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Da Vinci copied Chinese art, says British historian.

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New Page 1

62 Da Vinci copied Chinese art, says British
historian.


Leonardo da Vinci’s drawings of machines are
uncannily similar to Chinese originals and were undoubtedly derived from them, a
British amateur historian says in a newly-published book.


Gavin Menzies sparked headlines across the globe in
2002 with the claim that Chinese sailors reached America 70 years before
Christopher Columbus.


Now he says a Chinese fleet brought encyclopedias
of technology undiscovered by the West to Italy in 1434, laying the foundation
for the engineering marvels such as flying machines later drawn by Italian
polymath Leonardo.

The 70-year-old sold more than a million copies of
his first book, “1421”, which argued Chinese sailors mapped the world in the
early 1400s before abandoning global seafaring.

To support his argument, Menzies publishes drawings
of weapons, mills and pumps from a 1313 Chinese agricultural treatise, the Nung
Shu, and from other pre-1430 Chinese books, next to apparently similar
illustrations by Leonardo, Di Giorgio and Taccola. “By comparing Leonardo’s
drawings with the Nung Shu we have verified that each element of a machine
superbly illustrated by Leonardo had previously been illustrated by the Chinese
in a much simpler manual,” he says.

(Source : The Times of India, 30-7-2008)

 

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Recent Developments in Direct Taxation

Lecture MeetingDate
: 14th July, 2010


Venue : IMC Hall, Churchgate, Mumbai


Speaker : Pinakin D. Desai, Chartered Accountant


Subject :
Recent Developments in
Direct Taxation




1. After a brief
introduction of the topic for the evening, the learned speaker took up for
discussion the Source Rule. The amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 had widened
the source rule for interest, royalty and fees for technical services. As a
result, in case if technical services are rendered by a Non-Resident (NR) in
India, then even if the NR does not have a residence/place of business/business
connection in India or the NR has not rendered services in India, still a case
could be made out that the non-resident will be chargeable to tax in India.

The learned speaker explained the decision of Ishikawa
Jima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. CIT,
(288 ITR 408) (SC) which had laid
down the theory of Territorial Nexus for taxing the income of a non-resident in
India. The learned speaker was of the view that the retrospective amendment by
the Finance Act was made with a view to overrule the said decision as well as
the ratio of :




  •   Jindal Thermal Power Co. Ltd. (Kar.) (225 CTR 220)



  •   Clifford Chance v. DCIT, (Bom.) (221 CTR 1)



Subsequent to the amendment, the Mumbai Tribunal in the case
of Ashapura Minichem Ltd. (2010) (5 Taxman 57) made a distinction between
rendering of service in India and provision of service in India, viz.,
provision of service in India does not require that the service must be
performed or rendered in India. The speaker observed that in the context of
territorial nexus the rendition and provision of service should have been
regarded synonymous conditions. However, since this aspect was not addressed by
the Tribunal, the controversy in regard to whether or not the test of Ishikawa
is satisfied in case of a NR performing service from outside India remains open.

In the opinion of the speaker the following situations would
not be affected by amendment :




  •   Absence of Article on Fees for Technical Services (FTS) in DTAA



  •   DTAA on restrictive fees for included services (FIS) concept



  •   Cases protected by Independent Personal Services Article



  •   Interest/royalty/FTS paid for business/source of income outside India
    [Domestic Source Rule exception — in S. 9(1)(vi)(b)]



2. The next development discussed was the taxability of
shares received by non-corporates. S. 56 was amended w.e.f. 1st June 2010 to
hold that in case of a partnership firm or a closely-held company, if there is
receipt of shares of a closely-held company, without consideration or for a
consideration less than the fair market value (FMV), then such shares would be
liable to tax in the hands of the recipient if the difference between the FMV
and the consideration exceeds Rs.50,000.

As per the explanatory memorandum, the purpose of this
provision was to capture the clandestine transactions in the transfer of
property through the medium of shares. The speaker felt that this intent may not
be appreciated by lower judicial forums and that could result in problems in
respect of genuine transactions.

According to the learned speaker the amendment would not
apply to the following assets :




  •   Mutual fund units



  •   Convertible or non convertible debt instrument



  •   Coupon/warrants



Areas of concern would be receipt of bonus shares, rights
shares, receipt of shares on amalgamation, conversion, split, etc.

3. The third amendment was the insertion of S. 47(xiiib). The
speaker was of the view that the following conditions specified may pose a
challenge for a smooth conversion of a company to an LLP :




  •   All shareholders of company to become partners in the LLP : This
    would mean that even the preference shareholders should become partners in
    the LLP. This might not be an acceptable criteria and some remedial action,
    such as redemption or conversion of preference shares to debt, might need to
    be undertaken.



  •   Shareholders not to receive any benefit except by way of profit share &
    capital contribution
    : The safest position would be to convert the
    accumulated profits to capital contribution and not to withdraw the same for
    3 years. Salary and interest could be continued to be paid as they are not
    payments on conversion to LLP.



  •   Sales/Turnover/Gross Receipts in business to not exceed Rs.60 lakhs in
    the first 3 years
    : It could be contended that if the company is not in
    business, i.e., it is not carrying on any business activity, this
    condition would not apply. If the company is in profession, this condition
    may still apply because business includes profession.



Another issue would be as regards the operation of S. 79. In
the opinion of the speaker, the term shareholding has been defined very
restrictively by courts and hence, conversion to LLP could constitute change in
shareholding and as a result the benefit of carry forward of losses may be lost.

The fourth issue was regarding losses in respect of transaction in derivatives. The learned speaker felt that the CBDT issued Instruction to Assessing Officers to disallow losses in respect of such transactions decision of the Apex Court in Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. (312 ITR 254]  Actual losses allowable only if the transactions qualify as ‘eligible derivative transactions’ under clause (d) of proviso to S. 43(5)  : There have been judicial decisions that if a derivative transaction, not covered by S. 43(5)(d), is a hedging transaction, then the onus is on the assessee to prove the same. However, once it has been proved, then the transaction has to be treated as a business transaction and not as a speculation transaction. Hence, this part of the instruction is also questionable.

  4.  The speaker then discussed various proposal mooted by the Direct tax code (DTC) the concept of place of effective management (POEM) proposed by the DTC. According to judicial forums POEM would be where the Board of Directors or Executive Directors make their decisions. In such a case a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of an Indian company would have a POEM in India and therefore become resident.

The provision regarding Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) proposes to tax passive undistributed income of a CFC of a resident. In respect of the passive income earned by a Foreign Company (FCo) controlled directly or indirectly by an Indian resident, the DTC proposes that income not distributed shall be deemed to be dividend received from FCo.

As a result, there could be double taxation. The income of the CFC would be taxed once in the hands of the FCo on the basis of residential status and again, in the hands of the ICo on the basis of the CFC provisions.

General Anti-avoidance Rules (GAAR), gave immense powers to the Assessing Officer to disregard an arrangement that had been entered into by a taxpayer for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. According to the speaker, GAAR would apply to a transaction if while obtaining a tax benefit, the transaction fulfils any one of the following four conditions  :

  •     The arrangement not at arm’s length

  •     It represents misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Direct Tax Code

  •     Lacks commercial substance

  •     I sentered in a manner not normally employed for bona fide business purposes

The learned speaker then discussed the concerns regarding the implementation of GAAR provisions.

  5.  Finally, the following recent rulings were discussed by the learned speaker  :

  •     Vijaya Bank (SC) 320 ITR 577  :

Credit entry in debtor’s account not necessary to constitute ‘write-off’ for the purposes of bad debt write-off deduction u/s.36(1)(vii).

  •     Kelvinator of India (SC) (LB) 320 ITR 56  :

AO does not have power to ‘review’ his own order. S. 147 permits reassessment where there is ‘reason to believe’. Reassessment on change of opinion is review of order.

  •     Kanchanganga Sea Foods Ltd. (2010 TIOL 03 SC-Intl.)  :

S. 5(2) creates charge for NR Company, inter alia, in respect of income received in India. If first receipt in kind is in India, subsequent sale and realisation outside India does not impact taxation.

  •     Times Guarantee (Mum. SB) (ITA No. 4917 and 4918/Mum./2008)  :

Law as applicable on 1st day of relevant assessment year applies to carry forward and set-off of Unabsorbed Depreciation (UD). S. 32(2) was amended substantively from A.Y. 2002-03 and position applicable to A.Y. 1996-97 was restored. Such amendment is not applicable to UD of the period from A.Y. 1997-98 to A.Y. 2001-02.

ETHICAL PRACTICE IS A DELIBERATE EFFORT

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Namaskaar

“Like the sharp edge of a razor is that path difficult to
cross and hard to tread — thus the wise say”

(Kathopanishad)

Things around us do not auger well, not only for the human
mankind but also for all other living beings on this earth. There is rampant
corruption, greed, dishonesty and selfishness pervading our lives that we have
often forgotten of what it is to be ethical. I know not if these are the
characteristics of the so-called ‘Kaliyuga’, but suffice it to say that human
greed and dishonesty have broken all barriers and may be it is on account of
this that the quality of our lives both mentally and physically has waned.

In such an environment, there is a tendency to overlook
ethics, ethical practices and good values as all of us, or most of us, are in
the rat race. When one is approached and a topic of ethics is broached for
discussion, defences are built up to say that it is difficult to confront
negative tendencies in the environment. It is believed that it is easier to
behave like the masses, as that gets results rather than confronting the system.
This choice arises as individuals have the desire to stay away from difficulties
or that it creates a sense of insecurity.

To be ethical requires a great deal of determination. It has
to necessarily be both in thought and action. It has to be cultivated and
gradually nurtured to reach a stage of personal satisfaction and a character par
excellence. It is not a matter of recognition but it is a matter for deep
contemplation and personal satisfaction; a satisfaction for the soul. It is a
feeling beyond expression. To express is to lose the feeling of it, and it has
to be instantaneous without forethought. The terrain is a difficult one and
therefore requires constant endeavour, deliberate effort and sincerity in
approach. It is a path of dedication and requiring lot of sacrifices along the
way.

It is indeed not an easy task to expect any transformation
overnight. The ways of the world are tricky. But as Lord Gautama Buddha says
that to accept ethical living requires dispassionate reflection upon one’s
conduct. Such a one should develop positive skills and thinking so that human
mankind’s humane possibilities may be realised. If this is so, then this is
beyond monetary considerations, material comforts and mundane living. Can we
accept this challenge ? May be yes, but it requires building up tremendous
potential and grit of conviction for one to be there.

Public recognises money, recognises power and therefore
people tend to gravitate towards the wealthy and powerful. No attempt is made to
segregate the chaff from the grain. It is there for us to see as an everyday
phenomena and we bother not to worry about the methods or the means. We are awed
by their positions or with their possessions. On the other hand, we have no
respect for people who fall short of stature in public life. People who have
towed ethical lines may not have achieved anything in life, for obvious reasons,
but we tend to ignore them or praise their virtues for it is neither endowed
with riches or with positions in public life. Public life is replete with such
examples and requires no examples for substantiating it.

We are all aware that there are numerous examples in Mahatma
Gandhi’s life which are worthy of emulation. It was easy for him to live and
swear by those values, only because he had given up every material possession
and hence was beyond fear. When you have no fear of losing anything, you get the
liberty and freedom of behaving without causing harm to the living environment.
You can refuse and desist to actions beyond ethics. Therefore the bottom-line
for adopting ethical values stems from the thought of willing to lose and the
willingness to let go.

We cannot be lured by money, we cannot be lured by material
comforts and we are not going to be influenced by mass psychology. God has given
us the mind to think and therefore we think for the general good of mankind. We
shall desist to efforts which have the tendency of thwarting natural methods of
living. This then gives us the strength of acting and behaving without fear.

Let us not have a false sense of insecurity in our lives. Let
us live our lives fully without fear and this requires a constant endeavour of
living with values and virtues. Sacrifices are a must and we have to consciously
be aware to let go things that cannot be obtained or achieved through natural
means. Hence, ethical practice is by choice and deliberate efforts.


“Your only obligation in any lifetime is to be true to
yourself.”

— Richard Bach

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Drafting of Appeals, Representation and Rules of Evidence

Lecture Meeting

Subject : Drafting of Appeals, Representation
and Rules of Evidence

Speaker : Chetan Karia, Chartered
Accountant

Venue : I.M.C. Hall, Churchgate, Mumbai.

Date : 6th August 2008





(1) The learned speaker, while setting out the scope and
coverage, remarked that the subject has three elements. Actually each element
can become a topic by itself for discussion. Still to make the discussion
concise and informative, he combined the first 2 elements, viz. drafting
and representation together and the third one was considered separately.

(2) The right of appeal is not an inherent right, but is
conferred by statute to ensure natural justice in arriving at fair and just
quantum of income through Appellate process. In CIT v. Ashoka Engineering
Co.,
194 ITR 645 (SC), the Supreme Court held that such provisions giving
right of appeal should be liberally construed.

(3) The speaker suggested that before filing an appeal, the
order appealed against needs a careful study. Apart from quantum addition and
its tax effect, one has to ascertain whether the additions are unjust and unfair
and also whether they are contrary to provisions of law. One should also examine
whether addition, though small in the current year, would set a bad precedent
for future. While deciding whether the appeal is really called for the merits
and strength of the case should be looked objectively. The appellant should also
keep in mind the powers of enhancement vested in CIT(A). There is no right to
withdraw the appeal. The entire assessment gets open before CIT(A) and his
powers are co-terminus with powers of the AO. CIT v. Rai Bahadur Hardotrai
Motilal Chamaria,
66 ITR 443 (SC).

(4) Drafting of Statement of Facts and Grounds of Appeal
: The statement of facts plays very important role in appeal proceedings.
The Appellate authorities while deciding the appeal need to have before them the
basic facts and events that transpired during assessment proceeding. Whatever is
stated in the assessment order is the version and viewpoint of the AO while
arriving at his decision. If the appellant is in disagreement with the AO’s
version, he has to convincingly put forth before the Appellate Authority, his
standpoint and facts of his case and evidences in support of those facts. At
this juncture, it is necessary to consider whether all these facts and evidences
were laid before the AO during the assessment proceedings.

As regards drafting of grounds of appeal, the speaker advised
that grounds should not be argumentative and lengthy, but should be short,
precise and to the point. Once it is decided that the appeal is to be filed,
then it must be filed strictly within the period of limitation.

(5) The various issues that need consideration in appeal proceedings are :


(a) whether the AO had jurisdiction to pass the impugned
order. Jurisdiction means not only territorial, but also consideration of period
of limitation within which the order is to be passed (S. 153), the financial
limits, obtaining prior approvals of superior authorities, recording in
assessment order and on proceeding sheets about his satisfaction that a
particular default was committed, particularly in penalty proceeding
u/s.271(1)(c). In appropriate cases jurisdiction should be challenged.

(b) Consideration of additional evidence : If
it is the case of the appellant, that the AO has not given sufficient
opportunity to present such evidence before passing the order or that the
assesses was prevented by sufficient cause from adducing such evidence, then
specific prayer should be made to take on record and consider such evidence
before passing Appellate order.

(c) The appellant can take additional grounds and press fresh
claims not set out in appeal memo, if the material relevant thereto is already
on record. In the following cases before Supreme Court and High Courts, this
issue has been considered and the ratios of those cases should be considered
before taking up such additional grounds. The assessee can make alternative
pleas for consideration of Appellate Authority, e.g., allowing
depreciation, if certain expenditure is treated as capital expenditure.

The citation of cases on making fresh claims not originally
claimed in grounds of appeal are as follows :

(i) CIT v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate, 53 ITR 225 (SC).

(ii) CIT v. Jute Corporation, 187 ITR 688.

(iii) National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 229
ITR 383 (SC).

(iv) Ahmedabad Electric Co. v. CIT, 199 ITR 351 (Bom.)
(FB)


(d) The following judgments on filing of additional grounds
not originally taken in the appeal memo :

(i) Shilpa Associates v. ITO, 263 ITR 317 (Raj.),

(ii) Baby Samuel v. ACIT, 262 ITR 385 (Bom.).


It was held that additional ground can be taken any time
before the appeal is heard.

(e) The appellant should ensure that all taxes due on
returned income are paid before filing of appeal. S. 249(4) puts a clear bar or
powers of CIT(A) to entertain any appeal if taxes due on returned income are
unpaid on date of filing of appeal.

(6) Filing appeal before ITA Tribunal and filing of cross
objections :


Both the parties i.e., the assessee and the Assessing Officer, aggrieved by order of CIT(A) can file their appeal before the ITA Tribunal. The time limit is 60 days from the date of receipt of Appellate order of CIT(A) where the Department has filed an appeal to ITAT; the assessee can file cross objection to the Department’s appeal. In such cross objections the assessee can file an appeal on all grounds raised by him which have not found favour with CIT(A). So also where the assessee has claimed allowability on alternate grounds and CIT(A) has allowed on one ground and dismissed the other, then the assessee can raise cross objection against alternate ground dismissed by CIT(A).

(7) Representation before Appellate authorities:

The role of the representative is to assist the Court in arriving at correct and judicious judgment. While taking every effort to present the client’s case more effectively, the tax representative should not identify himself with success of client’s case. The facts of the case should be carefully studied before making appearance before the Court. The submission both on facts and on law should be compiled in the form of paper book.

The paper book should be exhaustive enough to cover all materials supporting the grounds but not bulky. The order in which the papers should be arranged should assist smooth flow of presentation of arguments to be made before the Appellate authorities.

In case of appeal before ITAT as per ITAT Rules, though bulky paper book is filed during proceedings, it is only those papers which are referred to in the Appellate order form part of the case records.

The rules governing the filing of additional evidence are Rule 46A of IT Rules for appeal before CIT(A) and Rule 29 of ITA Tribunal Rule, for appeal before the Tribunal.

8) Presentation of judgments, decided cases before the Court :

The accessibility to innumerable cases with citations has become possible due to computer technology. This calls for skill of a professional to be selective. it is not the decision, nor discussion in a judgment cited is to be relied upon, but the ratio decidendi is more important. There is difference between ratio and obiter dicta. Doctrine of precedents should also be borne in mind. Supreme Court judgment is binding on all authorities and becomes the law of the land. After the Supreme Court, the judgment of jurisdictional High Court has equal binding force in that State, till such judgment is reversed. Where there is no judgment of jurisdictional High Court, then judgments of High Courts of other States have binding force on the Tribunal. If there is conflict in judgments of two High Courts, the Tribunal can follow judgments which are closer to the case before it. So also the judgment of Special Bench is binding on coordinate Division Benches.

9) Some practical suggestions on presentation and on ideal behaviour of tax representative during hearing:

a) Dress Code: The prescribed dress to be worn should not be too gaudy.

b) Behaviour gestures, body language, should not be irritating, provocative but should be normal and decent.

c) Eye contact should be maintained with Members of the Bench.

(d) The speech, its tone and speed: The tone should be polite and should have clarity whereby the message gets conveyed.

e) It must always be remembered that the Appellate authority i.e., CIT(A) or the Tribunal Bench being deciding authorities, have every power to ask any question for finding of facts as well as for collecting information. The representative must reply all such questions patiently and to the point. He should never question the relevance of enquiry.

f) The representative should avoid the habit of interrupting when the representative of other side (DR) or members of the Bench are speaking.

g) The representative  should know where to stop.

(10) Rules  of evidence:

The authorities deciding the case, the AO, CIT(A) and the Tribunal have to give their findings while deciding the case. For that purpose support has to be taken of some credible and conclusive evidence. Such evidences is required to be brought on record by following certain procedure:

a) In Prabhavati S. Shah v. CfT, 231 ITR 1 (Born.); the Bombay High Court has held that the Rules put fetters on rights of the assessee to produce additional evidence, but not on Appellate authorities to consider it if they want to consider. Where the AO has made addition based on statement of any party behind the back of the assessee and contents of such statement is contradicted by the assessee, then he must be given opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. This is relevant while deciding merits of additions u/s.68 and u/s.69.

b) Income-tax proceedings are quasi-judicial civil proceedings and hence the provisions of the Evidence Act applicable to criminal proceedings are not applicable to Income-tax proceedings. This is held in the following cases:

    i) Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills v. CfT, 26 ITR 775 (SC)

    ii) Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT, 125 ITR 713 (SC)

    iii) J. S. Parker v. V. B. Palekar, 94 ITR 616 (Born.)

    iv) Chuharmal v. CfT, 172 ITR 250 (SC).

c) Books of accounts regularly maintained are good evidence but not conclusive. This is held as evidence in V. C. Shukla’s case 3 SCC 410 (SC), 82 ITD 85 (Mum.) (TM).

d) If opportunity is not given to the assessee, such evidence is not good evidence and addition based thereon will not sustain. [Kishinchand Chellaram, 125 ITR 713 (SC)]

e) Cross-examination and statement of witnesses: if during the cross-examination the witness contradicts his earlier statement, then his statement cannot be relied upon by the AO for making addition and is to be completely ignored.

f) The information given by the witness should be factual and not based on hearsay. It is necessary to prove what is apperant is real. [Durgaprasad More v. CIT, 82 ITR 540 (SC)]

g) Rule 46A : The CIT(A) has full right to decide whether additional evidence should be admitted or not. Where it is the contention of the assessee that he was prevented by sufficient cause, he has to prove it.

h) Substantial cause and Rule 46A of the LT. Rules or Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules: The Supreme Court in K. Venkat Ramaiah v. A. Seetharam Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 has ruled that in the interest of a fair judgment, the Appellate authority should take a sympa-thetic view and should not deny admission of evidence on hypertechnical ground.

The meeting terminated with a vote of thanks to the learned Speaker.

Prayer makes one complete — Part I

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Namaskaar

Prayer does not necessarily change things for you, it changes
you for things.” — Swami Chinmayananda


Two years back, when my mother was on deathbed, I prayed
intensely for her life. A few days passed as if my prayers were not answered as
her condition was deteriorating. Suddenly, one day, a realisation dawned on me
that she was suffering a lot and it was my love, which was holding her back.
From that moment, I left everything to God’s will, and when finally she passed
away, I remained calm. This realisation through prayers helped me to remain
composed and experience my mother’s presence beyond her physique.

Do we need Prayer ?

When I thought of this, a counter question flashed in my
mind as to whether we need food to live on ? What food is to body, prayer is
to the mind. Prayer makes our mind healthy, positive, sensitive and humble.
Our attitude or reaction to the situation undergoes change, even as we derive
strength from within.

Prayer and service


Service to mankind is prayer in action !

In May 2008, I visited a place called Nirmal Hriday (Tender-Hearts)
— a home for dying destitutes run by the Mother Teresa Foundation in Kolkata.
I was touched to the core by the selfless services rendered by the volunteers
to the terminally ill. I found that they bring people who are dying on the
roads of Kolkata and provide them refuge with love, care and affection. One of
the volunteers said, that “we are really doing no great thing but just are
serving the suffering humanity — a prayer, indeed. I saw ‘prayer in action’
for the first time. Prayer until then to me was reciting a few hymns — the
meaning of which I hardly ever knew. However, later I realised that prayer is
not merely reciting hymns or visiting temples but it (prayer) is a means
communicating with God. I also realised that one of the channels of
communication with GOD is service to the humanity — as it is said “Manav
Seva is Madhav Seva
.” To quote Mother Teresa “the fruit of silence is
prayer, the fruit of prayer is faith, the fruit of faith is love, the fruit of
love is service and the fruit of service is peace.”

Prayer and Emotions

An emotion laden prayer is an invocation to His grace !

Questions often arise in our mind, as to how do we pray ?
And what will make God answer our prayer ? For prayer to be effective or
responsive, it is not important how long we pray, but how intensely we pray.
Intensity comes from heart overwhelmed by emotions. Prayer without emotions is
blabbery, whereas prayer packed with emotions does not need any verbalisation,
for He is omnipotent and omniscient who knows all we intend, think or speak.

A small boy in a Church was reciting alphabets — A, B, C,
D. The presiding priest offered to teach him how to pray but was stunned by
the answer given by the boy who said, “I know not complex hymns or words,
though I know that they all are composed of alphabets, and God being
omnipotent, can understand my alphabets hence He can compose a prayer from me
of His choice’. Needless to say that the prayer of the child was well
received, rather than that of the priest who prayed more from his mind
rather
than from his heart. But then generating emotions in prayer
is easier said than done. How does one go about it ? Let me give you a simile.
We human beings have launched many communication satellites whose signals are
beamed across the globe. In order to receive these signals and strike a
communication link, we need to adjust the frequency and/or wavelength of our
handset (mobile). Some receive messages/images in colour, others in Black and
White. The quality of communication depends upon the quality of the handset,
that is, whether or not it is capable of receiving colour images, how it is
programmed and so on. If we switch off the handset, we cannot receive any
communication/message whatsoever, notwithstanding the fact that signals of the
message are there in the atmosphere. But, remember, there is no flaw in His
communication. We only need to fine-tune our receiving set to match His
wavelength and frequency in order to strike a link between HIM and us. This
can be done through love, faith and devotion, wherein faith and devotion make
for proper programming and love acts as a battery — battery that supplies
power, — power which keeps the receiving set tuned at all the times.

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Is life worth living ?

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Namaskaar

Poets and philosophers from days gone by have tried to find
an answer to the question “Is life worth living ?” However, with the
examinations mercifully more than four months away and Bombay’s less warm
season, (Bombay never has a winter), just about to make its bow, one would
really be a cynic to answer it in the negative.


Particularly when this question is put to college students
the answer cannot but be in the affirmative, for life with its vast uncharted
vistas full of adventures and the joy of accomplishment is still before us. Each
one of us has his ambitions to be a Fleming, an Edison, a Lincoln, a Marshall,
Hall and surely the mere opportunity of being able to put in an effort to bring
to fruition our dreams, makes life worth living.

By saying that life is worth living, I do not mean that there
are no hardships to be endured, nor does it signify the absence of pain and
sorrow, nor even of death; thought it so often strikes most cruelly and
unexpectedly. As a matter of fact it is these disappointments, it is this
challenge full of uncertainties and vicissitudes which life offers, the suspense
that it holds, adds zest to living. In the type of Brave New World envisaged by
Aldous Huxley, life would indeed be physically comfortable, but there we would
merely be existing and not living. We on the other hand want a world where a man
by facing his troubles can prove his manhood. May this world always have
something to be solved, patched, or mended ! But above all, may it never be a
soft place for soft people with soft heads. This world of ours with dreams for
us to dream, really deserves a vote of confidence, for, with its dirt and
cleanness, its ups and downs and its total unexpectedness, it has given, through
variety, more pleasure than pain. As the poet says :

“This world that we are living in,

Is mighty hard to beat

There is a thorn on every rose

But ain’t the roses sweet ?”

If, of course one wants to sit whimpering in a corner pitying
oneself for the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, then undoubtedly one
will not find life worth living for the simple reason that one is determined not
to find it so. Surely one lacks some essential human quality if one does not
find life worth living when a former President of the United States who could
not walk without being supported, an English poet who was blind, a German
composer who was deaf, an American lady, still happily with us, who for the
major portion of her life has been unable to see or hear or speak have all
unequivocally declared that life has given them great satisfaction and they
would not like to change anything if they were to re-live it.

The inventions of modern science have placed so much in the
hands of so many for so little, that today there is no reason for anyone to find
life not worth living. No longer do we have to regulate our work by the sun, no
longer does it take months to communicate information from one place to another,
no longer are optimism and a faith in God the main foundations of medical
science.

There is no excuse today to feel bored with life. We have the
cinemas, the theatres, the art galleries —to mention but a few of our modern
amenities. It may of course be stated that all this costs money and it is only
for the ‘haves’ that life is worth living. But let us not delude ourselves. The
best things in life are free. One does not need a large bank balance to watch
the sun reluctantly merging in the sea, sending forth a last ray in salutation
and leaving, as it departs, its footprints on the clouds of the sky amidst a
beautiful colour scheme. What more satisfying experience can one have than to
watch the sea on a full-moon night, the waves shimmering in the moonlight as
they dash, to no avail, against the rocks and then roll back. Here indeed is a
form of rock and roll more ancient and certainly more graceful than its human
variant.

One may ask next : “What is the secret which makes life worth
living ?” It is to remember to remain contented always — to thank God, it is not
worse. A small verse comes to mind :

“From the day that we were born

Till we ride the hearse

Nothing ever happens

That couldn’t have been worse.”

One should also not forget that when we point an accusing
finger at another, three are pointing towards ourselves and that it is far
better to trust and be cheated than never trust at all.

Life is not necessarily made worth living merely by
accomplishing great things. A Tom Thompson can find life as enjoyable as a
Winston Churchill. It is the little things which count. The smile received when
a frown was deserved, the first time one saw one’s name in print, that glorious
cover drive off the back foot by Wally Hammond, the memorable occasion when one
entered the Quarter-finals of the District Championships, the joy one obtained
in reading that book by P. G. Wodehouse, lying curled up in bed with the rain
beating outside and at a time when one really should have been in college, the
wonderful sense of achievement one felt when one successfully placed a mouse in
that nasty mathematics-teacher’s drawer, the sheer bliss of that first kiss —
these are the things which make life worth living.

I am not unaware of the fact that poets and sages throughout
the ages have stated that Life is not worth living. As Shelley said in his “Ode
to a Skylark”.

“We look before and after,

And pine for what is not.

Our sincerest laughter

With some pain is fraught,

Our sweetest songs are those that

tell of saddest thought.”

But as one rambles through the woods with a clear blue sky
above, with one’s pet dog trotting a few paces behind, with the trees in full
bloom and the birds giving vocal expression to the joy which one feels in one’s heart – the joy just to be alive at a time like this to be able to repeat such divine poetry does not that in itself make life worth living?

An insight into Draft Point of Taxation Rules

1.
Introduction :

Given the fact
that frequent change in the rate of tax on services over a period of time has
caused confusion and uncertainty both among tax officers and assessees as to
the criteria based on which the tax may be levied, the Government has decided
to provide framework to determine point of taxation in different situations by
publishing Draft Point of Taxation (for Services Provided or Received in India)
Rules, 2010 (the POT Rules). The said POT Rules are also accompanied by a
preamble letter and Explanatory Notes on the POT Rules. The Government has
clearly expressed that the proposed rules are meant to provide the regulatory
framework and clarity to determine point of taxation whenever there is a change
in the rate of service tax. Similar difficulty is faced in determining point of
tax in the cases of continuous services. The taxable event under the law takes
place on provision of service. However, the liability to pay service tax
currently arises only on the receipt of the payment. In the POT Rules, there is
a shift proposed by providing a link to the payment of tax with raising of
invoice or payment for service provided or to be provided or provision of
service, whichever is occurring earlier. According to the Government, the
current rule allowing payment of tax on receipt basis does not fall in line
with the Central Excise law and the VAT laws of the states of India. In both
these cases, the payment is required to be made on accrual basis i.e., on the
event of clearance of goods in the case of former and issue of invoice in the
case of latter and that Goods and Service Tax (GST) which is in the offing is
likely to follow this practice. Thus, the proposed POT Rules appear to be a
precursor to GST, which is likely to be implemented in April, 2011.

2. Taxable
event and point of taxation :

In any fiscal
legislation, specific provisions exist for charge of tax and collection of tax.
Under the service tax law, the charge of tax is created by S. 66 of the Finance
Act, 1994 (the Act) on prescribed taxable services. ‘Taxable Service’ is
defined as a service provided or to be provided. Therefore when a service is
provided or agreed to be provided, there takes place the taxable event. As
against this, the POT Rules seek to define ‘taxable event’ as the event which
causes the tax liability to arise, namely, the provision of service, issuance
of invoice or the receipt of payment. The events of issuance of invoice and
receipt of payment are deemed as provision of service under a fiction proposed
to be created under the law. When an invoice is issued or payment is received
prior to providing the service by a service provider, the service would be
deemed to be provided at the time the invoice was issued or the payment was
received, whichever occurred earlier and the liability to pay tax would arise
at this point. Referring now to the collection of service tax, currently Rule
6(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 provides that service tax liability arises
when payment for taxable services Is received. In the POT Rules however, ‘Point
of Taxation’ is defined to mean the point of time when the tax becomes payable
to the Government. Thus, the POT Rules have proposed to shift the point of
taxation away from the receipt of payment for the service to either at the time
of provision of service or the issuance of invoice for the service or the receipt
of payment, based on various situations as envisaged in the Rules, but
essentially on the concept of accrual rather than solely on the receipt of
payment.

3. Key
features :

3.1 The POT
Rules essentially provide framework to determine the point of taxation mainly
under the following situations :

à When any advance payment is received towards any
taxable service.

à When there is a change in the rate of tax with regard
to existing taxable service whether exempt or otherwise and there is a
difference in date and timing of provision of
service, raising of invoice and date of receipt of payment.

à When there is a change in the rate of tax with regard
to service which is taxed for the first time.

à When there is a continuous supply of a service or a
service provided on a long-term basis.

à When there is a transaction between associated
enterprises.

à In case of royalty and similar payments.

3.2 Advances
towards taxable services :

Under Rule 4,
the point of tax for advances is dealt with. It provides that service tax is to
be paid on the date of receipt of the advance towards provision of a taxable
service and the rate applicable would be the rate prevailing at the time of
receipt of such advance. Thus, the tax payment under this rule falls in line
with the basic principle underlying the provisions in the POT Rules that the
tax payment is linked to the issuance of invoice or receipt of payment,
whichever is earlier. The Government in its explanatory note in this regard has
clarified that once the tax is charged on the payment, the determination of tax
would be final. Further, it is expressly provided in the rule that no tax is to
be paid on interest-free refundable deposits.

3.3 Change in
rate of tax – Existing services :

Rule 5 seeks to
determine the point of taxation where there is a change in the rate of tax as
regards existing taxable services whether exempt or otherwise and there is a
difference of time between provision of service, raising of invoice and the
time of receipt of payment of taxable service. Table 1 sets out the
determination of point of taxation under the said rule.

 The principle followed in the above rule is that when two points of taxation have occurred, the ear-lier of the two would be the point of taxation.

3.4 Introduction of new services in the tax net :

Table
2

Sr.

Provision

Issue of

Receipt of

Point of

No.

of service

invoice

payment

taxation

 

 

 

for service

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

Before the

Irrelevant

Irrelevant

No tax

 

date of

 

 

 

 

new levy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

Irrelevant

Before

Before

No tax

 

when

the date

the date

 

 

provided

of new

of new

 

 

 

levy

levy

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

After the

After the

Before

No tax

 

date of

date of

the date

 

 

new levy

levy but

of new

 

 

 

within 14

levy

 

 

 

days of

 

 

 

 

receipt of

 

 

 

 

payment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rule 6 provides for determination of point of taxation when a service is brought in the tax net for the first time. Refer Table 2. This rule however does not apply to services provided on a continuous or long-term basis. (Rule 7 deals with services supplied continuously or for a long duration of time.)

3.5 Continuous supply of services :

Sr.

Provision of service

Issue of invoice

Receipt of payment

Point of taxation

No.

 

 

for service

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

Before change

After change

After change

Date of invoice or payment,

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

whichever is earlier

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

Before change

Before change

Within 30 days of

Date of invoice*

 

in rate

in rate

invoice date

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

After change

Before change

After change

Date of payment

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iv)

After change

Before change

Before change

Date of payment or invoice,

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

whichever is earlier

 

 

 

 

 

Continuous supply of services is defined to mean services supplied under a contract for a period exceeding six months or services as specified by the Government to be in continuous supply. The proposed Rule 7 provides that the rate of tax would be the rate applicable on the date of payment becoming due in terms of the contract irrespective of whether or not payment is received or invoice is raised. If the payment becomes due on completion of any milestone in terms of the contract, the date of completion of such milestone is the point of taxation. If the contract does not contain any clause for date of payment or mile-stone, the service tax is required to be paid on raising of invoice or receipt of payment, which occurs earlier.

It is further provided that when the service supplied continuously is covered under this rule is introduced for the first time in law, no service tax is required to be paid on payments received prior to service becoming taxable, even if the service is provided subsequently. The Government has clarified that in case of ongoing contracts of construction, the tax is liable to be paid on the basis of raising of invoice or the date provided for payment in the contract or the actual date of payment, as the case may be. When payment for construction is received prior to applicability of service tax and commencement of construction occurs after the levy coming into force, no service tax would be levied on such payments made prior to the applicable date.

3.6 Services provided to associated enterprises:

In case of transactions with associated enterprises, Rule 8 has provided that the relevant date is the date of debit or credit in the books of account or issuance of debit or credit note or the date of payment, which is earlier.

3.7  Royalty and similar payments:

As regards royalties and similar payments where the whole amount of consideration for service is not ascertainable at the time of performance of service and subsequently the use or the benefit of these services by a person other than the supplier gives rise to any payment of consideration, Rule 9 has provided that the service would be deemed to be provided at the time of each payment is made or invoice is raised, which is earlier.

    At the end:

While the attempt of the Government to introduce framework of POT Rules should be regarded as a welcome step since it is done with the basic objective of addressing some of the prevailing certainty and open issues under the current dispensations of law, there exists certain aspects which appear to add to complexity and difficulty of implementation. For instance :

    As aforesaid, currently the charging S. 66 of the Act determines the taxable event and which is ‘provision of a service’. To redefine this rudimentary aspect of the fiscal statute under the rules proposed to be issued in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.94(2) of the Act seem to be going beyond the Finance Act, 1994 and to this extent, re-consideration of this very fundamental aspect appears necessary.

    The objective of the Government as indicated in the preamble letter and Explanatory Notes is to specify point of taxation as the date of raising of invoice, provision of service or receipt of payment, whichever is earlier, whereas the POT Rules have dealt with only specific conflicting situations and not the remaining or residuary situation/s. If the point at which the service provider should pay tax is changed, it is not indicated whether the existing Rule 6(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would be amended consequent upon the proposed POT Rules coming into force. Or else, is it to be contended that the point of taxation except in the case of specified situations, would be still the time of receipt of payment? In any case, the proposed rules should be consistent with the provisions of the Service Tax Rules 1994, existing or suitably amended.

    Provision of multiple parameters under different situations if introduced without modification, is likely to pose a serious challenge in implementation as Rules 5, 6 and 7 are complex and keeping a track of all the three events viz. provisions of service, raising of invoice and receipt of payment under any of these rules is a huge task for businesses after understanding and interpreting the said rules.

    The POT Rules have not dealt with a situation when services are provided from outside India i.e., when reverse charge mechanism operates u/s.66A of the Act. Specific consideration for this also appears necessary.

    Rule 4 provides that interest-free refundable deposit would not attract service tax. Does this mean that when interest is payable on a refundable deposit, the tax is payable? If intention is not so, suitable change is required on this issue.

    The class of service providers in India is not analogical to that of manufacturing units or VAT dealers. There could be tremendous cash flow issue for a number of service providers when one is required to pay at the point of raising of invoice or provision of service which may result in delay in compliance of law followed by penal action and litigation. Further, the POT Rules as proposed are silent over the treatment of non-payment for services or bad debts, cancellation of invoice, discounts, etc. Similarly, in the current scenario also, there already exists the issue of availability of CENVAT credit (in terms of existing CENVAT Credit Rules) when service tax is paid on advances. If multiple taxable events as proposed are introduced, well-thought out consequential amendments in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 also would be required. Further, one could envisage a chaotic condition while taking CENVAT credit as complexity in record maintenance would also arise again resulting in litigation.

Since the Government has invited public comments on the Draft POT Rules before September 01, 2010, it can be hoped that major creases would be ironed out if the Government is keen on notifying the Rules. As a matter of fact, since GST is soon likely to be a reality, it would be a better proposition to implement broad-based rules along with GST rather than half-baked rules as precursor to GST, which may only worsen the already uncertain scenario.

