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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated 14th August, 2013

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Overseas Direct Investments

Presently, an Indian Party can invest under the Automatic Route up to 400% of its net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet in all its overseas Joint Ventures (JV)/Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) engaged in any bona fide business activity.

This circular has reduced the above limit of 400% of net worth to 100% of net worth in case of all fresh Overseas Direct Investment proposals under the Automatic Route. Also, in case of fresh investment in overseas unincorporated entities in the energy and natural resources sectors, the above limit of 400% of net worth has been reduced to 100% of net worth in case of all fresh Overseas Direct Investment proposals under the Automatic Route. ODI in excess of 100% of the net worth will be considered by RBI under the Approval Route. Existing JV/WOS set up under earlier regulations will continue to be governed by the same.

However, there is no change as regards investment overseas under the Automatic Route by Navratna Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and Oil India Ltd (OIL), in overseas unincorporated entities and the overseas incorporated entities in the oil sector (i.e., for exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.), which are duly approved by the Government of India. They can invest without any limit.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20 dated 12th August, 2013

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999.

This circular states that applications for compounding must contain details of the bank account of the applicant in the format annexed to this circular to facilitate refund of compounding fees in case the application has to be returned because of nonobtaining of proper approvals or permission from the concerned authorities or for any other reason(s).

Also, annexed to this circular are the revised annexures for submission of information with regards to violation in respect of Foreign Direct Investment, External Commercial Borrowings, Overseas Direct Investment and Branch Office/Liaison Office. In the revised annexures details of PAN and the activity as per NIC codes-1987 have to be given. If the said information is not given, the application will be treated as incomplete. Also, information regarding change in the address/contact detail of the applicant has to be submitted to the Compounding Authority.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19 dated 7th August, 2013

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Non-Resident Deposits–Comprehensive Single Return (NRD-CSR): Submission under XBRL

This circular states that RBI is shifting, from 1st October, 2013, the NRD-CSR reporting to eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) platform to provide validations for processing requirement in respect of existing NRD schemes, improve data quality, enhance the security-level in data submission, and enable banks to use various features of XBRL-based data submission, and tracking. The procedure and new formats are given in/annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18 dated 1st August, 2013

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Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings

This circular clarifies that an FII can enter into a hedge contract for the exposure relating to that part of the securities held by it against which it has issued any PN/ODI only if it has a mandate from the PN/ODI holder for the purpose.

Banks are expected to verify such mandates. However, in cases where this is difficult they must obtain a declaration from the FII:

a. Regarding the nature/structure of the PN/ODI establishing the need for a hedge operation; and

b. Such operations are being undertaken against specific mandates obtained from their clients.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17 dated 23rd July, 2013

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Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings – Reporting of Unhedged Foreign Currency Exposures of Corporates

Presently, banks are required to submit a quarterly statement on foreign currency exposures and hedges undertaken by corporates based on bank’s books.

This circular states that banks should now submit the said quarterly report as per the revised format online only from quarter ended September 2013 through the Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) system which may be accessed at https://secweb.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 22nd July, 2013

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies

This circular has modified the policy for import of gold by nominated banks/agencies as under:

A. Nominated Banks/Agencies

1.
They have to ensure that at least 20% of every lot of import of gold
(in any form/purity including import of gold coins/dore) is exclusively
made available for the purpose of export. Such imports have to be linked
to the financing of exporters by the nominated agencies (i.e. average
of last three years or any one year whichever is higher). Further,

2.
They can make available gold in any form for domestic use only to
entities engaged in jewellery business/bullion dealers supplying gold to
jewellers.

3. They will be required to retain 20% of the imported quantity in the customs bonded warehouses.

4.
They are permitted to undertake fresh imports of gold only after the
exports have taken place to the extent of at least 75% of gold remaining
in the customs bonded warehouse.

5. Any import of gold under any type of scheme, shall follow the 20/80 principle set out at (1) and (3) above.

6. Any other instructions, as regards import of gold on consignment basis, LC restrictions etc. stand withdrawn.

Entities/units
in the SEZ and EOU, Premier and Star trading houses are permitted to
import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.

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S. 45 read with S. 10(38) — Profit from delivery-based transactions in shares treated as capital gains and not as business income.

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60.    (2009) 29 SOT 117 (Mum.)


Gopal Purohit v. Jt. CIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 10-2-2009

S. 45 read with S. 10(38) — Profit from delivery-based
transactions in shares treated as capital gains and not as business income.

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee entered
into transactions of sale and purchase of shares in two forms i.e.,
delivery-based transactions and non-delivery-based transactions. Non-delivery
based transactions had been treated by the assessee as business activity and
income earned by assessee from delivery-based transactions was treated as
capital gain. The assessee’s claim for exemption of long-term capital gain
u/s.10(38) was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the following grounds :



  • the frequency of the transactions carried on by the assessee was very high
    with large volumes of shares.



  • the assessee had borrowed funds which were utilised for carrying out share
    transactions.



  •  transactions where no delivery was taken had been squared up on the same day
    the profit/ loss resulting therefrom was shown as business income.



  •  in respect of delivery-based transactions, as per the statement of capital
    gains filed by the assessee, the period of holding was few days only.


The Assessing Officer, therefore, held that the entire
profit was to be assessed as income from business and profession.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee contended that in earlier
five assessment years on identical facts, the assessment had been completed
u/s.143(3) by accepting the assessee’s claim. Hence, on the basis of the
principle of consistency and in absence of any fresh material, the same
treatment should be given by the Revenue for this year also. The CIT(A) upheld
the Assessing Officer’s order.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of
Sarnath Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Asst. CIT,
(2009) 120 TTJ 216 (Luck.),
held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The assessee had claimed himself both as a dealer as
well as an investor and offered income for taxation accordingly and he claimed
that such income had been accepted by the Revenue authorities in earlier
years. Hence, it becomes important to analyse the facts of earlier years. On
considering the facts of the earlier years, the following conclusions
emerged :

(i) The facts of the year under consideration with regard
to nature of income(s) earned by the assessee and the transactions were same
in all those years, except transactions in F & O segment in some of the
years, wherein this kind of activity was started by the stock exchange.

(ii) Interest on borrowed capital had been allowed as
business expenditure against the profit on jobbing activities shown by the
assessee as business profit.

(iii) The assessee had shown shares purchased on delivery
basis as investments at the end of the year and no stock-in-trade existed on
that date and the assessee had earned both long-term and short-term capital
gains which meant that the assessee had also held shares for the period of
more than 12 months.

Thus, the nature of activities, modus operandi of
the assessee, manner of keeping records and presentation of shares as
investments at the year end were the same in all the years and hence,
apparently, there appeared no reason as to why the claim made by the assessee
should not be accepted.

2. The Revenue authorities had taken a different view in
the year under consideration by holding that the principle of res judicata
was not applicable to the assessment proceedings. There could not be any
dispute on this aspect, but there is also another judicial thought that there
should be uniformity in treatment and consistency under the same facts and
circumstances and it was already found that facts and circumstances were
identical, even though a different stand had been taken by the Revenue
authorities.

3. On the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on
the basis of principle of consistency alone, the action of the Revenue
authorities was liable to be quashed.

4. On the basis of merits also, in view of the ratio of the
decision of Sarnath Infrastructure (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra), it was
held that the delivery-based transaction should be treated as of the nature of
investment transactions and profit therefrom should be treated as capital
gains.

5. The Revenue authorities had also held that borrowed
funds were utilised for making such investment. In earlier years, interest on
such loans had been allowed as business expenditure against profit on share
trading transaction shown as business income. In the year under consideration
also no nexus between the interest-bearing funds and investments had been
established and, hence, for this reason also, there was no merit in treating
the capital gains as business profit.


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Penalty: Concealment: Section 271(1)(c): Sale of immovable property for Rs. 2,51,50,000 which was valued at Rs. 5,19,77,000 for stamp duty: Assessee computed capital gain by taking actual consideration of Rs. 2,51,50,000: AO applied section 50C and also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c): Penalty not justified:

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CIT vs. Madan Theatres Ltd.; 260 CTR 75 (Cal):

The assessee had sold an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 2,51,50,000. The said property was valued at Rs. 5,19,77,000 for the purpose of stamp duty. The assessee computed the capital gain by taking actual consideration of Rs. 2,51,50,000. The Assessing Officer computed the capital gain taking deemed consideration u/s. 50C at Rs. 5,19,77,000 being the stamp duty valuation. The assessee did not dispute the said computation as it would not have made any difference because the capital gain still remained a loss. The Assessing Officer also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Revenue having failed to produce any evidence to the effect that the assessee has actually received more amount than that shown by it on the sale of property, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) cannot be levied simply because the Assessing Officer has worked out the capital gain by taking into account deemed sale consideration by invoking section 50C(1) instead of actual sale consideration shown by the assessee.”

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2013 (31) STR 229 (Tri-Mumbai) Greenspan Agritech Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex, Pune-I

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Refund Notification No.17/2009-ST dated 07-07-
2009 providing time limit of one year from date pf export did not have
retrospective effect.

Facts:
The appellant, a
100% EOU, filed a refund claim for the period October 2007 to February
2008 on 18-1-/2008 under Notification No.41/2007-ST dated 06-10-2007
which was partly rejected on the grounds of limitation and partly as not
admissible under the said notification.

The appellant contended
that since the notifications were amended time to time increasing the
period to file the refund claim from “2 months” to “6 months” vide
Notification No.32/2008-ST dated 18-11-2008 and further to “1 year” vide
Notification No.17/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009, they filed the refund
claim in time and further relied on ITW Signode India Ltd. vs. Collector
of Central Excise 2003 (158) ELT 403 (SC).

The department
contended that the part refund was time–barred as filed beyond the
admissible period of 6 months as per Notification No.32/2008 and thus
not to be allowed.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal held that
undisputedly the refund claim was filed beyond the period of “6 months”.
The amending notification was issued after the event of the date of
export and hence, the same was time-barred. The decision of ITW Signode
India Ltd. (supra) is irrelevant in the present case as the issue
involved is the claim of benefit of notification which was required to
be strictly construed and thus time-barred.

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2013 (31) STR 249 (Tri-Mumbai) Amdocs Business Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Pune.

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In case of a continuous exporter of a taxable output service, credit for input service is available, irrespective of the period to which the service pertained.

Facts:
The Appellant was a continuous exporter of taxable output services and thus filed a refund claim under Rule 5 for the period October 2010 to December 2010 for unutilised service tax paid on input services. The adjudicating authority rejected part refund of invoices for the period September 2008 to November 2008 and October 2009 to January 2010.

The department relied on Notification No.05/2006– CE (NT) dated 14-03-2006 and contended that since the services in respect of which credit was taken could not have been used for the export in the month of October 2010, refund was not admissible.

The Appellant relied on Circular No. 120/01/2010 dated 19-01-2010 and on the decision of CCE, Mysore vs. Chamundi Textiles (Silk Mills) Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 498 (Tri-Bang) and contended that there was no bar in Notification No.05/2006-CE (NT) to grant refund of input services not pertaining to the period of export for which claims were made.

Held:
Relying on Circular No.120/01/2010 dated 19-01-2010 and on Chamundi Textiles (Silk Mills) Ltd. (supra), the Hon. Tribunal held that since the Appellant was a continuous exporter of taxable output service, they were eligible for the refund of the entire amount of service tax paid by them on the input services irrespective of when the credit was taken.

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2013 (31) S.T.R. 152 (Tri.-Del) Om Shiv Transport vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad

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Whether service tax can be demanded from service provider under one service and from service recipient under another service for the same transaction?

Facts:
The Appellants were engaged in transportation of coal in tipping trucks from coal stockyard of Northern Coal Fields Ltd. (NCL) including loading of coal into tipping trucks and railway wagons by employing their own pay loaders apart from manual breaking of coal to the stipulated sizes. The revenue demanded service tax on this considering it a cargo handling service.

The Appellants, relying on Circular No. 137/175/2007- CX4 dated 06-08-2008, contended that the services were in the nature of transport of goods by road. In respect of the same transaction, NCL was assessed to service tax as recipient of service of transport of goods by road vide adjudication order dated 09-01-2008. Invoking extended period of limitation was not warranted since the transaction was already adjudicated against NCL.

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Orissa High Court in case of Coal Carriers vs. CCE 2011 (24) STR 295 (Ori), the Tribunal held that the goods become cargo when loaded into a railway wagon/truck/ tipper and that there is a distinction between goods and cargo. Services in respect of goods were leviable to service tax under transport of goods by road services and services in respect of cargo were leviable to service tax under cargo handling services and thus, the Appellant’s services would fall under cargo handling services. However, the adjudication order did not consider certain aspects and the matter was remanded to consider the applicability of extended period of limitation in lieu of the transactions having been noticed by the revenue qua notice issued to NCL and whether service tax could be assessed once again on the same transaction under cargo handling services in the hands of the Appellants when it was already classified as transport of goods by road and service tax was collected from NCL as recipient of services.

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2013 (31) STR 174 (Tri-Del) Narayan Builders vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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In case of conflicts between two High Courts, the decision of the High Court in whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose is to be followed.

Facts:
The Appellants entered into an agreement with Kota Thermal Power Station (KTPS) for execution of works for coal handling system including clearing under coal handling operation circle.

In view of the clarification issued in the Regional Advisory Committee meeting on 06-09-2004, the revenue contended to levy tax on the said activity under cargo handling services. The department further relied on the decision of Coal Carriers vs. CCE 2011 (24) STR 395 (Ori.) which held such service to be taxable.

The Appellants relied on various judgments of the Delhi Tribunal and Rajasthan High Court decision in case of S. B. Construction Company vs. Union of India 2006 (4) STR 545 (Raj.) wherein the activity of the Appellants were held not to be cargo handling services u/s. 65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal at New Delhi which was neither in the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court nor the Orissa High Court. The tribunal relied on the Full Bench decision of Delhi Tribunal in Madura Coats vs. CCE 1996 (82) ELT 512 which clarified that in case of conflicting decisions amongst High Courts relating to interpretation of statutory provisions or notifications, the decision of the jurisdictional High Court from where the matter was adjudicated earlier, must be followed.

Accordingly, since the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and the Appellants were assessed to service tax by Jurisdictional Commissioners and the Appellate Commissioner within the territorial jurisdiction of Rajasthan High Court, the Tribunal followed the decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of S. B. Construction (Supra) and decided the matter in favour of the Appellants.

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2013 (31) STR 123 (Tri – Delhi) VGL Softtech Ltd. vs. CCEx, Jaipur.

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Only a Division Bench can decide the matter involving determination of liability?

Facts:
Appellant preferred an appeal along with stay application against an order of Respondent levying service tax on activity of maintenance of software for the period 09-07-2004 to 30-07-2005. A Single Member Bench decided exparte on non-appearance and directed the Appellant to deposit the entire demand along with penalty within 8 weeks. The Appellant filed a Miscellaneous Application to recall the order of the Single Member indicating that the jurisdiction of the division Bench was exercisable in the present case. On merits, the Appellant contended that the said activity was exempt vide Notification No. 20/2003-ST dated 21-08-2003 and since Explanation to section 65(zzg) [which levied service tax on software maintenance] was introduced from 01-06-2007 onwards, service tax was not applicable prior to the said date.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal (division Bench) held that, since the Central Excise Act required the appeal involving a question of determination of liability to be heard by the division Bench, the order of Single Member Bench was recalled. On Merits, it was observed that at relevant time the said activity was exempt vide Notification No. 20/2003 and further an Explanation to section 65(zzg) was effective only from 01-06-2007. Accordingly, the stay application and appeal were allowed.

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2013-TIOL-1196-CESTAT-DEL Monsanto Manufacturer Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ghaziabad.

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Classification of service – essential character. Storage Charges integral part of Clearing and Forwarding Service, hence taxable under Clearing and Forwarding Service and not under Storage and Warehousing Service.

Facts:
The Appellant entered into an agreement with HLL to provide services of cold storage/clearing and forwarding operations of frozen products. Tax, interest and penalties were demanded for the said service which was confirmed by the adjudicating authority and also by the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Appellant contended that charges towards cold storage facility were distinct and different from holding of the goods which may take place during clearing and forwarding operation and were in the nature of rental for providing cold storage facility and thus incidental to the services of Clearing and Forwarding Services. Relying on CCE vs. Kulcip Medicines (P) Ltd. – 2009 (14) STR 608, they contended that the activity did not fall under C&F service. The respondents contended that the Appellant acted as a consignment agent and thus, activity of storage was an integral part of the operation of Clearing and Forwarding service.

Held:
Referring to the definition of Clearing and Forwarding service and the agreement entered by the Appellant, it was held that the Appellant was its principal’s agent. Since, the Appellant was required to maintain specific temperature for storage of frozen goods before dispatching the same as per direction of HLL, the storage of the goods in cold storage was an inseparable part of Clearing & Forwarding activity undertaken by the assessee. The essential character being Clearing and Forwarding service, referring to section 65A(2)(b), the storage charges were to be included in the taxable value and chargeable to service tax.

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2013-TIOL-1054-CESTAT-MUM M/s. Kotak Securities Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-I.

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Service tax is payable on equity research as market research agency.

Facts:
The
Appellant conducted equity research and prepared research reports on
the financials of listed companies for their affiliate company M/s.
Kotak Mahindra Capital Company Ltd. (KMCC) and received research fees on
which no service tax was paid. An SCN demanding tax, interest and
penalties was issued to the Appellant under the category “Market
Research Services”.

The Appellant contended that they did not
provide any services in relation to product, service or utility and thus
non-taxable under the said category. It further contended that no
service was provided by them to KMCC as it was under common shareholding
of the Kotak Mahindra Group. Further, placing reliance on Circular
No.109/3/2009- ST dated 23-02-2009, it was contended that the Appellant
and KMCC jointly provided services to clients on a cost/revenue sharing
basis, and thus out of tax net.

Held:
Ordering the pre-deposit of 50% of the dues confirmed, the Hon. Tribunal observed as follows:


The Appellant did not produce any evidence to prove that the amount
shown under “Fee Income/Research Fees Received” in its Profit & Loss
Account was for services other than “Research Activities” undertaken
for KMCC.

• In respect of sharing of expenses not to be
considered as consideration; when a service provider charges a
consideration, he takes into account all the expenses incurred by him
and includes an element of profit. Thus, expenses were an integral part
of the consideration charged. That would not mean that the amount
received is not a consideration for the services rendered. Service tax
was a tax on provision of service and hence, whatever amount was charged
for such provision, service tax was payable, irrespective of whether
any profit was made by the service provider in the said transaction.


It was not in dispute that the Appellant conducted equity research and
prepared reports on the financials of the listed companies. Equities
would come under the categories of products and were considered as goods
under the Sale of Goods Act, 1934. Therefore, research on equity was a
product research. Referring to the definition of Market Research Agency
u/s. 65(69), the activity undertaken by the Appellant would fall within
its scope and accordingly, the Appellant was, prima facie, liable to pay
service tax on the said activity.

• The Appellant informed the
department of the activities undertaken by them only in March 2004 and
September 2004 and SCN was issued in March 2005. It was the date of
knowledge that was relevant for computing the time limit and thus the
SCN was not held time barred.

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2013 (31) STR 227 (Tri.-Del) Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. Raipur

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Free supplied materials includible in the valuation of taxable services vide Circular No. 80/10/2004- ST dated 17-09-2004 read with Notification No. 15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004.

Facts:
The appellant did not include the value of free supplied materials in the gross amount of taxable services and claimed abatement under commercial or industrial construction vide Notification No. 15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004. The appellant further did not pay service tax on advances received and also availed the benefit of CENVAT credit.

The department contended that in view of the said notification read with Circular No. 80/10/2004-ST dated 17-09-2004, tax was to be levied on value addition and thus free supplies would be included in the valuation of taxable services. Further, service tax on advance received should also have been paid and CENVAT disallowed.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal dismissing the appeal in totality held as below:

• The adjudicating authority rightly decided the issue against the appellant with respect to free supplied materials following the taxation of incremental value principle and thus, liable to tax.

• The consideration received before, during and after providing taxable services is leviable to service tax and thus, advance was also liable to tax.

• Since there was no taxability, admissibility of CENVAT credit did not arise.

• Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 was rightly invoked since the appellants did not claim abatement in accordance with law.

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2013 (31) STR 226 (Tri.-Del.) Jai Shree Road Lines vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II

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IConsideration of services is liable to service tax and not sharing thereof.

Facts:
The appellant already deposited service tax on consideration towards GTA services. On sharing such consideration with the truck owners the department demanded service tax considering the same as commission received from providing business auxiliary services.

Held:
Considering the basic principle that only the consideration for services provided, and not appropriation of income, is liable to service tax under Finance Act, 1994, the appeal was decided in favour of the appellant.

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2013 (31) STR 251 (Tri-Ahmd) Aakash The Place To Celebrate vs. Commr. Of S. T., Ahmedabad.

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Service tax paid on advance money received. Amount refunded along with service tax, – Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules applicable and not section 11B, hence credit claimed without time limit.

Facts:
The appellant collected advance from its clients and paid service tax on the same. Due to unforeseen circumstances, they refunded the advances along with service tax. The appellant filed a refund claim of which part amount was rejected on the grounds of time bar u/s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

The appellant contended that, in the present case, Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 was applicable and thus they were eligible to avail credit of service tax paid by them since they have refunded the amount along with service tax to their clients.

The department contended that the amount was collected as service tax and deposited with the Government. Further, placing reliance on the Tribunal’s decision in case of Gujarat Road Transport Corporation, they contended that once the provisions of section 11B were invoked, the refund claim was to be filed within 1 year from the relevant date.

Held:
Citing Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the Tribunal held that the present case was covered by Rule 6(3) since all the conditions mentioned in the said Rule were satisfied. The Tribunal further observed that the appellant was again carrying on the same business and the appellant could utilise the credit of such excess service tax paid. Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, does not prescribe any time limit and therefore, the appellant could avail the total credit of such excess service tax paid for discharging subsequent service tax liability.

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2013 (31) STR 77 (Tri-Delhi) CCEx, Chandigarh vs. Facinate Advertising & Marketing.

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Incentives received in the course of advertising services – Not taxable. Bad debts and discounts are deductible for payment of service tax.

Facts:
The Revenue challenging the decision of CCE (Appeals) contended that incentives received by an advertising agency, bad debts and cash discounts were taxable and thus to be included in the taxable value.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal dismissing the appeal held that incentive was a receipt for appreciation of performance of services which was not known while providing the said service. Bad debts were on account of non-receipt of consideration and, similarly cash discounts were also not received. Thus, they do not enter into the realm of receipt of consideration to be included in the taxable value.

(Note: The period in dispute appears to be pertaining prior to the introduction of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011).

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S. 37(1) — Provision for service warranty expenses on actuarial basis allowed as expense.

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62.    (2009) 29 SOT 167 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v. LG Electronics (I) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 30-1-2009

S. 37(1) — Provision for service warranty expenses on
actuarial basis allowed as expense.

The assessee-company, which was providing a one year
service warranty on sale of its electronics products, made a provision towards
services warranty expenses on actuarial basis and claimed deduction in respect
of the same u/s.37(1), which was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. On
appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the following
cases, allowed the assessee’s claim :

(a) CIT v. Indian Transformers Ltd., (2004) 270
ITR 259; (2005) 142 Taxman 429 (Ker.)

(b) Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT, (2000) 245 ITR
428; 112 Taxman 61 (SC)

(c) Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1959) 37 ITR 1 (SC)

(d) IRC v. Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd.,
(1996) 222 ITR 697 (PC)

(e) CIT v. Vinitek Corpn. (P.) Ltd., (2005) 278
ITR 337; 146 Taxman 313 (Delhi )

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. In the light of plethora of judgments of both of the
Supreme Court as well as various High Courts it is well settled that once
the assessee is maintaining its accounts on the mercantile system, the
liability already accrued in a year though to be discharged at a future
date, would be a proper deduction while working out the profit and gains of
business, regard being had to the accepted principle of commercial practice
and accountancy. It is not as if such deduction is permissible only in the
case of amounts actually expended or paid.

2. The expression ‘the liability already accrued in the
year’ signifies that a business liability must have definitely arisen in
that accounting year. In other words, for allowing the deduction of a
liability while working out the profits and gains of business, a business
liability should have definitely arisen in that accounting year. What should
be certain is the incurring of the liability. The definite liability must be
in praesenti and not de futuro. The liability must have arisen under a
definite obligation. The obligation of the trader must not be of a purely
contingent nature for it to be a permissible outgoing or allowance or
deduction in the year of account.

3. The other condition to be satisfied is that the
definite liability in praesenti should also be capable of being estimated
with reasonable certainty though the actual quantification may not be
possible.

4. In the instant case, the issue related to the
assessee’s claim of deduction towards warranty liability under a condition
or stipulation made in the sale document imposing a liability upon the
assessee to discharge its obligation under warranty clause for the period of
warranty.

5. The assessee had made the provision of warranty
liability having regard to the past factor of actual expenses incurred by it
towards warranty liability. It had worked out the amount of liability by
applying a multiplying factor on the total sales made during the year on the
basis of past results. This method had been followed by the assessee
uniformly right from the first year of commencement of production.

 

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S. 28(iv) — Revaluation of assets by firm before conversion into a Company — Value of shares received by partners in excess of their capital was not taxable.

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61.    (2009) 29 SOT 138 (Mum.)


Dy. CIT v. Mahesh M. Chheda

A.Y. : 1999. Dated : 29-1-2009

S. 28(iv) — Revaluation of assets by firm before conversion
into a Company — Value of shares received by partners in excess of their
capital was not taxable.

The assessee was a partner in a firm which revalued its
assets before conversion into a Company which allotted shares to the partners
of the firm against their revalued capitals. The Assessing Officer taxed the
value of shares received by the partners in excess of their capital before the
revaluation of assets by the firm as value of perquisite or benefit arising to
the partners in terms of S. 28(iv). The CIT(A) upheld the assessment order.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High
Court in CIT v. Smt. Chetanaben B. Sheth, (1993) 203 ITR 24, deleted
the addition. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. One of the conditions necessary for applicability of
S. 28(iv) is that the benefit or perquisite sought to be taxed must be
arising in the course of business carried on.

2. The Gujarat High Court has held in the above-mentioned
case that the amount received by an assessee-partner of a firm towards
valuation of goodwill and assets of the firm at the time of retirement from
the firm does not attract provisions of S. 28(iv), since the same cannot be
said to be a perquisite arising from the business and that even otherwise it
would not partake the character of income. Besides the above, increase in
capital of a partner as a result of revaluation of assets of the firm has no
nexus with the business of firm and, therefore, it cannot be brought within
the ambit of S. 28(iv). Therefore, the provisions of S. 28(iv) could not be
applied to bring the sum in question to tax in the hands of the partners of
the firm.

On the issue whether there was any capital gains as a
result of increase in capital of the partners consequent to revaluation of
assets of the firm, the Tribunal noted as under :

1. The stand taken by the Revenue in the grounds of
appeal was that partner’s interest in the firm was transferred to the
Company at a higher value and, hence, the benefit should be taxed in the
hands of the partners. It had been further contended in the grounds of
appeal that the definition of ‘transfer’ as given in S. 2(47) is an
inclusive definition and, therefore, de hors the provisions of S.
45(4) capital gains can be brought to tax in the hands of the partners.

2. There was no transfer whatsoever by the partners. It
was the firm which got converted into a Company. On such conversion, capital
gain on such transfer could be brought to tax only in the hands of firm and
not in the hands of the partner. This was clear from the provisions of S.
45(4). Consequently, no ‘capital gain’ arose in the hands of the partners by
reason of revaluation of assets of the firm and the consequent increase in
capital account of the partners of the firm.

3. Transfer by the firm or consequent succession of the
firm by a Company should not be brought to tax in view of the provisions of
S. 47(xiii). The fact that such transfer and the resultant capital gains
could not be brought to tax was no ground to explore the possibility of
taxing capital gain in the hands of partners on the ground that there was
capital gain consequent to revaluation of assets and increase in capital of
the partners.

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Explanation (b) to S. 6(1)(c) : (i) Not applicable in case of permanent return (ii) period of visit to India to be excluded (iii) fraction of a day to be excluded.

Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions

    Shri Manoj Kumar Reddy v. ITO

    ITA No. 1020/Bang./2008

    S. 6(1)(c) [Explanation (b)], Income-tax Act;

    Article 4, India-USA DTAA

    A.Y. : 2005-2006. Dated : 3-4-2009

    Explanation (b) to S. 6(1)(c) : (i) Not applicable in case of permanent return (ii) period of visit to India to be excluded (iii) fraction of a day to be excluded.

    Facts :

    The assessment pertains to previous year 2004-05 (A.Y. 2005-06). The appellant was an employee of an Indian company. On 23rd January 2004, the employer issued a deputation letter to the appellant relocating him to the USA and directed him to work on specified projects of the customers of its US parent company. However, the appellant continued to be an employee of the Indian company.

    The appellant left India on 1st February 2004. He returned to India on 31st January 2005 at 4.00 a.m. The number of days of stay in India by the appellant during the preceding previous years 2000-01 to 2006-07 were as follows :

    As the appellant was in India for more than 365 days or more during the four preceding previous years and during the previous year 2004-05 and he was in India for more than 60 days, the AO concluded that in terms of S. 6(1)(c) of the Act, the appellant was resident in India. The AO also referred to Article 4(1) of India-USA DTAA which defines ‘resident of a contracting state’ and held that the residential status of the appellant is to be decided in terms of the domestic law. As appellant is resident under the Act, he would also be resident in terms of DTAA.

    The AO referred to Article 16 of India-USA DTAA which states that the salary derived by an Indian resident in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in India unless certain conditions are fulfilled. As AO held that the salary from rendering services in the USA was taxable in India as the appellant was resident in India.

    Before CIT(A), the appellant contended that Clause (b)1 of Explanation to S. 6(1)(c) applies in case the appellant comes on a visit to India and the fact that appellant had come to India permanently was not relevant. Hence, the appellant should be considered as non-resident. In support of its contention, the appellant relied on the decision of AAR in British Gas India P. Ltd., (2006) 285 ITR 218, wherein the AAR held that the term ‘for the purposes of employment outside India’ would also cover a case where an assessee is deputed outside India by an Indian employer.

    Before the Tribunal the appellant raised the following contentions :

    (i) Clause (b) of Explanation to S. 6(1)(c) applies in case the appellant comes on a visit to India and the fact that the appellant had come to India permanently was not relevant. Hence, the appellant’s status should be taken as non-resident.

    (ii) As he had arrived on 31st January 2005 at 4.00 a.m., the fraction of the day should not be counted while determining the period. He further contended that if 31st January 2005 is excluded, his stay in India was only 59 days. Hence, he would be non-resident. The appellant relied on Delhi High Court’s decision in Praveen Kumar and Another v. Sunder Singh Makkar.

    Held :

    (i) The Tribunal referred to the legislative history and the purpose of the amendment and relying on the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision in V. K. Ratti v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 295 (P& H), held that if the appellant has come to India permanently after leaving his employment outside India, Explanation (b) will not be applicable.

    (ii) For computing the period of 60 days mentioned in S. 6(1)(c), the period of visit to India should be excluded.

        (iii) Referring to the Delhi High Court’s decision in Praveen Kumar and Another v. Sunder Singh Makkar, Law Lexicon and S. 9 of the General Clauses Act, the Tribunal held that as per the General Clauses Act, the first in a series of a day is to be excluded if the word ‘from’ is used. Since for computation of the period, one has to necessarily import the word ‘from’, the first day should be excluded.

 Clause (b) relaxes the rigour of S. 6(1)(c) by substituting 182 days in place of 60 days

Held:

i) The Tribunal referred to the legislative history and the purpose of the amendment and relying on the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision in V. K. Ratti v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 295 (P& H), held that if the appellant has come to India permanently after leaving his employment outside India, Explanation (b) will not be applicable.

ii) For  computing the  period of 60 days mentioned in S. 6(1)(c), the period of visit to India should be excluded.

iii) Referring to the Delhi High Court’s decision in Praveen Kumar and Another v. Sunder Singh Makkar, Law Lexicon and S. 9 of the General Clauses Act, the Tribunal held that as per the General Clauses Act, the first in a series of a day is to be excluded if the word ‘from’ is used. Since for computation of the period, one has to necessarily import the word ‘from’, the first day should be excluded.

No tax is required to be deducted from commission paid to agent outside India if no services performed in India or no fixed place of business in India.

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Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions





  1. Spahi Projects Pvt. Ltd., in re




AAR No. 802 of 2009

S. 9(1), Income-tax Act; Article 7,

India-South Africa DTAA

Dated : 29-7-2009

No tax is required to be deducted from commission
paid to agent outside India if no services performed in India or no fixed
place of business in India.

Facts :

The applicant was an Indian company engaged in
the business of manufacture and sale of industrial pesticides. The applicant
appointed a South African company (‘SA Co’) to promote and market its products
in South Africa. In consideration of its services, SA Co was to receive
commission from the applicant in respect of completed transactions. SA Co was
to : (i) procure orders from different buyers; (ii) negotiate price and other
terms and intimate the same to the applicant; (ii) re-negotiate the
terms/price if necessary, based on the instructions of the applicant; (iv)
follow up in getting purchase orders from customers and forward the same to
the applicant; (v) follow up regarding LC opening, shipment and payment; (vi)
attend to queries in regard to shipment. The orders were to be directly
executed by the applicant. Sale consideration would also be directly received
by the applicant in India. After receipt of the sale consideration, the
applicant would remit commission to SA Co.

The applicant had raised the following issues for
ruling by AAR :

(i) Whether amount paid to SA Co was liable to
tax deduction u/s.195 of the Act read with India-South Africa DTAA.

(ii) As SA Co did not have permanent
establishment in India, whether amount paid to it was liable to tax
deduction.

(iii) Whether amount paid to SA Co could be
treated as ‘fees for technical services’ under the Act.

The applicant contended that : SA Co rendered all
its services outside India; it did not maintain any establishment in India;
the income received by SA Co was its business income; and hence, the income
cannot be taxed under the Act as SA Co did not have any business connection or
permanent establishment in India. The applicant also clarified that SA Co has
no authority to conclude contracts on its behalf or to take any decision
without referring to the applicant.

In support of its contention, the applicant
relied on CBDT’s Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July 1969, Circular No. 786 of
7th February 2000 and also on the decisions in CIT v. R. D. Aggarwal & Co.,
(1965) 56 ITR 20 and CIT v. T.I. and M. Sales Ltd., (1987) 166 ITR 93.

The AAR referred to Article 7 of India-South
Africa DTAA. The AAR also cited with approval certain observations of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. Toshoku Ltd., (1980) 125 ITR 525 (SC).

Held :



(i) As no business operations are carried out
in India by SA Co, no income can be attributed under Explanation (a) and
therefore no income can be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

(ii) SA Co has no fixed place of business in
India and hence, none of the sub-clauses of Article 5(2) are applicable.
Accordingly, the business profits of SA Co for services rendered as
commission agent in SA Co could not be brought to tax in India.

(iii) As SA Co will not be rendering services
of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature, provisions dealing with
fee for technical services cannot be invoked.

(iv) As commission paid by the applicant to SA
Co is not chargeable to tax in India by virtue of Art.7 of DTAA and S.
9(1)(i) read with the Explanation thereto, the applicant is not obliged to
deduct tax u/s.195 of the Act..



