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11. ITO vs. Jogesh Ghosh (Kolkata) Members : J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and Smt. Madhumita Roy (JM) ITA No.: 1532/Kol/2016 A.Y.: 2013-14. Dated: 1st June, 2018 Counsel for revenue / assessee: Sallong Yaden / Subash Agarwal Sections 69, 69A – Source of purchase of land held to be satisfactorily explained by the assessee if he has produced receipts confirming sale of land. Production of receipts issued by buyer, though not numbered, are sufficient discharge of burden.

FACTS 


The assessee derived income by way
of interest on fixed deposits.  During
the previous year under consideration, he had sold his land and also purchased
land.  In order to explain the source of
purchase of land, the assessee contended that it had received amounts in cash
from the purchaser to whom the assessee had sold his land.  To substantiate the contention, the assessee
produced receipts issued by the purchaser of land.  The Assessing Officer (AO) disbelieved the
receipts produced on the ground that (a) there was no agreement between the
assessee and the purchaser of land; (b) the receipts were not serially
numbered; (c) the letter issued by the AO to the purchaser of land Windstar
Realtors Pvt. Ltd., calling for information was returned unserved; and (d) the
conveyance deed mentioned that the amount had been received on execution of
sale deed by mentioning the word “today”.  
The AO did not accept the contention of the assessee that there was a
mistake in the conveyance deed which was rectified by a registered
rectification deed, which was produced by the assessee.

 

The AO added a sum of Rs. 76,05,701
to the income of the assessee on the ground that money was received from
undisclosed sources as well as on the ground that there was unexplained expenditure.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the CIT(A) who considered the set of money receipts produced by
the assessee and also affidavit signed by Mr. Dhar, authorised person of the
purchaser company.  The CIT(A) in his
order mentioned that the authorised person of the purchaser company appeared
before him and confirmed the cash payments as well as the dates mentioned in
the money receipts.  Mr. Dhar had also
confirmed that making cash payments were necessary and a common feature for
purchases of land in rural areas from the agriculturists and the company had
made the payments by withdrawing cash from its bank accounts. The Ld. CIT(A)
deleted the addition made  by the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the revenue, it was contended that
the order of CIT(A) be set aside as the CIT(A) had accepted additional evidence
in the form of affidavit of Mr. Dhar as well as his explanations and that the
AO was not provided an opportunity.  It
was also contended that the CIT(A) erred in accepting the rectification deed
produced by the assessee to correct the original conveyance deed. 

 

The assessee contended before the
Tribunal that all the details were filed before the AO and that filing of
affidavit was only supplementary and supporting evidence and additional
evidence.  Reliance was placed on the
following case laws –

 

i)   Shankar
Khandasari Sugar Mill vs. CIT reported in 193 ITR 669 (Kar);

ii)   DCIT vs. New Manas Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. (Gau) reported in 73 ITD
157 (Gau)

 

HELD 


The Tribunal held that the assessee
has discharged the onus that lay on him to prove the sources for purchase of
land. It observed that the AO has only doubted the timing of receipts of cash
by the assessee, consequent to the sale of land to Windstar Realtors Pvt. Ltd.
Any money receipts issued by an individual would have a date but not a serial
number, as in the case with a business concern. When the company has confirmed
the payments in cash on the dates mentioned in the receipts, nothing else
survives. In view of the factual findings of the Ld. CIT(A), the Tribunal
upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A). 

 

The appeal filed by the revenue was
dismissed.

21. [2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 102 Owais M Husain vs. ITO ITA No.: 4320/Mum/2016 A. Y.: 2006-07 Dated: 11th May, 2018 Section 23(1)(a)- Income from house property –– AO is directed to compute the deemed rent of the house property as per the municipal rateable value and assess the income from house property accordingly instead of estimating the letable value on the basis of the prevailing rate of rent of the building situated in the surrounding areas.

FACTS


  •   The assesse owned 3 flats
    i.e. one at Chennai which is treated as self-occupied property by the AO and
    other two properties being flat at Queens Court, Worli and Dhun apartment,
    Worli, Mumbai.

 

  •  The AO estimated the reasonable let out value of the house
    property after taking IT inspector’s report. The report was on the basis of the
    local enquiry conducted in the surrounding area of the building situated and
    the going rent per square feet of Rs.50.70 per square feet per month. Based on
    inspector’s report, the AO estimated the rent per month for each of the flats
    at Rs. 75,000 per month. Therefore, the AO worked out ALV of the flat at Dhun
    cooperative society, Worli, Mumbai, at Rs. 9 lakh and for the other flat at
    Queens Court, Worli, Mumbai at Rs. 9 lakh. 

 

  • Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
    confirmed the action of the AO.

 

HELD


  •     The Tribunal while
    relying upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, held that the
    municipal rateable value could be accepted as a bona fide rental value
    of the property and there could not be a blanket rejection of the same.


  •     The market rate in the
    locality was an approved method for determining the fair rental value but it
    was only when the AO was convinced that the case before him was suspicious,
    determination by the parties was doubtful that he could resort to enquire about
    the prevailing rate in the locality.

 

  •     In the result, the
    Tribunal directed the AO to compute the deemed rent as per municipal rateable
    value and assess the income accordingly.

20. [2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 225 Fancy Wear vs. ITO ITA No.: 1596 & 1597/Mum/2016 A. Ys.: 2010-11 and 2011-12 Dated: 20th September, 2017 Section 69C – Assessee having not been allowed to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were recorded by AO and accounts of assessee having not been rejected, addition made u/s. 69C by AO was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice as also on merits.

FACTS


  •     The assessee filed its
    return of income which was initially processed u/s. 143(1). Subsequently, the
    AO received information from the Sales Tax Department as well as from DGIT
    (Inv.) Mumbai that the assessee had received accommodation entries for
    purchases from suspicious parties.

 

  •     The AO initiated
    proceedings u/s. 147, after recording reasons thereof. He observed that the
    assessee had purchased goods from SE and SJE. The sales tax department had
    conducted independent enquiries in each of the hawala parties and conclusively
    proved that those parties were engaged in the business of providing
    accommodation entries only. The AO observed that the notices issued u/s. 133
    (6), had been returned with the mark ‘’not known’’ or “not claimed”.
    Accordingly, the aggregate of the purchases was treated as unexplained
    expenditure u/s. 69C and was added to the returned income of the assessee.

 

  •     The AO further observed
    that apart from the above purchases, the assessee had purchased goods from two
    more entities, namely RE and VE. The names of both the entities were appearing
    on the website of the Sales Tax Department in the list of the defaulters. Thus,
    he made a further addition to the income of the assessee invoking section 69C.

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
    reduced the addition to 25 per cent of the purchases.

 

HELD


  •   The Tribunal noted that
    though material for reopening was available to the AO, it was never shared with
    the assessee. The assessee had made a request for cross examining the parties
    who were treated as hawala-dealers by the Sales Tax Department. The AO did not
    provide the copies of statements of suppliers and opportunity of cross
    examination to the assessee.

 

  •   In case of the other two
    entities, the Tribunal held that a default under the Sales Tax Act, in itself,
    could not be equated with non-genuineness of the transaction entered by an
    entity with other party, unless and until some positive corroborative evidence
    was brought on record. It was a fact that all the payments to the suppliers
    were made through banking channels. No evidences were brought on record proving
    that the suppliers had withdrawn cash immediately after deposit of cheques of the
    assessee.

 

  •   The assessee had
    discharged the onus of proving the genuineness of the transactions by producing
    copies of purchase bills, delivery challans, bank statements showing payments
    made by the parties, confirmation of ledger accounts of the suppliers, sales
    tax returns and sales tax challans of the suppliers, income tax returns. After
    the submissions made by the assessee along with the above documents, the ball
    was in the court of the AO to discharge his onus-especially when he wanted to
    invoke the provisions of section 69C.

 

  •  The AO had completed the assessment without marshaling the facts
    properly and only on the basis of general information provided by the Sales Tax
    Department. The non-filing of appeals against the orders of the CIT(A), wherein
    he had deleted 75 per cent of the additions made by the AO, indicated that the
    department itself was not convinced about the approach adopted by the AO in
    making additions.

 

  •     In the end, the Tribunal
    held that the orders of the AO and CIT(A) were not valid because of violation
    of principles of natural justice. Besides, the addition made u/s. 69C was also
    not maintainable.

19. [2018] 193 TTJ (Jd) 751 ITO vs. Estate of Maharaja Karni Singh of Bikaner ITA NO.: 241/Jodh/2017 A. Y.: 2011-12 : 20th February, 2018 Section 50C- Capital gains – Assessee having contested the enhanced valuation of the property made by the stamp valuation authority and the AO having denied the request of the assesse to refer the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C(2), CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition on account of capital gain on the sale of land.

FACTS


  •     The assesse had sold two
    pieces of land for Rs.45,00,000 and Rs.30,00,000 respectively, the DLC value of
    which was Rs.1,12,04,236 and Rs.1,20,00,566 aggregating to Rs.2,32,04,802.
    After deduction of cost of acquisition of Rs.95,07,478 the resultant taxable
    long term capital gain was Rs.1,36,97,324.

 

  •     The AO stated that the
    reference to DVO could not be made in view of the provisions of section 50C(2)
    of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as the litigation for the charging of stamp duty
    was pending before KAR board, Ajmer.

 

  •     Therefore, the AO
    computed the Income of the assessee invoking of the provisions of section 50C,
    as the assessment was getting barred by limitation on 31st March,
    2014.

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). 

 

  •     The CIT(A) deleted the
    additions, holding that, before adoption of valuation of property sold by the
    valuation authority, the AO should have considered the objection raised by the
    assessee and should have referred the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C (2).

 

HELD


  •   The Tribunal held that as
    per section 50C, the value taken for stamp duty by the State registration
    authority would be considered as deemed sale consideration. There was solace
    for assessee u/s. 50C(2), which provided that if the assessee objected to the
    valuation of the property for stamp duty purposes, the AO might refer the
    valuation to the DVO.

 

  •     Thus, section 50C
    provided two remedies at the option of the assessee, in that, he could either
    file appeal against the stamp value or seek reference to the valuation cell.
    Adoption of the value by the valuation cell was again subject to regular
    appeals available against the order of the AO. 

 

  •     The Tribunal further
    stated that it was well settled that the principles of natural justice would be
    presumed to be necessary, unless there existed a statutory interdict, and also
    when substantial justice and technical consideration were pitted against each
    other, the cause of substantial justice deserved to be preferred.

 

  •     Therefore, denial of
    request or objections of the assessee against the value adopted by the stamp
    valuation authority by the AO was against the spirit of section 50C. It was not
    optional for the AO to make reference to DVO, the right of the assessee u/s.
    50C was a statutory right.

 

  •     In the result, the
    Tribunal held that there was no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) that the AO
    should have considered the objections raised by the assessee against the same
    and should have referred the matter to the DVO u/s. 50C(2).

18. [2018] 193 TTJ (Jp) 898 ACIT vs. Safe Decore (P.) Ltd ITA No.: 716/Jp/2017 A. Y.: 2014-15 Dated: 12th January, 2018 Section 56(2)(viib) read with Rule 11UA – Fair market value of shares determined by assessee as per discounted cash flow method being higher than the fair market value under net asset method, CIT(A) was justified in deleting addition made by AO u/s. 56(2)(viib)

FACTS

  •     During the year under
    consideration the assessee company allotted shares to ‘J’ Ltd. The assesse
    submitted valuation per equity share computed on the discounted cash flow
    method as per the certificate of Chartered Accountants wherein the value per
    shares was arrived at Rs.54.98 per share.

 

  •     The AO did not accept
    said valuation and applied Net Asset Value method as per which value of share
    came to Rs.26.69 per share. Applying the said value, the AO made addition u/s.
    56(2)(viib).

 

  •     Aggrieved by the
    assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). In appellate
    proceedings, the assessee contended that as per Rule 11UA of the Income-tax
    Rules,1962, the Fair Market Value of unquoted equity shares would be the value
    on the allotment date of such unquoted equity shares as determined as per
    method provided or Net Asset Value, whichever was higher.

 

  •     The CIT(A) accepted the
    contention of the assessee and deleted the addition made by the AO.

 

HELD

  •     The Tribunal held that
    there was no dispute that the assessee had issued shares to ‘J’ Ltd., during
    the year under consideration. Further, the fair market value as per the
    provision of section 56(2)(viib) had to be determined in accordance with the
    method prescribed under Rule 11UA of Income-tax Rules,1962 and as per Rule
    11UA(2), discounted cash flow method was one of the prescribed methods. Therefore,
    it was the option of the assessee to adopt any of the prescribed methods under
    Rule 11UA(2).

 

  •     Section 56(2)(viib) read
    with the Explanation had specifically provided that the fair market value of
    the unquoted shares should be determined as per the prescribed methods, and
    should be taken whichever is higher fair market value, by comparing the value
    based on the assets of the company.

 

Therefore, value as per the Net
Asset Value method as well as any of the other methods prescribed under Rule
11UA of Income-tax Rules,1962, whichever was higher, should be adopted as per
the option of the assessee.

 

  •     In the case of the
    assessee, the fair market value determined as per the discounted cash flow
    method at Rs.54.98 per share which was higher than the valuation adopted by the
    AO as per the Net Asset Value at Rs.26.69 per share.

 

  •     Therefore, the Tribunal
    held that as the AO had not found any serious defect in the facts and details
    used in determining the fair market value under discounted cash flow method, there
    was no error or illegality in the order of the CIT(A). 

46. CIT vs. ITD Cem India JV.; 405 ITR 533 (Bom): Date of order: 4th September, 2017 A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 40(a)(ia) – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Payments liable to TDS – Reimbursement of administrative expenses to joint venture partner – Genuineness of transaction established on verification – Finding of fact – Disallowance rightly deleted by Tribunal

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer found that the assessee did not deduct tax at source from the
payments made on account of administrative expenses which was paid by the joint
venture to the Indian company. According to the Assessing Officer section
40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity
referred to as the “Act”) was applicable and he disallowed the
expenditure.

 

The Tribunal held that it did not
find any reason to sustain the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) as the payments made
by the assessee to the co-venturer were only on account of salary and related
expenses.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“Once the Assessing Officer had
checked the debit notes raised by the co-venturer and they were test checked
and the amount of expenditure claimed by the assessee was verified and its
genuineness had been proved, there was no reason to interfere with the findings
of fact recorded by the Tribunal in its order.”

18. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT [ Income tax Appeal no 519 of 2003, Dated: 4th July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [Reversed ACIT vs. Jayantilal Investments. Ltd; AY 1988-89 , dated 20/07/2004 ; Mum. ITAT ] Section 36(1)(iii) prior to Amendment: Business expenditure — Capital or revenue – interest paid on the loan taken for purchase of plot of land – stock-in-trade – revenue expenditure

The assessee filed its return of
income for the subject A.Y. declaring an income of Rs.15,280/. Subsequently
revised return of income was filed by the assessee declaring a loss of Rs.2.30
lakh. In the revised return, the appellant had claimed amount of Rs.9.52 lakh
as interest expenditure allowable u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. During the course
of assessment proceedings on being so called upon by the A.O, the assessee
explained that so far as interest is concerned, it capitalises interest to the
extent it is expended, till the commencement of the project, therefore the
interest is taken as revenue expenditure. However, the A.O still entertained
doubts about allowing as deduction Rs.6.98 lakh being the interest expenditure
claimed on account of its construction project ‘Lucky Shoppe’. The assessee
pointed out that the above amount of Rs.6.98 lakh was debited to profit & loss
account but was wrongly capitalised in the original return of income, as during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year the work in the Lucky
Shoppe project had commenced. This was not accepted on the ground that mere
placing of orders would not amount to commencing of the project. Thus, not
allowable as revenue expenditure. The alternate submission of the appellant
that open plot of land in respect of ‘Lucky Shoppe’ forms stock in trade.
Therefore, the interest paid on the loan taken to purchase open plot of land
for Lucky Shoppe project is allowable as revenue expenditure being its
stock-in-trade. This alternative submission was negatived by the A.O on the
ground that purchase of plot of land is capital in nature. Hence, interest must
also be capitalised. Thus, the A.O disallowed the deduction of Rs.6.98 lakh
being interest paid on plot of land of Lucky Shoppe project.

 

The CIT(A) found that interest paid
on land was being allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier Assessment
Years and it was only in the subject Assessment Year that the A.O for the first
time treated the same as work in progress and capitalised the same. The CIT(A)
held that the interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its
stock-in-trade i.e., plot of land for the ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project has to be
allowed as expenditure to determine its income. In support reliance was placed
on the decision of this Court in S.F.Engineer & Ors. vs. CIT  57 ITR 455 (Bom). Consequently, the
CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the A.O in respect of interest paid on
‘Lucky Shoppe’ project.

 

The Revenue filed an appeal to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the assessee has not shown any work had
commenced on ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project plot of land during the previous year
relevant to the subject Assessment Year. Thus, it concluded that the A.O was
justified in coming to conclusion that interest expenditure in respect of Lucky
Shoppe project (plot of land) could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.
Thus, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue’s appeal and disallowed deduction of
interest in respect of ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project.

 

Being
aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the assessee filed an appeal to the High
Court. The Court found that the plot of land which was purchased out of
borrowed funds on which interest was paid, forms part of its stock-in-trade.
Therefore, interest paid on purchase of stock-in-trade is to be allowed as
revenue expenditure. This was negatived by the A.O on the ground that purchase
of plot is necessarily capital in nature and, therefore, interest thereon is
also to be capitalised. However, the fact is that the loan on which interest of
Rs.6.98 lakh is paid was taken for purchase of plot of land in the course of
its business. Therefore, the interest has been paid to acquire stock-in-trade.
In the above circumstances as held by the CIT(A), the same has to be allowed as
revenue expenditure. In view of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act as existing prior
to amendment with effect from 1.4.2004 all interest paid in respect of capital
borrowed for the purpose of business or profession has to be allowed as
deduction while computing income under had income from business. Prior to
amendment made on 1.4.2004, there was no distinction based on whether the
borrowing is for purchase of capital asset or otherwise, interest was allowable
as deduction in determining the taxable income. It was only after introduction
of proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act w.e.f. 1.4.2004 that the purpose of
borrowing i.e. acquisition of assets then interest paid would be capitalised.
The Supreme Court in Dy. CIT vs. Core Healthcare Ltd. 218 ITR 194 has
held that prior to 1.4.2004 interest paid on borrowings for purchase of asset
i.e. machinery is to be allowed as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. This
even if the machinery is not received in the year of booking. It held that the
restriction introduced in the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) of the Act was
effective only from A.Y 2004-05 and not for earlier Assessment Years. In this
case, the A.Y 1988-89 i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to
section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings
to purchase the ‘Lucky Shoppe’ project plot of land is allowable as a deduction
u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. This is so as it was incurred for the purposes of
its business. Accordingly, Assessee appeal was allowed.

45. CIT vs. Airlift (India) Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 487 (Bom): Date of order: 8th June, 2018 Section 260A – Appeal to High Court – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Failure by Department to remove office objections despite extension of time being granted – Absence of any particular reason for delay – Reason of administrative difficulty – Delay cannot be condoned

Notice of motion was filed by the
Department in appeal for condonation of delay on the ground that the office
objections could not be removed within the stipulated time in view of the
administrative difficulty including shortage of staff.

 

Rejecting the notice of motion, the
Bombay High Court held as under:

 

“The application for condonation
for delay was not bonafide as the applicant failed to remove the office
objections though it had secured extension of time on three occasions and the
affidavit offered no explanation as to what steps were taken by the Department
after the last extension to remove the office objections. The only reason made
out in the affidavit in support was administrative difficulty including
shortage of staff which could not be the reason for condonation of delay in the
absence of the same being particularised.”

REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW AND SECTION 35 AB

Issue for Consideration

Section 35 AB introduced by the Finance Act, 1985, w.e.f  1st April 1986, provides for
deduction of an amount paid towards any lump sum consideration for acquiring
know-how for the purposes of business in six equal annual instalments
commencing from the previous year in which the deductions is first allowed. The
relevant part contained in s/s. (1) reads as ; “S. 35AB. Expenditure on
know-how. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), where the assessee
has paid in any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or
before the 1st day of April, 1998 any lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how for use for the purposes of his business, one-sixth of
the amount so paid shall be deducted in computing the profits and gains of the
business for that previous year, and the balance amount shall be deducted in
equal instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years.”

 

The term ‘know-how’ is exhaustively defined vide an
Explanation to the section to mean any industrial information or technique
likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of
mine, oil, etc.

 

Prior to the insertion of section 35AB, an expenditure of
revenue nature, incurred on know-how, was allowed as deduction u/s. 37 of the
Income tax Act. A capital expenditure on know-how was not allowable as a
deduction and its treatment was governed by the other provisions of the Income
tax Act. With insertion of section 35AB, a capital expenditure became eligible
for deduction, subject to compliance of the prescribed conditions, in the
manner specified in the section.

Section 37 provides for a deduction of any expenditure laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business or
profession, in full, provided it is not in the nature of a capital expenditure
or personal expenses of the assessee and further that the expenditure is not in
the nature of the one described in section 30 to section 36 of the Act. 

 

Section 35 AB while opening a door for deduction of a capital
expenditure fuelled a new controversy, perhaps unintentionally, involving the
denial of 100% deduction to a revenue expenditure on know-how which was
hitherto allowable. It is the stand of the Revenue authorities that with the
introduction of section 35AB, the deduction for an expenditure on know-how, of
any nature, would be governed strictly by the new provision and be allowed in
six instalments and would not be allowed u/s. 37 as was the case before
insertion of the specific provision. Like any provision, a new one in
particular, section 35AB became a highly debatable provision not on one count
but on various counts. The related issues that arose, besides the issue of
identification of the relevant provision of the Act under which the deduction
for the revenue expenditure is allowable, are whether it was necessary that the
assessee acquired ownership rights over the know-how and whether the condition
for ‘lump sum’ payment meant payment in one go or even in instalments.  

 

Various High Courts had occasion to examine these issues or
some of them, leading to a fierce controversy surrounding the eligibility of a
deduction, in full u/s. 37, of an expenditure on a know-how, otherwise of a
revenue nature. The Madras, MP and the Bombay High Courts decided the issue in
favour of the Revenue by denying the deduction u/s. 37 and the Gujarat,
Karnataka and Punjab & Haryana High Courts favoured the deduction u/s. 37
for such an expenditure, incurred on know-how, in favour of the assessee. On
the issue of ‘lump sum’ payment , the Bombay High Court in two cases held that
the payment in instalments would not cease to be lump sum. The High Court also
decided that for application of section 35AB , it is not necessary to be an
owner of the know-how.

  

Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case 

The issue arose in the case of DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd., 57 taxmann.com 173 (Guj.)
for A.Y 1990-91, 1992-93 and
1993-94. While admitting one of the appeals, the following substantial
questions of law arose for the determination of the court; “Whether,
the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law and on facts in confirming the
order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (A) who held that the expenditure under
consideration was revenue in nature and allowable u/s 37 of the Act
disregarding the special provisions of sec.35AB?”

 

The Gujarat High Court at the outset noted that an identical
question had arisen before them in another appeal of the assessee for A.Y.
1989-90 numbered 326 of 2000 decided on 03.07.2012 , not otherwise reported,
and chose to reproduce the facts, pleadings, law and even the decision therein
to finally conclude, in the cases before them, that the provisions of section
35 AB were not applicable to the case of a revenue expenditure which was
allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. The facts and the sequence of events of the case
is therefore not available in the judgement and therefore the facts, pleadings
and the outcome of the case heavily relied upon by the court are placed and
considered here as had been done by the court.  

 

The assessee in that case, a company engaged in manufacturing
of starch and other similar products, during the year under consideration
relevant to assessment year 1989-90, paid 
the technical know-how and service fees, totalling to a sum of
Rs.23,23,880 and claimed deduction thereof in full as the revenue expenditure.
The assessee had contended that the provisions of section 35AB of the Act were
applicable only in respect of the capital expenditure and not in respect of the
revenue expenditure. The assessee further contended that the company while
acquiring such know-how, obtained no ownership right on such information and
know-how was furnished by the foreign company to the assessee under an
agreement. The assessee also contended that such technical know-how was for the
purpose of production of its existing items which are being manufactured by the
assessee company since many years.

 

The AO held that such expenditure fell within section 35AB of
the Act. The AO, did not accept the contentions of the assessee, though agreed
that such expenditure was revenue in nature and was covered within section 35AB of the Act and were to be amortised, as provided under the said
section, by spreading the benefit over a period of six years. Dissatisfied with
such a decision of the AO, the assessee carried the matter in appeal. Before
the CIT (Appeals), the assessee in addition to contending that a revenue
expenditure could not be brought under the ambit of section 35AB of the Act,
further contended that the provision of section 35AB of the Act was an enabling
provision, introduced to facilitate the deduction for a capital expenditure.

 

The CIT (A) rejected the assessee’s appeal as he was of the
opinion that section 37(1) of the Act, which covered expenditure not being in
the nature of the expenditure described in sections 30 to 36, would not apply
in the case by virtue of the provisions contained in section 35AB of the Act.
He held that since section 35AB of the Act made a specific provision to treat
the expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how by way of lump
sum payment and that even if such a payment was revenue in nature, it would not
fall within sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Act.

 

On a further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal reversed
the decisions of the revenue authorities. The Tribunal noted that as per the
agreement, all information and know-how furnished by the foreign company
remained the property of that company; the payment was made as a lump sum
consideration for use of the know-how, only, for the purpose of its running
business, for a limited period. The Tribunal noted that undisputedly, there was
no purchase of the know-how from the foreign company. The Tribunal held that
the case of the assessee was not covered u/s.35AB of the Act and that section
35AB had no application in the case and the assessee was entitled to deduction
u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In the appeal to the High Court, by the Revenue, it was
contended that the Tribunal committed grave error in allowing the assessee’s
appeal; that section 35AB of the Act was widely worded and included any
expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how and that  the concept of ownership was not material for
section 35AB; that once an expenditure, whether revenue or capital, was covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act then by virtue of the  language of sub-section
(1) of section 37 of the Act, the assessee could not claim any benefit thereof
u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical
Products Ltd., reported in 259 ITR 582
, wherein a division bench of the
Madras High Court had held that during the period when section 35AB of the Act
remained effective, any expenditure towards acquisition of know-how,
irrespective of whether it was a capital or a revenue expenditure, was to be
treated only in accordance with section 35AB and the deduction allowable in
respect of such know-how was 1/6th of the amount paid as lump sum consideration
for acquiring know-how. The Revenue relying on the decision of the MP High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bright Automotives and
Plastics Ltd.,
reported in 273 ITR 59 further contended that in
order to attract the rigour of section 35AB of the Act, it was not necessary
for the assessee to actually become an absolute owner of the know-how and also
that the nature of expenditure whether revenue or capital, was of no
consequence.

 

The assessee in response contended that the expenditure in
question was purely revenue in nature and the same was, therefore, not covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act; that the said provision was made to encourage acquisition
of know-how to improve the quality and efficiency of Indian manufacturing; that
the assessee had acquired the know-how for a limited period and had never
enjoyed any ownership or domain right over the know-how; that the know-how was
utilised for manufacturing of its existing items and that neither any new
manufacturing unit was established nor new item of manufacturing was
introduced. It was pointed out that even the AO agreed that the expenditure in
question was a revenue expenditure; that section 35AB of the Act had no
application to such an expenditure since the provision of section 35AB was an
enabling provision that was not introduced to limit the benefits which were
already existing. Attention was also drawn to the C.B.D.T. Circular No.421
dated 12.6.1985
wherein with respect to deduction in respect of an
expenditure on know-how, it was clarified that, the provision was inserted with
a view to providing encouragement for indigenous scientific research. Heavy
reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd., 309 ITR 443
in which the Apex Court
had an occasion to examine the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court noted that the AO himself had accepted
that the expenditure in question was of revenue nature and that the circular
No. 421 confirmed that the provisions of section 35AB were enabling provision
and if that be so, the deduction of such expenditure could not be limited by
applying section 35AB of the Act. The Court took note of the facts in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s case
and also of the decision therein and observed as under;
“The Apex Court decision would suggest that for determining whether certain expenditure
would fall within section 35AB or not, it would be important to examine the
nature of the expenditure. If it is found that the same is revenue in nature,
the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act would not arise. On
the other hand, if it is found to be capital in nature, then the question of
amortisation and spreading over, as contemplated under section 35AB of the Act
would come into play.”

 

The Court held that such provision, as was clarified by the
C.B.D.T, was made with a view to providing encouragement for indigenous
scientific research; that such statutory provision was made for making
available the benefits which were hitherto not available to the manufacturers
while incurring expenditure for acquisition of technical know-how; that to the
extent such expenditure was covered u/s. 35AB, amortised deduction spread over
six years was made available; that where such expenditure was capital in
nature, prior to introduction of section 35AB of the Act, no such deduction
could be claimed; that with introduction of section 35AB, to encourage
indigenous scientific research, such deduction was made available; that such a
provision could not be seen as a limiting provision restricting the existing
benefits of the assessee. In other words the revenue expenditure in the form of
acquisition of technical know-how, which was available as deduction u/s. 37(1)
of the Act, was never meant to be disallowed or taken away or limited by
introduction of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court also cited with approval the paragraph
from the Ninth Edition, Volume-I of Kanga & Palkhivala, while
explaining the provisions of section 35AB of the Act, : “This section
allows deduction, spread over six years, of a lump sum consideration paid for
acquiring know-how for the purposes of business even if later the assessee’s
project is abandoned or if such know-how subsequently becomes useless or if the
same is returned. The section, which is an enabling section and not a disabling
one, should be confined to that consideration which would otherwise be
disallowable as being on capital account. A payment for acquiring know-how or
the use of know-how which is on revenue account is allowable under section 37,
and does not attract the application of this section at all.”

 

The High Court concluded that the provisions of section 35AB
of the Act could apply only in case of a capital expenditure and would not
apply to a revenue expenditure even if the same was incurred for acquisition of
technical know-how and the deduction thereof could not be curtailed or limited
by applying section 35AB.A revenue expenditure remained within the ambit of
section 37(1) of the Act. The Court observed that it was unable to concur with
the view of the Madras High Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. (supra)
, which was in any case rendered
prior to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra).

 

Accordingly, the Gujarat High Court, in the case before it,
in appeal, in Anil Starch Ltd.’s case, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal
holding that the provisions of section 35AB did not apply to an expenditure
which otherwise was of a revenue nature. In deciding the case, the High Court
followed the ratio of the decisions in the cases of DCIT vs. Sayaji
Industries Ltd. 82 CCH 412
and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Diffusion
Engineers Ltd. vs. DCIT, 376 ITR 487.

 

Standard Batteries Ltd.’s case

Recently the issue came up for consideration, before the
Bombay High Court, in the case of Standard Batteries Ltd. vs. CIT, 255
Taxman 380 (Bom.).
The assessee, in that case, had entered into an
agreement with ‘O’, UK, in terms of which, the assessee was to receive outside
India a license to transfer and import information, know-how, advice,
materials, documents and drawings as required for the manufacture of miners’
cap lamp batteries and stationery batteries for a lump sum consideration paid
in three equal instalments, where the permission was only to use the know-how
and information without transfer of ownership. The assessee claimed deduction
in respect of the said payment u/s. 37(1). The AO however, rejected the claim
of the assessee but allowed deduction to the extent of 1/6th of the amount
spent and claimed, and the balance amount was to be deducted in equal
instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years in terms
of section 35AB.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee had acquired the
ownership rights in the technical know-how and accordingly the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s. 35AB, and not u/s. 37(1) as was claimed by the
assessee.

 

On appeal by the assessee to the High Court, the three
aspects before the Court were about the application of section 35 AB to the
case where; (i) a revenue expenditure was incurred (ii) payment was made in
instalments and (iii) the assessee was not an owner of the rights or asset for
an effective application of section 35AB.  

 

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the expenditure
for receipt of technical know-how would 
not fall u/s. 35AB of the Act but would appropriately fall u/s. 37 of
the Act for the following reasons;

 

(a)  Section 35AB of the Act
required a lump sum consideration to be paid for acquiring any technical
know-how, while in the case before the Court admittedly payment was made in 3
instalments, therefore could not be regarded as a lump sum payment and as such
was therefore, outside the scope of section 35AB of the Act;

 

(b)  There was no acquisition of a technical
know-how in the facts of the case, as the applicant merely obtained a lease /
license of the rights to use such technical know-how; not having any ownership
rights over the technical know-how, the requirement of acquiring the know-how
u/s. 35AB of the Act was not satisfied and was thus, outside the mischief of
section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c)  The technical know-how
obtained by the applicant under the agreement dated 19th June, 1984
was to be used in the regular course of its business of manufacturing batteries
and therefore, would be revenue in nature; section 35AB would apply only where
the expenditure was in the nature of a capital expenditure; the expenditure for
obtaining technical know-how being of revenue nature, would fall in the
residuary section 37 of the Act.

                       

In response, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue, that
:—

 

(a)  The payment made in three equal instalments
continued to be a lump sum payment;

 

(b) Section 35AB of the Act, did not require
obtaining ownership of the technical know-how; the license to use the know-how
by itself would be covered by the words “consideration paid for acquiring
any know-how”; there was no basis for restricting the plain meaning of the
word “acquiring” in section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c) The applicant had used the technical know-how
so obtained in its business and on plain interpretation of section 35AB of the
Act, it would apply; it did not exclude revenue expenditure from its purview,
as there was no requirement in section 35AB that the same would be available
only if the expenditure was of a capital nature and not if it was revenue in
nature: that wherever the legislature wanted to restrict the benefit in respect
of the deduction claimed of expenditure dependent upon its nature, described in
sections 30 to 36 of the Act, it specifically provided so therein as was in
sections 35A and 35ABB of the Act;

 

(d) In any event, section 37 of the Act excluded
expenditure of a nature described in sections 30 to 36 from the purview of s.
37 of the Act; section 35AB fell within sections 30 to 36 and therefore, no
occasion to apply section 37 of the Act would arise;

 

Relying on the decision of the Court in the case of CIT
vs. Raymond Ltd., 209 Taxman 154 (Bom.)
, the Court held that merely because
the payments were made in instalments for using the technical know-how, it
would not cease to be a lump sum payment where the amount payable was fixed and
not variable more so when the words used in section 35AB were ‘lump sum’
payment and not a one time payment. Therefore, making of lump sum payment in 3
instalments would not make the payment any less a lump sum payment.

 

On the issue of the need to be an owner of know-how, the
assessee reiterated that the word ‘acquiring’ as used in section 35AB would
necessarily mean, acquisition of ownership rights of the technical know-how;
that a mere lease / license, would not amount to acquisition of technical
know-how as per the dictionary meaning of the word “acquisition”. The
Court however held that the dictionary meaning relied upon did not exclude the
cases of obtaining any knowledge or a skill, as was in the case before them or
technical know-how for a limited use. It held that the gaining of knowledge was
complete / acquired by transfer of know-how and the limited use of it would not
detract the same from being included in the scope and meaning of the word
acquisition; that the word “acquisition” as defined in the larger
sense even in the Oxford Dictionary referred to above, would cover the use of
technical knowledge know-how by the applicant assessee which was made available
to it; thus, the restricted meaning of the word ‘acquisition’ to mean ‘only
obtaining rights on ownership’ was not the plain meaning in English language
and obtaining of technical know-how under a license would also amount to
acquiring know-how as the words ‘on ownership basis’ were completely absent in
section 35AB(1) of the Act. The Court held that accepting the contention of the
applicant, would necessarily lead to adding the words ‘by ownership’ after the
word ‘acquiring’ in section 35AB(1) of the Act, which addition was not
permitted while interpreting a fiscal statute.

 

On the main issue of allowability u/s. 37, it was reiterated
that the technical know-how which had been obtained was used in the regular
course of its business of manufacturing batteries and it would necessarily be
in the nature of revenue expenditure, allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance
was placed upon the decisions of Gujarat High Court in DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd. 232
Taxman 129 and DCIT vs. Sayaji Industries Ltd. 82
CCH 412 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers
Ltd. vs. DCIT 376 ITR 487
, to contend that the issue stood concluded in
favour of the company for the reason that while dealing with an identical
situation, the courts in the above referred three cases, have held that section
35AB of the Act would not be applicable where the expenses were of revenue
nature, and the expenditure was deductible u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In contrast, the Revenue reiterated that section 37 of the
Act itself excluded expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36
without any qualification as was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT
vs. Bright Automotives & Plastics Ltd. 273 ITR 59
and the Madras High
Court in CIT vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. 259 ITR 582. That the
courts in those cases had held that the expenditure incurred for acquiring technical
know-how would fall u/s. 35AB of the Act irrespective of the fact that the
expenditure was revenue in nature.

 

On due consideration of the submission of the parties , the
Bombay High Court held as under;

 

  •      The submission that the expenditure in
    question be allowed u/s. 37 could not be accepted for the reason that section
    35AB of the Act itself specifically provided that any expenditure incurred for
    acquiring know-how for the purposes of the assessee’s business be allowed under
    that section; that as detailed in the Explanation thereto the know-how to
    assist in the manufacturing or processing of goods would necessarily mean that
    any expenditure on know-how which was used for the purposes of carrying on
    business would stand covered by section 35AB of the Act.

 

  •      Section 37 of the Act itself excluded
    expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 of the Act without any
    qualification.

 

  •      On examination of sections 30 to 36 to find
    whether any of them restricted the benefit to
    only capital expenditure, it was found that section 35AB of the Act made no
    such exclusion / inclusion on the basis of the nature of expenditure i.e.
    capital or revenue. In fact, wherever the parliament sought to restrict the benefit
    on the basis of nature of expenditure falling u/s. 30 to 36 of the Act, it
    specifically so provided  viz. section
    35A which was introduced  along with
    section 35AB of the Act w.e.f. assessment year 1986-87. In fact, later sections
    35ABA and 35ABB have also provided for deduction thereunder only for a capital
    expenditure .

 

  •      Wherever the Parliament sought to restrict
    the expenditure falling within sections 30 to 36 only to a capital expenditure,
    the same was expressly provided for in the section concerned. To illustrate,
    section 35A and 35ABB of the Act have specifically restricted the benefits
    thereunder only to a capital expenditure.

 

  •      In the above view, submission on behalf of
    the assessee that section 35AB of the Act would apply only to the case of a
    capital expenditure and exclude the revenue expenditure, required adding words
    to s. 35AB which the legislature had specifically not put in; the court could
    not insert words while interpreting the fiscal legislation in the absence of
    any ambiguity in reading of section as it stood; thus, even if technical
    know-how was revenue in nature, yet it would be excluded from the provisions of
    section 37 of the Act.




The Court took note of the fact that Gujarat High Court in Anil
Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s
case (supra) did not agree with the view of the M.P. High Court in Bright
Automotives & Plastics Ltd.’s
case (supra) and of the Madras
High Court in Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s case (supra). It also
noted that the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case
(supra)
did not agree with the view of the Madras High Court in Tamil
Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s
case (supra). Having taken note, it
observed that the basis of all the above referred three decisions was the
subsequent decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd.  301 ITR 284. It further noted that the
above case before the Apex Court arose from the decision of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, wherein it was held
that payments made on account of the royalty would be deductible u/s. 37 and
not u/s 35AB of the Act; that the Apex Court had restored the issue to the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, by way of remand; that the Apex Court directed
that the High Court should first decide whether the expenditure incurred on
royalty would be capital or revenue in nature at the very threshold before
deciding the applicability of section 35AB or 37 of the Act.

 

The Court also observed that the Apex Court, while restoring
the issue, had clearly recorded that it had not expressed any opinion on the
matter and on the question whether the expenditure was revenue or capital in
nature and had instead, depending on the answer to that question, directed the
High Court to decide the applicability of section 35AB, and had kept all
contentions on both sides expressly open.

 

The entire issue, in the opinion of the Bombay High Court,
about whether section 35AB applied only in case of capital expenditure and not
in case of revenue expenditure had not been decided by the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) and was left to be decided by the Punjab
& Haryana High Court on the basis of the fresh submissions to be made by
the respective parties. It was clear to the High Court that the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) had not concluded the issue by holding
that section 35AB would apply only in cases where the expenditure was capital in
nature. Instead the Apex Court had expressed only a tentative view and the
issue itself was left open to be decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on remand.

 

The Bombay High Court importantly held that the reliance by
the Gujarat High Court in Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s case (supra) and by the Karnataka
High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case (supra), on the
Apex Court decision in Swaraj Industries Ltd.’s case (supra), to
hold that an expenditure which was revenue in nature would not fall u/s. 35AB
and would have necessarily to fall u/s. 37 of the Act, was not warranted by the
decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case (supra).
Hence, the Bombay High Court was unable to agree with the decisions of the
Gujarat High Court and the Karnataka High Court, in as much as the Apex Court
had not conclusively decided the issue and left it open for the Punjab &
Haryana High Court to adjudicate upon the said issue.

 

Observations

That the expenditure of revenue nature on acquiring know-how
is eligible for deduction u/s. 37 in full, prior to insertion of section 35AB,
was a position in law that was well settled by several decisions of the courts,
and in particular, the decisions in the cases of Ciba of India Ltd.69 ITR
692(SC), IAEC(Pumps) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR 337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC).
In contrast, the expenditure of
capital nature on know-how was not eligible for deduction u/s. 37, prior to
insertion of section 35AB, in as much as the section itself prohibited
deduction of an expenditure of a capital nature, though in the above referred
cases, the deduction was held to be allowable even where the expenditure
resulted in some enduring benefits.

 

This settled position in law was disturbed by the
introduction of section 35AB. With its introduction, the deduction for all
expenses on know-how, capital or revenue, was governed by the provisions of
section 35AB, was the understanding of the Revenue, a stand that was not
supported by the comments of the leading jurists published in the 9th
edition of the book titled Kanga & Palkhivala’s Law and Practice of
Income tax.
In contrast, tax payers hold that the insertion of section 35
AB had not changed the settled position for deduction in full u/s. 37 of the
Act for an expenditure of revenue nature.

 

Both the views, as noted, are supported by the conflicting
decisions of about six High Courts where some of the decisions are delivered in
favour of the taxpayers on the ground that the issue has already been settled
by the Apex Court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd.(supra) while
recently the Bombay High Court held to the contrary, leading to one more
controversy involving whether the Apex Court really adjudicated the issue for
good or it has left the issue open.

  

It is perhaps not difficult to decide whether the Supreme
court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra), at all concluded the
issue under consideration and if yes, was the conclusion arrived at in favour of
the proposition that the provisions of section 35AB applied only where the
expenditure in question was of capital nature. The Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case had noted, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision, that there was a
considerable amount of confusion whether the AO in the case before him applied
section 35AB at all and whether the said contention regarding applicability of
section 35AB was at all raised. The court had further observed that the order
of the AO was not clear, principally, because the order was focussed only one
point namely, on the nature of expenditure. It further observed that depending
on the answer to the said question, the applicability of section 35AB needed to
be considered; the said question needed to be decided authoritatively by the
High Court as it was an important question of law, particularly, after
insertion of section 35AB. The Court therefore remitted the matter to the High
Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. It also clarified, in
para 7, on the second question, that “we do not wish to express any opinion.
It is for the High Court to decide, after construing the agreement between the
parties, whether the expenditure is revenue or capital in nature and, depending
on the answer to that question, the High Court will have to decide the
applicability of section 35AB of the Income-tax Act. On this aspect we keep all
contentions on both sides expressly open”
. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh
consideration in accordance with law.

 

It seems that the
confusion has arisen out of the following observations of the Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case
, wherein it stated that “At the same time, it is important to note
that even for the applicability of section 35AB, the nature of expenditure is
required to be decided at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to
be revenue in nature, then section 35AB may not apply. However, if it is found
to be capital in nature, then the question of amortisation and spread over, as
contemplated by section 35AB, would certainly come into play. Therefore, in our
view, it would not be correct to say that in this case, interpretation of section
35AB was not in issue.”
These observations, made mainly to emphasise that
the decision of the High Court required to be set aside for further
examination, has been construed differently by the High Courts, some to support
the proposition that section 35AB had no application to an expenditure that was
held to be of revenue nature. In fact, in the said case, when the matter had
reached the High Court, it was dismissed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on an altogether different aspect of section 35AB which is not under
consideration, presently. The High Court in that case had held and observed
that effort of the revenue to bring the expenditure within the domain of
section 35AB was totally misplaced, since the pre-condition for application of
section 35AB was that the payment had to be a lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how and such pre-condition was not satisfied. On that basis,
the High Court had dismissed the appeal. It was this decision of the High Court
which had come up for consideration of the Apex Court . We respectfully submit
that the decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, has
not concluded that a revenue expenditure was outside the scope of section 35AB
. It has instead left this aspect of the issue open for a fresh consideration,
as has been explained by the Bombay High Court in Standard Batteries Ltd.’s
case.
 

Having noted the facts, the issue requires to be analysed on
the basis of;

 

  •     implication of the decisions favouring the
    claim for deduction u/s. 37

 

  •     an understanding of the position prevailing
    prior to insertion of section 35 AB,

 

  •     legislative intent behind introduction of
    section 35AB,

 

  •     whether section 35AB is an enabler or
    disabler,

 

  •     language of section 35AB and its scope , and

 

  •     restriction in section 37 .

 

We very respectfully submit that the decisions favouring the
claim u/s. 37, based simply on the perceived findings of the Apex Court in Swaraj
Machines Ltd.‘s
case, may not hold any force, in view of our considered
opinion that the Apex Court had, in that case, not adjudicated the issue but
had instead set aside the matter and restored the same to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court. If that is so, the decisions of the courts holding that the
deduction for expenses is governed by section 35AB alone become the only
available decisions of the High Courts leaving no controversy on the subject.
The best hope for the taxpayer is to await the decision of the Apex Court on
the subject. The issue till such time remains not concluded but the one on which
no other High Court has decided in favour of the tax payer after examining the
merits of the case.

 

The legal position, prevailing prior to insertion of section
35AB by the Finance Act, 1985, is cleared by the decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that an expenditure, on acquisition of know-how, of revenue nature is
eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act, once it was incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of the business and the expenditure in question
was not of a capital nature or for personal purposes. Ciba of India Ltd.69
ITR 692(SC), IAEC(Pumps ) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR
337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC) to name a few
wherein the deduction u/s 37 was held to be allowable for an expenditure incurred
on technical know-how acquisition even where the expenditure resulted in some
enduring benefit to the payer.

 

The CBDT circular No. 421 dated 12.6.1985, vide paragraphs
15.1 to 15.3
explains the intention behind the insertion of the new
provision in the form of section 35AB which is for providing further
encouragement for indigenous scientific research. The memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 1985 and the Notes thereon have been reiterated
by the circular. They together do not throw any light about the scope of the
new provision, nor about the intention to override the existing understanding,
nor the available decisions on the subject. If that had been the intent, the
same is not expressed by the supporting documents.

 

Ideally from the tax payers angle, the provision of section
35AB should be construed to be an enabling provision that facilitates the
deduction for a capital expenditure hitherto not available before its
introduction and its scope should be restricted to that. Its insertion should
not be taken as a disabling provision leading to a disentitlement not expressly
provided for nor intended. 

Section 35AB in its language does not limit the deduction to
the case of an expenditure that is capital in its nature. It also does not
expressly provide that a revenue expenditure on acquisition of know-how will
fall for deduction only u/s. 35AB. Neither does it provide that such an
expenditure will not qualify for deduction u/s. 35AB and thereby strengthening
the claim for deduction u/s. 37. Useful reference may be made to the provisions
of section 35A and section 35ABA and section 35ABB which specifically apply
only to the cases of capital expenditures.

 

Section 37 grants deduction for any and all types of
expenditures wholly and exclusively for business purposes, other than those
described under sections 30 to 36 of the Act. The true intent and meaning of
the words ‘not being the expenditure described in s.30 to 36’ placed in
s/s. (1) was examined in various cases by the courts over a period of time. It
has been held by the High Courts, including by the full benches of courts, that
section 37 is a residuary provision and can be activated only where it is found
not to be covered by any of the provisions of section 30 to section 36. If it
is covered by any of those provisions, then the deduction cannot be granted
under the residual section 37. It will be so even where the conditions
prescribed under sections 30 to 36 remain to be satisfied. The use of the term ‘described’
as against the terms ‘covered’ or ‘of the nature covered by or
prescribed in
’ is equally intriguing.

 

If the expenditure on know-how does not satisfy the
conditions of the lump sum payment and of the acquisition, then, in that case,
provisions of section 35AB would have no application. The deduction in such
cases would possibly be governed by the provisions of section 37, subject to
the satisfaction of the conditions satisfied therein. This view however is not
free from debate in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph.

 

Obviously, section 35 AB will have no application in cases
where the payment is not lump sum and is periodical or annual or is turnover
based, and the tax payer would be able to stake its claim u/s. 37, provided of
course that the payment is not of the capital nature. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. vs.
CIT, 335ITR 53 (Jhar.).

 

The Apex Court in the case of Drilcos (India) Pvt. Ltd.vs.
CIT, 348 ITR 382
has held that once section 35AB had come into play,
section 37 had no role to play. This decision of the court, delivered
subsequently to Swaraj Machines’ case, may play an important role in
addressing the outcome of the issue on hand. The Apex Court, in Drilcos’
case,
confirmed the decision of the Madras High Court reported in 266
ITR 12
, on an appeal by the company challenging the order of the High
Court. The High Court had held that the provisions of section 35AB encompassed
in its scope the case of a revenue expenditure, following the decision in the
case of Tamil Nadu Chemicals Products Ltd.(supra).

 

While the controversy continues for the past,
the position is now clear with effect from 1.10.1998. A ‘know-how’ is expressly
included in the definition of an intangible asset with effect from 1.10.1998
and is accordingly made eligible for depreciation. Obviously, no depreciation
would be claimed or allowed in respect of a revenue expenditure on know-how,
and with that, such an expenditure, on discontinuation of section 35AB w.e.f
1.04.1998, would be eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

BCAJ SURVEY ON CHALLENGES FACED BY PRACTITIONERS – AUGUST 2018

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick survey of professional
services firms to identify challenges faced by them. Respondents were asked to
rank the challenges faced by them.

 

Attributes of the respondents:

A>   Location and
Presence

        76%
respondents had presence in Metros and about 22% in both Metros and Non Metros.

B>   Size of
Firms

        18%
respondents were proprietors, 34% came from firms having 2-4 partners, 16% from
5-9 partner firms and 32% belonged to firms having more than 10 partners.

C>   Years in
Practice

        Only 5% respondents were in practice for
less than 10 years and another 4% were in practice for more than 10 years but
less than 20 years. Nearly 11% respondents were in practice between 20 to 30
years. Maximum respondents – 80% belonged to practices older than 30 years.

 

Challenges

Out of twelve challenges posed
before the respondents, the biggest challenges were as under:

Ranking

Nature of Challenge

Percentage of Respondents giving this ranking

1

Finding and
Retaining Staff

65%

2

Identifying
and Developing New Service Lines

60%

3

Motivating
Staff

54%

4

Business
Development and Getting New Work

54%

5

New
Regulations and Standards

53%

6

Training and
Enhancing Productivity

46%

7

Fees Pressure
and Pricing of Services

43%

8

Strategic
Focus

43%

9

Coping with
Automation

39%

10

Delivering
High Quality Services

36%

11

Losing clients
to competition

33%

12

Networking
with likeminded professionals

24%

 

 

Additional comments and challenges stated by respondents:

i.    Increasing level of compliance;

ii.   Frequent changes in regulations;

iii.   Skills of new Chartered Accountants are low;

iv.  Cost and Quality mismatch of staff;

v.   Unreasonable expectations of regulators;

vi.  Mid-sized firms becoming training schools for
larger firms;

vii.  Perception, that practice is difficult;

viii. Clients not able to keep up with applicable
changes

View and Counterview

Professional Practice: Is it all about size?

