The Bombay High Court was concerned with a petition where Landlords suit for eviction of tenant on the ground of unlawful subletting without consent was dismissed by the lower court and confirmed by the appellate court. According to the tenant, whilst retaining the possession of the suit premises he had merely entered into partnership for carrying on business through the suit premises and as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Helper Girdharbhai vs. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri & Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 538, such arrangement, does not amount to subletting. According to the Landlord, the partnership was merely a cloak to conceal the real transaction of subletting. It was held that that the clauses in the partnership deed that profit of partnership would be shared by sub-tenants only and tenant would receive fixed monthly amount irrespective of profit or loss in partnership business showed that partnership was not genuine and it was created to conceal real transaction of subletting. It was held that the tenant was liable to be evicted.
Month: May
Stamp Papers – Use of old stamp papers i.e., stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to proposed date of execution may certainly be a circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on authenticity of agreement but that cannot be clinching evidence to invalidate the agreement. [Indian Stamps Act,1899, Section 54].
Thiruvengadam Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and Anr (2008) 4 SCC 530.
In
this case, the Apex Court was concerned with the issue whether where
the stamp papers used in the agreement of sale were more than six months
old, they were not valid stamp papers and consequently, the agreement
prepared on such ‘expired’ papers was also not valid. This issue
required interpretation of section 54 of The Indian Stamps Act, 1899.
The
Apex Court held that The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 nowhere prescribes any
expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a
person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which
is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the
value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided
it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the
date on which it was so surrendered. The stipulation of the period of
six months prescribed in section 54 is only for the purpose of seeking
refund of the value of the unused stamp paper, and not for use of the
stamp paper. Section 54 does not require the person who has purchased a
stamp paper, to use it within six months. Therefore, there is no
impediment for a stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to the
proposed date of execution, being used for a document. Even assuming
that use of such stamp papers is an irregularity, the court can only
deem the document to be not properly stamped, but cannot, only on that
ground, hold the document to be invalid.
The fact that very old
stamp papers of different dates have been used, may certainly be a
circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on
the authenticity of the agreement. But that cannot be a clinching
evidence.
Precedent – Benefit of Judgements in rem affirmed by Supreme Court should enure to all similarly situated persons and it is impermissible for High Court to reopen such issues which are conclusively determined by previous judgements.
The U.P. State Cement Corporation Limited (for short, ‘the Corporation’) was wound up on 8th December, 1999. In the State of U.P. existed a set of rules, namely, the Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Retrenched Employees of Government or Public Corporations in Government Service Rules, 1991 (for short, ‘the 1991 Rules’).
After the Corporation was wound up, one Mr. Shailendra Kumar Pandey and some others, who were the employees of the Corporation, filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 36644 of 2003, seeking absorption under the aforesaid Rules. The learned Single Judge hearing the writ petition cogitated upon the U.P. Absorption of Retrenched Employees of the State Government/Public Sector Corporation in Government Service (Recession) Rules, 2003 (the 2003 Rules) and, eventually came to hold that the Absorption Rules, 1991 were applicable. This decision was confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the Apex Court.
When the matter stood thus, all the affected employees of the Corporation felt relieved, inasmuch as the controversy had travelled to the Apex Court and was put to rest. The impugned writ petitions which were preferred in the year 2001 were still pending before the High Court and the expectation of the Petitioners therein was that similar benefits shall enure to them, for the writ petitions instituted on later dates had been disposed.
The Learned single Judge allowed the Writ petitions. However, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on the ground that in Mr. Shailendra Kumar Pandey and other cases, the Recession Rules 2003 were not adverted to by the division benches.
In appeal before the Apex Court, allowing the appeal the Court held that there had already been interpretation of 2003 Rules by the learned Single Judge which had been affirmed up to this Court. In such a situation, we really fail to fathom how the Division Bench could have thought of entering into the analysis of the ratio of the earlier judgment and discussion on binding precedents when the controversy had really been put to rest by this Court. The decision rendered by this Court inter se parties was required to be followed in the same fact situation. When the factual matrix was absolutely luminescent and did not require any kind of surgical dissection, there was no necessity to take a different view.
HUF – Coparcener – Eldest daughter is entitled to be the Karta of the HUF – Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – All rights which were available to a Hindu male are now also available to a Hindu female. A daughter is now recognised as a co-parcener by birth in her own right and has the same rights in the co-parcenary property that are given to a son. [Hindu Succession Act 1956, Section 6]
The High Court had to consider whether the plaintiff, being the first born amongst the co-parceners of the HUF property, would by virtue of her birth, be entitled to be its Karta. HELD by the High Court upholding the claim:
(i) It is rather an odd proposition that while females would have equal rights of inheritance in an HUF property, this right could nonetheless be curtailed, when it comes to the management of the same. The clear language of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act does not stipulate any such restriction.
(ii) The impediment which prevented a female member of a HUF from becoming its Karta was that she did not possess the necessary qualification of co-parcenership. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is a socially beneficial legislation; it gives equal rights of inheritance to Hindu males and females. Its objective is to recognise the rights of female Hindus as co-parceners and to enhance their right to equality apropos succession. Therefore, Courts would be extremely vigilant apropos any endeavour to curtail or fetter the statutory guarantee of enhancement of their rights. Now that this disqualification has been removed by the 2005 Amendment, there is no reason why Hindu women should be denied the position of a Karta.
(Editor’s note: Readers are advised to refer to the feature Laws and Business by Anup Shah in various issues of BCAJ for a complete understanding of the subject).
HUF – Coparcenary – Rights of daughters in the coparcenary property governed by Mitakshara law are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. [Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6]
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with devolution of interest of Coparcenary property. With a view to confer right upon the female heirs, even in relation to the joint family property governed by Mitakshara law, the Parliament amended section 6 by enacting the Hindu Succession (Amendment Act), 2005 which came into effect from 9-9-2005. Phulavati, daughter of Late Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye (died on 18-2-1988) filed suit for partition in the Civil court somewhere in the year 1992. She amended her claim in the suit in terms of the Amendment Act of 2005.
The Karnataka High Court, on interpretation of section 6, held that the Amendment Act of 2005 would be applicable to pending proceedings. The matter travelled to the Apex Court.
The Apex Court held that the text of the amendment itself clearly provides that the right conferred on a ‘daughter of a coparcener’ is ‘on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005’. Accordingly, it was held that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20th December, 2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. An amendment of a substantive provision is always prospective, unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective. Even a social legislation cannot be given retrospective effect, unless so provided for or so intended by the legislature. Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.
Discounting of Retention money under Ind-AS
A consulting company provides
project management and design services to customers on very large
projects that take significant time to complete. The company raises
monthly bills for work done, which are promptly paid by the customers.
However, the customers retain 10% as retention money, which is released
one year after the contract is satisfactorily completed. The 10%
retention money is a normal feature in the industry, and is more akin to
providing a security to the customer rather than a financing
transaction. Under Ind-AS, is the consulting company required to discount retention monies?
Response
Technical Literature
1.
Under Ind AS 18 Revenue is measured at the fair value of consideration
received or receivable. Further, Ind AS 18 states as below:
“In
most cases, the consideration is in the form of cash or cash equivalents
and the amount of revenue is the amount of cash or cash equivalents
received or receivable. However, when the inflow of cash or cash
equivalents is deferred, the fair value of the consideration may be less
than the nominal amount of cash received or receivable. For example, an
entity may provide interest-free credit to the buyer or accept a note
receivable bearing a below-market interest rate from the buyer as
consideration for the sale of goods. When the arrangement effectively
constitutes a financing transaction, the fair value of the consideration
is determined by discounting all future receipts using an imputed rate
of interest…………….The difference between the fair value and the nominal
amount of the consideration is recognised as interest revenue in
accordance with Ind AS 109.”
2. Further IAS 18 provides an example with respect to instalment sales when consideration is receivable in instalments.
“Revenue
attributable to the sales price, exclusive of interest, is recognised
at the date of sale. The sale price is the present value of the
consideration, determined by discounting the instalments receivable at
the imputed rate of interest. The interest element is recognised as
revenue as it is earned, using the effective interest method.”
3.
Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers prohibits discounting
of retention monies when the retention monies do not reflect a financing
arrangement. For example, the retention money provides the customer
with protection from the supplier failing to adequately complete some or
all of its obligations under the contract. Further even in arrangements
where there is significant financing component, practical expediency
not to discount was allowed, provided the financing was for a period
less than one year. Ind AS 109 Financial Instruments was aligned to Ind
AS 115, and did not require any discounting if the trade receivables did
not contain a significant financing component or when the practical
expediency was available.
4. On withdrawal of Ind AS 115, the alignment paragraph in Ind AS 109 discussed above was also removed.
Possible Views
View 1: No discounting is required
The
arrangement does not entail instalment payments nor is a financing
transaction under Ind AS 18, and hence discounting of retention money is
not required. Though Ind AS 18 does not provide further elaboration on
what constitutes a financing arrangement, guidance is available in Ind
AS 115. Based on this guidance, retention money is on normal terms and
common to the industry and represents a source of protection with
respect to contract performance rather than a source of financing.
Though Ind AS 115 is withdrawn, the guidance on what constitutes a
financing transaction, in the absence of any guidance in Ind AS 18, is
useful and may be applied.
Though Ind AS 109 requires discounting of retention money, one may argue that Ind AS 18 should be allowed to trump Ind AS 109.
View 2: Discounting is required
The
requirement in Ind AS 18 to determine revenue at the fair value of
consideration received or receivable would necessitate the discounting
of retention money. The provisions in IFRS 13 Fair Value, and Ind AS 109
Financial Instruments would also require discounting of retention
money. In essence, in any arrangement where money is not paid
instantly, there will be a time value of money, which needs to be
recognized. The reason for which the payment is not made instantly or delayed is not relevant.
Author’s View
View
2 is the preferred view. However, View 1 should not be ruled out
because Ind AS 18 does not require discounting when the arrangement does
not effectively constitute a financing arrangement. View 1 can be ruled
out, only if Ind AS 18 is suitably amended to remove the reference to
financing arrangements. Suggest Institute should issue a clarification.
TS-126-ITAT-2016(Mum) Forbes Container Line Pte. Ltd. A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 11th March, 2016
Facts
The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in Singapore and engaged in the business of operating ships in international traffic across Asia and Middle East. The Taxpayer is a wholly owned subsidiary of an Indian Parent Co (ICo).
The Taxpayer filed a return of income claiming that the total income was NIL. However, AO contended that the Taxpayer had a real and intimate business connection in India for reasons that the ICo secured the business for Taxpayer in India and one of the directors of the Taxpayer was also a director in ICo, and such director looked after policy matters of the Taxpayer in India. Further, AO held that taxpayer had a fixed place of business in India. Further as ICO concluded various contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer with various Government agencies for carrying out various functions, ICo created an Agency PE for the taxpayer in India.
AO also contended that Taxpayer being a Non-vessel operating common carrier was not eligible to claim benefits under Article 8 of the DTAA, dealing with shipping income and the income of the Taxpayer would fall within the ambit of Article 7. The computation of such income would be governed by section 44B of the Act. However, the Taxpayer contended that it did not have a fixed place of business in India. Further, it was contended that as an independent entity all its decisions were taken in Singapore and ICo had no role in deciding taxpayer’s policies.
The Taxpayer appealed before First Appellate Authority (‘FAA ’). However, FAA upheld the order of AO.
Aggrieved by the order of FAA , the Taxpayer preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.
Held
On facts and records, it was clear that taxpayer was maintaining books of accounts as well as bank account in Singapore and all banking transactions were made from that account only. Nothing was brought on record to show that the effective control and management of taxpayer was in India.
Factors like staying of one of the directors in India or holding one meeting during the year under consideration or location of parent company would not decide the residential status of the Taxpayer.
The Taxpayer did not own or charter or took on lease any vessel or ship but was merely providing container services to its clients. Thus, the Taxpayer is not engaged in shipping business. This was also accepted by the AO. Therefore the provisions of section 44B dealing with income from shipping business would not be applicable in the present case.
The income of the Taxpayer had to be assessed as per Article 7 which deals with business income. In the absence of PE, such income is not taxable in India.
TS-187-ITAT-2016(Mum) Interroute Communications Limited A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 9th March, 2016
Facts
The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of UK. The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of providing international telecommunication network connectivity to various telecom operators around the world. The Taxpayer received certain amount from Indian customers towards the provision of virtual voice network (VVN). VVN is a standard inter-connect service provided to third party carriers. The Taxpayer contented that the income for use of VVN is in the nature of business income and since there was no PE in India, such income is not taxable in India.
The AO held that the Taxpayer provides use of its facilities/equipment/infrastructure to enable customers to interconnect with each other. Such facility includes proprietary software and hardware, technical expertise and other intellectual property. The AO observed that usage of such facilities amounted to usage of the Intellectual property held by the Taxpayer and hence, the payments received by the Taxpayer were in the nature of Royalty, or alternatively, FTS. Hence, the same was taxable in India. On further appeal, the First Appellate Authority also upheld the order of AO.
Aggrieved, the Taxpayer preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.
Held
Essentially, provision of VVN was connecting the call to the end operator, and, in that sense, it worked like a clearing house.
Payment made by the Indian entities can be held to be royalty only when it is payment for scientific work, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience (‘specified items’).
In the present case, the payment is not for a scientific work nor is there any patent, trademark, design, plan or secret formula or process for which the payment is being made. The payment is made for a service, which is rendered with the help of certain scientific equipment and technology. The Taxpayer is providing a facility which is a standard facility used by other telecom companies as well. Also, merely because the payment involves a fixed as also a variable payment, the same does not alter the character of service.
Though the Taxpayer may charge a fixed amount to cover its costs in employing enhanced capacity so as not to incur losses when this capacity is not used, but what the customer is paying for is a service and not the use of equipment involved in additional capacity, nor for any scientific work, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.
The payment for a service can be brought to tax under Article 13 of DTAA only when it makes available the technology in the sense that recipient of service is enabled to perform the same service without recourse to the service provider. Though the service rendered by the Taxpayer requires technical inputs, there is no transfer of technology. Hence, the make available condition is not satisfied. Therefore such payment is outside the ambit of fees for technical services (‘FTS’) taxable under Article 13 of the DTAA .
Further, since there is no dispute that the Taxpayer does not have any permanent establishment (‘PE’) in India, the payment made by Indian customers cannot be brought to tax in India.
TS-131-ITAT-2016(HYD) GVK Oil & Gas Limited A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 9th March, 2016
Facts
Taxpayer an Indian company was engaged in the business of Oil and Gas exploration. Taxpayer made certain payments to a USA and UK Company (FCo) towards a non-exclusive licence and right to use a dataset for an agreed licence fee.
The Taxpayer contended that the dataset was nothing but a compilation of data and licence was only for the use of data and not for providing any experience, knowledge or skill to the Taxpayer. Taxpayer also contended that
Use of the dataset is not a transfer of the copyright but it is a copyrighted article.
It was contended that the dataset was not customized according to the requirements of the Taxpayer nor was it for the exclusive use of the Taxpayer.
In absence of provision of knowhow, such licence fee does not qualify as royalty.
Against that AO observed that
NR agreed to grant non-exclusive license/right to use certain data and derivatives in consideration for an agreed license fee.
Such information/knowledge is not available in the public domain and available to the taxpayer only on securing a valid license.
Such payment amounts to consideration for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.
(a) In any case, the Taxpayer had ordered the dataset which was customised for the taxpayer. Accordingly, when such customised data is made available upon request of taxpayer, it becomes know-how as it cannot be used by any other party.
(b) Thus the licence fee amounts to royalty both under the Act as well as the DTAA and held the Taxpayer as an ‘assessee-in-default’ or failure to withhold taxes u/s. 195.
Held
The Taxpayer obtained a fixed period licence to use a dataset which is highly technical and complicated can be accessed only on the grant of a license by the owner.
On the expiry of licence, taxpayer is required to return the product or destroy the data accessed by him during the license period. However, taxpayer is not required to destroy the product produced by him by use of such data. This indicates that the data was made available to the taxpayer to enable it to process and use it for furtherance of its objects.
The definition of ‘Royalty’ under the Act is more exhaustive as compared to the definition under the India-USA and India-UK DTAA . Under the Act, consideration for granting of a license for the use of the property is also treated as royalty whereas, there is no such provision under the DTAA .
Reference was made to principle laid down in various judgments1 wherein it has been held that unless and until the license is given to use the copyrighted property itself, the consideration paid cannot be treated as ‘Royalty’.
In the facts of the case, license is granted to use information contained in the database. Further, the licenses are non-exclusive licenses and therefore, information/ data is not customized to meet the taxpayer’s requirements exclusively.
Though the information in the database is scientific as well as technical, taxpayer is permitted to use the information only as a licensee. It does not involve transfer of technical knowledge or experience. Therefore there is no use of copyright. Thus, under the DTAA unless the license is given to use the copyright itself, the consideration paid cannot be treated as royalty.
It is clear that FCo has only made available the data available with them but are not making available any technology available for use of such data by the taxpayer. Thus, such payments are not in the nature of ‘royalty’ as per the India-USA and India-UK DTAA and hence the provisions of S. 195 are not applicable.
PS: Royalty implications under the Act were not analysed as the royalty definition under the DTAA was considered to be narrower than royalty definition under the Act.
TS-144-ITAT-2016(Mum) Siro Clinpharm Private Limited A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 31st March, 2016
Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company, had given a guarantee to foreign banks on behalf of its associated enterprises (‘AE’). The Taxpayer did not charge any fee or commission for issuance of these guarantees. However, the AEs duly reimbursed the Taxpayer towards the bank charges incurred by the Taxpayer.
TPO held that the corporate guarantees, as provided by the Taxpayer to the bank, were specifically covered by the definition of ‘international transaction’ u/s. 92B and charged fees by imputing at arm’s length price. The same was upheld by the First Appellate Authority (‘FAA ’). Aggrieved Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.
Held
Finance Act 2012 inserted explanation to section 92B expanding the scope of definition of international transaction inter alia to include the transaction of guarantee within its ambit. Such amendment was stated to be clarificatory in nature and was made applicable with a retrospective effect.
Legislature may describe an amendment as ‘clarificatory’ in nature, but a call will have to be taken by the judiciary whether it is indeed clarificatory or not. The amendment in question is related to transfer pricing provisions which are in the nature of an antiabuse legislation. An anti-abuse legislation does not trigger the levy of taxes; it only tells you what behaviour is acceptable or what is not acceptable. What triggers levy of taxes, is non-compliance with the manner in which the anti-abuse regulations require the taxpayers to conduct their affairs. In that sense, all anti-abuse legislations seek a certain degree of compliance with the norms set out therein. It is, therefore, only elementary that amendments in the anti-abuse legislations can only be prospective. It does not make sense that someone tells you today as to how you should have behaved yesterday, and then goes on to levy a tax because you did not behave in that manner yesterday. Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of co-ordinate bench in the case of Micro Ink vs. ACIT (2016) 176 TTJ 8 (Ahd) and Bharti Airtel Ltd. (2014) 161 TTJ 428 (Delhi – Trib) and New skies (2016) 382 ITR 114 (Delhi). Hence, if the amendment increases the scope of international transaction u/s. 92B, then there is no way it could be implemented for the period prior to this law coming on the statute i.e. prior to 2012
Alternatively, the Tribunal held that if the amendment by Finance Act 2012 is considered clarificatory and does not add anything or expand the scope of international transaction defined u/s. 92B, then this provision has already been judicially interpreted in favour of the Taxpayers by the aforesaid Tribunal rulings, till it is reversed by a higher judicial forum.
Hence, Explanation to section 92B, though stated to be clarificatory and effective from 1st April 2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best the AY 2013-14. Hence, the impugned adjustments must stand deleted.
TS-177-ITAT-2016(Mumbai ITAT) Capegemini S.A. A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 28th March, 2016
Facts
The Taxpayer, a French Company provided a corporate guarantee to a French bank (bank). In lieu of such guarantee, the Indian branch of the bank provided loan to the Indian subsidiaries (ICo) of Taxpayer. ICo paid guarantee commission to the Taxpayer towards the guarantee given to the bank. The AO contended that the guarantee commission paid to the taxpayer arises in India and therefore, was taxable under “Other income” Article 23 of the India-France DTAA , for the following reasons
The guarantee had been provided for the purpose of raising finance by an Indian company
Finance was raised in India and the benefits were availed by Indian subsidiaries
Finance requirement was met by Indian branch of the French bank.
The Taxpayer, however, contended that guarantee commission did not arise in India and accordingly was not taxable in India.
Held
On appeal, ITAT held:
Guarantee commission received by the taxpayer does not accrue or arise in India, nor is it deemed to accrue or arise in India and therefore, it is not taxable in India under the Act.
Guarantee was given by a French company to a French bank in France. Therefore, such guarantee commission arises in France and not in India. Therefore, guarantee commission paid to the Taxpayer is not taxable in India under Article 23(3) of the DTAA .
Revised Procedure for making Remittances to Non Residents – New Rule 37BB u/s. 195(6) of the Income – tax Act, 1961
1. Purpose of section 195
Section 195 of the Act is a mechanism to deduct tax from any payment (which is chargeable to tax) made to a nonresident. The underlying philosophy behind any withholding tax provisions is “pay as you earn”. The ease and certainty of collection of taxes make such provisions attractive for any tax legislature.
2. Person responsible to deduct tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act
Section 195 casts an obligation on the person who is making any payment to a non-resident to deduct tax at source. The sweeping language of the section brings almost every payment, made to a non-resident, which is chargeable to tax, within its ambit. The only exclusion here is that of a payment of salaries. Section 192 of the Act deals with TDS provisions relating to salary paid to a non-resident, which is chargeable to tax in India.