Switching off mains can reduce power bills by 30%

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New Page 1

78 Switching off mains
can reduce power bills by 30%

Be careful of
electronic devices such as mobile chargers that you think don’t consume too much
power.

Putting off your
television set with a remote control does not mean that it (along with a set-top
box) has stopped consuming electricity. Similarly, pulling the charger from your
mobile handset does not mean that power consumption stops.

Not putting off
the main switches of even the smallest electronic appliances reflects in your
monthly bill. Such negligence, say power experts, inflates power bills by
25-30%. This, says power expert Ashok Pendse, means extra consumption of 75-90
units for average monthly residential consumption of 300-350 units.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 9-7-2010)

levitra

DOMESTIC ARBITRATION

Laws and Business1.
Introduction :

1.1 Arbitration is one of
the oldest dispute resolution systems across the world. Even in India,
arbitration has been in existence from ancient times. Considering the time it
takes in India for a Court case to be resolved, the importance of arbitration
has increased manifold in the last few years. Almost all types of civil disputes
can be subjected to arbitration, such as disputes in relation to joint ventures,
infrastructure projects, concession agreements with the Government, property
matters, etc.

1.2 The Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the Act’) totally revamped the law in relation to
arbitrations in India. The Act replaces the Arbitration Act, 1940. Let us
examine the process in relation to an arbitration under the 1996 Act.

1.3 An arbitration means any
arbitration whether or not administered by permanent arbitral institution.

1.4 This Article gives a
bird’s-eye view of some of the important features of ‘arbitration’.



2.
Arbitration Agreement :


2.1 An Arbitration Agreement
means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain
disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement
should be in writing and signed by both the parties. There is no prescribed form
for the same. It could also be by way of an exchange of letters, telex,
telegram, etc. The reference in a ‘contract document’ containing an arbitration
clause constitutes an arbitration agreement as that arbitration clause is part
of the contract.

2.2 The Arbitration
Agreement is the starting point by which parties refer disputes to arbitration.
Since it is an agreement, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 must
also be borne in mind. Thus, provisions, such as capacity of parties to
contract, agreements opposed to public policy, etc., should be considered.

2.3 Salient features of an
Arbitration Agreement :


(a) The intention for
reference to arbitration must be clear and unambiguous.

(b) It should mention :

(i) the place/venue of
arbitration

(ii) the law which would
be followed

(iii) the procedure for
appointing
arbitrators

(iv) the language in
which the arbitration proceedings will be conducted



Full freedom is accorded to
the parties in selecting the above features. In addition, the agreement may also
lay down the procedure for conducting arbitration proceedings, use of experts,
etc.

2.4 An arbitration agreement
is not discharged by the death of one of the parties and his legal
representatives would step into the shoes of the deceased party.

2.5 The arbitration
agreement may also provide that arbitration would be the only dispute resolution
mechanism and none of the parties will approach any Court for resolving the
dispute.



3.
Arbitrators :


3.1 The parties can decide
on the number of arbitrators to be appointed, provided that the number of
arbitrators is not an even number. Thus, they could be 1, 3, 5, etc. If the
agreement is silent, then the Act provides for a sole arbitrator. Usually, an
arbitral tribunal consist of 3 arbitrators with each party appointing one
arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators jointly appointing the third
arbitrator, who is known as the presiding arbitrator.

3.2 There is no
specification as to who can be appointed as an arbitrator. However, it is
preferable that he should be a man of commerce, law, or having expertise in the
field of dispute resolution and he should be someone who is perceived to be fair
and impartial to all parties. Usually, advocates, chartered accountants,
chartered engineers, bankers, and retired judges, etc. are appointed as
arbitrators.

3.3 If there is a failure to
appoint arbitrators, then the Chief Justice of the High Court has powers to
appoint an arbitrator under the Act.

3.4 Before accepting
appointment, the arbitrator must disclose to the parties any matters which are
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts about his independence or
impartiality. Similarly, the appointment of an arbitrator may be challenged on
grounds that there are circumstances which give rise to justifiable doubts about
his independence or impartiality. A challenge can also be made on grounds that
he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.



4.
Procedure of arbitration :


4.1 The arbitration tribunal
is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. The parties are, and failing them the tribunal, is free to determine the
procedure to be followed. In the absence of defined or agreed procedure.

4.2 The arbitral tribunal
would issue notice of hearing to the parties.

4.3 The parties would make their written and/ or oral submissions. The parties must submit their statement of claim and defence. They can also rely on various documents and evidence in support of their claims and defence. They may also rely on and submit expert testimony if so permitted by the tribunal or agreed upon by the parties. The other party may file rebuttal submissions against the expert testimony.

4.4 The arbitrator is bound to observe the principles of natural justice whilst conducting the proceedings. He must give an equal opportunity of being heard to both parties.

4.5 The arbitrator may also prescribe certain deposit for the costs of arbitration which both parties have to pay.

    5. Award:

5.1 The award shall be in writing, state its date and place of making. It must be signed by the arbitrator.

5.2 The reasons on the basis of which award was passed, shall be recorded unless the parties agree otherwise. The sum awarded may include ‘interest’ if the claimant is entitled to interest either under the agreement or the arbitration agreement.

5.3 It must provide for the costs and which party would bear them. Costs would include costs relating to fees and expenses of the arbitrators and witnesses, legal fees, administration and other costs in connection with the arbitration proceedings.

5.4 A signed copy of the award must be delivered to each party. Within 30 days from the receipt of an award by a party, the party may request the arbitration tribunal to correct any errors in the award.

5.5 The arbitrator can also make an interim arbitral award.

5.6 The award is final and binding on the parties and it can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it is a decree of the Court. However, this is subject to award not being be challenged and set aside by the Court.

    6. Setting aside of an award:

6.1 The Court would set aside an award in the following cases:

    a. The party was under some incapacity.
    b. The arbitration agreement is invalid.
    c. The party was not given proper notice of hearing or was unable to present its case.
    d. The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by the agreement or contains matters beyond the scope of the agreement.
    e. The award is in conflict with the public policy.
    f. The composition of arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the arbitration agreement.

6.2 An application for setting aside the award may be made to the Court u/s.34 of the Act. It must be made within 3 months from the receipt of the award. The Court may grant an additional 30 days in some circumstances.

    7. Role of CAs:

7.1 CAs can play a very important role in arbitration proceedings of their clients. They can make submissions on behalf of their clients or appear as an expert and give testimony on subjects, such as valuation, accounting, etc., or can even preside as an arbitrator. They can get empanelled with Chambers of Commerce, such as IMC, CII, etc., as arbitrators. Considering the slow pace of court litigation, CAs should advise their clients to strongly consider arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. They could also advise the clients whilst reviewing contracts during the course of audit to have an ‘arbitration agreement’ unless an arbitration clause is already included in the contract.

Legal compliance — Directors’ responsibility — Part 2

Laws and Business

Last month we examined the various laws under which a company
can be liable and thus, the directors can also be held responsible. Let us now
examine situations in which directors can be held responsible and the safeguards
they can take.


1. What is the meaning of the terms

‘Connivance, Neglect and Consent’ ?

Since the terms ‘connivance’, ‘neglect’ and ‘consent’ are
very important and often find mention in various statutes while defining
directors’ responsibilities, it is very essential to understand their meaning.
These words are defined by various judicial decisions and dictionaries as
follows :




1.1 Connivance :

(a) “A figurative expression, meaning voluntary blindness to some present act or conduct, to something going on before the eyes, and is inapplicable to anything past or future; an agreement or consent, directly or indirectly given that something unlawful shall be done by another; consent; passive consent; voluntary oversight

To constitute ‘connivance’ something more than mere negligence is necessary. Pothi Gollari v. Ghanni Modal, AIR 1963 Ori 60″.

(The Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, Wadhwa & Co.)

(b) “The secret or indirect consent or permission of one person to the commission of an unlawful or criminal act by another. A winking at; voluntary blindness; an intentional failure to discover or prevent the wrong; forbearance or passive consent. Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86 S.W. 2nd 293, 296.”

(Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, West Publishing Co.)

(c) “The Act of conniving — to encourage or assent to a wrong by silence or feigned ignorance; knowledge of a wrongful or criminal act during its occurrence”

(Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002 Edition, Trident Press Int.)

(d) “Secretly allow a wrongdoing”

(The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition, Oxford University Press)

(e) “Pretended ignorance or secret encouragement of wrongdoing; knowledge or encouragement of a wrongdoing without participation in it; avoid noticing something wrong; give aid to wrongdoing by not telling of it;”

(The World Book Dictionary, World Book, Inc.)

1.2 Neglect :

(a) “May mean to omit, fail or forbear to do a thing that can be done or that is required to be done, but it may also import an absence of care or attention in the doing or omission of a given act. And it may mean a designed refusal, indifference or unwillingness to perform one’s duty. In Re. Perkins, 234 Mo. App. 716, 117 S.W. 2d 686, 692.”

(Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, West Publishing Co.)

(b) “A failure to do what is required; omission, forbearance to do anything that can be done or that requires to be done; the omission to do or perform some work, duty or act; the omission or disregard of some duty; the omission from carelessness to do something that can be done and that ought to be done; negligence. Neglect to do a thing means to omit to do a duty which the party is able to do. King v. Burrell, 12A.&E.468.468.

The word ‘neglect’ is wide enough to cover erosion of the kind indulged in by the petitioner. (It certainly cannot mean that a person on whom a notice has been served can only be prosecuted if he fails to give any reply at all and that any sort of reply to the notice, however inadequate or evasive, is sufficient to avert the prosecution for failure to comply with the terms of the notice.) Pirthi Raj v. The State, AIR 1958 Pun 396, 397.

To disregard; to pay little or no attention to; to fail to perform, render, discharge (a duty) to take (a precaution).

The word ‘neglect’ means ‘gross neglect’, wilful, intentional, culpable or flagrant disregard of duties. Baburao Vishwanath Mathpati v. State, AIR 1996 Bom 227, 231 (DB), Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act Act”

(The Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, Wadhwa & Co.)

(c) “To neglect doing is the omission to do some duty which the party is able to do (per Patterson J. King v. Burrell, 12A & E, 468)”

(Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.)

(d) “To disregard; ignore; To fail to give proper attention to or to take proper care of; Habitual want of attention or care”

(Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002 Edition, Trident Press Int.)

(e) “Fail to give proper care or attention to; fail to do something”

(The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition, Oxford University Press)

(f) “To give too little care or attention to”

(The World Book Dictionary, World Book, Inc.)

1.3 Consent :

(a) “(In the Contract Act) Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense.”

‘Consent’ is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. Where a consent is given substantially, the Court does not look very minutely into the form in which it is given” (Per Stirling, J., Re Smith, 59 LJ Ch 284.)

“You cannot consent to a thing unless you have knowledge of it” Jessel, M.R., Ex parte Ford; In Re Caughey, (1876) LR 1 CD 528.

‘Consent’ must imply a knowledge of the necessary facts and materials which leads to the consent, consent cannot be given in the abstract or in vacuo : Walchandnagar Industries Ltd. v. Ratanchand Khimchand Motishaw, AIR 1953 Bom 285.

‘Consent’ must imply a knowledge of the necessary facts and materials which leads to the consent, consent cannot be given in the abstract or in vacuo: Walchandnagar Industries Ltd. v. Ratanchand Khimchand Motishaw, AIR 1953 Bom 285.

Consent and assent. ‘Consent’ in law means an affirmative, positive act and ‘assent’ means passivity or inaction: S. Raghbir Singh Sandhawalla v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1958 Pun 250, 252.

Connivance is also consent in the legal sense. ‘To consent’ means according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘to acquiesce’ or ‘to agree’ To connive’ at a thing means, to wink at it. The word’ connive’ is only used in connection with a thing which is, unlawful or immoral which one ought to oppose. It implies knowledge and lack of opposition where there is a duty to oppose. Sheopat Singh v. Narishchandra, AIR 1958 Raj 324, 332. [Representation of the People Act, 1951, S. 100].”

(The Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, Wadhwa & Co.)

a) “Consent. A concurrence of wills. Voluntarily yielding the will to the proposition of another; acquiescence or compliance therewith. Agreement; approval; permission; the act or result of coming into harmony or accord. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in a balance the good or evil on each side. It means voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice to do something proposed by another. It supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, determined, and free use of these powers. Consent is implied in every agreement. It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even mistake.”

(Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, West Publishing Co.)

c) “Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in balance, the good and evil on each side.”
(Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.)

d) “A voluntary yielding to what is proposed or desired by another; acquiescence; Agreement in opinion or sentiment”
(Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002 Edition, Trident Press Int.)

e) “Permission;  agree to do something”
(The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition, Oxford University Press)

2. Supreme Court  decision:

2.1 The Supreme Court has passed a landmark decision under the Negotiable Instruments Act in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, 2005 8 SCC 89. Although this is a judgment under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has several far reaching consequences and its ratio descendi can be applied under various other statutes which affix a vicarious criminal liability on directors in respect of offences committed by a company.

2.2 In this case, the Court was posed with important questions regarding the criminal liability of directors of a company in case of dishonour of a cheque issued by such company. Ultimately the Supreme Court answered the queries posed to it as under:

(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of the Negotiable Instruments Act and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements cannot be said to be satisfied.

(b) Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in-charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. The requirement of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that the person sought to be made liable should be in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact, as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.

(c) A Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director would be in-charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. Holders of such positions in a company become liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Merely by virtue of being a Managing Director or Joint Managing Director, these persons are in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under the Negotiable Instruments Act. So far as signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the dishonour and will be covered.

3. What can Directors do to safeguard their interests?

3.1 The vexed question which thus arises is, what can Directors do to safeguard their interests and ensure that they are not made personally liable for any defaults by the company?

3.2 One of the first things which the Board of Directors must ensure is that the company has a system for compliance with all the applicable laws. The company must have a written Compliance Manual enlisting all the laws applicable to it, which it must comply with and also who from the company is responsible for ensuring compliance with the same.

Further, the laws must be bifurcated into those which are critical to the survival of the company and those which although are not so crucial must be complied with. For instance, compliance with Food & Drug Administration Law is paramount for a pharmaceutical company. Similarly, compliance with the SEBI Merchant Banker Regulations .are critical for the existence of a merchant banker. Any serious lapse in such laws may result in the company’s registration being suspended or even permanently cancelled. There have been several recent instances where certificates of SEBI intermediaries have been suspended for not complying with the Code of Conduct or the conditions of registration.

The Manual may contain the important provisions with a reference to the relevant sections, rules, notifications, circulars, important case laws, etc., so that the user can refer to the same. It may be segregated into various sections, for instance, Corporate laws, SEBI Regulations, etc. It should be updated on a regular basis, so that the users do not refer to outdated material. The Referencer published by the BCAS is a very good starting point for preparing a Compliance Manual.

The optimum utility of the Manual would be if it is prepared by an outsider, i.e., not someone from within the company. A CA or a lawyer can be entrusted with this assignment. This is necessary because in several transactions there is a cross-influence of laws. For instance, in case of a loan given by a company to a related entity, the provisions of the Companies Act (e.g., S. 295), the Income-tax Act [e.g., S. 2(22)(e)], FEMA (if the recipient is a non-resident), etc. would have to be considered. In such situations, it is better if an independent professional prepares a comprehensive Manual. There must also be certain Red Flag Transactions, i.e., before such transactions are to be entered into, the Company Secretary or the Legal head must be consulted. A list of the Red Flag Transactions should also be circulated to the Head of the Accounts, so that his department should not process such transactions without receiving the prior approval of the legal department. A classic example of a Red Flag Transaction would be an inter-company investment within the group. In several cases it is observed that the listed company funds the private limited companies within the group by way of loans or investment. In all such cases, the concurrence of the legal department should be obtained before executing the transaction. Thus, the Accounts department should not write a cheque or pass an entry till it has been cleared by the legal cell.

3.3 The company must appoint a compliance officer to ensure compliance with various applicable laws and regulations. He must be a person who is well-versed with the legal and commercial fields, say, a Chartered Accountant, a Lawyer, a Company Secretary, etc. At every Board Meeting, the Compliance Officer should be asked to table a Compliance Certificate certifying compliance with all laws. This should also be preferably signed by the Managing Director and/ or the Whole-Time Directors and must be backed up with supporting certificates from various departmental heads who are responsible for compliance with individual laws. For instance, the Head of Administration can be asked to certify compliance with the Shops and Establishments Act; similarly, the Factory Head can be asked to certify compliance with pollution/ effluent control regulations, etc. This way the Directors can demonstrate that they have not failed in their duty of setting up a competent system for ensuring legal compliance. Whenever in doubt, the company should not hesitate to obtain an opinion from an appropriate CA or a lawyer. It is better to be cautious than to act in haste  and make  everyone repent  at leisure.

In addition to the Compliance Certificate, the CEO / MD and the various Departmental Heads along with the Legal Head/Company Secretary must be asked to table an Action Taken Report at each Board meeting. This Report must list down regulatory lapses, problems, issues which had arisen at the last meeting and the action taken by the company on the same. Quite often what happens is that niggling issues are swept under the rug and they come to the fore only once they have blossomed into full-fledged calamities. In this way, the Independent Directors can keep a track of the problems as they arise and the actions taken by the company and thereby nip a problem in the bud.

3.4 Another aspect which a good compliance system must have is a mechanism which provides for “what to do in case a default arises ?” Quite often, a small problem snowballs into a major crisis. Hence, if violations and lapses are tackled at an initial stage itself, then there might not be major problems at a later stage. The Compliance Officer and/or the Managing Director or some other Executive Director must be informed about all such compliance lapses and this must be followed up with immediate corrective action and expert professional aid.

Item 15 of Annexure-IA to Cl.49 of the Stock Exchange Listing Agreement, which provides for items which must be placed before the Board of Directors includes, “Non-compliance of any regulatory, statutory nature”.

3.5 It may be a good move to seek expert certifications on all important compliance matters, e.g., a periodic certificate from an outside consultant on matters of pollution control. Several listed companies have started obtaining certificates from practising company secretaries on compliances with various corporate laws. This is a step in the right direction and needs to be beefed-up with similar certificates in other areas of compliance.

3.6 Other important areas which the Directors need to monitor are of protecting and preserving the title of the company’s assets. Especially at the time of acquisition of assets, such as immovable properties, they should ensure the obtaining of a title search, proper conveyance/ adequate documentation, payment of appropriate stamp duty, registration, if required, etc. Similarly, the protection of intellectual capital of the company in the form of patents, copyrights, trademarks, designs, etc. is very essential. Proper steps must be taken in this regard to ensure that these IPRs are valid and subsisting. To ensure preservation of assets, the Directors must ensure that there is an appropriate system which addresses issues, such as payment of taxes, compliance with conditions of lease deeds, adequate insurance, etc.

3.7 Independent Directors have a vital role to play in ensuring that the company complies with all applicable laws. In case of defaults, they may be saddled with penalties and prosecutions for offences which they have never committed or were never even aware about. Hence, they should at every Board Meeting ask intelligent questions about the state of the company’s legal department, the compliance policies and procedures. If they feel that the company is taking a wrong view on certain issues or has wrongly interpreted certain provisions, they may insist upon a second opinion.

4. Epilogue:

4.1 To conclude, it must be remembered that compliance with laws and regulations is a journey and not a destination. It is more a question of a mindset which must percolate through the organisation right from the top, i.e., the Board of Directors all the way down to the lowest rank and file. Once the company imbibes a compliance culture, it would become second nature to the executives. Several companies have an attitude that they would tackle the problem only if and when it arises. Such a shortsighted fire-fighting approach is detrimental to the interests of all the stakeholders in the long run. It may yield some results in the short term, but once the law of averages catches up, there would be serious trouble. Hence, the top management must instill a ‘zero-tolerance’ attitude within the organisation towards legal lapses.

4.2 One can only wish that just as companies strive for prestigious Quality Certifications, such as ISO: 9001, ISO: 9002, etc., they would also strive for similar standards in the field of Regulatory Compliance.

4.3 It must also be reckoned that one of the tenets of ‘Corporate governance’ is to conduct business according to the laws of the land – hence to do this awareness of applicable laws is essential. An attempt has been made in this write-up to bring awareness of the consequences of non-compliance. It is also clarified that the list of laws applicable given here in above is not exhaustive and the directors must obtain from the management the list of applicable laws and record the same in the minutes. This list should be annually reviewed in view of the fact that new laws are being enacted and existing laws amended on a continuous basis at times without realising economic and social consequences.

Proposed recast of Takeover Regulations

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Securities Laws

(1) The SEBI (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 (‘the Regulations’ or
‘the Takeover Regulations’) are, at first impression, a set of Regulations that
has a fairly narrow applicability as they would seem to apply to the occasional
event of company takeovers. However, in reality, the scope of the Regulations is
far broader. They apply in a multitude of situations such as investments by
major investors, regular disclosures, inter-se transfers, sharing of control and
so on. The Regulations were originally notified in 1994 and then replaced by a
fresh set in 1997. Thereafter, there have been several amendments to them.

(2) However, particularly
considering the stakes involved and the wider application, many of the
provisions had to be tested and interpreted repeatedly and several times. This
required appeal to the Supreme Court. Further, the repetitive and sporadic
amendments made the Regulations complex. It was also felt that these amendments
were fire-fighting measures to meet rather than a considered overview of the
whole subject.

(3) SEBI thus set up a
Committee with very learned members from a range of background to reconsider the
Regulations in light of experience of more than a decade and in light of several
complaints and contentious issues. The Committee, after due deliberations and
inviting comments from all concerned, submitted its Report on 19th July 2010
making major recommendations for amending the Takeover code.

(4) The Report is quite
detailed and it not only contains the recommendations for amendments but also
provides a draft of the proposed and rewritten Regulations. Thus, even in legal
terms, it is possible to see what the exact proposed amendments and examine
their implications.

(5) It is worth considering
some important recommendations here since it would help us understand the
existing Regulations better and would also give a glimpse of things to come.
However, while the Report is quite detailed and makes numerous recommendations,
only certain important aspects are discussed here, though we can consider the
amendments in far more detail when they are actually made.

(6)
Increase of threshold limit from 15% to 25% :


(a) Presently, if a person
acquires 15% or more shares in a company, then he is required to make an open
offer for another 20%. Earlier, this threshold limit was 10%. Now, it is
proposed to increase it to 25%. Thus, acquisitions till such holding will only
require disclosures at various stages but no open offer. The increased threshold
would make things easier for large investors such as private equity funds. A
concern widely expressed, however, is that this will make it easier for
‘predators’ to increase their holdings to a larger extent and threaten existing
promoters. However, I do not see what is wrong in an outside investor increasing
his stake, even if the existing Promoters feel threatened. An existing Promoter
seeking to retain his control may well ensure that he invests sufficiently in
the company so as to retain control.

(b) The 25% limit is
apparently derived from the limit beyond which it may be possible to veto
special resolutions. Of course, this is only theoretically true. In practice, a
25% holding would be almost always more than 25% since at least some
shareholders would not come to the meeting and/or would not vote.

(c) A practical significance
of this increase in limit is that significant shareholders below 25% can now
increase their holding up to 24% without having to make an open offer.

(7)
Requirement of making 100% open offer :


(a) It is proposed that the
acquirer making an open offer should offer to buy 100% of the shares held by the
public shareholders instead of the existing just 20% of the capital from the
public shareholders. Thus, for example, if an acquirer acquires the Promoters’
holding of 40% of the share capital, then under existing Regulations, he would
be required to make an offer of another 20% of the share capital from the public
shareholders. If the public response is higher than the offered quantity, the
acceptance is on a proportionate basis. To give an example, if the response is
of 40%, then only half of the shares offered by every such public shareholder
would be accepted.

(b) Under the proposed
Regulations, the offeror would be required to acquire all the shares offered.

(c) This proposal is
strongly criticised on the ground that it would increase the cost of acquisition
since, at least theoretically, the offeror would have be ready to pay for 100%
of the share capital of the company. However, on another plane, it is not
difficult to see the logic and benefit of such a requirement. The existing
requirement allows the Promoters to sell the whole of his shareholding but the
public gets a chance to sell only a lesser quantity of their shares. Often,
takeover of companies are at a price that is at a premium over the ruling market
price. In such a case, the Promoters get the full price for their shares but
shareholders get a partial benefit only. The price of the shares in the market
often falls to the pre-takeover position.

(d) The proposed amendment
thus restores the balance and allows the public also to get the benefit of the
higher price.

(e) Skeptics have also
pointed out that the concern that there would be a higher response than the
existing 20% is theoretical and is not borne out of past experience. In other
words, in the past too, only in a few cases, the response from the public was
more than such 20%.

On the other hand, the
seamless delisting procedure may encourage multinationals to convert their
existing subsidiaries or new acquisitions into wholly-owned subsidiaries. If
this is not done at a fair price, then this could be an unhealthy trend and
deprives the Indian shareholder of sharing in the growth of the target. Thus
these provisions as well as related delisting and buyback provisions need to be
reconsidered.

(8) Voluntary open offer:


    If an acquirer triggers off any of the thresholds requiring a mandatory open offer, he has to offer to acquire 100% of the shares held by the public. However, in case the open offer is purely voluntary, then there is a special dispensation proposed. The acquirer can offer to acquire at least 10% of the equity share capital by way of a voluntary open offer. In such a case, the acquirer would acquire only that extent of shares that are offered within the limit he has proposed. In case of excess response, he would accept proportionately.


    Minimum public shareholding:

    An issue that comes up repetitively and is unfortunately covered by a diverse of provisions of law is that relating to the minimum public shareholding. It is worth reviewing the conceptual issue involved here. When a company makes a public issue, the law requires that a certain minimum percentage of the capital be issued to the public. This percentage has changed over a period of time and hence there are listed companies having differing initial public shareholding. In other words, different companies listed today on the stock exchanges have been subjected to differing initial public holding requirement. The matter is further complicated by the fact that owing to poor legal drafting and legal requirements, the holding of the public in numerous cases has fallen below even such initial public shareholding requirement. Where the public shareholding is very low, the purpose of listing may be lost.

    Over several years now, the government as well as SEBI has been making attempts to ensure that the companies, whose public shareholding is below a specified minimum holding, increase such holding to such minimum level. These attempts have been generally unsuccessful.

    However, while attempts continue to get all listed companies have a minimum specified public shareholding, in the meantime, steps are also taken to ensure that the existing situation does not get worse. That is to say, that existing companies do not cross this minimum shareholding limit and if they have already crossed such limit, they do not go further.

    One such situation where public shareholding can cross such limit is in case of a mandatory open offer under the Takeover Regulations. To take an example, if an acquirer acquires the Promoters’ holding of 60%, then he is required to make an open offer of 20%. The post-open offer holding could thus go to 80%. The Regulations thus provide that in such a case, since the maximum limit of 75% is breached, the acquirer should dilute his holding in the specified manner to at least 75%.

    Under the Report, the recommendation creates a situation where in every case, there is a chance of this limit being breached. The recommendation is that 100% of the public shareholding should be offered to be acquired.

    The Report suggests a better solution to the problem. Firstly, it states that in case the limit is breached, then the acquirer shall scale down his acquisitions from the Promoters as well as the public proportionately, so that the final share-holding of the acquirer is not more than the maximum permissible percentage.

    The alternative situation allowed is a case of delisting where the acquirer may actively pursue delisting of the shares. In such a situation he is permitted to acquire and retain shares beyond this limit. However, this is provided that he actually gets enough shares that are cumulatively beyond the 90% minimum holding required to permit delisting of the shares. If this limit is not reached, delisting is not permitted and the acquirer is required to scale down his acquisitions accordingly.

    A valid criticism against this proposal is that it permits direct delisting and to some extent circumvents the normal delisting requirements. Under the current Regulations, there is an elaborate procedure for delisting whereby the offer price has to be worked out in a certain manner and approval from the shareholders is also required as per the prescribed majority and manner. Further, though the proposal is well intended, it does not alleviate the existing complexity of multiple provisions of law dealing with the same issue.

    Having said this, in fairness, it must be also said that the Committee had to cover a situation where the maximum limit would be breached and within the scope of its mandate it has offered a reasonable compromise. However, ideally, SEBI should separate this issue and provide for a comprehensive solution at one place.

    Creeping acquisitions:

    Finally, an area that has seen numerous amendments in the past with the result that there is a complex set of provisions governing creeping acquisition. As readers may be aware, persons holding more than the threshold limit are permitted to increase their holdings by a specified percentage every year. In other words, they can increase their holding in a creeping manner without requiring an open offer.

    The Report seeks to simplify the provisions relating to creeping acquisitions considerably. Firstly, a uniform creeping acquisition of 5% per annum for all persons having holding between 25% and 75% is proposed. Thus, the elaborate set of existing provisions governing creeping acquisition at various percentages is sought to be dropped. Secondly, even the complications, explicit and implicit, relating to how this creeping acquisition would be counted, are clarified.

    Conclusion:

    It seems to me that the Takeover Regulations are given an importance in the media that is far disproportionate to its actual relevance. There are other serious issues such as insider trading, price manipulation, corporate governance, etc. that need more attention. Having said that, the Takeover Regulations also have relevance directly or indirectly in many areas. Rarely can any financial restructuring, investment, etc. in relation to listed companies be soundly worked out unless the provisions of the Takeover Regulations are kept in mind. Thus, the auditors and even other Chartered Accountants who have some or the other concern with listed companies would need to keep track of these Regulations and amendments thereto.

SEBI order on share warrants and amendments relating to creeping acquisitions

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Securities Laws

(1) In this article, two recent developments in the field of
Securities Laws are covered. One relates to clarifications issued by SEBI on
creeping acquisitions under the Takeover Regulations. The other relates to a
public interest litigation petition in relation to issue of Share Warrants
particularly to Promoters and SEBI’s order on the matter pursuant to directions
of the Bombay High Court. Let us consider the clarifications relating to
creeping acquisitions first.

(2) Readers may recollect that SEBI had amended the Takeover
Regulations in October 2008 and permitted an aggregate maximum of 5% creeping
acquisition of shares under the Takeover Regulations for acquirers who held
shares between 55-75%. It may also be recollected that in the normal course,
persons holding substantial shares in a listed company of more than 15% can
acquire another 5% shares in a financial year. However, this is possible only so
long as cumulative holding is 55%. SEBI had allowed in October 2008 what was
felt to be a temporary measure to allow holders to acquire another 5%, even
beyond 5%, considering the reces-sionary phase of the capital market at that
time. Ap-parently, there were certain areas where clarifications were needed and
now, after about 10 months, after the fact that the Sensex has almost doubled,
SEBI has issued a Circular dated August 6, 2009, clarifying on some issues
relating to the amendment. Some comments on the clarifications made :

(a) The clarifying Circular is issued under Regulation 5 of
the Takeover Regulations, which permits SEBI to, inter alia, issue
directions to remove difficulties in interpretation. S. 11 of the SEBI Act is
also relied on.

(b) It is seen that some of the interpretations given go
clearly beyond the plain wording and meaning of the dispensation given in
October 2008. It is possible that in the future, a legal issue may come up
whether such ‘clarification’ can go beyond the express and unambiguous wording
of the Regulations. An example of this is given later herein.

(c) It is clarified that the 5% acquisition may be made in
one or more tranches. Thus, the acquisitions can be made in one or more
tranches so long as the aggregate is not more than 5%.

(d) Further, the acquisitions need not be made in a single
financial year — it can be made any time in as many tranches as found
convenient.

(e) For calculating the 5% acquisitions, sales cannot be
netted off. Thus, only gross purchases would be counted. For example, the
acquirer cannot purchase 4%, then sell 3% and then acquire another 4% and
claim that the net purchases are within the 5% limit. This is not really
brought out by the plain reading of the amendment though, one must accept,
this is the well-accepted interpretation for other similar clauses.

(f) The cumulative holding of the acquirer cannot exceed
75%. Thus, a person holding, say, 73% can acquire only a further 2%.

(g) The cumulative holding limit of 75% is irrespective of
the minimum public shareholding that is required to be maintained under the
Listing Agreement. Thus, e.g., in respect of a company having a 10%
minimum public shareholding, the upper limit for this Regulation will still be
75% and not 90%.

(3) Public interest litigation relating to abuse of Share
Warrants and SEBI Order pursuant to the Bombay High Court decision :

(a) I had written earlier in the BCAJ issue of April 2009,
particularly on the inequity relating to Share Warrants. Essentially, I had
argued that Share Warrants were heavily being misused by Promoters. They
allotted, almost exclusively to themselves, Share Warrants at a price and
terms that appeared to be absurdly below their fair value. Had a really
independent Board been deciding the issue in each case, the Companies would
almost never have allotted Share Warrants to an outsider on such sweet
terms. Issuing Share Warrants to Promoters in this manner causes serious loss
to the Company and its non-Promoter, i.e., public, shareholders.

(b) Of course, while this issue was a concern for many
years, the article referred to earlier was in connection with the amendment by
SEBI of its DIP Guidelines in February 2009, whereby the upfront
non-refundable amount payable on Share Warrants was increased from 10% to 25%
of the Conversion Price.

(c) It did not help, hence promoters of numerous companies
gladly allowed their Share Warrants to lapse considering that the market price
had fallen far below the Conversion Price of the Share Warrants and thus
forfeited their 10% deposit. Many of them actually issued fresh Share Warrants
paying the higher 25% deposit but on a Conversion Price that was far lower.

(d) A public interest litigation was filed by Rajkot Saher/Jilla
Grahak Suraksha Mandal in the Bombay High Court and the Hon’ble Court had
directed SEBI vide order dated June 18th 2009 to hear the petitioner and pass
appropriate orders within 6 weeks of the order. SEBI has passed an order dated
July 30, 2009 on the matter.

(e) SEBI’s order dated July 30, 2009 is available on SEBI
website. In this 23-page order, SEBI has essentially concluded that there is
nothing wrong in the current law and safeguards :



  • if
    Promoters have allowed their Share Warrants and deposits to lapse, and



  •  if
    they acquired fresh warrants by paying higher upfront deposits.


(f) Readers may go through this 23-page order for more
detailed reasoning; however, I offer quick comments on some
observations/decisions of SEBI.

1. SEBI, justifying the low 10% deposit amount on Share
Warrants, says “I also note that in other jurisdictions, the option premium is
generally in the range of 10% to 15% for trading of long dated options.”. I
find this justification difficult to accept in the Indian context. The basic
important elements of the Black-Scholes option valuation formula (who, I
believe, got the Nobel Prize for this) are interest rates and volatility. Is
it plausible that interest, in India, is only 10% for a total period of 18
months? It is even less plausible — in fact consistently found untrue in every
option valuation I have come across — to believe that the volatility is 10%
over an 18 month period. And mind you, option value is at least the total of
the interest and volatility (and a few other factors).

2. Then, SEBI says that, from just 8 companies listed, a sum of Rs.1515 crores received as deposits from Promoters have been forfeited when they did not exercise the Share Warrants. SEBI seems to imply that far from the Company and the public losing, the Company has actually gained such a huge amount – it says – “it may be incorrect to argue that the Promoters stand to gain at the cost of the Company and its shareholders.” But is not the reality exactly the opposite? In fact, this shows that the companies granted options to exercise Rs. 15150 crores since the deposit amount is just 10%.

3. Further, of these Rs.1515 crores, effectively a significant portion goes back to the Promoters to the extent of their holding in the Company. If the average holding is, say, 50%, then Rs.758 crores goes back effectively to the Promoters!

4. SEBI then  goes on to say,

“It is also noted that of the 4934 listed companies, there had been 1108 preferential allotments since April 2007, of which only 360 were preferential allotments of warrants. Out of the said 360 cases, there were only 100 companies where promoters did not fully exercise the option on the warrants issued to them. Considering the total number of listed companies and number of preferential allotments made during the above period, it is seen that the instances of reissue of warrants to the promoters have not been significant or frequent.”

5. Again, I find it disturbing that as many as 360 companies allotted Share Warrants apparently to Promoters since April 2007. Further, in as many as 100 companies, the Promoters allowed their deposits and Share Warrants to lapse. While the 8 companies referred to ear-Her may be the larger of these companies, note that in just 8 companies, the amount lapsed was totally Rs.1515 crores!

6. On the issue raised by the petitioner that ‘issue of further securities should be only against full payment’, SEBI says, “the same would discourage the companies to raise funds through the allotment of warrants and also indirectly restrict the issue of capital to only shares of the company. Considering the nature of the said instruments (warrants) and the fact that only a few instances (as brought out in Para 10 above) were noticed where the warrants issued to the Promoters had not been exercised, it would be a retrograde step to disable a product which is accepted universally as a fund-raising tool. Such a restriction on issuance of warrants may also deprive the operational and capital structuring flexibility for Indian companies.” I find it difficult to believe that there would be anything wrong in prohibiting the issue of Share Warrants at a mere 10/25% deposit exclusively to Promoters – I find it even more difficult to believe it would be a retrograde step and would “deprive the operational and capital structuring flexibility for Indian companies”. What is wrong with a demand that if Share Warrants are to be issued, issue them to all shareholders – let each shareholder decide whether he wants to subscribe or not? Why are Promoters being preferred and given an exclusive deal and why banning such exclusive sweet deals will be a retrograde step?
    
7. In the end, SEBI does not find that the circumstances warrant any immediate ban and on a related aspect has stated that it “initiates a consultative process …. to suggest policy changes, if required …. “,

Conclusion:

All in all, while I personally feel SEBI has missed an opportunity to carry out a complete rehaul, it is also true that SEBI on its own cannot prevent mis-use of such instruments by the Promoters. The Promoters should remember that they would suffer in the long run if they lose their credibility and loss of credibility will eventually impact the capital market as a whole. Having said that, I raise a question:

‘Isn’t retaining and restoring the credibility of the capital market the function of SEBI?’

I feel SEBI has failed so far as the question of issue of Share Warrants to Promoters is concerned.

SC Notices by E-Mail

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New Page 1

81 SC Notices by
E-Mail

With the pendency
of cases refusing to come down, the Supreme Court decided to experiment with
email notices to respondents to cut the delay in the traditional method of
serving notices.

The traditional
method — registered post with acknowledgement due — usually takes a long time
and mostly results in adjournment of hearings because of non-service of the
notices on the
respondents. Chief Justice of India S. H. Kapadia, sitting with Justices K. S.
Radhakrishnan and Swatanter Kumar, realised the difficulty and took immediate
action by asking all the lawyers present in the Court about putting in practice
the serving of notice through emails, at least to start with in commercial
matters. When Attorney General
G. E. Vahanvati and senior advocate Harish Salve welcomed the idea, it took
Justice Kapadia no time to dictate an order to that effect — sending notices
through email in commercial cases.

To help speed up
the process, Vahanvati volunteered to give within two weeks details of email
addresses of every Central Government department, which is the single largest
litigant in the Court. The AG said : “The cabinet secretariat will provide email
addresses of each and every department and regulatory authorities and names of
nodal officers.”

But the
traditional method of serving notices would not be given up. “We hereby direct
the SC registry to send additional notice at the email addresses of respondents,
whenever the advocate . . . furnishes them with a soft copy of the petition or
appeal,” the Bench said.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 27-7-2010)

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Many of India’s billionaires have made money from proximity to government.

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New Page 1

80 Many of India’s
billionaires have made money from proximity to government.

The proliferation
of dollar billionaires in India in recent years has often been cited as evidence
of the country’s growing economic might, but Raghuram Rajan, previously chief
economist of the International Monetary Fund and now an economic advisor to the
Prime Minister said he had no problems with wealth creation, “but I do think
there is a problem if much of this wealth comes from proximity to government’’.

Pointing out that
India had the second largest number of billionaires per trillion dollars of GDP
in the world (after Russia) prior to the crisis, and now possibly the largest,
Rajan said “If you look at the areas where we have so many billionaires, many of
them are not software entrepreneurs, it’s things like land, real estate, natural
resources and areas that require licences.’’