 

Is size the pre dominant criteria
for professional services firms (PSF)? There are niche firms and then there are
those mammoth full service firms. Some focus on the markets that require size,
scale and spread, while many others focus on select clients and hyper focused
personalised services. What are the pros and cons? Is one better than the
other? Is size, distribution and scale greater than niche, personalised and
boutique? 

 

This sixth VIEW and COUNTERVIEW
tells the story from both perspectives. Both writers have been on both the
sides and in practice for decades. They share their perspectives from two
vantage points, so that the reader can get the whole picture.

 

VIEW: It is not all about size!

 

Ketan Dalal
Chartered
Accountant

 

Life is becoming increasingly
complex and it is very difficult to have one view without having a counterview
to any dimension of life, and the subject of this article is no exception.
Whether it is from the perspective of an experienced professional(s) or clients,
it is a very tricky choice! The purpose of this view is to bring out the
critical dimensions of size vs. niche and to discuss the case for niche
practice in certain circumstances.

 

What is Size?

To get a perspective, the global
network revenue of the smallest of the Big 4 entity would be in excess of USD
26.5 bn and the largest would be close to USD 39 bn (i.e. anywhere between Rs.
1,85,000 cr to Rs. 2,70,000 cr). As a global network, all of them employ in
excess of 1,80,000 people going up to 2,65,000 people. That’s size and scale!
As far as India is concerned, all of them in some form or the other would
employ between 8,000 – 15,000 people (excluding employees of global network
deployed in Indian operations, usually a back office); India contributes
anywhere between 1% to 2% percent of the global network revenue. Being a part
of such a global network enables professionals to access global knowledge,
global resources and global practices and also provides potentially significant
opportunities for global growth.

 

The big issue!

A key issue faced by the majority
of small-sized firms is the spectrum of services that it seeks to provide with
relatively limited skills and relatively limited strength. For example,
consider a 30-40 people firm seeking to do audit, tax and consulting work. It
would be very difficult for such a firm to make any meaningful impact in each
service line, since the size of the firm and levels of complexities involved
are unaligned. In fact, even if one looks at tax as a subject, it is an ocean
in itself; the complexity of international tax vis-à-vis domestic tax, the
depth of knowledge required for GST, the developments in the field of transfer
pricing such as CbCR, APA etc., means that each sub-domain itself can
constitute a practice and therefore, even the word ‘tax’ is fairly broad for a
small firm to meaningfully handle. While professional organisations of all
sizes are grappling to tackle the issue of complexity vis-à-vis specialised
skill sets in some form or the other, however, as Indian companies grow in size
and sophistication, the quality of the services and depth of knowledge required
to service them will still demand significant upgradation.

 

If one takes the example of audit,
there is not only statutory audit and internal audit, but there is Information
Technology audit, forensic audit, due diligence and others, and each of these
segments requires very distinct skill sets.

 

Another example beyond the usual
professional practice is consulting- another ocean in itself; there is strategy
consulting, which is very different from operations consulting, whereas
technology consulting and human resource consulting are two different worlds!
Within each are again various dimensions, and clients are now seeking experts
who understand their specific needs, rather than talking to generalists.

 

Significance of sector knowledge

Additionally, and very crucially,
an important aspect is sectoral knowledge. Most sizeable firms have sector
specialist teams. A few important examples where sectoral knowledge is
particularly important are financial services (within which banking, insurance
and private equity are sectors in themselves), infrastructure (where roads,
ports, power and airports are again sectors in themselves), shipping and
logistics (shipping being again different from logistics and logistics, in turn
has different sub-sectors such as CFS, warehousing, third party logistics
etc.), real estate, FMCG and several others. Clients in each such sector often
require professionals to have detailed sectoral knowledge to service them. A
comparison that always comes to my mind when I look at these sectors is
cuisine- a few years back, one used to think of going to a restaurant, but
today one first wants to first think about specific cuisine – is it Oriental,
Continental, etc., and amongst Oriental, is it Chinese or Japanese and so on…

 

The bottom line is that
specialisation, in terms of both domain and sector, is extremely important and,
to some extent inevitable, in client servicing. To put it in perspective,
knowledge needs to be deeper as opposed to being broader, although this
approach itself has its own challenges – for the professional, for the client
and also the organisation.

 

Need for Niche!

Necessity is the mother of
invention! This statement cannot ring more truer for a niche/boutique firm
where the need for a niche is an outcome of the need to tackle the challenges
mentioned above, particularly the need for deeper skill sets and more
integrated thinking, as well as more senior level attention. Incidentally,
there is no clear definition of a niche/ boutique firm, nor there are specific
attributes to define a boutique firm, but they are obviously small in size and
typically operate in specific domains or sectors and offer specialised
services; for example, management consultancy, litigation support, transaction
support or valuation. Incidentally, the fact that, very often, a boutique firm
is established by a professional with a proven track record is a very
comforting factor for the client as well as potential employees.

 

One key issue in the context of a
niche/ boutique firm is that there may be a niche in the market, but is there a
market in the niche? To elaborate, there may be a niche for a practice, dealing
with say, co-operative societies, but from a revenue perspective, it may be
difficult to say that there is a market in the niche!

 

The philosophy of a boutique firm
is a critical aspect. Elements like the area of service, kind of work, types of
clients, people etc., are important facets of firm philosophy. For example,
whether to service comparatively smaller assignments or to service a few large
assignments is a matter of firms’ philosophy.

 

Let me elaborate some situations
where a boutique firm could be a more compelling proposition. 

 

  •    In the M&A structuring
    space, the complexity of tax issues and their interconnect with regulations
    (such as Companies Act, SEBI regulations, RBI regulations, stamp duty
    regulations etc.) very often makes a boutique M&A firm a very good choice
    from a client stand point. 

 

  •    Another example is that of
    litigation where going to a boutique firm or a counsel (as opposed to a large
    firm) will usually be far more advisable, especially due to focus and the
    relevant vast experience of different matters, their ability to present matters
    in a manner that makes arguments more compelling and their sheer familiarity
    with the eco system; in this situation, of course, the dearth of such boutique
    firms and counsels is a major
    limiting factor.

 

  •    Valuation, such as
    required for mergers and acquisition, where a boutique firm with valuation
    expertise could be a good choice; larger firms often tend to take much longer,
    the cost is usually higher and the caveats in the valuation report can
    sometimes create confusion and be difficult to explain to stakeholders who may
    perceive these caveats to be virtually disclaimers.

 

  •    Forensic audit, especially
    if needed by a smaller organisation, where a boutique firm could give more
    personalise attention and perhaps do the work at much lower cost.

 

  •    Internal audit: a boutique
    firm with internal audit expertise, especially where there is direct partner
    involvement at a much intense level can often be very valuable.

 

In some of the examples mentioned
above, such as that of M&A restructuring, tax litigation or valuation, the
boutique firm can possibly be even a 10-20 people firm or even smaller, but in
situations like, say, internal audit where client size is not very large (say
up to 300 cr to 400 cr), a small-sized internal audit boutique firm could often
do a good job. Obviously, this assessment has to be done by the client, but as
a general proposition, in most examples given above, a boutique firm can serve
the purpose better from a client standpoint.

 

Niche practice – the client dimension

Usually, big organisations with a
global network are better placed to service MNCs. In fact, with most large MNCs
already in India and a large number of smaller MNCs having entered into India,
often a need for boutique firms is faced by smaller companies, which may not be
MNCs in the true sense. In a sense, smaller MNCs or smaller foreign companies,
may find that, in the Indian context, a boutique Indian firm is easier to deal
with, provided it has the relevant expertise. A good example is that of regular
tax work where smaller foreign companies find that boutique firms can give them
more attention and very often, would be less expensive; another advantage is
quicker turnaround time and more customised advice.

 

A similar situation from a client
standpoint is that of a domestic client which can be again divided between the
very large ones (say top line of Rs. 10,000 cr and above), the large ones (say
Rs. 5,000 cr to Rs. 10,000 cr) and those below Rs. 5,000 cr. In the last
category, there could also be sub-segments and without going into needless
details, the point is that in the 3rd category (and very often, even
in the 2nd category), there is a significant need felt by Indian
clients for attention from senior advisors and that is where boutique firms can
play an important part; this is especially so where relatively small teams are
required to work on client matters, as opposed to the need of a large team
(examples have already been given above in terms of M&A structure,
valuations, forensic audits etc).  One
additional dimension is that Indian companies are often promoter driven and
they feel more comfortable dealing with a boutique firm where they are directly
talking to, and being serviced by, the founder(s) of that firm and where there
may be existing relations or easier to build relationships.

 

An important concern for any client
is confidentiality. For example, in assignments involving family arrangement or
succession planning, even with non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in place, the
potential exposure levels in a big organisation can be high, as such data/
information can be (and often is) accessed by multiple people for a variety of
internal reasons. This is again a reason why clients may choose to explore
retaining a boutique firm.

 

As such, as would be seen above,
there are several aspects of a professional service practice which necessitate
deeper expertise, more integrated thinking and personal attention; the ‘silo’
ecosystem of large firms often creates a challenge, in terms of integrated
advice, coordination and turnaround time.

 

Niche practice – the people dimension

From the perspective of
professionals who are evaluating between a boutique firm vis-à-vis a big
organisation, there are several aspects to be considered. A boutique firm often
offers an opportunity to work directly with a ‘grey-haired professional’, a
rare possibility while working in a big organisation. A niche/ boutique firm
provides a professional an integrated learning experience, more client facing
exposure, and importantly, understanding the approach and thought process of a
senior professional. As such, it offers young professionals a platform to defy
the “boxed thinking” approach and innovate. Yet another important dimension is
the fact that large organisations have stringent processes for client acceptances
and formalising assignments, and rightly so from their perspective; however, it
does reduce the time available for actual client work and therefore, learning
opportunity (alternatively, it lengthens the hours of work significantly!).
Needless to say, a key consideration would be the financial and non-financial
benefits which needs to be weighed while making the choice. Thus, depending
upon the above aspects of career trajectory that a professional is looking for,
the choice should be evaluated!

 

Concluding Thoughts

There are often two (if not more)
perspectives to everything possible and the above discussion, as I mentioned
earlier, is clearly not an exception! Having said that, a particular view
cannot be viewed in isolation; there needs to be a relative comparison between
the two viewpoints to come to any conclusion. What one should really evaluate
is how much of one outweighs the other in a ‘relative’ sense.

 

Clearly (as this view has
presumably brought out), there are several services needed by the business
community where niche/ boutique firms not only have an important role to play,
but indeed could be preferred over a big organisation.

 

counterVIEW: Full Service firms can deliver holistic solutions


Milind Kothari 

Chartered
Accountant



When the Accounting profession was
formalised by the ICAI Act, 1949, the expectations from Chartered Accountants
were largely centered around providing Audit or Accounting service. Also, with
the Income Tax Act nearing completion of 100 years, providing tax service also
has been a mainstay for our professional community. Back then, these services
were largely availed by individuals and small businesses.

 

In the past 25 years, India’s
economy has taken a definitive shape, more than any other time in its history;
the influx of MNCs post-liberalisation in 1990’s to win a slice of large
domestic market, becoming the services hub of the world, thanks to the
domination of Indian IT companies, shared service centers (‘SSC’) being set up
by large global corporations and so on. This has catapulted Indian economy to
bring it in the reckoning to become the 5th largest economy in the
world.

 

The global economy itself has
transformed rapidly with the epicenter shifting to internet-driven business
models and new businesses being created with supply-chain modeled on creating a
borderless world. While there has been a recent push-back to globalisation in
many countries reeling under staggering challenge of refugee-crisis, the
businesses seem unmindful of this rethink and it appears that globally
delivered business models are here to stay. There has been no better time in
the history to set up a global business in the shortest possible time than
today. 

 

Most business groups are globally
focused, technology dependent and most likely, confronting overdose of
introduction of new tax laws and regulations. The list of new regulations being
introduced at a rapid pace is quite extraordinary as the Government and
Regulators are also trying to cope with the change unleashed by technology. The
process of disruption has been quite severe on economies and companies that
were unwilling or could not embrace change. On the other hand, people loose
jobs as companies that provided jobs shut down or they are unable to reskill
themselves. The word ‘disruption’ has suddenly acquired a cult-status.

 

So why is the history and the
present state of economy relevant to Chartered Accountants? Needless to mention
but Chartered Accountants are required to follow the trend of the business to
remain relevant.

 

In the present scenario, the
expectations from our professionals have increased multi-fold. We need to
provide answers to all the questions that would arise from parallel play of
multiple tax laws, regulations and changes in the accounting standards, while
mindful of the business challenges of clients. We also need to understand the
new laws and regulations that emerge around ‘data’ (considered as the new
‘oil’). However, in reality, an average professional finds it hard to cope with
significant change sweeping our profession; new Indian accounting standards,
introduction to GST, insolvency and bankruptcy reforms, industry regulations
such as RERA, data privacy laws and the list goes on. Then again demand of our
clients for forensic services, cyber security solutions and tech-driven
services such as data analytics, big data, predictive analysis, data mining, is
unending. We need to realise that there is no finishing line for technological
progress.

 

In this rapidly changing world, how
are Chartered Accountants going to keep pace with change and remain relevant?
Will the conventional service model of Audit and Tax see us through for the
next several decades? Let’s deep-dive and assess the situation on the ground as
well as peek into the future that would unfold for us. Also, before we
recommend a professional to join a large professional services firm or pursue a
niche as two clear career options within the profession-fold, it would be good
to understand the DNA of both these options.

 

Like in business, the past few
decades have seen flourishing of large accounting firms globally. The large
professional services organisation working as a team, provide all answers to a
client through deep expertise and support the client across the globe. A
one-stop shop for all the needs! To get this right, they invest in top talent
(relatively easy to get as they pay well), use technology extensively, build
world-class infrastructure and are connected globally through their partner
firms in nearly every country. They are well-placed to cope with change as
their ability to adopt to new demands of services by clients is extraordinary
and therefore, also less at risk for becoming redundant. These firms are
thriving and getting bigger as their clients are getting richer and more
complex and need myriad of services.

 

On the other hand, professionals
with niche expertise deliver well for a small part of a large puzzle but are
unable to provide a holistic solution across varied demands of clients. Again,
like in business, the small and boutique firms are getting squeezed out of the
profession as they are unable to sustain the momentous challenges that they
face on nearly every front. Inability to attract top corporates as clients,
retaining existing client-base (audit rotation has played havoc with mid-sized
Indian accounting firms), coping with technology, fight a losing battle to
retain talent, inability to invest to remain relevant and most importantly,
coping with the constantly evolving landscape of professional opportunity with
ever-changing legal and regulatory framework; the list of woes is unending and
growing.

 

In the recent past, one has
witnessed several top-class professionals who were independent for most part of
their career and achieved excellence, only succumbing to join the large
accounting firms. While the demand from clients for service is becoming
complex, such professionals realise that it is impossible to provide a
well-rounded service across several laws and regulations more so, when they are
unable to retain talent. For traditional tax practice, competition is coming
from different directions; in-house tax teams, management consultancies,
software developers, the business information providers are all increasingly
interested in conducting tax work. The biggest challenge is coming from
technology service providers who are first of the block as Government introduce
digitisation like in the case of GST.

 

Over time, a niche service
provider, at best, becomes a trusted advisor to the promoter but not to the
company he has promoted. Individuals with niche are much more at risk as
changes in law hit them hardest for them to reinvent their expertise. The
recent phase-out of all indirect law with GST is the classic example. Their
ability to reskill themselves remains limited and their years of building expertise
on a subject suddenly becomes redundant because of change in law or technology
taking over.

 

In a very subject relevant
publication, ‘The Future of the Professions’ the authors, Richard and Daniel
Susskind examine how technology will transform the work of human experts. The
authors observe that for centuries, much professional work was handled in the
manner of a craft, individual experts and specialists – people who know more
than others and offered essentially bespoke services. Their research strongly suggests
that bespoke professional work in this vein looks set to fade from prominence.
They observe that for a long time, professionals found it important to have all
sorts of information at their fingertips; in books, technical papers and case
files. But they say that a different need is arising and this is for the
professionals to have mastery over massive bodies of data that bear on their
disciplines with the help of many technology tools. As the boundaries of the
professions blur and service becomes more focused on meeting client’s overall
needs, it is probable that multi-disciplinary practices will be formed and
re-establish themselves as commercially viable. In the book, the authors have
given considerable insight into the current and future state of audit and the
tax profession.

 

Lastly, the key question remains,
is it about me or about us? Niche practices have always been about ‘me’ and
therefore die with the professional at the helm, whereas the large accounting
firms is about ‘us’; they survive the founder and become an institution. It
consistently fulfills demands for jobs for well-qualified and smart
professionals. They also fulfill a social responsibility for a nation that is
so starved of jobs for the millennials.

 

The
rules of the games are changing. It is not about the sheer brilliance of an
individual like in a game of chess (remember Gary Kasparov losing to the Big
Blue in the late 90’s), but how we perform as a team like in football. The new
superstars that world recognises are footballers!

HR MANTRA FOR MID-SIZED FIRMS: ATTRACT – ENGAGE – GROW

There is no other resource like human resource. As clichéd as it might sound, it is true. It is the people of the business that make it work. Be it a multi-national, a SME or just a mom & pop shop at the corner of the street; it is an accepted fact that, the better the people running the business are, the higher the chances of it being more successful.

Here’s another fact: finding good talent is hard but retaining it is even harder.

This conundrum is faced by many businesses. While singling out one specific industry is unfair, this is majorly witnessed by businesses engaged in the service sector, and that is where all professional services belong; not just chartered accountancy firms. Rather, the need, concern and effectiveness of a talented pool of human resources for a chartered accounting firm becomes even more critical considering the responsibility, statutory obligations and the positioning that this profession carries.

In the current era, significant changes are observed in the manner and behaviour of chartered accounting firms while dealing with their employees. The sole objective is not just to retain them, but ensuring that the firm stays attractive enough to bring new talent on board. This issue to some extent may be diluted for firms with a brand name or muscle power, though let me assure you that these are the firms that not only have the highest spends but also the maximum attention by bringing in best global practices. But the question is, can we say the same for a mid-sized chartered accounting firm? Probably not. All the firms want to put together the most effective and efficient team possible, to support their clients. Thus, the issue of talent retention remains universal.

MOVING WITH THE TIMES

I read somewhere that “Agile isn’t just for tech anymore.” And how true is that! There was a time when students used to go from firm to firm applying for articleship, with a hope that they would get selected. However, the paradigm that applies to the service sector also applies to chartered accounting firms. These days, it is the firm that needs to be ‘interesting’ enough for the students to even apply for an articleship. The onus to showcase how good a firm is, lies with the HR of that firm, who goes with a marketing pitch to these students who are years away from being Chartered Accountants. And, it is the students who make a choice. This is a perfect example of changing times.

With the changing landscape of chartered accounting firms and an ever-raising bar of clients’ expectations; mid-sized chartered accounting firms have no option but to let go of the inertia related to people processes, which has been the practice so far. So, the agility of the firm and ability to bring this change is crucial. But isn’t it true that anything crucial is never easy? As the saying goes, “It’s easier said than done”. Now, let’s see how mid-sized firms can do it, rather achieve it.

In this article, I have attempted to cover the following three core aspects of HR that mid-sized chartered accounting firms should focus on. I have also elaborated how with limited means this can best be achieved.

1. Talent Management – which includes talent attraction as well as retention.

2. Team Efficiency – also means growth and sustainability of the team, which includes:

  • Performance Management Systems
  • Reward Mechanism
  • Mid-Career Crises

3. Aspects that help to build Firm Culture:

  • Work environment where performance is recognised
  • Standardisation through HR processes
  • Fun element to make the work place exciting

But before we go to the core, here are a few thoughts: does the firm have a vision which is translated into common objectives? Is the team aligned with these objectives? And what is the approach?

DRAWING A GAME PLAN

If you don’t know where you’re going, then you’ll never get there… and if you don’t set the bar high enough, you’ll never live up to your potential.

It is essential for every firm to have a goal, which is well understood by every stakeholder in the firm. Some organisations call it ‘target’, some call it ‘objectives’, whereas some call it ‘areas of focus’. It is absolutely necessary to have this direction. Very often, firms get so engrossed in the execution mode that they are unable to take a pause and decide what they want to achieve collectively as a firm, throughout the year. The existence of a goal helps to channelise the firm’s energies in the right direction. Merely having a goal is not enough, continuous focus towards achieving it can only enable in channelising the firm’s energy. When firms know what they want to achieve, it becomes easier to align people and processes.

Having identified the firm’s goal, an important area is organisational structure – a backbone of any firm, irrespective of size, but it is often neglected in mid-sized firms. Creation of an organisational structure brings in significant clarity in many ways: the hierarchy, reporting lines, a span of control at each level, career path, etc. Unless there is an organisational structure, it is difficult to map the firm-wide talent need. Talent need encompasses the number of people, their experience level, required skill set, areas of expertise. Due to a lack of focus on HR functions, organisational structure is either absent or completely skewed. Though my experience tells me that, in some cases an informal organisational structure gets created. While it may achieve the results to some extent, it fails to optimise the full potential of the firm and its employees.

The existence of an organisational structure will help in identifying and eliminating excess bench strength and thereby optimising payroll cost and rationalising the operational cost.

Organisational structure will vary firm to firm, depending on the business model, expertise and skill level, delegation of responsibilities and of course, focused practice areas.

Setting up a goal supported by organisational structure helps in outlining clear roles and responsibilities at a firm level. And, it is needed. Even the junior most team member likes to know what is expected out of him/her, how the contribution will be measured, and what is the growth path. Role clarity further helps to bring accountability within the team.

ATTRACTING TALENT

Once you have the basics clear, you know what you are looking for. However, does it mean that the person on the opposite side of the table is also looking for the same thing? Chances are, that both of you might not be on the same page.

When you ask any aspirant, where he/she wants to work, the answer invariably is; at a good firm. For most, that ‘good firm’ is always at the top of the hierarchy. While this is always a matter of opinion, there is something ‘special’ about every firm and more so about a mid-sized CA firm. Let me add, if you believe that there is nothing ‘special’, it is essential that you work towards creating that element which makes your firm ‘special’. This ‘special’ element will enable your firm to attract talent.

How do you send this message across?

Creating a brand value is a crucial aspect while looking to hire for your firm. If your prospective candidate does not know what your firm does, how will you convince him/her to join you?

Talk about your brand value; you need to position your firm well while you are in the process of hiring new talent for your firm. How do you do that? Always remember that your brand needs are to be projected a cut above the rest. There are a few aspects that you have, which many other firms may not. While talking to your prospective candidates, why not highlight those aspects that would make them want to consider your firm? Illustrative constitution of the firm, niche created by the firm, nature of clientele, geographic spread, work policies, technical knowledge and expertise, etc.

While you may not be able to use the conventional ways of talking about your firm, you can certainly use the new age methods. Social media presence is one of the best ways to create your firm’s brand value that can help you find your spot in the mix of things.

Addition of a special column reflecting the work culture or work concept in regular newsletters or publications issued by the firm has also proved to be an effective medium to attract candidates.

Participating in knowledge sessions, lecture series or conducting seminars at various forums has traditionally been and still continues to be a tool to demonstrate to the candidate, a perspective of your firm. Recent times demand continued networking by the firm with these institutions. This in turn gives the candidate a better chance to know your firm and its culture. At the same time, expanding the options of prospective candidates of the firm.

Beyond the above, one may optimise all other channels while hiring including; internal referrals, campus recruitment, job portals/posts, internal transfers instead of losing talent, etc. Last but not the least, headhunting is always an option available and should be effectively used to fill senior level or unique positions.

PERFORMANCE, GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY

In this ultra-competitive job market, it is tough to find the right talent that fits the bill. Therefore, when you find one, retain. Just as you have managed to get the attention of the person you are looking for, you also need to make sure that the person stays with the firm and grows.

The new generation employees demand clarity in many ways including; process, career path, performance measures and rewards. This is where the annual goal setting, organisational structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities play a crucial role. Employees usually feel more engaged when they believe that the firm is concerned about their growth and provides avenues to reach individual career goals while fulfilling the firm’s objectives.

One of the most effective ways of achieving this is to have a robust Performance Management Process aligned with the firm’s goals and values. In recent times, the purpose of this process has expanded to not just determining annual increment, but acting as a source of mentoring and guidance for professional enhancement. No mentoring process can be a one-time affair, so the practice of annual performance review is fading away. E.g. when an employee works on multiple assignments throughout the year, performance feedback given once a year loses significance because most often such feedback tends to be based on recent experiences. On the other hand, a regular performance dialogue vis-à-vis performance measures is an apt, more constructive and meaningful process for the professional development of the employee. Such performance dialogues can be held on completion of each assignment or on a periodic basis. Whatever may be the periodicity, it is vital that such discussions are formally recorded for future reference and comparative analysis.

The traditional process of partner and manager giving feedback to an individual, helps the individual grow professionally. Similarly, for the firm to understand team expectations and to realign to the changing trends, upward feedback can be a great tool. This is generally best achieved when tried anonymously.

The next most important aspect is the reward mechanism, both extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic rewards are; salary and career progression and intrinsic rewards are; satisfaction and pride. A reward mechanism is a beautiful way of recognising performers in the system. In addition to fixed salary, a firm can always adopt a structure where a part of the pay-out is linked with the firm achieving its objectives, as well as individual performance.

While designing performance measures:

The performance linked pay-out will drive the team to achieve the firm’s goals and objectives, and at the same time, will motivate performers.

The planning, organisational structure, role and responsibilities and regular performance feedbacks will collectively support in having a fair reward system in place and will help in deciding the firm’s compensation philosophy. The overarching requirement while determining the reward mechanism is to stay in tune with market dynamics. Know what your competitors are offering; there are enough data points and ways to engage in compensation benchmarking.

DEALING WITH MID-CAREER CRISIS

Have you observed the enthusiasm and excitement with which a new employee enters the office on his/her first day? Have you also observed whether the same level of enthusiasm and excitement continues? As days went by, has this enthusiasm and excitement withered away? Do not take it personally. It is not that the firm has stopped offering the same environment as before. But because the firm has failed to enhance the environment, or let’s say that the employee’s expectations have increased or changed. This is a common phenomenon.

Most employees always want something new in their line of work. While they execute the same kind of roles and responsibilities, day after day, there comes a point when they become listless, and well, somewhat tired. This is not entirely the fault of the firm. Lets just call it “Mid-Career Crisis”.

One of the challenges mid-sized firms face is developing a career path for the employees who have progressed in the profession, but have reached a glass ceiling where they start feeling stagnated. Firms can help employees to explore new skills, new geographies, new roles, and can also offer job rotation.

Have you thought of mentoring mid-level employees to become future mentors – it helps in two ways; keeping long-term employees engaged with the firm, and instilling the work culture of the firm in newer employees.

HAVING A RETENTION PLAN

In the absence of a proper retention plan, keeping the talent within the firm is a difficult task. Planning, growth, performance management, and the compensation policy; are all a part of retention strategies, but is that all? There is more to it. If this has got you thinking about the people in your firm who are already looking like they are ready to jump the ship, there are a few things you can do:

  • Recognition: Everyone wants to be recognised for a job well done. All that it takes is a few internal announcements. Recognising your employees’ efforts go a long way into keeping them happy and motivated. This gives them a sense of belonging, knowing that someone is there to appreciate their work. It makes them feel more accountable towards their job, and they make extra effort.
  • Reward: Not all rewards need to be monetary. There are other ways to reward your hard-working employees with unusual and exciting things, e.g. movie tickets for the employee and family. Sometimes, small things make a huge difference for them. Your people appreciate when they know that they are cared.
  • Standardisation and policies: Adopting a standard yardstick when dealing with people related situations, creates an unbiased environment and will earn respect from the employees. It is always a good practice to have an Employee HR Manual which states the firm’s guidelines, which simply put, are accepted behavioural norms within the firm.
  • First impression: First few days can be crucial for any new employee. A new employee begins to form an impression of the firm, and sometimes it influences the decision to stay with the firm in the long term. Create an impeccable onboarding experience. Have a well-designed induction and orientation program which not only talks about the firm pedigree and processes, but also sets clear expectations for a new joinee. Everyone wants to be part of a professional firm, and this is where it all starts.
  • Fun quotient at work: All work and no play make Jack a dull boy. Fun quotient can be built in by having a structured calendar of team bonding activities and informal events throughout the year. Not necessarily an elaborate one. But believe it or not, the team that laughs together and has fun together is more likely to stick together. Because of the high emotional quotient, they treat the firm as family and the sense of belonging is high.

Clients being a source of revenue are important, and firms always ensure to make them feel that they are taken care of. The same applies to employees as well, since the absence of good employees will fail the effort to make clients feel important. Thus, a little bit of effort goes a long way and this can be seen not only in the work ethics but also the attitude of the employees.

EXIT DOES NOT MEAN THE END

If there is a beginning to every story, there is bound to be an end. For some, the end is retirement. In the current era, it is a complete rarity. These days, end arises through resignations. Not all resignations need to be sad or bad. In fact, the manner in which a firm handles these ends, goes a long way in enhancing the respect and repute thereof.

Each individual has his/her own aspirations and a quest to move ahead in life. For some, they find that in the same organisation, whereas, for some it may mean that the “grass is greener on the other side”, so they move to a new organisation. This situation is bound to arise no matter what the size of a chartered accounting firm is. Sometimes, even though there is no push factor, there is always a strong pull factor and individuals are lured to explore.

While you would be losing on a good resource, it does not mean that it is the end of a good relationship.

The exit process plays a very crucial role for mid-sized chartered accounting firms. There has to be a robust system in place so that the exit of an employee is a smooth transition. Have a feedback mechanism since an employee on the verge of exiting is more likely to give honest and open feedback, which will help in making improvements, for the betterment of the firm.

If the individual is leaving for growth, this is your chance to help the person bloom, so that he/she becomes a brand ambassador for the firm. It is a small world. Chances are that you will run into this employee somewhere at some point in time. Always keep your door open so that he/she feels comfortable enough to approach you in time of need. Don’t let emotions overpower you and do it more gracefully.

In this dynamic world, for businesses and especially those engaged in the service sector, the new mantra is to shift the focus from client management to resource management, because only the availability of resources as and when required, will enable you to cater to those clients. Adding to this, let me quote Sir Richard Branson who said “Clients do not come first. Employees come first. If you take care of your employees, they will take care of the clients.”

STRATEGY AND ROLE OF PARTNERS IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS

Strategy for a professional service firm is all about making
informed choices. It is fundamentally also about saying “No” to projects or
engagements or decisions that are not in alignment with the firm, as much as it
is about asking deep questions about the practice and the way we run it.

Every professional service firm needs to think about
strategy. This would mean having clarity about where is the firm headed, what
is the “business plan” of the firm, how will the firm think about its clients
and service areas, how will the firm embrace technology, respond to changing
economic and business environment, and keep itself relevant in today’s times.

This article is an attempt to provide a road map to develop a
strategic thought process in that direction.

 

Critical questions that the firm’s
partners need to address are:

1.  Have partners and leaders of professional
service firms built the growth blocks (“blocks”) that are necessary to ensure
sustained growth? Some of these vital blocks are:

  •    Firm’s vision and mission
  •    Strategy to grow and sustain
  •    Team to lead and execute
  •     Knowledge and expertise
  •     Client centricity
  •     Challenges to address
  •     Risks to mitigate
  •     Markets, technology and other functions

And are these blocks being reviewed on a consistent basis?
Are they aligned for growth? Are they aligned to the partners’ vision? Are the
partners aligned to these blocks?

2.  To
grow as a firm and to keep it in continuous alignment, strategic choices made
by the partners on various aspects of practice need to be given the highest
priority.

Partners and professional services firms have the fundamental
responsibility of producing and managing. The long-standing dichotomy of the
“Producer Manager” needs to be settled in a manner that is relative to the
firm’s size, stature and evolution in its growth cycle. A small- sized firm
can aspire to become a mid-sized firm and a mid-sized firm can aspire to become
a large firm only if there is a high level of focus on allowing producing
partners to produce and leaving the managing part to those best equipped to
manage.
A producing partner over time cannot be expected to be managing the
firm on
all aspects, as both the functions need dedicated time and focus.

3. Specific partners will invariably
have to focus on the managerial functions: client relationships, people
management, marketing, and functional roles such as accounting, compliances, administration,
compliance and alike.This in other words presupposes that partners will have to
take out time to perform management function. But this seldom happens. As a
result, output suffers and so does growth curve of the firm. For decades now,
firms have been suffering from this dichotomy, popularly knownas the “Producer
Manager Dilemma
”. For a mid-sized firm to grow, it is very important that
partners decide on their respective functional and technical roles such that
there is no overlapping of the functions and also there is high degree of
harmony, synergy and efficiency in the roles performed.

4.  There
could be instances where there is duality in certain roles requiring more than
one partner to partake in decision making.

Example: The firm’s management may recommend two or
three partners to constitute a Compensation Committee, which is entrusted with
the task of deciding on remuneration/bonus to partners, firm wide cost cutting
initiatives, cost of inflation factored determination of increments, HR
performance evaluation and the likes.

5.  Then
there are times when people decisions need to be taken such as which campuses
to be selected for potential young talent recruits, pre-qualifications, minimum
standard for all new recruitments, written and verbal tests during hiring
process, background checks and proliferation of ideas and thoughts. As one can
decipher from the above, there is a high degree of correlation between strategy
and partners’ contribution to the firm’s managerial functions.

6.  Having
a strategic mindset is not an option. It is critical for partners of
professional service firms to think about the firm and practice areas
constantly, to develop a sense of expertise and a visible perspective
difference in the market place. People retain professionals for the value they
seem to generate from time to time. It is this edge that makes professionals
stand out from amongst their peers. This is seldom looked at as a strategic
asset as it is never widely understood.

7. The Differentiated Firm:

A differentiated firm thinks about strategy in the following
segments:

a)  Growth
strategy

b)  Markets
strategy

c)  People
strategy

d)  Operations
strategy

e)  Finance
strategy

f)   Functional
strategy

Let’s discuss each of these and what its implications are on
the growth and evolution of a firm:

a.  Growth

Partners have a fundamental obligation to think about how
should their practice lines individually grow. What is the business plan for
their service line? How should they think about newer ways of improving the
execution, improving efficiencies, and providing a more qualitative product and
output each time. Being process driven is no longer an option; it’s a basic
requirement. Growth comes to practice areas which are led by partners who make
time to think about strategies to compete, strategies to develop a
differentiated product, strategies to develop a sound understanding of what the
client expects in terms of value, and finally a strategy to deliver that
value.The end goal is that the firm should collectively grow, if that practice
area grows.

Strategies to develop a differentiated product include
thinking about and developing a completely new solution to “problem solve” an
existing set of challenges.

Example: Data analytics tool: Can the auditor provide
a data analytics service to a client by using technology? If you can tell an
eCommerce company promoter that he is losing repeat customers because of, say,
quality of finishing of product, sub-optimal service experience or delivery
issues, the company will consider this as a priceless piece of input. And they
will be willing to pay for it. That’s where the audit world may need to focus
some of its energies on, going forward.

So what are the ways to think about strategy? One of the best
ways to do so is to ask specific questions related to the service line and then
the firm needs to develop its responses by way of partners coming together,
providing their inputs and working for a common purpose.

Some of these questions are:

  •     What is the market for the service line in
    terms of total revenues?
  •     What is our current market share?
  •     What can we reasonably aim at achieving, if
    the firm were to provide all the underlying infrastructure, people, tools and
    technology?
  •     To achieve the budgeted revenues, do we have
    an adequate team?
  •     Do we provide adequate resources and
    infrastructure to our teams to perform?
  •     Are our teams armed with the tools they need
    to perform their professional obligations – example: do they have access to
    online research libraries, databases, books, periodicals, journals, knowledge networks,
    knowledge sharing societies/groups/clubs? Do we measure them on such access and
    their proficiency?
  •     What is the firm’s policy with respect to
    using the existing clientele base for cross-selling the firm’s other service
    offerings? How is the value proposition made known to clients? Are these
    included in KPIs of the firm’s partners and senior managers?
  •     How is respective service line growth
    evaluated? For instance, it may not be appropriate to conclude that a 40% YoY
    growth in advisory services is a greater success than a 25% YoY growth in audit
    services.What are the contours of this growth – recurring vs. non-recurring,
    quality of the deliverable, the relationship being developed etc.
  •     Has the firm developed a framework for
    evaluating which service lines (either existing or completely new) will
    shape the firm’s growth trajectory? Does this framework consider the firm’s
    existing capabilities as well as the capabilities capable of being developed
    inorganically? What is the periodicity of such an evaluation?
  •     How does the firm identify trigger-events
    which can have long-term implications on a firm’s growth trajectory?
  •     How often is ‘growth’ discussed in partner
    meetings?

Responses to the above questions
will lead to a strategy to grow the practice. The form and shape of such a
strategy is not as relevant as its substance and the process used to arrive at
the conclusions. Thereafter, what is left is periodic monitoring and course
correction.


b.  Markets

The questions below have to be thought through within the
contours of code of ethics of the regulating body of the profession, the ICAI.
The idea here was to merely bring out that marketing of professional services
is more about projecting the capabilities to the right audiences, while
following the code of ethics and code of conduct prescribed by ICAI in form and
spirit. With this context, here are some questions to think through:

  •     Does the firm have a ‘curated profile’ which
    summarises its offerings?
  •     What is the firm best at? Why should a
    client work with you?
  •     What is the firm’s unique differentiator? Be
    it in product, quality, service, reliability, timeliness/responsiveness or
    similar.
  •     Does the firm have a focused ‘meeting/events
    calendar’which portrays the networking events the partners can participate in?
    How are the partners nominated to attend such events, in a way that costs are
    within budget and the best possible impact is envisaged?
  •     How are the follow-ups conducted post networking
    sessions? Are the leads profiled? Are meetings sought and held?
  •     Does the firm publish thought-leadership
    articles? Do the partners participate as speakers in relevant events? How is
    the firm’s expertise depicted outside the four walls of the firm?
  •     How does the firm sustain, manage and
    improve client relationships? Is there a documented process which is adhered to
    in this regard?
  •     Has the firm evaluated the need for a CRM
    software to better cater to its needs?
  •     How are the efforts and the outcome
    measured?
  •     Does the firm have an internal process in
    place which ensures that the firm does not violate the applicable regulations,
    ethical guidelines or the relevant pronouncements of the regulatory bodies, in
    its marketing endeavours?

 

Marketing professional services is not an easy thing to do.
It needs conviction, confidence and a strategy. The questions above should get
you started. Firms should keep refining their marketing strategy based on the
outcome and the measurement of the efforts.


c.  People

To attract the best people and thereafter to retain them to
ensure that they grow is yet another fundamental responsibility of the
partners. And strategy to provide a career roadmap is again a critical aspect
that partners need to align themselves to, such that the key performers are
retained.

  •     How involved are the partners in the
    recruitment drives?
  •     Do the partners give sufficient freedom to
    the managers to interview and hire candidates? Remember, the managers have to deal
    with the new recruits more than the partner group, and by extension, the
    managers deserve a say in the decision of whom to recruit and whom not to.
  •     How are the interview technical tests
    determined? Are these tests closely in sync with the job-description?
  •     How does the firm ensure cross-team
    interaction?
  •     Does the firm have an in-house
    bulletin/intranet which ensures that the communication flow within the firm
    isn’t hindered? Such initiatives ensure that the employees are closely knit.
  •     Is the process of compensation – especially,
    bonus and incentives, transparent and not arbitrary? Does an employee know
    beforehand how his bonus would be determined?
  •     How are the team-bonding exercises
    undertaken? What is the frequency of these exercises?
  •     Is there an anonymous grievance portal
    operating within the firm?
  •     Is the career roadmap customised for every
    employee?
  •     Do the partners follow an ‘open cabin’
    policy?
  •     Do the partners have ‘no-agenda’ meetings
    with the employees?
  •     Are the employees encouraged to maintain a
    knowledge repository? Is a service line over dependent on a single employee?
    Does the firm conduct a scenario analysis to assess the aftermath if that
    particular employee resigns?
  •     Is there a mechanism which ensures that even
    the most junior employee has a medium to express his/her ideas or suggestions
    directly to the partners, bypassing the reporting hierarchy?
  •     Are exit interviews documented, archived and
    acted upon?
  •     Does the firm have a recognised alumni
    association of the past employees?


d.  Operations

  •     What are the key operational metrics of the
    firm that are relevant?
  •     What is the per partner billing?
  •     What is the per FTE billing (FTE – full time
    equivalent)?
  •     What is the yield per billable hour (Total
    billing of a person divided by his billable hours) – Example: INR 1 Crore of
    revenues / 1,000 billable hours = billable rate of INR 10,000 per hour. If a
    large firm’s partner bills INR 5 Crores for the same 1,000 billable hours, his
    billable rate is INR 50,000 per hour. Can that be aspired for? How does one get
    there? How does one create the visible expertise that’s necessary to command
    higher rates? Does the firm provide the necessary tools and the environment
    that allows such expertise to be built and billed?
  •     What is the profitability per partner? What
    is the profitability per FTE?
  •     How many clients are serviced by each
    partner? What is the average billing per client? Does this provide good data
    about the type of practice/segmentation of each partner and their teams?

 

e.  Finance

  •     What is meaningful MIS to the partners? What
    reports are relevant? Do we have the in-house talent group to achieve this?
  •     Has the firm developed a balanced scorecard
    framework?
  •     Is there a practice of maintaining, updating
    and circulating finance trackers and dashboards internally? Does the firm use
    practice management tools and softwares to automate the information flow to
    ensure that rich data is generated for the partner group to take decisions?
  •     Is there a mechanism to identify which
    areas/teams/personnel can any delay be attributed to? This can help in devising
    better preventive and corrective strategies.
  •     Does the firm have a designated function of
    a CFO/Controller?
  •     Is a cash flow budget made periodically?How
    are the partners’ drawing limits determined? Are the drawings consistent?
  •     How are receivables monitored? Have all the
    partners concurred on a common line of thinking with respect to actions to be
    taken if the previous receivables aren’t settled? A zero-tolerance policy for
    bad debts isn’t necessarily a negative attribute to have, barring exceptions.

The finance function in professional
services firms has to be responsible for ensuring that meaningful data is provided
for the leadership group to take the right decisions.

 

f.   Functional

A lot of professional service firms do not necessarily spend
sufficient time on functions such as Admin, Technology, HR, Finance and
Marketing. Some aspects to think about are:

  •     What are the various functional areas that
    the firm’s resources needed to be expensed upon, and what are the results?
  •     Is every function led or overlooked by a
    designated partner? What say do the other partners have for a function not
    personally managed by them?
  •     How is functional efficiency adjudged? Which
    evaluation steps are in place to ensure zero redundancy of functional areas?
  •     How is cross-functional integration,
    interlink and inter-dependence evaluated?
  •     What are the fall-back options in case a
    function fails or is temporarily unavailable?
  •     Do each of the functions maintain a process
    and knowledge repository?

 

Call to Action

The call to action here is:

1.  To
achieve a working strategy document for your firm. And, for this purpose, it is
for the partners to make time to think through the above questions, and develop
a discussion paper.

2.  Next
step will be to discuss the finer aspects of the plan and fine tune it.

3.  Thereafter,
roll out the plan to the larger partner group and key people in the firm (who
are the identified future leaders).

4.  Once
the plan is rolled out, partners have to focus on execution and be the best
they can be and inspire and lead their teams with energy and enthusiasm.

5.  Every
quarter, the strategy needs to be then reviewed for efficacy.

6.  Finally,
the managing partner or the leadership group within the partners should take
care of periodic course corrections to keep the strategy in alignment.

Partners will do well to do this in right earnest. That’s the
way to develop your firm’s credentials, attract and retain talent, generate and
service clients and build a sustainable growing firm.

 

Fault lines of Obfuscation

India surprises both the optimist
and the pessimist. Some of the greatest, finest, unique and fascinating things
happen in this country. Some of the weirdest, obnoxious and unimaginable things
also happen at the same time. You will be wrong and you will be right if you
say things are getting better or things are not improving.

 

What stops India is India itself.
The attitude of Obfuscation1 and insistence on obfuscating wherever
possible seriously impairs the ability of the nation to move faster. It can be termed
as a fault line – as in a problem that may not be obvious and could cause
something to fail. Obfuscation has many facets – having processes larger than
purpose, making things hyper-technical, making things subjective and obscure,
bringing in a new compliances without adequate notice or clarity and so on.
Obfuscation makes things harder to understand, harder to action out and
difficult to serve an effective purpose.

 

Some recent experiences got me
thinking about this topic and its impact on dragging our country: 

 

i.   I
recently opened a new bank account for my minor daughter. The bank form
required signatures at about twelve places.

 

ii.   I
opened a ‘distribution account’ with a certain company. The form was for
allowing me to make investments through them. The form asked me to give:

 

a)   Details
of income, wealth, investment experience, …

 

b)   FATCA
/ CRS / UBO declaration – not only for that investment entity, but for CAMS,
Karvy, etc. It felt like someone outside India wanted to track me in my own country
for wrongdoing I could be involved in, according to the laws of that country
and I had to sign off to prove that I was on the right side from their
perspective;

_____________________________________________________

1   An act of making something obscure, unclear,
or unintelligible. Latin obfuscatio, from obfuscare (to darken)

 

c)   KYC
– In spite of having PAN, Central KYC Registry CKYC Number, Aadhaar – I had to
once again give PAN, Aadhaar, Address Proof or face long argumentation with a
compliance team on why this was mandatory.

 

iii.  I also opened a Share Trading account. I ended up signing at nearly
20 places plus on PAN and Aadhaar and of course signing across on my own
photograph.

 

I got a strange feeling of confirming
myself and certifying myself to be myself. For the world outside, I am just a
unit of statistics who has to sign off on long, winding and difficult to
understand forms at multiple places. While one can understand that frauds do
take place, particularly in financial services area and that the mechanism to
deal with them after they have happened is abysmally inadequate, an overkill of
this sort can be considered ‘necessary’. 
However, some of this seemed to not meet the test of ‘reasonableness’
which should stand on an equal footing with the ‘necessary’ conditions in the
digital age. One would have thought that Aadhaar would make things easy for
common citizens. However, we are yet to reach the level of ease which was felt
at the time of buying a Jio sim card.

 

Tax Instances

India is shinning with many
examples of making things complex, perhaps far beyond their need to be so. In
the darkness of complexity thrives corruption, delay, disputes, low impact
compliances, distancing masses from their rights and from delivering what is
due to them! Recent examples from tax perspective will prove the point:

 

i.   Tax
Audit Report (TAR) changes on 20th July 2017 for FY 2017-18 filing
in September:

 

a.  While
almost all the changes could have happened before March, the tax office chose
to ‘wake up’ from slumber in July.

 

b.  Isn’t
monthly GST data sufficient and available to the tax office, which is part of
the same ministry?


c.  Why
should some assessees who file before 20th August 2018 be allowed to
file old TAR, while others have to file with new clauses?

 

d.  If
there is delay in notifying the correct TAR form, why shouldn’t the assessee be
entitled to get more time to file?

 

e.  Several
clauses do not appear to be relevant to most assessees and perhaps can find a
place elsewhere? Isn’t TAR already long and bulky?

 

Some clauses per se are
debatable for their fitness to find a place in the TAR itself such as the one
on GAAR. There are other clauses such as address or GST Numbers etc., which
should be included in the ITR instead or done away with, as they can be part of
the master data. Points such as primary adjustments (clause 30A) should perhaps
be sitting in Form 3CEB. Tinkering with TAR in the middle of tax season in
spite of strictures by at least two High Courts2  can perhaps be dealt with only when such acts
are legislated as an ‘impermissible arrangement’ in a new chapter XXIV titled
Tax Payer Services. The ICAI ‘Implementation Guide w.r.t. Notification  33/2018’ on Page 1 sums it up well: The
amendment to Form No. 3CD has thrown yet another challenge for taxpayers and
tax auditors, by mandating large reporting requirements, besides requiring
sitting in judgement on certain contentious issues.

 

ii.   Changes
in ITR utilities post 31st March: ITRs were notified in April.
However, every single ITR utility has undergone changes between April and
August. Some have changed multiple times. ITR 2 was revised thrice.

 

iii.  CBDT ‘incentives’ to CIT (A) for passing ‘Quality’ Orders: This
deserves special reference without any further comments as it is explicit. The
stunning part is the definition of Quality:

___________________________________________________

2   Punjab and Haryana HC and Gujarat HC in
September 2015

 

a.  That
which enhances the Assessing Officer’s (AO) order

 

b.  Strengthens
the stand of AO

 

c.  Levying
penalties under 271(1)(c) on additions confirmed by the CIT(A)

 

iv.  Format
of Notices: A Notice, I had the privilege to respond to, had the same question
asked three times. Additionally, it asked for ‘Source of Income’. Wouldn’t it
be nice to take a few minutes and understand the assessee before shooting out a
notice. In this case the assessee is a tax filer for more than forty years.
When can a lay assessee expect meaningful and clear questions?

 

No doubt, many routine matters are
simplified by technology. We have come a long way. Yet our system justifies the
meaning of Obfuscation and gives it a new meaning. The Hon’ble President of
India, spoke for the second time this year and I quote his twitter handle: “The
taxpayer is your partner in nation building. Interaction with the taxpayers
should not inconvenience them.”

 

Even Albert Einstein said, “If you can’t explain it simply, you
don’t understand well enough”. Obfuscation shows that authorities miss the
point, way too often. Until we address these fault lines effectively and
promptly, our march to progress will be a few notches lower. We can celebrate
the jump in GDP growth rate of 8.2% for Q1 of 2019. At the same time we need to
ask – what made us stop at 8.2% and not touch 10%? To answer such questions we
will have to find the root causes and see if the tax payer and tax collector
can have unified interests. We will have to sort this out. In late PM Vajpayee
ji’s words we will have to walk together

 

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

Gratitude

In Sanskrit, a very beautiful
Subhashitam is:

   

              

Which means: Trees bear fruit
for the benefit of others, water flows in the rivers for the benefit of others,
Cows give milk for the benefit of others, and this body is meant for the
benefit of others.

We
owe everything to nature for this important lesson and must work for the
benefit of others. We can only wonder if there can be any life in the absence
of the five vital elements i.e the soil, fire, water, air and space.

Even
if we assume life can exist, would our five senses have anything to do if these
vital elements were not there? Let us ponder over who provides us with oxygen,
energy, light, fire? How these scenic mountains are formed? How can we perceive
these flowing rivers, or experience the vast oceans, see glittering stars, the
vast sky and the beautiful forests? This brings us to the question: Are we
grateful enough to mother earth, divine nature and all the elements for these
beautiful gifts of life? These are available to us freely and abundantly. We
often take for granted everything that is available to us easily!

It
may be important to remember that right from the moment one wakes up till the
moment one goes to sleep and even while asleep, every moment is a precious gift
that we are fortunate to experience.

If
we were to maintain a journal of gratitude, initially we may not be able to
think of a single line or person to express our gratitude towards. However,
with sincere introspection we can surely list down so many people, things,
incidences that we are grateful for.

A
few illustrative questions are listed below :

Who
gave me this healthy body with mind and intellect? Who brought me up? Who
taught me the first alphabet or the first number? Who cultivated the vegetables
and food I eat? Who provided the milk I drink? Who supplied me the essentials
like water, electricity? Who protects my country, or my street or society? Who
cures me when I am sick? Who takes care of me when I feel lonely? Who guides me
when I am confused? Who helps me understand and inspires me to excel in what I
do? Who makes me feel happy?

We
may appreciate that every moment, several known and unknown factors are at play
helping us, protecting us, guiding us and making meaningful contributions to
what we are.

We
may soon realise that gratitude brings a feeling of humility. Humility inspires
us to appreciate anything in true spirit. It also gives rise to compassion.
Appreciation encourages us to excel and brings out the best in each one of us.
In that sense, it purifies the self from within. And with experiencing inner
happiness, one is able to spread more happiness.