Section 195 provides that, “Any person responsible for paying to a non-resident not being a company, or to a foreign company, any interest or any other sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act (not being income chargeable under the head “salaries”) shall, at the time of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct income-tax thereon at the rates in force.”
The dissection of the above provision reveals that—
(i) The obligation to deduct tax at source is cast on every person making payment, be it individual, company, partnership firm, Government or a public sector bank etc. The term ’person’ as defined in section 2(31) of the Act is relevant here.
(ii) The payee may be any type of entity (i.e. individual, company etc.).
(iii) The payee must be a non-resident under the Act.
(iv) The payment may be for interest or any other sum chargeable to tax except salaries.
(v) Tax has to be deducted at source at the time of credit or payment of the sum to the non-resident, whichever is earlier.
(vi) There is no threshold for deduction of tax at source. It therefore means payment of even one rupee to a nonresident would attract TDS provisions.
3. TDS by a non-resident from payments to another non-resident
This issue had come up for examination in some landmark cases; notable amongst them is the Apex Court’s decision in case of Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India, wherein the Supreme Court held in favour of Vodafone and held that indirect transfer of shares2 by one non-resident to the another non-resident did not result in taxable income in the hands of the transferor and hence, there was no obligation for the payer to withheld tax at source. The Supreme Court followed the “look at” approach, i.e. form rather than substance, and refused to lift the corporate veil to bring the capital gains arising to HTIL to tax in India. In order to discourage such kind of indirect transfers and bring them to tax (especially where such transfers derives its value from assets situated in India) section 9 of the Act was amended retrospectively to bring to tax in India the capital gains arising on transfer of any assets outside India, between two non-residents, if such transfer derives substantial value in respect of any asset situated in India.
Section 195 was also amended, to clarify that the nonresident payer is liable to deduct tax at source, if the income in the hands of payee is taxable in India.
Explanation 2 was inserted to section 195 (1) of the Act vide Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1st April 1962, clarifying that the obligation to deduct tax at source u/s. 195 has always been there for any nonresident, whether such person has any place of business or business connection or presence in any other manner. Whether it results in an extra-territorial jurisdiction is a matter of debate. For the sake of understanding, the relevant provision is reproduced herein below:
Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the obligation to comply with sub-section (1) and to make deduction there under applies and shall be deemed to have always applied and extends and shall be deemed to have always extended to all persons, resident or non-resident, whether or not the non-resident person has—
(i) a residence or place of business or business connection in India; or
(ii) any other presence in any manner whatsoever in India.
4. Procedure for furnishing of information of deduction of tax at source u/s 195(6)
Section 195(6) of the Act provides that a person responsible for paying to a non-resident (hereafter referred to as ‘payer’) shall furnish such information as may be prescribed under Rule 37BB. The said Rule 37BB provides that Form No. 15CA and/or Form No. 15CB4 shall be furnished for the purpose of paying to a non-resident. Form No. 15CA is to be filled and submitted online by the deductor i.e. payer. Form 15CB is to be issued by the practicing Chartered Accountant (C.A) certifying (actually expressing his opinion) the taxability (chargeability) of the income in the hands of the payee and the amount of tax required to be deducted by the payer. In order to arrive at the amount of tax to be deducted the CA is required to take into account various applicable provisions of the Act (to compute the income of the non-resident payee) as well as provisions of the applicable Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ) and other relevant supporting documents and agreement, if any.
5. Steps while making a Remittance
Form 15CA is required to be furnished by the taxpayers for the purpose of remittance to a non-resident. It may be noted that Form 15CA should be filed in every case whether the remittance amount is chargeable to Incometax or not. However, exemption from filing of Form 15CA is provided in case of certain types of remittances.
Let us first deal with cases where the income is chargeable to tax. 15CA has four parts, namely, A,B,C and D. Following flow chart will be useful in understanding which part is to be filled in and under what circumstances.
6. Procedure where a remittance is not chargeable to tax:
6.1 Such remittances are classified in the following two categories as follows:
i. Non-reportable Transaction
ii. Reportable transaction
Let us first deal with transactions which are not required to be reported, meaning there is no need to file any form with the tax authorities.
6.2 Non-reportable Transactions
In following two cases there is no requirement to furnish Form 15CA or Form 15CB.
(i) Individuals making remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of FEMA and
(ii) Certain specified remittances as listed herein below.
Specified List of payments for which Form 15CA or Form 15CB are not required to be filed:
The earlier Rule 37BB contained 28 items which did not require submission of Form 15CA or 15CB at the time of the remittance. However, the new Notification No. 93/ 2015 now expands the list to 33 items.–
6.3 Reportable Transactions
Any transaction other than the non-reportable category is considered as reportable transaction. In other words, even if the remittance is not chargeable to tax, information in respect of such remittance is required to be provided in Part D of Form 15CA.
7. What is the difference between earlier Rule 37BB and the new Rule 37BB which is effective from 1st April, 2016?
Amendments in the new Rule 37BB as compared with earlier Rule 37BB are as follows:
Form 15CA and Form 15CB will not be required if an individual is making a remittance, which does not require RBI’s approval under FEMA or under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS).
The list of items which do not require submission of Forms 15CA and Form 15CB has been expanded from 28 to 33. The newly introduced items are as under –
i. Advance Payments against imports
ii. Payment towards import settlement of invoice
iii. Imports by diplomatic missions
iv. Intermediary trade
v. Imports below Rs. 5 Lakh (For use by Exchange Control Department offices)
Only the payments which are chargeable to tax under the provisions of Act in excess of Rs. 5 Lakh would require Certificate from a Chartered Accountant in Form 15CB.
A new reporting obligation is introduced for the authorised dealers (ADs) (i.e. the Banks). ADs will have to file Form 15CC (quarterly) in respect of the foreign remittances made by them.
8. Some Practical Issues
8.1 Cases where Tax Residency Certificate (TRC ) is required
Under the provisions of section 90(2), it has been provided that provisions of the Act or the DTAA , whichever are more beneficial to the assessee, shall be applicable. This benefit is, however, subject to satisfaction of conditions provided u/s. 90(4) of the Act. In order to claim the benefit of a DTAA , it has been provided that the non-resident payee must furnish a TRC which confirms that the payee is a Tax Resident of the other State. This becomes important from the perspective of the Act as well as DTAA since Article 4 (dealing with “Residence”) of almost all the DTAA s signed by India provides that benefits of the DTAA can be claimed only by such persons who are residents of either of the contracting states. In this connection, the reader may also refer to the Rule 21AB prescribing declaration in Form 10F to be obtained from the Non-resident payee.
8.2 Is there any other alternative other than a TRC since obtaining a TRC may not be feasible sometimes?
Section 90(4) provides for mandatory submission of TRC, issued by the foreign Government or a specified territory, in order to claim benefit of the DTAA. Thus, there is no alternative to submission of TRC.
However, if any foreign Government does not have a format or provision to issue TRC, then the taxpayer at best can get the information prescribed in Form 10F certified by the revenue authorities of the concerned foreign country or territory in order to avail the DTAA benefit.
It may be possible that the format in which TRC is issued by the foreign tax authority does not contain all the details required under Form 10F. For example, US IRS issues TRC in the Form 6166 which does not contain all details required in Form 10F. Therefore, the remitter needs to keep both the documents on record and submit to the Income tax Authorities in India, if and when required.
8.3 What are the details required to be provided in Form 10F?
Form 10F requires the following details –
(i) Name, Father’s name and designation of the person signing the form
(ii) Status (individual, company, firm etc.) of the assessee;
(iii) Nationality (in case of an individual) or country or specified territory of incorporation or registration (in case of others);
(iv) Assessee’s tax identification number in the country or specified territory of residence and in case there is no such number, then, a unique number on the basis of which the person is identified by the Government of the country or the specified territory of which the assessee claims to be a resident;
(v) Period for which the residential status, as mentioned in the certificate referred to in sub-section (4) of section 90 or sub-section (4) of section 90A, is applicable; and
(vi) Address of the assessee in the country or specified territory outside India, during the period for which the certificate, as mentioned in (iv) above, is applicable.
9. How to file Form No. 15 CA electronically
Form 15CA is required to be filed by the tax payer in every case of remittance except where remittance falls within the category of non-reportable transactions. (Refer paragraphs 5 and 6 supra).
In the subsequent paragraphs step by step procedure is given for filling up Form No. 15 CA and filing it electronically:
Note: Before proceeding to e-file Part D of Form No. 15CA, keep the hardcopy duly filled in ready with you to expedite the process.
Step 1. Go to the website of incometaxindiaefiling.gov. in.
Step 2. Login using:
a. User Id- PAN
b. Password- as is used for e-filing the income tax return
c. D ate of Birth/Incorporation- as is already registered with the income tax for e- filing of return of income etc.
Step 3. Next screen will appear:
– Click on ‘e-file’
– Select “prepare and submit online Form other than ITR”.
Step 4. Next screen will appear
– Select Form Name- “15CA”
– Click on “Click here to download the DSC Utility”
– O pen the “DSC Utility” and double click on the utility
– General Instruction Page will appear on the screen
– Click on “Register DSC” tab next to the Instruction tab
– Enter e-filing User- Id- which is PAN of the assessee
– Enter PAN of the DSC- Registered in e-filing which is the PAN of the person authorized to sign Form No. 15 CA
– Go to “Select type of digital signature certificate- Click on “USB token”
– Go to “Select USB token Certificate” and
select the name of the person authorized
to sign Form No. 15CA
– Click on “Generate Signature File”
– E nter the PIN of DSC and click ok.
– Save the “DSC Signature file”
– Come back to e-filing website- Attach “DSC
Signature File”. For this, click on “Browse” and attach the signature file saved and press “continue”.
– Select Relevant Part of Form No. 15CA from the drop down- PART D
– Click on continue and Form No. 15CA will be displayed on the screen.
Step 5. Fill up the details of the Remitter from the Hardcopy of PAR T D- Form No. 15CA.
– Following details are to be selected from the drop down
– State
– Country
– Status of the Remitter
– R esidential status of the remitter
Step 6. Fill up the details of the “Remittee”
– Following details are to be selected from the drop down
– State- Select “State outside India”
– Country- Select the Country of Residence of the remmittee
– Country to which remittance is to be made- Select the country of remittee
– Currency- Select the currency of remittance
– Country to which recipient of remittance is resident if available – Select the country of residence
Step 7. Fill up the details of “Remittance”
– Following details are to be selected from the drop down
– Name of the bank through which the remittance shall be made
Step 8. Fill up the “Nature of Remittance”
– Nature of Remittance as per the agreement / document is to be selected from the list of 65 categories of remittance mentioned in the Drop Down
Step 9. Fill up the “Relevant purpose code as per RBI”
– 1st Drop Down- Select the category of remittance from the list of 24(Twenty Four) categories mentioned
– 2nd Drop Down- Select the purpose code and description of remittance as mentioned in the hardcopy of Part D of Form No. 15CA
Step 10. Click on PAR T D- Verification tab next to Form 15CA on the top of the page.
– Fill up the details of the person authorized to sign “Form No. 15CA”
– Click on “Submit” button on the top of the page.
– Part D – Form No. 15 CA will be uploaded successfully.
Step 11. A fter filing Part D. Click on “My Account” tab nd Click on “View Form No. 15CA”
Step 12. Click on the Acknowledgement No link on the screen and then click on “ITR/FORM”.
Step 13. To open the PDF file enter the password. The password for the same is PAN in small letter with Date of birth/incorporation in continuation without using any special character.
Step 14. After downloading the PDF file, Save and print the same.
10. How to file Form No. 15 CB electronically
Step by step procedure for E-filing of Form Nos. 15 CA and 15 CB is as follows:
PRE-REQUISITES
In order to file Form 15CB, Tax payer must add CA. To add CA, Please follow the steps given below:
Step 1 – Login to e-filing portal, Navigate to: My Account? Add CA”.
Step 2 – E nter the Membership Number of the CA
Step 3 – Select 15 CB as Form Name and click submit.
Once the taxpayer adds the CA, the CA can file Form 15 CB in behalf of taxpayer.
In order to file Form 15CB, Chartered Accountant must follow the below steps.
Step 1 – U ser should be registered as “Chartered Accountant” in e-Filing. If not ready registered, user should click the link Register Yourself in the homepage.
Step 2 – Select “Chartered Accountants” under Tax Professional and click continue.
Step 3 – E nter the mandatory details and complete the registration process.
FILING PROCESS
Note:
Before proceeding to e-file Form No. 15CB keep the hardcopy duly filled in ready with you to expedite the process.
Kindly note that all the amounts to be entered in INR unless and until specifically required to be filled in Foreign Currency.
Step 1 – Go to the website of incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in.
Step 2 – on “Forms Other than ITR” on the Right Hand Side of the Website.
Step 3 – Download “Form No. 15CB”
Step 4 – on “ITD_EFILING_FORM15CB_PR1.jar”
Step 5 – General instruction page will appear on the screen
Step 6 – Click on “Form 15CB” tab on the Top left hand side
– F ill up Form 15CB from the hard copy of the Form 15CB prepared. Step 7 – Point No. 6 of Form 15CB
-1st Drop Down- Select “Nature of remittance” from 65 categories stated in drop down.
Step 8 – Point No. 7 of Form 15 CB
– 1st Drop Down- Select “Relevant Purpose Group Name” of remittance from 24 categories from the drop down.
– 2nd Drop Down- Select “Relevant Purpose Code and Description” of remittance.
– 3rd Drop Down- Select Yes or No for “In case the remittance is net of taxes, whether tax payable has been grossed up”
Step 9 – After filling up the details- Click on “Save Draft”
Step 10 – Click on “Validate”
Step 11 – Click on “Generate XML” and save the XML file.
Step 12– Go to “incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in” website and Login using:
a. User Id- PAN
b. Password- as is used for e-filing the income tax return
c. D ate of Birth/Incorporation- as is already registered with the income tax for e-filing of return of income etc.
Step 12 – Click on “e-file” – “Upload Form”
Step 13 – Fill up the following details
– PAN/TAN of the Assessee (Remitter)
– PAN of CA (for example: Name of CA – PAN of the CA)
– Select Form Name- 15CB
– Select filing type- Original
– A ttach the “XML” file saved
– A ttach “DSC of CA”
– Click on submit- Form No. 15CB will be submitted successfully
Step 14 – After filing Form 15CB Click on “My Account” tab and Click on “e-filed returns/forms”
– Click on PAN/TAN of assessee (Remitter)
– Click on relevant Acknowledgement Number link
– Click on ITR/FORM
– To open the PDF file, enter the password.
The password for the same is PAN in small letter with Date of birth/incorporation in continuation without using any special character.-
– After downloading the PDF file, Save and print the same.
– Click on “Receipt”
– Save and print the same.
11. Summation
Amendments to Rule 37BB though appearing complicated will reduce the compliance burden of the tax payer. It also provides the much needed certainty by specifying various transactions for which reporting is not required. Small value transactions not exceeding Rs. Five lakh per year are exempted from the cumbersome procedure of reporting by e-filing. However, a word of caution here is that the transactions not exceeding Rs. Five lakh per year are exempted only from reporting and not from the obligation of withholding tax wherever applicable. Therefore, the tax payer may have to deduct tax at source in an appropriate case even if the transaction value is less than Rs. Five lakh. Similarly, robust documentation would be required to justify the non-reporting or non-deduction transactions as hitherto. In order to determine whether the tax is deductible or not, the remitter would be required to ascertain the taxability of payment in the hands of the non-resident and that will require knowledge of the legal provisions governing Taxation of Cross Border Transactions. The remitter would be faced with a number of issues such as (i) Classification/ Characteriation of the payment (e.g. Business Income vs. Capital Gains or FTS or Royalty); (ii) Existence or otherwise of a PE (iii) Quantum of Income to be attributed to the PE (iv) Eligibility to access a Tax Treaty, (v) Application of the provisions of a DTAA vs. the Income-tax Act, (iv) issues relating to Interpretation and application of a DTAA , etc. In many cases although prima facie the remitter is not required to deduct tax at source and the new procedure also does not require him to obtain a CA Certificate in Form 15 CB, it would be advisable that he obtains CA Certificate in the Form 15 CB for NIL TDS because the CA would be able to substantiate the non-deduction of tax at source with valid documentation, judicial support and detailed and sound reasoning. In such a case, the remitter may fill up Part C of the Form 15 CA along with Form 15 CB.(However, in view of the language of Part D of Form 15CA, there is ambiguity as to whether Part C has to be filled up or Part D. In our view, once Form 15CB is obtained and uploaded electronically and acknowledgment number of such Form 15CB is filled in by the remitter in Form 15CA, Part C of Form 15CA will be automatically filled in). The issue needs to be clarified by the CBDT about the procedure to be followed by the remitter in case he desires, out of abundant caution, to obtain a CA Certificate in Form 15CB to be absolutely certain about taxability or otherwise of a particular remittance under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and/or the applicable Tax Treaty. Presently, the consequences of non-deduction of tax at source are very serious as it would not only lead to disallowance of the payment u/s. 40(a)(i) but also penalty u/s. 271C and levy of Interest u/s 201 of the Act. Many a time, the Assessing Officers are prone to summarily disallow all remittances from which tax has not been deducted at source and hence it may land the tax payer into a long drawn litigation. However, if the remitter has obtained a CA certificate for non-deduction of tax, it would help him in the Assessment and Penalty Proceedings, if any.
M/s. Naulakha Theatre vs. State of , [2013] 64 VST 481 (P & H)
Facts
The petitioners, owners of cinema theatre, made various representations to the Government for concession in payment of entertainment tax. In response, the Government took a decision to give 33% concession in the entertainment tax, if the tax is deposited in lump sum. Such decision was taken by the cabinet and was incorporated in the annual budget for the year 2003-04 presented before the Legislative Assembly on March 24, 2003. The petitioners have allegedly deposited the lump sum entertainment tax in pursuance of such budget proposal. It was later somewhere in September, 2004, the demand was raised against the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners have deposited entertainment tax availing of rebate of 33%, whereas no notification has been issued by the Punjab Government. The Petitioners filed writ petition, before the Punjab High court against such demand.
Held
The issue, whether entertainment tax can be permitted to be paid in lump sum or not, is a matter of policy. Such policy could be given effect to only by amending the Punjab Entertainment Tax (Cinematograph Shows) Rules, 1954. Neither the budget proposal nor the earlier statement of Chief Minister is to the effect that it has been decided to permit the payment of entertainment tax in lump sum. The representation is only that the State Government has proposed the payment of entertainment tax in lump sum so as to grant concession up to 33%. No promissory estoppel can be raised against the State on the basis of such promise, when the levy of entertainment tax is statutory.
One of the essential ingredients so as to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel is altering of position by a person. However, the averments do not show that the petitioners have altered their position on the basis of representation of the functionaries of the State. The petitioners were running cinemas and continued to run cinema even after the speech of the Chief Minister/ Finance Minister. If the petitioners have provided better facilities and infrastructure though in the absence of any material, such fact cannot be taken into consideration; still such better facilities do not lead to alteration of positions by the petitioners on the strength of promise made. It is the convenience of the visitors, which was taken care of by the cinema owners, when they provided better facilities and infrastructures or when they screen big budget films, which will obviously gave better revenue to the petitioners as well. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners have altered their position to their detriment on the basis of speech of the Finance Minister proposing the reduction of the entertainment tax. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioners.
[2016-TIOL-556-HC-PATNA-ST]Shapoorji Paloonji and Company Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax.
The IIT, a governmental authority – services not taxable under 2(s) of the Mega Exemption Notification-25/2012-ST an independent provisions and the expression “90% or more equity participation….” not applicable.
Facts
The Petitioner was awarded a works contract for construction of an academic complex of Indian Institute of Technology, Patna (IIT) by a project consultant appointed by IIT. On payment of appropriate taxes, a refund claim was filed contending that the activity was exempted under clause 12(c) of the Mega Exemption Notification as services were provided to a governmental authority by way of construction of a structure meant predominantly for use as an educational institution. According to the revenue, only an authority with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control to carry out any function entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution alone is a governmental authority and thus the refund claim was inadmissible.
Held
The High Court observed that the provisions contained in sub-clause (i) and (ii) of clause 2(s) of the Mega Exemption Notification-25/2012 are independent disconjunctive provisions and the expression “90% or more participation…..” is related to sub-clause (ii) alone. Since the clause (i) is followed by “;” and the word “or” it is an independent provision. Accordingly, IIT set up by the Act of Parliament i.e. Indian Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 not subjected to the condition of 90% or more participation… is a governmental authority and thus the construction activity is exempted and the tax paid is to be refunded. Further, it was also observed that as per the terms of contract with the project consultant, the service tax paid challans were to be submitted by them and the same would be reimbursed on receipt of the amount from IIT and accordingly, since the tax was paid by the petitioner alone, it was not a case of undue enrichment.
Note: It is important to note that in the present case, the contract is entered into between the Petitioner and the Project Consultant of IIT. However, since the transfer of property in goods takes place from the petitioner to IIT, the works contract service is determined to be provided directly to the governmental authority and thus is eligible for the benefit of the exemption notification.
