Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

MANDATED CSR AND IMPRISONMENT: A FIT CASE FOR RECONSIDERATION

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is in
the news with the passing of the Companies Amendment Act, 2019 because it has
made lapses in complying with CSR spends an offence subject to imprisonment for
a maximum period of three years1. The penal provision for
imprisonment replaces the earlier requirement to comply with CSR spends or
explain the reason why a company had not spent the mandated amount on CSR. This
change was brought in after witnessing five years’ track record of implementing
mandated CSR. Hence it is appropriate that we evaluate and take stock of the
idea behind Mandated CSR in the backdrop of India Inc’s track record on
implementing CSR spends in the last five years and evaluate the fairness of the
current punishment accorded for lapses in CSR spends in the overall context of
the penal provisions prescribed under the Companies Act, 2013.

 

India is the first and probably only country
till date to mandate CSR spends by large corporates. It was part of the
Companies Act, 2013 which was enacted to replace the 1956 Act and was seen as a
major measure to promote ease of doing business and corporate activity that
would accelerate the pace of India’s economic growth. Probably to balance the
inequality created by private sector-led economic growth, the new Act required
large companies, defined by their net-worth, turnover or profits beyond the
defined threshold level, to spend 2% of the average profits of the last three
years on specific activities identified in schedule VII of the Act.

__________________________________________________________________

1   135 (5)
The Board of every company referred to in sub-section (1), shall ensure
that the company spends, in every financial year, at least two per cent of the
average net profits of the company made during the three immediately preceding
financial years, or where the company has not completed the period of three
financial years since its incorporation, during such immediately preceding
financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy:

Provided that the
company shall give preference to the local area and areas around it where it
operates, for spending the amount earmarked for Corporate Social Responsibility
activities:

Provided further
that if the company fails to spend such amount, the Board shall, in its report
made under clause (o) of sub-section (3) of section 134, specify
the reasons for not spending the amount and, unless the unspent amount relates
to any ongoing project referred to in sub-section (6), transfer such
unspent amount to a Fund specified in Schedule VII, within a period of six
months of the expiry of the financial year.

Explanation—For the
purposes of this section “net profit” shall not include such sums as may be
prescribed and shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of section
198.

(6) Any amount remaining
unspent under sub-section (5), pursuant to any ongoing project,
fulfilling such conditions as may be prescribed, undertaken by a company in
pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy, shall be transferred
by the company within a period of thirty days from the end of the financial
year to a special account to be opened by the company in that behalf for that
financial year in any scheduled bank to be called the Unspent Corporate Social
Responsibility Account, and such amount shall be spent by the company in
pursuance of its obligation towards the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy
within a period of three financial years from the date of such transfer,
failing which, the company shall transfer the same to a fund specified in
schedule VII, within a period of thirty days from the date of completion of the
third financial year.

(7) If a company
contravenes the provisions of sub-section (5) or sub-section (6),
the company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than fifty
thousand rupees but which may extend to twenty-five lakh rupees and every officer of such company who is in default
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years
or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but
which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.

 

 

CSR RATIONALE – THE THREE VIEWPOINTS

The concept of CSR emerged in economies
where there was exclusive focus on corporate business responsibility. In
contrast, in social democratic societies in Northern Europe, especially the
Nordic countries, the concept of CSR is quite nascent and is focused more on
sustainability and innovations as the basic social security needs of health,
education and old-age relief are provided by the state. Even in continental
Europe, in countries like France and Germany, where some form of state
socialism prevails, CSR has limited appeal. Companies in the private sector of
these economies implement labour laws which are quite comprehensive and pay
their taxes which fund social security programmes for the rest of the society.

 

The idea of CSR has flourished only in
liberal market economies such as the United States where the private sector
dominates healthcare and education, catering only to the needs of the society
that can afford to use their service. The reason for this is not too difficult
to fathom. The primary business responsibility of a company in these economies
is restricted to earning a profit by conducting its affairs legally and the
social security system in place is not comprehensive enough to cover all the
vulnerable sections of the society. Further, some of these social concerns were
not addressed by the government despite the visible and pressing needs as it
was seen by some to infringe on the personal freedom of individuals, or seen by
some others to be discretionary for which tax-payers’ money should not be used.

 

Over time, three distinct views emerged to
justify CSR in these liberal economies. Initially, CSR spending was seen as an
optional marketing expense, essential for building a corporate brand and
goodwill among the public at large who were seen as potential customers or
employees in the long run. In the second stage, the pressure to spend on CSR
increased in companies operating in certain sectors like mining and energy that
used natural resources and caused noticeable pollution / environmental hazards.

 

But then a new rationale emerged, with CSR
being seen through the lens of the social contract theory. Using this theory,
CSR spending was justified as the fee paid by the polluting firms to society in
return for their right to carry on business. This view seems to have gained
credibility as firms with high CSR spends were found in highly polluting
sectors, or sectors with large negative externalities, such as mining, tobacco
and oil exploration.

 

Around the end of the second millennium, a
third view emerged. It was an interesting viewpoint, where CSR was seen as
businesses serving the base of the pyramid. This idea gained traction in
parallel with the idea of social enterprises gaining visibility, especially in
areas like micro-finance. Depending upon whom you talk to and which part of the
world you are in, all the three views can be heard.

 

MANDATED CSR – A
PRO-CON ANALYSIS

The idea of mandated CSR introduced by the
Companies Act, 2013 emerged in the backdrop of the prevailing concepts of CSR
expenditure seen as brand investment or as a social contract with the society
to compensate for the negative effects of business, or as catering to the needs
of the base of the pyramid, or as a variant of social enterprise. In this
context, mandated CSR was a new idea not found elsewhere in the world. Shorn of
its voluntary ‘mask’, mandated CSR is a form of taxation, where the tax,
instead of being paid to the exchequer, was now in the hands of the taxpayer to
be spent on pre-defined purposes. Instead of a legal process coercing the
company to spend with the threat of penalty for defaults in spending, the 2013
mandate used the principle of social pressure of ‘Comply or Explain’, a
technique using social standing and reputation as leverage to get companies to
spend on CSR.

 

Advocates of the mandated CSR approach
hailed it for three specific reasons:

(i) Companies would be more effective than
government in spending the money as they would bring in the speed and
efficiency of the corporate world in the selection, implementation and
monitoring of the CSR spends. Especially on the monitoring front, there was
huge expectation of corporate experience bringing in new techniques and methods
of monitoring that would help the social sector.

(ii) Absence of the bureaucracy and
discretion available in the corporate world would enable innovative projects to
be taken up in the social sector funded by the corporates. Once these projects
succeeded, they could be used by the government for scaling up and reaching
larger segments of the society.

(iii) Companies would cater to the needs of
specially deserving segments of the population and meet the specific needs of
their location that may not be visible to the larger government machinery.

 

Opponents of the mandated CSR school, in
addition to questioning the ‘corporate efficiency’ theory, also raised the
issue of intent where some corporates instead of allocating incremental budgets
for CSR spends may be reclassifying their current spends or placing a social
envelop for their business spends on marketing and pre-recruitment training
expenses to meet the mandate. Further, they also questioned the desire of
corporates to spend time and effort in building the competency required to
manage social projects.

 

While both sides had their merits, only the
track record of India Inc. in CSR spends could settle the issue one way or the
other. So what does the five-year track record of India Inc. show?

 

INDIA INC.’S CSR
PERFORMANCE – THE TRACK RECORD

In the first year of mandated CSR, if we
take Nifty 50 as representative of India Inc., the performance reflected
teething troubles as is to be expected of any new enactment, especially one
that involves discretionary spends. Against a mandated spend of Rs. 5,046
crores, reflecting 2% of the profits of the Nifty 50 companies, the actual
spend was at 79%, amounting to Rs. 3,989 crores2. Two of the Nifty
50 entities, State Bank of India and Bank of Baroda, are not regulated by the
Companies Act, 2013 and hence were not required to specify their mandated
spends on CSR.

__________________________________________-

2   CimplyFive’s India Secretarial Practice 2015,
Nifty 50 Annual Report Analysis, December 2015

 

Of the remaining 48 companies, 16 spent in
excess of the mandate, including three companies where the mandated spends on
CSR was negative due to lack of profits. The remaining 32 companies had a
shortfall in their spends, with 30 of them explaining the reason for their
inability to spend. Only two companies offered no explanation for not spending
the required amount on CSR. A further analysis revealed that 12 companies had
stated that being the first year, they were not able to spend as they were
building their capacity to spend.

 

Table 1: Comparison of CSR spends by Nifty 50
Companies in the first two years of mandate

 

Financial year

CSR amount mandated

Rs. crores

Amount spent

Rs. crores

% spent of mandated amount

Companies not spending mandated amount

2014-15

5,046

3,989

79%

32 (64%)

2015-16

5,478

5,082

93%

25 (50%)

 

In the second
year of implementation, we see a marked improvement in CSR spends compared to
the first year as depicted in Table 1. The mandated amount of CSR spends
increased by 8.5% to Rs. 5,478 crores and the amount spent on CSR activities
increased by 27% to Rs. 5,082 crores. Even the amount spent as percentage of
the mandate increased from 79% to 93%, an increase of 14%.3  Companies not spending the mandated amount
too decreased from 32 to 25 and only one company did not disclose the reason
for not spending the mandated amount.

 

The steady improvement in compliance becomes
more evident when we look at the last two years. In 2017-18, the CSR spend as a
percentage of mandate was 984 
and in the last financial year 2018-19, the spend as a percentage of
mandate was at 104. However, the number of companies with shortfall in CSR
spends in 2018-19 at ten remained at the same level as in 2017-18.

 

The performance of India Inc., as
represented by the Nifty 50 companies in the five-year period, reflects that
the objective of CSR mandate in getting companies to spend on social activities
is achieved as evidenced by Nifty 50 companies, as they spent 104% of the
mandated amount.

____________________________________________________

3   CimplyFive’s India Secretarial Practice 2016,
Nifty 50 Annual Reports Analysis, November 2016

4   CimplyFive’s India Secretarial Practice 2018,
A Study of Nifty 50 Companies, March 2019

 

 

Table 2: CSR spends of the Nifty 50 Companies
in last two years

 

Financial year

CSR amount mandated

Rs. crores

Amount spent

Rs. crores

% spent of mandated amount

Companies not spending mandated amount

2017-18

6,434

6,300

98%

10 (20%)

2018-19

6,858

7,109

104%

10 (20%)

 

 

The Indian experience of using ‘comply or
explain’ is at par with the international experience seen in Europe where it
takes three to four years for a new regulation to be widely adopted and
implemented. While the experience of Indian corporates outside the Nifty 50
companies could be different, there is no data that is analysed and presented
to show that. Given this analysis, was there a need to change the penal
provision to enforce CSR spends by Indian corporates to the extreme level of
imprisoning the officers in default for a maximum period of three years? How
does this punishment compare with penalties for other defaults in company law?

 

PENALTY IN CORPORATE
LAW

Conceptually, punishment or penalty can have
two distinct objectives:

 

(a) Compensatory, i.e., to punish the
wrongdoers by taking away from them the benefit accruing to them from their
wrongdoing. Most often this is in the form of monetary penalties; or

(b) Deterrent and preventive, i.e., act as a
disincentive to the wrongdoer and all other potential wrongdoers by imposing a cost on them that is prohibitive and dissuades them from
committing the wrong. Since the objective is to be a deterrent and preventive,
this takes the form of monetary penalties, where the amount recovered is more
than the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer and / or limiting the personal
freedom of the wrongdoer, i.e., imprisonment.

 

The Companies Act, 2013, consisting of 470
sections, has penalties both in the nature of compensatory and
deterrent-cum-preventive measures. The Act has 101 sections with monetary
penalties for non-compliance and 56 sections that have imprisonment as penalty
combined with fine, as monetary penalty.5  While monetary penalties can be levied on
either the company or the officers in default, imprisonment is a penalty
applied only to the officers in default.

__________________________________________________

5   CimplyFive’s Report on the Cost of Compliance
and Penalty for Non-compliance under the Companies Act, 2013, December 2017

 

 

Analysing the penalty provisions that
provide for imprisonment in the Companies Act, 2013 we can classify them into
six distinct categories based on their value as a deterrent, as detailed in
Table 3:

 

Table 3: Classification of penalty provisions
for imprisonment based on their value as a deterrent

 

Category

Quantum of imprisonment

Illustrative types of wrongdoing

I

Which may extend up to 6 months

If company issues shares at a discount (section 53)

II

Which may extend up to 1 year

If a company fails to comply with the orders of the Tribunal
regarding rectification of registers of members (section 59)

III

Which may extend up to 2 years

Tampering with minutes (section 118)

IV

Which may extend up to 3 years

If a company violates the provisions of buyback of securities
(section 68)

If a company violates the provisions of buyback of securities
(section 69)

Default in complying with the order of the Tribunal to redeem
debentures, pay interest, etc. (section 71)

V

Which may extend up to 7 years

If company fails to repay deposit, or interest thereof,
within the time specified (section 74)

VI

Which may extend up to 10 years

Incorporation of a company providing false or incorrect
information (section 7, attracting penalty under section 447)

 

 

Seen in this backdrop, lapses in complying
with the CSR requirements on spending / transferring the amount to specified
accounts with imprisonment up to three years equates it to a category IV
offence, which is higher than tampering with the minutes of meetings of the
company.

 

Further, an analysis of Nifty 50 companies
that have short-spent on the mandated amount reveals that in some companies,
the Profit After Tax may not be backed by Operating Cash flows providing them
the liquidity to spend. At the Nifty 50 level, Operating Cash flows at Rs. 3,13,638 crores
are 90% of Profit After Tax at Rs. 3,48,751 crores. For certain companies that
have short-spent on CSR, Operating Cash flow as a percentage of Profit After
Tax drops to 16. Given this anomaly of Operating Cash flows being lower than
Profit After Tax in many companies due to their business model of selling on
credit or having a long working capital cycle, the penal provision of
imprisonment for non-compliance which could be the result of a business reality
needs a review.

 

Given the fact that charity cannot be
mandated or legislated, this mandate to prescribe imprisonment for lapses in
CSR spends, which the world over is optional for corporates, needs to be
seriously reconsidered.
The regulators, by swiftly
amending the law to remove this aberration, would visibly signal a conducive
corporate environment to promote economic growth and employment generation.

 

 

PS: After this article was written but
before publication, the government has responded to implement the report of
high-level committee on CSR which has recommended that violations should be
treated as civil offences and made liable to monetary fines.

 

This is a welcome step and will go a long
way in the Indian companies feeling the responsive nature of the regulator to
critical feedback.

 

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS: LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES

This is a sequel to the article published
in the BCAJ of August, 2019: ‘De-layering Related Party Transactions through
Internal Audit’ by CA Ashutosh Pednekar

 

This article (a sequel) gives practical
approaches to identification of Related Parties (RPs), examining the legitimacy
of Related Party Transactions (RPTs) and such other matters that internal
auditors could integrate in their audits. Conflict of interest and RPTs have
become a very important part of audits of companies. The author offers case
studies that could inform the reader about some principles, techniques and
tools to uncover the substance of transactions where RPs are involved

 

The way an organisation deals with its
related parties speaks volumes about the culture and integrity of the
decision-makers, i.e., the management. To an Internal Auditor, reviewing the
dealings of a company with its related parties can provide an understanding of
its culture and beliefs, its core values and transparency.

 

There are various pronouncements and
regulations promulgated for guiding and monitoring identification and
disclosures of RPs and RPTs. There are governance mechanisms that place an
onerous responsibility on the Audit Committee of ensuring that all RPTs are at
arm’s length pricing. Taxation laws and transfer pricing audit requirements
further reduce the possibility of arbitrariness in the commercial terms agreed
for RPTs. What, then, can the Internal Auditor’s review of RPs and RPTs
contribute that is not already covered by the various disclosure, approval and
reporting protocols?

 

CASE 1: WHO IS A
RELATED PARTY? SUBSTANCE OVER FORM?

 

Background

Ms Smart is the Internal Auditor of a large
listed company. As part of the internal audit, she came across a transaction
where the company had awarded a three-year exclusive contract to a PR agency
called Connexions under which 70% of the contract value was paid upfront and
the balance 30% was to be paid in three equal instalments – the agreement also
stated that in case of premature termination of the agreement by the company,
Connexions would not be required to refund any amount already paid to it. There
were no past commercial transactions between the company and Connexions.

 

An
unusual transaction

Ms Smart found this transaction unusual and
uncharacteristic of the company. The terms of the contract seemed one-sided,
favouring the PR agency. Hence, she inquired about the vendor and found that
the agency was owned by three partners, one of whom was a woman whose name
appeared somewhat familiar.

 

A
smart search

Ms Smart engaged with social media platforms
like LinkedIn and Facebook to find out more about the partners / owners of the
PR agency. And she found that the woman partner was none other than the fiancée
of the Managing Director’s son. She also came across news items and YouTube
videos showing the lavish engagement ceremony of the MD’s son with the woman in
question.

 

Is
a fiancée a related party? In matters of doubt, err on the safe side

Ms Smart felt that while the PR Agency was
not strictly an RP under any regulations, the substance of the transaction made
it an RPT. She brought this to the notice of the Audit Committee and explained
why the transaction might need approval akin to the approval required for an
RPT to ensure good governance and transparency.

 

Next, Ms Smart
explained that the regulations define the ambit and the intent of the law. In
case of RPTs, the intent is to prevent the abuse of minority shareholders or
other stakeholders by decisions taken by the controlling shareholders favouring
their RPs. In cases where a counter party does not strictly meet the definition
of an RP, but for all practical purposes is perceived as an RP, it is better to
treat the transaction with such a party as an RPT.

Audit
Committee verdict

The Audit
Committee agreed to take a wider view of the policy related to RPs, and advised
the management to report transactions with potential RPs to the Audit
Committee. In the present case, based on the facts presented, the Audit
Committee found the transaction to be not at arm’s length and not transparent
and, hence, advised that necessary steps be taken to revise the contract.

 

CASE 2: EXAMINING THE
NEED / LEGITIMACY OF AN RPT

 

Internal
Audit mandate for review of RPTs

Ms Sceptic, the Internal Auditor of a
company dealing in industrial products, was asked by the Audit Committee to
undertake a special review of related party transactions of a listed entity.

 

Internal
Audit findings

Ms Sceptic went through the policy and the
entire process of identification and approval of RPTs. She was satisfied with
the contents of the policy and the process adopted for establishing fair price
for RPTs.

 

But in her
detailed review of reported RPTs she came across the following two transactions
that caught her attention:

(i) Purchase of three paintings from the
spouse of one of the Independent Directors, from an exhibition held at a
well-known art gallery. The total sum paid for these paintings was Rs.
84,00,000. The value of the paintings was as per the valuation certificate and
was in line with the price of other paintings sold at the exhibition. In the
same month, the company had paid interest on late payment of GST and TDS due to
a liquidity crunch that it had been facing for some months.

(ii) Brokerage, amounting to Rs. 40,00,000
(being 1% of property value, this being the norm in the broking industry) on a
large property purchase transaction was credited to Amanda Services in which a
director’s daughter is a partner. Amanda Services has an impressive website
projecting the entity as a real estate broking firm. The brokerage remained
unpaid for three months after the transaction of purchase of property was
concluded.

 

On inquiry, Ms Sceptic found that the
brokerage could not be paid as Amanda Services did not have a GST registration.
She also found that the GST registration was applied for almost two months
after the property purchase transaction was concluded. This suggested that
Amanda Services may not be an established player in the real estate broking
business.

In both the above cases, due disclosures
were made and approvals were in place. Arm’s length pricing was also
established. However, it appeared that in the first case the need to purchase
the paintings was not established, whereas in the second case there was a
reason to doubt as to whether Amanda Services had indeed provided broking
services for the property transaction.

 

The
conclusion

Ms Sceptic presented her findings, with
corroborative details, to the Audit Committee, clearly pointing out that before
determining the reasonableness of pricing, it is important to establish the
legitimacy of the need and the actual delivery of services. The Audit Committee
acknowledged that the review of RPs and RPTs must include validation of the
underlying legitimacy of the RPTs.

 

CASE 3: PROVISION OF FREE
FACILITIES

 

Background

Ms Curious is the Chief Internal Auditor of
a listed company where the promoters are from a single family and hold about
40% of the equity shares. The company operates out of its corporate office in a
metro city and rents five floors of the said building.

 

On a day when the internal audit was going
on, Ms Curious was told that there was no place for the Internal Audit team to
sit (this is not a surprise) for a few days as certain branch managers were
visiting and they needed to be provided working space. Hence, it was suggested
that the internal audit be rescheduled and the team assigned to a branch or a
depot audit for a few days.

 

Chance
discovery

Ms Curious, being curious by nature and keen
to complete the internal audit on hand expeditiously, walked around the five
floors trying to find space for her team to occupy temporarily. She came across
a part of the office with a  glass door
leading to an enclosed smaller office space. She found a group of about 15
people working there whom she had not interacted with before but had seen
around in the company cafeteria at lunch time. This appeared strange, as the
Internal Audit scope had covered all key areas of the company over the past few
years since she was appointed as the Chief Internal Auditor.

 

Research
and analysis – from doubt to a confirmed
finding

On exchanging courtesies, she learned that
these people were employees of the family office of the promoters, managing
entities dealing with personal investments of the promoter family. She also
found that the family office had been occupying the space for several years.

 

What
next? Communicating with those charged with governance

Ms Curious ran a search to find out if any
recovery was being made towards the rent or utilities from any related party.
She also looked up the disclosures for remuneration of directors and related
party transactions to see if there was any approval / disclosure for use of corporate
office premises for the private use of the promoters, free of cost. When her
search did not yield any positive results, it became clear to her that this was
an inappropriate action by the promoters that had perhaps not been disclosed to
the Audit Committee members and, hence, never been subjected to any scrutiny or
debate.

 

She considered various options to bring this
issue to the notice of the management. After mulling over the options, she
sought a meeting with the Audit Committee Chairman, expressed her concern,
handed over a confidential note giving details and requested him to take it up
with the management and the other Audit Committee members.

 

CASE 4: ALLOWING RP TO
TERMINATE AN ONEROUS COMMITMENT

 

Background

Ms No Nonsense is the internal auditor of a
corporate conglomerate comprising of a flagship listed company known as XYZ
Limited (XYZ), several subsidiaries and associate entities. The listed company
held large office premises in excess of its requirements.

 

XYZ had leased out some of its office
premises to an associate company in which it held 49% stake and the promoter
family held 51%. The lease was given on rent and other terms that were
established to be at arm’s length. Offices in the same building were also
leased out to an unrelated party at the same time, on the same rates and terms.
Both the leases were for a period of nine years, with a lock-in period of five
years and an escalation clause increasing the rent by 8% at the end of two
years.

 

Two years after entering into these leases, the
real estate market nosedived and rental rates came down drastically.
Consequently, both the parties requested premature termination of the lease.
XYZ did not permit the unrelated party to terminate the lease without paying
the liquidated charges stated in the lease agreement and issued legal notices
to that effect. However, for the RP, XYZ allowed the foreclosure without
charging the dues as per the agreement. The MD approved the foreclosure
decision but requested the Audit Committee for approval, this being an RPT.

 

The
Internal Auditor – Putting things in perspective

Ms No Nonsense, the Internal Auditor, was
required to review the RPTs on a quarterly basis and report to the Audit
Committee on the same. In the present case, she apprised the Audit Committee
that the RPT transaction (of waiver of escalation clause and permitting a
foreclosure of the lease without any penalties) was not in the interest of XYZ
and the treatment given to the RP was significantly favourable compared to an
exactly similar transaction undertaken with an unrelated counter party. In her
opinion, this RPT was a case of favouring the RP against the interest of XYZ
Limited.

 

 

Constraints
of the Audit Committee

When the Audit Committee is asked to approve
RPTs, at times the information given is incomplete and misleading. Comparable
transactions with unrelated parties are not always presented to the AC. Thus
approvals given by it may be based on incomplete facts. Besides, the attention
given at the time of entering into an RPT is much more compared to the
attention given to terminations, rollovers or extensions. Having an objective
review prior to giving approval may help the Audit Committee to grant approval
based on full facts and details.

 

 

LESSONS FROM THE CASE
STUDIES

The case studies presented above contain
several important lessons, both for the Internal Auditors and the Audit
Committee. A summary of these lessons is presented hereunder:

 

(a) Going
beyond the confines of definitions:
In identifying an RP and an RPT,
one needs to go beyond the confines of the regulatory definitions and apply the
‘substance over form’ principle by looking at the spirit of the regulations.

 

(b) Unmasking: Special attention may be paid to unravel:

(1) Arrangements for providing free usage of
assets, facilities and resources to RPs;

(2) Unusual, uncharacteristic arrangements
that do not reflect usual contractual acumen, as RPTs may be masked therein;

(3) Terminations and modifications of
approved RP transactions / contracts on terms favourable to the RP.

 

(c) Questioning
purpose and legitimacy:
Review of RPTs needs to go beyond the
disclosures and reporting protocols and must extend to questioning the
legitimacy and the purpose of entering into such transactions.

 

(d) Going beyond the obvious: Internal Auditors may periodically consider special audits like an
asset usage review, people deployment review, etc., to identify potential
redundancies and misuse, including violation of regulations pertaining to RPs.

 

(e) Engaging
with the AC:
The Audit Committee must create opportunities for direct,
periodic interactions between the auditors and the Audit Committee members in
the normal course. Internal Auditors need to maintain a line of communication
open with the Audit Committee members, to be able to escalate issues directly
relating to governance matters. Reporting on issues related to RPs and RPTs is
sensitive and requires tactful communication.

 

SHOULD INTERNAL AUDIT
SCOPE INCLUDE REVIEW OF RPTS?

The cases discussed above are very simple
and straightforward. As organisations become larger and the complexity, volume
and value of RPTs increase, it becomes difficult for the Audit Committee to
ensure that:

 

(I) All RPs and RPTs have been duly
identified;

(II) Adequate
processes and technology-based initiatives have been employed for
identification of all RPs and RPTs;

(III) Dealings not resulting in financial
transactions are also reported to the Audit Committee;

(IV) The facts and details required for a
fair assessment of the necessity for RPTs and the arm’s length pricing thereof
have been presented to them;

(V) Entities that are not strictly RPs but
are likely to be perceived as such are also subjected to similar scrutiny as
RPTs; and

(VI) The tendency of the executive
management to circumvent due scrutiny of RPTs is identified and escalated in a
timely manner.

 

With onerous responsibilities cast on the
Audit Committee with respect to related party dealings and disclosures, it has
become imperative for the Audit Committee to put the RP-related processes and
transactions through the objective scrutiny of specialist professionals.
Internal Auditors, with their curiosity, scepticism, smartness and
no-nonsense
approach, are well suited to give due assurance to the Audit
Committee and, where required, give early alerts with respect to cases of
abuse, inappropriateness, misuse or fraudulent conduct.

 

By extending the Internal Audit scope to
RPTs, the Internal Auditors are empowered to gain necessary access to such transactions
and through this, gain relevant insights into the culture and ethics of the
Management. Such insights make the overall Internal Audit more meaningful and
conversations with the Audit Committee more relevant.

To conclude, Internal Audit of processes
pertaining to Related Parties and Transactions is not just a compliance review
– it is an audit of integrity and culture, of the tone at the top, of
convergence between stated values and demonstrated actions. When looked at in
this light, this audit assumes great importance: it calls for great maturity,
sensitivity and experience from the Internal Auditors.

 

If
you have integrity, nothing else matters. If you don’t have integrity, nothing
else matters.

Alan K. Simpson

HIRING FOR TALENT – PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGY

If one were to keep processes and technology
aside, then recruitment is all about people – and, guess what? Inherently, most
people are hilarious! Nothing like the pressure of a job interview to bring out
the most awkward, silly and mystifying behaviour in us. So, while we often
celebrate the victories – perfect referrals, nailing your LinkedIn search on
the first try, the candidate saying yes as soon as they are offered the job –
let’s take some time to get to the basics.

 

RECRUITMENT AND
SELECTION

Many a time I have noticed even the best
using recruitment and selection interchangeably. In very simple terms,
recruitment is the process of finding and hiring the best-qualified candidate
(from within or outside of an organisation) for a job opening, in a timely and
cost-effective manner. The recruitment process includes analysing the
requirements of a job, attracting employees to that job, screening and selecting
applicants, hiring and integrating the new employee in the organisation.

 

Hiring for the right talent is incomplete
without a thorough job analysis before recruiting someone and a periodic
job evaluation later. Job analysis is a family of procedures to identify the
content of a job in terms of activities involved and attributes or job
requirements needed to perform the activities. Job analysis provides
information about organisations which helps to determine which employees are
the best fit for specific jobs. Through job analysis, we can understand what
the important tasks of the job are, how they are carried out and the necessary
human qualities needed to complete the job successfully.

 

A job
evaluation
is a
systematic way of determining the value / worth of a job in relation to other
jobs in an organisation. It tries to make a systematic comparison between jobs
to assess their relative worth for the purpose of establishing a rational
pay structure.
 

 

Job evaluation
needs to be differentiated from job analysis. Every job evaluation method
requires at least some basic job analysis in order to provide factual
information about the jobs concerned. Thus, job evaluation begins with job
analysis and ends at that point where the worth of a job is ascertained for
achieving pay equity between jobs and different roles.

 

JOB DESCRIPTION AND
SKILL NEEDS

In the light of changes in environmental
conditions (technology, products, services, etc.), jobs need to be examined
closely. For example, the traditional clerical functions have undergone a rapid
change in sectors like banking, insurance and railways after computerisation.
New job descriptions need to be written and the skill needs of new jobs
need to be duly incorporated in the evaluation process. Otherwise, employees
may feel that all the relevant job factors – based on which their pay has been
determined – have not been evaluated properly.

 

COST OF BAD HIRING

Misrepresentation
is the way employers end up making bad hires. It is not that you go and
deliberately hire the worst candidate. As per a study conducted by global human
resource consultancy CareerBuilder, 88% companies in Russia said they were
affected by bad hiring last year, followed by 87% in Brazil and China, and 84%
in India.

 

The study further said that three in every
ten Indian companies (29%) reported that a single bad hire – someone who turned
out not to be a good fit for the job or did not perform well – cost the company
more than Rs. 20 lakhs (USD 37,150) on an average. Apart from these study results,
there are many other aspects which get affected in an organisation because of a
bad hire, such as productivity, employee morale, increased turnover and the
financial costs of replacement.

 

CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS –
DEMAND VS. SUPPLY

After looking at the generic process and
impacts of hiring right, let’s take a step backward and look at the scenario of
chartered accountant professionals in India.

 

In a country of 125 crore citizens and 6.80
crore taxpayers in 2017-18, close to three lakh CAs serve as the finance
guides. As of 2018, there are 2.90 lakh CAs in India of whom only 1.30 lakhs
are in full-time practice – that means about 44% of the total number of CAs.

Growing
industry

The
demand for CAs in India has been on the rise because more businesses are being
established and the government has been making policies and regulations to
monitor the market. As of January, 2019, more than one crore taxpayers have
registered in the GST regime. However, there are not many professionals to
guide
these taxpayers.

 

There is an immediate need to tap the talent
and to skill them in advanced tax calculations. Training in Artificial
Intelligence to participate in the growing automation of auditing process is
also needed.

 

The demand is not just because of the change
in the economy but also because of the crucial job roles that CAs have been
playing, catering to, for instance, Internal Audit, Tax Audit, tax planning,
cost planning, due diligence, audit under various state and Central
legislations, government audit, management audit, etc. Around 98 lakh
businesses have been registered under the GST regime and every business
requires a professional to manage the accounts- related matters. ‘Under the GST
regime all the taxpayers whose annual turnover is above Rs. 2 crores will
require to have a GST audit carried out by CAs’.

 

Lack
of professionals

India produces a large number of engineers
and doctors, despite the fact that there are no jobs for skilled students. But
even after having a long-term scope of professional security, the accounting
sector faces a crunch of trained professionals. ‘The recent push and incentives
being provided for startups, where students get full
control of their businesses, is another reason why commerce students are
looking beyond chartered accountancy’.

 

The struggle during the exams and low
stipends at entry-level jobs and limited job opportunities are some of the
reasons that have pushed students away from pursuing the professional field of
chartered accountancy. The crisis here is also that demand is ever increasing,
but the supply is not at par because of the salaries when compared to MBA and
other niche degrees.

 

The problem also lies in the curriculum
which largely is theoretical and not in sync with the industry requirement.
‘The rigorous practical exposure during the course of study is missing, which
makes most of the CAs feel that they are not ready for the corporate world,’
says Raghav Bhargava, Director, Taxmann.

Low
pass percentage

While
there is no glamour associated with CA as a career, the low pass percentage is
yet another reason that the number of professionals is not high. The pass
percentage for the May, 2018 final CA exams was recorded at 14% as compared to
7.63% in May, 2019. Due to the challenging nature of the industry, the vast
syllabus and the absence of a strong, formal setup of classes, there is a high
dropout rate which leads to the low pass percentage.

 

ICAI has a uniform level of scaling as per the
demand. The number of students passing the CA exams depends on the demand
calculation through ICAI’s survey. Moreover, there is no formal setup for CA
education and students have to depend on coaching centres. Aspirants from Tier
II and Tier III cities have limited chances to qualify for the CA entrance exams
because quality coaching is not available.

 

The
secret

We all know the theories of demand and
supply and I truly believe that a prestigious course like CA through the
Institute has adopted those theories very well. Hence, not everyone becomes a
CA and those who do, end up commanding a premium given the demand-supply
dynamics. Hiring for the niche role performed by CAs is very difficult and
those with additional skill sets in forensics, fraud, complex structuring deals
come at a premium.

 

TALENT VS. PEOPLE

While all of the above holds true, the
constant challenge that organisations face is hiring the right talent in their
workforce. The solution is the ever-evolving recruitment strategies, tools and
disruptions. There is a change in the spectrum of activities that were followed
a decade back and now, leading to better hiring, and we are not yet there!
However, many factors, including CSR by organisations to social media, are
playing a big part now. Let’s look at the age-old hiring style vs. the
situation now.

 

The
legacy recruitment

The recruitment process has remained
somewhat resilient to the changes in technology and the social revolution of
the new generation. Over the last two decades, recruitment was about publishing
ads in leading classifieds, both print media and websites, placing candidates
for interviews, comparing them with scores on common selection criteria and
arriving at a decision.

 

However, the time taken to hire then and now
is different, now being much less. The systems and tools without the modern AI
and analytics had a rework to be done for every new role sourcing. The early
2000s already had some job portals but these were sparsely used, so the
database of prospective employees was also individually controlled by each firm
and was limited. LinkedIn came into the picture by 2009-10, breaching the gap
between the employees but still keeping it formal.

 

The candidates did not have any idea about
the internal culture, work scenarios and access to some facts of their
prospective new employer before joining the firm until ‘Glass Door’ or ‘Hush’
arrived recently.

 

All in all, both the employer and employee
were at a higher risk of finding wrong matches for themselves because of lack
of information, although the time spent in hiring and getting hired was higher.

 

The
new-age hiring

The hiring process has transformed
dramatically over the years, due in large part to technological advancements.

 

Beyond the rise of the internet, tools like
video interviewing and interview scheduling software have helped to streamline
the hiring process, saving both time and money and making an employer’s life much
easier.

 

But there are some other, more subtle
differences between how people acquire talent now versus a decade ago. Here is
how the hiring process has changed over time:

 

Reach
is much more expansive

Before social media and the internet, a
person looking to expand his team had to hope that a qualified professional saw
his job posting in the local newspaper or trade magazine. Their reach was
somewhat limited when it came to recruiting and employers felt that they were
talking to the same candidates over and over when it came time to fill a
vacancy – or worse, choosing less-than-qualified individuals for open roles,
simply because there was no one else available.

 

The internet has truly revolutionised
recruiting. There are so many more touch points available to an employer
looking to fill an open role. From LinkedIn to your company’s website to
Twitter, Facebook networking groups and beyond, it’s never been easier to
access a deep pool of qualified candidates.

 

In some ways this might feel overwhelming,
as it means you’re sorting through more resumes than ever before, but it also
greatly increases your chances of finding someone who’s the perfect fit for the
role in question.

 

If you don’t like the applications you’re
getting from those in your immediate area, you can go beyond your city and even
your state until you find the ideal candidate.

 

Drastic improvements in interviewing
technology

Video interviewing has become a dramatic
time and money saver for those looking to hire. Instead of having to fly a
candidate in for an interview or rely on the phone to get a sense of what the
person is all about, the employer can now utilise video interviewing technology
for the process. This enables him to see and hear  the professional without having to pay for
airfare and hotel costs. It’s much easier to schedule interviews. Thanks to the
arrival of interview scheduling software on the scene, employers are now able
to take the legwork out of bringing a professional in for an interview. This
enables them to shift their attention to preparing for the interview and making
the best hiring choice possible for the business.

 

An
increased focus on cultural fit

From an employer’s perspective, experience
and education matter, but they’re also taking a deeper look at who that
candidate is as an individual.

 

Those in charge of hiring have realised that
you can have the most qualified and experienced candidate available, but if the
person’s attitude is going to cause tension among clients or with veteran
employees, it’s probably best to look elsewhere when hiring.

 

They need to be in search of someone who
will add to the team in a positive way, not just someone who is competent
enough to get the job done. One person directly contributes to the morale of
the entire company, so choosing someone who will fit in well is essential.

 

Technical skill can be taught, the right
outlook simply can’t be

 

Greater
emphasis on employer branding

With the rise of the internet, it has become
easier than ever for job-seekers to gather information about the companies to
which they’re applying.

What kinds of clients does this company
typically work with? Based on pictures, blog posts, tweets and homepage
content, what kind of atmosphere does the office seem to exude? This is
something employers must constantly be mindful of and work to monitor. Your
online presence can either attract or deter talent, so make sure you’re using
these resources wisely.

 

Everyone within the company, especially
those tasked with interfacing with the public on behalf of the business, should
be aware of the organisation’s vision and values.

 

Being creative,
firms are using social media and their websites to show off that creativity and
attract job-seekers who want to be in a place where their ideas are allowed to
blossom.

 

Candidates
run the show

Today, job-seeking is much more tailored to
the candidate’s experience, particularly when a hiring manager is vying for
top-tier talent. Hiring managers have realised that if you want the attention
of a valuable would-be employee, you can’t make them bend over backwards to
move through your hiring process.

 

This is why allowing them to do a video
interview when it’s conducive to their schedule has become a popular option.
Instead of forcing a candidate to take time
off from work or make up an excuse about why they’re stepping out of the office
for two hours, they’re able to record an interview from the comfort of their
own home at a time that works for them. This shows that the hiring manager
respects their time and sends a subtle signal about what it would be like to
work for that company.

 

Additionally, many hiring managers have
become focused on moving through the talent acquisition process as quickly as
possible. They also understand the importance of keeping all candidates
informed as they go.

 

Years ago, you could wait months to hear
back about whether you landed a second or third round interview. If you didn’t
get the job, you might never find out about it at all. This put your job search
process into a constant, frustrating limbo.

 

Now, people tasked with hiring realise the
importance of being transparent with applicants. They want to find the best
candidate for the open role as quickly as possible, and when that person is
selected, they understand they owe those who weren’t chosen the courtesy of an
email or phone call so they can continue with their job search.

 

SUMMARY

To sum it all up, we can say that chartered
accountant hiring is a meticulous process of getting the right individual for
the right job. The contributors to this are the whole socio-economic conditions
created by the government, the educationists and the organisation.

 

Though a little tough with the numbers, we
surely will get there soon with all the advancements in technology – education
and India’s growth story. As I sign off, here is one for the road – this
article was written by a Bot (Robot), cannot believe it? Right? Well, he is
named the Ghost Rider! Did you just believe me? Ask yourself how you would
react when a Bot has a telephonic interview with you and you still think it’s a
human.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMPANIES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019

BACKGROUND

The Companies Act, 2013 (CA 2013) was enacted with a view to consolidate and amend the law relating to companies and it is now six years since its notification. However, it was observed that a large numbers of cases concerning compoundable offences are pending in the trial courts. Various settlement schemes were introduced in the past (in 2000, 2010 and 2014) to reduce the pendency of cases. The Vaish Committee constituted in 2005 even recommended withdrawal of cases where larger public interest was not involved. It was noted at that time that pendency every year was steadily increasing by about 2,000 cases, the average period of disposal of cases was five years and the average cost awarded per case to the government was alarming – Rs 5731.

It was further noted that under CA 2013 there are 18 instances where defaults are subject to civil liability by levying penalties through the adjudication mechanism. These broadly relate to technical non-compliances. It was then felt that this list was not exhaustive and there are other defaults which are also procedural / technical in nature and these can be rectified by levy of penalty instead of prosecution in the courts. This would incentivise enhanced compliance. In this backdrop, a committee was constituted in July, 2018 under the chairmanship of Injeti Srinivas (at present Secretary in the MCA).

The terms of reference of the committee were:

(i) Examine the nature of all acts categorised as compoundable offences (those which are punishable with fine only or with fine or imprisonment, or both) and recommend whether they can be re-categorised as acts which attract civil liabilities and thus be liable for penalty;

(ii) To review non-compoundable offences and recommend whether they can be re-categorised as compoundable offences;

(iii) Review the existing mechanism of levy of penalty under CA 2013 and suggest improvements therein;

(iv) To lay down the broad contours of an in-house adjudicatory mechanism wherein penalties can be levied in a non-discretionary manner;

(v) Suggest changes in the law and matters incidental thereto.

The said committee, after taking the views of several stakeholders, submitted its report in August, 2018. However, in view of the urgency, the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 was promulgated on 2nd November, 2018. To replace the aforesaid Ordinance, a bill, namely, the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2018, was introduced in the Lok Sabha and passed in the said House on 4th January, 2019. However, the Bill could not be taken up for consideration in the Rajya Sabha. In order to give continued effect to the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018, the President promulgated the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 and the Companies (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2019 on 12th January, 2019 and 21st February, 2019, respectively. The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 30th July, 2019 and by the Lok Sabha on 27th July, 2019.

Besides the terms of reference which are listed above, the objective of the committee was to unclog the trial courts of routine cases so that cases of more serious nature could be pursued with enhanced rigour. The committee had noted that as on 30th June, 2018, the total cases pending was as under:

Regional Directors Compoundable Non-Compoundable
All 7 Regional Directors 32,602* 1,055
Pending applications for withdrawal 6,391 0
Total 38,993 1,055
*Eastern Region (out of the total above) 18,292 268

The committee had classified the nature of defaults under CA 2013 and after detailed analysis it was noticed that compoundable offences under the CA 2013 could be classified as under:

Categories Type of offence under CA 2013 No. of offences Recommendation and rationale
I Non-compliance of the orders of statutory authorities and courts, etc. 15 Defiance will not be considered to be procedural lapse and shall continue with criminal action.
Status quo be maintained
II Those resulting from non-maintenance of certain records in registered office of the company 4 The defaults involve public interest therefore the same were not brought under the regime of
in-house adjudication
III Defaults on account of non-disclosures of interest of persons to the company, which vitiates the records of the company 3 Any non-disclosure of interest of persons in the company shall result in serious implications to the public and hence should not be brought under
in-house adjudication
by levying penalties
IV Defaults related to corporate governance norms 5 Offences under such category are technical and can be penalised by initiating in-house adjudication proceedings. Hence, such offences should be shifted to in-house adjudication
V Technical defaults relating to intimation of certain information by filing forms with ROC or in sending of notices to the stakeholders 13 11 out of these 13 offences should be brought under in-house adjudication
VI Defaults involving substantial violations which may affect the going concern nature of the company or are contrary to larger public interest or otherwise involve serious implications in relation to the stakeholder 29 These defaults are substantial violations which directly affect the status of the company, therefore involve large public interest. Hence these cannot be brought under the regime of in-house adjudication
VII Default related to liquidation proceedings 9 Offences under these sections shall not be replaced with penalty as the same are placed before the NCLT and the Tribunal shall be the decision-making authority. Hence there shall be no change
VIII Defaults not specifically punishable under any provision but made punishable through an omnibus clause 3 Due to the wide-ranging nature of defaults and unintended consequences, should not be brought under the in-house adjudication regime
  Total 81  

(A) Amendments carried out to CA 2013 vide Companies Amendment Act, 2019

Based on recommendations of the committee2 (refer para 1.5 of Chapter I of the report), the following offences are re-categorised as defaults carrying civil liabilities which would be subject to an in-house adjudication mechanism. Amendments made along with the pre-amendment punishment in each case are as under:

Clause of the Bill Section amended/ inserted Nature of default Before Now
9 Section 53(3)

Fine or imprisonment or both

Prohibition of issue of shares at a discount Fine or imprisonment or both Non-compliance shall result in the company and officer in default being liable to a penalty of amount raised or Rs 5 lakhs whichever is less. Besides, amount to be refunded with interest @ 12% per annum
10 Section 64(2)

Notice to be given to Registrar for alteration of share capital

(Form SH 7)

Failure / delay in filing notice for alteration of share capital (alteration includes changes in authorised capital, etc.) Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the company and officer in default being liable to a penalty of Rs 1,000 per day or Rs. 5 lakhs, whichever is less
14 Section 90

 

Register of significant beneficial owners in a company

(Form BEN 2 and related forms)

 

Failure / delay in making a declaration to the company and company has to maintain a register Fine only If any person fails to make a declaration as required, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 lakh but which may extend to Rs. 10 lakhs, or with both, and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 for every day after the first during which the failure continues.

If a company, required to maintain register (and file the information) or required to take necessary steps under sub-section (4A) fails to do so or denies inspection as provided therein, the company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 10 lakhs but which may extend to Rs. 50 lakhs, and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 for every day after the first during which the failure continues.

 

If any person wilfully furnishes any false or incorrect information or suppresses any material information of which he is aware in the declaration made under this section, he shall be liable to action under section 447

15 Section 92(5)

Annual return

(Form MGT 7)

Failure / delay in filing annual return Fine or imprisonment or both Non-compliance shall result in  the company and its every officer who is in default to be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day during
which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs
16 Section 102(5)

Statement to be annexed to notice (explanatory statement)

 

Attachment of a statement of special business in a notice calling for general meeting Fine only Non-compliance with the section shall result in every promoter, director, manager or other key managerial personnel who is in default being liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 or five times the amount of benefit accruing to the promoter, director, manager or other key managerial personnel or any of his relatives, whichever is higher
17 Section 105(3)

Proxies

 

Default in providing a declaration regarding appointment of proxy in a notice calling for general meeting Fine only Non-compliance shall result in every officer in default being liable to a penalty of Rs 5,000
18 Section 117(2)

Resolutions and agreements to be filed

(Form MGT 14)

Failure / delay in filing certain resolutions Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the company being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh and, in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 25 lakhs, and every officer of the company who is in default, including liquidator of the company, if any, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs
19 Section 121(3)

Report on annual general meeting (Form MGT 15 applicable to listed companies)

 

Failure / delay in filing report on AGM by public listed company Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the company being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh, and in case of continuing failure with a further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs, and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000, and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 1 lakh
21 Section 135 Failure / delay in complying with CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) Fine or imprisonment or both If a company contravenes the provisions, the company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 25 lakhs, and every officer of such company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 lakhs,
or with both
22 Section 137(3)

Copy of financial statement to be filed with Registrar

(Form AOC 4)

 

Failure / delay in filing financial statement Fine or imprisonment or both Non-compliance shall result in:

(i) the company being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1,000 for every day during which the failure continues but which shall not be more than Rs. 10 lakhs, instead of being punishable with fine; and

(ii) the managing director and the chief financial officer of the company, if any, and, in the absence of the managing director and the chief financial officer, any other director who is charged by the board of directors with the responsibility of complying with the provisions of section 137 and, in the absence of any such director, all the directors of the company, being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh, and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs

23 Section 140(3)

Removal, resignation of auditor and giving of special notice

(Form ADT2
and ADT3)

Failure / delay in filing statement by auditor after resignation Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the auditor being liable to a penalty, he or it shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 or an amount equal to the remuneration of the auditor, whichever is less, and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs
24 Section 157(2)

Company to inform Director Identification Number to Registrar

(Form DIR 3C)

Failure / delay by company in informing DIN of director Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the company in default being liable to a penalty of Rs. 25,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 1 lakh, and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of not less than Rs. 25,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 1 lakh
25 Section 159

Punishment for contravention – in respect of DIN

 

Contraventions related to DIN Fine or imprisonment or both Non-compliance shall result in any individual or director of a company in default being liable to a penalty, which may extend to Rs. 50,000, and where the default is a continuing one, with a further penalty which may extend to Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such default continues
27 Section 165(6)

Number of directorships

 

Section 165(6)

number of directorships

 

Fine only If a person accepts appointment as a director in contravention, such person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5,000 for each day after the first during which such contravention continues
28 Section 191(5)

Payment to

director for loss of office, etc., in connection with transfer of undertaking, property or shares

Payment to director not to be made on loss of office Fine only Non-compliance shall result in such director being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh
29 Section 197(15)

Overall maximum managerial remuneration and managerial remuneration in case of absence or inadequacy of profits

Managerial remuneration Fine only Non-compliance shall result in any person in default being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh and where any default has been made by a company, the company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5 lakhs
30 Section 203(5)

Appointment of key managerial personnel

Communication of appointment of KMPs in certain class of companies Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the company who is in default being liable to a penalty of Rs. 5 lakhs and every director and key managerial personnel of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000, and where the default is a continuing one, with a further penalty of Rs. 1,000 for each day after the first
during which such default continues, but not
exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs
31 Section 238(3)

Registration of the offer of scheme involving transfer of shares

Registration of the offer of scheme involving transfer of shares Fine only Non-compliance shall result in the
director being liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh

Note: In the process of re-categorisation of the offences and making them liable for civil liabilities, some unintended hardships are likely to be caused, especially to the smaller companies who do not have much professional assistance available. In such cases, it would have been better if penalty was imposed linked to slabs of paid-up capital instead of flat penalties.

(B) Serious offences: Pay more or suffer more

In case of repeated defaults, the habituated defaulter will now have to pay twice. To achieve the said objective, the Ordinance has modified sub-sections (3) and (8) of section 454 and also introduced a new section 454A as follows:

Section Title Post-Ordinance impact
454(3) Adjudication of penalties Opportunity be given to make good the default. Not to initiate action unless such opportunity is given
454(8) Adjudication of penalties Default would occur when the company or the officer in default would fail to comply with the order of the adjudicating officer or RD as the case may be
454A Penalty for repeated default Under this newly-inserted section it is provided that in case a penalty has been imposed on a person under the provisions of CA 2013 and the person commits the same default within a period of three years from the date of order imposing such penalty, he shall be liable for the second and every subsequent default for an amount equal to twice the amount provided for such default under the relevant provision of CA 2013

(C) De-clogging the NCLT: More powers to Regional Directors

Section Title Post-Ordinance impact
441(1)(b) Compounding of certain offences Power of Regional Director to compound offence punishable increased up to
Rs. 25,00,000

Pre-amendment, where the maximum amount of fine which may be imposed for such offence did not exceed Rs. 5 lakhs, such offence was compounded by the Regional Director or any officer authorised by the Central Government

Through the amendment, where the maximum amount of fine which may be imposed for such offence does not exceed Rs. 25 lakhs, such offence shall be compounded by the Regional Director or any officer authorised by the Central Government

441(6)(a) Compounding of certain offences Section 441(6)(a), which requires the permission of the Special Court for compounding of offences, being a redundant provision, is omitted

(D) Other Amendments

Vesting in the Central Government the power to approve the alteration in the financial year of a company u/s 2(41):

Section before amendment After amendment Remarks
First Proviso:

In case of associate companies incorporated outside India and required to follow different financial years, such companies were required to approach the Tribunal

First Proviso:

After amendment this power is now given to Central Government

 

Post-amendment, holding company or a subsidiary or associate company of a company incorporated outside India can apply to the Central Government for a different financial year.

Application pending before the Tribunal shall be
disposed of by the Tribunal

Requirements related to Commencement of Business (newly-inserted section 10A):

Section before amendment After amendment Remark
(1) A company incorporated after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 and having a share capital shall not commence any business or exercise any borrowing powers unless:

(a) a declaration is filed by a director within a period of one hundred and eighty days of the date of incorporation of the company in such form and verified in such manner as may be prescribed, with the Registrar that every subscriber
to the memorandum has paid the value of the shares agreed to be taken by him on the date of making of such
declaration;

and

(b) the company has filed with the Registrar a verification of its registered office as provided in sub-section (2) of section 12

 

(2) If any default is made in complying with the requirements of this section, the company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 and every officer who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1,000 for each day during which such default continues, but not exceeding an amount of Rs. 1 lakh

Re-introduction of section 11 omitted under the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2015 (after doing away with the requirements of minimum paid-up capital) to provide for a declaration by a company having share capital before it commences its business or exercises borrowing power

 

Non-compliance of section 11 by an officer in default shall result in liability to a penalty instead of fine

Inspection of Registered Office of the Company and consequent removal of the name of the company (section 12):

Section before amendment After amendment Remark
  If the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe that the company is not carrying on any business or operations, he may cause a physical verification of the registered office of the company in such manner as may be prescribed, and if any This provision is introduced to curb shell companies
default is found to be made in complying with the requirements he may, without prejudice to the provisions, initiate action for the removal of the name of the company from the
register of companies
 

Vesting in the Central Government the power to approve cases of conversion of public companies into private companies (section 14):

Section before amendment After amendment Remark
Third Proviso:

Every alteration of the articles under this section and a copy of the order of the Tribunal approving the alteration as per sub-section (1) shall be filed with the Registrar, together with a printed copy of the altered articles, within a period of fifteen days

Second Proviso:

Provided further that any alteration having the effect of conversion of a public company into a private company shall not be valid unless it is approved by an order of the Central Government on an application made in such form and manner as may be prescribed

 

Third Proviso:

Every alteration of the articles under this section and a copy of the order of the Central Government approving the alteration as per sub-section (1) shall be filed with the Registrar, together with a printed copy of the altered articles, within a period of fifteen days

Any application pending before the Tribunal shall be disposed of by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions applicable to it before these amendments.

The power has been shifted from Tribunal to Central Government

Registration of charges (Section 77):

Clause 11 of the Bill seeks to amend the first and second proviso of sub-section (1) of section 77 of the Act to provide that the Registrar may, on the application made by a company, allow registration of charge, in case of charges created before the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019, within a period of 300 days, or in case of charges created after the commencement of the said Act, within 60 days, on payment of additional fees. The additional period of 60 days within which the charges are required to be registered is also provided. In such case, an ad valorem fee will be charged which will be prescribed later.

Corporate Social Responsibility (Section 135):

The Bill seeks to amend sub-section (5) of section 135 and insert sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) in the said section of the Act to provide, inter alia, for (a) carrying forward the unspent amounts to a special account to be spent within three financial years and transfer thereafter to the fund specified in Schedule VII, in case of an ongoing project; and (b) transferring the unspent amounts to the fund specified under schedule VII, in other cases.

DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS (SECTION 164)

Section before amendment After amendment Remark
Insertion of Clause (i):

He has not complied with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 165

A new clause (i) after clause (h) in section 164(1) inserted, whereby a person shall be subject to disqualification if he accepts directorships exceeding the maximum number of directorships provided in section 165

CONCLUSION

The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was introduced to replace the Companies (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2019 with certain other amendments which were considered necessary to ensure more accountability and better enforcement to strengthen the corporate governance norms and compliance management in the corporate sector.

Article 12 of India-UAE DTAA; Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA; sections 9 and 195 of the Act – Since hiring of simulator by itself has no purpose, fee paid for simulator is not royalty – Payment to foreign companies for flight simulation training was in the nature of FTS – In absence of FTS article in India-UAE DTAA, it was to be treated as business income which, in absence of PE of foreign company in India, was not taxable – TDS obligation cannot be fastened on the assessee because of retrospective amendment if such obligation was not there at the time of payment

22. 
Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. vs. DDIT
ITA No.: 86 & 87/Bang./2011 and 143
& 144/Bang./2011 A.Ys.: 2007-08 & 2008-09
Date of order: 17th July, 2019; Members: N.V. Vasudevan (V.P.) and Jason P.
Boaz (A.M.)
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: None /
Harinder Kumar

 

Article 12 of India-UAE DTAA; Article 12 of
India-Germany DTAA; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA; sections 9 and 195 of
the Act – Since hiring of simulator by itself has no purpose, fee paid for
simulator is not royalty – Payment to foreign companies for flight simulation
training was in the nature of FTS – In absence of FTS article in India-UAE
DTAA, it was to be treated as business income which, in absence of PE of foreign
company in India, was not taxable – TDS obligation cannot be fastened on the
assessee because of retrospective amendment if such obligation was not there at
the time of payment

 

FACTS

The assessee was an Indian company in the
business of running an airline. During the relevant years, it had deputed its
pilots and cockpit crew to non-resident companies located in Dubai (UAE Co),
Germany (German Co) and Singapore (Sing Co) for training on flight simulators.
The assessee had made payments to the three foreign companies towards charges
for use of simulators and for training of its personnel. The assessee had not
deducted tax from the payments made to non-residents.

 

According to the AO, the main purpose of the
assessee was to lease the simulator, which also included charges of trainers.
Hence, the payment was in the nature of ‘royalty’ u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act. In
respect of payments made to the three foreign companies, the AO concluded as
follows:

 

In respect of the UAE Co, since the payment
was for use of equipment and also for imparting information concerning
industrial, commercial or scientific experience, knowledge or skill, it
constituted ‘royalty’ under Article 12 of the India-UAE DTAA.

 

As for the German Co, it was required to
make available the simulator to the assessee for training. Hence, the payment
was ‘royalty’ under Article 12(3) of the India-Germany DTAA. Besides, the
charges were for use of simulator and for imparting information concerning
industrial, commercial or scientific experience, knowledge or skill. Therefore,
the AO further concluded that the payment was also covered under Article 12(4)
as FTS. Accordingly, they were chargeable to taxin India.

 

In respect of the Sing Co, the payment was
for use of simulator and for training. The trainers were mainly involved in
imparting information to the personnel of the assessee. Accordingly, the
payments were in the nature of ‘royalties’ under Article 12(3), and FTS under
Article 12(4), of the India-Singapore DTAA. Therefore, they were chargeable to
tax in India.

 

Thus, the assessee was required to deduct
tax from the all the payments made to non-resident companies.

 

The CIT(A) directed the AO to exclude
payments made for use of simulators and to regard only the payments made for
training as FTS. CIT(A) held that as the India-UAE DTAA did not have any
article defining or dealing with FTS, and since the UAE Co had received payment
in the course of its business, the receipt was its business income; further,
even assuming that any income had arisen to the UAE Co in India, since the UAE
Co did not have a PE in India, in terms of Article 7(1) of the India-UAE DTAA,
such income could be taxed only in the UAE. This view was supported by the ITAT
Bangalore decision in ABB FZ-LLC vs. ITO (IT) Ward-1(1) Bangalore, [2016]
75 taxmann.com 83 (Bangalore – Trib.)
in the context of the India-UAE
DTAA.

 

In respect of
the payments made to the German Co and the Sing Co, relying on the AAR decision
in Inter Tek Testing Services India (Pvt.) Ltd. [2008] 307 ITR 418 (AAR),
the CIT(A) concluded that they were in the nature of FTS. Thereafter, referring
to the retrospective amendment to section 9 regarding deeming of income u/s
9(1)(v), (vi) and (vii), the CIT(A) held that the payment was taxable in India.
Further, insertion of Explanation 2 to section 195 of the Act made it
obligatory for the assessee to deduct tax.

 

HELD

Payment for simulator

Flight
simulator is an essential part of training. Merely because charges for simulator
are separately quantified on an hourly basis did not mean that the assessee had
hired the same or made payment for a right to use the same.

 

Without imparting training by the
instructors, hiring of the simulator on its own is of no purpose. Hence, the
charges paid by the assessee for use of simulator were ‘royalty’.

 

Payment to UAE Co.

In the case of the UAE Co, the question of
payment being FTS did not arise since the India-UAE DTAA does not have an
article relating to FTS.

It is settled position of law that in the
absence of an article in a DTAA regarding a particular item of income, the same
should not be regarded as residuary income but income from business. In the
absence of the PE of a non-resident in India, business income cannot be taxed
in India.

 

Retrospective amendment

The CIT(A) had upheld the order of the AO
only on the ground of retrospective amendment to section 9 in 2010 and to
section 195 in 2012.

 

The law is well settled that TDS obligation
cannot be fastened on a person on the basis of a retrospective amendment to the
law, which was not in force at the time when the payments were made. Since at
the time when the assessee made payments to the non-resident there was no TDS
obligation on him, it was not possible for him to foresee that by a
retrospective amendment to the law a TDS obligation would be fastened on him.

 

Sections 5 and 9 of the Act – As insurance compensation received by foreign parent company from foreign insurer was for protection of its financial interest in Indian subsidiary, it was not taxable in hands of the Indian subsidiary, although compensation was paid pursuant to fire damage to assets and stock of the Indian subsidiary

21. 
TS-439-ITAT-2019 (Del.)
M/s. Adidas India Marketing vs. IT Officer
(P) Ltd. ITA No.: 1431/Del/2015
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 2nd July, 2019;

 

Sections 5 and 9 of the Act – As insurance
compensation received by foreign parent company from foreign insurer was for
protection of its financial interest in Indian subsidiary, it was not taxable
in hands of the Indian subsidiary, although compensation was paid pursuant to
fire damage to assets and stock of the Indian subsidiary

 

FACTS

The assessee was an Indian company engaged
in the business of sourcing, distribution and marketing of products in India
under a brand name owned by its overseas group company. A German company (F Co)
was the ultimate parent / holding company of the assessee. The assessee had
insured its fixed assets and stocks with an Indian insurer. F Co had insured
its financial interest in its worldwide subsidiary companies (including in
India) under a global insurance policy (GIP) with a foreign insurer. The
assessee had a fire incident against which it received compensation from the
Indian insurer during the relevant year. In respect of loss incurred by the
assessee, F Co also received insurance compensation under GIP in Germany from
the foreign insurer towards loss in economic value of its financial interest in
the assessee. The compensation received was reduced by the amount of
compensation received by the assessee from the Indian insurer. Further, F Co
had paid taxes in Germany on the compensation received under GIP.

 

The AO contended that the insurance
compensation received by F Co was in respect of loss of stock of the assessee
and that the email correspondence between the assessee and F Co indicated that
all receipts from insurance, relating to physical loss, business interruption
and mitigation cost, belonged to the assessee. Thus, overseas compensation
received by F Co had a direct business relationship with the business
activities of the assessee and hence the same should be taxed in India in the
hands of the assessee.

 

The DRP also
held that insurance compensation was taxable in the hands of the assessee as
the profit foregone on the lost stock and the loss suffered on other assets
were part and parcel of the business of the assessee in India.

 

The assessee had contended that

The insurance compensation received by the
assessee and F Co were under two separate and distinct contracts of insurance.
The contracts were with unrelated third-party insurers. The respective insured
persons (claimants) had separately paid the premium without any cross-charge.

 

While the insurance policy taken by the
assessee exclusively covered risk arising out of loss of stock and fixed assets
owned by it, the GIP exclusively covered the financial interest of F Co in the
assessee.

 

The privity of the insurance contract of the
Indian insurer was with the assessee and that of the foreign insurer was with F
Co. Further, the assessee was not a contracting party to the GIP.

 

Income ‘accrues’ to the assessee only when
the assessee acquires the right to receive it. Since there was no actual or
constructive receipt by the assessee, compensation could not be taxed in India
in its hands. Moreover, no income accrued to the assessee as the assessee had
not acquired any unconditional and absolute right to receive claim of
compensation under GIP.

 

F Co had undertaken the GIP with the foreign
insurer for all its investments worldwide, including in India.

 

HELD

Insurance policy between the assessee and
the Indian insurer was to secure stock-in-trade, which is a tangible asset.
However, GIP between F Co and foreign insurer was for securing investment made,
or financial interest, in subsidiaries which is an intangible asset. Thus, the
interest insured by the assessee and that by F Co were two different interests.

 

The insurance contracts entered by the
assessee and F Co were separate and independent since: (i) there were two
different claimants; (ii) claimants had separately paid the premium; (iii) no
part of the premium on GIP was allocated to the assessee; and (iv) the privity
of contract was with different parties.

 

As the assessee did not have any right or
obligation in the GIP and it was not a party to it, the assessee did not have
any right to receive the claim of insurance. The same was also not vested in
the assessee to be regarded as having accrued in the hands of the assessee.
Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of ED
Sassoon [26 ITR 27 (SC)]
.

 

The claim under GIP was in respect of
insured financial interest of F Co in its worldwide subsidiaries. The foreign
insurer had paid compensation for diminution in financial interest. Merely
because the computation of the claim was with reference to loss by fire of the
stock, or profit that could have been earned if such stock was sold, cannot be
construed to mean that the claim was in respect of loss of tangible property in
the form of stock of the assessee. The claim was in respect of the intangible
asset in the form of financial interest of F Co. Hence, the claim cannot be
said to have any ‘business connection’ in India.

 

The insured interest of F Co cannot be said
to be through or from any property in India or through or from any asset or
source of income in India. F Co had entered into a contract in Germany for
insuring the intangible assets in the form of financial interest in its
subsidiaries. This was quite distinct from the physical stock-in-trade of the
assessee that was lost in fire. Thus, the claim received by F Co could not be
treated as income deemed to accrue or arise in the hands of the assessee in
India.Further, the email correspondence was merely to explore the modes of
transfer of money from F Co to the assessee for restoring the financial
interest of F Co in the assessee. The same cannot determine the tax liability.
Such correspondence was related to application of money but did not indicate in
whose hands the money was taxable.

 

The GIP was taken to cover the contingent
losses that may or may not arise in future. Further, as F Co had actually paid
premium in respect of GIP from time to time and also paid tax in Germany in
relation to the insurance claim, there was no colourable device adopted by the
assessee for evading taxes in India.

 

Sections 5, 9, 40(a)(i) and 195 of the Act; Article 7 of India-USA DTAA – As services were rendered outside India and payment was also made outside India, receipts of the foreign company were not within the scope of ‘total income’ in section 5(2) – Fee received for merely referring and introducing clients is business income which, in absence of PE in India, would not be chargeable in India – Besides, the services were not in the nature of managerial, technical or consultancy services

20. 
[2019] 107 taxmann.com 363 (Mum – Trib.)
Knight Frank (India) (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No.: 2842 (Mum.) of 2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 12th June, 2019;

 

Sections 5, 9, 40(a)(i) and 195 of the Act;
Article 7 of India-USA DTAA – As services were rendered outside India and
payment was also made outside India, receipts of the foreign company were not
within the scope of ‘total income’ in section 5(2) – Fee received for merely
referring and introducing clients is business income which, in absence of PE in
India, would not be chargeable in India – Besides, the services were not in the
nature of managerial, technical or consultancy services

 

FACTS

The assessee
was engaged in the business of rendering international real estate advisory and
property management services. During the course of the relevant year, the
assessee had paid referral fees to an American company (US Co) for introduction
of clients to the assessee. According to the assessee, the services rendered by
the US Co did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, experience, skill,
knowhow or processes to the assessee. Therefore, they were not in the nature of
‘Fees for included services’ in terms of Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA.
Since they were business profits of the US Co, in the absence of a PE in India
they could not be brought to tax in India.

 

However, the predecessor of the AO had, in
an earlier year, held that after retrospective amendment and insertion of
Explanation to section 9(2) of the Act, the income of a non-resident was deemed
to accrue or arise in India u/s 9(1)(v), (vi) or (vii)irrespective of whether
the non-resident had a place of business or business connection in India or
whether he had rendered services in India, and hence, the referral fee was taxable
in India. Following the order of his predecessor, the AO disallowed the fee u/s
40(a)(i) of the Act. The CIT(A) also followed the view held by his predecessor
CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal.

 

HELD

Sections 5 and 9 (post-2010 amendment)

Under section 5(2), income taxable in India
of a non-resident includes income received or deemed to be received in India
and income which has accrued or arisen, or is deemed to accrue or arise in
India.

 

Since the referral fee was paid outside
India, it was not received or deemed to be received in India. As regards
accrual, place of accrual would be relevant. Since the US Co had rendered the
services outside India, referral fee did not accrue or arise in India.

 

Section 9(1) in its clauses (i) to (vii)
deals with ‘income deemed to accrue or arise in India’. Clauses (ii) [salary
earned in India], (iii) [salary payable by government], and (iv) [dividend] are
not relevant in case of the US Co. Of the seven clauses, only the limb in
respect of ‘…directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in
India…’ of clause (i) is relevant because the US Co had rendered services in
the course of its business. Explanation 1(a) to section 9(i) provides that if
all operations of a business are not carried out in India, only the income
reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in India shall be
taxable.

 

Since the US Co had rendered all its
services outside India, no part of referral fee could be attributed to any
operation in India. Hence, there was no income deemed to accrue or arise in
India. And, since the CIT(A) had based his conclusion on Explanation to section
9(2), which mentions clauses (v), (vi) and (vii), their applicability should be
examined. As clause (v) is in respect of ‘interest’, it is not relevant.
Similarly, clause (vi) deals with ‘royalty’, which is also not the case. Hence,
what needs to be examined is whether, in terms of clause (vii), the services
rendered were in the nature of managerial services, technical services or
consultancy services.

 

Managerial services

The US Co was referring or introducing
clients to the assessee. It did not provide any managerial advice or services.
Therefore, referral fee cannot be said to have been received for managerial
services.

 

Technical services

The US Co had not performed any services
which required special skills or knowledge relating to a technical field.
Therefore, referral fee cannot be said to have been received for technical
services.

 

Consultancy services

The US Co was using its skill and knowledge for
its own benefit and merely referring or introducing clients to the assessee. It
had not provided any consultation or advise to the assessee. Therefore,
referral fee cannot be said to have been received for consultancy services.

 

Make available

The service of referring or introducing a
client did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, experience, skill,
knowhow or processes to the assessee. Therefore, the receipt was not ‘Fees for
included services’ in terms of Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA.

 

Disallowance under section 40(a)(i)

As referral fee was business income of the
US Co, it was covered under Article 7 of the India-USA DTAA. And since the US
Co did not have a PE in India, referral fee was not chargeable to tax in India.
Hence, the assessee was not obligated to deduct tax at source u/s 195 from the
referral fee. Consequently, no disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) could be made.

 

Article 7, India-Malaysia DTAA; Article 7, India-UK DTAA – Compensation paid for contractual default, being business profit, was not taxable in India if recipient had no PE in India – Rebate given for quality issues effectively being discount in sale price, was not taxable; even otherwise, rebate being business profit, was not taxable in India if recipient had no PE in India

19. 
[2019] 108 taxmann.com 79 (Vizag. – Trib.)
3F Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT, Circle-1, Eluru ITA No.: 01 (Viz.) of 2015 A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 17th July, 2019;

 

Article 7, India-Malaysia DTAA; Article 7,
India-UK DTAA – Compensation paid for contractual default, being business
profit, was not taxable in India if recipient had no PE in India – Rebate given
for quality issues effectively being discount in sale price, was not taxable;
even otherwise, rebate being business profit, was not taxable in India if
recipient had no PE in India

 

FACTS

The assessee was an Indian company engaged
in trading of certain products. The assessee procured the products from
suppliers in India and exported the same to foreign customers. Among others, it
had entered into export contracts with a Malaysian company (Malay Co) and a UK
company (UK Co). In respect of the contract with the Malay Co, as the price in
the Indian market was substantially higher the assessee could not procure the
products and did not fulfil the contract. Hence, the Malay Co claimed
compensation towards the losses suffered because of default by the assessee. To
maintain its business reputation and relationship with the Malay Co, the
assessee agreed upon the amount of compensation and paid up. In respect of its
contract with the UK Co, there were certain quality issues. Hence, the UK Co
claimed price rebate. Again, to maintain its business reputation and
relationship with the UK Co, the assessee agreed to a rebate.

 

The AO completed the assessment u/s 143(3)
of the Act. Subsequently, CIT undertook revision of the order u/s 263 and held
that as payment was made to a foreign company and no tax was deducted u/s 195
of the Act, the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue. He directed the AO to examine disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act.
The AO proposed disallowance, which the DRP upheld.

 

HELD

Compensation for contractual default

The transaction of export was a business
transaction. Compensation was paid because of failure of the assessee to supply
the products. Thus, the payment was to compensate the Malay Co for the loss
suffered by it because of non-fulfilment of contract by the assessee.