Then
the question that comes to one’s mind is “what makes one unhappy”?

Obsessing
over things like name, fame, money, wealth, recognition and social status,
sense-enjoyments create desire and attachment. Unfulfilled desire creates
anger. Anger in turn creates a feeling of emptiness and unhappiness. Thus,
anger ultimately destroys the person.

But,
appreciation, humility, and gratitude create a fragrant garden of happiness,
joy and peace that only multiply. Let us be truly grateful to everyone and
everything that contributes in making our lives worthy and meaningful.

Small
gestures like offering a glass of water to the delivery boy or a postman,
offering  a shed or water for birds or
animals, helping an elderly person cross a busy road, sparing some time with a
lonely person and encouraging them are all acts of noble selfless work that
only add to our own happiness.

This
reminds me of the beautiful quote by Nida Fazli:


  

Civil Suit or Criminal Case?

I.       Introduction


How often
have we seen a commercial deal gone sour, be it, a joint venture, an
investment, a lending transaction, a trading transaction, etc.? In most of the
cases, the dispute is entirely civil in nature, i.e., the remedies for the
parties lies in arbitration or approaching a Civil Court. However, in some
cases, the aggrieved party also moves the Criminal Court on the pretext that it
involves some sort of cheating or forgery or such other economic offences. This
gives the dispute an entirely different twist and could lead to arrest of the
defendant. While a criminal complaint may be justified in certain cases, it is
not so always and sometimes it is used as a bargaining ploy to exert greater
pressure on the other party. The Bombay High Court in the case of Ramesh
Dahyalal Shah vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, Cr. Appln. No. 613/2016,
Order dated 6th December 2017
, had an occasion to consider
one such commercial dispute where the plaintiff also sought recourse to
criminal course of action.

           

II.    Facts

2.1   One, Tushar Thakkar, the main respondent in
the suit, entered into negotiations with the applicant in the suit, based on
which he was to invest in a company owned by the applicant on the following
terms:

 

(a)   A Shareholders’ Agreement was executed based
on which the respondent acquired a 45% stake in the company.

 

(b)   The respondent was to be made the
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company.         

 

(c)   He was to receive a monthly remuneration for
acting as Vice-Chairman.


(d)   He and the applicant were to jointly take all
important decisions of the company.

 

(e)   The applicant submitted a Project Report
about setting up a plant at Karnataka. Based on the same, he obtained a bank
loan.

 

2.2   There were disputes between the respondent
and applicant based on which the respondent filed complaints alleging the
following:

 

(a)   He was not called for General Body meetings.

 

(b)   The Directors and financers of the company
were neglecting and avoiding him.

 

(c)   They also did not keep their promises like
appointing him as the Vice Chairman, paying his monthly remuneration and did
not give him authority to sign all the cheques, nor did they inform the change
in share holding to the bank, nor allow him to jointly take decisions of the
company, etc. He suffered loss of goodwill also since he was not given a
distributorship as promised. Thus, he alleged that the company and the
applicant cheated him.

 

(d)   Further, instead of installing new plant and
machinery at Karnataka, he alleged that second-hand machinery was installed
which was over 18 years old. It was alleged that this was done with the
connivance of the registered valuers and the bank. Moreover, the machinery was
over-invoiced, thereby getting more capital subsidy from the Government and
causing revenue loss.

 

The
respondent accordingly, claimed a certain amount from the applicant and various
cases for criminal breach of trust were made out against the applicant, the
registered valuers and the Government bank and accordingly, a case was
registered with the Economic Offence Wing, Mumbai.

 

2.3   Consequently, the accused filed a Writ
Petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR registered with the
EOW on the grounds that a civil dispute has been given the colour of a criminal
complaint.

 

2.4   Thus, the question, for consideration before
the Bombay High Court was whether the dispute between the parties was of a
predominantly civil nature which was being converted to a criminal nature by
the respondent so as to recover his claims from the applicant?

 

III.   Verdict of
Bombay High Court

3.1   The Court held that it was of the firm view,
that the matter was entirely a civil case and there was not even a prima
facie
criminal case under the Indian Penal Code pertaining to cheating,
forgery of security / will, using a genuine document as forged, falsification
of accounts, etc. It held that there clearly was a breach of the terms and
conditions of the shareholders agreement.

 

3.2   The Court considered the following facts
before delivering its verdict:

 

(a)   The respondent approached the applicant for
investing in his company.

 

(b)   The terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement were
very clear.

 

3.3   The Court also considered various Supreme
Court decisions which have distinguished between a civil offence and a criminal
complaint. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s verdict in Hridaya
Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168
wherein it was
held that the distinction between a mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It would depend upon the intention of the accused at
the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct. However,
every breach of contract would not give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention was shown right at the
beginning of transaction. Thus, it was necessary to show that he had fraudulent
or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. Based on that the
Court held that both parties had disputes regarding the Shareholders Agreement
and hence, it was clear that there was no cheating intention from the
beginning.

3.4   The fact that the dispute was first filed
before the Company Law Board showed that it was predominantly a civil dispute.
Accordingly, the High Court held that the main demand and grievance of the
respondent appeared to get back his sum invested. The Company Law Board also
held that there were no circumstances indicating fraud or mismanagement of the affairs
or other misconduct of the company. 

 

3.5   The Court noted that two recovery suits were
also filed by the respondent before the High Court for recovering the amounts
claimed by him.

 

3.6   The Court also noted that the machinery
imported was verified by a Government empanelled valuer and this valuation was
seconded by a bank appointed valuer when complaints were made by the
respondent. The Court agreed with the Company Law Board’s Order that the banks
would not invite any adverse report to their own project report prepared by
their officers during the time, they decide to advance loans to a company.
However, in absence of any corroborative material, it became difficult to
disbelieve the reports of independent persons merely because they were
favouring the applicant or to infer connivance between them and the applicant
so as to implead them also along with consortium of banks as accused in the
case. The Court noted that the Government bank had specifically noted that,
after inspection and verification of the cost of the project, primary and
secondary research and analysis of the comparative cost estimates of reputed
suppliers (domestic and international) for plant and machinery purchased and
installed by the Company, the costs incurred by the Company were reasonable and
fair and in line with the market norms taking into account the
specification/configuration and suitability for the project.

 

3.7   The High Court noted that it was apparent
that the respondent had approached every forum available to him to raise his
grievances and after being unsuccessful there, now he was giving the colour of
criminal offence to this civil dispute by filing the complaint and levelling
the same allegations. Once he realised that the Government banks were not
supporting him, he implicated them also in the case along with the two valuers.

 

The Court
made a very telling observation that the intention of the respondent, therefore,
appeared to be to use the police machinery with malafide intention to recover
the amounts which he was unable to recover by civil mode. Therefore, it was a
sheer abuse of the process of law.

 

3.8   The Court concluded that a case which was
predominantly of civil nature had been given the robe of criminal offence that
too, after availing civil remedies. It relied on the Supreme Court’s verdict in
State of Haryana  vs. Bhajan Lal
,1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
which held that where a criminal proceeding was
manifestly attended with malafide intention and/or the proceeding was
maliciously instituted with object to serve the oblique purpose of recovering
the amount, such proceeding needed to be quashed and set aside.

 

Again in Chandran
Ratnaswami vs. K.C. Palanisamy (2013) 6 SCC 740
, it was held that, when
the disputes were of civil nature and finally adjudicated by the competent
authority, (the CLB in the present case) and the disputes were arising out of
alleged breach of joint venture agreement and when such disputes had been
finally resolved by the Court of competent jurisdiction, then it was apparent
that complainant wanted to manipulate and misuse the process of Court. In this
judgment, it was held that, it would be unfair if the applicants are to be tried
in such criminal proceeding arising out of the alleged breach of a Joint
Venture Agreement. It was further held that the High Court was entitled to
quash a proceeding when it came to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding
to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice required that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It relied on its
earlier decision in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others,
(1977) 2 SCC 699
where it was observed that the wholesome power u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, entitled the High Court to quash a
proceeding when it came to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice required that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts had
been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to
achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted
to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the case of Inder
Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1,
it was held
that the court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an
instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior
motive to pressurise the accused.The issuance of non-bailable warrants involved
interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment meant deprivation
of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts had to be
extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. Similarly, in Uma
Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336,
it was held
that the complaint did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less any
cheating offence and the case was purely a civil dispute between the parties
for which a remedy was available before a civil court by filing a properly
constituted suit. Thus, allowing the police investigation to continue would
amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just
and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers
u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

 

In G.
Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636
the Apex
Court held that a Court’s Jurisdiction u/s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
had to be exercised with  great care. In
exercise of its jurisdiction, the High Court was not to examine the matter
superficially. It was to be seen if a matter, which was essentially of civil
nature, had been given the cloak of a criminal offence. Criminal proceedings
were not a shortcut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process
a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it
was a serious matter. Again in Chandrapal Singh vs. Maharaj Singh, AIR
(1982) SC 1238
, the Court held that that chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply
invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.

 

Further, in Indian
Oil Corpn vs. NEPC India Ltd, 2006 (3) SCC Cri 736
, the Apex Court
cautioned about the growing tendency to convert purely civil disputes into
criminal cases. Also, in V.Y. Jose vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78,
it was held that a matter which essentially involved disputes of civil nature,
should not be allowed to be subject matter of a criminal offence, the latter
being a shortcut of executing a decree which was non-existent.

 

3.9   The High Court distinguished other cases,
such as, Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, Cr. Appeal No.1723 / 2017
dated 4th October, 2017
where allegations were made in the
FIR of extortion, forgery, fabrication of documents, utilisation of those
documents to effectuate transfers of title before registering authorities and
the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of
fabricated power of attorney. The Supreme Court held that these were serious in
nature and cannot be mere civil in nature and thus, the High Court was
justified in refusing to quash the FIR even though the parties decided to
settle the matter.

 

4.0   Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed
the applications and quashed and set aside the F.I.R.s registered with the,
Police Station, the investigation of which was taken over by Economic Offence
Wing.

 

IV.   Conclusion

Several
civil cases are masquerading as criminal cases in the hope of getting the
accused to pay up. This decision would act as a defence to all such accused.
However, having said that it is unfortunate that one has yet go through the
process of the law and in several cases, it is only after the matter reaches
the High Court that relief is granted.Till then, the process of arrest, bail,
custody, etc., are an unfortunate episode in the life of the accused!            

 

One can only
hope that the Police would frame some directions which would serve as a
reference point to all Police Stations as to how to handle a case which appears
to be of a civil nature. Instead of instantly arresting the accused, the Police
may first carry out a detailed investigation of the matter, hear both parties
and then reach a conclusion as to whether or not to arrest the accused.
 

Is it Fair to have a Lopsided Tribunal Under GST?

Background

Section 112 of the Central
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”) provides for an appeal to
the GST Appellate Tribunal. This Tribunal sits as the second Appellate
authority in the appellate mechanism, the first appeal being to the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

Problem

Much water has flown under the bridge since
the first constitutional challenges were mounted against the rampant
tribunalisation in the country. The Supreme Court has dealt with such
tribunalisation on many occasions and cautioned against legislative devices to
tinker with the independence of the judiciary. However, the CGST Act not only
ignores these warnings, but goes on to push the envelope further than any
Government has attempted till date.

 

Unfairness

(1) Section 109(3), (4) and (9) of the CGST
Act mandates that the National Bench, Regional Bench, State Bench and the Area
Bench of the Appellate Tribunal be manned by one Judicial Member and two
Technical Members.

 

Now, the qualifications for the technical
members in section 110(1)(c) and (d) show that they will be invariably drawn
from the Departmental cadre. A 2:1 ratio of Judicial and Technical Members on
each bench will irredeemably tilt the Tribunal in the Government’s favour and
compromise independence of the Tribunal. In Union of India vs. R. Gandhi
(2010) 11 SCC 1
, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the
number of Technical Members on a bench cannot exceed the Judicial Members. The
Madras High Court has denounced a similar provision in the Administrative
Tribunals Act as an attempt to reduce the sole judicial member to a “decorative
piece” [S. Manoharan vs. Dy. Registrar (2015) 2 LW 343 (DB)]. It
is surprising that the Government wishes to foist the same injustice all over
again despite the position in law being well settled in this regard.

 

(2) The term of office of Judicial Members
u/s. 110(9) and (10) is 3 years, whereas the term of office of Technical
Members u/s. 110(11) is 5 years. Apart from such discrimination being outright
unconstitutional, it sends out a discouraging message to the public at large
that the Government will remain blessed with a compliant Tribunal for a long
time. Furthermore, coupled with clauses like those relating to reappointment
(which is also a subject completely within the control of Government), such
provisions are potent enough to create apprehensions in minds of the Judicial
Members about the manner in which these Judicial Members are to set about their
judicial functions.

 

It is submitted, in any case, the Judicial
Members would be projected as an inferior class to the outside world at large.
Furthermore, experience has shown that it is difficult to find Judicial Members
than Technical Members and that both Central and State Governments sit over
Tribunal vacancies for a very long time. Giving shorter tenures to Judicial Members
will only bring about frequent vacancies of Judicial Members in comparison with
Technical Members.

 

This may bring about repeated scenarios where
there is no option but to allow two Technical Members or even one Technical
Member to constitute a Bench for lack of adequate Judicial Members as provided
for in section 110(10). Litigants will have no option but to put up with such a
Bench since section 110(14) protects proceedings of the Tribunal from being
assailed on the ground of existence of any vacancy or defect in the
constitution of the Tribunal. 

(3) Section 110(1)(b)(iii) allows a member
from the Indian Legal Services to be appointed as a Judicial Member, which is
impermissible under our Constitution [Union of India vs. R. Gandhi (2010)
11 SCC 1]
.
A similar clause in the RERA legislation was struck down
recently by the Bombay High Court in Neelkamal Realtors vs. Union of
India [(2018) 1 AIR Bom R 558]
relying on R. Gandhi’s case.
It is against surprising that such a settled position of law is being ignored
to somehow create a compliant Tribunal.

 

(4) The qualifications for Technical Members
in section 110(1)(c) and (d) do not require the Technical Members to have any
experience in dealing with appellate work. In fact, even investigation officers
who have never handled any appeal will qualify to be appointed as Technical
Members under such a clause, as has been the unhappy experience of Sales Tax
Tribunals in some States like Maharashtra. Namit Sharma vs. Union of
India [(2013) 1 SCC 745]
has clearly laid down that Technical Members
must not only possess legal qualifications, but also have a judicial bend of
mind. The Bombay High Court has recently, in case of the Maharashtra Sales Tax
Tribunal, held that a “judicially trained mind”, as required in Namit
Sharma
, means long experience with quasi-judicial disputes and that the
mere status as a Deputy Commissioner for three years cannot suffice [Sales
Tax Tribunal Bar Association vs. State of Maharashtra – Judgment dated 28/29
September, 2017 in WP 2069/2015].

 

(5) Section 110(d) allows the State Government
to notify any rank of State Commissioners for appointment as Technical Member
(State). The criteria of qualifications pertains to the Constitutional
requirement of independence of the Members and must be dealt with by Parliament
itself. By allowing the Government control over deciding of qualifications, the
Legislature is allowing the Government to exert unholy influence over the
composition of the Tribunal. 

 

(6) While sections 110(2) and (4) recognise
the primacy of the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justices of the High
Court in appointment of Judicial Members, however the selection of the
Technical Members has been left to a Selection Committee whose composition is
undefined in the Act. Firstly, the Selection Committee deals with the sensitive
aspect of selection of Technical Members. The composition of this committee
should not have been left to the good senses of the rule-making authority, the
Legislature must deal with such aspects, being an essential legislative
function. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the members of the Selection
Committee themselves will be judicially trained. Why should bureaucrats have
control of the Selection Committee?  

 

(7) The clause for reappointment of Members
creates a conflict of interest. A similar clause was struck down by the Supreme
Court in the National Tax Tribunal case for its mischievous potential to tinker
with the independence of the members [Madras Bar Association vs. Union of
India (2014) 10 SCC 1]
.
Yet we see the same clause in GST law all over
again. Reappointment clauses are notorious in nature and create a sense of
insecurity in minds of Tribunal members.

 

(8) Similarly, salary, allowances and terms
and conditions of service cannot be left to the rule-making authority. These
are substantial mattes which affect independence of judiciary and should have
been dealt with by Parliament itself. Furthermore, the rule-making authority,
that is the State and Central Governments, will be the litigants in every case
before the Tribunal. They cannot be allowed to hold any power over Members’
salaries and allowances. 

 

Solution

Each of the concerns raised above arise
ultimately from settled jurisprudence and past experience. There is no solution
except curing the faults in the statutory mechanism. In time, the Courts will
reiterate their earlier judgments and strike down these offending clauses. But
given the pace at which justice comes in India, the people will suffer in the
interim. 

 

Conclusion


Is it really fair to have
such provisions? We are not talking here about some new model of
tribunalisation which is  yet untested in
Courts. There is ample jurisprudence on all the aspects mentioned above. Why is
it then that the people must suffer the same woes that the Courts have rescued
them from earlier? It is not simple a question of independence of judiciary:
one is forced to think about the unfairness in legislative power being
exercised in such an arbitrary manner to steamroll the rights of people to fair
adjudication of disputes.

17. The Pr. CIT-6 vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 94 of 2016, Dated: 27th June, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ACIT-10(1) vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd; dated 19/01/2015 ; ITA. No 1712/Mum/2011, AY: 2006-07 Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(2) : Assessment–Notice–Notice served on the old address- Assessment was held to be void [Section 292BB]

The assessee had filed its return
of income for A.Y 2006-07 giving its new address therein. However, the A.O
served the notice within the stipulated time u/s. 143(2) of the Act not on the
address in the return but upon the address in the PAN record. The above notice
sent by the Revenue within the prescribed time was not received by the assessee
as it ceased to be the address of the assessee. Thereafter, admittedly beyond
the time prescribed u/s. 143(2) of the Act, the notice was served upon the assessee.

 

During the Assessment proceedings,
the assessee did raise objections as to the jurisdiction to assess the
department u/s. 143(3) of the Act. However, the A.O did not accept it and
passed an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

The justification of the Revenue is
that, they served the notice dated 5th October, 2007 at the address
available in its PAN records. Therefore, the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act sent
on the earlier address was correct. Besides, the assessee participated in the
assessment proceedings and their action is protected by section 292BB of the
Act.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the A.O, the assessee filed the Appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) find that
the impugned statutory notices issued without jurisdiction. The notice u/s.
143(2) was not served to the assessee and therefore, the proceedings u/s.
143(2) were bad in law. In view of the assessee raising such objections during
assessment proceedings, the provisions of section 292BB were not applicable and
section 292BB could not have given validity to the illegality / irregularity of
the notices.

 

The CIT(A) held that the A.O
completed assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act without assuming valid jurisdiction
u/s. 143(2) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances, the assessment framed
u/s. 143(3) of the Act was invalid.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), the Revenue filed the Appeal before the ITAT. ITAT upheld the CIT(A) order.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed  that besides the return of
income indicating the new address, the appellant had by earlier letter dated 6th
December, 2005 intimated the change of its address to the A.O and also
requested a issue of fresh PAN. Besides, the A.O had infact served at the new
address, the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 30th
November, 2006 in respect of AY: 2004-05. This was much prior to the statutory
notice issued on 5th October, 2007 and 25th July, 2008 at
the address of the assessee as recorded in the PAN. The Assessee had taken up
the objection with regard to non service of notice during the assessment
proceedings. Thus, as rightly held by the impugned order of the Tribunal that,
in view of the proviso to section 292(BB) of the Act, the notice not being
served within time, cannot be deemed to be valid. Therefore, no fault can be
found with the impugned order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, revenue Appeal
was  dismissed.

16. The Pr. CIT-9 vs. Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 1361 of 2015, Dated: 12thJune, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ITO V Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd; dated 29/04/2015 ; ITA. No 2226/Mum/2011, AY 2003-04 Bench: K , Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(3) r.w.s 263 : Once the CIT(A) by its order had accepted the fact that the assessment order had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act – there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue

Assessee a 100% EOU is engaged in
the business of software development and export of software. In its return of
income, Assessee had claimed benefit of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in
respect of its 100% EOU. The assessment was completed on 29th March,
2006 u/s.  143 (3) of the Act.

 

The CIT passed an revision order
u/s.  263 of the Act, holding that the
assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. This
to the extent exemption was allowed u/s. 10B of the Act in respect of non
receipt of foreign exchange within six months of exports and on the issue of
International Transactions in respect of Transfer Pricing of International
Transactions with Associated Enterprises (AE), not being referred to the
Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) in terms of section 92CA of the Act. In the
light of the above, the CIT directed the A.O to finalise the assessment denovo,
on the above issues.

 

Consequent to the above order of
the CIT, the A.O proceeded to pass a fresh order. However, in the fresh order,
the A.O not only dealt with issue of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in relation
to delay in realisation of foreign exchange and referred the matter to the TPO
but also dealt with the issue of reallocation of R & D Expenses for
claiming deduction u/s.  10B of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of
A.O, the Assessee carried the matter in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) by an
order, accepted the contention of the assessee that, the A.O had gone beyond
the issue which were directed to be considered denovo by the CIT in its
order u/s.263 of the Act. Therefore, to that extent, the order was without
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the above finding, the CIT(A) proceeded further
to decide the issue, inter alia, with regard to R & D expenses on
merits, held that assessee is entitled to set off R & D expenses with the
profits of STIP units as the R & D expenses have a direct nexus with the
export business of the STIP unit.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), both the Revenue as well as assessee filed the Appeal to the
Tribunal. The Revenue in its appeal before the Tribunal, did not challenge the
finding of the CIT(A) that the order of the assessing officer dated 24th
December, 2009, was beyond the directions contained in the order dated 27th
September, 2007 passed by the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act and, therefore, without
jurisdiction. Nor did it urge this issue at the hearing before the Tribunal.
The Revenue’s only challenge was on the issue of allowing the set off of R
& D Expenses incurred in a non STIP Unit with STIP unit of the Respondent .

 

The Appellant’s basic contention
was that once the CIT(A) had by its order dated 12th January, 2011
had accepted the fact that the Assessment Order dated 24th December,
2009 had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act,
there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue. This as it
was beyond the scope of the directions of the CIT i.e. to the extent of set off
of R & D Expenses. The ITAT upheld the contention of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed that the Revenue has not challenged the finding of the CIT(A) that the
A.O has gone beyond the scope of directions given by the CIT(A) in its order
u/s. 263 of the Act. The issue now being urged by the Revenue in appeal. As
this was not an issue urged by them before the Tribunal, this question does not
arise from the order of the Tribunal.

 

Further the question as urged, is
beyond the issue raised before the Tribunal and cannot be urged before this
Court as held by this Court in CIT vs. Tata Chemicals 256 ITR 395. In
any case, it may be pointed out that the earlier Assessment Order dated 29th
March, 2006 has not been cancelled by the order of CIT u/s. 263 of the Act, for
passing a fresh Assessment Order. Once it is not disputed by the Revenue before
the Tribunal that, the order of the A.O on set off of R & D Expenses was
beyond the scope of the directions given by the CIT in exercise of its power
u/s. 263 of the Act, the occasion to examine the correctness of the same, would
not arise. Accordingly, the  Appeal
was  dismissed.

54. Dimension Data Asia Pacific PTE Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 182 (Bom): Date of order: 6th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2011-12 Section 144C r.w.s. 143(3) – Transfer pricing – Reference to DRP (Draft assessment order) – Where in case of foreign assessee, Assessing Officer passed final assessment order u/s. 144C(13), read with section 143(3) without passing a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1), said order being violative of provisions of section 144C(1), deserved to be set aside

The assessee was a foreign company
entitled to the procedure provided u/s. 144C. For relevant year assessee filed
its return declaring nil income. The Assessing Officer passed assessment order
u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) making certain addition to assessee’s income. The
assessee filed writ petition raising a contention that it was entitled to a
draft assessment order being passed u/s. 144C(1) before the final assessment
order as passed in this case u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) since the impugned
order ignored the mandate of section 144C same deserved be set aside.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  It
is an undisputed position that the assessee is a foreign company and an
eligible assessee as defined in section 144C(15)(b)(ii) of the Act. A foreign
company is entitled to being assessed in accordance with section 144C of the
Act. It is the section 144C, which provides a separate scheme for the manner in
which the Assessing Officer would pass assessment orders under the Act and a
separate procedure to challenge a draft order i.e. before an assessment order
which is subject to appeal under the Act is passed.

 

ii) The
entire object is to ensure that the disputes of Foreign Companies are resolved
expeditiously and final assessment orders are not passed without a re-look to
the proposed order (draft order), if so desired by the Foreign Company. In
essence, it obliges the Assessing Officer to first pass a draft of the proposed
assessment order indicating the proposed variation in the income returned. This
draft Assessment Order is to be passed u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which entitles
an eligible assessee such as a Foreign Company to approach the DRP with its
objection to the draft assessment order. This is so provided, so that an
eligible assessee can have his grievance addressed before the final assessment
order is passed. In case, an assessee does not object to the draft assessment
order, then a final assessment order is passed in terms of the draft assessment
order by the Assessing Officer. It is only on passing of the final assessment
order that the assessee, if aggrieved by it, would be able to approach the
appellate authorities under the Act. These special rights are made available
u/s. 144C to an eligible assessee such as the assessee. Therefore, it cannot be
ignored by passing a final order u/s. 144(13) of the Act without preceding it
with a draft assessment order as required therein.

 

iii) The contention of the revenue that the requirement of passing a
draft assessment order u/s. 144C of the Act would only extend to the orders
passed in the first round of proceedings or in respect of an order passed by
the Assessing Officer in remand proceedings by the Tribunal which has entirely
set aside the original assessment order. This distinction which is sought to be
drawn by the revenue is not borne out by section 144C of the Act. In fact, even
in partial remand proceedings from the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to pass a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act. The Assessing
Officer, is obliged to, in terms of section 144C to pass a draft assessment
order in all cases where he proposes to assess the Foreign Company under the
Act by making a variation in the returned income.

 

iv) In
this case, the impugned order has been passed in terms of section 143(3) read
with section 144C read with section 254 of the Act and it certainly makes a
variation to the returned income filed by the assessee. This even if, one
proceeds on the basis that the returned income stands varied by the order of
the Tribunal in the first round, to the extent the petitioner accepts it.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer correctly invokes section 144C of the Act in
the impugned order. Once having invoked section 144C, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to comply with it in full and not partly. This impugned order was
passed consequent to the order of the Tribunal restoring some of the issues before
it to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

 

v) This
‘fresh adjudication’ itself would imply that it would be an order which would
decide the lis between the parties, may not be entire lis, but
the dispute which has been restored to the Assessing Officer. The impugned
order is not an order merely giving an effect to the order of the Tribunal, but
it is an assessment order which has invoked section 143(3) of the Act and also
section 144C of the Act. This invocation of section 144C of the Act has taken
place as the Assessing Officer is of the view that it applies, then the
requirement of section 144C(1) of the Act has to be complied with before he can
pass the impugned order invoking section 144C(13) of the Act.

 

vi) In
fact, section 144C(13) of the Act can only be invoked in cases where the
assessee has approached the DRP in terms of s/s. 144C(2)(b) of the Act and the
DRP gives direction in terms of section 144C(5) of the Act. In this case, the
assessment order has invoked section 144C(13) of the Act without having passed
the necessary draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which alone would
make a direction u/s. 144C(5) of the Act by the DRP possible. Thus, the
impugned order is completely without jurisdiction.

 

vii) Moreover, so far as a foreign company is concerned, the
Parliament has provided a special procedure for its assessment and appeal in
cases where the Assessing Officer does not accept the returned income. In this
case, in the working out of the order of the Tribunal results in the returned
income being varied, then the procedure of passing a draft assessment order
u/s. 144C(1) of the Act is mandatory and has to be complied with, which has not
been done.

 

viii)  In the above view, the impugned order has
been passed without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 144C
of the Act which is applicable to a foreign company such as the assessee.
Therefore, the impugned order is quashed and set aside.”

53. CIT vs. Shark Roadways Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 78 (All): Date of order: 1st May, 2017: A. Y.: 2008-09 Sections 40(a)(ia) and 194C – TDS – Payments to contractors – Payment of hire charges – No contract between assessee and parties of hired vehicles on freight basis for transportation on behalf of principal – Transporters not contractors or sub-contractors – No liability to deduct tax at source

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer made additions to the assessee’s income on the ground that
the assessee was a transporter and not trader, and therefore, provisions of
section 194C of the Act were applicable to the hire charges paid by it to the
parties whom the lorries or trucks were hired.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) called
upon the assessee to produce copies of challans and after verifying them found
that section 194C was not attracted. He found that for the fulfillment of its
transportation commitment to its principals, the assessee, besides using its
own trucks and lorries was also hiring trucks and lorries from other owners or
directly from the drivers available in the market through brokers on a random
basis as and when required on freight basis. He further found that the payments
of hire charges were made directly by the assessee to those transporters without
there being any written or oral contract, vis-à-vis its principal. He held that
the payment of lorry hire charges to individual transporters was part of the
direct costs attributable to the receipts of the assessee, computable u/s. 28
and that in the absence of any evidence, it could not be said that the
individual truck owners or drivers of transporters were contractors or
sub-contractors of the assessee. Consequently, he held that the payments made
to such transporters hired by the assessee were not in the nature of payments
to contractors or sub-contractors within the meaning of section 194C. The
Tribunal affirmed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the
provisions of section 194C did not apply.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The
learned counsel for the appellant (Department) could not show that the
Assessing Officer while taking the view against the assessee by reference to
section 194C recorded his findings based on any evidence whatsoever and we find
that it was only on assumption.

 

ii)  It
is for this reason the findings of the Assessing Officer have been reversed by
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. These are concurrent findings of
fact and when vouchers otherwise were verifiable, we find no reason to take an
otherwise view in the matter.

 

iii)  The question is answered against the appellant, i.e., the Revenue.
The appeal lacks merit.”

52. Banco Products (India) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 405 ITR 318 (Guj): Date of order: 26th March, 2018: A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 35(2AB) – Scientific research expenditure – Weight deduction – Condition precedent for weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB) – Date of approval not relevant – Application for approval in December 2006 and approval granted in October 2008 – Assessee entitled to weighted deduction in A. Y. 2008-09

The assessee claimed weighted
deduction u/s. 35(2AB) of the Act on the expenditure incurred for setting up
research and development facility. This was supported by the approval granted
by the concerned authority with respect to such facility. The Assessing Officer
was of the opinion that such deduction could not be granted for the period
prior to the effective date
of approval.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld
the decision of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal took the view that the
facts were somewhat contradictory. It was not clear when the application for
approval was made and when actually approval was granted. The Tribunal
therefore, remanded the proceedings for fresh consideration by the Assessing
Officer.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Gujarat High Court held as under:

 

“i) Section 35(2AB) of the Act is
aimed at promoting development of in-house research and development facility
which necessarily would require substantial expenditure which immediately may
not yield desired results or be correlated to generation of additional revenue.
By very nature of things, research and development is a hit and miss exercise.
Much of the efforts, capital as well as human investment may go waste if the
research is not successful. The Legislature therefore, having granted special
deduction for such expenditure, it should be seen in the light of the purpose
for which it has been recognised. Research and development facility can be set
up only after incurring substantial expenditure. The application for approval
of such facility can be made only after setting up of such facility. Once an
application is filed by the assessee to the prescribed authority, the assessee
would have no control over when such application is processed and decided. Even
if therefore, the application is complete in all respects and the assessee is
otherwise eligible for grant of such approval, approval may take some time to
come by.  

 

ii)    The
claim for deduction cannot be defeated on the ground that such approval was
granted in the year subsequent to the financial year in which the expenditure
was incurred. In order to avail of the deduction u/s. 35(2AB) what is relevant
is not the date of recognition or the cut off date mentioned in the certificate
of the prescribed authority or even the date of approval, but the existence of
recognition.

 

iii)   The Assessing Officer was not right in restricting the deduction
to expenditure incurred prior to April 1, 2008. He had to recomputed such
deduction and give its effect to the assessee for the relevant assessment year.

 

iv)   In
the result, the appeal is allowed. The question is answered in favour of the
assessee. Decision of the Assessing Officer to restrict the assessee’s claim
for deduction on the expenditure which was incurred prior to April 1, 2008 is
set aside. The Assessing Officer shall recomputed such deduction and give its
effect to the assesee for the relevant assessment year.”

51. Ashokbhai Jagubhai Kheni vs. Dy. CIT (Appeals); 405 ITR 179 (Guj); Date of order: 12th March, 2018: A. Ys.: 2011-12, 2013-14 and 2014-15 Section 220(6) and CBDT Circulars – Recovery of tax – Stay of recovery pending appeal – Circular by CBDT that 15% of disputed demand to be deposited for stay – Permits decrease or even increase in percentage of disputed tax demand to be deposited – Requirement reduced to 7.5% on further condition of security for remaining 7.5% to satisfaction of Assessing Authority

For A. Ys. 2011-12, 2013-14 and
2014-15, the Assessing Officer raised a total demand of Rs. 30 crore. The
Assessee filed appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and requested for stay
of the demand pending appeals u/s. 220(6) of the Act. The Assessing Officer
required the assessee to deposit 15% of the disputed tax demand, upon which,
the recovery of the remaining amount would be stayed. The assessee approached
the Principal Commissioner, who refused to grant any further relief to the
assessee.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the
writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)  The
issue of granting stay of pending appeals is governed principally by two
circulars issued by the CBDT. The first circular was issued on 02/02/1993 being
Instruction No. 1914.

 

The circular contained guidelines
for staying the demand pending appeal, stating that the demand would be stayed
if there are valid reasons for doing so and mere filing of appeal against the
order of assessment would not be sufficient reason to stay the recovery of
demand. The instructions issued under office memorandum dated 29/02/2016 are
not in supersession of Instruction of Instruction No. 1914 but are in partial
modification thereof. This circular thus lays down 15% of the disputed demand to
be deposited for stay, by way of a general condition.

 

The circular does not prohibit or
envisage that there can be no deviation from this standard formula. In other
words, it is inbuilt in the circular itself that the percentage of the disputed
tax to be deposited could be either decreased or even increased for an assessee
to enjoy stay pending appeal. The circular provides the guidelines to enable
Assessing Officers and Commissioners to exercise such discretionary powers more
uniformly.

 

ii)   The
total tax demand was quite high. Even 15% of the disputed tax dues would run
into several crores of rupees. Considering such facts and circumstances, the
requirement of depositing the disputed tax dues was to be reduced to 7.5% in
order to enable the assessee to enjoy stay of pending appeals before the
Commissioner. This would however be on a further condition that he should offer
immovable security for the remaining 7.5% to the satisfaction of the assessing
authority.

 

iii)  The order passed by the Principal Commissioner was to be modified
accordingly. Both these conditions should be satisfied by April 30, 2018.”

50. Principal CIT vs. Geetaben Chandulal Prajapati; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 100 (Guj) : Date of order: 10th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2006-07 Section 271(1)(c) and 275(1A) – Penalty – Concealment of income – Where penalty proceeding initiated against assessee were dropped after considering reply submitted by assessee, Assessing Officer was not justified in initiating fresh penalty proceedings on same set of facts

The assessee did not file the
return of income for the year under consideration, though she received a total
sum of Rs. 62 lakh out of the sale consideration for sale of the land and
thereafter she filed the return of income only after notice u/s. 148 of the Act
and offered the aforesaid amount to tax. The income was assessed at Rs. 62
lakh. However, the Assessing Officer also initiated the penalty proceedings to
which the assessee filed the reply. The Assessing Officer dropped the penalty
proceedings considering the reply submitted by the assessee. Against the
assessment order the assessee filed appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).
The said appeal came to be dismissed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Thereafter,
the Assessing Officer issued the fresh notice to the assessee for imposing the
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) and passed the order imposing the penalty u/s.
271(1)(c).

 

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
cancelled the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c). The Tribunal confirmed the order
of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) 
It can be said that fresh penalty proceedings are permissible only with
a view to give effect to the order of the higher Forum revising the assessment
and a fresh penalty order can be passed and/or penalty can be imposed,
enhancing, reducing or canceling the penalty or dropping the proceedings for
the imposition of the penalty on the basis of the assessment as revised by
giving effect to such order of the Commissioner (Appeals) …. etc.

 

ii) 
Therefore, in a case where the assessment was not required to be revised
pursuant to the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate
Tribunal or the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, the power
u/s. 275(1A) cannot be exercised and the fresh penalty proceedings cannot be
initiated once earlier the penalty proceedings were dropped after considering
the reply submitted by the assessee, as there is no revised assessment which is
required to be giving effect to. Therefore, it is to be noted that the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal are justified in deleting the
penalty imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) faced with a situation that earlier the penalty
proceedings were dropped after considering the reply submitted by the assessee
and that thereafter the assessment was not required to be revised giving effect
to the order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) as the Commissioner
(Appeals) simply confirmed the assessment order determining the income at Rs.
62 lakh. In the facts and circumstances of the case narrated herein above, the
order passed by the Tribunal deleting the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is to be
confirmed.

 

iii)  No substantial question of law arises and
hence, present Tax Appeal deserves to be dismissed.”

49. Kalanithi Maran vs. Union of India; 405 ITR 356 (Mad): Date of order: 28th March, 2018 Sections 2(35)(b) and 276B – Offences and prosecution – TDS – Failure to pay tax deducted at source to Revenue – Company – Principal officer – Non-executive chairman not involved in day-to-day affairs of company – Managing director admitting liability and entering into negotiations with Revenue – Prosecution of non-executive chairman – Not valid

Criminal proceedings u/s. 276B of
the Act were initiated against a company for non-payment of tax deducted at
source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who was the non-executive chairman
of the company treating him as the principal officer of the company and an
order was also passed.

 

The non-executive chairman filed a
writ petition and challenged the said action against him. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  U/s.
2(35)(b) of the Act, the Assessing Officer can serve notice only to persons who
are connected with the management or administration of the company to treat
them as principal officer. Section 278B states that it shall not render any
such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that offence was committed
without his knowledge.

 

ii)  The
assessee had stated that he was not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the
company and that he was only a non-executive chairman and not involved in the
management and administration of the company. The managing director himself had
specifically stated that he was the person in charge of the day-to-day affairs
of the company.

 

iii)  The second respondent, while passing the order naming the assessee
as the principal officer had not given any reason for rejecting the contention
of the managing director. The second respondent without any reason had named
the assessee as the principal officer. Merely because the assessee was the
non-executive chairman, it could not be stated that he was in charge of the
day-to-day affairs, management and administration of the company.

 

The second respondent should have
given the reasons for not accepting the case of the managing director as well
as the petitioner in their respective reply. The conclusion of the second
respondent that the assessee being a chairman and major decisions were taken in
the company under his administration was not supported by any material evidence
or any legally sustainable reasons. The second respondent had not produced any
material to establish that the petitioner was responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the company.

 

iv) In
the absence of any material, the second respondent should not have come to the
conclusion that the assessee was the principal officer. The order which held
the assessee as the principal officer of the company and therefore, liable to
be prosecuted for the alleged default of the company u/s. 276B was not valid.”

48. CIT vs. Bhatia General Hospital; 405 ITR 24 (Bom): Date of order: 26th February, 2018: A. Y.: 2007-08 Sections 11, 32(1)(iii) and 37 – Charitable purpose – Hospital – Equipment – Equipment which had outlived its useful life – Depreciation – Government rules prohibiting sale as scrap – Additional depreciation allowable – Computation of income – On commercial principles

The assessee was a charitable
trust, running a hospital. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation on the hospital
equipment, which had completed their usefulness of 10 years. It was submitted
by the assessee that the claim was only for the purpose of writing off the
value of the assets. However, the Assessing Officer held that in a case where the
assets had outlived their useful life, they should have been sold as scrap and
in the absence of such evidence, disallowed the claim of additional
depreciation.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held
that the income of the trust was required to be computed on commercial
principles and allowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation. The
Tribunal recorded that the additional depreciation had been claimed by the
assessee in respect of hospital equipment which had outlived its life and that
according to the Government rules the assessee was prohibited from selling such
hospital equipment as scrap and upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals)
and reiterated the fact that the income of the trust had to be computed on
commercial principles.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  According
to the provisions of section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where a
plant and machinery was discarded or destroyed in the previous year, the amount
of money received on sale as such or as scrap or any insurance amount received
to the extent it fell short of the written down value was allowed as
depreciation, provided the same was written off in the books of account.

 

ii)   The
assessee could not sell the hospital equipment as scrap nor it could use the
hospital equipment. Therefore, the written down value of the hospital
equipment, was to be allowed as depreciation, as the asset had been written off
from its books of account. Thus, the nomenclature, as additional depreciation
rather than depreciation, was the only objection of the Department and the
nomenclature could not decide a claim.

 

iii)  It was also allowable as business u/s. 37 as it was an expenditure
incurred wholly and exclusively for carrying out its activity as hospital.(on
commercial principles).”

47. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 38 (Bom): Date of order: 4th July, 2018 A. Y.: 1988-89 Section 36(1)(iii) – Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Where assessee, engaged in construction business, purchased plot of land out of borrowed funds for implementation of a project, since plot of land was purchased in course of business of assessee, same formed part of its stock-in-trade, and, therefore, interest paid on borrowings for purchase of said land was to be allowed as revenue expenditure

The assessee partnership firm was
engaged in construction activity. The assessee had taken a loan to purchase
open plot of land for its project named, ‘LS’. The assessee had claimed an
amount paid as interest on said loan as revenue expenditure. The Assessing
Officer held that purchase of plot of land was capital in nature. Hence,
interest must also be capitalised. Thus, he disallowed the deduction on amount
being interest paid on loan for acquisition of land.

 

On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) found that interest paid on borrowings for purchase of land was
allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier assessment years and it was only
in the subject assessment year that the Assessing Officer for the first time
treated the same as work-in-progress and capitalised the same. He held that the
interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its stock-in-trade, i.e.,
plot of land for the ‘LS’ project had to be allowed as expenditure to determine
its income. Consequently, he deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing
Officer. The Tribunal held that crucial question to be decided was whether the
assessee could be said to have commenced work on project ‘LS’ during the
previous year relevant to subject assessment year. On facts it held that the
assessee had not shown any work had commenced on LS project plot of land during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year. Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that the Assessing Officer was justified in coming to conclusion that
interest expenditure in respect to ‘LS’ project (plot of land) could not be
allowed as revenue expenditure.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  In
view of section 36(1)(iii) as existing prior to amendment with effect from
1-4-2004 all interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purpose of
business or profession has to be allowed as deduction while computing income
under head ‘income from business’. Prior to amendment made on 1-4-2004, there
was no distinction based on whether the borrowing is for purchase of capital
asset or otherwise, interest was allowable as deduction in determining the
taxable income. It was only after introduction of proviso to section 36(1)(iii)
with effect from 1-4-2004 that the purpose of borrowing, i.e., acquisition of
assets then interest paid would be capitalised. In this case, concern is with
the A. Y. 1988-89, i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to section
36(1)(iii). Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings to purchase the plot
of land for LS project is allowable as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) as it was
incurred for the purposes of its business.

 

ii)   The
revenue’s submission is that the deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) will not be
available as no income has been earned in respect of LS project. This cannot be
appreciated. It is an undisputed position that the appellant-assessee has filed
return of income declaring income under the head income from business. The
assessee has various projects executing construction projects and, therefore,
interest expenditure is to be allowed as deduction to arrive at profits and
gains of business or profession of builders carried out by the assessee. It is
not a case where the only project of the assessee was the LS project.
Admittedly, in this case the business of the assessee as developer had already
commenced and income offered to tax.

 

iii)  In the above view, substantial question of law is answered in
negative, i.e., in favour of the appellant-assessee and against the
respondent-revenue.”

[2016-TIOL-1851-CESTAT-MUM] Bny Mellon International Operations India P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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When premium on group insurance does not vary with the number of family members covered, entire service tax charged on such premium is available as CENVAT credit.

Facts
The Appellant an exporter of services filed a refund claim of the accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. CENVAT credit of service tax paid on premium charged on group insurance scheme was disallowed on the ground that the said insurance also covered the family members of the employee which is not related to the output service.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the premium charged does not vary with the number of dependents who are additionally covered by the same insurance scheme. Accordingly even if none of the dependents were within the coverage, the premium amount would not alter or vary. Thus no part of premium is attributable to the extension of coverage to family members. Appeal is allowed and refund granted.

[2016-TIOL-1974-CESTAT-MUM] Raymond Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Nashik

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Section 11BB of Central Excise Act, 1944 is intended to ensure accountability on the part of revenue officials and therefore withholding of interest will only serve to encourage irresponsibility and non-responsiveness on part of tax authorities.

Facts
The Appellant paid service tax following a show cause notice issued. The adjudicating authority dropped the demand and after protracted recourse to appeal and review, the Tribunal also accorded finality to non-taxability. The refund claim filed was allowed but the amount sanctioned was transferred to the fund on the ground of “unjust enrichment”. On appeal the first appellate authority allowed the refund to be paid but claim for interest was rejected. Accordingly the present appeal is filed.

Held
The Tribunal noted that section 11BB of Central Excise Act, 1944 is unambiguously clear that non-sanction of refund within three months of filing of claim will set the “interest clock” ticking. Mere pendency of any appellate/ revisionary proceedings cannot justify non-sanction of such refunds. The law does not acknowledge recoveries to any such excuse or loopholes. Section 11BB is intended to ensure accountability on the part of revenue officials and if interest legally provided for in the law is not granted, it tantamounts to defying legislative intent. It was observed that wrongful collection of tax was known since the date of adjudication order and therefore there is no justification to hold back the wrongly credited amount. Accordingly appeal was allowed with a direction to immediately release the interest due on receipt of the order.

Note: Readers may also the note the decision in the case of CCE & ST vs. Ghatge Patil Industries Ltd [2016-TIOL-1970- CESTAT-MUM] holding that even though the amount became refundable after Tribunal order, the interest shall be payable for the period from three months of the date of application till the date of sanction of refund. Reference can also be made to a similar decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tahnee Heights Co-op Housing Society Ltd vs. The Union of India & ORS [2015-TIOL-1828-HC-MUM-ST] digest reported in the October 2015 issue of BCAJ.

2016 (43) STR 166 (Guj.) New Asian Engineers & Amp. vs. Union of India

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Application for condonation of delay shall be decided liberally.

Facts
Petitioner prayed for condonation of delay of 300 days on the ground of financial distress, his daughter’s suicide, scarcity of staff and unfamiliarity with legal procedures. CESTAT rejected the application since the grounds were related to the earlier period and not to the period of delay.

Held
Substantial justice shall be preferred as against technical requirements. Unless delay is inordinate or not explained at all or is due to mala fide intentions or neglect and lethargy, condonation shall be granted liberally. Having regard to the facts of the case, delay was condoned subject to payment of cost.

[2016-TIOL-2072-CESTAT-MUM] Jet Airways India Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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II. Tribunal

Tax paid under reverse charge mechanism which is available as CENVAT credit results in a revenue neutral situation and is a good ground to set aside demands, interest and penalties.

Facts
The Appellant is engaged in running airlines all over India as well as outside India. They have entered into agreements with the providers of computer reservation system (CRS) services outside India to display real time availability of flights, reservation of flights etc. on the basis of data collected from the main server of the Appellant for a consideration to be paid on the basis of each ticket issued by the travel agent.

A show cause notice was issued demanding service tax, interest and penalties on such payments made outside India u/s. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 under reverse charge mechanism falling under “online information and database access or retrieval service”. It was argued that to be covered under the said service category, the person who renders that service should be the owner or should have exclusive right over the relevant information/data so as to put him in a position to charge the recipient for access/retrieval of that data/information.

However in the present case the data/information was owned by the Appellant itself. Further revenue neutrality was claimed to set aside the demands.

Held
The Tribunal relying on the decision of British Airways [2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT-DEL] held that the classification of the activity is correctly determined by the revenue and therefore the demand stands correct. However, it was noted that the tax paid under reverse charge mechanism would be available as CENVAT credit against the output service tax liability of “transport by air and other services” resulting in a revenue neutral situation. It was held that it is trite law that question of revenue neutrality is a good ground, more so when the tax liability is being discharged under reverse charge mechanism and therefore demands, interest and penalties imposed are set aside.

2016 (43) STR 57(Kar.) Commr. of ST, Bangalore vs. Tavant Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.

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Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit be claimed without even having any service tax registration.

Facts
The respondent was engaged in export of services and is not registered under the Service Tax Law. However a refund claim of unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was filed. In absence of registration, the claim was rejected. Tribunal relied on the decision of M/s. mPortal India Wireless Solutions Private Limited 2011 (16) taxmann.com 353 (Kar) of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court and held that there is no such precondition under the CENVAT Credit Rules for the assessee to take any registration. Also, one to one co-relation with respect to the input services used for providing output services was established and accordingly refund was allowed. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, department has filed an appeal.

Held

The High Court dismissed the appeal due to absence of substantial question of law.

[2016-TIOL-1730-HC-Del-ST] Federation of Hotels and Restaurants Association of India and ORS vs. Union of India and ORS

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I. High Court

Constitutional validity of restaurant service along with Rule 2(C) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 is upheld and entry 65(105)(zzzzw) pertaining to levy of service tax on short term accommodation is held unconstitutional and invalid.

Facts:
The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzzv) viz. restaurant service and section 66E(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 seeking to constitute service portion in an activity of supply of food as a declared service. Further it is claimed that Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 arbitrarily determining 40% as the value of service is invalid. Further the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzzw) viz. Hotel, Inn, Club and Guest House service is also challenged. It was stated that with the insertion of clause 29(f) in Article 366 of the constitution, the state legislatures have the exclusive competence to legislate in respect of levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods and no part of the transaction of supply of food in a restaurant is amenable to service tax. Further in respect of hotel accommodation it was submitted that Entry 62 of the State List imposes tax on entertainment, amusement, betting and gambling and moreover state legislatures have enacted statutes for levy of luxury tax on hotel accommodation and therefore levy of service tax lacks legislative competence.

Held:
The High Court relied on the decision of Larsen and Toubro [2015-TIOL-187-SC-ST] and BSNL vs. Union of India [2006-TIOL-15-SC-CT-LB] wherein it has been observed that the taxation powers of the Centre and States are mutually exclusive under the constitution and therefore the moment a levy enters into a prohibited exclusive field it is liable to be struck down. Accordingly Parliament can only tax the service element and the states can only tax the transfer of property in goods. Therefore the Court noted that in the present writ it is essential to examine whether the composite catering contract is capable of being segregated into a portion pertaining to supply of goods and that pertaining to services provided. Relying on the decision of Larsen and Toubro vs. State of Karnataka [2013-TIOL-46-SC-CT-LB] it was held that even if some part of the composite transaction involves rendering of service, there should be no difficulty in recognizing the power of the Union to bring to tax that portion. Since the Parliament has made the legal position explicit by taxing the service portion of a composite contract of supply of food and drinks the same has sound constitutional basis and therefore section 65(105)(zzzzv) and section 66E(i) are constitutionally valid. In the matter of Rule 2C the Court relying on the decision of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. Union of India [2010-TIOL-87-SC-ST-LB] observed that the grant of abatement has the approval by the Supreme Court more so when the assessee does not maintain accounts to determine the service portion. However it was pointed out that if an assessee is able to demonstrate on the basis of accounts and records that the value of service is different than that provided in the Rule, the assessing authority is obliged to consider such submission and give a decision thereto. In respect of Hotel accommodation, however the Court noted that the “Delhi Tax on Luxuries Act, 1996” which provides for levy of luxury tax on provision of service of hotel accommodation is traceable to entry 62 of the State list and therefore the State is competent to levy tax on such taxable event. Thus, this is a case of encroachment by the Union in the domain of the State and therefore the Court strikes down section 65(105)(zzzzw) of the Finance Act 1994 pertaining to levy of service tax on provision of short-term accommodation.