While conceding
that some of these people have genuinely created entrepreneurial firms that have
done wonderful things, in telecom for instance, Rajan added, “There are other
areas which are less competitive and where proximity to government helps. That’s
a worrisome factor.’’

India, he said,
faced the danger of sliding into some sort of oligarchic capitalism like Mexico.
“I would argue that there is a danger that if we let the nexus between the
politician and the businessman get too strong, we could shut down competition.
That could slow us down tremendously and also maybe create questions eventually
for our democracy,’’ he warned.

Rajan, said there
has been a ‘privatisation by stealth’ of the state in India. Expanding on that
phrase, he said “I worry that in the areas where there isn’t adequate
governance, we are letting the private
sector determine things that should naturally be the prerogative of the state.’’

As with the
billionaires, so too with India’s membership of the G-20 — Rajan is not overly
impressed by this apparent sign of the country having arrived at the high table.
First, he maintained that international meetings rarely achieved anything
concrete.

Characterising the
NREGS as a stop-gap measure, Rajan said at least four elements were needed to
move the bulk of the population in the rural areas to the modern economy —
infrastructure to connect them to towns, education and healthcare to enable them
to participate in a modern economy, and financial inclusion. Without these, he
warned, India’s much-touted ‘population dividend’ could turn into a ‘population
curse’.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 31-7-2010)

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Comments and Suggestions by Bcas to Accounting Standards Board of ICAI on Exposure Drafts

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Representation

Reference :

Calculation of EPS : Weighted average number of treasury shares
held.

Comments :

In India, publishing of standalone financial statements is
required. At present, publishing of consolidated financial statements is
required only for listed companies. In this context clarification is required
that treasury shares held by subsidiaries are not required to be adjusted in
working of weighted average number of shares for standalone financial
statements.

Reference :

Para 26 and 27(b) — example 4, calculation of basic EPS for
the year 2001.

Comments :

Regarding rights issue, clarification is required on the
treatment to be given to the effects of the rights issue in working out diluted
EPS.

Reference :

Para 45, 46, 47 and 63.

Comments :

Clarification is required to calculate Average Market Price
(AMP) based on simple or weighted average.

Reference :

Appendix B : Example 1.

Comments :

In India, dividend on preference shares is liable to
dividend distribution tax
. In our view, for calculation of profit available
for equity shareholders, such distribution tax also needs to be deducted in
addition to dividend on pReference : shares. The same needs to be incorporated
in the illustration.

Reference :

Appendix B : Example 7.

Appendix B : Example 7 Note (e) of Diluted EPS.

Comments :.


Contingently issuable shares : Example explains that in
the working of basic EPS, earnings contingency for which shares are to be issued
at the year-end need not be considered in working out basic EPS for each quarter
of that year. The question arises whether the same treatment is required even if
there is substantial certainty of achieving the required earnings. Similarly, in
case of diluted EPS sum of EPS for all the quarters do not total to the EPS of
full year. An explanation for the same is required.

Note (e) mentions that anti-dilution rules do not apply
because the loss during the third quarter is attributable to a loss from
discontinued operations. It is not clear as to why anti-dilution rule is not
applicable in such circumstances. We believe that even if the rule is made
applicable, diluted EPS for quarter 3 will remain the same.

Reference :

Appendix B : Example 8.

Comments :

In the example, convertible bonds carry interest rate of 6%
against prevailing market rate of 9%. It seems that the issuing entity has
option to settle principal amount in cash. In such circumstances, question may
arise as to why lower rate for bond will be acceptable to the investors ?
Clarification is required in the context of breaking up components of liability
and equity in convertible bond. (as per related provisions of AS 31).

Reference :

Appendix D dealing with difference between the revised draft
and existing AS 20.

Comments :

The Appendix does not specify the following
additional differences :

(a) Para A16 deals with treatment to be given in
calculation of diluted EPS for partly paid shares. This has not been dealt
with in existing AS 20.

For the last sentence of Para A16 i.e., ‘the
number of shares included in diluted earnings per share is the difference
between the number of shares subscribed and the number of shares assumed to be
purchased’
, clarification is required whether it is applicable only if
partly paid shares are not entitled to participate in dividend or otherwise ?

(b) Paragraph 64 is different from paragraph 44 of the
existing AS 20. It does not provide for restatement of EPS for changes in
accounting policies.

Paragraph 64 of the draft contains the following :

In addition, basic and diluted earnings per share of all
periods presented shall be adjusted for the effects of errors and adjustments
resulting from changes in accounting policies accounted for retrospectively.

Comments on ED of Ind-AS 41

(Corresponding to IFRS 1)

‘First-Time Adoption of Indian Accounting Standards’

Reference :

Example in Para 8.

Comments :

Para 8 requires an entity not to apply different versions of
Ind-ASs which were effective at earlier dates. However, it (entity) can apply
new Ind-AS that is not mandatory if early application is permitted.
Concession on similar lines is also provided under IFRS. This requirement of
Para 8 is also indicated in the example to the said Para, under the heading
‘Application of requirements’,
which reads as under :


“If a new Ind-AS is not yet mandatory but permits early
application, entity A is permitted, but not required, to apply that Ind-AS in
its first financial statements.”


This requirement as specified in the example is restricted
only to an entity which applies Ind-ASs effective for financial year/periods
ending on March 31, 2012, but does not present
comparative information. However, the said requirement should also apply to an
entity which decides to present comparative information in those financial
statements for one year. Not considering the aforesaid requirement for the other
entities seems inadvertent.

In view of the foregoing, it is necessary that the aforesaid
Para (given in bold herein) either should be moved at the end of the example or
a new para with the same wordings be added at the end of the example.

Reference :

Appendix D — Para D5 and D6 on Deemed Cost.

Comments :

Para D5, allows an entity to measure an item of property,
plant and equipment (PPE) at the date of transition to Ind-ASs at its fair value
and use the same as its deemed cost.

Para D6 allows a first-time adopter to use a previous GAAP revaluation of an item of PPE at, or before, the date of transition to Ind-ASs as deemed cost at the date of the revaluation, if the revaluation was, at the date of the revaluation, broadly comparable to: (a) fair value; or cost or depreciated cost in accordance with Ind-ASs, adjusted to reflect, for example, changes in a general or specific price index.

It is not clear whether the fair value referred to in (a) has a Reference: to the fair value as on the date of transition or on the date of revaluation.

It may be appreciated that the revaluation carried out on an earlier date may not broadly be comparable to the fair value on the date of transition (which would be later than the date of the revaluation) and in that case, such concession to use the previous GAAP revaluation may not have any practical utility. Clarification is desired that on which date ‘the fair value’ in (a) should be comparable Is it at the date of transition or the date of the revaluation? It may be known that almost in all cases, the revaluation carried out at an earlier date, may not be broadly comparable with the fair value on the date of the transition.

Comments on ED ON AS 14 (revised) (corresponding to IFRS 3) ‘Business Combinations’

Reference:

Paragraph B56 of the Application Guidance.

Comments:

In the ED, the word ‘award’ has been replaced by ‘transaction’, (refer para 30, para 52 of the ED).

Various Representations

 August 18, 2009

Shri Pranab Mukherjee
Hon’ble Union Finance Minister
Government of India
North Block, Room No. 134
New Delhi-110001.

Respected Sir,

    Re : Extension of time period up to 31st October 2009 for submission of comments on the Direct Tax Code

    We would like to congratulate you on presenting the Direct Tax Code, well within the 45-day period that the UPA Government had promised.

    We appreciate the efforts of all contributors in the preparation and presentation of the same and also appreciate the Government’s decision for inviting suggestions from the public.

    The Direct Tax Code is of great interest not only to tax professionals and accountants, but also to a common man and we request that the time period for submission of comments be extended up to 31st October 2009 so as to give appropriate time to all to give their best input.

    The months of August and September being extremely busy for tax professionals and corporates, in view of the finalising of accounts and filing of tax audits and returns, the above request of extension is being made for.

    Thanking you,

    Sincerely yours,
    Ameet Patel,                    Kishor Karia                 Rajesh Shah
    President,                           Chairman,                   Co-chairman,
                                        Taxation Committee     Taxation Committee
   
       

CC :

(1) Shri S. S. Palanimanickan, Hon’ble Union Minister of State for Finance.

(2) Shri S. S. N. Moorthy, Chairman, CBDT.

(3) Shri Rahul Gandhi, Gen. Secretary, Indian National Congress.

    August 3, 2009

To,

The Chairman
Central Board of Direct Taxes,
North Block, New Delhi

Respected Sir,

    Subject : Representation on the procedure followed in disposal of applications u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961

        S. 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) deals with applications for deduction of tax deducted at source (TDS) at a lower rate. Recently, while obtaining such certificates, a large number of assessees have faced certain difficulty on account of a different interpretation by the Assessing Officers (AOs) and thereby denying the issuance of such certificates even if the assessee is otherwise rightfully eligible to get the same. S. 197 is meant for avoiding hardship to the assessee in cases where he has no tax liability or his tax liability is much less.

    We narrate the facts hereunder :

    Issue :

    S. 197 of the Act provides for grant of certificate for lower rate or nil rate of TDS. Upon an application being made, the AO is empowered to issue a certificate of lower rate or nil rate in the manner provided in Rule 28AA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules).

    Normally, the AOs work out lower rate or nil rate, as the case may be, prescribed under Rule 28AA(1) of the Rules, which inter alia pitches the word ‘average rate of tax’.

    Till recently, the AOs used to work out the average rate of tax on the gross amount received by the applicant as it is this amount on which tax is deducted. To explain with a simple illustration :

    • Amount received towards rent say Rs.100

    • TDS rate applicable 22.66%

    • Deduction for interest paid say Rs.20

    • The approximate tax liability would work out as under :

           
Accordingly, on the gross receipt, the rate would work out to 16.995%.

It was usual practice to grant certificate u/s.197 of the Act at such rate as ultimately that represents the actual liability for tax cf the applicant.

Recently, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (the CBDT) has issued a clarification’, upon the same being sought by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Chandigarh, regarding interpretation of the term ‘average rate of tax’ paid by the assessee in the last three years as mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of Rule 28AA of the Rules.

The CBDT viewed that the ‘average rate of tax’ should be considered as explicitly defined in S. 2(10) of the Act to mean the rate arrived at by dividing the amount of income-tax calculated on the total income, by such income. As no other interpretation of the term ‘average rate of tax’ is possible, the CBDT directed that the ‘average rate of tax’ should be taken with regard to total income rather than gross receipts disclosed by the assessee in the earlier years.

In the above illustration, the income works out to Rs.50 and the tax works out to 16.995. Applying the said clarification, the average rate of tax works out as under:

This is nothing but the tax rate applicable to corporate assesse on his/its taxable income. Applying this rate to the gross receipts results in a higher deduction than the actual liability of the assessee leading him/ it to apply for a certificate u/s.197 of the Act.

Background :

The relevant S. 197 of the Act is reproduced hereunder, for the sake of brevity:

“………

197. (1) Subject to rules made under  sub-section (2A), where, in the case of any income of any person or sum payable to any person, income-tax is required to be deducted at the time of credit or, as the case may be, at the time of payment at the rates in force under the provisions of Sections 192, 193, 194, 194A, 194C, 194D, 194G, 194H, 194-1, 194J, 194K, 194LA and 195, the Assessing Officer is satisfied that the total income of the recipient justifies the deduction of income-tax at any lower rates or no deduction of income-tax as the case may be, the Assessing Officer shall, on an application made by the assessee in this behalf, give to him such certificate as may be appropriate.

2) Where any such certificate is given, the person responsible for paying the income shall, until such certificate is cancelled by the Assessing Officer, deduct income-tax at the rates specified in such certificate or deduct no tax, as the case may be.

(2A) The Board may, having regard to the convenience of assessees and the interests of revenue, by Notification in the Official Gazette, make rules specifying the cases in which, and the circumstances under which, an application may be made for the grant of a certificate u/ss.(l) and’the conditions subject to which such certificate may be granted and providing for all other matters connected therewith.

3) [***]

………….”

S. 197 of the Act provides for the power to the AO to give a certificate of nil deduction or deduction at a lower rate, so as to avoid excessive deduction of tax at source.

In other words, S. 197 of the Act empowers AOs to grant certificate to the persons in receipt of income on which tax is required to be deducted at source; provided that the estimated total income justifies the lower rate or nil rate of tax. Presently, such certificate can be sought on incomes derived by way of salaries, interest on securities, other interest, payment to contractors or sub-contractors, commission or brokerages, rent, fees for professional or technical services, income in respect of certain units, and compensation on acquisition of certain immoveable property.

The lower rate or nil rate, if it is to be applied, shall be in respect of the aforesaid income only. This fact is evident from the terminology of section which covers income in respect of which tax is required to be deducted at source.

The mechanism for giving effect to the power granted to AOs u/s.197 of the Act is specified in Rule 28AA of the Rules, which reads as under:
“…………..

Certificate of no deduction of tax or deduction at lower rates from income other than dividends:

28AA. (1) The Assessing Officer, on an application made by a person under sub-rule (1) of Rule 28, may issue a certificate in accordance with the provisions of Ss.(l) of S. 197 for deduction of tax at source at the rate or rates calculated in the manner specified below:

    i) at such average rate of tax as determined by the total tax payable on estimated income, as reduced by the sum of advance tax already paid and tax already deducted at source, as a percentage of the payment referred to in S. 197 for which the application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 28 has been made; or

    ii) at the average of the average rates of tax paid by the assessee in the last three years, whichever is higher.

2) The certificate shall be valid for the assessment year to be specified in the certificate, unless it is cancelled by him at any time before the expiry of the specified period. An application for a fresh certificate may be made, if required, after the expiry of the period of validity of the earlier certificate.

(3) The certificate shall be valid only for the person named therein.

(4) The certificate shall be issued direct to the person responsible for paying the income under advice to the applicant.

 (5) [* * *].

……..”

This rule inter alia specifies the manner of calculating and arriving at nil rate or lower rate. It specifies that this rate should be higher of:

  •     average rate of tax arrived by the net total tax payable (after considering advance tax already paid and tax already deducted at source) on estimated income as a percentage of payments referred to in S. 197; or

  •     last 3 years’  average  of average  rate of tax.

The aforesaid CBDT’s letter has interpreted the average of average rate of tax of last 3 years.

Impact :

If one is to give effect to the aforesaid clarification, it may give rise to some anomalies and/ or predicaments, as explained hereunder, with the result that the assessees will be saddled in the administrative turmoil.

The maximum rate of income-tax would be 30%, in any case.

If one were to apply for lower rate or nil rate for particular income, then applying the definition of average rate of tax, as clarified, under Rule 28AA(1), the resultant rate of tax, for specified income on which lower TDS is applied, would always be at 30%, in case of corporate asses sees which is higher than the rate at which TDS on different income is to be effected.

This figure is the effect of being the higher of resultant rate arrived under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) to Rule 28AA(1). The reason being that

  • Under sub-clause (i), the. rate can be applied within the range from 0% up to 20% (being maximum rate prescribed for the income on which tax is required to be deducted at source);

  • Under sub-clause (ii), the average of average rate of tax for last 3 years would work out to 30%, in case of corporate assessees, even if there is a small portion of income

The rate derived under sub-clause (ii) would always be higher than the rate derived under sub-clause (i) and hence the whole process of seeking lower rate uls.197 becomes redundant. Effectively, all Companies/Firms etc., where income is taxable at flat rate will, in most cases, never be eligible for issue of such certificate even though undisputedly their tax liability is much lower or Nil.

Only covers assessees incurring or having  loss:

The Rule 28AA gives desired results to loss-making companies, as the tax payable in such case would be zero. However, this rule becomes redundant for assessees having higher turnover but lower profits as aforesaid. Therefore, in all such cases, funds of the asses sees will get unjustifiably blocked and they will have to claim re-funds.

This will also hinder assessees working on smaller margins, which will shrink their working capital due to unintended blockage of funds into Government treasury. With the present situation of slow down in the economy, this has become added problem for the business community. We believe that this can never be the intention of the CBDT.

Undue interest burden on the Government

As the assessees would claim refund of the excess TDS as aforesaid, such refunds would also result into interest entitlement which will be an unnecessary burden on the Government treasury.

Further, S. 197(2A) speaks about ‘convenience of assessees’ and ‘interests of the revenue’. Interests of the Revenue cannot be harmed since the AO is expected to take into account the estimated income-tax and the advance tax/TDS already paid. However, the assessees will surely be inconvenienced if the interpretation of the CBDT is allowed to be carried through.

Corrective measure:

As a corrective measure, it is suggested that the average rate of tax may be calculated taking into consideration the total gross receipts/turnover (that is liable for TDS) to the tax payable instead of total income. This mechanism will ensure that the legislative intent will be given effect and with the issuance of requisite certificate on that basis, undue hardship of the assessees will be removed. Moreover, in any case, as higher of sub-clause (i) or subclause (ii) is to be taken the lower rate of TDS that may be granted will never be less than the tax payable by the assessee (after considering advance tax and TDS already deducted). Since there is no loss to the revenue, a harmonious and mearingful interpretation is required to be given to the provisions.

The above view is also endorsed by the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Chandigarh through his request letter? for interpretation of Rule 28AA of the Rules.

In view of the above, there is urgent need to issue clarification on above basis and we have to request your Honour to kindly take necessary steps for the issue of much needed clarification.

Since large number of genuine assessees has been affected and the TDS is deducted on an ongoing basis, an early resolution of the matter would help to solve the genuine problem faced by them.

Thanking    you,

Sincerely  yours,

Ameet Patel,    Kishor Karia    Rajesh Shah

President,        Chairman,                  Co-chairman,

                 Taxation  Committee       Taxation  Committee

Reply of BCAS Letter

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Ombudsman OrdersOmbudsman’s
reply to BCAS’s application dated 25-5-2008, seeking supply of information.

D.O.F.No.Admn/Corres/D.O.
letters/07-08

Hardayal Singh
Ombudsman
Government of
India
Office of the Ombudsman
Income Tax Department, Mumbai-400020.
  Dated : 18th
April, 2007

My Dear,

1. May I at outset wish you and your officers every success
in your endeavours during the current financial year. Even as all of you attend
to your onerous responsibilities, I am sure you will all find time to attend to
taxpayer grievances, an important area of concern for the Government. I am happy
to return to Mumbai as the Department’s Ombudsman. I am indeed looking forward
to working with you and your officers in the larger interests of the
Organisation.

2. Since the institution of Ombudsman is new, I am enclosing
herewith a copy of Income Tax Ombudsman Guidelines – 2006. It would be helpful
to me if you could have this document circulated amongst all the officers of
your charge, so that they become conversant with its provisions.

3. Very briefly, the Ombudsman will mostly focus on
administrative complaints. These have been clearly specified in Guideline 9
(Chapter IV), and include inter alia grievances relating to delays in
disposal of applications related to rectification applications, appeal effects,
waiver of interest, release of seized books of accounts and assets, issue of
refunds, failure to give credit for taxes paid, etc.

4. Under Guideline 13, the Ombudsman is ordinarily expected
to settle a taxpayer’s grievance by agreement within a month of the filing of
the complaint. Accordingly, my office would directly be writing to the officer
concerned immediately on receipt of the complaint. Ordinarily, the officer would
be expected to reply back within 15 days of the receipt of this complaint. If he
has settled the grievance by then, he should indicate as such. In that case no
further action would be necessary. Ideally, from every point of view this would
be the best result. If, however, the grievance cannot be settled, the officer
should forward his comments to me after consulting his superiors. I am sure you
would agree with me that as a general rule there should be a genuine effort to
settle as many grievances as possible on the basis of agreement.

5. Where a grievance cannot be settled by agreement, I would
mediate as required under the Guidelines. If results are still not forthcoming,
I would be passing an Award.

6. Under Guideline 8(II)(e), I am required to send a monthly
report to the Chairman, CBDT and Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of
Finance, recommending appropriate action against erring officials who fail to
redress legitimate grievances. My own expectation however is that such instances
would be very rare indeed and mostly confined to very few cases where the
officials concerned are guilty of recalcitrant conduct involving deliberate
defiance.

7. Under Guideline 8(II)(g), I am required to annually
forward to you and the Board, a list of Awards made by me during the financial
year against the officials working in your charge, so that cognisance can be
taken of the same while writing their Annual Confidential Reports. Again, the
number of cases where adverse notice would need to be taken may perhaps be
limited.

8. The purpose behind my outlining some of the relevant
provisions in the preceding paragraphs is not to scare or demoralise your
officers. I would like to begin my innings on a very positive note. I am quite
sure if we all follow the spirit of Guidelines and take interest in redressing
the legitimate grievances of taxpayers in a prompt and efficient manner, there
will be no occasion to invoke any punitive provision.

9. Please rest assured that I will always be available to
your officers for any guidance or help. They are always free to approach me
after taking an appointment from my office.

With regards Yours

(Hardayal Singh)

Encl : As above†

To,

The Chief Commissioners of Income Tax — I to VII, IX to XIII, Cent-I & II,
Mumbai.

LEGAL DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A TRANSACTION

M

Any responsible management will
require a comprehensive assessment of the possible legal risks related to the
corporate status, assets, contracts, securities, intellectual property, etc. of
the target company concerned before concluding any merger and acquisition
(‘M&A’) deal. Therefore, the process of legal due diligence assumes great
importance in a M&A transaction.

Meaning :

The expression ‘due diligence’
in a M&A transaction is used to refer to sort of an audit of a company’s legal,
financial, environmental and business affairs, and includes investigations into
the acquisition of the assets, risk analysis and general inquiries about the
company prior to entering into a contract. This process is undertaken by the
buyer before investing in a company, to ensure that the seller and the target
company have good title to assets proposed to be bought and also to know the
extent of the liabilities it will assume. Therefore, this data gathering process
forms an integral and critical part of the M&A process as it provides
information about the target’s business that enables the buyer to decide whether
the proposed acquisition represents a sound commercial investment.

Purpose :

Typically in an acquisition, the
purpose of legal due diligence is for the acquirer to check :


(i) the value of the assets
the seller is proposing to sell,

(ii) that the seller has
good title to the assets/shares free from all encumbrances,

(iii) that there are no
liabilities or risks that will reduce the value or use of the assets,
i.e.,
no third party has any right to use the assets,

(iv) applicable labour laws
and service contracts, etc.; and

(v) that there are no
existing or potential undisclosed liabilities that may adversely affect the
business of the target company and also evaluate disclosed liabilities.


The due diligence process helps
the buyer to properly evaluate the target company by investigating items that
either validate the offered price or items that diminish the company’s value and
its purchase price. The buyer may seek contractual protection from the seller in
the form of representations and warranties, but in practice, the protection
offered may be limited by disclosure and other contractual provisions. The
seller is required to disclose all relevant information relating to the target
to the buyer and often finds himself in a conflicting situation. On the one
hand, the seller wants to provide all relevant information to the buyer so as to
make the buyer comfortable with the seller’s offered price and on the other
hand, the seller does not want to reveal unnecessary information to the buyer,
for fear that should the deal not consummate, the prospective buyer may obtain
valuable commercial information and use to compete unfairly with the seller. In
the event of buyer’s breach, seller’s right to sue for damages and injunctive
relief may not be adequate protection or remedy, as such damages for breach may
be difficult to quantify and to enforce. Some prudent sellers require the buyer
and its advisers to enter into a confidentiality agreement.

Scope :

The scope of due diligence
review will depend on the purpose and nature of M&A transactions. For example,
acquisition of a company will demand extensive areas of inquiry than the
investigation made by a potential joint venture partner on the other joint
venture partners or inquiry made by a purchaser of shares in a company. The
extent of due diligence review is also likely to be governed by factors such as
available time, cost, the need to get the transaction done and the seller’s
sensitivity about the exercise.

In a due diligence process,
risks are identified and are borne by one or both parties and the parties will
negotiate the risks and the bargaining between the seller and the buyer will
relate to apportionment of the risks between them. The seller may give
warranties and indemnities with respect to risks that are identified, but more
often the seller is not aware of its problems until the buyer discovers it
during the due diligence process. However, representations, warranties and
indemnities from a seller covering a particular risk is not an adequate
substitute for carrying out the due diligence, because :


(i) warranties and
indemnities survive only for a few years by operation of law and contract,

(ii) warranties are often
qualified as to the materiality or the warrantor’s best knowledge,

(iii) indemnity claim have a
de minimis limit,

(iv) there is a time limit
in which the claim must be made usually within two to three years after
closing,

(v) sellers are more
cooperative prior to the closing as they need to close the transaction, but
are reluctant to address even the most valid warranty claims post closing,
and

(vi) by the time the
warranty claim is made, the warrantor may not be in existence or may not be
in a position to meet the claims.


The information obtained in the
due diligence review will place the buyer in a better position to assess the
risks and advantages of his investment and enable him to appropriately
renegotiate the terms of the acquisition. Therefore, a buyer not undertaking due
diligence would lose the opportunity to obtain more favourable terms of
purchase.

It must be noted that every due
diligence investigation depends on the quantity of data supplied by the seller.
The data may be sent to the buyer and its due diligence team to analyse at it
own offices or the buyer’s due diligence team is sent to the target’s office
where it is given access to the data room. It is necessary for the buyer to
support the data collection by securing representation, warranties an indemnity
from the seller, wherever possible, on those issues that are impossible for the
buyer to check and verify.The buyer usually requires that the seller warrants that the information supplied by the seller to the buyer’s due diligence team is complete and accurate. The seller more often would not war-rant those matters that would be known to the buyer during the course of due diligence process. In a situation where the due diligence exercise is limited, the buyer usually investigates key issues and may take the following precautionary steps to protect itself, such as:

    i) secure appropriate representations, warranties and indemnities;

    ii) consider negotiating a retention of the purchase price to cover potential claims;

    iii) propose a price adjustment, if required;

    iv) require compliance of certain conditions as a condition precedent to close of transaction, for example, obtaining of consents to the change of control from lender, etc.

Team conducting due diligence:

The legal due diligence team of a law firm usually consists of a partner, a senior associate, associates and paralegals (number of associates and para-legals will depend on the volume of documents to be reviewed). The senior associate is generally responsible for preparing the due diligence report for the client. The partner will be responsible for supervising the due diligence report and negotiating the acquisition agreements. The legal team prepares the legal due diligence questionnaire/ checklist and same is forwarded to the buyer’s personnel who after reviewing it will forward it to the seller. The legal team is constantly in touch with the buyer’s personnel to discuss issues arising out the due diligence review as the buyer’s personnel is the only person who will be able to make effective judgments as to the commercial importance and potential risk brought to light by the information revealed in the due diligence process.

Areas of legal due diligence:

The legal due diligence exercise will generally cover all of the areas listed below. This list is usually indicative and not conclusive and is tailored according to such factors as to whether the transaction is an asset purchase or share purchase and will also depend on the target’s industrial sector and size of the transaction:

    i) Secretarial

    ii) Real Estate

    iii) Intellectual Property

    iv) Litigation

    v) Insurance

    vi) Licences

    vii) Employees

    viii) Loans/Debts

    ix) Material Contracts

    x) Investments

    xi) Environmental

    xii) Competition

    xiii) Other Laws

Gist of what the due diligence team investigates under the following heads are given below?:

Secretarial:

The investigation of corporate secretarial focus on the incorporation particulars, memorandum of association containing details about its objects, paid up capital, authorised capital, the number of shares issued, and the articles of association of the target containing provisions as to the directors, restrictions on shares, if any, shareholding pattern, etc. Under corporate secretarial, the register of members and directors and the minutes of meetings of the target are examined as well. Every company under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 is liable to maintain a register of members, register of charges and a register of directors to record and maintain minutes of all meetings of shareholders and of the board of directors held in the course of transacting business of the company. The target company is required to file records pertaining to their balance sheet and profit & loss account, annual return, consent of persons to act as directors, in case of increase of share capital/members, registration of resolution, creation/modification of charges, return of allotment, share transfer form, etc. with the registrar of companies. The due diligence team reviews all filings made with the registrar of companies. In case a company commits default in maintaining the said registers, or do not file their records with the registrar of companies in time, penal action may be initiated against the target company. The due diligence team besides examining compliance under the general provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, also gives particular attention to review compliances with provisions requiring government sanction.

Real Estate:

Investigation of real estate should delineate the immovable property held by the target, to whether it is leased, licensed or owned. If it is an owned property, the title of the target to such property must be ascertained. The due diligence team examines covenants attached to the transfer deed which may prohibit certain activities or may reserve easement rights and also assesses if there is a situation where the target may not have fully paid up the consideration or certain installments may be pending. In some cases, the target may not have obtained final deed of conveyance/sale deed in respect of the owned immovable property and there could also be outstanding dues pertaining to such property, namely, property tax, electricity and water charges, all of which needs to be checked. In case of leased and licensed property, one must check its capability to transfer the said property.

Intellectual property:

As regards the intellectual property, such as patents, designs, softwares, trade marks, careful assessment is required to ascertain whether they are owned and/or licensed by the target company and/ or licensed to the target company and whether they are registered or unregistered and whether they are in compliance with the relevant laws. The due diligence team examines whether there are any challenges, disputes or infringements of any registered and unregistered intellectual property rights licensed or owned by the target company. The due diligence team will also review pending applications related to intellectual property.

Litigation:

The due diligence team examines significant details of any disputes by or against the target company. Buyers may set a threshold in monetary terms to determine those litigation matters to be reviewed (for example, the buyer may not be interested in any claims for outstanding amounts from debtors below a certain figure). The diligence team may assess the contingent liability that the target may incur and examine the likely impact on the business of the target and details of any judgments given against the target and its assets as a result of litigation.

Insurance:

The investigation of documents relating to insurance would involve assessing the significant details of the insurance arrangements for the target company, such as whether there are any circumstances likely to give rise to a claim under insurance policies for the target company, whether insurance obtained by the target is valid, or whether the renewal of the policy is refused or premiums increased, whether there are any unusual terms in the insurance policies, and whether the target’s assets have been fully insured.

Licences:

The due diligence team must assess whether the licences or consents necessary to the operation of the target’s business, have been obtained, are valid and whether they are capable of being transferred/assigned to the buyer.

Employees:

With respect to employees and consultants of the target company, due diligence review would involve examination of service/employment contracts, letters of appointments, the executive and non-executive directors, consultants, key employees and managers have signed with the target company and the significant terms of those letters of appointments and contracts such as remuneration provisions, notice period for termination, any special payments on termination, term of contracts, absence of provisions on confidentiality, any restrictions during employment, restrictive covenants post-employment and confidentiality clause, etc.

The due diligence team inquires if there are any employees who have terminated or intend to terminate their employment in the period leading up to the transaction and examines the employee benefits such as share option schemes, bonus schemes, employee provident fund, gratuity, retirement benefits, etc. Investigation would also identify whether there are any trade unions / associations representing the personnel of the target company. The due diligence team makes inquiries about payment obligations to employees, whether relevant labour legislation has been complied with, whether there has been any strikes or litigation with respect to trade unions and employees or if there are any anticipated, industrial disputes or employment related litigation, involving the target company.


Loans:

Investigation with respect to loans would involve assessment of loans given by the target company to third parties and other members of the target group, whether there are any pending instalments or restrictive covenant in the loan documents that requires intimation to the lender in case of change in constitution of the target or whether the liability under the loan documents can be transferred to the buyer. The due diligence team also inquires if the seller has given any guarantees or indemnities in respect of the target and whether the target has provided any guarantees or indemnities for any other third party.

Material Contracts:

Evaluation of material contracts would include review of commercial agreements to which the target is party for example, any agency agreements, distribution agreements, share purchase agreements, licensing agreements and supply or purchase of goods agreements, hire-purchase agreements, etc. The due diligence team draws attention of the buyer to the relevant provisions in such agreements, such as obligations of the parties, termination provisions and effect of termination, change of control provisions, non-assignment provisions, representations and warranties, indemnities and guarantees, any other restrictive covenants.

Investments:

The due diligence team makes inquiries regarding any investments made by the target, including shares held in other companies, or fixed deposits or purchase of any other kind of instruments.

Environmental:

Environmental due diligence may be required in case of acquisition of a company which is a manufacturing company, or whose assets include land used for industrial processes. Environmental due diligence is conducted by lawyers or technical personnel who are experts in the field of environment. The environment due diligence team investigates potential responsibility for any clean-up and liability in relation to environmental damage. The investigation may range from a brief site visit to a more detailed survey involving detailed sampling of soil and ground water.

Competition:

The competition law is at a nascent stage in India, but the lawyer engaging in the diligence exercise is required to bear in mind the general competition law principles while reviewing the data of the target company. The due diligence team would need to seek information from the sellers to assess anti-competitive behavioural risks. Competition issues may have an effect on the acquisition value of the business or target, or may have an impact on the timelines for an M&A transaction. The analysis on competition issues is undertaken in consultation with lawyers specialising in competition law.

Other laws:

In case the target company is listed in any of the stock exchanges, the due diligence team would review all compliances the listed company is required to make under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and other applicable laws.

Legal due diligence report:

The legal due diligence report is prepared by the buyer’s lawyers and addressed to the client-buyer, pursuant to the due diligence process of reviewing documents provided by the seller. The client may request for detailed form of report or just an executive summary summarising all the key findings of the legal due diligence review. The key findings in the executive summary will enable the buyer to consider issues for negotiations with the seller and help in deciding whether or not to proceed with the transaction. The description of key issues would include the change of control provisions in material contracts, prohibitions on assignment in material contracts, expiration of critical agreements, licences and registrations necessary for the operation of the target’s business, high-value on-going litigation matters, etc. Detailed reporting would include summary of all the documents reviewed in all areas of law.

Is it fair that the Charity Commissioner’s office does not have a practice of updating the trusts’ records ?

Is It Fair

1. Introduction :


Various types of organisations are regulated by various
authorities established under the respective legislations. Each regulator’s
office has its own style of functioning. Trusts are governed basically under
two legislations — Indian Trusts Act, 1882 and Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950
(BPT Act). The regulatory authority is the Charity Commissioner. So also, the
Registrar under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is the same authority,
viz.
Charity Commissioner. In Maharashtra, every society under the
Societies Registration Act is also required to get itself registered as a
trust. This write-up proposes to bring out a peculiar system in the Charity
Commissioner’s (CC) office which causes enormous hardship to the honest social
organisations.

2. The ‘unfair’ practice :


Readers are aware that in respect of other organisations
like companies, partnership firms, etc. the changes in the names, addresses,
etc. of directors, partners as the case may be, are intimated to the ROC/ROF
and in due course of time, the changes get updated in the records of those
regulators. In the CC’s office, even if you submit the changes, etc. in the
particulars of trustees; or any other information about the trust — such as
addresses, alterations in rules and regulations; there is no system or
practice of updating the records. At the same time, when there are occasions
where you need a specific permission from the CC’s office — e.g.,
alienation of immovable property; borrowings, etc. you are required to first
ensure that your record in their office is updated. Thus, if there is a change
in the trustees or managing committee and the changes are duly intimated to
the CC’s office; and if the new trustees approach the CC’s office, they are
not entertained at all, on the ground that their names do not appear in CC’s
records. There were instances where the trusts had to do the exercise for 10
to 35 years ! That is the reason why such permissions may take an inordinately
long time — may be even a couple of years ! It is indeed a herculean task,
often very difficult if not impossible !

3. Reasons :


The probable reasons for such a situation may be numerous :

3.1 Innumerable trusts : Although the formation
process is a little cumbersome and time consuming, the cost of formation is
very meagre. Many people are overenthusiastic in forming such trusts with high
dreams. The initial corpus may be even less than a thousand rupees. Hence,
there is a mushrooming growth. The CC’s office does not have adequate
infrastructure and manpower.

3.2 No filing fee : The intimations to the offices
of ROC & ROF are accompanied by a filing fee. Thus, the administrative cost of
updating the records is largely taken care of. In the CC’s office there is a
yearly contribution payable by every trust — at 2% of its receipts. It is a
separate issue as to how the enormous amount collected so far by the CC’s
office is utilised. The accumulation may be in the vicinity of a few hundred
crores of rupees.

3.3 No incentive to staff : Most of the persons
dealing with the CC’s office on behalf of the trusts are supposed to be
‘social workers’. Many of them may not have resources and willingness to spend
on paperwork, etc. The staff may not have motivation to render service.

4. Some thoughts :


4.1 A few of the states have taken a practical and sensible
decision not to regulate the charities at all. I am told, the Karnataka State
does not have any legislation parallel to our BPT Act.

4.2 Since the year 2000, all companies were required to
have a minimum paid-up capital — i.e., Rs. one lakh for private limited
and Rs. five lakhs for public limited companies. A similar requirement may be
brought in respect of the basic corpus.

4.3 A small filing fee may be introduced for registering
all the changes.

4.4 Weeding out process may be carried out on a mass scale.
The trusts who have not sent any communication to the CC’s office for past,
say, 10 years, may be de-registered.

4.5 There are many trusts which were registered 30 to 40
years ago and have been defunct for 10 to 15 years. The trustees may be
planning to revive the activities. The present system is a serious deterrent
for the well-intentioned trustees. An amnesty scheme may be introduced and
only the present position may be taken on record by prescribing some
procedures — like affidavits, indemnity bonds, etc.

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Is it fair to create ambiguity about service of notice u/s.143(2) ?

Is It Fair

1. Introduction :


In recent years, ‘scrutiny assessments’ have become a
nightmare for taxpayers as well as professionals. It is also seen that many of
the officers themselves are not very comfortable with the manner in which things
are administered or thrust on them. The starting point of the ‘scrutiny’ is the
service of notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). After the
introduction of Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) by Finance Act, 2005, S. 115WE(2) also
contemplates an assessment similar to S. 143(3). Because of these two
assessments, a peculiar problem is faced. The same is discussed in the
succeeding paragraphs. This is all the more relevant, particularly when there
were two separate returns i.e., one for income and the other for FBT.
Even after introduction of combined form of return of income and FBT, it is
pertinent to note that there are two separate assessments for each.

2. Nature of problem :


2.1 A few assessees received notice u/s.115WE(2) for
assessment u/s.115WE for FBT. This was received within the prescribed time for
A.Y. 2006-07.

2.2 Further, due to e-filing of returns, the assessees also
received notices u/s.142(1) requiring them to furnish hard copies of accounts,
reports, TDS certificates and so on.

2.3 It may be pertinent to note that notice u/s. 142(1) is
common for both the assessments i.e., the assessment of income as well as
of fringe benefits.

2.4 Assessees confirm having received aforementioned notices;
but are sure that the cover did not contain any notice u/s.143(2).

2.5 These assessees received fresh notice u/s. 143(2) dated
much beyond the time permissible u/s.143(2). Strictly speaking, the notice is
out of time on the face of it.

2.6 Now, the dilemma arises. The acknowledge-ment is given
for the cover (envelope). There is no clarity as to its contents. If at all the
notice was served earlier u/s.143(2) along with the notice for FBT assessment,
there is no need for fresh notice u/s.143(2).


2.7 The Finance Act, 2008 has given considerable liberty to
the AOs to commit lapses —

E.g.,





S. 282A : Notice need not be signed and only name
and designation is printed/stamped/ otherwise written is sufficient.

S. 292BB : Where an assessee appeared in any
proceedings/co-operated in any inquiry, it shall be deemed that the notice has
been duly served and he shall be precluded from taking any objections in this
regard, after completion of assessment.


2.8 At the same time, one cannot really afford to take a
tough stand regarding non-service of notice. Everybody is aware of the nuisance
value resulting from such an action.

3. Conclusion :


There is already abundant litigation with regard to the
service of notice e.g., Notice accepted by a neighbour or a servant or a
person other than assessee. There are also issues of service of notice by
affixture. The dilemma being created by two separate assessments will add to
this litigation. Therefore, it is high time that the CBDT issues a Circular to
clarify the position.