 

Therefore, the receipt was business income
in the hands of the Malay Co. Further, the Malay Co did not have a PE in India.
In terms of Article 7 of the India-Malaysia DTAA, business income of the Malay
Co would be taxable only in Malaysia unless it had a PE in India. But since it
did not have a PE in India, the business income was not chargeable to tax in
India. Therefore, the question of disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act did not
arise.

 

Quality rebate

Quality rebate was given because of certain
quality issues. The perusal of the documents showed that the quality rebate
was, effectively, a discount in sale price. Hence, there was no question of
TDS.

 

Even otherwise, quality rebate was in the
nature of business profit for the UK Co. In terms of Article 7 of the India-UK
DTAA, the business income of the UK Co would be taxable only in the UK unless
it had a PE in India. But since it did not have a PE in India, the business
income was not chargeable to tax in India. Therefore, the question of
disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act did not arise.

 

Section 271(1)(c) – Imposition of penalty on account of inadvertent and bona fide error on the part of the assessee would be unwarranted

15. 
Rasai Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCITITAT Mumbai: ShamimYahya (AM) and
Ravish Sood (JM)
ITA No. 770/Mum./2018 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 28th June, 2019; Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Nilesh Kumar
Bavaliya / D.G. Pansari

 

Section 271(1)(c) – Imposition of penalty
on account of inadvertent and bona fide error on the part of the
assessee would be unwarranted

 

FACTS

For the assessment year under consideration,
the assessee filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs.
80,19,650. In the schedule of Block of Assets, there was a disclosure of a sum
of Rs. 67,00,000 against caption ‘Deductions’ under immovable properties.

 

On being queried about the nature of the
aforesaid deduction, the assessee submitted that the same pertained to certain
properties which were sold during the year under consideration. The AO called
upon the assessee to explain why it had not offered the income from the sale of
the aforementioned properties under the head income from ‘Long-Term Capital
Gain’ (LTCG). In response, the assessee offered long-term capital gain of Rs.
19,45,176 and also made a disallowance of Rs. 93,453 towards excess claim of
municipal taxes.

 

In the assessment order, the AO initiated
penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of
income and concealment of income in the context of the aforesaid addition /
disallowance. Subsequently, the AO being of the view that the assessee had
filed inaccurate particulars of income within the meaning of 271(1)(c) r.w.
Explanation 1, imposed a penalty of Rs. 6,29,936.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who deleted the penalty with reference to the disallowance of Rs.
93,453 but confirmed it with reference to addition of long-term capital gain
which was offered for taxation in the course of the assessment proceedings.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it was contended that the LTCG on the sale of three shops
had, on account of a bona fide mistake on the part of the assessee, had
not been shown in the return of income.

 

The fact that the assessee had never
intended to withhold sale of the property under consideration could safely be
gathered from a perusal of the chart of the tangible fixed assets that formed
part of its balance sheet for the year under consideration, wherein a deduction
of Rs. 67,00,000 was disclosed by the assessee.

 

Besides, on learning of his mistake, the
assessee had immediately worked out the LTCG on the sale of the aforementioned
properties and had offered the same for tax in the course of the assessment
proceedings.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that while the assessee
had admittedly failed to offer the LTCG on the sale of three shops for tax in
its return of income for the year under consideration, at the same time, the
‘chart’ of the ‘block of assets’ of tangible fixed assets, forming part of the
balance sheet of the assessee as ‘Note No. 6’ to the financial statements for
the year ended 31st March, 2013 clearly reveals that the assessee
had duly disclosed the deduction of Rs. 67,00,000 from the block of fixed
assets. The Tribunal also found that the assessee in the course of the
assessment proceedings on learning about its aforesaid inadvertent omission and
not offering the LTCG on the sale of the aforesaid shops, had worked out its
income under the said head and offered the same for tax.

 

The Tribunal held that:

(a) when the assessee had disclosed the
deduction of Rs. 67,00,000 pertaining to sale of the aforesaid three shops from
the ‘block of assets’ in its balance sheet for the year under consideration,
therefore, there is substantial force in its claim that the failure to offer
LTCG on the sale of the said shops had inadvertently been omitted to be shown
in the return of income for the year under consideration;

(b) imposition of penalty u/s 271(1)(c)
would be unwarranted in a case where the assessee had committed an inadvertent
and bona fide error and had not intended or attempted to either conceal
its income or furnish inaccurate particulars;

(c) its aforesaid view is fortified by the
judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of PriceWaterHouse Coopers
Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT(2012) 348 ITR 306;

(d) imposition of penalty u/s 271(1)(c)
would be unwarranted on account of the aforesaid inadvertent and bona fide
error on the part of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal set aside the order of the
CIT(A) and deleted the penalty imposed by the AO u/s 271(1)(c). The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

Section 254(2) – If the appeal against the order of the Tribunal has already been admitted and a substantial question of law has been framed by the Hon’ble High Court, the Tribunal cannot proceed with the Miscellaneous Application u/s 254(2) of the Act

14. 
Ratanlal C. Bafna vs. JCIT
ITAT Pune; Members: Anil Chaturvedi (AM) and
Vikas Awasthy (JM) MA No. 97/Pune/2018 in ITA No. 204/Pune/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order: 15th March, 2019; Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Sunil Ganoo
/ Ashok Babu

 

Section 254(2)
– If the appeal against the order of the Tribunal has already been admitted and
a substantial question of law has been framed by the Hon’ble High Court, the
Tribunal cannot proceed with the Miscellaneous Application u/s 254(2) of the
Act

 

FACTS

For the captioned assessment year, the
assessee preferred an application u/s 254(2) against the order of the Tribunal
in ITA No. 204/Pune/2012 for A.Y. 2008-09 on the ground that while adjudicating
the said appeal the Tribunal had not adjudicated ground No. 12 of the appeal,
although the same was argued before the Bench.

 

Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal in
ITA No. 204/Pune/2012 for A.Y. 2008-09, the assessee had preferred an appeal to
the Bombay High Court which was admitted by the Court vide order dated 26th
November, 2018 (in ITA No. 471 and 475 of 2016) for consideration of
substantial question of law.


Since the present M.A. was the second M.A.
against the impugned order of the Tribunal, the Bench raised a query as to
whether a second M.A. is maintainable since the first M.A. against the same
order has been dismissed by the Tribunal. In response, the assessee submitted
that the second M.A. is maintainable because it is on an issue which was not a
subject matter of the first M.A. For this proposition, reliance was placed on
the decision of the Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Aiswarya Trading Company
(2011) 323 ITR 521
, the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hiralal
Suratwala vs. CIT 56 ITR Page 339
(All.) and the decision
of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Smt. Vasantben H. Sheth (2015) 372
ITR 536 (Guj.).

 

At the time of hearing, the assessee relied
on the decision of the Bombay High Court in R.W. Promotions Private
Limited (W.P. No. 2238/2014)
decided on 8th April, 2015 to
support its contention that even though the assessee has filed an appeal
against the order of the Tribunal, the Tribunal can still entertain an
application u/s 254(2) of the Act seeking rectification of the order passed by
it. Relying on this decision, it was contended that since ground No. 12 of the
appeal has not been adjudicated, the Tribunal can recall the order to decide
the said ground.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that it is a settled
law that the judgement must be read as a whole and the observations made in a
judgement are to be read in the context in which they are made; for this
proposition it relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Goa
Carbon Ltd. vs. CIT (2011) 332 ITR 209 (Bom.).

 

It observed
that the slightest change in the facts changes the factual scenario and makes
one case distinguishable from the other. It observed that the Kolkata Bench of
the Tribunal in Subhlakshmi Vanijya (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 60
taxmann.com 60 (Kolkata – Trib.)
has noted as under:

 

‘13.d It is a well settled legal position
that every case depends on its own facts. Even a slightest change in the
factual scenario alters the entire conspectus of the matter and makes one case
distinguishable from another. The crux of the matter is that the ratio of any
judgement cannot be seen divorced from its facts.’

 

The Tribunal noted that in the case of R.W.
Promotions Pvt. Ltd. (Supra)
, the assessee had filed an appeal u/s 260A
of the Act before the High Court but the appeal was yet to be admitted. It was
in such a fact pattern that the Court held that the Tribunal has power to
entertain an application u/s 254(2) of the Act for rectification of mistake. In
the present case, however, it is not a case where the assessee has merely filed
an appeal before the High Court but it is a case where the High Court has
admitted the appeal for consideration after framing substantial question of
law.  On account of this difference in
the facts, the Tribunal held that the facts in the case of R.W.
Promotions (Supra)
and the present case are distinguishable.

 

The Tribunal noted that the Gujarat High
Court in the case of CIT vs. Muni Seva Ashram (2013) 38 taxmann.com 110
(Guj.)
has held that when an appeal has been filed before the High Court,
the appeal is admitted and substantial question of law has been framed in the
said appeal, then the Tribunal cannot recall the order.

 

The Tribunal held that since the appeal
against the order of the Tribunal has already been admitted and a substantial
question of law has been framed by the High Court, the Tribunal cannot proceed
with the miscellaneous application u/s 254(2) of the Act.

 

Hence, the Tribunal dismissed the
miscellaneous application u/s 254(2) of the Act seeking rectification in the
order of the Tribunal as being not maintainable.

 

Section 50C – Third proviso to section 50C inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2019 providing for a safe harbour of 5%, is retrospective in operation and will apply since date of introduction of section 50C, i.e., w.e.f. 1st April, 2003, since the proviso is curative and removes an incongruity and avoids undue hardship to assessees

13. 
Chandra Prakash Jhunjhunwala vs. DCIT (Kol.)
Members: A.T. Varkey (JM) and Dr. A.L. Saini
(AM) ITA No. 2351/Kol./2017
A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 9th August, 2019; Counsel for Assesssee / Revenue: Manoj
Kataruka / Robin Chowdhury

 

Section 50C – Third proviso to section 50C
inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2019 providing for a safe harbour of 5%,
is retrospective in operation and will apply since date of introduction of
section 50C, i.e., w.e.f. 1st April, 2003, since the proviso is
curative and removes an incongruity and avoids undue hardship to assessees

 

FACTS

The assessee in his return of income
declared total income to be Nil and claimed current year’s loss to be Rs. 1,19,46,383. In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that
the assessee had on 14th December, 2013 transferred his property at
Pretoria Street, Kolkata for a consideration of Rs. 3,15,00,000 and had
declared long-term capital gain of Rs. 1,22,63,576 on transfer thereof. The
stamp duty value (SDV) of this property was Rs. 3,27,01,950. In response to the
show cause notice issued by the AO as to why the SDV should not be adopted as
full value of consideration, the assessee asked the AO to make a reference to
the DVO to ascertain the fair market value of the property. Accordingly, the
reference was made but the DVO did not submit his report within the specified
time and the AO completed the assessment by adopting SDV to be the full value
of consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. The assessee then preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that:

(i) the fundamental purpose of introducing
section 50C was to counter suppression of sale consideration on sale of
immovable properties, and this section was introduced in the light of the
widespread belief that sale transactions of land and buildings are often
undervalued resulting in leakage of legitimate tax revenues;

(ii) the variation between SDV and the sale
consideration arises because of many factors;

(iii) Stamp duty value and the sale
consideration, these two values represent the values at two different points
of time;

(iv) in order to minimise hardship in case
of genuine transactions in the real estate sector, it was proposed by the
Finance Act, 2018 that no adjustments shall be made in a case where the
variation between the SDV and the sale consideration is not more than 5% of the
sale consideration. This amendment is with effect from 1st April,
2019 and applies to assessment year 2019-20 and subsequent years;

(v) the co-ordinate Bench of the ITAT
Mumbai, in the case of John Fowler (India) Ltd. in ITA No.
7545/Mum./2014, for AY 2010-11, order dated 25.1.2017
held that if the
difference between valuation adopted by the Stamp Valuation Authority and
declared by the assessee is less than 10%, the same should be ignored and no
adjustments shall be made.

 

The Tribunal noted that the amendment made
by the Finance Act, 2018 is introduced only with prospective effect from 1st
April, 2019. It noted that the observations in the memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 2018 make it abundantly clear that the
amendment is made to remove an incongruity, resulting in undue hardship to the
assessee. Relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Ansal Landmark Township (P) Ltd.,
the Tribunal held that once it is
not in dispute that a statutory amendment is made to remove an apparent
incongruity, such an amendment has to be treated as effective from the date on
which the law containing such an undue hardship or incongruity was introduced.

 

The Tribunal held that the insertion of the
third proviso to section 50C of the Act is declaratory and curative in nature.
The third proviso relates to computation of value of property and hence is not
a substantive amendment, it is only a procedural amendment and therefore the
co-ordinate Benches of ITAT used to ignore the variation of up to 10%, and
hence the said amendment should be retrospective. The third proviso to section
50C should be treated as curative in nature with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2003,. i.e., the date from which section 50C was introduced.

 

Since the difference between the SDV and the
consideration was less than 5%, the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the
AO and confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

This ground of
the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 56(2)(vii) – The amount received by the assessee from the HUF, being its member, is a capital receipt in his hands and is not exigible to income tax If the decisions passed by the higher authorities are not followed by the lower authorities, there will be chaos resulting in never-ending litigation and multiplication of cases

12. 
Pankil Garg vs. PCIT
ITAT Chandigarh; Members: Sanjay Garg (JM)
and Ms Annapurna Gupta (AM) ITA No.: 773/Chd./2018
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 3rd August, 2019; Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: K.R. Chhabra
/ G.S. Phani Kishore

 

Section 56(2)(vii) – The amount received by
the assessee from the HUF, being its member, is a capital receipt in his hands
and is not exigible to income tax

 

If the decisions passed by the higher
authorities are not followed by the lower authorities, there will be chaos
resulting in never-ending litigation and multiplication of cases

 

FACTS

For the assessment year under consideration,
the AO completed the assessment of total income of the assessee u/s 143(3) of
the Act by accepting returned income of Rs. 14,32,982. Subsequently, the AO
issued a notice u/s 147 on the ground that the assessee has received a gift of
Rs. 5,90,000 from his HUF and since the amount of gift was in excess of Rs.
50,000, the same was taxable u/s 56(2)(vii) of the Act.

 

In the course of reassessment proceedings,
the assessee contended that the amount received by him from his HUF was not
taxable and relied upon the decision of the Rajkot Bench of the Tribunal in Vineetkumar
Raghavjibhai Bhalodia vs. ITO [(2011) 46 SOT 97 (Rajkot)]
which was
followed by the Hyderabad Bench (SMC) of the Tribunal in Biravel I.
Bhaskar vs. ITO [ITA No. 398/Hyd./2015; A.Y. 2008-09; order dated 17th
June, 2015]
wherein it has been held that HUF being a group of
relatives, a gift by it to an individual is nothing but a gift from a group of
relatives; and further, as per the exclusions provided in clause 56(2)(vii) of
the Act, a gift from a relative is not exigible to taxation; hence, the gift
received by the assessee from the HUF is not taxable. The AO accepted the
contention of the assessee and accepted the returned income in an order passed
u/s 147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

Subsequently, the Ld. PCIT, invoking
jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, set aside the AO’s order and held that the HUF
does not fall in the definition of relative in case of an individual as provided
in Explanation to clause (vii) to section 56(2) as substituted by the Finance
Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1st October, 2009. Though
the definition of a ‘relative’ in case of an HUF has been extended to include
any member of the HUF, yet, in the said extended definition, the converse case
is not included. In the case of an individual, the HUF has not been mentioned
in the list of relatives.

 

The PCIT, thus, formed a view that though a
gift from a member to the HUF was not exigible to taxation as per the
provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Act, a gift by the HUF to a member
exceeding a sum of Rs. 50,000 was taxable.

The PCIT also held that the decisions of the
Rajkot and the Hyderabad Benches of the Tribunal relied upon by the assessee were
not in consonance with the statutory provisions of sections 56(2)(vii) and
10(2) of the Act and, thus, the AO had made a mistake in not taking recourse to
the clear and unambiguous provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Act and in
unduly placing reliance on judicial decisions which were not in accordance with
the provisions of law.

 

The order passed by the AO was held by the
PCIT to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue and was set aside. The AO was directed to make assessment afresh.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the AO had duly
applied his mind to the issue and followed the decisions of the co-ordinate
Benches of the Tribunal; hence, the order of the AO cannot be held to be
erroneous and, therefore, the PCIT wrongly exercised jurisdiction u/s 263 of
the Act and the same cannot be held to be justified and is liable to be set
aside on this score alone.

 

The Tribunal held that the PCIT neither had
any power nor any justification to say that the AO should not have placed
reliance on the judicial decisions of the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that if
such a course is allowed to subsist, then there will be no certainty and
finality to the litigation. If the decisions passed by the higher authorities
are not followed by the lower authorities, there will be chaos resulting in
never-ending litigation and multiplication of cases. The Tribunal held that the
impugned order of the PCIT is not sustainable as per law.

 

On merits, the Tribunal, after discussing
the concept of HUF and the provisions of sections 56(2)(vii) and 10(2), held
that any amount received by a member of the HUF, even out of the capital or
estate of the HUF cannot be said to be income of the member exigible to
taxation. Since a member has a pre-existing right in the property of the HUF,
it cannot be said to be a gift without consideration by the HUF or by other
members of the HUF to the recipient member. The Tribunal observed that
provisions of section 56(2)(vii) are not attracted when an individual member
receives any sum either during the subsistence of the HUF for his needs or on
partition of the HUF in lieu of his share in the joint family property.
However, the converse is not true, that is, in case an individual member throws
his self-acquired property into the common pool of an HUF. The HUF or its
members do not have any pre-existing right in the self-acquired property of a
member. If an individual member throws his own / self-acquired property in the
common pool, it will be an income of the HUF; however, the same will be exempt
from taxation as the individual members of an HUF have been included in the
meaning of relative as provided in the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) of the
Act. It is because of this salient feature of the HUF that in case of an
individual the HUF has not been included in the definition of relative in
Explanation to section 56(2)(vii), whereas in the case of an HUF, members of
the HUF find mention in the definition of relative for the purpose of the said
section.

 

In view of the above discussion, the amount
received by the assessee from the HUF, being its member, is a capital receipt
in his hands and is not exigible to income tax.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the
assessee.

 

Section 194J, section 40(a)(ia) – Payment made by film exhibitor to distributor is neither royalty nor FTS and is not covered by section 194J and, consequently, does not attract disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

29. 
[2019] 71 ITR 332 (Ahd. – Trib.)
ITO vs. Eyelex Films Pvt. Ltd. ITA No.: 1808 (Ahd.) of 2017 & 388
(Ahd.) of 2018
A.Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15 Date of order: 7th March, 2019;

 

Section 194J, section 40(a)(ia) – Payment
made by film exhibitor to distributor is neither royalty nor FTS and is not
covered by section 194J and, consequently, does not attract disallowance u/s
40(a)(ia)

 

FACTS

The assessee was an exhibitor of films. It
purchased cinematographic films from the distributors for exhibition in cinema
houses. The revenue earned from box office collections was shared with the
distributors as a consideration for purchase of films. The assessee had not
deducted tax at source on the said payments under the belief that the payment
does not fall under any of the provisions mandating TDS. However, the AO
categorised the said payments as royalty u/s 194J and, in turn, disallowed the
said payments u/s 40(a)(ia).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal. In turn, the aggrieved Revenue filed an
appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal discussed the observations made
by the CIT(A) and concurred with its view which was as under:

 

Section 194J defines royalty in Explanation
2 to section 9(1)(vi). As per the said definition, the consideration for sale /
distribution or exhibition of cinematographic films has been excluded. The
payment made by the appellant could not be included under the definition of
royalty u/s 9 of the Act, and therefore the provisions of section 194J were not
applicable. Payments made by the assessee to the distributors were nothing but
the procurement charges, meaning purchases of the rights of exhibition for a
certain period as per the terms and conditions of the contract.

 

The CIT(A) had even discussed the
applicability of section 194C as well as section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and concluded that even section 194C was not applicable as the impugned
payment was not for carrying out any work.

 

CBDT circular dated 8th August, 2019 – The relaxation in monetary limits for departmental appeals vide CBDT circular dated 8th August, 2019 shall be applicable to the pending appeals in addition to the appeals to be filed henceforth

28. 
[2019] 108 taxmann.com 211 (Ahd. – Trib.)
ITO vs. Dinesh Madhavlal Patel ITA No.: 1398/Ahd./2004 A.Y.: 1998-99 Date of order: 14th August, 2019;

 

CBDT circular dated 8th August,
2019 – The relaxation in monetary limits for departmental appeals vide CBDT
circular dated 8th August, 2019 shall be applicable to the pending
appeals in addition to the appeals to be filed henceforth

 

FACTS

The Tribunal vide its order disposed of the
present appeal and 627 other appeals filed by various AOs challenging the
correctness of the orders passed by CIT(A) and also cross-objections filed by
the assessees against the said appeals of the Revenue supporting the orders of
the CIT(A). The tax effect in each of these appeals is less than Rs. 50 lakhs.

 

The Tribunal noted that vide CBDT circular
dated 8th August, 2019 the income tax department has further
liberalised its policy for not filing appeals against the decisions of the
appellate authorities in favour of the taxpayers where the tax involved is
below certain threshold limits, and announced its policy decision not to file,
or press, the appeals before the Tribunal against appellate orders favourable
to the assessees – in cases in which the overall tax effect, excluding interest
except when interest itself is in dispute, is Rs. 50 lakhs or less.

 

Following the said circular, the Tribunal
sought to dismiss all the appeals. However, while dismissing the appeals, the
DR pointed out that the said circular is not clearly retrospective because in
para 4 it says, “(t)he said modifications shall come into effect from the
date of issue of this circular”. Relying on this, the argument sought to be
made was that the limits mentioned in the circular dated 8th August,
2019 will apply only to appeals to be filed after the date of the said
circular. The representatives of the assessees, however, argued that the
circular must be held to have retrospective application and must equally apply
to the pending appeals as well. It was submitted that the said circular is not
a standalone one but is required to be read with old circular No. 3 of 2018 which it seeks to modify.

 

HELD

The Tribunal did not have even the slightest
hesitation in holding that the concession extended by the CBDT not only applies
to the appeals to be filed in future but is also equally applicable to the
appeals pending disposal as of now. The Tribunal observed that the circular
dated 8th August, 2019 is not a standalone circular but has to be read
in conjunction with the CBDT circular No. 3 of 2018 (and subsequent amendment
thereto) and all it does is to replace paragraph Nos. 3 and 5 of the said
circular.

 

It observed that all other portions of the
circular No. 3 of 2018 have remained intact and that includes paragraph 13
thereof. Having noted the contents of paragraph 13 of the said circular No. 3
of 2018, the Tribunal held that the relaxation in monetary limits for
departmental appeals vide CBDT circular dated 8th August, 2019 shall
be applicable to the pending appeals in addition to the appeals to be filed
henceforth.

 

The Tribunal
dismissed all the appeals as withdrawn. As the appeals filed by the Revenue
were found to be non-maintainable and as all the related cross-objections of
the assessees arose only as a result of those appeals and merely supported the
order of the CIT(A), the cross-objections filed by them were also dismissed as
infructuous.


INSIDER TRADING – LESSONS FROM A RECENT DECISION

BACKGROUND


SEBI had levied a penalty of Rs. 40 crores
for insider trading on the promoters against a profit of about Rs. 14 crores.
Recently, SAT confirmed this hefty penalty. The case proves how SEBI is able to
unravel facts to the last transaction and establish relations between several
parties involved in insider trading. The case also establishes SEBI’s intention
to act tough in such cases by levying stiff penalties on promoters acting
through associates. However, the case also has some grey areas. The issues are
as follows:

 

(i) When can price-sensitive information be
said to have arisen, particularly in case of complex transactions?

(ii) Whether purchase on negotiated terms of
a large quantity of shares from a person can be said to be a case of insider
trading?

(iii) How are the profits of insider trading
calculated – profits actually made, or should an attempt be made to quantify
the impact of price-sensitive information on the price?

(iv) Should profits made by insider trading
be disgorged and handed over to the party who may have suffered a loss?

 

The present case was about a tender with
electricity bodies where it may be difficult even for the management to be 100%
sure and whether initial success necessarily means ‘confirmed outcome’.

 

BASIC FACTS OF THE CASE

The case concerns dealings in the shares of
ICSA (India) Limited. The findings were that the promoters (consisting of
husband and wife and certain companies belonging to their group) purchased,
through certain persons, 15.86 lakh shares in February, 2009. These shares were
purchased when certain price-sensitive information was not made public.
According to SEBI’s order the price-sensitive information related to the
company being successful bidders to large contracts aggregating to Rs. 464.17
crores with various electricity bodies. The purchase price was approx. Rs. 75
per share. The shares were sold at a significant profit of about Rs. 14 crores.

 

The transactions were routed through persons
who could be described as ‘associates’. These associates were funded by the
promoters’ group for purchasing the shares. The shares so purchased were either
transferred to the promoter entities or sold in the market and the sale
proceeds transferred to the promoters.

 

SEBI’s penalty also included a penalty for
giving misleading information about the relations between the promoters and the associates and making misleading disclosures relating to
shares pledged by the promoters / associates.

 

The penalty of Rs. 40 crores levied for such
insider trading, etc., has been upheld by SAT.

 

SEBI’s order is dated 15th
October, 2015. The SAT order is dated 12th July, 2019 (Appeal No.
509 of 2015).

 

ALLEGATIONS

SEBI alleged
that there was price-sensitive information related to the company being
successful bidders of contracts with certain electricity bodies amounting to
Rs. 464 crores. Under the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations,
1992 (Insider Trading Regulations), insiders are prohibited from dealing in
shares of the company while having access to or being in possession of
unpublished price-sensitive information. The promoters and their group entities
were alleged to be aware of this price-sensitive information and indulged in
the purchase of a large quantity of shares before publishing this information.

 

The purchasers were funded by the promoter’s
group entities. The shares so acquired were either sold by the associates or
transferred to group companies. The profit made was also transferred to group
companies.

 

SEBI further alleged that incorrect
information was given about shares pledged by the group companies and associates.

 

DEFENCE BY THE PROMOTERS

The promoters denied that they had financed the
purchase of shares or that the various transactions through the associates
amounted to insider trading. They stated that only a preliminary outcome had
been received in respect of the bids when the shares were purchased and at that
stage one could not be certain that the contracts would be granted to the
company. They explained the whole process of grant of bids, including
preliminary acceptance and certain processes thereafter, and that until final
award took place, ‘price-sensitive information’ could not be said to
have arisen.

 

They also stated that a large foreign
shareholder had desired to sell the shares and that to avoid a negative impact
on the market his shares were purchased. It was also stated that the reason for
making purchases through the associates was that if the promoters had
themselves purchased the shares, a negative image would have been created
giving an impression of promoters increasing their holding in the company.

 

They also denied that they had given
misleading disclosures relating to promoters or of the relations between the
parties.

 

RULING BY SEBI

SEBI presented detailed facts of
transactions including how funds were transferred by group entities of the
promoters to the associates. It was also shown how shares were sold and monies
transferred or shares were simply transferred to the promoter entities.

 

SEBI also established how the promoter
himself was very closely involved with the contract bidding, and hence it was
clear that he was aware of the progress regarding receiving the contract.

 

On facts, too, from the data provided by the
promoters, it was shown that largely, once the preliminary bids were
successful, an eventual successful outcome was fairly certain. However, even
otherwise, the information at that stage was too price-sensitive.

 

The promoters were also held guilty of
providing misleading information of relations between the parties. Further,
SEBI held that the promoters had given misleading information relating to
pledging of shares by promoters.

Penalties were thus levied on various
entities involved. For ‘insider trading’, a penalty of Rs. 40 crores was levied
on the promoters and group entities / associates. For providing misleading
information, a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs was levied on the promoters and one
associate. For giving misleading disclosure of promoter holdings, an aggregate
penalty of Rs. 38 lakhs was levied.

 

RULING BY SAT

The Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT)
after extensively considering the arguments and the facts held that

 

(a) On the matter of price-sensitive
information, on facts, that is, after considering comparable cases and their
earlier rulings, the nature of bids and the awarding process, even the preliminary
outcome of a bid amounted to price-sensitive information and promoters’ dealing
in shares was in violation of the Insider Trading Regulations.

 

(b) On the amount of penalty, SAT noted that
SEBI had powers to levy penalty up to three times the gains made. Thus, the
penalty levied of Rs. 40 crores on profits on insider trading of Rs. 14 crores
was within the limit prescribed under law.

 

However, SAT reversed both the penalties
levied relating to providing of misleading information regarding associates’
pledging of shares.

 

OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

The case presents some interesting aspects –
regarding how trades are done and how meticulous is SEBI’s investigation.
Despite there being some grey areas, the ruling should place promoters on guard
and about the dilemma they face whilst dealing in the shares of a company.

 

The manner in which trading was done was
curious and perhaps added to the complexity of the case. The promoters did not
themselves purchase the shares but provided finance to associates who acted (as
held by SEBI / SAT) more or less as a front / representatives. They used the
funds to buy the shares and then transferred the shares / sales proceeds to the
promoters. Hence, penalty was levied jointly and severally on all the concerned
parties. A side-effect of this was that even the associates, who may have been
parties of small means, were made liable to ensure payment of penalty.

 

The amount of penalty is fairly huge. The
profits made were Rs. 14 crores. The maximum possible penalty was Rs. 42
crores, i.e., three times the profits. Thus, by levying a penalty of Rs. 40
crores, the maximum limit of the penalty was almost touched. And SAT had no
hesitation in upholding it.

 

The grey area is about the time when
price-sensitive information can be said to have arisen. Both the SEBI and the
SAT orders deal with this aspect in detail. However, the dilemma remains as to
at what stage can a company and insiders be held to be confident that the
orders would be received. The matter becomes even more complex since companies
are required to share material information at the appropriate stage. The
dilemma is this:
share too early and you may be held to be providing
misleading information if eventually the bid is rejected; share too late and
you may be accused of withholding and delaying release of price-sensitive /
material information. Considering that such analyses are always in hindsight,
the dilemma is compounded.

 

However, at least one aspect is clear – that
insiders should act with caution. Refraining from trading during this period
would be a wise decision because the Insider Trading Regulations themselves
provide for mandatory closure of the trading window for the period when such
information is ripening. For example, a long period of trading window closure
is mandated during the time when financial results of a company are being
finalised. Importantly, even preliminary success in bids is price-sensitive
information.

 

The next question is – should the person who
has suffered because of such insider trading be compensated? Insider trading is
often said to be a victimless crime. However, in some cases the victim may be
obvious. In the present case, can it be said that the foreign seller who sold a
large quantity of shares would not have sold the shares if he was aware that a
large order was virtually possible? In such a case, should not the profits made
by the promoters be disgorged and handed over to the seller?

 

This is the one question that often comes up
also in cases of frauds and price manipulation, etc. In the author’s view, this
is one area where both the law and practice lack clarity.

 

Finally, compliments are due to SEBI for the
meticulous gathering and analysis of information. White-collar violations are
often said to be sophisticated. Insider trading cases are even more notorious
for the sheer difficulty in proving guilt. In this case, though the
transactions were routed through associates, SEBI analysed the data and brought
out the whole linkages of relations and financial dealings between the parties.
This ought to serve as a lesson to promoters, especially in view of the hefty
penalty levied.
 

 

CHALO KASHMIR

About eight to ten
days back I was on my morning walk when I saw a luxury bus standing near the
joggers’ park. To my surprise I saw a few CA friends in the bus      – Shah, Mehta,
Desai, Joshi, Kamat, Agarwal!

I wondered where all
of them were going together.

I asked: Are Ranchhodbhai, where are all of you going?

Shah: Kashmir!

I: Some seminar? Or RRC? But who has organised RRC in this tax and
audit season?

Shah: No RRC. No conference. Just on a visit.

I was even more
shocked. All CAs leaving in the month of August for a visit to Kashmir!?
Surely, they were crazy!

Q: You mean, there are all CAs in the bus?

A: No, only eight to ten of us.

Q: But what makes you visit Kashmir all of a sudden?

A: Now Article 370 is deleted.

Q: So what? How does it matter to us?

A: We are exploring business and professional opportunities there.

Q: (CAs becoming so proactive was another surprise to me!)

I said, but the
situation is not normal there. Terrorists are still active.

A: We are now not afraid of terrorists. We don’t mind fighting with
them!

I could not believe
what I was hearing! I checked up whether I was in a dream! A chartered
accountant – making such a bold and courageous statement? In my dictionary, the
antonym of CA was ‘a courageous person’.

Q: But why are you leaving the established things over here?

A: Kya settled hai?

Every year, New
Law! New Tax! New Regulation! New Accounting Standard! New Notice! New Penalty!
New Authority!

We felt the
terrorism by guns and bombs is much less disastrous than the tax and other
regulators’ terrorism over here!

Q: Oh! But life will be difficult there!

A: Idhar bhi kaunsa comfort hai? CA’s life is the most
miserable one! No one respects him. No one cares for him!

Q: Why? You have your own profession!

A: Own profession gaya paani mein! Kaun hamari sunata hai? We
have bosses everywhere and we are answerable to all. Ghar me biwi! In
office, our staff, our articles, clients – all are our bosses! You need to be
in their good books, always.

And in Government
Departments, the less said the better! As for the Government, you are only a
slave!

I saw considerable
truth in what they were saying. I wished I could join them; but as a typical CA
I lacked the courage to make up my mind!

I wished them good
luck, bid farewell to them and came back envying them.

 But just the day
before yesterday, I met Mr. Shah. He said they are now in a dilemma because the
first two buildings they saw there were the Income tax Office and the GST
office!

And the report was
that even the terrorists were afraid of attacking those two buildings!

 

CAN A GIFT BE TAKEN BACK?

Introduction

A gift is a transfer of
property, movable or immovable, made voluntarily and without consideration by a
donor to a donee. But can a gift which has been made be taken back by the
donor? In other words, can a gift be revoked? There have been several instances
where parents have gifted their house to their children and then the children
have not taken care of their parents or ill-treated them. In such cases, the parents
wonder whether they can take back the gift which they have made on grounds of
ill-treatment. The position in this respect is not so simple and the law is
very clear on when a gift can be revoked.

 

LAW ON GIFTS

The Transfer of Property
Act
, 1882 deals with gifts of property, both immovable and movable. Section
122 of the Act defines a gift as the transfer of certain existing movable or
immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration by a donor to a
donee. The gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donee during the
lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee
dies before acceptance, then the gift is void. In Asokan vs.
Lakshmikutty, CA 5942/2007 (SC),
the Supreme Court held that in order
to constitute a valid gift, acceptance thereof is essential. The Act does not
prescribe any particular mode of acceptance. It is the circumstances of the
transaction which would be relevant for determining the question. There may be
various means to prove acceptance of a gift. The gift deed may be handed over
to a donee, which in a given situation may also amount to a valid acceptance.
The fact that possession had been given to the donee also raises a presumption
of acceptance.

 

This section is clear that
it applies to gifts of movable properties, too. A gift is also a transfer of
property and hence, all the provisions pertaining to transfer of property under
the Act are applicable to it. Further, the absence of consideration is the
hallmark of a gift. What is consideration has not been defined under this Act
and hence, one would have to refer to the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section
2(d) of that Act defines ‘consideration’ as follows – when, at the desire of
one person, the other person has done or abstained from doing something, such
act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.

 

HOW ARE GIFTS TO BE MADE?

Section 123 of the Act
answers this question in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of
immovable property, while the second deals with gifts of movable property.
Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, section 123 makes
transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of
the words ‘transfer must be effected’. However, the second part of
section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that a gift
of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as
aforesaid or ‘by delivery’.

 

The difference in the two
provisions lies in the fact that insofar as the transfer of movable property by
way of gift is concerned, the same can be effected by a registered instrument
or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property requires a
registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of
the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be
valid and effective. This view has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Renikuntla
Rajamma (D) By Lr. vs. K. Sarwanamma (2014) 9 SCC 456.

 

REVOCATION OF GIFTS

Section 126 of the Transfer
of Property Act provides that a gift may be revoked in certain circumstances.
The donor and the donee may agree that on the occurrence of a certain specified
event that does not depend on the will of the donor, the gift shall be revoked.
Further, it is necessary that the condition should be express and also
specified at the time of making the gift. A condition cannot be imposed
subsequent to giving the gift. In Asokan vs. Lakshmikutty (Supra),
the Supreme Court has held that once a gift is complete, the same cannot be
rescinded. For any reason whatsoever, the subsequent conduct of a donee cannot
be a ground for rescission of a valid gift.

 

However,
it is necessary that the event for revocation is not dependent upon the wishes
of the donor. Thus, revocation cannot be on the mere whims and fancies of the
donor. For instance, after gifting the donor cannot say that he made a mistake
and now he has had a change of mind and wants to revoke the gift. A gift is a
completed contract and hence unless there are specific conditions precedent
which have been expressly specified, there cannot be a revocation. It is quite
interesting to note that while a gift is a completed contract, there cannot be
a contract for making a gift since it would be void for absence of
consideration. For instance, a donor cannot enter into an agreement with a
donee under which he agrees to make a gift but he can execute a gift deed
stating that he has made a gift. The distinction is indeed fine! It needs to be
noted that a gift which has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation,
coercion, duress, etc., would not be a gift since it is not a contract at all.
It is void ab initio.

 

DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE

In Jagmeet
Kaur Pannu, Jammu vs. Ranjit Kaur Pannu AIR 2016 P&H 210
, the
Punjab and Haryana High Court considered whether a mother could revoke a gift
of her house in favour of her daughter on the grounds of misbehaviour and
abusive language. The mother had filed a petition with the Tribunal under the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which had set
aside the gift deed executed by the mother. It held that the deed was voidable
at the mother’s instance. The daughter appealed to the High Court which set
aside the Tribunal’s order. The High Court considered the gift deed which had
stated that the gift was made voluntarily, without any pressure and out of
natural love and affection which the mother bore towards the daughter. There
were no preconditions attached to the gift.

 

The
High Court held that the provisions of section 126 of the Transfer of Property
Act would apply since this was an important provision which laid down a rule of
public policy that a person who transferred a right to the property could not
set down his own volition as a basis for a revocation. If there was any
condition allowing for a document to be revoked or cancelled at the donor’s own
will, then that condition would be treated as void. The Court held that there
have been decisions of several courts which have held that if a gift deed was
clear and operated to transfer the right of property to another but it also
contained an expression of desire by the donor that the donee will maintain the
donor, then such expression in the gift deed must be treated as a pious wish of
the donor and the sheer fact that the donee did not fulfil the condition could
not vitiate the gift.

Again,
in the case of Syamala Raja Kumari vs. Alla Seetharavamma 2017 AIR (Hyd)
86
a similar issue before the High Court was whether a gift which was
made without any pre-conditions could be subsequently revoked. The donor
executed a gift deed in favour of his daughters out of love and affection. He
retained a life-interest benefit and after him, his wife retained a life-interest
under the said document. However, there were no conditions imposed by the donor
for gifting the property in favour of the donees. All it mentioned was that he
and his wife would have a life-interest benefit. Subsequently, the donor
executed a revocation deed stating that he wanted to cancel the gift since his
daughters were not taking care of him and his wife and were not even visiting
them. The Court set aside the revocation of the gift. It held that once a valid
unconditional gift was given by the donor and was accepted by the donees, the
same could not be revoked for any reason. The Court held that the donees would
get absolute rights in respect of the property. By executing the gift deed, the
donor had divested his right in the property and now he could not unilaterally
execute any revocation deed for revoking the gift deed executed by him in
favour of the plaintiffs.

 

Similarly,
in the case of Sheel Arora vs. Madan Mohan Bajaj, 2007 (6) Bom CR 633,
the donor executed a registered gift deed of a flat in favour of a donee.
Subsequently, the donor unilaterally executed a revocation deed cancelling the
gift. The Bombay High Court held that after lodging the duly executed gift deed
for registration, there was a unilateral attempt on the part of the donor to
revoke the said gift deed. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act provides
that the revocation of gift can be done only in cases specified under the
section and the same requires participation of the donee. In the case on  hand, there was no participation of the donee
in an effort on the part of the donor to revoke the said gift deed. On the
contrary, unilateral effort on the part of the donor by execution of a deed of
revocation itself disclosed that the donor had clearly accepted the legal consequences
which were to follow on account of the execution of a valid gift deed and
presentation of the same for registration.

 

However,
in the case of S. Sarojini Amma vs. Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar 2018 (14)
SCALE 339
, the Supreme Court considered a gift where, in expectation
that the donee would look after the donor and her husband, she executed a gift
deed. The gift deed clearly stated that the gift would take effect after the
death of the donor and her husband. Subsequently, the donor filed a deed of
cancellation of the gift deed. The Supreme Court observed that a conditional
gift became complete on the compliance of the conditions mentioned in the deed.
Hence, it allowed the revocation.

 

GIFTS MADE RESERVING INTEREST
FOR DONOR

One other mode of making a gift is a gift where the donor reserves an
interest for himself. For instance, a father may gift his flat to his son but
reserve a life-interest benefit for himself and his wife. Thus, although the
son would become the owner of the flat immediately, he would have an overriding
obligation to allow his parents to reside in the flat during their lifetime.
Thus, as long as they are alive, he would not be able to sell / lease or
otherwise transfer the flat or prevent them from staying in the flat. This issue
of whether a donor can reserve an interest for himself was a controversial one
and even the Supreme Court had opined for and against the same.

 

Ultimately,
a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Renikuntla Rajamma (D) By Lr. vs.
K. Sarwanamma (Supra)
dealt with this matter. In this case, the issue
was that since the donor had retained to herself the right to use the property
and to receive rents during her lifetime whether such a reservation or
retention rendered the gift invalid? The Supreme Court upheld the validity of
such a gift and held that what was retained was only the right to use the
property during the lifetime of the donor which did not in any way affect the
transfer of ownership in favour of the donee by the donor. Thus, such a gift
reserving an interest could be a via media to making an absolute gift and then
being at the mercy of the donee. However, the gift deed should be drafted very
carefully else it would fail to serve the purpose.

 

CONCLUSION

‘Donor beware of how you gift, for a gift once given cannot be easily
revoked!’
If there are any
doubts or concerns in the mind of the donor then he should refrain from making
an absolute unconditional gift or consider whether to avoid the gift at all.
This is all the more true in the case of old parents who gift away their family
homes and then try to claim the same back since they are being ill-treated by
their children. They should be forewarned that it would not be easy to revoke
such a gift. In all matters of estate and succession planning, due thought must
be given to all possible and probable scenarios and playing safe is better than
being sorry
!  

 

 

RECENT IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS – PART II

In Part I of the article published in July,
we covered some of the important developments in India relating to
International Tax. In this Part II of the article, we cover recent major
developments in the area of International Taxation and the work being done at
OECD and UN in various other related fields. It is in continuation of our
endeavour to update readers on major International Tax developments at regular
intervals. The news items included here come from various sources and the OECD
and UN websites.

 

(A) DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL TAX

 

Ratification by India of the Multilateral
Convention to implement tax treaty-related measures to prevent Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (Press release dated 2nd July, 2019 issued by CBDT,
Ministry of Finance)

 

India has ratified the Multilateral
Convention to implement tax treaty-related measures to prevent Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (MLI), which was signed by the Hon’ble Finance Minister in
Paris on 7th June, 2017 along with representatives of more than 65
countries. On 25th June, 2019 India deposited the Instrument of
Ratification to OECD, Paris, along with its final position in terms of Covered
Tax Agreements (CTAs), reservations, options and notifications under the MLI,
as a result of which MLI will come into force for India on 1st
October, 2019 and its provisions will have effect on India’s DTAAs from FY
2020-21 onwards.

 

(B) OECD DEVELOPMENTS

 

(I) OECD
announces progress made in addressing harmful tax practices (BEPS Action 5)
(Source: OECD News Report dated 29th January, 2019)

 

The OECD has
released a new publication, Harmful Tax Practices – 2018 Progress Report on
Preferential Regimes,
which contains results demonstrating that
jurisdictions have delivered on their commitment to comply with the standard on
harmful tax practices, including ensuring that preferential regimes align
taxation with substance.

 

The assessment of
preferential tax regimes is part of ongoing implementation of Action 5 under
the OECD/G20 BEPS Project. The assessments are conducted by the Forum on
Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP), comprising of the more than 120 member
jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework. The latest assessment by the FHTP has
yielded new conclusions on 57 regimes, including:

 

  •    44 regimes where
    jurisdictions have delivered on their commitment to make legislative changes to
    abolish or amend the regime (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Costa
    Rica, Curaçao, France, Jordan, Macau (China), Malaysia, Panama, Saint Lucia,
    Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Seychelles, Spain, Thailand and Uruguay).
  •    As a result, all IP regimes
    that were identified in the 2015 BEPS Action 5 report are now ‘not harmful’ and
    consistent with the nexus approach, following the recent legislative amendments
    passed by France and Spain.
  •    Three new or replacement
    regimes were found ‘not harmful’ as they have been specifically designed to
    meet Action 5 standard (Barbados, Curaçao and Panama).
  •    Four other regimes have been
    found to be out of scope or not operational (Malaysia, the Seychelles and the
    two regimes of Thailand), and two further commitments were given to make
    legislative changes to abolish or amend a regime (Malaysia and Trinidad &
    Tobago).
  •    One regime has been found
    potentially harmful but not actually harmful (Montserrat).
  •    Three regimes have been
    found potentially harmful (Thailand).

 

The FHTP has
reviewed 255 regimes to date since the start of the BEPS Project, and the
cumulative picture of the Action 5 regime review process is as follows:

 

The report also
delivers on the Action 5 mandate for considering revisions or additions to the
FHTP framework, including updating the criteria and guidance used in assessing
preferential regimes and the resumption of application of the substantial
activities factor to no, or only nominal, tax jurisdictions. The report
concludes in setting out the next key steps for the FHTP in continuing to
address harmful tax practices.

 

(II) New
Beneficial Ownership Toolkit will help tax administrations tackle tax evasion
more effectively (Source: OECD News Report dated 20th March, 2019)

 

The first ever beneficial
ownership toolkit
was released today in the context of the OECD’s
Global Integrity and Anti-Corruption Forum.
The toolkit, prepared by the
Secretariat of the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes
in partnership with the Inter-American
Development Bank, is intended to help governments implement the Global Forum’s
standards on ensuring that law enforcement officials have access to reliable
information on who the ultimate beneficial owners are behind a company or other
legal entity so that criminals can no longer hide their illicit activities
behind opaque legal structures.

 

The toolkit was
developed to support Global Forum members and in particular developing
countries because the current beneficial ownership standard does not provide a
specific method for implementing it. To assist policy makers in assessing
different implementation options, the toolkit contains policy considerations
that Global Forum members can use in implementing the legal and supervisory
frameworks to identify, collect and maintain the necessary beneficial ownership
information.

 

‘Transparency of
beneficial ownership information is essential to deterring, detecting and
disrupting tax evasion and other financial crimes. The Global Forum’s standard
on beneficial ownership offers jurisdictions flexibility in how they implement
the standard to take account of different legal systems and cultures. However,
that flexibility can pose challenges particularly to developing countries,’
said Pascal Saint-Amans, Head of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration
. ‘This new toolkit is an invaluable new resource to help
them find the best approach.’

 

The toolkit covers
a variety of important issues regarding beneficial ownership, including:

  •    the concepts of beneficial
    owners and ownership, the criteria used to identify them, the importance of the
    matter for transparency in the financial and non-financial sectors;
  •    technical aspects of
    beneficial ownership requirements, distinguishing between legal persons and
    legal arrangements (such as trusts) and measures being taken internationally to
    ensure the availability of information on beneficial ownership, (such as)
    a series of checklists that may be useful in pursuing a specific beneficial
    ownership framework;
  •    ways in which the principles
    on beneficial ownership can play out in practice in Global Forum EOIR peer
    reviews;
  •    why beneficial ownership
    information is also a crucial component of the automatic exchange of
    information regimes being adopted by jurisdictions around the world.

 

With 154 members, a
majority of whom are developing countries, the Global Forum has been heavily
engaged in providing technical assistance on the new beneficial ownership
requirements, often with the support of partner organisations including the
IDB. The Toolkit offers another means to further equip members to comply with
the international tax transparency standards.

 

The Toolkit is the
first practical guide freely available for countries implementing the
international tax transparency standards. It will be frequently updated to
incorporate new lessons learned from the second-round EOIR peer reviews
conducted by the Global Forum, as well as best practices seen and developed by
supporting organisations.

 

(III)
International community agrees on a road-map for resolving the tax challenges
arising from digitalisation of the economy (Source: OECD News Report dated 31st
May, 2019)

 

The international
community has agreed on a road-map for resolving the tax challenges arising
from the digitalisation of the economy, and committed to continue working
towards a consensus-based long-term solution by the end of 2020, the OECD
announced on 31st May, 2019

 

The 129 members of
the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
adopted a Programme of Work laying out a process for reaching a new global
agreement for taxing multinational enterprises.

 

The document, which
calls for intensifying international discussions around two main pillars, was
approved during the 28-29 May plenary meeting of the Inclusive Framework, which
brought together 289 delegates from 99 member countries and jurisdictions and
ten observer organisations. It was presented by OECD Secretary-General Angel
Gurría to G20 Finance Ministers for endorsement during their 8-9 June
ministerial meeting in Fukuoka, Japan.

 

Drawing on analysis
from a Policy Note published in January, 2019 and informed by a public
consultation held in March, 2019, the Programme of Work will explore the
technical issues to be resolved through the two main pillars. The first pillar
will explore potential solutions for determining where tax should be paid and
on what basis (‘nexus’), as well as what portion of profits could or should be
taxed in the jurisdictions where clients or users are located (‘profit
allocation’).

 

The second pillar
will explore the design of a system to ensure that multinational enterprises –
in the digital economy and beyond – pay a minimum level of tax. This pillar
would provide countries with a new tool to protect their tax base from profit
shifting to low / no-tax jurisdictions and is intended to address remaining
issues identified by the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative.

 

In 2015, the OECD
estimated revenue losses from BEPS of up to USD 240 billion, equivalent to 10% of
global corporate tax revenues, and created the Inclusive Forum to co-ordinate
international measures to fight BEPS and improve the international tax rules.

 

‘Important progress
has been made through the adoption of this new Programme of Work, but there is
still a tremendous amount of work to do as we seek to reach, by the end of
2020, a unified long-term solution to the tax challenges posed by
digitalisation of the economy,’ Mr Gurría said. ‘Today’s broad agreement on the
technical roadmap must be followed by strong political support towards a
solution that maintains, reinforces and improves the international tax system.
The health of all our economies depends on it.’

 

The Inclusive
Framework agreed that the technical work must be complemented by an impact
assessment of how the proposals will affect government revenue, growth and
investment. While countries have organised a series of working groups to
address the technical issues, they also recognise that political agreement on a
comprehensive and unified solution should be reached as soon as possible,
ideally before the year-end, to ensure adequate time for completion of the work
during 2020.

 

(IV)
Implementation of tax transparency initiative delivering concrete and
impressive results (Source: OECD News Report dated 7th June, 2019)

International
efforts to improve transparency via automatic exchange of information on
financial accounts are improving tax compliance and delivering concrete results
for governments worldwide, according to new data released on 7th
June, 2019 by the OECD.

 

More than 90
jurisdictions participating in a global transparency initiative under the
OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) since 2018 have now exchanged
information on 47 million offshore accounts, with a total value of around EUR
4.9 trillion. The Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) initiative –
activated through 4,500 bilateral relationships – marks the largest exchange of
tax information in history, as well as the culmination of more than two decades
of international efforts to counter tax evasion.

 

‘The international
community has brought about an unprecedented level of transparency in tax
matters which will bring concrete results for government revenues and services
in the years to come,’ according to OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria,
unveiling the new data prior to a meeting of G20 finance ministers in Fukuoka,
Japan. ‘The transparency initiatives we have designed and implemented through
the G20 have uncovered a deep pool of offshore funds that can now be effectively
taxed by authorities worldwide. Continuing analysis of cross-border financial
activity is already demonstrating the extent that international standards on
automatic exchange of information have strengthened tax compliance and we
expect to see even stronger results moving forward,’ Mr Gurria said.

 

Voluntary
disclosure of offshore accounts, financial assets and income in the run-up to
full implementation of the AEOI initiative resulted in more than EUR 95 billion
in additional revenue (tax, interest and penalties) for OECD and G20 countries
over the 2009-2019 period. This cumulative amount is up by EUR 2 billion since
the last reporting by OECD in November, 2018.

 

Preliminary OECD
analysis drawing on a methodology used in previous studies shows the very substantial
impact AEOI is having on bank deposits in international financial centres
(IFCs). Deposits held by companies or individuals in more than 40 key IFCs
increased substantially over the 2000 to 2008 period, reaching a peak of USD
1.6 trillion by mid-2008.

 

These deposits have
fallen by 34% over the past ten years, representing a decline of USD 551
billion, as countries adhered to tighter transparency standards. A large part
of that decline is due to the onset of the AEOI initiative, which accounts for
about two-thirds of the decrease. Specifically, AEOI has led to a decline of 20
to 25% in the bank deposits in IFCs, according to preliminary data. The
complete study is expected to be published later this year.

 

‘These impressive
results are only the first stock-taking of our collective efforts,’ Mr Gurria
said. ‘Even more tax revenue is expected as countries continue to process the
information received through data-matching and other investigation tools. We
really are moving closer to a world where there is nowhere left to hide.’

 

(V) Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax
Auditors

The OECD in June,
2019 released an update of its 2009 Money Laundering Awareness Handbook for
Tax Examiners and Tax Auditors.
This update enhances the 2009 publication
with additional chapters such as ‘Indicators on Charities and Foreign Legal
Entities’ and ‘Indicators on Cryptocurrencies’ relating to money laundering. In
a separate chapter, the increasing threat
of terrorism is addressed by including indicators of terrorist financing.

 

The purpose of the Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax
Auditors
is to raise the awareness level of tax examiners and tax auditors
regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. As such, the primary
audience for this Handbook are tax examiners and tax auditors who may come
across indicators of unusual or suspicious transactions or activities in the
normal course of tax reviews or audits and report to an appropriate authority.
While this Handbook is not intended to detail criminal investigation methods,
it does describe the nature and context of money laundering and terrorist
financing activities, so that tax examiners and tax auditors, and by extension
tax administrations, are able to better understand how their contributions can
assist in the fight against serious crimes.

 

While the aim of
this Handbook is to raise the awareness of the tax examiners and tax auditors
about the possible implications of transactions or activities related to money
laundering and terrorist financing, the Handbook is not meant to replace
domestic policies or procedures. Tax examiners and tax auditors will need to
carry out their duties in accordance with the policies and procedures in force
in their country.

 

(VI)  G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration

The leaders of the
G20 met in Osaka, Japan on 28-29 June, 2019 to make united efforts to address
major global economic challenges. They stated in their declaration that they
will work together to foster global economic growth while harnessing the power
of technological innovation, in particular digitalisation, and its application
for the benefit of all.

 

In the declaration,
para 16, relating to tax, stated as follows:

 

‘16. We will
continue our co-operation for a globally fair, sustainable, and modern
international tax system, and welcome international co-operation to advance
pro-growth tax policies. We reaffirm the importance of the worldwide
implementation of the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package
and enhanced tax certainty. We welcome the recent progress on addressing the
tax challenges arising from digitalisation and endorse the ambitious work
programme that consists of a two-pillar approach, developed by the Inclusive
Framework on BEPS.
We will redouble our efforts for a consensus-based
solution with a final report by 2020. We welcome the recent achievements on tax
transparency, including the progress on automatic exchange of information for
tax purposes. We also welcome an updated list of jurisdictions that have not
satisfactorily implemented the internationally agreed tax transparency
standards. We look forward to a further update by the OECD of the list that
takes into account all of the strengthened criteria. Defensive measures will be
considered against listed jurisdictions. The 2015 OECD report inventories
available measures in this regard. We call on all jurisdictions to sign and
ratify the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters. We reiterate our support for tax capacity building in developing
countries.’

 

(VII)  OECD expands transfer pricing country
profiles to cover 55 countries

 

The OECD has just
released new transfer pricing country profiles for Chile, Finland and Italy,
bringing the total number of countries covered to 55. In addition, the OECD has
updated the information contained in the country profiles for Colombia and
Israel.

 

These country
profiles reflect the current state of legislation and practice in each country
regarding the application of the arm’s-length principle and other key transfer
pricing aspects. They include information on the arm’s-length principle,
transfer pricing methods, comparability analysis, intangible property,
intra-group services, cost contribution agreements, transfer pricing
documentation, administrative approaches to avoiding and resolving disputes,
safe harbours and other implementation measures as well as to what extent the
specific national rules follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

 

The transfer
pricing country profiles are published to increase transparency in this area
and reflect the revisions to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines resulting from the
2015 Reports on Actions 8-10 Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value
Creation and Action 13 Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country
Reporting
of the OECD/G20 Project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS), in addition to changes incorporating the revised guidance on safe
harbours approved in 2013 and consistency changes made to the rest of the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

 

A.    UN
DEVELOPMENTS

 

(VIII)     Manual
for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing
Countries, 2019

 

The United Nations Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties
between Developed and Developing Countries (2019) is a compact training tool
for beginners with limited experience in tax-treaty negotiations. It seeks to
provide practical guidance to tax-treaty negotiators in developing countries,
in particular those who negotiate based on the United Nations Model Double
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. It deals with
all the basic aspects of tax-treaty negotiations and it is focused on the
realities and stages of capacity development of developing countries.

 

The core of the Manual is contained in Section III which
introduces the different Articles of the United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (United Nations Model
Convention). This section is not intended to replace the Commentaries thereon,
which remain the final authority on issues of interpretation, but rather to
provide a simple tool for familiarising less experienced negotiators with the
provisions of each Article.

 

We sincerely hope that the reader would find the above developments to
be interesting and useful.

 

 

UNINSTALLED MATERIALS AND IMPACT ON REVENUE RECOGNITION

BACKGROUND


Contract Co (CoCo) enters
into a contract with a customer to refurbish a 40-storey building and install
new lifts for a total consideration of INR 1,62,000. The promised refurbishment
service, including the installation of the lifts, is a single performance
obligation satisfied over time. The refurbishment will be performed over a three-year
period. The total revenue is expected to be as follows:

 

TOTAL EXPECTED REVENUE

 

 

INR

Transaction
price

1,62,000

Expected
costs

 

Lifts

81,000

Other
costs

54,000

Total
expected costs

1,35,000

Expected
gross margin

27,000

 

 

The contract costs incurred
over the three-year period are as follows:

 

CONTRACT COSTS OVER  THREE YEARS

           

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Total

 

INR

INR

INR

INR

Other
costs incurred

18,000

18,000

18,000

54,000

Cost
of lifts delivered to site but not yet installed at year-end

81,000

81,000

Total
costs incurred

99,000

18,000

18,000

1,35,000

 

At the end of Year 1,
included in the total costs of INR 99,000 are the costs incurred to purchase
the lifts worth INR 81,000. These lifts had been delivered at the site at the
end of Year 1 but had not yet been installed. The lifts were procured from a third-party
supplier and CoCo was not involved in either the designing or the manufacture
of the lifts. These lifts were installed at the end of Year 2. CoCo recognises
revenue over time, applying an input method based on costs incurred. Assume
that in arriving at the agreed transaction price, CoCo had applied the
following mark-up to its costs:

 

COST MARK-UP BY THE COMPANY

 

 

Cost

Mark-up

Transaction

Price

Gross Margin

 

INR

INR

INR

%

Cost
of lifts

81,000

7,200

88,200

8.2

Other
costs

54,000

19,800

73,800

26.8

Total

1,35,000

27,000

1,62,000

16.7

 

 

CoCo has determined that it
acts as a principal in accordance with Ind AS 115.B34-B38, because it obtains
control of the lifts before they are transferred to the customer.

 

QUERY 1

CoCo uses an input method
based on costs incurred. How should it determine the amount of revenue, profit
and gross margin to be recognised in its financial statements for Year 1, Year
2 and Year 3?

 

YEAR 1

The general principle of
over time revenue recognition in Ind AS 115 is that the pattern of revenue
recognition should reflect the entity’s performance in transferring control of
goods and services to the customer (see Ind AS 115.39). Paragraph B19 of Ind AS
115 notes that when an input method is used, an entity should exclude the
effects of any inputs that do not reflect the entity’s performance to date. It
specifically requires that revenue is only recognised to the extent of costs
incurred if:

 

(a) the goods are not
distinct; (b) the customer is expected to obtain control of the goods
significantly before receiving services relating to the goods; (c) the cost of
the transferred goods is significant relative to the total expected costs to
completely satisfy the performance obligation; and (d) the entity procures the
goods from a third party and is not significantly involved in designing and
manufacturing the same (but the entity is acting as a principal in accordance
with paragraphs B34-B38).

 

Therefore, CoCo excludes
the cost of the lifts from the cost-to-cost calculation in Year 1 because the
cost of the lifts is not proportionate to CoCo’s measure of progress towards
performing the refurbishment. Paragraph B19 is met because:

 

(i) The
lifts are not distinct. The refurbishment and installation of the lifts represents
one single performance obligation;

(ii) The
customer obtains control of the lifts when they arrive on its premises at the
end of Year 1, but installation of the lifts is only performed at the end of
Year 2;

(iii) The
costs of the lifts are significant relative to the total expected costs of the
refurbishment; and

(iv) The
lifts were procured from a third party and CoCo is not involved in designing or
manufacturing the lifts.

 

CoCo
therefore adjusts the measure of its progress towards completion and excludes
the uninstalled lifts from the costs incurred when determining the entity’s
performance to date:

 

 

DETERMINING THE ENTITY’S PERFORMANCE

       

 

INR

Total costs incurred to date:

99,000

Less: uninstalled lifts

(81,000)

 

18,000

 

CoCo then
calculates the percentage of performance completed to date:

 

INR 18,000
other costs (excluding lifts) / INR 54,000 total other costs (excluding lifts)
= 33.33% complete. CoCo recognises revenue to the extent of the adjusted costs
incurred and does not recognise a profit margin for the uninstalled lifts:

PROFIT MARGIN RECOGNISED

 

 

Year 1

 

INR

Total transaction price

1,62,000

Less: Cost of lifts

(81,000)

Adjusted revenue (excluding lifts)

81,000

% of performance completed to date

33%

Revenue for the period (excluding lifts)

27,000

Revenue recognised for cost of lifts

81,000

Total revenue for the period

1,08,000

Less: Costs for the period

(99,000)

Profit for the period

9,000

Profit margin (profit / total revenue)

8.33%

 

The above
accounting is clearly in accordance with Ind AS 115 and there are no
interpretation issues. However, the accounting in the following years is not
clear under Ind AS 115, which is the subject of this discussion.

 

YEARS 2 & 3

At the end
of Year 2 the lifts have been installed and an additional INR 18,000 of costs
has been incurred. Ind AS 115 does not contain specific guidance on the
accounting for the previously uninstalled materials that have now been
installed. Possible approaches for the accounting in the remaining years are:

 

View 1
– Continue to exclude the cost of the lifts from the cost-to-cost calculation
in the remaining periods of the contract;

View 2
Include the cost of the lifts in the cost-to-cost calculation once the lifts
have been installed and use a contract-wide profit margin;

View 3
– The cost-to-cost calculation would continue to exclude the cost of the lifts;
however, once the lifts have been installed, an applicable profit margin on the
lifts would be recognised as revenue;

View 4 – Since Ind  AS 115 is not specific in its requirements,
Views 1, 2 or 3 might be acceptable depending on the facts and circumstances.
It is necessary to consider whether the approach selected meets the overall
principle in Ind AS 115.39 that the amount of revenue should ‘depict an
entity’s performance in transferring control of goods or services promised to a
customer’. This principle once selected should be applied consistently.

 

View 1
– Continue to exclude the cost of the lifts from the cost-to-cost calculation
in the remaining periods of the contract;

Under this
approach, no profit margin would be recognised for the installed lift. The
profit margin derived from the lifts is instead shifted to the other services
in the contract as costs for those services are incurred.

 

COSTS INCURRED TO DATE

 

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

 

INR

INR

INR

Total costs incurred to date

99,000

1,17,000

1,35,000

Less: Cost of lifts delivered but not installed at end of Year 1

(81,000)

(81,000)

(81,000)

Adjusted costs incurred to date (excl. lifts)

18,000

36,000

54,000

% of performance completed to date

33%

67%

100%

Revenue recognised to date (excl. lifts)

27,000

54,000

81,000

Revenue recognised for cost of lifts

81,000

81,000

81,000

Cumulative revenue recognised to date

1,08,000

1,35,000

1,62,000

 

 

REVENUE FOR THREE YEARS

 

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Total

 

INR

INR

INR

INR

Revenue for the period (excluding lifts)

27,000

27,000

27,000

81,000

Add: Revenue for cost of lifts

81,000

 

 

81,000

Revenue for the period

1,08,000

27,000

27,000

1,62,000

Less: Costs for the period

(99,000)

(18,000)

(18,000)

(1,35,000)

Profit for the period

9,000

9,000

9,000

27,000

Profit margin

8%

33%

33%

17%

 

Arguments for View 1:

 

Under B19(b)
only one accounting treatment applies to goods that meet the conditions set out
in B19(b). B19(b) does not distinguish goods that have been installed from
those that have not yet been installed. As per para B19(b), a faithful
depiction of an entity’s performance might be to recognise revenue at an amount
equal to the cost of goods used to satisfy a performance obligation if the
entity expects at contract inception that certain conditions are met.

The Basis
for Conclusions to IFRS 15 notes that the aim of the adjustment is to reflect
the same profit or loss and margin as if the customer had supplied those goods
themselves for the entity to install or use in the construction activity.
Paragraph BC172 of IFRS 15 notes: For goods that meet the conditions in paragraph
B19(b) of IFRS 15, recognising revenue to the extent of the costs of those
goods ensures that the depiction of the entity’s profit (or margin) in the
contract is similar to the profit (or margin) that the entity would recognise
if the customer had supplied those goods themselves for the entity to install
or use in the construction activity [IFRS 15.BC172].
If the customer had
supplied the lifts itself, then CoCo would not have recognised any profit or
margin on the lifts.

 

Per
paragraph IE98 from Illustrative Example 19, the adjustment to cost-to-cost can
be read to be applied throughout the entire life of the contract, in
accordance with paragraph B19 of Ind AS 115, the entity adjusts its measure of
progress to exclude the costs to procure the elevators from the measure of
costs incurred and from the transaction price.
The entity recognises
revenue for the transfer of the elevators in an amount equal to the costs to
procure the elevators (i.e., at a zero margin).

 

Arguments against View 1:

 

View 1 does not reflect the
reality of the transaction as an entity would typically charge a margin for
procurement (the extent of the margin would likely depend on whether the item
is generic or of a specialised nature – a higher margin is likely to be applied
for items that are specialised in nature or that are harder to source), and
would not recognise a profit margin on the item when it is installed. Rather,
the margin is being shifted to the other services in the contract as costs for those
services are incurred. However, such margins may not be material when the
entity is procuring a generic item and is not involved in its design.

 

View 1 would
result in a different cumulative amount of revenue being recognised using the
same input method at the end of Year 2 when there has been a significant delay
between delivery and installation compared to when there is no delay – even
though the same amount of work has been performed at the end of Year 2. This is
because B19(b)(ii) would not be met because the customer does not obtain
control of the goods significantly before receiving the services.

 

View 2
– Include the cost of the lifts in the cost-to-cost calculation once the lifts
have been installed.

Under this approach, once the lifts have been installed, the cost of the
lifts would be included in cost-to-cost calculations.

 

COST-TO COST CALCULATIONS

 

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

 

INR

INR

INR

Total costs incurred to date

99,000

1,17,000

1,35,000

Less: cost of lifts delivered but not yet installed

(81,000)

N/A

N/A

Costs incurred to date

18,000

1,17,000

1,35,000

% of POCM to date (rounded off)

33%

87%

100%

Revenue recognised to date

27,000

1,40,400

1,62,000

Revenue recognised for cost of lifts

81,000

N/A

N/A

Cumulative revenue recognised to date

1,08,000

1,40,400

1,62,000

                       

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Total

 

INR

INR

INR

INR

Revenue for the period

27,000

32,400

21,600

81,000

Add: Revenue for costs of lifts

81,000

N/A

N/A

81,000

Revenue for the period

1,08,000

32,400

21,600

1,62,000

Less: Costs for the period

(99,000)

(18,000)

(18,000)

(1,35,000)

Profit for the period

9,000

14,400

3,600

27,000

Profit margin

8%

44%

17%

17%

 

Arguments for View 2:

The
guidance in Illustrative Example 19 and the Basis for Conclusions to IFRS 15
focuses on the situation before the goods are installed, so the adjustment to
the cost-to-cost calculation only applies on goods that have been delivered but
not yet installed.

 

The
relevant extracts from the section for ‘Uninstalled materials’ in the Basis for
Conclusions are as follows:

 

BC171 of IFRS 15 states: The boards observed that if a customer
obtains control of the goods before they are installed by an entity… The boards
noted that recognising a contract-wide profit margin before the goods are
installed could overstate the measure of the entity’s performance and,
therefore, revenue would be overstated… [emphasis
added].

BC172: The
boards noted that the adjustment to the cost-to-cost measure of progress for
uninstalled materials… (emphasis added).

 

BC174: …Although
the outcome of applying paragraph B19(b) of 1FRS 15 is that some goods or
services that are part of a single performance obligation attract a margin, while any uninstalled materials attract only a zero margin…

 

Arguments against View 2

When the
profit margin applicable to the procured item(s) is significantly different
from the profit margin attributable to other goods and services to be provided
in accordance with the contract, the application of a contract-wide profit
margin will overstate the amount of revenue and profit that is attributed to
the procured item(s). This is not consistent with the underlying principle in
Ind AS 115.39, which is that the amount of revenue recognised should ‘depict an
entity’s performance in transferring control of goods or services promised to a
customer’ (i.e., the satisfaction of an entity’s performance obligation).

 

As noted
in the analysis for Year 1 above, Ind AS 115.B19(b) includes guidance for
uninstalled material at the point at which control has passed to the customer.
This guidance is noted as being an example of ‘faithful depiction’ of an
entity’s performance. Consequently, when there are significantly different
profit margins attributable to procured item(s), it is necessary to adjust the
amount of revenue that is attributable to those procured item(s).

 

View 3
– Once the lifts have been installed, an applicable profit margin is recognised
for the lifts separately from the rest of the project:

 

APPLICABLE PROFIT MARGIN

       

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

 

INR

INR

INR

Total costs incurred to date

99,000

1,17,000

1,35,000

Less: cost of lifts delivered but not yet installed

(81,000)

(81,000)

(81,000)

Adjusted costs incurred to date (excl. lifts)

18,000

36,000

54,000

% of performance completed to date

33%

67%

100%

Revenue recognised to date (excl. lifts)

24,600

49,200

73,800

Revenue recognised for lifts (mark-up included in Years 2 &
3)

81,000

88,200

88,200

Cumulative revenue recognised to date

1,05,600

1,37,400

1,62,000

 

       

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Total

 

INR

INR

INR

INR

Revenue for the period (excl. lifts)

24,600

24,600

24,600

73,800

Add: Revenue for lifts

81,000

7,200

0

88,200

Revenue for the period

1,05,600

31,800

24,600

1,62,000

Less: Costs for the period

(99,000)

(18,000)

(18,000)

(1,35,000)

Profit for the period

6,600

13,800

6,600

27,000

Profit margin

6%

43%

27%

17%

 

Arguments for View 3:

Same
arguments as for View 2, but it also addresses the downside of View 2 of
overstating profit margin once the materials are installed. Proponents of View
3 argue that this would most faithfully depict the economics of the transaction.

 

Arguments against View 3:

Mark-ups /
profit margins could be subject to management manipulation.

 

The
approach seems to have been considered but rejected by the boards as noted in
paragraph BC171 of IFRS 15. Alternatively, requiring an entity to estimate a
profit margin that is different from the contract-wide profit margin could be
complex and could effectively create a performance obligation for goods that
are not distinct (thus bypassing the requirements for identifying performance
obligations) [IFRS 15.BC171].

 

QUERY 2 –
assuming either View 2 or View 3 is followed for Question 1:

 

Where the
profit margins attributable to different components of a contract that is
accounted for as a single performance obligation are significantly different,
is it appropriate to use an input method as a measure of progress?