“Transfer of right to use” vis-à-vis “Permissible Use”

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Introduction
The controversy about nature of a transaction as to whether it is ‘transfer of right to use’ or nothas been debated for long.. Intermittently there are judgments from different forums giving different views and at times conflicting views. Asituation has also arisen that both VAT and Service Tax are being levied on same amount. It was long felt that the issue, whether service tax is attracted or VAT is attracted, should be decided by the Hon. High Court by making both authorities VAT and Service tax authorities parties to the dispute. Mahayco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.9175 of 2015) & Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd. (W.P.No.497 of 2015) dated 11.8.2016.

Recently Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to deal with the above delicate issue once more in above matters. The important aspect of the Writ Petitions is that along with VAT department of State Government, Service Tax Department of Central Government was also made party to the Writ Petition. Both writ petitions are decided by common judgment. However, facts in both cases are different.

It will be useful to refer to judgment in each case separately.

Mahayco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.9175 of 2015 dated 11.8.2016).

The facts as noted by Hon. High Court in above case are as under:

“11. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9175 of 2015, Monsanto India, is a joint venture company of Monsanto Investment India Private Limited (“MIIPL”) and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Monsanto India develops and commercializes insect-resistant hybrid cottonseeds using a proprietary “Bollgard technology”, one that is licensed to Monsanto India by Monsanto USA through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Monsanto Holdings Private Limited (“MHPL”). This technology is further sublicensed by Monsanto India to various seed companies on a non-exclusive and nontransferable basis to use, test, produce and sell genetically modified hybrid cotton planting seeds. In return for this technology, Monsanto India receives trait fees based on the number of packets of seeds sold by the sub-licensees. These sub-licensing agreements, with almost 40 seed companies, are the transactions in question. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the Monsanto Writ Petition are the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra respectively. Respondent No.3 is the Principal Commissioner of Service Tax. Respondent No. 4 is the Commissioner of Sales Tax.”

The arguments were from various angles including the argument that the allowance touse is non exclusive and not covered by ‘transfer of right to use’ category in view of judgment in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.(145 STC 91)(SC). Payment of service tax on same amount was also pointed out in the arguments made. Judgment in case of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (80 VST 173)(Bom) of Hon. Bombay High Court was argued to be distinguishable as well as otherwise argued to be per incurium. It was urged that no distinction can be made between tangible and intangible goods and therefore, the law laid down in BSNL equally applies to intangible goods also.

However, Hon. High Court did not concur with above submission and justified levy of VAT . Hon. High Court concluded as under:

“37. We have considered most carefully this submission. It is indeed sophisticated in its construction, and, at first blush, appears most appealing. On reflection and a closer examination, we find ourselves unable to subscribe to the interpretation Mr. Venkatraman so eloquently commends, viz., that his transaction is one of a merely permissive use. We find this interpretation not to be supported by law, and we have the most serious reservations about the universal applicability of his propositions, which seem to us to be overbroad and to cast the net too widely. The first question is whether there is a ‘transfer’ within the meaning of Article 366(29A)(d). We believe there is. It is true that the essence of a ‘transfer’ is the divesting of a right or goods from transferor and the investing of the same in the transferee, and this is what Salmond on Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum both say. In our opinion, the seeds embedded with the technology are, in fact, transferred. Monsanto India is divested of that portion of the technology embedded in these fifty seeds and these are fully vested in the sub-licensee. Mr. Venkatraman is not correct when he says that the effective control of the ‘goods’ is with Monsanto India. In RINL, the Supreme Court concluded that the contractor (transferee) did not have effective control over the machinery, despite the fact that he was using it, since he could not make such use of it as he liked. He could not use the machinery for any project other than that of the transferor’s, nor could he move it out during the period of the project. We do not see how we can draw a parallel from that case to the one at hand. The effective control over the seeds, and, therefore that portion of the technology that is embedded in the seeds, is entirely with the sub-licensee. That sub licensee is not bound to use the seeds (and the embedded technology) in accordance with Monsanto India’s wishes. Monsanto India cannot further dictate to the sub-licensee what he or it may do with these technology-infused seeds. The sub-licensee can do as it wishes with them. It may not use them at all. It may even destroy the seeds. Once the transaction is complete, i.e., once possession of the technology-imbued seeds is effected, and those seeds are delivered, Monsanto India has nothing at all to do with the technology embedded in those fifty seeds given to the sub-licensee.

At no point does Monsanto India have access to this portion of the technology. In other words, the transfer is to the exclusion of Monsanto India. This clearly satisfies the so-called BSNL “twin test” that Mr. Venkatraman is at pains to propound. Mr. Venkatraman’s argument that the seeds are “merely the media” and therefore irrelevant is, in our opinion, erroneous. They are relevant for the simple reason that the technology could not have been given to the sub-licensee without them; and there is no other method demonstrated anywhere of effecting any such transfer.”

Thus, Hon. High Court rejected all arguments about transfer of technology within scope of permissible use but held it as complete transfer of right, to constitute deemed sale liable under VAT . Hon. High Court has also cited various examples about what constitutes goods in relation to intangible goods.

The alternative argument that it is sale of seeds, hence exempt under Schedule Entry A-41 of MVAT Act was also rejected.

The other main argument about non attraction of VAT as Service Tax is paid did not impress the court. The further plea to direct transfer of service tax paid to VAT department was also not considered by Hon. Court by observing as under:

“53. Mr. Venkatraman makes one more, without prejudice argument, in case neither of his previous arguments succeeds. He submits that even if the agreement in question is held to be a transfer of the right to use (deemed sale) and that it does not fall under the exemption for seeds in the MVAT Act, then the levy and collection of Service Tax by the Union of India would be without the authority of law since VAT can only be levied and collected by the States. As argued earlier, the same transaction cannot be taxed as both a sale and a service. Monsanto India has already paid service tax for the entire period at a rate significantly higher than what is provided under the MVAT Act and therefore he says that it is not liable to pay further tax. For the period between May 2007 and February 2009, it has paid service tax at a rate of 12.36%, for March 2009 to March 2012 at a rate of 10.3%, for April 2012 to May 2015 at 12.36%, and for the period beginning June 2015 at a rate of 14%.

Under Entry 39 of Schedule C of the MVAT Act, the applicable rate of sales tax is only 5% since April 2010, prior to which it was 4%. He therefore seeks a Writ of Mandamus directing Union of India to transfer the amount paid as service tax from the Consolidated Fund of India to the Consolidated Fund of State of Maharashtra. He argues that such a transfer would not amount to unjust enrichment. We decline to enter into this debate. We leave it to Monsanto India to adopt suitable proceedings in this behalf, and leave their contentions open to the necessary extent.”

There will thus be a looming question of double tax payment.

Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd. (W.P.No.497 of 2015 dated 11.8.2016)

The facts in this case are noted by High Court as under:

“55. A brief description of Subway’s business is this. Subway was granted a non-exclusive sub-license by Subway International B.V. (“SIBV”), a Dutch limited liability corporation to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY -branded restaurants in India. This non-exclusive license was granted to SIBV itself by Subway Systems International Ansalt, which in turn was granted such a license by Doctor’s Associates Inc., an entity that owns the proprietary system for setting up and operating these restaurants.

These restaurants serve sandwiches and salads under the service mark SUBWAY. The agreement includes not only the trade mark SUBWAY , but also associated confidential information and goodwill, such as policies, forms, recipes, trade secrets and the like.

Typically, Subway enters into franchise agreements with third parties, under which it provides specified services to the franchisee. In return, the franchisee undertakes to carry on the business of operating sandwich shops in Subway’s name. The agreement only provides for a very limited representational or display right, and the franchisee cannot transfer or assign these exclusive rights to any third person. Subway also reserves the right to compete with these franchisees in the agreement. Under this agreement, Subway receives two kinds of consideration, one being a one-time franchisee fee which is paid when the agreement is signed; and the second is a royalty fee paid weekly by the franchisee on the basis of its weekly turnover. A sample franchise agreement is annexed. Under these agreements, the franchisees have no more than a right to display Subway’s intellectual property in the form of marks and logos, and a mere right to use such confidential information as Subway discloses and as prescribed by the franchise agreement.”

Based on above facts, the issue was examined by the Court. In this case also the ratio of BSNL relied upon. Hon. High Court ultimately held as under:

“69. We believe that Mr. Shroff is correct when he says that the agreement between Subway and its franchisees is not a sale, but is in fact a bare permission to use. It is, therefore, subject only to service tax. In our opinion, the fact that the agreement between Subway and its franchisee is limited to the precise period of time stipulated in the agreement is vital to Subway’s case. At the end of the period of the agreement, or before in case there was any breach of its terms, the right of the franchisee to display the mark ‘Subway’ and its trade dress, and all other permissions would also end. This is what sets this agreement apart from the case of Monsanto and its sublicensee. There, the seed companies could do as they pleased with the seeds; they could alienate or even destroy them. In Subway’s case, there are set terms provided by the agreement which have to be followed. A breach of these would result in termination of the agreement.

We believe that there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the franchisees. In fact, this agreement is a classic example of permissive use. It can be nothing else. For all the reasons in law and fact that the sub-licensing of technology in Monsanto is held to be a transfer of right to use, this franchising agreement must be held to be permissive use.”

Thus on ground that the agreement is for permissible use, it is held that it is not a sale by transfer of right to use but a ‘service agreement’.

One more issue dealt with by Hon. High Court is that for situs of sale by transfer of right to use, the place of agreement, as decided by Supreme Court in case of 20th Century Finance Corp. Ltd. ( 119 STC 182)(SC), is relevant.

In this case, the agreement was signed in Delhi and hence High Court held that otherwise also the transaction cannot be taxed in Maharashtra, inspite that the users are in Maharashtra.

Conclusion
The issue about sale by transfer of right to use or service transaction has become vexed and requires decision on facts of each case. Even in above judgment, Hon High Court has observed that each agreement, whether titled as franchise or something else, will be required to be decided on the basis of actual terms and scope of agreement. The dealers will thus be under threat of uncertainity taxation and most probably by both departments, till the issue gets resolved at a higher forum. Some undisputable criteria for deciding nature of transaction is required to be specified to avoid such uncertain situation.

Issue of limitation, an issue of jurisdiction

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In a recent judgment of Calcutta High Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata (2016) 42 STR 634 (Calcutta), the doctrine, the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction, although an established law has been examined at great length with reference to show cause notices issued for recovery of service tax. Therefore a brief analysis of observations of the Hon. High Court in the said case is provided below:

Petitioner’s case in brief:
The petitioners in the instant case were engaged in civil construction activity. They obtained registration under construction service in October, 2004. Prior to this, the department had initiated inquiry in June 1998 regarding applicability of service tax as consulting engineer. This was replied to by the petitioner promptly stating that they were engaged in civil construction and were not liable to pay service tax as consulting engineer. Since the matter was not pursued further for six years it was understood as concluded by the petitioner. Again in April, 2004, the petitioners on receipt of the inquiry, denied their liability to pay service tax as consulting engineer. Again, there was no communication for 16 months till the department issued summons in September 2005. This was followed by a show cause notice in April, 2006 invoking longer period of limitation alleging suppression and demanding service tax for the period October 2000 to March 2005. The petitioner filed a reply to this show cause notice reiterating that they did not act as consulting engineer etc. Until three years there was complete silence at the end of which another show cause notice was issued in September 2009 involving period of September 2004 to June 15, 2005. The said second show cause notice culminated in an order confirming demand of service tax with interest and imposing equal amount of penalty. Subsequent to this, the petitioner received intimation for hearing for the earlier show cause notice issued in 2006. The petitioner replied to this stating that no hearing could take place 7 years after issuing show cause notice as they did not have record of the same and that under the law, the assessee is required to maintain records for five years only. Further already adjudicated subsequent show cause notice included part of the period covered in the earlier show cause notice. Hence there could not be dual assessment for the same period under the law. Petitioner’s grievance among others was that though there may be no time limit for adjudication of show cause notices by the department, it should be done in a reasonable time frame. For this reliance was placed on Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SC 363 and in Government of India vs. Citetdal Fine Pharmaceuticals 1989 (42) ELT 515. In both the cases, it was observed by the Apex Court that in absence of any period of limitation, the statutory authority must exercise its power within a reasonable period. Similarly, Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Union of India (2012) 22 taxman.com 367(Bom), observed that it is well settled that adjudication proceedings have to be concluded in reasonable time and if not done, they stand vitiated on the said ground. Also in Bhagwandas S. Tolani vs. B C Aggarwal 1983 (12) ELT 44 (Bom), Universal Generics (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India 1993 taxmann.com 30 (Bom) and in Biswanath & Co. V. Union of India 2010 (257) ELT 30 (Cal), the Courts have set aside either the show cause notice or the order, as the case may be. Sum and substance of the petitioner’s pleadings was to hold the hearing notice and the show cause notice as non-est and invalid. Reliance was placed by the petitioner also on the decisions in CCE vs. Mohan Bakers (P) Ltd. 2009 (241) ELT A23 and Giriraj Industries vs. CCE 2009 (242) ELT A84 wherein the Courts held/affirmed respectively that show cause notice issued after two years/15 months from the date of inspection/cause of action, the proceedings initiated were without following the due process of law.

Revenue’s contentions in brief:
On behalf of revenue, relying on the decision in Surya Alloy Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India 2014 (305) ELT 340 (Cal) it was contended that High Court’s interference on classification issues challenged through writs was not maintainable and the petitioners should be directed to agitate their grievance before the revenue authorities. The revenue further pointed out that in Indian Cardboard Industries vs. Collector of Central Excise 1991 taxmann.com 847 (Cal) it was observed that ordinarily, High Court should not embark to decide the factual disputes but relegate the party to submit the reply before authority concerned who is obliged to decide the same. The said rule however is not free from exceptions which are quoted below:

1 When the show cause notice is ex facie or on the basis of admitted facts does not disclose the offence alleged to be committed;

2 When the show cause notice is otherwise without jurisdiction;

3 When the show cause notice suffers from an incurable infirmity;

4 When the show cause notice is contrary to judicial decisions or decisions of the Tribunal;

5 When there is no material justifying the issuance of the show cause notice.

According to revenue, none of the above applied to the petitioner’s case. Reliance by revenue was also placed on the decision of ACST vs. P. Kesavan & Co. 1996 taxmann. com 1512 and it was contended that the rule must apply even to cases where sufficient evidence is placed before the writ Court for an unambiguous conclusion upon technical matters and made reference to Apcotex Industries vs. Union of India 2011 (271) ELT 46. The revenue among others also contended that issuing notice for personal hearing after a delay of seven years did not vitiate the case of the department against the petitioner as the Finance Act, 1994 contains no bar to continue adjudication proceedings and relied on the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CCE vs. Bhagsons Paints Industries (India) 2003 taxmann. com 315 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Tribunal and allowed adjudication proceedings to be completed nine years after issuance of show cause notice as the statute did not prescribe any time limit. The revenue contended further that show cause notice of 2006 was issued within seven months of the summons dated September 2005 whereas inspection made in 1998 was for the period not covered by the 2006 show cause notice. Only after subsequent inquiries in 2004 and 2005, the impugned show cause notice was issued within seven months.

Court’s view:
The Court’s observations based on rival submissions are summarized as follows:

On the maintainability of the writ petition, it was held that extended period of limitation was wrongly invoked and the logical conclusion would be that the show cause notice was issued without jurisdiction. In such event, the Court is justified in interfering with the show cause notice in exercise of its Writ Jurisdiction. The court observed,

“It is trite law that an authority cannot confer on itself to do a particular thing by wrongly assuming the existence of certain set of facts, existence whereof is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction by such authority. An authority cannot assume jurisdiction to do a particular thing by erroneously deciding a point of fact or law.”

“There cannot be dispute that the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction and the Commissioner has no authority and/or jurisdiction to issue notice after the period of limitation prescribed in the Finance Act, 1994.”

The Court in this frame of reference relied on Raza Textiles Ltd vs,. ITO AIR 1973 SC 1362 and Shrisht Dhawan vs. Shaw Brother (1992) 1 SCC 534 wherein the proposition of Raza Textriles (supra) was reiterated that a Court or a Tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly. Also citing Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO AIR 1961 SC 372, the Court held that preliminary issue of maintainability of the writ petition is decided in favour of the petitioner and the writ cannot be dismissed in limine as unmaintainable.

On merits, after examining provisions of section 73 of the Finance Act 1994 under which the show cause notice was issued vis-à-vis the facts of the case, it was observed that the show cause notice was issued much beyond 18 months from the date when according to the department service tax was found payable. The Court expressed a clear view that a mere mechanical reproduction of the language of the proviso to section 73(1) of the Act does not per se justify invocation of the extended period of limitation. A mere ipse dixit that the Noticee willfully suppressed the material facts with intent to evade payment of service tax is not sufficient and that the department should be able to substantiate its allegation of suppression even if it is not included in the notice. The Court categorically found that to its mind, the instant case was not of suppression by the petitioner as they had provided copies of balance sheets and specimen contracts in 1996 & were found diligent in their response to all the notices. The impugned show cause notice merely contained a sweeping statement that had investigation not been conducted, material facts would not have been unearthed. There is no whisper as to the fact that was alleged as suppressed. The Court found that once the information called for was supplied and was not questioned, a belated demand has to be held to be barred by limitation.

For this, Punjab Laminates P. Ltd. 2006 (202) ELT 578 and CCE vs. Chennai Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (2007) 8 STT 168 were relied upon among various other such as CCE vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd. (2010) 29 STT 39 and Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. vs. CCE (2005) 2 STT 226 (SC).

The Court found the show cause notice to be hopelessly barred by limitation and noted that even if the Court was to decide the issue of limitation in favour of the department, there were other grounds on which would be compelled to quash the impugned show cause notice. The Bench in this reference indicated the ‘overlapped’ period and consequent double assessment and observed that such dual assessment is impermissible in law. Reliance was placed in case of Dankan Industries Ltd. vs. CCE 2006 (201) ELT 517 (SC) and found that the demand was rather predetermined. Further citing the case of Siemens Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2007 (207) ELT 168 (SC), it was observed that ordinarily a writ Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a Noticee to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been issued without jurisdiction, the question has to be considered from a different angle when a notice is issued with pre-meditation.

The Court finally also observed that as pleaded by revenue, the case in no way involved justifiability of classification but of sustainability of a show cause notice and allowed the assessee’s writ quashing the show cause notice of 2006 and dismissed all appeals filed by revenue in this regard.

Conclusion:
When alternate remedy is available and as categorically provided by Hon. High Court in the case of Indian Cardboard Industries (supra), the High Court interferes with the adjudication process in exceptional cases and in particular when there is a clear questionability of jurisdiction involved is proven to the Court. Service tax department in a number of cases may have exceeded its jurisdictional authority. However, considering cost and / or time factor or for want of adequate evidence, not many approach Courts to interfere in the matter. The analysis in the case above serves a good guidance to determine viability depending on facts of each case.

MODEL GST ACT – DICEY ISSUES

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I. BROAD STRUCTURE
1) Model law on Goods
and Service Tax, 2016 [GST] broadly consists of three legislations
Central Goods and Service Tax Act [CGST], State Goods and Service Tax
Act [SGST] covering intra state transactions and Integrated Goods and
Service Tax [IGST] touching upon inter-state transactions. CGST and IGST
will administered by Central Government, whereas SGST by respective
State Governments. Model Act borrows heavily from existing excise,
service tax and VAT statutes. Model GST law encompasses common law for
CGST/SGST to be adopted by Centre/States with necessary changes/
suggestions as also separate IGST to be framed only by Centre
respectively.

2) CGST mainly subsumes central levies such as
service tax, excise duty, countervailing duty [CVD] and special CVD and
the like because, generally speaking, Union possesses jurisdiction under
Constitution of India to levy excise duty on goods up to stage of
manufacture and service tax on services respectively. On the other hand,
SGST absorbs state value added tax [VAT], central sales tax, octroi,
entry tax, entertainment tax, luxury tax, lottery tax etc; since under
Constitution of India as commonly understood competency to exact tax on
post manufacturing activities lies with the states. However, under new
regime, both CGST and SGST are payable simultaneously on supplies
falling within charging section. In the result, there will be 36 state
level SGST Acts, one CGST Act and one IGST Act resulting in 38
legislations. Some critics have also made known their displeasure about
stamp duty at state level not being merged with GST. In my opinion,
there is no meeting point/synergy between a tax based on instrument i.e.
stamp duty and that oriented on concept of supply i.e. GST and thus
such apprehensions are misconceived.

II . CHARGEABILITY VIS-A-VIS TAXABLE EVENT

3)
Charging section 7 of Model CG/SG GST Act, 2016 [Act] brings within its
purview all intra state supplies of goods and/or services payable by
every taxable person. In turn, section 3 defines “supply” in a
comprehensive manner as including all form of supply of goods and/or
services such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental,
lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person in the course or furtherance of business. It is well settled that
when an inclusive connotation is employed in the definition clause of
an enactment it expands and enlarges the normal meaning of the words and
phrases occurring in body of statute and consequently, takes within its
sweep not only things which they usually signify, but also those which
interpretation clause declares that they all include [CIT vs. TAJ MAHAL
82 ITR 44, 47 (SC)]. Nonetheless, there is another parallel, but equally
strong if not less, rule of construction that an interpretation clause
which extends the meaning of the word does not take away its ordinary
meaning or prevent from receiving its popular and natural sense wherever
that would be properly applicable [CGT vs. GETTI CHETTIAR 82 ITR 599,
605 (SC). Legislature always tries to rope in all possible and
conceivable activities/transactions/ actions/occurrences and the like
[known as “taxable events”] to widen net of the charging provision. Yet a
discerning lawyer with a eagle’s eye will not let this happen within
the framework of interpretation and I have my cogent reservations as to
whether aforesaid charging section 7 of Act is foolproof depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. Let us dissect charging
section 7 read with section 3 of Act.

4) Section 3(1)(a) of Act
generally elucidates “supply” as “all forms of supply of any goods
and/or services made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person in the course or furtherance of business. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s
Advanced Law Lexicon, Volume 4 (Q-Z), page 4565, 2005, 3rd Edition,
word “supply” is described as “that which is or can be supplied;
available aggregate of things needed or demanded; an amount sufficient
for given use or purpose”. In the Imperial Dictionary, “that which is
supplied; sufficiency of things for use or want; a quantity of something
furnished or on hand”. The word “supply’ means to give”, or “to provide
or to afford something that is necessary” [page 4566]. Further, in
Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, Ramanatha Aiyar, Book 2 [D-I],
page 1997 expression “give” is depicted clinchingly as “make another the
recipient of something, bestow..………..,, grant”. Similarly, in Advanced
Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, Ramanatha Aiyar, Book 3, page 3813 the
expression “provide” has been described as “to furnish, to supply; one
provides a dinner in the contemplation that some persons are coming to
partake of it; one supplies a family with articles of daily use.” In my
opinion, on a conspectus of aforesaid purport of various terms, to
attract generic clause (a) of Section 3 two separate and distinct
persons must exist. In my opinion, therefore, mutual associations will
not only not fall foul of substantive definition of the term “supply”,
but also gain benefit of the GST Act not containing a deeming fiction to
rope in such entities and consequently, mutuality tenet, in my opinion,
will also prevail and sustain under GST. Principle of mutuality is
consistently countenanced and upheld in the context of service tax in
SATURDAY CLUB LTD vs. ACST (2006) 3 STR 305, 311 (CAL); (2005) 180 ELT
437 (CAL); DALHOUSIE INSTITUTE vs. ACST (2006) 3 STR 311, 314 TO 316
(CAL); (2005) 180 ELT 18 (CAL); SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT vs. UOI 20 STR 17
(GUJ); KARNAVATI CLUB vs. UOI 20 STR 169 (GUJ); SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT
vs. UOI 31 STR 645 (GUJ); RANCHI CLUB vs. CCE AND ST 26 ITR 401
(JHARKHAND); GREEN ENVIORNMENT vs. UOI 49 GST 563 (GUJ); CCE AND C vs.
SURAT TENNIS CLUB 50 GST 25 (GUJ); NATIONA L ASSOCIATION vs. CST 51 GST
301 (DEL); FICCI vs. CST 38 STR 529, 547 TO 549 (TRI-DEL-PRINCIPA L
BENCH); MATUN GA GYMKHANA vs. CST 38 ITR 407 (TRI-MUM); NASSCOM vs. CST
51 GST 301 TRI-DEL); DELHI CHIT FUND ASSOCIATION vs. UOI 30 STR 347, 352
(DEL)]. Similar approach is espoused under excise and sales tax laws,
for instance, the decision of the Supreme Court in CTO vs. YOUNG MEN’S
INDIAN ASSOCIATION 36 STC 241 pertaining to chargeability of sales tax
in relation to supply of various preparations by the club to its
members. In the same vein are judicial rulings reported in PRESCOT MILLS
LTD vs. CCE (2006) 5 STT 35 (CESTAT -BANG); SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT vs.
CST (1975) 36 STC 511 (GUJ) [SALES TAX] and BAJAJ AUTO LTD vs. CCE
(2005) 1 STT 83, 87 (MUM).

5) A charging Section must be
construed strictly and must integrate with and complement machinery and
collection provisions [CIT vs. SRINIVASA SETTY 128 ITR 294, 299 (SC)].
Besides, intra state supply is as such not explained in definition
clause of Act, but expounded in Section 3A of Integrated Goods and
Services Tax Act, 2016 [IGST] as “any supply where the location of the
supplier and place of supply are in the same state”. Branch transfers
are not expressly exempt from IGST, but, in my opinion, they do not fall
within ken of charging Section 3 of IGST. In my opinion, Sections 7
read with 3 of Act are bedrock of serious and fundamental litigation.
All the foregoing propositions of law are not from of doubt and may
entail protracted litigation.

III.COLLECTION OF GST

6)
Time for collection GST would depend upon time of supply of
goods/services as postulated in Sections 12 and 13 of Act respectively.
In respect of goods, broadly, time of supply will be earliest of either
date on which goods are removed by supplier for supply to recipient
where goods are required to be removed or where not required to be
removed when goods are made available to the recipient or date on which
supplier issues invoice in relation to supply or date on which supplier
receives payment or date on which recipient shows receipt of goods in
his books of accounts. In connection with services, liability to pay GST
will generally arise at time of supply of services being either date of
invoice or date of receipt of payment whichever is earlier or date of
completion of the provision of service or the date of receipt of
payment, whichever is earlier or date on which the recipient shows the
receipt of services in his books of accounts. I do not quite understand
as how supplier’s liability under the Act can be fixed on the foundation
of exhibition of the transaction in recipient’s books of accounts as
stated above in light of trite law that Assessee cannot be expected to
perform the impossible [LIC vs. CIT 219 ITR 410, 418 (SC) or still
Assessee cannot be saddled or blamed for what recipient third party does
in its books [CIT vs. BASANT 238 ITR 680 (CAL); CIT vs. OASIS 333 ITR
119 (DEL)].

IV. REGISTRATION

7) Section 19 of Act
contemplates every person liable to be registered shall apply for
registration in every such state in which he is exigible. In other
words, multiple registrations are envisaged by virtue of registration in
each of the states resulting in cumbersome and unwieldy administration,
management and maintenance. Mechanism must be devised by software
professionals comprised in Technology Advisory Group constituted earlier
by harnessing advanced information technology so that single
registration of same person with Unique Identity Number is sufficient to
carry out business in each of the states avoiding need for multiple
registrations. Sub-section (7) of section 19 of Act confers discretion
on the proper officer to reject application for registration which is
objected to by section of the GST stakeholders and hence a suggestion is
doing the rounds that it be made obligatory. In my opinion, there is
nothing fundamentally wrong with said provision inasmuch as sub-section
(8) of section 19 incorporates principles of natural justice to be
adhered to before dismissing application as also sub-section (9)
provides that if no deficiency is communicated to the applicant by
proper officer within time limit prescribed, registration shall be
deemed to have been granted. Moreover, section 79(1) of Act stipulates
that any person aggrieved by any decision or order under Act can file
appeal before first appellate authority. In my opinion, adequate
safeguards are engrafted to protect interests of applicant and no change
in his regard is warranted.

V. RETURNS

8)
Assessees have also launched scathing attack on the number of
details/returns mandated to be filed under model GST law vide sections
25, 26, 27 and 30. Assessee must not be oblivious of the fact that
presently he is dealing with multiple tax legislations [which are now
proposed to be consolidated] where he is required to file as many
returns, face large number of assessments, appeals, penalties and the
like and therefore, in my opinion, there is absolutely no justification
in the protest against multiple returns under GST, more particularly
because data of inward and outward supplies is indispensable for
cross-checking claims of Assessee concerning input tax credit by
matching them. Detection of false and bogus claims must be in-built into
the system itself in order that revenue is not deprived of its
legitimate taxes. Lack of either physical or electronic as also want of
implementation of existing corroborative systems and processes on
account of ulterior and oblique motives has been bane of Indian
assessment system and a section of delinquent Assessees through all
these years taken full advantage of and capitalized on the same and
consequently, caused a lot of heartburn to honest Assessees suffering in
frustration and disgust.

VI. APPEALS

9) Appeals
provisions are laid down in two sets of Sections 79 to 83 under two
different Chapters XVIII. First Chapter XVIII is applicable to CGST law,
whereas second Chapter XVIII is invokable under SGST law. Sections 84
to 93 are common to both. I shall deal with second Chapter XVIII apropos
SGST in ensuing paragraph.

10) First appeal from any “decision”
or “order” u/s. 79 (Second Chapter XVIII) of the Act shall lie before
prescribed first appellate authority within three months [with
condonation further one month] from date of communication of decision or
order to person preferring the appeal subject to inter alia payment of
10% pre-deposit of disputed amount arising out of order. I wonder
whether no predeposit is payable if any demand emanates from a
“decision”. Albeit, in serious cases involving disputed tax liability of
25 crore or more and considered as such by Commissioner vide order in
writing that the department has a very good case on merits, departmental
authorities can apply to first appellate authority urging that a higher
predeposit not exceeding 50% of disputed amount be ordered. Appellant
may raise additional grounds provided omission to take that ground in
original grounds of appeal was not wilful or unreasonable. First
appellate authority has no specific power to set aside any matter to
lower authorities although this issue is not free from doubt as there is
cleavage of opinion on this controversy though nothing prevents him
from calling a remand report inasmuch as under sub-section (8) of
section 79 he may make further inquiry as may be necessary to pass
order. Appellant by way of appropriate framed rules may also be allowed
to adduce additional evidences. Second appeal u/s. 82 of Act lies to
National Goods and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) against
appellate order framed u/s. 79 or revision order passed u/s. 80 within 3
months of date of communication of order sought to be appealed against
with unlimited power appertaining to period of condonation subject to
sufficient cause and predeposit as discussed hereinabove. Adjournments
shall be granted by first appellate authority/Tribunal subject to a
maximum limit of three times, but consequences of same party seeking
adjournment for fourth time is not stated implying that first appellate
authority/Tribunal will proceed to decide matter on merits. Further on a
bare reading of proviso to sub-section (6)/(2) of section 79/83, each
of the parties to litigation get a chance to apply for adjournment 3
times each; meaning if parties are two, I suppose, appeal itself can be
adjourned six times subject to maximum cap of three occasions per party.
Tribunal through section 83(1) possesses specific powers to admit
additional evidence and set aside issues for fresh adjudication to lower
authorities. Every Tribunal shall consists of as many members of
Technical (CGST), Judicial and Technical (SGST) as may be prescribed.
Appeal from order of Tribunal lies to the High Court on a substantial
question of law within 180 days of date of receipt of order appealed
against subject to condonation application for an unspecified period
with sufficient cause. Notwithstanding appeal vide section 87(2) shall
directly lie to Supreme Court from Tribunal’s order u/s. 83 if disputes
relates to treatment of transactions being intra state or inter state or
place of supply provided there is divergence of views between two or
more states or a state and Centre. Orders of High Court shall be
appealable to Apex Court vide section 88(1).

VII. MISCELLANEOUS

11)
Section 123 cast initial presumptive burden on any person to
demonstrate that he is not liable to tax under the Act in respect of any
supply of goods and/or services or that he is eligible for input credit
u/s. 16. In my opinion, first part of the section throwing primary onus
on person to show he is not covered by the charging provisions is
draconian inasmuch it is well entrenched by way of judge made law that
burden is on revenue to exhibit that a particular person is hit by the
charging provisions [PARIMISETTI SEETHARAMAMMA vs. CIT 57 ITR 532, 536
(SC)]. Indeed entire assumption of jurisdiction to assess is contingent
upon subject being brought within the tentacles of the charging section
and thus by common sense test revenue must first unload this
responsibility. In my opinion, a person cannot do the impossible, that
is, establish the negative fact that he does not fall within the
charging section [VARGHESE vs. ITO 131 ITR 597, 615 (SC)], but
department must positively demonstrate that subject is exigible to tax
by virtue of the substantive charge created by statute. In any case,
statutory presumption u/s. 123 is rebuttable and on clinching legal
arguments onus can shift on revenue to displace arguments of Assessee.
However, last segment of section 123 putting burden on the person
claiming input credit tax is in conformity with settled premise that
person claiming relief must prove that he satisfies conditions precedent
surrounding such concession [PARIMISETTI SEETHARAMAMMA vs. CIT 57 ITR
532, 537 (SC)]. Electronic commerce transactions [digital economy] are
bundled up under Chapter XIB captioned “Electronic Commerce” comprising
sections 43B and 43C of Act mainly on the lines of equalization levy
introduced under Income Tax Act, 1961 vide Chapter VIII of Finance Act,
2016 encompassing sections 163 to 180 thereof. In my opinion, in light
of the fact that these transactions take place in vague and hazy area of
“cyberspace” there is no particular specific identifiable territorial
jurisdiction to which these digital transactions can be traced and
attached and thus to tap potential revenue loss, one of the options
exercised by revenue founded on concept of Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting [BEPS] coined by The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is to impose an obligation on “electronic commerce
operator” (operator) to collect an amount at a prescribed rate as may be
notified out of the consideration payable towards supply of goods and/
or services made through such operator. Success of GST story will
primarily depend upon uniform and consistent adoption of model GST
legislation by various states with minimum localization, smooth,
efficient and competent working of logistics provided by Goods and
Service Tax Network [GSTN] to plug leakage of revenue through seamless
matching of input and output supplies, coordinated and unified operation
of the Goods and Service Tax Council (GST Council), education and
training of revenue officers and staff as also Assessees about new GST
law thereby leading to a development of robust common market across the
country reducing cascading effect of taxes affecting pricing of goods
and services.

Bastimal K Jain vs. ITO ITAT “B” Bench, Mumbai Before Mahavir Singh (J. M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A. M) ITA No.: 2896/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2010-11. Date of order: 8th June, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K. Shivaram / Sachidanand Dube

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Section 54 – Date of purchase of a new flat is the date of possession and not the date of agreement.

FACTS
During the year under consideration, the assessee had sold his flat for a consideration of Rs.55 lakh on 24.02.2010 resulting into long term capital gain of Rs.50.95 lakh. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 54 contending that he had purchased a new flat in earlier year, the possession of which was received on 11.09.2009. The AO noted that the agreement for purchase of the new flat was entered into on 28.12.2007 and registered on 28.02.2008. Thus, according to him, the purchase of new flat by the assessee was made one year before the date of the sale of the property. Hence, he denied the deduction claimed u/s 54. The CIT(A) on appeal, relying on the Madras High Court decision in the case of Late R Krishnaswamy (ITA No.697 & 698 of 2013 dated 26.11.2013), held that the date of registration of sale deed was material for the purpose of determining the date of purchase of a flat. Accordingly, the CIT(A) concurred with the views of the AO and held that the assessee had not acquired the new flat within one year before the sale of the Long Term Capital Asset and thus denied the benefit u/s 54 claimed by the assessee.

Before the Tribunal in support of the orders of the lower authorities, the revenue relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIV s. Jindas Panachand Gandhi [2005] 279 ITR 552.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the flat intended to be purchased by the assessee was not at all constructed on 28.12.2007 when the agreement for purchase was entered into. Eventually property’s possession was given to the assessee by the builder only on 11.09.2009. According to the Tribunal, the agreement for purchase was just a right for purchase of a flat in the proposed construction. The Tribunal also agreed with the assessee that the acquisition of the property is to be considered only when the possession of the flat was given to the assessee by the builder and that date was on 11.09.2009. Thus, the vital conditions of section 54 of the Act were fulfilled when the property’s possession was handed over to the assessee by the builder on 11.09.2009 i.e. within the time limit prescribed u/s. 54 of the Act for claiming deduction u/s 54 of the Act. In arriving at the above conclusion, the Tribunal also relied on the decision of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of V M Dujodwala vs. ITO (36 ITD 130) and of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Beena K Jain (217 ITR 363).

Shivam Steel & Tubes Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “E” Bench, Mumbai Before Rajendra (A. M.) and C. N. Prasad (J. M) ITA No.: 4691/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of order: 5th August, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Sanjeev Kashyap / Jayesh Dadia

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Section 271(1)(c) – Non-filing of appeal against the additions made cannot be a ground for justifying levy of penalty.

FACTS
During the assessment proceedings the AO made two disallowances viz., Rs. 0.17 lakh u/s. 14A and Rs. 10.71 lakh u/s.80IB. Penalty proceedings u/s.27l(1)(c) were also initiated at the time of assessment. In its reply to penalty notice, the assessee submitted that it had furnished all details of expenditure. However, according to the AO, the assessee by not filing any appeal against the additions has admitted its fault and hence, he levied a penalty of Rs. 3.7 lakh. On appeal, the first appellate authority confirmed the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities on the ground that the assessee filed the revised computation after the AO made enquiries. Assessee is a corporate entity, that it had made a patently wrong claim. It relied upon the cases of Mak Data (350 ITR 593) and Zoom communications (327 ITR 590).

HELD
According to the Tribunal, penalty cannot be levied just because additions are made during assessment proceedings and the assessee did not agitate the additions before the Appellate Authorities. As per the settled principles of taxation jurisprudence penalty proceeding and assessment proceedings are totally separate and distinct. Addition made during assessment cannot and should not result in automatic levy of penalty. Penalty has to be levied considering the explanation of assessee filed during penalty proceedings. According to the Tribunal, disallowance u/s 14A does not prove filing of inaccurate particulars of income. As regards the claim u/s 80IB, according to the Tribunal, the assessee had reasonable cause in as much as the claims – original as well as revised, both were made as per the advice of the chartered accountant. Further, relying on the Bombay high court decision in the case of CIT vs. Somany Evergreen Knits Ltd. (352 ITR 592) and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the assesse had not furnished inaccurate particulars of income and reversed the order of the lower authorities.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 147 (Delhi – Trib.) Sanjeev Puri vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 11th July, 2016

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Section 54F – For the purposes of section 54F, the question whether the assessee owns more than one residential house other than the new asset is to be determined based on the actual user of the property and not on the basis of what is shown in municipal record and therefore, ownership of a flat which is shown as a residential house in municipal records but is actually used as an office is not to be regarded as ownership of a “residential house”.

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2010-11, the assessee, a senior advocate, sold his rights in his Gurgaon Flat and earned long term capital gain of Rs. 1,48,23,645. This long term capital gain was invested in a residential property within the specified time and exemption claimed u/s. 54F of the Act. This claim for exemption u/s. 54F was denied by the Assessing Officer (AO) on the ground that the assessee was owner of more than one residential house.

The contention of the assessee that the property belonging to the assessee being property at E-575A, Ground floor, Gr. Kailash-II, New Delhi was used by the assessee as his office and therefore the same is not regarded as a residential house owned by the assessee for the purposes of section 54F of the Act was not accepted by the AO on the ground that as per the municipal records and the sale deed this property was a residential property.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that there was no dispute about the fact that the property E-575A, GK-II, New Delhi, owned by the assessee was being used by him as his office during the relevant period but the only dispute between the assessee and the Revenue remained on the entitlement of the deduction u/s. 54F of the Act on the basis of actual user of the property i.e. office use and not merely on the basis of the municipal record showing the property meant for residential use or in the sale deed shown as residential type.

The Tribunal noted that the ratio of the following decisions

(i) CIT vs. Geeta Duggal (357 ITR 153)(Del);

(ii) ITO vs. Ouseph Chacko (271 ITR 29 (Ker);

(iii) Smt. P. K. Vasanthi Rangarajan vs. CIT (23 taxmann. com 229)(Mad);

(iv) ITO vs.. Rasiklal & Satra (98 ITD 335)(Mum Trib); and

(v) ITO vs.. Smt. Rohini Reddy (122 TTJ 423)(Hyd.)

support the stand of the assessee that for availing the deduction u/s. 54F of the Act, the property though shown as residential on the record of the municipality but the test will be actual user of the premises by the assessee during the relevant period. It held that the actual user thereof by the assessee will be considered while adjudicating upon the eligibility of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act and the fact that the property has been shown as residential house on the record of the government authority does not make a difference.

The Tribunal held that the AO should not have considered the property E-575A, GK-II, New Delhi to be residential property on the basis of municipal record by ignoring the actual use thereof as office of the assessee. The authorities below were held to be not justified in denying the claim of deduction u/s. 54F on the basis that the assessee was owning more than one residential house by including the said house used as office to be a residential house.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

[2016] 159 ITD 165 (Pune Trib.) Cooper Corporation (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy CIT A.Y.: 2008-09. Date of order: 29th April, 2016.

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Section 37(1) – When the assessee converts Indian rupee loan borrowed for purchasing assets from India into foreign currency loan for taking benefit of lower interest rates and thereafter as per AS – 11 translates foreign currency loan into Indian Rupees by applying the foreign exchange rate as on the closing day of reporting period and such translation results in business loss, then the resultant loss is allowed as deduction u/s 37(1) as such loss is dictated by revenue considerations of saving interest costs.

FACTS
The assessee had initially availed various term loans in Indian rupees from banks for acquisition of assets and for expansion of project, etc. Subsequently, said loans were converted into foreign currency loans to take benefit of lower rate of interest on such foreign currency loans visa- vis loans in Indian rupee.

The assessee, following Accounting Standard – 11 (AS- 11) issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), translated foreign currency loan into Indian Rupees by applying the foreign exchange rate as on the closing day of reporting period and the same resulted in exchange loss. The said translation loss resulted in business loss which was disallowed by the AO.

The assessee argued before the AO that there is no provision in the Income-tax Act to reject the loss incurred on fluctuation in exchange as revenue expense except section 43A which provides for capitalization of such loss where the loan was taken on acquisition of any capital asset outside India. Since the assessee had not acquired assets from a country outside India section 43A was not applicable.

However, the AO held that the so-called loss was merely a notional loss and not an actual loss incurred by the company. The Assessing Officer further observed that even presuming that increased liability for repayment of foreign currency loans had been saddled on the assessee, still the same would be a payment of capital nature since impugned loans were obtained for acquiring the capital asset. The AO, thus, held that the loss claimed on account of fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.

On appeal, the CIT-(A) granted partial relief to assessee on account of foreign currency fluctuation loss arising on loans found by him to be connected to revenue items such as bill discounting, debtors, etc. However, in respect of other loans, the CIT-(A) observed that such loans were taken for capital purposes such as acquisition of assets and expansion of the projects and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to losses from fluctuation in currency as revenue expenditure.

On second appeal:

HELD
It may be pertinent to examine whether the increased liability due to fluctuation loss can be added to the carrying costs of corresponding capital assets with reference to section 43(1). Section 43(1) defines the expression ‘actual cost’. As per section 43(1), actual cost means actual cost of the assets of the assessee, reduced by that portion of the costs as has been met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority. Several Explanations have been appended to section 43(1). However, the section nowhere specifies that any gain or loss on foreign currency loan acquired for purchase of indigenous assets will have to be reduced or added to the costs of the assets.

The issue is also tested in the light of provision of section 36(1)(iii) governing deduction of interest costs on borrowings. Section 36(1)(iii) states that utilization of loan for capital account or revenue account purpose has nothing to do with allowing deduction of corresponding interest expenditure. A proviso inserted thereto by Finance Act, 2003, also prohibits claim of interest expenditure in revenue account only upto the date on which capital asset is put to use. Once the capital asset is put to use, the interest expenditure on money borrowed for acquisition of capital asset is also treated as revenue expenditure.

Thus, viewed from the perspective of section 43(1) and section 36(1)(iii), such increased liability cannot be bracketed with cost of acquisition of capital assets save and except in terms of overriding provisions of section 43A.

CBDT notification S.O. 892(E) dated 31-3-2015 also inter alia deals with recognition of exchange differences. The notification also sets out that the exchange differences arising on foreign currency transactions have to be recognized as income or business expense in the period in which they arise subject to exception as set out in section 43A or rule 115 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 as the case may be.

A bare reading of section 43A, which opens with a non obstante and overriding clause, would show that it comes into play only when the assets are acquired from a country outside India and does not apply to acquisition of indigenous assets. Another notable feature is that section 43A provides for making corresponding adjustments to the costs of assets only in relation to exchange gains/ losses arising at the time of making payment. It, therefore, deals with realised exchange gain/loss. The treatment of unrealised exchange gain/loss is not covered under the scope of section 43A. It is, thus, apparent that special provision of section 43A has no application to the facts of the case. Therefore, the issue whether the loss is on revenue account or a capital one is required to be tested in the light of generally accepted accounting principles, pronouncements and guidelines, etc.

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. [1998] 231 ITR 285 held that cost of an asset and cost of raising money for purchase of asset are two different and independent transactions. Therefore, fluctuations in foreign exchange rate while repaying instalments of foreign loan raised to acquire asset cannot alter actual cost of assets. The assessee may have raised funds to purchase the asset by borrowing but what the assessee has paid to acquire asset is the price of the asset. That price cannot change by any event subsequent to the acquisition of the asset.

The assessee has inter alia applied AS-11 dealing with effects of the changes in the exchange rate to record the losses incurred owing to fluctuation in the foreign exchange. AS-11 enjoins reporting of monetary items denominated foreign currency using the closing rate at the end of the accounting year. It also requires that any difference, loss or gain, arising from such conversion of the liability at the closing rate should be recognized in the profit & loss account for the reporting period.

As per section 209 of the Companies Act, 1956, the assessee being a company is required to compulsorily follow mercantile system of accounting. Section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 also mandates that accounting standards as applicable are required to be followed while drawing statement of affairs. Section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 similarly casts obligation to compute business income either by cash or mercantile system of accounting. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Woodward Governor India (P.) Ltd. [2009] 312 ITR 254 has observed that AS-11 is mandatory in nature. Thus, in view of the various provisions of the Companies Act and the Income-tax Act, it was mandatory for the assessee to draw accounts as per AS-11. Thus, the loss recognized on account of foreign exchange fluctuation as per notified accounting standard AS 11 is an accrued and subsisting liability and not merely a contingent or a hypothetical liability. A legal liability also exists against the assessee due to fluctuation and loss arising there from. Actual payment of expense is an irrelevant consideration to ascertain the point of accrual of liability. As a corollary, the revenue has committed error in holding the liability as notional or contingent.

Besides AS-11, the claim of exchange fluctuation loss as revenue account is also founded on the argument that the aforesaid action was taken to save interest costs and, consequently, to augment the profitability or reduce revenue losses of the assessee. The impugned fluctuation loss therefore, has a direct nexus to the saving in interest costs without bringing any new capital assets into existence. Thus, the business exigencies are implicit as well explicit in the action of the assessee. The argument that the act of conversion has served a hedging mechanism against revenue receipts from export also portrays commercial expediency. Thus, the plea of the assessee that claim of expenditure is attributable to revenue account has considerable merits.

For the aforesaid reasons and in the light of the fact that the conversion in foreign currency loans which led to impugned loss were dictated by revenue considerations towards saving interest costs, etc., the said loss is considered as being on revenue account and is an allowable expenditure u/s. 37(1). The order of the CIT-(A) sustaining the disallowance is thus reversed.

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 136 (Delhi-Trib)(SMC) Sushil Kumar Jain vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2006-07 Date of order: 24th June, 2016

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Section 147 r.w.s. 154 – Initiation of two parallel proceedings on a similar subject matter, cannot sustain. If first proceedings have been validly initiated, then such proceedings must come to an end for making a way for the initiation of another proceedings on the same subject matter. Unless the earlier proceedings are buried, either by way of an order on merits or by dropping the same, no fresh subsequent proceedings on the same subject matter can be initiated.

FACTS
The assessee, a senior advocate by profession, filed his return of income for assessment year 2006-07 declaring total income of Rs. 8,39,253. The Assessing Officer (AO) vide order dated 26.3.2008, assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 8,56,753.

The AO issued notice u/s. 154 of the Act dated 23.2.2011 intimating the assessee that he proposes to rectify the order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act to include in his total income receipts of Rs. 4,47,600 which were received by the assessee, as per TDS certificates, but which were not included in total income.

Subsequently, the AO reopened the assessment on the ground that assessee has claimed credit for TDS against current years income on receipts of Rs. 4,47,600 but the same have not been offered for taxation. The assessment was completed u/s. 147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act by making a total addition of Rs. 2,37,500.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and interalia argued that since the AO had issued notice u/s. 154 of the Act initiation of reassessment proceedings was not valid.The CIT(A) upheld the initiation of reassessment proceedings and the additions made.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal on perusal of copy of notice u/s. 154 along with the reasons recorded for reopening observed that the subject matter of both the notices was the same viz. receipts of Rs. 4,47,600 which in the opinion of the AO had escaped taxation. The Tribunal observed that during the continuation of the proceedings u/s. 154, the AO embarked upon the same issue by means of a separate reassessment proceedings without concluding the earlier proceedings initiated u/s. 154. It goes without saying that initiation of two parallel proceedings on a similar subject matter, cannot be sustained. If first proceedings have been validly initiated, then such proceedings must come to an end for making a way for the initiation of another proceedings on the same subject matter. Unless the earlier proceedings are buried, either by way of an order on merits or by dropping the same, no fresh subsequent proceedings on the same subject matter can be sustained. The Tribunal held that since the rectification proceedings u/s. 154 were initiated in 2011 and these were still on in the year 2013, when the proceedings u/s. 147 were initiated on the same subject matter, the proceedings u/s. 147 cannot stand during the continuation of proceedings u/s. 154. The Tribunal set aside the initiation of reassessment proceedings by means of a notice u/s. 148 and the proceedings flowing therefrom.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

[2016] 159 ITD 199 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) Urvi Chirag Sheth vs. ITO A.Y.: 2012-13. Date of order: 31st May, 2016.

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Sections. 2 and 4, read with sections 45, 56(2) (viii) and 145A – If the assessee receives interest, to compensate for the time value of money, on account of delay in payment of the motor accident compensation, then such interest takes the same character as that of the accident compensation and since the said accident compensation, being capital receipt, is not taxable, consequently receipt of interest on such compensation is also not taxable.

FACTS
The assessee had met with a serious motor car accident which had left her permanently disabled. The competent authority termed the disability at ninety per cent level.

She had claimed compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- for this tragic loss of her physical abilities. She was, finally after 21 years, awarded the said compensation along with the interest of Rs.14,94,286/- by Hon’ble Supreme Court. The said interest was computed using 8% interest rate, on the enhanced compensation, from the date of filing the claim petition before MACT (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal) till the date of realization.

The assessee had not offered the said interest income to tax. The main contention of the assessee was that the interest which is received by any person under any statute is taxable under the Act, however, if the interest is awarded by courts of higher authorities as part of fair and equitable compensation, the same is capital receipt and hence not taxable in the hands of the assessee.

The AO was of the opinion that the interest received on the said compensation came within the purview of section 145A(b) read with section 56(2)(viii) and hence, after allowing deduction of Rs.7,47,143/- as per provisions of section 57(iv) of the Act, taxed the balance Rs.7,47,143/- as income from other source.

The CIT-(A) upheld order of the AO.