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China is now world’s 2nd largest economy

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79 China is now
world’s 2nd largest economy

China has overtaken Japan to become the world’s
second largest economy, the fruit of three decades of rapid growth that has
lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Depending on how fast its
exchange rate rises, China is on course to overtake the United States and vault
into the No. 1 spot sometime around 2025, according to projections by the World
Bank, Goldman and others.

(Source : The Economic Times, dated 31-7-2010)

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Inflation to touch 17% by September, says Barclays.

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74 Inflation to touch 17% by September, says
Barclays.


Global Investment banker Barclays Capital has
projected that inflation may surge to 17% by September on back of another round
of hike in fuel prices in the same month. ‘We believe WPI inflation will remain
in double-digit territory until May 2009. We expect WPI inflation of 17% by
September 2008,’ the report said. For the week ended June 28, wholesale
prices-based inflation touched a new 13-year high of 11.89% — much higher than
the Reserve Bank’s tolerance limit of 5.5% for the current fiscal. According to
the report, the government is likely to hike fuel prices by 10-20% again as
early as September to limit fiscal risks. Rise in the price of the Indian crude
oil basket to $ 145-150 per barrel from the current $ 132 per barrel could be
the trigger for another round of increase in fuel prices, it said.

(Source : The Economic Times, 14-7-2008)

 

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UK urges return to wartime frugality.

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73 UK urges return to wartime
frugality.



Waste not, want not. Evoking an era of World War II
austerity, British families are being urged to cut food waste and use leftovers
in a nationwide effort to fight sharply rising global food prices.


With food and energy prices soaring around the
world, a constant supply of high-quality, affordable food is no longer
guaranteed, the officials are warning Britons.

Tim Lang, professor of food policy at London’s City
University, said junk food will remain readily available, but good-quality,
nutritious produce could become scarce worldwide. The government says the public
might find one solution by looking into their garbage pail. Britons throw out
4.5 million tonnes of edible food a year, or about $ 830 worth per home —
wastefulness the government says contributes substantially to rising prices.

(Source : The Times of India, 13-7-2008)

 

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S. 10B — Gain on account of foreign exchange rate fluctuation qua export proceeds credited/deposited in EEFC account of assessee in foreign exchange is export realisation which constitutes profits derived from export business eligible for exemption u/s.10

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59.    (2009) 121 TTJ 751 (Ahd.) (TM)


ITO v. Banyan Chemicals Ltd.

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated 29-12-2008

S. 10B — Gain on account of foreign exchange rate
fluctuation qua export proceeds credited/deposited in EEFC account of
assessee in foreign exchange is export realisation which constitutes profits
derived from export business eligible for exemption u/s.10B.

The assessee-company was a 100% EOU. For the relevant
assessment year, the Assessing Officer excluded the amount of net foreign
exchange gain which it received on account of gain on foreign exchange on
conversion of receipts from export sales. The learned CIT(A), by following the
decisions in the cases of K. Uttamlal Exports Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2003)
133 Taxman 196 (Mumbai) (Mag.) and Mohindra Impex v. Asstt. CIT, (2002)
121 Taxman 326 (Del.) (Mag.), allowed the claim of exemption u/s. 10B of the
Act. Since there was a difference of opinion between the Members, the matter
was referred to the Third Member u/s.255(4).

The Third Member held in favour of the assessee partly. The
Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The receipt of the sale consideration was in US
dollars. It was credited/deposited in the EEFC account of the assessee to be
retained in US dollars as per guidelines for operating this account. In this
account, the receipts may be kept in foreign currency instead of converting
it to Indian rupees.

(2) The gain on account of exchange fluctuation is part
of the receipt of foreign currency of export sales made by an assessee. It
is a part of the receipt of sale proceeds converted into Indian rupees.
There is no exception in S. 10B like that in Expln.(baa) to S. 80HHC.

(3) The gain accounted for by the assessee is the excess
rupee value of US dollars on the date of realisation of sale proceeds
credited. Therefore, the exchange gain on the date of deposit in the EEFC
account has to be treated as sales realised in US dollars on that date. The
exchange gain is thus sales realisation of the billed amount in US dollar
and would be an income derived from the export of goods and articles.

 


However, in respect of gains arising at the time of
withdrawal of amount from the EEFC account by way of difference in exchange
rates between the date of deposit into the account and the date of withdrawal
from the EEFC account, the Third Member noted adversely as under :

(1) Such gain would not be part of sales as once the sale
consideration is deposited in EEFC account, the exchange gain accrued
thereafter would not be a part of the turnover and, consequently, not a
profit arising from the export of goods.

The Third Member relied on the decisions in the following
cases :

(a) Smt. Sujata Grover v. Asst. CIT, (2002) 74
(Mumbai) TTJ (Del.) 347

(b) Renaissance Jewellery (P) Ltd. v. ITO, (2006)
104 TTJ (Mumbai) 382/(2006) 101 ITD 380 (Mumbai)

(c) Shah Originals v. Asst. CIT, (2007) 112 TTJ
(Mumbai) 754

(d) Priyanka Gems v. Asst. CIT, (2005) 94 TTJ (Ahd.)
557



 

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S. 140C, S. 244A(2) — Where power of attorney has not been attached to the return of income filed by a non-resident Company, which has been processed u/s.143(1)(a) and also assessment made u/s.143(3) without power of attorney, grant of interest u/s.244A(2

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58.    2009 TIOL 483 ITAT (Del.)


China Trust Commercial Bank v. ADIT

(International Taxation)

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 15-5-2009

S. 140C, S. 244A(2) — Where power of attorney has not been
attached to the return of income filed by a non-resident Company, which has
been processed u/s.143(1)(a) and also assessment made u/s.143(3) without power
of attorney, grant of interest u/s.244A(2) cannot be denied on the ground that
the delay is attributable to the assessee.

Facts :

The assessee, M/s. China Trust Commercial Bank incorporated
in Taiwan was engaged in the business of international banking services. The
assessee filed its return of income for A.Y. 1998-99 on 28-11-1998 declaring
taxable income of Rs.71,94,840. The return was processed u/s.143(1)(a) on
31-3-1999 and the assessment order u/s.143(3) was passed on 29-12-2000
accepting the income declared in the return of income. The Assessing Officer
issued a refund as claimed in the return of income, however, he did not grant
interest u/s.244A of the Act. The assessee filed an application u/s.154 of the
Act requesting the AO to rectify the mistake by granting interest u/s.244A.
The application u/s.154 of the Act was rejected on the ground that the
assessee had not filed valid power of attorney in due time, which was filed
only after the lapse of a long delay and, therefore, delay in issuing refund
was attributable to the assessee. He, therefore, denied granting interest
u/s.244A of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that the issue of declining interest
u/s.244A(2) to the assessee is well beyond the scope of proceedings u/s.154
being an issue on which two views are always possible. He upheld the order of
the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the power of attorney was filed on
30-9-2002. Non-grant of interest was because the power of attorney was not
filed alongwith the return. The refund became due on processing the return
u/s.143(1)(a) on 31-3-1999. The Tribunal noted the provisions of S. 140C of
the Act which mandate that in case of a non-resident company, the return of
income is to be signed and verified by a person who holds a valid power of
attorney and the power of attorney be attached to the return. The Tribunal
also noted that the return was processed without the power of attorney, the
assessment u/s. 143(3) was also made without the power of attorney. In the
circumstances, the Tribunal held that the refund due on such processing or on
making the assessment cannot be withheld because of the absence of such power
of attorney. The Tribunal held that if without the power of attorney the
return could be processed and assessment could be made, the refund could also
be prepared and made to the assessee. The Tribunal held that from a bare
reading of the Section it is evident that the delay is to be seen with
reference to the proceedings resulting in refund and the delay is attributable
in such proceedings, to the assessee. The proceedings which result in refund
are the processing of the return or making an assessment u/s.143(3) and since
these proceedings were completed long back even without the power of attorney,
the delay in filing the power of attorney was not the cause for delay in the
proceedings resulting in refund.

However, the Tribunal noted that the provisions of S.
244A(2) provide that where the question arises as to which period is to be
excluded, it shall be decided by the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner
whose decision thereon shall be final. Since the AO had not referred the
matter for the decision of the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner the
Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and the AO and remitted the matter
back to the file of the AO to decide the issue of excluding the period for
granting interest to be decided by the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner,
as the case may be, and follow his decision on that.

 

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S. 54 — Where assessee paid advance to a builder for purchase of a house, but due to inability to arrange funds, could not purchase the property and got the advance back, the conditions of purchase/construction within time specified in S. 54 are not satis

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57.    2009 TIOL 512 ITAT (Bang.)


Mrs. Shakuntala Devi v. DDIT (International
Taxation)

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 23-6-2009

S. 54 — Where assessee paid advance to a builder for
purchase of a house, but due to inability to arrange funds, could not purchase
the property and got the advance back, the conditions of purchase/construction
within time specified in S. 54 are not satisfied. In such a case, exemption
can be denied only on expiry of time period of 3 years from date of transfer
of original asset.

Facts :

During the previous year relevant to assessment year
2005-06 the assessee sold two flats — one at Prithvi Apartments and another at
Embassy Diamante, Bangalore. Long-term capital gain arising on sale of these
two flats was worked out at Rs.46,51,537. The assessee advanced a sum of
Rs.98,69,970 to the builder towards the purchase of the flat at Embassy
Habitat. Accordingly, it claimed the sum of Rs.46,51,537 to be deductible
u/s.54 of the Act. In an order passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act, the
Assessing Officer stated that the assessee failed to furnish either the
registered sale deed or the purchase agreements to substantiate her claim both
for sale of two properties and also for purchase of the flat at Embassy
Habitat. He also noted that the statement of affairs as on 31-3-2006 did not
reflect the flat at Embassy Habitat as her asset. He held that the since the
title of the property was not transferred to the assessee the provisions of S.
54 were violated and accordingly, he denied the exemption claimed by the
assessee u/s.54 of the Act.

The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. On behalf of the assessee it was submitted that the assessee had
entered into an agreement for purchase of a house and had paid an advance, but
subsequent to the payment of advance the assessee could not raise the
necessary funds for purchase of the flat and therefore, the agreement entered
into by the assessee was terminated and cancelled and the assessee received
back the advance paid by her. It was also contended that it is premature to
decide upon denial of exemption. It was submitted that unutilised amount is to
be brought to tax in the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which the period of three years from the time of transfer of original asset
ends. For this proposition reliance was placed on provisions of S. 54(2) of
the Act which provides for depositing the amount of gain into a Capital Gain
Account and utilisation therefrom within the prescribed time period. Upon
failure to utilise the amount deposited in Capital Gain Account for purchase
or construction within the prescribed time period, the unutilised amount is
charged to tax in the previous year relevant to the assessment year in which
the period of three years from the time of transfer of original asset (that
resulted in the capital gains arising in the first place) ends.

Held :

Since the transaction entered into by the assessee did not
culminate into purchase of residential house either one year before or two
years after the date of transfer nor a residential house was constructed
within a period of three years after the date of transfer, the CIT(A) was
justified in denying the claim of exemption u/s.54 of the Act.

As regards the alternative contention raised the Tribunal
restored the issue to AO with a direction to decide the same as per facts and
law, after providing due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

 

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S. 28, S. 45 — Gain arising on transfer of land held by the assessee as its capital asset in lieu of 50% of the constructed areas to be constructed by the developer at his own cost without any construction activity to be carried on by the assessee is char

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56.    2009 TIOL 477 ITAT (Mum.)


ACIT v. Shree Dhootapapeshwar Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2001-02 and 2002-03.

Dated : 30-3-2009

S. 28, S. 45 — Gain arising on transfer of land held by the
assessee as its capital asset in lieu of 50% of the constructed areas to be
constructed by the developer at his own cost without any construction activity
to be carried on by the assessee is chargeable to tax as capital gains.

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of
manufacturing and trading in ayurvedic medicines. It was owner of land
acquired by it in 1936 on which it had constructed a factory for manufacturing
ayurvedic products. The land was held by it as a fixed asset and was
consistently shown as fixed asset in its accounts. The assessee had not
converted this land into its stock-in-trade. The development agreement entered
into by the assessee recorded that the assessee did not have the requisite
expertise and know-how to undertake the development of the said land. As per
the agreement, the assessee was to part with the land and in lieu thereof was
entitled to receive 50% of the constructed area without carrying out any task
of development. The assessee was not required to meet any of the expenses
towards construction of the buildings.

The AO noted that — (i) the agreement described the
assessee as the owner and the developer as the licensee; and (ii) under the
agreement the assessee was given absolute rights to sell all the residential
as well as commercial property developed and handed over by the developers at
whatever rate as per the prevalent market conditions. Considering these, the
AO charged the profit arising on transfer of land under the head ‘Income from
Business’.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that CIT(A) has observed that (a) the
constructed area was to be shared amongst the parties; (b) the parties were
free to deal with their respective areas in the manner they thought fit; (c)
this was not a case where the parties by virtue of the agreement have decided
to share the profit from the project; (d) the assessee was to receive 50% of
the constructed area, irrespective of the cost of development incurred by the
developer.

On facts and having noted the observations of the CIT(A),
the Tribunal held that the agreement could not be regarded as a joint venture
and the constructed area received by the assessee was consideration for
transfer of land. The Tribunal agreed with the conclusion of the CIT(A) and
noted that the conclusion of the CIT(A) is supported by the following judicial
decisions :

(a) CIT v. Smt. Radha Bai, (272 ITR 265) (Del.)

(b) CIT v. B. K. Bhaumik, (245 ITR 614) (Del.)

(c) CIT v. Mohakampur Ice and Cold Storage, (281
ITR 354) (All.)

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

 


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S. 28, S. 45 and S. 56 — Amount of liquidated damages received by the assessee from the vendor of the property under an agreement for purchase of property constitutes a capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

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New Page 1

55.    2009 TIOL 511 ITAT (Bang.)


Mrs. Yogesh Aurora v. ITO

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 9-4-2009

S. 28, S. 45 and S. 56 — Amount of liquidated
damages received by the assessee from the vendor of the property under an
agreement for purchase of property constitutes a capital receipt not
chargeable to tax.

Facts :

The assessee was working as a consultant with a
pharmaceutical company. She had entered into an agreement for purchase of
property for Rs.17,95,175 and paid an advance of Rs.10 lakhs. The agreement
for purchase inter alia provided that if the vendor fails to register a
sale deed within the period mentioned in the agreement in favour of the
assessee or her nominee he shall be liable to pay liquidated damages of Rs.5
lakhs. The vendor did not execute the sale deed. The assessee obtained legal
opinion and was advised that the only legal recourse available to her was to
accept liquidated damages. The assessee contended that the amount of
liquidated damages received by her constituted capital receipt not exigible to
tax.

The Assessing Officer (AO) charged this sum to
tax.

The CIT(A) was of the view that the property
sought to be purchased was huge considering the fact that the assessee was a
professional. He, therefore, held that the transaction was an adventure in the
nature of trade. However, since on the date of receipt of the amount the
adventure in the nature of trade had not come into full-fledged existence, he
held that the amount be charged to tax under the head ‘Income from Other
Sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal where it was contended that the compensation was received on
foregoing a right to acquire a capital asset and therefore, it is a capital
receipt. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Kettlewell Bullen and Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (53 ITR 261) and also in the
case of Oberoi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (236 ITR 903).

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Gujarat High Court in
the case of CIT v. Hiralal Manilal Mody, (131 ITR 421) and Calcutta
High Court in the case of CIT v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd., (164 ITR 664)
had considered similar issue. Following the ratio of the decisions of these
two Courts the Tribunal held the amount of liquidated damages to be capital
receipt. It also observed that because no cost can be attached to the right,
therefore, following the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty, (128 ITR 294) the amount cannot be
taxed as capital gain.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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S. 142A r/w S. 143 — Reference to valuation cell u/s.142A can be made during the course of assessment and reassessment, and not for the purpose of initiating reassessment — Where Assessing Officer had not rejected books of accounts by pointing out any def

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54.    (2009) 118 ITD 382 (Luck.)


ITO v. Vijeta Educational Society

A.Ys. : 1998-99 to 2001-02 and 2003-04 to 2004-05

Dated : 28-9-2007

S. 142A r/w S. 143 — Reference to valuation cell u/s.142A
can be made during the course of assessment and reassessment, and not for the
purpose of initiating reassessment — Where Assessing Officer had not rejected
books of accounts by pointing out any defect, reference to DVO for valuation
of cost of construction of building incurred by the assessee was not valid,
and hence, the DVO’s report could not be utilised for framing
assessment/reassessment even though the same was obtained u/s.142A.

The assessee society was granted registration u/s. 12A. In
the course of assessment, the AO referred the valuation of building
constructed by the assessee to valuation cell. However the AO completed the
assessment without considering the report as the DVO’s report was not received
in time. Subsequently, the AO received the report from the DVO, wherein it was
shown that the assessee had made additional investment of Rs.46.87 lacs in the
building. On the basis of the said report, the AO initiated reassessment
proceedings, treating the differential amount as income from undisclosed
sources.

The CIT(A) held that even if the said addition was to be
added to the assessee’s income, the same would be exempt u/s.11, and deleted
the addition.

On second appeal by the department, it was held :

1. If the assessee has maintained proper books of
accounts and all details are mentioned in such books, which are duly
supported by vouchers, no defects are pointed out and the books are not
rejected, then the figures mentioned therein will have to be followed. The
valuation report has to be taken into consideration only when the books of
accounts are not reliable, in the opinion of the ITO.

2. Further, there cannot be any reference u/s.142A when
there is no process of assessment which is initiated after filing of return
of income, or issuance of notice u/s.142(1).

3. The process of reassessment can be initiated only
after issuance of notice u/s.148(1) after duly fulfilling the formalities
mentioned therein. It is clear that invoking S. 142A is a process after
re-opening of the assessment. The use of the word ‘require’ in S. 142A is
not superfluous but signifies a definite meaning, whereby some preliminary
formation of mind by the Assessing Officer is necessary which requires him
to make a reference to the DVO u/s.142A.

4. The provisions of S. 142A cannot be read in isolation
to S. 145. If books of accounts are found to be correct & complete in all
cases, no defect being pointed out therein, then addition made on account of
difference in cost of construction on the basis of DVO’s report is not
correct. Use of such a report obtained u/s.142A is not mandatory, but
discretionary.

Hence, the order of the CIT(A) was to be upheld, though on
different grounds.

 

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Assessee was a mutual concern in the strict sense as all the members were travel agents in India, and convention receipts, membership and subscription fees and interest therefrom were exempt being in the nature of mutual receipts — Hence, having regard to

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53.    (2009) 118 ITD 285 (Mum.)


Travel Agents Association of India v. ACIT

A.Ys. : 1997-98, 1998-99, 2001-02

Dated : 10-2-2008

Assessee was a mutual concern in the strict sense as all
the members were travel agents in India, and convention receipts, membership
and subscription fees and interest therefrom were exempt being in the nature
of mutual receipts — Hence, having regard to the fact that once said receipts
were taken out of computation of excess of income over expenditure, such
receipts could not decide the character of activities carried out by the
assessee and in such circumstances, when assessee was held to be a mutual
concern, S. 115JA was not applicable to it.

The assessee was a company incorporated u/s.25 of the
Companies Act, to promote interests of travel agents in India. Distribution of
income or property was prohibited by the Memorandum of Association & Articles
of Association. The assessee contended that it conformed with the requirements
of a mutual association and hence income was exempt from taxation on the
grounds of mutuality. The assessing authority held that even if the assessee
was a company registered u/s.25, it was liable for assessment u/s.115JA. The
CIT(A) held that as the Profit & Loss A/c had been prepared in accordance with
Schedule VI, book profit was liable to be taxed u/s.115JA.

On appeal to the Tribunal it was held :

1. S. 115JA deals with companies earning normal business
profits. The assessee was earning ‘income’ and not profits. The expression
‘income’ was a little different from ‘profits’, and hence S. 25 of the
Companies Act provides that such company has to prepare ‘Income &
Expenditure Account’, instead of ‘Profit & Loss A/c’. Companies carrying on
activities of charitable purposes or mutual interest are registered u/s.25.

2. Where the mutual association like the assessee does
not carry on any business and almost entire income is derived from mutual
activities, it is exempt from tax. Only when such a company indulges in
activity of earning profits and distributing the same, it comes out of the
tax exemption.

3. It is possible that a mutual association may earn
income from services/facilities provided to non-members. If such activity is
the major activity, then the question of taxability would arise in a
substantial way, and the rule of mutuality would be questioned.

4. In the instant case, the assessee was a professional
association and there was no case of non-members being involved in the
affairs of the company. Therefore, the activities carried on by the assessee
company were meant only for the member travel agents and were mutual in
character. It was held that the assessee was a mutual concern, it did not
declare dividends, nor distribute its income. Therefore, it did not come
under the MAT regime.

Hence, the computation of income made for the relevant
assessment years u/s.115JA was to be set aside.

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Provisions of S. 115JB (MAT) are not applicable to foreign companies that do not have physical presence in India, in the form of an office, branch or a permanent establishment (PE).

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

22 The Timken Company &

Praxair Pacific Limited

2010 TII 25 & 26 ARA-Intl.

S. 115JB of the Act, Article 5 of India-USA DTAA and

Article 13 of India-Mauritius Treaty

Dated : 23-7-2010

 

Provisions of S. 115JB (MAT) are not applicable to foreign
companies that do not have physical presence in India, in the form of an office,
branch or a permanent establishment (PE).

Facts :

  • As part of its global
    restructuring exercise, Timken, a US company (USCO) proposed to transfer
    shares of in an Indian listed company. The proposed transfer was to be through
    stock exchange, and hence, was expected to qualify for exemption from capital
    gains tax in terms of S. 10(38) of the Act.

  • The issue raised
    before AAR was whether in absence of any presence in India, USCO was liable to
    pay tax under MAT provisions on capital gains arising from transfer of shares.



Ruling of AAR :

On the following grounds, AAR held that MAT provisions did
not apply to foreign companies that had no business presence in India :

  • A foreign company
    that has not established a place of business in India is not required to
    prepare its financial statements in accordance with S. 591 r.w. S. 594 of the
    Companies Act.

  • The context of the
    MAT regime, the Finance Minister’s speech and the administrative circulars
    indicate that the MAT is not designed to be applicable to a foreign company
    which does not have presence in India.

  • The earlier AAR
    ruling holding that MAT is applicable to foreign companies was in the context
    of an entity that was doing business in India and had a PE in India. Such
    foreign company had obligation to comply with the provisions of the Companies
    Act and maintain books of accounts in India and therefore, was liable to MAT.



Note : This ratio was also applied when a foreign transferor
company earned capital gains, which was exempt from tax in terms of the
India-Mauritius Treaty. (Praxair Pacific Limited)

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Partnership firms, though assessed as fiscally transparent entities1 in the country of residence, are eligible to claim treaty benefits under the India-UK DTAA.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

21 Linklaters LLP v. ITO

2010 TII 80 ITAT Mum.-Intl.

Article 5 & 7, India-UK DTAA

 

  • Partnership firms,
    though assessed as fiscally transparent entities1 in the country of residence,
    are eligible to claim treaty benefits under the India-UK DTAA.

  • A Service PE is a
    deemed PE and, therefore, does not need to satisfy requirement of Basic PE
    rule. The presence of personnel in excess of the specified time-threshold,
    triggers service PE in India.

  • By providing for
    coverage ‘profits indirectly attributable to permanent establishment’ Article
    7 of India-UK DTAA incorporates Force of Attraction (FOA) rule. Profits
    relating to services rendered outside India in respect of Indian projects are
    also taxable in India.



Facts :

  • The taxpayer, was a
    UK-based limited liability partnership, engaged in law practice. It did not
    have a branch or any other similar form of presence in India, but rendered
    legal services to certain clients whose operations extended to India. These
    services were rendered partly from the UK and at times, by partners and staff
    visiting India. During the financial year under consideration, the taxpayer’s
    partners/staff were present in India for more than 90 days.

  • The taxpayer
    disclosed ‘nil’ taxable income in Indian tax return by claiming treaty benefit
    and by contending that it has no PE presence (including service PE) in India.

  • Without prejudice,
    the taxpayer also claimed that as per DTAA, profits of PE were to be computed
    having regard to the market conditions in India. Arm’s-length income of PE is
    based on fiction of independence and is required to be calculated having
    regard to the rates that would have been charged by Indian
    lawyers/professionals for similar services.

  • The Tax Department
    rejected the taxpayer’s arguments and concluded that the taxpayer had a
    service PE in India. Entire income in relation to Indian projects (including
    services rendered from the UK office) was taxed on the ground that no details
    about overseas work was furnished.

  • On appeal, the CIT(A)
    agreed with the AO on the applicability of service PE Rule, but restricted
    taxation only to the extent of services rendered in India.



Held :

Treaty eligibility to the overseas firm assessed as flow
through entity in home country :

The ITAT raised the issue about eligibility of the UK firm to
claim treaty benefit. The issue was raised on account of ‘reverse hybrid
situation’ and ‘asymmetrical taxation’ scenario arising from the UK firm being
taxed in India at an entity level, whereas in the UK, the assessment is as a
pass through/transparent entity in the name of the members of the firm. The ITAT
rejected primary contention of the taxpayer challenging right of the tribunal to
consider the issue for the first time. The ITAT was convinced that the legal
issue could be examined by it after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing
to the parties if the tribunal finding did not enlarge the quantum of income as
assessed by the lower authorities.

Having proceeded to answer the issue, the ITAT held :

  • The UK legal firm is
    a person under the treaty definition of the term.

  • The difference in
    taxation system applicable to the partnership firm in the source jurisdiction
    [(India) and residence country (UK)] results in economic double taxation
    though not juridical double taxation. The philosophy of DTAA which supports
    merits of avoiding juridical double taxation should equally be applicable to a
    situation of economic double taxation.

  • The decision of
    Canadian Court in the case of TD securities (USA) LLC v. Her Majesty the
    Queen, (2010 TCC 186) supports that the treaty benefit can be given even in a
    situation involving asymmetrical taxation. In this case, single-member LLC of
    the USA was given the benefit of USA-Canada treaty despite the fact that in
    Canada, assessment was in the names of LLC whereas in the USA, due to the
    option exercised, the assessment was in the name of the member of the LLC. The
    decision also supports that the treaties need to be interpreted on a
    contextual basis rather than based on strict principles of interpretation as
    applicable to tax laws. The treaty interpretation is not subjected to literal
    interpretation in isolation with the objects and the purpose for which the
    treaty provisions are made.

  • The treaty benefit is
    available to a person who is a treaty resident of the other country. In terms
    of the treaty, an entity is resident of the UK if it attracts tax liability in
    the UK on account of criteria such as domicile, residence, place of
    management. Though the modalities or mechanism of taxation may vary, facts of
    taxation need to be decided in an objective and uniform manner.

  •     In a situation where the entire income of a partnership firm is taxed in its own hands or in the hands of a partner, the definition of residence should be regarded as fulfilled. The Canadian decision in TD Security’s case supports that the term ‘liable to taxation’ needs to be interpreted in a pragmatic manner so as to extend the treaty benefits to fiscally transparent entities. The test of fiscal domicile relevant for treaty residence purpose is fulfilled so long as the country of residence has right to tax income of the firm, irrespective of whether such right is actually exercised by the resident state or not.


  •     As a result, the taxability of entire income in the country of residence is more relevant rather than the mode of taxability i.e., whether the tax is levied in the hands of the firm or in the hands of the partners. The treaty benefit therefore cannot be denied to the firm so long as entire income of the firm is taxed in the residence country, not in its own right but in the hands of the partners.


  •     Incongruent result arising on account of asymmetrical result needs to be avoided and the benefit of the treaties is to be given so long as income of the enterprise is subjected to taxation in the other jurisdiction either directly or indirectly.


  •     The OECD report dealing with applicability of DTAA to partnership has indicated that in case of asymmetrical taxation, benefit should be available to the partners and not to the partnership firm. The ITAT consciously took the decision of adopting a view different from that by the OECD report which suggested grant of treaty benefit to the members of the firm. Reference was made by the ITAT to the reservation of India on the OECD commentary to conclude that the Government had rejected the stand of the OECD.


Other issues :

  •     The firm had a fictional service PE in view of presence of its partners/personnel in excess of the specified threshold.


  •     Actual revenues earned by taxpayer needs to be considered in respect of third-party dealings. It is not correct to apply hypothetical rates of earnings based on what could be the earnings of other Indian legal firms.


  •     The UK treaty provides for taxation of profits in the state to the extent they are directly or ‘indirectly attributable’ to that PE. The inclusion of profits indirectly attributable to the PE incorporates a force of attraction principle in the UK treaty.


  •     This permits taxability of overseas income in respect of services rendered for an Indian project if it is similar or relatable to the services rendered by the PE.


Income from hiring of equipments under global usage Bareboat Charter Agreements (BCA) arises at the place where the equipment is delivered. Subsequent use by lessee as per his discretion is not relevant for determination of place of accrual.

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

20 Seabird Exploration FZ LLC

AAR No. 829 of 2009

S. 9(1)(vi) & S. 44BB, Income-tax Act

Dated : 25-6-2010

 

Income from hiring of equipments under global usage Bareboat
Charter Agreements (BCA) arises at the place where the equipment is delivered.
Subsequent use by lessee as per his discretion is not relevant for determination
of place of accrual.

Facts :

The taxpayer, UAE Company (UAECO) provides geophysical
services to the oil and gas industry in India. For this purpose, the taxpayer
entered into agreements for hiring the vessels (equipment) pursuant to BCA on
global-usage basis. Under the agreements, the lessor (owner) provided the
vessels to the taxpayer on hire without providing any crew or other services.
The terms of the agreement had the following features :

  • Agreements for hiring
    of vessels were entered into outside India;

  • In terms of the
    agreement, hire charges were payable outside India;

  • Delivery and
    redelivery of vessels was to take place outside India;

  • The taxpayer was
    obliged to pay period-linked hire charges irrespective of usage of vessel
    i.e., even during idle period fixed hire charges were payable;

  • Vessels were under
    complete control and dominion of the hirer;

  • It was the discretion
    of the hirers to use equipment in or outside India;

  • The owner had limited
    responsibility of maintenance of equipments and consequential right of
    inspecting the vessels during the term of the agreement.


The charges paid pursuant to the agreement were not covered
by royalty definition u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act in view of provisions of S. 44BB
of the Act. The taxpayer contended that the hire charges were not taxable in
India as it represented income earned by non-resident owners outside India.

The Tax Department sought to assess the amount on gross basis
u/s.44BB of the Act by contending that the income accrued/arose in India due to
use of vessels in India.

Held :

The AAR accepted contentions of the taxpayer and held :

  • The income can be
    taxed in the hands of the non-resident owner only if income accrues or arises
    in India or is deemed to be accruing or arising in India, given the fact that
    the hire charges were payable outside India.

  • The income can be
    deemed to accrue or arise in India if it was income earned through or from any
    asset or source of income in India. The source of income for owner of the
    equipment lies in delivering and transferring control of the vessel to the
    hirer outside India and not its subsequent utilisation which may or may not be
    in India.

  • The expression
    ‘source of income’ is not a legal concept, but needs to be understood the way
    a practical man would regard it to be a real source of income. It is required
    to be understood in a broad and practical sense and not in a technical manner.

  • Reliance was placed
    on the following extract of Privy Council decision in the case of Commissioner
    of Inland Revenue v. Hang Seng Bank Ltd. [1991 (1) AC 306]

    “. . . . . , if the profit was earned by the exploitation of property assets
    as by letting property, lending money or dealing in commodities or securities
    by buying and reselling at a profit, the profit will have arisen in or derived
    from the place where the property was let, the money was lent or the contracts
    of purchase and sale were effected.”

  • Having regard to the
    above, it was concluded that in case of hire of moveable property, the source
    of income is the place where property is let out and delivered and subsequent
    utilisation of such equipment as per the discretion of the hirer does not
    impact the determination of source.

  • Consequentially,
    income from hire charges does not accrue or arise in India if the asset is
    delivered outside India. It can be charged to tax only if the delivery of the
    asset is in India either at the time of entering into original agreement or at
    the time of renewal of the agreement.



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S. 92CA — Difference on tangible bearing on costs, price or profit to be given due weightage while comparing controlled & uncontrolled transactions

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New Page 1

22 Egain Communications Pvt. Ltd. v.
ITO Pune

(2008) TIOL 282 Pune

Transfer Pricing Provision — S. 92CA

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 10-6-2008

 

Issue :

While comparing the controlled and uncontrolled transactions
under the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), the differences having
tangible bearing on costs, price or profit are to be given due weightage to make
suitable adjustments.

 

Facts :

The assessee, an Indian company (ICO) was engaged in the
business of software development and was a registered STPI eligible for 100% tax
break u/s.10A of the Act. The entirety of turnover of ICO was in favour of its
parent in the USA (USCO). The USCO had assured complete buyback from ICO. USCO
had privity with the ultimate customers and was responsible for all risks
including the risk of credit, marketing risk, recovery risk, inventory risk,
warranty risk, foreign exchange risk and post-sales risk, etc.

 

The revenue model of ICO was based on cost plus basis. ICO
recovered mark-up of 5% of all the costs including depreciation which was
provided in the books of ICO based on the US system.

 

The TPO made addition on the ground that comparable PBIT was
about 16%. For the purpose of determining comparable mark-up, TPO took into
account 20 comparable cases which included two high margin cases where the
profit was 67% and 54%, respectively, as against average of 16%.

 

There was no dispute on application of TNMM being the most
appropriate method with reference to profit level indicator of PBIT.

 

Before the ITAT, the assessee claimed adjustment to the
comparable margin determined by the TPO on account of the following factors :

(1) Adjustment was made to rework PBIT of ICO by adopting
depreciation as per Schedule XIV rates. This was as against accelerated rates
at which depreciation was provided by ICO based on US system. The adjustment
lowered depreciation charge and improved profitability of ICO.

(2) Adjustment was made to exclude non operating income
like interest income in respect of the comparables adopted by TPO. This was
suggested as ICO did not have any other income.

(3) Adjustment was made to exclude margin of an entity
which was engaged in trading activity — the same being activity unrelated to
the activity of the assessee.

(4) Downturn economic adjustment on account of low risk
profile of ICO as it was a captive unit of USCO which was responsible for all
business risks.

It was also indicated that the parent suffered losses and the
fact that ICO was otherwise eligible for 100% deduction also supported that
there was no motive for transfer pricing evasion. It was also argued by the
assessee that no adjustment was warranted so long as the price charged by the
assessee was within the range of margin of the comparables.

Held :

The ITAT accepted the assessee’s claims for adjustments on
account of the factors narrated above.

The ITAT accepted that in application of TNMM, (i) the
differences likely to affect the price, cost charged or paid or the profit in
the open market are to be taken into consideration to make reasonable and
accurate adjustments to eliminate the differences having material impact; (ii)
if the differences are not capable of being evaluated, the comparables may need
to be ignored.

The ITAT confirmed that Rule 10B as also OECD Guidelines
specifically required suitable adjustments for differences on account of FAR and
other relevant factors. The ITAT also relied on decision of Delhi Tribunal in
the case of Mentor Graphics (Noida) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, (109 ITD 101) to
support that determination of arm’s-length price, functional profile, assets and
assumed risk of controlled and uncontrolled transactions (FAR analysis) need to
be appropriately screened and adjusted for the purpose of making them
comparable.

The ITAT relied on US IRS manual on transfer pricing
provisions which supported adjustments to be made to uncontrolled transactions
to make them comparable.

The ITAT also noted that from out of 20 comparables
considered by the TPO, there were two comparables with high profitability of 54%
and 68% as against the average of 16% and that such extreme cases needed special
consideration. For this ITAT relied on OECD Guidelines :

Para 1.47 of OECD guidelines is to the following effect :

“1.47 Where application of one or more methods produces a
range of figures, a substantial deviation among points in that range may
indicate that the data used in establishing some of the points may not be as
reliable as the data used to establish the other points in the range or that
the deviation may result from features of the comparable data that require
adjustments. In such cases, further analysis of those points may be necessary
to evaluate their suitability for inclusion in any arm’s-length range.”

 


Having observed the above, the ITAT permitted adjustments as
requested for, since the adjusted profit margin of the assessee was comparable
with uncontrolled margin with tolerance of 5%.

 

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S. 9(1)(vi) —Payment of USCO towards bandwidth for availing standard services not chargeable as equipment royalty.

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New Page 1

21 Dell International Services India Pvt.
Ltd. Bangalore

(2008) TIOL 09 ARA IT

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act

Article 12 of India-US DTAA

Dated : 18-7-2008

 

Issue :

Payment to USCO towards telecom bandwidth in the form of
private leased line telecom circuits is for availing standard services which is
not chargeable as equipment royalty. Such services are not fees for included
services.

 

In terms of S. 9(1)(vi)(b), source of income is not outside
India only because customers are located outside India.

 

Facts :

The applicant, Dell India, an Indian Company (ICO) was
engaged in the business of providing call centre, data processing and
information technology support services to its group companies. For providing
the services, ICO entered into agreement with US Company by name BT America (BTA)
for two-way transmission of voice and data through telecom bandwidth. For this
purpose, ICO was provided private leased line circuit for full country coverage
in the USA and in India. ICO established privity with BTA though the rates of
services were fixed pursuant to Master Services Agreement signed by ICO’s parent
with BTA for all the group concerns. BTA raised invoices for monthly recurring
charges on ICO. The invoice also described the amount as rent for dedicated
private telecom leased circuits.

 

BTA had its own network up to certain point while it tied up
with other service providers such as VSNL and Bharati for the balance part of
the connectivity. It was however a common ground that ICO had privity only with
BTA, while BTA was responsible for arrangements with VSNL/Bharati, etc. The
following chart depicts the flow of the arrangement.

 

The applicant sought ruling on TDS implications in respect of
remittance made on account of recurring charges to BTA.

 

The AAR noted the following to be the features of arrangement
entered into between ICO and BTA :



  •  Agreement described that BTA provided dedicated, point-to-point, international
    links directly connecting two customers sites via digital circuits for
    transmission of voice & data.



  • The services provided by BTA was an end-to-end offering between the specific
    site in country A and the specific site in country B.



  • BTA has huge network of optical fibres cables laid under sea, other equipments
    and infrastructure which were controlled and operated by BTA for the purpose
    of rendering such services. Additionally, BTA had tied up with other service
    providers for taking care of the segment in which BTA did not have its own
    network.



  • BT provided similar services to others also. Incidentally, similar services
    were provided by other service providers also. The services were standard
    services akin to telephone connection.



  • The agreement made it clear that the arrangement was for provisioning of
    services. BTA was responsible for maintenance of service levels. The agreement
    was clear that the ownership, right and responsibility of operating and
    maintaining assets and infrastructure was that of BTA. The agreement made it
    clear that ICO had no control, possession or right of operating the
    infrastructure, while BTA had control, possession, dominion over the assets of
    its network.



  • For establishing connectivity, certain instruments were placed at the location
    of ICO. While the agreement contemplated recovery of one-time installation
    charges, actually the same were waived.



 


The applicant contended that the remittance did not attract
tax implications either in terms of domestic Act provisions or in terms of
India-USA treaty.

 

As against that, the Department’s contention was
that the remittance was towards rental of equipment, hence subject to
withholding taxes in India as royalty income both in terms of provisions of S.
9(1)(vi) and in terms of provisions of India-USA treaty.

 

Held :

AAR held that the contract was for rendition of services
which was admittedly not in the nature of fees for included services and was
therefore not liable to tax in India in terms of India-USA treaty. The AAR held
that the amount was not in the nature of royalty for use or right to use the
equipment. For this purpose, the AAR concluded :



  • The use or the right to use equipment covers only those arrangements where
    there is some positive act of utilisation, application or employment of
    equipment for the desired purpose by the payer. Merely because
    facility/service is provided to the customer from sophisticated equipment
    installed and operated by the service provider does not result in grant of
    right of use of equipment to the service recipient.



