to it, in order to protect the interest earnings from fixed deposits and to meet her financial needs, when an assessee raises a loan against the fixed deposit, so as to keep the source of earning intact, the expenditure so incurred is wholly and exclusively to earn the fixed deposit interest income. It further observed that the assessee could have gone for premature encashment of bank deposits, and thus ended the source of income itself as well, but instead of doing so, she resorted to borrowings against the fixed deposit and thus preserved the source of earning. The expenditure so incurred, according to the tribunal was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for earning from interest on fixed deposits.

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ACIT vs. Iqbal M Chagala ITAT Mumbai “I” Bench Before Vijay Pal Rao (J.M.) and Rajendra (A. M.) ITA No. 877/Mum/2013 Assessment Year 2009-10. Decided on 30/07/2014 Counsel for Revenue/Assessee: Garima Singh/P J Pardiwala

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Section 14A and Rule 8D – Application of the Rule is not automatic. Disallowance cannot exceed the expenditure claimed and if no expenditure is claimed by the assessee then disallowance cannot be made

Facts:
During the assessment proceedings, the AO noted that the assessee had earned exempt income and the audit report did not show disallowance of any expenses relating to exempt income. According to the assessee, the investment transaction undertaken by him were managed by the investment advisors whose fees amounting to Rs. 5.64 lakh had been debited to the capital account of the assessee. Plus, demat expenses and security transaction tax amounting to Rs. 2.2 lakh was also debited to the capital account of the assessee. However, the AO held that looking into the fact that partof the expenses on account of salary, telephone and other administrative expenses must have been related to the activities for earning exempt income, he disallowed the sum of Rs. 16.36 lakh, being 0.5% of average investment of Rs. 32.72 crore.

On perusal of Profit and Loss Account of the assessee the CIT(A) noted that the assessee had not made any claim of expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income, therefore according to him, the provisions of section 14A (1) r.w.s.14A(2) were not attracted. Therefore, relying on the cases of Walfort Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd.(326 ITR 1) and Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd (328 ITR 81) he deleted the disallowance of Rs.16.36 lakh made by the AO.

Held:
The tribunal noted that as per the audit report filed by the assessee, expenses in respect of exempt income was Rs. Nil and the assessee had debited all expenses relating to exempt income in the capital account. The AO had merely presumed that the assessee must have incurred someexpenditure under the heads salary, telephone and other administrative charges for earning theexempt income. Further, it was noted that that the total expenditure claimed by the assessee for the year was about Rs. 13 lakh and the AO had made a disallowance of about Rs.16 lakh. According to it, the AO had just adopted the formula of estimating expenditure on the basis of investments. But, the justification for calculating the disallowance was missing. The onus was on the AO to prove that out of the expenditure incurred under various heads part related to earning of exempt income. Not only thatthe AO was required to give the basis of calculation. In any manner disallowance of Rs.16.36 lakh, as against the total expenditure of Rs.13 lakh claimed by the assessee was not justified. Provisions of Rule 8D cannot and should not be applied in a mechanical way. Facts of the case have to be analysed before invoking them. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the AO was dismissed and the order of the CIT(A) was confirmed.

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[2014] 149 ITD 363 (Agra) Rajeev Kumar Agarwal vs. Addl CIT A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated – 29th May, 2014

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Second proviso to section 40(a) (ia), which states that if assessee fails to deduct tax at source while making payments but the recipient has included the income embedded in the said payments in his tax return furnished u/s. 139 and had also paid the tax due thereon on such payments, then disallowance of such payments u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked for assessee; has retrospective effect from 01-04-2005.

Facts:
The assessee had made interest payments without discharging his tax withholding obligations u/s. 194A. Therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed payment u/s. 40(a)(ia).

The assessee contended that, in view of the insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2012, and in view of the fact that the recipients of the interest had already included the income embedded in the said interest payments in their tax returns filed u/s. 139, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) could not be invoked in this case.

He also contended that since the said second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is ‘declaratory and curative in nature’, it should be given retrospective effect from 01-04-2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

Held:
The scheme of section 40(a)(ia) is aimed at ensuring that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation in which income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee.

Section 40(a)(ia) is not a penalty for tax withholding lapse but it is a sort of compensatory deduction restriction to compensate for the loss of revenue for an income going untaxed due to tax withholding lapse. The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is separately provided for in section 271C, and section 40(a)(ia) does not add to the same Thus, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked in a case, where assessee fails to deduct tax at source but recipients have taken, in their computation of income, the income embedded in the payments made by the assessee, paid taxes due thereon and filed income tax returns in accordance with the law.

The provisions of section 40(a)(ia), as they existed prior to insertion of second proviso thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of the lawmakers and created undue hardships even in cases in which the assessee’s tax withholding lapses did not result in any loss to the exchequer. Now that the legislature has been compassionate enough to cure these shortcomings of provision and, thus, obviate the unintended hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well-settled legal position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it may not state so specifically, the insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) must be given retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal provision was introduced.

Accordingly, the insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has retrospective effect from 01-04-2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

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[2014] 149 ITD 169 (Hyderabad) Binjusaria Properties (P) Ltd vs. ACIT A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated- 4th April, 2014

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Section 2(47) of The Income-tax Act, 1961 Where assessee enters into a development agreement of land with a developer in terms of which developer has to develop property and deliver a part of constructed area to assessee, capital gains cannot be brought to tax in year of signing of development agreement if developer does not do anything to discharge obligations cast on it and it is only upon receipt of consideration in the form of developed area by the assessee in terms of the development agreement, the capital gains becomes assessable in the hands of the assessee.

Facts:

• The assesee gave its plot of Land for development and had received a refundable deposit in the relevant year. According to Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney, the developer had to develop the property, according to the approved plan from the competent authority, and deliver to the assessee 38% of the constructed area in the residential part.

• No development activity was carried out by the developer in the year of the agreement and accordingly, assessee did not offer the sum for tax.

• The Assessing Officer was of the view that, in terms of the development agreement, the transfer has taken place during the year under appeal and the assessee was liable to pay capital gain taxes on the date of transfer.

• The CIT (A) confirmed the view of assessing officer and, therefore aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
• Tribunal observed the following:-

The assessee has executed a ‘Development Agreement- cum-General Power of Attorney’ which indicates that the assessee has given a permissive possession to developer.

The refundable deposit received by the assessee is to be refunded on the complete handing over of the area falling to the share of the assessee and in the event of the failure on the part of the assesee, the same shall be adjusted at the time of final delivery.

It is undisputed that there is no development activity carried out in the said relevant year. Even the approval of plan was not obtained and the process of construction has not been initiated.

• Considering specific clauses in the agreement, all abovementioned facts and circumstances and the reading of section 2(47)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 alongwith section 53A of The Transfer of property Act, 1882, Tribunal held that the assessee had fulfilled its part of obligation under the development agreement but the developer had not done anything to discharge the obligations cast on it under the development agreement, the capital gains could not be brought to tax in the year under appeal, merely on the basis of signing of the development agreement .

It is only upon receipt of consideration in the form of developed area by the assessee in terms of the development agreement, the capital gains becomes assessable in the hands of the assessee.

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TDS: Salary: S/s. 192 and 201 of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2008-09: Consultant doctors employed by hospital: No administrative control: Doctors free to come at any time and treat patients: No provision for payment of provident fund and gratuity: No employer and employee relationship: Payment to doctors is not salary: Section 192 for TDS is not applicable:

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CIT vs. Yashoda Super Speciality Hospital; 365 ITR 356 (AP):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, orders u/ss. 201 and 201(1A) were passed treating the assessee hospital as an assessee in default for non deduction of tax at source u/s. 192 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the payments made by the assessee to the consultant doctors was salary. The Tribunal held that there was no employer employee relationship between the assessee and the consultant doctors and accordingly such payments did not constitute salary paid by the assessee. The Tribunal therefore set aside the said orders.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) O n the facts and on examining the agreement between the consultant doctors and the assessee hospital under which the services of the doctors were engaged, the appellate authorities found that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the doctors and the hospital. The doctors were not administratively controlled and managed by the assessee and they were free to come at any point of time as far as their attendance was concerned and treat the patients. There was no provision for payment of provident fund and gratuity to them.

ii) T he only clause in the agreement was that the doctors could not take up any other assignment. The existence of one prohibitory clause did not change the basic character of the relationship between the assessee and the doctors concerned. There was no employer and employee relationship. And their payments could not be treated to be salaries and, as such, deduction of tax at source did not need to be made u/s. 192.

iii) O n a careful reading of the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal, we are of the view that the law has been correctly applied. Therefore, we do not find any question of law involved in the matter. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Industrial undertaking: Manufacture: Deduction u/s. 80-IB: A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08: Assessee buying monitor, key board, mouse etc. and assembling them and selling computers so assembled: Activity is manufacturing activity: Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB:

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CIT vs. Sai Infosystem India P. Ltd.; 365 ITR 433 (Guj):

The assessee bought basic computer items such as monitor, key board, mouse, etc., and was into the activity of assembling them. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the activity of the assessee could not be said to be manufacturing activity so as to enable the assessee to claim the deduction. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal had rightly deleted the disallowance of deduction u/s. 80-IB made by the Assessing Officer. There was a specific finding of the Commissioner(Appeals) that the assessee had employed at least ten persons. This was a finding of fact and it could not be said that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.

ii) T he questions raised in the present tax appeals are held against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the tax appeals are dismissed.”

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Charitable purpose: Education: Exemption u/s. 11 r/w. s. 2(15): A. Y. 2009-10: Assessee-association conducting various continuing education diploma and Certificate Programmes, Management Development Programmes, Public Talks, Seminars, Workshops and Conferences: Assessee’s activities would fall within realm of education which is ‘charitable’ as per section 2(15): Proviso is not applicable: Assessee is entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

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DIT(E) vs. Ahmedabad Management Association: 366 ITR 85 (Guj): 47 taxmann.com 162 (Guj):

The assessee, a public charitable trust, was dedicated to pursue the objects of continuing education, training and research on various facets of management and related areas. It claimed exemption u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on ground that it undertook multifaceted activities comprising of conducting various continuing education diploma and certificate programmes, management development programmes, public talks, seminars, workshops and conferences which falls in the realm of “education” as the charitable purpose. For the A. Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer observed that considering the nature of courses, its durations and resultant surplus from each activity, the activity of the assessee is not educational in nature. The Assessing Officer held that activities of assessee fell within scope of amendment of ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility and any other activity’ of section 2(15) and, since the aggregate value of receipts were more than Rs. 10 lakh, proviso to section 2(15) was applicable and the assessee was not entitled for exemption u/s. 11. The Tribunal had held that the activities of the assessee were in the field of education and, therefore, the assessee was eligible for exemption u/s. 11.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) I t is required to be noted that all throughout for the previous years, right from the A. Y. 1995-96 till A. Y. 2008-09 the revenue has considered the activities of the assessee as educational activity and has granted the benefit u/s. 11.

ii) H owever, subsequently and w.e.f. A. Y. 2009-10, proviso to section 2(15) has been added and section 2(15) has been amended by the Finance Act, 2008 by adding the proviso which states that the ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’ shall not be a charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of (a) any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business; or (b) any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention of the income from such activity. The revenue has denied the exemption claimed by the assessee u/s. 11 mainly relying upon the amended section 2(15) by submitting that the case of the assessee would fall under the fourth limb of the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ i.e., ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’ and, therefore, the assessee shall not be entitled to exemption from tax u/s. 11.

iii) T he activities of the assessee such as continuing education diploma and certificate programme; management development programme; public talks and seminars and workshops and conferences etc., is educational activities and/or is in the field of education.

iv) O n fair reading of section 2(15) the newly inserted proviso to section 2(15) will not apply in respect of relief to the poor; education or medical relief. Thus, where the purpose of a trust or institution is relief of the poor; education or medical relief, it will constitute ‘charitable purpose’ even if it incidentally involves the carrying on of the commercial activities.

v) I n the present case, the activities of the assessee would fall within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ as per section 2(15) and, therefore, would be entitled to exemption u/s. 11.”