 

View 1

Yes. Although
different profit margins might arise from different parts of a contract, the
fact that the seller has a single performance obligation means that Ind AS 115
does not require those different components to be separately identified.
Proponents of this view note that IFRS 15.BC171 would appear to support this
approach: ‘Alternatively, requiring an entity to estimate a profit margin that
is different from the contract-wide profit margin could be complex and could
effectively create a performance obligation for goods that are not distinct
(thus bypassing the requirements for identifying performance obligations).’ It
is also noted that Example 19, which has different components that would
typically be expected to have different profit margins, is based on the vendor
using an input method to measure progress towards contract completion.

 

View 2

No. Ind AS
115.39 includes the objective that is required to be followed when measuring
progress where a performance obligation is satisfied over time, which is: ‘…The
objective when measuring progress is to depict an entity’s performance in
transferring control of goods or services promised to a customer (i.e., the
satisfaction of an entity’s performance obligation.’ Proponents of View 2
consider that, in the fact pattern set out above, the use of an input method,
with a single overall profit margin being allocated to costs incurred, would
result in an overstatement of performance for the transfer of the lifts and an
understatement of performance for the transfer of other services.

 

Supporters of View 2 also question whether the lifts are in fact part of
a single performance obligation. If the seller can procure the lifts
separately, then the customer could also procure the lifts, meaning that the
procurement of the lifts could be viewed as being a separate performance
obligation.

 

This
conclusion would also appear to be supported by IFRS 15.BC172, in that: ‘…For
goods that meet the conditions in paragraph B19(b) of IFRS15, recognising
revenue to the extent of the costs of those goods ensures that the depiction of
the entity’s profit (or margin) in the contract is similar to the profit (or
margin) that the entity would recognise if the customer had supplied those
goods themselves for the entity to install or use in the construction
activity.’

 

View 3

Ind AS115 is not specific in its requirements. Consequently, either View
1 or View 2 are acceptable as an accounting policy choice, to be applied
consistently to similar transactions.

 

AUTHOR’S VIEW AND
CONCLUSION

On Question
1,View 1 and View 2 are the two acceptable views, though on balance View 1 is
more preferred. View 3 and View 4 are not acceptable. View 1 practically makes
sense because it sticks with one approach throughout the period. This approach
is also consistent with Ind AS 115.B19 and meets the spirit of the requirement
in the Standard. View 2 may be accepted because Ind AS 115.B19 only applies to
uninstalled materials and once they are installed, then an entity goes back to
the general model for measuring progress.

 

On the
second question, View 1 is more appropriate. There is generally a better
alignment in margin using the input method, but not a guarantee of having a
consistent margin throughout in all cases.

 

The key
question is whether the use of the input method would be a faithful depiction
of the entity’s performance – and the response is in the affirmative. In any case, the standard
does not provide an option of applying input method, using different margins
for different components.
 

 

DCIT CC-44 vs. M/s Shreya Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 2835/Mum./2014; Bench E; Date of order: 20th November, 2015] Penalty u/s 221(1) r/w/s 140A(3) of the Act – Default on payment of self-assessment tax – Acute financial constraints – Good and sufficient reasons – Penalty deleted

18.  The Pr.
CIT-Central-4 vs. M/s Shreya Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 180
of 2017];
Date of order: 19th March, 2019; A.Y.: 2010-11

 

DCIT CC-44 vs. M/s Shreya Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 2835/Mum./2014;
Bench E; Date of order: 20th November, 2015]

 

Penalty u/s 221(1) r/w/s 140A(3) of the Act – Default on payment of
self-assessment tax – Acute financial constraints – Good and sufficient reasons
– Penalty deleted

 

The assessee is a pharmaceutical company manufacturing a wide range of
medicines and formulations. It filed its e-return on 15th October,
2010 and was liable to pay self-assessment tax of Rs. 2,61,19,300. But the
assessee did not pay the tax and merely uploaded the e-return. Asked the
reasons for not depositing the tax, it was submitted before the AO that the
assessee company was in great financial crisis.

 

However, the assessee’s contention was not accepted and the AO issued
notice u/s 221(1) r/w/s 140A(3) of the Act holding that the assessee had failed
to deposit self-assessment tax due to which a penalty was imposed u/s 221(1) of
the Act.

The CIT(A) deleted the penalty to the extent of Rs. 10 lakhs and upheld
the balance amount of Rs. 40 lakhs.

 

Both the assessee as well as the Department went in appeal before the
ITAT. The Tribunal, while deleting the penalty referred to relied upon the
further proviso to sub-section (1) of section 221 of the Act which provides
that where the assessee proves to the satisfaction of the AO that the default
was for good and sufficient reasons, no penalty shall be levied under the said
section.

 

The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s explanation that due to acute
financial constraints the tax could not be deposited. The assessee pointed out
that even the other dues such as provident fund, ESIC and bank interest could
not be paid. The assessee also could not deposit the government taxes such as
sales tax and service tax. In fact, the recoveries of the tax could be made only
upon adjustment of the bank accounts.

 

The financial crisis was because of non-receipt of proceeds for its
exports. Attention was drawn to the amount of outstanding receivables which had
increased from Rs. 291,96,24,000 to Rs. 362,54,82,000 during the year under
consideration.

 

On further appeal to the High Court, the Revenue appeal was dismissed.   

 

 

Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-6(3) vs. M/s Graviss Foods Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 4863/Mum./2014] Pre-operative expense – New project unconnected with the existing business – Deductible u/s 37(1) of the Act

17.  The Pr. CIT-7 vs. M/s Graviss
Foods Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 295 of 2017];
Date of order: 5th April, 2019; A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-6(3) vs. M/s Graviss Foods Pvt.
Ltd. [ITA No. 4863/Mum./2014]

 

Pre-operative expense – New project unconnected with the existing
business – Deductible u/s 37(1) of the Act

 

The assessee is a private limited company engaged in the business of
manufacturing ice cream and other milk products. For the AY 2010-11 the
assessee had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 1.80 crores (rounded off) in the
process of setting up a factory for production of ‘mawa’, which project the
assessee was forced to abandon.

 

The AO was of the opinion that the expenditure was incurred for setting
up of a new industry. The expenditure was a pre-operative expenditure and could
not have been claimed as revenue expenditure.

 

The AO held that the assessee had entered a new field of business of
producing and supplying ‘mawa’ (or ‘khoa’) which is entirely different from the
business activity carried on by it. The AO completed the assessment and
disallowed the expenditure on the ground that it was incurred in connection
with starting a new project, that the expenditure was incurred for setting up a
new factory at Amritsar and thus not for the expansion and extension of the
existing business but for an altogether new business. The CIT(A) allowed the
appeal. The Tribunal relied upon its earlier decision for A.Y. 2009-10 and
confirmed the view of the CIT(A) and dismissed the Revenue’s appeal.

 

Before the Hon’ble High Court counsel for Revenue submitted that the
assessee was previously engaged in the business of manufacturing ice cream. The
assessee desired to set up a new plant at a distant place for production of
‘mawa’. This was, therefore, a clear case of setting up of a new industry.

The High Court observed that there was interlacing of the accounts,
management and control. The facts on record as culled out by the Tribunal are
that the assessee company was set up with the object to produce or cause to be
produced by process, grate, pack, store and sell milk products and ice cream.
In furtherance of such objects, the assessee had already set up an ice cream
producing unit. Using the same management control and accounts, the assessee
attempted to set up another unit for production of ‘mawa’, which is also a milk
product. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly held that the expenditure was
incurred for expansion of the existing business and it was not a case of
setting up of new industry, therefore it was allowable as revenue expenditure.

 

The High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, Gujarat, [1989] 177 ITR 377,
and the Bombay High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Tata Chemicals
Ltd. (2002) 256 ITR 395 Bom.

 

The Department’s appeal was dismissed.

 

The DCIT vs. Mrs. Supriya Suhas Joshi [ITA No. 6565/Mum./2012; Bench: L; Date of order: 31st May, 2016; Mum. ITAT] Income from salary vis-a-vis income from contract of services – Dual control – Test of the extent of control and supervision

16.  The Pr. CIT-27 vs. Mrs.
Supriya Suhas Joshi
[Income tax Appeal No. 382 of 2017]; Date of order: 12th April, 2019; A.Y.: 2009-10

 

The DCIT vs. Mrs. Supriya Suhas Joshi [ITA No. 6565/Mum./2012; Bench: L;
Date of order: 31st May, 2016; Mum. ITAT]

 

Income from salary vis-a-vis income from contract of services – Dual
control – Test of the extent of control and supervision

 

The assessee is the sole proprietor of M/s Radiant
Services, engaged in Manpower Consultancy and Recruitment Services in India and
overseas. The said Radiant Services had entered into an agreement with M/s
Arabi Enertech, a Kuwait-based company, in 2007-08 for providing manpower to it
as per its requirements. Individual contracts were executed for providing the
personnel. As per the contract, the Kuwait-based company paid a fixed sum out
of which the assessee would remunerate the employee.

 

The AO treated the payments made by the assessee to
the persons recruited abroad as not in the nature of salaries and applied the
provisions of section 195 r/w/s 40(a)(ia) and disallowed the same as no TDS was
done by the assessee. The AO concluded that there was no master and servant
relationship between the assessee and the recruited persons and therefore the
payments could not be held to be salaries. He did not accept the assessee’s
stand that the persons so employed worked in the employment of the assessee and
were only loaned to the Kuwait-based company for carrying out the work as per
the requirements of the said company. It is undisputed that in case of payment
to a non-resident towards salary, it would not come within the scope of section
195 of the Act, and hence this controversy. The assessee carried the matter in
appeal. The CIT(A) took note of the documents from the records, including the contract
between the assessee and the Kuwait-based company and the license granted by
the Union Government to enable the assessee to provide such a service. The
Commissioner was of the opinion that the assessee had employed the persons who
had discharged the duties for the Kuwait-based company. The assessee was,
therefore, in the process making payment of salary and, therefore, there was no
requirement of deducting tax at source u/s 195 of the Act.

 

The Tribunal confirmed the view of the CIT(A) upon
which an appeal was filed before the High Court.

 

The Hon’ble High Court observed that the contract
between the assessee and the Kuwait-based company was sufficiently clear,
giving all indications that the concerned person was the employee of the
assessee. The preamble to the contract itself provided that as per the contract
the assessee would supply the Commissioning Engineer to the said company on
deputation basis for its ongoing project. Such deputation would be on the terms
and conditions mutually discussed between the assessee and the said company.
The contract envisaged payment of deputation charges which were quantified at
US$ 5,500 per month. Such amount would be paid to the assessee out of which the
assessee would remunerate the employee. The mode of payment was also specified.
The same would be released upon the assessee submitting invoices. The record
suggested that the assessee after receiving the said sum from the Kuwait-based
company would regularly pay to the employee US$ 4,000 per month, retaining the
rest. In clear terms, thus, the concerned employee was in the employment of the
assessee and not of the Kuwait-based company, contrary to what the Department
contended.

 

The Department argued that looking to the
supervision and control of the Kuwait-based company over the employee, it must
be held that he was under the employment of the said company and not of the
assessee. In this regard, it placed heavy reliance on the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prashad vs. Commissioner of Income tax
(1972) 86 ITR 122 (SC).
The Court observed that the test of the extent
of control and supervision of a person by the engaging agency was undoubtedly a
relevant factor while judging the question whether that person was an agent or
an employee. However, in a situation where the person employed by one employer
is either deputed to another or is sent on loan service, the question of dual
control would always arise. In such circumstances, the mere test of on-spot
control or supervision in order to decide the correct employer may not succeed.
It is inevitable that in a case such as the present one, the Kuwait-based
company would enjoy considerable supervising powers and control over the
employee as long as the employee is working for it.

Nevertheless, the assessee company continued to
enjoy the employer-employee relationship with the said person. For example, if
the work of such person was found to be wanting or if there was any complaint
against him, as per the agreement it would only be the assessee who could
terminate his services. Under the circumstances, no question of law arises. The
Department’s appeal was dismissed.

 

Sections 9(1)(vii)(b) and 195 of ITA 1961 – TDS – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Non-resident – TDS from payment to non-resident – Payment made to non-resident for agency services as global coordinator and lead manager to issue of global depository receipt – Services neither rendered nor utilised in India and income arising wholly outside India from commercial services rendered in course of carrying on business wholly outside India – Tax not deductible at source

46.  CIT(IT) vs. IndusInd Bank
Ltd.; [2019] 415 ITR 115 (Bom.)
Date of order: 22nd April, 2019;

 

Sections 9(1)(vii)(b) and 195 of ITA 1961 – TDS – Income deemed to
accrue or arise in India – Non-resident – TDS from payment to non-resident –
Payment made to non-resident for agency services as global coordinator and lead
manager to issue of global depository receipt – Services neither rendered nor
utilised in India and income arising wholly outside India from commercial
services rendered in course of carrying on business wholly outside India – Tax
not deductible at source

The assessee was engaged in banking business. For
its need for capital, the bank decided to raise capital abroad through the
issuance of global depository receipts. The assessee engaged the A bank,
incorporated under the laws of the United Arab Emirates and carrying on
financial services, for providing services of obtaining global depository
receipts. The assessee bank raised USD 51,732,334 by way of the gross proceeds
of global depository receipts issued. The agency would be paid the agreed sum
of money which was later on renegotiated. The assessee paid a sum of USD
20,09,293 as agency charges which in terms of Indian currency came to Rs. 90.83
lakhs. The AO held that tax was deductible at source on such payment.

 

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim that
there was no liability to deduct tax at source.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   The
assessee had engaged the A bank for certain financial services. The payment was
made for such financial services rendered by the A bank. The global depository
receipts were issued outside India. The services were rendered by the A bank
outside India for raising such funds outside India. It was, in this context,
that the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the services rendered by the
A bank were neither rendered in India nor utilised in India and the character
of income arising out of such transaction was wholly outside India emanating
from commercial services rendered by the bank in the course of carrying on business wholly outside India.

ii)    The Tribunal
was, therefore, correctly of the opinion that such services could not be
included within the expression “technical services” in terms of
section 9(1)(vii)(b) read with Explanation to section 9. Tax was not deductible
at source from such payment.’

 

 

Sections 69, 132 and 158BC of ITA 1961 – Search and seizure – Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Search at premises of assessee’s father-in-law – Valuation of cost of construction of property called for pursuant to search – Addition to income of assessee as unexplained investment based on report of Departmental Valuer – Report available with Department prior to search of assessee’s premises – Addition unsustainable

45.  Babu
Manoharan vs. Dy. CIT; [2019] 415 ITR 83 (Mad.) Date of order: 4th
June, 2019; A.Ys.: B.P. from 1st April, 1989 to 31st March,
2000

 

Sections 69, 132 and 158BC of ITA 1961 – Search and seizure – Block
assessment – Undisclosed income – Search at premises of assessee’s
father-in-law – Valuation of cost of construction of property called for
pursuant to search – Addition to income of assessee as unexplained investment
based on report of Departmental Valuer – Report available with Department prior
to search of assessee’s premises – Addition unsustainable

 

During a search operation u/s 132 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 conducted in the premises of the assessee’s father-in-law on 12th
August, 1999 it had been found that a house property was owned by the assessee
and his spouse equally and a valuation was called for from the assessee. After
the assessee submitted the valuation report, the Department appointed a valuer
who subsequently submitted his report in December, 1999. Thereafter, on 13th
January, 2000, a search and seizure operation was conducted in the premises of
the assessee. In the block assessment made u/s 158BC, the AO made an addition
to the income of the assessee on account of unexplained investment in the
construction of the house property.

Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
upheld the addition.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court
reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   In the
absence of any material being found during the course of search in the premises
of the assessee with regard to the investment in the house property, the
assessee could not be penalised solely based on the valuation report provided
by the Department. The house property of the assessee was found during the
search conducted in the premises of the father-in-law of the assessee on 12th
August, 1999 and a valuation report was called for from the assessee as well as
the Departmental valuer. The valuation report was prepared much earlier to the
search conducted on 13th January, 2000 in the assessee’s premises.
Therefore, the valuation report was material which was available with the
Department before the search conducted in the assessee’s premises and it could
not have been the basis for holding that there had been an undisclosed
investment.

 

ii)    The
assessee had not been confronted with any incriminating material recovered
during the search. According to the valuation report submitted in the year
1999, it was only to determine the probable cost of construction and the valuer
in his report had stated that the construction was in progress at the time of
inspection on 12th August, 1999 on the date of search of the premises
of the assessee’s father-in-law. Therefore, the assessee could not be faulted
for not filing his return since he had time till September, 2001 to do so. The
order passed by the Tribunal holding that the investment in the house property
represented the undisclosed income of the assessee was set aside.’

 

Sections 69B, 132 and 153A of ITA 1961 – Search and seizure – Assessment – Undisclosed income – Burden of proof is on Revenue – No evidence found at search to suggest payment over and above consideration shown in registration deed – Addition solely on basis of photocopy of agreement between two other persons seized during search of other party – Not justified

44.  Principal CIT vs. Kulwinder
Singh; [2019] 415 ITR 49 (P&H) Date of order: 28th March, 2019;
A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Sections 69B, 132 and 153A of ITA 1961 – Search and seizure – Assessment
– Undisclosed income – Burden of proof is on Revenue – No evidence found at
search to suggest payment over and above consideration shown in registration
deed – Addition solely on basis of photocopy of agreement between two other
persons seized during search of other party – Not justified

 

In the A.Y. 2009-10, the assessee purchased a piece
of land for a consideration of Rs. 1 crore. Search and seizure operations u/s
132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were conducted at the premises of the seller
(PISCO) and the assessee. Further, during the course of the search conducted at
the residential premises of the accountant of PISCO, certain documents and an
agreement which showed the rate of the land at Rs. 11.05 crores per acre were
found. Since the land purchased by the assessee was part of the same (parcel
of) land, the AO was of the view that the assessee had understated his
investment in the land. He adopted the rate as shown in the agreement seized
during the search of the third party and made an addition to the income of the
assessee u/s 69B of the Act as undisclosed income.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the evidence
relied upon by the AO represented a photocopy of an agreement to sell between
two other persons in respect of a different piece of land on a different date,
that the AO had proceeded on an assumption without a finding that the assessee
had invested more than what was recorded in the books of accounts and deleted
the addition. The Tribunal found that the original copy of the agreement was
not seized; that the seller, buyer and the witnesses refused to identify it;
that the assessee was neither a party nor a witness to the agreement and was not
related to either party; that the assessee had purchased the land directly from
PISCO at the prevalent circle rate; and that in the purchase deed of the
assessee the rate was Rs. 4 crores per acre as against the purchase rate of Rs.
11.05 crores mentioned in the agreement seized. The Tribunal held that the
burden to prove understatement of sale consideration was not discharged by the
Department and that the presumption of the AO could not lead to a conclusion of
understatement of investment by the assessee and upheld the order passed by the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana
High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘The Tribunal rightly upheld the findings recorded
by the Commissioner (Appeals). Learned Counsel for the appellant-Revenue has
not been able to point out any error or illegality therein.’

 

 

Section 69 – No addition u/s 69 could be made in year under consideration in respect of investment in immovable property made in earlier year(s)

27. 
[2019] 200 TTJ (Del.) 375
Km. Preeti Singh vs. ITO ITA No. 6909/Del./2014 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 31st October,
2018;

 

Section 69 – No addition u/s 69 could be
made in year under consideration in respect of investment in immovable property
made in earlier year(s)

 

FACTS

The AO made an
addition of Rs. 55.39 lakhs while completing the assessment, being the entire
amount of investment in immovable property. The aforesaid amount of Rs. 55.39
lakhs consisted of cost of property of Rs. 51.86 lakhs and stamp duty of Rs.
3.53 lakhs. The investment made by the assessee during the year under
consideration was only Rs. 12.58 lakhs. The remaining amount of investment was
made in the earlier year(s) for which no addition could be made in the year
under consideration. The assessee 
submitted that the aforesaid investment of Rs. 12.58 lakhs during this
year included Rs. 6.05 lakhs by cheque out of the assessee’s bank account and a
payment of Rs. 6.53 lakhs made in cash. The assessee provided copies of the
accounts from the books of the builder from whom the property was purchased.
She also provided copies of statements of bank accounts. The assessee showed
that there were sufficient deposits in her bank accounts carried forward from
the earlier year to explain the source of the aforesaid cheques. The brought
forward opening balance at the beginning of the year in the bank accounts of
the assessee had accumulated over a period of time in the past few years.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the addition of
Rs. 38.58 lakhs out of the aforesaid addition of Rs. 55.39 lakhs made by the
AO.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that on perusal of section
4(1), it was obvious that in the year under consideration no addition could be
made in respect of investments in property made by the assessee in earlier
years or in respect of deposits in bank accounts of the assessee made in the
earlier year which was brought forward to this year for making cheque payments
of the aforesaid total amount of Rs. 6.05 lakhs. Moreover, certain amounts were
invested by the assessee and certain other amounts were deposited in the bank
account of the assessee in previous years relevant to earlier assessment years;
such investments or deposits could not possibly have been out of the income of
the previous year under consideration.

 

It is well settled that each year is a
separate and self-contained period. The income tax is annual in its structure
and organisation. Each ‘previous year’ is a distinct unit of time for the
purposes of assessment; further, the profits made and the liabilities of losses
made before or after the relevant previous year are immaterial in assessing the
income of a particular year. Even if certain income has escaped tax in the
relevant assessment year because of a devise adopted by the assessee or
otherwise, it does not entitle Revenue to assess the same as the income of any
subsequent year when the mistake becomes apparent.

 

In view of the
above, the AO was directed to delete the additions in respect of those amounts
which were invested by the assessee in earlier years, i.e., before previous
year 2008-09. Secondly, the AO was directed to delete the addition amounting to
Rs. 6.05 lakhs which was made by the assessee during the year under
consideration through cheque transactions from the bank account because, as
stated earlier, it was not disputed that the assessee had sufficient deposits
in her bank account at the beginning of the year to explain the source of the
aforesaid transactions by cheque. Thirdly, as far as investment aggregating to
Rs. 6.53 lakhs in cash was concerned, the matter was restored to the file of
the AO with the direction to pass a fresh order on merits on this limited issue
after considering the explanation of the assessee.

Special Deduction u/s 80-IA – Infrastructure facility – Transferee or contractor approved and recognised by authority and undertaking development of infrastructure facility or operating or maintaining it eligible for deduction – Assessee maintaining and operating railway siding under agreement with principal contractor who had entered into agreement with Railways and recognised by Railways as transferee – Assessee entitled to benefit of special deduction

43. CIT vs. Chettinad Lignite Transport Services Pvt. Ltd.; [2019] 415
ITR 107 (Mad.) Date of order: 12th March, 2019; A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Special Deduction u/s 80-IA – Infrastructure facility – Transferee or
contractor approved and recognised by authority and undertaking development of
infrastructure facility or operating or maintaining it eligible for deduction –
Assessee maintaining and operating railway siding under agreement with principal
contractor who had entered into agreement with Railways and recognised by
Railways as transferee – Assessee entitled to benefit of special deduction


For the A.Y. 2006-07, the AO denied the assessee
the benefit u/s 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the
assessee itself did not enter into a contract with the Railways or with the
Central Government and did not satisfy the requirement u/s 80-IA(4).

 

The Tribunal found that though the assessee had
only an agreement with the principal contractor who had entered into an
agreement with the Railway authorities to put up rail tracks, sidings, etc.,
the Railways had recognised the assessee as a contractor. The Tribunal held
that impliedly the Department had accepted the fact that the assessee had
provided ‘infrastructure facility’ to the specified authority, to maintain a
rail system by operating and maintaining such infrastructure facility as
defined, and that the assessee performed the contract according to the terms
agreed upon, that the services rendered by the assessee were an integral and
inseparable part of the operation and maintenance of a lignite transport
system, and that the assessee’s claim that it had complied with the requisite
condition specified under the proviso and was entitled to deduction u/s 80-IA
in terms of the proviso to sub-section (4) had to be accepted.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   The term
“infrastructure facility” has been defined in the Explanation to section 80-IA
and it includes a toll road, a bridge or a rail system, a highway project,
etc., which are big infrastructure facilities for which the enterprises have
entered into a contract with the Central Government or the State Government or
local authority. The proviso to section 80-IA(4) extends the benefit of such
deduction even to a transferee or a contractor who is approved and recognised
by the concerned authority and undertakes the work of development of the
infrastructure facility or only operating and maintaining it. The proviso to
sub-section (4) stipulates that subject to the fulfilment of the conditions,
the transferee will be entitled to such benefit, as if the transfer in question
had not taken place.

ii)    The
Tribunal had rightly applied the proviso to section 80-IA(4) and had held that
the assessee was recognised as a contractor for the railway sidings, which fell
under the definition of “infrastructure facility” and that it was entitled to
the benefit u/s 80-IA. It had also rightly held that the proviso did not
require that there should be a direct agreement between the transferee
enterprise and the specified authority to avail the benefit u/s 80-IA.

iii)   There
was no dispute that the assessee was duly recognised as a transferee or
assignee of the principal contractor and was duly so recognised by the Railways
to operate and maintain the railway sidings in the two railway stations. It has
been found by the AO himself that the assessee under an agreement with the
principal contractor had undertaken the work of development of the railway
sidings and had operated and maintained them.

iv)   The
findings of fact with regard to such position recorded by the Tribunal were
unassailable and that attracted the first proviso to section 80-IA(4). The
grounds on which the assessing authority had denied the benefit to the assessee
ignoring the effect of the proviso to section 80-IA(4) could not be sustained.’

 

 

DIGITAL WILL OF DIGITAL ASSETS

You may have
decided on who to give your physical assets, but in this digital era, you will
also have to will your digital assets – your online photo albums, your Facebook
Account, your bitcoin wallet, your email accounts, your passwords and the
rest………that’s where your Digital Will comes in.

 

Death is
inevitable, and preparing for it is unavoidable! But many of us leave the
activity of making a Will pending, till it is too late. We have heard cases of
people dying intestate and the problems that follow – if the financial assets
are not in joint names / having a nominee, there are a host of problems with
Banks / Financial Institutions. If there is an immovable property, a probate
may be a must. And we all know the time and cost of obtaining a probate from the
High Court.

 

Digital
assets may be valuable intellectual property (IP) and hence planning about them
is important. An example could be that of a Twitter handle of say @SrBachchan.
In case of digital assets, the process is fairly simple, if executed by the
legator before death. And we must ensure that ALL our digital assets are
properly bequeathed so that the survivors are not put to inconvenience at best,
and pain at worst.

 

However, for
digital assets, there is this extra headache. It has been observed in multiple
studies, that few of us actually download and backup online content in a format
which is easily accessible to those after our death. And different agencies
have different rules for transmission of these assets to the rightful owner;
e.g. in the case of Facebook, parents of a 15 year old girl were refused access
to her account. However, in the case of Yahoo, a Court has overruled their
privacy policy, and allowed the legal heirs to access the deceased’s account.

 

Is there life after death on Social
Media?

Most Social
Media accounts continue online for varying periods, depending on the service
provider. A Digital Will will ensure that each of your accounts is properly
transferred / memorialised or closed, depending on your instructions.

 

Creating a Digital Will

A digital
will is an informal document that allows executors to access and execute your
instructions for all your online accounts.

Strictly speaking, it is of no legal value. If you want to transfer rights to
things such as a domain name or a website, it may be advisable to account for
these in your formal will. Certain rights are non-transferable and you need to
identify those, which will expire with your demise. Here are a few steps to
create your Digital Will:

 

1.  List All Your Online Accounts

Create a list
of all the sites where you have accounts, including social media, photo
storage, email accounts, online banking and brokerage accounts, blogs and
accounts that automatically withdraw from your bank account.

 

2.  Give Detailed Instructions

Let your
executors know exactly what you would like to see happen with each account. For
example, you may not want your Facebook page memorialised, but you do want your
photo albums shared with loved ones. If you are working on some project or have
a variety of resources which you have painstakingly collected online, decide
what you would like to be done with that. Think about stuff like copyrights
also, if you have created original material.

 

3.  Select your Digital
Executors

Select a
couple (or more) of mature persons to carry out your wishes after you are gone.
Let the executors know about your Digital Will in advance. Let them also know
how they will find the document on your demise. Be sure to name your executors
in your Digital Will. You may also name alternate executors in case any of one
or more of your executors is unable to serve.

 

4.  Store Your Digital Will
in a Safe Place

A will is
only useful if it can be found at the right time. If you store the will on a
password-protected device, make sure for that device can be accessed when you
die. Consider printing and signing your Digital Will, and storing it with your
other important personal documents.

 

Legacy Policies of some popular Websites
/ Portals

Many popular
websites / portals have legacy policies in their Terms of Service Agreement to
handle what will become of your digital footprint after you die. Policies vary
from allowing a named executor to close an account, to continue using your
account or finally how your account may be deleted after a period of
inactivity. It is a good idea to review a site’s legacy policy before drafting
your digital will. The following are a few examples from popular Websites /
Portals:

 

  •     PayPal allows an executor to close a
    user’s account. Remaining funds will be liquidated by a payment to the estate
    of the deceased on production of necessary forms / documents.
  •     Twitter does not provide log-in
    information to the executor or the legatee. The only option is to deactivate
    the profile by submitting a form with information on the deceased, including a
    death certificate.
  •     Ebay’s user agreement does not allow
    transfer of accounts to others on the expiry of a member. If you need to close
    an account due to death, you should contact their support team and follow the
    process suggested by them.
  •     Google’s “Inactive Account Manager”
    allows you to decide how your account is handled if it is inactive for a
    specified length of time. For example, if you have not logged into your email
    for more than a year, the account will be deleted. You can also add up to 10
    trusted contacts, who will receive an email that bequeaths files stored on a
    Google service if your account is left unattended between three and 18 months.
  •     Facebook lets family members convert
    the deceased’s account to a “memorialised” status or close the account. Upon
    receiving proof of death, sensitive personal information is deleted and the
    status of the account is changed.
  •     Instagram provides an option to
    memorialise an account, which means nobody can log in or change it. To
    memorialise an account, anyone can provide a link to an obituary or news
    article reporting the death. You can also request account closure.
  •     For LinkedIn, executors or even
    friends of the deceased can notify LinkedIn that someone has passed away, so
    their account can be closed and the profile removed.
  •     iTunes music files, television series
    and films are licensed, rather than owned, and cannot be bequeathed. The right
    to use the files expires with the death of an individual.

 

Password Managers

Organising a
digital will is essential, but it does take time. One way to simplify and
automate the process is to use a password manager to collect all of this
information in one, secure place. A password manager like LastPass (there are
several others) safeguards all of your website accounts, and the usernames and
passwords you use to access them. You can also store notes for other types of
important information, and even attach documents and photos for safekeeping.

 

And with
LastPass, you can designate an Emergency Access contact for your LastPass
account. That means your trusted contact could request access to your vault
should you pass or become incapacitated.

 

LastPass
thus, essentially acts as your digital will, and allows you to specify your
digital heir, then automates the process of securely transferring that digital
will with all of your passwords and important information to your trusted
contact. Not only do you have the benefit of a password manager that makes it
easy to remember your passwords and login to your online accounts, you can also
enjoy peace of mind knowing your loved ones can access the information they
need in your absence.

 

Digital Will Generator

Slate.com has
devised an interesting Digital Will Generator – you will find it at –  http://bit.ly/2MGSqHW. Just answer a
few simple questions, fill in the blanks and voila! your Digital Will is ready.
This may well be one of the quickest ways to create your Digital Will instantly.

 

Now that you
know the importance, have the information and are equipped with the tools, just
go ahead and create your own Digital Will – you owe it to yourself and your loved
ones! 
 

 

DEMOCRACY

In Maansarovar,
hauns” (swan) and “haunsini” (she swan) were staying happily.
Once upon a time, a flock of crows came flying over there. The leader of the
crows greeted the hauns and asked him as to “who he was and why he was
staying over there?” Hauns replied, “this is Maansarovar and it
belongs to the swans. So we are staying here for many generations”. Oh! said
the crow.” So the dispute is not on two issues but only on one point.”

 

Hauns was surprised. “Where is the dispute here?”. he asked.

 

Crow –
“Actually we came from a far off place and we were not sure whether this is Maansarovar
or something else. Since you said it is Maansarovar, we agree. The
second question was whether it belongs to Swans. We also accept that it belongs
to swans as you say”.

 

Hauns (terribly puzzled) – “Then where is the question of any dispute?” The
leader of the crow coolly said, “the question is who is the swan?” “We believe
in democracy”, he continued, “naturally, we will decide as to who is the
swan by majority votes”.

 

Hauns immediately agreed, “Satyameva Jayate”, he exclaimed. Haunsini
tried to resist but hauns pacified her.

 

Voting took
place. Crows became swans. Swan with his wife had to vacate the place. They
went away cursing their fate. Suddenly, they came across the Eagle. “Oh dear hauns,
what a pleasant surprise. What brings you here? All well at Mansarovar?”

 

Hauns – “No, actually there was a little problem.” Hauns narrated the
story of crows.

 

Eagle – “Arey,
are you a fool? Tomorrow these crows will come to me and claim that they are
eagles. I will tell them point blank. I will decide who is the eagle, by my
power”.

Hauns – “Yes, I see a point in what you say. I will immediately rush to
Maansarovar and tell the crows as you have guided”.

 

Hauns and haunsini came back. Hauns challenged the leader of the
crows, “Hey, listen, your majority voting is not acceptable to me. We will
decide as to who is the swan by our power of wings and beaks”.

 

 “I am a peace-loving person”, the crow
retorted, “Still if you wish to taste our power, we are ready”.

 

A squirrel
from the tree close-by was watching that the hauns was talking to the crows.
She came out and asked the hauns what was the matter. She asked why he came
back. Hauns told her about his conversation with the eagle.

 

Squirrel – “Arey
brother hauns, this showing of strength is alright for the eagle to say. With
what are you going to fight?, your delicate wings or beautiful beak? It will be
suicidal”.

 

Hauns – “I know, but I must fight for the truth. Ultimately, truth shall
succeed”.

 

The show of
power took place. Hauns was killed, haunsini was killed and since
the squirrel was advising them, she was also killed. Crows were triumphant.

 

The moral of
the story – “Hauns died since he did not realise the truth and squirrel
died since she knew the truth”.

 

Note – This article is
adapted from a story written by a well-known marathi author Late Mr. G.A.
Kulkarni. I acknowledge this with thanks to him. It has been written in the
context of many elections that we are going to experience within next few
months. The real moral is – if the swans really hope to succeed, they must
acquire real power including physical strength and remain united. This is true
in all walks of life. Otherwise the mediocre people will take the front seat.

SEBI PROPOSES RULES TO PENALISE ERRANT AUDITORS, VALUERS, ETC. – YET ANOTHER LAW & REGULATOR WILL GOVERN SUCH ‘FIDUCIARIES’

SEBI has proposed regulations that prescribe specific duties
of Chartered Accountants/auditors, cost accountants valuers, etc. (termed as
“fiduciaries”). These duties will have to be performed whilst carrying out
assignments for listed companies and other entities associated with the
securities markets. The “fiduciaries” will face a range of penal actions if
they do not comply with these provisions.

 

A question is often raised whether Chartered Accountants,
should be subjected to action by SEBI and other regulators, when they are
already regulated by the ICAI. The issue is: whether fiduciaries should face
action from multiple regulators for the same default?

 

SEBI has, in the past, taken action against auditors.
However, in the Price Waterhouse/Satyam case, the matter had reached the Bombay
High Court which laid down certain limits to the powers of SEBI. The Kotak
Committee in its report of 2017 on `corporate governance’ has recommended
broader powers for SEBI.  However, the
proposed regulations circulated by SEBI through a consultation paper dated 13th
July 2018 appear to go beyond Kotak Committee’s recommendations. Hence, the
need to review these recommendations to understand their implications.

 

Nature of Amendments Proposed

Over the years of its existence, SEBI has formulated several
Regulations to regulate intermediaries like stock-brokers, etc., and regulate
transactions in the securities markets. There exist regulations relating to
stock brokers, investment advisors, merchant bankers, etc. Then there are
regulations relating to issue of shares, insider trading, frauds, etc. Many of
these regulations require the services of auditors, company secretaries,
valuers, etc., to provide certificates, reports, etc. Clearly, defaults by
these fiduciaries in carrying out their duties can have repercussions for
investors and capital market who rely on their reports/certificates. Through
the consultation paper, SEBI has proposed amendments to 31 regulations to
provide for duties of fiduciaries and for penal action in case of
non-compliance.

 

Who are These Fiduciaries Covered?

The following fiduciaries are specifically covered:

 

1.  Chartered
Accountants including a statutory auditor

2.  Company
Secretary

3.  Valuers

4.  Monitoring
agency

5.  Cost
Accountants

6.  Appraising
or appraisal agency

 

The fiduciary could be an individual, firm, LLP or a
corporate entity. Relevant to this is the concept of  `engagement partner’. Hence, the term
“engagement partner” has been defined as:

 

“Engagement partner” means the partner or any other person
in the firm or limited liability partnership, who is responsible for the
engagement or assignment and its performance, and for the report or the
certificate, as the case may be, that is issued on behalf of the firm or
limited liability partnership, and who, has the appropriate authority from a
professional body, if required;

 

What is the nature of activities by fiduciaries covered?

The regulators cover submission or issue of any report or
certificate by any such fiduciary under the applicable Regulations. Each of the
Regulations provide for an indicative list of such reports/certificates that a
fiduciary may issue under that Regulations. These reports/certificates include
auditors report, compliance report, net worth certificate, valuation report,
etc.

 

What are the obligations of the fiduciaries in relation to
such reports/certificates?

The fiduciary whilst issuing a certificate/report is required
to:

 

“(a) exercise due care, skill and diligence and ensure
proper care with respect to all processes involved in the issuance of a
certificate or report;

 

(b) ensure that such a certificate or report issued by it
is true in all material respect; and

 

(c) report in writing to the Audit Committee of the listed
company, any material violation of securities laws, noticed while undertaking
such an assignment.” 
  

 

The requirements of individual regulations vary a little. For
example, in (c) above, the report relating to violation of securities laws may
be made to the other relevant party such as merchant banker or compliance
officer, etc.

 

This requirement also underlines the importance of working
papers to establish that ‘due care etc.’, has been exercised in the preparation
of the certificate / report.

 

What are consequences of
non-compliance by the fiduciaries?

If the fiduciary issues any false report/certificate or which
does not comply with any requirement of the applicable Regulations, SEBI would
take “appropriate action” under the general provisions of the securities laws.
Hence, the action that can be taken could include:

  •     Disgorgement of fees earned by the
    fiduciary.
  •     Debarment of the fiduciary from carrying out
    any assignment in relation to listed companies and other entities associated
    with securities markets.
  •     Monetary penalty
  •     Prosecution.

 

Action may be taken against whom?

In case of violation of the regulations in terms of
submission of false reports/certificates, not carrying out the work in the
manner prescribed, etc., the action would be taken “against the fiduciary, its
engagement partner or director, as the case may be.”.

 

The Bombay High Court decision
in case of Price Waterhouse/Satyam fraud

To understand the origin of this consultation paper, the
PwC/Satyam case may be recollected briefly. SEBI had issued a show cause notice
against Price Waterhouse and associate firms in relation to the audit, etc.,
carried out relating to Satyam scam. Price Waterhouse raised several questions
as to jurisdiction of SEBI. One of the objections was whether SEBI had any
jurisdiction to act against Chartered Accountants who are otherwise regulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

 

The Bombay High Court (Price Waterhouse & Co. vs.
SEBI ((2010) 103 SCL 96 (Bom.))
partially upheld the jurisdiction of
SEBI. It elaborated on the wide range of powers of SEBI in relation to the
securities market. It also held that SEBI does not and cannot regulate the
profession of Chartered Accountants. For example, it cannot prohibit a
Chartered Accountant from practicing, even if found to be at fault. However,
SEBI could, if facts show a default, debar an auditor from issuing
reports/certificates in relation to listed companies, etc. The Court stated
that SEBI could take action only if the auditor is complicit in the fraud.
Hence, if the auditor is not a party to the fraud, SEBI cannot take action. The
proposed regulations have also to be seen in light of this decision.

 

Kotak Committee on Corporate Governance

The more immediate source of the consultation paper is the
Kotak Committee report on corporate governance submitted in October 2017. In
the report, the Committee had recommended that SEBI should have specific powers
to take action against auditors and other fiduciaries not just in cases of
fraud/connivance, but also in cases of gross negligence. It observed:

 

“Given SEBI’s mandate to protect the interests of
investors in the securities market and regulating listed entities, the
Committee recommends that SEBI should have clear powers to act against auditors
and other third party fiduciaries with statutory duties under securities law
(as defined under SEBI LODR Regulations), subject to appropriate safeguards.
This power ought to extend to act against the impugned individual(s), as well
as against the firm in question with respect to their functions concerning
listed entities. This power should be provided in case of gross negligence
as well, and not just in case of fraud/connivance. This recommendation may be
implemented after due consultation with the relevant stakeholders, including
the relevant professional services regulators/ institutions.”
(emphasis
supplied)

 

Two points need to be particularly considered. Firstly, the
recommendation was to extend the powers to cover instances of gross negligence.
Secondly, it appears that the action would require concurrence of the relevant
regulator.  In view of these two issues
the consultation paper goes beyond gross negligence/fraud.

 

Lesser burden of proof to levy
penalty on Auditors

Supreme Court has laid down principles for levy of penalty in
civil proceedings. In SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera ([2016] 66 taxmann.com 288
(SC))
, the Supreme Court had held that the bar for taking adverse action is
much lower as compared to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court observed, The test, in our considered view, is one of
preponderance of probabilities so far as adjudication of civil liability
arising
out of violation of the Act or the provisions of the Regulations. Prosecution
under Section 24 of the Act for violation of the provisions of any of the
Regulations, of course, has to be on the basis of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.”

(emphasis supplied).

 

The test of ?preponderance of probabilities’ was
applied by SEBI in the case of Price Waterhouse (order dated 10th
January 2018). Accordingly, SEBI ordered disgorgement of fees earned with
interest and also debarment from taking up assignments in specified matters
relating to capital markets.

 

Thus, while prosecution would need proof beyond reasonable
doubt, actions such as levy of penalty, disgorgement of fees and debarment
could arguably be taken with a lower bar of `preponderance of probabilities’.

 

This is also to be seen in the light that the new
requirements now do not require that the fiduciaries should have themselves
engaged in or been complicit in fraud. For taking action it is enough if the
`fiduciary’ has not discharged the prescribed duties in the manner required by
the proposed new regulations.

 

Other implications and concerns

The scope of the proposed regulations is limited to
assignments carried out by ‘fiduciaries’ for entities operating in capital
markets. The regulations are broadly framed and comprehensive. Arguably, action
can be taken even in cases that do not involve gross negligence. Thus, it is
likely that action could be taken even in cases where otherwise action may not be attracted by the concerned regulator.

 

Needless to emphasise, parallel proceedings by several
regulators/authorities and double/multiple penal consequences may also be the
consequence.

 

Despite the fact that the ‘fiduciaries’ are experts
specialised in certain fields, the proposed regulations also do not give
guidance on how it would be determined whether the fiduciary has committed
violations. It is not provided, for example, that, in case of auditors, the
guidance and pronouncements of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
will be considered to test whether the work has been properly performed. Also,
the person who will decide whether the work has been properly done may not be a
peer or an expert in the field, but will be a SEBI member and / or officer.
Thus, fiduciaries would enter a whole new mine field/unexplored territory where
they would be uncertain as to how and who would determine whether they have
discharged their duties correctly or not.

 

It is likely that fiduciaries would feel
discouraged in carrying out assignments for matters covered under the proposed
regulations. At the very least, costs/professional fees for such work will rise
and will be borne by investors. 

VALUATION STANDARDS: ANALYSIS OF THE UNEXPLORED PROVISIONS OF REGISTERED VALUERS

Companies Act 2013 (“the Co’s Act”), introduced a new section
(i.e. section 247) to legislate valuations done under the requirements of the
said Act. While most of the other provisions of the statute were made
enforceable from September 2013 or April 2014, this provision dealing with
registered valuers remained latent for over four years. Like a slumbering
volcano it was forgotten.

 

While the other provisions became immediately applicable and
were analysed and tested, the provisions of section 247 were left behind and
not scrutinised for its implications. Now, vide notification dated October 18,
2017 the government has made these provisions effective with immediate effect.
Along with the bringing into effect of these provisions, new rules for
valuations by registered valuers were also notified from the same date.

 

This development should be closely understood by
professionals who carry out valuations under the provisions of the Co’s Act.
Some professionals take any new rule or regulation as a new opportunity. And I
often hear such exuberant remarks for the regulations.

 

So it is pertinent to understand if these provisions open up
more opportunities or would they actually curtail our practise? Would this
create a more transparent atmosphere conducive to investors? Will they give
rise to excessively controlled atmosphere for valuers? It is therefore,
imperative that we understand what these provisions hold for us. The purpose of
this article is to examine the new provisions threadbare and prepare ourselves
for an unbiased view on what awaits us.

 

We can start by looking at the
instances that require a valuation to be carried out under various statutes and
the special discipline for which they are reserved:

Valuation
required under the Co’s Act:

Section

Description

Valuation by

62

Further
issue of share capital

Registered
Valuer

192

Restriction
on non-cash transactions involving directors

Registered
Valuer

230

Power
to compromise or make arrangements with creditors and members

Registered
Valuer

236

Purchase
of minority shareholding

Registered
Valuer

281

Submission
of report by Company Liquidator

Registered
Valuer

232

Merger
and amalgamation of companies

Expert

Valuation
required under other statutes:

STATUTE

DESCRIPTION

Valuation by

FEMA

  •  Inbound Investment – Issue of Shares by
    a Resident
  • Transfer of Shares (Resident to Non
    Resident and vice-versa)
  • Outbound Investment – Direct Investment
    in JV/WOS less than USD 5 million
  • Outbound Investment – Direct Investment
    in JV/WOS less than USD 5 million

Merchant
banker (“MB”) or Chartered Accountant

 

 

 

 

 

MB

Income-Tax
Act

  •  Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962

Fair value of unquoted equity shares for 56(2)(x)

Fair value of unquoted equity for issue following the asset
approach

Fair value of unquoted shares other than equity for 56(2)(x)

Fair
value of unquoted equity shares for issue following DCF approach

 

 

 

Anyone

 







Chartered Accountant or MB

 

MB

SEBI

  •  Valuation of shares which are not frequently traded for the
    purposes of SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
    Regulations,2011
  •  Valuation of shares which are not frequently traded for the
    purposes of SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations,
    2009
  • Valuation of shares in a case of delisting under SEBI
    (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2009   

 

 

 

 

 


MB, Chartered Accountant

 

 

 

 

 

MB


From the
foregoing it can be observed that it is currently only for valuations required
under the Co’s Act that the valuer needs to be a registered valuer (“RV”).
These provisions of the Co’s Act became effective much before October 2017,
when section 247 the special provision that was enacted under the Co’s Act to
specifically deal with the code relating to the Registered Valuers and the new
Registered Valuers Rules (“RVR”) u/s.247 were notified. Therefore, in the
interim, while the RVR had not seen the light of the day it was provided in
Explanation to Rule 13(2) of Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules,
2014 (inserted by Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Amendment Rules,
2014 w.e.f. 18-6-2014) that a Chartered Accountant having ten years of
experience or an independent merchant banker registered with SEBI would be
treated as a registered valuer for the purposes of the Co’s Act. The
transitional arrangement under the RVR has also provided that persons who are
providing valuation services under the act on the date when the rules got
notified can continue to act as valuers without obtaining a certificate of
registration till March 31, 2018, which date is currently extended till
September 30, 2018.

 

The following part lists out some
key highlights that emerge from the RVR

 

The Authority that has
been granted the power to regulate the registered valuers is the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Board of India

 

Qualification and Eligibility

Some of the key eligibility
criteria for a person to be a Registered Valuer (“RV”) are:

 

1.  He should be a member of a Registered Valuers
Organisation (“RVO”).

 

2.  He should have passed the valuation exam
specified under the RVR.

 

3.  He should possess qualification as required
under the RVR.

 

4.  He should be a person resident in India as per
section 2 of Foreign Exchange Management Act.

 

5.  No penalty u/s. 271J of the Income Tax Act has
been levied on him which he has not appealed against or where it has been
confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal at least 5 years have elapsed from the date
of levy of penalty.

 

6.  Is a fit and proper person.

 

Besides the foregoing
requirements, the person should not be a minor or a bankrupt or of unsound
mind.

 

For a firm or a company to be an
RV, three of its partners or directors as the case may be should be RVs. Also,
the entity should be set up exclusively for the objects of rendering
professional or financial services. The entity should also ensure that one of
its partners is registered for the asset class that the entity seeks to value.
Besides, none of its partners should be disqualified under the foregoing
criteria that apply to an individual.

 

On a perusal of the qualification
criteria specified under the RVR one finds a number of disciplines recognised
for different types of valuations. Valuation of asset class of land and
buildings is reserved for graduates or post graduates in civil engineering or
architecture and of plant and machinery is reserved for graduate or post
graduates in mechanical or electrical engineering. On the other hand, for
valuation of financial assets or securities, one of the qualifications
recognised is graduation in any field. This means that while a commerce
graduate cannot undertake valuation of asset classes of land, building, plant
and machinery; an engineer or architect can undertake valuation of financial
assets.

 

Further, when one looks at the
post qualification experience requirement, one would observe that a Chartered
Accountant requires at least a three years’ experience post qualification to be
a member of an RVO. A graduate requires five years’ experience for such
membership. An analysis of this shows that a Chartered Accountant would have a
six years work experience if the period of articleship training was to be
considered. It is also beyond doubt that the curriculum and training of a
Chartered Accountant is rigorous and is highly competitive. So effectively,
while an RV who is a Chartered Accountant will have a six years’ of work
experience, a graduate in any stream with a five years’ work experience could
also be an eligible member of the RVO. The thought process that has gone
into this kind of unequal treatment meted out to Chartered Accountants needs
some clarification.

 

Process of registrations of RV

The process of registration of an
RV broadly involves the individual who desires to become RV to first take
membership of an RVO. Amongst the various documents that are required to be
filed, the individual needs to also file the copies of his income tax returns
of past three years. The only inference one could draw from this requirement is
that this could possibly be required for the RVO to ascertain that the applicant
is not insolvent at the time of making the application. After becoming a member
of the RVO, the applicant has to attend fifty hours of training, which is given
by the RVO, after completion of the training he should pass an examination
conducted by the Authority viz. IBBI. Upon passing the exam, the RVO where the
person is registered would make a recommendation to the Authority to recognise
him as an RV. For a firm or a company to be registered as RV, first three of
its partners or directors would need to be registered and after their
registration the firm or company has to make an application to the Authority
for recognising it as an RV.

This entire process of
registration would involve substantial time as can be seen from the following:

 

1.  If the authority is satisfied after the
abovementioned process, it may grant a certificate of registration as an RV in Form-C
of Annexure-II within 60 days.

 

2.  If the authority is not satisfied, it shall
communicate the reasons for forming such an opinion within 45 days of receipt
of the application, excluding the time given as above (21 days).

 

3.  The applicant shall submit an explanation as
to why its application should be accepted within 15 days of the receipt of the
communication

 

4.  After considering the explanation, the
authority shall either accept or reject the application and communicate its
decision to the applicant within 30 days of receipt of explanation.

 

Conduct of valuation and Valuation standards

Before the advent of these rules,
valuations in India did not need to comply with any valuation standards.
However, the RVR requires that valuations should comply with valuation
standards that will be notified under the same. And in the interim the RV
should either follow the international valuation standards or standards issued
by any RVO.

 

Currently, the RVO formed by
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has prescribed the following ICAI
Valuation Standards (“IVS”).

 

IVS

Contents

101

Definitions

102

Valuation
Bases

103

Valuation
Approaches and Methods

201

Scope
of Work, Analyses and Evaluation

202

Reporting
and Documentation

301

Business
Valuation

302

Intangible
Assets

303

Financial
Instruments

 

 

These standards were published on
May 25, 2018 and are effective for valuation reports issued on or after July 1,
2018. Thus, any valuation done post July 1, 2018 should be in compliance with
these standards.The ICAI Valuation Standards will be effective till Valuation
Standards are notified by the Central Government under Rule 18 of the Companies
(Registered Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2018.

 

Under the RVR, the Central
Government is required to notify standards and for this purpose it would be
advised by a committee which will be composed as follows:

 

Composition of Committee

  •     a Chairperson who shall be a person of eminence and well – versed
    in valuation, accountancy, finance, business administration, business law,
    corporate law, economics;

  •     one member nominated by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs;

  •     one member nominated by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of
    India;

  •   one member nominated by the Legislative
    Department;

  •   upto four members
    nominated by Central Government representing authorities which are allowing
    valuations by registered valuers;

  •  upto four members who are
    representatives of registered valuers organisations, nominated by Central
    Government.

  •  up to two members to represent industry and other
    stakeholder nominated by the Central Government in consultation with the
    authority;

 

The Chairperson and Members of
the Committee shall have a tenure of three years and they shall not have more
than two tenures.

 

From the foregoing it can be
observed that the committee will have upto 14 members. Of these upto a maximum
of 4 members can be from all the RVOs. Also, there is no cap on the number of
RVO that could be recognised by the Government. So it can be observed that 4
representations will be out of all the RVOs put together. This implies that
each RVO may not be able to represent on the committee.

 

Reporting requirements

Till now there was no statutory
guideline mandating the minimum requirements for a valuation report. The RVR
now specifies this framework, which is a welcome move. However, one of the
disclosures required is that of valuer’s interest or conflict. A question,
therefore, arises whether the disclosure should be detailed. But considering that
most of the services rendered by professionals is confidential in nature,
giving a very detailed description of all the other involvements would be a
breach of confidentiality. Considering this balancing act of maintaining
confidentiality of client information it should be in order to make a general
disclosure statement of involvements in various areas of professional services.

 

Another important requirement
under disclosure is a restriction on the RV from specifying a limitation that
restricts his responsibility for the valuation report. This restriction would
however, only operate within the ambit of the purpose and scope of valuation.
Thus, the limitations that limit the ambit of the report only to the scope
would still continue to be valid.

 

Code of conduct to be followed by RVs

The RVR has laid down an
elaborate code of conduct to be followed by RVs.This is given at Annexure I to
the RVR.The same requires the valuer to follow certain ethical code which
requires the RV to have high level of integrity, be straightforward, forthright
in all professional relationships, make truthful representation of facts, take
care of public interest etc.

 

The RV is expected to exercise
due diligence, use independent professional judgment, follow professional
standards, stay updated on knowledge. The RV should not disclaim liability for
his expertise except to the extent the assumptions are based on statements of
facts provided either by the company being valued or its auditors or consultant
and or from public domain, i.e., it is not generated by the RV.This is a very
important carve out from the responsibility on the RV as he cannot be held
liable for professional misconduct if he has relied on the information that he
has not generated. Though he should use due diligence in analysing such data.

 

Further, the valuer is required
to maintain complete objectivity and should not take up assignments where
either he or his relatives or associates are not independent. Here the term
relative should mean as what is defined in the Co’s Act. The term associate is
not defined under the RVR. Therefore, the meaning of this term can be taken
from the accounting standards that are prescribed under the Co’s Rules. The
term ‘associate’ is defined in Accounting Standard 23 to mean an enterprise in
which an investor has significant influence and which is neither a subsidiary
nor a joint venture of the investor. The term significant influence is defined
in that standard to mean the power to participate in financial and/ or
operating policy decisions of the investee but not control over those policies.
Thus, even if an associate of a relative of the RV has a conflict or a material
relationship with the company being valued it could be viewed as a situation
where the RV is deemed to be not independent. In connection with this it would
be pertinent to note the relevant provision of section 247 which debars a
valuer from undertaking a valuation if he has any direct or indirect interest
at any time within three years prior to his appointment and three years after
the valuation. It may be noted that the statute does not define the meaning of
the term interest.This would lead to a situation where if an RV purchases
shares of a company two years after he undertook valuation of its shares, then
the valuation would be considered void, since he could not have undertaken such
valuation. This restriction is not merely on the RV, but because of the
provisions of the RVR, also applicable to all the relatives and associates of
the RV. This would lead to absurd results whereby, if the RV undertakes a
valuation then he will need to take a clearance even from his relatives [as
defined under the Co’s Act] that they have not had any interest in the asset
for past three years as also will not have any interest in the asset for the
future three years. This is not a viable condition. Ideally, the statute should
have defined what should be considered as interest. Merely holding shares of a
company as a retail investor should be kept out of the purview of the
application of the section. There could be many other instances apart from
holding of shares which is just one absurd situation which is more likely, that
could disqualify a valuer.  

 

Further, the Code of Conduct also
requires an RV to maintain documents and make them available to certain persons
for inspection. The RV is required to maintain back up for all the decisions
taken and the documents must be maintained for at least three years. These are
to be maintained in case their production is required by a regulatory authority
or for peer review.

 

The Code also considers accepting
of gifts and giving gifts by RVs as a violation of the code. However, it would
be considered as a violation only if such action could have an effect on the
independence of the RV. Therefore, if an RV accepts small gifts which are
customary then such gifts should not be construed as a violation of the code of
conduct. The Code requires that the RV should not accept any fees other than
what is agreed contractually. Thus, an RV will now have to ensure that he
executes a contract with the client. It may also be noted that the valuation
standards on documentation requires that the RV should specify his scope of
work and his and his client’s responsibilities in the contract. This also
requires the RV to execute a contract with the client. Further, section 247 of
the Co’s Act requires appointment of RV to be done by the audit committee.
Thus, the contract of engagement should be approved by the audit committee. The
Code requires the RV to charge at a consistent level. The thought behind this
could be to prevent situation where an RV would compromise independent
assessment for an unreasonably high compensation. This would necessitate that
the RV should maintain adequate documentation to show that contemporaneous
assignments involving similar level of work and responsibility are charged in a
similar manner.

 

The Code also requires an RV to
accept only as many assignments which he can handle with adequate time.
Currently, there is no upper limit on the number of assignments. Also, adequate
time would depend on the infrastructure, resources and techniques available
with the RV. Therefore, generalisation of maximum number would anyway be
impractical.

 

Cancellation or suspension of registration

The authority is bestowed with
the power to cancel or suspend registration that is granted to an RV or an RVO
under Rule 15 of the RVR. The action of cancellation will necessarily have to
flow from a complaint filed with the Authority. Thus, it can be interpreted
that the cancellation of the registration of either the RV or the RVO can only
be upon a complaint.

 

However, the Rule does not
specify the triggers for the complaint. Considering that the complaint is
against the RV or the RVO, legally it can only stem from any violation of the
Act or the Rules which in turn would also include the bye-laws issued by the RVOs
which are also required to be adhered by the RVs.However, when one looks at the
contents of the show cause notice prescribed under Rule 17, it can be observed
that the show cause notice should state the provisions of the Act or Rules or
certificate of registration allegedly violated or the manner in which public
interest is allegedly affected. Now, if one were to see the code of conduct
given in Annexure I of the RVR or the model bye-laws for RVO given under Part
II to Annexure III to the RVR or the eligibility given under Rule 3 of the RVR,
we will find no reference to public interest. In this connection, it is
worthwhile to note the provisions of section 247 of the statute under which the
Rules are framed. Under s/s. 3 of the said section a penalty shall be imposed
on the RV if a valuer contravenes the provisions of this section or the rules
made thereunder he shall be punishable with a fine which shall not be less than
twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one
lakh rupees. 

 

Further, if the valuer has
contravened such provisions with the intention
to defraud the company or its members
, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment and would also be fined. Thus, the statute provides for punishment
only if the valuer has intended to defraud the company or its members. Whereas,
the RVR provides for action if public interest is affected. The meaning that
can be attributed to the term “public interest” is very wide and subjective.
Thus the rules have gone beyond the statutory framework. In this connection
attention is invited to the following judgments where it was held that rules
framed under the statute cannot go beyond the requirements spelt out in the
statute.

 

Case laws on this law

  •    CIT vs. Sirpur Paper Mills [(1999) 237 ITR 41 (SC)];
  •    CIT vs. Taj Mahal Hotels [(1971) 82 ITR 44 (SC)];
  •    Avinder Singh vs. State of Punjab [AIR 1979 SC 321];
  •    Harishankar Bagla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 465]

 

Thus, to the extent the rules
overstep the statute, they could be considered as ultra vires.

 

Now, Rule 17 further provides
that if based on the findings of inspection, investigation or complaint
received, or material otherwise available, the authorised officer is of
the prima facie opinion that there exists sufficient cause to cancel or
suspend the registration of the RV, then he shall issue a show cause notice. On
a combined reading of Rule 15 and Rule 17 it is fair to interpret that the
authority can only cancel or suspend registration if it has received a
complaint and upon receipt of the complaint it will have to first form a prima
facie opinion based on information that it may obtain on its own or based
on complaint received. Thus, the power of the authority should not be construed
as expanded by Rule 17 so as to interpret that the authority can even take suo
moto action even if there is no complaint made against the RV or the RVO.

 

If a complaint lies against the
RVO then the authorised officer is required to seek information from the RVO
and is not required to carry out an investigation on its own. It is further
provided that if sufficient and satisfactory information is not received from
the RVO then the authority can initiate proceedings under Rule 17 or direct the
matter to the Central Government for directions. This process would thus ensure
that the RVOs will have the benefit of being asked their version of information
before any show cause notice is issued on them. Whereas this benefit will not
be available to RVs, who can be issued show cause notice by the authorised
officer for forming a prima facie opinion against them. It is only upon
getting the show cause notice that the RVs would get an opportunity to explain
their case.

 

Interestingly, Rule 16 provides
that in case of a complaint against a director of a company or a partner of a
firm, the authority may refer the complaint to the relevant RVO and such
complaint is to be dealt with by the RVO in accordance with its bye laws. Thus,
there are two important observations to draw out from this provision viz;

 

1)  If the complaint is against an individual RV
then the complaint may be transferred to the RVO where he is registered. This
can be linked to the position that only an individual can be a member of an
RVO.

 

2)  However, it can be observed that the proviso
carves out the exception only for individuals. Therefore, if a complaint lies
against the partnership firm or a company which is an RV, then the complaint
will be dealt with at the level of the Authority.

 

From the foregoing one can
envisage that if a complaint is filed against a firm which is an RV then it
would be only dealt with by the Authority. However, if it is against the
individual partner of the said firm then it would be handled from the RVO. If
the complaint is filed against both the firm and the partner who has carried
out the valuation then the power to deal with the complaint would lie with two
regulators. In a situation of this type it is possible that the term may/could
be interpreted as an option with the Authority and not a mandatory requirement.
In such a situation, the Authority could step in to deal with the complaint and
the case of the individual member may not be transferred to the relevant RVO.

 

The authorised officer is
required to dispose of the show cause notice following the principles of
natural justice, which should entail giving reasonable opportunity and time to
respond to the notice. The order of disposal of the show-case notice could
provide any one of the following; 1) no action; 2) warning; 3) suspension or
cancellation of registration or recognition; 4) change in any partner or
director of the RVO.

 

For all of the above, the powers
vest with the authorised officer, who will be ‘specified’ by the Authority.
Currently, no such authorised officer is specified. Further, it is provided
that the appeal against the order of the authorised officer would lie before
the Authority. Thus, if the authorised officer does not act independent of the
Authority, then the appeal to the Authority against the order of the authorised
officer will violate the principle of natural justice. [Refer ICAI vs. L.K.
Ratna& Others[1987 AIR 71 (SC)].

 

Further, it can be noted that,
there is no provision for appeal to the higher courts. However, following the
principles of natural justice, the aggrieved person should have a natural right
to challenge such an order of the Authority before higher courts.

 

Thus, it may be observed that
the RVR needs to address several open issues. Also, the RVR should not exceed
the regulatory ambit laid down in the statute. It should be also noted that the
area of valuation was always open to anyone who had the requisite knowledge to
carry out that work. Historically Chartered Accountants were preferred for this
service as they have the requisite educational training through their
curriculum to carry out valuations as also have good knowledge of various
statutes to understand implications flowing from the regulatory framework. They
are trained in their domain i.e., accounting, and so have excellent ability to
understand and analyse financials, which is the foundation of this service.
Therefore, a Chartered Accountant has always been a natural choice for this
service. Through, section 247 of the Co’s Act this area of service has actually
been abrogated. It is therefore upon us to consider this regulation as an
“opportunity” as some, in ignorance of the true implication of the provisions,
may portray.

BENAMI ACT – NO LONGER A PAPER TIGER ! – PART 1

“The (1988) Ordinance will remain ‘a paper tiger’,
ineffective in every manner. It would be inane”. – 130th Report of
Law Commission on Benami Transactions.

 

1. INTRODUCTION

Few months ago, Government directed the Registrars to furnish
the particulars of immovable properties registered during last ten years having
value above Rs. 1 crore. The purpose of the directive was to trace the benami
properties purchased or held in violation of The Prohibition of Benami
Property Transactions Act, 1988 (“the Act”).

 

Also, Business Standard reported on 12th January
2018 that more than 900 properties worth about Rs 35 billion have been attached
under the Act. The attached properties included immovable assets, such
as, land, flats and shops worth Rs. 29 billion, while jewellery, vehicles and
bank deposits constituted the rest.

 

Some of the specific and important aspects of the Act are
reviewed below.

 

2. OBJECTIVE OF THE ACT

The following preamble of the Act as amended in 2016
reflects its objective.

 

“An Act to prohibit benami
transactions
and the right to recover
property held benami
and matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto”. (Emphasis supplied)

 

3. TRANSACTIONS AND ASSETS
COVERED

Section 3 of the Act puts blanket prohibition on
benami transactions. Thus, all transactions that fall within the definition of
benami transaction” would be covered by the blanket prohibition.

 

3.1 ‘Benami transaction’: Type 1

New section 2(9) has substituted the definition of ‘benami
transaction
’ with effect from 1st November 2016. The difference
between the old and new definition of ‘benami transaction’ can be
ascertained by the following comparative review.

 

 

Section
before amendment

 

Amended
Section

2(a)

“Benami transaction”
means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a
consideration paid or provided by another person.

2(9)

“benami transaction”
means,—

(A)
a transaction or an arrangement –

(a)
where a property is transferred to, or is
held by
, a person, and the consideration for such property has been
provided, or paid by, another person; and

(b)
the property is held for the immediate or
future benefit, direct or indirect, of the person who has provided the
consideration,

except where the property is held by … …

[Emphasis
supplied]

 

 

The above mentioned review indicates the following features
of the definition.

 

  •  The new definition
    introduces the element of “intention” of the real owner about the
    person for whose benefit the property is held1.

______________________________________________________

1   See:
Law Commission of India: 57th Report: 7 August 1973: Paragraph
5.2(b)

 

 

  •  The genesis of the
    concept of benami is three-fold:
  •  the consideration for purchase of the property must flow
    from one person;
  •  the property is purchased in the name of the other person;
    and
  •  the consideration so flowing for the purchase was not
    intended to be gift to the person in whose name the property is purchased2.

 

  •  After the main limb of
    the new definition, four types of transactions are described as “benami
    transaction
    ”.

 

Indeed, the definition of ‘benami transaction’ of Type
1
specifies four exclusions and their conditionalities. The exclusions
pertain to the properties of HUF, trustee, executor, partner, director,
depository, spouse, child, lineal ascendant and descendant and power of
attorney arrangement.

 

These exclusions ensure that honest and bona fide transactions
are out of the sweep of the Act.

 

The new definition of ‘benami transaction’ and their
exceptions with conditionalities are diagrammatically summarised below.

 

 

3.1.1  Property’;
‘Benami Property

Property’ is a crucial term in the definition of ‘benami
property
’. There is a difference between the wordings of the definition of
“property” in the pre-Amendment Act and the new definition. For a comparative
review, both the definitions are extracted below.

 

Section
before amendment

 

Amended
Section

2(c)

“Property”
means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, tangible or
intangible, and includes any right or
interest in such property.

2(26)

“property”
means assets of any kind, whether movable or immovable, tangible or
intangible, corporeal or incorporeal and
includes any right or interest or legal documents or instruments evidencing
title to or interest in the property and where the property is capable of
conversion into some other form, then the property in the converted form and
also includes the proceeds from the property;

[Emphasis supplied to show the
distinction between the two definitions]

2   Syed
Abdul Kader vs. Rami Reddy AIR 1979 SC 553

 

3.1.2     New asset
classes introduced

The new definition specifies the following nine asset classes
as “property”.

• Movable

• Immovable

• Tangible

• Intangible

Corporeal (new class introduced)

Incorporeal (new class introduced)

• Right/interest/legal document/instruments

– evidencing title to or interest in the property

Property in the converted form (new class introduced)

Proceeds from the property (new class introduced)

 

3.2 
      Benami transaction: Type 2

Transactions in fictitious name

 

The second type of benami transaction is the transaction or
arrangement made in a fictitious name.

 

3.3        Benami
transaction: Type 3

The owner “not aware of” “denies knowledge of”

 

Third type of benami transaction is “a transaction or
arrangement in respect of a property where the owner of the property is not aware of, or, denies knowledge of, such ownership”.

 

Connotation of the expressions “not aware of” and “denies
knowledge of
” can be understood by the following illustration.

 

In the course of a search action, a lady partner gave the
statement that she was a partner in a firm.

 

However, she admitted that she did not know her share in the
firm and other particulars of the firm.

 

On these facts, the question for consideration is: whether
her being a partner will involve a benami transaction
?

 

In this case, the lady was indeed aware of the fact that she
was a partner. She did not deny that fact. Her statement clearly indicated
that, as a partner, she was owner of her share in the firm.

 

Indeed, she admitted that she did not know the other
particulars relating to the firm. Having no knowledge of the firm’s
particulars, however, cannot be regarded as being “not aware of, or denies
knowledge of such ownership
”. Hence, in this case, it cannot be said that
the lady’s being a partner involves a benami transaction.

 

3.4    Benami
Transaction: Type 4

Provider of consideration “not traceable or is fictitious”

 

The issue is: whether this type of transaction would cover
charitable and religious institutions where often donors wished to remain
anonymous as a precondition to giving donations to the institution?

Section 58 of the Act addresses this issue. It
empowers the Central Government to exempt any property relating to charitable
or religious trusts from the operation of the Act. Therefore, large
donations received by the charities from anonymous donors will not be regarded
as benami property if covered by Central Government’s exemption notification.

 

4.   TRANSACTIONS NOT COVERED

As regards the benami transaction of Type 1, the
following four transactions are excluded from this type of benami transaction.

 

4.1   First exclusion:

Property held by HUF Karta or member

 

This exclusion is applicable in the following circumstances.

  •  The property is held for
    the benefit of Karta or other members of HUF; and
  •  Consideration for the
    property is provided out of known sources of HUF.

 

4.1.1     “Known
sources”

 

The crucial issue is: what is the meaning of the
expression “known sources
”? This expression is new and was not a part of
the pre-amended Act.

 

The expression “known sources” is different from “known
sources of income
”. The rationale behind the expression “known sources” was
explained by the Finance Minister during the debate on the Benami Amendment
Bill in the following words.

 

“… … This is exactly what the Standing Committee went into.
The earlier phrase was that you have purchased this property, so you must show
money out of your known sources of income. So, the income had to be personal.
Members of the Standing Committee felt that the family can contribute to it,
you can take a loan from somebody or you can take loan from bank which is not
your income. Therefore, the word ‘income’ has
been deleted and now the word is only ‘known sources’
. So, if a brother or
a sister or a son contributed to this, this itself would not make it benami,
because we know that is how the structure of the family itself is………” [Emphasis
supplied]

 

_________________________________________________-

3   Kalekhan
Mohammed Hanif vs. CIT (1963) 50 ITR 1(SC)

 

 

4.1.2     Under
the Income-tax Act if the assessee does not explain the nature and
source of credit in his books of account, the amount of credit will be regarded
as his taxable income. The Supreme Court3  has held that the onus to explain the nature
and source of cash credit is on the assessee. To discharge such onus, the
assessee must prove:


  •  The identity of the creditor
  •  The capacity of the creditor
  •  Genuineness of the transaction

 

4.1.3     According
to section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if any fact is
especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact
is on him. Thus, where wife holds the property as benami for her
husband, conjoint reading of Income-tax Act and the Evidence Act,
raises a question: whether the burden of proving that the consideration was
paid by the husband from his known sources is discharged when the wife
furnishes the particulars of the consideration provided by her husband who
purchased the property in her name
?

 

In other words, can the benamidar wife be asked to
prove the source from which her husband provided the consideration?

 

4.1.4     The
view that an assessee cannot be asked to prove the source of the source has
been recently called in question by the Calcutta High Court in the following
decisions.