 

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Liability to deduct tax — Payer not an assessee in default u/s.201 if payee has paid tax on income but payer liable to interest u/s.201(1A).

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Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions






  1. ITO v. Intel Tech India Pvt. Ltd.



ITA No. 71/Bang./2009

S. 195, S. 197, S. 200, S. 201, S. 248,

Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Dated : 9-4-2009

Liability to deduct tax — Payer not an assessee in default
u/s.201 if payee has paid tax on income but payer liable to interest
u/s.201(1A).

Facts :

US Co. is an American company. US Co. was carrying on
business in India through a branch (‘Indian branch’). The appellant is an
Indian company. On 15th March 2003, the appellant entered into an agreement
with US Co. for acquisition of the entire assets and liabilities of the Indian
branch. In terms of the agreement, on 1st April 2003, US Co. transferred all
the assets and the liabilities of the Indian branch to the appellant. The
consideration for the transfer was the difference between the WDV of the
assets and the liabilities. The appellant accounted for the purchase price by
debiting the assets and accounted for the consideration payable by crediting
US Co.

Being depreciable assets, in terms of S. 50 of the Act, the
sale proceeds were chargeable to tax as short-term capital gains. In terms of
S. 195 of the Act, the appellant was required to deduct tax from the purchase
consideration, which it failed to do. Hence, the AO issued the notice to the
appellant to show cause why u/s.201(1) it should not be treated as an assessee
in default, and further that why interest should not be levied u/s.201(1A).

In reply to the notice, the appellant submitted that :


à The
provisions of S. 195 are not applicable in a case where the non-resident or
foreign company has presence in India and is assessed to tax.


à The
transfer of the assets has resulted in a ‘loss’ in the hands of US Co.
Therefore there was no requirement to deduct tax at source u/s.195(1). In
its support, the appellant submitted valuation report dated 1st November
2003.


à Though
tax was not deducted, the Indian branch had deposited the tax. Therefore, in
terms of Explanation to S. 191, the appellant cannot be treated as an
assessee in default u/s.201(1).


The AO rebutted the submissions in the following manner and
concluded that the appellant was required to deduct tax from gross
consideration :


à S. 195
does not exempt a foreign company from the purview of S. 195 on the ground
that the foreign company is assessed to tax in India.


à The
appellant credited the consideration on April 1, 2003 and therefore,
liability to deduct tax arose on that date. As the valuation report was
subsequent to the date of credit, the appellant did not have any material to
reach the conclusion that the transaction will result in a loss.


à The
deductee paid tax on other income and not on the transactions on which tax
was to be deducted.


Before CIT(A), The appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2007) 293 ITR
226 (SC), wherein it was held that if the deductee/recipient had already paid
taxes on the amount received, tax cannot be recovered again from the
defaulting deductor. The appellant further relied on the following decisions :


à
Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. ITO,
(2006) 7 SOT 84 (Chennai)


à AP
Power Generation Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT,
(2007) 11 SOT 221 (Hyd.)


à
Golkonda Engineering Enterprises Ltd. v. ITO,
(2008 TIOL 169 ITAT Hyd.)


The CIT(A) held that : deductee was a regular assessee
under the Act is not a relevant consideration u/s.195; as the appellant and US
Co were related, the appellant was aware that the transaction will result in a
loss; as the deductee has filed its return of income and has paid due tax,
deductor cannot be treated as assessee in default; and therefore, the
appellant was not liable to any interest u/s.201(1A) of the Act.

Before the Tribunal, the tax authorities argued that if the
deductee has not obtained certificate u/s.197, the deductor is required to
deduct tax. Alternatively, after deducting tax, the deductor could have filed
an appeal u/s.248 and could have claimed that tax was not deductible. The
appellant argued before the Tribunal that purpose of S. 195 was to prevent
remittance to a non-resident without payment of tax and where the non-resident
was assessed to tax in India, S. 195 was not intended to apply. IndCo. also
relied on Circular No. 7/2003, dated 5th September 2003 and stated that if the
deductee has duly discharged his tax liability, deductor would not be treated
as assessee in default due to non-deduction and as a corollary, he would not
be chargeable interest u/s.201(IA).

The Tribunal observed that S. 195 nowhere provides that a
foreign company assessed to tax in India is exempt from S. 195. It supported
this observation with its order dated July 11, 2008 in Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd.
[ITA No 1403/Bang/07]. US Co. had not applied u/s.197 for non-deduction of
tax. If the appellant denied its liability for tax deduction u/s.195 and 200,
it could have filed an appeal u/s.248, which it did not. The appellant had
also not made any application u/s.195(2). The appellant credited the amount on
1st April 2003, whereas valuation report was of 1st November 2003. Hence, on
the date of credit, the appellant did not know that the amount paid will
result in loss and that the deductor cannot make an assessment of income in
the hands of the deductee. Therefore, the appellant was obliged to deduct tax
@ 40%. The Tribunal also referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in
Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. & Another v. CIT, (1999) 239 ITR
587 (SC) to the effect that the assessee has to file an application
u/s.195(2), u/s.195(3) and u/s.197 in case the sums being paid are not
chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient.

The deductee had filed the return of its income on 1st
November 2004 and as per the return, no tax was payable on the consideration
from which the appellant was required to deduct tax. Hence, liability of the
appellant ended on the date when the Indian branch filed the return. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme  Court’s decision  in CfT  v. Eli  Lilly Company (India) Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 312 ITR 225 (sq, wherein it was held that the object underlying S. 201(1) is to recover the tax. As far as the period of default is concerned, it starts from the date when the tax should have been deducted and lasts up to the date of actual payment. As the appellant was required to deduct tax but had not deducted it, it was an assessee in default. Since the Indian branch had filed the return, disclosed the consideration and the return showed that no tax was payable on the consideration, the default ended on the day the Indian branch filed the return. Hence, there would be no deduction u/s.201, but the appellant will be liable to interest u/s.201(lA) up to the date of filing the return by the Indian branch.

Held:

i) S. 195 does not exempt a foreign company assessed to tax in India from its provisions.

(ii) In the absence of certificate issued u/ s.197 or determination u/s.195 or order u/s.248, the deductor is required to deduct tax u/s.195. If however, the deductor has not deducted tax but the deductee has paid tax on his returned income, the deductor cannot be considered an assessee in default.

(iii) Even if the deductee has paid tax, the deductor would be liable to charge of interest u/s. 201(lA) up to the date of filing the return by the deductee.

S. 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A can be made even in the year in which no exempt income has been earned or received — Disallowance u/s.14A in respect of interest expenditure is to be made with reference to gross interest expenditure and not with reference to

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  1. Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO



ITAT Special Bench New Delhi — ‘B’ Bench

Before R. P. Garg (VP) and A. D. Jain (AM) and
Rajpal Yadav (JM)

ITA No. 87/Del./2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 5-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ajay Vohra, Rohit
Jain, Gaurav Jain & Rohit Garg/S. D. Srivastava, Rajesh Tuteja, & Manish Gupta

S. 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A can be made even in
the year in which no exempt income has been earned or received — Disallowance
u/s.14A in respect of interest expenditure is to be made with reference to
gross interest expenditure and not with reference to interest expenditure as
reduced by interest receipt.

Per R. P. Garg :

Facts :

The assessee had invested Rs.17,36,89,230 in
purchase of shares. Some of the shares were held by the assessee as its
capital assets, whereas the others were held as its stock-in-trade. The
assessee had taken unsecured loans of Rs.8,51,65,000. It had paid interest of
Rs.1,21,02,367 on unsecured loans borrowed by it. Of the borrowed funds a sum
of Rs.6,88,70,000 was invested in shares. During the previous year relevant to
the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee did not earn any dividend income.

In the course of assessment proceedings before
the Assessing Officer (AO), the assessee contended that since it had not
earned or received exempt income the question of disallowance of interest does
not arise. The AO did not accept the contention of the assessee and disallowed
interest on a proportionate basis i.e., a sum of Rs.97,87,570 was
disallowed out of total interest.

Aggrieved by the disallowance of interest the
assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO in
disallowing proportionate interest pertaining to investment for earning
dividend, though exempt income was not earned during the year. The CIT(A),
however, agreed with the alternative contention of the assessee that the
disallowance be computed with reference to the net interest amount debited to
the Profit & Loss Account and not the gross interest expenditure. The CIT(A)
directed the AO to work out disallowable interest on pro rata basis of
the net interest i.e., interest payment as reduced by receipt of
interest.

The assessee preferred an appeal on the ground
that disallowance was not warranted since the assessee had neither earned nor
received any exempt income during the previous year relevant to the assessment
year under consideration. The Revenue preferred an appeal on the ground that
the proportionate gross interest expenditure ought to have been held to be
disallowable.

In view of the contrary decisions on the issue
under consideration, the President, ITAT constituted a Special Bench (SB) to
dispose of the appeal and decide the following question :

“Whether disallowance u/s.14A of the Act can be
made in a year in which no exempt income has been earned or received by the
assessee ?”


Held :

The Special Bench held that —

(a) when the expenditure of interest is
incurred in relation to income which does not form part of total income, it
has to suffer the disallowance, irrespective of the fact whether any income
is earned by the assessee or not. S. 14A does not envisage any such
exception;

(b) when prior to introduction of S. 14A, an
expenditure both u/s.36 and u/s.57 was allowable to an assessee without such
requirement of earning or receipt of income, such a condition cannot be
imported when it comes to disallowance of the same expenditure u/s.14A of
the Act;

(c) in the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody the SC
held that irrespective of dividend receipt, expenditure has to be allowed.
Applying the ratio of this decision in the reverse case since dividend is
exempt, expenditure has to be disallowed. The fact that during the year
dividend has neither been earned nor has it been received would be
irrelevant;

(d) the allowance of expenditure in relation to
dividend income would thus be not admissible in computing the income of an
assessee under this Act, irrespective of whether the shares are held as
investment or they are held on trading account as stock-in-trade;

(e) S. 57 allows the expenditure incurred for
making or earning the income, whereas S. 14A disallows the expenditure ‘in
relation to income which does not form part of total income’. The term
‘expenditure in relation to’ is wider in scope and provides for disallowance
if it is related to income not forming part of total income;

(f) the disallowance has to be of the entire amount of the
expenditure so related and cannot be reduced by the receipt of interest which
has no relation to such expenditure.

 

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S. 115JA, S. 244A — While computing tax liability u/s.115JA credit for tax paid in foreign country is allowable — Grant of interest u/s.244A can not be denied on the ground that the TDS certificate was filed in the course of assessment proceedings and not

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  1. ACIT v. L. & T. Ltd.



ITAT Mumbai ‘A’ Bench

Before R. S. Syal (AM) and

Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)

ITA No. 4499/Mum/2008

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 22-7-2009

Counsel for revenue / assessee : Mayank Priyadarshi/Arvind Sonde

S. 115JA, S. 244A — While computing tax liability u/s.115JA
credit for tax paid in foreign country is allowable — Grant of interest
u/s.244A can not be denied on the ground that the TDS certificate was filed in
the course of assessment proceedings and not along with the return of income.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

The assessment of total income of the assessee was
completed u/s.143(3) of the Act on 31-3-2003 assessing the total income at
Rs.97,09,81,536 u/s.115JA. Subsequently, the AO observed that the assessee was
allowed double tax relief while assessing the income u/s.115JA. Notice u/s.154
of the Act was issued and the credit for foreign tax given was denied on the
ground that intention behind S. 115JA is that assessee should pay minimum tax
in India on 30% of book profits and credit for taxes paid in foreign country
could not be allowed against tax liability in India when income was assessed
u/s.115JA of the Act.

In the rectification proceedings the AO did not allow
interest in respect of TDS certificates on the ground that such certificates
were not submitted along with the return of income, but were submitted in the
course of assessment proceedings.

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the income on which tax has been
paid abroad was included in ‘book profit’ for the purpose of S. 115JA. The
Tribunal held that once taxable income is determined either under the normal
provisions or as per S. 115JA, subsequent portion relating to the computation
of tax has to be governed by the normal provisions of the Act. It also held
that there is no provision in the Act debarring granting of credit for tax
paid abroad in case income is computed u/s.115JA. It held the assessee cannot
be denied the set-off of tax relief of Rs.22,88,464 against the tax liability
determined u/s.115JA. It upheld the order of CIT(A) on this ground.

The Tribunal noted that tax was deducted at source at the
right time. It was also deposited into the exchequer in time. The Tribunal
noted that the AO had given credit for TDS, but had denied interest thereon
u/s.244A. The Tribunal held that interest u/s.244A cannot be denied only on
the ground that TDS certificates were not furnished along with the return of
income. It upheld the order of CIT(A) on this ground.

 

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S. 80IB(10) — Amenities provided by the assessee at the time of construction itself, though by way of a separate agreement, are to be treated as part of the housing project undertaken by the assessee — Deduction u/s.80IB(10) is allowable in respect of rec

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  1. Dy. CIT. v. Vimal Builders and
    Vimal Builders
    v. Dy. CIT



ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before M. A. Bakshi (VP) and

R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA No. 3646/Mum./2007 & 2730/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 28-7-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : J. V. D. Lanstich/

R. R. Vora and Manoj Anchalia

S. 80IB(10) — Amenities provided by the assessee at the
time of construction itself, though by way of a separate agreement, are to be
treated as part of the housing project undertaken by the assessee — Deduction
u/s.80IB(10) is allowable in respect of receipts for amenities — When there is
direct nexus between the funds borrowed and funds advanced to sister concerns
interest received on amounts advanced can be netted off against interest paid.

Per R. K. Panda :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of constructing
residential buildings. During the assessment year under consideration the
assessee had claimed deduction of Rs.3,15,40,268 u/s.80IB(10). The Assessing
Officer (AO) noted that the assessee had considered receipts for amenities as
part of total sales and had claimed deduction u/s.80IB on the profit element
contained in receipts for amenities. He observed that the amenities included
superior quality flooring, false ceiling, fans and tubes, superior quality
fittings in toilets, box grills and pipe gas from Mahanagar Gas Limited. The
AO did not consider profit derived from providing amenities as part of total
sales and accordingly denied benefit of deduction on an amount of Rs.22,12,360
being the profit on amenities receipts of Rs.55,34,797.

The CIT(A) held that provision of amenities should be
treated as part of the housing project undertaken by the assessee and since
these amenities are provided by the assessee at the time of construction
itself, though by way of a separate agreement, the profit element in receipts
for amenities qualifies for deduction u/s.80IB(10). He allowed the appeal of
the assessee.

The CIT(A), in the course of appeal proceedings before him,
noted that the assessee had advanced monies to its sister concerns and had
received interest of Rs.16,27,802 which interest was netted off against
interest paid. After giving an opportunity to the assessee, he held that
interest receipts should be excluded for the purpose of calculating deduction
u/s.80IB(10) of the Act. He directed AO to recompute the deduction
u/s.80IB(10) by excluding interest receipts.

Aggrieved, the Revenue and the assessee preferred appeals
to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the extra amenities are provided
only to purchasers of the flats at the time of purchase of flat itself and no
such activity has been undertaken for any other person; the agreement for sale
of flat and for provision of extra amenities were both entered on the same
date; work for extra amenities was carried out through the same contractor at
the time of construction of the flat itself. It found merit in the submission
that extra amenities given to the buyer cannot be provided in isolation as the
same are inextricably connected with the housing project and the decision of
providing such extra amenities to the buyer was a commercial decision and
within the conditions of S. 80IB(10) of the Act. Accordingly, this ground was
decided in favor of the assessee.

As regards the exclusion of interest receipts for computing
deduction u/s.80IB(10) the Tribunal after considering the submissions made on
behalf of the assessee (viz. that the funds were borrowed from banks
and private parties for the purpose of its housing project; the borrowings
from the banks were for a specified period and prepayment would have resulted
into levy of penalty interest and therefore funds were advanced to sister
concerns on a temporary basis so as to recoup part of the interest costs)
directed the AO to give an opportunity to the assessee to prove the nexus that
borrowed funds were used for giving advances on which interest has been earned
and if the assessee can prove such nexus then netting may be allowed.

 

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S. 80HHC — Entire amount received on sale of DEPB entitlements does not represent profit chargeable u/s.28(iiid). Computation of profit on sale of DEPB entitlements requires an artificial cost to be interpolated.

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  1. Topman Exports v. ITO



ITAT Special Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP),

R. S. Syal (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM)

ITA No. 5769/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 11-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rajan Vora/

G. C. Srivastava and Anil Kumar

S. 80HHC — Entire amount received on sale of DEPB
entitlements does not represent profit chargeable u/s.28(iiid). Computation of
profit on sale of DEPB entitlements requires an artificial cost to be
interpolated.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

The assessee, a manufacturer and exporter of
fabric/garments, filed its return of income declaring total income of
Rs.36,24,230. While computing its total income, the assessee had claimed
deduction of Rs.83,69,303 u/s.80HHC of the Act. The assessee had reduced a sum
of Rs.3,01,93,428 being sale proceeds of DEPB licence from its total purchases
of Rs.16,96,83,882 and had shown net purchases of Rs.13,94,90,454. The profit
on transfer of DEPB licence was only Rs.14,35,097 and profit on transfer of
DFRC licence was Rs.19,902. Before the Assessing Officer (AO) the assessee
justified its action by submitting that the profits on sale of DEPB licence
was an export incentive covered u/s.28(iiia) for the purpose of claiming
deduction u/s.80HHC. The AO held that the net profit after reduction of export
incentive of Rs.3.01 crores was a loss of Rs.1.82 crores. The AO denied the
deduction claimed u/s.80HHC of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that since the assessee did not satisfy the
two conditions mentioned in the third proviso to S. 80HHC(3), it is not
entitled to deduction in respect of amounts received under DEPB and DFRC
schemes. As regards the assessee’s contention that only the profit on transfer
of DEPB and DFRC licences was covered by the provisions of S. 28(iiid) and S.
28(iiie) and not the sale proceeds, the CIT(A) held that the cost of these
entitlements/certificates to the assessee was Rs.Nil and hence, the entire
sale consideration of the licences was profit on transfer. The CIT(A) directed
the AO to treat the entire amount of sale consideration of DEPB and DFRC
licences as profit on transfer for the purpose of working out deduction
u/s.80HHC as per the amended provisions. The CIT(A) did not give any finding
regarding the eligibility of duty drawback for deduction u/s.80HHC.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. The President of the Tribunal constituted a Special Bench (SB) and
referred the following question to the SB for its consideration and decision :

“Whether the entire amount received on sale of DEPB
entitlements represents profit chargeable u/s.28(iiid) of the Income-tax Act
or the profit referred to therein requires any artificial cost to be
interpolated ?”

Briefly stated, Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC defines the
term ‘profits of the business’ to mean the profits under the head ‘profits and
gains’ as reduced by 90% of the sum referred to in S. 28(iiid). The 2nd and
3rd provisos to S. 80HHC(3) provide that the profits computed thereunder shall
be increased by the said 90% amount computed in the proportion of export
turnover to total turnover. S. 28(iiid) refers to “any profit on the transfer
of Duty Entitlement Pass-book Scheme (‘DEPB’). The Special Bench had to
consider whether the entire amount received on sale of DEPB entitlement
represents ‘profits’ chargeable u/s.28(iiid) or the profit referred to therein
requires any artificial cost to be imputed.


Held :

The SB decided the appeal in favour of the assessee and
while so deciding it held that :

(i) the argument of the Revenue that DEPB is a
post-export event and has no relation with the purchase of goods cannot be
accepted. There is a direct relation between DEPB and the customs duty paid
on the purchases. For practical purposes, DEPB is a reimbursement of the
cost of purchase to the extent of customs duty;

(ii) the DEPB benefit (face value) accrues and becomes
assessable to tax when the application for DEPB is filed with the concerned
authority. Subsequent events such as sale of DEPB or making imports for
self-consumption, etc. are irrelevant for determining the accrual of income
on account of DEPB;

(iii) on a harmonious construction of clauses (iiia), (iiib)
and (iiic) of S. 28 it is evident that clauses (iiia) and (iiic) deal with
specific species of incentives, clause (iiib) is a residual clause which
brings within its sweep all forms of export incentives other than those
specifically set out in clauses (iiia) and (iiic);

(iv) the face value of DEPB benefit falls within the
ambit of S. 28(iiib);

(v) S. 28(iiid) which refers to the ‘profits on transfer
of the DEPB’, obviously refers only to the ‘profit’ element and not the
gross sale proceeds of the DEPB. If the Revenue’s argument that the sale
proceeds should be considered is accepted, there would be absurdity because
the face value of the DEPB will then get assessed in the year of the DEPB
and also in the year of its transfer;

(vi) profit on sale of DEPB representing the excess of
sale proceeds of DEPB over its face value is liable to be considered
u/s.28(iiid) at the time of sale;

(vii) only the ‘profit’ (i.e., the sale value less
the face value) is required to be considered for the purposes of S. 80HHC;

(viii) whatever has been said about DEPB also holds good
for DFRC, on both its components, viz. the face value of DFRC and
profit on its transfer, except for the fact that the profit on sale of DFRC
shall be charged to tax u/s.28(iiie);

(ix) Duty drawback shall be chargeable to tax at the time
of accrual of income u/s.28(iiie) when application is filed with the
competent authority after making exports.

 

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S. 115JA — Stock borrowing charges not debited to P & L Account as required under Schedule VI of the Companies Act can be claimed as revenue expenditure even in the case of an assessee who is mandatorily bound to follow the accounting standards as prescri

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  1. ITO v. Cyril Traders Pvt. Ltd.




ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and

R. S. Padvekar (JM)

ITA No. 5297/Mum/2004

A.Y. : 1998-99. Decided on : 28-7-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : S. B. Prasad/

J. D. Mistry

S. 115JA — Stock borrowing charges not debited to P & L
Account as required under Schedule VI of the Companies Act can be claimed as
revenue expenditure even in the case of an assessee who is mandatorily bound
to follow the accounting standards as prescribed.

Per R. S. Padvekar :

Facts :

The total income of the assessee, assessed u/s.143(3) of
the Act, was a loss of Rs.55,37,760. Subsequently vide order passed u/s.143(3)
r.w. S. 147 the AO inter alia disallowed Rs.53,55,000 towards stock
borrowing charges incurred by the assessee and claimed in its computation of
total income but were not debited to its Profit & Loss Account. The AO held
that not debiting the expenditure to P & L Account was in violation of clause
(xii)(b) of Rule 3 of Part II of Schedule VI and hence the same was not
allowable.

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the provisions of Minimum
Alternate Tax as contained in S. 115J were considered by the Apex Court in the
case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. It observed that the scheme of S. 115JA is identical
with that of S. 115J. It held that if the P & L Account prepared by the
assessee was not in accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of
Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956, then to that extent the AO can make
the corrections and adjustments, but the AO cannot make disallowance in
respect of expenses which are otherwise allowable but are not debited to P & L
Account. The Tribunal held that the stock borrowing charges were rightly
allowed as a deduction by the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

Cases referred to :



1. Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. CIT,
(82 ITR 363) (SC)

2. Tuticorin Alkali Chemcials and Fertilisers Ltd. v.
CIT,
(227 ITR 172) (SC)

3. DCIT, Cir 3(1) Mumbai v. Adbhut Trading Co. Pvt
Ltd.,
(ITA No. 3597/Mum./2002), dated 25-7-2005

4. ITO v. Adbhut Trading Co. Pvt Ltd., (ITA No.
2869/Mum./2004), dated 25-4-2007

5. ITO v. Vicraze Investments & Trdg. Co. P. Ltd.,
(ITA No. 6276/M/2004), dated 24-4-2007.

6. Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, (255 ITR 273) (SC)



 

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S. 68 — Cash credit — Loan amount received in earlier year converted into gift — Valid gift.

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  1. Haresh A. Dhanani v. ACIT



ITAT ‘SMC’ Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM)

ITA No. 5850/M/2008

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 22-5-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : R. Ajay Singh/

Malati Sridharan

S. 68 — Cash credit — Loan amount received in earlier year
converted into gift — Valid gift.

Facts :

During the year under appeal the assessee had claimed to
have received gift of Rs.2.5 lacs from his uncle on the occasion of his
marriage anniversary. As per the facts noted, the said amount had been shown
by the assessee in his balance sheet as loan from his uncle up to 31-3-2001.
During the year under consideration, the said loan was converted into gift
vide gift deed dated 6-1-2002. The assessee passed necessary journal entry and
the amount was transferred to his capital account from the loan account.
According to the AO since the gift was not received by actual delivery of
cash/cheque, it cannot be considered as valid gift and he treated the said
amount as unexplained cash credit in the hands of the assessee u/s.68 of the
Act. The CIT(A) on appeal relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of Dr. R. S. Gupta and upheld the order of the AO.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the case relied on by the CIT(A)
was distinguishable on the facts. In the case of Dr. R. S. Gupta, the amount
was deposited with a third person while in the case of the assessee, the loan
amount was with him only which was converted as gift. Further, it observed
that even if the gift was not considered as genuine gift, the addition of
Rs.2.5 lacs was not warranted u/s.68 because the credit entry as loan was
there as on 31-3-2001 with the assessee himself and there was no fresh cash
credit during the year.

Case referred to :


CIT v. Dr. R. S. Gupta, 165 ITR 36 (SC)

 

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S. 37(1) — Capital or revenue expenditure — Expenditure incurred on launching of a new model of car — Held as revenue expenditure.

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  1. Premier Ltd. v. DCIT




ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai

Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and

Asha Vijayaraghvan (JM)

ITA No. 2091/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 30-6-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Jayesh Dadia/

Yeshwant V. Chavan

S. 37(1) — Capital or revenue expenditure — Expenditure
incurred on launching of a new model of car — Held as revenue expenditure.

Per S. V. Mehrotra :

Facts :

The assessee was carrying on the business of manufacture
and sale of automobiles and machine tools. During the year under appeal, it
had incurred expenditure of Rs.2.93 crore on van project. In its return of
income the same was claimed as revenue expenditure though in its books of
account, the same was capitalised and shown as ‘Capital work in progress’. The
AO rejected the claim of the assessee for reasons amongst others, as under :



  •  The expense incurred was for development of a new car and hence cannot be
    termed as revenue expenditure;



  •  As per the Annual Report of the assessee — the project was under
    implementation and ready to launch. Therefore, the expense incurred up to the end of the previous year
    had rightly been capitalised by the assessee in its books of accounts.


The CIT(A) on appeal confirmed the action of the AO,
observing that the project was new business and not the expansion of an
existing business.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue justified the orders of
the lower authorities and further contended that :



  • The assessee had enhanced the capacity by installing new assembly line; and



  • The expenditure was for manufacturing of altogether a different car.



Held :

According to the Tribunal the moot point for consideration
was whether the expenditure incurred in launching a new model could be treated
as expansion of same business or a new business. It referred to the CIT(A)’s
observation that if the assessee had incurred expenditure for expansion of the
production capacity of its Premier Padmini car or any of the cars which it was
already manufacturing, it would amount to a case of expansion. According to
the CIT(A), the product sought to be manufactured was a totally new product,
even if it was a car. The Tribunal did not agree to it. According to it, the
test to be applied for deciding whether a particular project was an expansion
of the existing line of business or a new business was to determine whether
there was unity of control and management and interlacing of funds or not. It
noted that those two aspects in the case of the assessee had not been disputed
by the Revenue. Therefore, it held that the expenditure incurred on the van
project was revenue in nature being for expansion of the business.
Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.


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Interest u/s. 234B and 234C—Credit for minimum alternate tax has to be set off from the tax payable before levy of interest u/s. 234B and 234C of the Act.

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CIT vs. Sage Metals Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 675 (SC)

In a group of appeals filed by the Revenue before the Delhi High Court a common issue was involved, namely, whether interest u/s. 234B and 234C is to be charged before the tax credit (commonly referred to as MAT credit) available u/s. 115 JAA is set off against tax payable on total income or after it is set off? And additional issue was whether this question was debatable and therefore, the provisions of section 154 could not have been invoked.

The High Court dismissing the appeals of the Revenue held that interest u/s. 234B and 234C is to be charged after the tax credit (MAT credit) available u/s. 115JAA is set off against tax payment on total income of the year in question. The High Court further held that the decision of Benches of the Tribunal at Chandigarh and Chennai did indicate that the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that rectification could not be made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 154 of the Act as the issue regarding charging of interest u/s. 234B of the Act without giving set off of the MAT credit available to the assessee was highly debatable.

On a Special Leave Petition being filed before the Revenue before the Supreme Court, the Court noted that a short question which arose for its determination in the appeals before it was, whether the Department was entitled to charge interest u/s. 234B of the Act on the assessee bringing forward the tax credit balance into the year of account relevant to the assessment year 2001-02. According to the Supreme Court this question has been answered in favour of the assessee by its judgment in the case of CIT vs. Tulsyan NEC Ltd., (2011) 330 ITR 226 (SC). Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Department.

Note: Sections 234A/234B/234C have been amended to provide such set-off by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. Asst.Year 2007-08.

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Due Date of Payment for Allowability of Employee PF Contribution

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Issue for Consideration

Under the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, an eligible employee as well as his employer are required to make periodic contributions to the provident fund (PF) account of the employee. The employer deducts the employee’s contribution from his salary, and pays both the employer’s as well as the employee’s contribution together to the PF account of the employee. Similar provisions are contained under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 and Scheme (ESIC).

The employer’s contribution to the PF, etc., being a business expenditure, is an allowable deduction in computing the income of the employer under the head “Profits & Gains of Business or Profession” u/s.36(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The employee’s PF and ESIC contribution, on deduction by the Employer, is deemed to be the income of the employer in the first place by virtue of section 2(24)(x), but is an allowable business deduction u/s. 36(1)(va). However, in order to claim either the employer’s PF contribution or the employee’s PF contribution as a deduction, the payment of such contribution has to be made by a specified date. While the time limit for the deduction of the expenditure, under the Income-tax Act, of the employer’s contribution is governed by section 43B(b), the employee’s contribution is governed by section 36(1)(va) of the Act.

Section 43B(b) provides that the expenditure would be allowed only in the year of actual payment. Till Assessment Year 2003-04, the proviso to section 43B provided that the deduction of employer’s PF contribution would be allowed only if the amount had actually been paid before the due date referred to in section 36(1)(va). Section 36(1)(va) provides that the employee’s contribution shall be allowed as a deduction if the amount is credited by the employer to the employee’s account on or before the due date by which the employer is required to credit the employee’s contribution under the relevant Act .

Therefore, till Assessment Year 2003-04, both employer’s as well as employees’ PF contributions were allowable as deductions only if the amounts were paid before the due date under the PF law. The proviso to section 43B has however been amended with effect from Assessment Year 2004-05 to provide that section 43B would not apply to payments made before the due date of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(1). In effect therefore, employer’s PF contribution is now allowed as a deduction in the same previous year in which the liability to pay the amount is incurred, so long as the payment is made before the due date of filing of the return of income for that year. No corresponding amendment has been made in section 36(1)(va).

The question has arisen before the tribunal and the courts as to whether the due date of filing of the return of income as applicable to the employer’s PF contribution under the proviso to section 43B can also be taken as the due date for the purposes of allowability of the employees’ PF contribution. Can the amended provisions of section 43B relaxing the time for payment of employer’s contribution be extended and applied even for claiming deduction for employees’ contribution? While the Mumbai and the Kolkata benches and the Special bench of the Tribunal have taken the view that the due date under the PF law is the relevant date for employees’ PF contribution and any payment beyond that date shall defer the deduction to the year of payment, the Delhi and Hyderabad benches of the Tribunal have taken the view that it is the due date of filing of the return of income which is the relevant date and the making of the payment by that date will enable the employer to claim deduction for the employees’ contribution. The latter view has also been the unanimous view of the Karnataka, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand High Courts.

Sudhir Genset’s case:

The issue came up for consideration of the Delhi bench of the tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Sudhir Genset Ltd. 45 SOT 63 (URO).

In this case, pertaining to assessment years 2005- 06, 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessing officer had made disallowances of employees’ contributions to PF and ESIC on the ground that the assessee failed to make the payment of employees’ contributions within the due dates as provided in those Acts. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance on the ground that though these payments were not made within the limitation provided in the PF Act and ESIC Act, these were paid before the due date of filing of the returns of income in all the three assessment years.

The Delhi bench of the tribunal was of the view that the issue was covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. P.M. Electronics Ltd., 313 ITR 161, where it had been held that if the assessee made payment in the PF and ESIC account, including the employees’ contribution, before the due date of the filing of the return u/s. 139 of the Income-tax Act, then no disallowance of such payment could be made by virtue of section 43B.

Since all the payments were made before the due date of filing of the return of income, the Delhi bench of the tribunal upheld the deletion of disallowance of the employees’ PF contribution.

A similar view was taken by the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Imerys Ceramics (India) (P) Ltd 24 taxmann.com 320 and Patni Telecom Solutions (P) Ltd 35 taxmann.com 87 (Hyd), where the Tribunal followed the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the cases of CIT vs. Sabari Enterprises 298 ITR 141 and CIT vs. ANZ Information Technology (P) Ltd. 318 ITR 123.

Besides these two Karnataka High Court decisions, the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. AIMIL Ltd.321 ITR 508, the Karnataka High Court in the case of Spectrum Consultants India (P) Ltd 215 Taxman 597, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd. 350 ITR 327 and the Uttarakhand High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kichha Sugar Co Ltd. 35 taxmann.com 54 have all taken the view that employees’ PF contribution could not be added back to income or disallowed, even if the payment was made after the due date under the PF Act, so long as the payment was made before the due date of filing of the income-tax return u/s. 139.

LKP Securities’ case:

The issue came up recently before the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of ITO vs. LKP Securities Ltd. ITA No 638/Mum/2012 dated 17th May 2013.

In this case, the assessee made delayed payments of employees’ PF and ESIC contributions, beyond the stipulated dates of 15th and 21st of the following month under the respective Acts. The PF payment was, however, made within the 5 days of grace permitted under PF law. The assessing officer disallowed such payments on the ground that the grace period was only for the purposes of not charging penal interest and other penalties under the PF Act, and was not an extension of the due date under that Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance on the ground that the payments were made before the due date of filing of the return of income, following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of AIMIL Ltd. (supra).

Before the tribunal, on behalf of the revenue, reliance was placed on the Kolkata bench tribunal decision in the case of DCIT vs. Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 10 taxmann.com 26, where the tribunal after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd 319 ITR 306 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sabari Enterprises (supra), has held that employees’ contributions were not governed by section 43B. It was also argued that the same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Pamwi Tissues Ltd. 215 CTR 150. It was therefore argued that employees’ contribution to PF/ESIC was not allowable if not paid before the due dates under the respective Acts.

On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the Delhi High Court decision of AIMIL Ltd. (supra), where the court after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd 213 CTR (SC) 268, had clarified that the amendment to section 43B with effect from assessment year 2004-05 would apply to the employer’s as well as the employees’ contribution to the various welfare funds. The Delhi High Court had also held that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues (supra) was no longer a good law after the Supreme Court decision of Vinay Cements (supra), and that there was no scope for any doubt after the Supreme Court decision in the case of Alom Extrusions (supra). It was therefore argued that any payment by the employer, whether in respect of the employer’s or the employees’ contribution, made before the due date of filing of the return of income would qualify for being allowed as a deduction for the relevant year.