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Capital gain: Slump sale or exchange: S/s. 2(42C) and 50B: A. Y. 2005-06: Transfer of division of undertaking in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds: No monetary consideration: Exchange and not a sale: Not a slump sale:

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CIT vs. Bharat Bijlee Ltd.; 365 ITR 258 (Bom):

In the relevant year, the asessee transferred its lift field operations undertaking to one T under the scheme of arrangement as approved by the Court in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds. The assessee claimed that it is a case of exchange and not a case of slump sale attracting the provisions of section 50B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee and held that the transaction squarely fell within the definition of “slump sale” in section 2(42C) and was taxable in terms of section 50B of the Act. The Tribunal held that a reading of the clauses in the scheme of arrangement showed that the transfer of the undertaking had taken place in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds. The scheme did not refer to any monetary consideration for the transfer. It was a case of exchange and not a sale. Therefore, section 2(42C) was inapplicable and section 50B was also inapplicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) I n the given facts and circumstances and going by the clauses of the scheme of arrangement and reading them harmoniously and together, the Tribunal had held that the transfer of the lift division came within the purview of section 2(47) but could not be termed as a slump sale.

ii) This finding of fact could not be said to be perverse or based on no material. It also could not be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

iii) We do not find any merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: S/s. 9, 40(a)(i) and 195: A. Y. 2009-10: Commission paid by the assessee to the non-resident agent for procuring orders for leather business from overseas buyers – wholesalers or retailers: Services rendered by non-resident agent can at best be called as a service for completion of export commitment: Services provided by non-resident agent are not technical services: Assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source when the nonresident agent provides servi<

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CIT vs. Faizan Shoes P. Ltd.; [2014] 48 taxmann.com 48 (Mad):

The assessee is a company engaged in the business of manufacture and export of articles of leather. In the course of business, the assessee entered into an Agency Agreement with a non-resident agent to secure orders from various customers, including retailers and traders, for the export of leather shoe uppers and full shoes by the assessee. As per the terms of the Agency Agreement, the business will be transacted by opening letters of credit or by cash against document basis. The non-resident agent will be responsible for prompt payment in respect of all shipments effected on cash against document basis. The assessee undertook to pay commission of 2.5% on FOB value on all orders procured by the non-resident agent. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the said commission relying on the provisions of section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for non-deduction of tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act. The Commissioner(Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal observed that the non-resident agent was only procuring orders for the assessee and following up payments and no other services are rendered, and accordingly held that the nonresident agent was not providing any technical services to the assessee. The Tribunal also held that the commission payment made to non-resident agent does not fall under the category of royalty or fee of technical services and, therefore, the Explanation to section 9(2) of the Act has no application to the facts of the assessee’s case. The Tribunal, therefore held that the commission payments to non-resident agents are not chargeable to tax in India and, therefore, the provisions of section 195 of the Act are not applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he services rendered by the non-resident agent can at best be called as a service for completion of the export commitment and would not fall within the definition of “fees for technical services”, we are of the firm view that Section 9 of the Act is not applicable to the case on hand and consequently, section 195 of the Act does not come into play.

ii) We find no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal in confirming the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).

iii) I n the result appeal is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: Section 36(1)(ii): A. Y. 2006-07: Commission paid to directors for providing personal guarantee to bank as precondition for grant of credit facilities cannot be disallowed stating that otherwise it would have been payable to the directors as dividend;

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Control and Switchgear Contractors Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 365 ITR 312 (Del):

In the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee company had claimed deduction of Rs. 24,37,500/- being commission paid to the directors for providing personal guarantees to the bank for grant of credit facilities to the company. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction holding that the same would have been otherwise payable to the directors as dividend. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance. Assessee’s rectification application was rejected by the Tribunal.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The directors having provided personal guarantees had acted beyond the call of duty as employees of the assessee. It was not within the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to impose his views with regard to the necessity or the quantum of the expenditure undertaken by the assessee. The Assessing Officer had only to determine whether the transactions were genuine or real.

ii) The directors would not be entitled to receive the amount paid to them as commission, as dividends because even if it was assumed that non-payment of commission would add to the kitty of distributable profits these would have to be distributed pro rata to all the shareholders and not selectively to the directors. Dividend is paid by a company as distribution of profits to its shareholders in the ratio of their shareholding in the company. The directors were not the only shareholders of the company and, therefore, in the event the commission had not been paid by the assessee it could not have been distributed to them as dividend.

iii) The writ petition is allowed. The said disallowance and the additions made on this count are set aside.”

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Agent of non-resident: Section 163: A. Y. 2003- 04: Where a person in respect of whom agent is sought to be made a representative assessee, does not attain status of non-resident during relevant accounting period, provisions of section 163 cannot be invoked in such a case:

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Comverse Networks Systems India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2014] 48 taxmann.com 1 (Delhi)

One F was an employee with the petitioner. In respect of the A. Y. 2003-04, which is relevant in this case, the said F had filed the return of income and was assessed in the status of “Resident & Ordinarily Resident”. On 16/03/2010, the ACIT issued a notice u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 proposing to treat the petitioner as the representative agent of F for the A. Y. 2003-04. In reply, the petitioner stated that F was not a non-resident in the A. Y. 2003-04 and accordingly that the petitioner could not be treated as a representative agent of F u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner requested the ACIT to drop the proceedings. The ACIT did not agree with the submissions of the petitioner and passed an order dated 31.01.2011 treating the petitioner as the agent of F u/s. 163 of the Act for the A. Y. 2003-04. The Commissioner rejected the revision application made by the petitioner u/s. 264 of the Act.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) S ection 160(1)(i) of the said Act makes it clear that the expression “representative assessee” has to seen “in respect of the income of a non-resident”. It is obvious that when we construe the expression “income of a non-resident” it has reference to income in a particular previous year/accounting year. The income of that year must be of a non-resident. If that be so, the agent of the non-resident or the deemed agent u/s. 163 of the said Act would be the representative assessee. The petitioner is not an agent of F.

ii) S ection 163(1)(c) talks about the person from or through whom the non-resident “is in receipt of any income, whether directly or indirectly”. The income bears reference to the accounting year for which the statutory agent is to be appointed. In the present case, the year in question is the year ended on 31-03-2003. During that year F was not a nonresident. Therefore, the petitioner cannot even be regarded as a deemed agent u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Act. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be considered to be the representative assessee of F in respect of the A. Y. 2003-04.

iii) T he writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.”

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Income: Deemed dividend: Section 2(22)(e): Advance or loan to a shareholder: Section 2(22) (e) cannot be invoked where the assessee is not a shareholder in the lending company:

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CIT vs. Impact Containers Pvt. Ltd.(Bom); ITA No. 114 of 2012 dated 04/07/2014:

The Assessing Officer found that the assessee company had received loans from a company and also found that the assessee had shareholding in a company which had controlling interest in the lending company. The Assessing Officer applied the provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and held that the loan received by the assessee is deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and made the addition accordingly. The Tribunal found that the assessee company was not a shareholder of the lending company and therefore, by following the decision of the Special Bench in the case of ACIT vs. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd.; 313 ITR(AT ) 146 (Mum)(SB) deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he consistent view taken is that if the words as noted by us herein-above have been inserted in the definition so as to make reference to the beneficial owner of the shares, still the definition essentially covers the payment to the shareholder and the position of the shareholder as noted in the Supreme Court’s decision, cannot undergo any change. That legal position and the status of the shareholder being same, we do not see how the view prevailing from CIT vs. C. P. Sarthy; 83 ITR 170 (SC) is in any way said to be changed. That is how all the judgments subsequent thereto have been rendered.

ii) We have noted that the Delhi High Court, even after exhaustive amendment to section 2(22)(e) held that the payment made to any concern would not come within the purview of this sub-clause so long as it contemplated shareholders. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court has made detailed reference to all the decisions in the field. It has also referred to the order passed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in arriving at the same conclusion.

iii) In CIT vs. Ankitech Pvt. Ltd.; 340 ITR 14(Del), The Hon’ble Delhi High Court referred to both Sarathi Mudaliar and Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal, extensively. It also referred to the arguments of the Revenue which are somewhat similar to those raised before us. It is in dealing with these arguments that the Division Bench concluded that all the three limbs of the section analysed in CIT vs. Universal Medicare; 324 ITR 263 (Bom) denote the intention that closely held companies in which public are not substantially interested which are controlled by a group of members, even though having accumulated profits would not distribute such profits as dividend because if so distributed the dividend income would become taxable in the hands of the shareholders. Instead of distributing accumulated profits as dividend, companies distribute them as loan or advances to shareholders or to concerns in which such shareholders have substantial interest or make any payment on behalf of or for the individual benefit of such shareholders. In such an event, by the deeming provision, such payment by the company is treated as dividend. The purpose is to tax dividend in the hands of the shareholder.

iv) We do not see how such a view taken by the Delhi High Court and which reaffirms that of this Court in Universal Medicare can be said to be contrary to the legal fiction or the intent or purpose of the legislature in enacting it.

v) We are of the view that so long as the Tribunal holds that the assessee company is not a shareholder in any of the entities which have advanced and lent sums, then, the addition is required to be deleted.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance of expenditure in relation to exempt income: Section 14A: A. Ys. 2001-02 to 2005-06: Where available interest free funds are more than the investment in tax free securities, disallowance of interest u/s. 14A will not be justified:

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CIT vs. HDFC Bank Ltd.(Bom): ITA No. 330 of 2012 dated 23-07-2014:

In the relevant years, the assessee claimed that no disallowance of interest be made u/s. 14A of the Incometax Act, 1961 in view of the fact that the asessee had interest free funds available more than the investment in tax free securities. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and made disallowance of interest u/s. 14A on proportionate basis. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We find that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the judgment in the case of Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.; 313 ITR 340 (Bom). The findings of fact given by the ITAT in the present case is that the assessee’s own funds and other non-interest bearing funds were more than the investment in the tax-free securities.

ii) I n the present case, undisputedly the assessee’s capital, profit reserve, surplus and current account deposits were higher than the investment in the taxfree securities. In view of this factual position, as per the judgment of this Court in the case of Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.; 313 ITR 340 (Bom), it would have to be presumed that the investment made by the assessee would be out of the interest-free funds available with the assessee.

iii) We therefore, are unable to agree with the submission of Suresh Kumar that the Tribunal had erred in dismissing the appeal of the Revenue on this ground.

iv) We do not find that the question gives rise to any substantial question of law. Appeal is therefore rejected.

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Exemption – Educational Institute – Application for grant of certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was rejected for the reason that the applicant was not using the entire income for the educational purposes – In view of the amendment to the objects, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and authorities concerned with liberty to apply for registration afresh.

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Om Prakash Shiksha Prasar Samiti & Anr. vs. CCIT & Ors. [2014] 364 ITR 329 (SC)

The appellants had applied for grant of a certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, inter alia, requesting the authorities to grant certificate to claim exemption under the provisions of the Act. The said certificate was not granted by the authorities primarily on the ground that the appellants were not using the entire income for the educational purposes for which purpose the trust was established.

Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, the appellants approached the High Court. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court.

During the course of hearing before the Supreme Court the learned counsel for the appellants stated that the appellants had amended the objects of the society, with effect from 31st March, 2008. The Supreme Court was of the view that if that was so, the appellants should make an appropriate application before the authorities for grant of certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2007-08 along with the amended objects of the society.

In view of this subsequent development and keeping in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the High Court and the authorities concerned and permitted the appellants to file a fresh application within a month’s time from the date of the order. The Supreme Court directed that if such application is filed within the time granted the authority would consider the same in accordance with law, keeping in view the amended objects of the society, with effect from 31st March, 2008. All the contentions of both the parties were left open by the Supreme Court.

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Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

Appeal to the High Court – The High Court has the power to frame substantial questions of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal had been admitted.

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CIT vs. Engineers India Ltd. [2014] 364 ITR 686 (SC)

The Supreme Court noted that the appeal filed by the Revenue u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had been admitted by the High Court and two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration of the appeal.

The grievance of the Revenue before the Supreme Court was that by necessary implication, the other questions raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court stood rejected.

The Supreme Court held that the Revenue was under some misconception. The proviso following the main provision of section 260A(4) of the Act states that nothing stated in s/s. (4), i.e., “The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated” shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

According to Supreme Court, therefore, the High Court’s power to frame substantial questions of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal had been admitted remains u/s. 260A(4). This power is subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefore.

In view of the above legal position, the Supreme Court did not find any justifiable reason to entertain the special leave petitions. Accordingly, the special leave petitions were dismissed.

levitra

FINANCE (NO.2) AC T – 2014 – AN ANALYSIS

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1.Background

1.1 After the unique General Elections in May, 2014, the BJP led NDA Government, under the leadership of Shri Narendra Modi, presented its first Budget in the Parliament on 10th July, 2014. While presenting his first budget, the Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley, has stated as under in Para 2 of his Budget speech.

“The people of India have decisively voted for a change. The verdict represents the exasperation of the people with the status-quo. India unhesitatingly desires to grow. Those living below the poverty line are anxious to free themselves from the course of poverty. Those who have got an opportunity to emerge from the difficult challenges have become aspirational. They now want to be a part of the neo middle class. Their next generation has the hunger to use the opportunity that society provides for them. Slow decision making has resulted in a loss of opportunity. Two years of sub five per cent growth in the Indian economy has resulted in a challenging situation. We look forward to lower levels of inflation as compared to the days of double digit of food inflation in the last two years. The country is in no mood to suffer unemployment, inadequate basic amenities, lack of infrastructure and apathetic governance”.

1.2 T he Finance (No.2) Bill 2014 presented with the Budget, contained 71 sections dealing with amendments in the Income-tax Act and 41 sections dealing with amendments in Indirect Taxes and other matters. As is customary, the Finance Bills presented by the Governments elected in July after General Election are not referred to the standing committee on Finance and, therefore, there is no public debate on the amendments made in the Direct or Indirect Tax Laws. There was no serious debate on the amendments in the Parliament and the Bill, with minor modifications proposed by the Finance Minister in the Lok Sabha, was passed by the Lok Sabha on 25th July, 2014. This Bill was also passed by the Rajya Sabha on 30th July, 2014 and it has received the assent of the President on 6th August, 2014.

1.3 I t may be noted that in Para 4 of his Budget Speech, the Finance Minister stated his approach for economic growth as under:

“As Finance Minister I am duty bound to usher in a policy regime that will result in the desired macroeconomic outcome of higher growth, lower inflation, sustained level of external sector balance and a prudent policy stance. The Budget is the most comprehensive action plan in this regard. In the first Budget of this NDA government that I am presenting before the august House, my aim is to lay down a broad policy indicator of the direction in which we wish to take this country. The steps that I will announce in this Budget are only the beginning of a journey towards a sustained growth of 7-8 per cent or above within the next 3-4 years along with macro-economic stabilization that includes lower levels of inflation, lesser fiscal deficit and a manageable current account deficit. Therefore, it would not be wise to expect everything that can be done or must be done to be in the first Budget presented within forty five days of the formation of this Government”.

1.4 T he Finance Minister referred to the Retrospective Amendments made in the Income-tax Act in 2012 and gave the following assurance in Para 10 of his Budget speech.

“The sovereign right of the Government to undertake retrospective legislation is unquestionable. However, this power has to be exercised with extreme caution and judiciousness keeping in mind the impact of each such measure on the economy and the overall investment climate. This Government will not ordinarily bring about any change retrospectively which creates a fresh liability. Hon’ble Members are aware that consequent upon certain retrospective amendments to the Income-tax Act 1961 undertaken through the Finance Act 2012, a few cases have come up in various courts and other legal fora. These cases are at different stages of pendency and will naturally reach their logical conclusion. At this juncture I would like to convey to this August House and also the investors community at large that we are committed to provide a stable and predictable taxation regime that would be investor friendly and spur growth. Keeping this in mind, we have decided that henceforth, all fresh cases arising out of the retrospective amendments of 2012 in respect of indirect transfers and coming to the notice of the Assessing Officers will be scrutinized by a High Level Committee to be constituted by the CBDT before any action is initiated in such cases. I hope the investor community both within India and abroad would repose confidence on our stated position and participate in the Indian growth story with renewed vigour.”

1.5 While concluding his Budget Speech he stated that he had given relief to individuals, HUF etc. and also given incentives to manufacturing sector which will result in Revenue Loss of Rs. 22,200 crore in Direct Taxes. As regards Indirect Taxes, his proposals would yield additional Revenue of Rs. 7,525 crore.

1.6 I n this Article some of the important amendments made in the Income-tax Act by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014, have been discussed. It may be noted that this year, barring one or two, almost all amendments have prospective effect.

2. Rates of taxes:

2.1 T here are no major changes in the Rates of Taxes for A.Y. 2015-16. However, certain reliefs given to Individual Tax Payers are referred to in Para 192 of Budget Speech of the Finance Minister. These are explained in brief below.

2.2 Individual, HUF, AOP etc.: The Rates of Income Tax, Surcharge and Education Cess for Individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI and Artificial Juridical Person for A.Y. 2015-16 (Accounting Year ending 31.03.2015) will be as under.

Notes:
(i) Surcharge on Super Rich: In the Budget Speech of 2013 it was announced that surcharge of 10% of the tax on persons earning total income exceeding Rs. 1 crore will be levied for A.Y. 2014-15 only. In this year’s Budget, this surcharge is continued for A.Y. 2015-16
(ii) Rebate of Tax: A Resident Individual having total income not exceeding Rs. 5 lakh, will get rebate upto Rs. 2000/- or tax payable (whichever is less) u/s. 87A.
(iii) E ducation Cess: 3% (2+1) of the tax is payable as Education Cess by all assessees.

2.3 Other Assessees: The rates of taxes (including surcharge and education cess) for A.Y. 2015-16 are the same as in A.Y. 2014-15. In the case of domestic companies the surcharge of 5% of tax, if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore, but does not exceed Rs.10 crore will continue to be payable in A.Y.2015-16. Further, the rate of surcharge will be 10% of tax on the entire income in the case of domestic companies if the total income exceeds Rs.10 crore.

In the case of a foreign company, there is no change in the rates of taxes. The existing rate of surcharge will be 2% of tax if the total income is between Rs.1 crore and Rs.10 crore. If the total income exceeds Rs.10 crore, the rate of surcharge will be 5% of tax on the entire income, if the total income exceeds Rs.10 crore.

2.4 Tax On Book Profits: The rates of taxes on Book Profits u/s. 115JB and 115JC will continue to be the same in A.Y.2015-16 as in A.Y.2014-15.

2.5 Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT):
(i) Section 115.0 and 115-R provide for payment of additional tax by domestic companies and mutual funds on distribution of dividend or income. These two sections have been amended w.e.f. 01-10-2014. The amendment provides that the amount of dividend or income so distributed should now be grossed up and the additional tax at the rates specified in these two sections should be paid by the domestic companies or mutual funds.

ii)the logic for making this amendment is given in the explanatory memorandum to the finance Bill as under:

“prior to introduction of dividend distribution tax (ddt), the dividends were taxable in the hands of  the  shareholder.  the  gross  amount  of  dividend representing the distributable surplus was taxable, and the tax on this amount was paid by the shareholder at the applicable rate which varied from 0 to 30%. however,  after  the  introduction  of  the  ddt,  a  lower rate of 15% is currently applicable but this rate is being applied on the amount paid as dividend after reduction of distribution tax by the company. therefore, the tax is computed with reference to the net amount. similar case is there when income is distributed by mutual funds.

Due to difference in the base of the income distributed or the dividend on which the distribution tax is calculated, the effective tax rate is lower than the rate provided in the respective sections.

In order to ensure that tax is levied on proper base, the amount of distributable income and the dividends which are actually received by the unit holder of mutual fund or shareholders of the domestic company need to be grossed up for the purpose of computing the additional tax.

Therefore, it is proposed to amend section 115-o in order to provide that for the purposes of determining the tax on distributed profits payable in accordance with the section 115-o, any amount by way of dividends referred to in sub-section (1) of the said section, as reduced by the amount referred to in sub-section (1A) (referred to as net distributed profits), shall be increased to such amount as would, after reduction of the tax on such increased amount at the rate specified in s/s. (1), be equal to the net distributed profits.

Similarly,  it  is  proposed  to  amend  section  115r  to provide that for the purposes of determining the additional income-tax payable in accordance with sub-section (2) of the said section, the amount of distributed income shall be increased to such amount as would, after reduction of the additional income-tax on such increase amount at the rate specified in s/s. (2), be equal to be amount of income distributed by the mutual fund”.

iii)    On the above basis, the ddt on grossed up dividend distributed by a domestic company on or after 01-10-2014 shall be payable at 20.03% as against 17% as at present.

iv)    Similarly, the additional tax payable by the mutual funds on income distribution u/s115 r will work out as under:

v)    From the logic given in the explanatory memorandum it is evident that the additional that collected u/s. 115-0 and 115-R from domestic companies and mutual funds is nothing but tax payable by the shareholder/unit holder. instead of collecting such tax from the share holder/unit holder,  it  is  collected  from  the  company/mutual  fund. though  judicial  forums  have  taken  a  view  that  the  tax paid by the Companies/ mutual funds is not tax paid by the shareholder/unit holder, the rationale set out in the memorandum may give one further opportunity to the taxpayer to urge the proposition that this income is not ‘exempt’ and section 14a ought not to apply.

2.6    Rate    of    tax    on    dividends    from    foreign Companies:  the  concessional  rate  of  tax  at  15%  plus applicable surcharge and education cess which was applicable for only two years i.e., a.y. 2013-14 and
a.y. 2014-15 u/s. 115BBd has now been extended in respect of dividends received by an indian Company from a specified Foreign Company to A.Y. 2015-16 and subsequent years. For this purpose the indian Company should hold 26% or more of equity share capital in the foreign company.

3 Tax deduction at source (TDS):

the  following  amendments  are  made  in  some  of  the provisions relating to TDS w.e.f. 01-10-2014.

(i)    In section 194a it is provided that tax should not be deducted at source @ 10% from interest received by   a   Business   trust   from   special   purpose   Vehicle (i.e.,  the  indian  company  in  which  the  Business  trust holds controlling interest or  any  specified  percentage of shareholding or interest as provided in the relevant regulations).