DCIT vs. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `B’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Mahavir Singh (JM) ITA No. 1945/Mum/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of Order: 15th April, 2016 Counsel for revenue / assessee: Sanjiv Jain / A. V. Sonde & P. P. Jayaraman
Facts
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed from Schedule M forming part of P & L Account that the assessee had debited a sum of Rs. 193.46 lakh on account of secondment charges under the head `personnel cost’ but TDS had not been deducted on the same. He disallowed this sum u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who, relying on the decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of IDS Software Solutions (India) Pvt. Ltd. 122 TTJ 410 (Bang.) and also the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kotak Securities Ltd. (ITA No. 3111 of 2009) decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.
Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held
Upon going through the joint venture agreement entered into by the assessee with M/s GAIL and British Gas in respect of secondment charges paid by the assessee, it was observed that there was no mark up in payments made by them. Secondment agreement was entered into because the IPR rights were to remain with British Gas. The assessee also filed a letter from British Gas which clearly stated that all the taxes due in India of the employees seconded to the assessee have been deducted from salary paid to secondees and paid to the Government of India
The Tribunal observed that the issue is covered by the decision of ITAT Bangalore Bench in the case of IDS Software Solutions (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO (supra). Following the ratio of the said decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.
The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
Gurpreet Kaur vs. ITO ITAT Amritsar Bench (SMC) Before A. D. Jain (JM) ITA No. 87/Asr/2016 A.Y.: 2011-12. Date of Order: 24th March, 2016 Counsel for assessee / revenue : J. S. Bhasin / Tarsem Lal
Facts
The assessee filed his return of income on 17.10.2011. The Assessing Officer (AO) issued a notice dated 21.9.2012 seeking information in connection with return of income submitted by the assessee. This notice was marked “AIR Only”. Thereafter, the AO issued a notice, dated 15.7.2013, u/s. 142(1) of the Act, asking the assessee to produce accounts/or documents and information as per questionnaire to the said notice. The questionnaire called for details on various issues apart from the information of cash deposits made by the assessee in his savings bank account. The assessee, in his reply, stated that the notice was seeking information with evidence on various issues not covered by AIR information, though the first notice was marked “AIR Only” and that in accordance with instruction dated 8.9.2010 issued by CBDT scrutiny of cases selected on the basis of information received through the AIR returns would be limited only to aspects of information received through AIR.
In response to the query regarding the source of alleged cash deposit of Rs. 25 lakh in the assessee’s savings bank account with OBC, the assessee stated that she sold her residential house for Rs.32.25 lakh of which Rs. 25 lakh were received by cash which cash was deposited by her into her savings bank account. To substantiate her contention, copy of the sale deed was filed.
The AO noticed that the assessee had received a sum of Rs. 3,00,000 from Smt. Balbir Kaur under agreement dated 15.3.2009 entered into by the assessee with Smt. Balbir Kaur for sale of assessee’s property. Copy of the agreement was filed. He called upon the assessee to produce Smt. Balbir Kaur for his examination. Since the assessee had subsequently on 7.5.2010 sold this property to a different person, but had not refunded the amount received from Balbir Kaur to her, the AO added this sum of Rs. 3,00,000 as income of the assessee on the ground that it was forfeited by the assessee. He also denied exemption claimed by the assessee under section 54 of the Act.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the order of the AO.
Aggrieved, by the order passed by CIT(A), the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held
The Tribunal observed that in the present case, the question is, whether while computing capital gain and denying benefit of section 54 to the assessee, the AO has contravened CBDT’s Instruction no. F.No. 225/26/2006- ITA –II(Pt.) dated 8.9.2010 thereby rendering the assessment order invalid. It was observed that the Delhi Bench of ITAT has in the case of Crystal Phosphates Ltd. vs. ACIT 34 CCH 136 (Del. Trib.) held that once CBDT has issued instructions, the same have to be followed in letter and spirit by the AO. It also noted that the Calcutta High Court has in the case of Amal Kumar Ghosh vs. Addl. CIT 361 ITR 458 (Cal.), held that when the department has set down a standard for itself, the department is bound by that standard and it cannot act with discrimination. It also noted that the operative word in section 119(1) is `shall’. It observed that in the present case, the assessee’s case was picked up for scrutiny on the basis of AIR information and the notice was stamped “AIR Only” in compliance with para 3 of the CBDT instruction dated 8.9.2010. The AIR information in the present case was regarding cash deposit of Rs. 25 lakh by assessee in her savings bank account with OBC. The assessee explained the same as sale proceeds of her residential house. This assertion of the assessee was supported by a copy of the sale deed. As per CBDT instruction, nothing further was to be gone into by the AO since the information received through AIR was the cash deposits. The act of the AO of asking the assessee to produce Smt. Balbir Kaur for examination to ascertain whether the agreement was finalised or cancelled was not covered by AIR information and therefore, was not within the purview of the AO. This act of the AO amounted to widening the scope of scrutiny, which as per para 2 of the CBDT instruction, could have been done with the approval of the administrative Commissioner. Since this approval was not taken, the Tribunal held that the action of the AO was violative of the CBDT instruction and therefore the order passed by the AO in violation of specific CBDT instruction was not legally sustainable.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.
Uday K. Pradhan vs. Income Tax Officer ITAT “F” Bench, Mumbai Before Jason P. Boaz (AM) and Sandeep Gosain (JM) ITA No. 4669/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2005-06. Date of Order: 6th April, 2016 Counsel for assessee / revenue: Dharmesh Shah / Sandeep Goel
Facts
The assessee was a partner in a firm which was converted into a company. As per the books of the erstwhile firm, the assessee had a credit balance of Rs. 38.74 lakh and in lieu of the said credit balance, the assessee received two lakh equity shares and 2,07,417 redeemable preference shares. In the year under appeal, the said redeemable preference shares were redeemed at par and the assessee received Rs. 20.74 lakh. The AO was of the view that the assessee’s receipt of the sum of Rs. 20.74 lakh on redemption of preference shares resulted in reduction of the share capital and therefore, invoked the provisions of section 2(22)(d) of the Act to bring the same to tax as deemed dividend. On appeal, the CIT(A) was of the view that this was a colourable device for distribution of accumulated profits without any payment by the assessee and which benefitted the assessee/shareholder to the tune of Rs. 20.74 lakh therefore it was exigible to tax u/s. 2(22)(d).
Held
Based on the records, the Tribunal noted it was evident that the assessee received the 2,07,417 redeemable preference shares in lieu of his credit balance in capital account of Rs. 38.74 lakh in the erstwhile firm which had since been corporatised. Thus, the assessee was allotted the redeemable preference shares for valuable consideration and that there was no distribution of accumulated profits by the company to its shareholders on redemption of preference shares, which could result in reduction of share capital. Therefore the Tribunal held that the provisions of section 2(22) (d) of the Act would not apply. The Tribunal noted that even as per section 80(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, the redemption of preference shares is not considered as reduction of share capital. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, treating the redemption of preference shares as deemed dividend u/s. 2(22) (d) of the Act does not arise, as it can be treated so only when there is distribution of accumulated profits by way of reduction of share capital.
In coming to this finding the Tribunal relied on the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Parle Biscuits Pvt. Ltd. In ITA Nos. 5318 & 5319/Mum/2008 and 447/ Mum/2009 dated 19.08.2001.
[2016] 156 ITD 770 (Mumbai ) GSB Capital Markets Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 16th December, 2015
Facts
The assessee-company was a member of the Bombay Stock Exchange and engaged in the business of share broking, trading and dealing in shares and securities
The assessee had claimed set-off of brought forward short term capital loss against the long term capital gains during the relevant assessment year.
The AO opined that loss arising from transfer of shortterm capital assets (on which STT is paid) was assessed at 15 per cent tax rate while the long-term capital gain was assessed at 20 per cent tax rate and hence it could not be set-off in view of section 70(3).
The CIT(A) upheld the order of AO.
On appeal before Tribunal.
Held
Section 70 deals with the set-off of losses from one source against the income from another source under the same head of income and deals with intra-head adjustment of losses during the same assessment year under the different heads of income.
On the other hand, section 74 which deals with the carry forward of capital losses and set-off against the income of the subsequent financial year, clearly stipulates that loss arising from transfer of short-term capital asset which is brought forward from earlier years, can be set-off against the capital gain assessable for subsequent assessment year, in respect of any other capital asset which could be either long-term capital gain or short-term capital gain.
Circular no. 8 of 2002, dated 27-08-2002 issued by CBDT explains the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2002 as follows:
“Since long-term capital gains are subject to lower incidence of tax, the Finance Act, 2002 has rectified the anomaly by amending the sections to provide that while losses from transfer of short-term capital assets can be set-off against any capital gains, whether short-term or long-term, losses arising from transfer of long-term capital assets, will be allowed to be set-off only against long-term capital gains. It is further provided that a long term capital loss shall be carried forward separately for eight years to be set-off only against long-term capital gains. However, a short-term capital loss, may be carried forward and setoff against any income under the head Capital gains”.
Thus, in view of our above discussions and reasoning, it was held that the assessee had rightly claimed set-off of brought forward short term capital loss against the long term capital gains during the relevant assessment year.
In result, the appeal filed by the assessee-company was allowed and the orders of CIT-(A) and AO were set aside.
[2016] 156 ITD 793 (Kolkata ) Manoj Murarka vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 20th November, 2015
Facts
During the relevant assessment year, the assessee, his son and daughter had overdrawn certain amount from a company in which the assessee was a substantial shareholder holding 41% of shares. The son and daughter were not shareholders in the company.
The AO treated the aforesaid amount overdrawn by the assessee and his son and daughter from the company as deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) and added the same in the income of the assessee.
The CIT(A) held that the deemed dividend could be taxed only in the hands of shareholder holding more than 10% voting power in the company from which monies are drawn. He therefore deleted the addition made towards deemed dividend in respect of the amount overdrawn by the son and daughter, as they were not shareholders of company.
However, he confirmed the addition made towards deemed dividend in respect of the amount overdrawn by the assessee by ignoring assessee’s contention that there was only negative accumulated profits, if the tax exempt long term capital gain was excluded from accumulated profits.
On cross appeals to the Tribunal:
Held
In respect of amount overdrawn by son and daughter
Both the son and daughter of the assessee are not shareholders in the lending company. The deemed dividend, if any, could be assessed only in the hands of the shareholders and not otherwise. This argument was taken by the assessee even before the lower authorities and the revenue has not brought on record any contrary evidence to this fact. Hence, the provisions of section 2(22)(e) could not be invoked in respect of amount overdrawn by the son and daughter.
In respect of amount overdrawn by assessee
The legal fiction created in the Explanation 2 to section 2(22) states that ‘accumulated profits’ shall include all profits of the company up to the date of distribution or payment. For reckoning the said accumulated profits, apart from the opening balance of accumulated profits, only the profits earned in the current year are to be added and then the total accumulated profits should be considered for the purpose of calculation of dividend out of accumulated profits, if any. The said Explanation nowhere contemplates to bring within the ambit of expression ‘accumulated profits’ any capital profits which are not liable to capital gains tax.
In the instant case, the capital gains derived by the company are tax exempt and hence, the same should not be included in accumulated profits and if the said gains are excluded, then there are only negative accumulated profits available with the company.
In the absence of accumulated profits, there is no scope for making any addition towards deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e).
Accordingly, the ground raised by the assessee is allowed and appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
Note: Reliance was placed on CIT vs. Mangesh J. Sanzgiri [1979] 119 ITR 962 (Bom. HC) and ACIT vs. Gautam Sarabhai Trust No. 23 [2002] 81 ITD 677 (Ahd. Trib).
[2016] 177 TTJ 18 (Chandigarh) H. P. State Electricity Board vs. Addl. CIT A.Y.s.: 2007-08 to 2010-11 Date of Order : 10th December, 2015
Facts
The assessee company was engaged in generation, transmission and distribution of power in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It purchased/sold power from PGCIL and was also selling power to consumers. Power was transmitted through transmission network of PGCIL and assessee made payments on account of wheeling charges, SLDC, transmission charges to PGCIL. In respect of payments made by the assessee to PGCIL, during the financial years 2006-07 to 2009-10, the assessee company was liable to deduct tax at source, but did not deduct tax at source.
Since PGCIL was found to have paid taxes on its income received from the assessee, the assessee was not treated as an assessee-in-default u/s. 201 of the Act. However, the AO levied penalty u/s. 271C of the Act amounting to Rs.1,36,00,187; Rs., 2,48,13,453; Rs.2,76,67,625 and Rs.5,71,017 for the financial years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 respectively. He held that there was no reasonable cause for the deductor assessee not to deduct tax at source. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held
The Tribunal, having noted the provisions of section 271C of the Act and also the ratio of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Remco (BHEL) House Building Co-operative Society Ltd. vs. ITO (2015) 273 CTR 57 (Kar), and observed that the assessee has not been treated as “assessee in default” as per section 201 of the Act, and is therefore neither liable to deduct nor pay any tax as per Chapter XVII-B. It held that in such circumstances, the question of levy of penalty u/s. 271C does not arise. It observed that this view has been upheld by the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal, in the case of ACIT vs. Good Health Plan Ltd. in ITA No. 155/Hyd/2013, wherein penalty levied u/s. 271C was deleted, since the assessee was not held to be an assessee in default. The Tribunal held that no penalty u/s. 271C could be levied in the case of the assessee.
The Tribunal also observed, that the fact that the tax on impugned sums had been reimbursed to PGCIL had not been controverted by the Revenue. It held that in such circumstances, the belief harboured by the assessee that by deducting further TDS, it would tantamount to double taxation, appears to be a reasonable and bonafide belief. It considered the explanation of the term “reasonable cause” as explained by the Delhi High Court in the case of Woodward Governor India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT (2001) 168 CTR 394 (Del), and held that there is no merit in the contention of the Department Representative (DR) that the assessee did not have reasonable cause for not deducting tax at source.
The Tribunal held that the assessee not being in default in respect of the amount of tax itself, there cannot be any levy of penalty u/s. 271C, and more so, where there was a reasonable cause for not deducting the TDS on the payment made.
This ground of appeals filed by the assessee was allowed.
2016-TIOL-547-ITAT-DEL Hindustan Plywood Company vs. ITO A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of Order: 19th February, 2016
Section 40(b)(v) – Profit on sale of godown credited to profit & loss account by the assessee is not to be excluded for computing remuneration allowable to partners.
Facts – I
The Assessing Officer (AO) in the course of assessment proceedings, noticed that the assessee had not deducted tax at source on interest amounting to Rs. 2,52,043 paid to various depositors and also on Rs. 1,44,000 paid towards car hire charges. He disallowed both these expenses u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the second proviso is curative in nature, intended to supply an obvious omission, take care of unintended consequence and make the section workable and is therefore retrospective.
Held – I
The Tribunal noted that the contention made on behalf of the assessee is supported by the decision of the ITAT , Kolkata Bench in the case of Santosh Kumar Kedia vs. ITO in ITA No. 1905/Kol/2014 for AY 2007-08; order dated 4.3.2015. It observed that the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ansal Landmark Township Pvt. Ltd. (377 ITR 635) has also taken the similar view. The Tribunal restored this issue to the file of the AO, with the direction that the assessee shall provide all details to the AO with regard to the recipients of the income and taxes paid by them. The AO shall carry out necessary verification in respect of the payments and taxes of such income and also filing the return by the recipient. In case, the AO finds that the recipient has duly paid the taxes on the income, the addition made by the AO shall stand deleted.
This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
Facts – II
The assessee had credited Rs. 10,20,430 to its Profit & Loss Account being profit on sale of godown on which it had been claiming depreciation from year to year. The AO was of the view that salary paid to partners is not to be paid on these profits. He excluded profit on sale of godown for the purposes of computation of remuneration to partners. Accordingly, he recomputed the partners remuneration and disallowed Rs. 3,60,540 out of Rs. 5,40,000 claimed by the assessee as salary paid to the partners.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held – II
The Tribunal considered the provisions of section 40(b)(v) which lay down the maximum quantum of remuneration payable to partners and also Explanation 3 thereto which defines “book profit”. It held that from the Explanation 3, it is apparent that the book profit has to be the profit as has been shown in the profit & loss account for the relevant previous year. It observed that the profit received by the assessee on sale of godown amounting to Rs. 10,20,430 was credited to Profit & Loss Account as prepared by the assesse and was part of net profit as shown in profit & loss account. Both the authorities below did not appreciate the provisions of section 40(b)(v), Explanation 3 and misinterpreted definition of “book profit” as given under Explanation 3 to section 40(b) of the Act. It observed that this view is supported by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Md. Serajuddin & Brothers vs. CIT (2012 – TIOL- 593- HC – CAL) as well as the following decisions –
i) Suresh A. Shroff & Co. (Mum) (2013) 140 ITD 1;
ii) CIT v. J. J. Industries – (2013)(Guj.) 216 Taxman 162;
iii) S. P. Equipment & Services vs. ACIT – (Jaipur)(2010) 36 SOT 325;
iv) ITO vs. Jamnadas Muljibhai – 99 TTJ 197 (Rajkot);
v) Deepa Agro Agencies vs. ITO – 154 Taxman 80 (Bang. Trib.);
vi) Allen Career Institution vs. Addl CIT – (2010) 37 DTR 379 (Jp)(Trib.);
vii) ACIT vs. Bilawala & Co. – 133 TTJ 168 (Mum.)(Trib.)
The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.
[2016] 177 TTJ 1 (Mumbai.) Crompton Greaves Ltd. vs. CIT A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of Order: 1st February, 2016
143(3) r.w.s. 263 lies with CIT(A) u/s. 246A(1)(a) being an order passed
by AO u/s. 143(3). Order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 does not find
place in section 253(1).
Facts
The assessment of total
income of the assessee company was completed by the Assessing Officer
(AO) vide his order dated 28th December, 2010 passed u/s. 143(3) of the
Act. Subsequently, the AO passed an order, dated 24th February, 2014, to
give effect to an order dated 6th February, 2013 passed u/s. 263 of the
Act.
Aggrieved by the additions made in the order dated 6th
February, 2013 passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 of the Act, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held
The
Tribunal observed that the assessee company has preferred a first appeal
directly before the Tribunal against order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s.
263 of the Act. The Tribunal noticed that an appeal against an order
passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 lies with the CIT(A), u/s. 246A(1)(a) of
the Act, being an order passed u/s. 143(3) and not with the Tribunal
under section 253. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of CIT vs. Ashoka Engineering Co. (1992) 194 ITR 645 (SC), it
observed that an appeal under the Act is a statutory right which
emanates only from the statute. The assessee does not have a vested
right to appeal, unless provided for in the statute.
The
Tribunal held that it cannot adjudicate the appeal filed by the
assessee, and that the assessee is at liberty to file an appeal before
the CIT(A) u/s. 246A(1)(a) of the Act, for adjudication on merits. It
also observed that while adjudicating the condonation application, the
CIT(A) shall liberally consider the fact that in the intervening period,
the assessee company was pursuing the appeal with the Tribunal, albeit
at the wrong forum with the Tribunal, instead of filing the first appeal
with the CIT(A) as provided in the Act.
The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
Exemptions – On sale of Agricultural land – Sections 54 B & 54 F:
(Narsing Gopal Patil, Pune vs. Asst CIT ITA No. ITA No.1544/PN/2012 & ITA 1815/PN/2012 (A Y: 2008-09) dt 3rd, May 2013).
The assessee for the subject assessment year, sold land which according to him had been used as agricultural land. The sale consideration was partly invested in the purchase of agricultural land and partly utilised for construction of the two buildings claiming it to be a residential house. The assessee claimed the benefit of exemption as available u/s. 54B of the Act to the extent the sale proceeds were utilised for purchase of the agricultural land and section 54F to the extent that the sale proceeds were utilised to construct the residential house. The Assessing Officer denied both the claims. Regarding the claim for the benefit of section 54B was concerned, he held that the assessee had not been able to prove that the land sold had been used for Agricultural purposes in the two preceding years prior to its sale.
The CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 54B in as much as it had led evidence before the Assessing Officer, that the user of the land sold was for agricultural purposes by furnishing 7/12 extract and his return of income filed for the Assessment years 2002 – 03 to 2007 – 08 disclosing agricultural income. The other claim of the assessee for exemption u/s. 54F was denied by the CIT(A).
The Dept. challenged the CIT (A) order to the extent it allowed the claim for benefit of section 54B, and assessee as regard section 54 F, before the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) in granting the benefit of section 54B to the assessee, on the ground that the assessee had produced evidence, to show that the land which was sold, was in fact used for agricultural purpose during the period of two years prior to the date of its transfer. This evidence was in the form of 7/12 extract as per land revenue record and also return of income filed for the assessment year 2005 – 2006 to 2007- 2008 in which the assessee had declared its agricultural income.
Similarly, the Tribunal upheld the claim of section 54 F by holding that, so long as the assessee’s claim of exemption was limited to the investment in the construction of the residential portion of the building, the same was held to be allowable.
The Hon’ble High Court observed that the finding recorded by the lower authorities was a finding of fact, that the subject land was being used for agricultural purpose in the two years preceding the date of the sale. This finding of fact was rendered on the basis of 7/12 extract led as evidence before the Assessing Officer, which indicates the manner in which the land is being used. In fact, as correctly observed by the Tribunal, there is a presumption of the correctness of entries in the land revenue record in terms of section 157 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. This presumption is not an irrebuttable presumption and it will be open for the Assessing Officer to lead evidence to rebut the presumption. However, no such evidence was brought on record by the Revenue to rebut the presumption. Moreover, the assessee has also placed before the authorities its return of income filed for the assessment year 2005 – 2006 to 2007- 2008, wherein he had inter alia declared agricultural income. In view of the fact that the revenue has not been able to establish that the evidence led by the assessee is unreliable by leading any contrary evidence, there is no reason to discard the evidence produced by the assessee. Thus, there is a concurrent finding of fact by CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal that the land has been used for agricultural purpose. Thus, no substantial question of law arises. However, the Court admitted the question relating to section 54 F claim i.e allowing exemption under section 54F, when the investment made by the assessee is in a ‘commercial cum housing complex’.