 

  •  Rajmandir Estates Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (Principal) [2016]
    386 ITR 162 (Cal)
  •  CIT vs. Maithan International [2015] 375 ITR 123 (Cal)

 

4.1.5     There
is, indeed, a subtle difference in the nature of Income-tax Act and that
of the Benami Act. Income-tax Act is a Revenue law but the
Benami Act
is a law dealing with economic offence. In view of the said two
decisions, it stands to reason that under the Benami Act, benamidar may
be called upon to prove the source from which the real owner provided funds for
purchase of the benami property.

 

4.2        Second Exclusion: Property held by
trustee, executor, partner, director, depository or participant as agent of a
depository

 

This exclusion applies to the property held by the above
named persons. They are merely illustrative of the class of persons covered by
this exclusion. Hence, apart from the abovementioned persons, any other person,
too, may be covered by this exclusion where the following two facts exist.

 

  •  The property is held by the person in fiduciary
    capacity;
    and
  •  The person holds the property for the benefit of another
    towards whom he stands in fiduciary capacity.

 

The Supreme Court has held4 that “while the
expression “fiduciary capacity” may not be capable of precise definition, it
implies a relationship that is analogous to the
relationship between a trustee and the beneficiary of the trust.
The expression is in fact wider in its import for it extends to all such situations that place
the parties in positions that are founded on
confidence and trust
on the one part and
good faith
on other
”. [Emphasis supplied]

 

Moreover, the Central Government is empowered to notify any
other person for inclusion in the abovementioned exclusion.

 

4.3        Third
exclusion: Property held in the name of wife or child

 

This exclusion is
applicable only if the consideration is paid or provided from the individual’s “known
sources”
.

 

Following important
aspects of this exclusion may be noted.

 

  •  The expression mentioned
    in the condition is “known sources” and not “known sources of income”.
    Thus, where an individual takes loan for purchasing a property in child’s name,
    it will not be Benami transaction because loan is the individual’s
    “known source” though not necessarily, the known source of his income. Thus, it
    is sufficient that the property is purchased from the individual’s “known
    sources”. The person need not further prove that the property is purchased from
    the known sources of his income.

________________________________________________

4   Marcel
Martins vs. M Printer [2012] 21 taxmann.com 7

 

 

  •   The term “child” is not
    defined in the Act. Hence, in terms of section 2(31) of the Act,
    the definition of “child” given in section 2(15B) of the Income-tax Act
    may be adopted. This definition of ‘child’ includes a step-child and adopted
    child. The term “child” also includes “married daughter”. Moreover, “child”
    includes major child and also illegitimate child5.

 

4.4        Fourth Exclusion:
Property held jointly with

brother, sister, lineal ascendant or descendant

 

This exclusion is
applicable where the following facts exist.

 

  •  The name of the person providing consideration appears as
    joint owner in the property document.
  •  The consideration for property is provided out of
    individual’s known sources.

 

The following important aspects of this exclusion may be
noted.

 

  •  The terms “brother” or
    “sister” include half-brother/sister6. Though colloquially, it is
    customary to address cousins as “cousin brother” or “cousin sister”, they are
    not considered “brother” or “sister”.

 

  •  Likewise, step-brother
    and step-sister are not “brother” or “sister”.

 

  •  The properties held in
    the sole name of the brother, sister, lineal ascendant or descendant is
    not covered in this exclusion.

 

  •  “Lineal ascendant” and
    “lineal descendant” are not defined in the Act. Sections 24 and 25 of the Indian
    Succession Act, 1925
    throw light on these two expressions.

 

In the light of the Indian
Succession Act
, [section 24: kindred or consanguinity and section 25(1):
Lineal consanguinity], “lineal ascendant” or “lineal descendant” may be
described as the connection or relation between two persons, one of whom has
descended in a direct line from the other, as between a man and his father,
grandfather and great-grandfather, and so upwards in the direct ascending line;
or between a man and his son, grandson, great-grandson and so downwards in the
direct descending line.

 

4.5  Fifth
exclusion: Power of Attorney transactions

__________________________________________________

5   Sunderlal
Chaurasiya vs. Tejila AIR 2004 MP 138

6  ITO
vs. Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd (1983) 17 TTJ (All) 49

 

An important question for consideration is: whether “power of
attorney transactions” in immovable properties (POA transactions) are ‘benami
transactions
’?

 

This question is addressed by the Explanation to
section 2(9)of the Act. The Explanation clarifies that ‘benami
transaction’ shall not include any transaction involving the allowing of
possession of any property to be taken or retained in part performance of a
contract referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
if:-

 

  •  Consideration for such property was provided by the person
    to whom possession is allowed but the person who has granted possession thereof
    continues to be owner of such property;

 

  •  Stamp duty on such transaction or arrangement has been
    paid; and

 

  •  The agreement has been registered.

 

Thus, POA transactions are not regarded as benami
transactions
as per the following clarification given by the Finance
Minister7.

 

“As far as power of attorneys
are concerned,
I have already said, properties which are transferred in
part performance of a contract and possession is given then that possession is
protected conventionally under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
That is how all the power of attorney transactions in Delhi are protected, even
though title is not perfect and legitimate. Now,
those properties have also been kept out as per the recommendation made by the
Standing Committee”.
[Emphasis supplied]

 

As the Explanation uses the words “for the removal
of doubts, it is hereby declared …”
, it is clear that the Explanation
is retrospective in effect.

 

Another issue that may arise is whether the Explanation
is intended to confer legal title in the property on the power-of-attorney
holder who is in possession of property? It may be noted that the Explanation
merely removes the element of Benami from the POA transactions. It is
settled law that POA is not a title document. This aspect of the POA
transaction is not changed by the Explanation.

 

4.6        Further
exclusion: “Foreign property”

____________________________________________

7   See
the debate on the Amendment Bill in Rajya Sabha on 3-8-2016

 

A reference to the definition of ‘benami property’ in
section 2(8) and the definition of ‘property’ in section 2(26) of the Act shows that any property located abroad is not excluded from the said two
definitions.

 

However, the Finance
Minister has addressed this aspect in the following clarification8.

 

“What happens if the asset is outside the country? If an asset is outside the country, it would not be covered under this Act. It would be covered
under the Black Money Law
, because you are owning a property or an asset
outside the country”. [Emphasis supplied]

 

Thus, according to the
abovementioned clarification, the foreign property would not be covered under the
Act
. It would be covered under the Black Money Act.

 

4.7        One more exclusion: Sham transaction

 

A ‘sham transaction’
is different from a ‘benami transaction’.

 

In a benami transaction,
the transaction, in fact, takes place. A sham transaction is merely a
description given to a bogus or fictitious arrangement where transaction does
not take place at all. Sham transaction consists merely of fictitious entries
and fabricated documents, such as, bogus invoices.

 

The Supreme Court9
has explained the difference between “benami” and “sham” by observing
that the word ‘benami’ is used to denote two classes of transactions
which differ from each other in their legal character and incidents. To
demonstrate this proposition, the Supreme Court gave the following
illustration.

 

“A sells a property to B
but the sale deed mentions X as the purchaser. Here the sale is genuine, but
the real purchaser is B, X being B’s benamidar. This is the class of
transactions which is usually termed as benami. But the word ‘benami
is also occasionally used to refer to a sham transaction. e.g. when A purports
to sell his property to B without intending that A’s title should pass to B. The fundamental difference between these two
classes of transactions is that in a benami transaction, there is an
operative transfer resulting in the vesting of title in the transferee.
On
the other hand, in a sham transaction, there is
no real transfer since the transferor continues to retain the title even after
execution of the transfer deed.
In benami transactions, when a
dispute arises as to whether the person named in the deed is the real
transferee or B, it would be necessary to address the question as to who paid
the consideration for the transfer, X or B. However, when the question is whether the transfer is genuine or sham, the
point for decision would be, not who paid the consideration but whether any consideration at all was paid”.
(Emphasis supplied)

 

_______________________________________________

8   Rajya
Sabha Debate on 2-8-2016 on the Amendment Bill

9   Sree
Meenakshi Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 28 (SC);AIR 1957 SC 49

 

 

The essential feature of
sham transaction is that the real owner of the property transfers the property
to another without the intention of transferring the legal title in the
property10.

 

The distinction between Benami
transaction and sham transaction is lucidly explained in the undernoted
decision11 in the following words.

 

“The benami transaction
evidences an operative and valid transfer
resulting in the passing of title in the transferee,
whereas in the sham
transaction, there is no valid transfer of interest, though ostensibly the deed
incorporating the transaction seeks to clothe the transferee with the title in
the property. Sham transaction takes place, inter
alia
, when there is no consideration for the transfer. Hence, if the
transferor wants to assail the validity of the transaction, he will have to
seek cancellation of the document since as long as the document exists, the
transferee would remain clothed with the title to the property.
In case of benami
transaction, however, the document has legal effect being perfectly valid;
such as a sale deed executed for consideration. However, the issue is: who is
the true owner of the property – whether the transferee named in the deed or
any other person being a benami. In such a case, the aggrieved person
would not demand cancellation of the sale deed because, if the deed is
cancelled, he would not be clothed with any right, title or interest in the
property which is the subject matter of the sale deed.
This would be directly against his interest
inasmuch as he wants to derive right, title and interest in the property on the
strength of the sale deed, but wants a declaration that it is he who had
derived title and not the person named as transferee in the document. On the
other hand, in a sham transaction, the aggrieved person may require
cancellation of the deed where the transaction is of voidable nature.”
(Emphasis supplied)

 

The Act covers only Benami transaction and does not cover
sham transaction12.

(To be continued in part 2
to cover how this Act will bring out illicit money, its administration,
opportunities for CAs, case study and rigour of punitive provisions.)
 

___________________________________________________________________________________

10  Sree
Meenakshi Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (1957) 31 ITR 28 (SC), AIR 1957 SC 49; Thakur Bhim
Singh vs. Thakur Kan Singh: AIR 1980 SC 727; (1980) 3 SCC 72

11  Keshab
Chandra Nayak vs. Lakmidhar Nayak: AIR 1993 Ori 1 (FB)

12             Bhargary P. Sumathykutty vs.
Janaki Sathyabhama (1996) 217 ITR 129 (Ker)(FB)

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IFRS & Ind AS

The author Dolphy D’Souza has provided a detail
list of differences between IFRS and Ind AS. 
Different stakeholders will find this beneficial in different ways.  Companies seeking to prepare pure IFRS
financial statements for fund raising or global listing or group consolidation,
can use this to align their Ind AS financial statements to IFRS.  The standard-setters can use this list to
reduce or eliminate the differences.  If
Ind AS standards are fully aligned to IFRS standards, it will improve India’s
credibility in the global markets.

IFRS 1 differences

Deemed cost exemption for property, plant and equipment

IFRS 1 permits a first-time adopter to
measure its items of property, plant and equipment (PPE) at deemed cost at
the transition date. The deemed cost can be:

  • The
    fair value of the item at the date of transition
  • A
    previous GAAP revaluation at or before transition date, if revaluation meets
    certain criteria

Similar exemption is also available for
intangible assets and investment property measured at cost.

Ind AS 101 also provides similar deemed
cost exemption. In addition, if there is no change in the functional currency
at the transition date, Ind AS 101 allows a first-time adopter to continue
with the previous GAAP carrying value for all of its PPE as recognised in the
previous GAAP financial statements at the transition date. The same is   used as deemed cost at that date, after
making adjustment for decommissioning liabilities.

 

In Ind AS CFS, the previous GAAP amount
of the subsidiary is the amount used in the previous GAAP CFS. If an entity
avails the option under this paragraph, no further adjustments to the deemed
cost so determined is made.

 

Similar exemption is also available for
intangible assets and investment property. 
Fair value as deemed cost exemption is not allowed for investment
property.

Additional exemptions relating to composite leases and land
lease

Under IFRS 1, an entity classifies a
lease based on the lease terms that are in force at its date of transition
based on the circumstances that existed at the inception of the lease.

Ind AS 101 provides the following
additional exemptions:

 

  • When
    a lease includes both land and building elements, a first time adopter may
    assess the classification of each element as finance or operating lease at
    the date of transition to Ind AS based on the facts and circumstances existing
    as at that date.

 

  • If
    there is any land lease newly classified as finance lease, then the first
    time adopter may recognise asset and liability at fair value on that date.
    Any difference between those fair values is recognised in retained earnings.

Exchange differences arising on long-term monetary items

IAS 21 requires exchange differences
arising on restatement of foreign currency monetary items, both long term and
short term, to be recognised in the income statement for the period.

Under the erstwhile Indian GAAP,
companies recognised exchange differences arising on restatement of foreign
currency monetary items, both long term and short term, in the profit or loss
immediately. Alternatively, they were given an irrevocable option to defer/
capitalise exchange differences on long-term foreign currency monetary items.

IFRS 1 differences

 

 

For the companies applying second option
under the erstwhile Indian GAAP, Ind AS 101 provides an additional option.
They may continue to account for exchange differences arising on long-term
foreign currency monetary items recognised in the financial statements for
the period ending immediately before the beginning of first Ind AS reporting
period using the previous GAAP accounting policy. Ind AS 21 does not apply to
exchange differences arising on such long term foreign currency monetary
items.

Additional exemption relating to amortisation of toll roads

IAS 38 has a rebuttable presumption that
the use of revenue-based amortisation method is inappropriate for intangible
assets.

The old Indian GAAP allowed revenue
based amortisation for toll roads. 
Under Ind AS, an entity on first time adoption of Ind AS may decide to
retain the previous GAAP amortisation method for intangible assets arising
from service concession arrangements related to toll roads recognised in
financial statements for the period immediately before the beginning of the
first Ind AS reporting period.

 

Under Ind AS 38, the guidance relating
to amortisation method does not apply to the assets covered in the previous
paragraph.

Additional exemption relating to non-current assets held for
sale and discontinued operations

There is no exemption under IFRS 1
relating to non-current assets held for sale and discontinued operations.

Ind AS 101 allows a first-time adopter
to use the transition date circumstances to measure the non-current assets
held for sale and discontinued operations at the lower of carrying value and
fair value less cost to sell.

Previous GAAP

IFRS 1 defines the term “previous GAAP”
as a basis of accounting that a first-time adopter used immediately before
adopting IFRS. Thus, an entity preparing two complete sets of financial
statements, viz., one set of financial statements as per the Indian GAAP and
another set as per the US GAAP, may be able to choose either GAAP as its
“previous GAAP.”

Ind AS 101 defines the term “previous
GAAP” as the basis of accounting that a first-time adopter used immediately
before adopting Ind AS for its statutory reporting requirements in India. For
instance, the companies preparing their financial statements in accordance
with section 133 of Companies Act, 2013, will consider those financial
statements as previous GAAP financial statements.

 

Consequently, it is mandatory for Indian
entities to consider their Indian GAAP financial statements as previous GAAP
for transitions to Ind AS.

Differences from other IFRS standards

Current/ non-current classification on breach of debt covenant

If an entity breaches a provision of a
long-term loan arrangement on or before the period end with the effect that
the liability becoming payable on demand, the loan is classified as current
liability.

 

This is the case even if the lender has
agreed, after the period end and before the authorisation of the financial
statements for issue, not to demand payment as a consequence of the breach.
Such waivers granted by the lender or rectification of a breach after the end
of the reporting period are considered as non-adjusting event and disclosed.

First, Ind AS 1 refers to breach of
material provision, instead of any provision. This indicates that breach of
immaterial provision may not impact loan classification.

 

Second, under Ind AS 1, waivers granted
by the lender or rectification of breach between the end of the reporting
period and the date of approval of financial statements for issue are treated
as adjusting event. A corresponding change has also been made in Ind AS 10.

Analyses of expenses in the statement of profit and loss

IAS 1 requires an entity to present an
analysis of expenses recognised in profit or loss using a classification
based on either their nature or their function within the entity, whichever
provides the information that is reliable and more relevant.

Ind AS 1 requires entities to present an
analysis of expenses recognised in profit or loss using a classification
based on their nature only. Thus, there is no option to use functional
classification for presentation of expenses.

Materiality and aggregation

IAS 1 requires:

??each
material class of similar items to be presented separately in the financial
statements; and

??items
of a dissimilar nature or function to be presented separately unless they are
immaterial

Ind AS 1 modifies these requirement by
adding the words ‘except when required by law.’  Hence, if the applicable law requires
separate presentation/ disclosure of certain items, they are presented
separately irrespective of materiality.

Differences from other IFRS standards

 

Also,
IAS 1 states that specific disclosure need not be provided if the same is
considered immaterial.

 

Presentation of financial statements

IAS 1 provides broad illustrative
format.

In addition to the broad illustrative
format included in Ind AS 1, Schedule III prescribes a detailed format for
presentation of financial statements and disclosures. The disclosures include
information required under certain Indian statutes.  Companies Act, 2013 also requires certain
statutory disclosures (eg contribution to political parties) to be made in
Ind AS financial statements.

Cash flow statement –

Classification of interest paid and interest and dividend
received

For non-financial entities, interest
paid and interest and dividends received may be classified as ‘operating
activities’. Alternatively, interest paid and interest and dividends received
may be classified as ‘financing activities’ and ‘investing activities’
respectively.

Ind AS 7 does not give an option.  It requires non-financial entities to
classify interest paid as part of ‘financing activities’ and interest and
dividend received as ‘investing activities’.

Cash flow statement –

Classification of dividend paid

Dividend paid may be classified either
as operating or financing cash flows.

Dividend paid is classified as financing
cash flows.

Bargain purchase gains

Where consideration transferred for
business acquisition is lower than the acquisition date fair value of net
assets acquired, the gain is recognised in the income statement after a
detailed reassessment.

Ind AS 103 requires bargain purchase
gain to be recognised in OCI and accumulated in the equity as capital
reserve. However, if there is no clear evidence for the underlying reason for
bargain purchase, the gain is directly recognised in equity as capital
reserve, without routing the same through OCI. A similar change has also been
made with regard to bargain purchase gain arising on investment in associate/
JV, accounted for using the acquisition method.

Common control business combinations

IFRS 3 excludes from its scope common
control business combinations.

Ind AS 103 requires business
combinations of entities or businesses under common control to be mandatorily
accounted using the pooling of interest method. The application of this
method requires the following:

  • Assets
    and liabilities of the combining entities are reflected at their carrying
    amounts.
  • No
    adjustments are made to reflect fair values, or recognise any new assets or
    liabilities.
  • Financial
    information in respect of prior periods is restated as if business
    combination has occurred from the beginning of the earliest period presented.
  • The
    balance of the retained earnings appearing in the financial statements of the
    transferor is aggregated with the corresponding balance appearing in the
    financial statements of the transferee; alternatively, it is transferred to
    general reserves, if any.
  • The
    identity of the reserves is preserved and appear in the financial statements
    of the transferee in the same form in which they appeared in the financial
    statements of the transferor.
  • The
    difference between the amount recorded as share capital issued plus any
    additional consideration in cash or other assets and the amount of share
    capital of the transferor is transferred to capital reserve and presented
    separately from other capital reserves.

Foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCB)

A fixed amount of foreign currency does
not result in fixed amount in the entity’s functional currency. Consequently,
FCCBs, where the conversion price is fixed in foreign currency, do not meet
“fixed-for-fixed” criterion to treat the conversion option as equity. Hence,
FCCBs are generally treated as a hybrid financial instrument containing a
liability component and the conversion option being a derivative. The
derivative element is measured at fair value at each reporting date and
resulting gain/ loss is recognised in the profit or loss for the period.

Ind AS 32 contains an exception to the
definition of financial liability. As per the exception, the equity
conversion option embedded in a convertible bond denominated in foreign
currency to acquire a fixed number of entity’s own equity instruments is
considered an equity instrument if the exercise price is fixed in any
currency. Hence, entities will treat the conversion option as fixed equity
and no fair valuation thereof is required.

Differences from other IFRS standards

Straight-lining of lease rentals in operating leases

Rental under an operating lease are
recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term unless another
systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s
benefit.

Lease payments under an operating lease
are recognised as an expense on a straight-line basis over the lease term
unless either:

a) Another systematic basis is more
representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit, or

b) Payments to the lessor are structured
to increase in line with expected general inflation to compensate for the
lessor’s expected inflationary cost increases. If payments to the lessor vary
because of factors other than general inflation, then this condition is not
met.

Uniform accounting policies

Compliance with uniform accounting
policies is mandatory.

Ind AS 28 also requires the use of
uniform accounting policies. However, an exemption on the grounds of
“impracticability” has been granted for associates. This is for the reason
that the investor does not have
control” over the associate and it may not be able to
influence the associate to prepare additional financial statements or to
follow the accounting policies that are followed by the investor.

Use of the fair value model for investment property (IP)

An entity has an option to apply either
the cost model or the fair value model for subsequent measurement of its
investment property. If the fair value model is used, all investment
properties, including investment properties under construction, are measured
at fair value and changes in the fair value are recognised in the profit or
loss for the period in which it arises. Under the fair value model, the
carrying amount is not required to be depreciated.  Among other options, companies are allowed
to use fair value as deemed cost exemption for IP at the date of transition
to IFRS.

Ind AS 40 does not permit the use of
fair value model for subsequent measurement of investment property. It
however requires the fair value of the investment property to be disclosed in
the notes to financial statements. 
Also, consequent to the above change, companies are not allowed to use
fair value as deemed cost exemption for IP at the date of transition to Ind
AS.

Grants in the form of
non-monetary assets

IAS 20 provides an option to entities to
recognise government grants in the form of non-monetary assets, given at a
concessional rate, either at their fair value or at the nominal value.

Ind AS 20 requires measurement of such
grants only at their fair value. Thus, the option to measure these grants at
nominal value is not available under Ind AS 20.

Grants related to assets

IAS 20 gives an option to present the
grants related to assets, including non-monetary grants at fair value, in the
balance sheet either by setting up the grant as deferred income or by
deducting the grant in arriving at the carrying amount of the asset.

Ind AS 20 requires presentation of such
grants in the balance sheet only by setting up the grant as deferred income.
Thus, the option to present such grants by deduction of the grant in arriving
at the carrying amount of the asset is not available.

Use of equity method to account for investments in
subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates in SFS

IAS 27 allows an entity to use the
equity method to account for its investments in subsidiares, joint ventures
and associates in its SFS. Consequently, an entity is permitted to account
for these investments either

  • At
    cost
  • In
    accordance with IFRS 9
  • Using
    the equity method

This
is an accounting policy choice for each category of investment.

Ind AS 27 does not allow the use of
equity method to account for investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and
associates in SFS. This is because Ind AS considers equity method to be a
manner of consolidation rather than a measurement basis.

Confidentiality exemption

IAS 24 does not provide any exemption
from disclosure requirements on the grounds of confidentiality requirements
prescribed in any statute or regulation.

Ind AS 24 exempts an entity from making
disclosures required in the standard if making such disclosures will conflict
with its duties of confidentiality prescribed in a statute or regulation.

Definition of close members of the family of a person

As per IAS 24, “close members of the
family” of a person are those family members who may be expected to
influence, or be influenced by, that person in their dealings with the
entity. They may include

a)
the person’s spouse or domestic partner and children,

Definition “close members of the family”
under Ind AS 24 is similar.

 

In
addition to relations prescribed under IFRS, it includes brother, sister,
father and mother in sub-paragraph (a).

Differences from other IFRS standards

 

b) children of the person’s spouse or
domestic partner, and

c) dependents of the person or the
person’s spouse or domestic partner

 

Differences in local implementation

Classification of refundable deposits received from
customers/ suppliers

Deposits received from the customer/ dealer
are refundable on demand if the connection/ dealership is surrendered.
Deposits being repayable on demand are classified as current.

The ITFG has originally clarified that
refundable deposit repayable on demand should be classified as current. However,
this clarification was subsequently withdrawn by the ITFG.  Consequently, many entities present them as
non-current liabilities.

Application of the pooling of interest method in common
control business combinations

IFRS 3 excludes from its scope common
control business combinations.

Ind AS 103 requires common control
business combination to be accounted for using the pooling of interest
method. The ITFG has provided the following guidance on the use of SFS vs.
CFS numbers:

  • Where
    a subsidiary merges with the parent, then it would be appropriate to
    recognise combination at the carrying amounts appearing in the CFS of the
    parent, since nothing has changed from group perspective.
  • If
    a subsidiary is merged with other fellow subsidiary, then the amount as
    appearing in the SFS of the merging subsidiary should be used for application
    of the pooling of interest method.

Date of accounting for common control business combination

No specific guidance. Globally, business
combinations including those under common control are generally accounted
from the date on which all substantive approvals are received.

In India, many merger & amalgamation
schemes need to be approved by the Court/ National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT). In Indian scenario, the court/ NCLT approval is considered to be
substantive and is not merely a rubber stamping.  The ITFG has clarified that in a common
control business combination, the court/ NCLT approval received after the
reporting date and before approval of the financial statements for issue
would be treated as an adjusting event.

Determination of 
functional currency for the entity and its branch

Depending on specific facts, functional
currency for a branch can be different from that of the company.

A company is carrying on two businesses
in completely different economic environments, say, one INR and the other
USD. The ITFG has stated that the functional currency is determined at the
company level. Hence, functional currency should be same for both the
businesses.

SFS of parent: Impact of Interest free loan to subsidiary on
transition to Ind AS (Guidance provided by ITFG under Ind AS on matters which
are not relevant under IFRS)

  •  Under the erstwhile Indian GAAP, interest free loans to subsidiaries are
    accounted for at nominal amount. Under Ind AS, such loans are accounted at
    fair value. Any difference in nominal amount and fair value is added to
    investment subsidiary.
  • What
    happens to fair value impact of past loans outstanding at transition date?
    The company has used previous GAAP carrying amount as deemed cost option for
    measuring investment in subsidiary on the date of transition to Ind AS.

The
ITFG has clarified that any difference between the carrying amount and fair
value of loan will be added to the investment measured at cost.

Treatment of dividend distribution tax (DDT) – (Guidance
provided by ITFG under Ind AS on matters which are debatable under IFRS)

As per the tax provision in India,
companies paying dividend are required to pay dividend distribution tax.  The ITFG has clarified that the company is
paying DDT on behalf of shareholders. Hence, it should be treated as
distribution of profit and debited to SOCIE.

 

In
case of DDT paid by subsidiary on dividend distributed to holding company,
the holding company can claim deduction for tax paid by subsidiary against
its own tax liability pertaining to dividend distribution.  The ITFG has clarified that DDT paid by subsidiary
on dividend distributed to holding company is charged to P&L in CFS.  This is because there is a cash outflow for
the group to a third party; i.e., the tax authorities. Timing of charge is
based on Ind AS 12 principles. 
However, if a portion / total tax paid is claimed as set off against
holding company’s DDT liability (on dividends paid to its own shareholders) ,
then the offset amount is recognised in SOCIE and not P&L in CFS.  DDT paid on dividend distributed to NCI is
recognised in SOCIE.

Other minor differences

Variable consideration – Penalties

Under IFRS 15, the amount of
consideration, among other things, can vary because of penalties.

Under Ind AS 115, where the penalty is
inherent in determination of transaction price, it will form part of variable
consideration. For example, where an entity agrees to transfer control of a
good or service in a contract with a customer at the end of 30 days for
INR100,000 and if it exceeds 30 days, the entity is entitled to receive only
INR95,000, the reduction of INR5,000 will be regarded as variable
consideration. In other cases, the transaction price will be considered as
fixed.

Disclosure of reconciliation between revenue and contracted
price

IFRS 15 requires extensive qualitative
and quantitative disclosures including those on disaggregated revenue,
reconciliation of contract balances, performance obligations and significant
judgments.

Ind AS 115 contains all the disclosure
requirement in IFRS 15. In addition, Ind AS 115 requires presentation of a reconciliation
between the amount of revenue recognised in statement of profit or loss and
the contracted price showing separately adjustments made to the contracted
price, for example, on account of discounts, rebates, refunds, price
concessions, incentives, bonus, etc. specifying the nature and amount of each
such adjustment separately.

Exchange differences regarded as adjustment to interest costs

In accordance with IAS 23, borrowing
cost includes exchange difference arising from foreign currency borrowings to
the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs.
However, it does not provide any specific guidance on measurement of such
amounts.

Ind AS 23 is similar to IAS 23. However,
Ind AS 23 provides following additional guidance on manner of arriving at
this adjustment:

  • The
    adjustment should be of an amount equivalent to the extent to which the
    exchange loss does not exceed the difference between the costs of borrowing
    in functional currency when compared to the costs of borrowing in a foreign
    currency.
  • If
    there is an unrealised exchange loss which is treated as an adjustment to
    interest and subsequently there is a realised or unrealised gain in respect
    of the settlement or translation of the same borrowing, the gain to the extent
    of the loss previously recognised as an adjustment should also be recognised
    as an adjustment to interest amount.

Statements of comprehensive income/ Statement of profit and
loss

With regard to preparation of statement
of profit and loss, IFRS provides an option either to follow the single
statement approach or to follow the two statement approach. An entity may
present a

  • single
    statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income, with profit or
    loss and other comprehensive income presented in two sections; or
  • it
    may present the profit or loss section in a separate ‘statement of profit or
    loss’ which shall immediately precede the ‘statement of comprehensive
    income’, which shall begin with profit or loss.

Ind AS 1 allows only the single statement
approach and does not permit the two statements approach.  For deletion of two statements approach,
consequential amendments have been made in other Ind AS also.

Frequency of reporting

In accordance with IAS 1, an entity
consistently prepares financial statements for each one-year period. However,
for practical reasons, some entities prefer to report, for example, for a
52-week period. IAS 1 does not preclude this practice.

Ind AS 1 does not permit entities to use
a periodicity other than one year to present their financial statements.

Earnings Per Share –

Applicability

IAS 33 applies only to an entity whose
ordinary shares or potential ordinary shares are traded in a public market or
that files, or is in the process of filing, its financial statements with a
securities commission or other regulatory organisation for the purpose of
issuing ordinary shares in a public market.

This scope requirement has been deleted
in the Ind AS as the applicability or exemptions is governed by Companies
Act, 2013 and the rules made thereunder. 
Since there is no exemption from disclosing EPS under the Companies
Act, all companies covered under Ind AS need to disclose EPS.

Presentation of EPS in separate financial statements

IAS 33 provides that when an entity
presents both consolidated financial statements (CFS) and separate financial
statements (SFS), it provides EPS related information in CFS.

Ind AS 33 requires EPS related
information to be disclosed both in CFS and SFS. In CFS, such disclosures
will be based on consolidated information. In SFS, such disclosures will be
based on information given in the SFS.

Other minor differences

Segment reporting Application

IFRS 8 applies only to an entity whose
ordinary shares or potential ordinary shares are traded in a public market or
that files, or is in the process of filing, its financial statements with a
securities commission or other regulatory organisation for the purpose of
issuing ordinary shares in a public market.

This scope requirement has been deleted
in the Ind AS as the applicability or exemptions is governed by Companies
Act, 2013 and the rules made thereunder. 
Currently, the Companies Act does not exempt any company (except few
government companies in defence sector) from presentation of segment
information.

Aggregation of transactions for related party disclosure

IFRS does not provide any guidance on
the aggregation of transaction for disclosure purposes.

Ind AS 24 provides an additional
guidance whereby items of similar nature may be disclosed in aggregate by
type of related party. However, this is not done in such a way as to obscure
the importance of significant transactions. Hence, purchases or sales of
goods are not aggregated with purchases or sales of fixed assets. Nor a
material related party transaction with an individual party is clubbed in an
aggregated disclosure.

Regulatory Deferral Accounts 
– Explanation to the definition of “previous GAAP

IFRS 14 defines the term “previous GAAP”
as a basis of accounting that a first-time adopter used immediately before
adopting IFRS.

Ind AS 114 defines the term “previous
GAAP” as the basis of accounting that a first-time adopter used immediately
before adopting Ind AS for its reporting requirements in India. Further an
explanation has been added to the definition to consider the Guidance Note on
Accounting for the Rate Regulated Activities issued by the ICAI to be the
previous GAAP.

Regulatory Deferral Accounts 
– Scope

An entity is allowed to apply the
requirements of IFRS 14 in its subsequent financial statements if and only
if, in its first IFRS financial statements, it recognised regulatory deferral
account balances by electing to apply the requirements of IFRS 14.

Ind AS 114 contains similar requirement.
In addition, its states that an entity applies the requirements of previous
GAAP in respect of such regulated activities:

  • in
    the case of an entity subject to rate regulation coming into existence after
    Ind- AS coming into effect; or
  • if
    its activities become subject to rate regulation subsequent to preparation
    and presentation of its first Ind AS financial statements.

Repeat application of IFRS/Ind AS

IFRS 1 states that an entity that
stopped applying IFRS in the past and chooses, or is required, to resume
preparing IFRS financial statements has an option to either apply IFRS 1
again or to retrospectively restate its financial statements as if it had
never stopped applying IFRS.

Ind AS 101 does not contain this
provision. Rather, MCA roadmap states that once a company opts to follow Ind
AS, it will be required to follow the Ind AS for all the subsequent financial
statements.

Presentation of comparative information

IFRS 1 requires comparative information
for minimum one year. If an entity elects, it can give comparative
information for more than one year.

The ITFG has clarified that due to the
Companies Act notification, a first-time adopter can give Ind AS comparative
information only for one year.

Exemption relating to borrowing cost

IFRS 1 permits a first time adopter to
apply the requirements of IAS 23 from the date of transition or from an
earlier date as permitted by the transitional requirements of IAS 23.

There is no such exemption under Ind AS
101, since Indian GAAP requires the borrowing cost relating to qualifying
assets to be capitalised if the criteria laid down in AS 16 (Indian GAAP) are
fulfilled.

Small and medium-sized entities

The IASB had issued a separate IFRS for SMEs in July
2009. IFRS for SMEs is based on the fundamental principles of full IFRS, but
in many cases, it has been simplified to make the accounting requirements
less complex and to reduce the cost and effort required to produce the
financial statements. To achieve this, the IASB removed a number of the
accounting options available under full IFRS and attempted to simplify
accounting, including recognition and measurement principles, for SMEs in
certain areas.

Whilst the standard provides a broad
level definition of an SME to help in understanding the entities to which
IFRS for SMEs is applicable, the preface to the standard indicates that the
decision as to which entities are required or permitted to apply the standard
will lie with the regulatory and legislative authorities in each
jurisdiction.

In India, there is no separate standard
for SMEs that will correspond to IFRS for SMEs.  As per the MCA roadmap, Ind AS applies in
phases to:

  • Listed
    companies;
  • Non-listed
    companies having net worth of INR 250 crores or more;
  • Holding,
    subsidiary, joint venture and associate companies of the above companies

 

All other companies will continue to
apply Indian GAAP or they may adopt Ind AS voluntarily. ICAI is separately
upgrading Indian GAAP to bring it closer to Ind AS. In certain cases, the
ICAI may use IFRS for SMEs principles while revising Indian GAAP.
 

AMENDMENTS IN FORM 3CD ANNEXED TO TAX AUDIT REPORT

Section 44AB relating to Tax Audit was inserted in the Income
tax Act by the Finance Act, 1984. Tax Audit requirement has become effective
from A.Y. 1985-86.  The above provision
for compulsory Tax Audit in cases of assessees carrying on business or profession
and having annual Turnover or Gross Receipts exceeding certain specified limits
was introduced with a view to provide authentic information to the Assessing
Officer with the return of income. Separate Tax Audit report Form 3CA for
Corporate assessees and Form 3CB for non-corporate assessees have been
notified. In these Audit Reports it is specifically stated that “Statement of
Particulars required to be furnished under Section 44AB is annexed herewith in
Form No:3CD”. In other words, the intention from the beginning has been that
Form 3CD will give certain specified particulars (i.e. information) relating to
the accounts audited by the Tax Auditor. In other words, the Assessing Officer
is provided with authentic information to enable him to frame the assessment
without further verification.

 

The initial draft of Tax Audit Report with statement of
particulars, as prepared by the Taxation Committee of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants was notified by CBDT with certain modifications. The Tax
Audit Report as notified in A.Y. 1985-86, continued with minor modifications
upto A.Y. 1998-99. In the subsequent years, Form 3CD has been revised from time
to time and additional responsibilities are placed on Tax Auditors. Originally,
Tax Auditors were only required to give information about certain items
appearing in the Financial Statements. Later on reporting requirement in Form
3CD required the Tax Auditor to express his opinion on certain items of
income/expenditure and state whether the same is taxable as income or allowable
as expenditure.

 

At present, Form 3CD contains 41 items (with several
sub-items) in respect to which information or opinion is to be given. By
notification dated 20th July, 2018, Form 3CD is amended with effect
from 20th August, 2018.  The
amendments made in this Form places additional responsibility on Tax Auditors.
Nine new items viz. 29A, 29B, 30A, 30B, 30C, 36A, 42, 43 and 44 are added.
Besides these items, some additional information is called for in the existing
items. It may be noted that this amended Form 3CD is to be used in respect of
Tax Audit Report given on or after 20/08/2018. If the Tax Audit Report is given
before 20/08/2018, the old Form 3CD is to be used. Since the amendments made in
Form 3CD will put additional responsibilities on Tax Auditors and some
important issues of interpretation will arise, an attempt is made in this
article to analyse the amendments made in Form 3CD.

 

1. New Clause 29A

This is a new item under which, if any amount is to be
included as income chargeable u/s. 56(2)(ix) in the case of the assessee, the
nature of the income and the amount of income will have to be given. Section
56(2)(ix) provides that any amount received by the assessee as advance or
otherwise in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset is
taxable as income from other sources, if the said amount is forfeited and the
capital asset is not transferred.

 

2.  New clause 29B

Under this new item, if any amount is includible in the
income of the assessee u/s. 56(2)(x), the details about the nature and amount
of income will have to be given. It may be noted that section 56(2)(x) provides
that, if the assessee receives any gift or any movable or immovable property
for a consideration which is less than the Fair Market Value from a
non-relative, the difference in the value, if it is more than Rs. 50,000/- will
be taxable as income from other sources.

 

3.  New clause 30A

Under this item the Tax
Auditor has to state whether primary adjustment to transfer price, as referred
to in section 92CE(1), has been made during the previous year. If so, details
of such primary adjustment and amount of such adjustment should be stated. It
may be noted that this provision is applicable only if the primary adjustment
is more than Rs. 1 crore. If the excess money available with the associated
enterprise is required to be repatriated to India u/s. 92CE(2), whether such
remittance has been made within the prescribed time limit is also to be stated.
If not, the amount of imputed interest income on such amount which has not been
remitted to India within the prescribed time limit will have to be stated. This
item relates to International Transactions for which separate Tax Audit Report
u/s. 92E is required to be submitted in Form 3CEB. It is not understood as to
why this information is included in Form 3CD instead of Form 3CEB.

 

4.   New clause 30B

Under this item information about expenditure incurred by way
of interest, exceeding Rs. 1 crore,
as referred to u/s. 94B is to be given. This section applies to an Indian
Company or a permanent establishment (PE) of a foreign company in India. If
such Company or PE borrows money in India and pays interest, exceeding Rs.1 crore, and such interest is deductible
in computing income from business or profession in respect of foreign debt to
an associated enterprise, the deduction is limited to 30% of EBITDA or interest
paid, whichever is less. The information to be given under this item is as
under:-

 

(i)   Amount
of Interest Expenditure referred to in section 94B

 

(ii)   30%
of EBITDA for the year

 

(iii)  Amount
of Interest which exceeds 30% of EBITDA

 

(iv)  Information
of unabsorbed interest expenditure brought forward and carried forward u/s.
94B(4). It may be noted that u/s. 94B(4) interest expenditure which is not
allowed as deduction in one year u/s 94B is allowed to be carried forward for 8
years and will be allowed, within the limit u/s. 94B(2), in the subsequent
year.

 

5.  New clause 30C

(i)  Under
this item the Tax Auditor has to state whether the assessee has entered into an
impermissible avoidance arrangement, as referred to in section 96 during the
previous year. If so, nature of such arrangement and the amount of tax benefit
arising, in the aggregate, to all the parties to such arrangement should be
stated.

 

(ii)  This
is one item where the Tax Auditor has to give his opinion whether any
particular arrangement made by the assessee is for tax avoidance and is an
impressible arrangement. For this purpose one has to refer to sections 95 to
102 dealing with the General Anti-Avoidance (GAAR) provisions and section 144BA
of the Income tax Act. Reading these sections it will be noticed that the Tax
Auditor cannot give his opinion on the question whether GAAR provisions are
applicable in the case of the assessee and what is the tax benefit received by
all parties to this arrangement.

 

(iii) It may be noted that under Rule 10U it is provided that GAAR
provisions are not applicable to an arrangement where the benefit to all the
parties to the arrangement does not exceed, in the aggregate, Rs. 3 crore. Under Item 30C it is not
clarified whether the information is to be given only if the total tax benefit
exceeds Rs. 3 crore or in all cases.

 

(iv) If
we refer to procedure for declaring an arrangement as impermissible avoidance
arrangement, as provided in section 144BA, it will be noticed that even the
Assessing Officer cannot decide whether a particular arrangement is covered by
GAAR provisions. This procedure is as under:

 

(a) The
Assessing Officer (AO) can, at any stage of assessment or reassessment, make a
reference to the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner (CIT) for invoking
GAAR.

 

(b) On
receipt of this reference, the CIT has to give hearing to the assessee within
60 days and to decide whether GAAR provisions should be invoked.

 

(c) If
the CIT is satisfied with the submissions of the assessee he will have to
direct the AO not to invoke GAAR provision.

 

(d) If
the CIT is not satisfied with the submissions of the assessee, he has to refer
the matter to the “Approving Panel”.

 

(e) After
this reference by the CIT, it is for the Approving Panel to declare any
arrangement to be impermissible or not within six months.

(f)  It
is only after the above procedure is followed and the Approving Panel has
declared an arrangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement that the AO can
proceed to determine the tax consequences of such arrangement.

 

(v) In
view of the above provisions of sections 95 to 102 and 144BA, it can be
concluded that a Tax Auditor is not competent to say that a particular arrangement
is an impermissible avoidance arrangement. Even the AO or CIT has no authority
to decide whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement. It
is only the Approving Panel which can declare an arrangement as impermissible
avoidance arrangement.

 

(vi)
In view of the above, various Professional and Trade Bodies had made
representations to CBDT for deletion of Item 30C from Form 3CD. In response to
this, by a Notification dated 17/8/2018, the CBDT has deferred this Item upto
31/3/2019. Therefore, in the Tax Audit Report for A.Y. 2018-19 Item 30C in Form
3CD is not applicable. However, it is necessary to make a strong representation
to CBDT to delete this item altogether in subsequent years also.  If this item is not deleted in subsequent
years, it will be advisable for the Tax Auditor to put the following Note under
Item 30C.

 

“I am unable to express any opinion as to whether the
assessee has entered into an impermissible avoidance arrangement, as referred
to in Section 96, during the previous year. Whether an arrangement is an
impermissible avoidance arrangement or not can only be declared by the
Approving Panel as provided in Section 144BA(6) of the Income tax Act and I am
not authorised to express opinion in this matter.”

 

6.  Existing clause
31

Under this item particulars about loan or deposit taken or
given in cash as referred to in section 269SS and 269T are to be stated. Now,
following additional particulars are required to be given about certain
transactions as referred to in section 269ST. This is a new section which has
come into force from 01.04.2017. The section provides that no person shall
receive Rs. 2 lakh or more, in the
aggregate, from another person, in a day, or in respect of a single transaction
or in respect of transactions relating to one event or occasion in cash. In
other words, all such transactions have to be made by account payee cheques,
bank draft or by any electronic media. The following particulars of such
transactions are now to be stated under Item 31.

 

(i)  Particulars
of each receipt in cash of an amount exceeding Rs. 2 lakh, in the aggregate, as specified in section 269ST, from
a person in a day or in respect of a single transaction or in respect of
transactions relating to one event or occasion from a person (herein referred
to as receipt / payment in a day) are to be given. Here, particulars relating
to name, address, PAN of the payer, nature of transaction, amount received and
date of receipt is to be given.

 

(ii)  Particulars
of each such receipts of an amount exceeding Rs.
2 lakh in a day by a cheque or bank draft which is not an account payee
cheque or a bank draft.  In some cases it
may be difficult to find out whether the 
cheque/ bank draft is marked as account payee. In such cases the tax
auditor should follow the Guidance Note on Audit u/s. 44AB issued by ICAI
wherein certain directions are given while reporting about cash loans received
and repaid u/s. 269SS/ 269T under Item No.31.

 

(iii) Particulars of each payment in cash of an amount exceeding Rs. 2 lakh, in the aggregate, as specified
in section 269ST, to a person, in a day, are to be given.  Here, particulars of the name, address, PAN
of the payee; value of transaction amount paid and date of payment are to be
stated.

 

(iv) In
the above case, if the payment is made by cheque / bank draft which is not
marked “Account Payee”, the particulars of the same will have to be given. 

 

As stated above, if the tax auditor
is not able to ascertain this fact, he should follow the Guidance Note on Tax
Audit u/s 44AB issued by ICAI, relating to Item No.31 dealing with reporting on
section 269 SS / 219T.

 

7.  Existing clause
34

At present particulars about tax deducted or collected at
source (TDS/TCS) are to be given. Under Item 34(b) if the assessee has not
furnished the statement of TDS or TCS within the prescribed time to the Tax
Authorities, certain particulars are to be given. This Item 34(b) is now
replaced by another Item 34(b) which requires the tax Auditor to state (i) TAN,
(ii) Type of Form, (iii) Due date for furnishing the statement of TDS/TCS to
Tax Authorities, (iv) Date of furnishing the statements of TDS/TCS and (v)
Whether this statement contains information about all details/transactions
which are required to be reported. If not, a list of details/transactions not
reported to be given.  It may be noted
that at present such list of unreported items is not required to be given.
Preparation of such list is the additional responsibility put on the Tax Auditor.

 

8.  New clause 36A

Under this new item the Tax Auditor has to state, whether the
assessee has received any advance or loan from a closely held company in which
he holds beneficial interest in the form of equity shares carrying not less
than 10% of voting power. If so, the amount of advance or loan and the date of
receipt is to be given. In other words, the Tax Auditor will now have to give
his opinion whether there is any advance or loan received which is to be
treated as “Deemed Dividend” u/s. 2(22)(e). This is going to be difficult as
there are so many conflicting judicial pronouncements on the interpretation of
section 2(22)(e). Even the tax department had difficulty in deciding the person
who should be taxed on the deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e). For this reason
section 115-O has been amended by the Finance Act, 2018. Section 115-O now
provides that the closely held company giving such advance or loan to a related
party as specified in section 2(22)(e), on or after 1/4/2018, will have to pay
tax at the rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and cess.  Therefore, the requirement contained in Item
36A will apply for Tax Audit for A.Y. 2018-19 only.

 

9.  New clause 42

Under this item, if the assessee is required to file Forms
61, 61A or 61B with appropriate authorities, the particulars relating to the
same will have to be furnished. These particulars are (i) Income tax Department
Reporting Entity Identification Number, (ii) Type of Form, (iii) Due date for
furnishing the statement, (iv) Date of furnishing the same and (v) Whether the
Form contains the information about all details/transactions which are required
to be reported.  If this is not done, a
list of the details/transactions which are not reported.

 

The above requirement will place additional burden on the Tax
Auditor who will have to study the requirements of the following Sections,
Rules and Forms.

 

(a)  Section
139A(5), Rules 114C and 114D and Forms 60 and 61. These deal with declarations
received by the assessee in Form 60 from persons who have applied for PAN u/s.
139A.

(b) Section
285BA, Rule 114E and Form 61A.  This
refers to obligation of a person to furnish statement of financial transactions
or reportable account u/s. 285BA.

 

(c)  Section
285BA, Rule 114G and Form 61B. This also relates to the requirements of section
285BA relating to Annual Information Reporting.

 

10. New clause 43

This new item relates to report to be furnished in respect of
International Group u/s. 286. If the assessee or its parent or alternate
reporting entity is liable to furnish the Report u/s. 286(2), the following
information is to be furnished.

 

(i)    Whether
such Report u/s. 286(2) is furnished

 

(ii)   Name
of parent entity or alternate entity

 

(iii)  Date of furnishing the Report

 

11.  New clause 44

The Tax Auditor has now to furnish break-up of total
expenditure of entities registered or not registered under GST. It is not clear
as to whether the details are to be given only of expenditure such as telephone
expenses, professional fees and similar expenses or of purchases of raw
materials, stores, finished goods etc. The following details of expenditure are
to be given.

 

(i)   Total
amount of expenditure incurred during the year. Since break-up of the
expenditure is to be given the total expenditure under each head of expenditure
such as telephone, professional fees etc., will have to be given.

 

(ii)   Expenditure
in respect of entities registered under GST to be specified under different
categories viz. (a) Goods or Services exempt from GST (b) Entities falling
under composition scheme, (c) Entities which are registered under GST and (d)
Total payment to registered entities.

 

(iii)  Expenditure
relating to entities not registered under GST.

 

Reading this item it is not clear as
to why this information is called for. This information has no relevance with
the determination of total income or determination of tax liability under the
Income tax Act. Various Professional and Trade Bodies had made representations
to CBDT for deletion of this Item. In response to this, by a Notification dated
17/8/2018, the CBDT has deferred this Item upto 31/3/2019. Therefore, in the
Tax Audit report for A.Y. 2018-19 this Item is not now applicable. However,
efforts should be made to get this Item deleted even for subsequent years.

 

12. Some Additional Information to be Given

There are some other items in Form 3CD where specific
information is to be given. Some additional information is to be given under
these items in the amended Form 3CD. These items are as under:

 

(i)   In
Item No:4 GST Registration Number is to be given.

 

(ii)   In
Item 19 details of amounts admissible under various sections are to be given at
present. Now information of amount admissible u/s. 32AD dealing with Investment
in new plant or machinery in notified backward areas in certain States is to be
given. Similarly, this information is now to be given in Item 24 also.

 

(iii)  In
Item No:26 dealing with information relating to various items listed in section
43B, information about any sum payable by the assessee to the Indian Railways
for the use of Railway Assets which has not been paid during the accounting
year will have to be given.

 

TO SUM UP

From the above amendments in Form 3CD it will be noticed that
the Tax Auditor who gives his Tax Audit Report on or after 20/08/2018 will have
to devote considerable extra time to report on the new items added in Form
3CD.  As discussed above, he will have to
give his opinion about interpretation of section 2(22)(e) relating to deemed
dividend which is going to be difficult. Further, the Item 30C requiring the
Tax Auditor to express his opinion whether the assessee has entered into an
impermissible tax avoidance arrangement and what is the tax benefit to the
parties to such arrangement is beyond the authority of a Tax Auditor. Item 44
requiring particulars about GST transactions has no relationship with
computation of income or tax and therefore, this item should also be deleted
from Form 3CD. Although CBDT has notified that Items 30C and 44 are not
applicable for Tax Audit Report for A.Y. 2018-19, it is necessary to make a
strong representation for deletion of these two items from Form 3CD for
subsequent years also. There are some new areas in which the additional
particulars will have to be given by the Tax Auditor. Collection of these
particulars will be time consuming and the time between the publication of
amendments in Form 3CD and the date by which tax audit report is to be given
may not be found to be sufficient. It is essential that such important
amendments in Form 3CD should be made by CBDT well in advance after due consultation with the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India and all other stakeholders. 




 

PENALTY- CONCEALMENT-INTERPRETATION

Introduction

Under any fiscal law, there are
provisions for levy of penalty. Penalties are normally related to tax quantum
found payable at the end of the proceeding. Normally, these provisions are made
to tackle deliberate attempts of the assessee to avoid tax payment. One of the
events to attract penalty is concealment by the concerned assessee. However,
such penalty is not expected to be levied when the dues arise under bona
fide
belief and action. For example, there may be case where assessee shows
the transactions in his accounts and returns but claims the same as exempt on
its bona fide interpretation of provisions of law. Subsequently, such
interpretation may not be acceptable to the revenue department and dues may
arise. In such cases, levy of penalty cannot be justified. However, the issue
remains that, how to decide about bona fide mistake on part of the
assessee. There may be cases where the department will impose penalty inspite
of plea of bona fide mistake on part of assessee.

 

Recent
judgment

Recently, Hon’ble Rajasthan High
Court had an occasion to deal with such a situation in case of Commercial
Taxes Officer, Anti Evasion, Rajasthan, Circle-III, Jaipur. vs. I.C.I.C.I Bank
Ltd. (2018) 54 GSTR 389 (Raj)
.
      

 

The facts, as
narrated by Hon’ble High court, are as under:-

 

“The brief facts noticed are that
the claim of the assessee is that the assessee is engaged in providing finance
to the prospective buyers of vehicle and if buyers after certain time fail to
pay the regular installment (EMI) as per agreement arrived at by and between
the assesse and the buyer (assessee) gets the right to repossess the vehicle
and get it transferred in its own name and thereafter either directly or
through agent, can dispose/auction the vehicle whether such transaction is
eligible to tax under Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act (RVAT) or not. It is
undisputed fact that all the three authorities, namely assessing officer,
Deputy Commissioner (A) as well as the Tax Board have upheld that the
transaction is eligible to tax under the RVAT Act, following the judgment of
the apex court in the case of Federal Bank Ltd vs. State of Kerala(2007) 6
VST 736 (SC)
. However, in so far as penalty u/s. 61 of the Act is concerned,
while the assessing officer imposed penalty which was upheld by the Deputy
Commissioner (A) but the Tax Board in the impugned order has held that there is
no case of imposition of penalty u/s. 61 of the Act and accordingly, deleted
the penalty in all the assessment years.”  

 

The argument of the revenue
department was that when the law was already laid by Supreme Court in case of Federal
Bank Ltd vs. State of Kerala(2007) 6 VST 736 (SC)
, there is no
justification for non-levy of penalty. In other words it was submitted that
after above judgment there is no debatable position and what was done by the
assessee bank is deliberate and therefore, the penalty required to be restored.

 

Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court
observed that the Tax Board has come to correct finding. Since all the
transactions were duly disclosed and it is the matter of interpretation,
whether VAT is leviable or not, the issue cannot be covered under penalty
clause. In this respect, Hon’ble High Court has relied upon the Supreme Court
judgment in case of Sree Krishna Electricals vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(2009) 23 VST 249 (SC)
.

 

In above judgment regarding similar
clause of penalty under Tamil Nadu Sales Tax law, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:

“So far as the question of penalty
is concerned the items which were not included in the turnover were found
incorporated in the appellant’s accounts books. Where certain items which are
not included in the turnover are disclosed in the dealer’s own account books
and the assessing authorities includes these items in the dealers’ turnover,
disallowing the exemption. penalty cannot be imposed. The penalty levied stands
set aside.”  

                                                     

Accordingly, following above ratio
of Supreme Court judgment, Hon’ble Rajasthan High court has justified removal
of penalty by Tax Board.

 

In relation to penalty matters, the
basic principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the land mark judgment in
case of Hindustan Steel Limited, (25 STC 211), is also required
to be kept in mind. The relevant observations are as under:

 

“Under the Act penalty may be
imposed for failure to register as a dealer: section 9(1) r/w section 25(1)(a)
of the Act. But the liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof
of default in registering as a dealer. An order imposing penalty for failure to
carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding,
and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted
deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or
dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not
also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be
imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion
of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the
relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority
competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose
penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the
Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender
is not liable to the act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Those in
charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a
dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a
dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out.”

 

Conclusion

The
penalty is discretionary and can be justified only where there is deliberate
and conscious disregard of the law. When the disregard is due to technical
reasons, no penalty can be justified. From the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court’s
judgment, as above, it is also clear that in spite of judgment of courts on the
issue covered, the assessee can still take different view and litigate the
matter. If the transactions are otherwise recorded in the books levy of penalty
cannot be justified. It is expected that the above principles will be followed
by the revenue department in true spirit. 

GST ON CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETIES

Introduction

A co-operative housing
society is a mutual association wherein the membership is restricted to the
buyers of the flats situated in the said building. The society is managed by a
Managing Committee elected by the Members at the General Body Meeting of the
Society from amongst its members only. The primary role of the Managing
Committee is to manage, maintain and administer the property of the society.
This would include making payments to the municipal / local authorities for the
property tax, water charges, etc., arranging for various facility for the
members, such as security, lift (operation and maintenance), maintaining the
common area and facilities of the society (gymnasium, swimming pool, play or
garden area, etc.). For undertaking the above activities, the society needs
funds, which are collected from its members periodically in the form of
maintenance charges. We shall discuss in this article the levy of GST on such
maintenance charges.

 

At the outset, it is
important to note that the levy of taxes on the co-operative housing societies,
both under the income tax as well as the service tax regime has seen its fair
share of litigation and therefore, taking precedents from the said laws, we
shall discuss the alternate interpretations for different issues.

 

GST – Levy provisions

In order to determine
whether GST is leviable or not, reference to the charging section (section 9 of
the CGST Act, 2017) becomes necessary which provides that the tax shall be
levied on all supplies (intrastate or interstate) of goods or services
on the value to be determined u/s. 15 of the CGST Act, 2017 and the said
tax shall be paid by the taxable person.

 

From the above, it is
evident that the primary requirement for the levy of tax to succeed under GST
is that there should be a supply. While the term “supply” has not been defined
under the GST law, its scope has been explained u/s. 7. Clause (a) of section 7
(1) thereof is relevant which provides that the expression

 

“supply” includes —

 

(a) all forms of supply
of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence,
rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person in the course or furtherance of business;

 

Therefore, to treat a
transaction as supply the following three parameters are important:

 

    Supply of goods or supply of services

    Supply in the course or furtherance of business

    Supply for a consideration

 

Can a Co-operative housing
society be said to be engaged in supplying services?

While the activities
undertaken by a co-operative housing society for its members cannot be treated
as supply of goods, the question that needs consideration is whether the same
can be considered as supply of service or not? The term service has been defined
u/s. 2 of the Act to primarily mean anything other than goods and therefore, a
simple answer to this would be that the activities undertaken by a co-operative
housing society is a supply of service to its members.

 

However, an alternate view
is also possible. It would be important to note that the activities undertaken
by the society for its members come within the ambit of principle of mutuality
which says that a person cannot earn out of himself and a person cannot supply
to one self. Infact, applying the said principle, in the context of Income Tax,
receipts by a co-operative housing society from its members have been held as
not being income. Some of the important decisions in this regard are:

 

    Chelmsford Club vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax — 2000 (243) ITR 89 (SC)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. National
Sports Club of India — 1998 (230) ITR 373 (Del)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bankipur
Club Ltd — 1997 (22G) HR 97 (SC)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Delhi
Gymkhana Club Ltd. — 1905 (155) ITR 373 (Del)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Merchant
Navy Club — 1974 (96) ITR 2GI (AP)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Smt.
Godavaridevi Saraf — 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J624) (Bom.)

 

In fact, relying on the
above set of decisions, in the context of service tax, it has been held on
multiple occasions that services provided by a co-operative housing society /
club to its members come within the purview of principle of mutuality and
hence, not liable to service tax. Notable decision in this regard is in the case
of Ranchi Club Ltd. vs. Chief Commissioner [2012 (26) S.T.R. 401 (Jhar.)] wherein
it was held as under:

 

18. However, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that sale and service are different. It is true that sale and service
are two different and distinct transaction. The sale entails transfer of
property whereas in service, there is no transfer of property. However, the
basic feature common in both transaction requires existence of the two parties;
in the matter of sale, the seller and buyer, and in the matter of service,
service provider and service receiver. Since the issue whether there are two
persons or two legal entity in the activities of the members’ club has been
already considered and decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by the Full
Bench of this Court in the cases referred above, therefore, this issue is no
more res integra and issue is to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner
and
it can be held that in view of the mutuality and in view of the
activities of the club, if club provides any service to its members may be in
any form including as mandap keeper, then it is not a service by one to another
in the light of the decisions referred above as foundational facts of existence
of two legal entities in such transaction is missing.
However, so
far as services by the club to other than members, learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that they are paying the tax
.

 

Similar view has been held
in other cases as well.

    Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. vs. Union of
India [2013 (31) S.T.R. 645 (Guj.)]

    Karnavati Club Limited vs. Union of India
[2010 (20) STR 169 (Guj.)]

    Breach Candy Swimming Bath Trust vs. CCE,
Mumbai [2007 (5) STR 146 (Mumbai Tribunal)]

    Matunga Gymkhana vs. CST, Mumbai [2015
(38) STR 407 (Mumbai Tribunal)]

    Cricket Club of India Limited vs. CST,
Mumbai [2015 (40) STR 973 (Mumbai Tribunal)]

 

To summarise, in view of
the above judicial precedents, an important proposition that emerges is that
vis-à-vis the supplies to the members, the principle of mutuality continues to
apply even under the GST regime and therefore, any collection from members
continue to be outside the ambit of levy of tax. Therefore, GST shall apply
only in case of services provided to non-members.

 

However, all the above
decisions are contested by the Department and the matter is pending before the
Supreme Court.

 

Further aspect to be
examined is whether the said decisions rendered in the context of service tax
would have relevance under the GST Regime. It is felt that the concept of
mutuality not only continues under GST Regime but becomes even more fortified
due to the following reasons:

 

1.  Under the service tax regime, Explanation 3 to
section 65B(44) provided a deeming fiction treating an unincorporated
association and the members thereof as distinct persons. While it was possible
to argue that a co-operative society is an incorporated association and hence
the said deeming fiction is not applicable, the said Explanation did somewhere
indicate the intention of the Legislature. In contradistinction, the GST Law
nowhere has such a deeming fiction. It may also be important to note that such
deeming fiction is created in case of establishments in distinct States or
countries.

 

2.  Entry 7 of Schedule II treats supply of goods
by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof as a
supply of goods but does not specifically cover services under the ambit
thereof.

 

Can a co-operative housing
society be said to be providing services in the course or furtherance of
business?

The second aspect that
needs consideration is whether a co-operative housing society is carrying out
its activities in the course or furtherance of business or not? This becomes
essential since in the absence of the same, the service may not get
classifiable u/s. 7 to be covered within the scope of supply itself and hence,
may not attract GST at all (irrespective of position taken in the first case).

 

In order to determine
whether a co-operative housing society carries out its activities in the course
or furtherance of business or not, it becomes essential to refer to the
definition of business as provided for u/s. 2 (17) of the CGST Act, 2017, which
is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

(17) “business” includes —

 

(a) any
trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any
other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit;

 

(b) any
activity or transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to
sub-clause (a);

 

(c) any
activity or transaction in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there
is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity of such transaction;

 

(d) supply
or acquisition of goods including capital goods and services in connection with
commencement or closure of business;

 

(e) provision
by a club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any
other consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members;

 

(f) admission,
for a consideration, of persons to any premises;

 

(g) services
supplied by a person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him
in the course or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation;

(h) services
provided by a race club by way of totalisator or a licence to book maker in
such club; and

 

(i) any
activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State
Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public
authorities;

 

At this juncture, it is
relevant to note that the above definition is similar to the definition
applicable under the CST Act, 1956 (prior to amendment doing away with the
for-profit clause). In the context of the said definition, the Supreme Court
had in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Abdul Bakhi & Bros
[(1964) 15 STC 644 (SC)]
held that the expression “business” though
extensively used as a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used
in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention
and labor of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an
activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually
continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and not for
sport or pleasure. Keeping the said principles in mind (except for the clause
relating to pecuniary benefit), let us analyse as to whether the activities of
a co-operative housing society can be classified as trade, commerce,
manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar
activity or not?

 

To do so, let us first
understand the activities of a co-operative housing society. As discussed
earlier, the main object of incorporating a co-operative housing society is to
manage, maintain and administer the property of the society and thus protecting
the rights of the members of the society thereof. There is no apparent
intention to carry out any of the activities specified in clause (a) which a
co-operative housing society carries out. That being the case, the question of
activities of the co-operative housing society being classifiable as business
under clauses (a) to (c) of the above definition does not arise at all.

 

The only other clause,
which appears remotely relevant to the current topic of discussion is clause
(e) which is reproduced below

 

(e) provision by a
club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other
consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members.

 

Let us first understand
the concept of how the co-operative housing society model functions. A builder
develops land by constructing the building and other amenities, sells it to
potential buyers who after the completion of construction and handover of
possession, form a society to manage, maintain and administer the property. The
society incurs expense of two kind, one being directly incurred for the member
(such as property tax, water bill, etc.) and second being common expenses for
all the members (such as lighting of common area, lift operation and
maintenance, security, etc.) which are recovered from the members. However,
what is of utmost importance is that a member does not come to society for
enjoying the said facilities, but to stay there, which continues to be his
right by way of ownership which cannot be denied to him. Even if there is a
case where a member stops contributing to the expenses, other members of the
society cannot deny the access to the member to his unit, though the facilities
extended may be discontinued.

 

However, it is not so in
the case of a club or association. A person becomes a member only to enjoy the
facilities that the said club or association has to offer. If that be the case,
it can be argued the term “society” used in clause (e) of section 2 (17) is to be
read in context of the surrounding words like club or association and hence,
has to be restricted only to such societies where the purpose of obtaining
membership is to receive benefits/ facilities.

 

If a conservative view is
taken that the activities undertaken by a co-operative housing society is
classifiable as supply of services in the course or furtherance of business, is
the supply for a consideration?

Section 9 of the CGST Act,
2017 provides that tax shall be levied on the value of supply, as determined
u/s 15 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 15 (1) provides that where the supplier
and recipient are related and price is the sole consideration for the supply,
the value of supply shall be the transaction value, i.e., the price actually
paid or payable for the said supply of goods or services or both.

 

Therefore, following
points need analysis, namely:

    Whether the society and member can be
treated as related person or not?

    Is the price sole consideration for the
supply?

To
answer the first question, i.e., whether the society and member are related
person or not, it becomes necessary to refer to understand the scope of
“related person”. Explanation 1 to section 15 provides that

(a) persons
shall be deemed to be “related persons” if —

(i)     such persons are officers or directors of
one another’s businesses;

(ii) such
persons are legally recognised partners in business;

(iii) such
persons are employer and employee;

(iv) any
person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds twenty-five per cent. or
more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them;

(v)    one of them directly or indirectly controls
the other;

(vi)   both of them are directly or indirectly
controlled by a third person;

(vii)  together they directly or indirectly control a
third person; or;

(viii) they are members of the same family;

 

From the above, it is more
that evident that society and members cannot be classified as related persons
since it is not classifiable under either of the above entries.

 

Regarding the second point
also, it is more than evident that price is the sole consideration of the
supply. This is because the society does not recover anything over and above
the amounts charged for undertaking the maintenance activity.

 

That being the case, the
value of supply will have to be determined as per section 15 (1) of the CGST
Act, 2017, i.e., GST shall be attracted on the transaction value.

 

Charges not to be included
in the taxable value

A co-operative housing
society recovers various charges from its members, such as property tax, water
tax, water charges, NA Tax, electricity charges, contribution to sinking fund
and repairs and maintenance fund, car parking charges, non-occupancy charges,
interest on late payment, etc.

 

A detailed clarification
on the taxability of the above charges has been issued and the same is
tabulated below for ready reference, along with remarks wherever applicable:

 

Nature of Receipt

Clarification

Property
Tax

Not
Taxable

Water
Tax*

Not
Taxable

Electricity
charges**

Not
Taxable if collected under Statute

NA
Tax

Not
Taxable

Maintenance
& Society charges

Taxable

Parking
Charges

Taxable

Non-Occupancy
Charges

Taxable

Sinking
/ Repair Fund***

Taxable

Share
Transfer Fee****

Taxable

 

 

*The clarification
talks about only water tax. However, most of the local authority do not charge
tax but charge a fee based on usage by the member. However, this aspect may
also not have any impact on the taxability since the water charges are levied
basis the consumption per flat and hence, even if the society recovers the said
expense from members, the same will have to be excluded from the value of
taxable service in view of Rule 33 of the CGST Rules, 2017.

 

** In most of the
cases, electricity charges are not recovered by the municipal / local authority
but by the private players like Reliance Energy, Tata Power, BEST, etc. To the
extent the electricity charges pertain to the members’ flat, the same is
recovered directly by the service provider from the member. The society may
recover only the electricity charges relating to common area, on which the
claim of non-taxability may not be possible.

 

*** While the
Government clarification states that tax is applicable on such recoveries, it
can be claimed that the contribution to the said funds is not liable to GST for
the following reasons:

 

1.  Both the funds are statutory requirement under
the bye-laws of the society

 

2.  These funds are meant for specific use which
might happen in distinct future

 

3.  This are in the nature of deposits given by
members to safeguard future expenditure. Deposits by themselves are not liable
for GST.

 

Basis these three
propositions, a view can be taken that collection of sinking fund / repair
funds are not taxable, irrespective of the clarification issued.

 

****Share transfer fees
is the fees collected from an incoming member for transfer of ownership from
old member to new member. The issue that arises is that the definition of
business u/s. 2 (17) provides that provision of facilities / benefits by a
society to its’ members shall be treated as business. However, at the time when
the share transfer fees are collected from the incoming member, he is not
actually a member of the society. Only upon completion of the share transfer process
does a person become member of the society. Therefore, share transfer fees
recovered from such incoming members cannot be considered as business under
clause (e) of section 2 (17). In view of the earlier discussion, since the
activities of a co-operative housing society are not covered under any of the
other clauses of section 2 (17), collection of share transfer fees may not be
classifiable as being in the course or furtherance of business and hence, a
view can be taken that the share transfer fees are not liable to tax,
irrespective of the clarification issued.

 

Exemption for Co-operative Housing Societies

Notification 12 / 2017 –
Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 provides an exemption for services by an
unincorporated body or a non-profit entity registered under any law for the
time being in force, to its own members by way of reimbursement of charges or
share of contribution up to an amount of Rs. 7500[1]  per month per member for sourcing of goods or
services from a third person for the common use of its members in a housing
society or a residential complex.

 

Important observations
from the above exemption entries are:

 

– The monetary limit will
not include the amounts recovered which are not taxable in view of the society.

 

– The exemption will have
to be decided qua the member.

 

For instance, if a society
has houses of different sizes and the maintenance charges are decided based on
the house size, there can be an instance where maintenance for certain houses
is below the specified limit and for certain houses is above the specified
limits. In such cases, the exemption will be available for smaller houses with
maintenance lower than the specified limit and no exemption will be available
for houses having maintenance higher than the specified limit.

 

Registration Related Provisions

Section 22 (1) requires
that every supplier, having aggregate turnover exceeding Rs. 20 lakh in
previous financial year shall be required to obtain registration. The term
“aggregate turnover” has been defined u/s. 2 (6) to mean aggregate value of all
taxable supplies, exempt supplies, exports of goods or services to be computed
on all India basis but shall exclude GST thereof.

 

It may be noted that the
amounts recovered on account of property tax, water tax, etc., will have to be
excluded while computing the aggregate turnover. This is because they are not
treated as being a consideration received for making a supply (exempt or
taxable).

 

However, maintenance
charges recoveries which are exempted under Notification 12/2017 would have to
be considered while calculating the turnover of Rs. 20 lakh. Further, the
threshold limit will not apply in case a society is already registered. In that
sense, the threshold limit is a mere misnomer in the context of co-operative
housing society.

 

Conclusion

While the legal principle
of mutuality appears to be reasonably strong in view of consistent decisions of
the High Court, the matter has still not reached finality since the same is
pending in Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Government notifications and
clarifications suggest that GST is applicable to co-operative societies. In
this background, a decision from the Supreme Court is eagerly awaited to settle
the controversy to its fullest.


[1] Earlier the limit was Rs. 5000 per
month upto 25.01.2018

PROVISIONS OF TDS UNDER SECTION 195 – AN UPDATE – PART III

In Part I of the Article we dealt with overview of the
statutory provisions relating to TDS u/s. 195 and other related sections,
various aspects and issues relating to section 195(1), section 94A and section
195A.

 

In Part II of the Article, we dealt with provisions section
195(2), 195 (3), 195(4), section 197, refund u/s. 195, consequences of non-deduction
or short deduction, section 195A, section 206AA and Rule 37BC.

 

In this part of the Article we are dealing with various other
aspects and applicable relevant sections and issues.

 

1.     Furnishing of
Information relating to payments to non-residents

1.1    Section 195(6)

 

Section 195(6) substituted by the
Finance Act, 2015 wef 1-6-2015 reads as follows:

 

“(6)
The person responsible for paying to a non-resident, not being a company, or to
a foreign company, any sum, whether or not chargeable under the
provisions of this Act, shall furnish the information relating to payment of
such sum, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed.”