(ii)    Section 194da has been inserted w.e.f. 01-10-2014 to provide for tds @2% from the taxable amount (including Bonus)  paid  under  a  life  insurance  policy.  in  such  a case, no tax will be deductible under this section from the payments which are exempt u/s. 10 (10d). it is also provided that this provision for tds will not apply where the aggregate of taxable payments is less than rs.1 lakh in any financial year.

(iii)    Section 194lBa has been inserted w.e.f. 01-10-2014 to provide for tds @10% from income referred to in the new section 115ua (i.e., interest income received by Business trust from spV) distributed to a resident unit holder of Business trust.

If such income is distributed to a non-resident unit holder the rate of tds will be 5% plus applicable surcharge and education cess.

(iv)    Section  194lC  which  provides  for  tds  in  respect of payment of interest on loans in foreign Currency by specified companies will also apply to payment made by Business trust. further, the time limit of loan agreement provided in the section from 01-07- 2012 to 01-07-2015 has now been extended up to 01-07-2017.

(v)    Section 200(3) provides for filing of Statement of TDS. By amendment of this section it is now provided that   the tax deductor can now file a correction statement for rectification of any mistake, or to add, delete or update information. Consequential amendment has been made in section 200A.

(vi)    At present u/s. 201(3) no order treating a person as an assessee in default for failure to comply with tds provisions can be passed after the expiry of 2 years from the end of the financial year in which statement of TDS in filed and after expiry of 6 years if statement of TDS in not filed. This provision is now amended w.e.f. 01-10-2014 to provide for a common time limit of 7 years from the end of the f.y. in which payment is made or credit is given to the payee. Thus, even if TDS statement is filed, the tax deductor can be treated as assessee in default at anytime within 7 years. in other words, the existing time limit of 2 years is extended to 7 years.

(vii)    Section 206aa provides for tds at higher rate where the payee does not furnish permanent account number the  section  is  not  applicable  to  interest  on  long  –term infrastructure Bonds referred to in section 194 lC. it is now provided, w.e.f. 01-10-2014, that this section shall not apply to interest on long-term Bonds referred to in section 194 lC.

4.    Exemptions and deductions

4.1    Section 10AA: under this section, newly established undertakings in SEZs can claim deduction in respect of profits and gains derived from export of articles or things or from providing services. Presently, deduction can be claimed even by such undertakings carrying on ‘Specified Business’ u/s. 35AD. This section is now amended w.e.f. a.y.2015-16 to provide that where deduction u/s. 10AA has been availed by any assessee in respect of the profit of the Specified Business for any assessment year, no deduction u/s. 35AD shall be allowed in relation to such Specified Business for the same or any other assessment year.  Similarly,  section 35 AD has, also been amended  to prohibit claim of deduction u/s. 10AA in respect of Specified Business where deduction u/s. 35AD has  been claimed and allowed for the same or any other assessment year. Effectively, the assessee will, therefore, have to choose between a deduction u/s. 10AA and a deduction u/s. 35AD in respect of Specified Business.

4.2    Section 24 (b): While computing income from self occupied property (sop) constructed on or after 01-04- 1999, the assessee is eligible for deduction on account of interest paid on amounts borrowed for acquisition or construction of the s.o.p provided such acquisition or construction is completed within a period of three years from the end of the financial year in which the capital is borrowed. the deduction is restricted to rs. 1.5 lakh at present.  from  a.y.  2015-16,  this  limit  of  deduction  for such interest has now been increased to rs. 2 lakh. it may be noted that if construction of property is not completed within 3 years, deduction of interest will be of rs. 30,000/- only. if property is let out deduction of interest will be of the entire amount without any limit subject to conditions in section 24.

4.3    Section 80C: This section provides for deduction upto rs.1 lakh in respect of investment by an individual or huf in ppf, lip, elss etc. this deduction is increased from a.y.2015-16 to investment upto rs.1.5 lakh. in para 138 of the Budget speech, it is stated by the finance minister that the Limit for investment in PPF in the financial year will now be increased to rs.1 .5 lakh.

4.4    Section 80 CCD: This section provides for deduction in respect of contribution to pension scheme of Central Govt. at present non-Govt. employees employed on or after 01-01-2004 are eligible for such deduction. now, from a.y. 2015-16 even non-Govt. employees employed before 01-01-2004 will be eligible to get the benefit of this section. further, this section is amended from a.y. 2015- 16 to provide that the deduction under this section shall not exceed rs.1 lakh in any year.
4.5    Section  80  CCE:  This  section  lays  down  limit  for deduction u/s. 80C, 80CCC and 80CCd to rs. 1 lakh in the aggregate. this limit is now increased from a.y. 2015 to rs.1.5 lakh.

4.6    Section 80 – IA(4) (iv): At present,  deduction  under this section is allowed to undertakings which commence their business of Generation or Generation and distribution of power, transmission or distribution of power, complete substantial renovation or modernisation of existing transmission or distribution lines if the same is completed on or before 31-03-2014. this time limit is now extended to 31-03-2017.

4.7    New Investment Opportunities for Small Savings :
The  finance  minister  has  announced  the  revival  of  the following investment opportunities for small savings.

(i)    Kissan Vikas patra : This will be reintroduced during the year.

(ii)    Varishta  pension  Bima  yojna:  This  scheme  will  be reintroduced for one year from 15-08-2014 to 14-08-2015 for benefit of senior citizens.

5 Business Trusts:

(i)    This  is  a  new  concept  introduced  in  this  year’s Budget. The term “Business Trust” is defined in section 2(13a) of the income tax act from 01-10-2014 to mean “a trust registered as an “infrastructure investment trust” (invits)  or  a  “real  estate  investment  trust”  (reit),  the units of which are required to be listed on a recognized stock exchange, in accordance with the seBi regulations and notified by the Central Govt”.

(ii)    In para 26 of the Budget speech, the finance minister has explained this new concept as under:

“Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) have been successfully used as instruments for pooling of investment in several countries. I intend to provide necessary incentives to REITs which will have pass through for purpose of the taxation. As an innovation, a modified REITs type structure for infrastructure projects is also being announced as Infrastructure Investment Trusts (invits), which would have a similar tax efficient pass through status, for PPP and other infrastructure projects. These structures would reduce the pressure on the banking system while also making available fresh equity. I am confident that these two instruments would attract long term finance from foreign and domestic sources including the NRIs.”

(iii)    In order to implement the above scheme for taxation of  Business  trusts,  its  sponsors  and  unit  holders  new sections are inserted in the income-tax act and some sections   are   amended.   these   sections   are   2(13A), 10(23FC),  10(23FD),  10(38),  47(xvii),  49  (2AC),  111A, 115A,  115UA,  139(4E),  194A(3)  (Xi),  194LBA,  194LC, and sec. 97 and 98 of finance (no.2) act, 2004 relating to stt. these sections come into force from a.y. 2015-16 and/or 01-10-2014.

(iv)    The  Business  trusts  have  the  following  distinctive elements:

(a)    The trust would raise capital by way of issue of units ( to be listed on a recognised stock exchange) and can also raise debts directly both from resident as well as non- resident investors:

(b)    The income bearing assets would be held by the trust by acquiring controlling or other specific interest in an indian company (spV) from the sponsor.

(v)    The amendments are made to put in place a specific taxation regime for providing the way the income in the hands of such trusts is to be taxed and the taxability of the income distributed by such business trusts in the hands of the unit holders of such trusts. These provisions, briefly stated, are as under:

(a)    The listed units of a business trust, when traded on a recognised stock exchange, will attract same levy of stt and will given the same tax benefits in respect of taxability of capital gains as equity shares of a company i.e., long term capital gains, will be exempt and short term capital gains will be taxable at the rate of 15%.

(b)    In case of capital gains arising to the sponsor at   the time of exchange of shares in spV with units of the business trust, the taxation of gains shall be deferred and taxed at the time of disposal of units by the sponsor. However, the preferential capital gains tax (consequential to levy of stt) available in respect of units of business trust will not be available to the sponsor in respect of these units at the time of disposal of units. further, for the purpose of computing capital gain, the cost of these units shall be considered as cost of the shares to the sponsor. The  holding  period  of  shares  shall  also  be  included  in the holding period of such units. Indexation benefit in the case of long term capital gain will be available. (sections 47(xvii) and 49(2AC)).

(c)    The income by way of interest received by the business trust from SPV is accorded pass through treatment i.e., there is no taxation of such interest income in the hands of the trust and no withholding tax at the level of SPV    as provided in section 194a w.e.f. 01-10-2014. however, withholding tax at the rate of 5 % in case of payment of interest component of income distributed to non-resident unit holders and at the rate of 10 % in respect of payment of interest component of distributed income to a resident unit holder shall be deducted by the trust. this is provided in section 194lBa w.e.f. 01-10-2014 (sections 10 (23FC), 194A and 194LBA)).

(d)    In case of external commercial borrowings by the business trust, the benefit of reduced rate of 5 % tax on interest payments to non-resident lenders shall be available on similar conditions, for such period as is provided in section 194lC of the act w.e.f. 01-10-2014.

(e)    The  dividend  received  by  the  trust  shall  be  subject to dividend distribution tax at the level of SPV but will    be exempt in the hands of the trust, and the dividend component of the income distributed by the trust to unit holders will also be exempt. (section 10(38)).

(f)    The  income  by  way  of  capital  gain  on  disposal  of assets by the trust shall be taxable in the hands of the trust at the applicable rate. however, if such capital gains are distributed, then the component of distributed income attributable to capital gains would be exempt in the hands of the unit holder. any other income of the trust shall be taxable at the maximum marginal rate.

(section 115ua and 10(23fd)). (4e).

(g)    The business trust is required to furnish its return of income u/s139

(h)    The necessary forms to be filed and other reporting requirements  to  be  met  by  the  Business trust  shall  be prescribed to implement the above scheme.

6 Charitable Trusts :

In this finance act, sections 10(23C), 11, and 115 BBC have been amended from a.y. 2015-16 and sections 12a and 12 aa have been amended from 01-10-2014. all these amendments relate to taxation of Charitable trusts. These amendments are briefly discussed below :
6.1    Charitable   and   religious   trusts   cannot   claim exemption u/s. 10: a trust or institution which is registered or approved or notified as a charitable or religious Trust u/s. 12aa or 10(23C) (iv), (v),(vi) and (via) will not now be entitled to claim exemption under any of the general provisions of section 10. the intention is that such entities should be governed by the special provisions of sections 10(23C) 11,12 & 13, which are a code by themseves, and should not be entitled to claim exemption under other provisions  of  section  10. therefore,  such  entity  will  not now be able to claim that its income, like dividend income (exempt u/s. 10(34)) or income from mutual funds (exempt u/s. 10(35)), or interest on tax free bonds, is exempt u/s. 10 and hence, not liable to tax. such income continues to qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C) or section 11, subject to the conditions contained therein.

Agricultural income of such an entity, however, will continue to enjoy exemption u/s. 10(1). Further, such an entity eligible for exemption u/s. 11 will not be barred from claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C).