After analysing the provisions of section 43B and the amendments carried out with effect from assessment year 2004-05, the tribunal noted that section 43b(b) covered only the employer’s contribution to such welfare funds, and that the employees’ contribution was not covered by section 43B(b). After considering the provisions of sections 37(1), 2(24)(x), 36(1)(va) and 43B(b), the tribunal noted that while the due date for payment of both employer’s and employees’ contribution under the PF Act was the same, the deductibility of the employer’s contribution under the Income-tax Act was governed by section 37(1) while the employees’ contribution was deemed to be income u/s. 2(24)(x) and governed by section 36(1)(va).

According to the tribunal, even if one overlooked the clear language of section 2(24)(x) read with section 36(1)(va) (on one hand) and section 43B(b) (on the other hand), which clearly concerned separate and distinct sums, and consider for the sake of argument, section 43B(b) as applicable to section 36(1) (va) payments, it would be rendered otiose . This was on account of the fact that the sum had to be otherwise allowable under the relevant provision for section 43B to apply, and since the payment had not been made before the due date specified in section 36(1)(va), it was not allowable under that section, and therefore section 43B did not apply to the case of employees’ contribution. On the other hand, if the payment was made before the due date specified u/s. 36(1)(va), section 43B had no functional relevance.

The Mumbai tribunal also relied on the Kolkata Special Bench tribunal decision in the case of Jt. CIT vs. ITC Ltd. 112 ITD 57, where the Special Bench had held that section 43B did not apply to payment of the employees’ contribution. The tribunal further noted that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Vinay Cement (supra) and Alom Extru-sions (supra) related to the provisions of section 43B, which did not govern the deductibility of the employees’ contribution, and related merely to the retrospectivity of the amendment in section 43B. This aspect, according to the tribunal, had been explained by the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues ( supra ). Though this decision of Pamwi Tissues has been reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions, the reversal was only in respect of the subject matter of retro-spectivity of the amendment. The tribunal observed that the Bombay High Court in Pamwi Tissues’ case endorsed its decision in CIT vs. Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd 298 ITR 149, wherein issues other than those relating to the amendment to section 43B were also referred to. According to the tribunal, the question of applicability of the amendment in section 43B to the employees’ contribution remained unanswered or unaddressed by the Supreme Court in Alom Extrusions’ case (supra). The Supreme Court in that case did not consider or give any finding that the employees’ contribution, deduction of which was subject to section 36(1)(va), was further subjected to section 43B or that section 43B would apply even if the sum was otherwise not allowable.

As regards the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of AIMIL Ltd., the Mumbai tribunal noted that the said decision was considered by the Kol-kata bench of the tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 10 tax-mann.com 26 while deciding the issue against the assesssee. Though AIMIL’s decision covered payment of employees’ contribution to EPF and ESIC, according to the tribunal, the entire deliberation in that decision, as well as the subject matter of the decision was qua section 43B, including the amend-ments thereto. According to the tribunal, the High Court moved on the premise that the employees’ contribution was subject to section 43B(b), and accordingly interpreted the section as well as the nature of the amendments. Further, according to the Mumbai tribunal, the decision of the tribunal which was approved of by the Delhi High Court in AIMIL’s case did not consider the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITC Ltd (supra), and was also inconsistent with the decision of the jurisdictional Bombay High Court in Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case (supra), in so far as it related to the inapplicability of section 43B to payments specified u/s. 36(1)(va). Further, as per the tribunal, the absence of the relevant findings in Alom Extrusions’ case(supra), the decision in the case of AIMIL Ltd. was not the one that had considered all facts of the issue of deductibility of the employees’ contribution. The Mumbai bench of the tribunal therefore preferred not to follow the decision in the case of AIMIL Ltd. on the ground that it was not applicable or germane to the issue under consideration before the tribunal, but opted to follow the decision of the Special Bench of the tribunal in ITC Ltd. (supra) and the decision in the case of Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (supra), since both of these were consistent with the jurisdictional High Court on the material aspect before the Mumbai bench.

Therefore, the Mumbai tribunal held that the due date for the purposes of allowability of employees’ PF contribution meant the relevant date under the PF Act, and not the due date of filing of the return of income under the Income-tax Act. Following the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case (supra), the Mumbai tribunal however held that the benefit of the grace period had to be considered in computing the due date, and therefore held that any payments of the employees’ contribution made within the grace period was allowable as deduction.

Observations

The Delhi High Court in deciding the issue in favour of the assessee in AIMIL Ltd.’s case, clearly observed that if the employees’ contribution is not deposited by the due date prescribed under the relevant Acts and is deposited late, the employer not only paid interest on delayed payment but also attracted penalties, for levy of which specific provisions are made in the Provident Fund Act as well as the ESI Act. The court noted that those Acts permitted the employer to make the deposit with some delays, subject to the penal consequences. This aspect of the respective laws permitting delayed payment of the dues prevailed on the High Court in taking the view that it did. It is therefore respectfully submitted that had the Mumbai tribunal appreciated that the decision of the Delhi court was a well considered decision that took into account the comprehensive gamut of the provisions of all the statutes relevant to payment of the dues, including the provisions of the Income tax Act, it would have followed the AIMIL Ltd. decision instead of dissenting from it.

The decision of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal, as stated by it, seems to have been mainly swayed by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana. On going through this decision, while one notes that one of the issues that came up before the Bombay High Court was relating to employees’ contribution, the Bombay High Court has nowhere expressly discussed or highlighted or noted the distinction between the employees’ contribution and the employer’s contribution. The court merely took a note of the provisions of sections 43B and 36(1)(va) and the amendments to section 43B. The Bombay High Court, in that case, was primarily concerned with the issue of the retrospectivity of the amendments to section 43B, just as the Delhi High Court was in the case of AIMIL Ltd. In both the cases, the courts were mainly concerned with the applicability of the amendments in section 43B and if that was so, the Mumbai tribunal did not have much to choose between the said decisions as neither of them perhaps laid down any law as far as the deduction of the employees’ contribution was concerned. Further, the said decision of the Bombay High Court in Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case stood overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Alom Extrusions’ case.

The Special Bench decision in the case of ITC has been rendered on the basis of the specific language of the sections and not by keeping in mind the intention of the legislature and the spirit behind the amendments. In that case, the impact of the permission to make delayed payments under the PF and ESIC Acts on payment of interest and penalty was not examined in depth.

Government Accounting Needs Urgent Reforms

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At a time when the entire country is discussing the fall of the rupee, the economic gloom and the incremental damage that the Food Security Bill would cause to the Indian economy, readers will wonder why I am discussing accounting reform.

The primary reason for the panic is the presumption that a year ago, the country had plenty of foreign exchange “reserves” and this was due to consistent economic growth. There is no dispute that India has come a long way since 1947, and the comparison of the rupee-dollar exchange rate in 1947, and that of today is preposterous. Having said that, it is necessary to read the figures that the government dishes out in the context of the cash method of accounting that it follows. If the government followed the accrual method of accounting which is mandatory for corporates, the government’s balance sheet would be significantly different. Three illustrations will make the point clear.

Any student of accounting will tell you that a “reserve” in the balance sheet is a surplus which is vested in the owner of the entity. In short, reserves are nothing but owned funds. The recent liberalisation of foreign exchange controls was on the basis that the foreign exchange “reserves” that the country had were here to stay. In fact, they constituted capital inflows which were parked in India on account of the non-availability of a better return elsewhere in the world. These capital inflows had the potential of being withdrawn and were therefore a debt. Till foreign exchange inflows arise either in the form of equity investment (FDI) or are the result of income accruals, they would not have any degree of permanence. If the balance sheet was drawn up bringing to the fore this aspect, people would have been cautious while celebrating economic growth.

The second illustration is that of funding through oil bonds or similar instruments. Since government accounting is on cash basis, the bonds or similar instruments are reflected as assets in the books of oil companies but the corresponding liability is not reflected as a liability in the government balance sheet. Thus, while shoring up the economy temporarily one is creating an unrecognised liability in the hope that during the tenure of this instrument income would accrue to the government enabling it to discharge the liability when it dawned on the horizon.

The third illustration is closer to our professional domain. We all know that targets for collection of tax are set by the powers that be on the basis of the past, oblivious to the fact that tax collections would depend on the economic situation which has shown a gradual decline in the recent past. In the race to meet these irrational targets the tax authorities raise patently illegal tax demands and by misusing powers forcibly collect them as well. These collected disputed demands often constitute a liability of the government and are not its income. Though the judicial system in India is afflicted by many ills, it still functions. Consequently, many of the high-pitched demands are deleted in appeals and result in refunds. The target however is based on the tax collected in the preceding year resulting in the authorities creating further high-pitched demands which have a cascading effect. Everyone is busy passing the buck without coming to terms with reality.

The accounting and auditing profession is a much maligned profession. The auditor is restrained by the regulations of his profession and is therefore not able to defend himself in public. If analysts and regulators had paid adequate attention to what auditors report and had taken timely action, at least some of the economic disasters could have been avoided.

I believe that the accounting profession has a very important role to play in ensuring that the state of the economy is transparently put in the public domain. The first step in this direction is for the government to shift from the cash system to the accrual system. The process has begun, with an attempt to convert accounting of urban local bodies to double entry system, but the progress is agonisingly slow. This is for the reason that many of those involved in governance do not appreciate the significance of the change in method of accounting and the benefits thereof. It is treated as a low priority item on the agenda to be dealt with only if time permits. The other possibility is that they feign indifference because they are conscious that if the accrual method of accounting is followed, the picture of the economy may darken further.

The government continuously exhorts businesses to follow “global standards”. It needs to practice what it preaches. The government of New Zealand makes its financial statements public. The audited statements for the year ended 30th June 2012 are available on the government website. These have been prepared on accrual basis. The statements for the 11 months ended 31st May 2013, were released on 5th July 2013. Those interested may visit the website – www.treasury.govt.nz. I am conscious that New Zealand and India are not comparable. I have given the illustration only to establish that what is being suggested is possible. If we have the desire we will get there. But if we have to reach the goal we have to make a beginning. We are already late. The time to start is now!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
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The Bishop’s Candlesticks

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Lord Mahavir taught us forgiveness. Bhagvan Buddha taught us compassion. A classic example of forgiveness and compassion, the story of “The Bishop’s Candlesticks” from “Les Miserables” by Victor Hugo comes to my mind. There is an incident which has left a deep everlasting impression on me. Briefly the story is like this.

Jean Valjeen is the main character of this book. He is released from prison after serving 19 years as a galley slave, a very torturous inhuman punishment. His crime was that he stole a loaf of bread for the starving kids of his sister; and made attempts to escape from prison. In the words of Victor Hugo, “The pecfduliarity of punishment of this kind, in which what is pitiless, that is to say, what is brutalising, predominates, is to transfer little by little, by slow stupefaction, a man into a criminal, sometimes into a wild beast.”

His misery did not end with his release. He was issued a yellow passport which branded him as a dangerous criminal. He was denied food and shelter. All inns and hotels turned him out, inspite of the fact that he was wanting to pay for the same. He had no place to go. When he had lost all hope, he was directed to go to Bishop M’s house.

Who was this Bishop M? He was a bishop who was known for his good-heartedness, and charity, his empathy and love for the poor. Bishop M, spent away most of his substantial allowance for the poor, himself leading a simple and frugal life. He lived with his sister.

Jean Valjeen knocked at the door of the Bishop late in the evening, hungry, tired, dirty and devoid of all hope. He was surprised when the Bishop received him like an honoured guest and treated him with dignity. The Bishop told him “You need not tell me who you are. This is not my house; it is the house of Christ… You are suffering. You are hungry and thirsty. Be welcome”. Jean Valjeen was stunned. For the first time in his life he was treated like a human being. The Bishop made him sit with him for dinner — on a well laid table. This was the first time in 19 years that Jean was served a decent meal. The food was served in silver plates, and the table was lit with candles in silver candlesticks. The silver plates and the silver candlesticks were the only valuables which the Bishop owned. Jean was also given a decent bed, next to the Bishop’s bed for his night’s rest. From wooden planks to a clean comfortable bed after 19 years!

But the hardened criminal within him made him restless. He decamped with the silver plates in the night.

In the morning when the theft was discovered, the Bishop’s sister lamented the sheltering of such a criminal. The Bishop was unperturbed.

Jean was caught with the silver plates and brought to the Bishop. The Bishop asked the police to release him and stated that the plates were not stolen, but gifted by him to Jean! He then addressed Jean and told him that even the silver candlesticks were gifted to him, which Jean forgot to take with him, and then handed over the candlesticks also to Jean! This completely changed the life of Jean Valjeen.

These things happen in real life too. Sir Prabhashankar Pattani was the Diwan of the erstwhile state of Bhavnagar. His jewellery was stolen. The culprit, a servant in his house was brought to him by the police. Pattani Saheb got the servant released and also gave him financial help. The servant returned the jewellery and took a vow to lead an honest life.

There is also an event in the life of Swami Dayanand Saraswati, a Hindu saint who revived the dying spirit of Hinduism. The King of Jodhpur became his devotee and started a pious life. The King broke off his relations with a dancing girl, who in order to take revenge bribed the cook of Swamiji to poison him. As he was dying in great agony Swamiji realised what had happened, called the cook and asked the cook to run away for his life to escape the wrath of the King of Jodhpur who would most certainly have killed the cook. Swamiji forgave his murderer and helped him to escape.

These are the instances of true forgiveness, true compassion, and true charity. May these help us to learn to be better human beings.

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DDIT vs. Marriott International Licensing Company BV [2013] 35 taxmann.com 400 (Mumbai-Trib) A.Ys.: 2003-04 Dated: 17-07-2013 Article 12(4) of India-Netherlands DTAA

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Payment can be characterised as “royalties” only if it is consideration for use or right to use any defined property in existence at the time of use—since the payment made was not for pre-existing defined property, it could not be characterised as “royalties”. Contribution linked to percentage of turnover is unlikely to be regarded as reimbursement of expenses.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, the Netherlands. The taxpayer had entered into a Franchise Agreement with a hotel in India for providing sales, marketing publicity and promotion services outside India. The Indian hotel was also to participate in the hotel system of the taxpayer. Clause 3.2 of the agreement provided that the hotel was to pay certain proportion of its gross revenue for international marketing activities which were in the nature of advertising and printed media, marketing, promotional, public relations and sales campaigns etc. The issue before the Tribunal was, whether the payment made under clause 3.2 of the agreement was purely reimbursement of expenses on sales promotion and marketing and hence was not “royalties”?

Held:
To cover any amount within the purview of Article 12(4) of India-Netherlands DTAA, the payment should be received as consideration ‘for the use of or right to use’ any defined property (i.e. copyright, patent, trademark, etc). Thus, a payment would be “royalties” if it is made for defined property existing at the time of use and not for creation of defined property. Even if the payment contributed towards brand building, it would not be for use of the brand and hence cannot be characterised as “royalties”.

The contribution, being a percentage of gross revenue, was not reimbursement of actual expenses on itemised basis and no material was placed on record to demonstrate that actual expenses were equal to the reimbursed amount. Therefore, the AO should decide on the taxability of the amounts under Article 7 of India-Netherlands DTAA.

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ITO vs. Veeda Clinical Research Pvt Ltd [2013] 35 taxman.com 577 (Ahmedabad-Trib) A.Y. 2008-09, Dated: 28-06-2013 Article 13(4) (c), India-UK DTAA

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Fees paid by Indian company to UK company for general training does not involve transfer of technology and hence, is not covered under ‘make available’ clause.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company. It had made certain payments to a UK service provider for providing ‘market awareness and development training’ to its employees.

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the training fees paid to the service provider were covered under Article 13(4)(c) of India-UK DTAA and accordingly, were taxable in India?

Held:
The law on the connotation of ‘make available’ clause in definition of FTS is settled and the condition precedent for invoking this clause is that the services should enable the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained in such services.

Unless the technical services provided by the UK Company resulted in transfer of technology, the ‘make available’ condition was not satisfied. To invoke ‘make available’ clause, the onus is on the tax authority to demonstrate that the training services involved transfer of technology. This onus was not discharged.

The training services provided were general in nature and did not involve transfer of technology. Therefore, the fees paid for the same could not be covered under Article 13(4) of India-UK DTAA.

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Varian India (P.) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2013] 33 taxmann.com 249 (Mumbai-Trib) A.Ys.: 2002-03 to 2006-07, Dated: 27-02-2013

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Article 5 and 7 of India-USA DTAA, India-Australia DTAA and India-Italy DTAA

Since no condition under Article 5(4) dealing with dependent agent was fulfilled, the PE was not constituted—in absence of PE, ‘force of attraction rule’ did not apply.

Facts:
The taxpayer was the Indian branch of an American company VIPL, which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of Varian USA. Varian USA was engaged in manufacturing and marketing of various kinds of instruments. Varian group had five group entities in USA, Australia, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The taxpayer had entered into Distribution and Representation agreements with Varian group companies in respect of India. The taxpayer carried out pre-sale activities such as liaisoning and post-sale support activities and received commission for the same. The taxpayer did not have any authority to negotiate or conclude contracts on behalf of the group companies. Further, all the risks like market risk, product liability risk, research and development risk, credit risk, price risk, inventory risk or foreign currency risk were born by the selling entity.

The issues before the Tribunal were as follows.

(i) Whether the Indian branch of the taxpayer constituted PE of the group companies?
(ii) If the taxpayer was considered to constitute the PE, whether ‘force of attraction rule’ could apply?

Held:
(i) Dependent agent PE

The taxpayer did not have any authority to negotiate or conclude contract on behalf of group companies. The group companies directly sold the products to the Indian customers and also undertook all the associated risks.

Under Article 5 (4) of India-USA DTAA, an agent constitutes a PE only if he fulfils one of the three conditions specified therein. On facts, the taxpayer did not fulfil any of the three conditions as it had no authority to conclude contract, nor did it act as delivery agent, nor as order-securing agent. Therefore, the test of dependent agent PE failed and the US affiliate triggered no taxation in India.

The corresponding conditions under India-Australia DTAA and India-Italy DTAA were also similar to Article 5(4) of India-USA DTAA and in those cases too, the PE did not kick in.

(ii) Applicability of ‘force of attraction rule’

For application of ‘force of attraction rule’: the foreign enterprise should have a PE in India for selling goods, and the goods sold by the foreign enterprise should be same or similar to those sold by the PE. As the foreign enterprise did not have a PE in India, question of applicability of ‘force of attraction rule’ did not arise.

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Wellinx Inc vs., ADIT [2013] 35 taxmann.com 420 (Hyderabad-Trib) A.Ys.: 2006-07, Dated: 28-06-2013 Article 7(3), India-USA DTAA

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Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial services. While the former are taxable, the latter are not taxable. Customer care and medical transcription services provided by BO to HO were commercial services and hence taxable in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in USA. It was engaged in the business of medical transcription and software development related to health care. The taxpayer established a Branch Office (“BO”) in India for providing certain services to Head Office (“HO”) in USA after obtaining approval of RBI. BO received payments from HO for these services.

According to taxpayer, as BO was providing services to HO, in terms of Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA, the resultant income was not chargeable to incometax. However, the AO concluded that the BO was engaged in software development and estimated its income on cost plus basis.

Held:
The taxpayer had a PE in India.

Article 7(3) has two parts. The first part relates to commercial and business activities carried on by a PE whereas second part relates to certain specified non-commercial services performed by PE for its HO. While the commercial and business services are taxable, if HO assigns some non-commercial activities to its BO, income from such activities would not be taxable in terms of Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA.

In the present case, BO provided customer care and medical transcription services to the HO. These were commercial services outsourced by the HO. Hence, consideration for such services was taxable in India.

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T. Manikandan vs. Commercial Tax Officer, [2011] 46 VST 75 (Mad)

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Recovery of Sales Tax-Principle of First Charge– Priority of State over Property–Not Applicable to Assets Taken Over by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation–Before the Attachment of Property by The Commercial Tax Officer- Section 29 of The State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 and Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959

Facts
The petitioner purchased the immovable property in a public auction conducted by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation, which had taken possession of the said property u/s. 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 from the defaulter. The petitioner lodged the sale deed executed by the Corporation before the sub-registrar for registration. The sub-registrar refused to register the document on the ground that the property is attached by the Commercial Tax Officer to recover sales tax arrears of the defaulter dealer. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court against the refusal of registration of sale deed by the sub-registrar.

Held
It is trite that when the assets are secured assets and in case by invoking section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, the secured creditor takes possession of the property, the principle of first charge/priority of State over the property will not be applicable. Since possession of the property was already taken over by the Corporation by invoking section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, thereafter, there is no question of the attachment of it by the Commercial Tax Officer. Accordingly the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the sub-registrar to register the sale deed disregarding the order of attachment made by the Commercial Tax Officer.

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2013 (31) STR 47 (Tri- Bangalore) Sharavathy Conductors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCEx, Bangalore –I.

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No interest is payable on reversal of CENVAT credit availed but not utilised. Judgment of Supreme Court in Ind-Swift Laboratories distinguished.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer, had two units in Bangalore. The credit on input services received by both the units was shown in CENVAT account maintained in UNIT-I. On account of an audit objection, the Appellant reversed the said availment of credit. An SCN was issued demanding interest and proposing penalty on the said reversal. The Original Authority dropped the demands, the order was reviewed and the Commissioner (Appeals) in addition to interest and penalty also disallowed the CENVAT and appropriated the same on which equal penalty was also levied.

The Appellant contended that no issue other than one pertaining to interest on reversal could be examined by the lower appellate authority and further relying on the decision of the Hon. Karnataka High Court in CCE, Bang. vs. Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. 2012 (28) 214 (Kar) stated that no interest ought to have been levied since no amount was utilised for payment of duty.

The revenue relying on the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ind-Swift Laboratories contended that the term taken ‘or’ utilised cannot be construed to mean ‘and’, and thus interest was liable to be paid.

Held:
The Tribunal while relying on the decision of Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (supra) allowed the appeal and observed that duty to pay interest for delayed payment would not arise unless the credit of duty entered into the account books is duly taken to discharge the duty payable. The said credit was not actually utilised for payment of duty as the Appellant only availed the credit and not utilised.

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Whether ‘F’ Forms are Required on Monthly Basis?

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Introduction
When there is inter-state branch transfer or interstate consignment transfer, the transferor branch has to obtain ‘F’ form, under CST Act, 1956, from the transferee branch. The procedural requirements about ‘F’ forms are mentioned in rule 12(5) of CST (Registration & Turnover Rules), 1957. The said rule is reproduced below for ready reference: “

Rule 12. (5) The declaration referred to in s/s. (1) of section 6-A shall be in Form ‘F’:

Provided that a single declaration may cover transfer of goods by a dealer, to any other place of his business or to his agent or principal, as the case may be, effected during a period of one calendar month;

Provided further that if the space provided in Form ‘F’ is not sufficient for making the entries, the particulars specified in Form ‘F’ may be given in separate annexures attached to that form so long as it is indicated in the form that the annexures form part thereof and every such annexure is also signed by the person signing the declaration in Form ‘F’;

Provided also that Form ‘F’ in force before the commencement of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1973, may continue to be used upto 31st day of December, 1980 with suitable modifications.”

Controversy
As can be seen from the above rule, one single ‘F’ form can cover transfers effected during one calendar month. In other words, if there are transactions of more than one month in one ‘F’ form than the said ‘F’ form may not be effective for transactions exceeding the month.

In most of the judgments, given by Hon’ble Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, the above position is accepted. Reference can be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Tribunal in case of Akay Cosmetics Pvt. Ltd. (A.No.33 of 2008 & SA No.255 of 2009, SA No.610 of 2009 dt. 3.5.2010). In this case, Hon’ble Tribunal has held that if the ‘F’ form is for transactions exceeding one month then it should be allowed only for one month. It is also observed that the dealer can take benefit of month for which there is highest amount. However, it cannot be effective for transactions exceeding one particular month.

In this respect, generally reference is made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of India Agencies (Regd.) v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore (139 STC 329)(SC). In this case the issue was about admissibility of ‘C’ form. The Supreme Court has observed that the ‘C’ form should be submitted as per rules. Taking note of this judgment, it is generally interpreted that the declaration forms should be as per rules.

Recent judgment of Calcutta High Court
Recently, the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court had an occasion to deal with the said situation. The ‘F’ form was covering transactions for more than one month and hence, it was disallowed. The assessee, i.e. Cipla Ltd., filed a Writ Petition in the Hon’ble High Court. The Calcutta High Court has delivered judgment in case of Cipla Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Corporate Division & Others which is reported in (61 VST 445)(Cal). In this judgment, Hon’ble High Court has held as under:

“The order has apparently been passed ex parte. Three F forms have been disallowed on the purported ground that the three F forms bearing nos. 37514, 37518 and 37521 covered transactions exceeding a period of one month. It appears that the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, West Bengal has misconstrued rule 12(5) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules,1957 which provides that the declaration referred to in s/s. (1) of section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 shall be in Form F. The proviso to rule 12(5) provides that a single declaration might cover transfer of goods, by a dealer, to any other place of business, or agent, or principal, as the case may be, effected during a period of one calendar month. There is nothing in the rules which can be constructed to vitiate a declaration form only on the ground that it covers transactions exceeding a period of over a month. The assessment has apparently been revised suo motu and ex parte on a misconception of rule 12(5) of the Rules. The impugned order is, thus, set aside and quashed.”

In light of the above, it can safely be inferred that even if the ‘F’ form is for transactions exceeding one month, it still will be valid for all the transactions. In this case, the judgment of Supreme Court in India Agencies is not cited or considered. However, since the High Court judgment is in relation to specific rule 12(5), it will be applicable, so far as ‘F’ forms are concerned.

Situation in other states
An issue can arise, as to whether the above judgment will be effective in other States also. In this respect, reference can be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of Maniklal Chunnilal & Sons Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (24 ITR 375), wherein it is held that the judgment of any High Court under Central Act is binding in other States also except in a case where contrary judgment of the jurisdictional High Court of the respective state is available. The relevant portion of judgment is as under:

“A Special Bench of the Madras High Court has taken the view favourable to the Commissioner and contrary to the view suggested by Mr. Palkhiwala and in conformity with the uniform policy which we have laid down in income-tax matters, whatever our own view may be, we must accept the view taken by another High Court on the interpretation of the section of a statute which is an all-India statute.”

In light of the above, the judgment of the Calcutta High Court will be binding on other States also. It will be binding on Maharashtra also as there is no contrary judgment of the Hon‘ble Bombay High Court on the above issue.

Conclusion
It is a practical experience that getting declaration forms from the department is very difficult, more particularly, when substantial time has elapsed. It is also time consuming. Under the above circumstances, disallowance of claims on technical grounds cannot be justified. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court as such is very positive and practical and will give the much required relief to the dealers.

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB: Computation: A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-00, 2003-04 and 2004-05: Assessee printing and publishing magazines: Four units: One unit doing job work of printing for publishing unit: Expenses attributable to publishing unit not to be allocated to printing unit for computation of the amount deductible u/s. 80-IA/80-IB:

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CIT vs. Delhi Press Patra Prakashan Ltd. (No. 1); 355 ITR 1 (Del):

The assessee was engaged in the business of printing and publishing magazines. It had four units. One unit was doing the job work of printing for the publishing unit. The assessee had maintained separate accounts in respect of which deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB was claimed. Relying on sections 80-IA(8), (9) and (10), the Assessing Officer held that profits of the printing unit are required to be recomputed by allocating to the printing unit the expenses relating to the cost of paper and other expenses of the publishing unit inasmuch as section 80-IA(7) requires that the profits from the eligible business must be computed as if the eligible business was the only source of income for the assessee. Accordingly, he recomputed the profits of the printing unit and the amount deductible u/s. 80-IA/80-IB. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no material to support the view that the job work charges charged by the printing units from the publishing unit were not at market rates. In the absence of any defect or manipulation found by the Assessing Officer in the books maintained for the printing unit and in the absence of any material to indicate that the amounts charged by the printing unit from the publishing unit was not at comparable market rates, it would not be open for the Revenue to disregard the profits of the printing unit as disclosed by the assessee only on the basis that the profits were significantly higher than the profits earned by the assessee from other undertakings.

ii) The printing unit carried on job work of printing only and the expenses attributable to the publishing unit which relate to the publishing business could not be allocated to the printing unit. Only those expenses which related to the printing work carried on by the assessee in the printing unit were liable to be deducted from the job charges to arrive at the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB, as the case may be.”

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Income: Accrual: Retention money: Sections 4 and 5: A. Y. 2003-04: Amount retained to ensure satisfactory performance of contract does not accrue: Not income of that year:

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DIT vs. Ballast Nedam International; 355 ITR 300 (Guj):

The assessee executed contracts. In terms of the contracts, the amounts at the rate of 10% on the onshore activities, and at the rate of 15% on the construction and erection activities, were withheld by the principal towards retention money. For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed that the retention money of Rs. 14.31 crore did not accrue and accordingly cannot be assessed as income. However, the Assessing Officer held that the amount is the accrued income and made addition. The Commissioner and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Unless and until a debt is created in favour of the assessee, which is due by somebody, it cannot be said that the assessee has acquired a right to receive the income or that the income has accrued to him.
ii) The amount retained had not accrued to the assessee in the accounting year relevant to the A.Y. 2003-04.”

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Depreciation: Actual cost: Subsidy: Section 43(1), Expln. 10: A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03: Assessee a Government Company took over the telecommunication business from Government Department: Assets transferred at book value: Consideration in form of shares, debts and reserves: Reserve not a subsidy, grant or reimbursement for meeting cost of assets transferred: Reserves not to be reduced from fixed assets to arrive at actual cost: Reopening of the assessment for reducing the actual cost by reserve<

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BSNL vs. Dy. CIT; 355 ITR 188 (Del):

The assessee company was incorporated to provide the telecommunication services which were being provided earlier by the Department of Telecommunications of the Government of India. The assets were transferred at book value. Consideration was paid in the form of shares, debts and reserves. The Assessing Officer found that the consideration included reserves. He held that the cost of assets was being met by the reserves and therefore held that the reserve is required to be reduced from the cost of the assets in terms of Explanation 10 to section 43(1). He therefore reopened the assessments for the A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 and recomputed the depreciation by reducing the reserve from the cost of assets.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee, the Delhi High Court accepted the assessee’s claim and held as under:

“i) There was no basis for the Assessing Officer’s assumption that whereas value of share capital issued to the Government as part consideration for transfer of business to the assessee was limited only to the face value of the shares, reserves represented a subsidy, grant or reimbursement for meeting the cost of assets transferred.
ii) Free reserves and surpluses of a company could not be considered anything but part of shareholders’ funds. The book value of equity share consists of not only the paid up capital but also the reserves and surpluses of the company. The scheme of hiving off the business of telecommunication services by the Government of India to a corporate entity entailed incorporation of a wholly owned Government company (i.e., the assessee) and the transfer of the business as a going concern along with all its assets and liabilities to the company. Reserves was an integral part of the shareholders funds.
iii) The Government of India had transferred the assets to the assessee company at their book value and the book value of the Government of India’s holding on the assessee company as shareholder and a creditor aggregated the book value of the assets transferred. The configuration of the capital structure of the assessee had no impact on the value of the Government’s holding in the assessee as reserve(s) of a company are subsumed in the book value of its capital.
iv) There is no plausible reason to assume that the value of shareholders’ holding in a company is limited to the face value of the issued and paid up share capital and the reserves represent subsidy or a grant or reimbursement by the shareholders from which directly or indirectly the cost of the assets in the hands of the company are met.

v) We are thus of the view that the reasons as furnished by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessments could not possibly give rise to any belief that income of the petitioner had escaped assessment and the proceedings initiated on the basis of such reasons are liable to be quashed.”

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Charitable institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iv): Sections 2(15) and 10(23C)(iv): A.Ys. 2006- 07 to 2011-12: Charitable purpose: Applicability of proviso to section 2(15): Assessee’s activities fall in section 2(15) as existed prior to 01-04-2009 under the category of advancement of any other object of general public utility: Activity of assessee in conducting coaching classes is integral to its activity of conducting course in accountancy: Cannot be equated with private coaching classes:

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Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv): ICAI Vs. DGIT; 260 CTR 1 (Del):

The petitioner Institute was constituted under the Institute of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, with the object to regulate the profession of Chartered Accountants in India and to ensure that the standards of professional knowledge and skill are met and maintained. Up to the

A.Y. 2005-06, the petitioner was granted approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv). Subsequent applications for approval were rejected on the ground that the Petitioner was holding coaching classes for preparing students for the examinations conducted by the Petitioner and was charging fees for the same.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the said denial and held as under:

“i) Assessee’s activities fall within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ in section 2(15) as it existed prior to 01-04-2009, under the category of ‘advancement of any object of general public utility’.
ii) The activity of the assessee in conducting coaching classes is integral to its activity of conducting the course in accountancy and the same cannot be equated with private coaching classes being conducted by organisations on commercial basis for preparing students to take entrance or other examinations in various professional courses.
iii) The reasoning of the DGIT that conducting interviews for a fee for the purposes of placement of its students by the assessee amounts to carrying on of a business is not sustainable. Campus interview is only a small incidental activity carried on by the assessee Institute like Universities for the placement of their students in gainful employment. This too is an activity ancillary to the educational programme being conducted by the assessee and cannot be considered as a business.
iv) The reasoning of the DGIT that since the assessee institute charges a uniform fee from all students it cannot be said to be carrying on a charitable activity is also erroneous. It is well settled that eleemosynary is not an essential element of ‘charitable purpose’ as defined under the Act. If the object or purpose of an institution is charitable, the fact that it collects certain charges does not alter the character of the institution.
v) Expression “trade”, “commerce” and “business” as occurring in the first proviso to section 2(15) must be read in the context of the intent and purport of section 2(15) and cannot be interpreted to mean any activity which is carried on in an organised manner. Purport of the first proviso is not to exclude entities which are essentially for charitable purpose but are conducting some activities for a consideration or a fee. Thus, where the dominant object of an organisation is of charitable nature, any incidental activity for furtherance of the object would not fall within the expression “business”, “trade” or “commerce”.
vi) Impugned orders passed by the DGIT refusing to grant exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) are set aside and he is directed to recognise the assessee as eligible for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) as an institution established for charitable purposes.”