On second appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
Section 145A provides that interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be income of the year in which it is received. This provision was enacted with a view to mitigate hardship to taxpayers, where interested was awarded by judicial forums but on account of the decision being challenged the same was not received.Clause (viii) in sub-section (2) of section 56 provides that income by way of interest received on compensation or on enhanced compensation referred to in sub-section (2) of section 145A shall be assessed as ‘income from other sources’ in the year in which it is received.’

Section 145A deals with the method of accounting i.e. cash or mercantile and has its focus on the point of time when an income is taxable rather than taxability of income itself. Thus, when an income is not taxable, section 145A has no relevance. Nothing else needs to be read in this provision.

Section 56(2)(viii), is only an enabling provision, to bring interest income to tax in the year of receipt rather than in the year of accrual.

Thus only when interest received by the assessee is in the nature of income, such interest can be taxed u/s. 56(2)(viii). Section 56(1) makes this aspect even more clear when it states that income of every kind, which is not to be excluded from the total income under the Incometax Act, shall be chargeable to income tax under the head income from other sources, if it is not chargeable to income tax under any of the heads, and then, in the subsequent provision, i.e., section 56(2), proceeds to set out an illustrative, rather than exhaustive list of, such ‘incomes’. Clearly, section 56 does not decide what constitutes income. What section 56 holds is that if there is an income, which is not taxable under any of the other heads u/s. 14, then it is taxable under the head ‘income from other sources’.

To suggest that since an item is listed u/s. 56(2), even without there being anything to show that it is of income nature, it can be brought to tax is like putting the cart before the horse.

The payment made to the assessee is in the nature of compensation for the loss of her mobility and physical damages. Clearly, such a receipt, in principle, is a capital receipt and beyond the ambit of taxability of income, since only such capital receipts can be brought to tax which are specifically taxable u/s. 45. As it is the settled law, that a capital receipt, in principle, is outside the scope of income chargeable to tax and a receipt cannot be taxed as income unless it is in the nature of a revenue receipt or is specifically brought within ambit of income by way of specific provisions. The accident compensation is thus not taxable as income of the assessee.

What is termed as interest takes the same character as that of the accident compensation and it seeks to compensate the time value of money on account of delay in payment of the compensation. Such an interest cannot have a standalone character of income, unless the interest itself is a kind of statutory interest at the prescribed rate of interest. In this case, the interest is awarded by the Supreme Court in its complete and somewhat unfettered discretion. An interest of this nature is essentially a compensation in the sense it accounts for a fall in value of money itself at the point of time when compensation became payable vis-a-vis the point of time when it was actually paid, or, for the shrinkage of, what can be termed as, a measuring rod of value of compensation. If the money was given on the date of presenting the claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it would have been principal sum but since there is an inordinate, though partial, delay in payment of this amount, interest payment is to factor for fall in value of money in the meantime. The transaction thus remains the same, i.e., compensation for disability, and the interest rate, on a rather notional basis, is taken into account to compute the present value of the compensation which was lawfully due to the assessee in a somewhat distant past.

If compensation itself is not taxable, the interest on account of delay in payment of compensation cannot be taxable either. Essentially, this conclusion supports the school of thought that when principal transaction itself is outside the ambit of taxation, similar fate must follow for the subsidiary transaction as well.

The authorities below were thus completely in error in bringing the interest awarded by the Supreme Court to tax. The question of deduction u/s. 57(iii), given the above conclusion, is wholly irrelevant. The order of the AO taxing the interest on accident compensation and the order of the

CIT-(A) confirming AO’s order is disapproved.

In result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.

Condonation of delay – Appeal filed in wrong jurisdiction – An unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant – Liable to be condoned :

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Prashanth Projects Ltd vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax10(3), tax Appeal no – 192 of 2014 dt – 19/07/2016 (Bombay High Court).

[Prashanth Projects Ltd vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax10(3),; ITA No. 7167/Mum/2011 Bench: C ; dt: 04/09/2013 ; (A Y: 2005-06 )]

Assessee company, engaged in the business of construction of storage handling Terminal of Petroleum Products, filed its return of income on 31.10.2005 . The AO finalised the assessment order u/s.143(3) determining the total income at Rs.1,11,17.010/-. Assessment order was received by the assessee on 25.01.2008 and accordingly appeal was to be filed by 24.02.2008, however, by mistake instead of the appeal being filed in the office of the CIT(A), it was filed on 8th February, 2008 (within the period of limitation) with the office of the Assessing Officer i.e. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax10( 3), who accepted the same. Later on in May,2011,when it came to know that appeal was to be filed before the CIT(A), an application was moved by it to the AO for transferring the appeal to the office of the CIT(A). However same was refused. This resulted in the appellant having to file a fresh appeal on 9th June, 2011 to the CIT(A) from the order of the Assessing Officer dated 31st December, 2007. This appeal was accompanied alongwith an application for condonation of delay . Thus, there was delay of more than 3 years. The reason for the delay as explained by the assessee, was that by mistake it filed appeal in the office of the ACIT. After considering the submissions of the assessee,CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by it.

Effective Ground of appeal before ITAT was about not admitting the appeal by the CIT(A) on the ground of delay. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after citing various decisions of the Courts indicating the manner in which the application for condonation of delay has to be dealt with proceeded to reject the appeal.

The Assessee filed an appeal before the High court challenging the order of ITAT . The High Court held that it is an undisputed position that the appeal from order dated 31st December, 2007 of the Assessing Officer was prepared and filed in the prescribed Proforma viz. Form No.35. It was addressed to CIT(A). However, by mistake the same was tendered to the office of the Assessing Officer and the office of the Assessing Officer also accepted the same. In fact, as the appeal pertained to the CIT(A) and not its office, the Assessing Officer ought to have immediately returned the appeal which was filed in the office of the Assessing Officer. This would have enabled the appellant to take appropriate steps and file the appeal with the office of the CIT(A). It is not the case of the Revenue that the appeal addressed to the CIT(A) was not filed with the Office of the Assessing Officer on 8th February, 2008 i.e. within the period of limitation. In case, the Assessing Officer had returned the appeal immediately to the appellant or had forwarded it to the office of the CIT(A) as would be expected of the State no delay would have taken place. This would have resulted in the appeal being considered on merits.

Further, from the application made for stay in the same proceeding , it is very clear that the appellant as well as the department bonafide proceeded on the basis that its appeal before the CIT(A) was pending. The lapse on the part of the assessee was unintentional. Further, the analogy made in the impugned order with nature is inappropriate. Human interaction is influenced by human nature. Inherent in human nature is the likelihood of error. Therefore, the adage “to err is human”. Thus, the power to condone delay while applying the law of limitation. This power of condonation is only in view of human fallibility. The laws of nature are not subject to human error, thus beyond human correction. In fact, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradip Kumar 2000(7) SCC 372 has observed to the effect that although the law assists the vigilant, an unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant would not normally close the doors of adjudication so as to be permanently closed, as it is human to err. The High Court held that it was an unintentional lapse on the part of the appellant.

The appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh disposal in accordance with law, on payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- by a pay order drawn in the name of “The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax15, Mumbai”.

Estimate – on money – It is a settled principle of statistics that principle of averaging provides results of reliable nature – Such average minimizes the errors and brings out reasonable and reliable results.:

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The CIT- III vs. Prime Developers. [Income tax Appeal no 2452 of 2013 dt -18/07/2016 , AY 2004-05 (Bombay High Court)].

[Prime Developers. vs. DCIT, CC-33,; I.T.A. NO.323/M/2010, 321/M/2010, 322/M/2010, 324/M/2010 Bh – C, dt : 22/03/2013, AY: 2004-05 to 2007-08,]

Assessee was engaged in the business of construction. During the subject assessment year the assessee undertook construction of a project called ‘Prime Mall’. However in its return of income filed for the subject assessment year the assessee did not disclose any profits on its above project as it was following the Project Completion Method. There was a search on the assessee under Section 1 32 of the Act.

During the course of the search it was found that during the previous year relevant to assessment year under consideration it was found that the assessee had sold 14 units in its Prime Mall Project and received 65% of the total sales consideration as ‘on money’. Consequent to the search, the assessee contended that in the subject assessment year no income is chargeable to tax as it is following the Project Completion Method of Accounting . Therefore the profit, if any, would be subject to tax on completion of the project which takes place only for the A.Y. 2006- 07( 90%) and A.Y. 2007- 08.

The Assessing Officer did not accept the assessee’s contention of Project Completion Method and brought to tax, the entire amount received as ‘on money’ consideration i.e. 65% of total sales value (35% recorded plus 65% ‘on money’) of the 14 unit sold.

In appeal, the CIT(A) modified the order of the Assessing Officer to the extent it held that the total consideration received in respect of sales of 14 unit during the subject assessment year would be taxed at 40% as net profit of the total consideration in place of 65% in respect of sales of 14 units. The CIT(A) did not accept the assessee’s contention that only 8% should be taken as net profit of the unaccounted turnover. This was in view of the fact that annexure L found during the course of the search indicated the net profit at 28.18%.

Being aggrieved, both the Revenue as well as the assessee carried the issue in appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the facts and the NP of assessee held that the reasonable percentage of profits of the project – Prime Mall was somewhere in the range of said NPs ie 13.735% – 23.99% . It was a settled principle of statistics that principle of averaging provides results of reliable nature. Such average minimizes the errors and brings out reasonable and reliable results. The average of the 13.735% and 23.99% would give rise to a reasonable percentage of NP ie 17.08%. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer to work out the taxable profits after adopting a reasonable net profit of 17.08% on its gross sales turnover of Rs.11.60 crore in the subject AY .

The Revenue challenged before High Court the adoption of net profit of 17.08% as determined by the Tribunal was not correct . The High Court observed that the Revenue sought to substitute the estimated net profit arrived at by the Tribunal with a new figure of net profit . This was without showing that the estimate arrived at by the Tribunal in the impugned order was perverse. It was a settled position of law that in estimated net profit arrived at by the authorities is a question of fact and if the material on record supported the estimate arrived at by the Tribunal then it didnot give rise to any substantial question of law (see CIT v/s. Piramal Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. 124 ITR 408). In this case, High Court held that the net profit estimated at 17.08% was a very possible view on the facts found and dismissed revenue appeal.

FRAUD : Investigation techniques and other aspects –Part 1

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Variety in fraud investigation techniques: application of Vedic Mathematics
It is variety that makes life interesting and enjoyable. Virtually in every walk of life, we crave for variety. Take for instance our daily meals. Each meal we try to eat something different to make each meal more enjoyable. We try different kinds of breads, soups, vegetables, and fruits. We can actually survive just as well even if we have exactly the same items to eat everyday, but that would make our meals monotonous. Film makers make different kinds of films only because we would get bored of the same story over and over again. A cricket match would become absolutely boring if a batsman were to play each shot in the same identical manner. A popular batsman is one who has a range of different strokes and shots. Thus it has been correctly stated that variety is the spice of life.

Audit, investigation and forensic accounting are no exception to this maxim. It is very possible that if an auditor or an investigator approached every investigation with the same routine steps in a lackadaisical manner, a wrongdoer would be able to take suitable counter measures to ensure that he is protected and safe. Therefore it is absolutely essential to keep trying new methods, hitherto untried techniques and tools, and use a surprise element to get the best results. Research of algorithms, vedic scriptures can be extremely useful in this context. Many audits and investigations end at a dead end, or sometimes reach wrong conclusions, only because of the lack of application of imaginative and innovative methods.

The following is a case study where a chartered accountant was an advisor in an acquisition by a fruit juice manufacturing company. Initially by applying the standard auditing techniques, he felt that there was nothing serious to stop his client from acquiring a company owning a couple of mango farms based on details and information given. It was only after he looked at data differently, using ‘visual mathematics’ and an application of vedic mathematics that he was able to detect a sinister fraud.

Case Study: Fraud in mango farm sale
A fruit juice manufacturing company ABC was looking for more and more orchards and fruit plantations for expansion. In this hunt, they came across a proposal from a mango grower PQR in Maharashtra for sale of two mango farms. PQR had been growing mangoes and exporting them and seemed to have had a fairly good crop in the last season. The substantial part of the acquisition value was for the two fertile farms. The two mango farms commanded a rich premium because of their fertility and huge potential for growing mangoes in bulk. ABC had asked its CA to conduct a review of its financials and operating results for the last couple of years. Some extracts of the financial information given to him were as follows:

1. Farm A had 4 acres and Farm B was 6.3 acres in size. The potential for much greater crop of mangoes was huge and PQR had not been able to tap it because of its lack of resources. ABC realized that with more resources and better techniques the mango crop could be tripled.

2. Plucking and packing activity was performed over two days. The mangoes would be plucked and packed on the last two days of each month. On day 1, there would only be plucking activity and the mangoes would be stacked neatly. On day 2, the mangoes plucked the previous day would be washed and cleaned of all pesticide and then packed in boxes of one dozen each.

3. The packed mangoes from both the farms would be sent to the main godown where they would be counted and kept ready for export.

4. Costs of plucking and packaging for farm B were greater than farm A because it was further in the interior part of the district and labourers charged more to work at farm B

5. Costs of plucking and packaging during each month also varied based on demand supply of skilled labour in season time. Usually in May the cost would be the highest

The details of plucking and packaging costs per dozen are given in the table below

Conventional Audit checks did not throw up any adverse results.
The number of mangoes packed for each farm individually were not available, but the total mangoes packed for both farms for each month were physically verified by the management, as follows: March 720 mangoes, April, 2400 mangoes, and May 4800 mangoes. Though the CA was not conducting any investigation, he did have the responsibility of carrying out a special penetrative audit of the financial information given by PQR because ABC was going to invest a huge amount only based on the CA’s assessment. Therefore the CA applied all the conventional audit checks and tests. The bills for labourer’s payments were available in the form of wage sheets which prima facie looked satisfactory and his audit did have some routine queries but nothing serious.

The sales and collections audits and verifications using walk through tests also did not raise any alarm bells. These were also well documented. A decent price was earned by PQR for the sale of mangoes per reasonable market inquiries. In most respects, based on his routine audit techniques, the CA seemed to have derived a comfort in the financial information given. Under normal circumstances he would have given a ‘go ahead’ green signal to his client for acquisition of PQR.

How vedic mathematics helped the CA to spot a fraud by a mere visual look at the numbers.

The information given by PQR was incomplete in one important respect. The numbers of mangoes plucked and packaged in each farm for each month. This was important to determine the crop size and fertility of each farm. How could one find this? Actually applying mathematics using knowledge of algebra by solving simultaneous equations for each month it is possible. But that is a tedious task.

To illustrate, for the month of March, to find out how many mangoes were plucked and packaged, one would have to use algebra by using variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ to represent mangoes plucked and packed in farms A and B respectively. Then the cost information given above can be simply converted into a simultaneous equation in the conventional form as follows.

20x + 40y = 1200
70x + 85y = 4200

But solving such equations would be slightly tedious. However, through vedic mathematics, in one look, the viewer will be able to state that y = 0 in the above equations. How is this possible? Actually it is very simple.

A sutra of vedic mathematics called Anurupye Shunyamanayat’ states that if the co-efficients of one of the variables in a simultaneous equation are in the same ratio as the resulting values of each equation, then the other variable MUST BE ZERO

Thus in our above simultaneous equation of mangoes plucked and packaged in March

20x + 40y = 1200
70x + 85y = 4200

The coefficients of x are 20 and 70. Their ratio is therefore 2/7. The resulting values of each equation are 1200 and 4200. Their ratio is also 2/7. Since these two ratios are the same, the other variable, ‘y’ as per sutra 6 of vedic mathematics, anuraupye shunyamanayat, MUST be zero.

THUS THERE WERE ‘0’ MANGOES GROWN IN MARCH IN FARM B. BY USING THE SAME VEDIC MATHEMATICS APPROACH THERE WERE ‘0’ MANGOES GROWN IN FARM B FOR THE OTHER MONTHS AS WELL. THE COST FIGURES WERE IMAGINARY AND FICTITIOUS FOR FARM B.

In other words, Farm B was not producing any mangoes at all.

The fraud was a simple deception by PQR by claiming that mangoes were indeed being grown on farm B, even though it had no fertility to grow any mango at all.

Though it was the larger farm, since it was not a fertile plot, the price being demanded by PQR was an atrocious exponential value of its actual worth. ABC would obviously never be interested in purchasing such a farm. PQR’s labour costs were therefore nil for farm B and PQR was deceiving ABC by stating that mangoes were being plucked and packed in farm B. The CA then advised the client ABC not to go ahead with this acquisition.

What is important in this case study is that the CA always strived to upgrade his knowledge and he was always eager to learn new techniques and methods useful in his profession. He had recently been studying vedic mathematics. Vedic mathematics has some amazing solutions for certain types of mathematical problems. As we all know India discovered ‘0’ and a lot of vedic mathematics sutras are based on, or revolve around ‘0’. Among them, one of the sutras, sutra no 6 is ‘Anurupye Shunyamanayat’.

Vedic mathematics itself may be useful in a rare assignment, but what counted was the fact the CA was trying new things and different things every time to get better results. That, friends is the measure of life and true success.

Editor’s note: Fraud investigation and detection are an important area of practice for a chartered accountant. This involves acquisition of specialised knowledge. The law now casts an important duty in regard to reporting fraud on the auditor. Public expectations have now found statutory recognition. We have therefore thought it necessary to carry a series of articles by Mr. Chetan Dalal an expert on the subject. These will appear in the journal at intervals, that is probably in each alternate month. We hope readers will find this series useful.

[2016] 71 taxmann.com 172 (Bangalore – Trib.) Page Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of order: 24th June, 2016

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Sections 92A(1), 92A(2)(g) of the Act – Section 92A(2) cannot be read independent of Section 92A(1) for determining whether enterprises are associated.

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of ready-made garments. The Taxpayer was a licensee of the brandname owned by an USA Company (FCo).

The brand name was used by the Taxpayer for the purpose of exclusive manufacturing and marketing of the garments under the brand name of FCo. For grant of license, the Taxpayer was required to pay royalty at the rate of 5% of its sales to FCo. The Taxpayer owned the entire manufacturing facility, capital investment, employees and there was no participation of FCo in the capital and management of the Taxpayer. Taxpayer argued that the transfer pricing (TP) provisions do not apply as there is no ‘Associated Enterprise’ (AE) relationship between the Taxpayer and FCo. Nevertheless, Taxpayer disclosed the transaction in Form 3CEB.

Assessing officer (AO) referred the matter to Transfer pricing officer (TPO) for determination of arm’s length price (ALP) of the transaction. As per the TPO, the transaction was not at ALP and consequently he proposed an adjustment to the income of the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer filed objection before Dispute resolution panel (DRP), which rejected the objections of the Taxpayer.

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held
Section 92A(1) defines AE based on the parameters of management, control or capital. Section 92A(2) is a deeming provision and enumerates circumstances in which the enterprise can be deemed to be an AE.

Thus the conditions of both Sections 92A(1) and 92A(2) are to be satisfied in order to constitute an AE relationship.

The contra view that, satisfaction of the conditions of section 92A(2) alone is sufficient for creation of an AE relationship would render section 92A(1) otiose. While interpreting a provision in a taxing statute, the construction should preserve the purpose of the provision. If more than one interpretation is possible, that which preserves its workability and efficacy is to be preferred to the one which would render a part of it otiose or sterile.

Thus even though the conditions of section 92A(2)(g) are satisfied, in absence of any right with FCo to control and manage Taxpayer, Taxpayer and FCo cannot be considered as AEs, and consequently TP provisions will not apply to transactions undertaken between them.

(Unreported) ITA. Nos. 1548 and 1549/Kol/2009 Instrumentarium Corporation Limited, Finland vs. ADIT A.Y.: 2003-04 and 2004-05, Date of order: 15th July, 2016

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Section 92 of the Act – Tribunal upholds interest imputed on interest free loan; TP provisions, being anti-abuse provisions can tax notional income.

Facts
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Finland, was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling medical equipment. A wholly owned Indian subsidiary (ICo) of Taxpayer, acted as its marketing arm in India. In 2002, the Taxpayer entered into an agreement to grant interest free loan to ICo which was duly approved by RBI. Transfer pricing Officer (TPO) sought to impute interest on such loan.

For the relevant year, ICo had incurred losses. Had Taxpayer granted loan charging ALP, losses of ICo would have increased while Taxpayer would have suffered source taxation on interest @10 %.

The Taxpayer argued that there is no erosion of tax base in India on giving an interest free loan to its wholly owned Indian subsidiary and hence, transfer pricing provisions cannot be invoked. Further it was contended that for evaluating section 92(3) one must consider the tax implications of a transaction as a whole rather than tax implications in the hands of the Taxpayer alone and hence charging of higher service fees by the Taxpayer to ICo would have resulted in an erosion of tax base in India as it would increase losses of ICo. Additionally, where the Taxpayer has advanced interest free loan, the Assessing Officer (AO) cannot disregard the commercial expediency of the interest free loan and impute interest thereon.

Held
For the following reasons, Tribunal held that TPO was correct in imputing interest on the interest free loan given by the Taxpayer

Section 92(1) requires that any income from international transaction has to be computed at ALP. It is not in dispute that grant of interest free loan by the Taxpayer to its India AE was an international transaction. However, section 92(3) provides that, if on computation of ALP u/s 92(1), either the income of the Taxpayer is decreased or losses are increased, section 92(1) will not be pressed into service.

Moreover, section 92(3) refers to the Taxpayer in respect of whom computation of income is being done under section 92(1). Thus Taxpayer’s contention that while evaluating the impact of section 92(3), overall impact on profits and losses of not only the taxpayer but also the impact on its AEs should be considered, cannot be accepted.

It was further contended by Taxpayer that u/s. 92(3) one needs to not only consider the actual tax impact but also possible tax advantage de hors the time value of money. These contentions of the taxpayer cannot be accepted. The impact has to be seen only in respect of the previous year in which the international transaction was entered into and not for the subsequent years. Besides, mere possibility of a tax shield which may be available to AE as a result of accumulated losses, if any, can only affect the income of the subsequent years, which as stated above is not relevant for section 92(3).

If the transaction structure is to be accepted without ALP adjustment, while India will lose the taxability of interest in the hands of the Taxpayer @10%, it will have nothing to lose in the respect of taxability of the ICo because admittedly ICo was incurring losses.

In the present case, as a result of TP adjustment, there is neither any lowering of profit of AE nor increase in losses of AE, even while income of the Taxpayer is increased. Thus there is no base erosion by the ALP adjustments in the hands of Taxpayer. The base erosion could have, if at all, taken place at best in a situation in which ICo was actually allowed a deduction.

Further, there is no provision enabling corresponding deduction for ALP adjustments in the hands of ICo merely because TP adjustment is made in the hands of Taxpayer

Under the Indian TP provisions, the use of ALP is mandatory for computation of income arising from international transactions between the AEs. The only exception is that these provisions are not to be applied only in the event where section 92(3) is satisfied.

If the intent of legislature was that TP provisions are not to be invoked in the cases where there is lowering of the overall profits of all the AEs connected with the transactions, the words of the statutory provision would have been so provided so. In absence of the same, it is incorrect to say that, TP provisions are not to be invoked when, there is no erosion of Indian tax base.

Commercial expediency of a loan to subsidiary is wholly irrelevant in ascertaining ALP of such a loan. Once a transaction is treated as international transaction between AEs, section 92 mandates that income from such transaction be computed as per ALP. Transfer pricing provisions, being anti-abuse provisions with the sanction of the statute, come into play in specific situation of certain transactions with the associated enterprise and the same can tax notional income too.

While notional interest income cannot indeed be brought to tax in general, the arm’s length principle requires that income be computed, in certain situations, on the basis of certain parameters which inherently lead to notional taxation. When the legal provisions are not pari materia, (i.e the provision of normal computation of income and the provision of computation of income in the case of international transactions between the AEs), what is held to be correct in the context of one set of legal provisions has no application in the context of the other set of legal provisions.

TS-428-ITAT-2016(Mum) DDIT vs. Taj TV Ltd A.Y.: 2003-04 to 2005-06, Date of order: 5th July, 2016

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Section 9 of the Act, Article 5, 12 of India Mauritius DTAA – (i) in absence of principalagent relationship and authority to habitually conclude contract in India, Indian advertising agent did not create a Dependent Agency PE in India; (ii) transponder charges and uplinking charges did not constitute royalty under the DTAA , and retrospective amendment to the royalty definition under the Act cannot be read into the DTAA ; (iii) programming charges for acquiring telecasting rights of live events conducted outside India did not represent income accruing or arising in India.

Facts 1
The Taxpayer was incorporated as a company in British Virgin Islands (BVI) in the year 2000. However, it was subsequently registered as a company in Mauritius in July 2002.

The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of telecasting a sports channel across the globe including India. The Taxpayer had entered into following two contracts with its Indian subsidiary (“ICo”), with the prior approval of Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

Advertising Sales agreement for sale of commercial slot or spot to the prospective advertisers and other parties in India for which a commission at a flat rate of 10% was paid to ICo

Distribution agreement for distribution of the channel to cable operators who ultimately distribute to consumers in India. The distribution revenue collected by ICo was to be shared between the Taxpayer and ICo in the ratio of 60:40.

The Taxpayer contended that advertising and distribution revenue earned by it is not taxable in India because income is business income and is not taxable in absence of Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

However, Assessing Officer (AO) considered that ICo constituted a ‘dependent agent PE’ (DAPE) of the Taxpayer in India. Also, the distribution income was characterised as ‘Royalty’ u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

For F.Y. 2002, Taxpayer was registered in BVI as a company for part of the year and in Mauritius for the residuary period. Hence, it was suggested that Taxpayer was not eligible to claim treaty benefits for such part of the year during which it was registered in BVI. As a consequence, it was held that distribution income for that part of the year was taxable as royalty income under the Act, while for the balance period where the Taxpayer was registered in Mauritius, as the royalty income was attributable to the DAPE of Taxpayer, it would be taxable in India as per Article 7 of India Mauritius DTAA .

Held 1
Taking note of the terms of the distribution agreement and the actual conduct of the parties, it was held that ICo was not acting as an agent of Taxpayer in India. ICo merely obtained the right of distribution of channel for itself and subsequently entered into contract with other parties (sub-distributors) in its own name. Thus it was held that the transactions between the Taxpayer and ICo were on principal-to-principal basis.

As per Article 5(4) of the India Mauritius DTAA, an agent is considered to be creating a PE of a foreign enterprise in India if he is a dependent agent and habitually exercises any authority to conclude contract or habitually maintains stock of goods or merchandise in India on behalf of such foreign enterprise. Moreover, an agent is treated as dependent only if it is subject to instructions or comprehensive control of the foreign enterprise and no entrepreneurial risk is borne by the agent.

Thus, even if ICo is considered as an agent of the Taxpayer, since ICo did not satisfy any of the above conditions, it did not constitute DAPE of the Taxpayer in India.

The Taxpayer had not granted any license to use any copyright to the distributor or to the cable operators but merely made available the content to the cable operator which was transmitted to the ultimate viewer. In fact, the rights over the content were always held by the Taxpayer and were never made available to distributors or cable operators. Thus, the income from such arrangement would not constitute royalty.

Also, the contention of the AO that the income from distribution agreement be considered as royalty for some part of the year and as business income for the balance year was not acceptable.

Facts 2
Taxpayer made payments to a US Co for providing facility of transponder for telecasting its sports channel. Additionally certain ‘up-linking’ charges were paid to USCo for up-linking the signals of live events from the venue of the events to USCo’s satellite.

Taxpayer did not withhold taxes on such payments. AO contended that the payments made to USCo qualified as royalty under the Act as well as the India-USA DTAA and hence, were subject to withholding tax in India. Accordingly, AO disallowed such expenses for failure to withhold taxes.

Held 2
Article 12 of the India – USA DTAA exhaustively defines the term ‘royalty’ and therefore, the definition and scope of ‘royalty’ should be as provided in the DTAA not the Act. Hence, the definition of royalty as enlarged by Finance Act 2012 with retrospective effect cannot be read into the DTAA . Reliance in this regard was placed on the Delhi HC ruling in DIT vs. New Skies Satellite [2016] 95 CCH 0032 (Del).

Payment for transponder charges and up linking charges were not in the nature of any consideration in the nature of “use” or “right to use” any copyright of a literary or artistic or scientific work, patent, trademark or process etc., as referred to in Article 12 nor is it for the use of or right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Hence, they did not qualify as royalty under the DTAA .

Even otherwise, applying the maxim of “lex non cogit ad impossplia”, since the retrospective amendment was not in place when the payment was made by the Taxpayer, the Taxpayer cannot be held liable for failure to withhold taxes.

In absence of PE of the NR in India, the payment made to a NR outside India for availing service of equipment in relation to transponder and up-linking activity outside India cannot be taxed in India.

Facts 3
Taxpayer paid certain programming cost to various NR cricket boards and other sports associations for acquiring live telecast rights in relation to sport events taking place outside India.

AO contended that such payments were in the nature of acquiring copyrights and hence qualified as royalty under the Act. Taxpayer, however, contended that telecasting such live events did not constitute royalty as it did not involve any copyright.

Held 3
Programming cost was paid by Taxpayer to various nonresidents outside India for acquiring rights of sports events taking place outside India.

Further as liability to pay programming cost is assumed by the Taxpayer outside India and is not borne by any PE of NRs in India, such programming cost cannot be deemed to arise in India.

2016 (43) STR 249 (Tri. Ahmd.) L& T Sargent & Lundy Limited vs. CCE & ST, Vadodara

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Non-intimation to department regarding adjustment of service tax suo motu is a curable defect.

Facts
Excess payment of service tax was adjusted by the Appellants suo motu without intimation to department. The adjustment was denied. It was contended that no intimation was required under Rule 6 (3) of Service tax Rules, 1994. Even if intimation was required, it was a minor procedural defect and therefore, penalties were not warranted. Department argued that penalties shall be imposed on such big industrial group who must be well aware of these laws.

Held
Since there was no short payment of service tax and the defect was not so serious, adjustment was allowed and penalties were set aside.

Note: Readers may note a similar decision in the case of State Bank of Hyderabad [2016-TIOL-1105-CESTAT-HYD] reported in the June 2016 issue of BCAJ. Further please note the decision in the case of ONGC vs. CCE, Cus. & ST., Surat-II [2016 (43) STR 317 (Tri. – Ahmd.)] where on similar facts, the Tribunal had directed the appellant to follow prescribed procedure in future.

2016 (43) STR 234 (Tri. – Chan.) Jindal Water Infrastructure Ltd. vs. CCE, Rohtak

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In cases of centralized registration, appeal may be transferred to jurisdictional CESTAT even if adjudicated at some other place.

Facts
Appellant obtained centralized registration at Delhi. However, adjudication was made at Rohtak. Appeals relating to such adjudication were assigned to Chandigarh Bench on the basis of territorial jurisdiction.

Held
In view of centralized registration and since the cause of action had arisen in Delhi, appeal was directed to be transferred to Delhi CESTAT .

2016 (43) STR 110 (Tri-Mum.) Sumeet C. Tholle and Prathima S. Tholle vs. C.C.E.&C., Aurangabad

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Service Tax collected and deposited without authority of law by the service provider can be refunded to service receiver.

Facts
The appellants jointly purchased a house wherein service tax as well as VAT was collected from them. Even though the transaction between the appellants and its vendor was of transfer of immovable property, the vendor charged service tax. On understanding the facts, the appellants filed a refund claim with the department since tax was levied and collected without authority of law. The refund claim got rejected on the grounds that the appellants had not provided any proof of deposit of service tax by the service provider with the Government.

Held
Since the transaction of transfer of immovable property is squarely covered in the exclusion part of the definition, the activity of transfer of immovable property is not a taxable activity. Service recipient cannot be made liable to prove that the service tax paid by him to the service provider has been credited to the Government or not. Refund can be granted to the recipient on the basis of invoices held by them wherein service tax has been charged. Whether service tax has been deposited to the Government or not is to be looked by the department and not the service recipient. Service recipient having borne the incidence of tax can challenge taxability by claiming refund.

[2016-TIOL-1982-CESTAT-ALL] M/s. Shiel Autos vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur

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Extended period cannot be invoked and penalties cannot be imposed on matters involving interpretational issues referred to the larger bench.

Facts
The Appellant is an automobile dealer. On the basis of information obtained from various banks it was observed that they were in receipt of commission on which no service tax was paid. A show cause notice was issued proposing demand of service tax along with interest and penalties on the commission received as a direct selling agent. It was argued that they have only let the financing agency to use their premises in order to promote the sale of vehicles and there is no principal agent relationship with the finance company and that they merely act as a channel between the customer and the finance company. On confirmation of demand by the adjudicating authority, the first appellate authority observed that the receipt of commission from the bank is not on the basis of space occupied in the premises but is on the basis of quantum of finance sanctioned to the customers who purchased vehicle. Therefore demand as a direct selling agent of the bank/institution was confirmed. Accordingly the present appeal is filed.

Held
The Tribunal noted that no agreement with the banks was placed on record regarding provision of any space and further the commission amount varied from month to month. Therefore undoubtedly the activity falls under the category of “business auxiliary service” for promotion and marketing of services provided by banks. However considering the fact that there was an interpretational issue and the matter was decided by the larger bench in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad [2014-TIOL-141- CESTAT-DEL-LB, extended period is not invokable and penalties are set aside. Demand is upheld only for the normal period.

Transfer pricing- Reference to TPO (Opportunity of hearing)- Section 92CA of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2010-11- Assessing Officer is obliged to give assessee an opportunity of being heard prior to making reference where an objection as to jurisdiction is raised by assessee in relation to making a reference-

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Indorama Synthetics (India) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT; [2016] 71 taxmann.com 349 (Delhi):

The assessee-company entered into transactions of import of raw material amounting from ‘TPL’, a company incorporated in Thailand. It filed return of income declaring ‘Nil’ income. During pendency of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer referred the assessee’s case to TPO for determination of ALP in relation to the international transactions undertaken by the assessee with AE

The assessee filed writ petition contending that Assessing Officer could not have referred the matter to TPO without giving it an opportunity of being heard. The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s writ petition and held as under:

“i) The main issue is whether it was incumbent on the Assessing Officer to have given the assessee an opportunity of being heard before making a reference to the TPO u/s. 92CA(1). Section 92CA reveals that there are certain jurisdictional prerequisites for the making of a reference by the Assessing Officer to the TPO. In the first place, the Assessing Officer has to be satisfied that the assessee has entered into an international transaction or a specified domestic transaction. Whereas in the present case, the assessee raises a threshold objection that it has not entered into any international transaction within the meaning of section 92B, it is imperative for the Assessing Officer to deal with such an objection. If the Assessing Officer decides to nevertheless make a reference, he has to record the reasons, even prima facie, why he considers it necessary and expedient to make such a reference to the TPO.

ii) What is referred to the TPO is the determination of the ALP of the said international transaction or specified domestic transaction. Therefore, the satisfaction to be arrived at by the Assessing Officer regarding the existence of the international transaction or specified domestic transaction, even prima facie, is a sine qua non for making the reference to the TPO. Where such an accountant’s report is submitted by the assessee in Form 3CEB, then there should be no difficulty for the Assessing Officer to form an opinion, even a prima facie one, that it is necessary and expedient to make a reference to the TPO on the question of the determination of the ALP of such international transaction involving the assessee.

iii) CBDT’s Instruction No. 3 of 2003 categorically states that in order to make a reference to the TPO, the Assessing Officer has to satisfy himself that the assessee has entered into an international transaction with its AE. One of the sources from which the factual information regarding the international transaction can be gathered is Form No. 3 CEB filed with the return which is in the nature of an accountant’s report containing the details of the international transaction entered into by the taxpayer during the assessment year in question. Where no such report in Form 3 CEB is filed by the assessee, what will be the basis for the Assessing Officer to record that it is necessary and expedient to refer the question of determination of the ALP of such transaction to the TPO? Where the Assessing Officer is of the view that a transaction reflected in the filed return partakes of the character of an international transaction, he will put the assessee on notice of his proposal to make a reference to the TPO u/s. 92CA (1) of the Act. Before making a reference to the TPO, the Assessing Officer has to seek approval of the Commissioner/Director as contemplated under the Act. Therefore, all transactions have to be explicitly mentioned in the letter of reference. The very nature of this exercise is such that the Assessing Officer will first put the assessee on notice of his proposing to make a reference to the TPO and seek information and clarification from the assessee. If at this stage, the assessee raises an objection as to the very jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to make the reference, then it will be incumbent on the Assessing Officer to deal with such objection on merits.

iv) While section 92CA (1) does not itself talk about a hearing having to be given to the assessee upon the latter raising an objection as to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to make a reference, such requirement appears to be implicit in the very nature of the procedure that is expected to be followed by the Assessing Officer. As already noticed, the Assessing Officer has to record that he considers it necessary and expedient to make a reference. The Assessing Officer has to deal with the objections raised by the assessee. It is only thereafter that the Assessing Officer can come to the conclusion, even prime facie, that it is necessary and expedient to make the reference. This has to be done prior to making a reference

v) As far as the present case is concerned, the assessee has not filed the accountant’s report u/s. 92E yet the Assessing Officer has to proceed to determine the ALP u/s. 92C (3) or refer the matter to the TPO to determine the ALP u/s. 92CA (1) in case the assessee has not declared one or more international transactions in the report filed u/s. 92E of the Act. As explained above, the Assessing Officer must provide an opportunity of being heard to the taxpayer before recording his satisfaction or otherwise

vi) For all the aforesaid reasons, it is opined that the references made by the Assessing Officer to the TPO on the question of determination of ALP of the alleged international transactions involving the petitioner and its AE have been made without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard as was required by law. Accordingly, the said reference made by the Assessing Officer to the TPO is hereby set aside.

vii) The question of whether or not a reference should be made to the TPO, has to be determined by the Assessing Officer afresh after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard.”

TDS- Interest- Section 194A of I. T. Act, 1961- Motor Vehicles Act- Compensation to victims of motor accident- Tax not deductible from compensation or interest thereon-

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MD Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd. vs. Chinnadurai; 385 ITR 656 (Mad):

Dealing with the scope of the provisions of TDS on compensation and interest thereon payable to victims of motor accidents, the Madras High Court held as under:

“i) If there is a conflict between a social welfare legislation and a taxation legislation legislation, then, the social welfare legislation should prevail since it subserves larger public interest. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is one such legislation which has been passed with a benevolent intention for compensating the accident victims who have suffered bodily disablement or loss of life and the Income-tax Act which is primarily intended for tax collection by the state cannot spoke in the effective and efficacious enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act.

ii) The Income-tax Department had issued a circular dated October 4, 2011 whereby deduction of incometax has been ordered on the award amount and the interest accrued on the deposits made under the order of the court in motor accident cases. Taking a serious view of this circular, the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court took suomoto cognizance of the matter and considered it as public interest litigation in the Judgment reported in Court on its Motion vs. H. P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2014 SCC Online HP 4273 and quashed the circular.

iii) The compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal or other interest accruing thereon cannot be subjected to deduction of tax at source and since the compensation and the interest awarded therein do not fall under the term “income” as defined under the Income-tax Act.”

Speculation business- Section 73 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2004-05- Trading in units of mutual funds or bonds- Not trading in shares- Not speculation business-

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CIT vs. Hertz Chemicals Ltd.; 386 ITR 39 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer found that the assessee had offered its profits and loss from share trading as profit and loss of speculation business for the purpose of section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and amounts received from mutual funds/bonds as business income. For the year ending on March 31, 2003, the assessee had offered profit and loss from share trading as well as from mutual funds as income from speculation business showing the closing stock of shares at Rs. 6.69 crore while the opening stock as on April 1, 2003 for the assessment year in question was shown as Rs. 1.01 crores and the balance of Rs. 5.67 crore was shown as opening stock of mutual funds and bonds. The Assessing Officer held that bifurcation was not permissible and considered the activity of dealing in mutual funds and bonds to be an activity of dealing in shares as speculation business. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “i) Units were not shares and trading in units was not speculation business. The Tribunal was justified in confirming the deletion of the addition made by the Assessing Officer on account of the assesee’s trading activities in mutual funds and bonds. ii) No question of law arose.”

Search and seizure- Cash seized from third person- Third person stating that cash belonged to asessee and assessee admitting it- Amount included in return filed by assessee- Request to adjust tax dues and return balance to assessee- Request cannot be refused on ground that cash had been seized from third person-

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Hemal Dilipbhai Shah vs. ACIT; 386 ITR 91 (Guj):

In February 2012, Rs. 26 lakhs in cash were seized by the Department from one VS. VS stated that the cash did not belong to him but to the assessee. Such statement of VS was also confirmed by the assessee. The assessee filed his return for the A. Y. 2012-13 declaring total income of Rs. 27,52,100 including the income declared of Rs. 21,73,000 on account of unexplained cash. The assessee filed an application to the Assessing Officer to adjust the tax liability from the seized amount. Thereafter the asessee filed an application for release of the balance of the seized amount along with interest after adjusting the demand. By a communication, the Assessing Officer informed the assessee that the Department is not in a position to issue the refund until completion of assessment of the VS.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The fact as emerging from the record clearly revealed that in proceedings u/s. 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, VS from whom the cash had been seized had clearly stated that it belonged to the assessee and the assessee had also in proceedings u/s. 153C admitted this.

ii) The Department had treated the cash as belonging to the assessee. There was no dispute as regards the title to the seized assets (cash). The Department was, therefore, not justified in not releasing the balance amount to the assessee on the ground that the cash had been seized from VS.

iii) The Department is directed to forthwith refund the balance amount after adjusting the tax dues of the petitioner with interest.”

Income or capital- A. Y. 2009-10- Income from sale of carbon credits- Carbon credits not a by-product of business but an offshoot of environmental concerns- Is capital receipt and not income-

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CIT vs. Subhash Kabini Power Corporation Ltd.; 385 ITR 592 (Karn):

Tribunal held that the receipts on sale of carbon credits is capital receipt and not chargeable to tax.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In order to find out whether the particular amount received is a capital receipt or income out of business, there cannot be any standard yardstick or a straight jacket formula.

ii) Carbon credit is not an offshoot of business, but an offshoot of environmental concerns. Income received by sale of carbon credits is a capital receipt.”

Revision- Sections. 143, 145 and 163 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2005-06- Solicitor following cash system of accounting- Advance deposits received from clients treated as liabilities in accounts and adjusted towards fees for expenditure incurred on behalf of clients in subsequent years- No loss of revenue- Revision to bring deposits shown in balance sheet to tax not proper-

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CIT vs. Bijoy Kumar Jain; 385 ITR 339 (Cal):

The assessee was a solicitor and followed the cash method of accounting. He received advance deposits from his clients which he treated in his books as his liability. In subsequent years when expenses were incurred both out of pocket and on account of his fees the liability was adjusted. The advances were not treated as his income in his assessment. The Commissioner passed an order of revision u/s. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the order of assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue because the deposits had not been included in the assessee’s income despite the assessee’s following cash system of accounting. The Appellate Tribunal set aside the order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 263 interalia holding that the assessee had established that all the advances as on March 31, 2005 had been adjusted in the subsequent assessment years and the Department could not contradict the case of the assessee and that there was no justification for invoking the provisions of section 263.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The deposits were treated by the assessee as a capital receipt and the deposits were adjusted in the subsequent years against the expenditure incurred for or on behalf of the client from whom the deposit was received. Such expenditure also included the fees of the assessee himself. It was at that stage that the money was earned by him. Before that, he was holding the money as a agent or as a fiduciary of his client. The Appellate Tribunal was right in taking the view that it did.”

Charitable purpose- Registration of trusts- Application for registration- Audited accounts submitted subsequently- Registration to be allowed from the date of filing application and not from date on which defects in application cured-

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CIT vs. Garment Exporters Association of Rajasthan; 386 ITR 20 (Raj):

The assessee, a charitable trust had filed an application u/s. 12AA(1)(b)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for registration without submitting the audited accounts while filing the application. The audited accounts were subsequently filed. The Commissioner granted registration from the date of filing the audited accounts and refused to grant it from the date of application. The Tribunal found that the filing of the audited accounts along with the application was not mandatory and allowed the registration from the date of submission of the application.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajashan High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The application was filed without any defect and the audited accounts were submitted later on because submission of audited accounts along with the application was not mandatory.

ii) There was no error in the order of the Tribunal which allowed the registration from the date of submission of the application by the assessee. The Tribunal and the Department had not pointed out any defect in the application other than non filing of the audited accounts with the application, which was not mandatory.

iii) We find no error in the order passed by the Tribunal.”

Business expenditure- Disallowance u/s. 43B of I. T. Act, 1961- Provident fund- Employers and employees contribution- Although technical reading of section 43B and the provisions of subsection (2) of section 24 (x) read with section 36 (1) (va) creates the impression that the employees’ contribution would continue to be treated differently under a different head of deduction, as the head of deduction is separate u/s. 43B and section 36 but on a broader reading of the amendments made to section 43B repeatedly and the intention of Parliament, there appears to be sufficient justification for taking the view that the employees’ and the employer’s contribution ought to be treated in the same manner-

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Bihar State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT; [2016] 71 taxmann.com 247 (Patna):

The assessee was a Public Sector Undertaking of the Government of Bihar and was carrying on the business of warehousing. During assessment, the Assessing Officer after considering the fact that the contribution had been made after due date statutorily prescribed disallowed the payment of employer’s contribution to EPF u/s. 43B and also disallowed the employees’ contribution to Provident Fund treating the same as income from other sources as per the provision of sub-section (2) of section 24 read with section 36(1)(va). On appeal, the Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the appeal so far as the delayed payment of employer’s contribution to EPF u/s. 43B was concerned and deleted said addition. So far as the delayed payment of the employees’ contribution to EPF is concerned, the addition of the same was confirmed holding that no relief was allowable on the ground of section 43B as the omission of second proviso to the said section with effect from 1-4-2004 does not apply to delayed payment of employees’ contribution to any Provident Fund or any fund mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 24. The same was confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assesee, the Patna High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Both the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd. [2014] 368 ITR 749 (Bom) and Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hemla Embroidery Mills (P.) Ltd. [2014] 366 ITR 167 (P. & H.)) have deallt with the issue as to whether a distinction can be made between the employees’ contribution and employer’s contribution with regard to applicability of section 43B and held that both the employees’ and employer’s contributions are covered by the amendment of section 43B. Thus following same both contributions were to be treated on the same footing.”

Educational Institution – Exemption – Where an educational institution carries on the activity of education primarily for educating persons, the fact that it makes a surplus does not lead to the conclusion that it ceases to exist solely for educational purposes and becomes as intuition for the purpose of making profits – Assessing Authorities must continuously monitor from assessment year to assessment year whether such institutions continue to apply their income and invest or deposit their funds in accordance with the law laid down.

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Chief CIT vs. ST. Peter’s Educational Society [2016] 385 ITR 66 (SC)

The petitioner Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as well as under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, was engaged in imparting higher and specialised education. It is specialised in imparting education in the field of communication including advertising and its related subjects. The petitioner had also been granted the registration u/s. 12A of the Act. The Director of Income Tax (Exemption) had issued a notice u/s. 12AA(3) of the Act and called upon the petitioner to explain as to why its registration u/s. 12A of the Act should not be withdrawn. The said notice came to be challenged by the petitioner before the Gujarat High Court by filing a writ petition, which was withdrawn at a later stage in view of the fact that only show-cause notice was under challenge. However, the procedure initiated by the Director of income tax (Exemption) u/s. 12AA(3) of the Act were dropped by an order dated March 3, 2014 and accordingly the registration granted in favour of the petitioner u/s. 12A of the Act, remained intact. The petitioner submitted an application for getting an exemption certification u/s. 10 (23C)(vi) of the Act, for the assessment year 2013- 14 and onwards on September 30, 2013. The petitioner was called upon to make submissions. By two letters dated February 28, 2014 and August 13, 2014 detailed submissions were made before the Commissioner with whom the application was pending for adjudication. By the order dated September 29, 2014 the Commissioner refused to issue the certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act on various grounds.

By way of a writ petition under articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner challenged the order dated September 29, 2014 passed by the Commissioner by which the application submitted by the by the petitioner to issue exemption certificate in its favour u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. had been refused.

The High Court noted that it was an admitted position that a certificate u/s. 12A of the Act had already been issued in favour of the petitioner and the same had continued till date. Therefore, according to the High Court it was established that the petitioner-institution was a charitable trust as far as applicability of the Income-tax Act was concerned.

The High Court held that the sole object of the institution was to impart education. By providing latest information and thereafter training to those people who were already in the field of advertising communication, etc. and in such process if certain persons became super-specialists in a particular field, and for which the institution was charging fee, such a case would not fall under proviso to section 2(15).

The High Court concluded that the petitioner institution was established for the sole purpose of imparting education in a specialized field.

Before the Supreme Court, the learned Solicitor General appearing for the Income-tax Department and the counsel appearing for the respondent-assessee in the appeal did not dispute that the issue involved in these appeals was squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT [2015] 372 ITR 699 (SC). The Supreme Court noted that the matter pertained to the exemption to the educational institutions u/s.10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the said judgment, the court summarized the legal position as under:

“11. Thus, the law common to section 10(23C) (iiiad) and (vi) may be summed up as follow:

(1) Where an educational institution carries on the activity of education primarily for educating persons, the fact that it makes a surplus does not lead to the conclusion that it ceases to exist solely for educational purposes and becomes as intuition for the purpose of making profits.

(2) The predominant object test be applied- the purpose of education should not be submerged by a profit making motive. .

(3) A distinction must be drawn between the making of the surplus and an institution being carried on ‘for profit’. No inference arises that merely because imparting education result in making a profit, it becomes an activity for profit.

(4) If after meeting the expenditure, a surplus arises incidentally from the activity carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes.

(5) The ultimate test is whether on an overall view of the matter in the concerned assessment year the object is to make profit as opposed to educating persons.”

The Supreme Court noted that there was a difference of opinion amongst various High Courts on the aforesaid issue. While summarizing the law, it approved the judgments of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Delhi and Bombay High Courts and reversed the view taken by the Uttarakhand High Court. In so far as the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was concerned, it was given in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust vs. Union of India [2010] 327 ITR 73 (P&H). The relevant para in this behalf which also stated as to how such cases were to be dealt with reads as under:

“25. We approve the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana, Delhi and Bombay High Courts. Since we have set aside the judgment the Uttarakhand High Court and since the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax’s orders cancelling exemption which were set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court were passed almost solely upon the law declared by the Uttarakhand High Court, it is clear that these orders cannot stand. Consequently, the Revenue’s appeal from the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s judgment dated January 29, 2010, and the judgments following it are dismissed. We reiterate that the correct tests which have been culled out in the three Supreme Court judgment stated above, namely, Surat Art Silk Cloth, Aditanar and American Hotel and Lodging, would all apply to determine whether an educational institution exists solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profits. In addition, we hasten to add that the 13th proviso to section 10(23C) is of great importance in that assessing authorities must continuously monitor from assessment year to assessment year whether such institutions continue to apply their income and invest or deposit their funds in accordance with the law laid down. Further, it is of great importance that the activities of such institution be looked at carefully. If they are not genuine, or are not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which approval has been given, such approval and exemption must forthwith be withdrawn. All these cases are disposed of making it clear that the Revenue is at liberty to pass fresh order if such necessity is felt after taking into consideration the various provisions of law contained in section 10(23C) read with section 11 of the Income-tax Act.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal clarifying that the observations made in para. 25 in Queen’s Educational Society (supra) shall be followed

Business expenditure- TDS- Disallowance- Section 40(a)(ia) of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2006- 07- Freight charges- Supplier making payments to transporters- Assessee, buyer, reimbursing transportation expenses- Liability to deduct TDS on supplier under agreement- No liability on assessee to deduct tax and disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) not attracted-

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Hightension Switchgear Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT; 385 ITR 575 (Cal):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the payments made by the assessee on account of freight charges on the ground that it had failed to deduct tax at source u/s. 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In its appeal before CIT(A) and the Tribunal the assesee submitted that its supplier, IPCL, had reimbursed the total freight charges in its invoices and had paid them to the transporter, RLL after deducting tax at source which had been deposited by the supplier with the Department. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Under the contract of sale, the seller was bound to send the goods to the buyer. The relevant part of the price list had showed that the seller was bound to pay the transportation charges to the transport agency and was entitled to recover it from the buyer. The assessee had merely reimbursed the cost of transportation incurred by the seller. The liability to deduct and pay the tax was that of the seller who have admitted to have done that. In case the seller was unable to show that he had made the deduction, section 40(a)(ia) might be applied to his case but not to the case of the assessee who was the buyer.

ii) Even if it was assumed that the supplier, when it had transported the goods to the assessee, had acted as an agent of the assessee and the assessee had reimbursed the freight charges to the supplier, who in turn had paid to the transporters as the Tribunal had held, it was conceptually correct and no other conclusion was possible. The agent being the supplier had admittedly paid to the transporters and had also deducted tax at source. When the agent had complied with the provision, the principal could not have been visited with penal consequences. For one payment there could not have been two deductions. Moreover, when a person acted through another, in law, he acted himself.

iii) The Tribunal was wrong in holding that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source in respect of the freight component. When the assessee was not liable to make any deduction u/s. 194C the rigours of section 40(a)(ia) could not have been applied to it. The question is answered in favour of the assessee.”