 

In respect of section 195(6) it is
important to keep in mind that the substituted s/s. mandates furnishing
information for all payments to (a) a non-resident, not being a company, or (b)
to a foreign company, irrespective of chargeability of such sum under the
provisions of the Act.

 

Section
271-I inserted w.e.f 1-6-2015 provides that if a person, who is required to
furnish information u/s. 195(6), fails to furnish such information, or
furnishes inaccurate information, the AO may direct that such person
shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum of Rs. 1 lakh.

 

It is to be noted that though
section 195(6) was substituted w.e.f 1-6-2015, there was no simultaneous
amendment in rules. Rule 37BB was substituted by Notification No 93/2015 dated
16th December 2015 effective from 1.4.2016.

 

1.2    Rule 37BB –
Furnishing of information for payment to a non-resident, not being a company, or
to a foreign company

 

a)  It is worth noting that while section
195(6) provides that information is to be submitted in respect of any sum,
whether or not chargeable
under the provisions of Act, Rule 37BB(1)
provides that the person responsible for paying to a non-resident, not being a
company, or to a foreign company, any sum chargeable under the
provisions of the Act, shall furnish the prescribed information. Thus, on a
plain reading it is apparent that the Rule 37BB restricts the scope of
submission of the information as compared with the provisions of section
195(6).

b) Thus,
a question arises as to whether the rules can restrict the scope of the
section. Based on the various judicial precedents it is well settled that the
rules cannot restrict the scope of what is provided in the section.
Accordingly, the information should be furnished for all payments, irrespective
of chargeability under the provisions of Act except in cases given in Rule
37BB(3).

c) Rule
37BB in substance provides for submission of prescribed information in Form
15CA as follows:

 

i. If payments are chargeable to tax and not exceeding Rs. 5,00,000
in a financial year, information in Part A of Form 15CA.

ii. Payments chargeable to tax other than above:

 

Part B of Form 15CA
after obtaining 197 certificate from AO or Order u/s. 195(2) or 195(3) from AO

or Part C of Form 15CA
after obtaining Certificate in Form 15CB from an accountant.

iii.   Payments not chargeable to tax, information in Part D of Form
15CA.

 

d) Further,
Rule 37BB(3) provides that no information is required to be furnished for
any sum which is not chargeable
under the provisions of the Act, if,-

(i) the
remittance is made by an individual and
it does not require prior approval
of Reserve Bank of India as per the provisions of section 5 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999 read with Schedule III to the Foreign Exchange
(Current Account Transaction) Rules, 2000; or

(ii) the
remittance is of the nature specified in the specified list of 33 nature of
payments given in the rule.

 

e) Form
15CA to be furnished electronically by the assessee on e-filing portal, to be
signed by person competent to sign tax return.

Furnishing of information for
payment to non-resident is summarised as follows:

 

 

2. Certificate by a CA for remittance

The CA Certificate has to be
obtained in Form 15CB and has to be furnished electronically by the CA as
against earlier practice of issuing physically and signing of the 15CB with
digital signature of the CA is mandatory.

 

As mentioned above, there is no
requirement to furnish CA certificate in Form 15CB if (a) the payments are not
chargeable to tax and (b) the same are either included in the list of 33
payments specified in Rule 37BB(3) which does not require any information to be
furnished or (c) they are by individuals and are current account
transactions  mentioned in Schedule III
of the FEM Current Account Transaction Rules not requiring RBI approval (LRS
transactions).

 

However, in practice, it is observed
that in some ultra conservative and cautious payers insist upon a CA
certificate in Form 15CB in respect of all remittances.

 

Revised Remittance Procedures –
Flow Chart

 


 

 

3. Form 15CB –
Analysis re Documents that should be Reviewed and Maintained

Before issuing a Certificate in Form
15CB, it is strongly advisable that an accountant obtains and minutely reads
and analyses, inter alia, the following documents and information before
issuing a Certificate:

 

a. Agreement
between parties evidencing important terms of the Agreement, nature of payment,
consideration, withholding tax borne by whom, etc.;

b. Taxability
of the concerned remittance under the provisions of the Act as well as
applicable Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement [DTAA] particularly keeping in
mind the various issues relating to the taxability of the nature of payment in
India, controversies, latest judicial pronouncements, reconciliation of
conflicting judicial pronouncements in the context of the remittance, latest
thinking and developments in the area of international taxation etc.

 

In this connection, inter alia,
provisions of section 206AA, Rule 37BC, latest circulars / notifications, Most
Favoured Nation [MFN] clauses and various protocols of the DTAAs entered in to
by India should also be kept in mind.

 

It would be advisable to keep a
proper note in the file recording proper reasons for taxability /
non-taxability of the remittance as it is very difficult to recall at a later
date as to why a remittance was considered as taxable or non-taxable and
applicable rate of tax.

 

c. Obtain
Tax Residency Certificate [TRC] in order to claim Treaty benefits as required
by section 90(4);

d. Opinion
/ advice, if any, obtained from consultants while taking position on
withholding tax implications in respect of the given transaction;

e. Exchange
rate Certificate / letter from the bank in respect of SBI TT buying and selling
rate, as applicable;

f. Invoice(s),
Debit Notes, Credit Notes etc;

g. Ledger
account(s) of the Party and other relevant accounts;

h. Correspondence
on which reliance is placed including emails;

i. Declarations
regarding (a) No Permanent Establishment [PE] in India (including print out of
website details of payee, if relevant and required to ascertain PE in India
etc.); (b) Associated Enterprise relationship between the payer and payee
including under the DTAA; (c) beneficial owner of
royalty/FTS/interest/dividends; (d) Fulfilment of the conditions of Limitation
of Benefits [LoB] Clause, if present, in the DTAA.

 

j. In
cases of certificates for reimbursement of expenses to the non-residents,
obtaining supporting vouchers, invoices and other documents and information, is
a must.

 

k. It
is imperative that proper record/copies of the documents / information received
and reviewed should be kept so that the same would be very handy and helpful in
responding / substantiating to the letters / communications / notices / show
cause notices, which may be received from the revenue authorities at a later
date alleging non-deduction of tax or short deduction of tax.

 

4.     Issues relating to
the Certificate by a CA for Remittance

4.1    Whether CA
Certificate is an alternate to section 195(2)?

 

In the context of this important
issue, in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd vs. ADIT [2007] 106 ITD
521 (Mum ITAT),
the ITAT held as follows:

 

  •     CA Certificate is not in substitution
    of the scheme u/s. 195(2) but merely to supplement the same.

 

  •     CA Certificate has no role to play for
    determination of TDS liability.

 

  •     It is merely to support assessee’s
    contention while making remittance to a non-resident.

 

  •     Payer at his own risk can approach a CA and
    make remittance to a non-resident on the basis of CA’s Certificate.

 

4.2  Appeal to a
CIT(A) u/s. 248

In
the Mahindra & Mahindra’s case (supra), on the facts, it was held
that no appeal to a CIT(A) u/s. 248 is maintainable, against the CA
Certificate. In this case, in which the assessee filed an appeal directly
against the Chartered Accountant Certificate and had not taken the matter for
the consideration by the Assessing Officer (TDS) at all, the CIT(Appeals)
clearly erred in entertaining the appeal.

 

However, in this connection, in the
case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. vs ITO (IT) ITA No. 345/Mum/2008 ITAT
Mumbai
vide its Order dated 30th June 2010 (unreported)
where the assessee had deducted the TDS and paid and later on filed the appeal
before CIT(A) denying its liability to TDS, which was rejected by the CIT(A) on
the ground that no order u/s. 195 was passed by the AO, held that the assessee acted
u/s. 195(1) which does not contemplate any order being passed and therefore the
appeal to CIT(A) u/s. 248 was maintainable.

 

In the case of Jet Air (P.)
Ltd. vs. CIT (A) [2011] 12 taxmann.com 385 (Mumbai)
the matter was
remanded back to CIT(A) as the question whether section 248, as amended with
effect from 1-6-2007, was applicable or not, had not been adjudicated by
Commissioner (Appeals) and facts had not been verified.

 

4.3 Penalty in case
of non-deduction and short deduction based on CA Certificate

In the case of CIT vs. Filtrex
Technologies (P.) Ltd. [2015] 59 taxmann.com 371 (Kar)
,
the Karnataka
High Court held that in this case the Chartered Accountant has given a
certificate to the effect that the assessee is not required to deduct tax at
source while making the payment to Filtrex Holding Pte. Ltd., Singapore. Thus,
the assessee acted on the basis of the certificate issued by the expert and
hence the CIT (Appeals) and the ITAT have rightly concluded that this is not a
fit case to conclude that the assessee has deliberately concealed the income or
furnished inaccurate particulars of the income. The assessee has filed Form 3CD
along with the return of income in which the Chartered Accountant has not
reported any violation by the assessee under Chapter XVII B which would attract
disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

 

4.4   Non deduction
based on CA certificate – section 237B and section 276C

A question arises as to
non-deduction or short deduction based on a CA Certificate would constitute
reasonable cause u/s. 273B for non-levy of penalty u/s. 271C.

 

In
the case of ADIT vs. Leighton Welspun Contractors (P.) Ltd 65 taxmann.com
68 (Mum)
, the ITAT held as that “The decision with regard to the
obligation of the assessee for deduction of TDS on the aforesaid payments was
highly debatable, in the given facts of the case and legal scenario and the
view adopted by the assessee based upon the certificate of the CA, was one of
the possible views and can be said to be based upon bona fide belief of the
assessee. Therefore, under these circumstances, it can be held there was
reasonable cause as envisaged under section 273B for not deducting tax at
source by the assessee on the aforesaid payments, and therefore, the assessee
was not liable for levy of penalty under section 271C.”



Similarly, in the case of Aishwarya
Rai Bachchan vs. ADCIT 158 ITD 987 (Mum)
the ITAT held as follows:

 

“On a perusal of the relevant
facts on record, it is observed, the payment of U.S. $ 77,500 was made to a
non–resident for development of website and other allied works. Therefore,
question is whether such payment attracts deduction of tax under section 195.
As is evident, assessee’s C.A., had issued a certificate opining that tax is
not required to be deducted at source on the remittances to Ms. Simone
Sheffield, as the payment is made to a non–resident having no P.E. in India
that too, for services rendered outside India. It is a well accepted fact
that every citizen of the country is neither fully aware of nor is expected to
know the technicalities of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, for discharging their
statutory duties and obligations, they take assistance and advise of
professionals who are well acquainted with the statutory provisions. In the
present case also, assessee has engaged a chartered accountant to guide her in
complying to statutory requirements. Therefore, when the C.A. issued a
certificate opining that there is no requirement for deduction of tax at
source, assessee under a bona fide belief that withholding of tax is not
required did not deduct tax at source on the remittances made. …

 

While imposing penalty, the
authority concerned is duty bound to examine assessee’s explanation to find out
whether there was reasonable cause for failure to deduct tax at source. As
is evident, the assessee being advised by a professional well acquainted with
provisions of the Act had not deducted tax at source. Therefore, no mala fide
intention can be imputed to the assessee for failure to deduct tax. More so,
when the issue whether tax was required to be deducted at source, on payments
to a non–resident for services rendered is a complex and debatable issue requiring
interpretation of statutory provisions vis-a-vis relevant DTAA between the
countries. Therefore, in our considered opinion, failure on the part of the
assessee to deduct tax at source was due to a reasonable cause.
The
decisions relied upon by the learned Authorised Representative also support
this view. Accordingly, we delete the penalty imposed under section 271C.”

 

4.5  When should one
approach the AO for Certificate u/s.195(2) or (3) / 197

Many a time, when the facts of a
case where certificate is required in Form 15CB, are very complex and there is
divergence of judicial decisions, lack of clarity about the taxability /
non-taxability under the provisions of the Act as well as DTAAs and the stakes
are very high, it would be advisable for the assessees to approach the tax
office for a certificate for no deduction and or lower deduction u/s. 195(2) /
(3) or section 197. After obtaining the certificate from the AO, the
certificate of CA in Form 15CB should be obtained.

 

In view of severe consequences of
disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia), levy of interest and penalties under various
provisions of the Act for the assessee and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings
under the Act, it is imperative that a very cautious and judicious approach is
taken while issuing certificate in Form 15CB.

 

4.6 Validity period
of TRC / undertaking / declaration from the payee – for a quarter, a year or
for each single payment?

A question often arises while
issuing certificate in Form 15CB, is about the validity period of each TRC.
Revenue officials of various countries have different formats for issue of
TRCs. Some of them state the Tax Residency position as on particular date and
some of them state the same for a particular period. Obtaining TRC in the
respective countries is also time consuming and costly affair.

 

In such circumstances, should a CA
insist upon a fresh TRC each time a certificate u/s. 15CB is to be issued where
the TRC is silent about the validity period of TRC. Alternatively, for what
period the TRC should be reasonably be considered to be valid.

 

Similarly, whether a new no PE
declaration / undertaking, LoB certificate, beneficial ownership declaration
etc. should be insisted upon at the time of each remittance or can the same be
considered valid for a certain reasonable period, is not clear. Should the
reasonable period be a month or a quarter or half year or year, is not clear.

There is need for clarity from the
CBDT in this regard.

 

4.7  Responsibility of
CA

a. Whether
a Certificate under 15CB be issued in absence of a valid TRC, particularly in
cases where TDS has been deducted under the provisions of the DTAA.

 

As per the provisions of section
90(4), TRC is a pre-requisite for obtaining benefit under any treaty. However,
attention is invited to the decision of the ITAT Ahmedabad in the case of Skaps
Industries India (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO [2018] 94 taxmann.com 448 (Ahmedabad –
Trib.)
,
which has been dealt with in Part 2 of our article. 

 

b. Similarly,
whether it is necessary for a CA to insist upon the payment of TDS and verify
the TDS Challan before issuing the Form 15CB.

 

Form 15CB does not cast a duty on a
CA to verify or mention the details of TDS Challan. It only requires a CA to
mention the amount of TDS. However, out of abundant caution, it would be
advisable for the CA to obtain the receipted challan from the remitter.

 

4.8  Manner of
certification where issue debatable

Presently, there is not enough space
or provision in the 15CA / 15CB utility to elaborately explain the debateable
issues and the stand taken by the assessee / CA for TDS. Therefore, it would be
imperative for the assessee / CA to keep proper details / reasons for any stand
taken so that the same could be substantiated at a later date in case the
revenue authorities commence any proceedings for non/short deduction of TDS.

 

4.9 Section 271 J –
Penalty for furnishing incorrect information in reports or certificate – Rs.
10,000 for each report or certificate

Section 271-J provides that “Without
prejudice to the provisions of this Act, where the Assessing Officer or the
Commissioner (Appeals), in the course of any proceedings under this Act, finds
that an accountant or a merchant banker or a registered valuer has furnished
incorrect information in any report or certificate furnished
under any
provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder, the Assessing Officer or
the Commissioner (Appeals) may direct that such accountant or merchant
banker or registered valuer, as the case may be, shall pay, by way of penalty, a
sum of ten thousand rupees for each such report or certificate.”

 

It is important to note that both
the AO as well as the CIT(A) has power to levy penalty u/s. 271 J.

 

5.  Section 195(7)

“(7) Notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2), the Board may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify a class of persons or cases,
where the person responsible for paying to a non-resident, not being a company,
or to a foreign company, any sum, whether or not chargeable under the
provisions of this Act, shall make an application to the Assessing Officer
to determine, by general or special order
, the appropriate proportion of
sum chargeable, and upon such determination, tax shall be deducted under
sub-section (1) on that proportion of the sum which is so chargeable.”

 

Section 195(7) contains enabling
powers where under the CBDT may specify class of persons or cases where person
responsible for making payment to NR/Foreign company of any sum chargeable to
tax shall make application to AO to determine appropriate portion of sum
chargeable to tax. Thus, in prescribed cases Compulsory Application to AO would
have to be made and the AO may determine by general or special order the TDS to
be deducted on appropriate portion of sum chargeable.

 

Presently, no
notification has been issued u/s. 195(7).

CA
Certification and Remittance – Process to be followed

 


 

 

6.  Certain Cross Border Payments – TDS Issues

A large number of issues arises in
the context of payment of Fees for Technical Services [FTS], Royalties and
reimbursement of expenses the non-residents. There has been huge amount of
litigation in these areas.

 

It is not possible to cover various
legal issues arising in respect of the taxability of these payments in this
article.

 

It is strongly advisable that both
the assessees and the CAs issuing the Certificate in 15CB are aware of the
issues / developments in all the areas, to avoid severe consequences of
non-deduction or short deduction of TDS.

 

It is therefore advisable for a
remitter to obtain such a certificate from a CA who is well versed with the
subject and in case of any doubts about the taxability of a particular
remittance, to seek appropriate professional guidance.

 

7.  Key Takeaways in a
nutshell

a. Payments
to non-residents should be thoroughly examined from a withholding tax
perspective – under the beneficial provisions of the Act or DTAA.

 

b. Payments
can be remitted under alternative mechanism (CA certificate route) if assessee
is fairly certain about TDS obligation.

 

c. In case of a doubt or a substantial amount, it
is advisable to obtain tax withholding order section 195(2) / 197.

 

d. Mitigate
against severe consequences of non-compliance with exacting requirements of
section 195.

 

e. Ignorance
of relevant sections, rules and judicial developments may lead to avoidable
huge cost and consequences of long drawn litigation.

 

f.  Alternative
remedy of application before AO is conservative, but time consuming.

 

g. Enhanced
onerous provisions for issue of CA certificate.

 

h. Cumbersome
compliance provisions for the non-resident taxpayers.

 

i. Very
important to stay updated or take help of competent professionals for a
comprehensive evaluation of taxability of a particular remittance.

 

j. One
should have patience and trust in Indian tax judiciary and proper, balance and
judicious interpretation would enable success in these matters.

 

In view of reputational risks and
other professional consequences, more so in recent times, it would be advisable
for a professional who is not well versed with the intricacies of the entire
gamut of international taxation, to refrain from issuing the remittance
certificate without appropriate professional guidance.

 

8.  Conclusion

In these three parts of the Article
relating to ‘Provisions of TDS under section 195 – An Update’ we have covered
the developments in regard. TDS u/s. 195 is a very complex and an evergreen
subject with a large number of controversies and issues. There is no substitute
for remaining updated on the subject on a day to day basis, for proper
compliance and avoiding harsh consequences of non-compliance.  

MARKETING INTANGIBLES – EVOLVING LANDSCAPE

“Marketing
intangibles”, in the form of advertisement, marketing and sales promotion (AMP)
expenses is one of the key areas of dispute between the Indian tax authorities
and taxpayers. Increasingly, complicated business structures and policies being
adopted by Multinational Entities (‘MNEs’) in order to efficiently manage their
global businesses has contributed in fair measure to this trend.

 

In emerging markets
such as India, the issue assumes particular relevance as many MNEs have set up
their sales and distribution entities to reap benefits of huge consumer base. A
number of difficulties arise while dealing with marketing intangibles i.e.
conflicting rulings from courts, evolving and disruptive business models and
retrospective amendment made in the Indian transfer pricing regulations to
incorporate exhaustive definition of intangibles.

 

The main dispute
has been in the area of excessive expenditure incurred on advertising,
marketing and sales promotion activities and whether such expenses are of
routine or non-routine nature.
If the expenses are non-routine nature, the
Indian entity should be adequately compensated with arm’s length remuneration
so that there is no creation of marketing intangibles.

 

Over the past few
years, there have been two landmark Delhi High Court rulings on the AMP issue
namely Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India Private Limited[1] and
Maruti Suzuki India Limited[2]. In the
case of Sony Ericsson, the Delhi High Court held that since taxpayer
distributors had argued that the rewards around their excessive AMP expenses
were subsumed within the profit margins of distribution, the taxpayers could
not at the same time contend that AMP expenses were not “international
transactions”. Having held the same the High Court further added if a taxpayer
distributor performs additional functions on account of AMP, as compared to
comparable companies then such additional rewards may be granted through
pricing of products or distribution margin; and if so received, the Revenue
Officer cannot demand a separate remuneration.

 

In the case of Maruti
Suzuki, the Delhi High Court, while dealing with a taxpayer, being optically of
the character of an entrepreneurial licensed manufacturer, dismissed the
attempt on the part of the Revenue Officer to impute TP adjustment for the
excess AMP spend of Maruti Suzuki India, as a percentage of its turnover, over
the average of those of its comparable companies selected under an overall
transactional net margin method (TNMM) approach.

 

The main reasoning of
the High Court, while it concurred with the arguments of the taxpayer in
deciding the case in its favour, was that the AMP spend on a stand-alone basis,
could not be treated to as an “international transaction” under the provisions
of the Indian TP regulations, in the context of licensed manufacturers of the
type of Maruti Suzuki India, and thus the TP adjustment with respect to any
part thereof, in the manner proposed by the Revenue Officer, namely
reimbursement of the “so called” excess amount of the AMP spend, by the foreign
licensor of brand, was clearly not sustainable.

 

The AMP issue is far
from being resolved and Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) have been lodged with
the Supreme Court of India on the issue of AMP – both, by the tax payers as
well as by the Revenue. The Supreme Court, apart from dealing with primary
question of AMP being an international transaction or not, would also be
required to delve into issues such as whether higher profits at entity level
can be said to subsume the return for marketing intangible creating functions,
whether setoff of a higher price/profit in one transaction with lower
price/profit in another is permissible, whether application of the bright line
test is justified etc.

 

More recently, the
Mumbai ITAT in the recent decision in case of Nivea India Pvt Ltd[3]
has dealt with some of the key issues dealing with marketing intangibles
controversy.

 

Whether AMP expenditure qualifies as International Transaction

This has been a
primary bone of contention between tax payers and tax authorities.Tax payers
strongly contend that unless there is express provision in the law, the tax
authorities are not justified in inferring creation of marketing intangible for
the brand owner merely by virtue of excessive AMP expenditure incurred by the
tax payer.

 

Tax authorities’ stand
has been that mere fact the service or benefit has been provided by one party
to the other would by itself constitute a transaction irrespective of whether
the consideration for the same has been paid or remains payable or there is a
mutual agreement to not charge any compensation for the service or benefit
(i.e. gaining popularity or visibility of brand in the local market).

 

The Tribunal in line
with several past rulings negated tax authorities’ stand stating that
“Even if the word ‘transaction’ is given its widest connotation, and need
not involve any transfer of money or a written agreement or even if one resorts
to section 92F (v) of the Act, which defines ‘transaction’ to include
‘arrangement’, ‘understanding’ or ‘action in concert’, ‘whether formal or in
writing’, it is still incumbent on the tax authorities to show the existence of
an ‘understanding’ or an ‘arrangement’ or ‘action in concert’ between tax payer
and its Parent entity as regards AMP spend for brand promotion.” In other
words, unless it is demonstrated that the tax payer was obliged or mandated to
incur certain level of AMP expenditure for the purposes of promoting the brand,
the AMP expenditure incurred by the tax payer would not qualify as
international transaction.

 

Application of bright line test

Generally, the tax
authorities segregate the AMP expenditure incurred by the tax payer into
routine nature and non-routine nature by applying bright line test,
wherein they compare the AMP expenditure incurred by the tax payer vis-a-vis
comparables and deduce excessive / non routine of portion of AMP expenditure.

The Tribunal held that
bright line test cannot and should not be applied for making transfer pricing
adjustments, as same is not one of the recognised methods.

 

Incidental benefit

As the foreign brand
owner stands to benefit from AMP expenditure incurred in India, the tax
authorities insist on compensation for the Indian entity.

 

The Tribunal held that
with no specific guidelines on the AMP issue, merely because there is an
incidental benefit to the brand owner, it cannot be said that the AMP expenses
incurred by the tax payer was for promoting the brand.  Any incidental benefit accrued to the brand
owner would not alter the character of the expenditure incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of tax payer’s business. For e.g., the Indian
taxpayer incurs AMP expenses in the local market to create awareness about the
brand due to which his business is benefitted by virtue of increased sales and
at the same time overseas brand owner gets incidental benefit i.e. brand
becomes popular in the new geography, due to which intrinsic value of brand
gets enhanced.

 

Product promotion vs Brand Promotion

The Tribunal stated
there is a subtle but definite difference between the product promotion and
brand promotion. In the first case product is the focus of the advertisement
campaign and the brand takes secondary or backseat, whereas in second case,
brand is highlighted and not the product.

 

The distinction is
required to be drawn between expenditure incurred to perform distribution
function and a ‘transaction’ and that every expenditure forming part of the
function, cannot be construed as a ‘transaction’.The tax authorities’ attempt
to re-characterise the AMP expenditure as a transaction by itself when it has
neither been identified as such by the tax payer or legislatively recognised,
runs counter to legal position which requires tax authorities “to examine
the ‘international transaction’ as they actually exist.”

 

Letter of Understanding (LOU)

In certain instances,
it was observed that the Indian taxpayers entered into license agreement with
brand owner wherein certain conditions were stipulated by the brand owner to
maintain and enhance the brand in the local market.

Tax authorities
alleged that such conditions clearly showed the existence of agreement or
arrangement between AE and the taxpayer. The Tribunal held that financial responsibilities
on the tax payer did not prove understanding of sharing of AMP expenses.
Further, to compete with established brands in the local market the tax payer
may have to incur huge AMP expenses in local market. Thus, such arrangements
could not be viewed as being accretive to the brands owned by a foreign parent.

 

Conclusion

The ruling in case of
Nivea reiterates and lays down important guiding principles in connection with
marketing intangibles. It is only obvious that the facts of each case will differ
and the outcome therefor will differ. Even though all above rulings, provided
some guidance on the vexed issue of marketing intangible but they were not able
to fully address all concerns of both – the taxpayers and tax authorities and
they are now knocking at the doors of the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.

 

It is also pertinent
to note that in the recently released version of the United Nations Practical
Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, the references to ‘bright
line test’ is removed from the India country practice chapter. This deletion
supports the principles emerging from various High Court & ITAT decisions
on marketing intangibles.

 

It seems that the AMP
matter itself being dependent on various business models adopted by the
taxpayers, the Supreme Court rulings on marketing intangible may be highly
fact-specific, which both taxpayers and tax authorities will not be able to
uniformly follow in other cases. Hence, prolonged litigation seems inevitable.

 

Each taxpayer would,
therefore, need to find its own resolution to the marketing intangible
controversy. Besides pursuing normal litigation route, alternate modes for
seeking resolutions could be explored such as Advanced Pricing Agreements (for
future years) and Mutual Agreement Process (for years with existing dispute).  



[1] Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications
India Private Limited vs. CIT [TS-96-HC-2015(DEL)-TP]

[2] Maruti Suzuki Limited vs. CIT
[TS-595-HC-2015(DEL)-TP]

[3] Nivea India Private Ltd. vs. ACIT
[TS-187-ITAT-2018(Mum)-TP]

26. [2018] 96 taxmann.com 17 (Delhi – Trib) Ciena India (P) Ltd vs. ITO ITA Nos: 959 & 984 (Delhi) of 2011 A.Ys.: 2007-08 and 2008-09 Date of Order: 29th June, 2018 Articles 5, 12 of India-Netherlands DTAA; Section 9 of the Act – in absence of PE of the non-resident in India, purchaser of shrink-wrapped off-the-shelf software was not liable to withhold tax from payment.

Facts


The Taxpayer was an Indian Company.
It was a wholly owned subsidiary of an American Company (“USCo”). It was set up
as a 100% EOU under STPI Scheme of Government of India. The Taxpayer was
providing software development support to USCo. During the relevant years, the
Taxpayer made payments to a Netherlands based company for supply of computer
hardware, software and related support services for installation and
maintenance. It did not withhold any tax while remitting the said payments. The
software supplied was shrink-wrapped software, which was sold off-the-shelf in
retail.

 

The AO held that payments made for
software were in the nature of royalty and payments made for services were in
the nature of FTS. Hence, the Taxpayer was liable to withhold tax on both kinds
of payments.  

 

Held


  •     Sale of hardware together
    with embedded software was not taxable in absence of PE of the non-resident in
    India.

 

  •     Installation and other
    services did not make available any technical knowledge or technical knowhow.
    This was a pre-requisite for bringing such services within the ambit of Article
    12(5)(b) of India-USA DTAA.

 

  •     Hence, payments in
    respect of them could not be considered as FTS. Therefore, the order of the AO
    was to be set aside.  
     

25. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 280 (Hyderabad – Trib) Customer Lab Solutions (P) Ltd vs. ITO ITA No: 438 (Hyd.) of 2017 A.Y.: 2006-07 Date of Order: 4th July, 2018 Article 12 of India-USA DTAA; Section 9 of the Act – as there was no transfer of technical know-how or use of technical knowledge, affiliation fee paid by an Indian Company to an American Company was not royalty, either under the Act or under India-USA DTAA.

Facts


The Taxpayer was an Indian Company.
During the relevant year, the Taxpayer entered into an agreement with an
American Company (“USCo”) in connection with its consultancy business. The
Taxpayer paid fee under the agreement and claimed deduction of the same as
license fee. According to the Taxpayer, the payment was affiliation fee and had
no connection to use of any right for use of any material or service supplied
by US Co. Since no income accrued to USCo in India, no tax was required to be
withheld in India.

 

The AO held that the fee was
royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Act and disallowed the payment u/s. 40(a)(i)
since the Taxpayer had not withheld tax.

The CIT(A) held that the payment
was royalty under the Act as well as India-USA DTAA. 

 

Held


  •     The agreement provided
    for two kinds of fee. One was an annual affiliation fee. The affiliation fee
    did not provide for any transfer of technology. The other was “fees on
    consulting and reports”. It provided for payment to be made based on
    performance and achievement of targets.




  •     The claim of the Taxpayer
    was only in respect of the affiliation fee and not consulting fee. In
    consideration of the payment towards affiliation fee, the taxpayer received
    only a periodical magazine having various articles. This could not be
    considered right to use copyright.

 

  •     Accordingly, as there was
    no transfer of technical know-how or use of technical knowledge, the
    affiliation fee could not be considered as royalty, either under the Act or
    under India-USA DTAA. This view is also supported by the decision in Hughes
    Escort Communications Ltd vs. DCIT [2012] 51 SOT 356 (Delhi).

 

  •     Since USCo did not have
    any PE in India, Tax was not required to be withheld in India.

24. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 165 (Mumbai – Trib) Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte Ltd vs. DDIT ITA Nos: 8595 (Mum) of 2010 and 4365 ( Mum) of 2012 A.Ys.: 2006-07 and 2007-08 Date of Order: 6th July, 2018 Article 13 of India-Singapore DTAA; Section 9, 195 of the Act – Amount received by a Singapore company from its AE in India towards reimbursement of salary of its deputed employee could not be considered as FTS since there was no income element.

Facts


The Taxpayer was a company
incorporated in, and tax resident of, Singapore. The Taxpayer had deputed one
of its directors/employees to India to set up and develop the business of its
associated entity (“AE”) in India (“ICo”) under a contract executed between
them. ICo was engaged in providing support services to group companies outside
India. The Taxpayer continued paying salary of its deputed employee, which was
reimbursed by ICo.

 

Before the AO, the Taxpayer
contended that the payment received by it was reimbursement without any income
element. However, the AO contended that the deputed employee was highly
qualified and having vast technical experience and expertise. The AO noted that
while salary is generally paid on a monthly basis, ICo had made single remittance
of consolidated amount. Further, there was no evidence to suggest that
provision of managerial and consultancy services to an AE was not the business
of the taxpayer. Therefore, the AO treated the reimbursement received by the
Taxpayer as FTS and charged further markup of 23.3% by determining ALP on the
basis of the order of the TPO.

 

The CIT(A) confirmed the order of
the AO.

 

Held


  •     The contract between the
    Taxpayer and ICo clearly provided that the Taxpayer will pay salary on behalf
    of ICo and the same would be recharged by ICo. The tax authority had not
    disputed that the payment was reimbursement of salary without any income
    element.




  •     Since the amount was
    reimbursement of cost, it cannot be brought within definition of FTS in
    explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

 

  •  Hence, the reimbursed amount was to be regarded as salary in the
    hands of the deputed employee. Relying on the decisions in United Hotels Ltd
    vs. ITO [2005] 2 SOT 0267 (Delhi) and in ADIT vs. Mark and Spencer Reliance
    India Pvt Ltd (2013) 38 taxmann.com 190 (Mum-Trib)
    , the payment was
    reimbursement of salary and not FTS under India-Singapore DTAA and the Act.
    Accordingly, it could not be taxed in the hands of the Taxpayer.

23. [2018] 96 taxmann.com 80 (Delhi – Trib.) Cobra Instalaciones Y Servicios SA vs. DCIT ITA NO.: 2391 (Delhi) of 2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of Order: 28th June, 2018 Article 7 of India-Spain DTAA; Sections 9, 37(1) of the Act – Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of advance received by a PE from its HO was allowable as a deduction from income since the advance was received towards working capital for execution of project in India.

Facts


The Taxpayer was a Spanish company
engaged in the business of providing consultancy services for Projects,
Engineering and Electrical Contractors and Suppliers. In respect of the
projects being executed in India, the Taxpayer had established a project office
(also a PE) in India.

 

During the relevant year, the
Taxpayer had earned income from supply of goods and services from project being
executed by it. For executing the project in India, PE was utilising the
advance received from the customer or the advance received from the HO (i.e.,
the Taxpayer). In accordance with RBI guidelines, PE was receiving the advance
from the HO in Euro and was also repaying the same in Euro. During the relevant
year the PE claimed deduction under the head ‘Exchange Fluctuation Loss’ in
respect of the advances received and repayable in foreign exchange.

 

According to the AO, funds received
by the PE from the HO were actually capital contribution and not debt incurred
in the course of business. The AO noted that Article 7 of India-Spain DTAA
specifically prohibits any deduction of expenses relating to HO except
imbursement towards actual expenditure. Accordingly, the AO disallowed the
exchange fluctuation loss claimed by the PE.

 

The CIT(A) upheld the order of AO.

 

Held


  •     The loan received by the
    PE was towards working capital for project execution. Hence, it did not bring
    any capital asset into existence. Also, the PE had shown the amount as a
    liability in its balance sheet.

 

  •     Nothing was brought on
    record to show that the PE had contravened any provision of FEMA. The tax
    authority has not disputed that depreciation of rupee has resulted in exchange
    fluctuation loss in respect of the outstanding amount of advance received by
    the PE.

 

  •     Since the advance was
    received towards project execution, it was on revenue account and consequently,
    the loss too was revenue loss. Also, the project office being a PE, it could
    not borrow from banks in India for project execution. Further, the expenditure
    was not a notional expenditure. It was to be noted that in subsequent year the
    PE had earned exchange fluctuation gain and had accounted it as income. If, in
    the opinion of the AO, exchange fluctuation loss is not deductible, exchange
    fluctuation gain should not be taxed as income since the tax proceedings must
    follow the rule of consistency.

 

  •     Accordingly, the PE was
    entitled to claim deduction of exchange fluctuation loss from its income.

13. ITO vs. Dilip Kumar Shaw (Kolkata)(SMC) Member : P. M. Jagtap (AM) ITA No.: 1517/Kol/2016 A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 4th June, 2018. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Nicholas Murmu/ Tapas Mondal Section 154 – The difference between contract receipts as stated in Form 16A and as assessed while assessing total income u/s. 143(3) of the Act, cannot be brought to tax by passing an order u/s. 154 of the Act.

FACTS


For assessment year 2006-07, the
assessee, an individual, filed his return of income declaring therein a total income
of Rs. 8,85,386.  The Assessing Officer
(AO) vide order dated 18.7.2008 passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, assessed the
total income to be Rs. 9,25,390. 
Thereafter, it was noticed by the AO that the contractual receipts
credited in the Profit & Loss Account of the assessee were to the tune of
Rs.2,91,42,128/- whereas the contract receipts of the assessee as per TDS Form
16A were Rs.2,99,89,617/-. He, therefore, held that there was a mistake in the
assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) in taking the contract receipts short by
Rs.8,47,489/- and the same was rectified by him vide an order dated 08.12.2012
passed u/s. 154, wherein an addition of Rs.8,47,489/- was made by him to the
total income of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the CIT(A) who after considering the submission made by the
assessee as well as the material available on record set aside the order passed
by the Assessing Officer u/s. 154 by holding the same as not maintainable.

 

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was stated that the
said difference was due to the mistake committed by the concerned party in
deducting tax at source from the contract receipts of the earlier years, which
was corrected by them by deducting more tax from the contract receipts of the
year under consideration.

 

HELD 


The Tribunal agreed with the
observations of the CIT(A) that there could be many reasons for the difference
noted by the AO in the contract receipts credited in the Profit & Loss
Account of the assessee and the contract receipts as shown in the relevant TDS
certificates. It observed that the difference in the contract receipts as
noticed by the AO, thus, required more investigation and enquiry to find out as
to whether there was any escapement of income of the assessee and as rightly
held by the CIT(A) it was not a case of obvious and patent mistake, which could
be rectified u/s. 154. This issue involved a debatable point which required
further enquiry and investigation and the same, therefore, was beyond the scope
of rectification permissible u/s. 154 as rightly held by the ld. CIT(A). The
Tribunal set aside the order passed by the AO u/s. 154 by treating the same as
not maintainable.

 

The appeal filed by the revenue was
dismissed.

12. Jessie Juliet Pereira vs. ITO (Mumbai) Members : R. C. Sharma (AM) and Amarjit Singh (JM) ITA No.: 6914/M/2017 A.Y.: 2009-10. Dated: 4th June, 2018 Counsel for assessee / revenue: Subhash Chhajed & S. Balasubramanian / Ms. N. Hemalatha Section 54 – Claim for exemption u/s. 54 needs to be considered in a case where assessee has surrendered his flat in exchange for corpus fund/hardship allowance and a new flat in a scheme of redevelopment.

FACTS  


In the course of assessment
proceedings of MIG Group III Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (society), it is
noticed that the society has entered into a development agreement with Suyog
Happy Homes (developer) on 30.4.2008 and the members of the society have
received payments from the said developer. 
The details revealed that the assessee has received Rs. 40,75,302 and
had not filed return of income for assessment year 2009-2010.  Accordingly, reasons were recorded and a
notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued and served upon the assessee.  In response to the notice, the assessee filed
return of income declaring total income of Rs. 1,94,290. 

 

The society, of which the assessee
was a member, was the owner of property consisting of 9 buildings with 80
members. The society, on 30.4.2008, entered into an agreement with the
developer for development of the property in such a manner that each member of
the society shall receive a new flat in exchange of surrender of old flat
depending upon the size of the old flat along with interest in the additional
FSI allotted by MHADA. The property and the additional FSI would be with the
name of the society. All the expenses, costs and charges for the proposed
project of redevelopment of the said property including for purchase of
additional FSI from MHADA etc., were to be borne by the Developers alone and
the society and members were not liable to pay or contribute any amount towards
the same.

 

As per the agreement, the developer
was to pay the society being lawful owner of the property and the members an
aggregate monetary consideration of Rs.39.10 crore which was to be distributed
among the members of the society being shareholders depending upon the size of
their old flat.

 

During the year under
consideration, the assessee, as a shareholder of the society, received an
amount of Rs.40,75,302/- being consideration for surrender of his old flat
along with his interest in the additional FSI allotted by MHADA etc. The
developer issued the cheques in the name of the individual members which were
handed over to the society and in turn, the society diverted the same at source
to the members/shareholders. Thus, the said amount of Rs.39.10 crore never
routed through the books of accounts of the society though these cheques were
in the custody of the society before handing over to the individual members
being shareholder.

 

The said activity was treated as
commercial activity and the receipt of the amount of Rs.40,75,302/- was
considered as revenue receipt by AO and accordingly taxed as Income from Other
Sources.

 

Aggrieved by the order, the
assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) contending that the amount of corpus
money/hardship allowance is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax.  The CIT(A) treated the said receipt as long
term capital gain.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal on the ground that the amount of corpus
money/hardship allowance received by the assessee is a capital receipt not
chargeable to tax and without prejudice contending that the CIT(A) ought to
have appreciated that the Appellant has purchased a new house at Dahisar for
Rs.21,68,180/- out of the capital gains of Rs.31,68,313/- and hence the
proportionate deduction u/s. 54 ought to have been granted by the CIT (A).

 

HELD  


At the time of argument, the
assessee did not contest that the amount of corpus money/hardship allowance
constitutes capital receipt not chargeable to tax but only argued that the
CIT(A) has treated the receipt of Rs.40,75,302/- as capital gain and the
assessee has also acquired new flat, therefore, the benefit u/s. 54 of the Act
is required to be given. The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer
treated the receipt as income from other sources whereas the CIT(A) has treated
the said receipt as long term capital gain. It is not in dispute that the
assessee has also acquired a new flat in lieu of his old flat. The receipt to
the tune of Rs.40,75,302/- has been treated as long term capital gain.
Undoubtedly, the claim u/s. 54 of the Act was not raised earlier before the
revenue. Anyhow, since the receipt to the tune of Rs.40,75,302/- has been
treated as long term capital gain, therefore, in the said circumstances, the
claim u/s. 54 of the Act is also liable to be considered in accordance with
law.

 

The Tribunal remanded the alternate
ground raised (viz. claim for deduction u/s. 54) before the AO for consideration
in view of the provision u/s. 54 of the Act in accordance with law after giving
an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. This ground of appeal was
allowed.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee
was allowed.

 

Contributor’s Note:  The grounds of appeal state that the claim
u/s.54 ought to have been allowed in respect of flat purchased by the assessee
in Dahisar but the operative portion of the ITAT order refers to assessee
having acquired a new flat in lieu of old flat.

11. ITO vs. Jogesh Ghosh (Kolkata) Members : J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and Smt. Madhumita Roy (JM) ITA No.: 1532/Kol/2016 A.Y.: 2013-14. Dated: 1st June, 2018 Counsel for revenue / assessee: Sallong Yaden / Subash Agarwal Sections 69, 69A – Source of purchase of land held to be satisfactorily explained by the assessee if he has produced receipts confirming sale of land. Production of receipts issued by buyer, though not numbered, are sufficient discharge of burden.

FACTS 


The assessee derived income by way
of interest on fixed deposits.  During
the previous year under consideration, he had sold his land and also purchased
land.  In order to explain the source of
purchase of land, the assessee contended that it had received amounts in cash
from the purchaser to whom the assessee had sold his land.  To substantiate the contention, the assessee
produced receipts issued by the purchaser of land.  The Assessing Officer (AO) disbelieved the
receipts produced on the ground that (a) there was no agreement between the
assessee and the purchaser of land; (b) the receipts were not serially
numbered; (c) the letter issued by the AO to the purchaser of land Windstar
Realtors Pvt. Ltd., calling for information was returned unserved; and (d) the
conveyance deed mentioned that the amount had been received on execution of
sale deed by mentioning the word “today”.  
The AO did not accept the contention of the assessee that there was a
mistake in the conveyance deed which was rectified by a registered
rectification deed, which was produced by the assessee.

 

The AO added a sum of Rs. 76,05,701
to the income of the assessee on the ground that money was received from
undisclosed sources as well as on the ground that there was unexplained expenditure.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the CIT(A) who considered the set of money receipts produced by
the assessee and also affidavit signed by Mr. Dhar, authorised person of the
purchaser company.  The CIT(A) in his
order mentioned that the authorised person of the purchaser company appeared
before him and confirmed the cash payments as well as the dates mentioned in
the money receipts.  Mr. Dhar had also
confirmed that making cash payments were necessary and a common feature for
purchases of land in rural areas from the agriculturists and the company had
made the payments by withdrawing cash from its bank accounts. The Ld. CIT(A)
deleted the addition made  by the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the revenue, it was contended that
the order of CIT(A) be set aside as the CIT(A) had accepted additional evidence
in the form of affidavit of Mr. Dhar as well as his explanations and that the
AO was not provided an opportunity.  It
was also contended that the CIT(A) erred in accepting the rectification deed
produced by the assessee to correct the original conveyance deed. 

 

The assessee contended before the
Tribunal that all the details were filed before the AO and that filing of
affidavit was only supplementary and supporting evidence and additional
evidence.  Reliance was placed on the
following case laws –

 

i)   Shankar
Khandasari Sugar Mill vs. CIT reported in 193 ITR 669 (Kar);

ii)   DCIT vs. New Manas Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. (Gau) reported in 73 ITD
157 (Gau)

 

HELD 


The Tribunal held that the assessee
has discharged the onus that lay on him to prove the sources for purchase of
land. It observed that the AO has only doubted the timing of receipts of cash
by the assessee, consequent to the sale of land to Windstar Realtors Pvt. Ltd.
Any money receipts issued by an individual would have a date but not a serial
number, as in the case with a business concern. When the company has confirmed
the payments in cash on the dates mentioned in the receipts, nothing else
survives. In view of the factual findings of the Ld. CIT(A), the Tribunal
upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A). 

 

The appeal filed by the revenue was
dismissed.

21. [2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 102 Owais M Husain vs. ITO ITA No.: 4320/Mum/2016 A. Y.: 2006-07 Dated: 11th May, 2018 Section 23(1)(a)- Income from house property –– AO is directed to compute the deemed rent of the house property as per the municipal rateable value and assess the income from house property accordingly instead of estimating the letable value on the basis of the prevailing rate of rent of the building situated in the surrounding areas.

FACTS


  •   The assesse owned 3 flats
    i.e. one at Chennai which is treated as self-occupied property by the AO and
    other two properties being flat at Queens Court, Worli and Dhun apartment,
    Worli, Mumbai.

 

  •  The AO estimated the reasonable let out value of the house
    property after taking IT inspector’s report. The report was on the basis of the
    local enquiry conducted in the surrounding area of the building situated and
    the going rent per square feet of Rs.50.70 per square feet per month. Based on
    inspector’s report, the AO estimated the rent per month for each of the flats
    at Rs. 75,000 per month. Therefore, the AO worked out ALV of the flat at Dhun
    cooperative society, Worli, Mumbai, at Rs. 9 lakh and for the other flat at
    Queens Court, Worli, Mumbai at Rs. 9 lakh. 

 

  • Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
    confirmed the action of the AO.

 

HELD


  •     The Tribunal while
    relying upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, held that the
    municipal rateable value could be accepted as a bona fide rental value
    of the property and there could not be a blanket rejection of the same.


  •     The market rate in the
    locality was an approved method for determining the fair rental value but it
    was only when the AO was convinced that the case before him was suspicious,
    determination by the parties was doubtful that he could resort to enquire about
    the prevailing rate in the locality.

 

  •     In the result, the
    Tribunal directed the AO to compute the deemed rent as per municipal rateable
    value and assess the income accordingly.

20. [2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 225 Fancy Wear vs. ITO ITA No.: 1596 & 1597/Mum/2016 A. Ys.: 2010-11 and 2011-12 Dated: 20th September, 2017 Section 69C – Assessee having not been allowed to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were recorded by AO and accounts of assessee having not been rejected, addition made u/s. 69C by AO was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice as also on merits.

FACTS


  •     The assessee filed its
    return of income which was initially processed u/s. 143(1). Subsequently, the
    AO received information from the Sales Tax Department as well as from DGIT
    (Inv.) Mumbai that the assessee had received accommodation entries for
    purchases from suspicious parties.

 

  •     The AO initiated
    proceedings u/s. 147, after recording reasons thereof. He observed that the
    assessee had purchased goods from SE and SJE. The sales tax department had
    conducted independent enquiries in each of the hawala parties and conclusively
    proved that those parties were engaged in the business of providing
    accommodation entries only. The AO observed that the notices issued u/s. 133
    (6), had been returned with the mark ‘’not known’’ or “not claimed”.
    Accordingly, the aggregate of the purchases was treated as unexplained
    expenditure u/s. 69C and was added to the returned income of the assessee.

 

  •     The AO further observed
    that apart from the above purchases, the assessee had purchased goods from two
    more entities, namely RE and VE. The names of both the entities were appearing
    on the website of the Sales Tax Department in the list of the defaulters. Thus,
    he made a further addition to the income of the assessee invoking section 69C.

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
    reduced the addition to 25 per cent of the purchases.

 

HELD


  •   The Tribunal noted that
    though material for reopening was available to the AO, it was never shared with
    the assessee. The assessee had made a request for cross examining the parties
    who were treated as hawala-dealers by the Sales Tax Department. The AO did not
    provide the copies of statements of suppliers and opportunity of cross
    examination to the assessee.

 

  •   In case of the other two
    entities, the Tribunal held that a default under the Sales Tax Act, in itself,
    could not be equated with non-genuineness of the transaction entered by an
    entity with other party, unless and until some positive corroborative evidence
    was brought on record. It was a fact that all the payments to the suppliers
    were made through banking channels. No evidences were brought on record proving
    that the suppliers had withdrawn cash immediately after deposit of cheques of the
    assessee.

 

  •   The assessee had
    discharged the onus of proving the genuineness of the transactions by producing
    copies of purchase bills, delivery challans, bank statements showing payments
    made by the parties, confirmation of ledger accounts of the suppliers, sales
    tax returns and sales tax challans of the suppliers, income tax returns. After
    the submissions made by the assessee along with the above documents, the ball
    was in the court of the AO to discharge his onus-especially when he wanted to
    invoke the provisions of section 69C.

 

  •  The AO had completed the assessment without marshaling the facts
    properly and only on the basis of general information provided by the Sales Tax
    Department. The non-filing of appeals against the orders of the CIT(A), wherein
    he had deleted 75 per cent of the additions made by the AO, indicated that the
    department itself was not convinced about the approach adopted by the AO in
    making additions.

 

  •     In the end, the Tribunal
    held that the orders of the AO and CIT(A) were not valid because of violation
    of principles of natural justice. Besides, the addition made u/s. 69C was also
    not maintainable.

19. [2018] 193 TTJ (Jd) 751 ITO vs. Estate of Maharaja Karni Singh of Bikaner ITA NO.: 241/Jodh/2017 A. Y.: 2011-12 : 20th February, 2018 Section 50C- Capital gains – Assessee having contested the enhanced valuation of the property made by the stamp valuation authority and the AO having denied the request of the assesse to refer the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C(2), CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition on account of capital gain on the sale of land.

FACTS


  •     The assesse had sold two
    pieces of land for Rs.45,00,000 and Rs.30,00,000 respectively, the DLC value of
    which was Rs.1,12,04,236 and Rs.1,20,00,566 aggregating to Rs.2,32,04,802.
    After deduction of cost of acquisition of Rs.95,07,478 the resultant taxable
    long term capital gain was Rs.1,36,97,324.

 

  •     The AO stated that the
    reference to DVO could not be made in view of the provisions of section 50C(2)
    of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as the litigation for the charging of stamp duty
    was pending before KAR board, Ajmer.

 

  •     Therefore, the AO
    computed the Income of the assessee invoking of the provisions of section 50C,
    as the assessment was getting barred by limitation on 31st March,
    2014.

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). 

 

  •     The CIT(A) deleted the
    additions, holding that, before adoption of valuation of property sold by the
    valuation authority, the AO should have considered the objection raised by the
    assessee and should have referred the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C (2).

 

HELD


  •   The Tribunal held that as
    per section 50C, the value taken for stamp duty by the State registration
    authority would be considered as deemed sale consideration. There was solace
    for assessee u/s. 50C(2), which provided that if the assessee objected to the
    valuation of the property for stamp duty purposes, the AO might refer the
    valuation to the DVO.

 

  •     Thus, section 50C
    provided two remedies at the option of the assessee, in that, he could either
    file appeal against the stamp value or seek reference to the valuation cell.
    Adoption of the value by the valuation cell was again subject to regular
    appeals available against the order of the AO. 

 

  •     The Tribunal further
    stated that it was well settled that the principles of natural justice would be
    presumed to be necessary, unless there existed a statutory interdict, and also
    when substantial justice and technical consideration were pitted against each
    other, the cause of substantial justice deserved to be preferred.

 

  •     Therefore, denial of
    request or objections of the assessee against the value adopted by the stamp
    valuation authority by the AO was against the spirit of section 50C. It was not
    optional for the AO to make reference to DVO, the right of the assessee u/s.
    50C was a statutory right.

 

  •     In the result, the
    Tribunal held that there was no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) that the AO
    should have considered the objections raised by the assessee against the same
    and should have referred the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C(2).

18. [2018] 193 TTJ (Jp) 898 ACIT vs. Safe Decore (P.) Ltd ITA No.: 716/Jp/2017 A. Y.: 2014-15 Dated: 12th January, 2018 Section 56(2)(viib) read with Rule 11UA – Fair market value of shares determined by assessee as per discounted cash flow method being higher than the fair market value under net asset method, CIT(A) was justified in deleting addition made by AO u/s. 56(2)(viib)

FACTS

  •     During the year under
    consideration the assessee company allotted shares to ‘J’ Ltd. The assesse
    submitted valuation per equity share computed on the discounted cash flow
    method as per the certificate of Chartered Accountants wherein the value per
    shares was arrived at Rs.54.98 per share.

 

  •     The AO did not accept
    said valuation and applied Net Asset Value method as per which value of share
    came to Rs.26.69 per share. Applying the said value, the AO made addition u/s.
    56(2)(viib).

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). In appellate
    proceedings, the assessee contended that as per Rule 11UA of the Income-tax
    Rules,1962, the Fair Market Value of unquoted equity shares would be the value
    on the allotment date of such unquoted equity shares as determined as per
    method provided or Net Asset Value, whichever was higher.

 

  •     The CIT(A) accepted the
    contention of the assessee and deleted the addition made by the AO.

 

HELD

  •     The Tribunal held that
    there was no dispute that the assessee had issued shares to ‘J’ Ltd., during
    the year under consideration. Further, the fair market value as per the
    provision of section 56(2)(viib) had to be determined in accordance with the
    method prescribed under Rule 11UA of Income-tax Rules,1962 and as per Rule
    11UA(2), discounted cash flow method was one of the prescribed methods. Therefore,
    it was the option of the assessee to adopt any of the prescribed methods under
    Rule 11UA(2).

 

  •     Section 56(2)(viib) read
    with the Explanation had specifically provided that the fair market value of
    the unquoted shares should be determined as per the prescribed methods, and
    should be taken whichever is higher fair market value, by comparing the value
    based on the assets of the company.

 

Therefore, value as per the Net
Asset Value method as well as any of the other methods prescribed under Rule
11UA of Income-tax Rules,1962, whichever was higher, should be adopted as per
the option of the assessee.

 

  •     In the case of the
    assessee, the fair market value determined as per the discounted cash flow
    method at Rs.54.98 per share which was higher than the valuation adopted by the
    AO as per the Net Asset Value at Rs.26.69 per share.

 

  •     Therefore, the Tribunal
    held that as the AO had not found any serious defect in the facts and details
    used in determining the fair market value under discounted cash flow method, there
    was no error or illegality in the order of the CIT(A). 

46. CIT vs. ITD Cem India JV.; 405 ITR 533 (Bom): Date of order: 4th September, 2017 A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 40(a)(ia) – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Payments liable to TDS – Reimbursement of administrative expenses to joint venture partner – Genuineness of transaction established on verification – Finding of fact – Disallowance rightly deleted by Tribunal

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer found that the assessee did not deduct tax at source from the
payments made on account of administrative expenses which was paid by the joint
venture to the Indian company. According to the Assessing Officer section
40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity
referred to as the “Act”) was applicable and he disallowed the
expenditure.

 

The Tribunal held that it did not
find any reason to sustain the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) as the payments made
by the assessee to the co-venturer were only on account of salary and related
expenses.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“Once the Assessing Officer had
checked the debit notes raised by the co-venturer and they were test checked
and the amount of expenditure claimed by the assessee was verified and its
genuineness had been proved, there was no reason to interfere with the findings
of fact recorded by the Tribunal in its order.”

18. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT [ Income tax Appeal no 519 of 2003, Dated: 4th July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [Reversed ACIT vs. Jayantilal Investments. Ltd; AY 1988-89 , dated 20/07/2004 ; Mum. ITAT ] Section 36(1)(iii) prior to Amendment: Business expenditure — Capital or revenue – interest paid on the loan taken for purchase of plot of land – stock-in-trade – revenue expenditure

The assessee filed its return of
income for the subject A.Y. declaring an income of Rs.15,280/. Subsequently
revised return of income was filed by the assessee declaring a loss of Rs.2.30
lakh. In the revised return, the appellant had claimed amount of Rs.9.52 lakh
as interest expenditure allowable u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. During the course
of assessment proceedings on being so called upon by the A.O, the assessee
explained that so far as interest is concerned, it capitalises interest to the
extent it is expended, till the commencement of the project, therefore the
interest is taken as revenue expenditure. However, the A.O still entertained
doubts about allowing as deduction Rs.6.98 lakh being the interest expenditure
claimed on account of its construction project ‘Lucky Shoppe’. The assessee
pointed out that the above amount of Rs.6.98 lakh was debited to profit & loss
account but was wrongly capitalised in the original return of income, as during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year the work in the Lucky
Shoppe project had commenced. This was not accepted on the ground that mere
placing of orders would not amount to commencing of the project. Thus, not
allowable as revenue expenditure. The alternate submission of the appellant
that open plot of land in respect of ‘Lucky Shoppe’ forms stock in trade.
Therefore, the interest paid on the loan taken to purchase open plot of land
for Lucky Shoppe project is allowable as revenue expenditure being its
stock-in-trade. This alternative submission was negatived by the A.O on the
ground that purchase of plot of land is capital in nature. Hence, interest must
also be capitalised. Thus, the A.O disallowed the deduction of Rs.6.98 lakh
being interest paid on plot of land of Lucky Shoppe project.

 

The CIT(A) found that interest paid
on land was being allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier Assessment
Years and it was only in the subject Assessment Year that the A.O for the first
time treated the same as work in progress and capitalised the same. The CIT(A)
held that the interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its
stock-in-trade i.e., plot of land for the ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project has to be
allowed as expenditure to determine its income. In support reliance was placed
on the decision of this Court in S.F.Engineer & Ors. vs. CIT  57 ITR 455 (Bom). Consequently, the
CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the A.O in respect of interest paid on
‘Lucky Shoppe’ project.

 

The Revenue filed an appeal to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the assessee has not shown any work had
commenced on ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project plot of land during the previous year
relevant to the subject Assessment Year. Thus, it concluded that the A.O was
justified in coming to conclusion that interest expenditure in respect of Lucky
Shoppe project (plot of land) could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.
Thus, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue’s appeal and disallowed deduction of
interest in respect of ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project.

 

Being
aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the assessee filed an appeal to the High
Court. The Court found that the plot of land which was purchased out of
borrowed funds on which interest was paid, forms part of its stock-in-trade.
Therefore, interest paid on purchase of stock-in-trade is to be allowed as
revenue expenditure. This was negatived by the A.O on the ground that purchase
of plot is necessarily capital in nature and, therefore, interest thereon is
also to be capitalised. However, the fact is that the loan on which interest of
Rs.6.98 lakh is paid was taken for purchase of plot of land in the course of
its business. Therefore, the interest has been paid to acquire stock-in-trade.
In the above circumstances as held by the CIT(A), the same has to be allowed as
revenue expenditure. In view of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act as existing prior
to amendment with effect from 1.4.2004 all interest paid in respect of capital
borrowed for the purpose of business or profession has to be allowed as
deduction while computing income under had income from business. Prior to
amendment made on 1.4.2004, there was no distinction based on whether the
borrowing is for purchase of capital asset or otherwise, interest was allowable
as deduction in determining the taxable income. It was only after introduction
of proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act w.e.f. 1.4.2004 that the purpose of
borrowing i.e. acquisition of assets then interest paid would be capitalised.
The Supreme Court in Dy. CIT vs. Core Healthcare Ltd. 218 ITR 194 has
held that prior to 1.4.2004 interest paid on borrowings for purchase of asset
i.e. machinery is to be allowed as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. This
even if the machinery is not received in the year of booking. It held that the
restriction introduced in the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act was
effective only from A.Y 2004-05 and not for earlier Assessment Years. In this
case, the A.Y 1988-89 i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to
section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings
to purchase the ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project plot of land is allowable as a deduction
u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. This is so as it was incurred for the purposes of
its business. Accordingly, Assessee appeal was allowed.

45. CIT vs. Airlift (India) Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 487 (Bom): Date of order: 8th June, 2018 Section 260A – Appeal to High Court – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Failure by Department to remove office objections despite extension of time being granted – Absence of any particular reason for delay – Reason of administrative difficulty – Delay cannot be condoned

Notice of motion was filed by the
Department in appeal for condonation of delay on the ground that the office
objections could not be removed within the stipulated time in view of the
administrative difficulty including shortage of staff.

 

Rejecting the notice of motion, the
Bombay High Court held as under:

 

“The application for condonation
for delay was not bonafide as the applicant failed to remove the office
objections though it had secured extension of time on three occasions and the
affidavit offered no explanation as to what steps were taken by the Department
after the last extension to remove the office objections. The only reason made
out in the affidavit in support was administrative difficulty including
shortage of staff which could not be the reason for condonation of delay in the
absence of the same being particularised.”

REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW AND SECTION 35 AB

Issue for Consideration

Section 35 AB introduced by the Finance Act, 1985, w.e.f  1st April 1986, provides for
deduction of an amount paid towards any lump sum consideration for acquiring
know-how for the purposes of business in six equal annual instalments
commencing from the previous year in which the deductions is first allowed. The
relevant part contained in s/s. (1) reads as ; “S. 35AB. Expenditure on
know-how. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), where the assessee
has paid in any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or
before the 1st day of April, 1998 any lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how for use for the purposes of his business, one-sixth of
the amount so paid shall be deducted in computing the profits and gains of the
business for that previous year, and the balance amount shall be deducted in
equal instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years.”

 

The term ‘know-how’ is exhaustively defined vide an
Explanation to the section to mean any industrial information or technique
likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of
mine, oil, etc.

 

Prior to the insertion of section 35AB, an expenditure of
revenue nature, incurred on know-how, was allowed as deduction u/s. 37 of the
Income tax Act. A capital expenditure on know-how was not allowable as a
deduction and its treatment was governed by the other provisions of the Income
tax Act. With insertion of section 35AB, a capital expenditure became eligible
for deduction, subject to compliance of the prescribed conditions, in the
manner specified in the section.

Section 37 provides for a deduction of any expenditure laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business or
profession, in full, provided it is not in the nature of a capital expenditure
or personal expenses of the assessee and further that the expenditure is not in
the nature of the one described in section 30 to section 36 of the Act. 

 

Section 35 AB while opening a door for deduction of a capital
expenditure fuelled a new controversy, perhaps unintentionally, involving the
denial of 100% deduction to a revenue expenditure on know-how which was
hitherto allowable. It is the stand of the Revenue authorities that with the
introduction of section 35AB, the deduction for an expenditure on know-how, of
any nature, would be governed strictly by the new provision and be allowed in
six instalments and would not be allowed u/s. 37 as was the case before
insertion of the specific provision. Like any provision, a new one in
particular, section 35AB became a highly debatable provision not on one count
but on various counts. The related issues that arose, besides the issue of
identification of the relevant provision of the Act under which the deduction
for the revenue expenditure is allowable, are whether it was necessary that the
assessee acquired ownership rights over the know-how and whether the condition
for ‘lump sum’ payment meant payment in one go or even in instalments.  

 

Various High Courts had occasion to examine these issues or
some of them, leading to a fierce controversy surrounding the eligibility of a
deduction, in full u/s. 37, of an expenditure on a know-how, otherwise of a
revenue nature. The Madras, MP and the Bombay High Courts decided the issue in
favour of the Revenue by denying the deduction u/s. 37 and the Gujarat,
Karnataka and Punjab & Haryana High Courts favoured the deduction u/s. 37
for such an expenditure, incurred on know-how, in favour of the assessee. On
the issue of ‘lump sum’ payment , the Bombay High Court in two cases held that
the payment in instalments would not cease to be lump sum. The High Court also
decided that for application of section 35AB , it is not necessary to be an
owner of the know-how.

  

Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case 

The issue arose in the case of DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd., 57 taxmann.com 173 (Guj.)
for A.Y 1990-91, 1992-93 and
1993-94. While admitting one of the appeals, the following substantial
questions of law arose for the determination of the court; “Whether,
the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law and on facts in confirming the
order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (A) who held that the expenditure under
consideration was revenue in nature and allowable u/s 37 of the Act
disregarding the special provisions of sec.35AB?”

 

The Gujarat High Court at the outset noted that an identical
question had arisen before them in another appeal of the assessee for A.Y.
1989-90 numbered 326 of 2000 decided on 03.07.2012 , not otherwise reported,
and chose to reproduce the facts, pleadings, law and even the decision therein
to finally conclude, in the cases before them, that the provisions of section
35 AB were not applicable to the case of a revenue expenditure which was
allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. The facts and the sequence of events of the case
is therefore not available in the judgement and therefore the facts, pleadings
and the outcome of the case heavily relied upon by the court are placed and
considered here as had been done by the court.  

 

The assessee in that case, a company engaged in manufacturing
of starch and other similar products, during the year under consideration
relevant to assessment year 1989-90, paid 
the technical know-how and service fees, totalling to a sum of
Rs.23,23,880 and claimed deduction thereof in full as the revenue expenditure.
The assessee had contended that the provisions of section 35AB of the Act were
applicable only in respect of the capital expenditure and not in respect of the
revenue expenditure. The assessee further contended that the company while
acquiring such know-how, obtained no ownership right on such information and
know-how was furnished by the foreign company to the assessee under an
agreement. The assessee also contended that such technical know-how was for the
purpose of production of its existing items which are being manufactured by the
assessee company since many years.

 

The AO held that such expenditure fell within section 35AB of
the Act. The AO, did not accept the contentions of the assessee, though agreed
that such expenditure was revenue in nature and was covered within section 35AB of the Act and were to be amortised, as provided under the said
section, by spreading the benefit over a period of six years. Dissatisfied with
such a decision of the AO, the assessee carried the matter in appeal. Before
the CIT (Appeals), the assessee in addition to contending that a revenue
expenditure could not be brought under the ambit of section 35AB of the Act,
further contended that the provision of section 35AB of the Act was an enabling
provision, introduced to facilitate the deduction for a capital expenditure.

 

The CIT (A) rejected the assessee’s appeal as he was of the
opinion that section 37(1) of the Act, which covered expenditure not being in
the nature of the expenditure described in sections 30 to 36, would not apply
in the case by virtue of the provisions contained in section 35AB of the Act.
He held that since section 35AB of the Act made a specific provision to treat
the expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how by way of lump
sum payment and that even if such a payment was revenue in nature, it would not
fall within sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Act.

 

On a further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal reversed
the decisions of the revenue authorities. The Tribunal noted that as per the
agreement, all information and know-how furnished by the foreign company
remained the property of that company; the payment was made as a lump sum
consideration for use of the know-how, only, for the purpose of its running
business, for a limited period. The Tribunal noted that undisputedly, there was
no purchase of the know-how from the foreign company. The Tribunal held that
the case of the assessee was not covered u/s.35AB of the Act and that section
35AB had no application in the case and the assessee was entitled to deduction
u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In the appeal to the High Court, by the Revenue, it was
contended that the Tribunal committed grave error in allowing the assessee’s
appeal; that section 35AB of the Act was widely worded and included any
expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how and that  the concept of ownership was not material for
section 35AB; that once an expenditure, whether revenue or capital, was covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act then by virtue of the  language of sub-section
(1) of section 37 of the Act, the assessee could not claim any benefit thereof
u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical
Products Ltd., reported in 259 ITR 582
, wherein a division bench of the
Madras High Court had held that during the period when section 35AB of the Act
remained effective, any expenditure towards acquisition of know-how,
irrespective of whether it was a capital or a revenue expenditure, was to be
treated only in accordance with section 35AB and the deduction allowable in
respect of such know-how was 1/6th of the amount paid as lump sum consideration
for acquiring know-how. The Revenue relying on the decision of the MP High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bright Automotives and
Plastics Ltd.,
reported in 273 ITR 59 further contended that in
order to attract the rigour of section 35AB of the Act, it was not necessary
for the assessee to actually become an absolute owner of the know-how and also
that the nature of expenditure whether revenue or capital, was of no
consequence.

 

The assessee in response contended that the expenditure in
question was purely revenue in nature and the same was, therefore, not covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act; that the said provision was made to encourage acquisition
of know-how to improve the quality and efficiency of Indian manufacturing; that
the assessee had acquired the know-how for a limited period and had never
enjoyed any ownership or domain right over the know-how; that the know-how was
utilised for manufacturing of its existing items and that neither any new
manufacturing unit was established nor new item of manufacturing was
introduced. It was pointed out that even the AO agreed that the expenditure in
question was a revenue expenditure; that section 35AB of the Act had no
application to such an expenditure since the provision of section 35AB was an
enabling provision that was not introduced to limit the benefits which were
already existing. Attention was also drawn to the C.B.D.T. Circular No.421
dated 12.6.1985
wherein with respect to deduction in respect of an
expenditure on know-how, it was clarified that, the provision was inserted with
a view to providing encouragement for indigenous scientific research. Heavy
reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd., 309 ITR 443
in which the Apex Court
had an occasion to examine the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court noted that the AO himself had accepted
that the expenditure in question was of revenue nature and that the circular
No. 421 confirmed that the provisions of section 35AB were enabling provision
and if that be so, the deduction of such expenditure could not be limited by
applying section 35AB of the Act. The Court took note of the facts in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s case
and also of the decision therein and observed as under;
“The Apex Court decision would suggest that for determining whether certain expenditure
would fall within section 35AB or not, it would be important to examine the
nature of the expenditure. If it is found that the same is revenue in nature,
the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act would not arise. On
the other hand, if it is found to be capital in nature, then the question of
amortisation and spreading over, as contemplated under section 35AB of the Act
would come into play.”

 

The Court held that such provision, as was clarified by the
C.B.D.T, was made with a view to providing encouragement for indigenous
scientific research; that such statutory provision was made for making
available the benefits which were hitherto not available to the manufacturers
while incurring expenditure for acquisition of technical know-how; that to the
extent such expenditure was covered u/s. 35AB, amortised deduction spread over
six years was made available; that where such expenditure was capital in
nature, prior to introduction of section 35AB of the Act, no such deduction
could be claimed; that with introduction of section 35AB, to encourage
indigenous scientific research, such deduction was made available; that such a
provision could not be seen as a limiting provision restricting the existing
benefits of the assessee. In other words the revenue expenditure in the form of
acquisition of technical know-how, which was available as deduction u/s. 37(1)
of the Act, was never meant to be disallowed or taken away or limited by
introduction of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court also cited with approval the paragraph
from the Ninth Edition, Volume-I of Kanga & Palkhivala, while
explaining the provisions of section 35AB of the Act, : “This section
allows deduction, spread over six years, of a lump sum consideration paid for
acquiring know-how for the purposes of business even if later the assessee’s
project is abandoned or if such know-how subsequently becomes useless or if the
same is returned. The section, which is an enabling section and not a disabling
one, should be confined to that consideration which would otherwise be
disallowable as being on capital account. A payment for acquiring know-how or
the use of know-how which is on revenue account is allowable under section 37,
and does not attract the application of this section at all.”

 

The High Court concluded that the provisions of section 35AB
of the Act could apply only in case of a capital expenditure and would not
apply to a revenue expenditure even if the same was incurred for acquisition of
technical know-how and the deduction thereof could not be curtailed or limited
by applying section 35AB.A revenue expenditure remained within the ambit of
section 37(1) of the Act. The Court observed that it was unable to concur with
the view of the Madras High Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. (supra)
, which was in any case rendered
prior to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra).

 

Accordingly, the Gujarat High Court, in the case before it,
in appeal, in Anil Starch Ltd.’s case, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal
holding that the provisions of section 35AB did not apply to an expenditure
which otherwise was of a revenue nature. In deciding the case, the High Court
followed the ratio of the decisions in the cases of DCIT vs. Sayaji
Industries Ltd. 82 CCH 412
and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Diffusion
Engineers Ltd. vs. DCIT, 376 ITR 487.

 

Standard Batteries Ltd.’s case

Recently the issue came up for consideration, before the
Bombay High Court, in the case of Standard Batteries Ltd. vs. CIT, 255
Taxman 380 (Bom.).
The assessee, in that case, had entered into an
agreement with ‘O’, UK, in terms of which, the assessee was to receive outside
India a license to transfer and import information, know-how, advice,
materials, documents and drawings as required for the manufacture of miners’
cap lamp batteries and stationery batteries for a lump sum consideration paid
in three equal instalments, where the permission was only to use the know-how
and information without transfer of ownership. The assessee claimed deduction
in respect of the said payment u/s. 37(1). The AO however, rejected the claim
of the assessee but allowed deduction to the extent of 1/6th of the amount
spent and claimed, and the balance amount was to be deducted in equal
instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years in terms
of section 35AB.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee had acquired the
ownership rights in the technical know-how and accordingly the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s. 35AB, and not u/s. 37(1) as was claimed by the
assessee.