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Business expenditure: Payment to related person: Disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(b): A.Y. 1995-96: Payment to subsidiary company: Section 40A(2)(b) not applicable:

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CIT vs. Raman Boards Ltd.: 355 ITR 305 (Kar):

The assessee, a manufacturer of insulation paper boards, entered into an agreement with its subsidiary company for manufacture of footwear soles. Under the agreement, the assessee was to pay to the subsidiary management fees of Rs. 4 lakh per month. In the A. Y. 1995-96, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 48 lakh so paid to the subsidiary. The Assessing Officer allowed 50% of the claim and disallowed Rs. 24 lakh u/s. 40A(2)(b). The Tribunal held that the genuineness of the agreement and the services rendered by the subsidiary company were not doubted and there being no finding that the payment made by the assessee was excessive u/s. 40A(2)(b) the Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) To attract the provisions of section 40A(2), the assessee has to incur an expenditure by making payment to the person referred to in clause (b). The assessee was a company. The person to whom it had to make the payment in order to attract the provision was any director of the company or any relative of director.

ii) Admittedly, the payment was made to the subsidiary company and not to any director or any relative of director. Therefore, the requirement of section 40A(2)(b) was not fulfilled. The Tribunal was justified in directing the deletion of the disallowance.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: A. Y. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Investment in subsidiaries: In respect of part of investment dividends were taxable: In respect of balance, assessee had sufficient interest free funds: No disallowance could be made u/s. 14A:

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CIT vs. Suzlon Energy Ltd: 354 ITR 630 (Guj):

The assessee had made investments in subsidiaries. The Assessing Officer made disallowance of interest expenditure and administrative expenditure u/s. 14A in respect of such investment. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance. The Tribunal found that in respect of part of investment, dividends were taxable and in respect of the balance the assessee had sufficient interest free funds of its own. The Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeal).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was right in law and on facts in deleting disallowance u/s. 14A in respect of interest expenses incurred for investment in subsidiaries and administrative expenses such as staff salary of corporate office, audit fees, building rent and communication expenses.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) : Deduction of tax at a lesser rate due to difference of opinion: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not justified:

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CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal; 260 CTR 73 (Cal):

The assessee deducted tax @ 1% u/s. 194C(2) from the payments made to sub-contractors. The Assessing Officer held that the payments are in the nature of machinery hire charges falling under the head ‘Rent’ and the provisions of section 194-I are applicable as per which tax was deductible @ 10%. The assessing Officer, therefore, disallowed the payment proportionately by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). The Tribunal deleted the disallowance holding that no disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), if there is any shortfall in deduction of tax at source due to any difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payment falling under various TDS provisions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“We find no substantial question of law involved in this case and therefore, we refuse to admit the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.”

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Alleppy Company Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, [2011] 46 VST 24 (Ker)

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Sale in Course of Export-Purchase of Tags and Labels-Exporting After Attaching to Products Manufactured-Deemed Export-Exempt From Payment of Purchase Tax-Section 5(3) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

Facts
As per the requirement of foreign buyers and in terms of the export orders, the company purchased tags and labels from printing presses and attached to each and every coir product exported giving product description in terms of buyer’s norms. The assessing authorities held that the purchase of tags and labels by the company were consumed in manufacturing of coir products as such liable to purchase tax u/s. 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, which was confirmed by the Tribunal. The company filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against the levy of purchase tax by the assessing authorities.

Held
The High court, allowing the revision petition filed by the company, held that admittedly tags and labels were printed by the supplier printing press in terms of the company’s orders, which were in conformity with export orders. So much so, the commodity, even at the time of printing or manufacture, was earmarked for export, after purchase and they were attached to the products exported. Therefore the commodity purchased was for export by attachment to the coir products without any change and exempt from payment of purchase tax being deemed export u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act.

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Block assessment: Limitation: Special audit: Sections 142(2A) and 158BC: Direction for special audit without giving opportunity to assessee: Direction given to extend period of limitation: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Subboji Rao C. H.; 355 ITR 320 (Kar):

Pursuant to a search, block assessment proceedings were initiated by issuing a notice u/s. 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 15-05-1998. The assessee computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 24,18,360 and the Assessing Officer computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 70,00,246. The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the addition. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the assessment was barred by limitation since the direction for special audit u/s. 142(2A) was not valid. The Tribunal held that there was no complexity in the accounts requiring an audit u/s. 142(2A). It further held that invoking the provisions u/s. 142(2A) was bad in law and the assessment was barred by limitation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee was not heard before the order passed u/s. 142(2A). Such a procedure was resorted to extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the assessment order was void as being barred by limitation.”

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Assessment giving effect to the order of revision: Scope: Sections 143(3) and 263: A. Y. 2006-07: Assessee carrying on two businesses; i) Mentha business and ii) Cattle feed and green vegetable business: Separate accounts maintained: Assessment set aside u/s. 263 by finding errors in cattle feed and green vegetable business: Pursuant assessment is restricted to Cattle feed and green vegetable business: Queries concerning mentha business are beyond the scope and power:

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Smt. Shobha Govil vs. Add. CIT: 354 ITR 668 (All):

The assessee was carrying on two businesses; i) Mentha business and ii) Cattle feed and green vegetable business. Separate accounts were maintained for the two businesses. The accounts of mentha business were audited. For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3). The Commissioner found mistakes as regards the cattle feed and green vegetable business and accordingly, exercising the powers u/s. 263 set aside the assessment order and restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner had not found any mistake as regards the mentha business. After remand, the Assessing Officer served a questionnaire making inquiries with regard both the businesses. The assessee resisted the questionnaire on the ground that the remand order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 263 was confined to the determination of income of the cattle feed and green vegetable business and the income from mentha business has become final as it has not been interfered with u/s. 263 of the Act. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the said stand of the Assessing Officer and held as under:

“i) The entire discussion in the order u/s. 263 was confined to the question of determination of income and expenditure of the cattle feed and green vegetable business. The discussion, paragraph after paragraph, was with regard to the cattle feed and green vegetable business, viz. its sales, sale bills, absence of addresses of the purchasers of bhusa, truck expenses and freight outward expenses, salary of the staff, all related to the cattle feed and green vegetable business.

ii) There was nothing in the order of the Commissioner suggesting that the entire assessment order was being set aside. The Assessing Officer was not justified in coming to the conclusion that he was also required to pass a fresh assessment order for the mentha business.

iii) To this extent, the order cannot be allowed to stand and was liable to be set aside.”

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High Court—Matter remanded for de novo consideration as no reasons were given for dismissal of the writ petition.

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Parvez Nazir Hussein Jafri vs. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 235 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of the notice dated 26th July, 2010 issued u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment for the assessment year 2006-07 holding that there was no error in issuing notice u/s. 148 and noting that the income-tax return submitted by the Petitioner was processed u/s. 143(1) on 10th March, 2007.

On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for de novo consideration in accordance with law since the High Court had not given any reasons for not setting aside the reopening of the assessment.

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Co-operative Society—Deduction u/s. 80P(2) (a)(iii)—Matter remanded to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to determine whether the activity of obtaining sugar from the sugar cane constituted manufacture?

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Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 230 (SC)

The
assessee, a co-operative sugar mill, bought sugarcane grown by its
members. It undertook a particular operation whose outcome was a final
product in the form of sugar. The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the final product (sugar) would make the assessee entitled to
claim to benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(iii) in respect of marketing of
the agricultural produce grown by its members?

According to the
Supreme Court, the crucial issue was, whether at the time of marketing
of sugar, the same could be said to have retained the character of
agricultural produce (sugarcane) grown by members of the society or did
it represent an independent commercial commodity which no longer had the
character of agricultural produce? In short, the controversy was,
whether the operation undertaken by the assessee constituted
“manufacture”?

According to the assessee, the process undertaken
was not a “manufacture”. Broadly, according to the assessee, sugar
(also called “sucrose”) is synthesised by the sugarcane plant from water
and atmospheric carbon dioxide by the method of photosynthesis.
Sugarcane, according to the assessee, is produced in the agriculture
fields. In the sugar factory, after juice is extracted from the
sugarcane, it is boiled. Microscopic crystals coalesce together to form
macroscopic crystals and molasses.

This, according to the
assessee, did not constitute “manufacture”. In this connection, reliance
was placed by the assessee on the opinion given by the technical
advisor at the request of the National Federation of Co-operative Sugar
Factories Ltd.

According to the Department, the above operation/
activity constituted “manufacture”. In this connection, the Department
placed reliance on paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of CIT vs .
Oracle Software India Limited reported in (2010) 320 ITR 546 (SC), where
it was observed as follows (page 551):

“The term ‘manufacture’
implies a change, but every change is not a manufacture, despite the
fact that every change in an article is the result of a treatment of
labour and manipulation. However, this test of manufacture needs to be
seen in the context of the above process. If an operation/process
renders a commodity or article fit for use for which it is otherwise not
fit, the operation/process falls within the meaning of the word
‘manufacture’.”

According to the Supreme Court, the above test
had to be applied and adjudicated on a case-tocase basis. It depended on
the type of product which ultimately emerged from a given operation. In
its view, this aspect had not been examined by the courts below.

For
the above reasons, the Supreme Court remitted the case back to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to re-examine the matter, directing
that (i) Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would give an opportunity
to the assessee to put forth the opinion of an independent expert who
shall not be from the society or federation; (ii) A copy of the written
opinion shall be given to the Department; (iii) The Department would be
free to engage its own expert who, in turn, will give his opinion; (iv)
The parties be given liberty to cross-examine the experts. The
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would thereafter decide the case
and ascertain whether the operation undertaken by the assessee is or is
not “manufacture”. The Supreme Court disposed of the civil appeals
accordingly.

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Ordinance Empowers SEBI Even More – and Brings Some Ambiguities

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An Ordinance was issued on 18th July, 2013 amending
securities laws such as the SEBI Act, etc. Some provisions have
immediate effect while certain others have retrospective effect from
different dates. Some amendments are technical and meant to clear
certain doubts/concerns or strengthen the validity of certain
provisions. A couple of others are a little serious. One grants special
powers of search and seizure to SEBI. Another gives wider powers to
gather information. Yet another provision grants powers to SEBI to
arrest and jail people for strange reasons—if he does not pay penalty,
does not refund monies, or a mere nonpayment of fees, etc. Others like
special courts are meant to expedite prosecution of offenders.

The
important amendments can be briefly described as follows. The Consent
Order process, which presently operates through Guidelines, has now been
given specific legislative sanction. Special Courts are now authorised
to be set up for speedy prosecution of offences. Powers to search and
seize without need for sanction by Magistrate are given to SEBI. Powers
to recover monies from defaulting parties are also given. Disgorgement
of proceeds of unlawful transactions/activities also now has legislative
sanction. The scope of provisions relating to collective investment
schemes (CIS) has been expanded and certain large Schemes are treated as
CIS by a deeming fiction. SEBI also can now collect information from
practically anybody and not from a limited set of persons as was the
position earlier.

Similar amendments are made in regard to some
of these aspects to other securities laws—the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Depositories Act, 1999.

Some important amendments are discussed in a little more detail.

Collective Investment Schemes
SEBI—as
early as 1999—made fairly stringent Regulations for registration and
regulation of Collective Investment Schemes (“CISs”). It may be
recollected that CISs are schemes that pool monies from the public and
invest in certain businesses. The profits, after expenses, of such
businesses are intended to be divided amongst the investors. Often,
specific assets are earmarked to individual investors so the returns
from such assets are identifiable. The best example of this is mutual
funds, which are of course specifically excluded from the definition of
CIS but are still a good example to understand the concept.

However,
in practice, numerous schemes were introduced for fancy businesses
(teak plantations, goat raising, etc.). Some of them gave false promises
of high returns. Some were simply loans raised but disguised as CISs to
avoid various restrictions of other laws on raising of monies from the
public. Many of these schemes were found, usually too late, to be
outright Ponzi schemes where, on one hand the funds were used to pay
hefty commissions to motivate agents to collect monies and on the other,
the rest of the monies were used to repay interest and principal on
earlier loans. By the time the scam was discovered, most of the recent
investors could recover nothing.

The amendments and Regulations
of 1999 did help in closure of many leading schemes. However, recent
scams, particularly in West Bengal, showed that they had merely
re-invented themselves and, strangely, they were operating fairly
openly. One wonders whether this is not clearly a failure of the
regulator. SEBI did pass some quick orders in such cases recently but it
appears that it was too late.

Nevertheless, this Ordinance
makes certain amendments strengthening the powers of SEBI. The
definition of CISs has been enlarged to include by deeming fiction
certain large-sized schemes. Any scheme/arrangement of pooling of funds
having a corpus of Rs. 100 crore or more is now deemed to be a CIS.
Thus, it will need prior registration and compliance with several
formalities.

However, schemes which are specifically excluded
from the list will remain excluded from this deeming provision also.
Thus, public deposits raised by companies under corresponding
Rules/Directions, funds raised by mutual funds, insurance companies,
etc. will not be treated as CISs.

This deeming fiction, however, appears
to be unduly wide. The requirements for a scheme to become such a CIS
are simple and minimal (i) it has to be a scheme/arrangement (ii) it
should involve “pooling” of funds (iii) the total “corpus” should be Rs.
100 crore or more.

Would it cover investment in capital of private
limited companies? What about Inter-corporate deposits (or even bank
borrowings)? These and several other types of pooling of funds appear
prima facie to be covered by the new definition.

A question had arisen
whether the restrictions of registration, etc. on CISs were applicable
only if the CIS was set up by a company or whether it was applicable if
set up by other persons too. In Osian Art Fund’s case, for example, this
contention was raised and SEBI held that it also applied to entities
other than companies. However, to put this issue beyond doubt, the word
“company” has now been replaced by the word “person” in the Act. This
now makes it clear that the requirement of registration shall also apply
to other entities. The amendment, however, is not retrospective.

Consent Orders
The Guidelines relating to consent orders issued in 2007
enabled numerous cases to be settled without lengthy penal proceedings.
Persons accused of violations of provisions of securities laws, or even
persons who anticipated such allegations, could approach SEBI for
settlement. By payment of a settlement amount and sometimes accepting
certain non-monetary restrictions like debarment, etc. the proceedings
could expeditiously come to an end. Further, the proceedings would end
without admission or denial of guilt by such person.

While the
settlement mechanism was fairly speedy and independent, it attracted
criticism too, part of which was met by recent issuance of the revised
Guidelines. However, serious concerns were expressed over the legal
basis of the consent order guidelines. A PIL was also filed before the
Delhi High Court. If the Guidelines were set aside by the Court as being
without legal basis, hundreds of consent orders passed till now would
have got overturned. A new provision now gives retrospective validity to
the consent order process permitting SEBI to pass such consent orders.
This amendment is effective from April 2007, when the original consent
order Guidelines were issued.

Strangely, the amended provisions
specifically provide that the consent orders shall be in accordance with
Regulations
made in this regard. However, no Regulations have been
issued till date and the existing settlement scheme is in the form of
Guidelines
. This puts a question mark over all consent orders passed
till date under Consent Order Guidelines. A question arises whether any
Consent Order can be passed till Regulations on Consent Orders are
issued.

It is also provided that consent orders cannot be appealed against. The amendment, being retrospective, will thus invalidate existing appeals or future appeals against any consent order. This may make sense because consent orders are by definition by mutual consent. However, at times, SEBI may reject an application for consent. Discretion remains with SEBI whether or not to accept an application for consent. The Guidelines state that certain types of violations cannot be settled. However, in other cases too, there is discretion with SEBI. Question is whether such discretion is exercised judicially and whether it can be challenged. The new provision, however, provides that no appeal shall lie against the order passed.

The party concerned of course does not lose the right of proceeding with the adjudication or other proceedings in the normal course.

Powers of search and seizure

Till now, SEBI could initiate search and seizure under persons being investigated by making an application to a Magistrate who had jurisdiction over the persons. Certain reporting was also required to be made to the Magistrate. This requirement to apply to and obtain order from the Magistrate has now been dropped. The SEBI Chairman can now issue directions for search and seizure against persons being investigated. The powers of search and seizure have also been made more elaborate.

Powers to collect records from other entities (including telephone records)

Till now, SEBI had powers to seek information from banks or other authorities, etc. for information relating to transactions under investigation. Now the powers have been widened to include “any person”.

Disgorgement of funds

Persons may engage in transactions in contravention with the Act/Regulations and thus make gains or avoid losses. For example, a person may engage in insider trading and make profits or avoid losses. There have been concerns raised whether SEBI has adequate powers to order disgorgement of such gains/losses and direct its use, say, for credit to the Investor Protection Fund.

An explanation now introduced declares that SEBI always had powers to direct disgorgement of profits/losses from persons who have made such profits or avoided losses in contravention of the Act/ Regulations. Further, the amount disgorged shall be credited to the Investor Protection Fund.

It must be noted that disgorgement is in addition to the penalty that can be levied.

Action in case of default in payment of refund, penalty, fees, etc.

In case a person delays or defaults in payment of various types of amounts as he has been ordered or is otherwise required to pay by way of penalty, disgorgement or refund the monies raised or even dues on account of fees payable to SEBI, specific powers to recover such amounts, by attachment and sale of properties have been given.

However, there is a strange power given to SEBI. The person concerned can be arrested and imprisoned for making such defaults. Since power to attach and sell properties is given, the power to arrest and detain seems a little drastic, particularly when they cover even regular dues like fees payable to SEBI.

Conclusion

Powers of search and seizure and arrest and detention are a little scary, particularly considering how widely they are worded. However, it appears strange that instead of examining how powers given in 1999 to regulate/restrict CISs have worked, more powers in broader provisions have been given to SEBI. Based on past experience, persons are scared that the amended provisions will be arbitrarily used especially when governance (implementation and enforcement) is an issue.

PART A: High Court Decisions

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[In the H.C. of Uttarakhand: writ petition No.1814 of 2006 decided on 23-04-2013: Uttaranchal Public Services Commission vs. Chief Information Commissioner & Ors: Citation: RTI III (2013)82]

  •  Section 8(1)(d) & (j) of the RTI Act :

Information sought:

i) To provide the criteria applied in the selection procedure of the candidates to the post of Lecturer-Biology in Inter College.

ii) How many candidates appeared in the written examination for the post of lecturer Biology in Intermediate College and how many candidates were selected and how many candidates have appeared for interview before the Interview Board?

iii) To provide the details of the marks obtained by the selected candidates in the written test along with their marks in the interview and the details of their experience, educational qualification etc. with their preference/marks obtained by them.

iv) To give the details of the marks obtained by Mohd. Asif Tyagi (129639) in written test interview, educational qualification and experience etc. for the post of Lecturer-Biology.

PIO gave information on (i) & (ii) above. As regards information under (iii) & (iv), same were rejected on the ground that the said information cannot be provided in view of the provisions of section 8(1)(d) & 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. FAA dismissed the appeal. Hence, Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (UPSC) filed a writ petition before High Court of Uttarakhand.

The Court stated:
So far as the information on point no.3 is concerned, it is stated in para-10 of the writ petition that the respondent no.2 (Shri Jakir) has sought information with respect to one candidate Mohd. Asif Tyagi under the RTI Act. It is further stated in the writ petition that respondent no. 2 was neither the candidate in the screening examination nor in the interview. Further, as per provisions of section 8(1)(j) of the Act, the information sought by the respondent no.2 with respect to Mohd. Asif Tyagi, comes under the definition of third party as per the provisions of RTI Act and the provisions of sections 8(1)(d) clearly provides that the disclosure of such information would harm the competitive position of third party and the same has been exempted from disclosure under RTI Act.

The Court held:
By a perusal of the information sought by respondent no.2, it reveals that the information sought is of a general nature and the marks obtained in a competitive examination cannot be held to be an intellectual property of an individual. The petitioner cannot deny the information as to how many marks have been obtained by Asif Tyagi and the other selected candidates and their educational qualification and experience. In my opinion, this information is not covered u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act and the learned Chief Information Commissioner has rightly directed the petitioner to give information on point nos.3 and 4.

For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.

[Decision of High Court of Madras in the Registrar general, High Court of Madras, Chennai vs. K.Elango & Anr: W.P.No.20485 of 2012 And M.P.No.1 of 2012 decided on 17-04-2013 Citation: RTIR III (2013) 103 (Madras)]

• In this case The Tamil Nadu Information Commission passed an order by not accepting the argument “unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals” and allowed the appeal by directing the Registrar General, High Court of Madras to furnish the details sought for by K. Elango.

To start with the High Court of Madras noted:

It is to be borne in mind that under the Right to Information Act, 2005 an authority has a rudimentary function to perform either to furnish the information or deny the information. As a matter of fact, there is no specific Article in the Constitution of India which provides for the citizens right to know. However, Article 19(1)(a) provides for freedom of thought and expression which indirectly includes right to obtain information. Further, Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty to citizens. Undoubtedly, Right to Life is incomplete if basic human right viz., ‘Right to Know’ is not included within its umbrage.

K. Elango had sought from PIO of the High Court, Madras following information:

1. How may Subordinate Judges are there in service in the state of Tamil Nadu? The district-wise list may be furnished to me as per the hierarchy.

2. How many employees are serving in the judicial department in the whole of Tamil Nadu (including the Government servants on deputation)?

3. How many judicial officers, police officers and staffs are working in the Vigilance Department of the registry of Madras High Court?

4. Does your vigilance department have any branches in the district so as to receive the complaint from the general public against the judicial officer and court staffs?

5. Does your registry have any tie-up or coordination with the office of Vigilance and Anticorruption, Rajaannamalai Puram, Chennai 28 to trap the judicial officers or court staffs on the basis of the complaints from the affected persons?

6. Does your registry have a special team for trapping the corrupt judicial officers and court staffs?

7. Between 2001 to 2010, how many complaints have been received by your Registry and Vigilance Department, kindly give complaint-wise break-up figure (that is how many complaints against DJ, ADDLJ, SJ, DMC, FTC Judges, Magistrates and Court staffs)?

8. How many complaints ended in dismissal, suspension, issuance of memo and dropping of the case and conviction between the said 2001 to 2010?

9. Between 2001 to 2010 how many complaints against High Court staffs have been received relating to bribe and the fate of those complaints?

Both the sides in this case made elaborate submission and also cited number of courts’ decisions. The Court also cited number of courts’ decisions and further stated:

• In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta and others vs. President of India and others, [AIR 1982 Supreme Court 149], it is held that ‘the Right to know has been given a constitutional status by treating it as a part of speech and expression and thereby bringing this right within Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.’
• It will be quite in the fitness of things to recall the Golden words of Thomas Jefferson, who rightly said that ‘Information is the Currency of Democracy’.
• In the words of Amartya Sen, ‘the Right to Information Act, 2005 is a momentous engagement with the possibilities of freedom.’ [vide Lawz January 2008 at page 40 special page 41]
• Befittingly, we recall the observation of Lord Goff in the decision Attorney General vs. Guardian Newspapers Limited and others(No 2) 1990 1 A.P. at page 109 which runs as follows:

“Although the basis of Law’s protection of confidence is that there is a Law, nevertheless the public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure.”

• It is to be pointed out that the personal information and the information between persons in fiduciary relationship are exempted from disclosure under the Right to Information Act. Also, ‘Confidence’ may be outweighed by public interest in the matter of such disclosure.

The Court then concluded:

•    On a careful consideration of respective contentions and on going through the contents of the application dated 01-11-2010 filed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant this Court is of the considered view that the information sought for by him in Serial Nos. 1 to 9 pertaining to the internal delicate functioning/administration of the High Court besides the same relate to invasion of privacy of respective individuals if the information so asked for is furnished and more so, the information sought for has no relationship to any public activity or interest. Moreover, the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is not to a fuller extent open to public domain. It added further, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged, then, it will open the floodgates/Pandora’s Box compelling the Petitioner/High Court to supply the information sought for by the concerned Requisitionists as a matter of routine, without any rhyme or reason/restrictions as the case may be. Therefore, some self restrictions are to be imposed in regards to the supply of information in this regards. As a matter of fact, the Notings, Jottings, Administrative Letters, Intricate Internal Discussions, Deliberations etc. of the Petitioners/High Court cannot be brought u/s. 2(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, in considered opinion of this Court. Also that, if the information relating to Serial Nos.1 to 9 mentioned in the application of the 1st Respondent/Applicant dated 01-11-2010 is directed to be furnished or supplied with, then, certainly, it will impede and hinder the regular, smooth and proper functioning of the Institution viz. High Court (an independent authority under the Constitution of India, free from Executive or Legislature). As such, a Saner Counsel/Balancing Act is to be adopted in matters relating to the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, so that an adequate freedom and inbuilt safeguards can be provided to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court [competent authority and public authority as per section 2(e)(iii) and 2(h)(a) of the Act 22 of 2005] in exercising his discretionary powers either to supply the information or to deny the information, as prayed for by the Applicants/Requisitionists concerned.”

•    “Apart from the above, if the information requested by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, based on his letter dated 01-11- 2010, is supplied with, then, it will have an adverse impact on the regular and normal, serene functioning of the High Court’s Office on the impact on the Administrative side. Therefore, we come to an irresistible conclusion that the 1st Respondent/Applicant is not entitled to be supplied with the information/details sought for him, in his Application dated 01-11-2010 addressed to the Public Information Officer of the High Court, Madras under the provision of the Right to Information Act. Even on the ground of (i) maintaining confidentiality; (ii) based on the reason that the private or personal information is exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act,2005; and (iii) also u/s. 8(1)(e) of the Act in lieu of fiduciary relationship maintained by the High Court, the request of the 1st Respondent/Applicant, cannot be acceded to by this Court. Also, we opine that the 1st Respondent/Applicant’s requests, suffer from want of bona fides (notwithstanding the candid fact that Section 6 of the Right to Information Act does not either overtly or covertly refers to the ‘concept of Locus’)”

•    To put it differently, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged or furnished by the Office of the High Court (on administrative side), then, the secrecy and privacy of the internal working process may get jeopardised, besides the furnishing of said information would result in invasion of unwarranted and uncalled for privacy of individuals concerned. Even the disclosure of information pertaining to departmental enquiries in respect of Disciplinary Actions initiated against the Judicial Officers/Officials of the Subordinate Court or the High Court will affect the facile, smooth and independent running of the administration of the High Court, under the Constitution of India. Moreover, as per section 2(e) read with section 28 of the Right to Information Act, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of this Court is empowered to frame rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. In this regards, we point out that the ‘Madras High Court Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2007’ have been framed and as amended in regard to the Name and Designation of the Officers mentioned therein, the same has come into force from 18-11-2008.

•    In the upshot of quantitative and qualitative discussions mentioned supra, Information Commission, Chennai, to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice, this Court interferes with the order dated 10-01-2012 in Case No.10447/ Enquirt/A/11 passed by the 2nd Respondent/ Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai and sets aside the same, to secure the ends of Justice Resultantly, the Writ Petition is allowed. No. costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition Is closed.

Heritage TDR

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Introduction

The city of Mumbai is filled with ancient structures of neo-classical design/art deco structures which probably are the city’s last connection with its glorious past. In such a scenario, it becomes necessary to preserve this past and all things associated with it. However, there is also a need to redevelop/repair certain old structures.

To strike a balance between these two seemingly conflicting objectives, R. 67 of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai (DC Regulations) provide for the conversion of listed buildings, areas, artefacts, structures and precincts of historical and/or aesthetical/architectural/cultural value. These structures are known as “heritage buildings and heritage precincts”. A precinct generally means a space which has formal or artificial boundary lines around it. Thus, it is like an imaginary carved out area. Mumbai is the first city in India to get heritage protection.

The State Government comes out with a List of such structures and they are known as Listed Buildings/ Heritage Buildings and Listed Precincts/Heritage Precincts. The List divides the structures into three Grades—Grade I, Grade II and Grade III with Grade I being the most important and valuable.

Development/Redevelopment/Repairs of Heritage Buildings/Precincts

Carrying out any of the following activities in relation to heritage buildings/precincts requires the prior permission of the BMC Commissioner:

• Development/redevelopment
• Engineering operation • Additions/alterations/repairs/renovation
• Painting of buildings, replacement of special features
• Demolition of whole or part or plastering of the structure

The BMC Commissioner would consult the Heritage Conservation Committee of the State Government for this purpose. He has powers to overrule the Committee’s recommendations in exceptional cases. The Heritage Conservation Committee and the BMC have often been at loggerheads on several issues and the matters have gone to Court, for instance, hoardings on heritage buildings and precincts was the subject matter of dispute in the case of Dr. Anahita Pandole vs. State, 2004(6) Bom. CR.246. Hoardings in Heritage Precincts have also been the subject of other litigations, such as, Mass Holdings P Ltd vs. MCGM, 2006(1) AIR Bom. 658.

If there are any religious buildings in the List, then any changes required on religious grounds which are mentioned in any sacred texts or as a part of any holy practices shall be treated as permissible. However, they must be in consonance and in accordance with the original structure and architecture, designs, aesthetics and special features.

The above restrictions apply only to Grade I and Grade II heritage buildings.

Changes in Regulations
After consulting the Heritage Committee and with the State Government’s approval, the BMC Commissioner can alter, modify or relax the DC Regulations if it is needed for the conservation, preservation or retention of the historical, aesthetical, cultural or architectural quality of the Heritage Buildings/ Precincts. However, before carrying out any such modifications, he must hear out any persons who will suffer undue loss due to such changes.

Heritage TDR
If any application for development is refused/modified under R. 67, and such act results in depriving the owner/lessee of any unconsumed FSI, then the aggrieved shall be compensated by the grant of a Development Rights Certificate (also known as “Heritage TDR”). TDR from heritage buildings in the island city (that is, up to Mahim) may also be consumed in the same ward in which it originated. The TDR Certificate shall be governed by R. 34 and Appendix VIIA of the DC Regulations.

Before granting the TDR, the Commissioner would determine the extent to which it is required after consulting the Heritage Committee and it requires the prior sanction of the Government.

Restrictions on Heritage Structures Structures must maintain the skyline in the precinct as may be existing in the surrounding area so as not to diminish or destroy the value and beauty of the said listed Heritage Buildings. For instance, a 40-storey tower would look out of place in a group of heritage structures, all of which are 2-3 storeys tall. The tower would spoil the entire skyline of such an area. The BMC has issued Notification No. DCR. 1090/3197/(RDP)/UD-11 dated 25-04-1995 for the height of buildings in A Ward. The height after reconstruction must be limited to the existing height of the buildings of similar age in the area. Even a new building must conform to the general height pattern. In the case of listed heritage buildings and in the case of all buildings within the Fort precinct, clearance is required from the Heritage Committee. However, this restriction does not apply to the Backbay Reclamation Blocks area. Restrictive covenants imposed by the

State/BPT/Collector/BMC, etc., shall be in addition to the conditions of R. 67. However, if there is any conflict, then R. 67 shall prevail. Non-cessed buildings included in the List must be repaired by their owners/lessees and cessed buildings can be repaired by the MHADA/co-operative society/owner/ occupiers.

Grading
Grading of buildings in the List into I, II and III are carried out. Listing does not prevent change or ownership or usage. Care must be taken to ensure that the development permission relating to these buildings is given without delay. The Grading and various conditions for each Grade are as follows:


Conclusion

This is an important legislation to preserve and protect our city’s cultural heritage. Recently, the BMC has proposed to add some more structures to the Heritage List, a move which has been sharply opposed by the real estate developers and residents of those structures. While the debate over what should and what should not be included in the List would rage on, there is no denying that sustainable development with an eye on the past and future is the need in a metropolis like Mumbai.

Succession – Joint Family Property – Sale by Co-parcener without consent of others – validity: Hindu Succession Act 1956 section 30:

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The plaintiff-appellant had filed an Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge. The plaintiff-appellant- filed the aforesaid title suit for declaration that the registered sale deed dated 30-10-1998 executed by defendant No. 2-respondent No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1-respondent No. 1 as inoperative, illegal, without consideration and not binding on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendant No. 2 sold the suit property which is joint family property without the consent of the other coparceners.

The defendants filed the contesting written statement alleging that there had already been severance of status of coparcenary and there had already been separation in the family long ago. The suit property was in possession of the defendant No. 2, therefore, he sold the same to the defendant No. 1.

The trial court dismissed the suit finding that the defendant No. 2 had the authority to sell the property. On appeal, the Lower Appellate Court recording the same finding dismissed the title appeal.

The submission of the learned counsel was that although, there was separation between the parties but there had been no partition by metes and bounds, therefore, unless a consent is obtained by other coparcener/cotenant, the defendant No. 2 could not have transferred the property to the defendant No. 1. It may be mentioned here that in the case of Kalyani vs. Narayanan, AIR 1980 SC 1173, the Apex Court has held that partition is a word of technical import in Hindu law. Partition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenery is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition. In this narrow sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. Such an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenery with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-in-common. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the parties are separate. Therefore, there is no existence of coparcenery family. Now, therefore, even if it is held that there is no partition by metes and bounds accepting the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, then also after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, section 30 which proves that any Hindu may dispose of by Will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him or by her, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus and in the explanation, it is specifically mentioned that the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenery property be deemed to be the property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this section. Now, therefore, even if the property is held to be the joint property then also a coparcener has the right to dispose of the same i.e. his share. The relief claimed by the plaintiff is that because the property is coparcenery property, the coparcener could not have sold the property. This relief claimed by the plaintiff is contrary to the provision as contained in section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, in this case, separation has already been admitted. Whether there is partition or no partition is a matter that can be decided in properly constituted suit. Here, the question raised is as to whether a coparcener can sell his property or not?

In 2009(4) PLJR 225 SC (Gajara Vishnu Gosavi vs. Prakash Nanasahed Kamble & Ors.) the Apex Court has held that undivided share of a coparcener can be subject matter of sale/transfer. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the coparcener cannot transfer is concerned, has got no force in the eye of law.

Brij Kishore Chaubey vs. Ramkaran Singh Yadav AIR 2013 Patna 101

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Service of Notice – Termination of Tenancy – Service of Notice – 15 days notice send by Registered post – Agreement Stipulated 30 days – Suit filed after 30 days of deemed receipt of Notice – Transfer of Property Act section 106, General clauses Act 1897, section 27:

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The defendant was in occupation of one flat and a car parking area in a building on Camac Street. The rent last paid was Rs. 40,000 per month. The defendant entered this flat as a licensee of the plaintiff who was its owner. The licence agreement was dated 29th May, 2006. It was for an initial period of 11 months. It could be extended at the option of the licensee for two further periods of 11 months each. There is not much of a dispute that this licence for all practical purposes was treated as a tenancy. It was extended for two terms up to 28th February, 2009. It could be extended to the maximum extent up to this date. However, Clause 17 provided that before this period the tenancy was terminable at the option of the licensor or licensee. Either party had to give one month’s prior notice.

This option was exercised in 2007. By a notice dated 17th October, 2007 the defendants were asked to vacate the flat by November of that year. Thereafter, a suit was instituted by the plaintiff in the City Civil Court. The plaintiff withdrew that suit on 22nd April, 2010.

The plaintiff issued another notice to the defendant on 16th June, 2010. It was said to be sent by Registered post. A copy of the notice was also affixed on the entrance to the flat in the presence of two witnesses. The plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the flat. This time he gave them 15 days’ notice treating the defendant as a tenant, u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Thereafter, the suit and the Chapter XIII A Application were filed.

The Hon’ble Court observed that under Chapter XIIIA the plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment if on the available evidence on affidavits the Court is in a position to form an opinion that the defendant has no defence to the claim of the plaintiff. If the defendant is able to bring out a prima facie defence, which is equivalent to raising a triable issue, the court grants him leave to defend. Even when the defendant is unable to disclose any defence the Court may, out of sympathy, grant him leave to defend, if it forms the opinion that at a later point of time when the suit is ready for hearing, he has a very outside chance of putting forward some defence. But in that case the Court grants leave to defend upon obtaining security.

A few points of defence have been put forward by the defendant. The first is that this notice was never served. Secondly, 15 days’ notice was inadequate in terms of Clause 17 of the Licence Agreement between the parties which provided for 30 days’ notice.