Reassessment – Rent enhanced in 1994 with effect from 1-9-1987- Notice issued u/s.148 seeking to reopen the concluded assessment for the assessment year 1989-90- The notice was without jurisdiction inasmuch as such enhancement though with retrospective effect, was made only in the year 1994.

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P.G. And W Sawoo Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (SC) [2016] 385 ITR 60 (SC)

The premises belonging to the appellant were let out on rent to the Government of India. The rent was enhanced from Rs.4.00 to Rs. 8.11 per sq. ft. per month effective from September 1, 1987. The said enhancement of rent was made by a letter dated March 29, 1994 of the Estate Manager of the Government of India. The enhancement was subject to conditions including execution of a fresh lease agreement and communication of acceptance of the conditions incorporated therein. Such acceptance was communicated by the appellant by letter dated March 30, 1994.

A notice was issued u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) seeking to reopen the concluded assessment of the appellant-assessee for the assessment year 1989- 90 (for the period of 21 month commencing on July 1, 1987 and ending on March 31, 1989).

The contention of the assessee before the Supreme Court was that having regard to the provisions of sections 5, 22 and 23 of the Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon and Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1954] 26 ITR 27 (SC), no income accrued or arose and no annual value which is taxable under sections 22 and 23 of the Act was received or receivable by the assessee at any point of time during the previous year corresponding to the assessment year 1989-90. Hence, the impugned notice seeking to reopen the assessment in question was without jurisdiction or authority of law.

The Respondent –Revenue contended that the enhancement of rent was retrospective, i.e. from September 1, 1987 and, therefore, the income must have to be understood to have been received in the said assessment year, i.e. 1989-90.

The Supreme Court held that no such right to receive the rent accrued to the assessee at any point of time during the assessment year in question, inasmuch as such enhancement though with retrospective effect, was made only in the year 1994. The contention of Revenue that the enhancement was with retrospective effect did not alter the situation as retrospectivity was with regard to the right to receive rent with effect from an anterior date. The right, however, came to be vested only in the year 1994.

The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the notice seeking to reopen the assessment for the assessment year 1989-90 was without jurisdiction and authority of law. The said notice, therefore, was liable to be interfered with and the order of the High Court set aside. The Supreme Court ordered accordingly and consequently, the appeal was allowed.

Business of Derivatives Trading & Explanation to Section 73

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Issue for Consideration
Section 73 of
the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that any loss, computed in respect of a
speculation business carried on by the assessee, cannot be set off
except against profits of another speculation business. Explanation 2 to
section 28 provides that where speculative transactions carried on by
an assessee are of such a nature as to constitute a business, the
business is deemed to be distinct and separate from any other business,
and is referred to as ‘speculation business’ for the purposes of the
Act.

Section 43(5) defines the term “speculative transaction”,
as a transaction in which a contract for the purchase or sale of any
commodity, including stocks and shares, is periodically or ultimately
settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or transfer of the
commodity or scrips. Proviso to section 43(5) lists certain exceptions
to the ‘speculative transactions’, vide clasues (a) to (e). Clause (d)
of the proviso provides that an ‘eligible transaction’ in respect of
trading in derivatives referred to in section 2(ac) of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 carried out on a recognised stock
exchange shall be deemed not to be a speculative transaction.

Therefore,
derivatives transactions satisfying the needs of being treated as
‘eligible transactions’ are not regarded as speculative transactions for
the purposes of computing business profits u/s. 28.

The
explanation to section 73 provides for a deeming fiction where under
certain business carried on by a company is deemed to be a speculation
business. This fiction of explanation to section 73 applies only to a
company. If any part of the business of the company consists in the
purchase and sale of shares of other companies, such company is deemed
to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the
business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares. Certain
exceptions to this fiction are provided in this regard.

An
interesting issue which has come up for consideration before the courts
is as to whether the business of derivatives transactions, which are not
regarded as speculative transactions by virtue of the proviso to
section 43(5), can be deemed to be a speculation business by virtue of
the explanation to section 73. While the Delhi High Court has taken the
view that the provisions of the explanation to section 73 do apply to
such derivatives trading business, and it is therefore deemed to be a
speculation business, the Calcutta High Court has taken a contrary view
and held that the explanation to section 73 applies only to transactions
in shares, and not to transactions in derivatives, and that therefore
derivatives trading business cannot be deemed to be a speculation
business.

DLF Commercial Developers’ Case
The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. DLF Commercial Developers Ltd 218 Taxmann 45.

In
this case, the assessee claimed a loss of Rs 492.71 lakh on account of
purchase and sale of derivatives. It claimed that the loss in trading of
derivatives was not a speculation loss in terms of section 43(5), and
could not be disallowed as a speculation loss under any provisions of
the Income Tax Act. The assessing officer rejected that submission, and
held that the explanation to section 73 applied, since it was
independent of section 43(5). He therefore treated the loss as a
speculation loss, and did not permit the adjustment of the loss against
business income.

The Commissioner(Appeals) rejected the
assessee’s contention. In further appeal to the tribunal, the tribunal
held that the explanation to section 73 was not applicable, and granted
relief to the assessee.

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf
of the revenue, it was argued that the explanation to section 73
categorically provided that where any part of the business of the
company included purchase and sale of shares of another company, it
should l be deemed that the company was carrying on speculation business
to the extent to which the business consisted of that activity. It was
further argued that the intention of section 43 was to define certain
terms for the purposes of sections 28 to 41. It was argued that clause
(d) of the proviso to section 43(5) had restricted application, in that
it excluded transactions in derivatives only for a limited purpose. It
was claimed that section 73 had wider application and related to all
manner of losses concerning shares.

Reliance was placed on
behalf of the revenue on the decisions in the cases of CIT vs.
Intermetal Trade Ltd 285 ITR 536 (MP), CIT vs. Arvind Investments Ltd
192 ITR 365 (Cal) and Eastern Aviation and Industries Ltd vs. CIT 208
ITR 1023 (Cal). It was argued that the specific inclusion of the
activity of sale and purchase of shares of other companies from the
otherwise general application of principles underlying section 73 meant
that those transactions could not claim the benefit of the provision of
s.43(5). It was pointed out that derivatives of the kind and nature
traded by the assessee in the case before the court related to stocks
and shares, and were the subject matter of transactions on a stock
exchange. It was therefore claimed that the tribunal ought not to have
permitted the assessee the benefit of set of such loss.

On
behalf of the assessee, it was argued that the transactions in
derivatives were specifically excluded from the definition of
speculative transactions. Even though that definition was in section
43(5), it could not be ignored, since there was no other definition of
derivatives in the Income Tax Act. It was highlighted that derivatives
need not be only in respect of stocks and shares, but could also be in
respect of commodities. Reliance was placed on the decision of the
Madras High Court in Rajshree Sugars and Chemicals Ltd vs. Axis Bank Ltd
AIR 2011 Mad 144, for this proposition. The attention of the court was
also drawn to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Bharat R Ruia (HUF) 337 ITR 452, where the court had considered the
pre-amended section 43(5) before insertion of clause (d) in the proviso,
and held that derivatives in the light of the then existing law were
speculative transactions, but that the position had changed after
1.4.2006, when clause (d) was inserted in the proviso to section 43(5).
It was therefore argued that the tribunal had correctly held that the
assessee was entitled to the benefit of set off of the losses.

The
Delhi High Court analysing the provisions of section 73 and section
43(5) held that ; the term “speculative transaction” was defined only in
section 43(5) and the scope of the definition was restricted in its
application to working out the mandate of sections 28 to 41 in as much
as those provisions dealt with the computation of business income and
that it was not possible for the court to ignore or overlook that the
definition was confined in its application, to the extent it excluded
such transactions from the mischief of the expression “speculative
transactions”.

The Delhi High Court observed that while it was
tempting to hold that since the expression “derivatives” was defined
only in section 43(5), and since it excluded such transaction from the
odium of speculative transactions, and further, since it had not been
excluded from section 73, the explanation to section 73 did not apply,
however by doing so, the court would be doing violence to the
parliamentary intendment. This was because a definition enacted for only
a restricted purpose or objective should not be applied to achieve
other ends or purposes. Doing so would be contrary to the statute.

The
High Court stressed the contextual application of a definition or term.
The High Court observed that the stated objective of section 73, as was
apparent from the tenor of its language, was to deny speculative
businesses the benefit of set off of losses against other business
income.

The explanation to section 73 had been enacted to
clarify beyond any shadow of doubt that share business of of companies,
subject to certin exceptions, was deemed to be speculative. The fact
that in another part of the statute, which dealt with the competition of
business income, derivatives were excluded from the definition of
speculative transaction only underlined that such exclusion was limited
for the purposes of those provisions or sections. In the case before it,
the High Court noted that the derivatives were based on stocks and
shares, which fell squarely within the explanation to section 73.

According
to the Delhi High Court, it was therefore ideal to contend that
derivatives did not fall within the provision, when the underlying asset
itself did not qualify for the benefit, as derivatives were entirely
dependent on stocks and shares for the determination of their value. The
Delhi High Court therefore held that the explanation to section 73
applied to the case before it, and that the loss on trading in
derivatives could not be set off against other income.

Asian Financial Services’ Case

The
issue again came up recently before the Calcutta High Court In the case
of Asian Financial Services Ltd vs. CIT 70 taxmann.com 9.

In
this case, the assessee, a company, incurred a loss of Rs. 3,24,76,185
in futures and options transactions in shares being loss in derivatives
transactions. It claimed that this loss should be set off against other
business income, including profit from transactions in shares. The
assessing officer, for the purposes of s. 73, treated such loss as a
deemed speculation loss and did not allow set off of the loss against
the business income, by applying the explanation to section 73. While
the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal, the tribunal
held against the assessee, holding that the explanation to section 73
applied, and the loss was a speculation loss, which could not be set off
against any other income.

Before the Calcutta High Court, on
behalf of the assessee, it was argued that the loss was on account of
derivatives being the futures and options which was excepted from the
definition of the speculative transaction and as a consequence the loss
was to be treated as a business loss under the proviso to section 43(5).
It was argued that once it was deemed to be a business loss under the
proviso to section 43(5), the question of applying section 73 or the
explanation to that section for the purpose of refusing the loss to be
set off against business income was palpably wrong. It was claimed that
the decision of the Delhi High Court relied upon by the tribunal did not
lay down good law, and that the Delhi High Court erred in holding that
dealing in derivatives was also a speculation loss within the meaning of
section 73.

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that
section 43(5) was a general provision, while section 73 was a specific
provision. Attention was drawn to the explanation to section 73 to
submit that a company dealing in purchase and sale of shares amongst
others, which did not come within the exceptions carved out in the
explanation itself, was hit by the mischief of the explanation. A
question was raised that whether it could be said that when a business
consisting of purchase and sale of shares of other companies amounted to
a speculation business, business in derivatives, which depended on the
value of the underlying shares, was anything other than a speculation
business. It was argued that the view taken by the Delhi High Court in
DLF Commercial Developers’ case ( supra) was the correct view.

The
Calcutta High Court rejected the arguments of the revenue, observing
that, it could not be said that section 43(5) was a general provision
and section 73 was a specific provision. The Calcutta High Court in
fact, expressed the contrary view that the object of section 43(5) was
to define “speculative business”. The High Court observed that chapter
IV-D of the Income Tax Act, consisting of sections 28 to 44DB, dealt
with profits and losses of business or profession. It observed that when
the statute talked of profit, it also referred to losses, because loss
had been construed as a negative profit.

The Calcutta High Court
noted the language of the explanation to section 28 and observed that
from a plain reading of the explanation, the following deductions could
be made:

1. speculative transactions carried on by an assessee might be of such a nature as to constitute a business;

2. such speculation business carried on by an assessee should be deemed to be distinct and separate from any other business.

The
Calcutta High Court therefore concluded that speculation transactions
might partake the character of deemed business where the statute so
provided. The court then noted the definition of speculative transaction
contained in section 43(5), and the five exceptions contained in the
proviso thereto, and observed that such excepted transactions came
within the category of deemed business, which was distinct and separate
from any other business.

Addressing the question as to whether
loss arising out of such deemed business could be set off against the
profit arising out of other business or businesses, the High Court noted
that the provisions of section 70 permitted an assessee to set off loss
against his income from any other source under the same head, unless
otherwise provided. Therefore, the losses from the deemed business could
be set off against other business profits, unless otherwise provided.
The question was whether the explanation to section 73 provided
otherwise. According to the Calcutta High Court, a plain reading of the
explanation showed that it did not provide otherwise. Therefore,
according to the Calcutta High Court, the irresistible conclusion was
that the assessee was entitled to set of such loss arising out of deemed
business against other business income.

While the Calcutta High
Court agreed with the view of the Delhi High Court that shares fell
squarely within the explanation to section 73, it expressed its
disagreement with the treatment of derivatives at par with shares by the
Delhi High Court, since the Legislature had treated them differently.

The
Calcutta High Court therefore allowed the appeal of the assessee,
holding that the loss in derivatives transactions was not covered by the
explanation to section 73, and could be set off against other business
profits.

Observations
The definition of “securities”
u/s. 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation Act), 1956 makes it
clear that shares and derivatives are distinct from each other, though
both are securities, and even though derivatives derive their value from
the underlying shares or commodities.

The Companies Act, 2013
eliminates any possibility of treating the derivatives and shares to be
one. Section 2(84) defines ‘shares’ while section 2(33) defines the term
’derivatives’ and section 2(81) defines ‘securities’ and a combined
reading of all of them clearly confirm that the shares are not
derivatives for the purposes of the Companies Act, 2013 and if they are
not so there is no reason to treat as one and the same unless they are
defined to mean so for the purposes of the Income tax Act. In fact,
clause(d) of section 43(5) in turn refers to clause (ac) of section 2 of
the SCRA for providing the meaning to the term ‘derivatives’ for the
purposes of the Income tax Act.

It is well settled that a
deeming fiction is to be strictly construed. The explanation to section
73 deems certain business to be a speculation business, and is therefore
a deeming fiction. This deeming fiction merely refers to purchase and
sale of shares, and does not refer to purchase and sale of any other
securities. Therefore, given the fact that derivatives are not referred
to in the explanation, the deeming fiction of the explanation cannot be
extended to cover derivatives.

This view is supported by the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Apollo Tyres Ltd
255 ITR 273, where the Supreme Court held that units of mutual funds
were not shares, and therefore that the business loss in dealing in such
units was not covered by the explanation to section 73. In the case of
units of mutual fund also, as in the case of derivatives, the value of
the mutual fund units is derived from the underlying assets, which are
shares. If transactions of trading in mutual fund units do not fall
within the ambit of the explanation to section 73, logically,
transactions of trading in derivatives should also not fall within the
ambit of the explanation.

We have no doubt that the decision of
the Delhi high court could have been different had the court’s attention
been drawn to the decision of the apex court delivered in the context
of explanation to section 73 i.e on the same subject as is the subject
of discussion here.

Further, the provisions of section 43(5),
explanation 2 to section 28, and section 73 should be regarded as one
integrated scheme, for the limited purpose of set off of business loss
against any other income.

The term “speculation” is not used in
any other section of the Income Tax Act, and therefore this is a logical
interpretation. In the absence of section 73, there was no necessity of
the definition of speculative transaction in section 43(5), nor of
explanation 2 to section 28. When an item is specifically excluded from
the provisions of section 43(5), the intention clearly is to exclude it
also from the provisions of section 73, unless section 73 expressly
provides to the contrary. In any case, the explanation to section 73
while referring only to shares, clearly indicates that loss of trading
in derivatives does not fall within the deeming fiction of the
explanation.

The better view, therefore, seems to be that of the
Calcutta High Court, that loss on trading in derivatives is not
governed by the explanation to section 73, and that such loss incurred
by companies can be set off against other income.

Is there a limitation for ‘reassessment’ when the return is processed U/s.143(1)?

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The culminating point of the return filing exercise under the Income-tax Act, 1961 is its assessment. It may so happen that the income returned is accepted per se or subjected to some increase by virtue of the provisions of law. Section 2(8) very briefly defines the term ‘assessment’ as “assessment includes reassessment”. However, there is no definition of the term ‘reassessment’ under the Act.

When a return of income is filed by the taxpayer , it could be accepted. Later on, it could also be selected for detailed verification technically known as “scrutiny assessment”. However, there is a time limit for selecting a return for scrutiny assessment viz. six months from the end of the financial year in which the return was filed. Once this time limit expires, whether the tax authorities can invoke reassessment provisions which provide longer time limit has been litigated..

Recently, the Gujarat High Court in Olwin Tiles India P Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2016) 130 DTR (Guj) 209 analysed whether the Assessing Officer without having any extra material / information could reopen the case. This article discusses this decision which dissented from the decision in the case of CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd (2013) 87 DTR (Del) 313 / 354 ITR 536 (Del) as well asthe recent statutory amendments which require further fine tuning for having hassle free tax compliance in respect of the majority of taxpayers whose returns are accepted as it is by the tax authorities.

Olwin Tiles India (P) Ltd ’s case
The assessee filed its return of income declaring “nil” income. It was processed u/s. 143(1) and later on, a notice u/s. 148 was issued for reopening the assessment.

The reason given by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment was that the assessee had issued 60,000 equity shares of Rs.10 each at a premium of Rs.990 per share. The Assessing Officer based on the assets and liabilities furnished in the return of income computed the ‘net worth’ of the company and found book value of equity share to be Rs.33 per share. Hence, the Assessing Officer concluded that the shares were issued to the shareholders at a premium which was far above their book value or intrinsic worth.

Readers may note that the facts of the case relate to assessment year 2011-12 and hence clause (viib) of section 56(2) could not be applied as the said provision became operational by virtue of the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. the assessment year 2013-14.

The assessee submitted that the return having been accepted by the Assessing Officer cannot be subjected to reassessment on the basis of materials which are already available on record. It was contended that the Assessing Officer must have some tangible material which did not form part of the original record to enable him to reopen the case or else, it would amount to mere review of the earlier assessment, which is impermissible in law.

The reason recorded by the Assessing Officer was that the investors invested in the shares of the company at a value far above the net asset value which implied that the additional amounts represent unexplained cash credits chargeable to tax under section 68 of the Act.

The assessee relied on the decision in the case of CIT vs. Orient Craft Ltd (2013) 354 ITR 536 (Del).

Orient Craft’s case
The assessee in this case for the assessment year 2002- 03 filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs.445.35 lakh. The income returned included inter alia (i) claim of deduction u/s. 80HHC; and (ii) deduction u/s. 10B. The return was processed u/s. 143(1).

Later, a notice u/s. 148 was issued on the ground that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by virtue of the items such as (i) duty drawback; (ii) DEPB; (iii) premium on DEPB; and (iv) sale of quota all of which were included in the ‘export turnover’ and thus excess deduction was allowed u/s. 80HHC. The assessee filed a return in response to the notice issued under section 148 declaring the same total income as was admitted in the original return.

The assessee questioned the reopening of assessment which the Assessing Officer rejected by citing clause (c) of the Explanation to section 147. The Assessing Officer claimed that the assessee had claimed excess deduction under section 80HHC by including ineligible items. The reassessment was completed by scaling down the deduction u/s. 80HHC to Rs.683.95 lakh from the original claim of Rs.874.21 lakh.

The assessee challenged the reassessment order both on the grounds of jurisdiction and merit. The CIT (Appeals) rejected the objection to jurisdiction , but on merit decided the issue in favour of the assessee. Before the tribunal, both the assessee and the Revenue filed cross appeals. The assessee challenged the jurisdiction assumed for reopening the assessment u/s. 147 as also certain other issues on merit which were decided against it by the CIT (Appeals).

The tribunal examined the assessee’s claim and found that the issue was decided in favour of the assessee for the earlier assessment years and accordingly decided the case by citing decision in the case of CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) in which it was observed “since there was no tangible material available with the Assessing Officer to form the requisite belief of escapement of income, the reopening of the completed assessment is unsustainable in the eyes of law. The same is, therefore cancelled”.

The matter went to the Delhi High Court where the court held that even an assessment u/s. 143(1) can be reopened u/s. 147 subject to fulfillment of the conditions precedent, which includes that the Assessing Officer must have “reason to believe” that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

Though no assessment order was passed and intimation u/s. 143(1) is sent, the apex court in Asstt. CIT vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd (2007) 291 ITR 500 (SC) has held that for initiating the proceedings u/s. 147 the ingredients of section 147 are to be fulfilled. The ingredient is the presence of “reason to believe” that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The court held that this judgment does not give carte blanche to disturb the finality of the intimation issued u/s. 143(1).

The Delhi High Court finally held that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer were not based on any tangible material which came to his possession subsequent to the issue of intimation u/s. 143(1). It held that reopening of assessment after issue of intimation without any fresh material reflects an arbitrary exercise of the powers conferred u/s. 147. The decision hence was in favour of the assessee.

Reasoning in Olwin Tiles case
The Gujarat High Court referred to its precedent in Inductotherm India (P) Ltd vs. M.Gopalan, Dy. CIT (2012) 356 ITR 481 (Guj) where it was held that no assessment had taken place when an intimation under section 143(1) was issued accepting the return filed by the assessee. It held that the Assessing Officer would not have formed any opinion with respect to any of the aspect arising in such return. The power to reopen assessment is available when a return has been accepted u/s. 143(1) or a scrutiny assessment has been framed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. The common requirement in both the situations is that the Assessing Officer should have reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

The Gujarat High Court in Olwin Tiles case (Supra) hence held that it cannot accept the contention of the assessee that the Assessing Officer must have some material outside or extraneous to the records to enable him to form an opinion or entertain a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The only requirement to be fulfilled for issuing a notice for reopening the assessment is the ‘reason to believe’ that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.

It adverted to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Jhaveri’s case (Supra) where it has been highlighted that ‘reason to believe’ does not have to be a final opinion that the additions would certainly be made to the income originally admitted / assessed. The reason recorded in Olwin Tiles case (Supra) by the Assessing Officer was that the share valuation of the company on the basis of balance sheet furnished in the return of income was only Rs.33 as against the issued price of Rs.1000 per share.

The court observed that the assessee-company had not commenced manufacturing activity and whether or not it has earned income cannot be gone into at this stage viz. at the time of deciding the validity of reassessment notice. The court accordingly held that it was not inclined to terminate the reassessment proceedings at this stage on the grounds put forth by the appellant.

Olwin Tiles vS. Orient Crafts – a comparative study
Prima facie the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Olwin Tiles case (Supra) was in favour of the Revenue and it dissented from the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Orient Crafts Ltd (Supra).

The decision rendered in Orient Craft’s case related to assessment year 2002-03 being an era preceding the electronic filing / processing of returns. Hence, at that time the assessee would have furnished the necessary details along with the return of income. Whereas in Olwin Tiles case (Supra) which pertained to assessment year 2011-12, the return of income would have been filed electronically and is an annexure-less return. No further details except the return form duly filled in were available with the tax authorities. This would show that a return processed u/s. 143(1) is prima facie an acknowledgement of the return, subject to a cursory verification of the claims contained therein.

Further tax returns are presently processed by Centralized Processing Centres (CPC). Though CPC is managed by the officials of the Department, it is not possible to analyse or validate the contents of the return filed by the taxpayers in the absence of supporting documents / evidences as the returns filed nowadays are annexure-less.

In this backdrop, it is debatable whether the return processed by CPC can be called as an appraisal of the return of income filed by the taxpayers. It appears that the e processing of the return is adequate only for detection of apparent errors or inconsistencies detected by the software based on the schedules forming part of the return, Thus processing of return and issue of intimation u/s. 143(1) in all fairness cannot taken as approval of the return filed by the taxpayers.

If the Delhi High Court (dealt with Orient Craft’s case) had dealt with the assessment year where the return is processed by CPC and not by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, perhaps the decision may have been different. The decision of the Gujarat High Court (in Olwin Tiles case) is to be read in the context of the situation on the ground. Therefore a subsequent appraisal of the information contained in the return may also lead to formation of a reason to believe, and a consequent reopening.

Amendments in Finance Act, 2016
The Finance Act, 2016 probably taking note of the limitations in processing of returns by CPC enlarged the scope for adjustments on processing of returns which hitherto was limited to adjusting (i) arithmetical errors; and (ii) incorrect claims which are apparent from any information in the return.

Now w.e.f. 01.04.2017, four more sub-clauses to section 143(1) are inserted which validate adjustments to the returned income while processing the returns either by the Department (in the case of paper returns) or CPC which processes e-returns. These adjustments are popularly known as prima facie adjustments and they covers the following:

(i) Incorrect claim of brought forward loss when the return of the assessment year in which the loss was incurred, is filed beyond the ‘due date’ specified in section 139(1);

(ii) Disallowance of expenditure which could be deciphered from the audit report filed with the return but was not to be taken into account while computing the total income;

(iii) Disallowance of deduction under sections 10AA, 80- IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID or 80-IE when the return is furnished beyond the ‘due date’ specified in section 139(1); and

(iv) Addition of income due to mismatch of figures between Form 26AS or Form 16A or Form 16 vis a vis the income disclosed in the return.

Though the first three adjustments are are fully justified while processing the return u/s. 143(1), the fourth one could create substantial hardship, particularly when the mismatch arises on account of difference in method of accounting followed by the deductor and deductee. Consequently , if for any reason an adjustment falling within these categories is not made in processing u/s. 143(1), the provisions of section 148 cannot be resorted to subsequently. The tax authorities may invoke section 154 if such omitted adjustments would fall in the category of error apparent on record. Other debatable claim of expenditure or income, which do not require any disclosure in the return or in the audit report continue to remain beyond the scope of the said adjustments, and therefore possibly attract the provisions of section 148..An explicit amendment in sections 147 /148 would put an end to this kind of controversy.

Yet another subsisting controversy resolved by the Finance Act, 2016 relates to substitution of sub-section (1D) to section 143 by mandating processing of returns u/s. 143(1) before issue of notice u/s. 143(2). This is applicable w.e.f. 01.04.2017. However, processing of returns u/s. 143(1) is not permitted after issuance of an order u/s. 143(3). This amendment would provide the taxpayers the benefit of cash flow viz. refund of tax if any, on processing of return under section 143(1) which was hitherto kept in abeyance till the completion of assessment u/s. 143(3). Further as a corollary to insertion of sub-clauses (iii) to (vi) to section 143(1), the concept of limited scrutiny has been done away with by amending section 143(2) w.e.f. 01.06.2016.

Revision under section 263
Section 263 empowers the Commissioner to assume jurisdiction where any order passed by the Assessing Officer is erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Whether intimation u/s. 143(1) is an ‘order’ to permit the CIT to assume the revisionary jurisdiction u/s. 263 has also been litigated at various points of time.

The legislature by amending the law and the courts by interpreting the law have provided safeguards when Commissioner exercises revisionary powers u/s. 263 such as (i) revision not permissible in respect of debatable claims; (ii) mandating recording of reasons for revision; (iii) revision of matters limited to issues not pending in appeal; and (iv) wider meaning of ‘record’ for the purpose of permitting revision.

The catch phrase in section 263 is “any order passed therein by the Assessing Officer” which is erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of revenue. Prima facie, when the return is processed u/s. 143(1), there is no examination of the claims made in the return except prima facie items listed in section 143(1). Thus the intimation issued u/s. 143(1) may not qualify as an ‘order’ for the purpose of revision u/s. 263.

However, the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Anderson Marine & Sons (P) Ltd (2004) 266 ITR 694 has held that the intimation u/s. 143(1) will have to be understood as having the force of an ‘order’ on self-assessment. By legal fiction, intimation u/s. 143(1) shall be deemed to be a notice of demand issued u/s.156 and all the provisions of the Act are applicable.

Thus the court held in the affirmative that intimation u/s. 143(1) is eligible for interference u/s. 263.

Conclusion
Based on the two legal decisions given at different points of time in the light of the fact that the returns were processed manually vis a vis electronically and the provisions of law as it stands now, one may summarize the position as follows:

(i) A return processed u/s. 143(1) in spite of the expanded scope of adjustments may be subjected to reassessment proceedings provided the Assessing Officer has reason to believe escapement of income or on the basis of some credible information from which he entertains the belief of escapement of income chargeable to tax.

(ii) Processing of a return u/s. 143(1), in the current scenario does not indicate appraisal of the return. Thus it appears that formation of the belief on the basis of a scrutiny of the return subsequent to the processing might result in a notice u/s. 148 and possession of information or knowledge by the tax authorities beyond the return may not be mandatory for issue of notice u/s. 148.

Let everyone play a game!

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Three women, Sakshi, Sindhu and Deepa have done India proud by their achievements at the recently concluded Olympics in Rio. Predictably, they have been showered with awards and gifts by governments, individuals, associations and sponsors. While they undoubtedly deserve the honour that they have received, this postachievement support raises quite a few questions.

In the first few days when our athletes were not making a mark, many individuals were critical of their performance. It is a fact that while our sportspersons get bashed when they fail to perform, they get placed on a pedestal when they get results. However, very little attention is paid to their training and the effort that they have to put in, in the years before the competition takes place. A question is often raised as to why with a population of nearly 125 crore we have always faced a drought, in the medal tally. The problem I believe begins at home. Our children are rarely encouraged to participate in a sport. This is true across all households, with different economic backgrounds. In the case of the poor, it is of an economic constraint that prevents the child from taking up a sport; in the case of the middle class it is probably the desire to secure an economically sound future that drives the parents to force children to study rather than play. The situation is changing to some extent.

We must all realise, that merely having a large young population will not ensure Olympic medals for our country. For that all the children in the country must be able to play at least one sport of their choice. It is only then that we will have stellar achievers. In our country it is only those who achieve either national or international fame that can have an economically secure future. This must change. Even those who achieve some level in any sport must be in a position to make a reasonable living. This need not necessarily be achieved through reservation in jobs, but if the sport itself spreads far and wide, then that itself will give employment opportunities like, maintenance and creation of sports infrastructure, coaching et cetera. Every economist of repute has expressed the view that in order to achieve economic prosperity creation of a sound infrastructure is absolutely essential. This is equally true of any sport.

The next issue is in regard to the regulation of sports associations. It is true that over the last many decades many sports associations have been badly managed. There has been mismanagement of funds, in some cases even misappropriation. To run such institutions efficiently one has to strike a balance between those who have knowledge of the game and those who can administer it. A sportsman is not necessarily a good administrator and possibly a bureaucrat can fill in that role. Politicians can impress upon the government the requirements of the sport. While politicians and bureaucrats must not be permitted to misuse their positions to garner posts in such associations, a general bashing of these persons is also incorrect. When we are critical of politicians and bureaucrats as a class, we often forget that they have not fallen from heaven and are one amongst us. Many have actually contributed to the development of sport. Therefore while one welcomes regulation of sport, it must happen internally and through pressure from the public. The judiciary cannot do this job. Its role should be limited to nudging those concerned into action.

Finally, one must accept the role of sponsors and advertisers in the popularisation of a sport. Some are very critical of what they call “commercialisation” of a game. However, a game becomes popular only if it is viewed by more and more people. If that is so, then the needs of the public and their tastes have to be borne in mind. The IPL in cricket has been a total game changer. The format of the game has undergone a change. With the viewing public having less time on their hands, the T-20 form of the game has become more and more popular. With competition becoming more intense the skill levels have also increased tremendously. Very recently this format has been adopted by a local sport namely Kabaddi. A sport which was played mainly in Maharashtra and a few other parts of the country is now becoming a national sport and is increasing in popularity.

It needs to be accepted that sponsors and advertisers, the media moguls are here to stay. One must give them their due share, while ensuring that the game continues to be played fairly. A well regulated sport will be beneficial for those who enjoy it as well as those who play it. One hopes that the Olympic fever does not subside. If more and more children play a sport with standard facilities we will certainly see many more Olympic medals. It needs patience and perseverance. The Indian tricolour, being unfurled and the national anthem, being played at victory ceremonies will then not remain a dream but will become reality.

TS-438-ITAT-2016(Ahd) ITO(IT) vs. Susanto Purnamo A.Y.: 2011-12, Date of order: 4th August, 2016

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Article 15 and Article 12 of India – USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ) – Software development services rendered by an individual qualified as Independent professional services (IPS) as per Article 15. In absence of satisfaction of conditions provided in Article 15, such income was not taxable in India.

Facts
The Taxpayer, an individual resident in USA, carried on his business as a sole proprietor. During the year, Taxpayer had rendered certain software development services to an Indian company (ICo). As part of the software development services, Taxpayer was required to design, build and maintain a complete video streaming website for ICo.

Taxpayer contended that the income from the software development services was in the nature of business income and in absence of a PE or a fixed base in India, income from such services is not taxable in India under Article 7 as well as Article 15 of the DTAA. Further, even if one were to contend that the services were in the nature of technical services, as such services did not make available any technical knowledge or skill, it would not be covered by Fee for Included Services (FIS) Article.

AO rejected Taxpayer’s contention on the ground that services rendered by the Taxpayer were not in the nature of IPS but in the nature of FIS. Further it was contended that the services satisfied the “make available condition” and hence, income from software development services was taxable in India.

On appeal, the First Appellate Authority (FAA) held that software development services are covered by the IPS article. Further due to a specific carve out in FIS article, services covered by IPS article would fall outside the ambit of FIS. Since the Taxpayer did not have a fixed base in India, nor did his presence in India exceed 90 days, the income from such services was not taxable in India. Aggrieved, the AO filed an appeal with the Tribunal.

Held
On a conjoint reading of Article 12 and Article 15 of the India-USA DTAA, it is clear that once an amount is found to be of such a nature as it can be covered by IPS article, the same shall stand excluded from the ambit of FIS article.

The applicability of Article 15 is substantially influenced by the status of the recipient; whether the recipient is an individual or a corporate entity. Thus, although there may be overlapping effect in the scope of services covered by Article 12 and Article 15, as long as the services are rendered by an individual or group of individuals, rendition of such services is covered by Article 15. Reliance in this regard can be placed on decision of Mumbai Tribunal in Linklaters LLP vs. ITO (2011) 9 ITR Tri 271. In the context of India-USA DTAA, this is specifically exemplified by way of a specific carve out in Article 12.

The definition of professional service in Article 15 is only illustrative and not exhaustive. The emphasis is on the nature of services.

Software development service which essentially requires predominant intellectual skill and is dependent on individual characteristics of the person pursuing software development, and is based on specialized and advanced education and expertise qualifies as a professional service under Article 15. Reliance in this regard was placed on Kolkata Tribunal decision in the case of Graphite India Ltd (2002) 86 ITD 384

It was not in dispute that the Taxpayer did not have a fixed base in India, nor did his presence in India exceed 90 days in the relevant year. Thus, although the services are in the nature of IPS, in absence of satisfaction of conditions of Article 15, income from software development services was not taxable in India.

Whether the services satisfied the make available clause under the FIS Article is wholly academic and infructuous considering the above discussion.

[2016] 71 Taxmann.com 351 (Delhi-Trib) ADIT(IT) vs. International Technical Services LLC A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of order: 11th July, 2016

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Sections 44BB , 44DA, 115A of the Act – Section 44BB of the Act does not mandate that the services should be provided directly by the party engaged in prospecting etc. of mineral oil; Provision of services of technical personnel for carrying out drilling activities is covered by Section 44BB of the Act.

Facts
The Taxpayer a non-resident (NR) provided services of highly specialized offshore personnel to a third party. The third party (also a non-resident) required these personnel for carrying out drilling operations in relation to its contract with an Indian company.

Taxpayer contended that provision of technical personnel is for carrying out drilling operations and hence would be covered by presumptive taxation provisions of section 44BB. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) argued that the income of the Taxpayer would be determined on net basis as per the provisions of section 44DA.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), who subsequently directed the AO to compute income u/s 44BB.

The AO appealed before the Tribunal

Held
Taxpayer provided key technical personnel for conducting actual drilling operations. The service was an integral part of the drilling operations in connection with prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oil. Hence, it cannot be said that the activities of the Taxpayer were not “in connection with prospecting for or extraction or production of mineral oils”.

Section 44BB requires that the services/facilities provided by the Taxpayer should be “in connection with” prospecting etc. of mineral oil. It however, does not mandate that such services should be provided directly by the party engaged in prospecting etc. of mineral oil. Reliance in this regard was placed on the Mumbai Tribunal ruling in Micoperi S.P.A. Milano vs. DCIT (2002) 82 ITO 369 (Mum).

Section 115A was not applicable in the present case as payment was received from a NR. The decision in the case of CIT vs. Rolls Royce Pvt. Ltd. 170 Taxman 563 (Uttarakhand High Court) did not apply as in that case the services were rendered to an Indian company whereas in the present case services were rendered to a NR.

Thus services rendered by Taxpayer were covered by section 44BB.

GROWING SIGNIFICANCE OF PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002

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The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [PMLA], which extends to whole of India including Jammu and Kashmir, came into force with effect from 1st July, 2005. Major amendments to the Law were made in the year 2009 and 2012. However, PMLA has been in news in recent past as in many cases PMLA is being regularly invoked and concrete action is visible and in some cases the same has been invoked against professionals closely associated with such persons, as well.

It is therefore, of utmost importance to understand PMLA and its growing significance not only for the professionals in practice but for those in industry as well.

In this article, we have attempted to provide a brief overview of the Law and recent developments relating to PMLA.

SYNOPSIS
1. Background
2. Object of pmla
3. Meaning of money laundering
a) proceeds of crime
b) meaning of the terms ‘property’, ‘person’ ‘offence of cross border implications’
c) scheduled offences
d) major acts covered in the schedule
4. Process of money laundering
5. Impact of money laundering
6. Steps taken by govt. Of india to prevent the menace of money laundering
7. Some recent cases where pmla is invoked
8. Flow of events under pmla
9. Obligations of the reporting entities
10. Possible actions which can be taken against persons / properties involved in money laundering
11. Invocation of pmla against professionals
12. Reciprocal arrangement for assistance in certain matters and procedure for attachment and confiscation of property
13. Conclusion

1. Background
Money-laundering has been a huge challenge for the international community for quite some time. Moneylaundering poses a serious threat not only to the financial and banking systems of countries, but also to their integrity and sovereignty. To obviate such threats, international community has taken various initiatives.

Some of the major initiatives taken by the international community, from time to time, to obviate such threats have been as follows:—

a) the United Nations [UN] Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to which India is a party, called for prevention of laundering of proceeds of drug crimes and other connected activities and confiscation of proceeds derived from such offence.

b) the Basle Statement of Principles, enunciated in 1989, outlined basic policies and procedures that banks should follow in order to assist the law enforcement agencies in tackling the problem of money laundering.

c) the Financial Action Task Force [FATF] established at the summit of seven major industrial nations, held in Paris from 14th to 16th July, 1989, to examine the problem of money-laundering had made forty recommendations, which provided the foundation material for comprehensive legislation to combat the problem of money laundering. The recommendations were classified under various heads. Some of the important heads are –

i. declaration of laundering of monies carried through serious crimes a criminal offence;

ii. to work out modalities of disclosure by financial institutions regarding reportable transactions;

iii. confiscation of the proceeds of crime;

iv. declaring money-laundering to be an extraditable offence; and

v. promoting international co-operation in investigation of money laundering.

d) the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action adopted by UN General Assembly by its Resolution No. S-17/2 of 23rd February, 1990, inter alia, called upon the member States to develop mechanism to prevent financial institutions from being used for laundering of drug related money and enactment of legislation to prevent such laundering.

e) the UN in the Special Session on Countering World Drug Problem Together concluded on the 8th to the 10th June, 1998 had made another Declaration regarding the need to combat money laundering. India is a signatory to this Declaration.

2. Object of pmla
As stated in the Preamble to the Act, it is an Act to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and to punish those who commit the offence of money laundering.

3. Meaning of money laundering
The goal of a large number of criminal activities is to generate profit for an individual or a group. Money laundering is the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.

Illegal arms sales, smuggling and other organized crimes, including illicit gambling and betting drug trafficking and prostitution rings, can generate huge amounts of money. Embezzlement, insider trading, bribery and computer fraud schemes can also produce large profits and create the incentive to “legitimize” the ill-gotten gains through money laundering. The money so generated is tainted and is in the nature of ‘dirty money’. Money Laundering is the process of conversion of such proceeds of crime, the ‘dirty money’, to make it appear as ‘legitimate’ money. Section 2(p) of the PMLA provides that ‘“moneylaundering” has the meaning assigned to it in section 3.’

Section 3 of the PMLA provides for Offence of Moneylaundering as follows:

‘Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money laundering.”

a) PROCEEDS OF CRIME – Section 2(1)(u) “

“Proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property.”

b) MEANING OF THE TERMS ‘PROPERTY’, ‘PERSON’ ‘OFFENCE OF CROSS BORDER IMPLICATIONS’
“(v) “property” means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located;”

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the term “property” includes property of any kind used in the commission of an offence under this Act or any of the scheduled offences;”

“(s) “person” includes;—

(i) an individual,
(ii) a Hindu undivided family,
(iii) a company,
(iv) a firm,
(v) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
(vi) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses, and
(vii) any agency, office or branch owned or controlled by any of the above persons mentioned in the preceding sub-clauses;”

“(ra) “offence of cross border implications”, means –

(i) any conduct by a person at a place outside India which constitutes an offence at that place and which would have constituted an offence specified in Part A, Part B or Part C of the Schedule, had it been committed in India and if such person 2[transfers in any manner] the proceeds of such conduct or part thereof to India; or

(ii) any offence specified in Part A, Part B or Part C of the Schedule which has been committed in India and the proceeds of crime, or part thereof have been transferred to a place outside India or any attempt has been made to transfer the proceeds of crime, or part thereof from India to a place outside India.

Explanation.—Nothing contained in this clause shall adversely affect any investigation, enquiry, trial or proceeding before any authority in respect of the offences specified in Part A or Part B of the Schedule to the Act before the commencement of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009.”

c) SCHEDULED OFFENCES

The offences listed in the Schedule to the PMLA are scheduled offences in terms of section 2(1)(y) of the Act. The scheduled offences are divided into three parts – Part A, B & C.

In Part A, offences to the Schedule have been listed in 28 paragraphs and it comprises of offences under Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Explosive Substances Act, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Arms Act, Wild Life (Protection) Act, the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Explosives Act, Antiquities & Arts Treasures Act etc.

Prior to 15th February, 2013, i.e. the date of notification of the amendments carried out in PMLA, the Schedule also had Part B for scheduled offences where the monetary threshold of rupees thirty lakhs was relevant for initiating investigations for the offence of money laundering. However, all these scheduled offences, hitherto in Part B of the Schedule, have now been included in Part A of Schedule w.e.f 15.02.2013. Consequently, there is no monetary threshold to initiate investigations under PMLA.

The Finance Act, 2015, w.e.f. 14-5-2015 has again inserted section 132 of the Customs Act, 1962 relating to false Declaration, false documents etc. in Part B.

Part ‘C’ deals with trans-border crimes, and is a vital step in tackling Money Laundering across International Boundaries.

Every Scheduled Offence is a Predicate Offence. The Scheduled Offence is called Predicate Offence and the occurrence of the same is a pre requisite for initiating investigation into the offence of money laundering.

d) MAJOR ACTS COVERED IN THE SCHEDULE
(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860;
(ii) N arcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985;
(iii) Unlawful Activities (Prevention ) Act, 1967;
(iv) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988;
(v) Customs Act, 1962;
(vi) SEBI Act, 1992;
(vii) Copyright Act, 1957;
(viii) Trade Marks Act, 1999;
(ix) Information Technology Act, 2000;
(x) Explosive Substances Act, 1908;
(xi) Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972;
(xii) Passport Act, 1967;
(xiii) Environment Protection Act, 1986;
(xiv) Arms Act, 1959.
(xv) The offence of wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest referred to in section 51 of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015.

4. Process of money laundering

Money laundering is a single process. However, its cycle can be broken down into three distinct stages namely, placement stage, layering stage and integration stage.

a) Placement Stage: It is the stage at which criminally derived funds are introduced in the financial system. At this stage, the launderer inserts the “dirty” money into a legitimate financial institution often in the form of cash deposits in banks. This is the riskiest stage of the laundering process because large amounts of cash are pretty conspicuous, and banks are required to report high-value transactions. To curb the risks, large amounts of cash is broken up into less conspicuous smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, or by purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money orders, etc.) that are then collected and deposited into accounts at another location.

b) Layering Stage: It is the stage at which complex financial transactions are carried out in order to camouflage the illegal source. At this stage, the launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements of the money in order to distant them from their source. In other words, the money is sent through various financial transactions so as to change its form and make it difficult to follow. Layering may consist of several bankto- bank transfers, wire transfers between different accounts in different names in different countries, making deposits and withdrawals to continually vary the amount of money in the accounts, changing the money’s currency, and purchasing high-value items such as houses, boats, diamonds and cars to change the form of the money. This is the most complex step in any laundering scheme, and it’s all about making the origin of the money as hard to trace as possible. In some instances, the launderer might disguise the transfers as payments for goods or services, thus giving them a legitimate appearance.

c) Integration stage: It is the final stage at which the ‘laundered’ property is re-introduced into the legitimate economy. At this stage, the launderer might choose to invest the funds into real estate, luxury assets, or business ventures. At this point, the launderer can use the money without getting caught. It’s very difficult to catch a launderer during the integration stage if there is no documentation during the previous stages.

The above three steps may not always follow each other. At times, illegal money may be mixed with legitimate money, even prior to placement in the financial system. In certain cash rich businesses, like Casinos (Gambling) and Real Estate, the proceeds of crime may be invested without entering the mainstream financial system at all.

The Process of money laundering may be explained simply by way of diagram as follows:



Various techniques or methods used:
At each of the three stages of money laundering various techniques can be utilized. Following are the various measures adopted all over the world for money laundering, even though it is not exhaustive but it encompasses some of the most widely used methods:

1. Structuring Deposits: This is also known as smurfing. This is a method of placement whereby cash is broken into smaller deposits of money, used to defeat suspicion of money laundering and avoid antimoney laundering reporting requirements.

Smurfs – A popular method used to launder cash in the placement stage. This technique involves the use of many individuals (the “smurfs”) who exchange illicit funds (in smaller, less conspicuous amounts) for highly liquid items such as traveller cheques, bank drafts, or deposited directly into savings accounts. These instruments are then given to the launderer who then begins the layering stage. For example, ten smurfs could “place” $1 million into financial institutions using this technique in less than two weeks.

2. Shell companies: These are fake companies that exist for no other reason than to launder money. They take in dirty money as “payment” for supposed goods or services but actually provide no goods or services; they simply create the appearance of legitimate transactions through fake invoices and balance sheets.

3. Third-Party Cheques: Counter cheques or banker’s drafts drawn on different institutions are utilized and cleared via various third-party accounts. Third party cheques and travellers’ cheques are often purchased using proceeds of crime. Since these are negotiable in many countries, the nexus with the source money is difficult to establish.

4. Bulk cash smuggling: This involves physically smuggling cash to another jurisdiction and depositing it in a financial institution, such as an offshore bank, with greater bank secrecy or less rigorous money laundering enforcement.

5. Impact of Money laundering

Launderers are continuously looking for new routes for laundering their funds. Economies with growing or developing financial centres, but inadequate controls are particularly vulnerable as established financial centre countries implement comprehensive anti-money laundering regimes. Differences between national anti-money laundering systems are being exploited by launderers, who tend to move their networks to countries and financial systems with weak or ineffective counter measures.

The possible social and political costs of money laundering, if left unchecked or dealt with ineffectively, are serious. Organised crime can infiltrate financial institutions, acquire control of large sectors of the economy through investment, or offer bribes to public officials and indeed governments. The economic and political influence of criminal organisations can weaken the social fabric, collective ethical standards, and ultimately the democratic institutions of the society as is evident in many countries in Latin America. In countries transitioning to democratic systems, this criminal influence can undermine the transition.

If left unchecked, money laundering can erode a nation’s economy by changing the demand for cash, making interest and exchange rates more volatile, and by causing high inflation in countries where criminal elements are doing business. The draining of huge amounts of money a year from normal economic growth poses a real danger for the financial health of every country which in turn adversely affects the global market. Most fundamentally, money laundering is inextricably linked to the underlying criminal activity that generated it. Laundering enables criminal activity to continue and flourish.

Thus, the impact of money laundering can be summed up into the following points:

Potential damage to reputation of financial institutions and market

Weakens the “democratic institutions” of the society

Destabilises economy of the country causing financial crisis

Give impetus to criminal activities

Policy distortion occurs because of measurement error and misallocation of resources

Discourages foreign investors

Encourages tax evasion culture

Results in exchange and interest rates volatility

Provides opportunity to criminals to hijack the process of privatization

Contaminates legal transaction.

Results in provision of financial support toTerrorists activities

6. Steps taken by govt. of india to prevent the menace of money laundering

Government of India is committed to tackle the menace of Money Laundering and has always been part of the global efforts in this direction. India is signatory to the following UN Conventions, which deal with Anti Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism:

1. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999);

2. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); and

3. UN Convention against Corruption (2003).

In pursuance to the political Declaration adopted at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) held on 8th to 10th June 1998 (of which India is one of the signatories) calling upon member States to adopt Anti Money Laundering Legislation & Programme, the Parliament has enacted PMLA. This Act has been substantially amended, by way of enlarging its scope, in 2009 (w.e.f. 01.06.2009), by enactment of PML (Amendment) Act, 2009. The Act was further amended by PML (Amendment) Act, 2012 w.e.f. 15-02-2013.

7. Some recent high profile cases where PMLA is invoked


A. As per the media reports

a. Chhagan Bhujbal’s case:
Former Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra Mr. Chhagan Bhujbal and his family members and various real estate developer firms and other associated with them.

b. Himachal Pradesh’s Chief minister Virbhadra singh and family’s case

c. Former King Fisher Chairman Vijay Mallya’s case

d. FTIL promoter Jignesh Shah in the NSEL’s case

e. Gujarat Cadre IAS Officer Pradeep Sharma’s case

f. Zoom Developers Pvt. Ltd.’s promoters Vijay Choudhary and his co-director Sharad Kabra’s case

g. Lalit Modi’s case

h. Bank of Baroda Money laundering case

i. As per the Law reports

j. B. Rama Raju v. Union of India [2011] 12 taxmann .com 181 (AP)

k. Union of India v. Hassan Ali Khan [2011] 14 taxmann.com 127 (SC)

The number of cases filed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 from the year 2008 to mid-2015 in various High Courts and the Supreme Court are:

The number of cases filed in the Appellate Tribunal under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 from the year 2009 till 2014 are:

8. Flow of events under PMLA

The flow of events under PMLA is graphically depicted as follows:


9. Obligations of the reporting entities

Section 2(1)(wa) – “Reporting Entity” means a banking company, financial institution, intermediary or a person carrying on a designated business or profession. Section 2(1)(sa) – Persons carrying on Designated Business or Profession means:-

(i) a person carrying on activities for playing games of chance for cash or kind, and includes such activities associated with casino;

(ii) a Registrar or Sub-Registrar appointed u/s. 6 of the Registration Act, 1908, as may be notified by the Central Government.