Section 14A – Shares held as stock in trade – Disallowance cannot be made :
Commissioner of Income Tax 4 vs. Credit Suisse First Boston (India) Securities Pvt. Ltd. INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.2387 of 2013 dt : 21ST MAR CH, 2016 (Bom HC) (Affirmed Mumbai ITAT decision on the above issues DCIT, CIT – 4(1) vs. M/s Credit Suisse First Boston (India) Securities Ltd. ITA no : 7354/Mum/2004, AY : 2001- 02 dt: 06/03/ 2013)
The assessee had been reflecting in the service tax return, the brokerage on accrued basis but in profit and loss account the brokerage was been shown on actual basis on the basis of constant method adopted by the assessee. The AO made an addition on this account . The CIT (A) and Tribunal recorded a finding that sometime the assessee was required to reduce the brokerage at the request of the assessee during the final settlement of the bills and some time the assessee was also required to waive part of the brokerage disputed by the clients. Therefore, difference as per the service tax return and as per profit and loss account was found explainable. This was a minor difference, which had been reconciled by the assessee. In the above view, the Hon’ble Court held that question as formulated does not give rise to any substantial question of law.
As regards section 14 A, it was observed that the Assessing Officer had disallowed the expenditure, on the ground that the Assesee had earned dividend income in respect of the shares held by the assessee. There is no dispute between the parties that the shares held by the Assessee are stock in trade, as the assessee is a trader in shares and had in its books classified it under the head ‘Stock in Trade’. The Revenue conceeded that the issue stood concluded against the Revenue and in favour of the Assessee, by the decisions of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax2(3) (Writ Petition No.1753 of 2016 rendered on 25th February, 2016). In view of the above, the Hon’ble Court held that question as formulated did not give rise to any substantial question of law.
Section 48 – Capital gain – Full value of consideration – computation of capital gain only refers to full value of consideration received – no occasion to substitute the same :
(Affirmed Mumbai ITAT decision in ACIT Cir.16(3) vs. M/s. B. Arunkumar & Co., ITA No.8272/M/11, AY : 2008- 09, Bench B, dt: 24.05.2013).
The assessee was a firm belonging to one Harshad Mehta Group. The assessee firm owned 19% shares in a company namely M/s. Inter Gold (India) Pvt. Ltd. Shares in the aforesaid company were acquired by the assessee-firm during the years 2002 and 2003 at different rates and these shares were not tradable in the open market. The balance share holding in M/s. Inter Gold was held by Sh. Arun Kumar Mehta family members (38%) and by foreign companies (41%). The assessee sold its 19% shareholdings in M/s. Inter Gold (India) Pvt. Ltd. to one M/s. Rosy Blue (I) (P) Ltd. and returned a capital loss on account of indexation. The consideration for the sale of shares in two tranches was Rs.750 per share and Rs.936 per share respectively.
The Assessing Officer did not accept the capital loss as claimed and sought to substitute the consideration received by the assessee at Rs.936 and Rs.750 per share with the value of Rs.1,225 per share as consideration received on the sale of its shares to M/s. Rosy Blue India Pvt. Ltd. This substituted value being the breakup value of the shares, was taken as its fair market value (FMV). In the result, the Assessing officer worked out the long term capital gains at Rs.4.57 crore instead of loss at Rs.3.65 crore as claimed. Being aggrieved, the assessee carried the issue in appeal to the CIT (Appeals). The CIT (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee. He held that in the absence of any provision in the Act to replace the consideration received on sale of shares, by adopting the market value is not permissible.
In contrast, attention was drawn to section 50C, which provides for substitution of the consideration received on sale of land and buildings by the stamp duty value of land and buildings (immovable property). He further held, that the Assessing Officer cannot substitute the consideration shown as received on sale of shares by the assessee in the absence of evidence, to indicate that the consideration disclosed on sale of shares was not the complete consideration received and/or accrued to the assessee. Being aggrieved, the Revenue carried this issue in appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal reiterated the findings of fact rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) that the transfer of the shares at the declared consideration was not done by the assessee with the object of tax avoidance or reducing its tax liability. The Tribunal, in the impugned order, placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Gillaners Arbuthnot and Co. (87 ITR 407) and CIT vs. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. (66 ITR 622), to conclude that, where a transfer of a capital assets takes place by sale on receipt of a price, then the consideration fixed/bargained for by the parties should be accepted for the purpose of computing capital gains. It cannot be replaced by the market value or a notional value. The full value of consideration is the money received to transfer the assets. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s Appeal and upheld the order of the CIT (Appeals).
The Revenue before the Hon’ble High Court, contented that the decisions of the Apex Court relied upon in the impugned order were rendered under Income-tax Act, 1922 and therefore, would not apply while considering the Act.
The Hon’ble court held that, it was not the case of the revenue that the amount disclosed by the respondent assessee, was less than what has been received by them or what had accrued on sale of its shares. The revenue has not in any manner shown that the consideration disclosed by the assessee to the revenue, is not the correct consideration received by them and that the same should be replaced. Moreover, wherever the Parliament thought it fit ,that the consideration on a transfer of a capital asset has to be ascertained on the basis of market value of the asset transferred, specific provision has been made in the Act. To illustrate section 50C provides for stamp value duty in case of transfer of land or buildings. Similarly, section 45(2) and 45(4) provide that in cases of conversion of the investment into stock in trade or transfer of shares on dissolution of a firm to its partners respectively has to be at market value. The consideration disclosed on sale of shares by the assessee was infact the only consideration received/ accrued to it, no occasion to substitute the same can arise. Accordingly, the appeal of Revenue was dismissed.
TDS – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) – Royalty – Payment for import of software – Not royalty – Tax not deductible at source on such payments – Amount not disallowable u/s. 40(a)(i)
The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of expenditure incurred for import of software relying on section 40(a)(i), on the ground that the payment was a royalty and that the tax was not deducted at source. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim, holding that the payment made by the assessee for import of software is not royalty.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held that the payments made by the assessee for import of software did not constitute royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act and there was no obligation to deduct tax at source u/s. 195 and as such the expenditure cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act.
TDS – Rent – Section 194I – Where One Time Nonrefundable Upfront Charges paid by the assessee was not (i) under the agreement of lease and (ii) merely for the use of the land and the payment was made for a variety of purposes such as (i) becoming a co-developer (ii) developing a Product Specific SEZ(iii) for putting up an industry in the land and both the lessor as well as the lessee intended to treat the lease virtually as a deemed sale, the upfront payment made by the assessee for the acquisition of leasehold rights over an immovable property for a long duration of time say 99 years could not be taken to constitute rental income at the hands of the lessor and hence lessee, not obliged to deduct TDS u/s. 194-I
In the appeal filed by the assessee, the following questions were raised before the Madras High Court:
“i)
Whether the upfront payment made by an assessee, under whatever name
including premium, for the acquisition of leasehold rights over an
immovable property for a long duration of time say 99 years, could be
taken to constitute rental income at the hands of the lessor, obliging
the lessee to deduct tax at source u/s. 194-I ?
ii) Whether in
the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was
right in confirming the levy of interest u/s. 201(1-A) ?”
The High Court held as under:
“i)
The One Time Non-refundable Upfront Charges paid by the assessee was
not (i) under the agreement of lease and (ii) merely for the use of the
land. The payment made for a variety of purposes, such as (i) becoming a
co-developer (ii) developing a Product Specific Special Economic Zone
in the Sriperumbudur Hi-Tech Special Economic Zone (iii) for putting up
an industry in the land. The lessor as well as the lessee intended to
treat the lease virtually as a deemed sale, giving no scope for any
confusion. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the
upfront payment made by the assessee for the acquisition of leasehold
rights over an immovable property for a long duration of time, say 99
years, could not be taken to constitute rental income at the hands of
the lessor, obliging the lessor to deduct tax at source u/s. 194-I.
Hence, the first substantial question of law is answered in favour of
the appellant/assessee.
ii) Once the first substantial question
of law is answered in favour of the appellant/assessee, by holding that
the assessee was not under an obligation to deduct tax at source, it
follows as a corollary that the appellant cannot be termed as an
assessee in default. As a consequence, there is no question of levy of
interest u/s. 201(1-A).
iii) In the result, the appeal is allowed.”
Revision against a deceased person is not valid – Sections 263 and 159 and 292BB – A. Y. 2009-10 – Where revision Proceedings u/s. 263 are initiated against a deceased assessee after the Income Tax Department comes to know of his death by notice returned by postal dept with remarks “addressee deceased”, such proceedings are a nullity and are not saved by section 292BB by reason of legal heirs having co-operated in revision proceedings nor by section 159
For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) on 26/03/2011 in the case of the assessee, M. A. Margesan. Subsequently, a notice u/s. 263 of the Act dated 06/09/2013 was issued in the name of the assessee, who had died on 13/06/2013. The notice was sent by post, but was returned with the endorsement ‘addressee deceased’. This fact was intimated by the Income Tax Officer to the Assistant Commissioner, by a communication dated 23/9/2013. However, thereafter the Department served the very same show cause notice on the son (Resdpondent)of the deceased assessee through a messenger. Left with no alternative, the son engaged the services of an authorised representative, who participated in the proceedings u/s. 263. Eventually, an order was passed by the Commissioner on 21/3/2014, sustaining the show cause notice, setting aside the scrutiny assessment order dated 23/6/2011 and remitting the matter back to the Assessing Officer to pass orders afresh. The Tribunal allowed the appeal holding that the order passed u/s. 263 against a dead person is a nullity.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“Where revision proceedings u/s. 263 are initiated against a deceased assessee after the Income Tax Department comes to know of his death by notice returned by postal dept with remarks “addressee deceased”, such proceedings are a nullity and are not saved by section 292BB by reason of legal heirs having co-operated in revision proceedings nor by section 159. There is a distinction between proceedings initiated against a person, who is alive, but continued after his death and a case of proceedings initiated against a dead person.”
Non-resident – Royalty – Sections 9 and 90 – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2009-10 – Royalty having same meaning under I. T. Act and DTAA – Subsequent scope in I. T. Act widening scope of “royalty” – Meaning under DTAA not changed – Assessee entitled to exemption as per DTAA
The assessee, a non-resident, derived income from the “lease of transponders” of their respective satellites. This lease was for the object of relaying signals of their customers; both resident and non-resident television channels, that wished to broadcast their programs for a particular audience situated in a particular part of the world. The assessees were chosen because the footprint of their satellites, i.e. the area over which the satellite could transmit its signal, included India. Having held the receipts taxable u/s. 9(1)(vi), the Assessing Officer held that the assessee would not get the benefit of DTAA between India and Thailand and between India and Netherlands. The Tribunal held that they were not taxable in India in view of the DTAA .
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) Just because there is a domestic definition similar to the one under the DTAA , amendments to the domestic law, in an attempt to counter, restrict or expand the definition under its statute, cannot extend to the definition under DTAA . In other words, the domestic law remains static for the purpose of DTAA . Consequently, the Finance Act, 2012 will not affect article 12 of the DTAA , and it would follow that the first determinative interpretation given to the word ”royalty” in the case of Asia Satellite, when the definitions were in fact pari materia, will continue to hold the field for the purpose of assessment years preceding the Finance Act, 2012 and in all cases which involve DTAA , unless the DTAA s are amended jointly by both parties to incorporate income from data transmission services as partaking the nature of royalty, or amend the definition in a manner so that such income automatically becomes royalty.
ii) T he receipts of the assessee from providing data transmission services were not taxable in India.”
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 55 dated March 29, 2016
Investment by Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) in Government Securities
This circular contains the increased limits for investment by FPI in Government Securities over the next 2 quarters as under: –
Any limit which remains unutilised by the long term investors at the end of a half-year will be available as additional limit to the investors in the open category for the following half-year. Accordingly, limits for the long term investors remaining unutilized at the end of half year ending Sept 30, 2016 will be released for investment under the open category in October, 2016.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54 dated March 23, 2016
Presently, banks are required to submit to RBI: –
1. Quarterly reports giving details of the name and address of the firm / company in whose name a Diamond Dollar Account is opened, along with the date of opening / closing the said Account.
2. Fortnightly statements giving data on DDA balances maintained by them.
This circular states that, with immediate effect, the above two reports / statements are not required to be submitted to RBI. However, banks are required to maintain the said database at their end and submit the same to RBI whenever called upon to do.
Liability of Stock Brokers for clients’ frauds – Supreme Court Decides
A fairly common allegation
made by SEBI against stock and sub brokers concerns frauds, price
manipulation, etc. that their clients may have carried out on stock
exchanges. SEBI often holds brokers also liable for such acts of their
clients. They are held to be liable for having acted negligently or even
having deliberately allowed such acts. Sometimes they may be also held
liable for having actually participated in such acts. Many large stock
brokers having thousands or lakhs of clients may end up being
unwittingly used by such clients who carry out their nefarious deals
through them. Such frauds usually involve synchronised trading, i.e.,
the buyers and sellers both coordinate their purchase/sale in time and
quantity both. For the broker, who faces an opaque electronic trading
terminal where the counter parties cannot be known, it is difficult to
monitor whether such trades take place.
Nevertheless, brokers
are routinely proceeded against. Their defences are often ignored or
dealt with as per varying/subjective standards. The fact that
allegations of frauds are serious in nature and hence require a higher
degree of proof is not fully appreciated. This is not of course to say
that brokers are necessarily and always innocent.
In this light,
a recent decision of the Supreme Court (SEBI vs.Kishore R. Ajmera
[2016] 66 taxmann.com 288 (SC)) is very helpful. It lays down several
parameters and guidelines as to how the role of the stock brokers would
be determined in such cases.
Before we discuss the relevant
facts of the case and the decision of the Court, it is worth
understanding some concepts involved here.
Basic concepts
The
following paragraphs discuss briefly some of the concepts relevant to
such frauds/manipulation. The background is that certain parties carry
out pre-determined trades on the stock exchange through the electronic
trading mechanism. Such automated mechanism does have some safeguards.
However, determined and coordinated efforts by a group of persons can
easily override them, particularly if the shares are relatively
illiquid. The objective of such efforts may be several but they usually
involve manipulation of price, volumes, etc. of the shares/securities
and thus present an artificial/fake impression of what is happening in
the stock market. In essence, the normal market mechanism of
price/volume determination is tampered with for various purposes.
Opaque electronic Stock Exchange mechanism
The
electronic stock market trading mechanism is opaque. This means that
the buyer does not know who is the seller or how many sellers are there,
and vice versa. He punches in his order, and the mechanism matches his
order with the best orders presently available from any person spanning
across the country. He may end up buying from several sellers or just
one. He may end up buying at several prices too, but obviously not
exceeding the price that he has keyed in. The defence of a person
accused of price manipulation is usually that he does not know, cannot
know, and in any case cannot control, who the counter party is.
Synchronized dealing
While
stock market trading mechanism is opaque, it is still possible for
determined persons to override this system. They ensure that in terms of
price, volume and timing, their trades are matched. Two or more parties
enter orders simultaneously by prior coordination at such price and
volumes and at such time that usually the whole or most of their trades
match. Person A may enter an order to buy 10000 shares at Rs. 31.30
which person B at the same time enters an order to sell at same price
and of same quantity. Unless the shares are quite liquid, their orders
will wholly or substantially match.
Price/volume manipulation
Usually
the objective of such exercise is to manipulate the price or volumes of
the shares in such a way that an artificial picture is shown. The
parties may carry out such synchronized trading to, say, progressively
increase the price of the shares. The parties may also carry out
continuous trading amongst themselves whereby a fake picture arises that
the stock is quite liquid. The public gets a wrong picture and may end
up participating, and may incur a loss.
No transfer of beneficial interest in securities
The
essential feature of such acts is that, on the whole, there is no
transfer of beneficial interest in securities outside the group. The
group may start with a certain quantity of shares and finally end up
with the same or nearly the same quantity of shares. The whole objective
is to circulate these shares amongst themselves. Of course, at certain
stages, the shares actually move within the group. For this reason,
trading without transfer of beneficial interest in shares is
specifically considered to be a fraudulent/manipulative act under
certain circumstances.
Facts of the case
The decision
gives a common ruling for appeals in matter of several stock/sub
brokers accused of price manipulation/ fraud and/or violation of Code of
Conduct applicable to them, on account of acts of their clients. In
each of such case, it appears that price manipulation/fraud was indeed
carried out. The question to be answered was how would the role of the
brokers be determined? The Court lays down certain guiding factors.
Thereafter, it applied such factors to the facts of each case and
determined the role of each broker.
The various levels of liability of brokers as determined by Court and tests therefor
The Court essentially laid down various levels of liability of brokers, which have been summarised as follows.
Firstly,
the Court divided the liability under law in two parts. First concerned
a civil liability that could result in a monetary penalty, suspension,
etc. on the broker. The second concerned a criminal liability that would
result in prosecution. The criteria to determine whether broker was
guilty would differ depending on whether the proceedings were civil or
criminal. Further, the allegation may be of having violated the Code of
Conduct whereby the broker may not have exercised due diligence/been
negligent. The allegation may also be of the broker having deliberately
allowed such trading for earning brokerage. Finally, the allegation may
be of having been actively involved in such price manipulation.
For
criminal proceedings, the Court observed that, “Prosecution u/s. 24 of
the Act for violation of the provisions of any of the Regulations, of
course, has to be on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
(emphasis supplied).
For civil proceedings, the Court observed,
“While the screen based trading system keeps the identity of the parties
anonymous it will be too naive to rest the final conclusions on said
basis which overlooks a meeting of minds elsewhere. Direct proof of such
meeting of minds elsewhere would rarely be forthcoming. The test, in
our considered view, is one of preponderance of probabilities so far as
adjudication of civil liability arising out of violation of the Act or
the provisions of the Regulations framed thereunder is concerned”.
To determine what, if at all, the role of the broker was, the Court laid down the following factors:-
“The
conclusion has to be gathered from various circumstances like that
volume of the trade effected; the period of persistence in trading in
the particular scrip; the particulars of the buy and sell orders,
namely, the volume thereof; the proximity of time between the two and
such other relevant factors. The fact that the broker himself has
initiated the sale of a particular quantity of the scrip on any
particular day and at the end of the day approximately equal number of
the same scrip has come back to him; that trading has gone on without
settlement of accounts i.e. without any payment and the volume of
trading in the illiquid scrips, all, should raise a serious doubt in a
reasonable man as to whether the trades are genuine. The failure of the
brokers/sub-brokers to alert themselves to this minimum requirement and
their persistence in trading in the particular scrip either over a long
period of time or in respect of huge volumes thereof, in our considered
view, would not only disclose negligence and lack of due care and
caution but would also demonstrate a deliberate intention to indulge in
trading beyond the forbidden limits thereby attracting the provisions of
the FUTP Regulations. The difference between violation of the Code of
Conduct Regulations and the FUTP Regulations would depend on the extent
of the persistence on the part of the broker in indulging with
transactions of the kind that has occurred in the present cases. Upto an
extent such conduct on the part of the brokers/sub-brokers can be
attributed to negligence occasioned by lack of due care and caution.
Beyond the same, persistent trading would show a deliberate intention to
play the market. The dividing line has to be drawn on the basis of the
volume of the transactions and the period of time that the same were
indulged in. In the present cases it is clear from all these surrounding
facts and circumstances that there has been transgressions by the
respondents beyond the permissible dividing line between negligence and
deliberate intention.”
It can be seen that, the Court also
highlighted a difference between liability of negligence / lack of due
care and caution under the Code of Conduct and liability for frauds/
manipulation under the Regulations.
The type of evidence to be gathered by SEBI to determine liability of the broker
The
Court then discussed the type of facts that SEBI would have to gather
and place on record to determine the liability and nature thereof of the
broker. As discussed above, where proceedings are civil in nature and
also considering that liability has to be determined by preponderance of
factors, direct proof may not be available nor needed. The Court
observed:-
“It is a fundamental principle of law that proof of
an allegation levelled against a person may be in the form of direct
substantive evidence or, as in many cases, such proof may have to be
inferred by a logical process of reasoning from the totality of the
attending facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations/charges
made and levelled. While direct evidence is a more certain basis to come
to a conclusion, yet, in the absence thereof the Courts cannot be
helpless. It is the judicial duty to take note of the immediate and
proximate facts and circumstances surrounding the events on which the
charges/allegations are founded and to reach what would appear to the
Court to be a reasonable conclusion therefrom. The test would always be
that what inferential process that a reasonable/ prudent man would adopt
to arrive at a conclusion.” (emphasis supplied).
Finally, the
Court laid down the following specific facts as relevant to determine
the liability of broker in each case. Whether the scrip was illiquid? It
has to be considered whether “the scrips in which trading had been done
were of illiquid scrips meaning thereby that such scrips were not
actively traded in the Bombay Stock Exchange and, therefore, was not a
matter of everyday buy and sell transactions. While it is correct that
trading in such illiquid scrips is per se not impermissible, yet,
voluminous trading over a period of time in such scrips is a fact that
should attract the attention of a vigilant trader engaged/engaging in
such trades.” Whether the Stock Exchange has issued any caution in
regard to the dealing in the scrip? Dealing in such scrips thus needs
greater attention by the broker.
Whether the clients who deal
through the broker know each other and such fact is known to the broker?