6.2    Depreciation on Capital assets: (i) Hitherto, almost all courts in india while interpreting section 11 have held that income of a charitable trust u/s. 11 is to be computed on the basis of accounting method adopted by the trust following  commercial  principles.  (CIT  vs.  Trustees   of H.E.H. Nizam’s Supplemental Religious Endowment Trust 127 itr 378(ap), CIT vs. Estate of V.L.Ethiraj 136 itr  12  (mad)  and  CBdt  circular  no.5-p  (lxx-6)  dated 19-06-1968). on this basis, the courts have taken the view that depreciation on assets of the trust is to be deducted for the purpose of calculation of income of the trust in commercial sense u/s. 11 of the income-tax act. The well settled principle of law, as laid down by various courts, during the last more than 50 years is that under the scheme of section 11, there are two steps. in the first step, the income of the trust is to be “computed” on commercial principles and depreciation on capital assets is to be deducted for this purpose. In the second step, the income so computed is to be compared with “application” of this income to objects of the trust. For application of such income, Capital and revenue expenditure incurred during the year for the objects of the trust is be treated as application therefore, “depreciation” and outgoing for acquiring “Capital asset” are different and distinct claims and there is no double deduction of expenditure (refer CIT vs. Framjee Cawasjee Institute 109 Ctr 463 (Bom), CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnnel Selection 264ITR – 110 (Bom), CIT vs. Society of Sister of St. Anne 146itr 28 (Kar), CIT vs. Seth Manilal Ramchhoddas Vishram Bhavan Trust 198 itr 598(Guj)).

(ii)    By amendment of section 10(23C) and 11, from a.y. 2015-16, it is now provided that depreciation will not be allowed in computing the income of the trust or institution in respect of an asset, where cost of acquisition has already been claimed as deduction by way of application of income in the current or any earlier year. It may be noted that this amendment will overrule all the above decisions of various high Courts.

(iii)    Logic  for  the  above  amendment  is  given  in  the explanatory memorandum as under:

“The  existing  scheme  of  section  11  as  well  as  section 10(23C) provides exemption in respect of income when it is applied to acquire a capital assets. subsequently, while computing the income for purposes of these sections, notional deduction by way of depreciation etc. is claimed and such amount of notional deduction remains to be applied for charitable purpose. Therefore, double benefit is claimed by the trusts and institutions under the existing law. the provisions need to be rationalized to ensure that double benefit is not claimed and such notional amount does not get excluded from the condition of application of income for charitable purpose.”

It will be noticed that this logic is contraryto the well settled law as interpreted by various high Courts.

(iv)    The  effect  of  the  above  amendment  will  be  that  all the  trusts/institutions  which  will  be  affected  by  this amendment will have to maintain separate records of Capital assets as under:

(a)    WDV of Capital assets in respect of which depreciation as well as deduction by way of application of income is claimed upto a.y. 2014-15.

(b)    WDV of Capital assets in respect of which deduction by way application of income has not been claimed upto A.Y. 2014-15 but only depreciation is claimed and allowed.

It may be noted that from a.y. 2015-16, depreciation will not be allowed in respect of WdV of Capital assets as stated in (a) above. as regards WdV of Capital assets  as  stated  in  (b)  above,  it  appears  that  depreciation can be claimed in a.y. 2015-16 6 even after the above amendment, as the same is not retrospective

6.3    Section 10 (23C): The existing section 10(23C) (iiiab) and (iiiac) grant exemption to educational institutions, universities and hospitals that satisfy certain conditions and which are wholly or substantially financed by the Government. The term “substantially financed by the Government” is not defined and hence resulted in litigation (refer CIT vs. Indian Institute of Management 196 taxman 276 (Kar.)). It is now clarified that if the Government grant to such institutions exceeds the prescribed percentage of the total receipts, (including voluntary contributions), then it will be considered as being substantially financed by the Government.

6.4    Section 12A- Registration of trust: Section 12a has been amended w.e.f. 01-10-2014. at present a trust or an institution can claim exemption only from the year in which the application for registration u/s. 12aa has been made. as such, registration can be obtained only prospectively and this causes genuine hardship to several charitable organisations. It is now provided that the benefit of sections 11 and 12 will be available to such trusts for all pending assessments on the date of such registration, provided the objects and activities of such trusts in these earlier years are the same as those on the basis of which registration has been granted. it is also provided that no action for reopening assessment u/s. 147 shall be taken by the Assessing Officer merely on the ground of non- registration. accordingly, completed assessments in which benefit u/s. 11 has been granted, will not be adversely affected on account of non-registration. it may be noted that such benefit will not be available to trusts where the registration was earlier refused or was cancelled.

6.5    Section 12AA – Power to CIT to cancel registration: (i) the amendment made in section 12AA,
w.e.f. 01-10-2014, giving additional power to the CIT to cancel registration of a trust will create great hardships to the trusts. at present, for non-compliance with some of the requirements of section 11,12 or 13 a trust is liable to pay tax for that year. Now, the amendment in section 12aa empowering CIT to cancel registration of the trust for such non-compliance will mean that a trust which has been complying with these provisions for several years in the past and also in subsequent years will lose exemption in the year of non-compliance and also in subsequent years. this is a very harsh and uncharitable provision and will lead to unending litigation in which trustees will have to spend trust funds which they would have utilised for charitable purpose. Surprisingly, none of the public trusts or institutions have seriously opposed this amendment before it was passed in the parliament.
(ii)    Briefly stated, the amendment in section 12AA is as under:

At present, registration of a trust / institution once granted, can be cancelled only under the following two circumstances:

(a)    the activities of the trust are not genuine; or

(b)    the activities are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust.

Now, the Commissioner has also been given power to cancel registration, if it is noticed that the trust has not complied with the provisions of sections 11,12 and 13 i.e.,

(a)    Income does not enure for the benefit of the public;

(b)    Income is applied for the benefit of any religious community or caste (in case of a trust established on or after 01-04-1962).

(c)    Income is applied for the benefit of persons specified
in section13(3)

(d)    funds are invested in prohibited modes i.e. there is non-compliance with sections 11(5) or 13.

It is however provided that registration will not be cancelled if the trust/institution proves that there was reasonable cause for breach of any of the above conditions.

(iii)    It is true that the Trustees can file an appeal against the order of Cit to itat when such registration is cancelled. But this will invite litigation in which trust money will have to be spent.

(iv)    it may be noted that this additional power given to Cit raises several issues which have not been considered while making the above amendments. some of these issues are as under:

(a)    Compliance with section 11,12 and 13 raise several issues of interpretation. therefore, the question will arise as to at what stage the Cit will exercise this additional power to cancel registration. in other words, whether he can cancel registration when any adverse assessment order for a particular year is passed by the a.o. or whe the entire appellate proceedings, in which the order is challenged, are completed.

(b)    Whether cancellation of registration as a result of this amendment will be for the year in which there is non- compliance with sections 11, 12 or 13. if this is not the case, the trust will not be able to claim exemption u/s.  11 in subsequent years although all the conditions of sections 11 to 13 are complied with.

(c)    If the registration is cancelled for non-compliance with sections 11 to 13 in one year, whether the Cit can consider granting registration in subsequent years when the trust is complying with these provisions.

(d)    If registration is cancelled in the case of trust holding certificate u/s. 80 G, what will be the position of persons who have given donations and claimed deduction u/s 80G, in that year and in subsequent years. it may be noted that there is no amendment in section 80G where by CIT can cancel certificate given under the section.

(v)    Considering all these issues, it appears that when the trust is required to pay tax in the year when provisions of sections 11 to 13 are not complied with, this additional power to Cit to cancel registration of the trust should not  have  been  given.  there  is  a  grave  danger  of unhealthy practices being adopted by those dealing with assessments of Charitable trusts.

6.6    Section   115-BBC-  anonymous   donations:     the existing provisions of section 115BBC provide for levy of tax at the rate of 30 % in the case of certain assessees, being university, hospital, charitable organisation,  etc. on the amount of aggregate anonymous donations exceeding 5% of the total donations received by the assessee or rs. 1 lakh, whichever is higher. the section is amended from a.y. 2015-16 to provide that the income- tax payable shall be the aggregate of the amount of income-tax calculated at the rate of 30 % on aggregate of anonymous donations received in excess of 5 % of the  total  donations  received  by  the  assessee  or  rs.  1 lakh, whichever is higher, and the amount of income-tax with which the assessee would have been chargeable had his total income been reduced by such excess. this amendment is to rationalise the provisions of the section.

7    Income from business or profession:

7.1    Investment allowance – Section 32 aC: (i) in order to encourage manufacturing companies that investsubstantial amount in acquisition and installation of new plant and machinery, finance act, 2013 inserted section 32aC (1) in the act to provide that where a company engaged in the business of manufacture of an article or thing, invests a sum of more than rs.100 crore in new assets (plant and machinery) during the period 01-04- 2013 to 31-03-2015, then the assessee shall be allowed a deduction of 15% of cost of new assets for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16.
(ii) as growth of the manufacturing sector is crucial for employment generation and development of an economy, this section is amended to extend the deduction available u/s. 32aC for investment made in plant and machinery up to 31-03-2017. further, in order to simplify the existing provisions of section 32aC of the act and also to make medium-size investments in plant and machinery eligible for deduction, it is now provided that the deduction u/s. 32aC (1a) shall be allowed if the company, on or after 1st april, 2014, invests more than rs. 25 crore in plant and machinery in the previous year. it is also provided that the assessee who is eligible to claim deduction under the existing combined threshold limit of rs.100 crore for investment made in previous years 2013-14 and 2014-15 shall continue to be eligible to claim deduction under the existing provisions contained in section 32aC(1) even if its investment in the year 2014-15 is below the proposed new threshold limit of investment of rs. 25 crore during the previous year.

The deduction allowable under this section from a.y. 2015- 16 after the amendment in different cases of investment is given by way of illustration in the following table:

Sl.

No.

Particulars

P.Y. 2013-14

P.Y. 2014-15

P.Y. 2015-16

P.Y. 2016-17

Section applicable

1.

Amount of investment

20

90

32AC(1)

 

Deduction allowable

Nil

16.5

 

2.

Amount of Investment

30

40

32AC(1A)

 

Deduction allowable

Nil

6

 

3.

Amount of investment

30

30

30

40

32AC(1A)

 

Deduction allowable

Nil

4.5

4.5

6

 

4.

Amount of investment

150

20

70

20

32AC(1) &

32AC(1A)

 

Deduction allowable

22.5

3

10.5

Nil

Nil

Specified business. Further, section 28(vii) taxes any sum received on account of demolition, destruction, discarding or transfer of such asset, the entire cost of which was allowed as a deduction u/s. 35ad.

(ii) section 35AD has been amended from a.y.2015-16 as under:

(a)    The benefit of the section is extended to the following two businesses, commencing operation on or after 1st april, 2014:

(i)    Laying   and   operating   a   slurry   pipeline   for   the transportation of iron ore;

(ii)    Setting up and operating a semi-conductor wafer fabrication manufacturing unit notified by the Board in accordance with the prescribed guidelines.

(b)    It is now provided that any asset in respect of which deduction has been claimed and allowed under this section shall be used only for the specified business for a period of at least 8 years, beginning with the previous year in which such asset is acquired or constructed;

(c)    Further, it is provided that where any asset, in respect of which a deduction is claimed and allowed under this section, is used for any other purpose during the specified period of 8 years, the total deduction so claimed and allowed in one or more previous years, as reduced by the depreciation allowable u/s. 32, (as if no deduction u/s. 35ad was allowed) shall be deemed to be the business income of the assessee of the previous year in which the asset  is so used. however, this provision will not apply to a BIFR Company (sick company) during the specified period of 8

Investment Linked Deductions – Section

7.3    Corporate    Social Responsibility    (CSR) Expenditure Section 37:  (i)  it  is very strange that  section  37 of the act has been amended from a.y. 2015-16 to provide that expenditure incurred by a company for CSR activities as provided u/s. 135 of the Companies 35aD: (i) section 35ad provides for a deduction in respect of any capital expenditure, other than on the acquisition of any land or goodwill or financial instrument, incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of any act, 2013 shall not be considered as expenditure incurred for   the   purpose   of   Business   or   profession.  this   is strange because one legislation made by the parliament i.e.  Companies  Act,  2013,  mandates  certain specified companies to spend upto 2% of its average profits of last 3 years for Csr activities. elaborate list of such expenditure is given in schedule Vii of the Companies act and elaborate rules and forms are prescribed under that act. Csr expenditure is treated as part of the business expenditure of the company under the Companies act and when it comes to income-tax act it is now provided that this is not an expenditure for the business or profession of the Company. such a provision in section 37 is contrary to the provisions of section 135 of the Companies act and requires to be reconsidered. at best, the deduction u/s. 37 could have been restricted to 2% of the Gross total income under the income-tax act.