(iii) real estate agent, as may be notified by the Central Government.

(iv) dealer in precious metals, precious stones and other high value goods, as may be notified by the Central Government.

(v) person engaged in safekeeping and administration of cash and liquid securities on behalf of other persons, as may be notified by the Central Government; or

(vi) person carrying on such other activities as the Central Government may, by notification, so designate, from time to time.

Obligations [Section 12]

(i) Every reporting entity have to maintain a record of all transactions covered as per the nature and value of which may be prescribed, in such manner as to enable it to reconstruct individual transactions;

(ii) They shall furnish to the Director (FIU) within such time as may be prescribed information relating to such transactions, whether attempted or executed, the nature and value of which may be prescribed;

(iii) They shall verify the identity of its clients in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed;

(iv) They shall identify the beneficial owner, if any, of such of its clients, as may be prescribed;

(v) They shall maintain record of documents evidencing identity of their clients and beneficial owners as well as account files and business correspondence relating to their clients for a period of five years in case of record and information relating to transactions; and

(vi) They shall maintain the same for a period of five years after the business relationship between a client and the reporting entity has ended or the account has been closed, whichever is later.

10. Possible actions which can be taken against persons / properties involved in money laundering

Following actions can be taken against the persons involved in Money Laundering:-

(a) Attachment of property u/s. 5, seizure/ freezing of property and records u/s. 17 or Section 18. Property also includes property of any kind used in the commission of an offence under PMLA, 2002 or any of the scheduled offences.

(b) Persons found guilty of an offence of Money Laundering are punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but may extend up to seven years and shall also be liable to fine [Section 4].

(c) When the scheduled offence committed is under the Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 the punishment shall be imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend up to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.

(d) The prosecution or conviction of any legal juridical person is not contingent on the prosecution or conviction of any individual.

11. Risk of invocation of pmla against professionals

a. As pointed out above, section 3 of the PMLA dealing with the Offence of Money-laundering provides that ‘Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money laundering.” Thus, the language of Section 3 of PMLA has widest possible amplitude.

b. As per the media reports, PMLA has been invoked against the Chartered Accountant involved in the Chhagan Bhujbal case.

c. In CBI vs V. Vijay Sai Reddy Criminal Appeal No. 729 of 2013, a case relating to offence under Prevention of Corruption Act, the Supreme Court in its order dated 9th May, 2013, after analysing the facts while cancelling the bail of the respondent Chartered Accountant, observed as follows:

“26) Finally, though it is claimed that respondent herein (A-2) being only a C.A. had rendered his professional advise, in the light of the various serious allegations against him, his nexus with the main accused A-1, contacts with many investors all over India prima facie it cannot be claimed that he acted only as a C.A. and nothing more. It is the assertion of the CBI that the respondent herein (A-2) is the brain behind the alleged economic offence of huge magnitude. The said assertion, in the light of the materials relied on before the Special Court and the High Court and placed in the course of argument before this Court, cannot be ignored lightly.”

d. In order to ensure that a professional is not caught into the quagmire of PMLA it would be advisable to do a proper due diligence and KYC of the prospective clients and to ensure that one does not fall within very broad scope and contours of section 3 of PMLA. In other words, a Professional should ensure that he does not deal with clients who are engaged in various criminal activities included in the Schedule PMLA.

12. Reciprocal arrangement for assistance in certain matters and procedure for attachment and confiscation of property

a. Meaning of “Contracting State”
“Contracting State” means any country or place outside India in respect of which arrangements have been made by the Central Government with the Government of such country through a treaty or otherwise [Section 55].

b. Mechanism to obtain evidence required in connection with investigation into an offence or proceedings under PMLA if such evidence may be available in any place in a contracting State

An application is to be made to a Special Court by the Investigating Officer or any officer superior in rank to the Investigating Officer and the Special Court, on being satisfied, may issue a Letter of Request to a court or an authority in the contracting State competent to deal with such request to—

(i) examine facts and circumstances of the case,
(ii) take such steps as the Special Court may specify in such letter of request, and
(iii) forward all the evidence so taken or collected to the Special Court issuing such letter of request.

Every statement recorded or document or thing received from a Contracting State shall be deemed to be the evidence collected during the course of investigation [Section 57].

c. Mechanism to provide assistance to a Contracting State

Where a Letter of Request is received by the Central Government from a court or authority in a contracting State requesting for investigation into an offence or proceedings under PMLA, 2002 and forwarding to such court or authority any evidence connected therewith, the Central Government may forward such Letter of Request to the Special Court or to any authority under the Act for execution of such request [Section 58].

d. Confiscation of the properties involved in money laundering located in India, where the offence of money laundering has been committed outside India

The properties involved in money laundering located in India, where the offence of money laundering has been committed outside India, can be ordered to be confiscated by the Special Court/Adjudicating Authority on an application moved to the Special Court/ Adjudicating Authority [Sections 58B & 62A].

e. Reciprocal arrangements for processes and assistance for transfer of accused persons

(1) A Special Court, in relation to an offence punishable under section 4 for the service or execution of a summons, a warrant or a search warrant in a Contracting State shall send such summons or warrant, in duplicate, in prescribed form to the Court, Judge or Magistrate through specified Authorities.

(2) Similarly, a summons, a warrant or a search warrant in relation to an offence punishable under section 4, received for service or execution from a Contracting State, shall be served or executed as if it were a summons or warrant received by it from another Court in the said territories for service or execution.

After execution of summon or search warrant received from a Contracting State, the documents or other things produced or things found during search shall be forwarded to the Court issuing the summons or search-warrant through the specified Authority [Section 59].

f. Attachment or seizure of the property involved in money laundering and located in the Contracting State

In such cases, after issue of an order for attachment of any property made u/s. 5 or freezing u/s. 17(1A) or confirmation of attachment by Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 or confiscation by Special Court under Section 8, the Special Court, on an application by the Director or the Administrator may issue a Letter of Request to a court or an authority in the Contracting State for execution of such order as per the provisions of corresponding law of that country [Section 60(1)].

13. Conclusion

India has taken up various Anti-Money Laundering measures to deal with this issue but these measures somewhere or the other have some loopholes or lacunas and thus are not fulfilling their intended purpose. Some of such problems are pointed out below:

a) Growth of Technology: With the advent of technology at such a greater speed, it has been possible for the money launderers to act on obscuring the origin of proceeds of crime by cyber finance techniques. The enforcement agencies are not able to catch up with the speed of growing technologies.

b) Lack of awareness about the problem: The issue of money laundering is growing at a very high pace. Its unawareness among the common public is an impediment for implementation of proper anti-money laundering measures. The poor and illiterate people, instead of going through lengthy paper work transactions in Banks, prefer the Hawala system where there are fewer complexities and formalities, little or no documentation, lower rates and they also provide security and anonymity. Thus, they become unwitting accessories. This is mainly because such people don’t know the seriousness of this crime and are not aware of its harmful after effects.

c) Non-fulfilment of the purpose of KYC Norms: RBI has issued the policy of KYC norms with the objective to prevent banks from being used by criminals for money laundering or terrorist financing activities. However, it does not cease or abstain from the problem of Hawala transactions as RBI cannot regulate them. Further, such norms are only a mockery as the implementing agencies are indifferent to it. Also, the increasing competition in the market is forcing the Banks to lower their guards and thus facilitating the money launderers to make illicit use of the banking system in furtherance of their crime.

d) The widespread act of smuggling: There are a number of black market channels in India for the purpose of selling goods offering many imported consumers goods such as food items, electronics etc. which are routinely sold. The black market merchants deal in cash transactions and avoid custom duties thus offering better prices than the regular merchants. After liberalization of the economy, though this problem has been lessened but it has not been done away with completely and still poses a threat to a nation’s economy.

e) Lack of comprehensive enforcement agencies: The offence of money laundering is no more stuck to one area of operation but has expanded its scope include many different areas of operation. In India, there are separate wings of law enforcement agencies dealing with money laundering, cybercrimes, terrorist crimes, economic offences etc. Such agencies lack convergence among themselves. The issue of money laundering, as we have seen, is a borderless world but these agencies are still stuck with the laws and procedures of the states.

Combating the offence of money laundering is a dynamic process since the criminals involved in it are continuously looking for new ways to do it and achieve their illicit motives.

Apart from that, many a people are of the opinion that money laundering seem to be a victimless crime. They are unaware of the harmful effects of such a crime on the Nation’s economy and Democratic Institutions. So there is a need to educate such people and create awareness among them and therefore infuse a sense of watchfulness towards the instances of money laundering. This would also help in better law enforcement as it would be subject to public examination.

MVAT Amendment (Fifth) Rules, 2016

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VAT.1516/CR-86/Taxation-1 dated 6.8.2016

The Government of Maharashtra has issued Notification to amend Rule 17A whereby power has been given to Commissioner to issue Notification to specify order, certificate, notice, intimation or any other document which may be issued in an electronic form with or without digital signature.

New Rule 21A has been inserted with effect from 1.4.2011 to specify class of dealer, commodity and manner to determine fair market price under sec 28A.

MVAT Amendment (Fourth) Rules, 2016

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VAT.1516/CR-85/Taxation-1 dated 6.8.2016

The Government of Maharashtra has issued this Notification to amend Rule 52A for set-off in respect of the goods manufactured by mega units and Rule 83A for declaration to be issued by mega units.

Service Tax Liability in case of hiring of goods without the transfer of right to use goods

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Circular No. 198/8/2016 dated 17 08 2016

Transfer of Right to use goods for cash, deferred payment or valuable consideration is considered as deemed sales under sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29A) of Constitution of India and consequently liable to Sales Tax/VAT. Whereas in terms of Section 66E(f) of the Finance Act, 1994 transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods is a “Declared Service “ and hence liable to Service Tax.

The CBEC, vide this Circular has clarified the issue of applicability of service tax on hiring of goods without transfer of right to use of goods in line with the criteria laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL case.

CBEC has clarified that whether a transaction is a transfer of the right to use the goods or a service is essentially a question of fact which has to be determined in each case having regard to the terms of the contract. The transfer of effective control and possession of the goods in each case is important in determining whether it is a deemed sale or service.

Service Tax on Freight Forwarders on transportation of goods from India :

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SERVICE TAX UPDATES

Circular No. 197/7/2016-ST dated 12 08 2016

CBEC has issued this Circular to clarify doubts about “Service Tax liability of Freight Forwarders collecting “Freight”, for shipments moving from Indian Port to any place outside India”.

CBEC has clarified that as per Rule 10 of Place of Provision of Services (POPS) Rules 2012, since destination of the services is outside India, and the freight forwarder is acting as “Principal” therefore, the transaction will not attract Service tax.

CBEC has further clarified that as per Rule 2(f) read with Rule 9 of POPS Rules 2012, if the freight forwarder is acting as pure agent, then services of the freight forwarder will be taxable..

Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd., vs. The Union of India And Others And M/S. Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd V. The State Of Maharashtra And Others, WP. No. 9175 Of 2015 And 497 Of 2015, Dated 11th August, 2016 ( Bom).

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(a) Value Added Tax- Transfer Of Technical Know How- Sale- Liable To Vat.
(b) Value Added Tax- Frenchise Agreements- Not A Transfer Of Right To Use- Not A Sale- Not Liable For Vat, Schedule Entry C-39 of The Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

Facts
i) The Petitioner Monsanto India, a joint venture company of Monsanto Investment India Private Limited (“MIIPL”) and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Monsanto India developed and commercialized insect-resistant hybrid cotton seeds using a proprietary “Bollgard Technology”, one that is licensed to Monsanto India by Monsanto USA through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Monsanto Holdings Private Limited (“MHPL”). This technology is further sublicensed by Monsanto India to various seed companies on a non-exclusive and nontransferable basis to use, test, produce and sell genetically modified hybrid cotton planting seeds. In return for this technology, Monsanto India received trait fees based on the number of packets of seeds sold by the sub-licensees. These sub-licensing agreements, with almost 40 seed companies, were the transactions in question. The petitioner paid service tax on these transactions and did not paid vat. The department levied vat on these transactions treating transfer of technical knowhow as sale liable to vat. The petitioner file writ petition before the Bombay High Court.

ii) In other case the petitioner Subway was granted a non-exclusive sub-license by Subway International B.V. (“SIBV”), a Dutch limited liability corporation to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY – branded restaurants in India. This non-exclusive license was granted to SIBV itself by Subway Systems International Ansalt, which in turn was granted such a license by Doctor’s Associates Inc., an entity that owns the proprietary system for setting up and operating these restaurants. These restaurants serve sandwiches and salads under the trade mark ‘SUBWAY’. The agreement includes not only the trade mark SUBWAY, but also associated confidential information and goodwill, such as policies, forms, recipes, trade secrets and the like. Typically, Subway enters into franchise agreements with third parties, under which it provides specified services to the franchisee. In return, the franchisee undertakes to carry on the business of operating sandwich shops in Subway’s name. The agreement only provides for a very limited representational or display right, and the franchisee cannot transfer or assign these exclusive rights to any third person. Subway also reserves the right to compete with these franchisees in the agreement. Under this agreement, Subway received two kinds of consideration, one being a one-time franchisee fee which is paid when the agreement is signed; and the second is a royalty fee paid weekly by the franchisee on the basis of its weekly turnover. Under these agreements, the franchisees have no more than a right to display Subway’s intellectual property in the form of marks and logos, and a mere right to use such confidential information as Subway discloses and as prescribed by the franchise agreement. Since September 2003, Subway was paying service tax to the Union of India on the consideration received by it from the franchisees. The vat department took the view that this consideration should be subject to VAT and passed the orders levying tax, interest and penalty against which the Subway filed writ petition before the Bombay High Court.

The High Court disposed both writ petitions by common order.

Held
(a) In first case the High Court held that the first question is whether there is a ‘transfer’ within the meaning of Article 366(29A)(d) the answer is yes. It is true that the essence of a ‘transfer’ is the divesting of a right or goods from transferor and the investing of the same in the transferee, and this is what Salmond on Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum both say. The seeds embedded with the technology are, in fact, transferred. Monsanto India is divested of that portion of the technology embedded in those fifty seeds and those were fully vested in the sub-licensee. It is not correct to say that the effective control of the ‘goods’ is with Monsanto India. The effective control over the seeds, and, therefore that portion of the technology that is embedded in the seeds, is entirely with the sub-licensee. That sub licensee is not bound to use the seeds (and the embedded technology) in accordance with Monsanto India’s wishes. Monsanto India cannot further dictate to the sub-licensee what he or it may do with these technology-infused seeds. The sub-licensee can do as it wishes with them. It may not use them at all. It may even destroy the seeds. Once the transaction is complete, i.e., once possession of the technology-imbued seeds is effected, and those seeds are delivered, Monsanto India has nothing at all to do with the technology embedded in those fifty seeds given to the sub-licensee. At no point does Monsanto India have access to this portion of the technology. In other words, the transfer is to the exclusion of Monsanto India. Further, the High Court held that the Monsanto India sub-licensing transaction could only be a service in one circumstance, i.e., if the seed companies gave Monsanto India a bag of seeds to mutate and improve with the Bollgard Technology which would, thereafter, be returned to the seed companies. That might perhaps be a service contract. Accordingly, the High Court held that it is a clear case of sale of goods liable to tax (Vat).

As regards plea of petitioner for transfer of the amount paid as service tax from the Consolidated Fund of India to the Consolidated Fund of State of Maharashtra, the High Court did not give any direction and left it to Monsanto India to adopt suitable proceedings in this behalf, and left their contentions open to the necessary extent.

(b) It is not true that the eligibility of Vat is to be determined by the State, and therefore it could levy sales tax on a transaction which already attracts service tax. The decisions in BSNL, Imagic Creative, and Associated Lease Finance are exactly on this. Service Tax and Sales Tax are mutually exclusive of each other. The agreement between Subway and its franchisees is not a sale, but it is in fact a bare permission to use. It is, therefore, subject only to service tax. The fact that the agreement between Subway and its franchisee is limited to the precise period of time stipulated in the agreement is vital to Subway’s case. At the end of the period of the agreement, or before in case there was any breach of its terms, the right of the franchisee to display the mark ‘Subway’ and its trade dress, and all other permissions would also end. This is what sets this agreement apart from the case of Monsanto and its sub licensee. There, the seed companies could do as they pleased with the seeds; they could alienate or even destroy them. In Subway’s case, there are set terms provided by the agreement which have to be followed. A breach of these would result in termination of the agreement. There is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the franchisees. In fact, this agreement is a classic example of permissive use. It can be nothing else. For all the reasons in law and fact that the sub-licensing of technology in Monsanto is held to be a transfer of right to use, this franchising agreement must be held to be permissive use. It does not mean every franchise agreement will necessarily fall outside the purview of the amended MVAT Act. There is conceivably a class of franchise agreements that would have all the incidents of a ‘sale’ or a ‘deemed sale’ (i.e., a transfer of the right to use). Black’s Law Dictionary defines a franchise, in the context of a commercial transaction as: “The sole right granted by the owner of a trade mark or a trade name to engage in business or to sell a good or service e in a certain area”.

On facts, the High Court found that the Subway franchise does not meet these tests. There is no such exclusivity. The agreement itself says that Subway may itself open and operate its own outlets in direct competition with the franchisee. The agreements themselves expressly contemplate that Subway may create further franchisees in the very area in which these franchisees operate. The franchisee cannot unilaterally sub-franchise. The right of transferability is extremely restricted and it is impossible without Subway’s control throughout. Similarly, if there is no requirement of having to cease display and use or return the intangible property at the end of the franchise agreement’s term, then the transaction might arguably be a sale. Exercises in co-branding or sub-branding, where one party franchises its mark on a territorially-restricted basis and allows the franchisee to combine it with its own or other marks may also well have an element of sale. Similarly, where a dealership for, say, automobiles, has a territorial exclusivity, then it may amount to a franchise. The Subway franchise model has none of these elements. The so-called ‘system’ is controlled by Subway and it is exclusive to Subway. At the end of the franchise term, it cannot be used. The agreement gives Subway deep and pervasive control and dominion over the franchisee’s daily operations, without, at the same time, ceding to the franchisee the slightest hint or latitude in what it may do with the permitted marks and technology. This is, therefore, diametrically opposed to the Monsanto model, for Monsanto India has no control whatever in what its licensee does with the BT-infused donor seeds; that licensee may choose not to use them at all. There is also no question of any ‘return’ or ‘cessation’ to Monsanto India. Thus, viewed from any perspective, and on the facts of the case, the Subway franchise agreements does not have any of the necessary elements of a sale or a deemed sale.

Equally, the High Court rejected any general proposition to the effect that anything that is nothing but a service can be artificially converted into or treated as a sale merely by the insertion of an omnibus clause in a state-level taxing statute. To accept this argument, one would have to accept that the State Legislature can encroach upon the legislative powers of the Union in respect of items in the Union List simply by inserting such amendments that would by some process of fiscal and legal alchemy convert a pure service into a sale. The introduction of the word ‘franchise’ in the amended MVAT Act by way of a notification will have to be read to mean those franchises that can reasonably and plausibly be construed to have the effect of a sale; it cannot be widened to include agreements styled as ‘franchise’ agreements simply because of the nomenclature. Presumably, what the Legislature intended was to include only those franchise agreements that involved a transfer of the right to use or some other aspect of a deemed sale as defined under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. The Subway’s franchise agreement grants to the franchisee nothing more than mere permissive use of defined intangible rights. It is therefore a service, and is not amenable to VAT .

Accordingly, the High Court disposed both writ petitions.

Smt. B. Narsamma vs. The Deputy Commissioner Commercial Taxes, Karnataka & Anor., Civil Appeal Nos. 4149 of 2007,4318 of 2007,.4319 OF 2007, 7400 of 2016 , 7401-7872 of 2016 and 7873- 7916 of 2016, dated 11th August, 2016, (SC).

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a) Value Added Tax – Works Contract – Use of Reinforced Iron and Steel used in Construction –Remains Declared Goods – Liable to tax @ 4%.
b) Value Added Tax- Works Contract – Use of Iron and Steel for Fabrication of Doors and Windows – Which are Used in Construction- Does not Remain Iron and Steel – Not Exempt From Payment of Tax, section 5B of The Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 and section 4 of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The group of appeals, concerning the rate of taxability o f declared goods i.e. goods declared to be of special importance u/s. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 were filed before the SC. The common issue involved in all these appeals was whether iron and steel reinforcements of cement concrete that are used in buildings looses their character as iron and steel at the point of taxability, that is, at the point of accretion in a works contract. All these appeals came from the State of Karnataka relatable to the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, post 01.04.2005, and relatable to the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The facts in these appeals were more or less similar. Iron and Steel products were used in the execution of works contracts for reinforcement of cement, the iron and steel products becoming part of pillars, beams, roofs, etc. which were all parts of the ultimate immovable structure that is the building or other structure to be constructed.

In the other case appellant engaged in works contracts of fabrication and creation of doors, window frames, grills, etc. in which they claimed exemption under rule 6(4) of The Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957, for iron and steel goods that went into the creation of these items, after which they said doors, window frames, grills, etc. were fitted into buildings and other structures. The High Court denied the exemption as the iron and steel is not used in the same form in which it was purchased against which appeal was filed by the appellant.

The SC heard all those appeals and delivered a common judgment.

HELD
Given the fact, situation in those appeals relating to use of iron and steel for reinforcement of cement for construction of building, the SC held that where, commercial goods without change of their identity as such, are merely subject to some processing or finishing, or are merely joined together, and therefore remain commercially the same goods which cannot be taxed again, given the rigor of section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. Accordingly it is taxable as declared goods attracting rate of 4% under both acts.

In case of use of iron and steel for fabrication and creation of doors, window frames, grills, etc. which were fitted into buildings and other structures the SC held that the iron and steel goods, after being purchased, are used in the manufacture of other goods, namely, doors, window frames, grills, etc. which in turn are used in the execution of works contracts and are therefore not exempt from payment of tax.

Accordingly, the SC disposed all these appeals.

2016 (43) STR 301 (Tri.-Bang.) Kirthi Constructions vs. CCE. & ST., Mangalore

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Even if refund of service tax is on account of mistake of law, provisions of “time bar” and ‘unjust enrichment’ would apply.

Facts
Refund of service tax paid on construction services was claimed as it was not leviable to service tax. Appellants contested that since service tax was paid by mistake of law and it was not collected from buyers, refund claim cannot be held as time barred. Revenue demanded service tax as it was not a case of self-service, service tax was collected from buyers and in any case, the refund was time barred.

Held
Since the typical arrangement was that the Appellants were first selling the plot of land and then the buyer was appointing the Appellant for construction, it was covered by the exclusion clause of construction services. Accordingly, no service tax was payable. Relying on Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. UOI (1997 (89) ELT 247 (SC)), it was held that all refund claims except unconstitutional levies have to pass the test of limitation of one year (time bar) and non-passing of service tax burden to buyers (unjust enrichment).

2016 (43) STR 280 (Tri.-Mum.) JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd vs. CCE, Thane II

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CENVAT credit eligibility for input services and capital goods for generation of electricity which is partly consumed captively and partly sold to MSEB.

Facts
The Appellant is a manufacturer of excisable goods and had installed power plant for generating electricity. Some proportion of electricity generated was consumed captively and balance was sold. CENVAT credit on capital goods was rejected on the ground that they were used for the sale of electricity. Further, in view of non-maintenance of separate records for captive consumption and sale of electricity, demand was raised for payment on value of electricity sold vide Rule 6 (3) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. It was argued that when exclusively used for exempted production CENVAT credit on capital goods is not available. Further, CENVAT credit on input services was taken at the end of the month having regard to the actual captive consumption and therefore, proper records were maintained and therefore, CENVAT credit was not deniable and no payment was required to be made as per Rule 6 (3).

Held
Relying on the decision of H.E.G. Ltd. 2012 (275) ELT 316 (Chhattisgarh), it was held that since capital goods were not exclusively used in electricity sold, CENVAT credit cannot be denied. Further CENVAT credit was not availed on input services used in generation of electricity sold and therefore, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC), payment was not required to be made under Rule 6 (3).

Coparcener – Vested right after adoption – A coparcener/son continues to have vested right in joint family property of birth even after adoption. [Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, 12(b); Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 30].

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Purushottam Das Bangur AIR 2016 Cal. 227.

In the present case, son (born in a Mithakshara Undivided Hindu Family) given in adoption filed a caveat in the proceedings for probate of the will of his deceased natural father. The propounders seeking probate of the will asked for the discharge of the caveator on the ground that the caveator being given in adoption, had ceased to have any right in the natural family in view of the provisions of section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Propounders relied upon decisions of Devgonda Raygonda Patil vs. Shamgonda Raygonda Patil & Anr AIR 1992 Bom 189 and Santosh Kumar Jalan vs. Chandra Kishore Jalan & Anr AIR Patna 125, wherein it was held that until the joint family property is partitioned, there can be no vesting i.e. only if the Joint property is partitioned before the adoption, only then does the coparcenor continue to have a vested right in Joint family property even after adoption.

However, the Court, taking a contrary view held that, a vested interest in a property is understood to mean that a person has acquired proprietary interest therein. However, the enjoyment of such proprietary interest may be postponed till the happening of a certain event. Once that event happens such person would enjoy proprietary rights in respect of the property. A coparcener in a Mitakshara coparcenary acquires an interest in the properties of the Hindu family on his birth. His interest is capable of variation by events such as birth, adoption or death in the coparcenary. In the event of a partition of the coparcenary, a coparcener is entitled to a share of the properties belonging to joint Hindu family. On partition his share gets defined. He can still continue to enjoy his share in jointness with other family members or he can ask for partition of the properties by metes and bounds in accordance with the shares. On partition his share gets defined. This interest which the coparcener in a Mitakshara family acquires by his birth in the natural family continues to remain with him in spite of the adoption in view of section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

Twitter Treats

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When the Constitutional Amendment Bill to pave the way for GST was passed, the world of Twitter was flooded with GST related tweets. Some of these are shared below for our readers:

@adhia03
We are ready with state of art IT design for GST implementation. Hardware and software will all be ready for testing by january 17.

@v_shrivsatish
Passing of 15 bills including that of GST shows the maturity and the real spirit of cooperative federalism reflected by meaningful debates.

@bhawnakat
In the Lists of items that can’t be understand GST reached at second place!! Wife’s mood still on top

@MVenkaiahNaidu
Congrats to d people of Assam and its CM Shri @ sarbanandsonwal 4 becoming d 1st State 2 ratify GST bill. This time North East has taken lead

Twitter Storm of the month
Often, a controversial tweet by a well known personality causes a storm in the world of social media. This month, there was one such controversial tweet by well known socialite Shobhaa De. Her tweet criticising the Indian contingent’s performance at the Rio Olympics evoked immediate response. Her tweet and some of the responses are reproduced below:

@DeShobhaa
Goal of Team India at the Olympics: Rio jao. Selfies lo. Khaali haath wapas aao. What a waste of money and opportunity.

Abhinav Bindra @Abhinav_Bindra
@DeShobhaa that’s a tad unfair. You should be proud of your athletes perusing human excellence against the whole world.

Nishant Gambhir @madnish30 Aug 8
Not even worth a selfie. If scaring babies was Olympic sport, @DeShobhaa would strike gold!

Ra_Bies@Ra_Bies
By the time our kids put their feet in the swimming pool & scream “Mummy paani bahut thhanda hai”, Micheal Phelps wins another gold medal

#USA @CJBForHeisman Aug 8
If you ever feel useless just remember that someone is a lifeguard for the Olympic #swimming events Ra_Bies

@Ra_Bies 2h2 hours ago
Bill for 6 months maternity leave for women passed. Too glad, ultimately parliament delivered

Zeddonymous @ZeddRebel Aug 10
Trump voter: “I like Trump because he says exactly what he means.” Trump: ‘Somebody shoot my opponent’ Trump voter: ‘He didn’t mean that’

@_Buddha_Quotes
Let no one deceive another or despise anyone anywhere, or through anger or irritation wish for another to suffer.

@FinMinIndia
Till 5th August 2016, about 20.81 lakh refunds for AY 2016-17(current year returns) totaling Rs 2,922 crore have been issued by IT dept

And here are this month’s recommendations of famous people that you can follow. This time, the celebrities are from the corporate world.

Aanand Mahindra @anandmahindra
Harsh Mariwala @hcmariwala
Kiran Mazumdar Shaw @kiranshaw
Nita Mukesh Ambani @NitaMAmbani
Bill Gates @BillGates
Richard Branson @richardbranson
Ronnie Screwvala @RonnieScrewvala
Uday Kotak @udaykotak
Sajjan Jindal @sajjanjindal59
Harsh Goenka @hvgoenka

Banking overhaul

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Most of the current discussion on Indian banks is naturally focused on the bad loans mess.

Reserve Bank of India governor Raghuram Rajan has done well to highlight more fundamental challenges as well. The banking system is a mess at various levels. The multiplicity of regulators has led to poor outcomes. Bank boards have few powers. The government often uses the banks it owns to further its political goals. There is no reason to have central bank appointees on bank boards. The lack of talent means a missing middle in organizational charts. Bank officials are often generalists rather than specialists.

All this creates a problem of perverse incentives.

An organizational overhaul is overdue. So is a regulatory one. But these will take time. The longer they take, the more market share will public sector banks lose to more nimble private sector competitors. People in the financial markets are already describing the process as privatization by stealth. Will it be the airlines story all over again?

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 17-08-2016)

Lesson for the state

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Abhinav Bindra bowed out of the Olympics and signed off on his career with a brave performance that came within a whisker of securing him another medal. Sania Mirza and Rohan Bopanna suffered heartbreak in the tennis mixed doubles semi-finals. Dipa Karmakar has pushed herself to the limit, as has the rest of India’s Olympics contingent. Union sports minister Vijay Goel, meanwhile, has managed to earn an official rebuke from organizers who threatened to cancel his accreditation for allegedly unbecoming and aggressive behaviour.

This feels like a teachable moment-a particularly apt one at the time of India’s 70th Independence Day.

Ordinary citizens trying to do their best while the state absents itself from giving them adequate support? Check. The state making its presence abundantly known where it has no business? Also check.

We’ve seen this plenty of times before in every walk of life. It’s time to actually learn the lesson.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 15-08-2016)

Waiting for justice: Resolve the faceoff over judges’ appointments fast, it is really hurting citizens

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In the year 2016 Indians deserve a modern and streamlined judicial system. Instead what they are stuck with is a deficient structure groaning under a great pendency of cases. And the crisis only seems to be worsening, as a bench headed by Chief Justice T S Thakur has accused government of bringing the judiciary to a standstill by stalling judges’ appointments.

This eyeball to eyeball confrontation is part of a prolonged battle over the procedure to appoint judges. While the judicial collegium is criticised for opacity and favouritism, the National Judicial Appointments Commission, which envisaged a broader panel to choose judges and was passed by Parliament, was struck down by the apex court in October 2015.

The longer government and the collegium take to finalise a new memorandum of procedure to appoint HC and SC judges, the more citizens awaiting justice suffer. In practical terms, the high courts are now operating with 44.3% vacancies; pendency has risen to four million cases.

Any attempt at securing justice is an ordeal on its own, and financially ruinous for many people. As the CJI himself has noted, “By the time an appeal can be heard, the accused would already have served a life sentence.” Clearly the current clash of wills between the executive and the judiciary has only worsened matters. Remember that appointments had also remained frozen for nearly a year when the apex court scrutinised the constitutional validity of the proposed NJAC. Instead of wallowing on their respective sides of the legal logjam, both government and the judiciary must show much more teamsmanship – not only to finalise a new procedure to appoint judges but also to implement broader reforms to remedy judicial delays.

(Source: The Times of India dated 15-08-2016)

Representation in respect of the Model Goods and Services Tax Law.

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18th August, 2016

To,
Mr. Ravneet Khurana,
Deputy Commissioner (GST),
CBEC, Ministry of Finance,
Directorate General of Goods & Service Tax
NACEN, Centre of Excellence, 3rd Floor,
Tower 3 & 4, NBCC Plaza, Pushp Vihar,
Sector -5, Saket, New Delhii- 110017.

Dear Sir,

Subject:- Representation in respect of the Model Goods and Services Tax Law.


We enclose herewith our representation and suggestions in respect of the Model Goods & Service Tax Law, for your consideration.

We sincerely hope that our representation would receive favourable consideration.

Thanking you,
We remain,
Yours truly,

For Bombay Chartered Account ants ‘ Society

Chetan Shah
President

Govind G. Goyal
Chairman – Indirect Taxation Committee

GOODS AND SERVICE TAX SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT REPRESENTATIONS

1. Structure Of GST

1.1. Currently, the role of the GST Council under Article 279A is merely “recommendatory” in nature. This could result in some States deviating from the model GST law or the substantive provisions therein. Since GST is an indirect tax ecosystem, with each constituent dependent on another for smooth implementation of the law, it is suggested that though the role of GST Council under Article 279A is merely “recommendatory” in nature, the Centre as well as the States respect all the recommendations made by the GST Council and do not deviate from the same.

1.2. One important reason for the implementation of GST is to bring about uniformity of taxation across the country. It is therefore strongly recommended that the exemptions, rate of tax, classification and all other rules should be uniform for all the States. It may be noted that any deviation by a particular State can result in tax arbitrage, distortion of business processes and increased business compliances. Further it would also complicate the operations of the GST Network and could derail the entire GST Mechanism in the country.

1.3. The Constitution as well as the model GST Laws provide for the notification of the effective date from which GST will be implemented. It is recommended that this effective date should be common for all the States and that GST should be implemented from the first date of any financial year. Further, it is recommended that sufficient time should be provided to the industry and the Department Officers to prepare for GST and therefore, all relevant information should be made available in public domain at earliest opportune time.

2. SUPPLY

2.1. Section 3(1) and Schedule I of the model GST Law provides for taxation of supplies whether they are made for a consideration or otherwise. This can result in many difficulties and unforeseen situations of tax liabilities. Essentially, free supplies of not only goods but also services will become taxable. For example, retail chains providing products under free scheme would be required to discharge GST. Similarly, a common citizen downloading free software from the internet and using websites like Google, Facebook, etc. will be exposed to GST. Volunteers and NGOs will also be required to discharge GST on activities carried out by them without any charge.

2.2. It is therefore recommended that supplies should be taxed only if there is a consideration. Supplies made without consideration, especially in the case of services, should not be taxed.

2.3. Further, if the intent is to tax branch transfers, only such branch transfer of goods should be deemed to be supply and the term should be clearly defined to include only goods transferred from a branch in one State to another branch in another State for the purposes of further manufacture or resale.

2.4. The proviso inserted in Schedule I excludes supplies to the job worker following procedure under Section 43A. As per Section 43A, there is requirement to obtain permission from the Commissioner for such exempt movement of goods on account of job work. Such requirement for permission would not only increase the process time but would also conflict with the core attribute of GST being system driven.

3. NATURE OF SUPPLY

3.1. Under the model GST Law, on a reading of the definition of goods u/s 2(48) and services u/s 2(88), it appears that only supply of money and employment services are excluded from the scope of supply. This results in certain cases where the transaction is essentially of investment and not of consumption (like immoveable properties and securities) becoming liable for GST.

3.2. It is therefore recommended that supplies of immoveable properties and securities should be excluded from GST

4. TIME OF SUPPLY

4.1. Sections 12 and 13 of the model GST Law provides for complicated provisions requiring discharge of GST at the earliest of 4-5 trigger points. This should be done away with, since the provisions relating to time of supply do not create a tax liability but only state the time of paying the liability

4.2. It is therefore recommended that the time of supply should be the date of invoice. As an anti-avoidance measure, if required, the law may prescribe a maximum time (currently 30 days under the service tax law) from the date of removal of goods/ completion of service for the raising of the invoice

5. VALUE OF SUPPLY

5.1. The model GST Law provides for inclusion of various amounts in the value of the taxable supply. Since each of the specific inclusions in the value under Section 15(2) is an independent supply liable for GST, such inclusions are uncalled for and would result in double taxation. It is therefore recommended that the provisions for such notional inclusions should be done away with and only the consideration should be included in the value of supplies

6. PLACE OF SUPPLY

6.1. High Seas Sale should be excluded from the purview of IGST since the subsequent transaction is a subject matter of Customs Duty

6.2. The benefit of ‘zero rating’ provided under Section 2(109) to exports should be extended to deemed exports and supplies to SEZ, EOU and STP

6.3. It should be clarified that the location of supplier under Section 2(65) would be determined based on the person/establishment entitled to receive the consideration, this would bring parity with the definition of location of recipient of service.

6.4. Section 6(4) provides for the source rule in case of services connected with immoveable property. The said rule should cover only services “directly in relation to immovable property…” and should not cover services connected with vessels since they are moveable in nature

6.5. In case of re-classification issues between IGST vs. CGST/SGST, the respective Governments should internally transfer the funds and not require the assessee to once again pay the tax. Similar relaxation should be provided in case of issues of interpretation of place of supply in case of IGST transactions. Section 30 of the IGST Act may be suitably amended.

7. INPUT TAX CREDIT
7.1. Since GST has comprehensive coverage, all credits should be allowed. In fact the FA Q issued by the Government clearly acknowledges that it is a tax on value addition at each stage and there would be no cascading effect. In the light of this core aspect of GST, the restrictions provided under Section 16(9) should be done away with.

7.2. Genuine Credit should not be denied merely due to non reflection in the GST Network. The provisions for reversal of credit on account of mis-match under Section 29 should be done away with.

7.3. Non payment of tax by the vendor should not result in denial of credit to the taxpayer. The condition under Section 16(11)(c) should be deleted.

7.4. Input Service Distributor should be permitted to freely transfer the credits to any of its’ branches. Provisions of Section 17 should be suitably amended.

7.5. The current CENVAT Credit Rules defer the entitlement of credit in certain cases to a future date. While transition provision has been enacted for the claim of credit of second instalment of capital goods, many other transition provisions are not incorporated. It should therefore be provided that in all cases where the credit would have been allowable under the erstwhile CENVAT Credit Rules, the same should be permitted under the GST Law as well. Some examples are listed below

• Re-credit of service tax under proviso to Rule 4(7) in case of delayed payment to the vendor.
• Re-credit of amount revered under Rule 6(3) on finalisation of ratio of exempted turnover to total turnover
• Delayed receipt of invoices from the vendors
• Staggered Credit in respect of Spectrum Payments

8. RATES AND EXEMPTIONS
8.1. Threshold of Aggregate Turnover of Rs. 10 lakhs is across all States, includes exempted and exported supplies and therefore is fairly low when compared to the excise threshold of Rs. 150 lakhs. This will result in substantial hardship to small entrepreneurs. Further, this will also result in substantial increase in the number of assesses to be administered by the Centre (a rough estimate suggests at least 40 times the current bench strength), resulting in a huge pressure on the officials as well as on the network. It is therefore suggested that the aggregate turnover for exemption should be Rs. 50 lakhs with an optional compounding scheme upto Rs. 150 lakhs.

8.2. Exemption provided for agriculturist under Section 9 needs to be extended to cover agricultural produce throughout the supply chain. Further the definition of agriculture under Section 2(7) needs to be widely provided and activities like poultry, diary, etc. should be considered as part of agriculture.

8.3. At present, various tax exemptions are provided to units set up in specific areas. The said exemptions should also continue under the GST law since the units were set up in those areas due to the tax benefit provided. The government should provide clarity on the same.

8.4. In view of the comprehensive coverage and the self policing nature of GST, the base for taxation would increase fundamentally. Therefore, the revenue neutral rate suggested by the Arvind Subramaniam Committee is fair and adequate to meet the revenue requirements of the Centre and the States. It is therefore recommended that the standard rate of GST should not be higher than 18%.

8.5. The rates of GST need to be realigned considering the current rate structures. Many products which are currently exempted or liable for a very low rate of tax should not be directly moved to the RNR but either the exemption should be continued or such products should be kept under the merit rate.

9. REFUND
9.1. Section 38
allows refund only in two situations i.e. Export and Inverted Duty Structure. However, refund should also be allowed in cases where the credit which is accumulated due to other reasons.

10. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

10.1. The model GST Law provides for strict timeline for various compliances as under
• Filing of Details of Outward Supplies by 10th
• Filing of Details of Inward Supplies by 15th
• Filing of Return by 20th

10.2. S ince transaction level details are to be uploaded onto the GST Network, the above timelines are too short. Considering the diversity of the country, with frequent power cuts and unavailability of internet network in many parts of the country, these timelines cannot be complied with. Further, the volume of data to be uploaded on the GST Network is unprecedented and we do not have any prior benchmark of the same. Therefore, it is suggested that for the first two years, the time lines provided above should be relaxed and based on the stability of the new system, the timelines can be revisited

10.3. There is no justification to subject the taxpayer to two assessments for the same base and similar law. It is suggested that some suitable allocation of the taxpayers be decided such that some taxpayers are assessed by the State Authorities and some taxpayers are assessed by the Centre.

10.4. There are very wide powers to make rules, prosecution, confiscation, etc. which should be avoided. All such provisions merely result in harassment of the asssesees and reduce the ‘ease of doing business’ without any corresponding benefit to the exchequer.


Brexit- A Few Thoughts

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Query:
Why Britain separated from EU? What are its implications on – Britain, EU, and on India.

I submit my views.

Summary:
Britain is already on a downward slide. By exiting from European Union, it has hastened its fall. It is a non-event for rest of the world. Unless…the Britishers wake up and put their act together.

There is nothing unique in Britain’s tendency to bring harm upon itself. India has done it repeatedly. US is doing it right now very seriously.

1. Details.

History is Process Driven :
In studying human history, we tend to look at events. This is micro view. It would be better to look at the whole process that has resulted into the event; and then see:

(i) What caused the event;
(ii) If the process continues, what can be the consequences; and
(iii) If the process stops or reverses itself, what can be the consequences.

For this we also have to consider the human psychology, and the laws of philosophy. Realise that the process itself consists of several cycles – some virtuous cycles and some vicious cycles. The cycles keep changing in several manners – speed, intensity, direction etc. The interaction of all these cycles produces several events. We notice some.

This may be the practical Macro view, encompassing more than what the economists call a “Macro View”.

2. The British Process of Exit:
2.1 The Britishers left EU because, they still believe – majority still believes – that they are superior to rest of the world. (This is a universal human weakness). And their currency – Pound sterling is the best currency. They cannot be subordinate to anyone. EU was perceived as – making them lose their sovereignty and hence unacceptable. This was the first cause.

2.2 British economy is downhill. There is unemployment. The American economic crisis of the year 2008, has only exacerbated the British economic crisis. All the supply of additional money (Bail outs & Quantitative Easing) has not lifted the economy. People who are unemployed are dissatisfied with their own Government; EU Government and with many other causes that they can identify. After changing the British Governments, economy has not improved. So what do you do? Can’t change EU Government. So leave EU.

2.3 The U.K. current account deficit at 7% is an all-time high. With Brexit this deficit is likely to increase. This will devalue the sterling pound further. However, some believe it is good for Britain. Hence leave EU.

2.4 Despite the fact that British economy is down, the perception of majority of Britishers is that EU is dysfunctional and is a sinking ship. So leave EU.

2.5 The EU policy is that any citizen of EU can move anywhere within EU and can settle down anywhere that he likes. People from Eastern Europe and many countries where economy is far worse than in UK, did migrate into the UK and started working there for a lower pay. This was perceived as causing unemployment amongst the Britishers. This perception ignored the fact that many Britishers live in EU.

2.6 The Syrian refugee crisis exacerbated the fear of unemployment. Sheer number of refugees, and the fact that almost all of them were Muslims, made them unacceptable. And then media publicized news that the refugees were raping European women, terrorists enter Europe with refugees etc. These are big reasons for making refugees unacceptable. But refugees cannot be prevented from entering Britain as long as Britain is part of EU. So leave EU.

Remember the year 1971 when more than a crore of Bangladeshi refugees came into India. Western World advised India to accept them on humanitarian grounds. The refugees are still in India. At Wadala – Antop Hill, there is a whole area known as Bangladeshi Colony. This is just one of the areas spread all over India.

Also note that the USA – which is at the root of the Syrian crisis is not affected by the refugee crisis.

2.7 Then came a sheer coincidence. Cameron made a promise in his election campaign that he will call for a referendum – ‘whether UK should continue in the EU or not’. Having made the promise, when he won election, he was duty bound to call for the referendum. Cameron himself believed that UK should continue with the EU. He had made the promise just to get more votes. If no referendum was called, there would be no exit. But the referendum was called and there is BREXIT.

There were people who were dissatisfied with the EU for psychological reasons. Economics & Geopolitics were not on their mind. They seized the opportunity, canvassed heavily for exit. Most Britishers do not understand Global politics & economics. They only know whether they or their close ones have lost their jobs. People canvassing for Brexit also did not expect a win. When they won the referendum, they were shocked and went in the background.

3. Impact:
3.1 “United we stand & divided we fall” is understood by all. However, this is practised by few. European Union together is the largest economy. It can influence global politics and even challenge US influence. When one unit out of the Union separates, the strength of the Union certainly goes down. Hence, to that extent EU will suffer. To that extent, US might be happy.

3.2 Culturally and psychologically, Britain and Europe have always considered themselves separate and different. British ego increased and sharpened that separation.

However, the irony is that Britain is seeking to delay the exit whereas EU is working for an early exit.

3.3 Also, Britain has no strong leader. It is not in a position to impact world sentiment, leave aside world economics and politics. Its own economy is in doldrums. By exiting EU, worst sufferer will be UK. Pound sterling has already lost 10% of its value since the exit vote making import of raw materials and consumables expensive. This increases both the cost of production and cost of living – impacting industry, jobs and the common Britisher. Scotland and Ireland are reviewing their relationship with Britain.

3.4 If we consider the theory of “Butterfly Effect”, everything affects everything. There will be some impact on India as our exports to UK will become expensive. But the impact will be so small that does not merit discussion. Because of Brexit Netherlands, one of EU’s founding members will call for a UK like referendum and Hungary’s forthcoming October referendum will be on EU migrant policy. Mr. Geert Wilders leader of the Party for Freedom of Netherlands in the party’s manifesto has pledged to withdraw from EU. As opposed to this Germany is working for ?better Europe’ and not `more Europe’. Despite these developments E.U. will still be the second largest economy. Hence I am of the opinion that there will be little impact on world economy.

4. Principles of analysis :
Considering an event and then trying to project future events and consequences – amounts to ignoring an important principle of analysis. Human beings are an important cause of all the cycles and the total process. After the event, they are not going to sleep. They will act. How they will act will affect the cycles and hence future course of events. How humans will act in future is a difficult matter to project and I cannot cover it in this brief article. Hence my view: Future was always unpredictable, and will remain unpredictable and

‘Brexit is a non-event’.

Withdrawal of Open offer – lessons from Supreme Court/SAT/SEBI decisions

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Background
What happens when an open offer is made under the SEBI Takeover Regulations and thereafter the offerer, for some reason, changes his mind? Should he be allowed to withdraw his offer? If yes, under what circumstances? Can it be a unilateral withdrawal at his discretion or should it be under certain conditions only? Or should he be required to take approval of SEBI? Should SEBI have wide powers – and hence duty – to allow such withdrawal? What is the criteria SEBI should follow for permitting such withdrawal?

The stakes involved in such a case are large. For example there is a listed company whose market capitalisation is Rs. 1000 crore. The market price of its share is Rs. 100. An offerer believes that the shares are under priced and decides to acquire control and makes an open offer at Rs.150 per share. However, sometime later, for reasons such as new information coming to light, fresh developments or even change of mind, he wants to withdraw the open offer. However, the offer would have had consequences on the market. There may be persons who would have bought shares from the market at higher price. The Company would have faced restrictions in carrying out certain activities during the offer period under the Regulations. Further, withdrawal without regulation may make the whole process frivolous since offerers may make offers, disrupt the company and the market, perhaps profit from such disruption and then withdraw. Open offers thus may lose sanctity. At the same time, an absolute bar from withdrawal may result in heavy costs for the offerer even where there were genuine reasons for withdrawal. In the example, the offerer would have to pay about Rs. 390 crore to acquire the 26% from the shareholders. The offerer would thus be stuck with a huge lot of shares, whose value may have diluted for reasons beyond his control and perhaps not gain control of the company too.

Considering the huge stakes involved and also considering that this issue could often arise, the matter has been subject matter of serious litigation. The matter has twice reached the Supreme Court and litigated before the Securities Appellate Tribunal. Recently, once again, SEBI has passed an order (dated August 1, 2016 in respect of open offer for Jyoti Limited) which is under the latest SEBI (SAST) Regulations 2011 (“the Takeover Regulations”). Curiously, in each of these cases, the application to withdraw the open offer was rejected, but for differing reasons/facts. Study of these issues has importance for persons acquiring large stakes in companies to know whether and when they may be allowed to withdraw. They would carefully need to structure and prepare for their transactions since an inadvertent lapse may result into an irreversible open offer and huge losses. At the same time, the Regulations, which have been drafted in the interests of investors, are such that open offer is triggered off at a very early stage.

This issue is also relevant because the relevant provisions for withdrawal have been tweaked in the 2011 Takeover Regulations as compared to the 1997 Regulations. While these changes have not affected the outcome in each of these matters, they are relevant to future open offers.

Provisions of the Regulations for withdrawal of open offer Regulation 23(1) of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, deals with withdrawal of open offer. Regulation 23(1) provides 3 specific reasons and one general/residuary one under which an open offer can be withdrawn. Amongst the specific reasons, the first permits withdrawal where statutory approvals required for the open offer/acquisitions have not been received, provided due disclosures were made. The second reason permits withdrawal where the offerer, a natural person, has died. The third sub-clause provides for a situation where the agreement to acquire shares contained a condition that the acquirer/offerer could not meet for reasons beyond his reasonable control and provided that conditions were disclosed in advance, and that lead to rescinding of the agreement, withdrawal of offer is allowed.

Finally, there is the general/residuary ground, which is also the ground under which litigation has arisen. SEBI has discretion to grant withdrawal pursuant to “such circumstances as in the opinion of the Board, merit withdrawal.”. The question is whether this means there has to be an impossibility, taking color from the previous three grounds, as contended by SEBI? Or whether withdrawal can be permitted on other grounds such as the offer becoming uneconomical or other reasons, as contended by offerers? On this aspect, the law under the 1997 Regulations, on which preceding decisions have been rendered, is the same as under the 2011 Regulations on which the latest decision of SEBI has been rendered.

Decisions of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has on two occasions to dealt with this issue. In Nirma Industries Limited vs. SEBI (2013] 121 SCL 149 (SC) (“Nirma”), the offerer, a lender company, had lent monies to certain promoter entities of a listed company against pledge of shares of such listed company. On default, it exercised the pledge and thus acquired the shares which in turn resulted in obligation to make an open offer. However, it was claimed that later investigation brought to light that the Promoters of such listed company had allegedly siphoned off huge amount of funds, there were undisclosed liabilities, etc. and, thus, the value of the shares suffered in value. Yet, the lender was now stuck with the open offer at a price being as per the formula under the Regulations. Obviously, this would result in huge losses to the lender. It approached SEBI seeking withdrawal. SEBI rejected such application. Finally, the issue came before the Supreme Court. The core issue was whether the power of SEBI to grant withdrawal under the residuary clause was wide. Thus, whether it could allow withdrawal under varying circumstances at its discretion? Or whether it had very narrow powers, limited, on principles of ejusdem generis, to the nature of circumstances under the first three clauses under which withdrawal was permitted? In essence, thus, the issue was, whether power of SEBI to grant withdrawal was only if the offer was impossible to be proceeded with? The Supreme Court considered the facts of the case and the nature, scheme and purpose of the Regulations and held that SEBI could grant withdrawal only if there was impossibility in proceeding with the open offer. In the case before it, the offerer could still go ahead with the open offer and it has not become impossible merely because of changed circumstances.