If such clients deal with each other through the broker, that should
surely attract concern from the broker. Whether the volumes in illiquid
scrips was huge, as was found in a case?
Whether the gap in time
of matching of the trades was too short (between 0-60 seconds in the
case before the Court)? Whether such trades were very frequent?
It
also emphasised that while the point relating to opaque screen trading
was relevant, this does not always rule out manipuation/frauds where
offline prior meeting of minds could be demonstrated by other factors.
Decision of the Supreme Court
The
Court applied the guiding factors to the facts of each case and
depending on individual facts, it either confirmed the adverse action
against the broker or set it aside.
Conclusion
This
decision should help make the law clearer and should be also helpful to
brokers in laying down systems and procedures to ensure that
frauds/manipulations by their clients do not take place and make them
liable for negligence or otherwise. Decisions by SEBI and the Securities
Appellate Tribunal will also thus become consistent and based on
certain pre-decided specific factors.
Depreciation – Section 32 – A. Y. 1996-97 – Purchase and lease back of energy measuring devices – Lessee not claiming depreciation – Assessee entitled to depreciation
In the relevant year, the assessee claimed 100% depreciation on energy measuring devices purchased from the Haryana State Electricity Board. After purchase, they were leased back to the Board, under a lease agreement dated 29/09/1995. The Assessing Officer held that the purchase and lease back transaction was in fact and in substance a finance lease agreement. He disallowed the depreciation relying on the Circular No. 2 of 2001 dated 09/02/2001 and added the amount to income of the assessee. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal filed by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The condition precedent in a case of hire purchase is ownership of the assets and user for purposes of the business, i.e., not usage of the assets by the assessee itself but for purposes of its business of leasing.
ii) The entire case of the Department was based on Circular No. 2 of 2001, dated 09/02/2001. CIT(A) had examined the transactions and found them to be genuine. It was not disputed that the lessee had not claimed depreciation and the assessee had also taken loan against security of the leased assets.
iii) Accordingly, appeal is dismissed.”
Charitable Trust – Registration – Section 12AA(2) – Period of six months provided in section 12AA(2) for disposal of application is not mandatory – Non disposal of application before expiry of six months does not result in deemed grant of registration –
The following question of law was raised in an appeal by the Revenue:
“Whether the non-disposal of an application for registration, by granting or refusing registration, before the expiry of six months as provided u/s. 12AA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would result in deemed grant of registration?”
The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held as under:
“Parliament has carefully and advisedly not provided for a deeming fiction to the effect that an application for registration would be deemed to have granted, if it is not disposed of within six months. Therefore, nondisposal of an application for registration before the expiry of six months as provided u/s. 12AA(2) would not result in a deemed grant of registration.”
Charitable Institution-Exemption u/s. 10 & 11- In computing the income of charitable institutions exempt u/s. 11, income exempt u/s. 10 has to be excluded. The requirement in section 11 with regard to application of income for charitable purposes does not apply to income exempt u/s. 10 –
The Bombay High Court had to consider whether an assessee enjoying exemption u/s. 11 could claim that the income exempt u/s. 10(33) and 10(38) had to be excluded while computing the application of income for charitable or religious purpose.
The High Court held as under:
“There is nothing in the language of sections 10 or 11 which says that what is provided by section 10 or dealt with is not to be taken into consideration or omitted from the purview of section 11. If we accept the argument of the Revenue, the same would amount to reading into the provisions something which is expressly not there. In such circumstances, the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the income which in this case the assessee trust has not included by virtue of section 10, then, that cannot be considered u/s. 11.”
Capital gains – Computation – Section 50C – Valuation by DVO – Sale of land – Stamp duty assigning higher value to the land – Matter should be referred to DVO –
The assessee sold piece of land for Rs. 10,00,000/-. The stamp duty value of the same was Rs. 35,00,000/-. The Assessing Officer adopted the stamp duty value u/s. 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and computed the capital gain on that basis. The Tribunal upheld the same.
On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) T he case of the assessee was that the price offered by the buyer was the highest prevailing price in the market. If this were his case then it is difficult to accept the proposition that the assessee had accepted that the price fixed for stamp duty was the fair market value of the property. No such inference could be made as against the assessee because he had nothing to do in the matter.
ii) Stamp duty was payable by the purchaser. It was for the purchaser to either accept it or dispute it. The assessee could not have done anything. In the case of this nature the Assessing Officer should, in fairness, have given an option to the assessee to have the valuation made by the DVO contemplated u/s. 50C.”
Capital gains – Section 45(4) – A. Y. 1993-94: Conversion of firm into company – Transfer of assets means a physical transfer or intangible transfer of rights to property – Conversion of shares of partners to shares in company – No transfer within meaning of section 45(4) – No capital gain:
In the A. Y. 1993-94, the assessee firm was converted into a private limited company. The entire assets and liabilities of the firm were made over to the company. The respective partners were issued shares by the company corresponding to the value of their share in the firm. The Assessing Officer took the view that there was transfer of assets from the firm to the private limited company and thereby the capital gains tax u/s. 45 became payable. The Tribunal held that section 45 was not applicable and deleted the addition.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) From a perusal of section 45(4) of the Incometax Act, 1961, it becomes clear that two aspects become important, viz., the dissolution of the firm and the distribution of the assets as a consequence thereof. The distribution must result in some tangible act of physical transfer of properties or tangible act of conferring exclusive rights vis-à-vis an item of property on the erstwhile shareholder. Unless these other legal correlatives take place, it cannot be inferred that there was any distribution of assets.
ii) The shares of the respective shareholders in the assessee company were defined under the partnership deed. The only change that had taken place on the assessee being transformed into the company was that the shares of the partners were reflected in the form of share certificates. Beyond that, there was no physical distribution of the assets in the form of dividing them into parts, or allocation of the assets to the respective partners or even distribution the monetary value thereof. Section 45 was not applicable.”
Business expenditure – Bogus purchases – A. Y. 2001-02 – No rejection of books of account – Substantial amount of sales to Government Department – Confirmation letters filed by suppliers, copies of invoices of purchases as well as copies of bank statements indicating purchases were made – Non-appearance of suppliers before authorities is not a ground to hold purchases bogus – No addition could be made –
For the A. Y. 2001-02, the assessee declared a total income of Rs. 42.08 lakh. The Assessing Officer disallowed an expenditure of Rs. 1.33 crore on account of purchases from seven parties on the ground that they were not genuine. The Tribunal found that the assessee had filed the letters of confirmation of suppliers, copies of bank statements showing entries of payment through account payee cheques to the suppliers, copies of invoices for purchases and stock statement, i.e. stock reconciliation statement and no fault was found with regard to it. Books of account of the assessee had not been rejected. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance holding that the purchases were not bogus.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The Tribunal had deleted the additions made on account of bogus purchases not only on the basis of stock statement, i.e. reconciliation statement but also in view of other facts. The Tribunal recorded that the books of account of the assessee had not been rejected. Similarly, the sales had not been doubted and it was an admitted position that a substantial amount of sales had been made to the Government Department.
ii) Further, there were confirmation letters filed by the suppliers, copies of invoices of purchases as well as copies of bank statements all of which would indicate that the purchases were in fact made.
iii) Merely because the suppliers had not appeared before the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals), one could not conclude the purchases were not made by the assessee. The order of the Tribunal was well reasoned order taking into account all the facts before concluding that the purchases of Rs. 1.33 crore were not bogus. No fault could be found with the order of the Tribunal.”
Business expenditure – Section 37(1) – A. Y. 2000-01 to 2002-03 – Where assessee, engaged in manufacturing and selling of motorcycles, made payment of royalty to a foreign company for merely acquiring right to use technical know how whereas ownership and intellectual property rights in know how remained with foreign company, payment in question was to be allowed as business expenditure –
The assessee was a joint venture between the Hero Group and Honda, Japan, for manufacture and sale of motorcycle using technology licensed by Honda. The assessee and Honda thereupon entered into an agreement called ‘licence and technical assistance agreement’ in terms of which assessee paid royalty to the Honda. The assessee claimed deduction of said payment u/s. 37(1). The Assessing Officer rejected assessee’s claim holding that it was in the nature of capital expenditure. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) In the facts of the present case, one has to consider whether the expenditure incurred on acquisition of right to technical information and know-how would satisfy the enduring benefit test in the capital field, or the right acquired had enabled the assessee’s trading and business apparatus, in practical and commercial sense.
ii) Technical information and know-how are intangible and have unique characteristics as distinct from tangible assets. These are acquired by a person over a period of time or acquired from a third person, who may transfer ownership or grant a licence in the form of right to use, i.e., grant limited rights, while retaining ownership rights. In the latter case technical information or know-how even when parted with, the proprietorship is retained by the original holder and in that sense what is granted to the user would be a mere right to use and not transfer absolute or complete ownership.
iii) In the instant case, from perusal of terms and conditions and applying the tests expounded, it has to be held that the payments in question were for right to use or rather for access to technical know how and information. The ownership and the intellectual property rights in the know how or technical information were never transferred or became an asset of the assessee. The ownership rights were ardently and vigorously protected by Honda. The proprietorship in the intellectual property was not conveyed to the assessee but only a limited and restricted right to use on strict and stringent terms were granted. The ownership in the intangible continued to remain the exclusive and sole property of Honda. The information, etc. were made available to assessee for day to day running and operation, i.e., to carry on business. In fact, the business was not exactly new. Manufacture and sales had already commenced under the agreement dated 24-1-1984. After expiry of the first agreement, the second agreement dated 2-6-1995, ensured continuity in manufacture, development, production and sale.
iv) In view of the aforesaid, it is held that the Tribunal was right in holding that the payment made to ‘Honda’ Japan under the ‘know-how’ agreement is revenue expense and not partly or wholly capital expense.”
PAN AND NON RESIDENT – Section 206AA
A person
entitled to receive any sum or income or amount, on which the is
deductible under chapter XVIIB, is required to furnish his Permanent
Account Number(PAN) to the payer as per section 206AA of the Income tax
Act, w.e.f. 01.04.2010. Failure to furnish PAN requires the payer to
deduct tax at the higher of the following rates;
(i) rate specified in the Act,
(ii) rate in force, or
(iii) rate of 20%.
Section 206AA also provides that a person cannot furnish a valid declaration u/s 197A without furnishing his PAN.
Section
195 requires a payer to deduct tax at source, at the rates in force, on
payments to a non-resident or a foreign company of any interest or any
other sum chargeable to tax under the Act. Section 2(37A) defines ‘rate
or rates in force’. One of the clauses of this section provides that for
the purposes of deduction of tax u/s. 195, the rate at which tax to be
deducted is the rate of income tax specified by the Finance Act of the
relevant year or the rate or rates specified in the relevant DTAA.
Section 2 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014, vide various sub-sections,
provides for payment of surcharge, education cess and secondary and
higher education cess on taxes, including on tax deduction at source, on
payments to a non-resident or a foreign company.
Issues have arisen, in the context of abovementioned provisions, which are listed as under;
are provisions of section 206AA applicable to cases of payees who are non resident or foreign companies,
are they applicable in cases where the tax is payable as per the provisions of DTAA ,
is
there a liability to deduct and pay surcharge and education cess in
cases where tax is deducted at 20% as per section 206AA, on payments to
non-resident or foreign company, and
what shall be the amount of tax that is to be grossed up for the payment of section 195A in cases where tax is paid by payer.
Bosch Ltd .’s case.
The
issue first came up for consideration of the Bangalore tribunal in the
case of Bosch Ltd., 28 taxmann.com 228 (Bangalore – Trib.) for
Assessment Year 2011-12. In that case, the assessee, a manufacturing
company with both imported and indigenous plant and machinery, entrusted
Annual Maintenance Contracts as well as repairs contracts to foreign
suppliers of machinery and equipments. The suppliers were residents of
Germany. The assessee made payments towards the AMCs and RCs without
deduction of tax at source on the understanding that the payments
represented business receipts of non-resident companies, who did not
have any PE in India, and as such, the payments were not chargeable to
tax in India. The AO as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the
payments made by the assessee to the non-residents towards AMC and RC
were not their business profits, but were ‘fees for technical services’,
and the assessee was liable to withhold tax at the rate of 20 %. They
further held that since non-resident recipients did not furnish their
PANs to assessee-deductor, tax was required to be deducted at source at
higher rate u/s. 206AA.
In the appeal to the Tribunal, as
regards the applicability of the rate of 20% u/s. 206AA, the assessee
submitted that, the non-residents are not required to apply and obtain a
PAN u/s. 139A as per section 139A(8)(d) r.w.rule 114c(b); the reliance
of the CIT(A) on the press note dated 20.01.2010 was misplaced, as a
press note could not override the provisions of law; the provisions of
section 206AA were applicable only where the recipients were required
under the law to obtain the PAN and not otherwise. In support of the
contention, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Karnataka High
Court in the case of Smt. A. Kowsalya Bai, 346 ITR 156.
On the
other hand, the Income tax Department supported the orders of the CIT(A)
and submitted that as per the form 15CB furnished by the assessee, the
payments for repairs had been treated as ‘FTS’ and the rate of tax was
mentioned as 20%; that the certificate issued by the assessee’s own
auditors was binding on the assessee and the assessee had rightly
deducted tax @ 20%, though out of caution, as provided u/s. 206AA of the
Act; that the CBDT in its press note dated 20.01.2010 had clearly
stated that the procedure of obtaining PAN was easy and inexpensive and
that even non-residents were required to obtain the same; s. 206AA had
overriding effect over all other provisions of the Act and, therefore,
whenever there was taxable income, the non-residents were required to
furnish their PANs to the deductor, failing which the rate specified u/s
206AA had to be applied; the decision of the Karnataka High Court, in
the case of Smt. A. Kowsalya Bai (supra), relied upon by the assessee,
was distinguishable on facts in as much as in that case, the assessees’
therein, whose income was below the taxable limit were residents, while
in the case before the tribunal, the recipients of the remittances were
non-residents having income above the taxable limit; and the income
being taxable in India as FTS, the recipients were required to obtain
PAN, failing which the rate u/s 206AA was applicable.
In
rejoinder, the assessee submitted that the Form 15CB prepared by the C.A
of the assessee company only reflected the opinion or a view of the C.A
and could not be considered as the admission of the assesse, and the
assessee had the right to deny its liability to deduct tax at source and
the issue had to be decided in accordance with law, and not on the
basis of the opinion of the C.A of the assessee.
The tribunal
first dealt with the issue of Form No.15CB and its binding nature on the
assessee. It held that the argument of the Department that the assessee
by furnishing Form No.15CB had admitted that the payment was ‘fees for
technical services’ could not be accepted, because Form No.15CB was a
certificate issued by an accountant (other than an employee) and,
therefore, it was the opinion or view of the accountant and could not be
said to be binding on the assessee; every transaction between the
assessee and the non-residents had to be considered in its own right,
and its nature was to be decided in accordance with the intention of the
parties and in accordance with law; even where it was to be considered
as an admission by the assessee, the same could not be accepted to be
the gospel truth and had to be verified by the AO; and the assessee had
every right to challenge the opinion given by its own C.A and it was for
the Revenue authorities to decide the issue in accordance with law and,
therefore, Form No.15CB alone would not determine the nature of the
transaction.
On applicability of section 206AA the tribunal
observed that the provisions of section 206AA clearly override the other
provisions of the Act and therefore, a nonresident whose income was
chargeable to tax in India had to obtain PAN and provide the same to the
assessee deductor; the only exemption given was that non-resident whose
income was not chargeable to tax, in India was not required to apply
for and obtain a PAN; however, where the income was chargeable to tax
irrespective of the residential status of the recipients, every assessee
was required to obtain a PAN and this provision was brought to ensure
that there was no evasion of tax by foreign entities.
The assessee’s contention that the assesse, being a non resident, was not required to apply for and obtain a Pan by virtue of rule 114(C)(b) of income-tax rules read with section 139a(8)(d) of the income-tax act was negatived by the tribunal as, in its view, the provisions of section 206aa clearly override the other provisions of the act. therefore, a non-recipient whose income was chargeable to tax in india had to obtain a Pan and provide the same to the assessee deductor. the assessee’s reliance upon the decision of the Karnataka high Court in the case of Smt. A. Kowsalya Bai (supra), was found to be misplaced and distinguishable on facts from the facts of the case as, in the case of Smt. A. Kowsalya Bai (supra), the recipients of the interest were residents of india and their total income was less than the taxable limit prescribed by the relevant finance act. it was in such facts and circumstances that the high Court had held that where the recipients of the ‘interest income’ were not having income exceeding taxable limits, it was not required to obtain a Pan. it held that in the instant case, the recipients were non-residents and admittedly the income exceeded the taxable limit prescribed by the relevant finance act. In the circumstances, the recipients were bound and were under an obligation to obtain a Pan and furnish the same to the assessee; for failure to do so, the assessee was liable to withhold tax at the higher of rates prescribed u/s. 206aa i.e. 20 % and the Commissioner (appeals) had rightly held that the provision of section 206aa were applicable to the assessee.
Serum Institute of India LTD.’s case
The issue again came up for consideration of the Pune tribunal in the case of Serum institute of india Ltd., ita no.s 1601 to 1604/Pn/2014. in that case, the assessee, a company incorporated under the Companies act, 1956 was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of vaccines, and was a major exporter of the vaccines. in the course of its business activities, the assessee made payments to non-residents on account of interest, royalty and fees for technical services during the financial year 2010-11, relevant to the assessment year under consideration. These payments were subjected to withholding tax u/s 195 of the act and the assessee deducted tax at source on such payment in accordance with the tax rates provided in the double taxation avoidance agreements (dtaas) with the respective countries. The tax rate so provided in the dtaas was lower than the rate prescribed under the act and therefore, in terms of the provisions of section 90(2) of the act, the tax was deducted at source by applying the beneficial rates prescribed under the relevant dtaas.
The ao found that in cases of some of the non-residents, the recipients did not have Permanent account numbers (PANs). As a consequence of such finding, he treated such payments, as cases of ‘short deduction’ of tax in terms of the provisions of section 206aa of the act. as a consequence, demands were raised on the assessee for the short deduction of tax and also for interest u/s. 201(1a) of the act. The aforesaid dispute was carried by the assessee in appeal before the Commissioner (appeals), who allowed the appeals of the assessee.
Aggrieved by the orders of the Commissioner (appeals), the revenue raised common Grounds of appeal as under :-
“1) The CIT(A) erred in law in concluding that sec 206AA is not applicable in case of non-residents as the DTAA overrides the Act as per section 90(2).
2) The decision of the CIT(A) is not according to the law and erred in ignoring the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2009 which clearly states that the sec. 206AA applies to non-residents and also Press Release of CBDT No.402/92/2006-MC (04 of 2010) dated 20.01.2010 which reiterates that sec. 206AA will also apply to all non-residents in respect of payments/remittances liable to TDS.
3) The CIT(A) erred in ignoring the decision of the ITAT Bangalore in the case of Bosch Ltd. vs ITO, ITA No.552 to 558 (Bang.) of 2011 dated 11.10.2012, in which it was held that if the recipient has not furnished the PAN to the deductor, the deductor is liable to withhold tax at the higher rates prescribed u/s. 206AA.”
The assessee contested the claims of the department and reiterated the contentions raised before the Commissioner(appeals) by submitting that the provisions of section 206aa were not applicable to payments made to non-residents; that the provisions of section139a(8) of the act r.w. rule 114C(1) of the income tax rules, 1962 prescribed that non-residents were not required to apply for Pan; that section 206aa of the act prescribed that the recipient should furnish Pan and such furnishing would be possible only where the recipient was required to obtain Pan under the relevant provisions; that where the non-residents were not obliged to obtain a Pan, the requirement of furnishing the same in terms of section 206aa of the act did not arise; that the tax rate applicable in terms of section 206aa of the act could not prevail over the tax rate prescribed in the relevant dtaas, as the rates prescribed in the DTAAs were beneficial.
The assessee relied on the provisions of section 90(2) of the act, which prescribed that provisions of the act were applicable to the extent that they were more beneficial to the assessee, and since section 206aa of the act prescribed higher rate of withholding tax, it would not be beneficial to the assessee vis-à-vis the rates prescribed in the dtaas.
On consideration of the rival submissions, the tribunal observed and held as under;
- There cannot be any doubt in view of section 90(2), that the tax liability in india of a non-resident was to be determined in accordance with the more beneficial provisions of the act or the dtaa,
- The CIT(a), relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of azadi Bachao andolan and others, (2003) 263 itr 706 (SC), had correctly held that the provisions of the DTAAs would prevail over the general provisions contained in the act to the extent they were beneficial to the assessee,
- The dtaas entered into between india and the other relevant countries in the present context, provided for scope of taxation and/or a rate of taxation which was different from the scope/rate prescribed under the act, and for the said reason, the assessee deducted the tax at source having regard to the provisions of the respective DTAAs which provided for a beneficial rate of taxation,
- Even the charging section 4 as well as section 5 of the act, which dealt with the principle of ascertainment of total income under the act, were subordinated to the principle enshrined in section 90(2) as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of azadi Bachao andolan and others (supra), and
- In so far as the applicability of the scope/rate of taxation with respect to the impugned payments made to the non-residents was concerned, no fault could be found with the rate of taxation invoked by the assessee based on the DTAAs, which prescribed for a beneficial rate of taxation.
- In our considered opinion, it would be quite incorrect to say that though the charging section 4 of the act and section 5 of the act dealing with ascertainment of total income are subordinate to the principle enshrined in section 90(2) of the act but the provisions of Chapter XVii-B governing tax deduction at source were not subordinate to section 90(2) of the act.