 

On appeal by the assessee to the High Court, the three
aspects before the Court were about the application of section 35 AB to the
case where; (i) a revenue expenditure was incurred (ii) payment was made in
instalments and (iii) the assessee was not an owner of the rights or asset for
an effective application of section 35AB.  

 

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the expenditure
for receipt of technical know-how would 
not fall u/s. 35AB of the Act but would appropriately fall u/s. 37 of
the Act for the following reasons;

 

(a)  Section 35AB of the Act
required a lump sum consideration to be paid for acquiring any technical
know-how, while in the case before the Court admittedly payment was made in 3
instalments, therefore could not be regarded as a lump sum payment and as such
was therefore, outside the scope of section 35AB of the Act;

 

(b)  There was no acquisition of a technical
know-how in the facts of the case, as the applicant merely obtained a lease /
license of the rights to use such technical know-how; not having any ownership
rights over the technical know-how, the requirement of acquiring the know-how
u/s. 35AB of the Act was not satisfied and was thus, outside the mischief of
section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c)  The technical know-how
obtained by the applicant under the agreement dated 19th June, 1984
was to be used in the regular course of its business of manufacturing batteries
and therefore, would be revenue in nature; section 35AB would apply only where
the expenditure was in the nature of a capital expenditure; the expenditure for
obtaining technical know-how being of revenue nature, would fall in the
residuary section 37 of the Act.

                       

In response, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue, that
:—

 

(a)  The payment made in three equal instalments
continued to be a lump sum payment;

 

(b) Section 35AB of the Act, did not require
obtaining ownership of the technical know-how; the license to use the know-how
by itself would be covered by the words “consideration paid for acquiring
any know-how”; there was no basis for restricting the plain meaning of the
word “acquiring” in section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c) The applicant had used the technical know-how
so obtained in its business and on plain interpretation of section 35AB of the
Act, it would apply; it did not exclude revenue expenditure from its purview,
as there was no requirement in section 35AB that the same would be available
only if the expenditure was of a capital nature and not if it was revenue in
nature: that wherever the legislature wanted to restrict the benefit in respect
of the deduction claimed of expenditure dependent upon its nature, described in
sections 30 to 36 of the Act, it specifically provided so therein as was in
sections 35A and 35ABB of the Act;

 

(d) In any event, section 37 of the Act excluded
expenditure of a nature described in sections 30 to 36 from the purview of s.
37 of the Act; section 35AB fell within sections 30 to 36 and therefore, no
occasion to apply section 37 of the Act would arise;

 

Relying on the decision of the Court in the case of CIT
vs. Raymond Ltd., 209 Taxman 154 (Bom.)
, the Court held that merely because
the payments were made in instalments for using the technical know-how, it
would not cease to be a lump sum payment where the amount payable was fixed and
not variable more so when the words used in section 35AB were ‘lump sum’
payment and not a one time payment. Therefore, making of lump sum payment in 3
instalments would not make the payment any less a lump sum payment.

 

On the issue of the need to be an owner of know-how, the
assessee reiterated that the word ‘acquiring’ as used in section 35AB would
necessarily mean, acquisition of ownership rights of the technical know-how;
that a mere lease / license, would not amount to acquisition of technical
know-how as per the dictionary meaning of the word “acquisition”. The
Court however held that the dictionary meaning relied upon did not exclude the
cases of obtaining any knowledge or a skill, as was in the case before them or
technical know-how for a limited use. It held that the gaining of knowledge was
complete / acquired by transfer of know-how and the limited use of it would not
detract the same from being included in the scope and meaning of the word
acquisition; that the word “acquisition” as defined in the larger
sense even in the Oxford Dictionary referred to above, would cover the use of
technical knowledge know-how by the applicant assessee which was made available
to it; thus, the restricted meaning of the word ‘acquisition’ to mean ‘only
obtaining rights on ownership’ was not the plain meaning in English language
and obtaining of technical know-how under a license would also amount to
acquiring know-how as the words ‘on ownership basis’ were completely absent in
section 35AB(1) of the Act. The Court held that accepting the contention of the
applicant, would necessarily lead to adding the words ‘by ownership’ after the
word ‘acquiring’ in section 35AB(1) of the Act, which addition was not
permitted while interpreting a fiscal statute.

 

On the main issue of allowability u/s. 37, it was reiterated
that the technical know-how which had been obtained was used in the regular
course of its business of manufacturing batteries and it would necessarily be
in the nature of revenue expenditure, allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance
was placed upon the decisions of Gujarat High Court in DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd. 232
Taxman 129 and DCIT vs. Sayaji Industries Ltd. 82
CCH 412 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers
Ltd. vs. DCIT 376 ITR 487
, to contend that the issue stood concluded in
favour of the company for the reason that while dealing with an identical
situation, the courts in the above referred three cases, have held that section
35AB of the Act would not be applicable where the expenses were of revenue
nature, and the expenditure was deductible u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In contrast, the Revenue reiterated that section 37 of the
Act itself excluded expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36
without any qualification as was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT
vs. Bright Automotives & Plastics Ltd. 273 ITR 59
and the Madras High
Court in CIT vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. 259 ITR 582. That the
courts in those cases had held that the expenditure incurred for acquiring technical
know-how would fall u/s. 35AB of the Act irrespective of the fact that the
expenditure was revenue in nature.

 

On due consideration of the submission of the parties , the
Bombay High Court held as under;

 

  •      The submission that the expenditure in
    question be allowed u/s. 37 could not be accepted for the reason that section
    35AB of the Act itself specifically provided that any expenditure incurred for
    acquiring know-how for the purposes of the assessee’s business be allowed under
    that section; that as detailed in the Explanation thereto the know-how to
    assist in the manufacturing or processing of goods would necessarily mean that
    any expenditure on know-how which was used for the purposes of carrying on
    business would stand covered by section 35AB of the Act.

 

  •      Section 37 of the Act itself excluded
    expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 of the Act without any
    qualification.

 

  •      On examination of sections 30 to 36 to find
    whether any of them restricted the benefit to
    only capital expenditure, it was found that section 35AB of the Act made no
    such exclusion / inclusion on the basis of the nature of expenditure i.e.
    capital or revenue. In fact, wherever the parliament sought to restrict the benefit
    on the basis of nature of expenditure falling u/s. 30 to 36 of the Act, it
    specifically so provided  viz. section
    35A which was introduced  along with
    section 35AB of the Act w.e.f. assessment year 1986-87. In fact, later sections
    35ABA and 35ABB have also provided for deduction thereunder only for a capital
    expenditure .

 

  •      Wherever the Parliament sought to restrict
    the expenditure falling within sections 30 to 36 only to a capital expenditure,
    the same was expressly provided for in the section concerned. To illustrate,
    section 35A and 35ABB of the Act have specifically restricted the benefits
    thereunder only to a capital expenditure.

 

  •      In the above view, submission on behalf of
    the assessee that section 35AB of the Act would apply only to the case of a
    capital expenditure and exclude the revenue expenditure, required adding words
    to s. 35AB which the legislature had specifically not put in; the court could
    not insert words while interpreting the fiscal legislation in the absence of
    any ambiguity in reading of section as it stood; thus, even if technical
    know-how was revenue in nature, yet it would be excluded from the provisions of
    section 37 of the Act.




The Court took note of the fact that Gujarat High Court in Anil
Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s
case (supra) did not agree with the view of the M.P. High Court in Bright
Automotives & Plastics Ltd.’s
case (supra) and of the Madras
High Court in Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s case (supra). It also
noted that the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case
(supra)
did not agree with the view of the Madras High Court in Tamil
Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s
case (supra). Having taken note, it
observed that the basis of all the above referred three decisions was the
subsequent decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd.  301 ITR 284. It further noted that the
above case before the Apex Court arose from the decision of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, wherein it was held
that payments made on account of the royalty would be deductible u/s. 37 and
not u/s 35AB of the Act; that the Apex Court had restored the issue to the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, by way of remand; that the Apex Court directed
that the High Court should first decide whether the expenditure incurred on
royalty would be capital or revenue in nature at the very threshold before
deciding the applicability of section 35AB or 37 of the Act.

 

The Court also observed that the Apex Court, while restoring
the issue, had clearly recorded that it had not expressed any opinion on the
matter and on the question whether the expenditure was revenue or capital in
nature and had instead, depending on the answer to that question, directed the
High Court to decide the applicability of section 35AB, and had kept all
contentions on both sides expressly open.

 

The entire issue, in the opinion of the Bombay High Court,
about whether section 35AB applied only in case of capital expenditure and not
in case of revenue expenditure had not been decided by the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) and was left to be decided by the Punjab
& Haryana High Court on the basis of the fresh submissions to be made by
the respective parties. It was clear to the High Court that the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) had not concluded the issue by holding
that section 35AB would apply only in cases where the expenditure was capital in
nature. Instead the Apex Court had expressed only a tentative view and the
issue itself was left open to be decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on remand.

 

The Bombay High Court importantly held that the reliance by
the Gujarat High Court in Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s case (supra) and by the Karnataka
High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case (supra), on the
Apex Court decision in Swaraj Industries Ltd.’s case (supra), to
hold that an expenditure which was revenue in nature would not fall u/s. 35AB
and would have necessarily to fall u/s. 37 of the Act, was not warranted by the
decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case (supra).
Hence, the Bombay High Court was unable to agree with the decisions of the
Gujarat High Court and the Karnataka High Court, in as much as the Apex Court
had not conclusively decided the issue and left it open for the Punjab &
Haryana High Court to adjudicate upon the said issue.

 

Observations

That the expenditure of revenue nature on acquiring know-how
is eligible for deduction u/s. 37 in full, prior to insertion of section 35AB,
was a position in law that was well settled by several decisions of the courts,
and in particular, the decisions in the cases of Ciba of India Ltd.69 ITR
692(SC), IAEC(Pumps) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR 337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC).
In contrast, the expenditure of
capital nature on know-how was not eligible for deduction u/s. 37, prior to
insertion of section 35AB, in as much as the section itself prohibited
deduction of an expenditure of a capital nature, though in the above referred
cases, the deduction was held to be allowable even where the expenditure
resulted in some enduring benefits.

 

This settled position in law was disturbed by the
introduction of section 35AB. With its introduction, the deduction for all
expenses on know-how, capital or revenue, was governed by the provisions of
section 35AB, was the understanding of the Revenue, a stand that was not
supported by the comments of the leading jurists published in the 9th
edition of the book titled Kanga & Palkhivala’s Law and Practice of
Income tax.
In contrast, tax payers hold that the insertion of section 35
AB had not changed the settled position for deduction in full u/s. 37 of the
Act for an expenditure of revenue nature.

 

Both the views, as noted, are supported by the conflicting
decisions of about six High Courts where some of the decisions are delivered in
favour of the taxpayers on the ground that the issue has already been settled
by the Apex Court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd.(supra) while
recently the Bombay High Court held to the contrary, leading to one more
controversy involving whether the Apex Court really adjudicated the issue for
good or it has left the issue open.

  

It is perhaps not difficult to decide whether the Supreme
court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra), at all concluded the
issue under consideration and if yes, was the conclusion arrived at in favour of
the proposition that the provisions of section 35AB applied only where the
expenditure in question was of capital nature. The Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case had noted, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision, that there was a
considerable amount of confusion whether the AO in the case before him applied
section 35AB at all and whether the said contention regarding applicability of
section 35AB was at all raised. The court had further observed that the order
of the AO was not clear, principally, because the order was focussed only one
point namely, on the nature of expenditure. It further observed that depending
on the answer to the said question, the applicability of section 35AB needed to
be considered; the said question needed to be decided authoritatively by the
High Court as it was an important question of law, particularly, after
insertion of section 35AB. The Court therefore remitted the matter to the High
Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. It also clarified, in
para 7, on the second question, that “we do not wish to express any opinion.
It is for the High Court to decide, after construing the agreement between the
parties, whether the expenditure is revenue or capital in nature and, depending
on the answer to that question, the High Court will have to decide the
applicability of section 35AB of the Income-tax Act. On this aspect we keep all
contentions on both sides expressly open”
. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh
consideration in accordance with law.

 

It seems that the
confusion has arisen out of the following observations of the Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case
, wherein it stated that “At the same time, it is important to note
that even for the applicability of section 35AB, the nature of expenditure is
required to be decided at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to
be revenue in nature, then section 35AB may not apply. However, if it is found
to be capital in nature, then the question of amortisation and spread over, as
contemplated by section 35AB, would certainly come into play. Therefore, in our
view, it would not be correct to say that in this case, interpretation of section
35AB was not in issue.”
These observations, made mainly to emphasise that
the decision of the High Court required to be set aside for further
examination, has been construed differently by the High Courts, some to support
the proposition that section 35AB had no application to an expenditure that was
held to be of revenue nature. In fact, in the said case, when the matter had
reached the High Court, it was dismissed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on an altogether different aspect of section 35AB which is not under
consideration, presently. The High Court in that case had held and observed
that effort of the revenue to bring the expenditure within the domain of
section 35AB was totally misplaced, since the pre-condition for application of
section 35AB was that the payment had to be a lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how and such pre-condition was not satisfied. On that basis,
the High Court had dismissed the appeal. It was this decision of the High Court
which had come up for consideration of the Apex Court . We respectfully submit
that the decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, has
not concluded that a revenue expenditure was outside the scope of section 35AB
. It has instead left this aspect of the issue open for a fresh consideration,
as has been explained by the Bombay High Court in Standard Batteries Ltd.’s
case.
 

Having noted the facts, the issue requires to be analysed on
the basis of;

 

  •     implication of the decisions favouring the
    claim for deduction u/s. 37

 

  •     an understanding of the position prevailing
    prior to insertion of section 35 AB,

 

  •     legislative intent behind introduction of
    section 35AB,

 

  •     whether section 35AB is an enabler or
    disabler,

 

  •     language of section 35AB and its scope , and

 

  •     restriction in section 37 .

 

We very respectfully submit that the decisions favouring the
claim u/s. 37, based simply on the perceived findings of the Apex Court in Swaraj
Machines Ltd.‘s
case, may not hold any force, in view of our considered
opinion that the Apex Court had, in that case, not adjudicated the issue but
had instead set aside the matter and restored the same to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court. If that is so, the decisions of the courts holding that the
deduction for expenses is governed by section 35AB alone become the only
available decisions of the High Courts leaving no controversy on the subject.
The best hope for the taxpayer is to await the decision of the Apex Court on
the subject. The issue till such time remains not concluded but the one on which
no other High Court has decided in favour of the tax payer after examining the
merits of the case.

 

The legal position, prevailing prior to insertion of section
35AB by the Finance Act, 1985, is cleared by the decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that an expenditure, on acquisition of know-how, of revenue nature is
eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act, once it was incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of the business and the expenditure in question
was not of a capital nature or for personal purposes. Ciba of India Ltd.69
ITR 692(SC), IAEC(Pumps ) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR
337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC) to name a few
wherein the deduction u/s 37 was held to be allowable for an expenditure incurred
on technical know-how acquisition even where the expenditure resulted in some
enduring benefit to the payer.

 

The CBDT circular No. 421 dated 12.6.1985, vide paragraphs
15.1 to 15.3
explains the intention behind the insertion of the new
provision in the form of section 35AB which is for providing further
encouragement for indigenous scientific research. The memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 1985 and the Notes thereon have been reiterated
by the circular. They together do not throw any light about the scope of the
new provision, nor about the intention to override the existing understanding,
nor the available decisions on the subject. If that had been the intent, the
same is not expressed by the supporting documents.

 

Ideally from the tax payers angle, the provision of section
35AB should be construed to be an enabling provision that facilitates the
deduction for a capital expenditure hitherto not available before its
introduction and its scope should be restricted to that. Its insertion should
not be taken as a disabling provision leading to a disentitlement not expressly
provided for nor intended. 

Section 35AB in its language does not limit the deduction to
the case of an expenditure that is capital in its nature. It also does not
expressly provide that a revenue expenditure on acquisition of know-how will
fall for deduction only u/s. 35AB. Neither does it provide that such an
expenditure will not qualify for deduction u/s. 35AB and thereby strengthening
the claim for deduction u/s. 37. Useful reference may be made to the provisions
of section 35A and section 35ABA and section 35ABB which specifically apply
only to the cases of capital expenditures.

 

Section 37 grants deduction for any and all types of
expenditures wholly and exclusively for business purposes, other than those
described under sections 30 to 36 of the Act. The true intent and meaning of
the words ‘not being the expenditure described in s.30 to 36’ placed in
s/s. (1) was examined in various cases by the courts over a period of time. It
has been held by the High Courts, including by the full benches of courts, that
section 37 is a residuary provision and can be activated only where it is found
not to be covered by any of the provisions of section 30 to section 36. If it
is covered by any of those provisions, then the deduction cannot be granted
under the residual section 37. It will be so even where the conditions
prescribed under sections 30 to 36 remain to be satisfied. The use of the term ‘described’
as against the terms ‘covered’ or ‘of the nature covered by or
prescribed in
’ is equally intriguing.

 

If the expenditure on know-how does not satisfy the
conditions of the lump sum payment and of the acquisition, then, in that case,
provisions of section 35AB would have no application. The deduction in such
cases would possibly be governed by the provisions of section 37, subject to
the satisfaction of the conditions satisfied therein. This view however is not
free from debate in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph.

 

Obviously, section 35 AB will have no application in cases
where the payment is not lump sum and is periodical or annual or is turnover
based, and the tax payer would be able to stake its claim u/s. 37, provided of
course that the payment is not of the capital nature. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. vs.
CIT, 335ITR 53 (Jhar.).

 

The Apex Court in the case of Drilcos (India) Pvt. Ltd.vs.
CIT, 348 ITR 382
has held that once section 35AB had come into play,
section 37 had no role to play. This decision of the court, delivered
subsequently to Swaraj Machines’ case, may play an important role in
addressing the outcome of the issue on hand. The Apex Court, in Drilcos’
case,
confirmed the decision of the Madras High Court reported in 266
ITR 12
, on an appeal by the company challenging the order of the High
Court. The High Court had held that the provisions of section 35AB encompassed
in its scope the case of a revenue expenditure, following the decision in the
case of Tamil Nadu Chemicals Products Ltd.(supra).

 

While the controversy continues for the past,
the position is now clear with effect from 1.10.1998. A ‘know-how’ is expressly
included in the definition of an intangible asset with effect from 1.10.1998
and is accordingly made eligible for depreciation. Obviously, no depreciation
would be claimed or allowed in respect of a revenue expenditure on know-how,
and with that, such an expenditure, on discontinuation of section 35AB w.e.f
1.04.1998, would be eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

BCAJ SURVEY ON CHALLENGES FACED BY PRACTITIONERS – AUGUST 2018

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick survey of professional
services firms to identify challenges faced by them. Respondents were asked to
rank the challenges faced by them.

 

Attributes of the respondents:

A>   Location and
Presence

        76%
respondents had presence in Metros and about 22% in both Metros and Non Metros.

B>   Size of
Firms

        18%
respondents were proprietors, 34% came from firms having 2-4 partners, 16% from
5-9 partner firms and 32% belonged to firms having more than 10 partners.

C>   Years in
Practice

        Only 5% respondents were in practice for
less than 10 years and another 4% were in practice for more than 10 years but
less than 20 years. Nearly 11% respondents were in practice between 20 to 30
years. Maximum respondents – 80% belonged to practices older than 30 years.

 

Challenges

Out of twelve challenges posed
before the respondents, the biggest challenges were as under:

Ranking

Nature of Challenge

Percentage of Respondents giving this ranking

1

Finding and
Retaining Staff

65%

2

Identifying
and Developing New Service Lines

60%

3

Motivating
Staff

54%

4

Business
Development and Getting New Work

54%

5

New
Regulations and Standards

53%

6

Training and
Enhancing Productivity

46%

7

Fees Pressure
and Pricing of Services

43%

8

Strategic
Focus

43%

9

Coping with
Automation

39%

10

Delivering
High Quality Services

36%

11

Losing clients
to competition

33%

12

Networking
with likeminded professionals

24%

 

 

Additional comments and challenges stated by respondents:

i.    Increasing level of compliance;

ii.   Frequent changes in regulations;

iii.   Skills of new Chartered Accountants are low;

iv.  Cost and Quality mismatch of staff;

v.   Unreasonable expectations of regulators;

vi.  Mid-sized firms becoming training schools for
larger firms;

vii.  Perception, that practice is difficult;

viii. Clients not able to keep up with applicable
changes

View and Counterview

Professional Practice: Is it all about size?

 

Is size the pre dominant criteria
for professional services firms (PSF)? There are niche firms and then there are
those mammoth full service firms. Some focus on the markets that require size,
scale and spread, while many others focus on select clients and hyper focused
personalised services. What are the pros and cons? Is one better than the
other? Is size, distribution and scale greater than niche, personalised and
boutique? 

 

This sixth VIEW and COUNTERVIEW
tells the story from both perspectives. Both writers have been on both the
sides and in practice for decades. They share their perspectives from two
vantage points, so that the reader can get the whole picture.

 

VIEW: It is not all about size!

 

Ketan Dalal
Chartered
Accountant

 

Life is becoming increasingly
complex and it is very difficult to have one view without having a counterview
to any dimension of life, and the subject of this article is no exception.
Whether it is from the perspective of an experienced professional(s) or clients,
it is a very tricky choice! The purpose of this view is to bring out the
critical dimensions of size vs. niche and to discuss the case for niche
practice in certain circumstances.

 

What is Size?

To get a perspective, the global
network revenue of the smallest of the Big 4 entity would be in excess of USD
26.5 bn and the largest would be close to USD 39 bn (i.e. anywhere between Rs.
1,85,000 cr to Rs. 2,70,000 cr). As a global network, all of them employ in
excess of 1,80,000 people going up to 2,65,000 people. That’s size and scale!
As far as India is concerned, all of them in some form or the other would
employ between 8,000 – 15,000 people (excluding employees of global network
deployed in Indian operations, usually a back office); India contributes
anywhere between 1% to 2% percent of the global network revenue. Being a part
of such a global network enables professionals to access global knowledge,
global resources and global practices and also provides potentially significant
opportunities for global growth.

 

The big issue!

A key issue faced by the majority
of small-sized firms is the spectrum of services that it seeks to provide with
relatively limited skills and relatively limited strength. For example,
consider a 30-40 people firm seeking to do audit, tax and consulting work. It
would be very difficult for such a firm to make any meaningful impact in each
service line, since the size of the firm and levels of complexities involved
are unaligned. In fact, even if one looks at tax as a subject, it is an ocean
in itself; the complexity of international tax vis-à-vis domestic tax, the
depth of knowledge required for GST, the developments in the field of transfer
pricing such as CbCR, APA etc., means that each sub-domain itself can
constitute a practice and therefore, even the word ‘tax’ is fairly broad for a
small firm to meaningfully handle. While professional organisations of all
sizes are grappling to tackle the issue of complexity vis-à-vis specialised
skill sets in some form or the other, however, as Indian companies grow in size
and sophistication, the quality of the services and depth of knowledge required
to service them will still demand significant upgradation.

 

If one takes the example of audit,
there is not only statutory audit and internal audit, but there is Information
Technology audit, forensic audit, due diligence and others, and each of these
segments requires very distinct skill sets.

 

Another example beyond the usual
professional practice is consulting- another ocean in itself; there is strategy
consulting, which is very different from operations consulting, whereas
technology consulting and human resource consulting are two different worlds!
Within each are again various dimensions, and clients are now seeking experts
who understand their specific needs, rather than talking to generalists.

 

Significance of sector knowledge

Additionally, and very crucially,
an important aspect is sectoral knowledge. Most sizeable firms have sector
specialist teams. A few important examples where sectoral knowledge is
particularly important are financial services (within which banking, insurance
and private equity are sectors in themselves), infrastructure (where roads,
ports, power and airports are again sectors in themselves), shipping and
logistics (shipping being again different from logistics and logistics, in turn
has different sub-sectors such as CFS, warehousing, third party logistics
etc.), real estate, FMCG and several others. Clients in each such sector often
require professionals to have detailed sectoral knowledge to service them. A
comparison that always comes to my mind when I look at these sectors is
cuisine- a few years back, one used to think of going to a restaurant, but
today one first wants to first think about specific cuisine – is it Oriental,
Continental, etc., and amongst Oriental, is it Chinese or Japanese and so on…

 

The bottom line is that
specialisation, in terms of both domain and sector, is extremely important and,
to some extent inevitable, in client servicing. To put it in perspective,
knowledge needs to be deeper as opposed to being broader, although this
approach itself has its own challenges – for the professional, for the client
and also the organisation.

 

Need for Niche!

Necessity is the mother of
invention! This statement cannot ring more truer for a niche/boutique firm
where the need for a niche is an outcome of the need to tackle the challenges
mentioned above, particularly the need for deeper skill sets and more
integrated thinking, as well as more senior level attention. Incidentally,
there is no clear definition of a niche/ boutique firm, nor there are specific
attributes to define a boutique firm, but they are obviously small in size and
typically operate in specific domains or sectors and offer specialised
services; for example, management consultancy, litigation support, transaction
support or valuation. Incidentally, the fact that, very often, a boutique firm
is established by a professional with a proven track record is a very
comforting factor for the client as well as potential employees.

 

One key issue in the context of a
niche/ boutique firm is that there may be a niche in the market, but is there a
market in the niche? To elaborate, there may be a niche for a practice, dealing
with say, co-operative societies, but from a revenue perspective, it may be
difficult to say that there is a market in the niche!

 

The philosophy of a boutique firm
is a critical aspect. Elements like the area of service, kind of work, types of
clients, people etc., are important facets of firm philosophy. For example,
whether to service comparatively smaller assignments or to service a few large
assignments is a matter of firms’ philosophy.

 

Let me elaborate some situations
where a boutique firm could be a more compelling proposition. 

 

  •    In the M&A structuring
    space, the complexity of tax issues and their interconnect with regulations
    (such as Companies Act, SEBI regulations, RBI regulations, stamp duty
    regulations etc.) very often makes a boutique M&A firm a very good choice
    from a client stand point. 

 

  •    Another example is that of
    litigation where going to a boutique firm or a counsel (as opposed to a large
    firm) will usually be far more advisable, especially due to focus and the
    relevant vast experience of different matters, their ability to present matters
    in a manner that makes arguments more compelling and their sheer familiarity
    with the eco system; in this situation, of course, the dearth of such boutique
    firms and counsels is a major
    limiting factor.

 

  •    Valuation, such as
    required for mergers and acquisition, where a boutique firm with valuation
    expertise could be a good choice; larger firms often tend to take much longer,
    the cost is usually higher and the caveats in the valuation report can
    sometimes create confusion and be difficult to explain to stakeholders who may
    perceive these caveats to be virtually disclaimers.

 

  •    Forensic audit, especially
    if needed by a smaller organisation, where a boutique firm could give more
    personalise attention and perhaps do the work at much lower cost.

 

  •    Internal audit: a boutique
    firm with internal audit expertise, especially where there is direct partner
    involvement at a much intense level can often be very valuable.

 

In some of the examples mentioned
above, such as that of M&A restructuring, tax litigation or valuation, the
boutique firm can possibly be even a 10-20 people firm or even smaller, but in
situations like, say, internal audit where client size is not very large (say
up to 300 cr to 400 cr), a small-sized internal audit boutique firm could often
do a good job. Obviously, this assessment has to be done by the client, but as
a general proposition, in most examples given above, a boutique firm can serve
the purpose better from a client standpoint.

 

Niche practice – the client dimension

Usually, big organisations with a
global network are better placed to service MNCs. In fact, with most large MNCs
already in India and a large number of smaller MNCs having entered into India,
often a need for boutique firms is faced by smaller companies, which may not be
MNCs in the true sense. In a sense, smaller MNCs or smaller foreign companies,
may find that, in the Indian context, a boutique Indian firm is easier to deal
with, provided it has the relevant expertise. A good example is that of regular
tax work where smaller foreign companies find that boutique firms can give them
more attention and very often, would be less expensive; another advantage is
quicker turnaround time and more customised advice.

 

A similar situation from a client
standpoint is that of a domestic client which can be again divided between the
very large ones (say top line of Rs. 10,000 cr and above), the large ones (say
Rs. 5,000 cr to Rs. 10,000 cr) and those below Rs. 5,000 cr. In the last
category, there could also be sub-segments and without going into needless
details, the point is that in the 3rd category (and very often, even
in the 2nd category), there is a significant need felt by Indian
clients for attention from senior advisors and that is where boutique firms can
play an important part; this is especially so where relatively small teams are
required to work on client matters, as opposed to the need of a large team
(examples have already been given above in terms of M&A structure,
valuations, forensic audits etc).  One
additional dimension is that Indian companies are often promoter driven and
they feel more comfortable dealing with a boutique firm where they are directly
talking to, and being serviced by, the founder(s) of that firm and where there
may be existing relations or easier to build relationships.

 

An important concern for any client
is confidentiality. For example, in assignments involving family arrangement or
succession planning, even with non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in place, the
potential exposure levels in a big organisation can be high, as such data/
information can be (and often is) accessed by multiple people for a variety of
internal reasons. This is again a reason why clients may choose to explore
retaining a boutique firm.

 

As such, as would be seen above,
there are several aspects of a professional service practice which necessitate
deeper expertise, more integrated thinking and personal attention; the ‘silo’
ecosystem of large firms often creates a challenge, in terms of integrated
advice, coordination and turnaround time.

 

Niche practice – the people dimension

From the perspective of
professionals who are evaluating between a boutique firm vis-à-vis a big
organisation, there are several aspects to be considered. A boutique firm often
offers an opportunity to work directly with a ‘grey-haired professional’, a
rare possibility while working in a big organisation. A niche/ boutique firm
provides a professional an integrated learning experience, more client facing
exposure, and importantly, understanding the approach and thought process of a
senior professional. As such, it offers young professionals a platform to defy
the “boxed thinking” approach and innovate. Yet another important dimension is
the fact that large organisations have stringent processes for client acceptances
and formalising assignments, and rightly so from their perspective; however, it
does reduce the time available for actual client work and therefore, learning
opportunity (alternatively, it lengthens the hours of work significantly!).
Needless to say, a key consideration would be the financial and non-financial
benefits which needs to be weighed while making the choice. Thus, depending
upon the above aspects of career trajectory that a professional is looking for,
the choice should be evaluated!

 

Concluding Thoughts

There are often two (if not more)
perspectives to everything possible and the above discussion, as I mentioned
earlier, is clearly not an exception! Having said that, a particular view
cannot be viewed in isolation; there needs to be a relative comparison between
the two viewpoints to come to any conclusion. What one should really evaluate
is how much of one outweighs the other in a ‘relative’ sense.

 

Clearly (as this view has
presumably brought out), there are several services needed by the business
community where niche/ boutique firms not only have an important role to play,
but indeed could be preferred over a big organisation.

 

counterVIEW: Full Service firms can deliver holistic solutions


Milind Kothari 

Chartered
Accountant



When the Accounting profession was
formalised by the ICAI Act, 1949, the expectations from Chartered Accountants
were largely centered around providing Audit or Accounting service. Also, with
the Income Tax Act nearing completion of 100 years, providing tax service also
has been a mainstay for our professional community. Back then, these services
were largely availed by individuals and small businesses.

 

In the past 25 years, India’s
economy has taken a definitive shape, more than any other time in its history;
the influx of MNCs post-liberalisation in 1990’s to win a slice of large
domestic market, becoming the services hub of the world, thanks to the
domination of Indian IT companies, shared service centers (‘SSC’) being set up
by large global corporations and so on. This has catapulted Indian economy to
bring it in the reckoning to become the 5th largest economy in the
world.

 

The global economy itself has
transformed rapidly with the epicenter shifting to internet-driven business
models and new businesses being created with supply-chain modeled on creating a
borderless world. While there has been a recent push-back to globalisation in
many countries reeling under staggering challenge of refugee-crisis, the
businesses seem unmindful of this rethink and it appears that globally
delivered business models are here to stay. There has been no better time in
the history to set up a global business in the shortest possible time than
today. 

 

Most business groups are globally
focused, technology dependent and most likely, confronting overdose of
introduction of new tax laws and regulations. The list of new regulations being
introduced at a rapid pace is quite extraordinary as the Government and
Regulators are also trying to cope with the change unleashed by technology. The
process of disruption has been quite severe on economies and companies that
were unwilling or could not embrace change. On the other hand, people loose
jobs as companies that provided jobs shut down or they are unable to reskill
themselves. The word ‘disruption’ has suddenly acquired a cult-status.

 

So why is the history and the
present state of economy relevant to Chartered Accountants? Needless to mention
but Chartered Accountants are required to follow the trend of the business to
remain relevant.

 

In the present scenario, the
expectations from our professionals have increased multi-fold. We need to
provide answers to all the questions that would arise from parallel play of
multiple tax laws, regulations and changes in the accounting standards, while
mindful of the business challenges of clients. We also need to understand the
new laws and regulations that emerge around ‘data’ (considered as the new
‘oil’). However, in reality, an average professional finds it hard to cope with
significant change sweeping our profession; new Indian accounting standards,
introduction to GST, insolvency and bankruptcy reforms, industry regulations
such as RERA, data privacy laws and the list goes on. Then again demand of our
clients for forensic services, cyber security solutions and tech-driven
services such as data analytics, big data, predictive analysis, data mining, is
unending. We need to realise that there is no finishing line for technological
progress.

 

In this rapidly changing world, how
are Chartered Accountants going to keep pace with change and remain relevant?
Will the conventional service model of Audit and Tax see us through for the
next several decades? Let’s deep-dive and assess the situation on the ground as
well as peek into the future that would unfold for us. Also, before we
recommend a professional to join a large professional services firm or pursue a
niche as two clear career options within the profession-fold, it would be good
to understand the DNA of both these options.

 

Like in business, the past few
decades have seen flourishing of large accounting firms globally. The large
professional services organisation working as a team, provide all answers to a
client through deep expertise and support the client across the globe. A
one-stop shop for all the needs! To get this right, they invest in top talent
(relatively easy to get as they pay well), use technology extensively, build
world-class infrastructure and are connected globally through their partner
firms in nearly every country. They are well-placed to cope with change as
their ability to adopt to new demands of services by clients is extraordinary
and therefore, also less at risk for becoming redundant. These firms are
thriving and getting bigger as their clients are getting richer and more
complex and need myriad of services.

 

On the other hand, professionals
with niche expertise deliver well for a small part of a large puzzle but are
unable to provide a holistic solution across varied demands of clients. Again,
like in business, the small and boutique firms are getting squeezed out of the
profession as they are unable to sustain the momentous challenges that they
face on nearly every front. Inability to attract top corporates as clients,
retaining existing client-base (audit rotation has played havoc with mid-sized
Indian accounting firms), coping with technology, fight a losing battle to
retain talent, inability to invest to remain relevant and most importantly,
coping with the constantly evolving landscape of professional opportunity with
ever-changing legal and regulatory framework; the list of woes is unending and
growing.

 

In the recent past, one has
witnessed several top-class professionals who were independent for most part of
their career and achieved excellence, only succumbing to join the large
accounting firms. While the demand from clients for service is becoming
complex, such professionals realise that it is impossible to provide a
well-rounded service across several laws and regulations more so, when they are
unable to retain talent. For traditional tax practice, competition is coming
from different directions; in-house tax teams, management consultancies,
software developers, the business information providers are all increasingly
interested in conducting tax work. The biggest challenge is coming from
technology service providers who are first of the block as Government introduce
digitisation like in the case of GST.

 

Over time, a niche service
provider, at best, becomes a trusted advisor to the promoter but not to the
company he has promoted. Individuals with niche are much more at risk as
changes in law hit them hardest for them to reinvent their expertise. The
recent phase-out of all indirect law with GST is the classic example. Their
ability to reskill themselves remains limited and their years of building expertise
on a subject suddenly becomes redundant because of change in law or technology
taking over.

 

In a very subject relevant
publication, ‘The Future of the Professions’ the authors, Richard and Daniel
Susskind examine how technology will transform the work of human experts. The
authors observe that for centuries, much professional work was handled in the
manner of a craft, individual experts and specialists – people who know more
than others and offered essentially bespoke services. Their research strongly suggests
that bespoke professional work in this vein looks set to fade from prominence.
They observe that for a long time, professionals found it important to have all
sorts of information at their fingertips; in books, technical papers and case
files. But they say that a different need is arising and this is for the
professionals to have mastery over massive bodies of data that bear on their
disciplines with the help of many technology tools. As the boundaries of the
professions blur and service becomes more focused on meeting client’s overall
needs, it is probable that multi-disciplinary practices will be formed and
re-establish themselves as commercially viable. In the book, the authors have
given considerable insight into the current and future state of audit and the
tax profession.

 

Lastly, the key question remains,
is it about me or about us? Niche practices have always been about ‘me’ and
therefore die with the professional at the helm, whereas the large accounting
firms is about ‘us’; they survive the founder and become an institution. It
consistently fulfills demands for jobs for well-qualified and smart
professionals. They also fulfill a social responsibility for a nation that is
so starved of jobs for the millennials.

 

The
rules of the games are changing. It is not about the sheer brilliance of an
individual like in a game of chess (remember Gary Kasparov losing to the Big
Blue in the late 90’s), but how we perform as a team like in football. The new
superstars that world recognises are footballers!

HR MANTRA FOR MID-SIZED FIRMS: ATTRACT – ENGAGE – GROW

There is no other resource like human resource. As clichéd as it might sound, it is true. It is the people of the business that make it work. Be it a multi-national, a SME or just a mom & pop shop at the corner of the street; it is an accepted fact that, the better the people running the business are, the higher the chances of it being more successful.

Here’s another fact: finding good talent is hard but retaining it is even harder.

This conundrum is faced by many businesses. While singling out one specific industry is unfair, this is majorly witnessed by businesses engaged in the service sector, and that is where all professional services belong; not just chartered accountancy firms. Rather, the need, concern and effectiveness of a talented pool of human resources for a chartered accounting firm becomes even more critical considering the responsibility, statutory obligations and the positioning that this profession carries.

In the current era, significant changes are observed in the manner and behaviour of chartered accounting firms while dealing with their employees. The sole objective is not just to retain them, but ensuring that the firm stays attractive enough to bring new talent on board. This issue to some extent may be diluted for firms with a brand name or muscle power, though let me assure you that these are the firms that not only have the highest spends but also the maximum attention by bringing in best global practices. But the question is, can we say the same for a mid-sized chartered accounting firm? Probably not. All the firms want to put together the most effective and efficient team possible, to support their clients. Thus, the issue of talent retention remains universal.

MOVING WITH THE TIMES

I read somewhere that “Agile isn’t just for tech anymore.” And how true is that! There was a time when students used to go from firm to firm applying for articleship, with a hope that they would get selected. However, the paradigm that applies to the service sector also applies to chartered accounting firms. These days, it is the firm that needs to be ‘interesting’ enough for the students to even apply for an articleship. The onus to showcase how good a firm is, lies with the HR of that firm, who goes with a marketing pitch to these students who are years away from being Chartered Accountants. And, it is the students who make a choice. This is a perfect example of changing times.

With the changing landscape of chartered accounting firms and an ever-raising bar of clients’ expectations; mid-sized chartered accounting firms have no option but to let go of the inertia related to people processes, which has been the practice so far. So, the agility of the firm and ability to bring this change is crucial. But isn’t it true that anything crucial is never easy? As the saying goes, “It’s easier said than done”. Now, let’s see how mid-sized firms can do it, rather achieve it.

In this article, I have attempted to cover the following three core aspects of HR that mid-sized chartered accounting firms should focus on. I have also elaborated how with limited means this can best be achieved.

1. Talent Management – which includes talent attraction as well as retention.

2. Team Efficiency – also means growth and sustainability of the team, which includes:

  • Performance Management Systems
  • Reward Mechanism
  • Mid-Career Crises

3. Aspects that help to build Firm Culture:

  • Work environment where performance is recognised
  • Standardisation through HR processes
  • Fun element to make the work place exciting

But before we go to the core, here are a few thoughts: does the firm have a vision which is translated into common objectives? Is the team aligned with these objectives? And what is the approach?

DRAWING A GAME PLAN

If you don’t know where you’re going, then you’ll never get there… and if you don’t set the bar high enough, you’ll never live up to your potential.

It is essential for every firm to have a goal, which is well understood by every stakeholder in the firm. Some organisations call it ‘target’, some call it ‘objectives’, whereas some call it ‘areas of focus’. It is absolutely necessary to have this direction. Very often, firms get so engrossed in the execution mode that they are unable to take a pause and decide what they want to achieve collectively as a firm, throughout the year. The existence of a goal helps to channelise the firm’s energies in the right direction. Merely having a goal is not enough, continuous focus towards achieving it can only enable in channelising the firm’s energy. When firms know what they want to achieve, it becomes easier to align people and processes.

Having identified the firm’s goal, an important area is organisational structure – a backbone of any firm, irrespective of size, but it is often neglected in mid-sized firms. Creation of an organisational structure brings in significant clarity in many ways: the hierarchy, reporting lines, a span of control at each level, career path, etc. Unless there is an organisational structure, it is difficult to map the firm-wide talent need. Talent need encompasses the number of people, their experience level, required skill set, areas of expertise. Due to a lack of focus on HR functions, organisational structure is either absent or completely skewed. Though my experience tells me that, in some cases an informal organisational structure gets created. While it may achieve the results to some extent, it fails to optimise the full potential of the firm and its employees.

The existence of an organisational structure will help in identifying and eliminating excess bench strength and thereby optimising payroll cost and rationalising the operational cost.

Organisational structure will vary firm to firm, depending on the business model, expertise and skill level, delegation of responsibilities and of course, focused practice areas.

Setting up a goal supported by organisational structure helps in outlining clear roles and responsibilities at a firm level. And, it is needed. Even the junior most team member likes to know what is expected out of him/her, how the contribution will be measured, and what is the growth path. Role clarity further helps to bring accountability within the team.

ATTRACTING TALENT

Once you have the basics clear, you know what you are looking for. However, does it mean that the person on the opposite side of the table is also looking for the same thing? Chances are, that both of you might not be on the same page.

When you ask any aspirant, where he/she wants to work, the answer invariably is; at a good firm. For most, that ‘good firm’ is always at the top of the hierarchy. While this is always a matter of opinion, there is something ‘special’ about every firm and more so about a mid-sized CA firm. Let me add, if you believe that there is nothing ‘special’, it is essential that you work towards creating that element which makes your firm ‘special’. This ‘special’ element will enable your firm to attract talent.

How do you send this message across?

Creating a brand value is a crucial aspect while looking to hire for your firm. If your prospective candidate does not know what your firm does, how will you convince him/her to join you?

Talk about your brand value; you need to position your firm well while you are in the process of hiring new talent for your firm. How do you do that? Always remember that your brand needs are to be projected a cut above the rest. There are a few aspects that you have, which many other firms may not. While talking to your prospective candidates, why not highlight those aspects that would make them want to consider your firm? Illustrative constitution of the firm, niche created by the firm, nature of clientele, geographic spread, work policies, technical knowledge and expertise, etc.

While you may not be able to use the conventional ways of talking about your firm, you can certainly use the new age methods. Social media presence is one of the best ways to create your firm’s brand value that can help you find your spot in the mix of things.

Addition of a special column reflecting the work culture or work concept in regular newsletters or publications issued by the firm has also proved to be an effective medium to attract candidates.

Participating in knowledge sessions, lecture series or conducting seminars at various forums has traditionally been and still continues to be a tool to demonstrate to the candidate, a perspective of your firm. Recent times demand continued networking by the firm with these institutions. This in turn gives the candidate a better chance to know your firm and its culture. At the same time, expanding the options of prospective candidates of the firm.

Beyond the above, one may optimise all other channels while hiring including; internal referrals, campus recruitment, job portals/posts, internal transfers instead of losing talent, etc. Last but not the least, headhunting is always an option available and should be effectively used to fill senior level or unique positions.

PERFORMANCE, GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY

In this ultra-competitive job market, it is tough to find the right talent that fits the bill. Therefore, when you find one, retain. Just as you have managed to get the attention of the person you are looking for, you also need to make sure that the person stays with the firm and grows.

The new generation employees demand clarity in many ways including; process, career path, performance measures and rewards. This is where the annual goal setting, organisational structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities play a crucial role. Employees usually feel more engaged when they believe that the firm is concerned about their growth and provides avenues to reach individual career goals while fulfilling the firm’s objectives.

One of the most effective ways of achieving this is to have a robust Performance Management Process aligned with the firm’s goals and values. In recent times, the purpose of this process has expanded to not just determining annual increment, but acting as a source of mentoring and guidance for professional enhancement. No mentoring process can be a one-time affair, so the practice of annual performance review is fading away. E.g. when an employee works on multiple assignments throughout the year, performance feedback given once a year loses significance because most often such feedback tends to be based on recent experiences. On the other hand, a regular performance dialogue vis-à-vis performance measures is an apt, more constructive and meaningful process for the professional development of the employee. Such performance dialogues can be held on completion of each assignment or on a periodic basis. Whatever may be the periodicity, it is vital that such discussions are formally recorded for future reference and comparative analysis.

The traditional process of partner and manager giving feedback to an individual, helps the individual grow professionally. Similarly, for the firm to understand team expectations and to realign to the changing trends, upward feedback can be a great tool. This is generally best achieved when tried anonymously.

The next most important aspect is the reward mechanism, both extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic rewards are; salary and career progression and intrinsic rewards are; satisfaction and pride. A reward mechanism is a beautiful way of recognising performers in the system. In addition to fixed salary, a firm can always adopt a structure where a part of the pay-out is linked with the firm achieving its objectives, as well as individual performance.

While designing performance measures:

The performance linked pay-out will drive the team to achieve the firm’s goals and objectives, and at the same time, will motivate performers.

The planning, organisational structure, role and responsibilities and regular performance feedbacks will collectively support in having a fair reward system in place and will help in deciding the firm’s compensation philosophy. The overarching requirement while determining the reward mechanism is to stay in tune with market dynamics. Know what your competitors are offering; there are enough data points and ways to engage in compensation benchmarking.

DEALING WITH MID-CAREER CRISIS

Have you observed the enthusiasm and excitement with which a new employee enters the office on his/her first day? Have you also observed whether the same level of enthusiasm and excitement continues? As days went by, has this enthusiasm and excitement withered away? Do not take it personally. It is not that the firm has stopped offering the same environment as before. But because the firm has failed to enhance the environment, or let’s say that the employee’s expectations have increased or changed. This is a common phenomenon.

Most employees always want something new in their line of work. While they execute the same kind of roles and responsibilities, day after day, there comes a point when they become listless, and well, somewhat tired. This is not entirely the fault of the firm. Lets just call it “Mid-Career Crisis”.

One of the challenges mid-sized firms face is developing a career path for the employees who have progressed in the profession, but have reached a glass ceiling where they start feeling stagnated. Firms can help employees to explore new skills, new geographies, new roles, and can also offer job rotation.

Have you thought of mentoring mid-level employees to become future mentors – it helps in two ways; keeping long-term employees engaged with the firm, and instilling the work culture of the firm in newer employees.

HAVING A RETENTION PLAN

In the absence of a proper retention plan, keeping the talent within the firm is a difficult task. Planning, growth, performance management, and the compensation policy; are all a part of retention strategies, but is that all? There is more to it. If this has got you thinking about the people in your firm who are already looking like they are ready to jump the ship, there are a few things you can do:

  • Recognition: Everyone wants to be recognised for a job well done. All that it takes is a few internal announcements. Recognising your employees’ efforts go a long way into keeping them happy and motivated. This gives them a sense of belonging, knowing that someone is there to appreciate their work. It makes them feel more accountable towards their job, and they make extra effort.
  • Reward: Not all rewards need to be monetary. There are other ways to reward your hard-working employees with unusual and exciting things, e.g. movie tickets for the employee and family. Sometimes, small things make a huge difference for them. Your people appreciate when they know that they are cared.
  • Standardisation and policies: Adopting a standard yardstick when dealing with people related situations, creates an unbiased environment and will earn respect from the employees. It is always a good practice to have an Employee HR Manual which states the firm’s guidelines, which simply put, are accepted behavioural norms within the firm.
  • First impression: First few days can be crucial for any new employee. A new employee begins to form an impression of the firm, and sometimes it influences the decision to stay with the firm in the long term. Create an impeccable onboarding experience. Have a well-designed induction and orientation program which not only talks about the firm pedigree and processes, but also sets clear expectations for a new joinee. Everyone wants to be part of a professional firm, and this is where it all starts.
  • Fun quotient at work: All work and no play make Jack a dull boy. Fun quotient can be built in by having a structured calendar of team bonding activities and informal events throughout the year. Not necessarily an elaborate one. But believe it or not, the team that laughs together and has fun together is more likely to stick together. Because of the high emotional quotient, they treat the firm as family and the sense of belonging is high.

Clients being a source of revenue are important, and firms always ensure to make them feel that they are taken care of. The same applies to employees as well, since the absence of good employees will fail the effort to make clients feel important. Thus, a little bit of effort goes a long way and this can be seen not only in the work ethics but also the attitude of the employees.

EXIT DOES NOT MEAN THE END

If there is a beginning to every story, there is bound to be an end. For some, the end is retirement. In the current era, it is a complete rarity. These days, end arises through resignations. Not all resignations need to be sad or bad. In fact, the manner in which a firm handles these ends, goes a long way in enhancing the respect and repute thereof.

Each individual has his/her own aspirations and a quest to move ahead in life. For some, they find that in the same organisation, whereas, for some it may mean that the “grass is greener on the other side”, so they move to a new organisation. This situation is bound to arise no matter what the size of a chartered accounting firm is. Sometimes, even though there is no push factor, there is always a strong pull factor and individuals are lured to explore.

While you would be losing on a good resource, it does not mean that it is the end of a good relationship.

The exit process plays a very crucial role for mid-sized chartered accounting firms. There has to be a robust system in place so that the exit of an employee is a smooth transition. Have a feedback mechanism since an employee on the verge of exiting is more likely to give honest and open feedback, which will help in making improvements, for the betterment of the firm.

If the individual is leaving for growth, this is your chance to help the person bloom, so that he/she becomes a brand ambassador for the firm. It is a small world. Chances are that you will run into this employee somewhere at some point in time. Always keep your door open so that he/she feels comfortable enough to approach you in time of need. Don’t let emotions overpower you and do it more gracefully.

In this dynamic world, for businesses and especially those engaged in the service sector, the new mantra is to shift the focus from client management to resource management, because only the availability of resources as and when required, will enable you to cater to those clients. Adding to this, let me quote Sir Richard Branson who said “Clients do not come first. Employees come first. If you take care of your employees, they will take care of the clients.”

STRATEGY AND ROLE OF PARTNERS IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS

Strategy for a professional service firm is all about making
informed choices. It is fundamentally also about saying “No” to projects or
engagements or decisions that are not in alignment with the firm, as much as it
is about asking deep questions about the practice and the way we run it.

Every professional service firm needs to think about
strategy. This would mean having clarity about where is the firm headed, what
is the “business plan” of the firm, how will the firm think about its clients
and service areas, how will the firm embrace technology, respond to changing
economic and business environment, and keep itself relevant in today’s times.

This article is an attempt to provide a road map to develop a
strategic thought process in that direction.

 

Critical questions that the firm’s
partners need to address are:

1.  Have partners and leaders of professional
service firms built the growth blocks (“blocks”) that are necessary to ensure
sustained growth? Some of these vital blocks are:

  •    Firm’s vision and mission
  •    Strategy to grow and sustain
  •    Team to lead and execute
  •     Knowledge and expertise
  •     Client centricity
  •     Challenges to address
  •     Risks to mitigate
  •     Markets, technology and other functions

And are these blocks being reviewed on a consistent basis?
Are they aligned for growth? Are they aligned to the partners’ vision? Are the
partners aligned to these blocks?

2.  To
grow as a firm and to keep it in continuous alignment, strategic choices made
by the partners on various aspects of practice need to be given the highest
priority.

Partners and professional services firms have the fundamental
responsibility of producing and managing. The long-standing dichotomy of the
“Producer Manager” needs to be settled in a manner that is relative to the
firm’s size, stature and evolution in its growth cycle. A small- sized firm
can aspire to become a mid-sized firm and a mid-sized firm can aspire to become
a large firm only if there is a high level of focus on allowing producing
partners to produce and leaving the managing part to those best equipped to
manage.
A producing partner over time cannot be expected to be managing the
firm on
all aspects, as both the functions need dedicated time and focus.

3. Specific partners will invariably
have to focus on the managerial functions: client relationships, people
management, marketing, and functional roles such as accounting, compliances, administration,
compliance and alike.This in other words presupposes that partners will have to
take out time to perform management function. But this seldom happens. As a
result, output suffers and so does growth curve of the firm. For decades now,
firms have been suffering from this dichotomy, popularly knownas the “Producer
Manager Dilemma
”. For a mid-sized firm to grow, it is very important that
partners decide on their respective functional and technical roles such that
there is no overlapping of the functions and also there is high degree of
harmony, synergy and efficiency in the roles performed.

4.  There
could be instances where there is duality in certain roles requiring more than
one partner to partake in decision making.

Example: The firm’s management may recommend two or
three partners to constitute a Compensation Committee, which is entrusted with
the task of deciding on remuneration/bonus to partners, firm wide cost cutting
initiatives, cost of inflation factored determination of increments, HR
performance evaluation and the likes.

5.  Then
there are times when people decisions need to be taken such as which campuses
to be selected for potential young talent recruits, pre-qualifications, minimum
standard for all new recruitments, written and verbal tests during hiring
process, background checks and proliferation of ideas and thoughts. As one can
decipher from the above, there is a high degree of correlation between strategy
and partners’ contribution to the firm’s managerial functions.

6.  Having
a strategic mindset is not an option. It is critical for partners of
professional service firms to think about the firm and practice areas
constantly, to develop a sense of expertise and a visible perspective
difference in the market place. People retain professionals for the value they
seem to generate from time to time. It is this edge that makes professionals
stand out from amongst their peers. This is seldom looked at as a strategic
asset as it is never widely understood.

7. The Differentiated Firm:

A differentiated firm thinks about strategy in the following
segments:

a)  Growth
strategy

b)  Markets
strategy

c)  People
strategy

d)  Operations
strategy

e)  Finance
strategy

f)   Functional
strategy

Let’s discuss each of these and what its implications are on
the growth and evolution of a firm:

a.  Growth

Partners have a fundamental obligation to think about how
should their practice lines individually grow. What is the business plan for
their service line? How should they think about newer ways of improving the
execution, improving efficiencies, and providing a more qualitative product and
output each time. Being process driven is no longer an option; it’s a basic
requirement. Growth comes to practice areas which are led by partners who make
time to think about strategies to compete, strategies to develop a
differentiated product, strategies to develop a sound understanding of what the
client expects in terms of value, and finally a strategy to deliver that
value.The end goal is that the firm should collectively grow, if that practice
area grows.

Strategies to develop a differentiated product include
thinking about and developing a completely new solution to “problem solve” an
existing set of challenges.

Example: Data analytics tool: Can the auditor provide
a data analytics service to a client by using technology? If you can tell an
eCommerce company promoter that he is losing repeat customers because of, say,
quality of finishing of product, sub-optimal service experience or delivery
issues, the company will consider this as a priceless piece of input. And they
will be willing to pay for it. That’s where the audit world may need to focus
some of its energies on, going forward.

So what are the ways to think about strategy? One of the best
ways to do so is to ask specific questions related to the service line and then
the firm needs to develop its responses by way of partners coming together,
providing their inputs and working for a common purpose.

Some of these questions are:

  •     What is the market for the service line in
    terms of total revenues?
  •     What is our current market share?
  •     What can we reasonably aim at achieving, if
    the firm were to provide all the underlying infrastructure, people, tools and
    technology?
  •     To achieve the budgeted revenues, do we have
    an adequate team?
  •     Do we provide adequate resources and
    infrastructure to our teams to perform?
  •     Are our teams armed with the tools they need
    to perform their professional obligations – example: do they have access to
    online research libraries, databases, books, periodicals, journals, knowledge networks,
    knowledge sharing societies/groups/clubs? Do we measure them on such access and
    their proficiency?
  •     What is the firm’s policy with respect to
    using the existing clientele base for cross-selling the firm’s other service
    offerings? How is the value proposition made known to clients? Are these
    included in KPIs of the firm’s partners and senior managers?
  •     How is respective service line growth
    evaluated? For instance, it may not be appropriate to conclude that a 40% YoY
    growth in advisory services is a greater success than a 25% YoY growth in audit
    services.What are the contours of this growth – recurring vs. non-recurring,
    quality of the deliverable, the relationship being developed etc.
  •     Has the firm developed a framework for
    evaluating which service lines (either existing or completely new) will
    shape the firm’s growth trajectory? Does this framework consider the firm’s
    existing capabilities as well as the capabilities capable of being developed
    inorganically? What is the periodicity of such an evaluation?
  •     How does the firm identify trigger-events
    which can have long-term implications on a firm’s growth trajectory?
  •     How often is ‘growth’ discussed in partner
    meetings?

Responses to the above questions
will lead to a strategy to grow the practice. The form and shape of such a
strategy is not as relevant as its substance and the process used to arrive at
the conclusions. Thereafter, what is left is periodic monitoring and course
correction.


b.  Markets

The questions below have to be thought through within the
contours of code of ethics of the regulating body of the profession, the ICAI.
The idea here was to merely bring out that marketing of professional services
is more about projecting the capabilities to the right audiences, while
following the code of ethics and code of conduct prescribed by ICAI in form and
spirit. With this context, here are some questions to think through:

  •     Does the firm have a ‘curated profile’ which
    summarises its offerings?
  •     What is the firm best at? Why should a
    client work with you?
  •     What is the firm’s unique differentiator? Be
    it in product, quality, service, reliability, timeliness/responsiveness or
    similar.
  •     Does the firm have a focused ‘meeting/events
    calendar’which portrays the networking events the partners can participate in?
    How are the partners nominated to attend such events, in a way that costs are
    within budget and the best possible impact is envisaged?
  •     How are the follow-ups conducted post networking
    sessions? Are the leads profiled? Are meetings sought and held?
  •     Does the firm publish thought-leadership
    articles? Do the partners participate as speakers in relevant events? How is
    the firm’s expertise depicted outside the four walls of the firm?
  •     How does the firm sustain, manage and
    improve client relationships? Is there a documented process which is adhered to
    in this regard?
  •     Has the firm evaluated the need for a CRM
    software to better cater to its needs?
  •     How are the efforts and the outcome
    measured?
  •     Does the firm have an internal process in
    place which ensures that the firm does not violate the applicable regulations,
    ethical guidelines or the relevant pronouncements of the regulatory bodies, in
    its marketing endeavours?

 

Marketing professional services is not an easy thing to do.
It needs conviction, confidence and a strategy. The questions above should get
you started. Firms should keep refining their marketing strategy based on the
outcome and the measurement of the efforts.


c.  People

To attract the best people and thereafter to retain them to
ensure that they grow is yet another fundamental responsibility of the
partners. And strategy to provide a career roadmap is again a critical aspect
that partners need to align themselves to, such that the key performers are
retained.

  •     How involved are the partners in the
    recruitment drives?
  •     Do the partners give sufficient freedom to
    the managers to interview and hire candidates? Remember, the managers have to deal
    with the new recruits more than the partner group, and by extension, the
    managers deserve a say in the decision of whom to recruit and whom not to.
  •     How are the interview technical tests
    determined? Are these tests closely in sync with the job-description?
  •     How does the firm ensure cross-team
    interaction?
  •     Does the firm have an in-house
    bulletin/intranet which ensures that the communication flow within the firm
    isn’t hindered? Such initiatives ensure that the employees are closely knit.
  •     Is the process of compensation – especially,
    bonus and incentives, transparent and not arbitrary? Does an employee know
    beforehand how his bonus would be determined?
  •     How are the team-bonding exercises
    undertaken? What is the frequency of these exercises?
  •     Is there an anonymous grievance portal
    operating within the firm?
  •     Is the career roadmap customised for every
    employee?
  •     Do the partners follow an ‘open cabin’
    policy?
  •     Do the partners have ‘no-agenda’ meetings
    with the employees?
  •     Are the employees encouraged to maintain a
    knowledge repository? Is a service line over dependent on a single employee?
    Does the firm conduct a scenario analysis to assess the aftermath if that
    particular employee resigns?
  •     Is there a mechanism which ensures that even
    the most junior employee has a medium to express his/her ideas or suggestions
    directly to the partners, bypassing the reporting hierarchy?
  •     Are exit interviews documented, archived and
    acted upon?
  •     Does the firm have a recognised alumni
    association of the past employees?


d.  Operations

  •     What are the key operational metrics of the
    firm that are relevant?
  •     What is the per partner billing?
  •     What is the per FTE billing (FTE – full time
    equivalent)?
  •     What is the yield per billable hour (Total
    billing of a person divided by his billable hours) – Example: INR 1 Crore of
    revenues / 1,000 billable hours = billable rate of INR 10,000 per hour. If a
    large firm’s partner bills INR 5 Crores for the same 1,000 billable hours, his
    billable rate is INR 50,000 per hour. Can that be aspired for? How does one get
    there? How does one create the visible expertise that’s necessary to command
    higher rates? Does the firm provide the necessary tools and the environment
    that allows such expertise to be built and billed?
  •     What is the profitability per partner? What
    is the profitability per FTE?
  •     How many clients are serviced by each
    partner? What is the average billing per client? Does this provide good data
    about the type of practice/segmentation of each partner and their teams?

 

e.  Finance

  •     What is meaningful MIS to the partners? What
    reports are relevant? Do we have the in-house talent group to achieve this?
  •     Has the firm developed a balanced scorecard
    framework?
  •     Is there a practice of maintaining, updating
    and circulating finance trackers and dashboards internally? Does the firm use
    practice management tools and softwares to automate the information flow to
    ensure that rich data is generated for the partner group to take decisions?
  •     Is there a mechanism to identify which
    areas/teams/personnel can any delay be attributed to? This can help in devising
    better preventive and corrective strategies.
  •     Does the firm have a designated function of
    a CFO/Controller?
  •     Is a cash flow budget made periodically?How
    are the partners’ drawing limits determined? Are the drawings consistent?
  •     How are receivables monitored? Have all the
    partners concurred on a common line of thinking with respect to actions to be
    taken if the previous receivables aren’t settled? A zero-tolerance policy for
    bad debts isn’t necessarily a negative attribute to have, barring exceptions.

The finance function in professional
services firms has to be responsible for ensuring that meaningful data is provided
for the leadership group to take the right decisions.

 

f.   Functional

A lot of professional service firms do not necessarily spend
sufficient time on functions such as Admin, Technology, HR, Finance and
Marketing. Some aspects to think about are:

  •     What are the various functional areas that
    the firm’s resources needed to be expensed upon, and what are the results?
  •     Is every function led or overlooked by a
    designated partner? What say do the other partners have for a function not
    personally managed by them?
  •     How is functional efficiency adjudged? Which
    evaluation steps are in place to ensure zero redundancy of functional areas?
  •     How is cross-functional integration,
    interlink and inter-dependence evaluated?
  •     What are the fall-back options in case a
    function fails or is temporarily unavailable?
  •     Do each of the functions maintain a process
    and knowledge repository?

 

Call to Action

The call to action here is:

1.  To
achieve a working strategy document for your firm. And, for this purpose, it is
for the partners to make time to think through the above questions, and develop
a discussion paper.

2.  Next
step will be to discuss the finer aspects of the plan and fine tune it.

3.  Thereafter,
roll out the plan to the larger partner group and key people in the firm (who
are the identified future leaders).

4.  Once
the plan is rolled out, partners have to focus on execution and be the best
they can be and inspire and lead their teams with energy and enthusiasm.

5.  Every
quarter, the strategy needs to be then reviewed for efficacy.

6.  Finally,
the managing partner or the leadership group within the partners should take
care of periodic course corrections to keep the strategy in alignment.

Partners will do well to do this in right earnest. That’s the
way to develop your firm’s credentials, attract and retain talent, generate and
service clients and build a sustainable growing firm.

 

Fault lines of Obfuscation

India surprises both the optimist
and the pessimist. Some of the greatest, finest, unique and fascinating things
happen in this country. Some of the weirdest, obnoxious and unimaginable things
also happen at the same time. You will be wrong and you will be right if you
say things are getting better or things are not improving.

 

What stops India is India itself.
The attitude of Obfuscation1 and insistence on obfuscating wherever
possible seriously impairs the ability of the nation to move faster. It can be termed
as a fault line – as in a problem that may not be obvious and could cause
something to fail. Obfuscation has many facets – having processes larger than
purpose, making things hyper-technical, making things subjective and obscure,
bringing in a new compliances without adequate notice or clarity and so on.
Obfuscation makes things harder to understand, harder to action out and
difficult to serve an effective purpose.

 

Some recent experiences got me
thinking about this topic and its impact on dragging our country: 

 

i.   I
recently opened a new bank account for my minor daughter. The bank form
required signatures at about twelve places.

 

ii.   I
opened a ‘distribution account’ with a certain company. The form was for
allowing me to make investments through them. The form asked me to give:

 

a)   Details
of income, wealth, investment experience, …

 

b)   FATCA
/ CRS / UBO declaration – not only for that investment entity, but for CAMS,
Karvy, etc. It felt like someone outside India wanted to track me in my own country
for wrongdoing I could be involved in, according to the laws of that country
and I had to sign off to prove that I was on the right side from their
perspective;

_____________________________________________________

1   An act of making something obscure, unclear,
or unintelligible. Latin obfuscatio, from obfuscare (to darken)

 

c)   KYC
– In spite of having PAN, Central KYC Registry CKYC Number, Aadhaar – I had to
once again give PAN, Aadhaar, Address Proof or face long argumentation with a
compliance team on why this was mandatory.

 

iii.  I also opened a Share Trading account. I ended up signing at nearly
20 places plus on PAN and Aadhaar and of course signing across on my own
photograph.

 

I got a strange feeling of confirming
myself and certifying myself to be myself. For the world outside, I am just a
unit of statistics who has to sign off on long, winding and difficult to
understand forms at multiple places. While one can understand that frauds do
take place, particularly in financial services area and that the mechanism to
deal with them after they have happened is abysmally inadequate, an overkill of
this sort can be considered ‘necessary’. 
However, some of this seemed to not meet the test of ‘reasonableness’
which should stand on an equal footing with the ‘necessary’ conditions in the
digital age. One would have thought that Aadhaar would make things easy for
common citizens. However, we are yet to reach the level of ease which was felt
at the time of buying a Jio sim card.

 

Tax Instances

India is shinning with many
examples of making things complex, perhaps far beyond their need to be so. In
the darkness of complexity thrives corruption, delay, disputes, low impact
compliances, distancing masses from their rights and from delivering what is
due to them! Recent examples from tax perspective will prove the point:

 

i.   Tax
Audit Report (TAR) changes on 20th July 2017 for FY 2017-18 filing
in September:

 

a.  While
almost all the changes could have happened before March, the tax office chose
to ‘wake up’ from slumber in July.

 

b.  Isn’t
monthly GST data sufficient and available to the tax office, which is part of
the same ministry?


c.  Why
should some assessees who file before 20th August 2018 be allowed to
file old TAR, while others have to file with new clauses?

 

d.  If
there is delay in notifying the correct TAR form, why shouldn’t the assessee be
entitled to get more time to file?

 

e.  Several
clauses do not appear to be relevant to most assessees and perhaps can find a
place elsewhere? Isn’t TAR already long and bulky?

 

Some clauses per se are
debatable for their fitness to find a place in the TAR itself such as the one
on GAAR. There are other clauses such as address or GST Numbers etc., which
should be included in the ITR instead or done away with, as they can be part of
the master data. Points such as primary adjustments (clause 30A) should perhaps
be sitting in Form 3CEB. Tinkering with TAR in the middle of tax season in
spite of strictures by at least two High Courts2  can perhaps be dealt with only when such acts
are legislated as an ‘impermissible arrangement’ in a new chapter XXIV titled
Tax Payer Services. The ICAI ‘Implementation Guide w.r.t. Notification  33/2018’ on Page 1 sums it up well: The
amendment to Form No. 3CD has thrown yet another challenge for taxpayers and
tax auditors, by mandating large reporting requirements, besides requiring
sitting in judgement on certain contentious issues.

 

ii.   Changes
in ITR utilities post 31st March: ITRs were notified in April.
However, every single ITR utility has undergone changes between April and
August. Some have changed multiple times. ITR 2 was revised thrice.

 

iii.  CBDT ‘incentives’ to CIT (A) for passing ‘Quality’ Orders: This
deserves special reference without any further comments as it is explicit. The
stunning part is the definition of Quality:

___________________________________________________

2   Punjab and Haryana HC and Gujarat HC in
September 2015

 

a.  That
which enhances the Assessing Officer’s (AO) order

 

b.  Strengthens
the stand of AO

 

c.  Levying
penalties under 271(1)(c) on additions confirmed by the CIT(A)

 

iv.  Format
of Notices: A Notice, I had the privilege to respond to, had the same question
asked three times. Additionally, it asked for ‘Source of Income’. Wouldn’t it
be nice to take a few minutes and understand the assessee before shooting out a
notice. In this case the assessee is a tax filer for more than forty years.
When can a lay assessee expect meaningful and clear questions?

 

No doubt, many routine matters are
simplified by technology. We have come a long way. Yet our system justifies the
meaning of Obfuscation and gives it a new meaning. The Hon’ble President of
India, spoke for the second time this year and I quote his twitter handle: “The
taxpayer is your partner in nation building. Interaction with the taxpayers
should not inconvenience them.”

 

Even Albert Einstein said, “If you can’t explain it simply, you
don’t understand well enough”. Obfuscation shows that authorities miss the
point, way too often. Until we address these fault lines effectively and
promptly, our march to progress will be a few notches lower. We can celebrate
the jump in GDP growth rate of 8.2% for Q1 of 2019. At the same time we need to
ask – what made us stop at 8.2% and not touch 10%? To answer such questions we
will have to find the root causes and see if the tax payer and tax collector
can have unified interests. We will have to sort this out. In late PM Vajpayee
ji’s words we will have to walk together

 

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

Gratitude

In Sanskrit, a very beautiful
Subhashitam is:

   

              

Which means: Trees bear fruit
for the benefit of others, water flows in the rivers for the benefit of others,
Cows give milk for the benefit of others, and this body is meant for the
benefit of others.

We
owe everything to nature for this important lesson and must work for the
benefit of others. We can only wonder if there can be any life in the absence
of the five vital elements i.e the soil, fire, water, air and space.

Even
if we assume life can exist, would our five senses have anything to do if these
vital elements were not there? Let us ponder over who provides us with oxygen,
energy, light, fire? How these scenic mountains are formed? How can we perceive
these flowing rivers, or experience the vast oceans, see glittering stars, the
vast sky and the beautiful forests? This brings us to the question: Are we
grateful enough to mother earth, divine nature and all the elements for these
beautiful gifts of life? These are available to us freely and abundantly. We
often take for granted everything that is available to us easily!

It
may be important to remember that right from the moment one wakes up till the
moment one goes to sleep and even while asleep, every moment is a precious gift
that we are fortunate to experience.

If
we were to maintain a journal of gratitude, initially we may not be able to
think of a single line or person to express our gratitude towards. However,
with sincere introspection we can surely list down so many people, things,
incidences that we are grateful for.

A
few illustrative questions are listed below :

Who
gave me this healthy body with mind and intellect? Who brought me up? Who
taught me the first alphabet or the first number? Who cultivated the vegetables
and food I eat? Who provided the milk I drink? Who supplied me the essentials
like water, electricity? Who protects my country, or my street or society? Who
cures me when I am sick? Who takes care of me when I feel lonely? Who guides me
when I am confused? Who helps me understand and inspires me to excel in what I
do? Who makes me feel happy?

We
may appreciate that every moment, several known and unknown factors are at play
helping us, protecting us, guiding us and making meaningful contributions to
what we are.

We
may soon realise that gratitude brings a feeling of humility. Humility inspires
us to appreciate anything in true spirit. It also gives rise to compassion.
Appreciation encourages us to excel and brings out the best in each one of us.
In that sense, it purifies the self from within. And with experiencing inner
happiness, one is able to spread more happiness.

Then
the question that comes to one’s mind is “what makes one unhappy”?