The licence or lease agreement dated 29th May, 2006 was an unregistered document. Any lease of over one year’s duration can be made only by a registered document. Therefore, the agreement did not affect the property according to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. In other words, the document is to be treated as non est.

If the document is non est no rights are created by it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant was a lessee up to 28th February, 2009. For all purposes the lease was from month to month.

If the terms of the lease or licence agreement dated 29th May, 2006 were inoperative, there was no obligation to give any notice under those terms to determine the lease or tenancy. In those circumstances, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act came into play.

The Court observed that the notice dated 16th June, 2010 was rightly given. Only 15 days’ notice was required to be given under that section. Therefore, the notice determining the tenancy was valid.

Each of the defendants was sent the notice dated 16th June, 2010 by registered post with acknowledgment due. Each notice was delivered at the post office on 17th June, 2010. On each of the postal documents to record receipt there is a remark by the post office that an intimation was left at the office of the defendants on 19th June, 2010. Each of the notices was not claimed.

U/s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, if a document is required to be served by post, service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document. Unless the contrary is proved, service is deemed to have been made at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. U/s. 106(4) of the said Act, the notice u/s.s. (1) is to be sent, inter alia, by post.

Hence it was held there was good service of the section 106 notice dated 16th June, 2010.

Ajay Kumar Singh vs. Dasa AIR 2013 Cal. 125

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Recovery – Realisation of income tax dues – Priority over secured debt – State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.

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The Petitioner, a State owned Corporation and a Financial Institution governed by The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (SFC Act) sanctioned a term loan of Rs. 1,25,00,000 to M/s. Veekay Developers Pvt. Ltd. to establish a Luxury Hotel on 13-09-1995, which term loan was transferred to V.K. Clubs and Homes Pvt. Ltd. By way of security, the borrower—M/s. V.K. Clubs and Homes Pvt. Ltd, created an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds, of the portion of land and building. By way of further security, the said borrower created equitable mortgage over freehold rights in three shops. Additional loan of Rs. 86,00,000 was also sanctioned.

The borrower, having failed to repay the amount due together with interest the petitioner invoked section 29 of the SFC Act and took over possession of the properties, mortgaged and furnished as security.

On 05-12-2000, the Tax Recovery Officer, the second respondent, passed an order attaching the immovable properties, including properties mortgaged of the petitioner invoking Rule 48 of II Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 to recover Rs. 80,03,276 towards income tax dues, from Sri Vivian Kamath D’Souza, M/s. Veekay Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Shalimar Constructions and M/s. Canara Builders. On 23-12-2000, he issued a public notice in Udayavani newspaper informing about the attachment of the immovable properties calling upon anybody who had any claim or right to the said properties, to furnish necessary documents in support of the claim.

On 05-01-2001, petitioner brought to the notice of the second respondent the sanction of the loan on 13-09-1995 and 20-03-1998; the mortgage of the immovable properties, as also taking possession of the said properties on 30-12-1998 and 25-02-1999, invoking section 29 of the ‘SFC Act’. This was followed by notice dated 06-05-2005 to the second respondent, in response to which, a letter dated 27-01-2006 was addressed by the Tax Recovery Officer requesting the petitioner to proceed with the sale of the immovable properties as it had the first charge and to treat the Income-tax Department as a second mortgagee and after appropriation of the sale proceeds, hand over the remainder if any, to hand over the same for appropriation towards income-tax dues. The question before the court was

“Whether realisation of income-tax dues from the assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961 will have priority over the secured debt in terms of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951?”

The Hon’ble Court referred to the Apex Court decision in Union of India and others vs. Sicom Limited and another (2009) 2 SCC 121, observing that under Article 372 of the Constitution, as also well settled principles of law, statutory provisions will prevail over the Crown debt, and coupled with the non-obstante clause in section 46-B of the SFC Act, it would not only prevail over contracts but also other laws. In other words, the ‘SFC Act’, having provided for recovery of debt in preference to all other debts under any other law, the Financial Corporations were entitled to appropriate the sale proceeds towards the discharge of debt due to it, at the first instance.

Regards the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, it is clear that a first charge on the property is created giving priority to the dues of the said statutory authority over all other charges on the property, on the basis of the mortgage. The Income-tax Act, 1961 does not provide for a priority to the statutory charge over all other charges including mortgage under the ‘SFC Act’. The order of the tax recovery officer attaching property mortgaged in favour of the petitioner is quashed and the incometax authorities are restrained from interfering with the process of sale of immovable properties subject matter of mortgage in favour of the Petitioner, for recovery of its dues.

Karnataka State Industrial Investment Development Corporation Ltd vs. CIT, AIR 2013
Karnataka 104.

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Exports—Exemption u/s. 10A—Matter remanded to the Tribunal to consider the transaction of earning of interest on foreign currency deposit in detail to determine whether there existed any nexus between interest and industrial undertaking.

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India Comnet International vs. ITO (2013) 354 ITR 673 (SC)

The assessee, a private limited company established under the Madras Export Processing Zone, a 100% export oriented unit, engaged in the business of development and export of software filed its return of income for the assessment year 2002- 03 on 31st October, 2002, admitting “nil” income after claiming exemption u/s. 10A amounting to Rs. 8,34,84,900. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act by adding to income, the interest on deposits amounting to Rs. 92,06,602. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, namely that the interest income of Rs. 92,06,602 did not qualify for exemption u/s. 10A of the Act and the same had to be assessed to tax under the head “Income from other sources”. The Tribunal following the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (2003) 259 ITR 403 (Mad) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal holding that the interest income was earned out of the export realisation and kept in the foreign currency deposit account, as permitted by the FERA under the banking regulations and that there was no direct nexus between the interest earned and the industrial undertaking since the interest was received on deposit made in banks and it was that deposit which was the source of income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court observed that in that case, the Madras High Court examined in detail the transaction in question and found that the assessee had set up a new industrial undertaking in Kandla Free Trade Zone for manufacturing light engineering goods. The goods therein were exported during the assessment year 1985-86. In the course of business, the assessee was required to open a letter of credit. On such deposit, the assessee earned interest. Under the said circumstances, the High Court held, following the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Sterling Foods reported in [1999] 237 ITR 579 (SC), that the interest received by the assessee was on deposit made by it in the banks; that such deposit was the source of income; and that, the mere fact that the deposit was made for obtaining letter of credit which letter was, in turn, used for the purpose of business undertaking did not establish a direct nexus between the interest and industrial undertaking. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Madras High Court in Menon Import P. Ltd. ( supra) was based on the examination of the transaction in detail which exercise had not been undertaken in the present case.

For the above reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the case to the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal for deciding the matter afresh after examining the transaction in question, as done by the Madras High Court in the case of Menon Import P. Ltd. (supra).

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Foreign Court Decree – Order awarding costs would amount to decree – Execution – CPC section 35A, 44A

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The Defendant-Judgment Debtor challenged the order dated 15th April, 2011 passed by the learned District Judge-2, Nashik, rejecting the Petitioner’s Application for declaration that the recovery proceeding filed by the Respondents-original Plaintiffs be disposed of/dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or even otherwise on facts and further holding that the execution proceeding filed by Respondents being maintainable and the judgment and order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court was executable before District Court at Nashik. The Respondents-original Plaintiffs filed a Suit against the Petitioner-original Defendant in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court in England. In the said Suit, the Petitioner preferred Application dated 11th May, 2006 for declaration that the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court, U.K. would have no jurisdiction to entertain the Claim. The said Application was rejected by the Hon’ble High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, by an order dated 19th October, 2006 and imposed a cost in the sum of £12,429.75 equivalent to Rs. 10,16,753.55 with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Thereafter, the Respondents-original Plaintiffs filed Special (Civil) Darkhast in the Court of District Judge-2, Nashik for execution of the order passed by the Foreign Court, for recovery of sum of Rs. 10,16,753.55 towards decretal amount under Order dated 19th October, 2006 (costs) and Rs. 67,786/- towards interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal amount from the date of the order date i.e. 19th October, 2006 to 14th August, 2007 and further interest till the recovery of the amount. In the said Execution Petition, the Petitioner preferred on 1st March, 2008 an application for declaration that the Execution Application filed by the Respondents is not maintainable as the same is in respect of the costs imposed by a foreign Court. At the time of dismissing the Petitioner’s Interim Application, whereas, the main matter was still pending for hearing and final disposal. This Application for declaration was rejected by the District Judge-2, Nashik by impugned order dated 15th April, 2011 and hence, the Civil Revision Application was filed before the Hon’ble Court.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the explanation in section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure shows that the legislature has intentionally included the term judgment within the meaning of the term decree, for purpose of section 44A of CPC. The intention was to expand or enlarge the scope of term decree for the purpose of this section. Therefore, an order which may not amount to a decree but may amount to judgment would be a “judgment” for the purpose of section 44A of CPC. Thus, awarding costs would amount to decree within the meaning of section 44A and these can be recovered by executing order u/s. 44A of the CPC.

The issue of jurisdiction of the Court to execute order/decree of a country having reciprocal arrangement with our country was decided by the Division Bench of the Court in the matter of Janardhan Mohandas Rajan Pillai (deceased through Lrs.) & Anr. (2010) 4 AIR Bom R. 230. Therefore, the Execution Petition filed by the Respondents for execution of the order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by the English Court was maintainable.

Alcon Electronics P. Ltd vs. Celem S A AIR 2013 Bom 108.

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IFRS Conceptual Framework – Time to Revise

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In July 2013, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a discussion paper on review of the Conceptual Framework for financial reporting for comment only. Comments on this paper need to be given by 14th January, 2014.

The IASB’s discussion paper on the Conceptual Framework provides a welcome opportunity to set out the fundamental principles of accounting necessary to develop robust and consistent standards. Although this is not an immediate project, it would set the tone for the future direction of accounting.

Need for a review of the Conceptual Framework

In recent times, there have been many discussions regarding the extent of fair value accounting under IFRS, the measurement of performance, keeping assets on or off balance sheet etc. which raise questions on the fundamentals of accounting under IFRS. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as the accounting complexities increase, the IASB’s thinking about some of these fundamentals has also evolved. This gave rise to the need for a revised Conceptual Framework which reflects the recent changes in accounting and provides a backbone for future changes.

This discussion paper is designed to obtain initial views and comments on a number of matters, and focuses on areas that have caused problems in practice for standard setters as well as companies. It also sets out the IASB’s preliminary views on some of the topics under discussion.

Key changes envisaged

Revised definitions of assets and liabilities

The revised Conceptual Framework proposes to clarify the existing definitions of assets and liabilities. Rather than the focus of the current definition on inflow or outflow of resources, the proposals suggest that the focus should be on underlying resources or obligations as the basis for determining the recognition of an asset or liability. Given below are the proposed definitions:

(a) an asset is a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events.

(b) a liability is a present obligation of the entity to transfer an economic resource as a result of past events.

(c) an economic resource is a right, or other source of value, that is capable of producing economic benefits.

Additional guidance on applying the definitions of assets and liabilities

The IASB proposes to provide additional guidance on the meaning of economic resource, control, transfer of economic resource, constructive obligations and present obligation. Additional guidance would be provided also on reporting the substance of contractual rights and contractual obligations and executory contracts. These would be helpful to support the proposed new definitions of asset and liability explained above.

Revised guidance on when assets and liabilities should be recognised

The IASB’s preliminary view on recognition is that an entity should recognise all its assets and liabilities unless the IASB decides when developing or revising a particular standard that an entity need not, or should not, recognise an asset or a liability either because of cost benefit considerations or that such recognition would not be a faithful representation.

New guidance on when assets and liabilities should be derecognised

The existing Conceptual Framework does not address derecognition in a comprehensive manner. The IASB’s preliminary view is that an entity should derecognise an asset or a liability when it no longer meets the recognition criteria. However, for cases in which an entity retains a component of an asset or a liability, the IASB should determine, when developing or revising the standards, how the entity would best portray the changes that resulted from the transaction. This could be achieved by way of enhanced presentation or disclosure or continuing to recognise the original asset or liability and treating the proceeds received or paid for the transfer as a loan received or granted.

New way to present information about equity claims against the reporting entity

Financial statements currently do not clearly show how equity instruments with prior claims against the entity affect possible future cash flows to investors. Also, the IASB proposes to address the distinction between equity and liability, specifically the problems of applying the definition of liability consistently within IFRS.

Measurement requirements

This section of the discussion paper provides guidance to assist the IASB in developing measurement requirements in new or revised standards. The proposals state that there are different bases of measurement i.e cost, market prices including fair value and other cash flow based measurements. These bases should be applied based on their relevance, cost benefit analysis and their impact on the profit and loss/other comprehensive income (OCI) statement.

Principles for distinguishing profit or loss from OCI

The extant Framework does not provide guidance on presentation and disclosure. The reporting of financial performance (including the use of OCI and recycling) is a key topic that needs to be addressed. Further, the IASB proposes to provide more guidance in the area of materiality.

This Discussion Paper incorporates the views received through the IASB’s public consultation carried out in 2011. It has detailed discussions around the key topics mentioned above and other topics where different views have been deliberated and the IASB’s preliminary views have been stated out for comment. This is an important project for the IASB as it not only addresses concerns around the fundamental areas as they exist today but also set the principles for standards to be developed in the future.

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GAP in GAAP— Fair Value of Revenue

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Background

Company A sells handsets—either for upfront cash or for payment in installments. Until recently, its pricing was:

• Rs. 810 for upfront cash; or
• 36 monthly installments of Rs. 25 (total Rs. 900), implying an interest rate of 7% pa on the cash price of Rs. 810.

New competitors that sell handsets for cash but not on credit have entered the market—this has led to a drop in the cash sale price to Rs. 621 but A still makes most of its sales on credit on the same terms as before (i.e. Rs. 25 a month for 36 months).

This gives an imputed interest rate of 29% pa on the installment contract relative to the new cash price of Rs. 621. A believes this implied interest rate is unreasonably high. It sells some receivables on a non-recourse basis at yields approximating 7-8% pa.

How should A measure its revenues from handsets?

Options under Indian GAAP

View 1-The fair value of the consideration is the cash sale price (i.e. Revenue Rs. 621)

Since the handsets sold have a cash alternative price that is clearly determinable, revenue should be recognised at this price. In addition, even if the fair value of the consideration were higher than the cash sale price, this premium represents a payment for services to be received (financing services) that should be recognised over the service period as part of finance income rather than immediately as part of revenue from selling the handset.

The support for this view can be found in AS-9 itself. As per the illustration in AS 9 Revenue Recognition, “When the consideration is receivable in installments, revenue attributable to the sales price exclusive of interest should be recognised at the date of sale. The interest element should be recognised as revenue, proportionately to the unpaid balance due to the seller.” Though this paragraph supports the discounting of the installments, it does not provide any guidance on how the interest is determined. Therefore it is possible to determine the cash sale price based on an observable market and to treat the residue as interest, though that interest amount is much higher than the market.

View 2-The fair value of the consideration is the price derived by discounting the installment payments using market-based interest rates (i.e. Revenue Rs. 810)

The support for this view can be found in AS-9 itself. As per the illustration in AS 9 Revenue Recognition, “When the consideration is receivable in installments, revenue attributable to the sales price exclusive of interest should be recognised at the date of sale. The interest element should be recognised as revenue, proportionately to the unpaid balance due to the seller.” Though this paragraph supports the discounting of the installments, it does not provide any guidance on how the interest is determined. Therefore, it is possible to determine the cash sale price by discounting the installments at the market yield of 7% p.a.

In addition, Paragraph 47 of AS 30 Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement (not yet mandatory) states that the initial measurement of financial assets should be based on their fair value and the receivables are the consideration being valued. Therefore, under this view the fair value of the consideration should be derived by discounting the future cash flows using market-related interest rates.

View 3–No discounting (i.e. Revenue Rs. 900)
The illustration in AS-9 requires discounting in the case of installment sales. If the fact pattern was somewhat different, so that the payment was not based on installments, but the sales were on deferred payment terms, then discounting may not be required. For example, sale was made at Rs. 900 but entire payment of Rs. 900 is collected after six months. In such a case, it may be argued that the illustration in AS-9 which applies to installment sales does not apply in this case. This may be particularly true in schemes where a customer paying upfront or a customer paying over a short period, say 6 months, ends up paying the same amount. In other words, there is no interest amount to be imputed or the interest amount is immaterial. An interesting point to note is that under IAS 18 Revenue, revenue is always recognised at fair value of the consideration, and hence discounting is mandatory unless immaterial. Unlike IAS 18, under AS-9 there is no requirement to recognise revenue at fair value. The illustration in AS 9 to discount and separate revenue and finance income is only applicable when the sales are made purely on an installment payment scheme.

View 4-Accounting policy choice
In the absence of any detailed guidance, the author believes that either of the views above can be accepted. I suggest that the Institute should provide guidance as the object of an accounting standard is to eliminate diverse accounting practices.

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DCIT vs. Kaushik Shah Shares & Securities Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and Vivek Varma (JM) ITA No. 2163/Mum/2013 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 10th July, 2013.

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Counsel for revenue / assessee: Surinder Jit Singh/ Jinesh Doshi Section 88E, 115JB—It is the gross tax payable under normal provisions without deducting rebate u/s. 88E is to be compared with tax payable u/s. 115JB. From the higher of the two, rebate u/s. 88E is to be allowed. Rebate u/s. 88E is allowable even from tax payable on book profits u/s. 115JB.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made tax payment under normal provisions by comparing its tax liability (before claiming rebate u/s. 88E) on total income with income u/s. 115JB. The assessee submitted that tax rebate is a step which comes after determining income-tax payable on total income computed as per applicable provisions. It supported its view by income tax return ITR 6 prescribed by CBDT wherein gross tax liability before claim of rebate u/s 88E is first to be compared with tax credit under MAT and then from the higher of the MAT liability and tax liability under normal provisions of the Act, tax rebate u/s. 88E is to be reduced to arrive at a final tax payable by the assessee. The contention of the assessee was rejected by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where it was contended that rebate u/s. 88E was also to be allowed while working out tax liability u/s. 115JB for the purpose of determining tax liability u/s. 115JB. Reliance was placed on decision of Bangalore Bench of ITAT in the case of Horizon Capital Ltd and also on the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Naman Securities Finance Pvt. Ltd. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee on this ground.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the issue is covered by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Horizon Capital Ltd. (ITA No. 434 of 2010 dated 24.10.2011) and by the following decisions of coordinate Bench –

1 Ambit Securities Broking P. Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 7856/M/2011, AY 2008-09, order dated 6.6.2013);
2 DCIT vs. Arcadia Share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1515/M/2012, AY 2008-09, order dated 20.3.2013);
3 SVS Securities Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 6149/M/2011, AY 2008-09, order dated 8.8.2012).
Since the CIT(A) had followed the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Horizon Capital Ltd which was confirmed by the Karnataka High Court and also the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Naman Securities Finance Pvt. Ltd. which in turn has been followed by other co-ordinate Benches, the Tribunal did not see any merit in the grounds raised by the revenue.
The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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136 ITD 315 (Mum.) Arrow Coated Products Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y 2006-07 Dated : 14th March, 2012

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Section 36(1)(vii)—Deduction of bad debts available when debited to P&L Account—In order to claim deduction on account of bad debts, it is not necessary that individual debtor’s account has to be closed by crediting said account—a mere reduction in loans and advances/debtors account to extent of provision for bad and doubtful debt is sufficient

Facts:
The assessee had made provision for bad and doubtful debts in books of accounts in AY 2004-05 of Rs. 70 lakh. The provision was debited to Profit and Loss Account and also correspondingly reduced from gross total sundry debtors in the balance sheet. The individual ledger of debtor account was not written off by the amount of doubtful debts. In the return of income the assessee had not claimed deduction of provision of doubtful debts for AY 2004-05. In AY 2005-06 & 2006-07, the assessee wrote off the provision of doubtful debts of Rs. 20,36,000 (being part of Rs. 70 lakh) from the individual account of debtors thereby closing debtors account. The AO held that as the amount of doubtful debts was not transferred to P&L Account, the claim cannot be allowed. The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held:

After insertion of Explanation to section 36(1)(vii), the taxpayer is now required to debit Profit and Loss Account and also simultaneously reduce debtors account to the extent of corresponding amount. It is not necessary that individual debtors account be closed in order to claim deduction of bad debts. In the present case the assessee had not claimed deduction on account of bad debts in AY 2004-05. It is not required for the assessee to actually close the individual account of each debtor.

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(2012) 135 ITD 233 (Mumbai) Pranik Shipping & Services Limited vs. ACIT (Mumbai ITAT) ITA No.5962 /Mum/2009 18th January, 2012

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Section 36(1)(iii)- Interest free loans given to sister concerns—if assessee held interest free funds and also interest bearing funds, presumption would be that investments were made from interest free funds available with assessee.

Section 40(a)(ia) and section 194A—Business expenditure—assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure for which no accounting entry was passed in books of account— the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier—Since the said interest was neither credited in the books of account nor paid in the year, section 194A cannot be attracted—Once there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

Facts I:
The assessee had given interest-free funds to its sister concerns. The AO observed that no interest was charged on such advances to sister concerns whereas substantial interest was paid on borrowed funds. In absence of any nexus between the interest-free funds advanced and interest-free funds available with the assessee, the AO made disallowance by applying 15% rate of interest. The CIT(A) also upheld the AO’s action.

Held I:
The Tribunal observed that the interest-free funds available at the disposal of the assessee were far in excess of the interest-free loans advanced to the sister concerns. Relying on the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Utility and Power Limited [(2009) 313 ITR 340 (Bom.)], the Tribunal held that if the assessee has interest-free funds as well as interest-bearing funds at its disposal, it shall be presumed that investments were made from interest-free funds available with the assessee. The addition was deleted.

Facts II:
Assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure in the computation of total income for which no accounting entry was passed in the books of account. The AO held that assessee followed cash system of accounting in respect of accounting of interest expenditure and as assessee had not made any payment of interest, the same was not deductible. The Ld CIT(A) held that the assessee had not deducted TDS on interest payable and hence u/s. 40(a)(ia) the deduction was not allowed.

Held II:
The Ld. AO was not justified in applying hybrid system of accounting i.e., applying cash system for accounting of interest expenditure and mercantile system for accounting for all other items. As per section 145, income under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ is to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. The assessee was regularly following mercantile system of accounting.

In the mercantile system of accounting, deduction is allowed on accrual of liability and it is not material whether the amount is paid or not or whether or not it is recorded in the books of account. Assessee’s similar claim of deduction of such interest expenditure was allowed in earlier assessment years also.

As per sections 40(a)(ia) and 194A, the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier. The assessee did not credit such interest in the books of account under any account and further such interest had not been paid during the year. The deduction had been claimed on the basis of mercantile system of accounting straightway in the computation of income, without routing it through books of account, which had been held by us to be allowable. Hence, the mandate of section 194A cannot be attracted. As there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

This loophole was probably not contemplated by the Legislature while enacting the relevant provisions, which has been exploited by the assessee as a measure of tax planning.

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(2011) 135 ITD 398 (Pune) Patni Computer Systems Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y 2002-03 & 2003-04. Dated : 30th June, 2011

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Section 92B—Transfer Pricing—Extension of credit to the Associated Enterprises (‘AEs’) beyond the stipulated credit period vis-a-vis others cannot be construed as an “international transaction” for the purposes of section 92B(1) so as to require adjustment for ascertaining the ALP.

Section 92B—Transfer pricing—Adjustment for cost of consultancy fees paid for undertaking study for the purpose of restructuring the assessee’s organisational structure—Apportionment of impugned cost is permissible only in a situation where there exists a “mutual agreement or arrangement” between two or more AEs for apportionment of cost.

Section 10A—Establishment of three new units at three different locations, with investments in fixed assets is not mere expansion and would be eligible for deduction u/s 10A.

Facts I:
Assessee had international transactions with AEs and on this count, the AEs had some outstandings due to the assessee. Such outstandings were overdue and no interest was charged by the assessee on such amounts. The TPO has considered non-charging of interest as an ‘international transaction’ requiring adjustment to determine the ALP on the basis that the normal period of credit allowed to the AEs was 90 days, and to the other similarly placed customers the credit period allowed was 30 to 45 days. The fundamental question raised by the assessee was as to whether extending the credit limit can be considered as “international transaction” under section 92B(1) of the Act.

Held I:
Relying on the judgement of the Mumbai Bench Tribunal in case of Nimbus Communications Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT. ITA No. 6597/Mum/2009, it was held that a continuing debit balance is not an international transaction per se, but is a result of international transaction. The commercial transaction, as a result of which the debit balance has come into existence, and the terms and conditions, including terms of payment, has to be examined for the purpose of arm’s length price.

Facts II:
The assessee had undertaken a study for the purpose of restructuring the organisational structure. According to the TPO, changes proposed in the study would also give benefits to the AEs and thus an arm’s length allocation of cost of consultancy expenses paid for study was required to be made. According to the Revenue, it was imperative for the assessee to have recovered such costs from the AEs and since the assessee had not done so, certain expenditure was allocated by the TPO on this score.

Held II:
Apportionment of impugned cost is permissible only in a situation where there exists a “mutual agreement or arrangement” between two or more AEs for apportionment of cost. There existed no such agreement or arrangement in the given case. The study reports may bring certain intangible benefits in the form of enhanced productivity to the businesses of the AEs, however, this would not ipso facto justify the apportionment of the cost incurred, where the use of such studies by the AEs is not obligated in terms of any mutual agreement or arrangement between the assessee and the AEs, but the use is only discretionary on the part of the foreign AEs.

Moreover, there would not be any justification for apportioning the expenditure unless it is shown that the expenses incurred on such activities was disproportionate and the benefit which accrued to the AEs in the form of increased business productivity was not merely incidental, but was tangible and concrete. There was no material to show that any tangible and concrete benefit has accrued to the AEs as a result of the expenditure incurred by the assessee in obtaining consultancy.

Facts III:
The AO noted that the assessee has treated three new units as separate independent units for the purpose of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The AO further noted that approval from STPI reflected the new units as expansion of existing units. On the basis of this the AO concluded that the profitability of the aforesaid three units was liable to be combined with that of the corresponding old units and thus the eligible period for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act with respect to the said three units would be reckoned from the first year of the eligibility of the corresponding old units. The CIT(A), however, held that the assessee fulfilled all the conditions prescribed u/s. 10A(2) of the Act. All the three units had their own plant and machinery having substantial investment and substantial turnover and were located in different premises.

Held III:

For claim of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, examination as to whether the three units are independent units and whether they fulfil the conditions prescribed u/s. 10A(2) of the Act is important. There is no prohibition that an expansion in the same line of business achieved by setting up a new independent unit would lead to denial of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The assessee would not be disentitled to deduction u/s. 10A merely due to the fact that the requisite permissions from STPI refer them as expansions of the existing units.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28, S. 37 — Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of unmatured forward contracts on the last date of the accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange prevailing on that date is allowable as a deduction.

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New Page 2

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS


17 DCIT v. Bank of Bahrain &
Kuwait

ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai (SB)

Before D. Manmohan (VP),

S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and D. K.
Agarwal (JM)

ITA Nos. 4404 & 1883/Mum./2004

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 & 1998-99

Decided on : 13-8-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee :
Ajit Kumar
Sinha/F. V. Irani

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28, S.
37 — Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of unmatured forward contracts on the
last date of the accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange
prevailing on that date is allowable as a deduction.

Per S. V. Mehrotra :

Facts :

The assessee was a non-resident
company carrying on banking business in India. It entered into forward contracts
with its clients to buy or sell foreign exchange at an agreed price on a future
date. On the date of maturity, the execution of the contract resulted in profits
or losses to the assessee. There was no dispute as regards losses arising on
execution of the contracts within the same year. However, in cases where the
date of maturity of the contract fell beyond the end of the accounting period,
the assessee evaluated the unmatured forward contract on the last day of the
accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange prevailing on that
date and booked the profit or loss accordingly. The Assessing Officer (AO) taxed
the profit so booked but did not allow the assessee’s claim of loss, by relying
on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank
(183 ITR 200), on the ground that the loss is incurred on the date of maturity
of the contract and there cannot be any loss prior to such date. In other words,
he held such loss to be notional.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred
an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the assessee’s
appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal.

The assessee supported its claim
by relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Deutsche Bank
A.G., 86 ITD 431 (Mum.). The Tribunal noted that in the case of Deutsche Bank
(supra) the decision of the Madras High Court was distinguished on the ground
that the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether notional or
anticipated loss could be allowed as deduction or not, while the Tribunal was
concerned with the valuation of stock-in-trade. The Bench referred the matter,
since the assessee, as a banker, only entered into contract to sell/buy the
foreign currency at a future date, but did not buy or sell such contracts from
or in the market. It observed that the assessee was not holding these contracts
as stock-in-trade and, therefore, the decision in the case of Deutsche Bank was
not applicable.

The Bench framed the following
question of law for reference :

“Whether on facts and
circumstances of the case, can it be said that where a forward contract is
entered into by the assessee to sell the foreign currency at an agreed price at
a future date falling beyond the last date of accounting period, the loss is
incurred to the assessee on account of evaluation of the contract on the last
date of the accounting period i.e., before the date of maturity of the forward
contract.”

Held :

The Special Bench of the
Tribunal decided this ground in favour of the assessee and held :

(1) Deduction is allowable
under the Act in respect of those liabilities which crystalise during the
previous year. Therefore, the concept of crystalisation of liability under
the Income-tax Act assumes significance vis-à-vis commercial principles in
vogue. As per the commercial principles of policy of prudence, all
anticipated liabilities have to be accounted, but as per Income-tax Act,
only that liability will be allowed which has actually accrued. Due
weightage must be given to commercial principles in deciding such issues.

(2) Anticipated liabilities
which are contingent in nature are not allowable, but if an anticipated
liability is coupled with present obligation and only quantification can
vary depending upon the terms of the contract, then a liability is said to
have crystalised on the balance sheet date.

(3) A contingent liability
depends purely on the happening or not happening of an event, whereas if an
event has already taken place, which, in the present case, is of entering
into the contract and undertaking of obligation to meet the liability, and
only consequential effect of the same is to be determined, then, it cannot
be said that it is in the nature of contingent liability.

    4. The issues relating to accrual of income cannot be decided on the same footing and considerations on which the issues relating to loss/expense is to be decided. In case of loss/expense, it is the concept of reasonable certainty to meet an existing obligation which comes into play which in legal terminology is said to be ‘crystalisation of liability’. When outflow of economic resources in settlement of present obligation can be anticipated with reasonable accuracy, then it is to be recognised as a crystallised liability. This is in consonance with the principle of prudence as considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward Governor of India Pvt. Ltd.

    5. The Revenue’s contention that liability can arise only when contract matures is completely divorced of principles of commercial accounting and, therefore, cannot be accepted. Both legal obligation and commercial principles have to be taken into consideration for deciding such issues.

    6. The anticipated losses on account of existing obligation on 31st March, determinable with reasonable accuracy, being in the nature of expenditure/accrued liability, have to be taken into account while preparing financial statements.

    7. The elements of financial statement can be broadly divided into the following five groups, viz. assets, liabilities, equity, income/gains and expenses/loss. These items are recognised in a financial statement if both the following criteria are met :

    a) future economic benefit will be there from the said events,

    b) the event can be measured in monetary terms.

In the present case, the AO himself has observed in the assessment order that at the time of entering into the contract, the assessee has recorded the income/loss on the basis of difference between the contracted rate and spot rate. Thus, to say that the contract was incapable of being recognised in the books of account, is not correct. The assessee recorded only the net effect of the transaction and not the entire transaction. Whether the deduction is allowable or not, therefore, cannot be guided by this factor.

    8. The AO cannot reject the method of accounting followed by the assessee merely on the ground that a better method of accounting could be the alternate one. However, in the present case, though observations have been made by the AO to this effect, but actual disallowance has been made by treating the impugned amount as contingent liability.

    9. Accounting Standard 11 issued by ICAI is mandatory and mandates that in a situation like in the present case, since the transaction is not settled in the same accounting period, the effect of exchange difference has to be recorded on 31st March.

    10. The foreign exchange currency held by the assessee bank is its stock-in-trade. On facts, this contract was incidental to the assessee’s holding of the foreign currency as current assets. Therefore, in substance, it cannot be said that the forward contract had no trappings of stock-in-trade.

    11. Profits are considered only when actual debt is created in favour of the assessee, but in case of anticipated losses, if an existing binding obligation, though dischargeable at a future date, is determinable with reasonable certainty, then the same is allowable.

    12. The principle that the liability in paraesenti is an allowable deduction but a liability in futuro, which for the time being is only contingent is not allowable has to be applied keeping in view the principles of prudence and applicable Accounting Standards.

13. When  profits  are  being  taxed  by  the Department in respect of such unmatured foreign exchange contracts, then there was no reason to disallow the loss as claimed by the assessee in respect of the same contracts on the same footing.

S. 40(a)(ia) read with S. 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Tax deductible for the year deducted belatedly on the last day of the accounting year and paid before the due date for filing of return — Whether AO justified in disallowing the expenditure u/s.

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(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS

16 Bapusaheb Nanasaheb Dhumal v.
ACIT

ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai

Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and

Vijay Pal Rao (JM)

ITA No. 6628/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on :
25-6-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue :
Anil J. Sathe/

S. S. Rana

S. 40(a)(ia) read with S. 194C
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Tax deductible for the year deducted belatedly on
the last day of the accounting year and paid before the due date for filing of
return — Whether AO justified in disallowing the expenditure u/s.40(a)(ia) —
Held, No.

Per Vijay Pal Rao :

Facts :

During the year, the assessee
had paid various sums to contractors but the tax was deducted only on 31-3-2005.
According to the AO, as per the provisions of S. 194C, the assessee was required
to deduct and pay the tax regularly in each month when the contractors were
paid. Since the assessee had deducted full amount of the tax only on 31-3-2005,
he restricted the allowance of deduction only in respect of payments made during
the month of March and disallowed the deduction in respect of the payments which
were credited and made during the period other than the month of March 2005. On
appeal the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue
submitted that the assessee had failed to deduct and pay tax as required
u/s.194C. According to it, S. 40(a)(ia) grants relaxation of time period in
depositing the TDS only in a case when the tax was deductible and deducted in
the last month of the previous year — where the time for deposit of tax is
allowed till the due date of filing of the return u/s.139(1). In cases where the
tax is deductible prior to the month of March, then the same has to be deducted
before the end of the last month of the previous year and paid by the due date
as given in S. 194C. According to it, since the assessee had failed to deduct
and pay tax as required u/s.194C and other provisions of Chapter XVII of the
Act, the AO was justified in disallowing the expenditure claimed. It also relied
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madurai Mills and Co. Ltd.
(89 ITR 445).