- Notably, section 206aa of the act was not a charging section but was a part of procedural provisions dealing with collection and deduction of tax at source. The provisions of section 195 of the act, which cast a duty on the assessee to deduct tax at source on payments to a non-resident, could not be looked upon as a charging provision. in-fact, in the context of section 195 of the act also, the hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of eli Lily & Co., 312 itr 225 (SC) observed that the provisions of tax withholding i.e. section 195 of the act would apply only to sums which were otherwise chargeable to tax under the act. the Supreme Court in the case of Ge india technology Centre Pvt. Ltd., 327 itr 456 (SC) held that the provisions of dtaas along with the sections 4, 5, 9, 90 & 91 of the act were relevant while applying the provisions of tax deduction at source, and
In view of the schematic interpretation of the act, section 206AA of the act could not be understood to override the charging sections 4 and 5 of the act.
The provisions of section 90(2) of the act had the effect of overriding domestic law, including the charging sections 4 and 5 of the act, and in turn, section 206aa of the act.
The Pune tribunal accordingly held that where the tax had been deducted on the strength of the beneficial provisions of dtaas, the provisions of section 206AA of the act could not be invoked by the ao to insist on the tax deduction @ 20%, having regard to the overriding nature of the provisions of section 90(2) of the act. The Tribunal affirmed the ultimate conclusion of the CIT(A) in deleting the tax demand relatable to difference between 20% and the actual tax rate on which tax was deducted by the assessee in terms of the relevant dtaas.
Observations
Section 90(2) provides for application of the provisions of the DTAA over the provisions of the income-tax act. The rate of tax provided for in dtaa apply in preference to the rate provided in the Act where beneficial. The internationally acclaimed position that the provisions of dtaa override the provisions of the domestic law is now also enshrined in the income tax act vide section 90(2) of the act. Please see azadi Bachao aandolan, 263 ITR 706, wherein the Supreme court clearly confirms that the provisions of section 90(2) override the provisions of the act as also the provisions of sections 4 and 5 thereof.
Section 206 aa provides for the rate at which tax is to be deducted at source in cases where the payee does not furnish his Pan. the provisions of section 206aa contain non-obstante clause that override the application of other provisions of the act. Section 90(2) also overrides the provisions of the act including the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the act, in the manner noted above. in the circumstances, the issue that requires to be considered is which provision shall prevail over the other. apparently, both are special provisions and override the general provisions.
The operation of section 206aa however is limited to the provisions of chapter XVii-B of the act while the application of the dtaa r.w.s.90(2) is sweeping and travels to cover even the charging provisions. A combined reading of these provisions reveal that in deciding the tax that is ultimately payable by the payee, the tax that is determined by applying the dtaa rates, will alone be relevant and the amount of TDS if found higher will be refunded. There does not prevail any doubt on this position in law. There is therefore an agreement that the ultimate charge is based on the rate provided by section 90(2) read with the provisions of the DTAA and not by section 206 AA.
Section 195 read with the rules and the prescribed forms, clearly permit a deductor to deduct tax at such rate that has been provided under the DTAA. On a combined reading of these provisions, it is clear that the tax is to be deducted at the rate provided in DTAA in as much it is the rate at which the income of a non-resident will be ultimately taxable. There is also no disagreement that no tax is deductible where income is otherwise not taxable even where Pan is not furnished.
The two overriding provisions of the act operate in different fields. One for determining the rate at which the tax is deductible, and the other for determining the rate at which the income will ultimately be taxed. the usual approach in situations, where such conflicting special provisions exist, is to apply both of them to the extent possible. Accordingly, one view of resolving the issue on hand is to deduct tax at 20% while making payment to a non-resident who does not furnish Pan, and eventually tax his income at the rate prescribed under the dtaa and grant refund to him. The other view is to shorten this exercise by deducting only such tax as is ultimately payable by a non-resident which, in the absence of section 206AA, is otherwise the correct approach and meets the due compliance of sections 195, 4, 5, 90 and the provisions of the DTAA; an approach which has the benefit of avoiding the round tripping for refund. The second view is otherwise also supported by acceptance of the position in law by both the parties that provisions of section 206aa are not applicable where no tax is otherwise required to be deducted at source, on the ground that the income of the non-resident is not liable to tax at all.
It is also worthwhile to note that section 206aa is not a charging section and perhaps is also not a provision that creates an obligation to deduct tax at source. A primary obligation to deduct tax at source is under different provisions of chapter XViiB and is not u/s. 206AA, which section has a limited scope of redefining the rate at which tax, otherwise deductible, is to be deducted. In the absence of a preliminary obligation to deduct tax at source, provision of section 206aa fails.
An important consideration that has to be kept in mind is that there is no leakage of revenue in adopting the second view. The tax that is deducted as per the provisions of section 195 r.w.s 2(37a) and section 90 and the provisions of the dtaa, is the only tax that is otherwise payable on the income of the non-resident. The tax is deducted in full not leaving claim for payment of balance tax. as against that, not applying the provisions of section 206aa in cases of residents, may result into leakage of some
Revenue where the payee without PAN, chooses not to file a return of income.
We are of the considered view that in the following cases, the provisions of section 206aa should not be applied;
• where the income of the non-resident is not taxable under the income-tax act either on account of the provisions of the income-tax act or on account of the provisions of the dtaa,
• where the income of the non-resident is taxable at the fixed rate as specified in the Income-tax Act or in the dtaa and the tax deductible u/s. 195 matches such rate.
Logically, in most of the cases of payment to non- residents, the provisions of section 206aa should have no application for the simple reason that the tax that is required to be deducted by the payer u/s. 195, is the same that has to be paid on his total income. nothing less, nothing more, and nothing is gained by asking for a higher deduction for non-furnishing of the Pan and thereafter refunding the higher tax so deducted.
It is for this reason, perhaps, that the provisions of section 139A(8) of the act r.w. rule 114C(1) of the income tax rules, 1962 prescribed that non-residents were not required to apply for Pan.
Having said that, we need to take notice of sub- section(7) of section 206aa which grants exemption, from application of the provisions of section 206aa, in respect of payment of interest on long-term bonds referred to in section 194LC to a non-resident. This means that the tax is such a case is to be deducted at the specified rate of 5%, even where the non-resident does not furnish Pan. This provision in our opinion should be considered to have been inserted out of abundant precaution, and should not be construed to mean that in all other cases of payments to non-residents, provisions of section 206aa should apply.
There does not seem to be any apparent need for reading down the provisions of section 206AA, in our considered view, to exclude its applicability to the cases of non- residents, in as much as it is possible to exclude such application on the basis of the reasonable interpretation of the two special provisions of the act. However, it may be read down if it is so required in the interest of the administration of law.
The view expressed here can be further tested by answering the question as to what shall be the ao’s prescription of the rate at which tax is to be deducted, on a payment to a non-resident, where an application is made to him u/s 195(2) or 195(3). Can an ao order that the tax should be deducted at 20%, disregarding the provisions of dtaa and the act, simply because the non-resident has not furnished Pan? We do not think so.
The Press note dated 20.01.2010 has no legal force and, in any case, its scope should be restricted to the very limited cases of payments to non-residents, where the tax deducted at source u/s. 195 does not represent the tax that is finally payable by them.
Section 206aa therefore cannot be applied in isolation simply because it contains a non-obstante clause. in applying the provisions, it is necessary to read the provisions of the act and in particularly the provisions of sections 2(37a), 4, 5, 90 and 195 and the dtaa as also some of the provisions of the act that provide for the rate at which income of a non-resident is required to be taxed. The Supreme Court in the case of Ge india technology Centre Pvt. Ltd., 327 ITR 456 (SC) held that the provisions of dtaas along with the sections 4, 5, 9, 90 & 91 of the act would have a role to play while applying the provisions of tax deduction at source contained in chapter XVii B of the act.
In view of the observations, the surcharge and education cess in cases of payments to a non-resident, where applicable, shall be payable on the basis of the rate of tax determined in accordance with the provisions of section 195. However, section 206aa shall not apply, as discussed here.
It is also interesting to note that even the Bangalore tribunal in Bosch’s case, while upholding the revenue’s stand that the tax was required to be deducted at 20% in cases of non furnishing of Pan, held that for the purposes of grossing up in terms of section 195A, the rate that has to adopted is the rate in force and not 20% as prescribed by section 206AA.
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act – the Indian side of regulations
In a country which has
entered into an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) Model 1 agreement,
the Foreign Financial Institutions (FFIs) are not required to report
financial information directly to the US IRS. Instead, the FFIs have to
report such financial information to the Government of the country where
they are operating. This addresses a major hurdle in FAT CA
implementation viz., the issue of data privacy. Once the laws of an IGA
Model 1 country provide for the FFIs to provide data to the Government
of the country in which they are operating, it is difficult for the FFI
or the clients of the FFI to challenge such requirements under data
privacy laws operating in most countries.
In India, the term FFI,
would generally include banks, nonbank finance companies, housing
finance companies, depository participants (custodians), insurance
companies and similar institutions. In order to make FAT CA reporting
possible in the IGA Model 1 framework, the Government of India needed to
have a policy decision that India would participate in the information
exchange programme, a legal framework to authorise collection of such
financial information, an agency to administer the exchange of
information requirements. Work on some of these areas started in 2013
and significant steps have been taken till end of March 2015. Additional
steps are being taken to strengthen the information exchange programme.
India – policy decision
One of the first decision
points was whether India would participate in the FAT CA initiative
launched by the US. After examining possible consequences for the Indian
financial sector if India remains away and in light of India’s
commitment to global financial transparency, the Government of India
decided that it would enter into an IGA. As negotiation of tax treaties
and exchange of information was generally handled by the Ministry of
Finance (MoF), it was decided that the MoF would be the nodal agency for
FATCA and other similar financial information exchange initiatives.
From the second half of 2013 to early 2014, the MoF officials worked
with regulators in the Indian financial sector to determine what should
be the broad agreement with the US IRS. The principal regulators
involved in the consultation were the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Insurance
Regulatory & Development Authority (IRDA). Based on this
consultation, an agreement ‘in substance’ was entered into in April
2014. One crucial administrative detail that remained was the formal
approval by the Union Cabinet supporting the signing of the final IGA.
This was scheduled for March 2014 but ultimately was obtained in March
2015.
Regulations
Before the IGA in substance was
entered into, one of the key questions before the Indian Government, the
regulators and before the FFIs was whether there was any regulatory
support for FFIs to send financial information in respect of their
clients to the US IRS directly. One school of thought was that Article
28(1) and 28(2) of the India-US Double Tax Avoidance (DTAA ) allowed the
exchange of information subject to the limitations under Article 28(3) –
for ease of reference, all three are reproduced below – at Government
to Government level but FFIs could not directly report to the US IRS.
1.
The competent authorities of the Contracting State shall exchange such
information (including documents) as is necessary for carrying out the
provisions of this Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting
States concerning taxes covered by the Convention insofar as the
taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention, in particular,
for the prevention of fraud or evasion, of such taxes. The exchange of
information is not restricted by Article 1 (General Scope). Any
information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret
in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of
that State. However, if the information is originally regarded as secret
in the transmitting State, it shall be disclosed only to persons or
authorities (including Courts and administrative bodies) involved in the
assessment, collection, or administration of, the enforcement or
prosecution in respect of or the determination of appeals in relation
to, the taxes which are the subject of the Convention. Such persons or
authorities shall use the information only for such purposes, but may
disclose the information in public Court proceedings or in judicial
decisions. The competent authorities shall, through consultation,
develop appropriate conditions, methods and techniques concerning the
matters in respect of which such exchange of information shall be made,
including, where appropriate, exchange of information regarding tax
avoidance.
2. The exchange of information or documents shall be
either on a routine basis or on request with reference to particular
cases, or otherwise. The competent authorities of the Contracting States
shall agree from time to time on the list of information or documents
which shall be furnished on a routine basis.
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on a Contracting State the obligation :
(a)
to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b)
to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting
State;
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade,
business, industrial, commercial, or professional secret or trade
process, or information the disclosure of which would be country to
public policy (ordre public).
The regulators, however, believed
that the statutes did not generally empower them to ask for financial
information of the type envisaged under FAT CA and that an amendment of
the statute was necessary. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2015 amended the
Income-tax Act, 1961 by substituting new section 285BA for the earlier
section with effect from 1st April, 2015. This amendment also provides
for registration with the Government of India, of any reporting
institution, a provision that was absent in the old section 285BA.
Registration
Although
an FFI may be operating in an IGA Model 1 country like India and will
report through its host country Government, it is still required to
obtain the Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN) as an FFI.
Although India entered into an IGA in substance in early April 2014,
Indian regulators did not give the green signal to apply for GIIN in
April 2015 i.e. the cut-off date for getting the GIIN by June before the
FAT CA implementation date of 1st July, 2014. FFIs having multi-country
operations e.g. State Bank of India, however, applied for and obtained
GIIN in the first list. FFIs operating in India were treated as being
FAT CA compliant till 31st December, 2014 in terms of the IGA in
substance. On 30th December, 2014, both RBI and SEBI directed FFIs to
apply for and obtain GIIN by 1st January, 2015. The IRDA issued similar
instructions a little later. The stage was set for FFIs in India to
obtain GIIN.
Regulations
In late 2014, the mof circulated to a limited group, the draft version 3 of the proposed rules for CRS and fatCa for comments by stakeholders. in early 2015, the draft version 5 was similarly circulated for comments. the suggestions that have come in are currently under evaluation on the MOF side. It is understood that a reporting entity will obtain, apart from the 20-character GIIN under FATCA, a 16-character indian reporting entity identification number. This will be in addition to any Permanent account number (PAN) that the entity may have but will capture the PAN (or TAN) as part of the 16-characters. this requirement is broadly similar to that in the UK, where FATCA implementation under model 1 IGA has progressed further. The FFI will have to file separate reports in respect of different activities e.g. a bank maintaining bank accounts and also providing demat accounts will report the information for bank accounts separately from that relating to custody accounts. the nature of the reporting requirements and complications will also necessitate issuance of detailed guidance by the MOF.
Meanings of specific terms
Certain terms have been defined under the draft regulations. Some of the important ones are briefly discussed here.
A financial institution (hereinafter referred to as ‘fi’) is defined to mean a custodial institution, a depository institution, an investment entity or a specified insurance company. the terms ‘custodial institution’ and ‘depository institution’ are not directly defined. We have to derive the meaning indirectly from usage in the definition of ‘financial account’.
A ‘financial account’ means an account (other than an excluded account) maintained by an FI and includes (i) a depository account; (ii) a custodial account (iii) in the case of an investment entity, any equity or debt interest in the FI; (iv) any equity or debit interest in an FI if such interest in the institution is set up to avoid reporting under (iii); and
(v) cash value insurance contract or an annuity contract (subject to certain exceptions).
For this purpose, a ‘depository account’ includes any commercial, savings, time or thrift account or an account that is evidenced by certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness or other similar instrument maintained by a FI in the ordinary course of banking or similar business. It also includes an account maintained by an insurance company pursuant to a guaranteed investment contract. In ordinary parlance, a ‘depository account’ relates to a normal bank account plus certificates of deposit (CDs), recurring deposits, etc. A ‘custodial account’ means an account, other than an insurance contract or an annuity contract, or the benefit of another person that holds one or more financial assets. In normal parlance, this would largely refer to demat accounts. The national Securities depository Ltd. (NSDL) statement showing all of their investments listed at one place will give the readership an idea of what a ‘custodial account’ entails. These definitions are at slight variance with the commonly understood meaning of these terms in india.
the term ‘equity interest’ in an FI means,
(a) in the case of a partnership, share in the capital or share in the profits of the partnership; and
(b) in the case of a trust, any interest held by
– Any person treated as a settlor or beneficiary of all or any portion of the trust; and
– any other natural person exercising effective control over the trust.
For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the beneficiary has the direct or the indirect right to receive under a mandatory distribution or a discretionary distribution from the trust.
An ‘insurance contract’ means a contract, other than an annuity contract, under which the issuer of the insurance contract agrees to pay an amount on the occurrence of a specified contingency involving mortality, morbidity, accident, liability or property. an insurance contract, therefore, includes both assurance contracts and insurance contracts. an ‘annuity contract’ means a contract under which the issuer of the contract agrees to make a periodic payment where such is either wholly or in part linked to the life expectancy of one or more individuals. a ‘cash value insurance contract’ means an insurance contract that has a cash value but does not include indemnity reinsurance contracts entered into between two insurance companies. in this context, the cash value of an insurance contract means
(a) Surrender value or the termination value of the contract without deducting any surrender or termination charges and before deduction of any outstanding loan against the policy; or
(b) The amount that the policy holder can borrow against the policy
whichever is less. the cash value will not include any amount payable on death of the life assured, refund of excess premiums, refund of premium (except in case of annuity contracts), payment on account of injury or sickness in the case of insurance (as opposed to life assurance) contracts
An ‘excluded account’ means
(i) A retirement or pension account where
• The account is subject to regulation as a personal retirement account;
• The account is tax favoured i.e. the contribution is either tax deductible or is excluded from taxable income of the account holder or is taxed at a lower rate or the investment income from such account is deferred or is taxed at a lower rate;
• Information reporting is required to the income-tax authorities with respect to such account;
• Withdrawals are conditional upon reaching a specified retirement age, disability, death or penalties are applicable for withdrawals before such events;
• The contributions to the account are limited to either $ 50,000 per annum or to $ one million through lifetime.
(ii) An account which satisfies the following requirements viz.
• The account is subject to regulations as a savings vehicle for purposes other than retirement or the account (other than a uS reportable account) is subject to regulations as an investment vehicle for purposes other than for retirement and is regularly traded on an established securities market;
• The account is tax favoured i.e. the contribution is either tax deductible or is excluded from taxable income of the account holder or is taxed at a lower rate or the investment income from such account is deferred or is taxed at a lower rate;
• Withdrawals are conditional upon specific criteria (educational or medical benefits) or penalties are applicable for withdrawals before such criteria are met;
• The contributions to the account are limited to either $ 50,000 per annum or to $ one million through lifetime.
(iii) An account under the Senior Citizens Savings Scheme 2004;
(iv) A life insurance contract that will end before the insured reaches the age of 90 years (subject to certain conditions to be satisfied);
(v) An account held by the estate of a deceased, if the documentation for the account includes a copy of the will of the deceased or a copy of the deceased’s death certificate;
(vi) An account established in connection with any of the following
• A court order or judgment;
• A sale, exchange or lease of real or personal property, if the account is for the extent of down payment, earnest money, deposit to secure the obligation under the transaction, etc.
• An FI’s obligation towards current or future taxes in respect of real property offered to secure any loan granted by the FI;
(vii) In the case of an account other than a US reportable account, the account exists solely because a customer overpays on a credit card or other revolving credit facility and the overpayment is not immediately returned to the customer. Up to 31st december, 2015, there is a cap of $ 50,000 applicable for such overpayment.
Before any analysis of these definitions can be done in the India context, it is important to note the definition of ‘non-reporting financial institution’. A ‘non-reporting financial institution’ means any FI that is, –
(a) A Government entity, an international organisation or a central bank except where the fi has depository, custodial, specified insurance as part of its commercial activity;
(b) Retirement funds of the Government, international organisation, central bank at (a) above;
(c) A non-public fund of the armed forces, an employee state insurance fund, a gratuity fund or a provident fund;
(d) An entity which is indian fi solely because of its direct equity or debt interest in the (a) to (c) above;
(e) A qualified credit card issuer;
(f) A FI that renders investment advice, manages portfolios for and acts on behalf or executes trades on behalf a customer for such purposes in the name of the customer with a fi other than a non- participating fi;
(g) An exempt collective investment vehicle;
(h) A trust set up under indian law to the extent that the trustee is a reporting fi and reports all information required to be reported in respect of financial accounts under the trust;
(i) An FI with a local client base or with low value accounts or a local bank;
(j) In case of any US reportable account, a controlled foreign corporation or sponsored investment entity or sponsored closely held investment vehicle.
An FI with a local client base is one that does not have a place of business outside india and which also does not solicit customers or account holders outside india. It should not operate a website that indicates its offer of services to uS persons or to persons resident outside india. The test of residency to be applied here is that of tax residency. The term ‘local bank’ will include cooperative credit societies. In this case also offering of account to US persons or to persons resident outside india, will be treated as a bar to being characterised as a local bank.
Due Diligence
The draft regulations provide for three categories of due diligence exercise in respect of client documentation under FATCA for accounts of US persons viz.
(i) new account due diligence (NADD);
(ii) Pre-existing account due diligence (PADD)
• For high value accounts i.e. where the balance is in excess of $ one million as at 30th june, 2014 or as at 31st december of any subsequent year;
• For low value accounts i.e. where the balance is in excess of $ 50,000 but does not exceed US$ one million as at 30th june, 2014 or as at 31st december of any subsequent year.