(ii)    The  logic  for  this  provision  in  section  37  is explained in the explanatory memorandum as under:

“Under the Companies act, 2013 certain companies (which have  net  worth  of  Rs.500  crore  or  more,  or  turnover  of Rs.1,000 crore or more, or a net profit of Rs.5 crore or more during any financial year) are required to spend certain percentage of their profit on activities relating to Corporate social responsibility (CSR). under the existing provisions of the act expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business is only allowed as a deduction for computing taxable business income. Csr expenditure, being an application of income, is not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of carrying on business. as the application of income is not allowed as deduction for the purposes of computing taxable income of a company, amount spent on Csr cannot be allowed as deduction for computing the taxable income of the company. moreover, the objective of Csr is to share burden of the Government in providing social services by companies having net worth/ turnover/profit above a threshold. If such expenses are allowed as tax deduction, this would result in subsidizing of around one-third of such expenses by the Government by way of tax expenditure”.

From the above, it will be noticed that for tax purposes the Government has taken the view that Csr expenditure is application of income whereas under the Companies act the same Government states that it is business expenditure. if it is only application of income how there can be compulsion under the Companies act on the Directors that 2% of average profits of previous 3 years should be spent for specified activities listed in schedule Vii of the Companies act.

(iii)    In the Explanatory Memorandum it is clarified that CSR expenditure which qualify for deduction u/s. 30 to 36 of the income-tax act will be allowed as deduction. if we refer to schedule Vii, most of the items of expenditure may not qualify for deduction under the above sections. in order to get deduction of the CSR expenditure most of the companies may prefer to contribute to (a) the prime minister’s national relief fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government for socio-economic development and relief and welfare of the sC, st, OBC, minorities and Women or for (b) contribution to approved rural development projects approved u/s. 35AC.

(iv)    It may be noted that CSR expenditure incurred by the Company will be allowable in computing Book profits u/s. 115jB. no such disallowance is required to be made u/s. 115JB.

7.4    Disallowance for non deduction of Tax Section 40(a): (i) section40 (a) (i) is amended from a.y. 2015- 16 to provide that if tax is deducted from payment made for specified expenditure to a Non-Resident in a previous year, no disallowance for the expenditure will be made if the tds amount is deposited by the deductor with the Government before the due date for filing return of income u/s. 139(1). At present, the time limit for such deposit of tax is as prescribed in section 200(1) (refer rule 30). if the tds amount is deposited after the due date, deduction for expenditure will allowed in the year in which tds amount is deposited.

(ii) Section 40(a)(ia) provides for disallowance of payment of specified expenditure to a Resident, if tax deductible has not been deducted or deposited with the Government before the due date for filing the Return of Income. This section is amended from a.y. 2015-16 as under:

(a)    At present, the section applies to payment under certain  specified  heads  viz.  interest,  rent,  professional fees, Brokerage, Commission etc. it is now provided, by this amendment, that the section will apply to all payments from which tax is to be deducted under Chapter XVii B. In other words, the assessee will suffer disallowance under this section if tax deductible in respect the above specified heads as well other payments viz. salaries, director’s fees,  purchase  of  immovable  property  as  stock-in- trade, non-compete fees etc. has not been deducted or deposited with the Govt.

(b)    At present, if the tds amount is not deducted and/or deposited with the Government, 100% of the expenditure is disallowed. By this amendment, it is provided that only 30% of the expenditure will be disallowed from a.y. 2015-16.
 
(c)    further,  the  amended  section  provides  that  if  the amount from which tax is deductible under chapter XViiB is deducted but paid after the due date as stated above, 30% deduction will be allowed in the year in which such tds amount is deposited with the Government. it may  be noted that this amendment does not take care of the following type of situations which will arise in many cases.

Illustration

•    ABC Ltd. has deducted tax of Rs. 2 lakh from payment of commission during the year ending 31-03-2013.
•    Due date for filing return for A.Y. 2013-14 is 30-09- 2013, but the company has deposited tds amount of Rs. 2 lakh in april, 2014.
•    100% of the Commission Amount will be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) in a.y. 2013-14.
•    Under the amended section 40(a)(ia) since the TDS amount is deposited in april,  2014  i.e.  a.y. 2015-  16, only 30% of the commission will be allowed as deduction when 100% of the commission has been disallowed in a.y.2013-14.
•    To this extent, this amendment requires reconsideration.

(d)    The second proviso to section 40(a) (ia) inserted by the finance act, 2012 from a.y. 2013-14 provides that if the resident payee has paid tax on such income on the date of furnishing his return of income, no disallowance under the section will be made in the case of the payee. it may be noted that explanation below this second proviso refers to payments under specified heads viz. commission, Brokerage, professional fees, rent, royalty, technical service fees and payment to contractors. Since section 40(a) (ia) is now amended to provide for disallowance   in respect of non-deduction of tds from all sections under Chapter XVii B, including salaries, directors’ fees etc.,explanation below the second proviso of this section should have been similarly amended.

7.5    Commodity Derivatives Section 43 (5): Commodity derivative transactions were excluded from the purview of speculative transactions with effect from a.y.2014-15 u/s. 43(5)(e) by the Finance Act, 2013. It is now clarified from a.y. 2014-15, that in order to be eligible for such exclusion, such transactions should be chargeable to Commodities transaction tax (Ctt).

7.6    Goods Carriages Business – Section 44 aE: section 44ae (2) is amended to provide that the presumptive amount of profits and gains for any type of goods carriage shall be Rs. 7,500 per month or part of a month for which
each such goods carriage is owned by the assessee or the amount claimed to have been actually earned by the assessee, whichever is higher. the earlier amounts were rs.5,000 for each heavy goods carriage and rs. 4,500 for  each  other  goods  carriage. the  distinction  between goods carriages and heavy goods carriages has been done away with from the a.y. 2015-16.

7.7    Losses in Speculation Business –Section 73:
at present, section 73 provides that if any part of the business of a specified company consists of purchase and sale of shares of other Companies, loss in such business shall be treated as speculation loss. there is one exception in the case of a company whose principal business is of banking or granting of loans and advances. this  exception  is  now  widened  from  a.y.  2015-  16  to provide that in the case of a company whose principal business is of trading in shares, such loss in purchase and sale of shares will not be considered as a speculation loss. this is a welcome provision for companies which are share brokers and which are mainly dealing the shares of Companies.

8 Income from other sources

(i)    Sections 2(24), 51 and 56(2) have been amended from a.y. 2015-16. section 51 provides that where any capital asset was on any previous occasion the subject of negotiations for its transfer, any advance or other money received or retained by the taxpayer in respect of such negotiations shall be deducted from the cost for which the asset was acquired or the written down value or the fair market value, while computing cost of acquisition.

(ii)    It is now provided in the newly inserted section 56(2)
(ix) That the amount received as advance or otherwise   in the course of negotiations for transfer of capital asset shall be chargeable to tax under the head “income from other sources” if:
(a)    such advance money is forfeited; and

(b)    the negotiations do not result in transfer of the capital asset.

(iii) Corresponding amendment is made in section 51 to provide that any such forfeited advance, taxed u/s. 56(2) (ix), Shall not be deducted from the cost or the written down value or the fair market value of capital  asset while computing the cost of acquisition. Consequential amendment is also made in section 2(24)(xvii).
 
9    Capital gains
9.1    Definition of Capital asset: Section 2 (14): section 2(14) defining the term “Capital Asset” has been amended from a.y.2015-16. it is now provided that any security held  by  a  foreign  institutional  investor  (fii)  which  has invested in such security as per seBi regulations shall be  considered  as  a  “Capital  asset”.  the  effect  of  this amendment will be that in the case of fii any gain from transfer of such investment in shares and securities as per seBi regulations will be treated as short/long term Capital Gain only. it will not be considered as Business income.  it  may  be  noted  that  fii  is  now  called  foreign portfolio investors (FPI) under SEBI regulations.

9.2    Short Term/Long – Term Capital asset and Tax rate-Section 2(42A) and 112:
(i)    By an amendment of section 2(42a)  from a.y.2015-16, the holding period for (a) unlisted shares of Companies and
(b) units of m.f. (other than units of equity – oriented funds) shall now be 36 months, instead of 12 months, as at present. accordingly, these assets will now be treated as short-term capital assets if they are held by the assessee for 36 months or less before the date of transfer, subject to applicable relaxation provided in the explanation (1) to section 2(42a).

(ii)    Presently, under the proviso to section 112, an option is available to a taxpayer to pay tax at 10% on un-indexed long-term capital gains or 20% on indexed long-term capital  gains  on  transfer  of  units  of  m.f.  this  option  in respect of such units has now been withdrawn and the same will now be taxed at 20% after indexing the cost.

(iii)    It  may  be  noted  that  the  finance  minister  has announced at the stage of passing the finance Bill that the above provision will not apply to shares of unlisted Companies or units of mf transferred during the period 01-04-2014  to  10-07-2014.  The  relevant  sections  have been amended for this purpose.

9.3    Enhanced Compensation received on Compulsory acquisition of Capital asset – Section 45(5): (i) at present, section 45(5)(b) provides that where enhanced compensation is awarded by any court, tribunal or other authority in case of compulsory acquisition of a capital asset, it shall be taxed in the year in which it is received. it is now provided that, if any amount of compensation   is received in pursuance of an interim order of a court, tribunal or any other authority, it shall be taxable as capital gains in the previous year in which the final order of such court, tribunal or other authority is made. This amendment is made from a.y. 2015-16.
 

(ii) it may be noted that the amendment does not clarify as to how capital gain will be computed if such enhanced compensation received under an interim order of the court passed in an earlier year was taxed in that year u/s. 45(5) (b). it is presumed that only the amount receivable as per the final order, after deducting the amount taxed in the earlier years, will be taxable in the year in which the final order is passed by the court, tribunal or other authority.

9.4    Section 47:
section 47 has been amended from a.y. 2015-16 to provide that transfer of a Government security carrying a periodic payment of interest made outside india through an intermediary dealing in settlement of securities, from one non-resident to another non-resident, will not be liable to Capital Gains tax.

9.5    Cost Inflation Index – Section 48:
At present, cost inflation index for a particular financial year means such index as may be notified by the Government having regard to 75% of the average rise in Consumer price index (Cpi) for urban non-manual employees for the immediately preceding year to such financial year. since this method of Cpi has been discontinued, it is now provided that cost inflation index shall mean such index as may be notified by the Government having regard to 75% of the average rise in Consumer price index (urban) for the immediately preceding previous year to such financial year. This provision will apply from A.Y. 2016-17.