Held :

According to the Tribunal the
controversy revolves around the applicability of the provisions of S. 194C while
disallowing the expenditure u/s. 40(a)(ia). According to it, the provisions of
S. 194C are relevant only for the purposes of ascertaining the deductibility of
the tax from the payments made. Once it is determined that the nature of payment
falls under the provisions of Chapter XVII, the disallowance for non-compliance
with TDS provisions would be governed by the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).
According to it, the proviso to S. 40(a)(ia) makes it further clear that even in
the case when the tax has been deductible as per the provisions of Chapter XVII,
but deducted in the subsequent year or deducted during the last month of
previous year, but paid after the due date u/s.139(1) or deducted during the
other months of the previous year, but paid after the end of the said previous
year, then the said sum would be allowed as deduction in the previous year in
which the tax is paid. According to it, if the conditions of deduction and
payment prescribed under Chapter XVII are applicable for disallowance of
deduction, then the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) would be rendered as meaningless.
It further added that as per S. 40(a)(ia) when the tax is deducted, even
belatedly, and deposited belatedly, then deduction is not denied and is
allowable in the previous year in which the tax was deposited. According to it,
the provisions of Chapter XVII were relevant only for ascertaining the
deductibility of the tax at source and not for the actual deduction and payment
for attracting the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).

Therefore, since the assessee
had deducted the tax in the last month of the previous year and deposited the
same before the due date of filing of the return, it allowed the claim of the
deduction of the assessee. It further observed that the case relied on by the
Revenue is not relevant.

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S. 147 — AO cannot assess other income noticed in proceedings

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26 ITO v. Smt. Darshan Kaur

w/o S. Adesh Singh

ITAT Amritsar Bench, Amritsar (SMC)

Before Sh. Joginder Pall (AM)

ITA No. 282/ASR/2007

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 16-11-2007

Counsel for revenue/assessee : M. S. Minhas/

P. N. Arora

S. 147 — Reassessment — When no addition is made on the
ground for which reassessment was initiated, can the AO assess any other income
which comes to his notice in the course of such proceedings — Held, No.

Facts :

The assessee filed return of income for A.Y. 2001-02,
declaring total income of Rs.32,180, which was processed u/s.143(1)(a) of the
Act. Subsequently, based on tax evasion petition, the Assessing Officer
initiated proceedings u/s.147 allegedly on the ground that the assessee had
purchased ½ share of land with one room, on 15-11-2000, for a consideration of
Rs.1,19,250 from undisclosed income. Thus, reassessment proceedings were
initiated to bring to tax unexplained investment in property. In response to
notice u/s.147, the assessee filed return of income declaring total income to be
the same as that shown in his original return. Along with this return of income,
he filed copy of capital account indicating opening capital of Rs.4,56,298. The
assessee had shown withdrawals of Rs.1,25,000 from the said opening capital as
being invested in purchase of property. The assessee explained the source of
opening capital to be accumulated savings of the past. The Assessing Officer
observed that income earned in the past must have been utilised for purchase of
property from which rental income is being shown in the returns. Thus, the
Assessing Officer allowed credit of Rs.1,00,000 of past savings and made an
addition of Rs.3,56,298 on account of opening capital shown in the return. No
addition on account of unexplained investment in purchase of property for which
proceedings were initiated u/s.147 was made. The CIT(A) quashed the order passed
by the Assessing Officer on the ground that no addition in respect of ground for
which proceedings u/s.147 were initiated has been made by the Assessing Officer.
Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the Revenue preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue on the
ground that since the Assessing Officer has not made any addition, in respect of
which proceedings were initiated, he was not competent to bring to tax the
opening capital during the course of completing the reassessment. The Tribunal
observed as under :

(a) No doubt, the amended provisions of S. 147 empower the
AO to assess or reassess the income chargeable to tax, which has escaped
assessment and also any other income chargeable to tax, which has escaped
assessment which comes to his notice subsequently during the proceedings
u/s.147. However, the question of bringing to tax any other income chargeable
to tax, which comes to his notice subsequently during the course of
reassessment proceedings would arise only if the ground for which proceedings
u/s.147 were initiated was found valid.

(b) Since in this case, the AO has not made any addition in
respect of ground for which proceedings were initiated, he was not competent
to bring to tax the opening capital during the course of completing the
reassessment. The AO was competent to initiate separate proceedings u/s.147 to
bring to tax the unexplained capital by dropping the proceedings already
initiated, provided such action was within the time allowed.

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S. 80JJA — Subsidy received from State Government qualifies for deduction.

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25 Arvind Gupta v. ITO


ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Jaipur

Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and

B. P. Jain (AM)

ITA No. 799/JP/07

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 31-3-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mahendra Gargieya & Sharvan
Gupta/D. P. Gupta

S. 80JJA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 –– Whether subsidy
amount received from the State Government qualifies for deduction u/s.80JJA —
Held, Yes.

Facts :

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2003-04, the
assessee was granted subsidy aggregating to Rs.26.16 lacs by the Government of
Rajasthan. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80JJA of the Act, included the
said amount of subsidy. The AO was of the view that the subsidy is not derived
from the specified business and therefore he disallowed the claim of deduction
u/s.80JJA. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the certificate of the Additional
Director of Agriculture made it evident that subsidy was not given to the
manufacturer, but it was a subsidy to the cultivators. As per the procedure laid
down by the Government, the assessee had to receive a part of the sale price
from the Government. Thus, the subsidy was only a part of the selling price and
hence was a trading receipts. The Tribunal agreed with the contentions of the
assessee that the subsidy granted was nothing but a part of the sale price of
the product, which was realised. The Tribunal further observed that u/s.80JJA,
the subjected profit is not confined merely to the undertaking, but profit and
gains should be derived from any business of an undertaking, thus giving it a
wider meaning.


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S. 32(1) read with S. 43(6) — WDV of block brought forward from preceeding year to be reduced by WDV of assets discarded.

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24 Yamaha Motors India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Delhi

Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and

Deepak R. Shah (AM)

ITA No. 1986 (Del.) 2005

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 23-5-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ved Jain/

Surkesh K. Jain

S. 32(1) read with S. 43(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Depreciation — Block of assets — certain assets forming part of block of assets
were discarded — Whether WDV of the block brought forward from the immediately
preceding previous year needs to be reduced by the WDV of the assets which have
been discarded — Held, the scrap value of the assets discarded needs to be
reduced from the WDV of the block of assets brought forward.

Facts :

The assessee had capitalised certain assets at Rs.4,71,51,016
on 1-11-1996. WDV of these assets as on 31.3.1999 was Rs.2,32,07,141. These
assets were discarded and written off by the assessee in the books of accounts
during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2001-02. The discarded assets were not
disposed of or sold during the relevant financial year. The assessee while
computing the WDV of the block of assets qualifying for depreciation did not
reduce the WDV of the block brought forward from immediately preceding previous
year by the WDV of the assets discarded. The AO disallowed a sum of Rs.58,01,785 being depreciation on assets written off in the books of accounts,
on the ground that these assets have not been used for the purpose of the
business of the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. The
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the scheme of depreciation effective
from 1-4-1988 has done away with the assetwise depreciation by substituting the
same by the scheme of block of assets by putting all the assets entitled to the
same rate of depreciation in one block of assets. The WDV of the block can now
be adjusted only in the manner provided in Ss.(6) of S. 43 of the Act. The
action of the AO in reducing the WDV of a block of assets by WDV of individual
assets by working out the same on the basis of asset-wise depreciation was held
by the Tribunal to be not in accordance with the provisions of S. 43(6)(c) of
the Act. The Tribunal held that what needs to be reduced from WDV of a block of
assets in the present case is only the scrap value of assets which have been
discarded during the year under consideration.


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S. 14 — Income from redemption of deep discount bonds taxed as capital gains

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23 C. S. Gosalia v. ITO


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

V. K. Gupta (AM)

ITA No. 1373/Mum./2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Decided on : 30-7-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Ajay C. Gosalia/

S. Srivastava

S. 14 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Heads of income — Deep
discount bonds held as investment — Taxability of gains earned on redemption
thereof — Held that income arising therefrom is taxable as capital gains and not
as income from other sources.

Per V. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee had purchased 64 deep discount bonds between
February 1999 and April 1999 through Bombay Stock Exchange for a total cost of
Rs.4.9 lacs. The same were held by the assessee as investment and he had not
offered to tax any income thereon in the year of holding. The said bonds were
redeemed by IDBI on 31-3-2002, resulting into gain of Rs.2.78 lacs. The said
gain was offered to tax by the assessee as long-term capital gain.

According to the AO, the income was liable to be taxed as
‘Income from other sources’ as per the Board Circular dated 15-2-2002. The
asssessee’s contention that the Circular relied on by the AO was applicable to
bonds issued after 15-2-2002 and his case was covered by the earlier Circular
dated 12-3-1996 was rejected. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the
AO.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee and held that the
subsequent Circular issued by the Board was not retrospective in nature and the
case of the assessee was covered by the earlier Circular of the Board viz.,
the Circular dated 12-3-1996. It also took note of the fact that the
assessee was holding the bonds as investment. Accordingly, the assessee’s appeal
was allowed.


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S. 115JA — Capital gains credited directly to capital reserve in balance sheet not to be considered in book profit.

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22 ACIT v. Vijay Furniture Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd.


ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sushma Chawla (JM) and

Abraham P. George (AM)

ITA No. 7104/Mum./2005

A. Y. 2000-01. Decided on : 9-7-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : B. K. Singh/

Jayesh Dadia

S. 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital gain earned
during the year was directly credited to capital reserve in balance sheet —
Whether AO justified in adding such gain to the book profit — Held, No.

Per Sushma Chawla :

Facts :

During the year under consideration the assessee had earned
capital gain of Rs.8.81 crore. In the accounts the said capital gain was
credited directly to the capital reserve in the balance sheet. The as-sessee had
claimed the capital gain as exempt u/s. 54E of the Act.

As per the accounts of the assessee, there was a book loss.
However as per the Assessing Officer, the capital gain was required to be
credited to the profit and loss account. Thus, according to him, there was a
book profit u/s.115JA. Applying the ratio of the Bombay High Court decision in
the case of Veekaylal Investment Co. Ltd., he assessed the income at Rs.2.66
crore, after adjusting the book loss disclosed in the Profit and Loss Account
against the capital gains.

The CIT(A), relying on the Apex Court decision in the case of
Appollo Tyres Ltd. and of the Mumbai High Court decision in the case of Kinetic
Motor Co. Ltd., held that the Assessing Officer had no power to recast the
profit disclosed in the audited accounts. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in
the case of Appollo Tyres Ltd. and of the Mumbai High Court in the case of
Akshay Textile Trading & Agencies Pvt. Ltd. agreed with the CIT(A) and held that
the AO has no power to recast the profit once the same was certified by the
statutory auditors, and only those adjustments which are permitted by
Explanation to Ss.(2) of S. 115JA of the Act, can be made.

Cases referred to :



1. Appollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, 255 ITR 273 (SC)

2. CIT v. Akshay Textile Trading & Agencies Pvt. Ltd.,
203 Taxation 303 (Bom.)

3. Kinetic Motor Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, 262 ITR 330
(Mum.)

4. CIT v. Veekaylal Investment Co. Ltd., 249 ITR 330
(Bom.)


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S. 272A(2)(e) — Delay in return due to non-availability of accounts condoned.

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21 ADIT (E) v. Shri Vardhaman Sthanakvasi Jain
Sangh


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA Nos. 961 to 965/Mum./2006

A.Y. 1998-99 to 2002-03. Decided on : 16-5-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Malathi Sridharan/ K. Shivaram
and Paras Savla

S. 272A(2)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for delay
in furnishing of return — Delay was on account of non-availability of the
accounts — Whether cause of the delay was reasonable to condone the delay —
Held, Yes.

Per Bench :

Facts :

In respect of the years under appeal there was delay in
filing of returns of income which ranged between 553 days to 1,649 days. The
delay according to the assessee, was due to non-availability of accounts which
were taken by the accountant of the assessee and which could be obtained by the
assessee after long persuasion, in the year 2003-04. This resulted into delay in
finalisation of accounts and in auditing thereof. However, according to the
Assessing Officer, there was no reasonable cause for the failure to file the
return within the stipulated time and relying on the Bombay High Court decision
in the case of Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical Relief, levied a penalty
u/s.272A(2)(e) of the Act, which aggregated to Rs.6.44 lacs computed @ Rs.100
for each day of default. On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on the decisions listed at
S. Nos. 2 to 4 below and deleted the penalty.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue went in appeal before the
Tribunal and relied on the order of the Assessing Officer, and the Bombay High
Court decision relied on by the Assessing Officer.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A). Further, according to
the Tribunal, the returns filed by the assessee were non-est returns.
Therefore, relying on the Tribunal decision in the case of Rupam Cut Piece
Centre, it held that no penalty can be imposed.

Cases referred to :



1. Rupam Cut Piece Centre, 42 TTJ 533

2. CIT v. Sulekha Works Pvt. Ltd., 156 ITR 190
(Cal.)

3. CIT v. Vishnu Brass Parts Works Taxation, 48(1)
Guj.

4. CIT v. Maheshprasad Gupta, 178 ITR 468 (MP)

5. DIT (Exemption) v. Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical
Relief,
250 ITR 488 (Mum.)



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Reassessment: Limitation: Exclusion from limitation: S/s. 147, 148, 149 and 150: A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2002-03: Reassessment pursuant to order of appellate authority in case of third party: Condition precedent for exclusion of limitation: Assessee must be given opportunity to be heard: Order of Tribunal in case of third party holding that interest income belonged to assessee: Notice for reassessment beyond six years to assessee without giving opportunity to be heard: Notice barred by time:

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Rural Electrification Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT; 355 ITR 345 (Del):

The assessee advanced loans to a co-operative society which created a special corpus fund. The society earned interest on the special fund but did not disclose it in its return of income on the ground that the money actually belonged to the assessee and that any income earned thereon was on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal agreed with the submissions of the society and held that the interest was not taxable in the hands of the society but ought to be taxed in the hands of the assessee. On the basis of the said observations of the Tribunal the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 23-03-2011 for reopening the assessment for the A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2002-03.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, set aside the notices issued u/s. 148 and held as under:

“i) Before a notice u/s. 148 can be issued beyond the time limit prescribed u/s. 149, the ingredients of Explanation 3 to section 153 have to be satisfied. Those ingredients require that there must be a finding that income which is excluded from the total income of one person is income of another person. The second ingredient is that before such a finding is recorded, such other person should be given an opportunity of being heard.

ii) When the Tribunal held in favour of the society concluding that the interest was not taxable in its hands and that the interest ought to have been taxed in the hands of the assessee, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the assessee. No opportunity of hearing was given to the assessee prior to the passing of the order by the Tribunal in the case of the society.

iii) As such, one essential ingredient of Explanation 3 was missing and, therefore, the deeming clause would not get triggered. Thus, section 150 would not apply and, therefore, the bar of limitation prescribed by section 149 was not lifted. In such a situation, the normal provisions of limitation prescribed u/s. 149 would apply.

iv) Those provisions restrict the time period for reopening to a maximum of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The notices u/s. 148 having been issued beyond the period of six years were time barred.”

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Penalty u/s.29(8) of MVAT Act vis-à-vis High Court judgment

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VAT

S. 29(8) about levy of
penalty was amended from 1-7-2009. The amended S. 29(8), from 1-7-2009, reads as
under :

“29. Imposition of penalty
in certain instances :


(8) Where, any person or
dealer has failed to file within the prescribed time, a return for any
period as provided in S. 20, the Commissioner shall impose on him, a sum of
rupees five thousand by way of penalty. Such penalty shall be without
prejudice to any other penalty which may be imposed under this Act.”


It appears that from
1-7-2009 the quantum of penalty is sought to be fixed and also to make it
mandatory. Simultaneously, by amendment in S. 85(2) (b-2) the above penalty
order is made non-appealable. The learned Commissioner of Sales Tax has issued
Circular No. 22T of 2009, dated 6-8-2009 in which the implications of the above
amendments are explained and amongst others it is mentioned as under :


“3.
Penalty for non-filing or late filing of
returns — S. 29(8) is substituted :


(e) Amended sub-section
provides mandatory penalty and is in addition to any other penalty provided
under the Act.

(f) The officer shall
not have any discretion whether to levy or not to levy the penalty as also
to decide the quantum of penalty.

(g) The penalty order
passed under this Section is made non-appeallable; therefore there shall be
no appeal against the levy of penalty. [S. 85(2) amended]

(h) Needless to state
that since the levy of penalty for non-filing or late filing of returns has
become mandatory; there is no need to issue the show-cause notice before the
levy of such a penalty.”


The above mandatory levy of
penalty, in all circumstances, without right of appeal and without hearing
opportunity was agitating the minds of traders/dealers. On the behest of Tax
Consultants Association, Sangli and Federation of Association of Maharashtra,
writ petitions in case of Sanjay Dresses and Ravindra Udyog were filed before
Hon. Bombay High Court. In both the writ petitions the following challenges were
made :


(1) The S. 29(8) is
ultra vires the Constitution. It does not allow discretion in the matter of
levy of penalty. There can be a number of instances where delay will be due
to circumstances beyond control of the dealer, like medical emergency,
computer failure and others. The penalty amount of Rs.5000 may also exceed
the tax amount payable in return, e.g. tax payable may be Rs.100 but penalty
would be Rs.5000. The penalty is not commensurate to the object to be
achieved. This will be confiscatory as well as amounting to levy of tax on
income rather the penalty.

(2) That the order is
not appealable was also challenged. The penalty, being discretionary, the
mechanism of appeal is necessary.

(3) The penalty cannot
be levied without hearing. It is against the principles of natural justice.
Even assuming that the penalty is mandatory, still it may be levied in case
where return is not due, or the return is filed but not noticed by the
Department, etc., if levied without hearing. Therefore the hearing is a
must.

(4) The penalty be
deleted/reduced on the facts of the case.


When the above writ
petitions came up for hearing, the High Court was of the opinion that since
penalty order is passed without hearing, it is bad in law. At this juncture the
learned advocate on behalf of the Department tried to argue that post-levy
remedy is available like rectification. However when the High Court pointed out
that the hearing is required before the penalty order is passed, the learned
advocate conceded that the hearing is necessary before levy of penalty u/s.29(8)
and requested to set aside the order and remand back the matter. It is at this
point the High Court passed the order (Sanjay Dresses W.P. 1705 of 2009, dated
6-8-2010 and Ravindra Udyog W.P. 1214 of 2010, dated 6-8-2010, one of which is
reproduced below). When pointed out to the High Court that there are other
challenges, the High Court has specifically stated in the order that even after
passing a speaking penalty order, if there is a grievance, the petitioner can
again file a writ petition. Thus the other challenges are kept open to be dealt
with in subsequent matter, which may take place later.

“In the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
— Writ Petition No. 1705 of 2010

M/s. Sanjay Dresses …
Petitioner

v.

The State of Maharashtra …
Respondent

C. B. Thakar for the
petitioner.

V. A. Sonpal, ‘A’ Panel
counsel for the respondent.

Coram : V. C. Daga and S. J.
Kathawalla, JJ.

Dated : 6th August 2010.

P.C. :

Perused petition.

Heard learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Sonpal, learned counsel for the respondent.

    2. Mr. Sonpal, during the course of hearing, urged that the impugned order levying penalty be set aside and the matter be remitted back for consideration afresh so as to enable the Department to comply with the requirement of principles of natural justice. He further submits that fresh notice will be issued to the petitioner indicating the grounds on which the Department proposes to levy penalty. That the petitioner would be given an opportunity to reply the same and after considering the reply and affording personal hearing to the petitioner a reasoned order would be passed dealing with all the contentions raised by the petitioner.

    3. In the above view of the submission, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition reserving his right to challenge adverse order on the grounds as may be available in law including the grounds raised in this petition. All contentions of the parties on merits are kept open.

    4. Petition stands disposed of as withdrawn in terms of this order with no order as to cots.
(S. J. Kathawalla, J.)    (V. C. Daga, J.)”

Conclusion :

    1) The other challenges like Constitutional validity, and non-appealability are still open issues before the High Court.

    2)Since the Department itself has accepted that hearing is necessary before levy of penalty, the said principle will be required to be followed in case of other dealers also. The Department cannot take a stand that hearing is required to be given only to those who come before the High Court and not to others, though principle of giving hearing before levy of penalty u/s.29(8) is accepted. It will be an absurd contradiction and also discriminatory. If any other dealer approaches the High Court on the same ground, surely it will be difficult for the Department to save the situation in view of their own admission about giving hearing.

Follow-up action in case of penalty orders already passed:

Since 1st July 2009, a large number of penalty orders have already been passed without giving hearing. Such dealers can now file Form 307 (Rectification) and ask for cancellation of such orders, as bad in law. The Department will be required to cancel the same, give hearing and then pass reasoned orders, if required.

It may be noted that, in several cases, in the matters of levying penalty, the courts and tribunals have ruled that penalty cannot be levied if there is a genuine reason for the delay.

Inter-State works contract vis-à-vis application of composition scheme provided under local act :

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VAT

Inter-State works contract vis-à-vis application of
composition scheme provided under local act :


After 11-5-2002 inter-State works contracts are also liable
to tax under the CST Act. A question arises about deciding the value of goods
for levy of tax. Since works contract is a composite contract, involving supply
of goods as well as rendering of services, it becomes necessary to determine the
value of goods from the composite value for levy of tax under the CST Act.
Normally the said value is to be decided as per the guidelines given by the
Supreme Court in case of M/s. Gannon Dunkerly and Co. (88 STC 204) (SC). For
ready reference the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below :

“The value of the goods involved in the execution of a
works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by taking into account
the value of the entire works contract and deducting there-from the charges
towards labour and services which would cover :

(a) labour charges for execution of the works;

(b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and
services;

(c) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;

(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery
and tools used for execution of the works contract;

(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel,
etc., used in execution of the works contract the property in which is not
transferred in the course of execution of a works contract; and

(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent
it is relatable to supply of labour and services;

(g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour
and services;

(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is
relatable to supply of labour and services.

The amounts deductible under these heads will have to be
determined in the light of the facts of a particular case on the basis of the
material produced by the contractor.”

However to decide the value of goods, as per above
guidelines, is sometimes very difficult depending upon complexity of the
contract. Under Local Sales Tax Laws, a standard deduction method (i.e.,
abatement at fixed percentage) is provided for giving deduction for labour
portion and the balance is considered as value of the goods. Under the CST Act,
enabling provision for prescribing standard deduction rates is made by way of
proviso to S. 2(h) (definition of ‘sale price’) of the CST Act. However, till
today no such standard deduction rates are prescribed. Therefore, a question
arises as to whether a dealer can opt for such deduction rates provided under
the Local Act, for deciding the value of goods under the CST Act. Though the
issue was debatable, but, after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Mahim Patram (6 VST 248)(SC) it has became fairly clear. In light of the
observations made by the Supreme Court, it is felt that determination of value
of goods in a works contract is a part of assessment procedure and since by S.
9(2) of the CST Act the provisions of the Local Act for assessment are made
applicable to the CST Act also, the provisions about standard deduction can also
apply for determination of taxable value of works contracts under the CST Act,
1956. However after taking deduction of labour charges on standard deduction
basis, the further issue is about dividing the turnover in relation to
particular slab rates, like liable to 4%/12.5%, etc.

The determination of tax rate for a particular turnover under
the CST Act is provided u/s.8 of the CST Act, 1956. There is no other provision
under the CST Act for deciding the rate of tax. Therefore, though one can
determine the value of the goods, the division of the same in different slab
rates is again a complex issue. Under the Local Act, to avoid the difficulties
of reducing contract value by labour charges as well as deciding taxable value
into different slab rates, etc., the composition schemes are provided. Under
such composition schemes the dealer can pay the tax on total contract value
(lump sum) at prescribed percentage. Thus, such composition schemes make
taxation of works contracts easier and simpler. For example, under the MVAT Act,
2002, two composition schemes for works contracts are provided. Under one of the
schemes, on notified construction contract, a dealer can pay at the rate of 5%
of the total contract value, whereas under the other general scheme, a dealer
can pay at the rate of 8% of the total contract value. Such schemes are normally
optional and they are in lieu of tax payable as per normal rates under the Local
Act. As under such schemes there is no determination of rate of tax as per S. 8
of the CST Act, it was felt that such optional composition schemes cannot apply
to inter-State works contracts. S. 8 provides for deciding rate of taxes as per
legal provisions and there is also no alternative composition scheme under the
CST Act for paying tax on lump sum contract value.

However, it appears that the said issue is also now resolved
by the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority (CSTAA). This authority, which is
set up to determine inter-State tax disputes under the CST Act, when two or more
states are involved, is constituted under the provisions of the CST Act, 1956.
The said authority has recently decided the above issue in the case of
Commissioner of VAT v. State of Haryana,
(23 VST 10). In this case the issue
was about the nature of contract as well as determining assessable value of the
contract. The facts were that the contractor had received a contract from the
Government of New Delhi for improvement of roads, etc. For completing the said
work the contractor transported bituminous mixture (known as dense asphalt
concrete) from Haryana to New Delhi. The New Delhi authorities wanted to tax the
transaction as local sale. The Haryana Government protested the same on the
ground that it is inter-State sale from Haryana liable to tax in Haryana under
the CST Act, 1956. CSTAA agreed to this proposition of the Haryana Government.

The next issue under the said judgment was about discharging
of the CST liability on the said contract in Haryana. In Haryana, there was
composition scheme and a contractor could opt for the same. The CSTAA observed
as under :


“Just as in the Ll.P, Trade Tax Act, in the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 too, there are provisions dealing with the manner of determination of sale price of goods involved in a works contract. The relevant provisions are the following:

The definition of ‘sale’ includes consideration for the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract [vide (ze) of clause (ii)]. Clause (zg) defines ‘sale price’. Explanation thereto which is relevant for our purpose reads thus:
 
“Explanation (i): In relation to the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in execution of a works contract, sale price shall mean such amount as is arrived at by deducting from the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable toa person for the execution of such works contract, the amount representing labour and other service charges incurred for such execution, and where such labour and other service charges are not quantifiable, the sale price shall be the cost of acquisition of the goods and the margin of profit on them prevalent in the trade plus the cost of transferring the property in the goods and all other expenses in relation thereof till the property in them, whether as such or in any other form, passes to the contractee and where the property passes in a different form shall include the cost of conversion.”

Thus the manner of ascertainment of sale price has been specified in Explanation (i). Then, Rule 49 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 provides for a lump sum scheme of tax payment in respect of works contract. The framing of such rule is in accordance with S. 9 of the HVAT Act. It reads thus:

“A contractor liable to pay tax under the Act may, in respect of a works contract awarded to him for execution in the State, pay in lieu of tax payable by him under the Act on the transfer of property (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of the contract, a lump sum calculated at four percent of the total making an application to the appropriate assessing authority within thirty days of the award of the contract to him, containing the following particulars ….

and appending therewith a copy of the contract or such part thereof as relates to total cost and payments.”

Thus, the procedure for arriving at the sale price in relation to works contract has been put in place in the HVAT Act which was enacted in 2003 by repealing the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. It is, therefore clear that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahim Patram case (2007) 6 VST 248 applies with equal force to the present case.”

In light of above observations it appears that the CSTAA has considered both, deduction method as well as composition scheme, as applicable to the CST Act, 1956. Therefore, a dealer can now safely opt for composition scheme under the CST Act also for discharging tax liability on inter-State works contracts. This may be useful to dealers in discharging liability on inter-State works contract by opting for a simple method.

Liability of Builders — “K. Raheja” explained

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VAT

A controversy is floating around as to whether Builders or
Developers are liable to sales tax (VAT) on sale of premises such as flats,
offices, etc.


It is well understood that sales tax (VAT) may be levied on
sale of goods and not on sale of immovable properties, and the transactions of
sale of flats, offices, etc. are in the nature of sale of immovable properties,
hence the same are outside the purview of sales tax laws. However, there may be
a situation where the builder or developer may commence construction activity
for building, etc. and while the construction is on, the builder may enter into
an agreement with the prospective buyer for sale of premises. These are normally
referred to as ‘Under-Construction Contracts’. The controversy is about the
above transactions. The Revenue Department is of the opinion that the work
carried on by the builder/developer, after entering into such Under-Construction
Contract, is liable to sales tax as works contract. The argument is that since
there is an agreement for sale of premises and the work, using the property of
the builder, is done after such agreement, the property used in such work can be
said to have been transferred in the execution of works contract and hence the
liability will accrue. In fact this was the issue taken up by the Sales Tax
Department in Karnataka in case of K. Raheja. The matter went to the Supreme
Court.

The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in 2005 in the case
of K. Rehaja Construction, which is reported in 141 STC 298. Based on this
judgment, the Department is taking a view that all under-construction agreements
are liable to sales tax as works contracts. A similar view is also tried to be
adopted by the Sales Tax Department of Maharashtra as is evident from Circular
issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax bearing No. 12T of 2007, dated 7-2-2007.
In the ‘Sales Tax Corner’ of BCAJ (March, 2007), we have analysed the position
and observed that in spite of the judgment in the case of K. Raheja, all the
under-construction agreements cannot be liable to sales tax. The distinguishing
features in K. Raheja were also highlighted. In the case of K. Raheja, there
were in fact two separate agreements, one for sale of land and other for
construction, though embodied in one agreement. It is under these circumstances,
the Supreme Court observed that there is a separate sale of land and a separate
contract for construction. Therefore it was held by the Court that it is a works
contract liable to sales tax. In light of the above observations of the Supreme
Court it was pointed out that if in the under-construction contract the price of
land is not mentioned separately, then the judgment in the case of K. Raheja
cannot apply.

Recently the Gauhati High Court had an occasion to deal with
similar controversy in the case of Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others v.
Union of India,
(15 VST 17). The issue was in relation to service tax on
builders. While deciding the issue, the High Court has dealt with the effect of
the judgment of K. Raheja. A gist of the judgment is as under :

The petitioner was involved in development and sale of
immovable properties like, flats, etc. They entered into ‘flat purchase
agreements’ with various purchasers, wherein the petitioner-company allotted and
sold flats to the purchasers. The petitioner-company entered into an agreement
for sale of flat, which was registered. The Service Tax Department issued notice
on the ground that the petitioner- company is providing ‘Commercial or
Industrial Construction Service/Construction of Complex Service’. The
petitioner-company filed writ petition before the High Court and contended that
the transaction between the petitioner and the flat purchaser was purely a
transaction of sale of flat (i.e., sale of immovable property) and not a
contract for rendering of service of any nature whatsoever.

The High Court observed that in the case of
petitioner-company, the petitioner was not shown to have undertaken any
construction work for and on behalf of proposed customer and the title in the
flat passed to the customer only on execution of sale deed and registration
thereof. Until the time the sale deed was executed, the title and interest
including the ownership and possession in the construction made remained with
the petitioner. The construction activities which the petitioner had been
undertaking were in respect of the petitioner’s own work and it was only the
constructed work which was sold by the petitioner-company to the buyer, who
might have entered into agreement for sale before construction had actually
started or during the progress of construction activity. Any advance made by a
prospective buyer was against the consideration for sale of flat to the
prospective buyer and not for the purpose of obtaining services from the
petitioner. Under the above circumstances, the Gauhati High Court held that the
transaction cannot be liable to service tax.

The same principle will apply even for deciding the liability
under sales tax laws. As there is no element of rendering services while
selling the flat, similarly there cannot be sale of material, as ultimately in
such an agreement the flat, an immovable property is sold.


Amongst others, in relation to the judgment of K. Raheja, the
High Court observed as under :


34. Referring to K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka Assistant, (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 RC 105; (2005) 5 SCC 162, learned Assistant Solicitor-General has submitted that when the construction activities are carried on by a person by creating its own agency, it would amount to construction services. There can be no doubt that when a person creates an entity and engages such entity for its own constructional activities for the purpose of construction of residential complex, not for itself but for others, it would amount to construction service. What may, however, be pointed out is that the decision of the Apex Court in K. Raheja Development (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 SCC 162, which the respondents rely upon, is not applicable to the case at hand, inasmuch as this decision was rendered on the facts of its own case. In the present case, the petitioner-company is not shown to have under-taken any construction work for and on behalf of proposed customer / allottees and the title, in the flat/ apartments so constructed, passes to the customer only on execution of sale deeds and registration thereof. Until the time the sale deed is executed, the title and interest, including the ownership and possession in the constructions made, remain with the petitioner-company. The payments made by prospective purchasers in instalments, are aimed at facilitating purchase of the flat/premises by these probable purchasers, so that they may not be required to pay whole consideration at a time. From the condition so incorporated in the relevant agreement for sale, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner company is making construction for and on behalf of the probable allottees or purchasers.

35. Further, in K. Raheja Development Corporation (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 RC 105; (2005) 5 SCC 162, the Apex Court was considering the issue relating to ‘sales tax’ and the issue therein was not at all related to ‘service tax’. While interpreting the provisions of ‘sales tax’ under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, the Apex Court held in K. Raheja Development Corporation (2005) 141 STC 298 (SC); (2005) 5 RC 105; (2005) -I 5 SCC 162, that the definition of ‘works contract’ given under the Finance Act, 1994 is very wide and is not restricted to the ‘works contract’ as commonly understood, i.e., a contract to do some work on behalf of someone else. The Apex Court, therefore, held as under (at page 302 of STC) :

“…..The definition would  therefore  take within its ambit any type of agreement wherein construction of a building takes place either for cash or deferred payment, or valuable consideration. To be also noted that the definition does not lay down that the construction must be on behalf of an owner of the property or that the construction cannot be by the owner of the property. Thus even if an owner of property enters into an agreement to construct for cash, deferred payment or valuable consideration a building or flats on behalf of anybody else it would be a works contract within the meaning of the term as used under the Finance Act, 1994./1

36. In K. Raheja Development  Corporation  (2005) STC 298 (SC); 2005 5 RC 105; (2005) 5 SCC 162, the agreement provided that K. Raheja Development Corporation, as developers, on its own behalf, and also as developer for those persons, who would eventually purchase the flats, do the construction works. Thus, K. Raheja Development Corporation was not only undertaking construction work on its own behalf, but also on behalf of others who were prospective buyers. It is, in such circumstances, that K. Raheja Development Corporation was treated to have been doing the ‘works contract’. In the present case there is no material to show that the petitioner-company constructs the flat/ apartments on behalf of the prospective allottees and, hence, it cannot be said that the constructions done by the petitioner-company are the constructions undertaken by the petitioner-company for and on behalf of their prospective buyers/allottees. Thus, there is no ‘service’ rendered by the petitioner-company to the prospective allottees. Similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Assotech Realty Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 8 VST 738, wherein the Court has held as under (atpage  759):

“……In the present case, we find that  the petitioner is constructing the flats/ apartments not for and on behalf of the prospective allottees but otherwise. The payment schedule would not alter the transaction. The right, title and interest in the construction continue to remain with the petitioner. It cannot be said that the constructions were undertaken for and on behalf of the prospective allottees and, therefore, the constructions in question undertaken by the petitioner would not fall under clause (m) of S. 2 read with S. 3F of the Act and are outside the purview of the provisions of the Act. In other words, they cannot be subjected to tax under the Act and the action, in imposing tax on such constructions treating them to be works contract, is wholly without jurisdiction ….