The methodology of the due diligence differs for these although the documentation requirements are broadly similar. For NADD, the residency certificate issued by the authorities overseas forms the primary evidence of tax residency. For Padd, the address on record should be treated as being the indicator of the tax residency. If the FI does not rely on current mailing address, it must do an electronic search of its records for identification of tax residency outside india, or a place of birth in the US, or a current mailing or residence address (including post office box) outside India, or one or more telephone numbers outside india and no telephone number in india, or standing instructions to transfer funds to an account maintained in a jurisdiction outside india, or power of attorney given to a person outside india, or ‘hold mail’ or ‘care of’ address outside india. all of these indicia may be overridden by specific declarations from the customer. The FI will not be entitled to rely on the customer’s self- declaration, if the fi knows or has reason to know that the self-certification or documentation is incorrect. An example of this is where an account holder who is ostensibly a resident of india informs the fi’s representative that he (the account holder) is uS ‘green card’ holder and has to visit the US to retain his green card this is a case where the fi has to ignore the local address in india and treat the account holder s being a US person. For high value accounts, enhanced due diligence is required to be done through the relationship manager meeting with the customer. Where any indicia show the account holder to be resident of more than one jurisdiction, the FI should treat the customer as being resident of each of the jurisdictions i.e. the FI shall not apply tie breaker tests. The Padd exercise must be completed by 30th june, 2015 for US reportable accounts and by 30th jun, 2016 for other accounts. For US reportable accounts, an FI is not required to do Padd (but may elect to do so) in respect of accounts where the depository account or the cash value of the insurance contract is up to $ 50,000 as at 31st december, 2014. For entity accounts (as opposed to individual accounts), the threshold cut off is $ 250,000 but the measurement date is 30th june, 20141. Once an account is identified as a US reportable account, it shall be continued to be treated in such a manner unless the indicia are appropriately cured at a later stage.
Reporting Deadlines
The draft regulations provide for reporting deadline of 31st july, 2015 for reporting to be done in respect for 2014 and as 31st may in later years. This reporting is, in terms of the model 1 IGA, to be done through the MOF.
Next Steps and Conclusion
The next steps, from the side of the Government, are signing of the IGA, issuance of the final regulations, notifying the data structure and setting up the infrastructure for receiving the reports. For the industry, the work has already begun with nadd and Padd. interim work on development of reporting systems is in progress but the UAT stages are held up for want of the final data structure from the Government side. Over the next few years, the fis will invest a lot of time and capital in the preparedness for financial transparency in respect of customer accounts in line with the expectations of the G20 nations, as we move beyond FATCA to the OECD’s Common reporting Standards (CRS).
The CA Course – Need for a relook
Following the principle of “catch them young”, a student is able to harbour ambitions of joining this premier course immediately after clearing the 12th standard. At the time that he passes the higher secondary education examination a student is barely 18, and is therefore as mature as one can be at that age. He can then appear for the entrance examination and having cleared it, commence articleship to become a chartered accountant. Statistics will show that the entry point to the course is reasonably easy. Either on account of the entrance course content, or students having perfected the technique in that regard, students find it easy to pass this examination, but find the final examination significantly harder. Thus for this course, the entry point seems to be easier, while the exit is difficult. This unnecessarily permits entry to a large number of students, who then flounder when they reach the final frontier. We therefore hear a number of stories of students being frustrated, with the qualification eluding them.
Further, if after passing an examination of a particular standard which is the IPCC, a student is entitled to undertake articleship, one does not understand the logic of permitting one to start the course having cleared only one group. Once this happens, a student who is pursuing the graduate course as well as the CA course, falls between two stools creating unnecessary pressure in his career.
The initial concept of the course was that the course content would be supplemented by the on hands training that the student received while undergoing articleship. This was very true nearly 3 decades ago. Over a period of time the complexities of legislation, the variety of services that professional renders, and the consequent specialisation have limited the benefit that the training imparts. Undoubtedly it is of extreme significance, but in view of the fact that a Chartered Accountant will practice or work only in certain areas, there are gaps in the training that need to be filled in. Coaching classes are certainly not a substitute. Undoubtedly, they may assist the student being able to pass the examination easily, but they are not able to aid acquisition of knowledge. Given the fact that students from all state of society pursue this course, some degree of classroom support will have to be thought of by the Institute.
Coming to the course content itself, it appears that even the course requires significant modification. Firstly, considering the era of specialisation, students should be able to select some specific subjects. Further, some new subjects areas need to be looked at. Over the last two decades in the financial world, there have been significant advances and new products in the category of derivatives have been developed. To understand these models, quantitative analysis has to be factored into the course. Very rarely would one find a fund manager who is a Chartered Accountant. There are opportunities but our students need to be equipped with the requisite knowledge to exploit them. A significant population of professions practice in the Direct tax and Indirect tax field. Even those who join industry require this knowledge. One finds that in this regard, while the subjects of taxation undoubtedly form part of the course, the principles of interpretation are not given adequate importance. That is precisely why, most of our professional colleagues tend to interpret tax laws and regulatory laws in the same manner. The advice that they tender on the basis of such interpretation is often likely to lead the clients into a problem and consequently diminish confidence in the profession.
The profession has grown from being a backroom profession, to one where Chartered Accountants have to present themselves effectively. Communication skills were never the strength of our profession. This problem has been addressed to some extent by creating modules which the student has to undergo during his period of article training. However, there is still a long way to go in this aspect as well.
Finally, in regard to manner of testing the ability there needs to be a change. One finds that increasingly the test that the student undertakes is a memory test. Application of mind and interpretation skills are not tested to the extent necessary. I would believe that at least in regard to the core subjects, the manner of examination needs to change. In that light, in certain subjects one may even look at an open book examination.
I am deeply conscious that, those engaged in designing the curriculum at the ICAI would be well equipped to deal with some of the issues that are raised for they are wellknown. One also appreciates that one is dealing with an examination which is an all India examination and therefore to design a curriculum to suit all requirements is definitely a challenge. However, if one is considering a change, one should bear in mind all these aspects.
There is no denying the fact that the profession has a significantly important role to play. Those who pass the examination and thereafter enrol themselves as members of this august institution, deserve their place in the sun. It is necessary that the course they undertake equips them fully to meet the challenges that they would face.
LEARN TO SLOW DOWN
The next day was a rest day. The next batch of trekkers arrived passing through the volcanic area. They arrived in record time. When we asked them whether they saw the smoke coming out from the volcano, they had a strange look. “What volcano?” “What smoke?” They did not see a thing.
The point is when in haste, we miss our surroundings. It is better to slow down and enjoy this journey of life, than to speed through being blind to the beauty around. That is why R.L. Stevenson said:
But first, we have to understand what we mean by slowing down. It is not becoming lazy, sleeping for 12 hours a day, not being on time at your office or not completing the work allotted to you. It means cutting down on needless activity, saving on time wasted by excessive hurry, improving on the quality of one’s work, and enjoying the work instead of considering it a drudgery. It is not being burnt out at an early age.
The question we have constantly to ask ourselves is ‘Why am I in a hurry! Is it a matter of life and death?’
I am reminded of a story of an American and a Chinese travelling in a car. The American guy is at the wheel. He manages to cross a unmanned railway crossing. An express train missed hitting them by a few seconds. On crossing, the American says to his Chinese friend, “Great, we have saved two minutes!” The Chinese, with all his eastern wisdom, asks, “My friend now tell me what we shall do with these two minutes?”
Most of us are no different from the American, risking our lives, speeding recklessly just to save two minutes, which we do not know what to do with. This is how we waste our lives, ruining our health and peace of mind rushing through life at break neck speed to make more money, get more fame, which in the end mean nothing. Whether you amass a million or 10 million, when you go, you leave behind everything. Perhaps leaving behind 10 million would be more painful! Let us remember that even Emperor Alexander left the world empty-handed.
I will ask a question. You need an operation. You are recommended two surgeons: one who is fast and performs the surgery in a short time but his success rate is not good, and another who is slow but his success rate is better. The question is what does one want from a surgeon: speed or safety? The choice is obvious and clear – safety over speed. If this be so, then this should apply to all our actions.
It is for us professionals to learn to have a work life balance take on only that much work that we can handle efficiently without hurrying our work, avoiding situations which bring stress in our lives which we also transmit to our families. We must have time to do something more meaningful, and leave our footprints on the sands of time. Let us learn to slow down. Let us not rush through life. Let us once in a while stop to smell the flowers of the way side. Let us remember those beautiful lines:
So let us all learn the art of “how to hasten slowly”.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 93 dated April 1, 2015
Presently, Exim Bank in participation with commercial banks in India can extend Buyer’s credit up to US $ 20 million to foreign buyers in connection with export of goods on deferred payment terms and turn key projects from India.
This circular has done away with the said limit of US $ 20 million. Hence, Exim Bank in participation with commercial banks in India can now extend Buyer’s credit without any limit to foreign buyers in connection with export of goods on deferred payment terms and turn key projects from India.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 92 dated March 31, 2015
This circular states that a financial institution or a branch of a financial institution set up in an IFSC permitted/ recognised as such by the Government or a Regulatory Authority will be treated as person resident outside India and their transaction(s) with any person resident in India will be treated as a transaction between a resident and non-resident and will be subject to the provisions of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Rules /Regulations/Directions issued thereunder.
Further, subject to the provisions of section 1 (3) of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, nothing contained in any other Regulations will apply to a financial institution or a branch of a financial institution set up in an IFSC unless there is some express and specific provision to that effect in the Foreign Exchange Management (International Financial Services Centre) Regulations 2015 or any other Regulation.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 90 dated March 31, 2015
This circular has made the following changes in the guidelines relating to ETCD, as contained in Notification No. FEMA. 25/RB-2000 dated May 3, 2000 (Foreign Exchange Derivative Contracts) and A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 147 dated June 20, 2014, as under: –
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 85 dated March 18, 2015
This circular states that from March 2015 banks dealing in foreign exchange need not send Stat 5 and Stat 8 Returns (both hard and soft copies) to the Department of Statistics and Information Management, RBI.
Powers to arrest – SEBI’s wide exercise curtailed by the Bombay High Court
a) In an earlier article in this column, certain recent amendments to the SEBI Act were pointed out. One amendment that was noteworthy was of the powers given to SEBI to arrest any person for having defaulted in paying certain dues to SEBI. The dues to SEBI could be of several types – on account of penalty, on account of amounts ordered to be disgorged or even on account of fees, etc. SEBI could arrest and send to prison such a defaulter. Such arrest did not even require a court order. A relatively junior official of SEBI could arrest and send such person to prison for such a period. However, this is subject to conditions on the lines of and indeed borrowed from the Incometax Act, 1961.
b) Recently, however, on 18th December 2014, SEBI exercised this power for the first time and arrested a defaulter and sentenced him to prison for six months. The arrested person had to file a writ petition and the Bombay High Court set aside this order and released him. He was in prison for more than two and a half months. As will be seen later, the power to arrest was exercised by misconstruing and misapplying the provisions, in an arbitrary manner and, as the Court held, quite illegally too. The only silver lining to this episode was that the pre-conditions for such arrest were duly highlighted by the Court and thus, in future cases, hopefully, these pre-conditions will be observed.
c) Let us discuss the law first, as amended, and thereafter the SEBI Order and then the decision of the Bombay High Court that set it aside.
2) The Law
a) SEBI collects dues from various persons on several accounts. It collects fees for registration, fees for carrying out activities under securities laws such as public issues, open offers, buybacks, etc. It also levies penalties. It disgorges ill-gotten gains. And so on. Some of such amounts are remitted to the Consolidated Fund of India i.e., to the central government. Most of the others are used by SEBI. A person from whom amounts are due on such specified accounts may default for various reasons. He may not have the money or he may have the money but avoids paying it. He may even transfer his assets to his relatives/benami persons or others to avoid recovery. SEBI has several powers to deal with such defaulters. It can attach assets of the defaulter and recover the dues. It can even prosecute such defaulters (which is totally different from the new power discussed here) in court which may sentence such person to jail. However, vide the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014, a fresh power was given to deal with such defaulters. Vide the newly inserted section 28A, a defaulter can be, inter alia, arrested and detained in jail. The relevant provisions of this section have been reproduced below (certain words are highlighted which need review since the Court relied on these words to release the arrested in the case under discussion):-
Recovery of amounts
28A. (1) If a person fails to pay the penalty imposed by the adjudicating officer or fails to comply with any direction of the Board for refund of monies or fails to comply with a direction of disgorgement order issued under section 11B or fails to pay any fees due to the Board, the Recovery Officer may draw up under his signature a statement in the specified form specifying the amount due from the person (such statement being hereafter in this Chapter referred to as certificate) and shall proceed to recover from such person the amount specified in the certificate by one or more of the following modes, namely:—
(a) attachment and sale of the person’s movable property;
(b) attachment of the person’s bank accounts;
(c) attachment and sale of the person’s immovable property;
(d) arrest of the person and his detention in prison;
(e) appointing a receiver for the management of the person’s movable and immovable properties, and for this purpose, the provisions of sections 220 to 227, 228A, 229, 232, the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time, in so far as may be, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules made thereunder were the provisions of this Act and referred to the amount due under this Act instead of to income-tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
…
(4) For the purposes of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the expression ‘‘Recovery Officer’’ means any officer of the Board who may be authorised, by general or special order in writing, to exercise the powers of a Recovery Officer.
b) As can be seen, the Recovery Officer exercises the powers under this Section. The Recovery Officer is any officer of SEBI who is authorised to act as such. In the present case, he was an Assistant General Manager.
3) SEBI order
a) The facts as stated in the SEBI Order are as follows. Certain penalties were levied against a person (“the Defaulter”) in respect of two companies where he was a non-executive Chairman. The cumulative amount was about Rs. 1.65 crore. The Defaulter failed to pay despite reminders. His bank accounts, etc. were attached but the amounts available were grossly insufficient. SEBI asked such Defaulter to submit a plan to pay such dues but he could not submit. He was finally asked to appear before the Recovery Officer to submit such a plan or be arrested. He appeared and could not either pay the dues nor submit a satisfactory plan. He was arrested u/s. 28A and sent to prison by the Recovery Officer for six months or till he paid the dues.
b) Interestingly, the provisions of Section 28A can be exercised irrespective of the nature of the dues. That is to say, the dues can be for having committed some malpractices or could even be dues on account of unpaid fees to SEBI.
c) The Defaulter filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court.
4) Bombay High Court Order
a) In the Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court, an initial point was made that the Writ Petition was not maintainable since the Defaulter had a right of appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal. However, considering the facts of the case and precedents on this point, this point was rejected and the WP allowed.
b) The Court analysed the prerequisites for making an arrest u/s. 28A as clearly laid down in the section. It pointed out that the specified provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (and specified Schedules/ Rules made thereunder) would apply. A review of such Schedule/Rules showed that it is a pre-requisite for arrest that at least one of two conditions should be satisfied. The Defaulter should have sought to obstruct the recovery by dishonestly transferring, concealing or removing his property. Alternatively, he should have refused or neglected to pay the whole or part of the dues despite having property to meet the dues. Apart from establishing such facts, the Recovery Officer should also record the reasons, etc. for the proposed arrest. The Court observed several things. Firstly, it was not shown at all that either of the two pre-conditions. Secondly, no inquiry was made giving a fair opportunity to the Defaulter to establish this. Finally, the reasons for arrest giving existence of these pre-conditions were not recorded. The reasons were sought to be put forth in the reply which obviously the Court found it to be too little and too late. The Court analysed Rule 73 to 77 of Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and made the following observations for setting aside the SEBI Order:-
23. A perusal of aforesaid relevant provision indicates that Part V of Second Schedule provides a detail procedure which is required to be complied with when the Tax Recovery Officer resorts to the mode of arrest and detention. Needless to state that the mode of arrest and detention though not a punitive action, is a drastic step which infringes upon the liberty of a person. Hence, recourse to such mode has to be necessarily in strict compliance with the provisions stipulated in Part V of second Schedule.
28. A bare reading of the notice and the impugned orders makes it abundantly clear that the power of arrest has not been exercised in the manner and for the circumstances provided for in Rule 73(1). It is to be noted that Rule 73(1) confers power of arrest and detention only in two situations i.e. when the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that
(i) the defaulter, with the object or effect of any obstructing the execution of the certificate, has dishonestly transferred, property or (ii) despite having means the defaulter, refuses or neglects to pay the dues. Rule 73(1) further mandates the Tax Recovery Officer to record in writing the reasons of his satisfaction.
29. In the instant case, the Tax Recovery Officer had not recorded his satisfaction with reasons in writing, as regards the existence of two situations, which are specified in Clause (a) of Rule 73(1). The Tax Recovery Officer has not detained and arrested the petitioner on the ground that he had transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property. The respondent had stated in the affidavit that upon issuance of the attachment orders, none of the banks have reported any accounts in the name of the petitioner, except Punjab National Bank at Mira Road (E) branch and only an amount of Rs.5160.82 was recovered by the respondent Board. By these averments, the respondent has sought to justify the arrest. Needless to state that having failed to record the reasons as regards existence of the situation in clause (a), the respondent cannot rectify the lacuna by stating the reasons in the reply.
30. It is also not the case of the Respondent Authority that the petitioner had failed to pay to dues despite having means to pay the arrears or some substantial part thereof. On the contrary, a bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the petitioner was detained and arrested for non¬payment of dues and further for not giving a proposal of payment
32. In the light of the aforesaid principles, the Tax Recovery could not have ordered detention of the petitioner solely on the ground that he had failed to pay an amount or give the proposal.
33. The authority of the respondent had therefore not arrived at a satisfaction that the conditions specified in clause (a) and (b) of Rule 73(1) were satisfied and had further not complied with the mandate of Rule 73(1) of recording the reasons of satisfaction in writing. The absence of satisfaction as well as recording of reasons vitiates the exercise of power of arrest. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the detention and arrest is patently illegal and arbitrary.
c) Thus, the defaulter was forthwith released from prison. however, he was ordered not to leave the country during pendency of the proceedings and his passport was retained with the EOW. The recovery Officer could pass a fresh order after due compliance of the procedures and establishment of the conditions as stated in the law.
5) Concluding Comments
a) The Court thus has confirmed the essential pre- requisites for making such an arrest u/s. 28a. Arrest of a defaulter merely for not having paid dues would thus not be possible even if such dues were on account penalty for misdeeds.
b) Having said that, some other provisions of the act need to be noted since they too may result in imprisonment. Firstly, attention is invited to section 24(1) of the SeBi act which states that violation of any of the provisions of the act, regulations, etc. may result in a fine or imprisonment upto 10 years. However, this would obviously require due prosecution proceedings before the Court, demonstrating to the Court that such violations deserve imprisonment, etc. there is also section 24(2) which states that if a person on whom a penalty has been levied fails to pay the same, he can be sentenced to imprisonment from one month to 10 years. Here too, this can only be after due prosecution proceedings before the jurisdictional Court.
c) However, it is sad and curious that, with due respect, though the Court emphatically held that the arrest was arbitrary and illegal, the defaulter had to suffer more than two months in jail. But he was not awarded any compensation or even the costs of the legal proceedings.
Nominee vs. Will: The Tide Turns?
The problems of inheritance and succession are inevitable especially in a country like India where many businesses are still family owned or controlled. Many a times bitter succession battles have destroyed otherwise well established businesses.
A Will is the last wish of a deceased individual and it determines how his estate and assets are to be distributed. However, in several cases, the deceased has not only made a Will, but he has also made a nomination in respect of several of his assets.
Nomination is something which is extremely popular nowadays and is increasingly being used in co-operative housing societies, depository/demat accounts, mutual funds, Government bonds/securities, shares, bank accounts, etc. Nomination is something which is advisable in all cases even when the asset is held in joint names. Simply put, a nomination means that the owner of the asset has designated another person in his place after his death. A question which often arises is which is superior – the will or the nomination made by the deceased member. While the position was quite clear that a nominee was not superior to the legal heir, a judgment rendered in the context of shares in a company had taken a contrary view. A recent decision of the Bombay High Court suggests that the tide has turned, or has it?
Effect of Nomination
The legal position in this respect is crystal clear. Once a person dies, his interest stands transferred to the person nominated by him. Thus, a nomination is a facility to provide the society, company, depository, etc., with a face which whom it can deal with on the death of a person. On the death of the person and up to the execution of the estate, a legal vacuum is created. Nomination aims to plug this legal vacuum. A nomination is only a legal relationship created between the society, company, depository, bank, etc., and the nominee.
The nomination seeks to avoid any confusion in cases where the will has not been executed or where there are disputes between the heirs. It is only an interregnum between the death and the full administration of the estate of the deceased.
Which is Superior?
A nomination continues only up to and until such time as the will is executed. No sooner the will is executed, it takes precedence over the nomination. Nomination does not confer any permanent right upon the nominee nor does it create any beneficial right in his favour. Nomination transfers no beneficial interest to the nominee. A nominee is, for all purposes, a trustee of the property. He cannot claim precedence over the legatees mentioned in the will and take the bequests which the legatees are entitled to under the will.
The Supreme Court in the case of Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, 55 Comp. Cases 214 (SC), had an occasion to examine this issue in the context of a nomination under a life insurance policy. The Court held, in the context of the Insurance Act, 1938, that a mere nomination made does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.
The Supreme Court, once again in the case of Vishin Khanchandani vs. Vidya Khanchandani, 246 ITR 306 (SC), examined the effect of a nomination in respect of a National Savings Certificates. The issue here was whether the nominee of a National Savings Certificate can claim that he is entitled to the payment in exclusion to the other heirs. The Court examined the National Savings Certificate Act and various other provisions and held that, the nominee is only an administrative holder. Any amount paid to a nominee is part of the estate of the deceased which devolves upon all persons as per the succession law and the nominee must return the payment to those in whose favour the law creates a beneficial interest.
Again, in Shipra Sengupta vs. Mridul Sengupta, (2009) 10 SCC 680, the Supreme Court upheld the superiority of a legal heir as opposed to a nominee in the context of a nomination made under a Public Provident Fund.
The Supreme Court again reinforced its view on a nominee being a mere agent to receive proceeds under a life insurance policy in Challamma vs. Tilaga (2009) 9 SCC 299.