  • To determine whether the arrangement involves right of user, the question to be asked is whether the payer is required to do positive act in relation to the equipment such that he operates and controls the equipment in order to enjoy the facility. The right of adapting the equipment for the use by the payer is essential to characterise the transaction as that of equipment rental. The fact that the service availer exercises no possessory rights in relation to the network and merely enjoys facilities/services rendered from the infrastructure, supports that the transaction is that of service and not that  of rent.
  • The fact that BTAmaintains the entire infrastructure for offering services to various other cus-tomers also indicates that use of equipment is by BTA. The AAR likened and compared the arrangement with the use of bridge, road or telephone connection.
  •  The AAR referred to following extract from Professor Klaus Vogel’s commentary to make distinction between service and rent of equipment.


“……the use of a satellite is a service, not rental; this would not be the case only in the event that the entire direction and control over the satellite such as piloting, steering were transferred to the user” (at page 802)”.

The use of expression rentals or the fact that certain part of the instruments were installed at the premises of the assessee were held to be of no relevance.

The AAR also held that the amount was not royalty as consideration for use of secret process. In view of AAR, the treaty triggered royalty taxation only in the event when consideration was for use of secret process and the fact that services were of standard nature and provided by multiple other service providers supported that the arrangement was not for use of secret process.

The AAR did not accept the applicant’s contention that the amount remitted was protected from taxation in India on account of exception of S. 9(1)(vi)(b). In view of AAR, the assessee had its business principally carried out in India and the fact that the export was made to the US counterpart did not lead to conclusion that the source of income was situated outside India. In view of AAR, source is the starting point or the origin from where something springs or comes into existence and the fact that the customers were located outside India did not make the source of income to be outside India.

S. 2(31) — AOP is assesable person even when formed without object of deriving income

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New Page 1

20 Geoconsult Zt GmbH (2008)

TIOL 11 AAR IT

Explanation to S. 2(31) of the Act

Article 5 and 12 of India-Austria DTAA

Dated : 31-7-2008

 

Issue :

Joining together with common purpose gives rise to emergence
of AOP, which is assessable as such, even when the members share gross
consideration.

 

Explanation to S. 2(31)(v) makes AOP an assessable person
even when formed without the object of deriving income.

 

Facts :

The applicant GZT, a company incorporated in Austria (Ausco),
was specialised in providing consultancy services.

 

Ausco entered into joint venture with other two Indian
companies by name Rites and Secon.

 

Under MOU signed in April, 06, Ausco, Rites and Secon agreed
to collaborate together in a joint venture for providing consultancy services to
Himachal Pradesh Road and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. (HPRIDC).
The joint venture executed service agreement with HPRIDC in August 2006, wherein
the JV was service provider / consultant to HPRIDC being the client. The
services were to be rendered by the JV to HPRIDC for HPRIDC’s project of
development of seven tunnels in Shimla. JV was responsible only for consultancy
services and to carry out implementation of said services. The service contract
was a fixed price contract. Ausco was the lead member. In terms of the
agreement, each of the joint venture members was jointly and severally liable to
HPRIDC for performance of the contract.

 

As a sequel to the service contract signed with HPRIDC,
formal joint venture agreement was executed between three parties viz.
Ausco, Rites & and Secon in September 2006. The AAR took note of the following
features of the joint venture agreement :

(1) The preamble read that the three parties had agreed to
‘collaborate’ for performing all works associated with the consultancy
services to be rendered to HPRIDC.

(2) Each of the members had joint and several liability to
the client, though Ausco was a leading member and one of the employees of
Ausco present in India was designated to be the team leader.

(3) Certain of the tasks were entrusted to each of the
members. The agreement however clarified that while each member had primary
responsibility in respect of task allotted to it, the other parties were bound
to render assistance to the other members.

(4) Each of the members had unrestricted access to the work
carried out by the other members in connection with the project.

(5) In the event of default/insolvency of one of the
members, other members were irrevocably appointed to step in and perform the
work of the defaulting member in view of joint and several liability of the
parties. Also, in the event of default by one, the work was assigned to the
others.

(6) The total consideration received from the client was
distributed at gross level with Ausco receiving approximately 50% of the
amount, while the other parties received 20% and 30% of the amount. The amount
was directly paid to the respective party pursuant to common bill on the
client being raised by HPRIDC. The agreement also clarified that each party
was responsible for meeting its own cost and expenses and was responsible for
maintenance of accounts concerning its own affairs.

 


The applicant Ausco primarily sought ruling of the AAR on tax
implications of the amount which fell to Ausco’s share. It was the claim of
Ausco that consultancy services which Auso was liable to render viz. the
services of carrying out geological and technical investigation, undertaking
field survey, collecting seismological data, surveying topographical conditions,
etc. were primarily rendered from outside India. And, in absence of PE or long
duration presence in India in connection with the project, the amount was not
chargeable as business income. The applicant however conceded that the amount
was fees for technical services chargeable as such at 10% on gross basis
u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act read with Article 12 of India-Austria treaty.

 

During the course of hearing, the department representative
contended that the joint venture of Ausco with Rites and Secon constituted an
AOP, particularly in terms of Explanation to S. 2(31) of the Act.

 

It was agreed by the parties that the issue of presence or
absence of emergence of AOP was crucial to determine the tax implications of
Ausco and the questions raised before the AAR would be influenced by conclusion
on this basic issue.

 

Before the AAR, the applicant relied on the AAR’s ruling in
the case of Van Oord ACZBV, 248 ITR 399 (AAR). It was claimed by the applicant
that there was no emergence of AOP as :



  • Each of the members was responsible for identified task allocated and that
    consortium or joint venture was only for convenience of execution.



  • The agreement was clear that the task of each individual member was identified
    and the cooperation amongst them was only for co-ordination and satisfactory
    completion of the project.



  • The joint venture was clear that each of the parties to the contract merely
    shared gross revenue and there was no sharing of profit/loss.



  • All in all, each individual member was executing a standalone and independent
    portion of the overall contract and was receiving revenue for the work done by
    the member and each member alone was responsible for meeting its part of the
    cost.


S. 195 — Commission paid to foreign selling agents does not trigger tax with-holdings obligation on payer

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New Page 1

19 DCIT, Hyderabad v.
Hyderabad Industries Ltd.

(2008) TIOL 309 Hyd.

S. 195 of the Act.

A.Ys. : 1996-97 to 2000-01. Dated : 30-5-2008

 

Issue :

Commission paid to foreign selling agents does not trigger
tax withholding obligation on the payer.

 

Facts :

The assessee, Indian manufacturer of engineering goods,
exported goods to various foreign countries through its sales agents based in
the foreign countries. The assessee remitted commission to foreign agents
without deducting tax at source.

 

As a sequel to survey operations, the Department held that
the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source in respect of commission
payment. The Department raised huge demand u/s.201(1) and u/s.201(1A) on the
ground that :



  • The assessee ought to have made application u/s.195(2) before taking the view
    on non-applicability of TDS;



  •  The amount was taxable in the hands of the recipient as payment was received
    by the agents in India.


 


Incidentally, the decision has considered only domestic law
provision. It is not clear whether any of the recipients had benefit of a
treaty.

 

Before the Tribunal, the DR also sought to justify taxation,
on the ground that remittance was in the nature of royalty for commercial
information given by the agent or was in the nature of technical services
rendered by the agent who provided assistance in obtaining LC established or
getting advance payment from customers, etc.

 

Held :

The Tribunal held that :



  • Since the contract between the assessee and the overseas agent did not specify
    any mode of payment, the remittance made by the assessee by way of cheque or
    draft cannot be regarded as payment made in India to the agent of non-resident
    in India.



  • The services rendered by the commission agent were commercial services in
    respect of sales effected. The commercial information provided or after-sales
    services provided to the customers of the assessee were part of the composite
    arrangement which the assessee had with the agent.



  • The information provided by the commission agent was simple market information
    and over which the agent had no exclusive domain. Payment for information can
    be termed as royalty only when it is consideration for information concerning
    industrial, commercial or scientific experience over which the granter has an
    exclusive right. The Tribunal observed :

“The commercial information which the agent in our case is
expected to provide to the assessee is not such over which the agent has an
exclusive domain. It is merely a market information which any Tom, Dick and
Harry can go into the market and obtain it. The definition given in the DTAA
is also in consonance with the definition discussed above. It states that
royalty means payment of any kind received as a consideration for information
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. It simply means
that a person who has an exclusive right over a particular information and
over which no one else in the world is a privy to it, can assign a right to
use such information to the other.”


  • The Tribunal also held that the services of commission agent were not
    technical in nature.



  • In absence of tax liability of the recipient, the remittance made without
    deduction of tax at source was held to be justified.

“. . . ., the Circulars of the Board apply with full force
to the facts of the present case and since the payments made to the
non-residents are not income chargeable to tax in India, the assessee was not
liable to deduct at source u/s.195 of the Act”.


 

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S. 9(1)(i) — Liaison office of USCO acting as buyer’s agent for exports by independent manufacturers to associates of USCO, covered by exclusion

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New Page 118 Nike Inc. India Liaison Office
v.
ACIT

(2008) TIOL 255 Bang.

S. 9(1)(i) of the Act

India-USA Treaty

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 to 2002-03. Dated : 28-5-2008


Issue :

Liaison office of a US Company, which is acting as
buyer’s agent in respect of exports made by independent manufacturers to the
associates of USCO is covered by exclusion provided in terms of Explanation to
S. 9(1)(b) of the Act.

.

Facts :

Nike Inc., (USCO) is a company incorporated in USA.
It is a world-known name and brand in sports apparels. It has its main office in
the USA with AEs, subsidiaries (associates) in various parts of the world. The
associates distribute goods in various countries.

From its office in the USA, the USCO arranges
sourcing of goods for all its subsidiaries and associates (being sports
apparels, accessories) from independent manufacturers spread across the globe.
The associates establish direct privity with independent manufacturers. The USCO
acts as procurement and liaisoning agent and provides diverse services to the
associates enabling them to procure the goods. The associates pay
commission/fees to the assessee company for providing assistance in procurement
and purchase of goods from the independent manufactures.

In respect of procurements from India, USCO set up
a liaison office in India with approval of RBI. The approval was obtained for
acting as a communication channel between the manufacturers in India, the H.O.
and the associates. The activities of the Indian liaison office involved the
following functions :

1. Liaisoning with manufacturers. For this
purpose, the liaison office employed merchandisers, product analysts, quality
engineers, fabric controllers, etc.

2. Giving opinion on reasonableness of rates to
be negotiated with independent manufacturers.

3. Getting the samples of products approved by
the H.O. or the associate and ensuring that the final product matched with the
approved sample.

4. Providing training to personnel of the
manufacturers, undertake evaluation of the factory, etc.

5. Supervising the production schedule and
activities of the manufacturer.

6. Undertaking fabric testing, garment testing
and generally to do quality assurance activities.

7. Keeping tab on delivery schedule and shipments
for ensuring timely delivery to the concerned purchaser.



In a nutshell, as a buying agent of its associates,
the USCO assisted by liasoning with the manufacturers, assisting in selection of
goods, supervising production, scheduling, quality control and managing
transportation and logistics of shipment, etc.

The USCO, as a buying agent for the associates, had
entered into agreement with the manufacturers on behalf of the associates. The
agreement with the manufacturers defined their obligations, including the
obligation to purchase equipments required specifically for production of
apparels on which the brand ‘Nike’ was put.

It was a common ground that there was direct
privity between the manufacturers and the associates. USCO earned commission
from associates for performing buying agency services.

The goods which were procured from India
constituted less than a fraction of one percent i.e., about 0.22% of the
overall goods procured the world over, in respect of which USCO earned
commission income from the associates.

The Tax Department held that the liaison office in
India had transgressed the scope of RBI-permitted functions and had indulged in
income earning activity. The Department assessed 5% of the global income as
attributable to the operations of liaison office in India. The Tax Department
rejected contention of USCO that the operations carried out by the liaison
office in India were preparatory and auxiliary and were confined to export of
goods from India and hence no part of income was taxable having regard to
provisions of Explanation to S. 9(1)(b).

To support its contention that the operations of
the assessee were not limited to that of facilitating export and were involved
functions, the Tax Department relied on statements of the employees and the job
profile of the employees employed by the liaison office. The Department
contended that as per the statements of the employees, the employees indulged in
the activities of designing, providing suggestions on manufacturing, verifying
the receipt of raw materials, commercial negotiations of pricing with the
manufacturers, etc. These activities, according to the Department, were part of
core income-earning activity. The Department also contended that exclusion from
taxation in respect of purchase of goods by a non-resident for the purpose of
export would not apply to the buying agent and was limited only to the person
who actually purchased the goods.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the role of USCO and its
liaison office in India was restricted to provide assistance to the associates
in the matter of procuring goods from India and that USCO/Liaison office had not
acted as an agent of manufacturers and had not received any remuneration or
commission from the manufacturers. The only source of income for the USCO was
buying agent’s commission that it received from its associates.

Bhawanji Kunverji Haria vs. DCIT Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Bench “F”, Mumbai Before Vijay Pal Rao (J. M.) and N. K. Billaiya (A. M.) ITA No. 4032/Mum/2009 A Y. 2006-07. Decided on 25.05.2012 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: G. C. Lalka/M. Rajan

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Sections 22 and 23—(i) Where on account of interior work being carried out during the year the property could only be leased out from the next financial year, no notional rent could be added as the income of the assessee in the current year; (ii) Income from house property which is used in the business carried out in the partnership firm in which the assessee was a partner eligible for exemption u/s. 22.

Facts:

The assessee owned two commercial properties. In his return of income filed, he had not offered income from house property. According to him, the possession of one of the properties was received in December 2005. He took three months to complete the furniture work and the property was let out from April 2006. The other property was used by the partnership firm in which he was the partner. As regards the first property, the AO held that as the property was in possession of the assessee, the provisions of section 23(1) were attracted and the annual value of the property was deemed to be the income of the assessee. As regards the second property, he held that the individual and partnership firm are two different entities, hence, the exemption claimed in respect of the same u/s. 22 was not available. On appeal, the CIT (A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held:

In respect of the first property, the tribunal noted that the facts regarding the date of its possession and the time the assessee took to furnish the premises were not in dispute and that immediately thereafter, the premises was let out in April 2006. Therefore, it accepted the assessee’s submission and held that no notional rent could be added as the income of the assessee qua the said property.

As regards the second property which was let out to a partnership firm where the assessee was a partner, the tribunal relying on the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rabindranath Bhol (211 ITR 299) held that the income from the house property which is used in the business carried out in the partnership firm in which the assessee was a partner would qualify for the exemption provided u/s. 22.

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Khar Gymkhana vs. DIT(E) In the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Bench ‘A’, Mumbai Before B. Ramakotaiah, (A. M.) and Vivek Varma, (J. M.) I.T.A. No.: 373/Mum/2012 Asst. Year: 2009-10. Decided on 10-07-2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: A. H. Dalal/ Surinder Jit Singh

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Section 12AA—Order cancelling Registration of the trust for carrying on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business revoked. Registration restored.

Facts:

The assessee trust was granted registration under section 12A(a) since the year 1984. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the assessee had earned income by the sale of liquor at Rs. 1.45 crore, canteen compensation at Rs. 20.67 lakh, Card and daily games, at Rs. 0.82 lakh, guest fees at Rs. 31.50 lakh and income from banquet. According to the AO these receipts were clearly in the nature of business income and were in excess of the monetary limit as laid down in the provisions of section 2(15) r.w. proviso which has come into effect from A.Y. 2009-10. Therefore, he concluded that such entity cannot be considered as for charitable purpose. Since the assessee is not for charitable purpose then the trust itself becomes non-genuine as it loses its public charitable status and accordingly the provision of section 12AA(3) of the Act gets attracted. Thus in view of the facts and circumstances the AO held that the assessee trust has become non-genuine and the registration as allowed to it in earlier years u/s. 12AA was cancelled/ withdrawn w.e.f A.Y. 2009-10.

Before the tribunal, the assessee contended that the rigours of section 12AA get attracted “if the activities of the trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust, as the case may be.” According to the assessee just because the legislature has inserted section 2(15), registration, as allowed by the Income-tax Department cannot get cancelled, without the change of objects and character of the trust. He further placed reliance on the earlier decisions of the tribunal in ITAs no. 4315 & 4316/ Mum/2010 in assessee’s own case.

On the other hand, the revenue justified the order of the DIT and submitted that with the insertion of section 2(15), the character of the charitable trust has got very limited scope. It becomes ineligible for registration, if the trust gets into the field of trade or profit making.

Held:

The tribunal noted that the case of the department was that the assessee had crossed the twin conditions, as mentioned in section 12AA(3), viz., ”that the activities of such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution”. However, it noted that in the instant case, the department had nowhere mentioned that “social intercourse among members” was not one of the objects of the trust, when it was originally formed on 04-10-1934. Further, it also noted that in the tribunal orders in the assessee’s own case which were relied on by the assessee, the aspect of section 2(15) had also been taken and adjudicated upon. Thus, noting that none of the revenue authorities have made any observation/comments on the objects recited as early as 04-10-1934 of the assessee trust, the twin conditions existing in section 12AA(3) and for ignoring the existing orders of the coordinate Bench in the case of the assessee and following the principles of judicial propriety, as well as the facts coming out of the documents placed before it, the tribunal held that the revenue has erred in cancelling the registration u/s. 12AA(3).

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Knight Frank (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and Vivek Verma (JM) ITA No. 2021/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: M. M. Golvala/ Kalik Singh.

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Sections 43B, 145A. Provisions of section 145A do not apply to service tax. Accordingly, service tax is not includible in cost of components.

Facts:

The assessee had not considered service tax for computing cost of components. In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) asked the assessee to explain why the same should not be included in view of the provisions of section 145A. Rejecting the submissions made by the assessee, the AO enhanced the trading profit by Rs. 69,20,599 and added the same to the total income returned by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who sustained the order of the AO on the point of inclusion of service tax by invoking the provisions of section 145A.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it placed reliance on the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Noble & Hewitt (I) Pvt. Ltd. (305 ITR 324)(Del) and Chennai ITAT decision in the case of ACIT vs. Real Image Media Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (306 ITR 106)(AT-Chennai).

Held:

The Tribunal held that since the assessee is a service provider company patently the provisions of section 145A cannot be made applicable because the provision was specifically introduced for the purposes of manufacturing segment of the business. It noted that section 145A(a)(ii) mentions “…by the assessee being goods to the place of location & conditions as on the date of valuation are required to be included.” It also noted that the issue is now covered by the decisions relied upon by the assessee. Following the said decisions, the Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition.

This ground of appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

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DCIT v. Hemal Raju Shete ITAT Mumbai `H’ Bench Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM) ITA No. 2198/Mum/2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: P. K. Shukla/J. D. Mistry & M. A. Gohel.

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Section 45, 48. What is to be taxed is the gain received or accrued. Accordingly, deferred consideration under the share sale agreement cannot be taxed. Maximum cap provided in the agreement cannot be equalled either with sale value nor with full value of consideration since the said maximum cap is neither received nor accrued for the purposes of calculating capital gains.

Facts:

The assessee filed its return of income for AY 2006-07 declaring total income of Rs. 11,68,470. The assessee had shown long term capital gain of Rs. 42,38,674 on sale of 75,000 shares of Unisol Infrastructures Ltd and had claimed exemption u/s. 54EC by investing the sale proceeds in bonds of SIDBI. In the course of assessment proceedings, on examining the agreement dated 25.1.2006 pertaining to transfer of shares the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the said agreement grants absolute right to the assessee as well as other transferors to receive the specified amount in a deferred manner with nomenclature of `initial’ and `deferred’ consideration being employed. The AO reworked the share of the assessee in the alleged total consideration `accrued’ to the transferors by clubbing the initial consideration and deferred consideration and thereby assessed the capital gain at Rs. 4,91,94,923. He therefore made an addition of Rs. 4,48,54,923 to the total income returned by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee since according to him the deferred gain could not be taxed as the gain was not received nor accrued to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was pointed out to the tribunal that clause 3 of the agreement dealing with consideration provided that Rs. 20 crore is the maximum limit. This clause served as a cap to the effect that the aggregate of initial and deferred consideration shall not exceed the cap of Rs. 20 crore. The manner of computation of deferred consideration was explained to demonstrate that the assessee may or may not get the deferred consideration. It was pointed out that since there was no certainty of receiving the amount and also that the quantum to be received was not known, taxing the maximum cap provided is not tenable.

Held:

On perusal of the agreement the tribunal found that the amount of Rs. 20 crore was the maximum amount which could be received by the assessee’s group. This amount comprised initial consideration and deferred consideration. There was no guarantee for receipt of this maximum amount by the assessee’s group. In view of these facts, the tribunal agreed that what is to be taxed is the gain received or accrued and not the notional/hypothetical income. It held that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. and that of ITAT in Mrs. Alpana Piramal, relied upon by DR have no application as the ratio in the said cases is applicable when the dispute relates to adopting the full value of consideration visà- vis the sale consideration which is not the case in the present appeal. Maximum cap mentioned in the agreement cannot be equated either with sale value consideration (sic sale consideration) or with full value of consideration since the said maximum cap is neither received nor accrued for the purposes of claiming capital gains. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 25 dated 14th August, 2013

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All Scheduled Commercial Banks which are Authorised Dealers (ADs) in Foreign Exchange/All Agencies nominated for import of gold

This circular states that it supersedes all earlier instructions is respect of import of gold by Authorised Dealers in Foreign Exchange/Nominated Agencies. The circular provides that: –

a) Import of gold in the form of coins and medallions is now prohibited.

b) All nominated banks/nominated agencies and other entities must ensure that at least 20% of every lot of gold imported into the country is exclusively made available for the purpose of exports and the balance for domestic use. A working example of the operations of the 20/80 scheme is annexed to this circular. The scheme shall be monitored by customs authorities, and will be implemented port-wise only.

c) Nominated banks/nominated agencies and other entities can make available gold for domestic use only to the entities engaged in jewellery business/ bullion dealers and to banks authorised to administer the Gold Deposit Scheme against full upfront payment only.

d) Nominated banks/agencies/refineries and other entities must ensure that there is no front loading of imports, particularly in the first and second lots of imports. Such imports have to be linked to normal quantities of gold supplied to the exporters by the nominated banks/agencies and must not exceed the highest quantity supplied during any one year out of last three years. The quantity thus arrived at, however, will not be imported in one or two lots only. As a thumb rule, imports of more than maximum of two months of requirements of the exporters in a lot would be considered unusual. In case there is no previous record of having supplied gold to the exporters then nominated banks/agencies must seek prior approval of the RBI before placing orders for import of gold for the first lot under the 20/80 scheme.

e) The 20/80 principle would also apply for the henceforth import of gold in any form/purity including gold dore, whereby 20 % of the gold imported will be provided to the exporters. This will be administered and monitored at the refinery level for each consignment at the time of such imports as well as by the customs authorities. The refinery can make available gold for domestic use only to the entities engaged in jewellery business/bullion dealers and to the banks authorised to administer the Gold Deposit Scheme against full upfront payment and sale of gold against any other form of payment shall not be permitted. Import of gold dore can be permitted only against a license issued by the DGFT.

f) Any authorisation such as Advance Authorisation/ Duty Free Import Authorisation (DFIA) can be utilised for import of gold meant for export purposes only and no diversion for domestic use is permitted.

However, entities/units in the SEZs and EOUs, Premier and Star Trading Houses are permitted to import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 24 dated 14th August, 2013

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NOTIFICATION [NO.FEMA 263/RB-2013]/GSR 529(E), DATED 05–03-2013

Liberalised Remittance Scheme for Resident Individuals- Reduction of limit from $200,000 to $75,000

This circular has made changes as under to the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS):

1. The existing limit of $200,000 per financial year has been reduced to $75,000 per financial year (April-March).

2. Remittance can be made for any permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both. However, no remittance under LRS can be made for acquisition of immovable property, directly or indirectly, outside India.

3. With effect from 5th August, 2013 resident individuals (single or in association with another resident individual or with an ‘Indian Party’ as defined in this Notification) satisfying the criteria as per Schedule V of Notification No. 263/RB-2013 dated 5th March 2013, may make overseas direct investment in the equity shares and compulsorily convertible preference shares in any Joint Ventures (JV)/ Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) outside India for bona fide business activities outside India within the limit of $75,000.

4. The existing limit for gift in rupees by Resident Individuals to NRI close relatives and loans in rupees by resident individuals to NRI close relatives has been reduced to $75,000 per financial year.

Schedule V [See Regulation 20A]

A. Overseas Direct Investments by Resident Individuals

1. Resident individual is prohibited from making direct investment in a JV or WOS abroad which is engaged in the real estate business or banking business or in the business of financial services activity.

2. The JV or WOS abroad shall be engaged in bona fide business activity.

3. Resident individual is prohibited from making direct investment in a JV/WOS [set up or acquired abroad individually or in association with other resident individual and/or with an Indian party] located in the countries identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as “non-co-operative countries and territories” as available on FATF website www.fatf-qafi.org or as notified by the Reserve Bank.

4. The resident individual shall not be on the Reserve Bank’s Exporters Caution List or List of defaulters to the banking system or under investigation by any investigation/enforcement agency or regulatory body.

5. At the time of investments, the permissible ceiling shall be within the overall ceiling prescribed for the resident individual under Liberalised Remittance Scheme as prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time. [Explanation: The investment made out of the balances held in EEFC/RFC account shall also be restricted to the limit prescribed under LRS.]

6. The JV or WOS, to be acquired/set up by a resident individual under this Schedule, shall be an operating entity only and no step-down subsidiary is allowed to be acquired or set up by the JV or WOS.

7. For the purpose of making investment under this Schedule, the valuation shall be as per Regulation 6(6)(a) of this Notification.

8. The financial commitment by a resident individual to/on behalf of the JV or WOS, other than the overseas direct investments as defined under Regulation 2(e) read with Regulation 20Aof this Notification, is prohibited.

B. Post Investment Changes

Any alteration in shareholding pattern of the JV or WOS may be reported to the designated AD within 30 days including reporting in the Annual Performance Report as required to be submitted in terms of Regulation 15 of this Notification.

C. Disinvestment by Resident Individuals

1. A resident individual, who has acquired/set up a JV or WOS under the provisions of this Schedule, may disinvest (partially or fully) by way of transfer/sale or by way of liquidation/ merger of the JV or WOS.

2. Disinvestment by a resident individual shall be allowed after one year from the date of making first remittance for setting up or acquiring the JV or WOS abroad.

3. The disinvestment proceeds shall be repatriated to India immediately and in any case not later than 60 days from the date of disinvestment and the same may be reported to the designated AD.

4. No write-off shall be allowed in case of disinvestments by the resident individuals.

D. Reporting Requirements

1. The resident individual, making overseas direct investments under the provisions of this Schedule, shall submit Part I of the Form ODI, duly completed, to the designated authorised dealer, within 30 days of making the remittance.

2. The investment, as made by a resident individual, shall be reported by the designated authorised dealer to the Reserve Bank in Form ODI Parts I and II within 30 days of making the remittance.

3. The obligations as required in terms of Regulation 15 of this Notification shall also apply to the resident individuals who have set up or acquired a JV or WOS under the provisions of this Schedule.

4. The disinvestment by the resident individual may be reported by the designated AD to the Reserve Bank in Form ODI Part IV within 30 days of receipt of disinvestment proceeds.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated 14th August, 2013

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Overseas Direct Investments

Presently, an Indian Party can invest under the Automatic Route up to 400% of its net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet in all its overseas Joint Ventures (JV)/Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) engaged in any bona fide business activity.

This circular has reduced the above limit of 400% of net worth to 100% of net worth in case of all fresh Overseas Direct Investment proposals under the Automatic Route. Also, in case of fresh investment in overseas unincorporated entities in the energy and natural resources sectors, the above limit of 400% of net worth has been reduced to 100% of net worth in case of all fresh Overseas Direct Investment proposals under the Automatic Route. ODI in excess of 100% of the net worth will be considered by RBI under the Approval Route. Existing JV/WOS set up under earlier regulations will continue to be governed by the same.

However, there is no change as regards investment overseas under the Automatic Route by Navratna Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and Oil India Ltd (OIL), in overseas unincorporated entities and the overseas incorporated entities in the oil sector (i.e., for exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.), which are duly approved by the Government of India. They can invest without any limit.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20 dated 12th August, 2013

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999.

This circular states that applications for compounding must contain details of the bank account of the applicant in the format annexed to this circular to facilitate refund of compounding fees in case the application has to be returned because of nonobtaining of proper approvals or permission from the concerned authorities or for any other reason(s).

Also, annexed to this circular are the revised annexures for submission of information with regards to violation in respect of Foreign Direct Investment, External Commercial Borrowings, Overseas Direct Investment and Branch Office/Liaison Office. In the revised annexures details of PAN and the activity as per NIC codes-1987 have to be given. If the said information is not given, the application will be treated as incomplete. Also, information regarding change in the address/contact detail of the applicant has to be submitted to the Compounding Authority.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19 dated 7th August, 2013

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Non-Resident Deposits–Comprehensive Single Return (NRD-CSR): Submission under XBRL

This circular states that RBI is shifting, from 1st October, 2013, the NRD-CSR reporting to eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) platform to provide validations for processing requirement in respect of existing NRD schemes, improve data quality, enhance the security-level in data submission, and enable banks to use various features of XBRL-based data submission, and tracking. The procedure and new formats are given in/annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18 dated 1st August, 2013

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Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings

This circular clarifies that an FII can enter into a hedge contract for the exposure relating to that part of the securities held by it against which it has issued any PN/ODI only if it has a mandate from the PN/ODI holder for the purpose.

Banks are expected to verify such mandates. However, in cases where this is difficult they must obtain a declaration from the FII:

a. Regarding the nature/structure of the PN/ODI establishing the need for a hedge operation; and

b. Such operations are being undertaken against specific mandates obtained from their clients.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17 dated 23rd July, 2013

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Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings – Reporting of Unhedged Foreign Currency Exposures of Corporates

Presently, banks are required to submit a quarterly statement on foreign currency exposures and hedges undertaken by corporates based on bank’s books.

This circular states that banks should now submit the said quarterly report as per the revised format online only from quarter ended September 2013 through the Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) system which may be accessed at https://secweb.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 22nd July, 2013

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies

This circular has modified the policy for import of gold by nominated banks/agencies as under:

A. Nominated Banks/Agencies

1.
They have to ensure that at least 20% of every lot of import of gold
(in any form/purity including import of gold coins/dore) is exclusively
made available for the purpose of export. Such imports have to be linked
to the financing of exporters by the nominated agencies (i.e. average
of last three years or any one year whichever is higher). Further,

2.
They can make available gold in any form for domestic use only to
entities engaged in jewellery business/bullion dealers supplying gold to
jewellers.

3. They will be required to retain 20% of the imported quantity in the customs bonded warehouses.

4.
They are permitted to undertake fresh imports of gold only after the
exports have taken place to the extent of at least 75% of gold remaining
in the customs bonded warehouse.

5. Any import of gold under any type of scheme, shall follow the 20/80 principle set out at (1) and (3) above.

6. Any other instructions, as regards import of gold on consignment basis, LC restrictions etc. stand withdrawn.

Entities/units
in the SEZ and EOU, Premier and Star trading houses are permitted to
import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.

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S. 45 read with S. 10(38) — Profit from delivery-based transactions in shares treated as capital gains and not as business income.

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New Page 1

60.    (2009) 29 SOT 117 (Mum.)


Gopal Purohit v. Jt. CIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 10-2-2009

S. 45 read with S. 10(38) — Profit from delivery-based
transactions in shares treated as capital gains and not as business income.

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee entered
into transactions of sale and purchase of shares in two forms i.e.,
delivery-based transactions and non-delivery-based transactions. Non-delivery
based transactions had been treated by the assessee as business activity and
income earned by assessee from delivery-based transactions was treated as
capital gain. The assessee’s claim for exemption of long-term capital gain
u/s.10(38) was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the following grounds :



  • the frequency of the transactions carried on by the assessee was very high
    with large volumes of shares.



  • the assessee had borrowed funds which were utilised for carrying out share
    transactions.



  •  transactions where no delivery was taken had been squared up on the same day
    the profit/ loss resulting therefrom was shown as business income.



  •  in respect of delivery-based transactions, as per the statement of capital
    gains filed by the assessee, the period of holding was few days only.


The Assessing Officer, therefore, held that the entire
profit was to be assessed as income from business and profession.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee contended that in earlier
five assessment years on identical facts, the assessment had been completed
u/s.143(3) by accepting the assessee’s claim. Hence, on the basis of the
principle of consistency and in absence of any fresh material, the same
treatment should be given by the Revenue for this year also. The CIT(A) upheld
the Assessing Officer’s order.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of
Sarnath Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Asst. CIT,
(2009) 120 TTJ 216 (Luck.),
held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The assessee had claimed himself both as a dealer as
well as an investor and offered income for taxation accordingly and he claimed
that such income had been accepted by the Revenue authorities in earlier
years. Hence, it becomes important to analyse the facts of earlier years. On
considering the facts of the earlier years, the following conclusions
emerged :

(i) The facts of the year under consideration with regard
to nature of income(s) earned by the assessee and the transactions were same
in all those years, except transactions in F & O segment in some of the
years, wherein this kind of activity was started by the stock exchange.

(ii) Interest on borrowed capital had been allowed as
business expenditure against the profit on jobbing activities shown by the
assessee as business profit.

(iii) The assessee had shown shares purchased on delivery
basis as investments at the end of the year and no stock-in-trade existed on
that date and the assessee had earned both long-term and short-term capital
gains which meant that the assessee had also held shares for the period of
more than 12 months.

Thus, the nature of activities, modus operandi of
the assessee, manner of keeping records and presentation of shares as
investments at the year end were the same in all the years and hence,
apparently, there appeared no reason as to why the claim made by the assessee
should not be accepted.

2. The Revenue authorities had taken a different view in
the year under consideration by holding that the principle of res judicata
was not applicable to the assessment proceedings. There could not be any
dispute on this aspect, but there is also another judicial thought that there
should be uniformity in treatment and consistency under the same facts and
circumstances and it was already found that facts and circumstances were
identical, even though a different stand had been taken by the Revenue
authorities.

3. On the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on
the basis of principle of consistency alone, the action of the Revenue
authorities was liable to be quashed.

4. On the basis of merits also, in view of the ratio of the
decision of Sarnath Infrastructure (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra), it was
held that the delivery-based transaction should be treated as of the nature of
investment transactions and profit therefrom should be treated as capital
gains.

5. The Revenue authorities had also held that borrowed
funds were utilised for making such investment. In earlier years, interest on
such loans had been allowed as business expenditure against profit on share
trading transaction shown as business income. In the year under consideration
also no nexus between the interest-bearing funds and investments had been
established and, hence, for this reason also, there was no merit in treating
the capital gains as business profit.


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Penalty: Concealment: Section 271(1)(c): Sale of immovable property for Rs. 2,51,50,000 which was valued at Rs. 5,19,77,000 for stamp duty: Assessee computed capital gain by taking actual consideration of Rs. 2,51,50,000: AO applied section 50C and also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c): Penalty not justified:

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CIT vs. Madan Theatres Ltd.; 260 CTR 75 (Cal):

The assessee had sold an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 2,51,50,000. The said property was valued at Rs. 5,19,77,000 for the purpose of stamp duty. The assessee computed the capital gain by taking actual consideration of Rs. 2,51,50,000. The Assessing Officer computed the capital gain taking deemed consideration u/s. 50C at Rs. 5,19,77,000 being the stamp duty valuation. The assessee did not dispute the said computation as it would not have made any difference because the capital gain still remained a loss. The Assessing Officer also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Revenue having failed to produce any evidence to the effect that the assessee has actually received more amount than that shown by it on the sale of property, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) cannot be levied simply because the Assessing Officer has worked out the capital gain by taking into account deemed sale consideration by invoking section 50C(1) instead of actual sale consideration shown by the assessee.”

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2013 (31) STR 229 (Tri-Mumbai) Greenspan Agritech Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex, Pune-I

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Refund Notification No.17/2009-ST dated 07-07-
2009 providing time limit of one year from date pf export did not have
retrospective effect.

Facts:
The appellant, a
100% EOU, filed a refund claim for the period October 2007 to February
2008 on 18-1-/2008 under Notification No.41/2007-ST dated 06-10-2007
which was partly rejected on the grounds of limitation and partly as not
admissible under the said notification.

The appellant contended
that since the notifications were amended time to time increasing the
period to file the refund claim from “2 months” to “6 months” vide
Notification No.32/2008-ST dated 18-11-2008 and further to “1 year” vide
Notification No.17/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009, they filed the refund
claim in time and further relied on ITW Signode India Ltd. vs. Collector
of Central Excise 2003 (158) ELT 403 (SC).

The department
contended that the part refund was time–barred as filed beyond the
admissible period of 6 months as per Notification No.32/2008 and thus
not to be allowed.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal held that
undisputedly the refund claim was filed beyond the period of “6 months”.
The amending notification was issued after the event of the date of
export and hence, the same was time-barred. The decision of ITW Signode
India Ltd. (supra) is irrelevant in the present case as the issue
involved is the claim of benefit of notification which was required to
be strictly construed and thus time-barred.

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2013 (31) STR 249 (Tri-Mumbai) Amdocs Business Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Pune.

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In case of a continuous exporter of a taxable output service, credit for input service is available, irrespective of the period to which the service pertained.

Facts:
The Appellant was a continuous exporter of taxable output services and thus filed a refund claim under Rule 5 for the period October 2010 to December 2010 for unutilised service tax paid on input services. The adjudicating authority rejected part refund of invoices for the period September 2008 to November 2008 and October 2009 to January 2010.

The department relied on Notification No.05/2006– CE (NT) dated 14-03-2006 and contended that since the services in respect of which credit was taken could not have been used for the export in the month of October 2010, refund was not admissible.

The Appellant relied on Circular No. 120/01/2010 dated 19-01-2010 and on the decision of CCE, Mysore vs. Chamundi Textiles (Silk Mills) Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 498 (Tri-Bang) and contended that there was no bar in Notification No.05/2006-CE (NT) to grant refund of input services not pertaining to the period of export for which claims were made.

Held:
Relying on Circular No.120/01/2010 dated 19-01-2010 and on Chamundi Textiles (Silk Mills) Ltd. (supra), the Hon. Tribunal held that since the Appellant was a continuous exporter of taxable output service, they were eligible for the refund of the entire amount of service tax paid by them on the input services irrespective of when the credit was taken.

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2013 (31) S.T.R. 152 (Tri.-Del) Om Shiv Transport vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad

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Whether service tax can be demanded from service provider under one service and from service recipient under another service for the same transaction?

Facts:
The Appellants were engaged in transportation of coal in tipping trucks from coal stockyard of Northern Coal Fields Ltd. (NCL) including loading of coal into tipping trucks and railway wagons by employing their own pay loaders apart from manual breaking of coal to the stipulated sizes. The revenue demanded service tax on this considering it a cargo handling service.

The Appellants, relying on Circular No. 137/175/2007- CX4 dated 06-08-2008, contended that the services were in the nature of transport of goods by road. In respect of the same transaction, NCL was assessed to service tax as recipient of service of transport of goods by road vide adjudication order dated 09-01-2008. Invoking extended period of limitation was not warranted since the transaction was already adjudicated against NCL.