If the above observations are read along with the detailed facts narrated in the Supreme Court judgment, it transpires that if the land price is shown separately, then a presumption can be made that there is sale of land and construction thereon is a separate transaction. This will amount to carryon work on behalf of others i.e., on behalf of prospective buyers. Therefore, where there is no such separation, the ratio of the above judgment will apply and there cannot be any liability under sales tax as works contract. Though one can wait for a direct judgment on the issue, the above judgment will be useful for understanding the effect of K. Raheja Construction and for advancing the contention that builders/ developers cannot be liable to sales tax in relation to each and every under-construction agreement. The liability will depend upon the facts of each case based upon terms of agreement, etc.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14 dated 22nd July, 2013

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Export of Goods and Software – Realisation and Repatriation of export proceeds – Liberalisation

This circular clarifies that exporters are required to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported upto 30th September, 2013 within nine months from the date of export i.e. the provision will be applicable for exports undertaken between 1st April, 2013 and 30th September, 2013. However, there are no changes in the provisions with respect to period of realisation and repatriation of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to warehouses established outside India.

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Challenge to Arbitration Award issued in foreign country should be in the country where award is published

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In the present case, the parties agreed that the arbitration would be held at Geneva, Switzerland. Hence, the Swiss law could be the curial law. The parties agreed, rules framed by ICC, Paris would be the appropriate procedure. In any event, Indian law would have no role to play when the parties expressly agreed that they would have sitting of arbitration abroad where Indian law would have no force.

When there was no express designated venue, the law applicable to the seat of arbitration would be the curial law.

If a contracting party feels, his counterpart in contract committed any breach, place of committing of breach would be ordinarily place where he should ventilate his grievance. Similarly, when arbitration is held in a particular place and losing party feels, the Tribunal did not decide issue in the way it ought to have, he has to approach the Court where arbitration was held and/or award was published unless parties mutually agree to be guided by another law or law of place where contract was performed.

Coal India Ltd vs. Canadian Commercial Corporation AIR 2013 (NOC) 265 (Cal.)

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NEW BANKING LICENSES-THE WAY FORWARD

1. Objective and Evolution of Global Banking

The word “bank” was borrowed from Middle French “banque”, from Old Italian “banca”, from Old High German “banc” which means “bench, counter”. Benches were used as desks or exchange counters during the Renaissance by Florentine bankers , who used to make their transactions atop desks covered by green tablecloths. Today, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) the world’s largest bank , has about $2.43 trillion of deposits, which is almost higher than the nominal GDP of India, Italy, Russia, France and the UK.

Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 defines a bank as “a banking company which transacts the business of banking in India”. Further, section 5 (b) of the Act defines banking as “accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, or deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise.”

Typically, the provision of deposit and loan products normally distinguishes banks from other types of financial firms. The core activity of banks is to act as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. However, several banks have successfully leveraged this relationship with depositors and borrowers (channel) to provide all sort of financial services ranging from core services (ATM, Cards, project finance) to ancillary services (Bancassurance, Investment banking, Wealth Management, etc.) to complex & structured solutions (Mortgage Backed Securities, Collateralised Debt Obligation, etc.). For example, other income (non-funded revenues) of Axis Bank was at ~20% of total revenues in FY13.

Conversely, non-financial entities having eminent distribution networks have migrated to the role of providing banking services. For example, Japan Post Bank which is owned by Japan Post Holdings Co., has the largest public deposit in Japan ($1.81 trillion) garnered through a nationwide network of post offices. However, the bank primarily invests its money in government bonds and acts merely as a savings bank. In India, the Department of Posts has applied for a banking license and perhaps is pursuing a similar model.

Banks can create new money when they make a loan. New loans throughout the banking system generate new deposits elsewhere in the system. The money supply is usually increased by the act of lending, and reduced when loans are repaid faster than new ones are generated. In the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2007, there was a big increase in the money supply, largely caused by much more bank lending, which served to push up property prices and increase private debt. The amount of money in the economy in the UK went from £750 billion to £1700 billion between 1997 and 2007, much of the increase caused by bank lending. In fact in many European countries, bank assets dwarf the size of the local economy and are far in excess of other regions in the world as per Table 1.

Excessive or risky lending can cause borrowers to default, the banks then become more cautious, so there is less lending and therefore less money so that the economy can go from boom to bust as happened in the UK and many other Western economies after 2007. Consequently, European banks’ profits have plummeted from 46% to 1.58% in the Top 1000 bank profits list whereas Asia’s banks have increased their profits from 19% to 56%.

2.    Evolution of Banking in India and need for new banking licenses

While global banking has seen regional disproportional growth due to country specific economic and regulatory requirements, India has its own model for financial development and its regulations. To a great extent, the conservative approach adopted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has helped insulate the domestic banks from global crisis; on the other hand, none of the Indian banks have become global in size.

India has 168 Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) and 82 cooperative banks. Of the 168 SCBs, 82 are Regional Rural Banks and 26 are Public Sector Banks. Thus, only 60 banks are private of which, 40 are foreign banks. According to RBI’s quarterly statistics on deposits and credit of scheduled commercial banks in March 2012, PSBs accounted for approximately 75% per cent of the aggregate deposits. This lopsided structure, where all the eggs are in the same basket, increases the risks to the economy and erodes financial stability while adding a lot of stress on the public banks to increase financial Inclusion. Further, Indian banks will have to bring in additional capital of Rs. 5 lakh crore to meet Basel III norms. The government on its part has to infuse Rs. 90,000 crore into the PSBs to maintain majority shareholding under Basel III.

RBI has as a strategy, since the economic liberalisation in 1991, has followed the cycle of permitting new bank licenses once every decade—in 1993, 2003 and 2013. This permits RBI to regulate the growth and stability of the banking system as well as the new entrants.

The key economic environment under which new banking licenses will be awarded in 2013 could be summarised as below:

•    Overall economic growth

We are in a situation where economic growth has collapsed, industrial output has stagnated for two years, jobs are being shed, consumer inflation is close to 10%, the current account deficit (CAD) in the balance of payments is nearly 5% of GDP at last count, investment is fleeing abroad, external debt maturing in the current fiscal year exceeds $170 billion and the rupee is touching new lows against the dollar each week. While the RBI and the Government are intervening with short-term measures, longer term initiatives are imperative.

As per the discussion paper on the entry of new banks into the private sector (Discussion Paper): “It is generally accepted that greater financial system depth, stability and soundness contribute to economic growth. But beyond that for growth to be truly inclusive requires broadening and deepening the reach of banking. A wider distribution and access of financial services helps both consumers and producers raise their welfare and productivity.”

There are three fundamental reasons for this cor-relation: (1) the banking system creates a more stable employment environment and provides more business opportunity, (2) it helps enlarging the per capita GDP as it brings the unaccounted sector into its fold and (3) it brings additional capital to the banking system, which has a snowball effect.

•    Financial Inclusion

As per the census of India about 59% of households had access to banking services in 2011 and the all-India average population per bank branch was 12,500 in 2012. The majority of India’s 6,50,000 villages do not have even one bank branch, and just 3.5 of every 10 Indians have access to formal banking services in the country, according to a 2011 World Bank survey. Only 37,471 branches were operational in rural India, as of March 2012, while the total banking outlets in villages (including branches, business correspondents and other modes) number just 1,81,753.

While the existing banks also function as per the same mandate (one rural branch out of every four branches), the entry of new players, with a specific and deeper financial inclusion as a license condition, should augment the overall rural presence.

•    Efficiency and Competition

While the overall efficiency of banks in India is increasing, there exists a lot of scope to improve the efficiency of the public sector banks. Net impaired assets (net NPAs + restructured assets) have increased rapidly in FY12 and FY13. Net impaired assets to net worth ratios are now at alarming levels, particularly for PSU banks. Barring BOB and SBI, for all other PSU banks, net impaired assets are almost equal to or even more than 1Q14 net worth. However, for private sector banks, stress levels are very much under control and manageable. Net impaired assets as a percentage of net worth is ~10% for private sector banks (except for Axis Bank at 14% and ICICI Bank at 12%).

Even for private banks, bringing in fresh competition from well-managed business houses, having proven track record in both profitability and setting up pan-India networks (e.g. telecom), will improve the competition and bring in innovation into the system which will only benefit the consumer. Currently, since there are only 3-4 private banks which have pan-India presence, entry of larger business houses will provide competition and much required depth to the financial system in India.

3.    New banking license guidelines

RBI granted licenses to 10 private players between 1993 and 2003. The players were ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, UTI Bank (now Axis), Global Trust Bank (GTB), IDBI Bank, Times Bank, Centurion Bank, Bank of Punjab, IndusInd Bank, and businessman CR Bhansali, who was accorded an in-principle approval but the bank never materialised. Of the 10, four were promoted by financial institutions and the remaining six by individual banking professionals. As it turned out, all those promoted by individuals either failed or merged with other banks, (viz., GTB with Oriental Bank of Commerce and Times Bank, Bank of Punjab and Centurion Bank with HDFC Bank).

The central bank become more cautious, and be-tween 2004 and 2010 granted licenses only to Kotak Mahindra Bank and Yes Bank.

The failures/mergers were essentially due to (1) weak corporate governance/frauds (CR Bhansali and GTB) and (2) lack of promoter interest or deep pockets (Times Bank, Bank of Punjab and Centurion Bank). RBI also noted that the experience of the Local Area Banks have also not been encouraging due to small size and concentration risk. Similar is the situation with RRBs.

The discussion paper thus notes: “The experience of the Reserve Bank over these 17 years has been that, only those banks that had adequate experience in broad financial sector, financial resources, trust-worthy people, strong and competent managerial support could withstand the rigorous demands of promoting and managing a bank.”

Further, Indian regulators have also learnt that during the 2008 crisis, it was the strength of the Indian JV partner which helped sustain the business, for example, an entity like Tata AIG. Further, RBI also learnt that only domestic banks (unlike foreign banks) have been able to penetrate the country and support financial inclusion.

In light of the macroeconomic situation and experiences both domestically and internationally (Lehman Brothers collapse, etc), RBI has come out with guidelines for issuance of new banking licenses. The table below attempts to summarise the key conditions of the guidelines and rationale for the same:

While the objective tests have been laid down as above, RBI has retained subjectivity in the allotment of banking license to give itself flexibility in decision making. It is expected that the RBI may consider the following and perhaps more, while evaluating each of the applications:

•    Industrial and business houses having a long history of building and nurturing new businesses in highly regulated sectors such as Telecom, Power,

Automobiles, Defence, infrastructure projects like Airports, Highways, Dams, Ports probably may be considered favourably as industrial and business houses with presence across various sectors would face a higher reputational risk compared to a pure individual promoter or financial services player.

•    Background of promoter, directors and top executives. No objection certificate of the promoter’s credentials, integrity and background will probably be taken from banks, other regulatory agencies and also from investigating agencies.

•    Corporate governance standards in the corporate entity, extent of financial activities carried out by the industrial/business house, comfort with the corporate structure within the group, whether ownership is diversified and separate from management and the source of promoters’ equity.

4.    Applicants and way forward

Unlike an NBFC License, a banking license is controlled with an occasional window which opens briefly, once in a decade. Essentially, some sort of excitement is expected over the number of applicants. In 1993, 13 applications were received out of which 10 were awarded the license. In 2003, 100+ applications were received out which license was awarded only to two. When the current guidelines of 2013 were announced, media reports expected over 100 applications to be received by RBI before the cut-off date of 1st July, 2013. To everyone’s surprise, only 26 applicants were received. Expected big names like Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd opted not to apply citing that the new rules may be too hard for businesses to implement.

Of course, each applicant would have done his cost benefit analysis before applying. The apparent benefits, amongst others, would be

(1)    Scalability and stability of business,

(2)    Better cost of capital due to access to public deposits,

(3)    Distribution network so as to improve the fee based income (eg- Bancassurance), and

(4)    Return on investments. Table 2 indicates the share price performance of new banks commenced since 1993.

The key challenges for setting up the bank would, amongst others, be

(1)    Stringent regulations, not just for the bank, but for all financial regulated entities in the Applicant group and

(2)    Cost on account of priority sector lending, branch expansion and financial inclusion.

The bigger issue arises from the fact that the conditions are expected to be complied with from day one of the commencement of the bank business. RBI has emphasised that it will not deviate from the guidelines while allotting licenses and thus, will not grant any exemptions.

The list of applicants along with a possible classification, and RBI’s potential key consideration for that bucket is tabled below.

RBI is now expected to set up a committee to screen and shortlist the applicants who will be called for interviews and discussion on the business plan. The in-principle approvals for the licenses are expected to be issued anywhere before the election next year and most probably between January to March 2014. It also needs to be seen if Mr Raghuram Rajan, the new RBI Governor (and former IMF chief economist) who was not in favour of the government giving banking licenses to industrial houses, has a decisive role to play in the grant of the banking licenses. His opinion has been that existing peers, like NBFCs and MFIs, should be given preference over corporates owing to their experience in this business. According to Mr Rajan, “If corporates are given license, the regulator needs to ensure there is no inter-company lending, proper risk management processes are followed and there is enough transparency.”5

Of the number of applicants, RBI will now be required to address several critical questions, including:

•    How many banking licenses should be issued, assuming the industry is likely to consolidate?

•    Will players with pan-India focus be given preference over regional players? Or whether both the categories of applicant will be considered?

•    Whether large industrial houses with experience in setting up pan-India networks like telecom, automobiles, etc., will get preference?

* The authors are senior officials of a well-known financial company. The views expressed in the article are their personal views.

1Medici Bank

2The Bankers Top 1000 World Banks Ranking – July 2013

5http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-02/ news/29374475_1_banking-licence-corporate-houses-raghuram-rajan

E-filing of tax returns goes to the next level

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Readers would be aware of the e-filing requirements with reference to income-tax returns. These were brought onto the statute long back and, by now, most of us are well versed in the process of e-filing of the ITR forms. We also have the e-filing requirements under Company Law whereby we have been filing documents electronically with the MCA. For the past few years, ever since the e-filing of returns was made mandatory, we have had a situation where the audited accounts, the tax audit report, the MAT certificate etc., have not been submitted to the tax department unless specifically called for during a scrutiny. This, in my opinion, has inadvertently led to a bit of leniency being shown by many of our members in terms of timely closure of documentation and filing.

Background:
Section 139 requires certain categories of persons to file tax returns in India. Section 139(1) states that the returns need to be in prescribed form. Rule 12 lays down the prescribed forms. Proviso to Rule 12(3) as amended vide Notification No. 37/2011/F. No. 149/68/2011-SO(TPL) dated 01-07-2011 makes it mandatory for some of these categories of return filers to e-file their returns mandatorily. For others, there is an option to e-file the returns (section 139(1B)) but only if they are assessable in specified cities. Section 139(1B) empowers the Government to formulate a scheme for e-filing. In pursuance of this power, the “Furnishing of Return of Income on Internet Scheme 2004” was notified on 30-9-2004. Then, this scheme was superseded by the “Electronic Furnishing of Return of Income Scheme 2007” vide notification No. SO 1281 (E) d. 27-70-2007.

As per Rule 12 (2), ITR-1, 2, 3, 4, 4S, 5 & 6 are not required to be accompanied by any documents. For A.Y. 2009-10, vide Circular No. 3/2009 d. 21-05-2009, the TP reports were to be filed physically before the due date. Thereafter, we have not had any such similar circulars but the practice of filing the TP reports on or before the due date for filing the returns has continued.

Recent notifications:

Now, on 1st May, 2013, the CBDT issued a Notification (No. 34/2013/F. No. 142/5/2013-TPL) which made amendments to Rule 12 whereby, the following proviso has been inserted in sub Rule (2) w.e.f. 1st April, 2013:

“Provided that where an assessee is required to furnish a report of audit under sections 44AB, 92E or 115JB of the Act, he shall furnish the same electronically.”

It is on account of this amendment that now, tax payers who are subject to a tax audit or a transfer pricing audit or who have to pay MAT, are now required to file the respective reports electronically.

Subsequent to the abovementioned notification, another notification has been issued on 11th June, 2013 (Notification No. 42/2013/ F.No.142/5/2013-TPL) which amended the proviso to Rule 12(2) which was inserted by the earlier notification dated 1st May. Now, the amended proviso reads as under:

“Provided that where an assessee is required to furnish a report of audit specified under sub-clauses (iv), (v), (vi) or (via) of clause (23C) of section 10, section 10A, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, section 44AB, section 80-IA, section 80-IB, section 80-IC, section 80-ID, section 80JJAA, section 80LA, section 92E or section 115JB of the Act, he shall furnish the same electronically.”

As a result of the above amendment, now, many more reports are required to be filed electronically.

Another interesting amendment that was made vide the notification dated 11th June is the insertion of second proviso to sub rule (3) of Rule 12. The newly inserted proviso reads as under:

“Provided further that a person who is required to furnish any report of audit referred to in proviso to sub-rule (2) electronically, other than a person to whom clause (aaa) or clause (ab) of the first proviso is applicable, shall furnish the return, in Form as applicable to him, in the manner specified in clause (ii) or clause (iii).”

The cumulative impact of all the amendments is that any taxpayer who is subject to any audit will have to file the audit report electronically and, in addition, also have to file its tax return electronically.

The new e-filing regime:
Before we look at the details of the new e-filing regime, a quick look at the changes in type of tax return forms that can be filed for A.Y. 2013-14:

 Form No.

 Change applicable from A.Y. 2013-14

 ITR-1 (Sahaj) 

 Cannot be used by an individual having:
i. A loss under IFOS
ii. A claim for foreign tax credit/relief under section 90/90A/91
iii. Exempt income exceeding Rs. 5,000

 ITR-4S (Sugam)

Cannot be used by an individual/HUF having:
i. A claim for foreign tax credit/relief under section 90/90A/91
ii. Exempt income exceeding Rs. 5,000

Similarly, the amended position regarding how the tax returns can be filed with effect from A.Y. 2013-14:

Registration of Chartered Accountant on e-filing portal:

Significantly, the onus of uploading the tax audit report, transfer pricing report, MAT certificate, trust audit report etc., has been cast on the concerned Chartered Accountant who signs such a report/certificate. As a result, the process of e-filing of such reports would begin with the concerned CA having to register himself/herself on the e-filing portal. It may be noted that many CAs would already be registered with the said portal and would have been filing their personal tax returns electronically. However, even such CAs would still need to register themselves once again on the portal. For this, one would need to visit www. incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in and register on the site under the sub-category of “Chartered Accountants” under the main category of “Tax Professional”.

While registering, the CA will have to provide his ICAI Membership Number and date of enrolment with the ICAI. We need to be careful with this data since I am informed by a Regional Council Member of ICAI that this data is cross-verified by the portal with the ICAI records. While this information is not verified by me, if it is true, then even a small mistake may lead to problems in registration. Once the CA is registered successfully, he/she would get a notification by email and on a mobile (so, both these fields are mandatory and we will have to provide a valid email ID and a valid mobile number while registering). The activation link received through email has to be activated and then the registration would be completed. The CA would then get a new login name which is based on this ICAI Membership Number as opposed to the PAN-based login ID that we are generally accustomed to.

Once the CA registers on the site, his client will then need to register the CA as the signatory to the respective report/certificate. So, for example, in case of a taxpayer XYZ Pvt. Ltd., the tax audit report will be signed by CA Mr. A, the transfer pricing report will be signed by CA Ms. B and the MAT certificate will be signed by CA Mr. C, then the said company will have to log onto the e-filing portal and register each of these CAs for the respective report/ certificate. When this is done, the concerned CA will get a mail informing that a particular taxpayer has registered the CA as its signatory. The message contains the following line:

Dear AMEET NAVINCHANDRA PATEL,

User AAXXXXXX1B has added you as the CA for FORM3CA, FORM3CB for 2013-14.

Filing of tax returns only after uploading other reports:

It may be noted that it is no longer possible for a taxpayer to file the ITR form unless the various applicable audit reports (tax audit, transfer pricing, trust, MAT) are uploaded electronically. In the ITR form, the date of uploading of each such document has to be mentioned.

Actual uploading of tax audit reports:

Once the CA has registered himself/herself and the client has also registered the CA as the tax auditor, the uploading of the tax audit report (TAR) can be done. This has to be done by the concerned CA. It may be noted that in case of partnership firms who are appointed as the tax auditors, it is the individual partner who has to register himself/herself and not the firm. Also, the same partner will also need a Digital Signa-ture Certificate (DSC) to be able to upload the TAR.

For uploading the TAR, a CA would need to download the utility provided by the tax department on their portal. Once the utility is downloaded onto a local computer, the CA can start feeding in the data. This is offline preparation of the form. The CA also has the option of going online and preparing the form and submitting it immediately thereafter. However, considering the various issues that have already been faced by the CAs who have tried to use the utility, and also considering that this is the first year of e-filing of the TAR, one would need to be very courageous to attempt an online preparation and submission.

A very important feature of the utility provided by the tax department on their site is that it is NOT MS Excel based. This is one of the biggest drawbacks of the said utility. The utility is not user friendly and requires every bit of data to be manually entered by the CA. Also, it does not allow a user to “cut-paste” from any other file. So, if you thought that you could keep an Excel sheet open and then cut from there and paste the data into the utility, you have a shock in store for you. Many CA firms use private software for preparing the computation of income and also the ITR forms. Such firms will need to decide whether they would like to use the utility provided by the Government for uploading the TAR or whether their private software vendors will provide the utility. This article refers to the utility provided by the Government. For running this utility, you will require your computer to have Java Runtime Environment Version 7 Update 6 or above (32 bit) installed in it.

Once the data is entered into the utility, the entire file needs to be validated (on similar lines as the validation required for ITR forms). Upon successful validation, the CA needs to generate a .XML file. The .XML file then has to be uploaded onto the portal with the help of a DSC (which can be either in the form of a .pfx file or a USB token). Once this is done by the CA, the ball then moves to the court of the concerned taxpayer who will get a notification that his CA has uploaded the TAR for his (taxpayer’s) approval. The taxpayer will then have to review the TAR and “Approve” or “Reject” the same. If for any reason, the assessee rejects the TAR, then the concerned CA would need to resolve the difference that the assessee has and then once again generate a fresh .XML file and upload it. The assessee would then again need to log in and “Approve” the same. Once the assessee approves the TAR with the help of a DSC, the same gets officially filed with the Income-tax department and an e-acknowledgement gets generated. This closes the e-filing procedure as far as the TAR is concerned.

Uploading of financials:

Quietly, along with the e-filing of the TAR, the Government has also simultaneously made it mandatory for the tax auditor to also upload the scanned copies of the audited accounts. Fortunately, the tax auditor does not need to feed in the balance sheet and P&L items all over again but merely scan the accounts and upload the same. This has to be done at the time of uploading the TAR. The scanned documents can be either in .TIFF format or in .PDF format. The overall size of the files cannot exceed 20MB. It appears that this limit stands increased to 50MB as per the General Instructions in the utility. However, the main screen where the said accounts are to be uploaded continues to show the size restriction as 20MB.

Actual uploading of other reports:

The same procedure as is adopted for uploading the TAR has to be followed for other forms as well. Thus, whether it is the Transfer Pricing Report in Form 3CEB or the MAT certificate in Form 29B or the audit reports of trusts, the same procedure of uploading data by the CA, validating the file, generating .XML file, uploading the said .XML file with the help of a DSC and then approving of the same by the assessee with the help of his DSC has to be followed. Upon successful “approval” of each report by the assessee, a separate e-acknowledgement gets generated.

Issues currently being faced:

There are a number of hardships that CAs are facing in the context of e-filing of the various audit reports. Some of the important ones (on which the BCAS has already made a representation) are:

1.    After the notification, the forms and the utility files were hosted on the e-filing website in the month of July, 2013 and have undergone several changes. After each change, an assessee, who has partly filled in a report but has not uploaded it, is required to re-feed the entire data, verify and then upload in the latest version, for the report to be furnished on the website. As a result, all the work-in-progress is wasted.

2.    It is not clear as to whether the financial statements to be attached have to be a scanned copy of the manually signed statements or even a PDF file digitally signed will be treated as sufficient compliance. Also, it is unclear as to where the notes to account, the auditor’s report, director’s report and the schedules are to be uploaded. In the portal, there are only the following fields for uploading the accounts:

a)    Balance Sheet

b)    Profit & Loss Account

3.    In respect of several clauses of the Form 3CD, it is normal practice for CAs to give appropriate comments. But in the e-filing utility, there is no space provided for such comments/notes/ remarks/disclaimers etc. In such a situation, would it be legally valid for the assessee/tax auditor to keep the appropriate comments/remarks/explanation in the hard copy and in the utility, mention either “Yes”/”No”/”0” etc. as the case may be? Here the real question is whether an assessee can have two sets of 3CD—one that is uploaded electronically and another one that is signed physically? My personal view is that this would not be correct. However, considering the problem at hand, one needs a written clarification from the Government. The other option that a tax auditor may consider is of putting all comments/remarks/ disclaimers etc. in the 3CA/3CB. However, there seems to be an overall limit on the number of characters that one can feed into the 3CA/3CB. So, in many cases, this option may not work. Also, whether doing such a thing results in the report being perceived to be a qualified report is also a question that needs pondering over.

4.    In the clause relating to depreciation on fixed assets, there is no column to give details of additional depreciation. Further, it appears that date-wise details of all the minor items of additions to fixed assets are also required to be given. This data could run into a few thousand entries for many businesses, and would take substantial time to re-enter.

5.    In the clause relating to quantitative details, often, such data is not available. In such cases, the tax auditor simply reports “Information Not Available”. Now, in the e-filing utility, it is not possible to give such a comment. What does one do in such a situation? In the same clause, in case of manufacturing assessees, if the yield is more than 100%, the utility does not accept the figure. On a lighter vein, does it indicate that the Government does not expect taxpayers to be extra-efficient?

6.    In the clause relating to ratios, in case of service industry or professionals, normally the tax auditor states that “since the activity of the assessee is neither trading nor manufacturing, such ratios are not applicable.” In the e-filing utility, there is no space for such a comment. In this situation, can a tax auditor simply skip this clause?

7.    If one sees the Income-tax Rules, in Form 3CD, Annexure II is still a part thereof despite the fact that from A.Y. 2010-11, the provisions of FBT are made ineffective. The e-filing utility does not provide this Annexure II. It is not clear as to what the exact position is. Can an e-filing utility override the statutory forms prescribed?

8.    In the clause relating to payments covered u/s. 40(A)(2)(b), it appears that every payment so made is required to be reported. Hitherto, the tax auditor used to report only the total amount for each type of transaction with a particular party. Now, it seems that the date-wise transaction details are to be given. This will cause a lot of hardship to the tax auditor while filling in the data.

9.    In the clause relating to loans taken or repaid, one has to give the PAN of the party reported. It appears that the utility matches this PAN with the Government’s PAN records and if the name and PAN do not match exactly then the file does not get validated. If this is true, then this is likely to cause tremendous slowdown in the preparation of the reports.

Thus, as can be seen from the above paragraphs, filing of returns and tax audit and other reports for A.Y. 2013-14 is going to be a very cumbersome and difficult process and unless the tax department comes up with solutions to the numerous problems very soon, we are very clearly headed for an extremely stressful month of September and then later, November. One hopes that the CBDT will read the representations sent by professional bodies like BCAS and act expeditiously.

Levy on Restaurants & Hotels Held Unconstitutional

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Background

Service tax levy was introduced on Restaurants & Hotels as under:

• Services provided by air-conditioned restaurants with license to serve liquor, with effect from 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%.

• Short Term Accommodation Services provided by hotels, with effect from 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 50%.

The above services have been discussed earlier in this column in the August, 2011 and September, 2011 issues respectively of BCAJ and in particular, the dual taxation issues arising therefrom. The same are not repeated for the sake of brevity.

The above stated levies continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced with effect from 01-07-2012 also, with a few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement. However, the scope of air-conditioned restaurant service was substantially expanded with effect from 01-04- 2013, withdrawing the condition of having license to serve liquor. Far reaching implications of this amendment also were discussed in the April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. With these facts in the background, discussed below is the recent Kerala High Court’s ruling wherein levy of service tax on restaurants and hotels has been held beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. Considering that levy of tax on supply of food or drink whether by way of or as a part of service is a State subject, the levy by the Centre is held unconstitutional in a Single Member Bench’s decision.

Kerala High Court Ruling in Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association & Others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER)

The Petitioners through writ petitions challenged the validity of sub-clause (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) of clause 105 of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) and section 66 of the Act, as amended by the Finance Act 2011 relating to levy of service tax on taxable services referred there and for consequential reliefs. The relevant portion reads as under:

“(zzzzv) Services provided or to be provided to any person, by a restaurant, by whatever name called, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the financial year, which has license to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises;

(zzzzw) Services provided or to be provided to any person, by a hotel, inn, guest house, club or camp-site, by whatever name called, for providing of accommodation for a continuous period of less than three months;”

Contentions of the Petitioner

The main contention urged by the petitioners was that the imposition of service tax in relation to serving of food or beverage including alcoholic beverages represents only sale of goods which transaction squarely falls under Entry 54 of List II (State List) of the 7th schedule to the Constitution of India and therefore within the exclusive competence of the State legislature. The service tax was originally introduced by Parliament in exercise of the residuary power under Entry 97 of List I. Though Entry 92 C has been introduced to List I of the 7th schedule which enables the Union to levy “taxes on services”, the said entry had not come into effect as it was not notified by the Government. Similarly the State legislature had enacted Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, by which tax is levied for accommodation. By introducing service tax on the basis of sub-clauses (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) to clause 105 of section 65, the Parliament has encroached upon the legislative powers of the State under Entry 54 and 62 of List II.

Hence, the main contention of the petitioners was with reference to the legislative competence of Parliament to impose a tax on sale of goods/ luxuries which is absolutely the domain of the State legislation.

Contention of the Revenue

The respondents contended that the legislation has been brought in terms of Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 of List I of the 7th schedule. Therefore according to the respondent, on a perusal of judgments cited by them it is all the more clear that service tax can be imposed on the service involved during the sale of a product and so long as the Statute does not transgress upon any restriction contained in the Constitution, contentions regarding lack of legislative power cannot be sustained. It is further contended that the Sales Tax Act and the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act are framed by the State Government. Service tax levied by the Government of India is not for serving alcoholic beverages and it is a tax on the services provided by restaurants and hotels. In that view of the matter, according to them, the challenge to the provisions aforesaid is absolutely baseless and seeks for dismissal of the writ petitions.

Questions for Consideration before the Court

The following questions arose for consideration by the Court:

Whether “taxes on the sale and purchase of goods” in Entry 54 of List II of the seventh schedule covers service in the light of the definition of “tax on sale and purchase of goods” under Article 366 (29A)(f) of the Constitution of India.

Whether the service provided in a hotel, inn, guest house, club etc. imposed with luxury tax under the State Act in terms of Entry 62 of List II can be separately assessed and imposed by the Union with service tax, invoking the residuary powers at Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution.

Judgment relied upon by the Revenue for Consideration of Constitutionality of a statute

The judgment in State of M.P. vs. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312) = (2012-TIOL-44-SC-MISC) was relied upon by the respondent to highlight the principles to be kept in mind by courts while considering constitutionality of a statute and the Supreme Court held as under:

“32. While dealing with constitutional validity of a taxation law enacted by Parliament or State Legislature, the Court must have regard to the following principles:

(i) there is always presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law made by Parliament or a State Legislature,

(ii) no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable or irrational but some constitutional infirmity has to be found,

(iii) the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law as Parliament and State Legislatures are supposed to be alive to the needs of the people whom they represent and they are the best judge of the community by whose suffrage they come into existence,

(iv) hardship is not relevant in pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a fiscal statute or economic law, and

(v) in the field of taxation, the legislature enjoys greater latitude for classification.”

Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. State of A.P. [(2008) 2 SCC 254], Govt. of A.P. vs. P. Laxmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720] and Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 236). There is no dispute regarding the proposition as held in the above judgments and hence the only enquiry is to find out whether the impugned legislation has trenched upon the legislative powers of the State Government, keeping in mind the limitations as held in the aforesaid judgments.

• Important and Relevant Judgments for consideration by the Court

  •  In Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. vs. State of U.P., (2005) 2 SCC 515) = (2005-TIOL-10-SC-LT-CB) the Supreme Court held as under:

“83. Hence on an application of general principles of interpretation, we would hold that the word “luxuries” in Entry 62 of List II    means the activity of enjoyment of or indulgence in that which is costly or which is generally recognised as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society and not articles of luxury.”

“93. Given the language of Entry 62 and the legislative history we hold that Entry 62 of List II does not permit the levy of tax on goods or articles. In our judgment, the word “luxuries” in the entry refers to activities of indulgence, enjoyment or pleasure. Inasmuch as none of the impugned statutes seek to tax any activity and admittedly seek to tax goods described as luxury goods, they must be and are declared to be legislatively incompetent. However, following the principles in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. while striking down the impugned Acts we do not think it appropriate to allow any refund of taxes already paid under the impugned Acts. Bank guarantees if any furnished by the assessees will stand discharged.”

In T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 632) = (2004-TIOL-36-SC-ST) the Supreme Court was considering whether the imposition of service tax on the services rendered by the mandap-keepers was intra vires the Constitution, and held as under:

“44. In regard to the submission made on Article 366(29-A)(f), we are of the view that it does not provide to the contrary. It only permits the State to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink by whatever mode it may be made. It does not conceptually or otherwise include the supply of services within the definition of sale and purchase of goods. This is particularly apparent from the following phrase contained in the said sub-article “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods”. In other words, the operative words of the said sub-article are supply of goods and it is only supply of food and drinks and other articles for human consumption that is deemed to be a sale or purchase of goods.”

In K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. vs. State of T.N., (2000) 1 SCC 521) = (2002-TIOL-884-SC-CT-CB) while considering the entitlement of the States to levy tax on the sale of food and drink a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court held as under:

“9. The provisions of sub-clause (f) of clause (29-A) of Article 366 need to be analysed. Sub-clause (f) permits the States to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink. The supply can be by way of a service or as part of a service or it can be in any other manner whatsoever. The supply or service can be for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The words of sub-clause (f)    have found place in the Sales Tax Acts of most States and, as we have seen, they have been used in the said Tamil Nadu Act. The tax, therefore, is on the supply of food or drink and it is not of relevance that the supply is by way of a service or as part of a service. In our view, therefore, the price that the customer pays for the supply of food in a restaurant cannot be split up as suggested by learned counsel. The supply of food by the restaurant-owner to the customer though it may be a part of the service that he renders by providing good furniture, furnishing and fixtures, linen, crockery and cutlery, music, a dance floor and a floor show, is what is the subject of the levy. The patron of a fancy restaurant who orders a plate of cheese sandwiches whose price is shown to be Rs.50 on the bill of fare knows very well that the innate cost of the bread, butter, mustard and cheese in the plate is very much less, but he orders it all the same. He pays Rs. 50 for its supply and it is on Rs. 50 that the restaurant-owner must be taxed.”

Other judgments considered by the Court were as follows:

  •     Assn. of Leasing & Financial Services Companies vs. UOI (2011) [2 SCC 352 = 2010–TIOL–87–SC–ST– LB.]

  •     All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI (2007) [TIOL–149 –SC– ST]

  •     BSNL vs. UOI (2006) [TIOL–15–SC–CT–LB]

  •     Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn of India vs. UOI (2002) [TIOL- 699 –SC–MISC]

•    Observations & Findings of the Court

On a consideration of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that:

Para 18

“There are two judgments which throw light on the subject matter in issue. Those are K. Damoda-rasamy Naidu (Supra) and T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (Supra). In fact, the effect of Article 366(29-A)(f) has been considered by the Supreme Court in Assn. of Leasing & Financial Service Companies (Supra) and other judgments referred above includ-ing BSNL (Supra) . But the factual situation with reference to the case on hand is available only in the cases referred above. But it could be seen that in T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (Supra) the question was with reference to services rendered by mandap-keepers which is not the situation here. Here the factual situation is almost similar to the statement of law as held by the Supreme Court in K. Damodarasamy Naidu (Supra).”