Obsessing
over things like name, fame, money, wealth, recognition and social status,
sense-enjoyments create desire and attachment. Unfulfilled desire creates
anger. Anger in turn creates a feeling of emptiness and unhappiness. Thus,
anger ultimately destroys the person.

But,
appreciation, humility, and gratitude create a fragrant garden of happiness,
joy and peace that only multiply. Let us be truly grateful to everyone and
everything that contributes in making our lives worthy and meaningful.

Small
gestures like offering a glass of water to the delivery boy or a postman,
offering  a shed or water for birds or
animals, helping an elderly person cross a busy road, sparing some time with a
lonely person and encouraging them are all acts of noble selfless work that
only add to our own happiness.

This
reminds me of the beautiful quote by Nida Fazli:


  

Civil Suit or Criminal Case?

I.       Introduction


How often
have we seen a commercial deal gone sour, be it, a joint venture, an
investment, a lending transaction, a trading transaction, etc.? In most of the
cases, the dispute is entirely civil in nature, i.e., the remedies for the
parties lies in arbitration or approaching a Civil Court. However, in some
cases, the aggrieved party also moves the Criminal Court on the pretext that it
involves some sort of cheating or forgery or such other economic offences. This
gives the dispute an entirely different twist and could lead to arrest of the
defendant. While a criminal complaint may be justified in certain cases, it is
not so always and sometimes it is used as a bargaining ploy to exert greater
pressure on the other party. The Bombay High Court in the case of Ramesh
Dahyalal Shah vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, Cr. Appln. No. 613/2016,
Order dated 6th December 2017
, had an occasion to consider
one such commercial dispute where the plaintiff also sought recourse to
criminal course of action.

           

II.    Facts

2.1   One, Tushar Thakkar, the main respondent in
the suit, entered into negotiations with the applicant in the suit, based on
which he was to invest in a company owned by the applicant on the following
terms:

 

(a)   A Shareholders’ Agreement was executed based
on which the respondent acquired a 45% stake in the company.

 

(b)   The respondent was to be made the
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company.         

 

(c)   He was to receive a monthly remuneration for
acting as Vice-Chairman.


(d)   He and the applicant were to jointly take all
important decisions of the company.

 

(e)   The applicant submitted a Project Report
about setting up a plant at Karnataka. Based on the same, he obtained a bank
loan.

 

2.2   There were disputes between the respondent
and applicant based on which the respondent filed complaints alleging the
following:

 

(a)   He was not called for General Body meetings.

 

(b)   The Directors and financers of the company
were neglecting and avoiding him.

 

(c)   They also did not keep their promises like
appointing him as the Vice Chairman, paying his monthly remuneration and did
not give him authority to sign all the cheques, nor did they inform the change
in share holding to the bank, nor allow him to jointly take decisions of the
company, etc. He suffered loss of goodwill also since he was not given a
distributorship as promised. Thus, he alleged that the company and the
applicant cheated him.

 

(d)   Further, instead of installing new plant and
machinery at Karnataka, he alleged that second-hand machinery was installed
which was over 18 years old. It was alleged that this was done with the
connivance of the registered valuers and the bank. Moreover, the machinery was
over-invoiced, thereby getting more capital subsidy from the Government and
causing revenue loss.

 

The
respondent accordingly, claimed a certain amount from the applicant and various
cases for criminal breach of trust were made out against the applicant, the
registered valuers and the Government bank and accordingly, a case was
registered with the Economic Offence Wing, Mumbai.

 

2.3   Consequently, the accused filed a Writ
Petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR registered with the
EOW on the grounds that a civil dispute has been given the colour of a criminal
complaint.

 

2.4   Thus, the question, for consideration before
the Bombay High Court was whether the dispute between the parties was of a
predominantly civil nature which was being converted to a criminal nature by
the respondent so as to recover his claims from the applicant?

 

III.   Verdict of
Bombay High Court

3.1   The Court held that it was of the firm view,
that the matter was entirely a civil case and there was not even a prima
facie
criminal case under the Indian Penal Code pertaining to cheating,
forgery of security / will, using a genuine document as forged, falsification
of accounts, etc. It held that there clearly was a breach of the terms and
conditions of the shareholders agreement.

 

3.2   The Court considered the following facts
before delivering its verdict:

 

(a)   The respondent approached the applicant for
investing in his company.

 

(b)   The terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement were
very clear.

 

3.3   The Court also considered various Supreme
Court decisions which have distinguished between a civil offence and a criminal
complaint. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s verdict in Hridaya
Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168
wherein it was
held that the distinction between a mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It would depend upon the intention of the accused at
the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct. However,
every breach of contract would not give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention was shown right at the
beginning of transaction. Thus, it was necessary to show that he had fraudulent
or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. Based on that the
Court held that both parties had disputes regarding the Shareholders Agreement
and hence, it was clear that there was no cheating intention from the
beginning.

3.4   The fact that the dispute was first filed
before the Company Law Board showed that it was predominantly a civil dispute.
Accordingly, the High Court held that the main demand and grievance of the
respondent appeared to get back his sum invested. The Company Law Board also
held that there were no circumstances indicating fraud or mismanagement of the affairs
or other misconduct of the company. 

 

3.5   The Court noted that two recovery suits were
also filed by the respondent before the High Court for recovering the amounts
claimed by him.

 

3.6   The Court also noted that the machinery
imported was verified by a Government empanelled valuer and this valuation was
seconded by a bank appointed valuer when complaints were made by the
respondent. The Court agreed with the Company Law Board’s Order that the banks
would not invite any adverse report to their own project report prepared by
their officers during the time, they decide to advance loans to a company.
However, in absence of any corroborative material, it became difficult to
disbelieve the reports of independent persons merely because they were
favouring the applicant or to infer connivance between them and the applicant
so as to implead them also along with consortium of banks as accused in the
case. The Court noted that the Government bank had specifically noted that,
after inspection and verification of the cost of the project, primary and
secondary research and analysis of the comparative cost estimates of reputed
suppliers (domestic and international) for plant and machinery purchased and
installed by the Company, the costs incurred by the Company were reasonable and
fair and in line with the market norms taking into account the
specification/configuration and suitability for the project.

 

3.7   The High Court noted that it was apparent
that the respondent had approached every forum available to him to raise his
grievances and after being unsuccessful there, now he was giving the colour of
criminal offence to this civil dispute by filing the complaint and levelling
the same allegations. Once he realised that the Government banks were not
supporting him, he implicated them also in the case along with the two valuers.

 

The Court
made a very telling observation that the intention of the respondent, therefore,
appeared to be to use the police machinery with malafide intention to recover
the amounts which he was unable to recover by civil mode. Therefore, it was a
sheer abuse of the process of law.

 

3.8   The Court concluded that a case which was
predominantly of civil nature had been given the robe of criminal offence that
too, after availing civil remedies. It relied on the Supreme Court’s verdict in
State of Haryana  vs. Bhajan Lal
,1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
which held that where a criminal proceeding was
manifestly attended with malafide intention and/or the proceeding was
maliciously instituted with object to serve the oblique purpose of recovering
the amount, such proceeding needed to be quashed and set aside.

 

Again in Chandran
Ratnaswami vs. K.C. Palanisamy (2013) 6 SCC 740
, it was held that, when
the disputes were of civil nature and finally adjudicated by the competent
authority, (the CLB in the present case) and the disputes were arising out of
alleged breach of joint venture agreement and when such disputes had been
finally resolved by the Court of competent jurisdiction, then it was apparent
that complainant wanted to manipulate and misuse the process of Court. In this
judgment, it was held that, it would be unfair if the applicants are to be tried
in such criminal proceeding arising out of the alleged breach of a Joint
Venture Agreement. It was further held that the High Court was entitled to
quash a proceeding when it came to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding
to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice required that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It relied on its
earlier decision in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others,
(1977) 2 SCC 699
where it was observed that the wholesome power u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, entitled the High Court to quash a
proceeding when it came to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice required that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts had
been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to
achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted
to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the case of Inder
Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1,
it was held
that the court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an
instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior
motive to pressurise the accused.The issuance of non-bailable warrants involved
interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment meant deprivation
of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts had to be
extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. Similarly, in Uma
Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336,
it was held
that the complaint did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less any
cheating offence and the case was purely a civil dispute between the parties
for which a remedy was available before a civil court by filing a properly
constituted suit. Thus, allowing the police investigation to continue would
amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just
and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers
u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

 

In G.
Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636
the Apex
Court held that a Court’s Jurisdiction u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
had to be exercised with  great care. In
exercise of its jurisdiction, the High Court was not to examine the matter
superficially. It was to be seen if a matter, which was essentially of civil
nature, had been given the cloak of a criminal offence. Criminal proceedings
were not a shortcut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process
a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it
was a serious matter. Again in Chandrapal Singh vs. Maharaj Singh, AIR
(1982) SC 1238
, the Court held that that chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply
invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.

 

Further, in Indian
Oil Corpn vs. NEPC India Ltd, 2006 (3) SCC Cri 736
, the Apex Court
cautioned about the growing tendency to convert purely civil disputes into
criminal cases. Also, in V.Y. Jose vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78,
it was held that a matter which essentially involved disputes of civil nature,
should not be allowed to be subject matter of a criminal offence, the latter
being a shortcut of executing a decree which was non-existent.

 

3.9   The High Court distinguished other cases,
such as, Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, Cr. Appeal No.1723 / 2017
dated 4th October, 2017
where allegations were made in the
FIR of extortion, forgery, fabrication of documents, utilisation of those
documents to effectuate transfers of title before registering authorities and
the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of
fabricated power of attorney. The Supreme Court held that these were serious in
nature and cannot be mere civil in nature and thus, the High Court was
justified in refusing to quash the FIR even though the parties decided to
settle the matter.

 

4.0   Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed
the applications and quashed and set aside the F.I.R.s registered with the,
Police Station, the investigation of which was taken over by Economic Offence
Wing.

 

IV.   Conclusion

Several
civil cases are masquerading as criminal cases in the hope of getting the
accused to pay up. This decision would act as a defence to all such accused.
However, having said that it is unfortunate that one has yet go through the
process of the law and in several cases, it is only after the matter reaches
the High Court that relief is granted.Till then, the process of arrest, bail,
custody, etc., are an unfortunate episode in the life of the accused!            

 

One can only
hope that the Police would frame some directions which would serve as a
reference point to all Police Stations as to how to handle a case which appears
to be of a civil nature. Instead of instantly arresting the accused, the Police
may first carry out a detailed investigation of the matter, hear both parties
and then reach a conclusion as to whether or not to arrest the accused.
 

Is it Fair to have a Lopsided Tribunal Under GST?

Background

Section 112 of the Central
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”) provides for an appeal to
the GST Appellate Tribunal. This Tribunal sits as the second Appellate
authority in the appellate mechanism, the first appeal being to the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

Problem

Much water has flown under the bridge since
the first constitutional challenges were mounted against the rampant
tribunalisation in the country. The Supreme Court has dealt with such
tribunalisation on many occasions and cautioned against legislative devices to
tinker with the independence of the judiciary. However, the CGST Act not only
ignores these warnings, but goes on to push the envelope further than any
Government has attempted till date.

 

Unfairness

(1) Section 109(3), (4) and (9) of the CGST
Act mandates that the National Bench, Regional Bench, State Bench and the Area
Bench of the Appellate Tribunal be manned by one Judicial Member and two
Technical Members.

 

Now, the qualifications for the technical
members in section 110(1)(c) and (d) show that they will be invariably drawn
from the Departmental cadre. A 2:1 ratio of Judicial and Technical Members on
each bench will irredeemably tilt the Tribunal in the Government’s favour and
compromise independence of the Tribunal. In Union of India vs. R. Gandhi
(2010) 11 SCC 1
, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the
number of Technical Members on a bench cannot exceed the Judicial Members. The
Madras High Court has denounced a similar provision in the Administrative
Tribunals Act as an attempt to reduce the sole judicial member to a “decorative
piece” [S. Manoharan vs. Dy. Registrar (2015) 2 LW 343 (DB)]. It
is surprising that the Government wishes to foist the same injustice all over
again despite the position in law being well settled in this regard.

 

(2) The term of office of Judicial Members
u/s. 110(9) and (10) is 3 years, whereas the term of office of Technical
Members u/s. 110(11) is 5 years. Apart from such discrimination being outright
unconstitutional, it sends out a discouraging message to the public at large
that the Government will remain blessed with a compliant Tribunal for a long
time. Furthermore, coupled with clauses like those relating to reappointment
(which is also a subject completely within the control of Government), such
provisions are potent enough to create apprehensions in minds of the Judicial
Members about the manner in which these Judicial Members are to set about their
judicial functions.

 

It is submitted, in any case, the Judicial
Members would be projected as an inferior class to the outside world at large.
Furthermore, experience has shown that it is difficult to find Judicial Members
than Technical Members and that both Central and State Governments sit over
Tribunal vacancies for a very long time. Giving shorter tenures to Judicial Members
will only bring about frequent vacancies of Judicial Members in comparison with
Technical Members.

 

This may bring about repeated scenarios where
there is no option but to allow two Technical Members or even one Technical
Member to constitute a Bench for lack of adequate Judicial Members as provided
for in section 110(10). Litigants will have no option but to put up with such a
Bench since section 110(14) protects proceedings of the Tribunal from being
assailed on the ground of existence of any vacancy or defect in the
constitution of the Tribunal. 

(3) Section 110(1)(b)(iii) allows a member
from the Indian Legal Services to be appointed as a Judicial Member, which is
impermissible under our Constitution [Union of India vs. R. Gandhi (2010)
11 SCC 1]
.
A similar clause in the RERA legislation was struck down
recently by the Bombay High Court in Neelkamal Realtors vs. Union of
India [(2018) 1 AIR Bom R 558]
relying on R. Gandhi’s case.
It is against surprising that such a settled position of law is being ignored
to somehow create a compliant Tribunal.

 

(4) The qualifications for Technical Members
in section 110(1)(c) and (d) do not require the Technical Members to have any
experience in dealing with appellate work. In fact, even investigation officers
who have never handled any appeal will qualify to be appointed as Technical
Members under such a clause, as has been the unhappy experience of Sales Tax
Tribunals in some States like Maharashtra. Namit Sharma vs. Union of
India [(2013) 1 SCC 745]
has clearly laid down that Technical Members
must not only possess legal qualifications, but also have a judicial bend of
mind. The Bombay High Court has recently, in case of the Maharashtra Sales Tax
Tribunal, held that a “judicially trained mind”, as required in Namit
Sharma
, means long experience with quasi-judicial disputes and that the
mere status as a Deputy Commissioner for three years cannot suffice [Sales
Tax Tribunal Bar Association vs. State of Maharashtra – Judgment dated 28/29
September, 2017 in WP 2069/2015].

 

(5) Section 110(d) allows the State Government
to notify any rank of State Commissioners for appointment as Technical Member
(State). The criteria of qualifications pertains to the Constitutional
requirement of independence of the Members and must be dealt with by Parliament
itself. By allowing the Government control over deciding of qualifications, the
Legislature is allowing the Government to exert unholy influence over the
composition of the Tribunal. 

 

(6) While sections 110(2) and (4) recognise
the primacy of the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justices of the High
Court in appointment of Judicial Members, however the selection of the
Technical Members has been left to a Selection Committee whose composition is
undefined in the Act. Firstly, the Selection Committee deals with the sensitive
aspect of selection of Technical Members. The composition of this committee
should not have been left to the good senses of the rule-making authority, the
Legislature must deal with such aspects, being an essential legislative
function. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the members of the Selection
Committee themselves will be judicially trained. Why should bureaucrats have
control of the Selection Committee?  

 

(7) The clause for reappointment of Members
creates a conflict of interest. A similar clause was struck down by the Supreme
Court in the National Tax Tribunal case for its mischievous potential to tinker
with the independence of the members [Madras Bar Association vs. Union of
India (2014) 10 SCC 1]
.
Yet we see the same clause in GST law all over
again. Reappointment clauses are notorious in nature and create a sense of
insecurity in minds of Tribunal members.

 

(8) Similarly, salary, allowances and terms
and conditions of service cannot be left to the rule-making authority. These
are substantial mattes which affect independence of judiciary and should have
been dealt with by Parliament itself. Furthermore, the rule-making authority,
that is the State and Central Governments, will be the litigants in every case
before the Tribunal. They cannot be allowed to hold any power over Members’
salaries and allowances. 

 

Solution

Each of the concerns raised above arise
ultimately from settled jurisprudence and past experience. There is no solution
except curing the faults in the statutory mechanism. In time, the Courts will
reiterate their earlier judgments and strike down these offending clauses. But
given the pace at which justice comes in India, the people will suffer in the
interim. 

 

Conclusion


Is it really fair to have
such provisions? We are not talking here about some new model of
tribunalisation which is  yet untested in
Courts. There is ample jurisprudence on all the aspects mentioned above. Why is
it then that the people must suffer the same woes that the Courts have rescued
them from earlier? It is not simple a question of independence of judiciary:
one is forced to think about the unfairness in legislative power being
exercised in such an arbitrary manner to steamroll the rights of people to fair
adjudication of disputes.

17. The Pr. CIT-6 vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 94 of 2016, Dated: 27th June, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ACIT-10(1) vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd; dated 19/01/2015 ; ITA. No 1712/Mum/2011, AY: 2006-07 Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(2) : Assessment–Notice–Notice served on the old address- Assessment was held to be void [Section 292BB]

The assessee had filed its return
of income for A.Y 2006-07 giving its new address therein. However, the A.O
served the notice within the stipulated time u/s. 143(2) of the Act not on the
address in the return but upon the address in the PAN record. The above notice
sent by the Revenue within the prescribed time was not received by the assessee
as it ceased to be the address of the assessee. Thereafter, admittedly beyond
the time prescribed u/s. 143(2) of the Act, the notice was served upon the assessee.

 

During the Assessment proceedings,
the assessee did raise objections as to the jurisdiction to assess the
department u/s. 143(3) of the Act. However, the A.O did not accept it and
passed an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

The justification of the Revenue is
that, they served the notice dated 5th October, 2007 at the address
available in its PAN records. Therefore, the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act sent
on the earlier address was correct. Besides, the assessee participated in the
assessment proceedings and their action is protected by section 292BB of the
Act.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the A.O, the assessee filed the Appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) find that
the impugned statutory notices issued without jurisdiction. The notice u/s.
143(2) was not served to the assessee and therefore, the proceedings u/s.
143(2) were bad in law. In view of the assessee raising such objections during
assessment proceedings, the provisions of section 292BB were not applicable and
section 292BB could not have given validity to the illegality / irregularity of
the notices.

 

The CIT(A) held that the A.O
completed assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act without assuming valid jurisdiction
u/s. 143(2) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances, the assessment framed
u/s. 143(3) of the Act was invalid.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), the Revenue filed the Appeal before the ITAT. ITAT upheld the CIT(A) order.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed  that besides the return of
income indicating the new address, the appellant had by earlier letter dated 6th
December, 2005 intimated the change of its address to the A.O and also
requested a issue of fresh PAN. Besides, the A.O had infact served at the new
address, the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 30th
November, 2006 in respect of AY: 2004-05. This was much prior to the statutory
notice issued on 5th October, 2007 and 25th July, 2008 at
the address of the assessee as recorded in the PAN. The Assessee had taken up
the objection with regard to non service of notice during the assessment
proceedings. Thus, as rightly held by the impugned order of the Tribunal that,
in view of the proviso to section 292(BB) of the Act, the notice not being
served within time, cannot be deemed to be valid. Therefore, no fault can be
found with the impugned order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, revenue Appeal
was  dismissed.

16. The Pr. CIT-9 vs. Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 1361 of 2015, Dated: 12thJune, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ITO V Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd; dated 29/04/2015 ; ITA. No 2226/Mum/2011, AY 2003-04 Bench: K , Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(3) r.w.s 263 : Once the CIT(A) by its order had accepted the fact that the assessment order had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act – there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue

Assessee a 100% EOU is engaged in
the business of software development and export of software. In its return of
income, Assessee had claimed benefit of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in
respect of its 100% EOU. The assessment was completed on 29th March,
2006 u/s.  143 (3) of the Act.

 

The CIT passed an revision order
u/s.  263 of the Act, holding that the
assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. This
to the extent exemption was allowed u/s. 10B of the Act in respect of non
receipt of foreign exchange within six months of exports and on the issue of
International Transactions in respect of Transfer Pricing of International
Transactions with Associated Enterprises (AE), not being referred to the
Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) in terms of section 92CA of the Act. In the
light of the above, the CIT directed the A.O to finalise the assessment denovo,
on the above issues.

 

Consequent to the above order of
the CIT, the A.O proceeded to pass a fresh order. However, in the fresh order,
the A.O not only dealt with issue of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in relation
to delay in realisation of foreign exchange and referred the matter to the TPO
but also dealt with the issue of reallocation of R & D Expenses for
claiming deduction u/s.  10B of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of
A.O, the Assessee carried the matter in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) by an
order, accepted the contention of the assessee that, the A.O had gone beyond
the issue which were directed to be considered denovo by the CIT in its
order u/s.263 of the Act. Therefore, to that extent, the order was without
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the above finding, the CIT(A) proceeded further
to decide the issue, inter alia, with regard to R & D expenses on
merits, held that assessee is entitled to set off R & D expenses with the
profits of STIP units as the R & D expenses have a direct nexus with the
export business of the STIP unit.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), both the Revenue as well as assessee filed the Appeal to the
Tribunal. The Revenue in its appeal before the Tribunal, did not challenge the
finding of the CIT(A) that the order of the assessing officer dated 24th
December, 2009, was beyond the directions contained in the order dated 27th
September, 2007 passed by the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act and, therefore, without
jurisdiction. Nor did it urge this issue at the hearing before the Tribunal.
The Revenue’s only challenge was on the issue of allowing the set off of R
& D Expenses incurred in a non STIP Unit with STIP unit of the Respondent .

 

The Appellant’s basic contention
was that once the CIT(A) had by its order dated 12th January, 2011
had accepted the fact that the Assessment Order dated 24th December,
2009 had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act,
there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue. This as it
was beyond the scope of the directions of the CIT i.e. to the extent of set off
of R & D Expenses. The ITAT upheld the contention of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed that the Revenue has not challenged the finding of the CIT(A) that the
A.O has gone beyond the scope of directions given by the CIT(A) in its order
u/s. 263 of the Act. The issue now being urged by the Revenue in appeal. As
this was not an issue urged by them before the Tribunal, this question does not
arise from the order of the Tribunal.

 

Further the question as urged, is
beyond the issue raised before the Tribunal and cannot be urged before this
Court as held by this Court in CIT vs. Tata Chemicals 256 ITR 395. In
any case, it may be pointed out that the earlier Assessment Order dated 29th
March, 2006 has not been cancelled by the order of CIT u/s. 263 of the Act, for
passing a fresh Assessment Order. Once it is not disputed by the Revenue before
the Tribunal that, the order of the A.O on set off of R & D Expenses was
beyond the scope of the directions given by the CIT in exercise of its power
u/s. 263 of the Act, the occasion to examine the correctness of the same, would
not arise. Accordingly, the  Appeal
was  dismissed.

54. Dimension Data Asia Pacific PTE Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 182 (Bom): Date of order: 6th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2011-12 Section 144C r.w.s. 143(3) – Transfer pricing – Reference to DRP (Draft assessment order) – Where in case of foreign assessee, Assessing Officer passed final assessment order u/s. 144C(13), read with section 143(3) without passing a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1), said order being violative of provisions of section 144C(1), deserved to be set aside

The assessee was a foreign company
entitled to the procedure provided u/s. 144C. For relevant year assessee filed
its return declaring nil income. The Assessing Officer passed assessment order
u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) making certain addition to assessee’s income. The
assessee filed writ petition raising a contention that it was entitled to a
draft assessment order being passed u/s. 144C(1) before the final assessment
order as passed in this case u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) since the impugned
order ignored the mandate of section 144C same deserved be set aside.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  It
is an undisputed position that the assessee is a foreign company and an
eligible assessee as defined in section 144C(15)(b)(ii) of the Act. A foreign
company is entitled to being assessed in accordance with section 144C of the
Act. It is the section 144C, which provides a separate scheme for the manner in
which the Assessing Officer would pass assessment orders under the Act and a
separate procedure to challenge a draft order i.e. before an assessment order
which is subject to appeal under the Act is passed.

 

ii) The
entire object is to ensure that the disputes of Foreign Companies are resolved
expeditiously and final assessment orders are not passed without a re-look to
the proposed order (draft order), if so desired by the Foreign Company. In
essence, it obliges the Assessing Officer to first pass a draft of the proposed
assessment order indicating the proposed variation in the income returned. This
draft Assessment Order is to be passed u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which entitles
an eligible assessee such as a Foreign Company to approach the DRP with its
objection to the draft assessment order. This is so provided, so that an
eligible assessee can have his grievance addressed before the final assessment
order is passed. In case, an assessee does not object to the draft assessment
order, then a final assessment order is passed in terms of the draft assessment
order by the Assessing Officer. It is only on passing of the final assessment
order that the assessee, if aggrieved by it, would be able to approach the
appellate authorities under the Act. These special rights are made available
u/s. 144C to an eligible assessee such as the assessee. Therefore, it cannot be
ignored by passing a final order u/s. 144(13) of the Act without preceding it
with a draft assessment order as required therein.

 

iii) The contention of the revenue that the requirement of passing a
draft assessment order u/s. 144C of the Act would only extend to the orders
passed in the first round of proceedings or in respect of an order passed by
the Assessing Officer in remand proceedings by the Tribunal which has entirely
set aside the original assessment order. This distinction which is sought to be
drawn by the revenue is not borne out by section 144C of the Act. In fact, even
in partial remand proceedings from the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to pass a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act. The Assessing
Officer, is obliged to, in terms of section 144C to pass a draft assessment
order in all cases where he proposes to assess the Foreign Company under the
Act by making a variation in the returned income.

 

iv) In
this case, the impugned order has been passed in terms of section 143(3) read
with section 144C read with section 254 of the Act and it certainly makes a
variation to the returned income filed by the assessee. This even if, one
proceeds on the basis that the returned income stands varied by the order of
the Tribunal in the first round, to the extent the petitioner accepts it.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer correctly invokes section 144C of the Act in
the impugned order. Once having invoked section 144C, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to comply with it in full and not partly. This impugned order was
passed consequent to the order of the Tribunal restoring some of the issues before
it to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

 

v) This
‘fresh adjudication’ itself would imply that it would be an order which would
decide the lis between the parties, may not be entire lis, but
the dispute which has been restored to the Assessing Officer. The impugned
order is not an order merely giving an effect to the order of the Tribunal, but
it is an assessment order which has invoked section 143(3) of the Act and also
section 144C of the Act. This invocation of section 144C of the Act has taken
place as the Assessing Officer is of the view that it applies, then the
requirement of section 144C(1) of the Act has to be complied with before he can
pass the impugned order invoking section 144C(13) of the Act.

 

vi) In
fact, section 144C(13) of the Act can only be invoked in cases where the
assessee has approached the DRP in terms of s/s. 144C(2)(b) of the Act and the
DRP gives direction in terms of section 144C(5) of the Act. In this case, the
assessment order has invoked section 144C(13) of the Act without having passed
the necessary draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which alone would
make a direction u/s. 144C(5) of the Act by the DRP possible. Thus, the
impugned order is completely without jurisdiction.

 

vii) Moreover, so far as a foreign company is concerned, the
Parliament has provided a special procedure for its assessment and appeal in
cases where the Assessing Officer does not accept the returned income. In this
case, in the working out of the order of the Tribunal results in the returned
income being varied, then the procedure of passing a draft assessment order
u/s. 144C(1) of the Act is mandatory and has to be complied with, which has not
been done.

 

viii)  In the above view, the impugned order has
been passed without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 144C
of the Act which is applicable to a foreign company such as the assessee.
Therefore, the impugned order is quashed and set aside.”

53. CIT vs. Shark Roadways Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 78 (All): Date of order: 1st May, 2017: A. Y.: 2008-09 Sections 40(a)(ia) and 194C – TDS – Payments to contractors – Payment of hire charges – No contract between assessee and parties of hired vehicles on freight basis for transportation on behalf of principal – Transporters not contractors or sub-contractors – No liability to deduct tax at source

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer made additions to the assessee’s income on the ground that
the assessee was a transporter and not trader, and therefore, provisions of
section 194C of the Act were applicable to the hire charges paid by it to the
parties whom the lorries or trucks were hired.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) called
upon the assessee to produce copies of challans and after verifying them found
that section 194C was not attracted. He found that for the fulfillment of its
transportation commitment to its principals, the assessee, besides using its
own trucks and lorries was also hiring trucks and lorries from other owners or
directly from the drivers available in the market through brokers on a random
basis as and when required on freight basis. He further found that the payments
of hire charges were made directly by the assessee to those transporters without
there being any written or oral contract, vis-à-vis its principal. He held that
the payment of lorry hire charges to individual transporters was part of the
direct costs attributable to the receipts of the assessee, computable u/s. 28
and that in the absence of any evidence, it could not be said that the
individual truck owners or drivers of transporters were contractors or
sub-contractors of the assessee. Consequently, he held that the payments made
to such transporters hired by the assessee were not in the nature of payments
to contractors or sub-contractors within the meaning of section 194C. The
Tribunal affirmed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the
provisions of section 194C did not apply.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The
learned counsel for the appellant (Department) could not show that the
Assessing Officer while taking the view against the assessee by reference to
section 194C recorded his findings based on any evidence whatsoever and we find
that it was only on assumption.

 

ii)  It
is for this reason the findings of the Assessing Officer have been reversed by
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. These are concurrent findings of
fact and when vouchers otherwise were verifiable, we find no reason to take an
otherwise view in the matter.

 

iii)  The question is answered against the appellant, i.e., the Revenue.
The appeal lacks merit.”

52. Banco Products (India) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 405 ITR 318 (Guj): Date of order: 26th March, 2018: A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 35(2AB) – Scientific research expenditure – Weight deduction – Condition precedent for weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB) – Date of approval not relevant – Application for approval in December 2006 and approval granted in October 2008 – Assessee entitled to weighted deduction in A. Y. 2008-09

The assessee claimed weighted
deduction u/s. 35(2AB) of the Act on the expenditure incurred for setting up
research and development facility. This was supported by the approval granted
by the concerned authority with respect to such facility. The Assessing Officer
was of the opinion that such deduction could not be granted for the period
prior to the effective date
of approval.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld
the decision of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal took the view that the
facts were somewhat contradictory. It was not clear when the application for
approval was made and when actually approval was granted. The Tribunal
therefore, remanded the proceedings for fresh consideration by the Assessing
Officer.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Gujarat High Court held as under:

 

“i) Section 35(2AB) of the Act is
aimed at promoting development of in-house research and development facility
which necessarily would require substantial expenditure which immediately may
not yield desired results or be correlated to generation of additional revenue.
By very nature of things, research and development is a hit and miss exercise.
Much of the efforts, capital as well as human investment may go waste if the
research is not successful. The Legislature therefore, having granted special
deduction for such expenditure, it should be seen in the light of the purpose
for which it has been recognised. Research and development facility can be set
up only after incurring substantial expenditure. The application for approval
of such facility can be made only after setting up of such facility. Once an
application is filed by the assessee to the prescribed authority, the assessee
would have no control over when such application is processed and decided. Even
if therefore, the application is complete in all respects and the assessee is
otherwise eligible for grant of such approval, approval may take some time to
come by.  

 

ii)    The
claim for deduction cannot be defeated on the ground that such approval was
granted in the year subsequent to the financial year in which the expenditure
was incurred. In order to avail of the deduction u/s. 35(2AB) what is relevant
is not the date of recognition or the cut off date mentioned in the certificate
of the prescribed authority or even the date of approval, but the existence of
recognition.

 

iii)   The Assessing Officer was not right in restricting the deduction
to expenditure incurred prior to April 1, 2008. He had to recomputed such
deduction and give its effect to the assessee for the relevant assessment year.

 

iv)   In
the result, the appeal is allowed. The question is answered in favour of the
assessee. Decision of the Assessing Officer to restrict the assessee’s claim
for deduction on the expenditure which was incurred prior to April 1, 2008 is
set aside. The Assessing Officer shall recomputed such deduction and give its
effect to the assesee for the relevant assessment year.”

51. Ashokbhai Jagubhai Kheni vs. Dy. CIT (Appeals); 405 ITR 179 (Guj); Date of order: 12th March, 2018: A. Ys.: 2011-12, 2013-14 and 2014-15 Section 220(6) and CBDT Circulars – Recovery of tax – Stay of recovery pending appeal – Circular by CBDT that 15% of disputed demand to be deposited for stay – Permits decrease or even increase in percentage of disputed tax demand to be deposited – Requirement reduced to 7.5% on further condition of security for remaining 7.5% to satisfaction of Assessing Authority

For A. Ys. 2011-12, 2013-14 and
2014-15, the Assessing Officer raised a total demand of Rs. 30 crore. The
Assessee filed appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and requested for stay
of the demand pending appeals u/s. 220(6) of the Act. The Assessing Officer
required the assessee to deposit 15% of the disputed tax demand, upon which,
the recovery of the remaining amount would be stayed. The assessee approached
the Principal Commissioner, who refused to grant any further relief to the
assessee.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the
writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)  The
issue of granting stay of pending appeals is governed principally by two
circulars issued by the CBDT. The first circular was issued on 02/02/1993 being
Instruction No. 1914.

 

The circular contained guidelines
for staying the demand pending appeal, stating that the demand would be stayed
if there are valid reasons for doing so and mere filing of appeal against the
order of assessment would not be sufficient reason to stay the recovery of
demand. The instructions issued under office memorandum dated 29/02/2016 are
not in supersession of Instruction of Instruction No. 1914 but are in partial
modification thereof. This circular thus lays down 15% of the disputed demand to
be deposited for stay, by way of a general condition.

 

The circular does not prohibit or
envisage that there can be no deviation from this standard formula. In other
words, it is inbuilt in the circular itself that the percentage of the disputed
tax to be deposited could be either decreased or even increased for an assessee
to enjoy stay pending appeal. The circular provides the guidelines to enable
Assessing Officers and Commissioners to exercise such discretionary powers more
uniformly.

 

ii)   The
total tax demand was quite high. Even 15% of the disputed tax dues would run
into several crores of rupees. Considering such facts and circumstances, the
requirement of depositing the disputed tax dues was to be reduced to 7.5% in
order to enable the assessee to enjoy stay of pending appeals before the
Commissioner. This would however be on a further condition that he should offer
immovable security for the remaining 7.5% to the satisfaction of the assessing
authority.

 

iii)  The order passed by the Principal Commissioner was to be modified
accordingly. Both these conditions should be satisfied by April 30, 2018.”

50. Principal CIT vs. Geetaben Chandulal Prajapati; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 100 (Guj) : Date of order: 10th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2006-07 Section 271(1)(c) and 275(1A) – Penalty – Concealment of income – Where penalty proceeding initiated against assessee were dropped after considering reply submitted by assessee, Assessing Officer was not justified in initiating fresh penalty proceedings on same set of facts

The assessee did not file the
return of income for the year under consideration, though she received a total
sum of Rs. 62 lakh out of the sale consideration for sale of the land and
thereafter she filed the return of income only after notice u/s. 148 of the Act
and offered the aforesaid amount to tax. The income was assessed at Rs. 62
lakh. However, the Assessing Officer also initiated the penalty proceedings to
which the assessee filed the reply. The Assessing Officer dropped the penalty
proceedings considering the reply submitted by the assessee. Against the
assessment order the assessee filed appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).
The said appeal came to be dismissed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Thereafter,
the Assessing Officer issued the fresh notice to the assessee for imposing the
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) and passed the order imposing the penalty u/s.
271(1)(c).

 

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
cancelled the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c). The Tribunal confirmed the order
of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) 
It can be said that fresh penalty proceedings are permissible only with
a view to give effect to the order of the higher Forum revising the assessment
and a fresh penalty order can be passed and/or penalty can be imposed,
enhancing, reducing or canceling the penalty or dropping the proceedings for
the imposition of the penalty on the basis of the assessment as revised by
giving effect to such order of the Commissioner (Appeals) …. etc.

 

ii) 
Therefore, in a case where the assessment was not required to be revised
pursuant to the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate
Tribunal or the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, the power
u/s. 275(1A) cannot be exercised and the fresh penalty proceedings cannot be
initiated once earlier the penalty proceedings were dropped after considering
the reply submitted by the assessee, as there is no revised assessment which is
required to be giving effect to. Therefore, it is to be noted that the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal are justified in deleting the
penalty imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) faced with a situation that earlier the penalty
proceedings were dropped after considering the reply submitted by the assessee
and that thereafter the assessment was not required to be revised giving effect
to the order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) as the Commissioner
(Appeals) simply confirmed the assessment order determining the income at Rs.
62 lakh. In the facts and circumstances of the case narrated herein above, the
order passed by the Tribunal deleting the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is to be
confirmed.

 

iii)  No substantial question of law arises and
hence, present Tax Appeal deserves to be dismissed.”

49. Kalanithi Maran vs. Union of India; 405 ITR 356 (Mad): Date of order: 28th March, 2018 Sections 2(35)(b) and 276B – Offences and prosecution – TDS – Failure to pay tax deducted at source to Revenue – Company – Principal officer – Non-executive chairman not involved in day-to-day affairs of company – Managing director admitting liability and entering into negotiations with Revenue – Prosecution of non-executive chairman – Not valid

Criminal proceedings u/s. 276B of
the Act were initiated against a company for non-payment of tax deducted at
source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who was the non-executive chairman
of the company treating him as the principal officer of the company and an
order was also passed.

 

The non-executive chairman filed a
writ petition and challenged the said action against him. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  U/s.
2(35)(b) of the Act, the Assessing Officer can serve notice only to persons who
are connected with the management or administration of the company to treat
them as principal officer. Section 278B states that it shall not render any
such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that offence was committed
without his knowledge.

 

ii)  The
assessee had stated that he was not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the
company and that he was only a non-executive chairman and not involved in the
management and administration of the company. The managing director himself had
specifically stated that he was the person in charge of the day-to-day affairs
of the company.

 

iii)  The second respondent, while passing the order naming the assessee
as the principal officer had not given any reason for rejecting the contention
of the managing director. The second respondent without any reason had named
the assessee as the principal officer. Merely because the assessee was the
non-executive chairman, it could not be stated that he was in charge of the
day-to-day affairs, management and administration of the company.

 

The second respondent should have
given the reasons for not accepting the case of the managing director as well
as the petitioner in their respective reply. The conclusion of the second
respondent that the assessee being a chairman and major decisions were taken in
the company under his administration was not supported by any material evidence
or any legally sustainable reasons. The second respondent had not produced any
material to establish that the petitioner was responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the company.

 

iv) In
the absence of any material, the second respondent should not have come to the
conclusion that the assessee was the principal officer. The order which held
the assessee as the principal officer of the company and therefore, liable to
be prosecuted for the alleged default of the company u/s. 276B was not valid.”

48. CIT vs. Bhatia General Hospital; 405 ITR 24 (Bom): Date of order: 26th February, 2018: A. Y.: 2007-08 Sections 11, 32(1)(iii) and 37 – Charitable purpose – Hospital – Equipment – Equipment which had outlived its useful life – Depreciation – Government rules prohibiting sale as scrap – Additional depreciation allowable – Computation of income – On commercial principles

The assessee was a charitable
trust, running a hospital. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation on the hospital
equipment, which had completed their usefulness of 10 years. It was submitted
by the assessee that the claim was only for the purpose of writing off the
value of the assets. However, the Assessing Officer held that in a case where the
assets had outlived their useful life, they should have been sold as scrap and
in the absence of such evidence, disallowed the claim of additional
depreciation.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held
that the income of the trust was required to be computed on commercial
principles and allowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation. The
Tribunal recorded that the additional depreciation had been claimed by the
assessee in respect of hospital equipment which had outlived its life and that
according to the Government rules the assessee was prohibited from selling such
hospital equipment as scrap and upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals)
and reiterated the fact that the income of the trust had to be computed on
commercial principles.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  According
to the provisions of section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where a
plant and machinery was discarded or destroyed in the previous year, the amount
of money received on sale as such or as scrap or any insurance amount received
to the extent it fell short of the written down value was allowed as
depreciation, provided the same was written off in the books of account.

 

ii)   The
assessee could not sell the hospital equipment as scrap nor it could use the
hospital equipment. Therefore, the written down value of the hospital
equipment, was to be allowed as depreciation, as the asset had been written off
from its books of account. Thus, the nomenclature, as additional depreciation
rather than depreciation, was the only objection of the Department and the
nomenclature could not decide a claim.

 

iii)  It was also allowable as business u/s. 37 as it was an expenditure
incurred wholly and exclusively for carrying out its activity as hospital.(on
commercial principles).”

47. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 38 (Bom): Date of order: 4th July, 2018 A. Y.: 1988-89 Section 36(1)(iii) – Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Where assessee, engaged in construction business, purchased plot of land out of borrowed funds for implementation of a project, since plot of land was purchased in course of business of assessee, same formed part of its stock-in-trade, and, therefore, interest paid on borrowings for purchase of said land was to be allowed as revenue expenditure

The assessee partnership firm was
engaged in construction activity. The assessee had taken a loan to purchase
open plot of land for its project named, ‘LS’. The assessee had claimed an
amount paid as interest on said loan as revenue expenditure. The Assessing
Officer held that purchase of plot of land was capital in nature. Hence,
interest must also be capitalised. Thus, he disallowed the deduction on amount
being interest paid on loan for acquisition of land.

 

On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) found that interest paid on borrowings for purchase of land was
allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier assessment years and it was only
in the subject assessment year that the Assessing Officer for the first time
treated the same as work-in-progress and capitalised the same. He held that the
interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its stock-in-trade, i.e.,
plot of land for the ‘LS’ project had to be allowed as expenditure to determine
its income. Consequently, he deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing
Officer. The Tribunal held that crucial question to be decided was whether the
assessee could be said to have commenced work on project ‘LS’ during the
previous year relevant to subject assessment year. On facts it held that the
assessee had not shown any work had commenced on LS project plot of land during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year. Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that the Assessing Officer was justified in coming to conclusion that
interest expenditure in respect to ‘LS’ project (plot of land) could not be
allowed as revenue expenditure.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  In
view of section 36(1)(iii) as existing prior to amendment with effect from
1-4-2004 all interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purpose of
business or profession has to be allowed as deduction while computing income
under head ‘income from business’. Prior to amendment made on 1-4-2004, there
was no distinction based on whether the borrowing is for purchase of capital
asset or otherwise, interest was allowable as deduction in determining the
taxable income. It was only after introduction of proviso to section 36(1)(iii)
with effect from 1-4-2004 that the purpose of borrowing, i.e., acquisition of
assets then interest paid would be capitalised. In this case, concern is with
the A. Y. 1988-89, i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to section
36(1)(iii). Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings to purchase the plot
of land for LS project is allowable as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) as it was
incurred for the purposes of its business.

 

ii)   The
revenue’s submission is that the deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) will not be
available as no income has been earned in respect of LS project. This cannot be
appreciated. It is an undisputed position that the appellant-assessee has filed
return of income declaring income under the head income from business. The
assessee has various projects executing construction projects and, therefore,
interest expenditure is to be allowed as deduction to arrive at profits and
gains of business or profession of builders carried out by the assessee. It is
not a case where the only project of the assessee was the LS project.
Admittedly, in this case the business of the assessee as developer had already
commenced and income offered to tax.

 

iii)  In the above view, substantial question of law is answered in
negative, i.e., in favour of the appellant-assessee and against the
respondent-revenue.”

[2016-TIOL-1851-CESTAT-MUM] Bny Mellon International Operations India P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

fiogf49gjkf0d
When premium on group insurance does not vary with the number of family members covered, entire service tax charged on such premium is available as CENVAT credit.

Facts
The Appellant an exporter of services filed a refund claim of the accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. CENVAT credit of service tax paid on premium charged on group insurance scheme was disallowed on the ground that the said insurance also covered the family members of the employee which is not related to the output service.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the premium charged does not vary with the number of dependents who are additionally covered by the same insurance scheme. Accordingly even if none of the dependents were within the coverage, the premium amount would not alter or vary. Thus no part of premium is attributable to the extension of coverage to family members. Appeal is allowed and refund granted.

[2016-TIOL-1974-CESTAT-MUM] Raymond Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Nashik

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 11BB of Central Excise Act, 1944 is intended to ensure accountability on the part of revenue officials and therefore withholding of interest will only serve to encourage irresponsibility and non-responsiveness on part of tax authorities.

Facts
The Appellant paid service tax following a show cause notice issued. The adjudicating authority dropped the demand and after protracted recourse to appeal and review, the Tribunal also accorded finality to non-taxability. The refund claim filed was allowed but the amount sanctioned was transferred to the fund on the ground of “unjust enrichment”. On appeal the first appellate authority allowed the refund to be paid but claim for interest was rejected. Accordingly the present appeal is filed.

Held
The Tribunal noted that section 11BB of Central Excise Act, 1944 is unambiguously clear that non-sanction of refund within three months of filing of claim will set the “interest clock” ticking. Mere pendency of any appellate/ revisionary proceedings cannot justify non-sanction of such refunds. The law does not acknowledge recoveries to any such excuse or loopholes. Section 11BB is intended to ensure accountability on the part of revenue officials and if interest legally provided for in the law is not granted, it tantamounts to defying legislative intent. It was observed that wrongful collection of tax was known since the date of adjudication order and therefore there is no justification to hold back the wrongly credited amount. Accordingly appeal was allowed with a direction to immediately release the interest due on receipt of the order.

Note: Readers may also the note the decision in the case of CCE & ST vs. Ghatge Patil Industries Ltd [2016-TIOL-1970- CESTAT-MUM] holding that even though the amount became refundable after Tribunal order, the interest shall be payable for the period from three months of the date of application till the date of sanction of refund. Reference can also be made to a similar decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tahnee Heights Co-op Housing Society Ltd vs. The Union of India & ORS [2015-TIOL-1828-HC-MUM-ST] digest reported in the October 2015 issue of BCAJ.

2016 (43) STR 166 (Guj.) New Asian Engineers & Amp. vs. Union of India

fiogf49gjkf0d
Application for condonation of delay shall be decided liberally.

Facts
Petitioner prayed for condonation of delay of 300 days on the ground of financial distress, his daughter’s suicide, scarcity of staff and unfamiliarity with legal procedures. CESTAT rejected the application since the grounds were related to the earlier period and not to the period of delay.

Held
Substantial justice shall be preferred as against technical requirements. Unless delay is inordinate or not explained at all or is due to mala fide intentions or neglect and lethargy, condonation shall be granted liberally. Having regard to the facts of the case, delay was condoned subject to payment of cost.

[2016-TIOL-2072-CESTAT-MUM] Jet Airways India Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

fiogf49gjkf0d
II. Tribunal

Tax paid under reverse charge mechanism which is available as CENVAT credit results in a revenue neutral situation and is a good ground to set aside demands, interest and penalties.

Facts
The Appellant is engaged in running airlines all over India as well as outside India. They have entered into agreements with the providers of computer reservation system (CRS) services outside India to display real time availability of flights, reservation of flights etc. on the basis of data collected from the main server of the Appellant for a consideration to be paid on the basis of each ticket issued by the travel agent.

A show cause notice was issued demanding service tax, interest and penalties on such payments made outside India u/s. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 under reverse charge mechanism falling under “online information and database access or retrieval service”. It was argued that to be covered under the said service category, the person who renders that service should be the owner or should have exclusive right over the relevant information/data so as to put him in a position to charge the recipient for access/retrieval of that data/information.

However in the present case the data/information was owned by the Appellant itself. Further revenue neutrality was claimed to set aside the demands.

Held
The Tribunal relying on the decision of British Airways [2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT-DEL] held that the classification of the activity is correctly determined by the revenue and therefore the demand stands correct. However, it was noted that the tax paid under reverse charge mechanism would be available as CENVAT credit against the output service tax liability of “transport by air and other services” resulting in a revenue neutral situation. It was held that it is trite law that question of revenue neutrality is a good ground, more so when the tax liability is being discharged under reverse charge mechanism and therefore demands, interest and penalties imposed are set aside.

2016 (43) STR 57(Kar.) Commr. of ST, Bangalore vs. Tavant Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit be claimed without even having any service tax registration.

Facts
The respondent was engaged in export of services and is not registered under the Service Tax Law. However a refund claim of unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was filed. In absence of registration, the claim was rejected. Tribunal relied on the decision of M/s. mPortal India Wireless Solutions Private Limited 2011 (16) taxmann.com 353 (Kar) of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court and held that there is no such precondition under the CENVAT Credit Rules for the assessee to take any registration. Also, one to one co-relation with respect to the input services used for providing output services was established and accordingly refund was allowed. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, department has filed an appeal.

Held

The High Court dismissed the appeal due to absence of substantial question of law.

[2016-TIOL-1730-HC-Del-ST] Federation of Hotels and Restaurants Association of India and ORS vs. Union of India and ORS

fiogf49gjkf0d
I. High Court

Constitutional validity of restaurant service along with Rule 2(C) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 is upheld and entry 65(105)(zzzzw) pertaining to levy of service tax on short term accommodation is held unconstitutional and invalid.

Facts:
The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzzv) viz. restaurant service and section 66E(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 seeking to constitute service portion in an activity of supply of food as a declared service. Further it is claimed that Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 arbitrarily determining 40% as the value of service is invalid. Further the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzzw) viz. Hotel, Inn, Club and Guest House service is also challenged. It was stated that with the insertion of clause 29(f) in Article 366 of the constitution, the state legislatures have the exclusive competence to legislate in respect of levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods and no part of the transaction of supply of food in a restaurant is amenable to service tax. Further in respect of hotel accommodation it was submitted that Entry 62 of the State List imposes tax on entertainment, amusement, betting and gambling and moreover state legislatures have enacted statutes for levy of luxury tax on hotel accommodation and therefore levy of service tax lacks legislative competence.

Held:
The High Court relied on the decision of Larsen and Toubro [2015-TIOL-187-SC-ST] and BSNL vs. Union of India [2006-TIOL-15-SC-CT-LB] wherein it has been observed that the taxation powers of the Centre and States are mutually exclusive under the constitution and therefore the moment a levy enters into a prohibited exclusive field it is liable to be struck down. Accordingly Parliament can only tax the service element and the states can only tax the transfer of property in goods. Therefore the Court noted that in the present writ it is essential to examine whether the composite catering contract is capable of being segregated into a portion pertaining to supply of goods and that pertaining to services provided. Relying on the decision of Larsen and Toubro vs. State of Karnataka [2013-TIOL-46-SC-CT-LB] it was held that even if some part of the composite transaction involves rendering of service, there should be no difficulty in recognizing the power of the Union to bring to tax that portion. Since the Parliament has made the legal position explicit by taxing the service portion of a composite contract of supply of food and drinks the same has sound constitutional basis and therefore section 65(105)(zzzzv) and section 66E(i) are constitutionally valid. In the matter of Rule 2C the Court relying on the decision of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. Union of India [2010-TIOL-87-SC-ST-LB] observed that the grant of abatement has the approval by the Supreme Court more so when the assessee does not maintain accounts to determine the service portion. However it was pointed out that if an assessee is able to demonstrate on the basis of accounts and records that the value of service is different than that provided in the Rule, the assessing authority is obliged to consider such submission and give a decision thereto. In respect of Hotel accommodation, however the Court noted that the “Delhi Tax on Luxuries Act, 1996” which provides for levy of luxury tax on provision of service of hotel accommodation is traceable to entry 62 of the State list and therefore the State is competent to levy tax on such taxable event. Thus, this is a case of encroachment by the Union in the domain of the State and therefore the Court strikes down section 65(105)(zzzzw) of the Finance Act 1994 pertaining to levy of service tax on provision of short-term accommodation.

“Transfer of right to use” vis-à-vis “Permissible Use”

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
The controversy about nature of a transaction as to whether it is ‘transfer of right to use’ or nothas been debated for long.. Intermittently there are judgments from different forums giving different views and at times conflicting views. Asituation has also arisen that both VAT and Service Tax are being levied on same amount. It was long felt that the issue, whether service tax is attracted or VAT is attracted, should be decided by the Hon. High Court by making both authorities VAT and Service tax authorities parties to the dispute. Mahayco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.9175 of 2015) & Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd. (W.P.No.497 of 2015) dated 11.8.2016.

Recently Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to deal with the above delicate issue once more in above matters. The important aspect of the Writ Petitions is that along with VAT department of State Government, Service Tax Department of Central Government was also made party to the Writ Petition. Both writ petitions are decided by common judgment. However, facts in both cases are different.

It will be useful to refer to judgment in each case separately.

Mahayco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.9175 of 2015 dated 11.8.2016).

The facts as noted by Hon. High Court in above case are as under:

“11. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9175 of 2015, Monsanto India, is a joint venture company of Monsanto Investment India Private Limited (“MIIPL”) and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Monsanto India develops and commercializes insect-resistant hybrid cottonseeds using a proprietary “Bollgard technology”, one that is licensed to Monsanto India by Monsanto USA through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Monsanto Holdings Private Limited (“MHPL”). This technology is further sublicensed by Monsanto India to various seed companies on a non-exclusive and nontransferable basis to use, test, produce and sell genetically modified hybrid cotton planting seeds. In return for this technology, Monsanto India receives trait fees based on the number of packets of seeds sold by the sub-licensees. These sub-licensing agreements, with almost 40 seed companies, are the transactions in question. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the Monsanto Writ Petition are the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra respectively. Respondent No.3 is the Principal Commissioner of Service Tax. Respondent No. 4 is the Commissioner of Sales Tax.”

The arguments were from various angles including the argument that the allowance touse is non exclusive and not covered by ‘transfer of right to use’ category in view of judgment in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.(145 STC 91)(SC). Payment of service tax on same amount was also pointed out in the arguments made. Judgment in case of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (80 VST 173)(Bom) of Hon. Bombay High Court was argued to be distinguishable as well as otherwise argued to be per incurium. It was urged that no distinction can be made between tangible and intangible goods and therefore, the law laid down in BSNL equally applies to intangible goods also.

However, Hon. High Court did not concur with above submission and justified levy of VAT . Hon. High Court concluded as under:

“37. We have considered most carefully this submission. It is indeed sophisticated in its construction, and, at first blush, appears most appealing. On reflection and a closer examination, we find ourselves unable to subscribe to the interpretation Mr. Venkatraman so eloquently commends, viz., that his transaction is one of a merely permissive use. We find this interpretation not to be supported by law, and we have the most serious reservations about the universal applicability of his propositions, which seem to us to be overbroad and to cast the net too widely. The first question is whether there is a ‘transfer’ within the meaning of Article 366(29A)(d). We believe there is. It is true that the essence of a ‘transfer’ is the divesting of a right or goods from transferor and the investing of the same in the transferee, and this is what Salmond on Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum both say. In our opinion, the seeds embedded with the technology are, in fact, transferred. Monsanto India is divested of that portion of the technology embedded in these fifty seeds and these are fully vested in the sub-licensee. Mr. Venkatraman is not correct when he says that the effective control of the ‘goods’ is with Monsanto India. In RINL, the Supreme Court concluded that the contractor (transferee) did not have effective control over the machinery, despite the fact that he was using it, since he could not make such use of it as he liked. He could not use the machinery for any project other than that of the transferor’s, nor could he move it out during the period of the project. We do not see how we can draw a parallel from that case to the one at hand. The effective control over the seeds, and, therefore that portion of the technology that is embedded in the seeds, is entirely with the sub-licensee. That sub licensee is not bound to use the seeds (and the embedded technology) in accordance with Monsanto India’s wishes. Monsanto India cannot further dictate to the sub-licensee what he or it may do with these technology-infused seeds. The sub-licensee can do as it wishes with them. It may not use them at all. It may even destroy the seeds. Once the transaction is complete, i.e., once possession of the technology-imbued seeds is effected, and those seeds are delivered, Monsanto India has nothing at all to do with the technology embedded in those fifty seeds given to the sub-licensee.

At no point does Monsanto India have access to this portion of the technology. In other words, the transfer is to the exclusion of Monsanto India. This clearly satisfies the so-called BSNL “twin test” that Mr. Venkatraman is at pains to propound. Mr. Venkatraman’s argument that the seeds are “merely the media” and therefore irrelevant is, in our opinion, erroneous. They are relevant for the simple reason that the technology could not have been given to the sub-licensee without them; and there is no other method demonstrated anywhere of effecting any such transfer.”

Thus, Hon. High Court rejected all arguments about transfer of technology within scope of permissible use but held it as complete transfer of right, to constitute deemed sale liable under VAT . Hon. High Court has also cited various examples about what constitutes goods in relation to intangible goods.

The alternative argument that it is sale of seeds, hence exempt under Schedule Entry A-41 of MVAT Act was also rejected.

The other main argument about non attraction of VAT as Service Tax is paid did not impress the court. The further plea to direct transfer of service tax paid to VAT department was also not considered by Hon. Court by observing as under:

“53. Mr. Venkatraman makes one more, without prejudice argument, in case neither of his previous arguments succeeds. He submits that even if the agreement in question is held to be a transfer of the right to use (deemed sale) and that it does not fall under the exemption for seeds in the MVAT Act, then the levy and collection of Service Tax by the Union of India would be without the authority of law since VAT can only be levied and collected by the States. As argued earlier, the same transaction cannot be taxed as both a sale and a service. Monsanto India has already paid service tax for the entire period at a rate significantly higher than what is provided under the MVAT Act and therefore he says that it is not liable to pay further tax. For the period between May 2007 and February 2009, it has paid service tax at a rate of 12.36%, for March 2009 to March 2012 at a rate of 10.3%, for April 2012 to May 2015 at 12.36%, and for the period beginning June 2015 at a rate of 14%.

Under Entry 39 of Schedule C of the MVAT Act, the applicable rate of sales tax is only 5% since April 2010, prior to which it was 4%. He therefore seeks a Writ of Mandamus directing Union of India to transfer the amount paid as service tax from the Consolidated Fund of India to the Consolidated Fund of State of Maharashtra. He argues that such a transfer would not amount to unjust enrichment. We decline to enter into this debate. We leave it to Monsanto India to adopt suitable proceedings in this behalf, and leave their contentions open to the necessary extent.”

There will thus be a looming question of double tax payment.

Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd. (W.P.No.497 of 2015 dated 11.8.2016)

The facts in this case are noted by High Court as under:

“55. A brief description of Subway’s business is this. Subway was granted a non-exclusive sub-license by Subway International B.V. (“SIBV”), a Dutch limited liability corporation to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY -branded restaurants in India. This non-exclusive license was granted to SIBV itself by Subway Systems International Ansalt, which in turn was granted such a license by Doctor’s Associates Inc., an entity that owns the proprietary system for setting up and operating these restaurants.

These restaurants serve sandwiches and salads under the service mark SUBWAY. The agreement includes not only the trade mark SUBWAY , but also associated confidential information and goodwill, such as policies, forms, recipes, trade secrets and the like.

Typically, Subway enters into franchise agreements with third parties, under which it provides specified services to the franchisee. In return, the franchisee undertakes to carry on the business of operating sandwich shops in Subway’s name. The agreement only provides for a very limited representational or display right, and the franchisee cannot transfer or assign these exclusive rights to any third person. Subway also reserves the right to compete with these franchisees in the agreement. Under this agreement, Subway receives two kinds of consideration, one being a one-time franchisee fee which is paid when the agreement is signed; and the second is a royalty fee paid weekly by the franchisee on the basis of its weekly turnover. A sample franchise agreement is annexed. Under these agreements, the franchisees have no more than a right to display Subway’s intellectual property in the form of marks and logos, and a mere right to use such confidential information as Subway discloses and as prescribed by the franchise agreement.”

Based on above facts, the issue was examined by the Court. In this case also the ratio of BSNL relied upon. Hon. High Court ultimately held as under:

“69. We believe that Mr. Shroff is correct when he says that the agreement between Subway and its franchisees is not a sale, but is in fact a bare permission to use. It is, therefore, subject only to service tax. In our opinion, the fact that the agreement between Subway and its franchisee is limited to the precise period of time stipulated in the agreement is vital to Subway’s case. At the end of the period of the agreement, or before in case there was any breach of its terms, the right of the franchisee to display the mark ‘Subway’ and its trade dress, and all other permissions would also end. This is what sets this agreement apart from the case of Monsanto and its sublicensee. There, the seed companies could do as they pleased with the seeds; they could alienate or even destroy them. In Subway’s case, there are set terms provided by the agreement which have to be followed. A breach of these would result in termination of the agreement.

We believe that there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the franchisees. In fact, this agreement is a classic example of permissive use. It can be nothing else. For all the reasons in law and fact that the sub-licensing of technology in Monsanto is held to be a transfer of right to use, this franchising agreement must be held to be permissive use.”

Thus on ground that the agreement is for permissible use, it is held that it is not a sale by transfer of right to use but a ‘service agreement’.

One more issue dealt with by Hon. High Court is that for situs of sale by transfer of right to use, the place of agreement, as decided by Supreme Court in case of 20th Century Finance Corp. Ltd. ( 119 STC 182)(SC), is relevant.

In this case, the agreement was signed in Delhi and hence High Court held that otherwise also the transaction cannot be taxed in Maharashtra, inspite that the users are in Maharashtra.

Conclusion
The issue about sale by transfer of right to use or service transaction has become vexed and requires decision on facts of each case. Even in above judgment, Hon High Court has observed that each agreement, whether titled as franchise or something else, will be required to be decided on the basis of actual terms and scope of agreement. The dealers will thus be under threat of uncertainity taxation and most probably by both departments, till the issue gets resolved at a higher forum. Some undisputable criteria for deciding nature of transaction is required to be specified to avoid such uncertain situation.

Issue of limitation, an issue of jurisdiction

fiogf49gjkf0d
In a recent judgment of Calcutta High Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata (2016) 42 STR 634 (Calcutta), the doctrine, the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction, although an established law has been examined at great length with reference to show cause notices issued for recovery of service tax. Therefore a brief analysis of observations of the Hon. High Court in the said case is provided below:

Petitioner’s case in brief:
The petitioners in the instant case were engaged in civil construction activity. They obtained registration under construction service in October, 2004. Prior to this, the department had initiated inquiry in June 1998 regarding applicability of service tax as consulting engineer. This was replied to by the petitioner promptly stating that they were engaged in civil construction and were not liable to pay service tax as consulting engineer. Since the matter was not pursued further for six years it was understood as concluded by the petitioner. Again in April, 2004, the petitioners on receipt of the inquiry, denied their liability to pay service tax as consulting engineer. Again, there was no communication for 16 months till the department issued summons in September 2005. This was followed by a show cause notice in April, 2006 invoking longer period of limitation alleging suppression and demanding service tax for the period October 2000 to March 2005. The petitioner filed a reply to this show cause notice reiterating that they did not act as consulting engineer etc. Until three years there was complete silence at the end of which another show cause notice was issued in September 2009 involving period of September 2004 to June 15, 2005. The said second show cause notice culminated in an order confirming demand of service tax with interest and imposing equal amount of penalty. Subsequent to this, the petitioner received intimation for hearing for the earlier show cause notice issued in 2006. The petitioner replied to this stating that no hearing could take place 7 years after issuing show cause notice as they did not have record of the same and that under the law, the assessee is required to maintain records for five years only. Further already adjudicated subsequent show cause notice included part of the period covered in the earlier show cause notice. Hence there could not be dual assessment for the same period under the law. Petitioner’s grievance among others was that though there may be no time limit for adjudication of show cause notices by the department, it should be done in a reasonable time frame. For this reliance was placed on Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SC 363 and in Government of India vs. Citetdal Fine Pharmaceuticals 1989 (42) ELT 515. In both the cases, it was observed by the Apex Court that in absence of any period of limitation, the statutory authority must exercise its power within a reasonable period. Similarly, Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Union of India (2012) 22 taxman.com 367(Bom), observed that it is well settled that adjudication proceedings have to be concluded in reasonable time and if not done, they stand vitiated on the said ground. Also in Bhagwandas S. Tolani vs. B C Aggarwal 1983 (12) ELT 44 (Bom), Universal Generics (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India 1993 taxmann.com 30 (Bom) and in Biswanath & Co. V. Union of India 2010 (257) ELT 30 (Cal), the Courts have set aside either the show cause notice or the order, as the case may be. Sum and substance of the petitioner’s pleadings was to hold the hearing notice and the show cause notice as non-est and invalid. Reliance was placed by the petitioner also on the decisions in CCE vs. Mohan Bakers (P) Ltd. 2009 (241) ELT A23 and Giriraj Industries vs. CCE 2009 (242) ELT A84 wherein the Courts held/affirmed respectively that show cause notice issued after two years/15 months from the date of inspection/cause of action, the proceedings initiated were without following the due process of law.

Revenue’s contentions in brief:
On behalf of revenue, relying on the decision in Surya Alloy Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India 2014 (305) ELT 340 (Cal) it was contended that High Court’s interference on classification issues challenged through writs was not maintainable and the petitioners should be directed to agitate their grievance before the revenue authorities. The revenue further pointed out that in Indian Cardboard Industries vs. Collector of Central Excise 1991 taxmann.com 847 (Cal) it was observed that ordinarily, High Court should not embark to decide the factual disputes but relegate the party to submit the reply before authority concerned who is obliged to decide the same. The said rule however is not free from exceptions which are quoted below:

1 When the show cause notice is ex facie or on the basis of admitted facts does not disclose the offence alleged to be committed;

2 When the show cause notice is otherwise without jurisdiction;

3 When the show cause notice suffers from an incurable infirmity;

4 When the show cause notice is contrary to judicial decisions or decisions of the Tribunal;

5 When there is no material justifying the issuance of the show cause notice.

According to revenue, none of the above applied to the petitioner’s case. Reliance by revenue was also placed on the decision of ACST vs. P. Kesavan & Co. 1996 taxmann. com 1512 and it was contended that the rule must apply even to cases where sufficient evidence is placed before the writ Court for an unambiguous conclusion upon technical matters and made reference to Apcotex Industries vs. Union of India 2011 (271) ELT 46. The revenue among others also contended that issuing notice for personal hearing after a delay of seven years did not vitiate the case of the department against the petitioner as the Finance Act, 1994 contains no bar to continue adjudication proceedings and relied on the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CCE vs. Bhagsons Paints Industries (India) 2003 taxmann. com 315 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Tribunal and allowed adjudication proceedings to be completed nine years after issuance of show cause notice as the statute did not prescribe any time limit. The revenue contended further that show cause notice of 2006 was issued within seven months of the summons dated September 2005 whereas inspection made in 1998 was for the period not covered by the 2006 show cause notice. Only after subsequent inquiries in 2004 and 2005, the impugned show cause notice was issued within seven months.

Court’s view:
The Court’s observations based on rival submissions are summarized as follows:

On the maintainability of the writ petition, it was held that extended period of limitation was wrongly invoked and the logical conclusion would be that the show cause notice was issued without jurisdiction. In such event, the Court is justified in interfering with the show cause notice in exercise of its Writ Jurisdiction. The court observed,

“It is trite law that an authority cannot confer on itself to do a particular thing by wrongly assuming the existence of certain set of facts, existence whereof is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction by such authority. An authority cannot assume jurisdiction to do a particular thing by erroneously deciding a point of fact or law.”

“There cannot be dispute that the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction and the Commissioner has no authority and/or jurisdiction to issue notice after the period of limitation prescribed in the Finance Act, 1994.”

The Court in this frame of reference relied on Raza Textiles Ltd vs,. ITO AIR 1973 SC 1362 and Shrisht Dhawan vs. Shaw Brother (1992) 1 SCC 534 wherein the proposition of Raza Textriles (supra) was reiterated that a Court or a Tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly. Also citing Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO AIR 1961 SC 372, the Court held that preliminary issue of maintainability of the writ petition is decided in favour of the petitioner and the writ cannot be dismissed in limine as unmaintainable.

On merits, after examining provisions of section 73 of the Finance Act 1994 under which the show cause notice was issued vis-à-vis the facts of the case, it was observed that the show cause notice was issued much beyond 18 months from the date when according to the department service tax was found payable. The Court expressed a clear view that a mere mechanical reproduction of the language of the proviso to section 73(1) of the Act does not per se justify invocation of the extended period of limitation. A mere ipse dixit that the Noticee willfully suppressed the material facts with intent to evade payment of service tax is not sufficient and that the department should be able to substantiate its allegation of suppression even if it is not included in the notice. The Court categorically found that to its mind, the instant case was not of suppression by the petitioner as they had provided copies of balance sheets and specimen contracts in 1996 & were found diligent in their response to all the notices. The impugned show cause notice merely contained a sweeping statement that had investigation not been conducted, material facts would not have been unearthed. There is no whisper as to the fact that was alleged as suppressed. The Court found that once the information called for was supplied and was not questioned, a belated demand has to be held to be barred by limitation.

For this, Punjab Laminates P. Ltd. 2006 (202) ELT 578 and CCE vs. Chennai Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (2007) 8 STT 168 were relied upon among various other such as CCE vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd. (2010) 29 STT 39 and Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. vs. CCE (2005) 2 STT 226 (SC).

The Court found the show cause notice to be hopelessly barred by limitation and noted that even if the Court was to decide the issue of limitation in favour of the department, there were other grounds on which would be compelled to quash the impugned show cause notice. The Bench in this reference indicated the ‘overlapped’ period and consequent double assessment and observed that such dual assessment is impermissible in law. Reliance was placed in case of Dankan Industries Ltd. vs. CCE 2006 (201) ELT 517 (SC) and found that the demand was rather predetermined. Further citing the case of Siemens Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2007 (207) ELT 168 (SC), it was observed that ordinarily a writ Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a Noticee to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been issued without jurisdiction, the question has to be considered from a different angle when a notice is issued with pre-meditation.

The Court finally also observed that as pleaded by revenue, the case in no way involved justifiability of classification but of sustainability of a show cause notice and allowed the assessee’s writ quashing the show cause notice of 2006 and dismissed all appeals filed by revenue in this regard.

Conclusion:
When alternate remedy is available and as categorically provided by Hon. High Court in the case of Indian Cardboard Industries (supra), the High Court interferes with the adjudication process in exceptional cases and in particular when there is a clear questionability of jurisdiction involved is proven to the Court. Service tax department in a number of cases may have exceeded its jurisdictional authority. However, considering cost and / or time factor or for want of adequate evidence, not many approach Courts to interfere in the matter. The analysis in the case above serves a good guidance to determine viability depending on facts of each case.

MODEL GST ACT – DICEY ISSUES

fiogf49gjkf0d
I. BROAD STRUCTURE
1) Model law on Goods
and Service Tax, 2016 [GST] broadly consists of three legislations
Central Goods and Service Tax Act [CGST], State Goods and Service Tax
Act [SGST] covering intra state transactions and Integrated Goods and
Service Tax [IGST] touching upon inter-state transactions. CGST and IGST
will administered by Central Government, whereas SGST by respective
State Governments. Model Act borrows heavily from existing excise,
service tax and VAT statutes. Model GST law encompasses common law for
CGST/SGST to be adopted by Centre/States with necessary changes/
suggestions as also separate IGST to be framed only by Centre
respectively.

2) CGST mainly subsumes central levies such as
service tax, excise duty, countervailing duty [CVD] and special CVD and
the like because, generally speaking, Union possesses jurisdiction under
Constitution of India to levy excise duty on goods up to stage of
manufacture and service tax on services respectively. On the other hand,
SGST absorbs state value added tax [VAT], central sales tax, octroi,
entry tax, entertainment tax, luxury tax, lottery tax etc; since under
Constitution of India as commonly understood competency to exact tax on
post manufacturing activities lies with the states. However, under new
regime, both CGST and SGST are payable simultaneously on supplies
falling within charging section. In the result, there will be 36 state
level SGST Acts, one CGST Act and one IGST Act resulting in 38
legislations. Some critics have also made known their displeasure about
stamp duty at state level not being merged with GST. In my opinion,
there is no meeting point/synergy between a tax based on instrument i.e.
stamp duty and that oriented on concept of supply i.e. GST and thus
such apprehensions are misconceived.