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Orissa High Court in case of Coal Carriers vs. CCE 2011 (24) STR 295 (Ori), the Tribunal held that the goods become cargo when loaded into a railway wagon/truck/ tipper and that there is a distinction between goods and cargo. Services in respect of goods were leviable to service tax under transport of goods by road services and services in respect of cargo were leviable to service tax under cargo handling services and thus, the Appellant’s services would fall under cargo handling services. However, the adjudication order did not consider certain aspects and the matter was remanded to consider the applicability of extended period of limitation in lieu of the transactions having been noticed by the revenue qua notice issued to NCL and whether service tax could be assessed once again on the same transaction under cargo handling services in the hands of the Appellants when it was already classified as transport of goods by road and service tax was collected from NCL as recipient of services.

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2013 (31) STR 174 (Tri-Del) Narayan Builders vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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In case of conflicts between two High Courts, the decision of the High Court in whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose is to be followed.

Facts:
The Appellants entered into an agreement with Kota Thermal Power Station (KTPS) for execution of works for coal handling system including clearing under coal handling operation circle.

In view of the clarification issued in the Regional Advisory Committee meeting on 06-09-2004, the revenue contended to levy tax on the said activity under cargo handling services. The department further relied on the decision of Coal Carriers vs. CCE 2011 (24) STR 395 (Ori.) which held such service to be taxable.

The Appellants relied on various judgments of the Delhi Tribunal and Rajasthan High Court decision in case of S. B. Construction Company vs. Union of India 2006 (4) STR 545 (Raj.) wherein the activity of the Appellants were held not to be cargo handling services u/s. 65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal at New Delhi which was neither in the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court nor the Orissa High Court. The tribunal relied on the Full Bench decision of Delhi Tribunal in Madura Coats vs. CCE 1996 (82) ELT 512 which clarified that in case of conflicting decisions amongst High Courts relating to interpretation of statutory provisions or notifications, the decision of the jurisdictional High Court from where the matter was adjudicated earlier, must be followed.

Accordingly, since the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and the Appellants were assessed to service tax by Jurisdictional Commissioners and the Appellate Commissioner within the territorial jurisdiction of Rajasthan High Court, the Tribunal followed the decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of S. B. Construction (Supra) and decided the matter in favour of the Appellants.

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2013 (31) STR 123 (Tri – Delhi) VGL Softtech Ltd. vs. CCEx, Jaipur.

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Only a Division Bench can decide the matter involving determination of liability?

Facts:
Appellant preferred an appeal along with stay application against an order of Respondent levying service tax on activity of maintenance of software for the period 09-07-2004 to 30-07-2005. A Single Member Bench decided exparte on non-appearance and directed the Appellant to deposit the entire demand along with penalty within 8 weeks. The Appellant filed a Miscellaneous Application to recall the order of the Single Member indicating that the jurisdiction of the division Bench was exercisable in the present case. On merits, the Appellant contended that the said activity was exempt vide Notification No. 20/2003-ST dated 21-08-2003 and since Explanation to section 65(zzg) [which levied service tax on software maintenance] was introduced from 01-06-2007 onwards, service tax was not applicable prior to the said date.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal (division Bench) held that, since the Central Excise Act required the appeal involving a question of determination of liability to be heard by the division Bench, the order of Single Member Bench was recalled. On Merits, it was observed that at relevant time the said activity was exempt vide Notification No. 20/2003 and further an Explanation to section 65(zzg) was effective only from 01-06-2007. Accordingly, the stay application and appeal were allowed.

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2013-TIOL-1196-CESTAT-DEL Monsanto Manufacturer Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ghaziabad.

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Classification of service – essential character. Storage Charges integral part of Clearing and Forwarding Service, hence taxable under Clearing and Forwarding Service and not under Storage and Warehousing Service.

Facts:
The Appellant entered into an agreement with HLL to provide services of cold storage/clearing and forwarding operations of frozen products. Tax, interest and penalties were demanded for the said service which was confirmed by the adjudicating authority and also by the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Appellant contended that charges towards cold storage facility were distinct and different from holding of the goods which may take place during clearing and forwarding operation and were in the nature of rental for providing cold storage facility and thus incidental to the services of Clearing and Forwarding Services. Relying on CCE vs. Kulcip Medicines (P) Ltd. – 2009 (14) STR 608, they contended that the activity did not fall under C&F service. The respondents contended that the Appellant acted as a consignment agent and thus, activity of storage was an integral part of the operation of Clearing and Forwarding service.

Held:
Referring to the definition of Clearing and Forwarding service and the agreement entered by the Appellant, it was held that the Appellant was its principal’s agent. Since, the Appellant was required to maintain specific temperature for storage of frozen goods before dispatching the same as per direction of HLL, the storage of the goods in cold storage was an inseparable part of Clearing & Forwarding activity undertaken by the assessee. The essential character being Clearing and Forwarding service, referring to section 65A(2)(b), the storage charges were to be included in the taxable value and chargeable to service tax.

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2013-TIOL-1054-CESTAT-MUM M/s. Kotak Securities Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-I.

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Service tax is payable on equity research as market research agency.

Facts:
The
Appellant conducted equity research and prepared research reports on
the financials of listed companies for their affiliate company M/s.
Kotak Mahindra Capital Company Ltd. (KMCC) and received research fees on
which no service tax was paid. An SCN demanding tax, interest and
penalties was issued to the Appellant under the category “Market
Research Services”.

The Appellant contended that they did not
provide any services in relation to product, service or utility and thus
non-taxable under the said category. It further contended that no
service was provided by them to KMCC as it was under common shareholding
of the Kotak Mahindra Group. Further, placing reliance on Circular
No.109/3/2009- ST dated 23-02-2009, it was contended that the Appellant
and KMCC jointly provided services to clients on a cost/revenue sharing
basis, and thus out of tax net.

Held:
Ordering the pre-deposit of 50% of the dues confirmed, the Hon. Tribunal observed as follows:


The Appellant did not produce any evidence to prove that the amount
shown under “Fee Income/Research Fees Received” in its Profit & Loss
Account was for services other than “Research Activities” undertaken
for KMCC.

• In respect of sharing of expenses not to be
considered as consideration; when a service provider charges a
consideration, he takes into account all the expenses incurred by him
and includes an element of profit. Thus, expenses were an integral part
of the consideration charged. That would not mean that the amount
received is not a consideration for the services rendered. Service tax
was a tax on provision of service and hence, whatever amount was charged
for such provision, service tax was payable, irrespective of whether
any profit was made by the service provider in the said transaction.


It was not in dispute that the Appellant conducted equity research and
prepared reports on the financials of the listed companies. Equities
would come under the categories of products and were considered as goods
under the Sale of Goods Act, 1934. Therefore, research on equity was a
product research. Referring to the definition of Market Research Agency
u/s. 65(69), the activity undertaken by the Appellant would fall within
its scope and accordingly, the Appellant was, prima facie, liable to pay
service tax on the said activity.

• The Appellant informed the
department of the activities undertaken by them only in March 2004 and
September 2004 and SCN was issued in March 2005. It was the date of
knowledge that was relevant for computing the time limit and thus the
SCN was not held time barred.

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2013 (31) STR 227 (Tri.-Del) Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. Raipur

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Free supplied materials includible in the valuation of taxable services vide Circular No. 80/10/2004- ST dated 17-09-2004 read with Notification No. 15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004.

Facts:
The appellant did not include the value of free supplied materials in the gross amount of taxable services and claimed abatement under commercial or industrial construction vide Notification No. 15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004. The appellant further did not pay service tax on advances received and also availed the benefit of CENVAT credit.

The department contended that in view of the said notification read with Circular No. 80/10/2004-ST dated 17-09-2004, tax was to be levied on value addition and thus free supplies would be included in the valuation of taxable services. Further, service tax on advance received should also have been paid and CENVAT disallowed.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal dismissing the appeal in totality held as below:

• The adjudicating authority rightly decided the issue against the appellant with respect to free supplied materials following the taxation of incremental value principle and thus, liable to tax.

• The consideration received before, during and after providing taxable services is leviable to service tax and thus, advance was also liable to tax.

• Since there was no taxability, admissibility of CENVAT credit did not arise.

• Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 was rightly invoked since the appellants did not claim abatement in accordance with law.

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2013 (31) STR 226 (Tri.-Del.) Jai Shree Road Lines vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II

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IConsideration of services is liable to service tax and not sharing thereof.

Facts:
The appellant already deposited service tax on consideration towards GTA services. On sharing such consideration with the truck owners the department demanded service tax considering the same as commission received from providing business auxiliary services.

Held:
Considering the basic principle that only the consideration for services provided, and not appropriation of income, is liable to service tax under Finance Act, 1994, the appeal was decided in favour of the appellant.

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2013 (31) STR 251 (Tri-Ahmd) Aakash The Place To Celebrate vs. Commr. Of S. T., Ahmedabad.

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Service tax paid on advance money received. Amount refunded along with service tax, – Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules applicable and not section 11B, hence credit claimed without time limit.

Facts:
The appellant collected advance from its clients and paid service tax on the same. Due to unforeseen circumstances, they refunded the advances along with service tax. The appellant filed a refund claim of which part amount was rejected on the grounds of time bar u/s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

The appellant contended that, in the present case, Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 was applicable and thus they were eligible to avail credit of service tax paid by them since they have refunded the amount along with service tax to their clients.

The department contended that the amount was collected as service tax and deposited with the Government. Further, placing reliance on the Tribunal’s decision in case of Gujarat Road Transport Corporation, they contended that once the provisions of section 11B were invoked, the refund claim was to be filed within 1 year from the relevant date.

Held:
Citing Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the Tribunal held that the present case was covered by Rule 6(3) since all the conditions mentioned in the said Rule were satisfied. The Tribunal further observed that the appellant was again carrying on the same business and the appellant could utilise the credit of such excess service tax paid. Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, does not prescribe any time limit and therefore, the appellant could avail the total credit of such excess service tax paid for discharging subsequent service tax liability.

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2013 (31) STR 77 (Tri-Delhi) CCEx, Chandigarh vs. Facinate Advertising & Marketing.

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Incentives received in the course of advertising services – Not taxable. Bad debts and discounts are deductible for payment of service tax.

Facts:
The Revenue challenging the decision of CCE (Appeals) contended that incentives received by an advertising agency, bad debts and cash discounts were taxable and thus to be included in the taxable value.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal dismissing the appeal held that incentive was a receipt for appreciation of performance of services which was not known while providing the said service. Bad debts were on account of non-receipt of consideration and, similarly cash discounts were also not received. Thus, they do not enter into the realm of receipt of consideration to be included in the taxable value.

(Note: The period in dispute appears to be pertaining prior to the introduction of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011).

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S. 37(1) — Provision for service warranty expenses on actuarial basis allowed as expense.

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62.    (2009) 29 SOT 167 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v. LG Electronics (I) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 30-1-2009

S. 37(1) — Provision for service warranty expenses on
actuarial basis allowed as expense.

The assessee-company, which was providing a one year
service warranty on sale of its electronics products, made a provision towards
services warranty expenses on actuarial basis and claimed deduction in respect
of the same u/s.37(1), which was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. On
appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the following
cases, allowed the assessee’s claim :

(a) CIT v. Indian Transformers Ltd., (2004) 270
ITR 259; (2005) 142 Taxman 429 (Ker.)

(b) Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT, (2000) 245 ITR
428; 112 Taxman 61 (SC)

(c) Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1959) 37 ITR 1 (SC)

(d) IRC v. Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd.,
(1996) 222 ITR 697 (PC)

(e) CIT v. Vinitek Corpn. (P.) Ltd., (2005) 278
ITR 337; 146 Taxman 313 (Delhi )

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. In the light of plethora of judgments of both of the
Supreme Court as well as various High Courts it is well settled that once
the assessee is maintaining its accounts on the mercantile system, the
liability already accrued in a year though to be discharged at a future
date, would be a proper deduction while working out the profit and gains of
business, regard being had to the accepted principle of commercial practice
and accountancy. It is not as if such deduction is permissible only in the
case of amounts actually expended or paid.

2. The expression ‘the liability already accrued in the
year’ signifies that a business liability must have definitely arisen in
that accounting year. In other words, for allowing the deduction of a
liability while working out the profits and gains of business, a business
liability should have definitely arisen in that accounting year. What should
be certain is the incurring of the liability. The definite liability must be
in praesenti and not de futuro. The liability must have arisen under a
definite obligation. The obligation of the trader must not be of a purely
contingent nature for it to be a permissible outgoing or allowance or
deduction in the year of account.

3. The other condition to be satisfied is that the
definite liability in praesenti should also be capable of being estimated
with reasonable certainty though the actual quantification may not be
possible.

4. In the instant case, the issue related to the
assessee’s claim of deduction towards warranty liability under a condition
or stipulation made in the sale document imposing a liability upon the
assessee to discharge its obligation under warranty clause for the period of
warranty.

5. The assessee had made the provision of warranty
liability having regard to the past factor of actual expenses incurred by it
towards warranty liability. It had worked out the amount of liability by
applying a multiplying factor on the total sales made during the year on the
basis of past results. This method had been followed by the assessee
uniformly right from the first year of commencement of production.

 

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S. 28(iv) — Revaluation of assets by firm before conversion into a Company — Value of shares received by partners in excess of their capital was not taxable.

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61.    (2009) 29 SOT 138 (Mum.)


Dy. CIT v. Mahesh M. Chheda

A.Y. : 1999. Dated : 29-1-2009

S. 28(iv) — Revaluation of assets by firm before conversion
into a Company — Value of shares received by partners in excess of their
capital was not taxable.

The assessee was a partner in a firm which revalued its
assets before conversion into a Company which allotted shares to the partners
of the firm against their revalued capitals. The Assessing Officer taxed the
value of shares received by the partners in excess of their capital before the
revaluation of assets by the firm as value of perquisite or benefit arising to
the partners in terms of S. 28(iv). The CIT(A) upheld the assessment order.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High
Court in CIT v. Smt. Chetanaben B. Sheth, (1993) 203 ITR 24, deleted
the addition. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. One of the conditions necessary for applicability of
S. 28(iv) is that the benefit or perquisite sought to be taxed must be
arising in the course of business carried on.

2. The Gujarat High Court has held in the above-mentioned
case that the amount received by an assessee-partner of a firm towards
valuation of goodwill and assets of the firm at the time of retirement from
the firm does not attract provisions of S. 28(iv), since the same cannot be
said to be a perquisite arising from the business and that even otherwise it
would not partake the character of income. Besides the above, increase in
capital of a partner as a result of revaluation of assets of the firm has no
nexus with the business of firm and, therefore, it cannot be brought within
the ambit of S. 28(iv). Therefore, the provisions of S. 28(iv) could not be
applied to bring the sum in question to tax in the hands of the partners of
the firm.

On the issue whether there was any capital gains as a
result of increase in capital of the partners consequent to revaluation of
assets of the firm, the Tribunal noted as under :

1. The stand taken by the Revenue in the grounds of
appeal was that partner’s interest in the firm was transferred to the
Company at a higher value and, hence, the benefit should be taxed in the
hands of the partners. It had been further contended in the grounds of
appeal that the definition of ‘transfer’ as given in S. 2(47) is an
inclusive definition and, therefore, de hors the provisions of S.
45(4) capital gains can be brought to tax in the hands of the partners.

2. There was no transfer whatsoever by the partners. It
was the firm which got converted into a Company. On such conversion, capital
gain on such transfer could be brought to tax only in the hands of firm and
not in the hands of the partner. This was clear from the provisions of S.
45(4). Consequently, no ‘capital gain’ arose in the hands of the partners by
reason of revaluation of assets of the firm and the consequent increase in
capital account of the partners of the firm.

3. Transfer by the firm or consequent succession of the
firm by a Company should not be brought to tax in view of the provisions of
S. 47(xiii). The fact that such transfer and the resultant capital gains
could not be brought to tax was no ground to explore the possibility of
taxing capital gain in the hands of partners on the ground that there was
capital gain consequent to revaluation of assets and increase in capital of
the partners.

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Explanation (b) to S. 6(1)(c) : (i) Not applicable in case of permanent return (ii) period of visit to India to be excluded (iii) fraction of a day to be excluded.

Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions

    Shri Manoj Kumar Reddy v. ITO

    ITA No. 1020/Bang./2008

    S. 6(1)(c) [Explanation (b)], Income-tax Act;

    Article 4, India-USA DTAA

    A.Y. : 2005-2006. Dated : 3-4-2009

    Explanation (b) to S. 6(1)(c) : (i) Not applicable in case of permanent return (ii) period of visit to India to be excluded (iii) fraction of a day to be excluded.

    Facts :

    The assessment pertains to previous year 2004-05 (A.Y. 2005-06). The appellant was an employee of an Indian company. On 23rd January 2004, the employer issued a deputation letter to the appellant relocating him to the USA and directed him to work on specified projects of the customers of its US parent company. However, the appellant continued to be an employee of the Indian company.

    The appellant left India on 1st February 2004. He returned to India on 31st January 2005 at 4.00 a.m. The number of days of stay in India by the appellant during the preceding previous years 2000-01 to 2006-07 were as follows :

    As the appellant was in India for more than 365 days or more during the four preceding previous years and during the previous year 2004-05 and he was in India for more than 60 days, the AO concluded that in terms of S. 6(1)(c) of the Act, the appellant was resident in India. The AO also referred to Article 4(1) of India-USA DTAA which defines ‘resident of a contracting state’ and held that the residential status of the appellant is to be decided in terms of the domestic law. As appellant is resident under the Act, he would also be resident in terms of DTAA.

    The AO referred to Article 16 of India-USA DTAA which states that the salary derived by an Indian resident in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in India unless certain conditions are fulfilled. As AO held that the salary from rendering services in the USA was taxable in India as the appellant was resident in India.

    Before CIT(A), the appellant contended that Clause (b)1 of Explanation to S. 6(1)(c) applies in case the appellant comes on a visit to India and the fact that appellant had come to India permanently was not relevant. Hence, the appellant should be considered as non-resident. In support of its contention, the appellant relied on the decision of AAR in British Gas India P. Ltd., (2006) 285 ITR 218, wherein the AAR held that the term ‘for the purposes of employment outside India’ would also cover a case where an assessee is deputed outside India by an Indian employer.

    Before the Tribunal the appellant raised the following contentions :

    (i) Clause (b) of Explanation to S. 6(1)(c) applies in case the appellant comes on a visit to India and the fact that the appellant had come to India permanently was not relevant. Hence, the appellant’s status should be taken as non-resident.

    (ii) As he had arrived on 31st January 2005 at 4.00 a.m., the fraction of the day should not be counted while determining the period. He further contended that if 31st January 2005 is excluded, his stay in India was only 59 days. Hence, he would be non-resident. The appellant relied on Delhi High Court’s decision in Praveen Kumar and Another v. Sunder Singh Makkar.

    Held :

    (i) The Tribunal referred to the legislative history and the purpose of the amendment and relying on the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision in V. K. Ratti v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 295 (P& H), held that if the appellant has come to India permanently after leaving his employment outside India, Explanation (b) will not be applicable.

    (ii) For computing the period of 60 days mentioned in S. 6(1)(c), the period of visit to India should be excluded.

        (iii) Referring to the Delhi High Court’s decision in Praveen Kumar and Another v. Sunder Singh Makkar, Law Lexicon and S. 9 of the General Clauses Act, the Tribunal held that as per the General Clauses Act, the first in a series of a day is to be excluded if the word ‘from’ is used. Since for computation of the period, one has to necessarily import the word ‘from’, the first day should be excluded.

 Clause (b) relaxes the rigour of S. 6(1)(c) by substituting 182 days in place of 60 days

Held:

i) The Tribunal referred to the legislative history and the purpose of the amendment and relying on the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision in V. K. Ratti v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 295 (P& H), held that if the appellant has come to India permanently after leaving his employment outside India, Explanation (b) will not be applicable.

ii) For  computing the  period of 60 days mentioned in S. 6(1)(c), the period of visit to India should be excluded.

iii) Referring to the Delhi High Court’s decision in Praveen Kumar and Another v. Sunder Singh Makkar, Law Lexicon and S. 9 of the General Clauses Act, the Tribunal held that as per the General Clauses Act, the first in a series of a day is to be excluded if the word ‘from’ is used. Since for computation of the period, one has to necessarily import the word ‘from’, the first day should be excluded.

No tax is required to be deducted from commission paid to agent outside India if no services performed in India or no fixed place of business in India.

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Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions





  1. Spahi Projects Pvt. Ltd., in re




AAR No. 802 of 2009

S. 9(1), Income-tax Act; Article 7,

India-South Africa DTAA

Dated : 29-7-2009

No tax is required to be deducted from commission
paid to agent outside India if no services performed in India or no fixed
place of business in India.

Facts :

The applicant was an Indian company engaged in
the business of manufacture and sale of industrial pesticides. The applicant
appointed a South African company (‘SA Co’) to promote and market its products
in South Africa. In consideration of its services, SA Co was to receive
commission from the applicant in respect of completed transactions. SA Co was
to : (i) procure orders from different buyers; (ii) negotiate price and other
terms and intimate the same to the applicant; (ii) re-negotiate the
terms/price if necessary, based on the instructions of the applicant; (iv)
follow up in getting purchase orders from customers and forward the same to
the applicant; (v) follow up regarding LC opening, shipment and payment; (vi)
attend to queries in regard to shipment. The orders were to be directly
executed by the applicant. Sale consideration would also be directly received
by the applicant in India. After receipt of the sale consideration, the
applicant would remit commission to SA Co.

The applicant had raised the following issues for
ruling by AAR :

(i) Whether amount paid to SA Co was liable to
tax deduction u/s.195 of the Act read with India-South Africa DTAA.

(ii) As SA Co did not have permanent
establishment in India, whether amount paid to it was liable to tax
deduction.

(iii) Whether amount paid to SA Co could be
treated as ‘fees for technical services’ under the Act.

The applicant contended that : SA Co rendered all
its services outside India; it did not maintain any establishment in India;
the income received by SA Co was its business income; and hence, the income
cannot be taxed under the Act as SA Co did not have any business connection or
permanent establishment in India. The applicant also clarified that SA Co has
no authority to conclude contracts on its behalf or to take any decision
without referring to the applicant.

In support of its contention, the applicant
relied on CBDT’s Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July 1969, Circular No. 786 of
7th February 2000 and also on the decisions in CIT v. R. D. Aggarwal & Co.,
(1965) 56 ITR 20 and CIT v. T.I. and M. Sales Ltd., (1987) 166 ITR 93.

The AAR referred to Article 7 of India-South
Africa DTAA. The AAR also cited with approval certain observations of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. Toshoku Ltd., (1980) 125 ITR 525 (SC).

Held :



(i) As no business operations are carried out
in India by SA Co, no income can be attributed under Explanation (a) and
therefore no income can be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

(ii) SA Co has no fixed place of business in
India and hence, none of the sub-clauses of Article 5(2) are applicable.
Accordingly, the business profits of SA Co for services rendered as
commission agent in SA Co could not be brought to tax in India.

(iii) As SA Co will not be rendering services
of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature, provisions dealing with
fee for technical services cannot be invoked.

(iv) As commission paid by the applicant to SA
Co is not chargeable to tax in India by virtue of Art.7 of DTAA and S.
9(1)(i) read with the Explanation thereto, the applicant is not obliged to
deduct tax u/s.195 of the Act..



 

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Liability to deduct tax — Payer not an assessee in default u/s.201 if payee has paid tax on income but payer liable to interest u/s.201(1A).

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Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions






  1. ITO v. Intel Tech India Pvt. Ltd.



ITA No. 71/Bang./2009

S. 195, S. 197, S. 200, S. 201, S. 248,

Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Dated : 9-4-2009

Liability to deduct tax — Payer not an assessee in default
u/s.201 if payee has paid tax on income but payer liable to interest
u/s.201(1A).

Facts :

US Co. is an American company. US Co. was carrying on
business in India through a branch (‘Indian branch’). The appellant is an
Indian company. On 15th March 2003, the appellant entered into an agreement
with US Co. for acquisition of the entire assets and liabilities of the Indian
branch. In terms of the agreement, on 1st April 2003, US Co. transferred all
the assets and the liabilities of the Indian branch to the appellant. The
consideration for the transfer was the difference between the WDV of the
assets and the liabilities. The appellant accounted for the purchase price by
debiting the assets and accounted for the consideration payable by crediting
US Co.

Being depreciable assets, in terms of S. 50 of the Act, the
sale proceeds were chargeable to tax as short-term capital gains. In terms of
S. 195 of the Act, the appellant was required to deduct tax from the purchase
consideration, which it failed to do. Hence, the AO issued the notice to the
appellant to show cause why u/s.201(1) it should not be treated as an assessee
in default, and further that why interest should not be levied u/s.201(1A).

In reply to the notice, the appellant submitted that :


à The
provisions of S. 195 are not applicable in a case where the non-resident or
foreign company has presence in India and is assessed to tax.


à The
transfer of the assets has resulted in a ‘loss’ in the hands of US Co.
Therefore there was no requirement to deduct tax at source u/s.195(1). In
its support, the appellant submitted valuation report dated 1st November
2003.


à Though
tax was not deducted, the Indian branch had deposited the tax. Therefore, in
terms of Explanation to S. 191, the appellant cannot be treated as an
assessee in default u/s.201(1).


The AO rebutted the submissions in the following manner and
concluded that the appellant was required to deduct tax from gross
consideration :


à S. 195
does not exempt a foreign company from the purview of S. 195 on the ground
that the foreign company is assessed to tax in India.


à The
appellant credited the consideration on April 1, 2003 and therefore,
liability to deduct tax arose on that date. As the valuation report was
subsequent to the date of credit, the appellant did not have any material to
reach the conclusion that the transaction will result in a loss.


à The
deductee paid tax on other income and not on the transactions on which tax
was to be deducted.


Before CIT(A), The appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2007) 293 ITR
226 (SC), wherein it was held that if the deductee/recipient had already paid
taxes on the amount received, tax cannot be recovered again from the
defaulting deductor. The appellant further relied on the following decisions :


à
Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. ITO,
(2006) 7 SOT 84 (Chennai)


à AP
Power Generation Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT,
(2007) 11 SOT 221 (Hyd.)


à
Golkonda Engineering Enterprises Ltd. v. ITO,
(2008 TIOL 169 ITAT Hyd.)


The CIT(A) held that : deductee was a regular assessee
under the Act is not a relevant consideration u/s.195; as the appellant and US
Co were related, the appellant was aware that the transaction will result in a
loss; as the deductee has filed its return of income and has paid due tax,
deductor cannot be treated as assessee in default; and therefore, the
appellant was not liable to any interest u/s.201(1A) of the Act.

Before the Tribunal, the tax authorities argued that if the
deductee has not obtained certificate u/s.197, the deductor is required to
deduct tax. Alternatively, after deducting tax, the deductor could have filed
an appeal u/s.248 and could have claimed that tax was not deductible. The
appellant argued before the Tribunal that purpose of S. 195 was to prevent
remittance to a non-resident without payment of tax and where the non-resident
was assessed to tax in India, S. 195 was not intended to apply. IndCo. also
relied on Circular No. 7/2003, dated 5th September 2003 and stated that if the
deductee has duly discharged his tax liability, deductor would not be treated
as assessee in default due to non-deduction and as a corollary, he would not
be chargeable interest u/s.201(IA).

The Tribunal observed that S. 195 nowhere provides that a
foreign company assessed to tax in India is exempt from S. 195. It supported
this observation with its order dated July 11, 2008 in Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd.
[ITA No 1403/Bang/07]. US Co. had not applied u/s.197 for non-deduction of
tax. If the appellant denied its liability for tax deduction u/s.195 and 200,
it could have filed an appeal u/s.248, which it did not. The appellant had
also not made any application u/s.195(2). The appellant credited the amount on
1st April 2003, whereas valuation report was of 1st November 2003. Hence, on
the date of credit, the appellant did not know that the amount paid will
result in loss and that the deductor cannot make an assessment of income in
the hands of the deductee. Therefore, the appellant was obliged to deduct tax
@ 40%. The Tribunal also referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in
Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. & Another v. CIT, (1999) 239 ITR
587 (SC) to the effect that the assessee has to file an application
u/s.195(2), u/s.195(3) and u/s.197 in case the sums being paid are not
chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient.

The deductee had filed the return of its income on 1st
November 2004 and as per the return, no tax was payable on the consideration
from which the appellant was required to deduct tax. Hence, liability of the
appellant ended on the date when the Indian branch filed the return. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme  Court’s decision  in CfT  v. Eli  Lilly Company (India) Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 312 ITR 225 (sq, wherein it was held that the object underlying S. 201(1) is to recover the tax. As far as the period of default is concerned, it starts from the date when the tax should have been deducted and lasts up to the date of actual payment. As the appellant was required to deduct tax but had not deducted it, it was an assessee in default. Since the Indian branch had filed the return, disclosed the consideration and the return showed that no tax was payable on the consideration, the default ended on the day the Indian branch filed the return. Hence, there would be no deduction u/s.201, but the appellant will be liable to interest u/s.201(lA) up to the date of filing the return by the Indian branch.

Held:

i) S. 195 does not exempt a foreign company assessed to tax in India from its provisions.

(ii) In the absence of certificate issued u/ s.197 or determination u/s.195 or order u/s.248, the deductor is required to deduct tax u/s.195. If however, the deductor has not deducted tax but the deductee has paid tax on his returned income, the deductor cannot be considered an assessee in default.

(iii) Even if the deductee has paid tax, the deductor would be liable to charge of interest u/s. 201(lA) up to the date of filing the return by the deductee.

S. 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A can be made even in the year in which no exempt income has been earned or received — Disallowance u/s.14A in respect of interest expenditure is to be made with reference to gross interest expenditure and not with reference to

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  1. Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO



ITAT Special Bench New Delhi — ‘B’ Bench

Before R. P. Garg (VP) and A. D. Jain (AM) and
Rajpal Yadav (JM)

ITA No. 87/Del./2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 5-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ajay Vohra, Rohit
Jain, Gaurav Jain & Rohit Garg/S. D. Srivastava, Rajesh Tuteja, & Manish Gupta

S. 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A can be made even in
the year in which no exempt income has been earned or received — Disallowance
u/s.14A in respect of interest expenditure is to be made with reference to
gross interest expenditure and not with reference to interest expenditure as
reduced by interest receipt.

Per R. P. Garg :

Facts :

The assessee had invested Rs.17,36,89,230 in
purchase of shares. Some of the shares were held by the assessee as its
capital assets, whereas the others were held as its stock-in-trade. The
assessee had taken unsecured loans of Rs.8,51,65,000. It had paid interest of
Rs.1,21,02,367 on unsecured loans borrowed by it. Of the borrowed funds a sum
of Rs.6,88,70,000 was invested in shares. During the previous year relevant to
the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee did not earn any dividend income.

In the course of assessment proceedings before
the Assessing Officer (AO), the assessee contended that since it had not
earned or received exempt income the question of disallowance of interest does
not arise. The AO did not accept the contention of the assessee and disallowed
interest on a proportionate basis i.e., a sum of Rs.97,87,570 was
disallowed out of total interest.

Aggrieved by the disallowance of interest the
assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO in
disallowing proportionate interest pertaining to investment for earning
dividend, though exempt income was not earned during the year. The CIT(A),
however, agreed with the alternative contention of the assessee that the
disallowance be computed with reference to the net interest amount debited to
the Profit & Loss Account and not the gross interest expenditure. The CIT(A)
directed the AO to work out disallowable interest on pro rata basis of
the net interest i.e., interest payment as reduced by receipt of
interest.

The assessee preferred an appeal on the ground
that disallowance was not warranted since the assessee had neither earned nor
received any exempt income during the previous year relevant to the assessment
year under consideration. The Revenue preferred an appeal on the ground that
the proportionate gross interest expenditure ought to have been held to be
disallowable.

In view of the contrary decisions on the issue
under consideration, the President, ITAT constituted a Special Bench (SB) to
dispose of the appeal and decide the following question :

“Whether disallowance u/s.14A of the Act can be
made in a year in which no exempt income has been earned or received by the
assessee ?”


Held :

The Special Bench held that —

(a) when the expenditure of interest is
incurred in relation to income which does not form part of total income, it
has to suffer the disallowance, irrespective of the fact whether any income
is earned by the assessee or not. S. 14A does not envisage any such
exception;

(b) when prior to introduction of S. 14A, an
expenditure both u/s.36 and u/s.57 was allowable to an assessee without such
requirement of earning or receipt of income, such a condition cannot be
imported when it comes to disallowance of the same expenditure u/s.14A of
the Act;

(c) in the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody the SC
held that irrespective of dividend receipt, expenditure has to be allowed.
Applying the ratio of this decision in the reverse case since dividend is
exempt, expenditure has to be disallowed. The fact that during the year
dividend has neither been earned nor has it been received would be
irrelevant;

(d) the allowance of expenditure in relation to
dividend income would thus be not admissible in computing the income of an
assessee under this Act, irrespective of whether the shares are held as
investment or they are held on trading account as stock-in-trade;

(e) S. 57 allows the expenditure incurred for
making or earning the income, whereas S. 14A disallows the expenditure ‘in
relation to income which does not form part of total income’. The term
‘expenditure in relation to’ is wider in scope and provides for disallowance
if it is related to income not forming part of total income;

(f) the disallowance has to be of the entire amount of the
expenditure so related and cannot be reduced by the receipt of interest which
has no relation to such expenditure.

 

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S. 115JA, S. 244A — While computing tax liability u/s.115JA credit for tax paid in foreign country is allowable — Grant of interest u/s.244A can not be denied on the ground that the TDS certificate was filed in the course of assessment proceedings and not

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  1. ACIT v. L. & T. Ltd.



ITAT Mumbai ‘A’ Bench

Before R. S. Syal (AM) and

Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)

ITA No. 4499/Mum/2008

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 22-7-2009

Counsel for revenue / assessee : Mayank Priyadarshi/Arvind Sonde

S. 115JA, S. 244A — While computing tax liability u/s.115JA
credit for tax paid in foreign country is allowable — Grant of interest
u/s.244A can not be denied on the ground that the TDS certificate was filed in
the course of assessment proceedings and not along with the return of income.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

The assessment of total income of the assessee was
completed u/s.143(3) of the Act on 31-3-2003 assessing the total income at
Rs.97,09,81,536 u/s.115JA. Subsequently, the AO observed that the assessee was
allowed double tax relief while assessing the income u/s.115JA. Notice u/s.154
of the Act was issued and the credit for foreign tax given was denied on the
ground that intention behind S. 115JA is that assessee should pay minimum tax
in India on 30% of book profits and credit for taxes paid in foreign country
could not be allowed against tax liability in India when income was assessed
u/s.115JA of the Act.

In the rectification proceedings the AO did not allow
interest in respect of TDS certificates on the ground that such certificates
were not submitted along with the return of income, but were submitted in the
course of assessment proceedings.

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the income on which tax has been
paid abroad was included in ‘book profit’ for the purpose of S. 115JA. The
Tribunal held that once taxable income is determined either under the normal
provisions or as per S. 115JA, subsequent portion relating to the computation
of tax has to be governed by the normal provisions of the Act. It also held
that there is no provision in the Act debarring granting of credit for tax
paid abroad in case income is computed u/s.115JA. It held the assessee cannot
be denied the set-off of tax relief of Rs.22,88,464 against the tax liability
determined u/s.115JA. It upheld the order of CIT(A) on this ground.

The Tribunal noted that tax was deducted at source at the
right time. It was also deposited into the exchequer in time. The Tribunal
noted that the AO had given credit for TDS, but had denied interest thereon
u/s.244A. The Tribunal held that interest u/s.244A cannot be denied only on
the ground that TDS certificates were not furnished along with the return of
income. It upheld the order of CIT(A) on this ground.

 

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S. 80IB(10) — Amenities provided by the assessee at the time of construction itself, though by way of a separate agreement, are to be treated as part of the housing project undertaken by the assessee — Deduction u/s.80IB(10) is allowable in respect of rec

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  1. Dy. CIT. v. Vimal Builders and
    Vimal Builders
    v. Dy. CIT



ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before M. A. Bakshi (VP) and

R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA No. 3646/Mum./2007 & 2730/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 28-7-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : J. V. D. Lanstich/

R. R. Vora and Manoj Anchalia

S. 80IB(10) — Amenities provided by the assessee at the
time of construction itself, though by way of a separate agreement, are to be
treated as part of the housing project undertaken by the assessee — Deduction
u/s.80IB(10) is allowable in respect of receipts for amenities — When there is
direct nexus between the funds borrowed and funds advanced to sister concerns
interest received on amounts advanced can be netted off against interest paid.

Per R. K. Panda :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of constructing
residential buildings. During the assessment year under consideration the
assessee had claimed deduction of Rs.3,15,40,268 u/s.80IB(10). The Assessing
Officer (AO) noted that the assessee had considered receipts for amenities as
part of total sales and had claimed deduction u/s.80IB on the profit element
contained in receipts for amenities. He observed that the amenities included
superior quality flooring, false ceiling, fans and tubes, superior quality
fittings in toilets, box grills and pipe gas from Mahanagar Gas Limited. The
AO did not consider profit derived from providing amenities as part of total
sales and accordingly denied benefit of deduction on an amount of Rs.22,12,360
being the profit on amenities receipts of Rs.55,34,797.

The CIT(A) held that provision of amenities should be
treated as part of the housing project undertaken by the assessee and since
these amenities are provided by the assessee at the time of construction
itself, though by way of a separate agreement, the profit element in receipts
for amenities qualifies for deduction u/s.80IB(10). He allowed the appeal of
the assessee.

The CIT(A), in the course of appeal proceedings before him,
noted that the assessee had advanced monies to its sister concerns and had
received interest of Rs.16,27,802 which interest was netted off against
interest paid. After giving an opportunity to the assessee, he held that
interest receipts should be excluded for the purpose of calculating deduction
u/s.80IB(10) of the Act. He directed AO to recompute the deduction
u/s.80IB(10) by excluding interest receipts.

Aggrieved, the Revenue and the assessee preferred appeals
to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the extra amenities are provided
only to purchasers of the flats at the time of purchase of flat itself and no
such activity has been undertaken for any other person; the agreement for sale
of flat and for provision of extra amenities were both entered on the same
date; work for extra amenities was carried out through the same contractor at
the time of construction of the flat itself. It found merit in the submission
that extra amenities given to the buyer cannot be provided in isolation as the
same are inextricably connected with the housing project and the decision of
providing such extra amenities to the buyer was a commercial decision and
within the conditions of S. 80IB(10) of the Act. Accordingly, this ground was
decided in favor of the assessee.

As regards the exclusion of interest receipts for computing
deduction u/s.80IB(10) the Tribunal after considering the submissions made on
behalf of the assessee (viz. that the funds were borrowed from banks
and private parties for the purpose of its housing project; the borrowings
from the banks were for a specified period and prepayment would have resulted
into levy of penalty interest and therefore funds were advanced to sister
concerns on a temporary basis so as to recoup part of the interest costs)
directed the AO to give an opportunity to the assessee to prove the nexus that
borrowed funds were used for giving advances on which interest has been earned
and if the assessee can prove such nexus then netting may be allowed.

 

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S. 80HHC — Entire amount received on sale of DEPB entitlements does not represent profit chargeable u/s.28(iiid). Computation of profit on sale of DEPB entitlements requires an artificial cost to be interpolated.