Para 19

Now, coming to Article 366(29-A)(f) of the Constitution of India one could see that a deeming provision has been incorporated by way of 46th amendment to the Constitution of India and the history of such a legislation has been clearly dealt with in the judgments cited above. The very purpose of incorporating the definition of tax on sale or purchase of goods in Article 366 was to empower the State Governments to impose tax on the supply, whether it is by way of or as a part of any service of goods either being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink either intoxicating or not intoxicating whether such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The words “and such transfer delivery or supply of goods” is deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer. Therefore the incidence of tax is on the supply of any goods by way of or as part of any service. When food is supplied or alcoholic beverages are supplied as part of any service, such transfer is deemed to be a sale. Apparently, the transfer is during the course of a service and when the deeming provision permits the State Government to impose a tax on such transfer, there cannot be a different component of service which could be imposed with any service tax in exercise of the residuary power of the Central Government under Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution of India.

Para 20

Therefore, it can be seen from Article 366(29-A)(f) that service is also included in the sale of goods. If the constitution permits sale of goods during service as taxable, necessarily Entry 54 has to be read giving the meaning of sale of goods as stated in the Constitution. If read in that fashion, necessarily service forms part of sale of goods and State Government alone will have the legislative competence to enact the law imposing a tax on the service element forming part of sale of goods as well, which they have apparently imposed. I am supported to take this view in the light of the Constitution Bench judgment in K. Damodarasamy Naidu (Supra).

Para 21

Coming to the next question regarding the imposition of service tax in respect of hotel, inn, guest house, club or camp site etc., the contention of the petitioners is based on Entry 62 of List II. What exactly is the meaning of the expression ‘luxuries’ in Entry 62 of List II has been held by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (Supra), wherein it is held that luxuries is an activity of enjoyment or indulgence which is costly or which is generally recognised as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society. While giving the said meaning to Entry 62 and if we look at the sub-clause (zzzzw), the service tax is imposed on services provided in a hotel and other similar establishments when State Legislature had enacted the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act by exercising their legislative power under Entry 62 of List II. When applying the dictum laid down in Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (supra) which gives an extended meaning to the word ‘luxuries’, I am of the view that the amendment now made to the service tax trenches upon the legislative function of the State under Entry 62 of List II.

Having come to the aforesaid findings, these writ petitions are allowed as follows:

•    It is declared that sub-clauses (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) to clause 105 of section 65 of the Finance Act 1994 as amended by the Finance Act 2011 is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament as the sub-clauses are covered by Entry 54 and Entry 62 respectively of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

•    That if any payments have been made by the petitioners on the basis of the impugned clauses, they are entitled to seek refund of the same.

Impact of Kerala High Court Ruling

•    As per the Court order, the petitioners are entitled to seek refund of service tax. However, it may not be easy and feasible inasmuch as the restaurants merely collect service tax from the customers and pay to the Government. Hence, if the service tax collected (rightly or wrongly) is duly deposited with the Government, onus stands discharged under the law. Alternatively, the prospect of each customer filing for refund of tax is highly unlikely.

•    Since the ruling is a consequence of a Writ Petition and there being presently no other conflicting High Court ruling, a view could be adopted (although debatable) to the effect that this ruling is applicable to restaurants across the country. However, the Government would without any doubt file an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High Court Order. Hence, it would appear that there is no finality on the issue.

•    Whether the Kerala High Court ruling would apply under the negative list based taxation regime introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, is a matter which is being intensely debated.

It is interesting to note the following clarification issued in the context of Negative List regime of service tax:

•    Extracts from Education Guide (TRU Circular dt. 20/6/12)

Para 6.9

Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as part of the activity. [Section 66E (i) of the Act]

Para 6.9.1

What are the activities covered in this declared list entry?

The following activities are illustration of activities covered in this entry –

•    Supply of food or drinks in a restaurant;

•    Supply of food and drinks by an outdoor caterer.

In terms of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, supply of any goods being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case [2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. This declared list entry has been incorporated to capture this position of law in simple terms.

Based on the above, the Government could contend that what is being taxed is only the service component without encroaching upon the powers of the State Government under the Constitution. This aspect would have to be judicially tested.

The 46th amendment to the Constitution which introduced clause 29A to the Article 366 contained six transactions which were deemed to be a transaction of sale or purchase of goods. For example, tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract is one of the deemed sales transportation under this amendment.

After the judgment by the Kerala High Court, an old debate is likely to be revived. The question arises is that whether on similar grounds, the levy of service tax on a transaction of works contract where the buyer only intends to buy, say for example a constructed building and pay consideration on per square foot of constructed building could also be challenged? The buyer of the building has no interest in the services that the builder has used in construction of such building. Therefore, can the Central Government tax the services that are provided in a works contract when these transactions are deemed sales under the Constitution?

The clause 29A was introduced in Article 366 of the Constitution, as it was felt necessary to declare those transactions as deemed sale of goods which could otherwise lead to a dilemma in classification between sale of goods and/or services.

•    Yet another question arising out of this situation is, shouldn’t there be a similar provision in the Constitution to declare the other portion of such transactions as the deemed/declared services as is done for sales tax/VAT, before the same could be brought under the tax net by the Centre?

There are no ready answers to the above posers. However, it appears that, there could to be a fresh round of litigations and resultant uncertainties.

Conclusion

To conclude, it would appear that the Kerala High Court does not resolve the larger burning issue of dual taxation of transactions by the Centre and the States whereby the increased burden is being felt by the end user/consumer. To put it in simple terms, an ideal scenario would be that in case of composite transactions, one component is taxed by the States and the other by the Centre in terms of clear statutory provisions. However, presently despite the fact that service tax is being levied on the service component (40%), the States continue to charge VAT on the 100% amount, resulting in dual taxation and increased burden on the end user/consumer.

It is expected that the GST regime would address this burning issue impacting businesses and end users. However, it is felt that the Government needs to urgently address this issue without waiting for the introduction of GST Regime whereby Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers can have a dialogue with the Centre and States and arrive at an agreement for a consistent abatement regime across the country which can be adopted by the Centre as well as the States.

Registration Act- Proposal to modify law on land registration tabled in Parliament

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A proposal to modify India’s land registration law
to make for clear titles and help the government to fairly compensate
owners if their land was acquired for industrialization was tabled in
the Rajya Sabha.

The amendments to the Registration Act, 1908,
mainly relate to ensuring transparency and digitization that will help
establish clear land ownership. The Registration (Amendment) Bill, 2013,
was cleared by the cabinet in June.

Land acquisition is a
complex and contentious subject in India due to the lack of
documentation and the absence of contemporary land records. This has
been causing problems for investors trying to buy land for
infrastructure projects.

The proposed amendments include
registration of documents relating to the adoption of a daughter to
ensure gender equity, opening of the miscellaneous register that
contains details of all registered documents to public scrutiny, and
promotion of electronic registration of documents.

“Documents
such as power of attorney, developers/ promoters agreements and any
other agreements relating to the sale or development of immovable
property now need to be mandatorily registered. This is being done with
the intention of minimize cases of document forgery,” the ministry said.

“A new section 18A is proposed to be inserted (into the Act) to
provide for prohibition of registration of certain types of
properties,” it said. This is to prevent unauthorized people from
obtaining false registrations.

In addition, the government has
proposed the deletion of section 28 of the 1908 law, which allows a
person with immovable property in more than one state to register
documents relating to transfer in any of these states.

Many of
the changes proposed will also help in the award of compensation to land
owners under the proposed Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill, 2012, which
is pending before Parliament.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 09-08-2013)
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Young India & polls 2014

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What do Indians want and what are their concerns?

In the rare cases where such questions are asked, there are no surprises: price rise, corruption, job creation, law and order, education and health, the precise ranking varying from survey to survey.

More than 50% of India’s population is under-25 and there will be a clutch of new voters in 2014. Priorities of under-25s aren’t necessarily the same as priorities of those over 65. With gerontocracy characterising political leadership, there is a disconnect between what Young India wants and what Old India thinks Young India wants.

Old India lives in yesterday and, unfortunately, uses its prism to deliver policies for tomorrow, when Old India will no longer be around. Young India will live in tomorrow and will be hamstrung by policies Old India fashions today.

One doesn’t know whether the structural shift will lead to a shift in electoral dynamics in 2014. What one does know is that few political parties and leaders have understood that a shift is taking place. This is reflected in discourse and debates and will be reflected in manifestos and vision documents. The Bible states, “Your young men will see visions, your old men will dream dreams.”

While the old men will dream of coming back to power, it should be a function of a vision that is sold to Young India of betterment of lives and economic empowerment, not doles and handouts. It should be a vision of where we want India to be in 2025, or beyond. That differentiates 20/20 vision from myopia.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 05-08-2013)
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Govt files review petition against SC verdicts on lawmakers

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The Union government decided to take up cudgels on behalf of the political class, or at least those members of it who could find themselves on the wrong side of the law, and also opposed any move to place restrictions on the freebies they can promise voters in their manifestos.

Both moves were criticized by political reform activists who see them as part of efforts by the political establishment to protect its own interests.

The government filed a review petition in the Supreme Court (SC) against verdicts of the apex court that disqualified lawmakers who were convicted by a court and barred those in prison or those who had been convicted from contesting elections.

The decision, the petition said, would jeopardize a government that has a thin majority, they said, citing the contents of the petition. Supreme Court advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan was critical of the government’s petition. “It boggles my mind as to how governance is anyway prejudiced if a criminal politician is allowed to continue in the House, with his disqualification stayed,” he said. “A wafer-thin majority government ought not to be protected merely because its majority is maintained on the shoulders of criminals.”

Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act gave a window of opportunity to convicted lawmakers to appeal within three months, during which period, disqualification would not take effect. Disqualification would be on hold until the appeal was disposed of by the court. The apex court struck down this provision.

There has been strong opposition to the verdict by all political parties on the grounds that the “supremacy of the Parliament” should be maintained.

The petition asserted Parliament’s right to legislate on the disqualification of members, as the Constitution hasn’t specified the grounds. It also raised the issue of the irreversible impact of the disqualification to the extent that the reversal of a conviction wouldn’t lead to restoration of membership.

The government is also seeking a reference to a “larger constitution bench as it relates to interpretation of articles in the constitution” and that failure to do so would constitute an error.

Sankaranarayanan said the section is discriminatory.

“The simple fact is section 8 (4) discriminates between a sitting legislator and the rest of the populace, simply because one of them occupies a place of high position of power and the others don’t,” he said.

At the Election Commission-convened meeting, the political parties also opposed guidelines for manifestoes, criticizing a 5 July order of the apex court that asked the commission to come up with guidelines on freebies offered by parties in their manifestos.

All major national political parties said that there should be no such restriction.

(Source: Mint Newspaper dated 13-08-2013)
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India’s darkest hour – Companies, bankers and experts have all given up hope of an economic recovery

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I recently spent a week in India meeting a wide range of economic participants – companies (both large and small), banks, industry experts and economic commentators. What is clear is that the economy is entering another down leg. The bountiful monsoon may save us to an extent, but things are getting worse in terms of industrial production and private sector capital expenditure.

Of the factors that were expected to lead to an acceleration in the rate of economic growth – falling interest rates, unclogging of the investment cycle and some pickup in exports – none seem to be playing out. In meeting after meeting, I felt that people had finally given up. All the enthusiasm generated by Finance Minister P Chidambaram in his first six months in office has dissipated. It is extraordinarily difficult to implement most of the policy.

Industrialists have absolutely no interest in making any fresh investments, and have very little confidence that projects that are currently stuck will start moving. Capital goods providers also seem to see little sign of the public sector investment stepup that the finance minister talks about. Domestic order books remain subdued. Even consumption seems vulnerable; most of the participants agreed that consumption beyond a point couldn’t keep growing independent of the broader economy.

Everyone is convinced that this growth slowdown is largely self-inflicted. We have lost the plot and cannot blame our travails on external factors. The business class has given up the hope that the country would ever get back to the high growth rates achieved in 2003-07. Most have made business plans assuming that growth will be at best six per cent over the coming few years. Cost cutting and asset rationalisation, not growth, are at the top of their agenda. The complaint that India was uncompetitive in terms of infrastructure, land, labour (adjusted for productivity) and capital remains. If this is true, how will any new manufacturing investment happen?

Most small and medium-sized entrepreneurs seem to be fed up with the daily harassment of doing business in India. Basically, when India was booming, the sheer adrenaline of growing at nine per cent was exciting enough for investors to put up with the hassles of doing business. Now at five per cent growth – and dropping – the upside of doing business here does not seem to justify the hassles. Every industrialist I met had bought property overseas in the last 18 months and was in the process of creating a parallel establishment as a hedge.

In short, the mood was deeply pessimistic. Many now fear for the country’s future. It is always darkest before the dawn, and this deep pessimism may be a contrarian indicator, but even rational and sensible people now seem to have given up. While it is truly difficult to be positive at present, one should not forget that we are a democracy with checks and balances. We have a very young and hugely aspirational population. The political system will eventually have to adapt to the needs and wishes of this huge demographic. We will have to make the systemic changes to bring growth back. It is wrong to think that we have permanently lost our way. The risk is that we could have some more pain ahead, maybe even a crisis before the required changes happen.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr. Akash Prakash in Business Standard dated 30-07-2013)
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Civil Service – Why Durga’s Shakti matters for India

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This is not about Durga Shakti anymore. It is about the many Durga Shaktis in the IAS and the paramount need to protect them. And this is about why Durga’s Shakti matters to not just the IAS, but also to India’s health as a democracy. It is about creating strong, upright civil servants and not civil “servants” and the need for the political executive to understand that honest, upright officers are not their personal vassals. It is about protecting and preserving the constitutional democracy of India whose lynchpin is the permanent executive working in tandem with the political executive, and where the former is not expected to be subservient to the latter, much less carry out its illegal orders.

The political executive needs to understand that every single enforcement action by any IAS officer will necessarily have a repercussion, both good and perhaps some bad, and indeed it must have a repercussion for it get to its desired objective and be effective. That must not become a convenient scapegoat for the political executive to suspend or even transfer inconvenient officers. Being a rubber stamp destroys institutions and, with them, individuals forever. The political executive must learn to have good officers around them, who may not and should not, always agree with them, which alone makes for impartial, honest advice. They need to learn to get along with those officers who know when to say “No Minister” as much as when to say “Yes Minister”.

In Durga’s specific case there is a clear violation of procedure by the government of UP. This makes for a manifestly colourable exercise of power. The UP government stands in violation of several provisions and the officers who signed the orders, without applying their mind and judgement, should have exemplary damages imposed on them by the courts.

Constitutional protection of the IAS under Article 311 is integral to our democracy and without it, India can might as well disband the IAS and bring in a USstyle spoils system instead.

What are young, conscientious IAS officers supposed to do when they witness violations of law in their jurisdiction? Wring their hands helplessly or take action? Who is causing communal tension- a senior minister sanctioning the loot of natural resources by invoking the name of God in full public view, or an officer who has stopped the encroachment of public land and upheld the spirit of the January 19, 2013 judgment of the Supreme Court?

IAS bashing is no longer the favourite avocation for India’s politicians; it is now their favourite vocation. Many in the IAS break the law, loot the exchequer, collude with a rapacious political executive and the common weal is often dammed in the process. Yet every single day, all across the country, away from the glare of the media, there are many more doing enormous good work and holding the country together in circumstances in which no corporate sector professional, or even members from the hallowed armed forces, would like to work in. They need to be treated with respect and fairness, especially by those who disagree with some decision of theirs, just as they are expected to treat others likewise.

(Source: Extracts from Article by Mr. Srivatsa Krishna in the Times of India dated 04-08-2013)
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India’s Ecosystem is Pro-Big, Anti-Small

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Indices representing small and mid-cap stocks have plunged. Both small and mid-caps, on the other hand, are down about 25% each. The vertiginous drop in these indices represents the real story of Indian businesses. Sensex companies, with their deep pockets and even deeper connections to India’s political, administrative and financial elites, will weather most crises unscathed. But smaller companies, without any patrons, will come out bruised.

Decades of crony capitalism have created a deep division among India’s businesses: among those with access to the powers-that-be and those without. The former run giant businesses, relatively insulated from domestic or global turbulence. Smaller businesses, which include start-up and first-time ventures, are nimbler, more entrepreneurial and often more creative in the ways they go about things. That should have given them some advantages in a properly-functioning market. But in India, success hinges on massaging the system and clearing massive regulatory hurdles. One manufacturing project can require around 30 clearances from all levels of government. In this sort of market, smaller enterprises are punished. This is in stark contrast with the West: in Germany, the mid-cap index is up 33%, in London by 35% and in New York, small caps are up 31%.

This anti-democratic cronyism is likely to drive many small and mid-size businesses out of India. Already, sugar and farm companies in Maharashtra are planning to move parts of their businesses to Africa, where land is plentiful, local markets have demand, exports to Europe are duty-free and cronyism of the desi variety is absent. Unless India clears up the policy clutter, our nimbler companies will continue to vote with their feet.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 14-08-2013)
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A third of India’s top firms face severe debt crisis

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Economic slowdown and the accompanying demand destruction have taken a heavy toll on India’s top companies. The worst-hit are those that had launched aggressive growth plans, largely funded through debt, believing the demand growth in the years to come would be robust.

Many of these firms now find themselves in a spiral of declining profitability, shrinking market capitalisation and rising liabilities. This raises a question mark over their financial viability. On this parameter, nearly a third of India’s top companies are either financially insolvent or on the verge of it. They can’t use equity markets to raise enough capital to fund these projects or lighten their debt burden. Of the 406 firms in the BSE-500 list (excluding banking and financial ones) that have declared their results so far, the market capitalisation of 143 is either below their debt or just a notch above. The sample includes companies with average market capitalisation (during July this year) of less than 1.5 times their net debt as at the end of 2012-13.

According to figures from Capitaline, at the end of March this year, these companies were sitting on a debt of Rs 13.2 lakh crore — nearly twice their average market capitalisation in July. Two years ago, however, it was the other way around. In July 2011, their market value was 40 per cent higher than their net debt. Over the past two years, their debt (adjusted for cash and other liquid investments on their books) has risen 61 per cent, while their market capitalisation has declined 40 per cent. This has shut for these companies the equity window for project funding or debt repayment.

The list includes companies like Tata Steel, Hindalco Industries, Tata Power, L&T, Jaypee Associates, Adani Power, GMR Infra, GVK Power, JSW Steel, Reliance Infra, IndianOil, HPCL, Shri Renuka Sugars, Bajaj Hindusthan and Suzlon. Their marketcap- to-debt-coverage ratio will look even worse if deferred tax liability and contingent liabilities are included. Most of these firms also have high debt-to-equity ratio (greater than 1.0), poor interest coverage ratio (less than 2.0) and falling profitability.

(Source: The Business Standard dated 12-08-2013)
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Wealth-tax : Penalty : Legal representative : S. 15B, S. 18 and S. 19 of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1983-84 and 1984-85 : Assessee filing returns and receiving notices for penalty : Penalty order passed after death of assessee

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II. Reported :

  1. Wealth-tax : Penalty : Legal representative : S. 15B, S. 18 and S. 19 of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1983-84 and 1984-85 : Assessee filing returns and receiving notices for penalty : Penalty order passed after death of assessee on legal representative : Not justified.

[ACIT v. Late Shrimant F. P. Gaekwad, 313 ITR 192 (Guj.)]

For the A.Ys. 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1983-84 and 1984-85 the assessee had filed the returns of wealth. At the time of assessment, penalty proceedings were initiated u/s.18(1)(a), u/s.18(1)(c) and u/s.15B of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The assessee expired in 1988 before the penalty proceedings could be completed. The estate of the assessee devolved upon his mother who also passed away and thereafter it devolved upon the sister of the assessee. On 29-8-2003 the Assessing Officer passed penalty orders u/s.18(1)(a), u/s.18(1)(c) and u/s.15B of the Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty orders.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) No penalty order was passed during the life-time of the deceased. To make the legal representative liable for penalty u/s.19(1) it was not enough that the penalty proceedings should be initiated during the lifetime of the deceased. It was also necessary that such penalty proceedings must result in penalty orders during his lifetime. Therefore, neither S. 19(1) nor S. 19(3) casts any obligation on the executor, administrator or other legal representative to pay the amount of penalty as they were not liable to face any such penalty proceedings for which they have not committed any default.

(ii) The default, if any, was committed by the assessee and the assessee was not alive when the penalty proceedings culminated in penalty orders.”

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Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2001-02 : Reason to believe : Satisfaction not of AO of the assessee but borrowed from another AO : Not sufficient : Reopening not valid.

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II. Reported :

  1. Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
    A.Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 and 2001-02 : Reason to believe : Satisfaction not of
    AO of the assessee but borrowed from another AO : Not sufficient : Reopening
    not valid.

[CIT v. Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd., 313 ITR 231 (Raj.)]

The assessee company had leased out certain plant and
machinery to another company. The depreciation claimed by the assessee on the
capital asset so leased out was allowed by the Assessing Officer. The lessee
had claimed revenue expenditure for the lease rent paid to the assessee but
the Assessing Officer had allowed depreciation on the capital value of the
plant and machinery. On noticing this fact, the Assessing Officer of the
assessee, reopened the completed assessments and disallowed the claim for
depreciation. The Tribunal held that the reopening was not valid as the
satisfaction was not of the Assessing Officer of the assessee, but that of the
Assessing Officer of the lessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The reassessment proceedings had been initiated only on
account of the opinion of the Assessing Officer of the lessee and the
Tribunal was right in finding that it was ‘borrowed satisfaction’ which was
not sufficient to confer power on the Assessing Officer to initiate
reassessment proceedings against the assessee.”

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Penalty : Concealment : S. 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : Bona fide claim for exemption in terms of conflicting determination of law : Assessee disclosed entire facts : Imposition of penalty not justified : Judgment of Supreme Court in

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II. Reported :

  1. Penalty : Concealment : S. 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act,
    1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : Bona fide claim for exemption in terms of
    conflicting determination of law : Assessee disclosed entire facts :
    Imposition of penalty not justified : Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of
    UOI v. Dharmendra Textile Processors, 306 ITR 277 (SC) considered.

[CIT v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation, 314 ITR 215
(P&H)]

The assessee, a warehousing corporation had made a claim
for exemption u/s.10(29) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of which there
were conflicting decisions. The claim for exemption was disallowed by the
Assessing Officer and a penalty of Rs. 1,04,61,330 was imposed u/s.271(1)(c)
of the Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The deduction claimed by the assessee was legitimate
and bona fide in terms of the conflicting determination of law on the
proposition in question. The categorical finding at the hands of the
Tribunal in its order was that the assessee had disclosed the entire facts
without having concealed any income. There was no allegation against the
assessee that it had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The
determination of the Tribunal had not been controverted even in the grounds
raised in the appeal. The assessee was guilty of neither of the two
conditions. Therefore, in the absence of the two pre-requisites postulated
u/s.271(1)(c) it was not open to the Revenue to inflict any penalty on the
assessee.

(ii) The second contention advanced by the appallent-Revenue
was that the impugned order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
deleting the penalty imposed on the respondent-assessee u/s.271(1)(c) of the
Act was not sustainable in law because of the clear judgment in UOI v.
Dharmendra Textile Processors,
(2008) 306 ITR 277. According to the
learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue, the entire income which remained
undisclosed, ‘with or without’ any conscious act of the assessee was liable
to penal action. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellant-Revenue that the concept of law with regard to levy of penalty has
drastically changed in view of the said judgment, inasmuch as now penalty
can be levied even when an assessee claims deduction or exemption by
disclosing the correct particulars of its income. According to the learned
counsel, if an addition is made in quantum proceedings by the Revenue
authorities, which addition attains finality, an assessee per se
becomes liable for penal action u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. It is the vehement
contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue that a penalty
automatically becomes leviable against the respondent-assessee u/s.271(1)(c)
of the Act, after the finalisation of quantum proceedings. In this behalf,
it is also pointed out that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court,
referred to above, the dichotomy between penalty proceedings and assessment
proceedings stands completely obliterated.

(iii) It is also essential for us to notice, while
dealing with the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant-Revenue, that the issue which arose for determination before the
Supreme Court in UOI v. Dharmendra Textile Processors (supra)
was whether u/s.11AC inserted in the Central Excise Act, 1944, by the
Finance Act, 1996, penalty for evasion of payment of tax had to be
mandatorily levied, in case of short of levy or non-levy of duty under the
Central Excise Act, 1944, irrespective of the fact whether it was an
intentional or innocent omission. In other words, the Apex Court was
examining a proposition whether mens rea was an essential ingredient
before penalty u/s.11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, could be levied. In
view of the factual position noticed herein above, the issue of mens rea
does not arise in the present controversy because the ingredients, before
any penalty can be imposed on an assessee u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, were not
made out in the instant case as has been concluded in the foregoing
paragraph. Thus viewed, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for
the appellant-Revenue is, besides being a judgment under a different
legislative enactment, is totally inapplicable to the facts and
circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we find no merit even in the second
contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue.”

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment : S. 132 and S. 158B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal cannot go into validity or otherwise of administrative decision for conducting search and seizure.

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II. Reported :


58. 


Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment : S. 132 and S. 158B of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal cannot go into validity or otherwise of
administrative decision for conducting search and seizure.


[CIT v. Paras Rice Mills, 313 ITR 182 (P&H)]


In an appeal before the Tribunal against a block assessment order the assessee
raised the ground that the search and the consequent block assessment order were
not valid. The Tribunal held that the search and seizure was illegal as no
material was produced to show that the requirements of S. 132 (1) of the Act
were complied with.


On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held as under :


“While hearing an appeal against the order of assessment, the Tribunal could not
go into the question of validity or otherwise of any administrative decision for
conducting search and seizure. It could be challenged in an independent
proceeding where the question of validity of the order could be gone into. The
appellate authority was concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the
assessment.”

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment : S. 132 and S. 158B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal can look into validity of search : Authorisation for search not valid : Consequent search and block assessment also not valid : Tribunal justif

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II. Reported :

  1. Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Search : Block assessment :
    S. 132 and S. 158B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Tribunal can look into validity
    of search : Authorisation for search not valid : Consequent search and block
    assessment also not valid : Tribunal justified in setting aside block
    assessment order.

[CIT v. Smt. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.)]

In the appeal before the Tribunal against the block
assessment order the assessee contended that there was no material with the
Director to form the belief as was required u/s.132(1) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 and therefore the search and the block assessment order were not valid.
The Tribunal held that the search was not valid in the absence of
authorisation based on reasons as required u/s.132(1) and consequently the
block assessment was illegal.

On appeal by the Revenue challenging the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to look into the validity of search the Rajasthan High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Since the assessment in the present case is made
under Chapter XIV-B and when it was specifically challenged by the assessee,
that the circumstances contemplated by S. 132(1) did not exist, this is a
matter which goes to the root of the matter about jurisdiction of the
assessing authority to proceed under Chapter XIV-B, the Tribunal was very
much justified, and had jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether
the search was conducted consequent upon the authorisation having been
issued in the background of the existence of eventualities and material
mentioned in 132(1).

(ii) The basic ingredient of the term ‘block period’
u/s.158B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is that it relates to a certain number
of years relating to and relevant to the search conducted u/s.132. The
conclusion is that there should be a search conducted u/s.132. S. 132
contemplates existence of certain eventualities, in the event of existence
whereof, the competent authority should have reason to believe the existence
of the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of S. 132(1). The
consequence is that if the requirement of Ss.(1) about the existence of the
reason to believe consequent upon the information in the possession of the
concerned authority is not satisfied there could possibly be no
authorisation, irrespective of the fact that it may have been made and in
turn if a search is conducted in pursuance of the authorisation issued in
the absence of the requisite sine qua non the search cannot be a
‘search’ u/s.132 of the Act, as contemplated by the provisions of S. 158B of
the Act.

(iii) The Revenue failed to produce records containing
relevant material including information in the possession of the competent
authority, on the basis of which it had entertained the reason to believe
the existence of one or more of the eventualities covered by clauses (a) to
(c) of S. 132(1). In the absence of a legal search, in accordance with
provisions of S. 132 the ‘block period’ or the previous year in which the
search was conducted could not be said to have come into existence and
therefore any assessment order based on such search could not stand.

(iv) The Tribunal was justified in holding that when the
authorisation to conduct the search based on reasons germane to S. 132(1)
did not exist the search became invalid and that the assessment order based
on such search could not stand and had rightly set it aside.”

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Litigation between public sector undertaking of State Government and Income-tax Department : No power to decide whether appeal to be admitted : Refusal to admit appeal relegating parties to Committee of Disputes : Not permiss

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II. Reported :

  1. Appellate Tribunal : Powers : Litigation between public
    sector undertaking of State Government and Income-tax Department : No power to
    decide whether appeal to be admitted : Refusal to admit appeal relegating
    parties to Committee of Disputes : Not permissible.

[Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. v. ITAT,
314 ITR 14 (Guj.)]

The assessee, a public sector undertaking of the Government
of Gujarat, filed appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The
Department also filed cross appeals. Without going into the merits of the
matter, the Tribunal non-suited the parties by refusing to admit the appeals
without approval of the Committee of Disputes.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petitions and
appeals against the said orders of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Supreme Court in the three ONGC cases and in
Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of AP v. Collector,
(2003) 3
SCC 472 and MTNL v. Chairman CBDT, (2004) 267 ITR 647 was dealing
with disputes between a public sector undertaking of the Central Government
and a Department of the Central Government or between two Departments of the
State Government of Andhra Pradesh. The directions given and the
observations made by the Supreme Court therein have to be read in the
context and against the backdrop of the controversy before the Court,
including the litigants who were before it. There is no order made by the
Supreme Court which relates to a dispute between the Union of India and a
State, or a public sector undertaking of the Union of India and a State, or
between two States inter se, the term ‘State’ here meaning and
including the State Government, a Department of the State Government or an
undertaking of the State Government. None of these cases suggest that the
Committee set up by the Central Government would have jurisdiction to
consider resolution of such disputes between a State and the Union, the
respective Departments and undertakings included.

(ii) Hence, it is not possible to expand the scope of the
directions of the Supreme Court so as to include a dispute between a
Department of the Central Government and a State Government undertaking.

(iii) The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a creature of
statute. Such a constituted Tribunal is required to exercise powers and
discharge the functions conferred on the Tribunal by the Act. The Tribunal,
therefore, cannot exercise powers or discharge functions which are not
conferred on the Tribunal by the Act.

(iv) The powers available to the Tribunal are governed by
the provisions of S. 253 and S. 254 of the Act. These provisions cannot be
read to mean that the Tribunal has power to hold that an appeal is not
admitted.

(v) Both the assessee and the Department are statutorily
vested with a right under the Act by virtue of S. 253(1), (2) and (4) of the
Act to file an appeal or cross-objections. Such right granted by the statute
cannot be divested by the Tribunal on an erroneous assumption of powers
arrogated to itself under a mistaken belief of law.

(vi) The Tribunal had assumed powers which it did not
have, for determining whether the appeal was to be admitted or not. There
was no such requirement in the facts of the case to approach the Committee
as the assessee and the Income-tax Department could not be asked to go and
obtain clearance from a Committee which had no jurisdiction over them.

(vii) The appeals filed by the assessee and the
Department before the Tribunal were accordingly restored to the file of the
Tribunal for being heard and decided afresh on the merits in accordance with
law.”

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Settlement Commission : Abatement of proceedings : S.245D(4A)(1), S.245HA(1) (iv) and S. 245HA(3) not valid : Settlement applications not disposed of by 31-3-2008 for reasons not attributable to the applicant cannot be treated as having abated.

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I. Unreported :


 



  1. Settlement Commission : Abatement of
    proceedings : S.245D(4A)(1), S.245HA(1) (iv) and S. 245HA(3) not valid :
    Settlement applications not disposed of by 31-3-2008 for reasons not
    attributable to the applicant cannot be treated as having abated.

[Star Television News Ltd. v. UOI (Bom.), W.P. No.
952 of 2008 dated 7-8-2009]

The Finance Act, 2007, amended S. 245D(4A) and S. 245HA to
provide that if in respect of a settlement application filed before 1-6-2007,
the Settlement Commission did not pass a final order before 31-3-2008, the
proceedings would abate. In a group of writ petitions the constitutional
validity of the said amendment was challenged. The Bombay High Court allowed
the petitions and held as under :

“(i) The fixing of the cut-off date u/s.245D(4A)(i), the
abatement of proceedings u/s.245HA(1)(iv) and the making available of
confidential information u/s.245HA(3) for no fault of the applicant are
ultra vires
the Constitution. In order to save these provisions from
being struck down as being unconstitutional, they will have to be read down
as applying only to cases where the Settlement Commission is unable to pass
an order on or before 31-3-2008 for any reasons attributable on the part of
the applicant.

(ii) Accordingly, the Settlement Commission has to
consider whether the proceedings have been delayed on account of any reasons
attributable on the part of the applicant. If it comes to the conclusion
that it is not so, then it has to proceed with the application as if not
abated.

(iii) The Government shall consider appointment of more
benches of the Settlement Commission if it desires early disposal of pending
applications.”


 



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Reassessment : Notice u/s.148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1993-94 : Assessee Co-operative Housing Society : Notice u/s.148 issued claiming that transfer fee is liable to tax relying on judgment of Bombay High Court in CIT v. The Presidency

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I. Unreported :

  1. Reassessment : Notice u/s.148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
    A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1993-94 : Assessee Co-operative Housing Society : Notice
    u/s.148 issued claiming that transfer fee is liable to tax relying on judgment
    of Bombay High Court in CIT v. The Presidency Co-operative Housing Society,
    216 ITR 321 (Bom.) : Reopening not valid : Notice quashed.


[Mittal Court Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. v. ITO
(Bom.),
W. P. No. 526 of 1996, dated 17-7-2009]

In this case the assessee is a co-operative society of
commercial premises. As provided in the bye-laws the assessee had received
transfer fees from the transferees. On the basis of principles of mutuality
the transfer fees were not offered for tax. The Assessing Officer issued
notice u/s.148 proposing to assess the transfer fees to tax relying on the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. The Presidency
Co-operative Housing Society,
216 ITR 321 (Bom.).

On a writ petition challenging the notice u/s.148, the
Bombay High Court quashed the notice and held as under :

“(i) Notices basically have been issued on the ground
that the transfer fees received by the petitioners from incoming members was
assessable to tax considering the judgment of this Court in the case of
CIT v. The Presidency Co-operative Housing Society,
216 ITR 321 (Bom.)

(ii) We have in the judgment delivered today in
Income-tax Appeal No. 931 of 2004 and other connected appeals distinguished
the same on the ground that the issue of mutuality had not at all been in
issue before the learned Bench when it decided the reference. Once we have
held the transfer fee even paid by incoming members is not assessable to tax
applying the doctrine of mutuality, the notice issued would be without
jurisdiction and consequently will have to be set aside.”

 



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