The Court thus concluded that “Therefore, the term such circumstances in clause (d) would also be restricted to situation which would make it impossible for the acquirer to perform the public offer. The discretion has been left to the Board”. Merely because the offerer may suffer losses does not make the offer impossible to make or to be proceeded with. In the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, “The possibility that the acquirer would end-up making loses instead of generating a huge profit would not bring the situation within the realm of impossibility.” Thus, the plea of the lender/offerer was rejected.

The Supreme Court had soon thereafter again to deal with a similar matter. In SEBI vs. Akshya Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. (126 SCL 125 (SC)(2014))(“Akshya”) too, the question was whether, if the open offer becomes uneconomical owing to changed circumstances (curiously, this was allegedly owing to huge delay by SEBI in approving the open offer document), should it be allowed to be withdrawn? The Court followed Nirma and observed that:-

“This impossibility envisioned under the aforesaid regulation would not include a contingency where voluntary open offer once made can be permitted to be withdrawn on the ground that it has now become economically unviable.”.

The Court also explained the rationale of this conclusion as follows:

“Accepting such a submission, would give a field day to unscrupulous elements in the securities market to make Public Announcement for acquiring shares in the Target Company, knowing perfectly well that they can pull out when the prices of the shares have been inflated, due to the public offer.”

Decision of SAT
A similar issue was agitated in case of an open offer for shares of Golden Tobacco Limited (“GTL”) (in Pramod Jain vs. SEBI [2014] 48 taxmann.com 226 (SAT – Mumbai)). Here too, an open offer was made to acquire shares at a certain point of time. However, during the intervening time (which again included a huge delay allegedly caused by time taken by SEBI in approving the offer document), the offerer alleged that owing to acts by the Promoters of GTL, the shares of the Company lost hugely in value. The offerer thus sought to withdraw the open offer. Following and applying Nirma and Akshaya, the SAT, in a majority decision, refused to allow the offer to be withdrawn since there was no impossibility in proceeding with the offer.

Decision in case of open offer for shares of Jyoti Limited. In this latest case, SEBI had occasion to consider a peculiar case though with underlying similar issues. The offerer had made an open offer to acquire 75% of the shares and thus control of the listed company at a price of Rs. 63 per share. However, it came to light that the Company was a sick industrial company, having lost its net worth. The BIFR ordered status quo on operations/controlling stake and change in control of the Company was prohibited in the interim. Appeal of the offerer against such order of BIFR was dismissed by the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. The question was whether, since the open offer could not be proceeded with, this was a fit case for permitting withdrawal of open offer. SEBI noted that the BIFR had not prohibited the open offer, but had merely given a stay to it, pending final decision. It was thus possible for the offerer to proceed with the open offer post such decision. In other words, the pre-condition of impossibility did not exist. Hence, applying Nirma and Akshaya, SEBI rejected the application of the offerer to withdraw the open offer.

Conclusion
It would be a rare case, thus, that an open offer would be allowed to be withdrawn. The offerer will have to demonstrate that either one of the three specific circumstances as laid down in Regulation 23(1) existed or there should be some other impossibility in proceeding with an open offer. If something happens in between, even if caused by SEBI’s delay or actions by the Company/its Promoters, or other unavoidable circumstances, so long as it is possible to proceed with the open offer, SEBI will not allow withdrawal. As explained earlier, the Regulations have sensitive triggers for the open offer to arise and once a trigger is set off, it is more or less irreversible. The offerer would thus have to proceed warily and with adequate planning to ensure that (i) either the open offer does not arise (ii) if it does arise, he is prepared to proceed through it till completion, whatever arises in between. Apart from difficulties in negotiated takeovers, this can make hostile open offers near-infeasible. Even in negotiated cases, often owing to delayed processing by SEBI, disputes in the interim with the Company/Promoters, changed circumstances, etc. could create problems. Nevertheless, there is an underlying sensible principle involved here. Offerers should not be given a broad leeway that offers can be made and withdrawn at their discretion. This would, inter alia, play havoc with markets and harm interests of investors.

Benami Transactions

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Introduction
A Benami Transaction is a transaction in which the property is acquired by one person in the name of another person or a business may be carried on by some person in the name of another person. Thus, the real or beneficial owner remains unknown and the apparent owner is only a name lender. As the word ‘benami” suggests it is one without a name. This practice of benami transactions has been extremely prevalent in India for several years. Benami transactions are one of the main sources of utilisation of black money, tax and duty evasion, corruption, etc. Benami transactions are quite common in the real estate business. However, they have also entered the arena of the stock market and other areas. Benami transactions were also used as a device for asset protection as the creditors would never be able to get their hands on a property which did not legally belong to their debtor. To deal with and curb benami transactions, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (“the Act”) was passed. However, this law suffered from various inadequacies. Accordingly, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Bill, 2016 was moved by the Central Government to substantially modify the Act. This Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 27th July 2016 and by the Rajya Sabha on 2nd August 2016 and has also received the assent of the President and has been notified in the Official Gazette on 11th August 2016, thereby, becoming the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 (“the Amendment Act”). One important feature of the Amendment Act is that it empowers the Government to frame Rules something which the original Act did not have.

Definitions

Benami Transaction
A Benami Transaction had been originally defined to mean a transaction in which the property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. Thus, in a benami transaction, there are two persons, the real or beneficial owner who actually owns the property, but the property does not stand in his name and the second person is the one in whose name the property stands who is but a mere front i.e., the benamidar. The term “Benami” means one which has no name. Thus, the definition of a benami transaction may be summarised as under :

It is a transaction
(i) in which a property is bought by one person and transferred to another person; or

(ii) in which the property is directly bought by one person in the name of another person

The Amendment Act seeks to considerably enhance the definition of a benami transaction. The modified definition defines it as under:

(A) a transaction or an arrangement-

(i) where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by, another person; and

(ii) the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of the person who has provided the consideration;

(B) a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property carried out or made in a fictitious name; or

(C) a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property where the owner of the property is not aware of, or, denies the knowledge of, such ownership;

(D) a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property where the person providing the consideration is not traceable or is fictitious.

Thus, even a transaction wherein the real owner is not aware of ownership has been added. Further, in cases where the consideration provider is untraceable or fictitious would also qualify as a benami transaction. The Amendment Act also seeks to carve out certain exceptions to the definition of a benami transaction:

(i) property held by a Karta, or a member of an HUF on behalf of the HUF where the consideration for such property has been paid by the HUF;

(ii) property held by a person standing in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person towards whom he stands in such capacity and includes a trustee, executor, partner, director of a company, a depository or a depository participant and any other person as may be notified by the Central Government for this purpose;

(iii) property held by an individual in the name of his spouse / his child and the consideration for such property has been paid by the individual;

(iv) property held by any person in the name of his brother or sister or lineal ascendant or descendant, where the names of such relative and the individual appear as joint-owners, and the consideration for such property has been paid by the individual.

(v) property the possession of which has been obtained in part performance of a contract referred to in section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provided the contract has been stamped and registered.

The Supreme Court in the case of SreeMeenakshi Mills Ltd., 31 ITR 28 (SC) has defined a benami transaction as thus:

“……..The word benami is used to denote two classes of transactions which differ from each other in their legal character and incidents. In one sense, it signifies a transaction which is real, as for example, when A sells properties to B but the sale deed mentions X as the purchase. Here the sale itself is genuine, but the real purchaser is B, X being his benamidar. This is the class of transactions which is usually termed as benami. But the word “Benami” is also occasionally used, perhaps not quite accurately, to refer to a sham transaction, as for example, when A purports to sell his property to B without intending that his title should cease or pass to B.

The fundamental difference between these two classes of transactions is that whereas in the former there is an operative transfer resulting in the vesting of title in the transferee, in the latter there is none such, the transferor continuing to retain the title notwithstanding the execution of the transfer deed.

It is only in the former class of cases that it would be necessary, when a dispute arises as to whether the person named in the deed is the real transferee or B, to enquire into the question as to who paid the consideration for the transfer, X or B. But in the latter class of cases, when the question is whether the transfer is genuine or sham, the point for decision would be, not who paid the consideration but whether any consideration was paid.”

Property
The definition of Property has been expanded by the Amendment Act and is now defined to mean, Property of any kind:

(a) Whether movable or immovable,

(b) Whether tangible or intangible,

(c) Including any right or interest or legal documents evidencing title or interest in such property. I t includes proceeds from the property also

Benami Property
This is a new definition and is defined to mean any property which is the subject matter of a benami transaction and includes proceeds from such property.

Benamidar and Beneficial owner
The Amendment Act adds two new definitions. While a benamidar is defined to mean the person / the fictitious person in whose name the benami property is transferred or one who is the name lender; the beneficial owner is the mysterious person for whose benefit the benamidar holds the benami property.

Prohibition of Benami Transactions
Section 3 is the operative section of the Act. It provides that no person shall enter into any benami transactions. The Act provided that a benami offence would be bailable and non-cognizable. This has now been deleted by the Amendment Amendment Act.

Consequences of Benami Properties

In case of a benami property, the real owner of the property cannot enforce or maintain any right against the benamidar or any other person. Thus, the real owner or any person on his behalf is prevented from filing any of a suit, claim or action against the namesake owner.

Similarly, the real owner or any person on his behalf cannot take up a defence based on any right in respect of the benami property against the benamidar or any other person.

Confiscation of Benami Properties
All benami properties are liable to be confiscated by the Central Government. For this purpose, the Amendment Act seeks to appoint an Adjudicating Authority and Initiating Officers. The Deputy Commissioner of the Income tax would be the Initiating Officer. Where the Initiating Officer has, based on material he possesses, reason to believe that any person is a benamidar of a property, he may ask him to show cause why the property should not be treated as benami property. He can also provisionally attach the property for a maximum period of 90 days. He must then draw up a statement of case and refer it to the Adjudicating Authority. The Authority must provide a hearing to the person affected and pass an order either holding the property to be a benami property or holding it not to be a benami property. The Authority has a maximum period of 1 year from the date of reference to pass its order. The affected person can appear before the Authority in person or through his lawyer / CA.

Once an order is passed by the Authority treating a property to be a benami property, it must pass an order confiscating the benami property. An appeal lies against the orders of the Adjudicating Authority to the Appellate Tribunal to be constituted under the Act. An appellant can appear before the Tribunal in person or through his lawyer / CA. The orders of the Appellate Tribunal can appealed before the High Court.

Once a property is confiscated, the Income-tax Officer would be appointed as the Administrator of such benami property who will take possession of the property and manage it.

The Act provides that if an Initiating Officer has issued a notice seeking to treat a property as benami property, then after the issuance of such a Notice, the subsequent transfer of the property shall be ignored. If the property is subsequently confiscated then the transfer will be deemed to be null and void.

Re-transfer of Benami Property
A benamidar cannot re-transfer the benami property held by him to the beneficial owner or any other person acting on his behalf. If any benami property is re-transferred the transaction of such a benami property shall be deemed to be null and void. However, this does not apply to a re-transfer of benami property initiated pursuant to a declaration made under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016. In this respect, section 190 of the Finance Act, 2016 provides that the Benami Act shall not apply in respect of the declaration of the undisclosed asset, if the benamidar transfers such benami property to the declarant who is the real beneficial owner within the period notified by the Central Government, i.e., on or before 30th September 2017.

Repeal of Certain Sections
The original Act had repealed the following sections, which continue under the Amendment Act:
(a) Sections 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts, Act, 1882;
(b) Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and
(c) Section 281A of the Income-tax Act.

Trusts Act
The Trusts Act originally recognised and allowed the concept of benamidar under certain situations which were covered under the repealed sections.

(i) Section 81 originally provided that where the owner of a property, transfers / bequeaths (by will) it and It is not possible to infer from the surrounding circumstances that the transferor intended to depose of the beneficial interest contained therein, then the transferee may hold the property for the benefit of the owner or his legal representative.

(ii) Section 82 originally provided that where the property is transferred to one person and the consideration is paid for by another person and it appears that such other person did not intend to pay for the same then the Transferee must hold the property for the benefit of the payer.

(iii) Section 94 originally applied where there was no trust and the possessor of the property did not have the entire beneficial interest in the property, then in such a case he must hold the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Thus, now even honest benami transactions are prohibited.

Civil Procedure Code
Section 66 of the Code originally provided that no suit shall be maintained against any person claiming title under a Court certified purchase on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff. Thus, after the repeal of section 66 it is no longer possible to raise a defence on the plea of benami.

Income Tax Act
Section 281A of this Act originally provided that in case the real owner desired to file a suit in respect of a benami property against the benamidar or any other person, then he could not do so unless he had first given a notice in prescribed format to the Commissioner of Income tax within one year of the acquisition of the property. In case the suit related to a property exceeding Rs. 50,000 in value, then it was sufficient if the notice was given at any time before the suit.

Thus, the above sections provided statutory recognition to certain genuine benami transactions but after the enactment of the 1988 Act they were rendered inconsistent and hence, the 1988 Act has repealed them which repeal has been continued under the Amendment Act.

Punishment
If any person enters into a benami transaction in order to defeat the provisions of any law or to avoid payment of statutory dues or to avoid payment to creditors, the beneficial owner, benamidar and any other person who abets or induces any person to enter into the benami transaction, shall be guilty of the offence of a benami transaction. Any person guilty of the offence of benami transaction shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to 25% of the fair market value of the property.

Thus, in addition to the compulsory acquisition of the property, the Act also provides for a severe penalty. The offence of entering into a benami transaction is not bailable and is non-cognizable.

The penalty for giving false information is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years and fine up to 10% of the fair market value of the property.

In case a Company enters into any benami transaction, not only is the property liable to be acquired but the every person who at the time of the contravention was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business would be proceeded against and punished.

Conclusion
This is one more step in the Government’s fight against black money. While the Black Money Act, 2015 is a weapon against foreign black money, the Benami Act seeks to fight domestic black money.

Independence

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Arjun (A) — Slogging! Slogging!! Slogging!!! Please help me God. Oh Shrikrishna, where are you?

Shrikrishna (S) — My dear Arjun, I am always with you. I am everywhere! Omni-present!.

A — And Omnipotent, Omniscient as well! You have no boundaries; but we are bound by so many constraints.

S — Didn’t you celebrate your Independence Day?

A — There was that flag – hoisting in our housing society. But who will wake up early on a holiday? I never attend it.

S
— Oh! Shame on you. Don’t you remember the martyrs that sacrificed
everything for independence of the country? Even their lives! How dare
you be so callous about independence?

A — Oh, Lord, please pardon me. I never meant offence to anyone.

S — I thought, at least you would be valuing the independence above all!

A — Yes. I do. In fact, our profession is expected to be ‘independent’. We are supposed to act without fear or favour.

S — Then how can you afford to sleep when flag hoisting is on? You CAs should be in the forefront.

A
— I agree. But you know, we get so tired. So much of tension. Last
time, I narrated all our difficulties. You advised us to gear ourselves
up.

S — Then what have you done about it? You are in the habit of mere crying.

A — What to do? We are so helpless. Clients are not serious. Our staff is also useless. Everything comes on us.

S
— But you are an independent professional. You have to overcome the
situation some day or the other. How many years you can pull on like
this?

A — Lord, ‘Independence’ is a myth. Everybody dictates on
us. Regulators, Clients, staff, articles, our Institute; and even our
family members.

S — Ha ! Ha !! Ha !! Rukmini and Satyabhama also
keep dominating on me. Jokes apart; tell me, have you taken steps to
complete the audits in time?

A — Ah! There is so much time upto 30th September. Clients wake up only after 15th of September.

S — Let clients not wake up. What about you yourself? You need to be eternally vigilant. That is the cost of independence!

A
— So many holidays in August. Independence Day, Parsi New Year, then
Rakhi, then your own birthday of Krishnashtami. Again in September,
Ganapati will take away our time! I think, we cannot do things in time.
We must start crying for extension. You only said, we need to be
‘proactive’!

S — Wah! Great thought! You are very much aware
that this year courts will not support you. Tell me, have you studied
new CARO; have you looked into IFC?

A — IFC? What is that?

S — Internal Financial Controls. You have to specifically report on that. And CFS?

A — You are giving me surprises. What is this new ghost?

S — Consolidated Financial Statements. Are you at least aware that even your CARO format is changed?

A — Yes, Yes. I have heard about it. Frankly, I have not studied the new company law as yet. So much of ambiguity there!

S
— True. But you can’t afford to be totally ignorant. Remember,
Government is appointing new regulatory authority to look into the
quality of your work.

A — Baap Re! Already we have disciplinary
committee, consumer forum, NFRA, and what not! And on the top of it,
this new Authority? God save the profession.

S — I will surely save you, only if you are vigilant and diligent.

A — Oh Lord, I know, I am rather lethargic. I have to be constantly on my toes. Even slightest of relaxation may be suicidal.

S
— Assure you that so long as you can prove honest efforts and support
it by documentation, your Council will always help you. Don’t worry.

A — Thank you, Lord!

Om Shanti.

The
above dialogue aims at highlighting the importance of having the right
attitude towards the profession. Being alert and proactive towards the
dynamic laws becomes extremely important in today’s world.

Interpretation of Statutes – Construction of Rules – Prospective or Retrospective – Any legislation said to be dealing with substantive rights shall be prospective in nature and not retrospective. [General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 6]

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Collector vs. K. Govindaraj (2016) 4 SCC 763 (SC)

In the present case, a notification dated 09.10.1996 was published by the Appellant (Collector) inviting applications for grant of stone quarrying leases. This notification was issued under the provisions of Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and it was stated therein that lease would be granted for a period of five years. However, when these leases were still in operation and the said period of five years for which these leases were granted had not expired, rule came to be amended vide G.O. dated 17.11.2000. The amended rule provided that the period for quarrying stone in respect of virgin areas, which had not been subjected to quarrying earlier, shall be ten years whereas the period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of other areas shall be five years. On the basis of this amendment, the Respondents pleaded that since they were granted lease for quarrying stone in respect of virgin areas, amended provision was applicable in their cases and they were entitled to continue on lease for a period of ten years.

The Supreme Court held that, “though the Legislature has plenary powers of legislation within the fields assigned to it and can legislate prospectively or retrospectively, the general rule is that in the absence of the enactment specifically mentioning that the concerned legislation or legislative amendment is retrospectively made, the same is to be treated as prospective in nature. It would be more so when the statute is dealing with substantive rights. No doubt, in contrast to statute dealing with substantive rights, wherever a statute deals with merely a matter of procedure, such a statute/amendment in the statute is presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. At the same time, it is to be borne in mind that a particular provision in a procedural statute may be substantive in nature and such a provision cannot be given retrospective effect. To put it otherwise, the classification of a statute, either substantive or procedural, does not necessarily determine whether it may have a retrospective operation”. It was thus held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that the right which is substantive in nature, accrued to the virgin areas for the first time by way of amendment only.

It was thus an unamended Rule under which the notification dated 09.10.1996 was issued and tenders were invited and auction held. Rule 8(8) of the 1959 Rules which prescribes period for grant of lease is not procedural but substantive in nature. It is only in respect of virgin areas that the period of lease stands enhanced to ten years whereas in respect of other areas the period of lease continues to be five years. This was clearly a substantive amendment which had nothing to do with any procedure. There was no concept of “virgin area” in the unamended rule which has been introduced for the first time by way of aforesaid amendment.

These appeals were accordingly allowed.

Evidence – Compact Disk – Primary or Secondary evidence – A Compact Disk produced as a source of information of corrupt practice is inadmissible as a primary evidence . [Evidence Act, 1872, Section 65-B]

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Mohammad Akbar vs. Ashok Sahu & Ors. AIR 2016 (NOC) 428 (CHH).

The Court held that where a compact disk is produced as a source of information of corrupt practice, it shall be admissible only as a secondary evidence and not as a primary evidence, where the compact disk did not contain any certificate as required u/s 65-B(4), hence not admissible as Evidence.

Contempt – Non-Compliance of order of a Court on the ground that the appeal is pending against the Court’s order is not permissible. [Contempt of Courts Act, Section 2]

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Sk. Abdul Matleb vs. R.P.S. Khalon & Ors. AIR 2016 Cal. 235.

The alleged respondents were not ready to comply with the Court’s directions on the ground that they had filed an appeal.

It is a well settled law that till the order passed by a competent Court is set aside/or stayed and/or varied and/ or modified, the said order remains valid and subsisting and is required to be complied with, both in law and in spirit.

However, if one has to accept the stand taken by the respondents, it would mean that no order passed by any competent Court will be ever complied with, till the person aggrieved exhausts all his appellate remedies which certainly is not in conformity with the scheme for rendering effective justice in any matter. The Court in such circumstances, issued Rule of Contempt against the respondents.

Arrest – Procedure to be followed by Police Officer – The police must follow the procedures laid down by the courts – if any situation/circumstance is covered u/s. 41 and 41-A of the CR.P.C proper reasoning for the arrest is required [Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 Section 41, 41-A]

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Dr. Rini Johar & Another vs. State of M.P. & Ors. AIR 2016 SC 2679

In the present case, Petitioners being a lady doctor and a lady advocate, against whom a complaint was filed and an FIR u/s. 420 (cheating) and 34 of IPC and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was registered by the Cyber Police. Petitioners submitted that this Court should look into the manner in which they had been arrested, how the norms fixed by this Court had been flagrantly violated and how their dignity was sullied permitting the atrocities to reign. It was urged that if this Court is prima facie satisfied that violations are absolutely impermissible in law, they would be entitled to compensation.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court (SC) held that before the police proceed to arrest, certain guidelines as prescribed by the SC in the case of D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B. (1977) SC 416 should be adhered to.

Thereafter, the Court referred to Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (inserted by Amendment Act of 2009) and analysing the said provision, opined that a person accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on his satisfaction that such person had committed the offence. It has been further held that a police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required cannot be ensured.

It has been held that section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that where the arrest of a person is not required u/s. 41(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the police officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time. Law obliges such an accused to appear before the police officer and it further mandates that if such an accused complies with the terms of notice he shall not be arrested, unless for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary. At this stage also, the condition precedent for arrest as envisaged under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be complied and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate as aforesaid.

Representation on Model GST Law

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29th August, 2016

To,
Shri Arun Jaitley
The Finance Minister
Government of India
134/North Block
New Delhi – 110 001

Respected Sir,

Subject:- Representation on Model GST Law

This is with reference to draft Model GST Law released by the Empowered Committee and hosted on the website of DOR inviting comments from stake holders and public at large. We would like to take this opportunity to present before you some of the views and suggestions of our members.

May we request your good selves to kindly consider the same appropriately while preparing the final Model GST Law and related business processes on proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST).

Yours sincerely,

For Bombay Chartered Accountants ‘ Society

Chetan Shah
President

Govind G. Goyal
Chairman – Indirect Taxation Committee

Indirect Taxation Committee Observations and Suggestions on DRAFT MODEL GST LAW


Major Areas of Concern, which need to be addressed appropriately

1. The Draft Model GST Law, coupled with Reports on Business Processes under GST, has conveyed a very negative feeling among the trade and industries. The same needs to be addressed immediately (may be through a 2nd revised draft or so).

2. There is wide spread confusion about the uniformity of taxation across the country particularly regarding classification, valuation, exemptions and rates of tax.

3. There is an urgent need to dispel the fear of artificial disallowance of Input Tax Credit (ITC), through monthly matching concepts, etc., and, excessive compliance burden in the proposed GST regime.

4. Sanctity of ‘Tax Invoice’, issued by a registered dealer, and seamless Input Tax Credit are basic tenet of any successful VAT law. The same should be maintained.

5. It is also necessary to clarify how dual control by Central and States will be exercised over the same assessee in respect of same transaction liable to tax for CGST and SGST, or for IGST.

6. Small manufacturers, vendors and job workers, in small scale industries (SSI) and Cottage Industries, etc., are clueless about their future in the proposed GST regime. It may be noted that such units constitute a significantly large number of business population of India. Their genuine concerns need to be addressed satisfactorily before deciding about introduction of GST in the proposed format.

7. The proposed threshold of Rs. 10 lakh for compulsory registration is too low a limit. It may back fire. Considering various aspects of smooth transition it would be necessary to seriously reconsider the same. (An appropriate limit, in present conditions, may be Rs. 50 lakh of taxable supplies)

8. It would be necessary to design simple and convenient Composition Schemes for various categories of dealers and for certain specific types of businesses (may be on the lines of composition schemes designed in some of the State VAT laws and various other countries who have successfully implemented VAT /GST).

9. Being entirely new system of taxation across the country, it may not be possible for anyone to determine correct RNR at present. There are several factors, particularly in the present scenario of diverse system of indirect taxation by the Centre and States, and, organized as well as unorganized sectors of manufacture, trade and services, etc. It would be necessary, therefore, that the rates of tax are decided in accordance with the acceptability of such rate/s by the ultimate consumers (who are the real tax payers).

10. The best policy in deciding rates of tax is that the Government should get adequate revenue, trade & industry should not have any burden and the consumers feel happy. To achieve this, it may be necessary to decide in advance (a) the list of exempted goods and services, (b) list of goods and services which deserve a merit rate, (c) list of goods and services which needs to be taxed at very low rate in the beginning (special merit rate) and (d) list of goods and services which can be taxed at fairly high rate. However, it should be ensured that all States apply the same rate on such commonly agreed lists of goods and services.

11. Taking clue from various sources, the general rate of GST @ 15% may be the most appropriate rate, with merit rate (5% to 8%), special merit rate @ 2% and higher rates (25% to 35%).

12. Various definitions, contained in section 2 of draft Model GST Act, need appropriate review and necessary modifications.

13. The terms like ‘supply’ in section 3 and Schedule-1, ‘nature of supply’ in section 2, ‘time of supply’ in section 12 &13, ‘value of supply’ in section 15 and ‘place of supply’ in various sections, need a thorough review.

14. The provisions like RCM, TDS and TCS have made the draft law much more cumbersome. Only those provisions need to be kept, which are necessary. The Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM) should apply in respect of international transactions only.

15. One needs to look into whether such elaborate provisions of valuation are required in the proposed GST regime where tax is being levied till final stage of consumption. Ultimately tax cannot be levied at a price (value) more than what the consumer has paid to the supplier.

16. Procedural aspects have to be designed in such a manner that all assessees, all over India, are able to comply with the requirements well within time and without facing undue burden of time and money.

17. Appropriate transition provisions need to be spelled out clearly so there is no undue burden on the existing tax payers. Similarly taxation of continuing contracts may need to be clarified appropriately.

18. Interest of those units, presently enjoying exemption under various promotional schemes, needs to be protected.

19. Applicability of IGST on various types of transactions of supply of goods as well as services needs much more clarity.

20. Although, the Government has shown its intention to implement GST with effect from 1st April 2017, there is no harm if it is implemented from a later date. For smooth implementation of such a major reform, it is necessary that the final law is designed after considering all aspects. And sufficient time is given to trade, industry and the Government Departments to gear up for the new regime.

Our observations and suggestions on some of the important provisions are enclosed herewith for your kind consideration.

Complete Representation on Model GST Law can be viewed and downloaded from BCAS home page www.bcasonline.org

Impact on MAT from First Time Adoption (FTA) of Ind AS

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The MAT Ind AS Committee (hereinafter referred to as ‘Committee’) on 18th March 2016 issued a draft report on the ‘Framework for computation of book profit for the purposes of levy of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) u/s. 115JB of the Income-tax Act 1961 for Indian Accounting Standards (lnd AS) compliant companies in the year of adoption and thereafter’. The Report was revised on 23rd July 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Framework’). The Framework is a draft and is subject to public comments and final changes. Once the Framework is final, the same will have to be incorporated in the Income-tax Act, to make it effective.

This article discusses the issues and challenges on first time adoption (FTA ) of Ind AS and the consequences for companies that fall under MAT . Though the revised Framework is an improvement from the pre-revised draft, the provisions do not appear to be fair or reasonable, and will significantly hamper the ease of doing business. In addition, the environment is most likely to become very litigious and painful.

The accounting policies that an entity uses in its opening Ind AS balance sheet at the time of FTA may differ from those that it previously used in its Indian GAAP financial statements. An entity is required to record these adjustments directly in retained earnings/reserves at the date of transition to Ind AS. The Committee noted that several of these items would subsequently never be reclassified to the statement of P&L account or included in the computation of book profits.

Consider a company has a net worth of Rs 500 crore, and therefore falls under phase 1of Ind AS implementation. Its date of transition to Ind AS is 1 April, 2015; comparative period is financial year 2015-16, and first Ind AS reporting period is financial year 2016-17. The company is engaged in several businesses and makes the following seven transition decisions at 1 April, 2015 in order to comply with Ind AS.

1. The company’s accounting policy for fixed assets is cost less depreciation under Ind AS. However, as per option available in Ind AS 101 all fixed assets are stated at fair value at date of transition. The revalued amount is a deemed cost of fixed assets at 1 April, 2015. In other words, the company’s policy is not to use revaluation on a go forward basis as the accounting policy. The uplift on revaluation is recorded in retained earnings and will never be recycled to the P&L account.

2. In the stand-alone accounts the company has several investments in subsidiaries which under Indian GAAP are stated at cost less diminution other than temporary. Under Ind AS the company will continue to account them at cost less impairment. However, as per option available in Ind AS 101 the investments in subsidiaries are stated at fair value at date of transition. The fair value is the deemed cost of investments at 1 April, 2015. Subsequently, the investments in subsidiaries are not fair valued but tested only for impairment. The uplift on fair valuation is recorded in retained earnings and will never be recycled to the P&L account.

3. Under Indian GAAP, the company discloses assets under a service concession arrangement (SCA) as intangible assets at cost and which does not include construction margin. On date of transition, the company accounts for the intangible assets in accordance with Ind AS 11 (Appendix A), treating them as service concession assets. Consequently, under Ind AS 11 (Appendix A), the construction margin is also reflected in the value of the intangible asset.Therefore at transition date, the value of the intangible assets will be increased with a corresponding increase in retained earnings. The increase in retained earnings will never be recycled to the P&L account. However, the increase in the value of the intangible asset will be amortized in the future years.

4. At 31 March 2015, the Company has a lease equalization liability under Indian GAAP for an operating lease. Under Ind AS 17, the Company is required to charge operating lease payments in the P&L account without equalizing the lease payments, since those lease payments are indexed to inflation. Consequently on the transition date, the company reverses the lease equalization liability and takes the credit to retained earnings. The increase in retained earnings will never be recycled to the P&L account.

5. The Company has a cash flow hedge reserve at 31 March 2015 under Indian GAAP, which meets all hedge accounting requirements under Ind AS. In accordance with Ind AS 101, the Company is required to maintain the cash flow hedge reserve, and recycle the same to the P&L account, in accordance with the principles of Ind AS 109.

6. The Company has a foreign branch and a positive foreign currency translation reserve (FCTR) in Indian GAAP stand alone accounts at 31 March 2015. In accordance with Ind AS 101, it restates the FCTR to zero on 1 April, 2015 – the date of transition. Consequently the corresponding effect is taken to retained earnings. The increase in retained earnings will never be recycled to the P&L account.

7. In addition to investments in subsidiaries the company has investments in unquoted securities that are held long term for strategic reasons, but which are neither, subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures. The Company designates these investments as FVOCI (Fair Value through Other Comprehensive Income). As per this accounting policy choice, the fair value changes are permanently recorded in reserves (not retained earnings) and are never recycled to the P&L account.

As per the Framework, the MAT implication for the above seven FTA items is given below, along with the author’s recommendation of the changes required and grounds for such recommendations.

The FTA adjustments made at 1 April, 2015 are to be appropriately dealt with to determine the book profits for MAT purposes. The big question is – Is it included in the book profits over three years starting from the comparative period, ie, financial year 2015-16 or in the year of FTA, ie, financial year 2016-17? Though the intent of the government may have been to include the adjustments in the book profits for 2015-16, it is no longer practically feasible to do so. It is most likely that the adjustments would be included to determine the book profits starting from the financial year 2016-17. Hopefully that clarity will come in the forthcoming budget, as this requirement would require an amendment to the Act. This is again an unpleasant outcome, given that companies would be paying advance taxes without the knowledge of the final law on this subject.

Conclusion
Companies need to make careful choices of FTA options to minimize a negative MAT impact. They can make those choices up till financial statements for year ended 31 March 2017 are finalized. However, changes in those choices will cause significant fluctuations in 2016- 17 quarterly results. For example, a company decides to carry forward fixed assets at previous GAAP carrying value as a transition choice to avoid any MAT liability on fair value uplift. Subsequently, in the last quarter, the budget clarifies that the fair value uplift on fixed assets will be completely tax neutral from MAT perspective. Because of the clarity, the Company prefers to fair value the fixed assets from the transition date instead of carrying them at previous GAAP carrying value. This would mean that the lower depreciation charge in the earlier quarters and the comparative period will have to be adjusted, thereby resulting in significant change in the reported numbers in the last quarter.

As a bold step, the Government may consider simplifying the MAT provision, and lower the MAT rates. Alternatively, AMT (Alternate Minimum Tax) regime applicable to noncorporate assesses and which is highly successful may be introduced for corporate assesses. However, given the time constraint it is generally understood, that the Government may not explore these choices.

Mutual benefit company – Principle of mutuality – Income from sale of shares and the occupancy rights – cannot be assessed in the hands of the assessee – Land continues to be owned by the assessee – No transfer of any FSI attached to the land – Tax under the head ‘capital gain’ in the hands of the shareholder not company:

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CIT- 6 vs. M/s. Calico Dyeing and Printing Mills Pvt. Ltd. [ Income tax Appeal no 14 of 2014 dt – 04/07/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[The ITO 6(2)(1) vs. M/s. Calico Dyeing and Printing Mills Pvt.Ltd . [ITA No. 4297/MUM/2009 ; Bench : C ; dated 05/06/2013 ; A Y: 2006- 2007. Mum. ITAT]

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction and started construction of 15 storied building consisting of 85 dwellings units in the year 2002-03. The assessee had finished major construction activity in early 2005 and had received the “Occupation Certificate” from BMC authorities upto the 13th floor on 31st May, 2005. As per the details, totally 67 flats weresold 67.

It was the claim of the assessee that it was a mutual benefit company therefore it had not made any profit from the construction activity as it had only collected the construction cost from the flat owner. The company has entered into a tripartite agreement with the flat owners. The parties to the sale agreement being the flat purchaser, the assessee company and a partnership firm Viz., M/s. Calico Associates who held 12,100 shares of the assessee company.

After considering these facts, the AO issued show cause asking the assessee why the activity of construction and sale of residential units should not be considered as a business of the assessee company and the profits arising out of the same not be taxed in its hands as business income. The assessee explained to the AO that the activity of construction and allotment of residential flat cannot be treated as business venture because it was a Non Trading Company doing activities of construction of residential buildings for the benefit of its members. Therefore, there was no motive of earning any profits or gains from the activity. It was explained that the assessee was working solely for the benefit of its members/share holders. The AO did not accept the contention of the assessee and was of the firm belief that the flat owners at the time of booking of the premises were not share holders of the company. The AO further observed that the flat owners had no right other than the flats occupied by them. The AO further observed that principle of mutuality did not apply on the facts of the case because there is no reciprocity or mutual dependence which are necessary conditions in the case of mutuality. The AO was of the view that the claim of the assessee is nothing but a sham and a colourable device used by it to divert and avoid taxable income in its own hands.

Being aggrieved by this finding of the AO, the assessee carried the matter before the Ld. CIT(A). Before the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee explained the entire nature of transaction and contended that only the share holders are liable to tax on the income arising from such transfer and the share holders have already offered the income to tax. If the income was taxed in the hands of the assessee, it would amount to double taxation. The Ld. CIT(A) was convinced that what was attached to the shares and subject matter of transfer were the occupancy rights of the constructed flats in the building Kamal Darshan and not the land. Such rights did not belong to the assessee since before rights came into existence, they were attached to the shares of the company.

CIT(A) held that in terms of Section 27(iii) of the Act, the shareholder was the owner of the flat. It found that in fact what had been sold were its shares held by its shareholder one M/s.Calico Associates. The sale of shares by its shareholder – M/s. Calico Associates was brought to tax under the head ‘capital gain’ in the hands of the shareholder for the subject Assessment Year. It also held that there was no sale of the land by the asseseee nor any sale of FSI available on the land which continued to be owned by the asseseee. In these circumstances, it allowed the asseseee’s appeal.

Aggrieved by the above finding of the Ld. CIT(A), Revenue carried the matter before ITAT . This ground of appeal was dismissed by the ITAT .

The Revenue filed an appeal before the High court challenging the order of ITAT . The High Court held that the question as raised was in respect of impairment of land (use of FSI) was not canvassed before the Tribunal. Therefore, the question raised does not arise out of the Tribunal’s order. In any case, the finding of fact rendered by the CIT(A) that land continued to be owned by the assessee and there was no transfer of any FSI attached to the land was not shown to be perverse and/or arbitrary. In the above view, the Appeal was dismissed.

EMPTY HANDED

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It is said we come into this world `empty handed’ and will leave `empty handed’. Alexander – the Great – believed in this and that is the reason he directed that when he is carried to his grave both his hands should be out of the coffin for people to see that the conqueror is leaving the world `empty handed’. However, the issue is : Is this true – Is this a fact ! The answer is No.

However, those who believe in the concept of `free will’ – that is – karma – do not / will not accept that a person comes into or goes out of this world empty handed. The believers of `free will’ believe that they are masters of their actions and are doers. They accept responsibility for their actions. In other words, they enjoy the fruits of their actions and also suffer the consequences of their mistakes.

Hence, they are born to live the consequences of deeds of their present and past life or lives. In short, they are once again given the opportunity to do good deeds so that in their next birth they enjoy the result of their good actions alongwith suffering for their mistakes. There is no quid pro quo. It also affords an opportunity through good deeds and prayer to merge with the Lord and get out of this cycle of birth-death-birth.

Every religion preaches this concept and that is why we have the concept of the? day of judgement’. Guru Nanak advised ‘Do good deeds’ – `share what you have’ and above all? remember the Giver – the Lord’. Hence, it can be said guru advocated ‘free will’. It is upto the individual to choose his path and to write his destiny. Fethullah Gulen writes : `God does not look at your body or your physical appearance. He looks at your heart and the sincerity of your deeds – and deeds determine misery or happiness in the next world’. Barnet Bain, express the same thought when he writes :  ‘know that each one of us is the writer and director of our own unforgettable life story’. Further one of the Ten Commandments is ‘Do unto others what you wish them do unto you’ is based on the concept that every action has a reaction. What a dynamic philosophy – nay – concept of life – which gives one the liberty to choose the way one wants to live.

The issue is : what is the impact of this concept. The impact is that it makes us conscious – aware – of our actions and believe me if one is conscious of what one is doing one will desist – nay – never do anything that is wrong or hurts someone. ‘Free will‘ makes us conscious – aware – of the good old saying that ‘every action has a reaction’. It brings awareness in our life. William Penn advises us to do good without waiting when he says :

‘I expect to pass through life but once. If, therefore, there be any kindness I can show, or any good thing I can do to any fellow being, let me do it now, and not defer or neglect it, as I will not pass this way again’.

Hence, – it is wrong to say we come `empty handed’ and go `empty handed’. The reality is we come with full hands and go with full hands. It is upto us : what we fill in our hands.

So to have a contended and happy life and a happy life thereafter let us be conscious of our thoughts and actions. Let us not forget that `thought is also an action’. I would conclude by quoting an often quoted saying :

‘we reap what we sow’.

NB :The author believes that to the aim of life in accounting jargon is to have a zero balance sheet – a balance sheet with no debits and with nil credits. The issue is this possible ! The answer is yes based on the belief that one is not the doer – In other words, one has to give up ownership of both – one’s thoughts and actions.

‘Real Beauty’

A few years ago, I read a news item
that the sense of beauty in Indian men’s perception is not mature enough! It
was in the context of the ‘vital statistics’ of a woman’s figure, her complexion
and other criteria.

 

I wondered as to who are the
Americans or Europeans to dictate the standards of beauty. After all, the
beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder –as rightly said by an Urdu ‘Shayar’

 

“Kubsoorti dekhnewale ke dilme hoti
hai”

           

There is a story of Jesus Christ.
His mother went to his school a little before the school recess. She was in a
hurry; so she handed over the tiffin to another lady waiting to give tiffin to
her child. Jesus’s mother requested her to hand over the tiffin box to Jesus.
The lady said she did not know Jesus. The mother said when the children would
come out, the most beautiful child would be Jesus. The lady agreed.

 

Obviously, the lady handed over the
tiffin to her own son!

 

This is a universal truth. ‘Beauty’
– like many other qualities is a relative and subjective term. It varies from
viewer to viewer.

 

Once upon a time, there was a great
quarrel between Shree Laxmidevi – Lord Vishnu’s wife – Goddess of
riches and Shree Shanidev (God of planet Saturn who is known to trouble
the people for a period of seven and a half years – called sade sati).
The dispute was as to who between them looks more beautiful.

 

About the beauty of Goddess
Laxmi,
all of us know well. But Saturn as a planet also looks very nice –
with the three illuminating rings around him. The dispute was not getting
resolved. Fortunately, there was no judicial system like it is of today.
Otherwise, the litigation could have continued for thousands of years; and
perhaps even Laxmiji would not have afforded the lawyers’ fees!

When they were arguing between
themselves at the top of their voice, Shree Naradmuni was passing by. He
heard it, saw them and tried to escape from there. He smelt that he was in
trouble!

 

Laxmiji and Shaniji
saw Naradji and called him close. They referred the dispute to his sole
Arbitration. He was not like present arbitrators and being a Sanyasi,
had no greed for money! At the same time, he wanted to avoid the embarrassing
‘assignment’ since he could not afford the frown of either! But despite his
request, and the pretext of ‘hurry,’ they would not let him go.

 

After all, Narad
was the son of Lord Brahma – and had extraordinary intelligence. He
thought of an idea. He asked both of them to walk upto a distant tree and come
back. They were wild. They said – “Naradji, we are asking you to decide who
between us is more beautiful and you are asking us to walk to the tree?”. But
they had no choice as the arbitrator had certain powers!

 

They walked reluctantly and
returned.

 

“No, No, No, No, No, No!” said Naradji;
“I didn’t see properly. You should not have anger on your faces. It mars the
beauty! Please do it again”. Poor Laxmiji and Shaniji were
furious in their minds; but could not express their displeasure before him.
They performed the ‘walking’ act again.

 

Naradji smiled and said
“yes, yes! Now I realised. While walking away from here, Shanidev looked
more beautiful and while coming back from the tree, Laxmiji was more
beautiful!

 

So friends, beauty lies in your
perception; your mood and your expectations!

 

Can
the same thing be said about ‘GST’?

Furnishing of Form GSTR-3B

August 9, 2017

To,

The Revenue Secretary

Shri Hasmukh Adhia

The Government of India

Ministry of Finance,

(Department of Revenue)

(Central Board of Excise
& Customs)

New Delhi.

Dear Sir,

Ref: Notification No.
21/2017 – Central Tax dated 08.08.2017 [F. No.349 /74 /2017-GST(Pt.)]

Sub.: Furnishing of
Form GSTR-3B

This has a reference to the
above referred Notification issued by your office regarding the dates by which
the summary return in Form GSTR-3B has to be filed.

As per the said notification,
the Form GSTR-3B for the month of July 2017 has to be filed before 20th
August 2017. Accordingly, the effective last date for filing the same is 19th
August 2017.

While filling the Form GSTR-3B,
we are able to fill in all the details but when we try to upload the Form by
clicking on the “submit” tab, the uploading does not take place. We are
unable to move further.

Further, between the date of the
notification and the last date of filing the Form GSTR-3B though there are
eleven days but out that, five are holidays as listed hereunder:

Sr.
No.

Date

Nature
of Holiday

1.

12th August
2017

Second Saturday of the
month

2.

13th August
2017

Sunday

3.

14th August
2017

Janmashtami

4.

15th August
2017

Independence Day

5.

17th August
2017

Parsi New Year

As such, the effective working
days are just 6 days which are too short to ensure timely filing of the Form.

In view of the above, we request
your goodself to kindly consider the difficulties faced by the tax payers and
the professionals and extend the said date to 1st September 2017.

Thanking you

 

For
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,

                                                                             

 

Narayan
Pasari                                                           Deepak
R. Shah              

President                                                                                            Chairman
– Indirect Tax Committee

38. Revision – Scope of power of Commissioner – Section 264 1 – A. Y. 2006-07 – Record includes all records relating to any proceedings – Not confined to return of income and assessment order in case of assessee – Order passed on other party treating lease rent received by it from assessee as its income – Application by assessee for revision on basis of order – Order can be considered and applied to allow deduction in assessee’s hands – Remedy u/s. 264 appropriate

Selvamuthukumar vs. CIT; 394 ITR 247 (Mad):

The petitioner had entered into an agreement with S for the
purchase of its hostel buildings. The hostels were being managed by the
petitioner pending finalisation of sale and depreciation claimed thereupon in
respect of A. Ys. 2003-04 to 2005-06. The transaction could not be completed
and upon cancellation of the agreement the hostels reverted back to S in
December 2005. The petitioner received back only a sum of Rs. 8,63,70,652 as
against the consideration of Rs. 9,79,44,847 paid by it originally.
Accordingly, no depreciation was claimed in the A. Y. 2006-07. For the purpose
of taxability on the transaction, an order u/s. 144A of the Act, 1961 was
passed to the effect that the transaction was one of lease. The Assessing
Officer of S was directed to bring to tax the difference between the amount of
the original sale consideration received and the amount returned by it to the
assessee pursuant to the cancellation of the sale agreement, considering it as
lease rent to be spread over four years pro rata. The order u/s. 144A had
attained finality. Consequently, the assessee claimed the lease rentals paid by
it over the period of the four A. Ys. 2003-04 to 2006-07, as business
expenditure u/s. 37. Notices u/s. 148 were issued to the assessee for
reassessment in respect of the A. Ys. 2003-04 to 2005-06 and the claims for
depreciation and the claim of lease rentals as business expenditure were allowed
in the reassessment. The assessee filed revision petition u/s. 264 before the
Commissioner for deduction of lease rentals for the A. Y. 2006-07. The
Commissioner rejected the application on the ground, that, (a) the order u/s.
144A was passed in the case of S and as such was not relevant in the case of
any other assessee and, (b) the power to revise u/s. 264 was specific to
consideration of any issue discussed or decided in an order of assessment which
was not the case of the assessee. He was of the view that the contention raised
by the assessee did not emanate from either the return filed by him or the
order of assessment and therefore, jurisdiction u/s. 264 could not be invoked.

The Division Bench of the Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)  The embargo placed on an Assessing Officer in
considering a new claim would not impinge on the power of the appellate
authority or revisional authority.

ii)  Section 264 of the Act has been inserted as a
parallel and alternate remedy and relief available to an assessee. It provides
powers to the Commissioner to make or cause such enquiry to be made as he
thinks fit in dealing with an application for revision. The power u/s. 264 is
wide and extends to passing any order as the Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner may think fit after making an inquiry and subject to the
provisions of the Act, suo moto or on an application by the assessee.

iii)  The order passed u/s. 144A of the Act in the
case of S had relevance in the assessment of the assessee for the reason that
the transaction dealt with in that order was one between S and the assessee.
Effect had been given to the directions in the order u/s. 144A in the
assessment of S as well as in the assessment of the assessee for the A. Ys.
2003-04 to 2005-06. There was no reason why a different conclusion was taken
for the A. Y. 2006-07, when the transaction, the facts, the circumstances and
the law remained identical and unchanged throughout. Even applying the
principle of consistency, the treatment accorded to an issue that arose in a
continuing transaction should be consistent for the entire period.

iv) Section 264 provides powers to the Commissioner
to make or cause such inquiry to be made as he thought fit while deciding an
application for revision which included taking into consideration, the relevant
material that had a bearing on the issue under consideration, which in the
assessee’s case, include the order issued to S u/s. 144A. The order u/s. 144A
ought to have been taken into consideration and applied.

v)  The order u/s. 264 was appropriate and ought
to have been exercised in favour of the assessee by the Commissioner.”

37. Penalty – Block assessment – Sections 132(4), 158BC and 158BFA(2) – On mutual understanding with department, director of assessee – company filed return showing undisclosed income and assessee filed Nil return – Undisclosed income assessed finally partly in hands of director and partly in hands of assessee – Penalty not leviable on assessee

CIT vs. Saraf Agencies Ltd.; 394 ITR 444(Cal):

Pursuant to a search and seizure, the assessee company and
its director filed returns. On a mutual understanding with the Department, the
director of the assessee-company filed return showing undisclosed income of Rs.
2,02,66,971 and the assessee filed Nil return. The Assessing Officer assessed
the undisclosed income of the assessee company at Rs. 491.50 lakh and initiated
penalty proceedings u/s. 158BFA(2) of the Act, 1961. The undisclosed income of
the assessee was reduced to Rs. 37 lakh by the Commissioner (Appeals). The
Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 158BFA(2) on the undisclosed income of
Rs. 37 lakh. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the penalty. The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that the developments in the course of the assessment
proceedings did not modify the quantum of undisclosed income but only the
proportion of distribution of the undisclosed sum between the assessee and the
director. He also held that the director was acting upon some kind of understanding
about the person who should make the declaration and that the levy of penalty
on the technical ground that the assessee declared nil undisclosed income u/s.
158BC of the Act and that there was some income found after the appellate
decision, was not justified and cancelled the penalty. The Tribunal upheld the
order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The imposition of penalty, when the returns of
undisclosed income were filed in consultation with the Department, was
inequitable. What had emerged after the search and seizure was that the
Department itself was unable to conclude whether the undisclosed income
belonged to the assessee or its director. It was on the basis of an
understanding arrived at between the parties that the director had made a
disclosure of Rs. 2.16 crore and the assessee filed a nil return. Finally, the
undisclosed income of the director was assessed at Rs. 2.02 crore approximately
and that of the assessee at Rs. 37 lakh.

ii)  Both
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had held that in the facts of the
case no penalty should be levied upon the assessee. The understanding arrived
at between the Department, the assessee and the director had not been disproved
nor had that finding been assailed. The cancellation of penalty was justified.“

36. Income- Exempt income – A. Y. 1991-92 – When the royalty and interest income were claimed as exempt on accrual basis in earlier years, forex fluctuation gain or loss arising on receipt of such income in subsequent period could not also be considered as exempt. Such gain or loss could not be considered as part of royalty or interest income and it should be taxed on basis of AS-11

Ballarpur Industries Ltd. vs. CIT; [2017] 84 taxmann.com
61 (Bom)

Assessee-company had accounted for royalty and interest
income on accrual basis, which were exempt under the then India-Malaysia DTAA.
During the subsequent period (A. Y. 1991-92), the assessee had received such
income that was more than what was accounted in earlier years due to exchange
differences. The assessee argued that the exchange difference should be treated
as part of royalty and interest income. Accordingly, it would be exempt from
tax as per India-Malaysia DTAA. The Assessing Officer did not accept the
assessee’s claim and assessed the exchange difference as taxable income. The
Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On reference by the assessee, the Bombay High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  Gain or loss arising on account of foreign
exchange variation could not bear the same character of exempt income

ii)  The revenue had correctly placed reliance on
AS 11 which indicates that benefit derived on account of currency fluctuation
after the year of accrual is to be considered as income or expense in the
period in which they arise

iii)  This gain/loss on account of foreign exchange
fluctuation is not part of royalty and interest nor is it any accretion to it.
In this case, it is the generation of further income which is taxable in the
subject assessment year when the variation in foreign exchange has resulted in
further income in India

iv) Thus,
differential amount arising on account of exchange fluctuation was an extra
income which would be subject to tax in the year in which it was received.”