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  1. Topman Exports v. ITO



ITAT Special Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP),

R. S. Syal (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM)

ITA No. 5769/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 11-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rajan Vora/

G. C. Srivastava and Anil Kumar

S. 80HHC — Entire amount received on sale of DEPB
entitlements does not represent profit chargeable u/s.28(iiid). Computation of
profit on sale of DEPB entitlements requires an artificial cost to be
interpolated.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

The assessee, a manufacturer and exporter of
fabric/garments, filed its return of income declaring total income of
Rs.36,24,230. While computing its total income, the assessee had claimed
deduction of Rs.83,69,303 u/s.80HHC of the Act. The assessee had reduced a sum
of Rs.3,01,93,428 being sale proceeds of DEPB licence from its total purchases
of Rs.16,96,83,882 and had shown net purchases of Rs.13,94,90,454. The profit
on transfer of DEPB licence was only Rs.14,35,097 and profit on transfer of
DFRC licence was Rs.19,902. Before the Assessing Officer (AO) the assessee
justified its action by submitting that the profits on sale of DEPB licence
was an export incentive covered u/s.28(iiia) for the purpose of claiming
deduction u/s.80HHC. The AO held that the net profit after reduction of export
incentive of Rs.3.01 crores was a loss of Rs.1.82 crores. The AO denied the
deduction claimed u/s.80HHC of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that since the assessee did not satisfy the
two conditions mentioned in the third proviso to S. 80HHC(3), it is not
entitled to deduction in respect of amounts received under DEPB and DFRC
schemes. As regards the assessee’s contention that only the profit on transfer
of DEPB and DFRC licences was covered by the provisions of S. 28(iiid) and S.
28(iiie) and not the sale proceeds, the CIT(A) held that the cost of these
entitlements/certificates to the assessee was Rs.Nil and hence, the entire
sale consideration of the licences was profit on transfer. The CIT(A) directed
the AO to treat the entire amount of sale consideration of DEPB and DFRC
licences as profit on transfer for the purpose of working out deduction
u/s.80HHC as per the amended provisions. The CIT(A) did not give any finding
regarding the eligibility of duty drawback for deduction u/s.80HHC.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. The President of the Tribunal constituted a Special Bench (SB) and
referred the following question to the SB for its consideration and decision :

“Whether the entire amount received on sale of DEPB
entitlements represents profit chargeable u/s.28(iiid) of the Income-tax Act
or the profit referred to therein requires any artificial cost to be
interpolated ?”

Briefly stated, Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC defines the
term ‘profits of the business’ to mean the profits under the head ‘profits and
gains’ as reduced by 90% of the sum referred to in S. 28(iiid). The 2nd and
3rd provisos to S. 80HHC(3) provide that the profits computed thereunder shall
be increased by the said 90% amount computed in the proportion of export
turnover to total turnover. S. 28(iiid) refers to “any profit on the transfer
of Duty Entitlement Pass-book Scheme (‘DEPB’). The Special Bench had to
consider whether the entire amount received on sale of DEPB entitlement
represents ‘profits’ chargeable u/s.28(iiid) or the profit referred to therein
requires any artificial cost to be imputed.


Held :

The SB decided the appeal in favour of the assessee and
while so deciding it held that :

(i) the argument of the Revenue that DEPB is a
post-export event and has no relation with the purchase of goods cannot be
accepted. There is a direct relation between DEPB and the customs duty paid
on the purchases. For practical purposes, DEPB is a reimbursement of the
cost of purchase to the extent of customs duty;

(ii) the DEPB benefit (face value) accrues and becomes
assessable to tax when the application for DEPB is filed with the concerned
authority. Subsequent events such as sale of DEPB or making imports for
self-consumption, etc. are irrelevant for determining the accrual of income
on account of DEPB;

(iii) on a harmonious construction of clauses (iiia), (iiib)
and (iiic) of S. 28 it is evident that clauses (iiia) and (iiic) deal with
specific species of incentives, clause (iiib) is a residual clause which
brings within its sweep all forms of export incentives other than those
specifically set out in clauses (iiia) and (iiic);

(iv) the face value of DEPB benefit falls within the
ambit of S. 28(iiib);

(v) S. 28(iiid) which refers to the ‘profits on transfer
of the DEPB’, obviously refers only to the ‘profit’ element and not the
gross sale proceeds of the DEPB. If the Revenue’s argument that the sale
proceeds should be considered is accepted, there would be absurdity because
the face value of the DEPB will then get assessed in the year of the DEPB
and also in the year of its transfer;

(vi) profit on sale of DEPB representing the excess of
sale proceeds of DEPB over its face value is liable to be considered
u/s.28(iiid) at the time of sale;

(vii) only the ‘profit’ (i.e., the sale value less
the face value) is required to be considered for the purposes of S. 80HHC;

(viii) whatever has been said about DEPB also holds good
for DFRC, on both its components, viz. the face value of DFRC and
profit on its transfer, except for the fact that the profit on sale of DFRC
shall be charged to tax u/s.28(iiie);

(ix) Duty drawback shall be chargeable to tax at the time
of accrual of income u/s.28(iiie) when application is filed with the
competent authority after making exports.

 

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S. 115JA — Stock borrowing charges not debited to P & L Account as required under Schedule VI of the Companies Act can be claimed as revenue expenditure even in the case of an assessee who is mandatorily bound to follow the accounting standards as prescri

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  1. ITO v. Cyril Traders Pvt. Ltd.




ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and

R. S. Padvekar (JM)

ITA No. 5297/Mum/2004

A.Y. : 1998-99. Decided on : 28-7-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : S. B. Prasad/

J. D. Mistry

S. 115JA — Stock borrowing charges not debited to P & L
Account as required under Schedule VI of the Companies Act can be claimed as
revenue expenditure even in the case of an assessee who is mandatorily bound
to follow the accounting standards as prescribed.

Per R. S. Padvekar :

Facts :

The total income of the assessee, assessed u/s.143(3) of
the Act, was a loss of Rs.55,37,760. Subsequently vide order passed u/s.143(3)
r.w. S. 147 the AO inter alia disallowed Rs.53,55,000 towards stock
borrowing charges incurred by the assessee and claimed in its computation of
total income but were not debited to its Profit & Loss Account. The AO held
that not debiting the expenditure to P & L Account was in violation of clause
(xii)(b) of Rule 3 of Part II of Schedule VI and hence the same was not
allowable.

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the provisions of Minimum
Alternate Tax as contained in S. 115J were considered by the Apex Court in the
case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. It observed that the scheme of S. 115JA is identical
with that of S. 115J. It held that if the P & L Account prepared by the
assessee was not in accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of
Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956, then to that extent the AO can make
the corrections and adjustments, but the AO cannot make disallowance in
respect of expenses which are otherwise allowable but are not debited to P & L
Account. The Tribunal held that the stock borrowing charges were rightly
allowed as a deduction by the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

Cases referred to :



1. Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. CIT,
(82 ITR 363) (SC)

2. Tuticorin Alkali Chemcials and Fertilisers Ltd. v.
CIT,
(227 ITR 172) (SC)

3. DCIT, Cir 3(1) Mumbai v. Adbhut Trading Co. Pvt
Ltd.,
(ITA No. 3597/Mum./2002), dated 25-7-2005

4. ITO v. Adbhut Trading Co. Pvt Ltd., (ITA No.
2869/Mum./2004), dated 25-4-2007

5. ITO v. Vicraze Investments & Trdg. Co. P. Ltd.,
(ITA No. 6276/M/2004), dated 24-4-2007.

6. Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, (255 ITR 273) (SC)



 

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S. 68 — Cash credit — Loan amount received in earlier year converted into gift — Valid gift.

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  1. Haresh A. Dhanani v. ACIT



ITAT ‘SMC’ Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM)

ITA No. 5850/M/2008

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 22-5-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : R. Ajay Singh/

Malati Sridharan

S. 68 — Cash credit — Loan amount received in earlier year
converted into gift — Valid gift.

Facts :

During the year under appeal the assessee had claimed to
have received gift of Rs.2.5 lacs from his uncle on the occasion of his
marriage anniversary. As per the facts noted, the said amount had been shown
by the assessee in his balance sheet as loan from his uncle up to 31-3-2001.
During the year under consideration, the said loan was converted into gift
vide gift deed dated 6-1-2002. The assessee passed necessary journal entry and
the amount was transferred to his capital account from the loan account.
According to the AO since the gift was not received by actual delivery of
cash/cheque, it cannot be considered as valid gift and he treated the said
amount as unexplained cash credit in the hands of the assessee u/s.68 of the
Act. The CIT(A) on appeal relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of Dr. R. S. Gupta and upheld the order of the AO.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the case relied on by the CIT(A)
was distinguishable on the facts. In the case of Dr. R. S. Gupta, the amount
was deposited with a third person while in the case of the assessee, the loan
amount was with him only which was converted as gift. Further, it observed
that even if the gift was not considered as genuine gift, the addition of
Rs.2.5 lacs was not warranted u/s.68 because the credit entry as loan was
there as on 31-3-2001 with the assessee himself and there was no fresh cash
credit during the year.

Case referred to :


CIT v. Dr. R. S. Gupta, 165 ITR 36 (SC)

 

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S. 37(1) — Capital or revenue expenditure — Expenditure incurred on launching of a new model of car — Held as revenue expenditure.

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  1. Premier Ltd. v. DCIT




ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai

Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and

Asha Vijayaraghvan (JM)

ITA No. 2091/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 30-6-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Jayesh Dadia/

Yeshwant V. Chavan

S. 37(1) — Capital or revenue expenditure — Expenditure
incurred on launching of a new model of car — Held as revenue expenditure.

Per S. V. Mehrotra :

Facts :

The assessee was carrying on the business of manufacture
and sale of automobiles and machine tools. During the year under appeal, it
had incurred expenditure of Rs.2.93 crore on van project. In its return of
income the same was claimed as revenue expenditure though in its books of
account, the same was capitalised and shown as ‘Capital work in progress’. The
AO rejected the claim of the assessee for reasons amongst others, as under :



  •  The expense incurred was for development of a new car and hence cannot be
    termed as revenue expenditure;



  •  As per the Annual Report of the assessee — the project was under
    implementation and ready to launch. Therefore, the expense incurred up to the end of the previous year
    had rightly been capitalised by the assessee in its books of accounts.


The CIT(A) on appeal confirmed the action of the AO,
observing that the project was new business and not the expansion of an
existing business.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue justified the orders of
the lower authorities and further contended that :



  • The assessee had enhanced the capacity by installing new assembly line; and



  • The expenditure was for manufacturing of altogether a different car.



Held :

According to the Tribunal the moot point for consideration
was whether the expenditure incurred in launching a new model could be treated
as expansion of same business or a new business. It referred to the CIT(A)’s
observation that if the assessee had incurred expenditure for expansion of the
production capacity of its Premier Padmini car or any of the cars which it was
already manufacturing, it would amount to a case of expansion. According to
the CIT(A), the product sought to be manufactured was a totally new product,
even if it was a car. The Tribunal did not agree to it. According to it, the
test to be applied for deciding whether a particular project was an expansion
of the existing line of business or a new business was to determine whether
there was unity of control and management and interlacing of funds or not. It
noted that those two aspects in the case of the assessee had not been disputed
by the Revenue. Therefore, it held that the expenditure incurred on the van
project was revenue in nature being for expansion of the business.
Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.


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Interest u/s. 234B and 234C—Credit for minimum alternate tax has to be set off from the tax payable before levy of interest u/s. 234B and 234C of the Act.

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CIT vs. Sage Metals Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 675 (SC)

In a group of appeals filed by the Revenue before the Delhi High Court a common issue was involved, namely, whether interest u/s. 234B and 234C is to be charged before the tax credit (commonly referred to as MAT credit) available u/s. 115 JAA is set off against tax payable on total income or after it is set off? And additional issue was whether this question was debatable and therefore, the provisions of section 154 could not have been invoked.

The High Court dismissing the appeals of the Revenue held that interest u/s. 234B and 234C is to be charged after the tax credit (MAT credit) available u/s. 115JAA is set off against tax payment on total income of the year in question. The High Court further held that the decision of Benches of the Tribunal at Chandigarh and Chennai did indicate that the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that rectification could not be made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 154 of the Act as the issue regarding charging of interest u/s. 234B of the Act without giving set off of the MAT credit available to the assessee was highly debatable.

On a Special Leave Petition being filed before the Revenue before the Supreme Court, the Court noted that a short question which arose for its determination in the appeals before it was, whether the Department was entitled to charge interest u/s. 234B of the Act on the assessee bringing forward the tax credit balance into the year of account relevant to the assessment year 2001-02. According to the Supreme Court this question has been answered in favour of the assessee by its judgment in the case of CIT vs. Tulsyan NEC Ltd., (2011) 330 ITR 226 (SC). Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Department.

Note: Sections 234A/234B/234C have been amended to provide such set-off by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. Asst.Year 2007-08.

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Due Date of Payment for Allowability of Employee PF Contribution

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Issue for Consideration

Under the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, an eligible employee as well as his employer are required to make periodic contributions to the provident fund (PF) account of the employee. The employer deducts the employee’s contribution from his salary, and pays both the employer’s as well as the employee’s contribution together to the PF account of the employee. Similar provisions are contained under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 and Scheme (ESIC).

The employer’s contribution to the PF, etc., being a business expenditure, is an allowable deduction in computing the income of the employer under the head “Profits & Gains of Business or Profession” u/s.36(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The employee’s PF and ESIC contribution, on deduction by the Employer, is deemed to be the income of the employer in the first place by virtue of section 2(24)(x), but is an allowable business deduction u/s. 36(1)(va). However, in order to claim either the employer’s PF contribution or the employee’s PF contribution as a deduction, the payment of such contribution has to be made by a specified date. While the time limit for the deduction of the expenditure, under the Income-tax Act, of the employer’s contribution is governed by section 43B(b), the employee’s contribution is governed by section 36(1)(va) of the Act.

Section 43B(b) provides that the expenditure would be allowed only in the year of actual payment. Till Assessment Year 2003-04, the proviso to section 43B provided that the deduction of employer’s PF contribution would be allowed only if the amount had actually been paid before the due date referred to in section 36(1)(va). Section 36(1)(va) provides that the employee’s contribution shall be allowed as a deduction if the amount is credited by the employer to the employee’s account on or before the due date by which the employer is required to credit the employee’s contribution under the relevant Act .

Therefore, till Assessment Year 2003-04, both employer’s as well as employees’ PF contributions were allowable as deductions only if the amounts were paid before the due date under the PF law. The proviso to section 43B has however been amended with effect from Assessment Year 2004-05 to provide that section 43B would not apply to payments made before the due date of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(1). In effect therefore, employer’s PF contribution is now allowed as a deduction in the same previous year in which the liability to pay the amount is incurred, so long as the payment is made before the due date of filing of the return of income for that year. No corresponding amendment has been made in section 36(1)(va).

The question has arisen before the tribunal and the courts as to whether the due date of filing of the return of income as applicable to the employer’s PF contribution under the proviso to section 43B can also be taken as the due date for the purposes of allowability of the employees’ PF contribution. Can the amended provisions of section 43B relaxing the time for payment of employer’s contribution be extended and applied even for claiming deduction for employees’ contribution? While the Mumbai and the Kolkata benches and the Special bench of the Tribunal have taken the view that the due date under the PF law is the relevant date for employees’ PF contribution and any payment beyond that date shall defer the deduction to the year of payment, the Delhi and Hyderabad benches of the Tribunal have taken the view that it is the due date of filing of the return of income which is the relevant date and the making of the payment by that date will enable the employer to claim deduction for the employees’ contribution. The latter view has also been the unanimous view of the Karnataka, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand High Courts.

Sudhir Genset’s case:

The issue came up for consideration of the Delhi bench of the tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Sudhir Genset Ltd. 45 SOT 63 (URO).

In this case, pertaining to assessment years 2005- 06, 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessing officer had made disallowances of employees’ contributions to PF and ESIC on the ground that the assessee failed to make the payment of employees’ contributions within the due dates as provided in those Acts. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance on the ground that though these payments were not made within the limitation provided in the PF Act and ESIC Act, these were paid before the due date of filing of the returns of income in all the three assessment years.

The Delhi bench of the tribunal was of the view that the issue was covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. P.M. Electronics Ltd., 313 ITR 161, where it had been held that if the assessee made payment in the PF and ESIC account, including the employees’ contribution, before the due date of the filing of the return u/s. 139 of the Income-tax Act, then no disallowance of such payment could be made by virtue of section 43B.

Since all the payments were made before the due date of filing of the return of income, the Delhi bench of the tribunal upheld the deletion of disallowance of the employees’ PF contribution.

A similar view was taken by the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Imerys Ceramics (India) (P) Ltd 24 taxmann.com 320 and Patni Telecom Solutions (P) Ltd 35 taxmann.com 87 (Hyd), where the Tribunal followed the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the cases of CIT vs. Sabari Enterprises 298 ITR 141 and CIT vs. ANZ Information Technology (P) Ltd. 318 ITR 123.

Besides these two Karnataka High Court decisions, the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. AIMIL Ltd.321 ITR 508, the Karnataka High Court in the case of Spectrum Consultants India (P) Ltd 215 Taxman 597, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd. 350 ITR 327 and the Uttarakhand High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kichha Sugar Co Ltd. 35 taxmann.com 54 have all taken the view that employees’ PF contribution could not be added back to income or disallowed, even if the payment was made after the due date under the PF Act, so long as the payment was made before the due date of filing of the income-tax return u/s. 139.

LKP Securities’ case:

The issue came up recently before the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of ITO vs. LKP Securities Ltd. ITA No 638/Mum/2012 dated 17th May 2013.

In this case, the assessee made delayed payments of employees’ PF and ESIC contributions, beyond the stipulated dates of 15th and 21st of the following month under the respective Acts. The PF payment was, however, made within the 5 days of grace permitted under PF law. The assessing officer disallowed such payments on the ground that the grace period was only for the purposes of not charging penal interest and other penalties under the PF Act, and was not an extension of the due date under that Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance on the ground that the payments were made before the due date of filing of the return of income, following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of AIMIL Ltd. (supra).

Before the tribunal, on behalf of the revenue, reliance was placed on the Kolkata bench tribunal decision in the case of DCIT vs. Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 10 taxmann.com 26, where the tribunal after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd 319 ITR 306 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sabari Enterprises (supra), has held that employees’ contributions were not governed by section 43B. It was also argued that the same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Pamwi Tissues Ltd. 215 CTR 150. It was therefore argued that employees’ contribution to PF/ESIC was not allowable if not paid before the due dates under the respective Acts.

On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the Delhi High Court decision of AIMIL Ltd. (supra), where the court after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd 213 CTR (SC) 268, had clarified that the amendment to section 43B with effect from assessment year 2004-05 would apply to the employer’s as well as the employees’ contribution to the various welfare funds. The Delhi High Court had also held that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues (supra) was no longer a good law after the Supreme Court decision of Vinay Cements (supra), and that there was no scope for any doubt after the Supreme Court decision in the case of Alom Extrusions (supra). It was therefore argued that any payment by the employer, whether in respect of the employer’s or the employees’ contribution, made before the due date of filing of the return of income would qualify for being allowed as a deduction for the relevant year.

After analysing the provisions of section 43B and the amendments carried out with effect from assessment year 2004-05, the tribunal noted that section 43b(b) covered only the employer’s contribution to such welfare funds, and that the employees’ contribution was not covered by section 43B(b). After considering the provisions of sections 37(1), 2(24)(x), 36(1)(va) and 43B(b), the tribunal noted that while the due date for payment of both employer’s and employees’ contribution under the PF Act was the same, the deductibility of the employer’s contribution under the Income-tax Act was governed by section 37(1) while the employees’ contribution was deemed to be income u/s. 2(24)(x) and governed by section 36(1)(va).

According to the tribunal, even if one overlooked the clear language of section 2(24)(x) read with section 36(1)(va) (on one hand) and section 43B(b) (on the other hand), which clearly concerned separate and distinct sums, and consider for the sake of argument, section 43B(b) as applicable to section 36(1) (va) payments, it would be rendered otiose . This was on account of the fact that the sum had to be otherwise allowable under the relevant provision for section 43B to apply, and since the payment had not been made before the due date specified in section 36(1)(va), it was not allowable under that section, and therefore section 43B did not apply to the case of employees’ contribution. On the other hand, if the payment was made before the due date specified u/s. 36(1)(va), section 43B had no functional relevance.

The Mumbai tribunal also relied on the Kolkata Special Bench tribunal decision in the case of Jt. CIT vs. ITC Ltd. 112 ITD 57, where the Special Bench had held that section 43B did not apply to payment of the employees’ contribution. The tribunal further noted that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Vinay Cement (supra) and Alom Extru-sions (supra) related to the provisions of section 43B, which did not govern the deductibility of the employees’ contribution, and related merely to the retrospectivity of the amendment in section 43B. This aspect, according to the tribunal, had been explained by the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues ( supra ). Though this decision of Pamwi Tissues has been reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions, the reversal was only in respect of the subject matter of retro-spectivity of the amendment. The tribunal observed that the Bombay High Court in Pamwi Tissues’ case endorsed its decision in CIT vs. Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd 298 ITR 149, wherein issues other than those relating to the amendment to section 43B were also referred to. According to the tribunal, the question of applicability of the amendment in section 43B to the employees’ contribution remained unanswered or unaddressed by the Supreme Court in Alom Extrusions’ case (supra). The Supreme Court in that case did not consider or give any finding that the employees’ contribution, deduction of which was subject to section 36(1)(va), was further subjected to section 43B or that section 43B would apply even if the sum was otherwise not allowable.

As regards the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of AIMIL Ltd., the Mumbai tribunal noted that the said decision was considered by the Kol-kata bench of the tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 10 tax-mann.com 26 while deciding the issue against the assesssee. Though AIMIL’s decision covered payment of employees’ contribution to EPF and ESIC, according to the tribunal, the entire deliberation in that decision, as well as the subject matter of the decision was qua section 43B, including the amend-ments thereto. According to the tribunal, the High Court moved on the premise that the employees’ contribution was subject to section 43B(b), and accordingly interpreted the section as well as the nature of the amendments. Further, according to the Mumbai tribunal, the decision of the tribunal which was approved of by the Delhi High Court in AIMIL’s case did not consider the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITC Ltd (supra), and was also inconsistent with the decision of the jurisdictional Bombay High Court in Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case (supra), in so far as it related to the inapplicability of section 43B to payments specified u/s. 36(1)(va). Further, as per the tribunal, the absence of the relevant findings in Alom Extrusions’ case(supra), the decision in the case of AIMIL Ltd. was not the one that had considered all facts of the issue of deductibility of the employees’ contribution. The Mumbai bench of the tribunal therefore preferred not to follow the decision in the case of AIMIL Ltd. on the ground that it was not applicable or germane to the issue under consideration before the tribunal, but opted to follow the decision of the Special Bench of the tribunal in ITC Ltd. (supra) and the decision in the case of Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (supra), since both of these were consistent with the jurisdictional High Court on the material aspect before the Mumbai bench.

Therefore, the Mumbai tribunal held that the due date for the purposes of allowability of employees’ PF contribution meant the relevant date under the PF Act, and not the due date of filing of the return of income under the Income-tax Act. Following the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case (supra), the Mumbai tribunal however held that the benefit of the grace period had to be considered in computing the due date, and therefore held that any payments of the employees’ contribution made within the grace period was allowable as deduction.

Observations

The Delhi High Court in deciding the issue in favour of the assessee in AIMIL Ltd.’s case, clearly observed that if the employees’ contribution is not deposited by the due date prescribed under the relevant Acts and is deposited late, the employer not only paid interest on delayed payment but also attracted penalties, for levy of which specific provisions are made in the Provident Fund Act as well as the ESI Act. The court noted that those Acts permitted the employer to make the deposit with some delays, subject to the penal consequences. This aspect of the respective laws permitting delayed payment of the dues prevailed on the High Court in taking the view that it did. It is therefore respectfully submitted that had the Mumbai tribunal appreciated that the decision of the Delhi court was a well considered decision that took into account the comprehensive gamut of the provisions of all the statutes relevant to payment of the dues, including the provisions of the Income tax Act, it would have followed the AIMIL Ltd. decision instead of dissenting from it.

The decision of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal, as stated by it, seems to have been mainly swayed by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana. On going through this decision, while one notes that one of the issues that came up before the Bombay High Court was relating to employees’ contribution, the Bombay High Court has nowhere expressly discussed or highlighted or noted the distinction between the employees’ contribution and the employer’s contribution. The court merely took a note of the provisions of sections 43B and 36(1)(va) and the amendments to section 43B. The Bombay High Court, in that case, was primarily concerned with the issue of the retrospectivity of the amendments to section 43B, just as the Delhi High Court was in the case of AIMIL Ltd. In both the cases, the courts were mainly concerned with the applicability of the amendments in section 43B and if that was so, the Mumbai tribunal did not have much to choose between the said decisions as neither of them perhaps laid down any law as far as the deduction of the employees’ contribution was concerned. Further, the said decision of the Bombay High Court in Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case stood overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Alom Extrusions’ case.

The Special Bench decision in the case of ITC has been rendered on the basis of the specific language of the sections and not by keeping in mind the intention of the legislature and the spirit behind the amendments. In that case, the impact of the permission to make delayed payments under the PF and ESIC Acts on payment of interest and penalty was not examined in depth.

Government Accounting Needs Urgent Reforms

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At a time when the entire country is discussing the fall of the rupee, the economic gloom and the incremental damage that the Food Security Bill would cause to the Indian economy, readers will wonder why I am discussing accounting reform.

The primary reason for the panic is the presumption that a year ago, the country had plenty of foreign exchange “reserves” and this was due to consistent economic growth. There is no dispute that India has come a long way since 1947, and the comparison of the rupee-dollar exchange rate in 1947, and that of today is preposterous. Having said that, it is necessary to read the figures that the government dishes out in the context of the cash method of accounting that it follows. If the government followed the accrual method of accounting which is mandatory for corporates, the government’s balance sheet would be significantly different. Three illustrations will make the point clear.

Any student of accounting will tell you that a “reserve” in the balance sheet is a surplus which is vested in the owner of the entity. In short, reserves are nothing but owned funds. The recent liberalisation of foreign exchange controls was on the basis that the foreign exchange “reserves” that the country had were here to stay. In fact, they constituted capital inflows which were parked in India on account of the non-availability of a better return elsewhere in the world. These capital inflows had the potential of being withdrawn and were therefore a debt. Till foreign exchange inflows arise either in the form of equity investment (FDI) or are the result of income accruals, they would not have any degree of permanence. If the balance sheet was drawn up bringing to the fore this aspect, people would have been cautious while celebrating economic growth.

The second illustration is that of funding through oil bonds or similar instruments. Since government accounting is on cash basis, the bonds or similar instruments are reflected as assets in the books of oil companies but the corresponding liability is not reflected as a liability in the government balance sheet. Thus, while shoring up the economy temporarily one is creating an unrecognised liability in the hope that during the tenure of this instrument income would accrue to the government enabling it to discharge the liability when it dawned on the horizon.

The third illustration is closer to our professional domain. We all know that targets for collection of tax are set by the powers that be on the basis of the past, oblivious to the fact that tax collections would depend on the economic situation which has shown a gradual decline in the recent past. In the race to meet these irrational targets the tax authorities raise patently illegal tax demands and by misusing powers forcibly collect them as well. These collected disputed demands often constitute a liability of the government and are not its income. Though the judicial system in India is afflicted by many ills, it still functions. Consequently, many of the high-pitched demands are deleted in appeals and result in refunds. The target however is based on the tax collected in the preceding year resulting in the authorities creating further high-pitched demands which have a cascading effect. Everyone is busy passing the buck without coming to terms with reality.

The accounting and auditing profession is a much maligned profession. The auditor is restrained by the regulations of his profession and is therefore not able to defend himself in public. If analysts and regulators had paid adequate attention to what auditors report and had taken timely action, at least some of the economic disasters could have been avoided.

I believe that the accounting profession has a very important role to play in ensuring that the state of the economy is transparently put in the public domain. The first step in this direction is for the government to shift from the cash system to the accrual system. The process has begun, with an attempt to convert accounting of urban local bodies to double entry system, but the progress is agonisingly slow. This is for the reason that many of those involved in governance do not appreciate the significance of the change in method of accounting and the benefits thereof. It is treated as a low priority item on the agenda to be dealt with only if time permits. The other possibility is that they feign indifference because they are conscious that if the accrual method of accounting is followed, the picture of the economy may darken further.

The government continuously exhorts businesses to follow “global standards”. It needs to practice what it preaches. The government of New Zealand makes its financial statements public. The audited statements for the year ended 30th June 2012 are available on the government website. These have been prepared on accrual basis. The statements for the 11 months ended 31st May 2013, were released on 5th July 2013. Those interested may visit the website – www.treasury.govt.nz. I am conscious that New Zealand and India are not comparable. I have given the illustration only to establish that what is being suggested is possible. If we have the desire we will get there. But if we have to reach the goal we have to make a beginning. We are already late. The time to start is now!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
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The Bishop’s Candlesticks

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Lord Mahavir taught us forgiveness. Bhagvan Buddha taught us compassion. A classic example of forgiveness and compassion, the story of “The Bishop’s Candlesticks” from “Les Miserables” by Victor Hugo comes to my mind. There is an incident which has left a deep everlasting impression on me. Briefly the story is like this.

Jean Valjeen is the main character of this book. He is released from prison after serving 19 years as a galley slave, a very torturous inhuman punishment. His crime was that he stole a loaf of bread for the starving kids of his sister; and made attempts to escape from prison. In the words of Victor Hugo, “The pecfduliarity of punishment of this kind, in which what is pitiless, that is to say, what is brutalising, predominates, is to transfer little by little, by slow stupefaction, a man into a criminal, sometimes into a wild beast.”

His misery did not end with his release. He was issued a yellow passport which branded him as a dangerous criminal. He was denied food and shelter. All inns and hotels turned him out, inspite of the fact that he was wanting to pay for the same. He had no place to go. When he had lost all hope, he was directed to go to Bishop M’s house.

Who was this Bishop M? He was a bishop who was known for his good-heartedness, and charity, his empathy and love for the poor. Bishop M, spent away most of his substantial allowance for the poor, himself leading a simple and frugal life. He lived with his sister.

Jean Valjeen knocked at the door of the Bishop late in the evening, hungry, tired, dirty and devoid of all hope. He was surprised when the Bishop received him like an honoured guest and treated him with dignity. The Bishop told him “You need not tell me who you are. This is not my house; it is the house of Christ… You are suffering. You are hungry and thirsty. Be welcome”. Jean Valjeen was stunned. For the first time in his life he was treated like a human being. The Bishop made him sit with him for dinner — on a well laid table. This was the first time in 19 years that Jean was served a decent meal. The food was served in silver plates, and the table was lit with candles in silver candlesticks. The silver plates and the silver candlesticks were the only valuables which the Bishop owned. Jean was also given a decent bed, next to the Bishop’s bed for his night’s rest. From wooden planks to a clean comfortable bed after 19 years!

But the hardened criminal within him made him restless. He decamped with the silver plates in the night.

In the morning when the theft was discovered, the Bishop’s sister lamented the sheltering of such a criminal. The Bishop was unperturbed.

Jean was caught with the silver plates and brought to the Bishop. The Bishop asked the police to release him and stated that the plates were not stolen, but gifted by him to Jean! He then addressed Jean and told him that even the silver candlesticks were gifted to him, which Jean forgot to take with him, and then handed over the candlesticks also to Jean! This completely changed the life of Jean Valjeen.

These things happen in real life too. Sir Prabhashankar Pattani was the Diwan of the erstwhile state of Bhavnagar. His jewellery was stolen. The culprit, a servant in his house was brought to him by the police. Pattani Saheb got the servant released and also gave him financial help. The servant returned the jewellery and took a vow to lead an honest life.

There is also an event in the life of Swami Dayanand Saraswati, a Hindu saint who revived the dying spirit of Hinduism. The King of Jodhpur became his devotee and started a pious life. The King broke off his relations with a dancing girl, who in order to take revenge bribed the cook of Swamiji to poison him. As he was dying in great agony Swamiji realised what had happened, called the cook and asked the cook to run away for his life to escape the wrath of the King of Jodhpur who would most certainly have killed the cook. Swamiji forgave his murderer and helped him to escape.

These are the instances of true forgiveness, true compassion, and true charity. May these help us to learn to be better human beings.

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DDIT vs. Marriott International Licensing Company BV [2013] 35 taxmann.com 400 (Mumbai-Trib) A.Ys.: 2003-04 Dated: 17-07-2013 Article 12(4) of India-Netherlands DTAA

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Payment can be characterised as “royalties” only if it is consideration for use or right to use any defined property in existence at the time of use—since the payment made was not for pre-existing defined property, it could not be characterised as “royalties”. Contribution linked to percentage of turnover is unlikely to be regarded as reimbursement of expenses.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, the Netherlands. The taxpayer had entered into a Franchise Agreement with a hotel in India for providing sales, marketing publicity and promotion services outside India. The Indian hotel was also to participate in the hotel system of the taxpayer. Clause 3.2 of the agreement provided that the hotel was to pay certain proportion of its gross revenue for international marketing activities which were in the nature of advertising and printed media, marketing, promotional, public relations and sales campaigns etc. The issue before the Tribunal was, whether the payment made under clause 3.2 of the agreement was purely reimbursement of expenses on sales promotion and marketing and hence was not “royalties”?

Held:
To cover any amount within the purview of Article 12(4) of India-Netherlands DTAA, the payment should be received as consideration ‘for the use of or right to use’ any defined property (i.e. copyright, patent, trademark, etc). Thus, a payment would be “royalties” if it is made for defined property existing at the time of use and not for creation of defined property. Even if the payment contributed towards brand building, it would not be for use of the brand and hence cannot be characterised as “royalties”.

The contribution, being a percentage of gross revenue, was not reimbursement of actual expenses on itemised basis and no material was placed on record to demonstrate that actual expenses were equal to the reimbursed amount. Therefore, the AO should decide on the taxability of the amounts under Article 7 of India-Netherlands DTAA.

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ITO vs. Veeda Clinical Research Pvt Ltd [2013] 35 taxman.com 577 (Ahmedabad-Trib) A.Y. 2008-09, Dated: 28-06-2013 Article 13(4) (c), India-UK DTAA

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Fees paid by Indian company to UK company for general training does not involve transfer of technology and hence, is not covered under ‘make available’ clause.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company. It had made certain payments to a UK service provider for providing ‘market awareness and development training’ to its employees.

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the training fees paid to the service provider were covered under Article 13(4)(c) of India-UK DTAA and accordingly, were taxable in India?

Held:
The law on the connotation of ‘make available’ clause in definition of FTS is settled and the condition precedent for invoking this clause is that the services should enable the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained in such services.

Unless the technical services provided by the UK Company resulted in transfer of technology, the ‘make available’ condition was not satisfied. To invoke ‘make available’ clause, the onus is on the tax authority to demonstrate that the training services involved transfer of technology. This onus was not discharged.

The training services provided were general in nature and did not involve transfer of technology. Therefore, the fees paid for the same could not be covered under Article 13(4) of India-UK DTAA.

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Varian India (P.) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2013] 33 taxmann.com 249 (Mumbai-Trib) A.Ys.: 2002-03 to 2006-07, Dated: 27-02-2013

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Article 5 and 7 of India-USA DTAA, India-Australia DTAA and India-Italy DTAA

Since no condition under Article 5(4) dealing with dependent agent was fulfilled, the PE was not constituted—in absence of PE, ‘force of attraction rule’ did not apply.

Facts:
The taxpayer was the Indian branch of an American company VIPL, which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of Varian USA. Varian USA was engaged in manufacturing and marketing of various kinds of instruments. Varian group had five group entities in USA, Australia, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The taxpayer had entered into Distribution and Representation agreements with Varian group companies in respect of India. The taxpayer carried out pre-sale activities such as liaisoning and post-sale support activities and received commission for the same. The taxpayer did not have any authority to negotiate or conclude contracts on behalf of the group companies. Further, all the risks like market risk, product liability risk, research and development risk, credit risk, price risk, inventory risk or foreign currency risk were born by the selling entity.

The issues before the Tribunal were as follows.

(i) Whether the Indian branch of the taxpayer constituted PE of the group companies?
(ii) If the taxpayer was considered to constitute the PE, whether ‘force of attraction rule’ could apply?

Held:
(i) Dependent agent PE

The taxpayer did not have any authority to negotiate or conclude contract on behalf of group companies. The group companies directly sold the products to the Indian customers and also undertook all the associated risks.

Under Article 5 (4) of India-USA DTAA, an agent constitutes a PE only if he fulfils one of the three conditions specified therein. On facts, the taxpayer did not fulfil any of the three conditions as it had no authority to conclude contract, nor did it act as delivery agent, nor as order-securing agent. Therefore, the test of dependent agent PE failed and the US affiliate triggered no taxation in India.

The corresponding conditions under India-Australia DTAA and India-Italy DTAA were also similar to Article 5(4) of India-USA DTAA and in those cases too, the PE did not kick in.

(ii) Applicability of ‘force of attraction rule’

For application of ‘force of attraction rule’: the foreign enterprise should have a PE in India for selling goods, and the goods sold by the foreign enterprise should be same or similar to those sold by the PE. As the foreign enterprise did not have a PE in India, question of applicability of ‘force of attraction rule’ did not arise.

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Wellinx Inc vs., ADIT [2013] 35 taxmann.com 420 (Hyderabad-Trib) A.Ys.: 2006-07, Dated: 28-06-2013 Article 7(3), India-USA DTAA

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Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial services. While the former are taxable, the latter are not taxable. Customer care and medical transcription services provided by BO to HO were commercial services and hence taxable in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in USA. It was engaged in the business of medical transcription and software development related to health care. The taxpayer established a Branch Office (“BO”) in India for providing certain services to Head Office (“HO”) in USA after obtaining approval of RBI. BO received payments from HO for these services.

According to taxpayer, as BO was providing services to HO, in terms of Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA, the resultant income was not chargeable to incometax. However, the AO concluded that the BO was engaged in software development and estimated its income on cost plus basis.

Held:
The taxpayer had a PE in India.

Article 7(3) has two parts. The first part relates to commercial and business activities carried on by a PE whereas second part relates to certain specified non-commercial services performed by PE for its HO. While the commercial and business services are taxable, if HO assigns some non-commercial activities to its BO, income from such activities would not be taxable in terms of Article 7(3) of India-USA DTAA.

In the present case, BO provided customer care and medical transcription services to the HO. These were commercial services outsourced by the HO. Hence, consideration for such services was taxable in India.

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T. Manikandan vs. Commercial Tax Officer, [2011] 46 VST 75 (Mad)

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Recovery of Sales Tax-Principle of First Charge– Priority of State over Property–Not Applicable to Assets Taken Over by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation–Before the Attachment of Property by The Commercial Tax Officer- Section 29 of The State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 and Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959

Facts
The petitioner purchased the immovable property in a public auction conducted by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation, which had taken possession of the said property u/s. 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 from the defaulter. The petitioner lodged the sale deed executed by the Corporation before the sub-registrar for registration. The sub-registrar refused to register the document on the ground that the property is attached by the Commercial Tax Officer to recover sales tax arrears of the defaulter dealer. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court against the refusal of registration of sale deed by the sub-registrar.

Held
It is trite that when the assets are secured assets and in case by invoking section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, the secured creditor takes possession of the property, the principle of first charge/priority of State over the property will not be applicable. Since possession of the property was already taken over by the Corporation by invoking section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, thereafter, there is no question of the attachment of it by the Commercial Tax Officer. Accordingly the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the sub-registrar to register the sale deed disregarding the order of attachment made by the Commercial Tax Officer.

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2013 (31) STR 47 (Tri- Bangalore) Sharavathy Conductors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCEx, Bangalore –I.

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No interest is payable on reversal of CENVAT credit availed but not utilised. Judgment of Supreme Court in Ind-Swift Laboratories distinguished.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer, had two units in Bangalore. The credit on input services received by both the units was shown in CENVAT account maintained in UNIT-I. On account of an audit objection, the Appellant reversed the said availment of credit. An SCN was issued demanding interest and proposing penalty on the said reversal. The Original Authority dropped the demands, the order was reviewed and the Commissioner (Appeals) in addition to interest and penalty also disallowed the CENVAT and appropriated the same on which equal penalty was also levied.