II . CHARGEABILITY VIS-A-VIS TAXABLE EVENT

3)
Charging section 7 of Model CG/SG GST Act, 2016 [Act] brings within its
purview all intra state supplies of goods and/or services payable by
every taxable person. In turn, section 3 defines “supply” in a
comprehensive manner as including all form of supply of goods and/or
services such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental,
lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person in the course or furtherance of business. It is well settled that
when an inclusive connotation is employed in the definition clause of
an enactment it expands and enlarges the normal meaning of the words and
phrases occurring in body of statute and consequently, takes within its
sweep not only things which they usually signify, but also those which
interpretation clause declares that they all include [CIT vs. TAJ MAHAL
82 ITR 44, 47 (SC)]. Nonetheless, there is another parallel, but equally
strong if not less, rule of construction that an interpretation clause
which extends the meaning of the word does not take away its ordinary
meaning or prevent from receiving its popular and natural sense wherever
that would be properly applicable [CGT vs. GETTI CHETTIAR 82 ITR 599,
605 (SC). Legislature always tries to rope in all possible and
conceivable activities/transactions/ actions/occurrences and the like
[known as “taxable events”] to widen net of the charging provision. Yet a
discerning lawyer with a eagle’s eye will not let this happen within
the framework of interpretation and I have my cogent reservations as to
whether aforesaid charging section 7 of Act is foolproof depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. Let us dissect charging
section 7 read with section 3 of Act.

4) Section 3(1)(a) of Act
generally elucidates “supply” as “all forms of supply of any goods
and/or services made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person in the course or furtherance of business. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s
Advanced Law Lexicon, Volume 4 (Q-Z), page 4565, 2005, 3rd Edition,
word “supply” is described as “that which is or can be supplied;
available aggregate of things needed or demanded; an amount sufficient
for given use or purpose”. In the Imperial Dictionary, “that which is
supplied; sufficiency of things for use or want; a quantity of something
furnished or on hand”. The word “supply’ means to give”, or “to provide
or to afford something that is necessary” [page 4566]. Further, in
Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, Ramanatha Aiyar, Book 2 [D-I],
page 1997 expression “give” is depicted clinchingly as “make another the
recipient of something, bestow..………..,, grant”. Similarly, in Advanced
Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, Ramanatha Aiyar, Book 3, page 3813 the
expression “provide” has been described as “to furnish, to supply; one
provides a dinner in the contemplation that some persons are coming to
partake of it; one supplies a family with articles of daily use.” In my
opinion, on a conspectus of aforesaid purport of various terms, to
attract generic clause (a) of Section 3 two separate and distinct
persons must exist. In my opinion, therefore, mutual associations will
not only not fall foul of substantive definition of the term “supply”,
but also gain benefit of the GST Act not containing a deeming fiction to
rope in such entities and consequently, mutuality tenet, in my opinion,
will also prevail and sustain under GST. Principle of mutuality is
consistently countenanced and upheld in the context of service tax in
SATURDAY CLUB LTD vs. ACST (2006) 3 STR 305, 311 (CAL); (2005) 180 ELT
437 (CAL); DALHOUSIE INSTITUTE vs. ACST (2006) 3 STR 311, 314 TO 316
(CAL); (2005) 180 ELT 18 (CAL); SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT vs. UOI 20 STR 17
(GUJ); KARNAVATI CLUB vs. UOI 20 STR 169 (GUJ); SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT
vs. UOI 31 STR 645 (GUJ); RANCHI CLUB vs. CCE AND ST 26 ITR 401
(JHARKHAND); GREEN ENVIORNMENT vs. UOI 49 GST 563 (GUJ); CCE AND C vs.
SURAT TENNIS CLUB 50 GST 25 (GUJ); NATIONA L ASSOCIATION vs. CST 51 GST
301 (DEL); FICCI vs. CST 38 STR 529, 547 TO 549 (TRI-DEL-PRINCIPA L
BENCH); MATUN GA GYMKHANA vs. CST 38 ITR 407 (TRI-MUM); NASSCOM vs. CST
51 GST 301 TRI-DEL); DELHI CHIT FUND ASSOCIATION vs. UOI 30 STR 347, 352
(DEL)]. Similar approach is espoused under excise and sales tax laws,
for instance, the decision of the Supreme Court in CTO vs. YOUNG MEN’S
INDIAN ASSOCIATION 36 STC 241 pertaining to chargeability of sales tax
in relation to supply of various preparations by the club to its
members. In the same vein are judicial rulings reported in PRESCOT MILLS
LTD vs. CCE (2006) 5 STT 35 (CESTAT -BANG); SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT vs.
CST (1975) 36 STC 511 (GUJ) [SALES TAX] and BAJAJ AUTO LTD vs. CCE
(2005) 1 STT 83, 87 (MUM).

5) A charging Section must be
construed strictly and must integrate with and complement machinery and
collection provisions [CIT vs. SRINIVASA SETTY 128 ITR 294, 299 (SC)].
Besides, intra state supply is as such not explained in definition
clause of Act, but expounded in Section 3A of Integrated Goods and
Services Tax Act, 2016 [IGST] as “any supply where the location of the
supplier and place of supply are in the same state”. Branch transfers
are not expressly exempt from IGST, but, in my opinion, they do not fall
within ken of charging Section 3 of IGST. In my opinion, Sections 7
read with 3 of Act are bedrock of serious and fundamental litigation.
All the foregoing propositions of law are not from of doubt and may
entail protracted litigation.

III.COLLECTION OF GST

6)
Time for collection GST would depend upon time of supply of
goods/services as postulated in Sections 12 and 13 of Act respectively.
In respect of goods, broadly, time of supply will be earliest of either
date on which goods are removed by supplier for supply to recipient
where goods are required to be removed or where not required to be
removed when goods are made available to the recipient or date on which
supplier issues invoice in relation to supply or date on which supplier
receives payment or date on which recipient shows receipt of goods in
his books of accounts. In connection with services, liability to pay GST
will generally arise at time of supply of services being either date of
invoice or date of receipt of payment whichever is earlier or date of
completion of the provision of service or the date of receipt of
payment, whichever is earlier or date on which the recipient shows the
receipt of services in his books of accounts. I do not quite understand
as how supplier’s liability under the Act can be fixed on the foundation
of exhibition of the transaction in recipient’s books of accounts as
stated above in light of trite law that Assessee cannot be expected to
perform the impossible [LIC vs. CIT 219 ITR 410, 418 (SC) or still
Assessee cannot be saddled or blamed for what recipient third party does
in its books [CIT vs. BASANT 238 ITR 680 (CAL); CIT vs. OASIS 333 ITR
119 (DEL)].

IV. REGISTRATION

7) Section 19 of Act
contemplates every person liable to be registered shall apply for
registration in every such state in which he is exigible. In other
words, multiple registrations are envisaged by virtue of registration in
each of the states resulting in cumbersome and unwieldy administration,
management and maintenance. Mechanism must be devised by software
professionals comprised in Technology Advisory Group constituted earlier
by harnessing advanced information technology so that single
registration of same person with Unique Identity Number is sufficient to
carry out business in each of the states avoiding need for multiple
registrations. Sub-section (7) of section 19 of Act confers discretion
on the proper officer to reject application for registration which is
objected to by section of the GST stakeholders and hence a suggestion is
doing the rounds that it be made obligatory. In my opinion, there is
nothing fundamentally wrong with said provision inasmuch as sub-section
(8) of section 19 incorporates principles of natural justice to be
adhered to before dismissing application as also sub-section (9)
provides that if no deficiency is communicated to the applicant by
proper officer within time limit prescribed, registration shall be
deemed to have been granted. Moreover, section 79(1) of Act stipulates
that any person aggrieved by any decision or order under Act can file
appeal before first appellate authority. In my opinion, adequate
safeguards are engrafted to protect interests of applicant and no change
in his regard is warranted.

V. RETURNS

8)
Assessees have also launched scathing attack on the number of
details/returns mandated to be filed under model GST law vide sections
25, 26, 27 and 30. Assessee must not be oblivious of the fact that
presently he is dealing with multiple tax legislations [which are now
proposed to be consolidated] where he is required to file as many
returns, face large number of assessments, appeals, penalties and the
like and therefore, in my opinion, there is absolutely no justification
in the protest against multiple returns under GST, more particularly
because data of inward and outward supplies is indispensable for
cross-checking claims of Assessee concerning input tax credit by
matching them. Detection of false and bogus claims must be in-built into
the system itself in order that revenue is not deprived of its
legitimate taxes. Lack of either physical or electronic as also want of
implementation of existing corroborative systems and processes on
account of ulterior and oblique motives has been bane of Indian
assessment system and a section of delinquent Assessees through all
these years taken full advantage of and capitalized on the same and
consequently, caused a lot of heartburn to honest Assessees suffering in
frustration and disgust.

VI. APPEALS

9) Appeals
provisions are laid down in two sets of Sections 79 to 83 under two
different Chapters XVIII. First Chapter XVIII is applicable to CGST law,
whereas second Chapter XVIII is invokable under SGST law. Sections 84
to 93 are common to both. I shall deal with second Chapter XVIII apropos
SGST in ensuing paragraph.

10) First appeal from any “decision”
or “order” u/s. 79 (Second Chapter XVIII) of the Act shall lie before
prescribed first appellate authority within three months [with
condonation further one month] from date of communication of decision or
order to person preferring the appeal subject to inter alia payment of
10% pre-deposit of disputed amount arising out of order. I wonder
whether no predeposit is payable if any demand emanates from a
“decision”. Albeit, in serious cases involving disputed tax liability of
25 crore or more and considered as such by Commissioner vide order in
writing that the department has a very good case on merits, departmental
authorities can apply to first appellate authority urging that a higher
predeposit not exceeding 50% of disputed amount be ordered. Appellant
may raise additional grounds provided omission to take that ground in
original grounds of appeal was not wilful or unreasonable. First
appellate authority has no specific power to set aside any matter to
lower authorities although this issue is not free from doubt as there is
cleavage of opinion on this controversy though nothing prevents him
from calling a remand report inasmuch as under sub-section (8) of
section 79 he may make further inquiry as may be necessary to pass
order. Appellant by way of appropriate framed rules may also be allowed
to adduce additional evidences. Second appeal u/s. 82 of Act lies to
National Goods and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) against
appellate order framed u/s. 79 or revision order passed u/s. 80 within 3
months of date of communication of order sought to be appealed against
with unlimited power appertaining to period of condonation subject to
sufficient cause and predeposit as discussed hereinabove. Adjournments
shall be granted by first appellate authority/Tribunal subject to a
maximum limit of three times, but consequences of same party seeking
adjournment for fourth time is not stated implying that first appellate
authority/Tribunal will proceed to decide matter on merits. Further on a
bare reading of proviso to sub-section (6)/(2) of section 79/83, each
of the parties to litigation get a chance to apply for adjournment 3
times each; meaning if parties are two, I suppose, appeal itself can be
adjourned six times subject to maximum cap of three occasions per party.
Tribunal through section 83(1) possesses specific powers to admit
additional evidence and set aside issues for fresh adjudication to lower
authorities. Every Tribunal shall consists of as many members of
Technical (CGST), Judicial and Technical (SGST) as may be prescribed.
Appeal from order of Tribunal lies to the High Court on a substantial
question of law within 180 days of date of receipt of order appealed
against subject to condonation application for an unspecified period
with sufficient cause. Notwithstanding appeal vide section 87(2) shall
directly lie to Supreme Court from Tribunal’s order u/s. 83 if disputes
relates to treatment of transactions being intra state or inter state or
place of supply provided there is divergence of views between two or
more states or a state and Centre. Orders of High Court shall be
appealable to Apex Court vide section 88(1).

VII. MISCELLANEOUS

11)
Section 123 cast initial presumptive burden on any person to
demonstrate that he is not liable to tax under the Act in respect of any
supply of goods and/or services or that he is eligible for input credit
u/s. 16. In my opinion, first part of the section throwing primary onus
on person to show he is not covered by the charging provisions is
draconian inasmuch it is well entrenched by way of judge made law that
burden is on revenue to exhibit that a particular person is hit by the
charging provisions [PARIMISETTI SEETHARAMAMMA vs. CIT 57 ITR 532, 536
(SC)]. Indeed entire assumption of jurisdiction to assess is contingent
upon subject being brought within the tentacles of the charging section
and thus by common sense test revenue must first unload this
responsibility. In my opinion, a person cannot do the impossible, that
is, establish the negative fact that he does not fall within the
charging section [VARGHESE vs. ITO 131 ITR 597, 615 (SC)], but
department must positively demonstrate that subject is exigible to tax
by virtue of the substantive charge created by statute. In any case,
statutory presumption u/s. 123 is rebuttable and on clinching legal
arguments onus can shift on revenue to displace arguments of Assessee.
However, last segment of section 123 putting burden on the person
claiming input credit tax is in conformity with settled premise that
person claiming relief must prove that he satisfies conditions precedent
surrounding such concession [PARIMISETTI SEETHARAMAMMA vs. CIT 57 ITR
532, 537 (SC)]. Electronic commerce transactions [digital economy] are
bundled up under Chapter XIB captioned “Electronic Commerce” comprising
sections 43B and 43C of Act mainly on the lines of equalization levy
introduced under Income Tax Act, 1961 vide Chapter VIII of Finance Act,
2016 encompassing sections 163 to 180 thereof. In my opinion, in light
of the fact that these transactions take place in vague and hazy area of
“cyberspace” there is no particular specific identifiable territorial
jurisdiction to which these digital transactions can be traced and
attached and thus to tap potential revenue loss, one of the options
exercised by revenue founded on concept of Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting [BEPS] coined by The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is to impose an obligation on “electronic commerce
operator” (operator) to collect an amount at a prescribed rate as may be
notified out of the consideration payable towards supply of goods and/
or services made through such operator. Success of GST story will
primarily depend upon uniform and consistent adoption of model GST
legislation by various states with minimum localization, smooth,
efficient and competent working of logistics provided by Goods and
Service Tax Network [GSTN] to plug leakage of revenue through seamless
matching of input and output supplies, coordinated and unified operation
of the Goods and Service Tax Council (GST Council), education and
training of revenue officers and staff as also Assessees about new GST
law thereby leading to a development of robust common market across the
country reducing cascading effect of taxes affecting pricing of goods
and services.

Bastimal K Jain vs. ITO ITAT “B” Bench, Mumbai Before Mahavir Singh (J. M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A. M) ITA No.: 2896/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2010-11. Date of order: 8th June, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K. Shivaram / Sachidanand Dube

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 54 – Date of purchase of a new flat is the date of possession and not the date of agreement.

FACTS
During the year under consideration, the assessee had sold his flat for a consideration of Rs.55 lakh on 24.02.2010 resulting into long term capital gain of Rs.50.95 lakh. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 54 contending that he had purchased a new flat in earlier year, the possession of which was received on 11.09.2009. The AO noted that the agreement for purchase of the new flat was entered into on 28.12.2007 and registered on 28.02.2008. Thus, according to him, the purchase of new flat by the assessee was made one year before the date of the sale of the property. Hence, he denied the deduction claimed u/s 54. The CIT(A) on appeal, relying on the Madras High Court decision in the case of Late R Krishnaswamy (ITA No.697 & 698 of 2013 dated 26.11.2013), held that the date of registration of sale deed was material for the purpose of determining the date of purchase of a flat. Accordingly, the CIT(A) concurred with the views of the AO and held that the assessee had not acquired the new flat within one year before the sale of the Long Term Capital Asset and thus denied the benefit u/s 54 claimed by the assessee.

Before the Tribunal in support of the orders of the lower authorities, the revenue relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIV s. Jindas Panachand Gandhi [2005] 279 ITR 552.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the flat intended to be purchased by the assessee was not at all constructed on 28.12.2007 when the agreement for purchase was entered into. Eventually property’s possession was given to the assessee by the builder only on 11.09.2009. According to the Tribunal, the agreement for purchase was just a right for purchase of a flat in the proposed construction. The Tribunal also agreed with the assessee that the acquisition of the property is to be considered only when the possession of the flat was given to the assessee by the builder and that date was on 11.09.2009. Thus, the vital conditions of section 54 of the Act were fulfilled when the property’s possession was handed over to the assessee by the builder on 11.09.2009 i.e. within the time limit prescribed u/s. 54 of the Act for claiming deduction u/s 54 of the Act. In arriving at the above conclusion, the Tribunal also relied on the decision of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of V M Dujodwala vs. ITO (36 ITD 130) and of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Beena K Jain (217 ITR 363).

Shivam Steel & Tubes Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “E” Bench, Mumbai Before Rajendra (A. M.) and C. N. Prasad (J. M) ITA No.: 4691/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of order: 5th August, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Sanjeev Kashyap / Jayesh Dadia

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 271(1)(c) – Non-filing of appeal against the additions made cannot be a ground for justifying levy of penalty.

FACTS
During the assessment proceedings the AO made two disallowances viz., Rs. 0.17 lakh u/s. 14A and Rs. 10.71 lakh u/s.80IB. Penalty proceedings u/s.27l(1)(c) were also initiated at the time of assessment. In its reply to penalty notice, the assessee submitted that it had furnished all details of expenditure. However, according to the AO, the assessee by not filing any appeal against the additions has admitted its fault and hence, he levied a penalty of Rs. 3.7 lakh. On appeal, the first appellate authority confirmed the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities on the ground that the assessee filed the revised computation after the AO made enquiries. Assessee is a corporate entity, that it had made a patently wrong claim. It relied upon the cases of Mak Data (350 ITR 593) and Zoom communications (327 ITR 590).

HELD
According to the Tribunal, penalty cannot be levied just because additions are made during assessment proceedings and the assessee did not agitate the additions before the Appellate Authorities. As per the settled principles of taxation jurisprudence penalty proceeding and assessment proceedings are totally separate and distinct. Addition made during assessment cannot and should not result in automatic levy of penalty. Penalty has to be levied considering the explanation of assessee filed during penalty proceedings. According to the Tribunal, disallowance u/s 14A does not prove filing of inaccurate particulars of income. As regards the claim u/s 80IB, according to the Tribunal, the assessee had reasonable cause in as much as the claims – original as well as revised, both were made as per the advice of the chartered accountant. Further, relying on the Bombay high court decision in the case of CIT vs. Somany Evergreen Knits Ltd. (352 ITR 592) and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the assesse had not furnished inaccurate particulars of income and reversed the order of the lower authorities.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 147 (Delhi – Trib.) Sanjeev Puri vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 11th July, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 54F – For the purposes of section 54F, the question whether the assessee owns more than one residential house other than the new asset is to be determined based on the actual user of the property and not on the basis of what is shown in municipal record and therefore, ownership of a flat which is shown as a residential house in municipal records but is actually used as an office is not to be regarded as ownership of a “residential house”.

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2010-11, the assessee, a senior advocate, sold his rights in his Gurgaon Flat and earned long term capital gain of Rs. 1,48,23,645. This long term capital gain was invested in a residential property within the specified time and exemption claimed u/s. 54F of the Act. This claim for exemption u/s. 54F was denied by the Assessing Officer (AO) on the ground that the assessee was owner of more than one residential house.

The contention of the assessee that the property belonging to the assessee being property at E-575A, Ground floor, Gr. Kailash-II, New Delhi was used by the assessee as his office and therefore the same is not regarded as a residential house owned by the assessee for the purposes of section 54F of the Act was not accepted by the AO on the ground that as per the municipal records and the sale deed this property was a residential property.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that there was no dispute about the fact that the property E-575A, GK-II, New Delhi, owned by the assessee was being used by him as his office during the relevant period but the only dispute between the assessee and the Revenue remained on the entitlement of the deduction u/s. 54F of the Act on the basis of actual user of the property i.e. office use and not merely on the basis of the municipal record showing the property meant for residential use or in the sale deed shown as residential type.

The Tribunal noted that the ratio of the following decisions

(i) CIT vs. Geeta Duggal (357 ITR 153)(Del);

(ii) ITO vs. Ouseph Chacko (271 ITR 29 (Ker);

(iii) Smt. P. K. Vasanthi Rangarajan vs. CIT (23 taxmann. com 229)(Mad);

(iv) ITO vs.. Rasiklal & Satra (98 ITD 335)(Mum Trib); and

(v) ITO vs.. Smt. Rohini Reddy (122 TTJ 423)(Hyd.)

support the stand of the assessee that for availing the deduction u/s. 54F of the Act, the property though shown as residential on the record of the municipality but the test will be actual user of the premises by the assessee during the relevant period. It held that the actual user thereof by the assessee will be considered while adjudicating upon the eligibility of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act and the fact that the property has been shown as residential house on the record of the government authority does not make a difference.

The Tribunal held that the AO should not have considered the property E-575A, GK-II, New Delhi to be residential property on the basis of municipal record by ignoring the actual use thereof as office of the assessee. The authorities below were held to be not justified in denying the claim of deduction u/s. 54F on the basis that the assessee was owning more than one residential house by including the said house used as office to be a residential house.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

[2016] 159 ITD 165 (Pune Trib.) Cooper Corporation (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy CIT A.Y.: 2008-09. Date of order: 29th April, 2016.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 37(1) – When the assessee converts Indian rupee loan borrowed for purchasing assets from India into foreign currency loan for taking benefit of lower interest rates and thereafter as per AS – 11 translates foreign currency loan into Indian Rupees by applying the foreign exchange rate as on the closing day of reporting period and such translation results in business loss, then the resultant loss is allowed as deduction u/s 37(1) as such loss is dictated by revenue considerations of saving interest costs.

FACTS
The assessee had initially availed various term loans in Indian rupees from banks for acquisition of assets and for expansion of project, etc. Subsequently, said loans were converted into foreign currency loans to take benefit of lower rate of interest on such foreign currency loans visa- vis loans in Indian rupee.

The assessee, following Accounting Standard – 11 (AS- 11) issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), translated foreign currency loan into Indian Rupees by applying the foreign exchange rate as on the closing day of reporting period and the same resulted in exchange loss. The said translation loss resulted in business loss which was disallowed by the AO.

The assessee argued before the AO that there is no provision in the Income-tax Act to reject the loss incurred on fluctuation in exchange as revenue expense except section 43A which provides for capitalization of such loss where the loan was taken on acquisition of any capital asset outside India. Since the assessee had not acquired assets from a country outside India section 43A was not applicable.

However, the AO held that the so-called loss was merely a notional loss and not an actual loss incurred by the company. The Assessing Officer further observed that even presuming that increased liability for repayment of foreign currency loans had been saddled on the assessee, still the same would be a payment of capital nature since impugned loans were obtained for acquiring the capital asset. The AO, thus, held that the loss claimed on account of fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.

On appeal, the CIT-(A) granted partial relief to assessee on account of foreign currency fluctuation loss arising on loans found by him to be connected to revenue items such as bill discounting, debtors, etc. However, in respect of other loans, the CIT-(A) observed that such loans were taken for capital purposes such as acquisition of assets and expansion of the projects and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to losses from fluctuation in currency as revenue expenditure.

On second appeal:

HELD
It may be pertinent to examine whether the increased liability due to fluctuation loss can be added to the carrying costs of corresponding capital assets with reference to section 43(1). Section 43(1) defines the expression ‘actual cost’. As per section 43(1), actual cost means actual cost of the assets of the assessee, reduced by that portion of the costs as has been met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority. Several Explanations have been appended to section 43(1). However, the section nowhere specifies that any gain or loss on foreign currency loan acquired for purchase of indigenous assets will have to be reduced or added to the costs of the assets.

The issue is also tested in the light of provision of section 36(1)(iii) governing deduction of interest costs on borrowings. Section 36(1)(iii) states that utilization of loan for capital account or revenue account purpose has nothing to do with allowing deduction of corresponding interest expenditure. A proviso inserted thereto by Finance Act, 2003, also prohibits claim of interest expenditure in revenue account only upto the date on which capital asset is put to use. Once the capital asset is put to use, the interest expenditure on money borrowed for acquisition of capital asset is also treated as revenue expenditure.

Thus, viewed from the perspective of section 43(1) and section 36(1)(iii), such increased liability cannot be bracketed with cost of acquisition of capital assets save and except in terms of overriding provisions of section 43A.

CBDT notification S.O. 892(E) dated 31-3-2015 also inter alia deals with recognition of exchange differences. The notification also sets out that the exchange differences arising on foreign currency transactions have to be recognized as income or business expense in the period in which they arise subject to exception as set out in section 43A or rule 115 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 as the case may be.

A bare reading of section 43A, which opens with a non obstante and overriding clause, would show that it comes into play only when the assets are acquired from a country outside India and does not apply to acquisition of indigenous assets. Another notable feature is that section 43A provides for making corresponding adjustments to the costs of assets only in relation to exchange gains/ losses arising at the time of making payment. It, therefore, deals with realised exchange gain/loss. The treatment of unrealised exchange gain/loss is not covered under the scope of section 43A. It is, thus, apparent that special provision of section 43A has no application to the facts of the case. Therefore, the issue whether the loss is on revenue account or a capital one is required to be tested in the light of generally accepted accounting principles, pronouncements and guidelines, etc.

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. [1998] 231 ITR 285 held that cost of an asset and cost of raising money for purchase of asset are two different and independent transactions. Therefore, fluctuations in foreign exchange rate while repaying instalments of foreign loan raised to acquire asset cannot alter actual cost of assets. The assessee may have raised funds to purchase the asset by borrowing but what the assessee has paid to acquire asset is the price of the asset. That price cannot change by any event subsequent to the acquisition of the asset.

The assessee has inter alia applied AS-11 dealing with effects of the changes in the exchange rate to record the losses incurred owing to fluctuation in the foreign exchange. AS-11 enjoins reporting of monetary items denominated foreign currency using the closing rate at the end of the accounting year. It also requires that any difference, loss or gain, arising from such conversion of the liability at the closing rate should be recognized in the profit & loss account for the reporting period.

As per section 209 of the Companies Act, 1956, the assessee being a company is required to compulsorily follow mercantile system of accounting. Section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 also mandates that accounting standards as applicable are required to be followed while drawing statement of affairs. Section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 similarly casts obligation to compute business income either by cash or mercantile system of accounting. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Woodward Governor India (P.) Ltd. [2009] 312 ITR 254 has observed that AS-11 is mandatory in nature. Thus, in view of the various provisions of the Companies Act and the Income-tax Act, it was mandatory for the assessee to draw accounts as per AS-11. Thus, the loss recognized on account of foreign exchange fluctuation as per notified accounting standard AS 11 is an accrued and subsisting liability and not merely a contingent or a hypothetical liability. A legal liability also exists against the assessee due to fluctuation and loss arising there from. Actual payment of expense is an irrelevant consideration to ascertain the point of accrual of liability. As a corollary, the revenue has committed error in holding the liability as notional or contingent.

Besides AS-11, the claim of exchange fluctuation loss as revenue account is also founded on the argument that the aforesaid action was taken to save interest costs and, consequently, to augment the profitability or reduce revenue losses of the assessee. The impugned fluctuation loss therefore, has a direct nexus to the saving in interest costs without bringing any new capital assets into existence. Thus, the business exigencies are implicit as well explicit in the action of the assessee. The argument that the act of conversion has served a hedging mechanism against revenue receipts from export also portrays commercial expediency. Thus, the plea of the assessee that claim of expenditure is attributable to revenue account has considerable merits.

For the aforesaid reasons and in the light of the fact that the conversion in foreign currency loans which led to impugned loss were dictated by revenue considerations towards saving interest costs, etc., the said loss is considered as being on revenue account and is an allowable expenditure u/s. 37(1). The order of the CIT-(A) sustaining the disallowance is thus reversed.

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 136 (Delhi-Trib)(SMC) Sushil Kumar Jain vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2006-07 Date of order: 24th June, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 147 r.w.s. 154 – Initiation of two parallel proceedings on a similar subject matter, cannot sustain. If first proceedings have been validly initiated, then such proceedings must come to an end for making a way for the initiation of another proceedings on the same subject matter. Unless the earlier proceedings are buried, either by way of an order on merits or by dropping the same, no fresh subsequent proceedings on the same subject matter can be initiated.

FACTS
The assessee, a senior advocate by profession, filed his return of income for assessment year 2006-07 declaring total income of Rs. 8,39,253. The Assessing Officer (AO) vide order dated 26.3.2008, assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 8,56,753.

The AO issued notice u/s. 154 of the Act dated 23.2.2011 intimating the assessee that he proposes to rectify the order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act to include in his total income receipts of Rs. 4,47,600 which were received by the assessee, as per TDS certificates, but which were not included in total income.

Subsequently, the AO reopened the assessment on the ground that assessee has claimed credit for TDS against current years income on receipts of Rs. 4,47,600 but the same have not been offered for taxation. The assessment was completed u/s. 147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act by making a total addition of Rs. 2,37,500.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and interalia argued that since the AO had issued notice u/s. 154 of the Act initiation of reassessment proceedings was not valid.The CIT(A) upheld the initiation of reassessment proceedings and the additions made.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal on perusal of copy of notice u/s. 154 along with the reasons recorded for reopening observed that the subject matter of both the notices was the same viz. receipts of Rs. 4,47,600 which in the opinion of the AO had escaped taxation. The Tribunal observed that during the continuation of the proceedings u/s. 154, the AO embarked upon the same issue by means of a separate reassessment proceedings without concluding the earlier proceedings initiated u/s. 154. It goes without saying that initiation of two parallel proceedings on a similar subject matter, cannot be sustained. If first proceedings have been validly initiated, then such proceedings must come to an end for making a way for the initiation of another proceedings on the same subject matter. Unless the earlier proceedings are buried, either by way of an order on merits or by dropping the same, no fresh subsequent proceedings on the same subject matter can be sustained. The Tribunal held that since the rectification proceedings u/s. 154 were initiated in 2011 and these were still on in the year 2013, when the proceedings u/s. 147 were initiated on the same subject matter, the proceedings u/s. 147 cannot stand during the continuation of proceedings u/s. 154. The Tribunal set aside the initiation of reassessment proceedings by means of a notice u/s. 148 and the proceedings flowing therefrom.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

[2016] 159 ITD 199 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) Urvi Chirag Sheth vs. ITO A.Y.: 2012-13. Date of order: 31st May, 2016.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sections. 2 and 4, read with sections 45, 56(2) (viii) and 145A – If the assessee receives interest, to compensate for the time value of money, on account of delay in payment of the motor accident compensation, then such interest takes the same character as that of the accident compensation and since the said accident compensation, being capital receipt, is not taxable, consequently receipt of interest on such compensation is also not taxable.

FACTS
The assessee had met with a serious motor car accident which had left her permanently disabled. The competent authority termed the disability at ninety per cent level.

She had claimed compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- for this tragic loss of her physical abilities. She was, finally after 21 years, awarded the said compensation along with the interest of Rs.14,94,286/- by Hon’ble Supreme Court. The said interest was computed using 8% interest rate, on the enhanced compensation, from the date of filing the claim petition before MACT (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal) till the date of realization.

The assessee had not offered the said interest income to tax. The main contention of the assessee was that the interest which is received by any person under any statute is taxable under the Act, however, if the interest is awarded by courts of higher authorities as part of fair and equitable compensation, the same is capital receipt and hence not taxable in the hands of the assessee.

The AO was of the opinion that the interest received on the said compensation came within the purview of section 145A(b) read with section 56(2)(viii) and hence, after allowing deduction of Rs.7,47,143/- as per provisions of section 57(iv) of the Act, taxed the balance Rs.7,47,143/- as income from other source.

The CIT-(A) upheld order of the AO.

On second appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
Section 145A provides that interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be income of the year in which it is received. This provision was enacted with a view to mitigate hardship to taxpayers, where interested was awarded by judicial forums but on account of the decision being challenged the same was not received.Clause (viii) in sub-section (2) of section 56 provides that income by way of interest received on compensation or on enhanced compensation referred to in sub-section (2) of section 145A shall be assessed as ‘income from other sources’ in the year in which it is received.’

Section 145A deals with the method of accounting i.e. cash or mercantile and has its focus on the point of time when an income is taxable rather than taxability of income itself. Thus, when an income is not taxable, section 145A has no relevance. Nothing else needs to be read in this provision.

Section 56(2)(viii), is only an enabling provision, to bring interest income to tax in the year of receipt rather than in the year of accrual.

Thus only when interest received by the assessee is in the nature of income, such interest can be taxed u/s. 56(2)(viii). Section 56(1) makes this aspect even more clear when it states that income of every kind, which is not to be excluded from the total income under the Incometax Act, shall be chargeable to income tax under the head income from other sources, if it is not chargeable to income tax under any of the heads, and then, in the subsequent provision, i.e., section 56(2), proceeds to set out an illustrative, rather than exhaustive list of, such ‘incomes’. Clearly, section 56 does not decide what constitutes income. What section 56 holds is that if there is an income, which is not taxable under any of the other heads u/s. 14, then it is taxable under the head ‘income from other sources’.

To suggest that since an item is listed u/s. 56(2), even without there being anything to show that it is of income nature, it can be brought to tax is like putting the cart before the horse.

The payment made to the assessee is in the nature of compensation for the loss of her mobility and physical damages. Clearly, such a receipt, in principle, is a capital receipt and beyond the ambit of taxability of income, since only such capital receipts can be brought to tax which are specifically taxable u/s. 45. As it is the settled law, that a capital receipt, in principle, is outside the scope of income chargeable to tax and a receipt cannot be taxed as income unless it is in the nature of a revenue receipt or is specifically brought within ambit of income by way of specific provisions. The accident compensation is thus not taxable as income of the assessee.

What is termed as interest takes the same character as that of the accident compensation and it seeks to compensate the time value of money on account of delay in payment of the compensation. Such an interest cannot have a standalone character of income, unless the interest itself is a kind of statutory interest at the prescribed rate of interest. In this case, the interest is awarded by the Supreme Court in its complete and somewhat unfettered discretion. An interest of this nature is essentially a compensation in the sense it accounts for a fall in value of money itself at the point of time when compensation became payable vis-a-vis the point of time when it was actually paid, or, for the shrinkage of, what can be termed as, a measuring rod of value of compensation. If the money was given on the date of presenting the claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it would have been principal sum but since there is an inordinate, though partial, delay in payment of this amount, interest payment is to factor for fall in value of money in the meantime. The transaction thus remains the same, i.e., compensation for disability, and the interest rate, on a rather notional basis, is taken into account to compute the present value of the compensation which was lawfully due to the assessee in a somewhat distant past.

If compensation itself is not taxable, the interest on account of delay in payment of compensation cannot be taxable either. Essentially, this conclusion supports the school of thought that when principal transaction itself is outside the ambit of taxation, similar fate must follow for the subsidiary transaction as well.

The authorities below were thus completely in error in bringing the interest awarded by the Supreme Court to tax. The question of deduction u/s. 57(iii), given the above conclusion, is wholly irrelevant. The order of the AO taxing the interest on accident compensation and the order of the

CIT-(A) confirming AO’s order is disapproved.

In result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.

Condonation of delay – Appeal filed in wrong jurisdiction – An unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant – Liable to be condoned :

fiogf49gjkf0d
Prashanth Projects Ltd vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax10(3), tax Appeal no – 192 of 2014 dt – 19/07/2016 (Bombay High Court).

[Prashanth Projects Ltd vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax10(3),; ITA No. 7167/Mum/2011 Bench: C ; dt: 04/09/2013 ; (A Y: 2005-06 )]

Assessee company, engaged in the business of construction of storage handling Terminal of Petroleum Products, filed its return of income on 31.10.2005 . The AO finalised the assessment order u/s.143(3) determining the total income at Rs.1,11,17.010/-. Assessment order was received by the assessee on 25.01.2008 and accordingly appeal was to be filed by 24.02.2008, however, by mistake instead of the appeal being filed in the office of the CIT(A), it was filed on 8th February, 2008 (within the period of limitation) with the office of the Assessing Officer i.e. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax10( 3), who accepted the same. Later on in May,2011,when it came to know that appeal was to be filed before the CIT(A), an application was moved by it to the AO for transferring the appeal to the office of the CIT(A). However same was refused. This resulted in the appellant having to file a fresh appeal on 9th June, 2011 to the CIT(A) from the order of the Assessing Officer dated 31st December, 2007. This appeal was accompanied alongwith an application for condonation of delay . Thus, there was delay of more than 3 years. The reason for the delay as explained by the assessee, was that by mistake it filed appeal in the office of the ACIT. After considering the submissions of the assessee,CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by it.

Effective Ground of appeal before ITAT was about not admitting the appeal by the CIT(A) on the ground of delay. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after citing various decisions of the Courts indicating the manner in which the application for condonation of delay has to be dealt with proceeded to reject the appeal.

The Assessee filed an appeal before the High court challenging the order of ITAT . The High Court held that it is an undisputed position that the appeal from order dated 31st December, 2007 of the Assessing Officer was prepared and filed in the prescribed Proforma viz. Form No.35. It was addressed to CIT(A). However, by mistake the same was tendered to the office of the Assessing Officer and the office of the Assessing Officer also accepted the same. In fact, as the appeal pertained to the CIT(A) and not its office, the Assessing Officer ought to have immediately returned the appeal which was filed in the office of the Assessing Officer. This would have enabled the appellant to take appropriate steps and file the appeal with the office of the CIT(A). It is not the case of the Revenue that the appeal addressed to the CIT(A) was not filed with the Office of the Assessing Officer on 8th February, 2008 i.e. within the period of limitation. In case, the Assessing Officer had returned the appeal immediately to the appellant or had forwarded it to the office of the CIT(A) as would be expected of the State no delay would have taken place. This would have resulted in the appeal being considered on merits.

Further, from the application made for stay in the same proceeding , it is very clear that the appellant as well as the department bonafide proceeded on the basis that its appeal before the CIT(A) was pending. The lapse on the part of the assessee was unintentional. Further, the analogy made in the impugned order with nature is inappropriate. Human interaction is influenced by human nature. Inherent in human nature is the likelihood of error. Therefore, the adage “to err is human”. Thus, the power to condone delay while applying the law of limitation. This power of condonation is only in view of human fallibility. The laws of nature are not subject to human error, thus beyond human correction. In fact, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradip Kumar 2000(7) SCC 372 has observed to the effect that although the law assists the vigilant, an unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant would not normally close the doors of adjudication so as to be permanently closed, as it is human to err. The High Court held that it was an unintentional lapse on the part of the appellant.

The appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh disposal in accordance with law, on payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- by a pay order drawn in the name of “The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax15, Mumbai”.

Estimate – on money – It is a settled principle of statistics that principle of averaging provides results of reliable nature – Such average minimizes the errors and brings out reasonable and reliable results.:

fiogf49gjkf0d
The CIT- III vs. Prime Developers. [Income tax Appeal no 2452 of 2013 dt -18/07/2016 , AY 2004-05 (Bombay High Court)].

[Prime Developers. vs. DCIT, CC-33,; I.T.A. NO.323/M/2010, 321/M/2010, 322/M/2010, 324/M/2010 Bh – C, dt : 22/03/2013, AY: 2004-05 to 2007-08,]

Assessee was engaged in the business of construction. During the subject assessment year the assessee undertook construction of a project called ‘Prime Mall’. However in its return of income filed for the subject assessment year the assessee did not disclose any profits on its above project as it was following the Project Completion Method. There was a search on the assessee under Section 1 32 of the Act.

During the course of the search it was found that during the previous year relevant to assessment year under consideration it was found that the assessee had sold 14 units in its Prime Mall Project and received 65% of the total sales consideration as ‘on money’. Consequent to the search, the assessee contended that in the subject assessment year no income is chargeable to tax as it is following the Project Completion Method of Accounting . Therefore the profit, if any, would be subject to tax on completion of the project which takes place only for the A.Y. 2006- 07( 90%) and A.Y. 2007- 08.

The Assessing Officer did not accept the assessee’s contention of Project Completion Method and brought to tax, the entire amount received as ‘on money’ consideration i.e. 65% of total sales value (35% recorded plus 65% ‘on money’) of the 14 unit sold.

In appeal, the CIT(A) modified the order of the Assessing Officer to the extent it held that the total consideration received in respect of sales of 14 unit during the subject assessment year would be taxed at 40% as net profit of the total consideration in place of 65% in respect of sales of 14 units. The CIT(A) did not accept the assessee’s contention that only 8% should be taken as net profit of the unaccounted turnover. This was in view of the fact that annexure L found during the course of the search indicated the net profit at 28.18%.

Being aggrieved, both the Revenue as well as the assessee carried the issue in appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the facts and the NP of assessee held that the reasonable percentage of profits of the project – Prime Mall was somewhere in the range of said NPs ie 13.735% – 23.99% . It was a settled principle of statistics that principle of averaging provides results of reliable nature. Such average minimizes the errors and brings out reasonable and reliable results. The average of the 13.735% and 23.99% would give rise to a reasonable percentage of NP ie 17.08%. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer to work out the taxable profits after adopting a reasonable net profit of 17.08% on its gross sales turnover of Rs.11.60 crore in the subject AY .

The Revenue challenged before High Court the adoption of net profit of 17.08% as determined by the Tribunal was not correct . The High Court observed that the Revenue sought to substitute the estimated net profit arrived at by the Tribunal with a new figure of net profit . This was without showing that the estimate arrived at by the Tribunal in the impugned order was perverse. It was a settled position of law that in estimated net profit arrived at by the authorities is a question of fact and if the material on record supported the estimate arrived at by the Tribunal then it didnot give rise to any substantial question of law (see CIT v/s. Piramal Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. 124 ITR 408). In this case, High Court held that the net profit estimated at 17.08% was a very possible view on the facts found and dismissed revenue appeal.

FRAUD : Investigation techniques and other aspects –Part 1

fiogf49gjkf0d
Variety in fraud investigation techniques: application of Vedic Mathematics
It is variety that makes life interesting and enjoyable. Virtually in every walk of life, we crave for variety. Take for instance our daily meals. Each meal we try to eat something different to make each meal more enjoyable. We try different kinds of breads, soups, vegetables, and fruits. We can actually survive just as well even if we have exactly the same items to eat everyday, but that would make our meals monotonous. Film makers make different kinds of films only because we would get bored of the same story over and over again. A cricket match would become absolutely boring if a batsman were to play each shot in the same identical manner. A popular batsman is one who has a range of different strokes and shots. Thus it has been correctly stated that variety is the spice of life.

Audit, investigation and forensic accounting are no exception to this maxim. It is very possible that if an auditor or an investigator approached every investigation with the same routine steps in a lackadaisical manner, a wrongdoer would be able to take suitable counter measures to ensure that he is protected and safe. Therefore it is absolutely essential to keep trying new methods, hitherto untried techniques and tools, and use a surprise element to get the best results. Research of algorithms, vedic scriptures can be extremely useful in this context. Many audits and investigations end at a dead end, or sometimes reach wrong conclusions, only because of the lack of application of imaginative and innovative methods.

The following is a case study where a chartered accountant was an advisor in an acquisition by a fruit juice manufacturing company. Initially by applying the standard auditing techniques, he felt that there was nothing serious to stop his client from acquiring a company owning a couple of mango farms based on details and information given. It was only after he looked at data differently, using ‘visual mathematics’ and an application of vedic mathematics that he was able to detect a sinister fraud.

Case Study: Fraud in mango farm sale
A fruit juice manufacturing company ABC was looking for more and more orchards and fruit plantations for expansion. In this hunt, they came across a proposal from a mango grower PQR in Maharashtra for sale of two mango farms. PQR had been growing mangoes and exporting them and seemed to have had a fairly good crop in the last season. The substantial part of the acquisition value was for the two fertile farms. The two mango farms commanded a rich premium because of their fertility and huge potential for growing mangoes in bulk. ABC had asked its CA to conduct a review of its financials and operating results for the last couple of years. Some extracts of the financial information given to him were as follows:

1. Farm A had 4 acres and Farm B was 6.3 acres in size. The potential for much greater crop of mangoes was huge and PQR had not been able to tap it because of its lack of resources. ABC realized that with more resources and better techniques the mango crop could be tripled.

2. Plucking and packing activity was performed over two days. The mangoes would be plucked and packed on the last two days of each month. On day 1, there would only be plucking activity and the mangoes would be stacked neatly. On day 2, the mangoes plucked the previous day would be washed and cleaned of all pesticide and then packed in boxes of one dozen each.

3. The packed mangoes from both the farms would be sent to the main godown where they would be counted and kept ready for export.

4. Costs of plucking and packaging for farm B were greater than farm A because it was further in the interior part of the district and labourers charged more to work at farm B

5. Costs of plucking and packaging during each month also varied based on demand supply of skilled labour in season time. Usually in May the cost would be the highest

The details of plucking and packaging costs per dozen are given in the table below

Conventional Audit checks did not throw up any adverse results.
The number of mangoes packed for each farm individually were not available, but the total mangoes packed for both farms for each month were physically verified by the management, as follows: March 720 mangoes, April, 2400 mangoes, and May 4800 mangoes. Though the CA was not conducting any investigation, he did have the responsibility of carrying out a special penetrative audit of the financial information given by PQR because ABC was going to invest a huge amount only based on the CA’s assessment. Therefore the CA applied all the conventional audit checks and tests. The bills for labourer’s payments were available in the form of wage sheets which prima facie looked satisfactory and his audit did have some routine queries but nothing serious.

The sales and collections audits and verifications using walk through tests also did not raise any alarm bells. These were also well documented. A decent price was earned by PQR for the sale of mangoes per reasonable market inquiries. In most respects, based on his routine audit techniques, the CA seemed to have derived a comfort in the financial information given. Under normal circumstances he would have given a ‘go ahead’ green signal to his client for acquisition of PQR.

How vedic mathematics helped the CA to spot a fraud by a mere visual look at the numbers.

The information given by PQR was incomplete in one important respect. The numbers of mangoes plucked and packaged in each farm for each month. This was important to determine the crop size and fertility of each farm. How could one find this? Actually applying mathematics using knowledge of algebra by solving simultaneous equations for each month it is possible. But that is a tedious task.

To illustrate, for the month of March, to find out how many mangoes were plucked and packaged, one would have to use algebra by using variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ to represent mangoes plucked and packed in farms A and B respectively. Then the cost information given above can be simply converted into a simultaneous equation in the conventional form as follows.

20x + 40y = 1200
70x + 85y = 4200

But solving such equations would be slightly tedious. However, through vedic mathematics, in one look, the viewer will be able to state that y = 0 in the above equations. How is this possible? Actually it is very simple.

A sutra of vedic mathematics called Anurupye Shunyamanayat’ states that if the co-efficients of one of the variables in a simultaneous equation are in the same ratio as the resulting values of each equation, then the other variable MUST BE ZERO

Thus in our above simultaneous equation of mangoes plucked and packaged in March

20x + 40y = 1200
70x + 85y = 4200

The coefficients of x are 20 and 70. Their ratio is therefore 2/7. The resulting values of each equation are 1200 and 4200. Their ratio is also 2/7. Since these two ratios are the same, the other variable, ‘y’ as per sutra 6 of vedic mathematics, anuraupye shunyamanayat, MUST be zero.

THUS THERE WERE ‘0’ MANGOES GROWN IN MARCH IN FARM B. BY USING THE SAME VEDIC MATHEMATICS APPROACH THERE WERE ‘0’ MANGOES GROWN IN FARM B FOR THE OTHER MONTHS AS WELL. THE COST FIGURES WERE IMAGINARY AND FICTITIOUS FOR FARM B.

In other words, Farm B was not producing any mangoes at all.

The fraud was a simple deception by PQR by claiming that mangoes were indeed being grown on farm B, even though it had no fertility to grow any mango at all.

Though it was the larger farm, since it was not a fertile plot, the price being demanded by PQR was an atrocious exponential value of its actual worth. ABC would obviously never be interested in purchasing such a farm. PQR’s labour costs were therefore nil for farm B and PQR was deceiving ABC by stating that mangoes were being plucked and packed in farm B. The CA then advised the client ABC not to go ahead with this acquisition.

What is important in this case study is that the CA always strived to upgrade his knowledge and he was always eager to learn new techniques and methods useful in his profession. He had recently been studying vedic mathematics. Vedic mathematics has some amazing solutions for certain types of mathematical problems. As we all know India discovered ‘0’ and a lot of vedic mathematics sutras are based on, or revolve around ‘0’. Among them, one of the sutras, sutra no 6 is ‘Anurupye Shunyamanayat’.

Vedic mathematics itself may be useful in a rare assignment, but what counted was the fact the CA was trying new things and different things every time to get better results. That, friends is the measure of life and true success.

Editor’s note: Fraud investigation and detection are an important area of practice for a chartered accountant. This involves acquisition of specialised knowledge. The law now casts an important duty in regard to reporting fraud on the auditor. Public expectations have now found statutory recognition. We have therefore thought it necessary to carry a series of articles by Mr. Chetan Dalal an expert on the subject. These will appear in the journal at intervals, that is probably in each alternate month. We hope readers will find this series useful.

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 172 (Bangalore – Trib.) Page Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of order: 24th June, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sections 92A(1), 92A(2)(g) of the Act – Section 92A(2) cannot be read independent of Section 92A(1) for determining whether enterprises are associated.

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of ready-made garments. The Taxpayer was a licensee of the brandname owned by an USA Company (FCo).

The brand name was used by the Taxpayer for the purpose of exclusive manufacturing and marketing of the garments under the brand name of FCo. For grant of license, the Taxpayer was required to pay royalty at the rate of 5% of its sales to FCo. The Taxpayer owned the entire manufacturing facility, capital investment, employees and there was no participation of FCo in the capital and management of the Taxpayer. Taxpayer argued that the transfer pricing (TP) provisions do not apply as there is no ‘Associated Enterprise’ (AE) relationship between the Taxpayer and FCo. Nevertheless, Taxpayer disclosed the transaction in Form 3CEB.

Assessing officer (AO) referred the matter to Transfer pricing officer (TPO) for determination of arm’s length price (ALP) of the transaction. As per the TPO, the transaction was not at ALP and consequently he proposed an adjustment to the income of the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer filed objection before Dispute resolution panel (DRP), which rejected the objections of the Taxpayer.

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held
Section 92A(1) defines AE based on the parameters of management, control or capital. Section 92A(2) is a deeming provision and enumerates circumstances in which the enterprise can be deemed to be an AE.

Thus the conditions of both Sections 92A(1) and 92A(2) are to be satisfied in order to constitute an AE relationship.

The contra view that, satisfaction of the conditions of section 92A(2) alone is sufficient for creation of an AE relationship would render section 92A(1) otiose. While interpreting a provision in a taxing statute, the construction should preserve the purpose of the provision. If more than one interpretation is possible, that which preserves its workability and efficacy is to be preferred to the one which would render a part of it otiose or sterile.

Thus even though the conditions of section 92A(2)(g) are satisfied, in absence of any right with FCo to control and manage Taxpayer, Taxpayer and FCo cannot be considered as AEs, and consequently TP provisions will not apply to transactions undertaken between them.

(Unreported) ITA. Nos. 1548 and 1549/Kol/2009 Instrumentarium Corporation Limited, Finland vs. ADIT A.Y.: 2003-04 and 2004-05, Date of order: 15th July, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 92 of the Act – Tribunal upholds interest imputed on interest free loan; TP provisions, being anti-abuse provisions can tax notional income.

Facts
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Finland, was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling medical equipment. A wholly owned Indian subsidiary (ICo) of Taxpayer, acted as its marketing arm in India. In 2002, the Taxpayer entered into an agreement to grant interest free loan to ICo which was duly approved by RBI. Transfer pricing Officer (TPO) sought to impute interest on such loan.

For the relevant year, ICo had incurred losses. Had Taxpayer granted loan charging ALP, losses of ICo would have increased while Taxpayer would have suffered source taxation on interest @10 %.

The Taxpayer argued that there is no erosion of tax base in India on giving an interest free loan to its wholly owned Indian subsidiary and hence, transfer pricing provisions cannot be invoked. Further it was contended that for evaluating section 92(3) one must consider the tax implications of a transaction as a whole rather than tax implications in the hands of the Taxpayer alone and hence charging of higher service fees by the Taxpayer to ICo would have resulted in an erosion of tax base in India as it would increase losses of ICo. Additionally, where the Taxpayer has advanced interest free loan, the Assessing Officer (AO) cannot disregard the commercial expediency of the interest free loan and impute interest thereon.

Held
For the following reasons, Tribunal held that TPO was correct in imputing interest on the interest free loan given by the Taxpayer

Section 92(1) requires that any income from international transaction has to be computed at ALP. It is not in dispute that grant of interest free loan by the Taxpayer to its India AE was an international transaction. However, section 92(3) provides that, if on computation of ALP u/s 92(1), either the income of the Taxpayer is decreased or losses are increased, section 92(1) will not be pressed into service.

Moreover, section 92(3) refers to the Taxpayer in respect of whom computation of income is being done under section 92(1). Thus Taxpayer’s contention that while evaluating the impact of section 92(3), overall impact on profits and losses of not only the taxpayer but also the impact on its AEs should be considered, cannot be accepted.

It was further contended by Taxpayer that u/s. 92(3) one needs to not only consider the actual tax impact but also possible tax advantage de hors the time value of money. These contentions of the taxpayer cannot be accepted. The impact has to be seen only in respect of the previous year in which the international transaction was entered into and not for the subsequent years. Besides, mere possibility of a tax shield which may be available to AE as a result of accumulated losses, if any, can only affect the income of the subsequent years, which as stated above is not relevant for section 92(3).

If the transaction structure is to be accepted without ALP adjustment, while India will lose the taxability of interest in the hands of the Taxpayer @10%, it will have nothing to lose in the respect of taxability of the ICo because admittedly ICo was incurring losses.

In the present case, as a result of TP adjustment, there is neither any lowering of profit of AE nor increase in losses of AE, even while income of the Taxpayer is increased. Thus there is no base erosion by the ALP adjustments in the hands of Taxpayer. The base erosion could have, if at all, taken place at best in a situation in which ICo was actually allowed a deduction.

Further, there is no provision enabling corresponding deduction for ALP adjustments in the hands of ICo merely because TP adjustment is made in the hands of Taxpayer

Under the Indian TP provisions, the use of ALP is mandatory for computation of income arising from international transactions between the AEs. The only exception is that these provisions are not to be applied only in the event where section 92(3) is satisfied.

If the intent of legislature was that TP provisions are not to be invoked in the cases where there is lowering of the overall profits of all the AEs connected with the transactions, the words of the statutory provision would have been so provided so. In absence of the same, it is incorrect to say that, TP provisions are not to be invoked when, there is no erosion of Indian tax base.

Commercial expediency of a loan to subsidiary is wholly irrelevant in ascertaining ALP of such a loan. Once a transaction is treated as international transaction between AEs, section 92 mandates that income from such transaction be computed as per ALP. Transfer pricing provisions, being anti-abuse provisions with the sanction of the statute, come into play in specific situation of certain transactions with the associated enterprise and the same can tax notional income too.

While notional interest income cannot indeed be brought to tax in general, the arm’s length principle requires that income be computed, in certain situations, on the basis of certain parameters which inherently lead to notional taxation. When the legal provisions are not pari materia, (i.e the provision of normal computation of income and the provision of computation of income in the case of international transactions between the AEs), what is held to be correct in the context of one set of legal provisions has no application in the context of the other set of legal provisions.

TS-428-ITAT-2016(Mum) DDIT vs. Taj TV Ltd A.Y.: 2003-04 to 2005-06, Date of order: 5th July, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 9 of the Act, Article 5, 12 of India Mauritius DTAA – (i) in absence of principalagent relationship and authority to habitually conclude contract in India, Indian advertising agent did not create a Dependent Agency PE in India; (ii) transponder charges and uplinking charges did not constitute royalty under the DTAA , and retrospective amendment to the royalty definition under the Act cannot be read into the DTAA ; (iii) programming charges for acquiring telecasting rights of live events conducted outside India did not represent income accruing or arising in India.

Facts 1
The Taxpayer was incorporated as a company in British Virgin Islands (BVI) in the year 2000. However, it was subsequently registered as a company in Mauritius in July 2002.

The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of telecasting a sports channel across the globe including India. The Taxpayer had entered into following two contracts with its Indian subsidiary (“ICo”), with the prior approval of Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

Advertising Sales agreement for sale of commercial slot or spot to the prospective advertisers and other parties in India for which a commission at a flat rate of 10% was paid to ICo

Distribution agreement for distribution of the channel to cable operators who ultimately distribute to consumers in India. The distribution revenue collected by ICo was to be shared between the Taxpayer and ICo in the ratio of 60:40.

The Taxpayer contended that advertising and distribution revenue earned by it is not taxable in India because income is business income and is not taxable in absence of Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

However, Assessing Officer (AO) considered that ICo constituted a ‘dependent agent PE’ (DAPE) of the Taxpayer in India. Also, the distribution income was characterised as ‘Royalty’ u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

For F.Y. 2002, Taxpayer was registered in BVI as a company for part of the year and in Mauritius for the residuary period. Hence, it was suggested that Taxpayer was not eligible to claim treaty benefits for such part of the year during which it was registered in BVI. As a consequence, it was held that distribution income for that part of the year was taxable as royalty income under the Act, while for the balance period where the Taxpayer was registered in Mauritius, as the royalty income was attributable to the DAPE of Taxpayer, it would be taxable in India as per Article 7 of India Mauritius DTAA .

Held 1
Taking note of the terms of the distribution agreement and the actual conduct of the parties, it was held that ICo was not acting as an agent of Taxpayer in India. ICo merely obtained the right of distribution of channel for itself and subsequently entered into contract with other parties (sub-distributors) in its own name. Thus it was held that the transactions between the Taxpayer and ICo were on principal-to-principal basis.

As per Article 5(4) of the India Mauritius DTAA, an agent is considered to be creating a PE of a foreign enterprise in India if he is a dependent agent and habitually exercises any authority to conclude contract or habitually maintains stock of goods or merchandise in India on behalf of such foreign enterprise. Moreover, an agent is treated as dependent only if it is subject to instructions or comprehensive control of the foreign enterprise and no entrepreneurial risk is borne by the agent.

Thus, even if ICo is considered as an agent of the Taxpayer, since ICo did not satisfy any of the above conditions, it did not constitute DAPE of the Taxpayer in India.

The Taxpayer had not granted any license to use any copyright to the distributor or to the cable operators but merely made available the content to the cable operator which was transmitted to the ultimate viewer. In fact, the rights over the content were always held by the Taxpayer and were never made available to distributors or cable operators. Thus, the income from such arrangement would not constitute royalty.

Also, the contention of the AO that the income from distribution agreement be considered as royalty for some part of the year and as business income for the balance year was not acceptable.

Facts 2
Taxpayer made payments to a US Co for providing facility of transponder for telecasting its sports channel. Additionally certain ‘up-linking’ charges were paid to USCo for up-linking the signals of live events from the venue of the events to USCo’s satellite.

Taxpayer did not withhold taxes on such payments. AO contended that the payments made to USCo qualified as royalty under the Act as well as the India-USA DTAA and hence, were subject to withholding tax in India. Accordingly, AO disallowed such expenses for failure to withhold taxes.

Held 2
Article 12 of the India – USA DTAA exhaustively defines the term ‘royalty’ and therefore, the definition and scope of ‘royalty’ should be as provided in the DTAA not the Act. Hence, the definition of royalty as enlarged by Finance Act 2012 with retrospective effect cannot be read into the DTAA . Reliance in this regard was placed on the Delhi HC ruling in DIT vs. New Skies Satellite [2016] 95 CCH 0032 (Del).

Payment for transponder charges and up linking charges were not in the nature of any consideration in the nature of “use” or “right to use” any copyright of a literary or artistic or scientific work, patent, trademark or process etc., as referred to in Article 12 nor is it for the use of or right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Hence, they did not qualify as royalty under the DTAA .

Even otherwise, applying the maxim of “lex non cogit ad impossplia”, since the retrospective amendment was not in place when the payment was made by the Taxpayer, the Taxpayer cannot be held liable for failure to withhold taxes.

In absence of PE of the NR in India, the payment made to a NR outside India for availing service of equipment in relation to transponder and up-linking activity outside India cannot be taxed in India.

Facts 3
Taxpayer paid certain programming cost to various NR cricket boards and other sports associations for acquiring live telecast rights in relation to sport events taking place outside India.

AO contended that such payments were in the nature of acquiring copyrights and hence qualified as royalty under the Act. Taxpayer, however, contended that telecasting such live events did not constitute royalty as it did not involve any copyright.

Held 3
Programming cost was paid by Taxpayer to various nonresidents outside India for acquiring rights of sports events taking place outside India.

Further as liability to pay programming cost is assumed by the Taxpayer outside India and is not borne by any PE of NRs in India, such programming cost cannot be deemed to arise in India.

2016 (43) STR 249 (Tri. Ahmd.) L& T Sargent & Lundy Limited vs. CCE & ST, Vadodara

fiogf49gjkf0d
Non-intimation to department regarding adjustment of service tax suo motu is a curable defect.

Facts
Excess payment of service tax was adjusted by the Appellants suo motu without intimation to department. The adjustment was denied. It was contended that no intimation was required under Rule 6 (3) of Service tax Rules, 1994. Even if intimation was required, it was a minor procedural defect and therefore, penalties were not warranted. Department argued that penalties shall be imposed on such big industrial group who must be well aware of these laws.

Held
Since there was no short payment of service tax and the defect was not so serious, adjustment was allowed and penalties were set aside.

Note: Readers may note a similar decision in the case of State Bank of Hyderabad [2016-TIOL-1105-CESTAT-HYD] reported in the June 2016 issue of BCAJ. Further please note the decision in the case of ONGC vs. CCE, Cus. & ST., Surat-II [2016 (43) STR 317 (Tri. – Ahmd.)] where on similar facts, the Tribunal had directed the appellant to follow prescribed procedure in future.

2016 (43) STR 234 (Tri. – Chan.) Jindal Water Infrastructure Ltd. vs. CCE, Rohtak

fiogf49gjkf0d
In cases of centralized registration, appeal may be transferred to jurisdictional CESTAT even if adjudicated at some other place.

Facts
Appellant obtained centralized registration at Delhi. However, adjudication was made at Rohtak. Appeals relating to such adjudication were assigned to Chandigarh Bench on the basis of territorial jurisdiction.

Held
In view of centralized registration and since the cause of action had arisen in Delhi, appeal was directed to be transferred to Delhi CESTAT .

2016 (43) STR 110 (Tri-Mum.) Sumeet C. Tholle and Prathima S. Tholle vs. C.C.E.&C., Aurangabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Service Tax collected and deposited without authority of law by the service provider can be refunded to service receiver.

Facts
The appellants jointly purchased a house wherein service tax as well as VAT was collected from them. Even though the transaction between the appellants and its vendor was of transfer of immovable property, the vendor charged service tax. On understanding the facts, the appellants filed a refund claim with the department since tax was levied and collected without authority of law. The refund claim got rejected on the grounds that the appellants had not provided any proof of deposit of service tax by the service provider with the Government.

Held
Since the transaction of transfer of immovable property is squarely covered in the exclusion part of the definition, the activity of transfer of immovable property is not a taxable activity. Service recipient cannot be made liable to prove that the service tax paid by him to the service provider has been credited to the Government or not. Refund can be granted to the recipient on the basis of invoices held by them wherein service tax has been charged. Whether service tax has been deposited to the Government or not is to be looked by the department and not the service recipient. Service recipient having borne the incidence of tax can challenge taxability by claiming refund.

[2016-TIOL-1982-CESTAT-ALL] M/s. Shiel Autos vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur

fiogf49gjkf0d
Extended period cannot be invoked and penalties cannot be imposed on matters involving interpretational issues referred to the larger bench.

Facts
The Appellant is an automobile dealer. On the basis of information obtained from various banks it was observed that they were in receipt of commission on which no service tax was paid. A show cause notice was issued proposing demand of service tax along with interest and penalties on the commission received as a direct selling agent. It was argued that they have only let the financing agency to use their premises in order to promote the sale of vehicles and there is no principal agent relationship with the finance company and that they merely act as a channel between the customer and the finance company. On confirmation of demand by the adjudicating authority, the first appellate authority observed that the receipt of commission from the bank is not on the basis of space occupied in the premises but is on the basis of quantum of finance sanctioned to the customers who purchased vehicle. Therefore demand as a direct selling agent of the bank/institution was confirmed. Accordingly the present appeal is filed.

Held
The Tribunal noted that no agreement with the banks was placed on record regarding provision of any space and further the commission amount varied from month to month. Therefore undoubtedly the activity falls under the category of “business auxiliary service” for promotion and marketing of services provided by banks. However considering the fact that there was an interpretational issue and the matter was decided by the larger bench in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad [2014-TIOL-141- CESTAT-DEL-LB, extended period is not invokable and penalties are set aside. Demand is upheld only for the normal period.

Transfer pricing- Reference to TPO (Opportunity of hearing)- Section 92CA of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2010-11- Assessing Officer is obliged to give assessee an opportunity of being heard prior to making reference where an objection as to jurisdiction is raised by assessee in relation to making a reference-

fiogf49gjkf0d
Indorama Synthetics (India) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT; [2016] 71 taxmann.com 349 (Delhi):

The assessee-company entered into transactions of import of raw material amounting from ‘TPL’, a company incorporated in Thailand. It filed return of income declaring ‘Nil’ income. During pendency of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer referred the assessee’s case to TPO for determination of ALP in relation to the international transactions undertaken by the assessee with AE

The assessee filed writ petition contending that Assessing Officer could not have referred the matter to TPO without giving it an opportunity of being heard. The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s writ petition and held as under:

“i) The main issue is whether it was incumbent on the Assessing Officer to have given the assessee an opportunity of being heard before making a reference to the TPO u/s. 92CA(1). Section 92CA reveals that there are certain jurisdictional prerequisites for the making of a reference by the Assessing Officer to the TPO. In the first place, the Assessing Officer has to be satisfied that the assessee has entered into an international transaction or a specified domestic transaction. Whereas in the present case, the assessee raises a threshold objection that it has not entered into any international transaction within the meaning of section 92B, it is imperative for the Assessing Officer to deal with such an objection. If the Assessing Officer decides to nevertheless make a reference, he has to record the reasons, even prima facie, why he considers it necessary and expedient to make such a reference to the TPO.

ii) What is referred to the TPO is the determination of the ALP of the said international transaction or specified domestic transaction. Therefore, the satisfaction to be arrived at by the Assessing Officer regarding the existence of the international transaction or specified domestic transaction, even prima facie, is a sine qua non for making the reference to the TPO. Where such an accountant’s report is submitted by the assessee in Form 3CEB, then there should be no difficulty for the Assessing Officer to form an opinion, even a prima facie one, that it is necessary and expedient to make a reference to the TPO on the question of the determination of the ALP of such international transaction involving the assessee.

iii) CBDT’s Instruction No. 3 of 2003 categorically states that in order to make a reference to the TPO, the Assessing Officer has to satisfy himself that the assessee has entered into an international transaction with its AE. One of the sources from which the factual information regarding the international transaction can be gathered is Form No. 3 CEB filed with the return which is in the nature of an accountant’s report containing the details of the international transaction entered into by the taxpayer during the assessment year in question. Where no such report in Form 3 CEB is filed by the assessee, what will be the basis for the Assessing Officer to record that it is necessary and expedient to refer the question of determination of the ALP of such transaction to the TPO? Where the Assessing Officer is of the view that a transaction reflected in the filed return partakes of the character of an international transaction, he will put the assessee on notice of his proposal to make a reference to the TPO u/s. 92CA (1) of the Act. Before making a reference to the TPO, the Assessing Officer has to seek approval of the Commissioner/Director as contemplated under the Act. Therefore, all transactions have to be explicitly mentioned in the letter of reference. The very nature of this exercise is such that the Assessing Officer will first put the assessee on notice of his proposing to make a reference to the TPO and seek information and clarification from the assessee. If at this stage, the assessee raises an objection as to the very jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to make the reference, then it will be incumbent on the Assessing Officer to deal with such objection on merits.

iv) While section 92CA (1) does not itself talk about a hearing having to be given to the assessee upon the latter raising an objection as to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to make a reference, such requirement appears to be implicit in the very nature of the procedure that is expected to be followed by the Assessing Officer. As already noticed, the Assessing Officer has to record that he considers it necessary and expedient to make a reference. The Assessing Officer has to deal with the objections raised by the assessee. It is only thereafter that the Assessing Officer can come to the conclusion, even prime facie, that it is necessary and expedient to make the reference. This has to be done prior to making a reference

v) As far as the present case is concerned, the assessee has not filed the accountant’s report u/s. 92E yet the Assessing Officer has to proceed to determine the ALP u/s. 92C (3) or refer the matter to the TPO to determine the ALP u/s. 92CA (1) in case the assessee has not declared one or more international transactions in the report filed u/s. 92E of the Act. As explained above, the Assessing Officer must provide an opportunity of being heard to the taxpayer before recording his satisfaction or otherwise

vi) For all the aforesaid reasons, it is opined that the references made by the Assessing Officer to the TPO on the question of determination of ALP of the alleged international transactions involving the petitioner and its AE have been made without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard as was required by law. Accordingly, the said reference made by the Assessing Officer to the TPO is hereby set aside.

vii) The question of whether or not a reference should be made to the TPO, has to be determined by the Assessing Officer afresh after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard.”

TDS- Interest- Section 194A of I. T. Act, 1961- Motor Vehicles Act- Compensation to victims of motor accident- Tax not deductible from compensation or interest thereon-

fiogf49gjkf0d
MD Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd. vs. Chinnadurai; 385 ITR 656 (Mad):

Dealing with the scope of the provisions of TDS on compensation and interest thereon payable to victims of motor accidents, the Madras High Court held as under:

“i) If there is a conflict between a social welfare legislation and a taxation legislation legislation, then, the social welfare legislation should prevail since it subserves larger public interest. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is one such legislation which has been passed with a benevolent intention for compensating the accident victims who have suffered bodily disablement or loss of life and the Income-tax Act which is primarily intended for tax collection by the state cannot spoke in the effective and efficacious enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act.

ii) The Income-tax Department had issued a circular dated October 4, 2011 whereby deduction of incometax has been ordered on the award amount and the interest accrued on the deposits made under the order of the court in motor accident cases. Taking a serious view of this circular, the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court took suomoto cognizance of the matter and considered it as public interest litigation in the Judgment reported in Court on its Motion vs. H. P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2014 SCC Online HP 4273 and quashed the circular.

iii) The compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal or other interest accruing thereon cannot be subjected to deduction of tax at source and since the compensation and the interest awarded therein do not fall under the term “income” as defined under the Income-tax Act.”

Speculation business- Section 73 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2004-05- Trading in units of mutual funds or bonds- Not trading in shares- Not speculation business-

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Hertz Chemicals Ltd.; 386 ITR 39 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer found that the assessee had offered its profits and loss from share trading as profit and loss of speculation business for the purpose of section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and amounts received from mutual funds/bonds as business income. For the year ending on March 31, 2003, the assessee had offered profit and loss from share trading as well as from mutual funds as income from speculation business showing the closing stock of shares at Rs. 6.69 crore while the opening stock as on April 1, 2003 for the assessment year in question was shown as Rs. 1.01 crores and the balance of Rs. 5.67 crore was shown as opening stock of mutual funds and bonds. The Assessing Officer held that bifurcation was not permissible and considered the activity of dealing in mutual funds and bonds to be an activity of dealing in shares as speculation business. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “i) Units were not shares and trading in units was not speculation business. The Tribunal was justified in confirming the deletion of the addition made by the Assessing Officer on account of the assesee’s trading activities in mutual funds and bonds. ii) No question of law arose.”

Search and seizure- Cash seized from third person- Third person stating that cash belonged to asessee and assessee admitting it- Amount included in return filed by assessee- Request to adjust tax dues and return balance to assessee- Request cannot be refused on ground that cash had been seized from third person-

fiogf49gjkf0d
Hemal Dilipbhai Shah vs. ACIT; 386 ITR 91 (Guj):

In February 2012, Rs. 26 lakhs in cash were seized by the Department from one VS. VS stated that the cash did not belong to him but to the assessee. Such statement of VS was also confirmed by the assessee. The assessee filed his return for the A. Y. 2012-13 declaring total income of Rs. 27,52,100 including the income declared of Rs. 21,73,000 on account of unexplained cash. The assessee filed an application to the Assessing Officer to adjust the tax liability from the seized amount. Thereafter the asessee filed an application for release of the balance of the seized amount along with interest after adjusting the demand. By a communication, the Assessing Officer informed the assessee that the Department is not in a position to issue the refund until completion of assessment of the VS.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The fact as emerging from the record clearly revealed that in proceedings u/s. 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, VS from whom the cash had been seized had clearly stated that it belonged to the assessee and the assessee had also in proceedings u/s. 153C admitted this.

ii) The Department had treated the cash as belonging to the assessee. There was no dispute as regards the title to the seized assets (cash). The Department was, therefore, not justified in not releasing the balance amount to the assessee on the ground that the cash had been seized from VS.

iii) The Department is directed to forthwith refund the balance amount after adjusting the tax dues of the petitioner with interest.”