9.6    Reinvestment in residential House – Section 54 and 54F

At present section 54 dealing with long term capital gains arising on transfer of a residential house, and section 54f dealing with long –term capital gain on transfer of a capital asset other than a residential house, provide for exemption from capital gains u/s. 45, subject to specified conditions. one of the conditions is that the taxpayer, within a period of one year before or two years after the date of transfer, purchases, or within a period of three years after the date of transfer, constructs a residential house. There is a controversy as to whether the benefit of exemption is available in respect of purchase/construction of more than one residential house and whether such house has necessarily to be located in india. Both these sections are now amended from a.y. 2015 – 16 to provide that the exemption under the above section will be available only in respect of one residential house situated in India. It may be noted that if one or more adjacent flats are acquired and they satisfy the test of one residential
 
House  as  held  in  various tribunal  and  Court  decisions, the tax payer may still be entitled to claim the exemption in respect of such adjacent flats

9.7    Investment of Capital gains in Specified Bonds – Section 54 EC:

(i)Section 54eC provides that where capital gain arise from the transfer of a long-term capital asset and the assessee has, within a period of six months after the date of such transfer, invested the whole or part of capital gains in the long- term (specified bonds) such capital gains shall be proportionately exempt. Such investment in specified Bonds is Limited to Rs. 50 lakh in a financial Year.

(ii)    Some  assesses  invested  rs.  50  lakh  each  in  two successive years (while ensuring that both dates of investment fell within the specified time limit of six months)  and  claimed  exemption  of  up  to  rs.1  crore. this   interpretation   was   upheld   in   certain   tribunal orders. In order to set at rest this controversy, this section is amended from a.y. 2015-16 to  provide  that the investment made by an assessee in the long-term specified bonds in respect of capital gains arising from transfer of one or more capital assets during the financial year shall not exceed `50 lacs whether the investment is made in that year or in the subsequent financial year.

10    Transfer pricing – sections 92b, 92c, 92cc and 271g:

10.1    Section 92B: section 92B(2) extends the scope of the definition of ‘international transaction’ by providing that a transaction entered into with an unrelated person shall be deemed to be a transaction with an associated enterprise, if there exists a prior agreement in relation   to the transaction  between  such  other  person  and  the associated enterprise or the terms of the relevant transaction are determined in substance between the other person and the associated enterprise.

There   was   a   doubt   as   to   whether   or   not,   for   the transaction to be treated as an international transaction, the unrelated person should be a non-resident. By amendment of this section from a.y. 2015-16 it is now provided that such transaction shall be deemed to be   an “international transaction” entered into between two associated enterprises, whether or not such other person is a resident or non-resident.

10.2    Section   92C:   at   present,   under   the   transfer
 

Pricing (tp) regulations, where more than one price is determined by most appropriate method, the arithmetic mean of all such prices is taken for determination of arm’s length price (alp) with a tolerable range of +/-3% or +/- 1%. the  application  of  this  methodology  has  been  one of the reasons for tp litigation. to reduce this litigation a third proviso is inserted in section 92C to provide that where more than one price is determined by the most appropriate method, the alp in relation to an international transaction or specified domestic transaction shall be computed in such manner as may be prescribed. With the introduction of the new mechanism from a.y. 2015-16 the existing methodology as stated above for determination of alp will not apply.

10.3    Section 92CC: section 92CC dealing with advance pricing agreements (apa) is amended w.e.f.10-10-2014 to provide for roll-back mechanism. accordingly, the apa may provide for determining the alp or specify the manner in which alp is to be determined in relation to an international transaction entered into, during any period not exceeding four previous years preceding the first of the previous year for which the apa applies in respect of  the  international  transaction  to  be  undertaken.  this roll-back provision would be subject to conditions, procedure and manner to be prescribed, providing for determining the alp or for specifying the manner in which alp is to be determined.

10.4    Section 271g: penalty u/s. 271G can be levied upon any person, who has entered into an international transaction or specified domestic transaction and fails to furnish any such document or information as required by section 92d(3). such penalty can now be levied not only by the Assessing Officer or Commissioner (Appeals) but also by the Transfer Pricing Officer w.e.f. 01-10-2014.

11    Alternate  minimum  tax  –  section  115jc  and 115 jee

(i)    The  provisions  relating  to  alternate  minimum  tax (amt) contained in section 115jC to 115jf apply to non- corporate assessees claiming deduction u/s. 10 aa or chapter Vi-a. section 115jee has been amended from
a.y. 2015-16 to provide that the provisions relating to amt will apply if deduction u/s. 35ad is claimed by the assessee.
(ii)    AMT is payable with respect to adjusted income. section 115JC has been amended from A.Y.2015-16 to provide  that  for  computing  the  adjusted  total  income, the total income shall be increased by deduction claimed
u/s. 35ad as reduced by the amount of depreciation that would have been allowable as if the deduction u/s. 35ad was not allowed. this adjustment will be in addition to the adjustments already specified in the section.

(iii)    section 115jee  is  amended   from  a.y.2015-16 to provide that even if provisions of the Chapter are otherwise not applicable in that year, either because non- corporate assessee’s (other than partnerships and llps) adjusted total income does not exceed rs. 20 lakh or it has not claimed deduction under Chapter Via, section 10aa or section 35ad, it will be entitled to claim credit for the amt paid in the earlier years u/s 115jd.

12    Survey – Section 133A:
(i)    At present the income-tax authorities can retain the custody of impounded books of account and documents for a period of 10 days without obtaining the approval of the Chief Commissioner or director General u/s 133a. this period is now increased to 15 days.
(ii)    further,  by  insertion  of  section  133a (2a)  additional powers have been granted to the income- tax authorities to carry out survey for the purpose of verification of compliance of provisions of deduction of tax at source and collection of tax at source. in such survey, the income-tax authorities cannot impound any books of accounts or any document nor make an inventory of cash, stock or other valuable article or thing. these amendments take effect from 1st october 2014.

13    Power to call for information – New Section 133C section 133C has been inserted with effect from 1st october, 2014 to empower prescribed income-tax authorities to call for information or documents from any person for the purpose of verification of information in its possession relating to any person, which may be useful for any inquiry or proceedings.

14    Assessment and Reassement
14.1    Return of Income – Section 139: it is now made mandatory  for  a  mutual  fund  referred  to  in  section 10(23d),   securitisation   trust   referred   to   in   section 10(23DA) and Venture Capital Company/fund referred to section 10(23FB) to file its return of income, if its income, without considering provisions of section 10, exceeds the non-taxable limit. every Business trust is also required to file its return of income. This amendment is made from a.y. 2015-16.

14.2    Reference to Valuation Officer – Section 142a, 153 – 153B: the existing section 142a has been replaced
by new section 142a from 01-10-2014 to provide that the Assessing Officer can make a reference to the Valuation Officer to estimate the value or  fair  market  value  of any asset, property or investment, whether or not he is satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee. The Valuation Officer shall estimate the value based on the evidence gathered after giving an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.     If the assessee does not co-operate, the Valuation Officer may estimate the value based on his judgment. The Valuation Officer is required to send a copy of his report to the Assessing Officer and to the assessee within a period of six months from the end of the month in which reference is made by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer will then complete the assessment after taking into account such report, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard. the period from the date of reference to the Valuation Officer to the date of receipt of the report by the Assessing Officer shall be excluded while computing the period of limitation for the purpose of sections 153 and 153B.

14.3    Method of accounting – Section 145: section 145 is amended from a.y. 2015-16 to provide that the Central Government may notify income Computation  and disclosure standards for computing income under the heads ‘Profits and gains of business of profession’ and ‘income from other sources’ . such standards are required to be regularly followed by the assessee and the income is required to be computed in accordance with such standards in order to avoid best judgment assessment u/s. 144.

14.4    Assessment in Search Cases – Section 153 C:  In cases of search, if the Assessing Officer is satisfied that the assets seized or books of account or other documents requisitioned belong to another person, then he has to hand over the same to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person. Hitherto, it was mandatory for the other Assessing Officer to assess/ reassess income of such other person in accordance with the provisions of section 153A in such cases. the section is amended from 1st october, 2014 to provide that such other Assessing Officer shall proceed against such other person to assess/reassess his income in accordance with the provisions of section 153, only if he is satisfied that the books of account or documents or assets seized have a bearing on the determination of the total income of such other person for the relevant assessment year or years. 15 Settlement Commission – Section 245a and 245C:
 
(i) An assessee may apply to settlement Commission for settlement of cases at any stage of the case relating to him u/s. 245C. the term ‘case’ as per section 245a (b) means any proceeding for assessment which may be pending before an Assessing Officer on the date on which application is made before settlement Commission. At present a taxpayer is not able  to file an application  for  settlement  of cases in cases where reassessment is pending before the Assessing Officer. By an amendment the proviso to section 245a which restricts the scope of the term ‘case’ has been deleted. This amendment will enable an assessee to apply to settlement commission in those cases where reassessment proceedings are pending. the changes in the provisions shall take effect from 1st october, 2014.

Similar changes have been made in Wealth-tax act as well for settlement of cases.

16    Authority for advance ruling(aar) – sections 245 n and 245-O

(i)    Currently, an advance ruling can be obtained for determining the tax liability of a non-resident. this facility is not available to resident taxpayers, except public sector undertakings. section 245n(a) is amended to provided that the term ‘advance ruling’ shall mean a determination by the authority in relation to the tax liability of a resident applicant arising out of a transaction undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by him. further, the meaning of the applicant has been amended so that the Central Government may notify the class of resident persons for the purpose of obtaining the advance ruling.

(ii)    Following  amendments  have  been  made  in  section 245-O in order to strengthen the aar.

(a)    The  existing  provision  provides  that  the  aar  will consist of three members. the amendment provides for additional appointment of Vice- Chairmen as members of aar. Further, Central Government has been empowered to appoint such number of Vice-Chairmen, revenue members and law members as it deems fit.

(b)    The existing provision does not provide for constitution of benches of aar at various locations. it merely provides that office of AAR shall be located in Delhi. The amended provisions provide as under:

•    The office of AAR shall be located in Delhi and its benches shall be located at such places as Central Government may specify.
 

•    Further, benches of AAR have been given authority  to exercise power and functions of aar and it has been further provided that such benches will consist of Chairman or the Vice-Chairman and one revenue member and one law member.

17    Penalties and Prosecution:

(i)    section  271  FAA:  this  is  a  new  section  inserted from a.y.2015-16. it provides that if a person furnishes inaccurate   statement   of   financial   transactions   or reportable account u/s. 285 Ba, penalty of rs. 50,000/- can be imposed by the prescribed income tax authority.

(ii)    Section 271 H: at present this section does not specify the authority which can levy penalty u/s 271h for assessee’s failure to furnish or for furnishing inaccurate particulars for tds/tcs. it is now provided w.e.f. 01-10- 2014 that such penalty can be levied by the assessing officer

(iii). Section 276D: this section provides that if a person willfully fails to produce accounts and documents as required in any notice issued u/s.142(1) or willfully fails to comply with a direction issued to him u/s.142(2a), he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine equal to a sum calculated at a rate which shall not be less than Rs. 4  or more than Rs. 10 for every day during which the default continues, or with both. now in such a case, such person shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and also with fine. This amendment is with effect from 01-10-2014.

18    Other Provisions

18.1    Income Tax authorities – Section 116: the following new income tax authorities are created w.e.f. 01-06-013. these are in addition to existing I.T. authorities.

(i)    principal directors General of income tax.
(ii)    principal Chief Commissioners of income-tax;
(iii)    principal directors of income-tax;
(iv)    principal Commissioners of income-tax.

18.2    Interest Payable by assessee–Section 220:
(i) s/s.(1A) Has been inserted to provide that when the notice of demand has been served upon the assessee and any appeal or other proceedings are filed or initiated in respect of the amount of such demand, then, such demand shall be valid till the disposal of the appeal by the last appellate authority or disposal of the proceedings and the same shall have effect as specified in section 3 of the taxation laws (continuation and validation of recovery proceedings) act, 1964.