The Appellant contended that no issue other than one pertaining to interest on reversal could be examined by the lower appellate authority and further relying on the decision of the Hon. Karnataka High Court in CCE, Bang. vs. Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. 2012 (28) 214 (Kar) stated that no interest ought to have been levied since no amount was utilised for payment of duty.

The revenue relying on the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ind-Swift Laboratories contended that the term taken ‘or’ utilised cannot be construed to mean ‘and’, and thus interest was liable to be paid.

Held:
The Tribunal while relying on the decision of Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (supra) allowed the appeal and observed that duty to pay interest for delayed payment would not arise unless the credit of duty entered into the account books is duly taken to discharge the duty payable. The said credit was not actually utilised for payment of duty as the Appellant only availed the credit and not utilised.

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Whether ‘F’ Forms are Required on Monthly Basis?

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Introduction
When there is inter-state branch transfer or interstate consignment transfer, the transferor branch has to obtain ‘F’ form, under CST Act, 1956, from the transferee branch. The procedural requirements about ‘F’ forms are mentioned in rule 12(5) of CST (Registration & Turnover Rules), 1957. The said rule is reproduced below for ready reference: “

Rule 12. (5) The declaration referred to in s/s. (1) of section 6-A shall be in Form ‘F’:

Provided that a single declaration may cover transfer of goods by a dealer, to any other place of his business or to his agent or principal, as the case may be, effected during a period of one calendar month;

Provided further that if the space provided in Form ‘F’ is not sufficient for making the entries, the particulars specified in Form ‘F’ may be given in separate annexures attached to that form so long as it is indicated in the form that the annexures form part thereof and every such annexure is also signed by the person signing the declaration in Form ‘F’;

Provided also that Form ‘F’ in force before the commencement of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1973, may continue to be used upto 31st day of December, 1980 with suitable modifications.”

Controversy
As can be seen from the above rule, one single ‘F’ form can cover transfers effected during one calendar month. In other words, if there are transactions of more than one month in one ‘F’ form than the said ‘F’ form may not be effective for transactions exceeding the month.

In most of the judgments, given by Hon’ble Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, the above position is accepted. Reference can be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Tribunal in case of Akay Cosmetics Pvt. Ltd. (A.No.33 of 2008 & SA No.255 of 2009, SA No.610 of 2009 dt. 3.5.2010). In this case, Hon’ble Tribunal has held that if the ‘F’ form is for transactions exceeding one month then it should be allowed only for one month. It is also observed that the dealer can take benefit of month for which there is highest amount. However, it cannot be effective for transactions exceeding one particular month.

In this respect, generally reference is made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of India Agencies (Regd.) v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore (139 STC 329)(SC). In this case the issue was about admissibility of ‘C’ form. The Supreme Court has observed that the ‘C’ form should be submitted as per rules. Taking note of this judgment, it is generally interpreted that the declaration forms should be as per rules.

Recent judgment of Calcutta High Court
Recently, the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court had an occasion to deal with the said situation. The ‘F’ form was covering transactions for more than one month and hence, it was disallowed. The assessee, i.e. Cipla Ltd., filed a Writ Petition in the Hon’ble High Court. The Calcutta High Court has delivered judgment in case of Cipla Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Corporate Division & Others which is reported in (61 VST 445)(Cal). In this judgment, Hon’ble High Court has held as under:

“The order has apparently been passed ex parte. Three F forms have been disallowed on the purported ground that the three F forms bearing nos. 37514, 37518 and 37521 covered transactions exceeding a period of one month. It appears that the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, West Bengal has misconstrued rule 12(5) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules,1957 which provides that the declaration referred to in s/s. (1) of section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 shall be in Form F. The proviso to rule 12(5) provides that a single declaration might cover transfer of goods, by a dealer, to any other place of business, or agent, or principal, as the case may be, effected during a period of one calendar month. There is nothing in the rules which can be constructed to vitiate a declaration form only on the ground that it covers transactions exceeding a period of over a month. The assessment has apparently been revised suo motu and ex parte on a misconception of rule 12(5) of the Rules. The impugned order is, thus, set aside and quashed.”

In light of the above, it can safely be inferred that even if the ‘F’ form is for transactions exceeding one month, it still will be valid for all the transactions. In this case, the judgment of Supreme Court in India Agencies is not cited or considered. However, since the High Court judgment is in relation to specific rule 12(5), it will be applicable, so far as ‘F’ forms are concerned.

Situation in other states
An issue can arise, as to whether the above judgment will be effective in other States also. In this respect, reference can be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of Maniklal Chunnilal & Sons Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (24 ITR 375), wherein it is held that the judgment of any High Court under Central Act is binding in other States also except in a case where contrary judgment of the jurisdictional High Court of the respective state is available. The relevant portion of judgment is as under:

“A Special Bench of the Madras High Court has taken the view favourable to the Commissioner and contrary to the view suggested by Mr. Palkhiwala and in conformity with the uniform policy which we have laid down in income-tax matters, whatever our own view may be, we must accept the view taken by another High Court on the interpretation of the section of a statute which is an all-India statute.”

In light of the above, the judgment of the Calcutta High Court will be binding on other States also. It will be binding on Maharashtra also as there is no contrary judgment of the Hon‘ble Bombay High Court on the above issue.

Conclusion
It is a practical experience that getting declaration forms from the department is very difficult, more particularly, when substantial time has elapsed. It is also time consuming. Under the above circumstances, disallowance of claims on technical grounds cannot be justified. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court as such is very positive and practical and will give the much required relief to the dealers.

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB: Computation: A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-00, 2003-04 and 2004-05: Assessee printing and publishing magazines: Four units: One unit doing job work of printing for publishing unit: Expenses attributable to publishing unit not to be allocated to printing unit for computation of the amount deductible u/s. 80-IA/80-IB:

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CIT vs. Delhi Press Patra Prakashan Ltd. (No. 1); 355 ITR 1 (Del):

The assessee was engaged in the business of printing and publishing magazines. It had four units. One unit was doing the job work of printing for the publishing unit. The assessee had maintained separate accounts in respect of which deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB was claimed. Relying on sections 80-IA(8), (9) and (10), the Assessing Officer held that profits of the printing unit are required to be recomputed by allocating to the printing unit the expenses relating to the cost of paper and other expenses of the publishing unit inasmuch as section 80-IA(7) requires that the profits from the eligible business must be computed as if the eligible business was the only source of income for the assessee. Accordingly, he recomputed the profits of the printing unit and the amount deductible u/s. 80-IA/80-IB. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no material to support the view that the job work charges charged by the printing units from the publishing unit were not at market rates. In the absence of any defect or manipulation found by the Assessing Officer in the books maintained for the printing unit and in the absence of any material to indicate that the amounts charged by the printing unit from the publishing unit was not at comparable market rates, it would not be open for the Revenue to disregard the profits of the printing unit as disclosed by the assessee only on the basis that the profits were significantly higher than the profits earned by the assessee from other undertakings.

ii) The printing unit carried on job work of printing only and the expenses attributable to the publishing unit which relate to the publishing business could not be allocated to the printing unit. Only those expenses which related to the printing work carried on by the assessee in the printing unit were liable to be deducted from the job charges to arrive at the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB, as the case may be.”

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Income: Accrual: Retention money: Sections 4 and 5: A. Y. 2003-04: Amount retained to ensure satisfactory performance of contract does not accrue: Not income of that year:

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DIT vs. Ballast Nedam International; 355 ITR 300 (Guj):

The assessee executed contracts. In terms of the contracts, the amounts at the rate of 10% on the onshore activities, and at the rate of 15% on the construction and erection activities, were withheld by the principal towards retention money. For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed that the retention money of Rs. 14.31 crore did not accrue and accordingly cannot be assessed as income. However, the Assessing Officer held that the amount is the accrued income and made addition. The Commissioner and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Unless and until a debt is created in favour of the assessee, which is due by somebody, it cannot be said that the assessee has acquired a right to receive the income or that the income has accrued to him.
ii) The amount retained had not accrued to the assessee in the accounting year relevant to the A.Y. 2003-04.”

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Depreciation: Actual cost: Subsidy: Section 43(1), Expln. 10: A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03: Assessee a Government Company took over the telecommunication business from Government Department: Assets transferred at book value: Consideration in form of shares, debts and reserves: Reserve not a subsidy, grant or reimbursement for meeting cost of assets transferred: Reserves not to be reduced from fixed assets to arrive at actual cost: Reopening of the assessment for reducing the actual cost by reserve<

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BSNL vs. Dy. CIT; 355 ITR 188 (Del):

The assessee company was incorporated to provide the telecommunication services which were being provided earlier by the Department of Telecommunications of the Government of India. The assets were transferred at book value. Consideration was paid in the form of shares, debts and reserves. The Assessing Officer found that the consideration included reserves. He held that the cost of assets was being met by the reserves and therefore held that the reserve is required to be reduced from the cost of the assets in terms of Explanation 10 to section 43(1). He therefore reopened the assessments for the A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 and recomputed the depreciation by reducing the reserve from the cost of assets.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee, the Delhi High Court accepted the assessee’s claim and held as under:

“i) There was no basis for the Assessing Officer’s assumption that whereas value of share capital issued to the Government as part consideration for transfer of business to the assessee was limited only to the face value of the shares, reserves represented a subsidy, grant or reimbursement for meeting the cost of assets transferred.
ii) Free reserves and surpluses of a company could not be considered anything but part of shareholders’ funds. The book value of equity share consists of not only the paid up capital but also the reserves and surpluses of the company. The scheme of hiving off the business of telecommunication services by the Government of India to a corporate entity entailed incorporation of a wholly owned Government company (i.e., the assessee) and the transfer of the business as a going concern along with all its assets and liabilities to the company. Reserves was an integral part of the shareholders funds.
iii) The Government of India had transferred the assets to the assessee company at their book value and the book value of the Government of India’s holding on the assessee company as shareholder and a creditor aggregated the book value of the assets transferred. The configuration of the capital structure of the assessee had no impact on the value of the Government’s holding in the assessee as reserve(s) of a company are subsumed in the book value of its capital.
iv) There is no plausible reason to assume that the value of shareholders’ holding in a company is limited to the face value of the issued and paid up share capital and the reserves represent subsidy or a grant or reimbursement by the shareholders from which directly or indirectly the cost of the assets in the hands of the company are met.

v) We are thus of the view that the reasons as furnished by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessments could not possibly give rise to any belief that income of the petitioner had escaped assessment and the proceedings initiated on the basis of such reasons are liable to be quashed.”

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Charitable institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iv): Sections 2(15) and 10(23C)(iv): A.Ys. 2006- 07 to 2011-12: Charitable purpose: Applicability of proviso to section 2(15): Assessee’s activities fall in section 2(15) as existed prior to 01-04-2009 under the category of advancement of any other object of general public utility: Activity of assessee in conducting coaching classes is integral to its activity of conducting course in accountancy: Cannot be equated with private coaching classes:

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Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv): ICAI Vs. DGIT; 260 CTR 1 (Del):

The petitioner Institute was constituted under the Institute of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, with the object to regulate the profession of Chartered Accountants in India and to ensure that the standards of professional knowledge and skill are met and maintained. Up to the

A.Y. 2005-06, the petitioner was granted approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv). Subsequent applications for approval were rejected on the ground that the Petitioner was holding coaching classes for preparing students for the examinations conducted by the Petitioner and was charging fees for the same.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the said denial and held as under:

“i) Assessee’s activities fall within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ in section 2(15) as it existed prior to 01-04-2009, under the category of ‘advancement of any object of general public utility’.
ii) The activity of the assessee in conducting coaching classes is integral to its activity of conducting the course in accountancy and the same cannot be equated with private coaching classes being conducted by organisations on commercial basis for preparing students to take entrance or other examinations in various professional courses.
iii) The reasoning of the DGIT that conducting interviews for a fee for the purposes of placement of its students by the assessee amounts to carrying on of a business is not sustainable. Campus interview is only a small incidental activity carried on by the assessee Institute like Universities for the placement of their students in gainful employment. This too is an activity ancillary to the educational programme being conducted by the assessee and cannot be considered as a business.
iv) The reasoning of the DGIT that since the assessee institute charges a uniform fee from all students it cannot be said to be carrying on a charitable activity is also erroneous. It is well settled that eleemosynary is not an essential element of ‘charitable purpose’ as defined under the Act. If the object or purpose of an institution is charitable, the fact that it collects certain charges does not alter the character of the institution.
v) Expression “trade”, “commerce” and “business” as occurring in the first proviso to section 2(15) must be read in the context of the intent and purport of section 2(15) and cannot be interpreted to mean any activity which is carried on in an organised manner. Purport of the first proviso is not to exclude entities which are essentially for charitable purpose but are conducting some activities for a consideration or a fee. Thus, where the dominant object of an organisation is of charitable nature, any incidental activity for furtherance of the object would not fall within the expression “business”, “trade” or “commerce”.
vi) Impugned orders passed by the DGIT refusing to grant exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) are set aside and he is directed to recognise the assessee as eligible for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) as an institution established for charitable purposes.”

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Business expenditure: Payment to related person: Disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(b): A.Y. 1995-96: Payment to subsidiary company: Section 40A(2)(b) not applicable:

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CIT vs. Raman Boards Ltd.: 355 ITR 305 (Kar):

The assessee, a manufacturer of insulation paper boards, entered into an agreement with its subsidiary company for manufacture of footwear soles. Under the agreement, the assessee was to pay to the subsidiary management fees of Rs. 4 lakh per month. In the A. Y. 1995-96, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 48 lakh so paid to the subsidiary. The Assessing Officer allowed 50% of the claim and disallowed Rs. 24 lakh u/s. 40A(2)(b). The Tribunal held that the genuineness of the agreement and the services rendered by the subsidiary company were not doubted and there being no finding that the payment made by the assessee was excessive u/s. 40A(2)(b) the Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) To attract the provisions of section 40A(2), the assessee has to incur an expenditure by making payment to the person referred to in clause (b). The assessee was a company. The person to whom it had to make the payment in order to attract the provision was any director of the company or any relative of director.

ii) Admittedly, the payment was made to the subsidiary company and not to any director or any relative of director. Therefore, the requirement of section 40A(2)(b) was not fulfilled. The Tribunal was justified in directing the deletion of the disallowance.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: A. Y. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Investment in subsidiaries: In respect of part of investment dividends were taxable: In respect of balance, assessee had sufficient interest free funds: No disallowance could be made u/s. 14A:

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CIT vs. Suzlon Energy Ltd: 354 ITR 630 (Guj):

The assessee had made investments in subsidiaries. The Assessing Officer made disallowance of interest expenditure and administrative expenditure u/s. 14A in respect of such investment. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance. The Tribunal found that in respect of part of investment, dividends were taxable and in respect of the balance the assessee had sufficient interest free funds of its own. The Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeal).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was right in law and on facts in deleting disallowance u/s. 14A in respect of interest expenses incurred for investment in subsidiaries and administrative expenses such as staff salary of corporate office, audit fees, building rent and communication expenses.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) : Deduction of tax at a lesser rate due to difference of opinion: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not justified:

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CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal; 260 CTR 73 (Cal):

The assessee deducted tax @ 1% u/s. 194C(2) from the payments made to sub-contractors. The Assessing Officer held that the payments are in the nature of machinery hire charges falling under the head ‘Rent’ and the provisions of section 194-I are applicable as per which tax was deductible @ 10%. The assessing Officer, therefore, disallowed the payment proportionately by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). The Tribunal deleted the disallowance holding that no disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), if there is any shortfall in deduction of tax at source due to any difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payment falling under various TDS provisions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“We find no substantial question of law involved in this case and therefore, we refuse to admit the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.”

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Alleppy Company Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, [2011] 46 VST 24 (Ker)

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Sale in Course of Export-Purchase of Tags and Labels-Exporting After Attaching to Products Manufactured-Deemed Export-Exempt From Payment of Purchase Tax-Section 5(3) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

Facts
As per the requirement of foreign buyers and in terms of the export orders, the company purchased tags and labels from printing presses and attached to each and every coir product exported giving product description in terms of buyer’s norms. The assessing authorities held that the purchase of tags and labels by the company were consumed in manufacturing of coir products as such liable to purchase tax u/s. 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, which was confirmed by the Tribunal. The company filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against the levy of purchase tax by the assessing authorities.

Held
The High court, allowing the revision petition filed by the company, held that admittedly tags and labels were printed by the supplier printing press in terms of the company’s orders, which were in conformity with export orders. So much so, the commodity, even at the time of printing or manufacture, was earmarked for export, after purchase and they were attached to the products exported. Therefore the commodity purchased was for export by attachment to the coir products without any change and exempt from payment of purchase tax being deemed export u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act.

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Block assessment: Limitation: Special audit: Sections 142(2A) and 158BC: Direction for special audit without giving opportunity to assessee: Direction given to extend period of limitation: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Subboji Rao C. H.; 355 ITR 320 (Kar):

Pursuant to a search, block assessment proceedings were initiated by issuing a notice u/s. 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 15-05-1998. The assessee computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 24,18,360 and the Assessing Officer computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 70,00,246. The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the addition. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the assessment was barred by limitation since the direction for special audit u/s. 142(2A) was not valid. The Tribunal held that there was no complexity in the accounts requiring an audit u/s. 142(2A). It further held that invoking the provisions u/s. 142(2A) was bad in law and the assessment was barred by limitation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee was not heard before the order passed u/s. 142(2A). Such a procedure was resorted to extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the assessment order was void as being barred by limitation.”

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Assessment giving effect to the order of revision: Scope: Sections 143(3) and 263: A. Y. 2006-07: Assessee carrying on two businesses; i) Mentha business and ii) Cattle feed and green vegetable business: Separate accounts maintained: Assessment set aside u/s. 263 by finding errors in cattle feed and green vegetable business: Pursuant assessment is restricted to Cattle feed and green vegetable business: Queries concerning mentha business are beyond the scope and power:

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Smt. Shobha Govil vs. Add. CIT: 354 ITR 668 (All):

The assessee was carrying on two businesses; i) Mentha business and ii) Cattle feed and green vegetable business. Separate accounts were maintained for the two businesses. The accounts of mentha business were audited. For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3). The Commissioner found mistakes as regards the cattle feed and green vegetable business and accordingly, exercising the powers u/s. 263 set aside the assessment order and restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner had not found any mistake as regards the mentha business. After remand, the Assessing Officer served a questionnaire making inquiries with regard both the businesses. The assessee resisted the questionnaire on the ground that the remand order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 263 was confined to the determination of income of the cattle feed and green vegetable business and the income from mentha business has become final as it has not been interfered with u/s. 263 of the Act. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the said stand of the Assessing Officer and held as under:

“i) The entire discussion in the order u/s. 263 was confined to the question of determination of income and expenditure of the cattle feed and green vegetable business. The discussion, paragraph after paragraph, was with regard to the cattle feed and green vegetable business, viz. its sales, sale bills, absence of addresses of the purchasers of bhusa, truck expenses and freight outward expenses, salary of the staff, all related to the cattle feed and green vegetable business.

ii) There was nothing in the order of the Commissioner suggesting that the entire assessment order was being set aside. The Assessing Officer was not justified in coming to the conclusion that he was also required to pass a fresh assessment order for the mentha business.

iii) To this extent, the order cannot be allowed to stand and was liable to be set aside.”

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High Court—Matter remanded for de novo consideration as no reasons were given for dismissal of the writ petition.

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Parvez Nazir Hussein Jafri vs. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 235 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of the notice dated 26th July, 2010 issued u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment for the assessment year 2006-07 holding that there was no error in issuing notice u/s. 148 and noting that the income-tax return submitted by the Petitioner was processed u/s. 143(1) on 10th March, 2007.

On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for de novo consideration in accordance with law since the High Court had not given any reasons for not setting aside the reopening of the assessment.

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Co-operative Society—Deduction u/s. 80P(2) (a)(iii)—Matter remanded to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to determine whether the activity of obtaining sugar from the sugar cane constituted manufacture?

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Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 230 (SC)

The
assessee, a co-operative sugar mill, bought sugarcane grown by its
members. It undertook a particular operation whose outcome was a final
product in the form of sugar. The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the final product (sugar) would make the assessee entitled to
claim to benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(iii) in respect of marketing of
the agricultural produce grown by its members?

According to the
Supreme Court, the crucial issue was, whether at the time of marketing
of sugar, the same could be said to have retained the character of
agricultural produce (sugarcane) grown by members of the society or did
it represent an independent commercial commodity which no longer had the
character of agricultural produce? In short, the controversy was,
whether the operation undertaken by the assessee constituted
“manufacture”?

According to the assessee, the process undertaken
was not a “manufacture”. Broadly, according to the assessee, sugar
(also called “sucrose”) is synthesised by the sugarcane plant from water
and atmospheric carbon dioxide by the method of photosynthesis.
Sugarcane, according to the assessee, is produced in the agriculture
fields. In the sugar factory, after juice is extracted from the
sugarcane, it is boiled. Microscopic crystals coalesce together to form
macroscopic crystals and molasses.

This, according to the
assessee, did not constitute “manufacture”. In this connection, reliance
was placed by the assessee on the opinion given by the technical
advisor at the request of the National Federation of Co-operative Sugar
Factories Ltd.

According to the Department, the above operation/
activity constituted “manufacture”. In this connection, the Department
placed reliance on paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of CIT vs .
Oracle Software India Limited reported in (2010) 320 ITR 546 (SC), where
it was observed as follows (page 551):

“The term ‘manufacture’
implies a change, but every change is not a manufacture, despite the
fact that every change in an article is the result of a treatment of
labour and manipulation. However, this test of manufacture needs to be
seen in the context of the above process. If an operation/process
renders a commodity or article fit for use for which it is otherwise not
fit, the operation/process falls within the meaning of the word
‘manufacture’.”

According to the Supreme Court, the above test
had to be applied and adjudicated on a case-tocase basis. It depended on
the type of product which ultimately emerged from a given operation. In
its view, this aspect had not been examined by the courts below.

For
the above reasons, the Supreme Court remitted the case back to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to re-examine the matter, directing
that (i) Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would give an opportunity
to the assessee to put forth the opinion of an independent expert who
shall not be from the society or federation; (ii) A copy of the written
opinion shall be given to the Department; (iii) The Department would be
free to engage its own expert who, in turn, will give his opinion; (iv)
The parties be given liberty to cross-examine the experts. The
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would thereafter decide the case
and ascertain whether the operation undertaken by the assessee is or is
not “manufacture”. The Supreme Court disposed of the civil appeals
accordingly.

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Ordinance Empowers SEBI Even More – and Brings Some Ambiguities

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An Ordinance was issued on 18th July, 2013 amending
securities laws such as the SEBI Act, etc. Some provisions have
immediate effect while certain others have retrospective effect from
different dates. Some amendments are technical and meant to clear
certain doubts/concerns or strengthen the validity of certain
provisions. A couple of others are a little serious. One grants special
powers of search and seizure to SEBI. Another gives wider powers to
gather information. Yet another provision grants powers to SEBI to
arrest and jail people for strange reasons—if he does not pay penalty,
does not refund monies, or a mere nonpayment of fees, etc. Others like
special courts are meant to expedite prosecution of offenders.

The
important amendments can be briefly described as follows. The Consent
Order process, which presently operates through Guidelines, has now been
given specific legislative sanction. Special Courts are now authorised
to be set up for speedy prosecution of offences. Powers to search and
seize without need for sanction by Magistrate are given to SEBI. Powers
to recover monies from defaulting parties are also given. Disgorgement
of proceeds of unlawful transactions/activities also now has legislative
sanction. The scope of provisions relating to collective investment
schemes (CIS) has been expanded and certain large Schemes are treated as
CIS by a deeming fiction. SEBI also can now collect information from
practically anybody and not from a limited set of persons as was the
position earlier.

Similar amendments are made in regard to some
of these aspects to other securities laws—the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Depositories Act, 1999.

Some important amendments are discussed in a little more detail.

Collective Investment Schemes
SEBI—as
early as 1999—made fairly stringent Regulations for registration and
regulation of Collective Investment Schemes (“CISs”). It may be
recollected that CISs are schemes that pool monies from the public and
invest in certain businesses. The profits, after expenses, of such
businesses are intended to be divided amongst the investors. Often,
specific assets are earmarked to individual investors so the returns
from such assets are identifiable. The best example of this is mutual
funds, which are of course specifically excluded from the definition of
CIS but are still a good example to understand the concept.

However,
in practice, numerous schemes were introduced for fancy businesses
(teak plantations, goat raising, etc.). Some of them gave false promises
of high returns. Some were simply loans raised but disguised as CISs to
avoid various restrictions of other laws on raising of monies from the
public. Many of these schemes were found, usually too late, to be
outright Ponzi schemes where, on one hand the funds were used to pay
hefty commissions to motivate agents to collect monies and on the other,
the rest of the monies were used to repay interest and principal on
earlier loans. By the time the scam was discovered, most of the recent
investors could recover nothing.

The amendments and Regulations
of 1999 did help in closure of many leading schemes. However, recent
scams, particularly in West Bengal, showed that they had merely
re-invented themselves and, strangely, they were operating fairly
openly. One wonders whether this is not clearly a failure of the
regulator. SEBI did pass some quick orders in such cases recently but it
appears that it was too late.

Nevertheless, this Ordinance
makes certain amendments strengthening the powers of SEBI. The
definition of CISs has been enlarged to include by deeming fiction
certain large-sized schemes. Any scheme/arrangement of pooling of funds
having a corpus of Rs. 100 crore or more is now deemed to be a CIS.
Thus, it will need prior registration and compliance with several
formalities.

However, schemes which are specifically excluded
from the list will remain excluded from this deeming provision also.
Thus, public deposits raised by companies under corresponding
Rules/Directions, funds raised by mutual funds, insurance companies,
etc. will not be treated as CISs.

This deeming fiction, however, appears
to be unduly wide. The requirements for a scheme to become such a CIS
are simple and minimal (i) it has to be a scheme/arrangement (ii) it
should involve “pooling” of funds (iii) the total “corpus” should be Rs.
100 crore or more.

Would it cover investment in capital of private
limited companies? What about Inter-corporate deposits (or even bank
borrowings)? These and several other types of pooling of funds appear
prima facie to be covered by the new definition.

A question had arisen
whether the restrictions of registration, etc. on CISs were applicable
only if the CIS was set up by a company or whether it was applicable if
set up by other persons too. In Osian Art Fund’s case, for example, this
contention was raised and SEBI held that it also applied to entities
other than companies. However, to put this issue beyond doubt, the word
“company” has now been replaced by the word “person” in the Act. This
now makes it clear that the requirement of registration shall also apply
to other entities. The amendment, however, is not retrospective.

Consent Orders
The Guidelines relating to consent orders issued in 2007
enabled numerous cases to be settled without lengthy penal proceedings.
Persons accused of violations of provisions of securities laws, or even
persons who anticipated such allegations, could approach SEBI for
settlement. By payment of a settlement amount and sometimes accepting
certain non-monetary restrictions like debarment, etc. the proceedings
could expeditiously come to an end. Further, the proceedings would end
without admission or denial of guilt by such person.

While the
settlement mechanism was fairly speedy and independent, it attracted
criticism too, part of which was met by recent issuance of the revised
Guidelines. However, serious concerns were expressed over the legal
basis of the consent order guidelines. A PIL was also filed before the
Delhi High Court. If the Guidelines were set aside by the Court as being
without legal basis, hundreds of consent orders passed till now would
have got overturned. A new provision now gives retrospective validity to
the consent order process permitting SEBI to pass such consent orders.
This amendment is effective from April 2007, when the original consent
order Guidelines were issued.

Strangely, the amended provisions
specifically provide that the consent orders shall be in accordance with
Regulations
made in this regard. However, no Regulations have been
issued till date and the existing settlement scheme is in the form of
Guidelines
. This puts a question mark over all consent orders passed
till date under Consent Order Guidelines. A question arises whether any
Consent Order can be passed till Regulations on Consent Orders are
issued.

It is also provided that consent orders cannot be appealed against. The amendment, being retrospective, will thus invalidate existing appeals or future appeals against any consent order. This may make sense because consent orders are by definition by mutual consent. However, at times, SEBI may reject an application for consent. Discretion remains with SEBI whether or not to accept an application for consent. The Guidelines state that certain types of violations cannot be settled. However, in other cases too, there is discretion with SEBI. Question is whether such discretion is exercised judicially and whether it can be challenged. The new provision, however, provides that no appeal shall lie against the order passed.

The party concerned of course does not lose the right of proceeding with the adjudication or other proceedings in the normal course.

Powers of search and seizure

Till now, SEBI could initiate search and seizure under persons being investigated by making an application to a Magistrate who had jurisdiction over the persons. Certain reporting was also required to be made to the Magistrate. This requirement to apply to and obtain order from the Magistrate has now been dropped. The SEBI Chairman can now issue directions for search and seizure against persons being investigated. The powers of search and seizure have also been made more elaborate.

Powers to collect records from other entities (including telephone records)

Till now, SEBI had powers to seek information from banks or other authorities, etc. for information relating to transactions under investigation. Now the powers have been widened to include “any person”.

Disgorgement of funds

Persons may engage in transactions in contravention with the Act/Regulations and thus make gains or avoid losses. For example, a person may engage in insider trading and make profits or avoid losses. There have been concerns raised whether SEBI has adequate powers to order disgorgement of such gains/losses and direct its use, say, for credit to the Investor Protection Fund.

An explanation now introduced declares that SEBI always had powers to direct disgorgement of profits/losses from persons who have made such profits or avoided losses in contravention of the Act/ Regulations. Further, the amount disgorged shall be credited to the Investor Protection Fund.

It must be noted that disgorgement is in addition to the penalty that can be levied.

Action in case of default in payment of refund, penalty, fees, etc.

In case a person delays or defaults in payment of various types of amounts as he has been ordered or is otherwise required to pay by way of penalty, disgorgement or refund the monies raised or even dues on account of fees payable to SEBI, specific powers to recover such amounts, by attachment and sale of properties have been given.

However, there is a strange power given to SEBI. The person concerned can be arrested and imprisoned for making such defaults. Since power to attach and sell properties is given, the power to arrest and detain seems a little drastic, particularly when they cover even regular dues like fees payable to SEBI.

Conclusion

Powers of search and seizure and arrest and detention are a little scary, particularly considering how widely they are worded. However, it appears strange that instead of examining how powers given in 1999 to regulate/restrict CISs have worked, more powers in broader provisions have been given to SEBI. Based on past experience, persons are scared that the amended provisions will be arbitrarily used especially when governance (implementation and enforcement) is an issue.

PART A: High Court Decisions

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[In the H.C. of Uttarakhand: writ petition No.1814 of 2006 decided on 23-04-2013: Uttaranchal Public Services Commission vs. Chief Information Commissioner & Ors: Citation: RTI III (2013)82]

  •  Section 8(1)(d) & (j) of the RTI Act :

Information sought:

i) To provide the criteria applied in the selection procedure of the candidates to the post of Lecturer-Biology in Inter College.

ii) How many candidates appeared in the written examination for the post of lecturer Biology in Intermediate College and how many candidates were selected and how many candidates have appeared for interview before the Interview Board?

iii) To provide the details of the marks obtained by the selected candidates in the written test along with their marks in the interview and the details of their experience, educational qualification etc. with their preference/marks obtained by them.

iv) To give the details of the marks obtained by Mohd. Asif Tyagi (129639) in written test interview, educational qualification and experience etc. for the post of Lecturer-Biology.

PIO gave information on (i) & (ii) above. As regards information under (iii) & (iv), same were rejected on the ground that the said information cannot be provided in view of the provisions of section 8(1)(d) & 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. FAA dismissed the appeal. Hence, Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (UPSC) filed a writ petition before High Court of Uttarakhand.

The Court stated:
So far as the information on point no.3 is concerned, it is stated in para-10 of the writ petition that the respondent no.2 (Shri Jakir) has sought information with respect to one candidate Mohd. Asif Tyagi under the RTI Act. It is further stated in the writ petition that respondent no. 2 was neither the candidate in the screening examination nor in the interview. Further, as per provisions of section 8(1)(j) of the Act, the information sought by the respondent no.2 with respect to Mohd. Asif Tyagi, comes under the definition of third party as per the provisions of RTI Act and the provisions of sections 8(1)(d) clearly provides that the disclosure of such information would harm the competitive position of third party and the same has been exempted from disclosure under RTI Act.

The Court held:
By a perusal of the information sought by respondent no.2, it reveals that the information sought is of a general nature and the marks obtained in a competitive examination cannot be held to be an intellectual property of an individual. The petitioner cannot deny the information as to how many marks have been obtained by Asif Tyagi and the other selected candidates and their educational qualification and experience. In my opinion, this information is not covered u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act and the learned Chief Information Commissioner has rightly directed the petitioner to give information on point nos.3 and 4.

For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.

[Decision of High Court of Madras in the Registrar general, High Court of Madras, Chennai vs. K.Elango & Anr: W.P.No.20485 of 2012 And M.P.No.1 of 2012 decided on 17-04-2013 Citation: RTIR III (2013) 103 (Madras)]

• In this case The Tamil Nadu Information Commission passed an order by not accepting the argument “unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals” and allowed the appeal by directing the Registrar General, High Court of Madras to furnish the details sought for by K. Elango.

To start with the High Court of Madras noted:

It is to be borne in mind that under the Right to Information Act, 2005 an authority has a rudimentary function to perform either to furnish the information or deny the information. As a matter of fact, there is no specific Article in the Constitution of India which provides for the citizens right to know. However, Article 19(1)(a) provides for freedom of thought and expression which indirectly includes right to obtain information. Further, Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty to citizens. Undoubtedly, Right to Life is incomplete if basic human right viz., ‘Right to Know’ is not included within its umbrage.

K. Elango had sought from PIO of the High Court, Madras following information:

1. How may Subordinate Judges are there in service in the state of Tamil Nadu? The district-wise list may be furnished to me as per the hierarchy.

2. How many employees are serving in the judicial department in the whole of Tamil Nadu (including the Government servants on deputation)?

3. How many judicial officers, police officers and staffs are working in the Vigilance Department of the registry of Madras High Court?

4. Does your vigilance department have any branches in the district so as to receive the complaint from the general public against the judicial officer and court staffs?

5. Does your registry have any tie-up or coordination with the office of Vigilance and Anticorruption, Rajaannamalai Puram, Chennai 28 to trap the judicial officers or court staffs on the basis of the complaints from the affected persons?

6. Does your registry have a special team for trapping the corrupt judicial officers and court staffs?

7. Between 2001 to 2010, how many complaints have been received by your Registry and Vigilance Department, kindly give complaint-wise break-up figure (that is how many complaints against DJ, ADDLJ, SJ, DMC, FTC Judges, Magistrates and Court staffs)?

8. How many complaints ended in dismissal, suspension, issuance of memo and dropping of the case and conviction between the said 2001 to 2010?

9. Between 2001 to 2010 how many complaints against High Court staffs have been received relating to bribe and the fate of those complaints?

Both the sides in this case made elaborate submission and also cited number of courts’ decisions. The Court also cited number of courts’ decisions and further stated:

• In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta and others vs. President of India and others, [AIR 1982 Supreme Court 149], it is held that ‘the Right to know has been given a constitutional status by treating it as a part of speech and expression and thereby bringing this right within Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.’
• It will be quite in the fitness of things to recall the Golden words of Thomas Jefferson, who rightly said that ‘Information is the Currency of Democracy’.
• In the words of Amartya Sen, ‘the Right to Information Act, 2005 is a momentous engagement with the possibilities of freedom.’ [vide Lawz January 2008 at page 40 special page 41]
• Befittingly, we recall the observation of Lord Goff in the decision Attorney General vs. Guardian Newspapers Limited and others(No 2) 1990 1 A.P. at page 109 which runs as follows:

“Although the basis of Law’s protection of confidence is that there is a Law, nevertheless the public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure.”

• It is to be pointed out that the personal information and the information between persons in fiduciary relationship are exempted from disclosure under the Right to Information Act. Also, ‘Confidence’ may be outweighed by public interest in the matter of such disclosure.

The Court then concluded:

•    On a careful consideration of respective contentions and on going through the contents of the application dated 01-11-2010 filed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant this Court is of the considered view that the information sought for by him in Serial Nos. 1 to 9 pertaining to the internal delicate functioning/administration of the High Court besides the same relate to invasion of privacy of respective individuals if the information so asked for is furnished and more so, the information sought for has no relationship to any public activity or interest. Moreover, the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is not to a fuller extent open to public domain. It added further, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged, then, it will open the floodgates/Pandora’s Box compelling the Petitioner/High Court to supply the information sought for by the concerned Requisitionists as a matter of routine, without any rhyme or reason/restrictions as the case may be. Therefore, some self restrictions are to be imposed in regards to the supply of information in this regards. As a matter of fact, the Notings, Jottings, Administrative Letters, Intricate Internal Discussions, Deliberations etc. of the Petitioners/High Court cannot be brought u/s. 2(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, in considered opinion of this Court. Also that, if the information relating to Serial Nos.1 to 9 mentioned in the application of the 1st Respondent/Applicant dated 01-11-2010 is directed to be furnished or supplied with, then, certainly, it will impede and hinder the regular, smooth and proper functioning of the Institution viz. High Court (an independent authority under the Constitution of India, free from Executive or Legislature). As such, a Saner Counsel/Balancing Act is to be adopted in matters relating to the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, so that an adequate freedom and inbuilt safeguards can be provided to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court [competent authority and public authority as per section 2(e)(iii) and 2(h)(a) of the Act 22 of 2005] in exercising his discretionary powers either to supply the information or to deny the information, as prayed for by the Applicants/Requisitionists concerned.”

•    “Apart from the above, if the information requested by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, based on his letter dated 01-11- 2010, is supplied with, then, it will have an adverse impact on the regular and normal, serene functioning of the High Court’s Office on the impact on the Administrative side. Therefore, we come to an irresistible conclusion that the 1st Respondent/Applicant is not entitled to be supplied with the information/details sought for him, in his Application dated 01-11-2010 addressed to the Public Information Officer of the High Court, Madras under the provision of the Right to Information Act. Even on the ground of (i) maintaining confidentiality; (ii) based on the reason that the private or personal information is exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act,2005; and (iii) also u/s. 8(1)(e) of the Act in lieu of fiduciary relationship maintained by the High Court, the request of the 1st Respondent/Applicant, cannot be acceded to by this Court. Also, we opine that the 1st Respondent/Applicant’s requests, suffer from want of bona fides (notwithstanding the candid fact that Section 6 of the Right to Information Act does not either overtly or covertly refers to the ‘concept of Locus’)”

•    To put it differently, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged or furnished by the Office of the High Court (on administrative side), then, the secrecy and privacy of the internal working process may get jeopardised, besides the furnishing of said information would result in invasion of unwarranted and uncalled for privacy of individuals concerned. Even the disclosure of information pertaining to departmental enquiries in respect of Disciplinary Actions initiated against the Judicial Officers/Officials of the Subordinate Court or the High Court will affect the facile, smooth and independent running of the administration of the High Court, under the Constitution of India. Moreover, as per section 2(e) read with section 28 of the Right to Information Act, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of this Court is empowered to frame rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. In this regards, we point out that the ‘Madras High Court Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2007’ have been framed and as amended in regard to the Name and Designation of the Officers mentioned therein, the same has come into force from 18-11-2008.

•    In the upshot of quantitative and qualitative discussions mentioned supra, Information Commission, Chennai, to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice, this Court interferes with the order dated 10-01-2012 in Case No.10447/ Enquirt/A/11 passed by the 2nd Respondent/ Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai and sets aside the same, to secure the ends of Justice Resultantly, the Writ Petition is allowed. No. costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition Is closed.