(i)    Section 220(2) provides for payment of interest in respect of unpaid amount of demand. such interest is payable for the period commencing from the due date   of payment of demand to the date of payment. it is further provided that if as a result of any order passed subsequently u/s. 154, 250, 254 etc., the amount on which interest was payable is reduced, then the interest shall  also  be  reduced  accordingly.  This  section  is  now amended to provide that in such cases, subsequently,  as a result of any order under the aforesaid sections     or u/s. 263, the amount on which interest was payable   is increased, then the assessee shall be liable to pay interest u/s. 220(2) for the period from the original due date of payment of demand, up to the date of payment.

The above amendments are made from 01-10-2014.

18.3    Acceptance or repayment of Loans or Deposits – section 269ss and 269t: sections 269ss & 269t prohibit every person from taking/ accepting or repaying any loan or deposit otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft, if the amount of loan or deposit exceeds the specified threshold. The sections now permit from a/y:2015-16 taking/accepting or repaying such loan or deposit by use of electronic clearing system through a bank account (i.e., by way of internet banking facilities or by use of payment gateways).

18.4    Period for Provisional attachment of Properties
–Section 281B: under the provisions of section 281B, the Assessing Officer may provisionally attach the properties of the assessee during the pendency of the assessment proceedings. such order of provisional attachment can remain into operation for a maximum period of six months from the date of the order. However, the Chief Commissioner, Commissioner, director General or director are given the power to extend such period up to two years. Under the amended provisions, from 01-01- 2014, the above period is extended to 2 years and six months from the date of assessment or reassessment whichever is later.

18.5    Financial Transactions or reportable account
– Section 285Ba: (i) existing section 285 Ba has been replaced by a new section 285 Ba from 01-10-2014. The new section provides for furnishing of statement of Information by a prescribed reporting financial institution along with other persons as stated in existing section 285 BA in respect of any specified financial transaction or reportable account to the income tax authority or prescribed authority  or  agency.  The  statement  shall  be  furnished for such period, within such time, and in such form and manner as may be prescribed. The Central Government may notify the persons required to be registered with the prescribed income tax authority, the nature of information, the manner in which such information shall be maintained by the person and the due diligence to be carried out by the person for the purpose of identification of any reportable account. any person who furnishes a statement of information, or discovers any inaccuracy in the information provided in the statement, shall within a period of ten days of discovering the mistake, inform the income tax authority or any other prescribed authority of the inaccuracy and furnish the revised information. Thus, statement of financial transactions or reportable account will now replace ‘annual information return’.

(ii)    In line with the amendments u/s. 285Ba as stated above, provisions of  section 271fa have been suitably modified to provide for levy of penalty for failure in furnishing such new statement. Further, section 271faa has  been  inserted  which  provides  for  a  penalty  of  Rs. 50,000 which can be levied by the prescribed income- tax authority on concerned reporting financial institution which provides inaccurate information in such statement.

19    To sum up:

19.1    From the above discussion, it will be noticed that the Finance Minister in his first Budget of the new Government has made an honest attempt to reduce the burden of tax on individuals, huf etc., to give incentives for increasing savings, to encourage manufacturing activities with a view to create new jobs and encourage growth of economy, to reduce tax litigation and to make the tax laws taxpayer friendly. in this context, his following observations in para 209 and 210 of the Budget speech need to be noted

“209. Income tax Department is expected to function not only as an enforcement agency but also as a facilitator. A number of Aykar Seva Kendras (ASK) have been opened in different parts of the country.    I propose to extend this facility by opening 60 more such Seva Kendras during the current financial year to promote excellence in service delivery.

210. The focus of any tax administration is to broaden the tax base. Our policy thrust is to adopt non intrusive methods to achieve this objective. In this direction, I propose to make greater use of information technology techniques”.

19.2    The concept of Business trusts has been introduced for the first time with a view to encourage investment in infrastructure  projects.  Let  us  hope  that  this  becomes popular in the years to come. similarly, the transfer pricing provisions have been simplified to reduce tax Litigation. Again, the benefit of AAR is extended to Residents. This was the demand of the business community which has been  accepted  after  over  two  decades.  The  provisions for approaching settlement Commission  have  also been amended to enable assessees to approach the commission when reassessment proceedings are pending.

19.3    There  are  some  disturbing  provisions  which  will increase tax litigation in the coming years. One is about CSR expenditure for which specific provision is made that these expenses will be disallowed on the ground that these are not expenses incurred for business or profession.  The  logic  for  this  given  by  the  Government that this expenditure is application of income is not   at all convincing when the Companies act mandates that specified companies should spend at least 2% of average profits of earlier 3 years for CSR activities. This expenditure is treated as business expenditure under schedule iii of the Companies act and considered as application of income under the income-tax act. The other disturbing provision is about the additional power given to CIT to cancel registration of a charitable trust u/s. 12AA if the trust does not comply with requirements u/s. 10(23C), 11 or 13. for non-compliance with these provisions in any year, the existing act provides for levy of tax on the trust or institution for that year. If the registration of the trust/ institution is cancelled there will be unending litigation for which expenditure will have to be incurred out of funds of the trust/institution which would otherwise have been spent for charitable purposes. There is yet another area which relates to capital gains on transfer or redemption of units of mutual fund (other than equity oriented funds). This amendment will reduce the investment in such funds and affect the mutual fund industry.

19.4    In  para  208  of  the  Budget  speech,  the  finance minister  has  discussed  about  the  direct  taxes  Code (DTC) as under:
 

“The Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 has lapsed with the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha. Having considered the report of the Standing Committee on Finance and the views expressed by the stakeholders, my predecessor had placed a revised Code in the public domain in March, 2014. The Government shall consider the comments received from the stakeholders on the revised Code. The Government will also review the DTC in its present shape and take a view in the whole matter”.

The above observation shows that the new Government is determined to replace the existing 5 decade old income
-tax act by the DTC. We are hearing about Government intention about introducing DTC for the last about 10 years.  Let  us  hope  that  this  Government  is  able  to simplify the provisions of the direct tax laws by enacting a taxpayer friendly DTC. One wonders as to why the finance minister has made so many amendments in the existing income tax act if he is keen to bring the DTC into force in the near future.

19.5    GST is another area which is under public debate for over a decade now. In pare 9 of the Budget speech the finance minister has observed as under.

“9 The debate whether to introduce a Goods and Service Tax (GST) must now come to an end. We have discussed the issue for the past many years. Some States have been apprehensive about surrendering their taxation jurisdiction; others want to be adequately compensated. I have discussed the matter with the States both individually and collectively. I do hope we are able to find a solution in the course of this year and approve the legislative scheme which enables the introduction of GST. This will streamline the tax administration, avoid harassment of the business and result in higher revenue collection both for the Centre and the States. I assure all States that government will be more than fair in dealing with them.”

Let us hope that the new Government is able to introduce GST during this year and get the necessary legislation passed. This will help all concerned and also simplify the levy of indirect taxes.

Tax Audit – Need for defining roles

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For around the past one month, virtually all practising chartered accountants have been discussing the revised form of the tax audit report. The form underwent a change by virtue of a notification dated 25th July 2014. The changes in the form were in line with thinking of the tax department which is – shift the onus and the responsibility to assessees or the hapless professionals ! Assuming that the changes were necessary to facilitate assessments, it would have been appropriate to make them from the next assessment year so that both assessees as well as professionals would have geared up for compliance. That not having been done, the representations, including one from the Society were made to the authorities. The concern regarding the 30th September deadline has been partially addressed by the circular of the CBDT on 19th August 2014, extending the date for obtaining and furnishing the tax audit report to 30th November 2014.

Tax audit has been in existence for more than three decades but there appears to be no clarity in regard to the role of the auditor in the minds of the assessee or the auditor himself. Similarly, there is confusion about the scope and purpose of the tax audit in the minds of the tax authorities. When the concept of tax audit was introduced in 1984, the stated objective was to ensure proper maintenance of books of account, reflection of true income of the taxpayer and facilitate assessment. At that time, the role of the tax auditor was restricted to that of expressing an opinion on the true and fair view of the accounts and authenticating the correctness of the particulars prescribed. Over a period of time, a large number of clauses have been added to the report which require, compilation and consequent verification of exhaustive details, as well as expression of opinion on a large number of aspects which involve interpretation of both the Income-tax Act as well as other tax laws. The professional therefore has two roles to perform one that being that of an auditor and the other being that of a tax consultant/advisor/expert. These roles may not necessarily be in sync and could be in conflict with each other.

The problems that arise are for two reasons. Given the threshold prescribed for tax audit, a large spectrum of the business organisations/ assessees who require to get their accounts audited do not have the requisite wherewithal to compile comprehensive accounts and data that is required for the purpose of the tax audit. Consequently, at every stage in this process, a tax auditor is involved in varying degrees. In addition, he normally performs the role of tax advisor to the organisation. This means he is to ensure compliance with tax laws as well as ensure the minimum tax liability for his client. This requires that he wear different hats. The challenge is in understanding that he can wear only one hat at a time and in making a client understand this position.

When he undertakes the role of an auditor, he must in his mind accept that he is performing his duties as an independent person. He will have to express an opinion on the accounts as well as the correctness of the particulars, without letting the fact that he is also the tax advisor, colour his mind. Even if his expression of opinion may have some adverse consequences for his client, he will have to perform that task with the requisite diligence. When he represents his client’s case before the tax authorities he is performing this task as a counsel, and is entitled to urge the assesee’s case, on the basis of views held by the assessee. To my mind there is nothing wrong for an auditor to hold one view while conducting audit, but to canvass the other view before a tax authority as while he does so he is the authorised representative for his client. I am conscious that this is easier said than done. It is this role definition that is extremely important. If a professional permits these two roles to converge he will not be able to do justice to either of them.

As far as the business organisations are concerned, they must appreciate that the prime responsibility of maintenance of accounts and preparation of particulars for tax audit is their responsibility. The work of compilation can be outsourced and not the responsibility. The responsibility of carrying out a verification of the accounts so maintained and the particulars so compiled is that of the auditor. The auditor needs to emphatically state this and the auditee needs to be appreciate it.

The problem is compounded by the mind set of our professional colleagues. We tend to associate with our clients to an extent that it can causes discomfort. I have seen that many chartered accountants fight shy of making a remark in their audit report, for they believe that should they do so, the client will be affected in a tax proceeding. This is because we tend to hold ourselves responsible for the problems of the client, when more often than not the problem is the client’s own creation. We should advise a client to take the requisite steps to avoid recurrence of the problem, but if it has occurred we need to report.

While this is the case with auditors and auditees, the lawmakers must also decide what they want from a tax audit. While requiring an auditor to ensure that the accounts show a true and fair view and that the factual particulars prescribed are correct, to ask an auditor to express an opinion on interpretation of a provision is requiring him to act as an expert. Doing so will be merging the roles of an auditor and a tax expert. If this is so, then those opinions expressed need to be respected unless they are perverse or are contrary-a judicial precedent. When an officer disagrees with an opinion expressed by the tax auditor, it should not be done perfunctorily and the officer should record detailed reasons for the same. One often finds that the tax audit report is dealt with casually.

If this position changes, it will change the perspective of both, auditors and the organisations they audit. If the tax audit exercise is to become more meaningful to business organisations whose accounts are audited, useful to the tax department which relies on the report, and less stressful to chartered accountants, there will have to be a change in attitude and perspective of all stakeholders. Let us hope that Lord Ganesha whose festival we are celebrating, blesses all concerned with the requisite wisdom to do so.

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