In Ramesh Chander Talwar vs. Devender Kumar Talwar, (2010) 10 SCC 671, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the legal heirs to receive the amount lying in the deceased’s bank deposit to the exclusion of the nominee.
In Gopal Vishnu Ghatnekar vs. Madhukar Vishnu Ghatnekar, (1982) 84 Bom LR 41, the Bombay High Court, observed, in the context of a nomination made in respect of a flat in a co-operative housing society, that the purpose of the nomination was to make certain the person with whom the Society has to deal and not to create interest in the nominee to the exclusion of those who in law will be entitled to the estate. The persons entitled to the estate of the deceased do not lose their right to the same. Society has no power, except provisionally and for a limited purpose to determine the disputes about who is the heir or legal representative, it, therefore, follows that the provision for transferring a share and interest to a nominee or to the heir or legal representative as will be decided by the Society was only meant to provide for interregnum between the death and the full administration of the estate and not for the purpose of conferring any permanent right on such a person to a property forming part of the estate of the deceased. The idea was to provide for a proper discharge to the Society without involving the Society into unnecessary litigation which may take place as a result of dispute between the heirs’ uncertainty as to who are the heirs or legal representatives. Even when a person was nominated or even when a person was recognised as an heir or a legal representative of the deceased member, the rights of the persons who were entitled to the estate or the interest of the deceased member by virtue of law governing succession were not lost and the nominee or the heir or legal representatives recognised by the Society held the share and interest of the deceased for disposal of the same in accordance with law. It was only as between the Society and the nominee or heir or legal representative that the relationship of the Society and its member were created and this relationship continued and subsisted only till the estate was administered either by the person entitled to administer the same or by the Court or the rights of the heirs or persons entitled to the estate were decided in the Court of law. Thereafter, the Society was bound to follow such decision.
The Bombay High Court reiterated its stand on a nominee being subordinate to a legal heir in its judgments in the cases of Nozer Gustad Commissariat vs. Central Bank of India, 1993 Mh LJ 228 and Antonio Joao Fernandes vs. Assistance Provident Fund Commissioner, 2010 (4) Bom. CR 208, both rendered in the context of provident fund dues. Decisions of the other High Courts which have taken similar views include, Leelawati Singh vs. State of Delhi, 1998 (75) DLT 694; Hardial Devi Ditta vs. Janki Das, AIR 1928 Lah 773; D Mohanavelu Mudaliar vs. Indian Insurance & Banking Corporation, AIR 1957 Mad 115; Shashikiran Ashok Parekh vs. Rajesh Agarwal, 2012 (4) MhLJ 370.
Thus, the legal position in this respect is very clear. Nomination is only a legal relationship and not a permanent transfer of interest in favour of the nominee. If the nominee claims ownership of an asset, the beneficiary under the will can bring a suit against him and reclaim his rightful ownership.
Companies act – Nominee is superior
Section 109a of the Companies act, 1956, was added by the amendment act of 1999. Section 109a provided that any nomination made in respect of shares or debentures of a company, if made in the prescribed manner, shall, on the death of the shareholder/debenture holder, prevail over any law or any testamentary disposition, i.e., a will. thus, in case of shares or debentures in a company, the nominee on the death of the shareholder/debenture holder, became entitled to all the rights to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner. In case the nominee is a minor, then the shareholder/debenture holder can appoint some other person who would be entitled to receive the shares/debentures, if the nominee dies during his minority. This position continues under the Companies act, 2013 in the form of section 72 of this act read with rule 19 of the Companies (Share Capital and debentures) rules, 2014. a similar position is contained in Bye Law
9.11 Made under the depositories act, 1996 which deals with nomination for securities held in a dematerialised format.
A Single judge of the Bombay high Court explained this proposition in the case of Harsha Nitin Kokate vs. The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Ltd, 112 (5) Bom. L.R. 2014. interpreting section 109a of the Companies act, 1956 and the depositories act, the Court ruled that the rights of a nominee to shares of a company would override the rights of heirs to whom property may be bequeathed. In other words, what one writes in one’s will would have no meaning if one has made a nomination on the shares in favour of someone other than the heir mentioned in the will. The high Court ruled that securities automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of shares. the nominee is required to follow the prescribed procedure in the Business rules. Upon the death of the holder of shares the nominee would be entitled to elect to be registered as a beneficiary owner by notifying the Bank along with a certified copy of the death certificate. The bank would be required to scrutinize the election and nomination of the nominee registered with it. Such nomination carries effect notwithstanding anything contained in a testamentary disposition (i.e. Wills) or nominations made under any other law dealing with Securities. the last of the many nominations would be valid.
The Court referred to and noted the provisions of section 39 of insurance act and section 30 of the maharashtra Cooperative act also. it held that these are totally different from the Companies act. the key is the use of the word “vest” in the provisions of section 109a of the Companies act, 1956, which the court interpreted as giving ownership rights and not just custody rights as is the case for an insurance policy or shares of a housing society. the Bombay high Court distinguished the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, 55 Comp. Cases 214 (SC) citing a difference in the language of the applicable law. Section 109a of the Companies act, 1956 provided that upon the death of a shareholder, the shares would “vest” in the nominee. A nominee became entitled to all the rights attached to the shares to the exclusion of all others regardless of anything stated in any other disposition, testamentary or otherwise. The Court concluded that the Legislature’s intent u/s.109a of the Companies act, 1956 and Bye Law 9.11 made under the depositories act, 1996 was very clear, i.e., to vest the property in the shares in the nominee alone.
A similar view was also endorsed by a Single judge of the delhi high Court in the case of Dayagen P. Ltd. vs. Rajendra Dorian Punj, 151 Comp. Cases 92 (Del).
This decision has caused a lot of heartburn since the entire succession law in the case of shares has been thrown for a toss. It may be noted that while the Companies act deals with nomination in the case of physical shares the depositories act deals with nomination in the case of demat accounts/shares held in dematerialised format. it is submitted that a Bye Law under the depositories act does not carry the same force as a section of the Companies act. hence, it may be a moot point whether this distinction could in any manner salvage the situation?
A Twist in The Tale?
another Single judge of the Bombay high Court, very recently, had an occasion to consider the above provisions of the Companies act and the earlier decision of the Bombay high Court in jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar vs. Jayashree Jayant Salgaonkar and others, Notice of Motion No. 822/2014 in Suit No. 503/2014 decided on 31st March, 2015. The Bombay high Court after an exhaustive study of all the Supreme Court and Bombay high Court decisions on the subject of superiority of will / legal heirs over nomination, concluded as follows:
a) The earlier decision of Harsha Nitin Kokate vs. The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Ltd was rendered per incuriam, i.e., without reference to several binding Supreme Court and Bombay high Court decisions.
b) It wrongly distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi whereas the reality was that the ratio of that decision was applicable even under the Companies act, 1956.
c) Neither the Companies act, 1956 nor the depositories act provide for the law of succession or transfer of property. They must be viewed as being sub-silentio (i.e., as being silent on) of the testamentary and other dispositive laws.
d) If a nomination is held as supreme then it cannot be displaced even by a Will made subsequent to the nomination. this obviously cannot be the case.
e) The nomination would even oust personal law, such as, mohammedan Law and become all-pervasive.
f) The nomination under the Companies act is not subject to the rigour of the indian Succession act in as much as it does not require witnesses as mandated under this act. It cannot be assailed on grounds of importunity, fraud, coercion or undue influence. there cannot be a codicil to a nomination. In short, a nomination, if held supreme, wholly defenestrates the indian Succession act. According to the judgment in harsha nitin Kokate, a nomination becomes a “Super-Will” one that has none of the defining traits of a proper Will.
g) Thus, a nomination, even under the Companies act only provides the company or the depository a quittance. A nominee only continues to hold the securities in trust and as a fiduciary for the legal heirs under Succession Law.
Legal Issues
The recent Bombay high Court judgment may come as great solace for those who were severely impacted by the judgment in the case of Harsha Nitin Kokate. However, it is humbly submitted that it also raises a few interesting legal issues?
Could a Single judge hold the judgment of another Single judge of the same high Court to be per incuriam or would it have been more appropriate if this question had been referred to and decided by a larger Bench?
Kanga & Palkhivala, in their commentary, the Law and Practice of income tax, 10th edition, Lexisnexis, state that a single judge of a high Court cannot give a decision contrary to an earlier judgment of a single judge of the same high Court.
In CIT vs. BR Constructions, 202 ITR 222 (AP FB) it was held that a single judge cannot differ from the earlier judgments of co-ordinate jurisdiction merely because he holds a different view on the question of law for the reason that certainty and uniformity in the administration of justice is of paramount importance. But if the earlier judgment is erroneous or adherence to the rule of precedents results in manifest injustice, differing from an earlier judgment will be permissible. Further, a precedent ceases to be binding when it is inconsistent with the earlier decisions of the same rank or when it is sub silentio or when it is rendered per incuriam. The Court even held that though a judgment rendered per incuriam can be ignored yet when a Single judge doubts the correctness of an otherwise binding precedent, the appropriate course would be to refer the case to a division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. It also referred to Salmond on jurisprudence which held that the mere fact that the earlier decision misconstrued a Statute is no ground for per incuriam.
A similar view has been taken by the division Bench of the Bombay high Court in CIT vs. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd, 202 ITR 727 (Bom) wherein the Court held that a single judge of a high Court is bound by the decision of another single judge of the same high Court. It would be judicial impropriety to ignore that decision. judicial comity demands that a binding decision to which his attention had been drawn should neither be ignored nor overlooked. If he does not find himself in agreement with the same, the proper procedure is to refer the binding decision and direct the papers to be placed before the Chief justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. the Bombay high Court took this its view based on a Supreme Court decision in the case of Food Corporation of India vs. Yadav Engineer and Contractor AIR 1982 SC 1302.
Conclusion
While one would like to believe that the position as explained by the recent Bombay high Court decision is the correct legal position in law, it would be interesting to see whether this decision is challenged before a larger forum? one feels that we may not have heard the last on the issue of nomination versus legal heirs in the context of shares in a company!
Registration –Agreement to sell – Not required to be compulsorily registered: Registration Act, section 17(1A):
The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant and the plaintiff in such suit prayed that a decree be passed under Specific Relief Act directing the defendant to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit property in terms of the agreement for sale dated 26-04-2006 entered in between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff also prayed for a decree directing the defendant not to disturb the possession of the plaintiff from the suit property. The trial court, after hearing the parties and considering the evidence on record, dismissed the said suit and directed the defendant to refund the earnest money. The trial court dismissed the said suit mainly on the ground that the agreement for sale is not a registered instrument and therefore the plaintiff is debarred from getting any relief in the said suit. The plaintiff filed another Appeal. The learned District Judge affirmed the view of the learned Trial Court that since the said agreement for sale is not a registered instrument, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief by virtue of the agreement for sale dated 26-04- 2006. The learned First Appellate Court was of the view that since the said agreement for sale is not a registered document as per the provisions of section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any decree.
The Hon’ble High Court observed that a document which happens to be an agreement for sale does not by itself confer any right, title and/or interest in favour of the proposed transferee and it is only a document by which the parties entered into an agreement to create a further document which is called a deed of conveyance. There cannot be any dispute that such deed of conveyance is required to be compulsorily registered if the value of the immovable property is more than Rs. 100/- but since the agreement for sale does not create any such right, title and/or interest, there is no such provision in law which mandates that the said agreement for sale will also have to be registered excepting in cases where section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908 applies. The provisions of the Registration Act, would also clearly indicate that an agreement for sale is not required to be compulsorily registered.
The Court further observed that, section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act stipulates that when a transferee has, in part performance of contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of contract and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract then in that event the transferor is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of such property.
The plaintiff accordingly, gets a decree of specific performance of contract against the defendant/respondent in respect of the suit property in terms of the agreement for sale dated 26-04-2006 and the defendant was directed to execute an appropriate sale deed in favour of the plaintiff/ appellant in respect of the suit property and in terms of the said agreement for sale dated 26-04-2006.
Partnership – Rights of outgoing partner – Firm continued its business – Retired partner cannot claim share in subsequent profits made by firm: Partnership Act, 1932 section 37.
The case of the plaintiff is that the first defendant is the partnership firm comprising of four partners i.e. the plaintiff and defendant nos 2 to 4 by virtue of partnership deed dated 03-04-1992. The partnership firm was engaged in advertising business and allied matters. Each of the partner has contributed a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards share capital and the partnership was one at will. While so, the plaintiff expressed her willingness to retire from the partnership firm and sent letter on 17-01-1994. The said letter was acknowledged by the defendants 2 to 4 by letter dated 24-01-1994, confirming that the plaintiff was deemed to have retired from the partnership firm with effect from 18-01-1994. Though the plaintiff retired from the partnership firm, the existing partners reconstituted the deed of partnership and carried on their business. It was contended by the plaintiff that the partnership firm did not settle her accounts on retirement despite several demands and that she demanded to settle all her share in respect of transactions from 03-04-1992 to 18-01-1994, till the date of settlement of her dues. The plaintiff also had given break-up of the amounts that she is entitled to from the partnership firm
The suit was contested by the defendants who are the other partners on the ground that the plaintiff was acting detrimental to the interest of the partnership firm. It was further contended that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff only retired voluntarily from the partnership firm and the partnership firm was not dissolved as alleged by her.
The Hon’ble Court observed that u/s. 37 of the Partnership Act, the court can grant relief to outgoing partner who has not been made a final settlement and the partnership is carrying out of the business with the surviving partners and the court has jurisdiction to grant such relief based on the findings of the fact. In the instant case plaintiff partner has categorically stated that she voluntarily resigned from the firm. Therefore, she cannot be expected to claim profits of the partnership firm subsequent to her exit as there was no contribution from her side. Share of the partner would be his/her proportion of the partnership assets after they have been all realised and converted into money, all the partnership debts and liabilities have been paid and discharged. Liability to pay arises when the partnership firm is dissolved and the legal existence is taken away. After voluntary resignation of partner from firm even presuming that immovable assets purchased from the plaintiffs participation in the firms as a partner and admittedly the partnership firm was continuing the business even after the exit of the plaintiff, the retired partner can only demand her share, be it an asset or liability based on the value on the date of her exit and she cannot claim profits of the firm.
2ND YOU TH RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (YRRC ) OF BCAS HELD AT THE BYKE RESORT, GOA FEBRUARY 19-22, 2015
Designed with the intent to share knowledge in an unconventional manner using a youth-friendly approach, the YRRC was a mix of interactive workshops, group discussions, presentations, networking and entertainment spread over a wide range of topics of professional interest. While the days were filled with technical sessions, evenings provided opportunities to unwind by the beach with music, networking, singing and dancing.
Most of all, the YRRC provided a platform to its participants to learn from an elite group of speakers in a rather closed and personal setting and to interact and network with them at an informal level.
Summarised below is a snapshot of the technical sessions.
DAY 1 Thursday, 19th February 2015
Inauguration Session by Chairman of the MPR Committee – Mr. Naushad Panjwani
Chairman, Mr. Naushad Panjwani, inaugurated the YRRC by extending a warm welcome to all the participants and set the tone and momentum for the 4 days of the event.
SESSION 1
INTERACTIVE WORKSHOP – CLIENT PITCHING
Speaker: Mr. Vaibhav Manek
Mr. Manek, author of the book ‘CA Firm of the Future’, explained in detail concepts such as mission, vision and values of a CA firm, clients development process, marketing strategies, balanced scorecard, marketing funnel, etc. He carried out exercises with the participants to demonstrate how to have effective marketing strategies and how to prepare for client presentations.
SESSION 2 PRESENTATION – MAKE YOUR MONEY WORK FOR YOU
Speaker: Mr. Sunil Jhaveri
Mr. Jhaveri, an expert at financial planning, explained the various investment avenues which young professionals could avail of to get into the habit of investing early and investing smart. He shared the mantras to make goal-oriented investments.
DAY 2 Friday, 20th February 2015
Session 1 – group discussion – rea l estate , reits and aifs – issues in accountin g, taxation & fema
Speaker: Mr. Anup Shah
During the group discussion led by Ms. Kinjal Bhuta, the participants discussed the posers raised by the Paper Writer, Mr. Anup Shah. The discussion revolved around the relatively newer concepts of REITs and AIFs and the various taxation and accounting issues in the subject. The speaker delved deep into the concepts of REITs and AIFs. He highlighted the controversies in accounting and taxation of these instruments and spoke about his expectations from the Budget on the subject. All the participants’ queries were satisfactorily answered.
SESSION 2 – PRESENTATION – OPPORTUNITIES IN MULTI-CHANNEL RETAIL
Speaker: Mr. Kumar Rajagopalan
Mr. Rajagopalan, CEO of the Retailers Association of India, spoke on career opportunities for CAs in the multichannel retail segment. His detailed analysis of the retail segment in India provided great insights to participants to the retail business world. He highlighted the various stages in the retail industry which a CA can service. He also brought to light some of the niche areas where a CA’s professional expertise could be put to use. Newer exciting career avenues for practicing as well as industry-based CAs were brought to the fore.
SESSION 3 – INTERATIVE WORKSHOP – BUSINESS ETIQUETTES
Speaker: Ms. Shital Kakkar
Ms. Kakkar, one of India’s best known corporate etiquettes trainer, spoke to the participants about the musthave etiquettes in a business environment. In a world which is getting increasingly polished by the day, proper professional behavior and courtesies go a long way in making good first impression and retaining it for the longer term. Through activities and exercises, she brought out the tricks to making good impressions and to avoid a business faux pas.
DAY 3 Saturday, 21st February 2015
SESSION 1 – BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
Speaker: Mr. Tilokchand P. Ostwal
Well renowned in the world of international taxation and transfer pricing, Mr. Ostwal explained to the participants about the upcoming Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project of the OECD and its impact on India. He shared some of the more commonly arising issues for India, his views of the same and the Governments’ actions/inactions to resolve. This was a great opportunity for the young CAs to get introduced to a project which the world has its spotlight on.
Sight-seeing, dinner & entertainment
Post the afternoon siesta, participants embarked on the Goa sight-seeing trip organised by BCAS to explore the bounties Goa had to offer.
DAY 4 Sunday, 22nd February 2015
SESSION 1 – PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DUE DILIGENCE
Speaker: Mr. Akshay Kapur
Mr. Kapur discussed different types of due diligence that exist in a business scenario. Mr. Kapur took the participants through the process flow in the life cycle of a deal and stage at which due diligence has a role to play. He explained with examples how a due diligence finding could make or break a deal. He discussed case studies based on issues he had come across during the course of his career in the field.
SESSION 2 – BUSINESS OF MOVIES & OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAs
Speaker: Mr. Komal Nahta
Mr. Nahta, editor and publisher of “Film Information” and a television show host, joined the participants for the last session of the YRRC to share insights into the glitzy and glamour world of the movie business. He explained how the movie industry trades and the revenue models peculiar to the industry. Mr. Nahta shared some ideas as to how a young CA could make headway in seeking clients from the movie industry.
The YRRC ended on a happy note with vote of thanks to the organisers and the participants.
FEMA – Pricing – Put & Call Options – A Needless Curb on Doing Business – Stalled Tata-Docomo deal betrays timidity
Two issues are at stake. One, how companies source capital. Hesitant foreign capital could be persuaded to enter the country by offering it guaranteed exit options that minimise or quantify the possible loss it could make. Should India say no to such capital? Should all equity investments that come with put/call options automatically be deemed suspect? The answer is a resounding ‘No!’ The second issue is how to prevent a liberal view on put/ call options at the time of entry of foreign capital being misused by Indian companies to siphon capital out.
The way out is to check if the bathwater contains a baby or not, before throwing it out. This calls for use of judgement and intelligence. Scam-scarred policymakers in India are too scared to allow themselves to use discretion, and want to go by the rule book, regardless of whether it meets the larger goal, to subserve which the rules were framed. The signal a stalled Tata-NTT Docomo deal would send out to the world is that India continues in the grip of political timidity, leaving passing the buck the only game in town, even in these, post-UPA, post-policy-paralysis, so-called good times.
(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 26-03- 2015.)
Stacked against ourselves: Foreign capital gets better tax treatment at the cost of its domestic counterpart
Globally, private equity and hedge funds have assets under management of over $3.5 trillion and $2.5 trillion respectively. In India, the domestically domiciled Alternate Investment Funds (AIF) have total commitments of less than Rs 25,000 crore (roughly $4 billion), with the actual inflows just a fraction of the commitments. By any measure, the AIF industry in India is sub-scale and not commensurate with the size of a $2-trillion economy.
Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) and foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) route their investments via Mauritius and other tax havens with double taxation-avoidance agreements and pay zero tax on their business income and capital gains and a maximum 10% withholding tax on their interest income in India. Also, all securities held by FIIs/FPIs including derivatives were reclassified as capital assets in last year’s Budget.
With pass-throughs denied for AIF Category 3 funds, the investors in these funds see even their equity returns classified as business income, if there is any interest income or other income from derivatives, and all income taxed at maximum marginal rates. AIF Category 2 fund investors, even with the benefit of pass-throughs, still have their derivative income classified as business income.
The result of the perverse tax rules is that while even equity returns of investors in AIF Category 3 funds get re-characterised as business income resulting in higher tax liability, for foreign investors, what was previously business income now gets re-characterised as capital gains, enabling them to enjoy lower or nil taxes.
A large global top-tier hedge fund like AQR, DE Shaw or Renaissance Technologies that deploys quantitative strategies and invests in Indian equities and derivatives via the Mauritius route pays zero tax, while a domestic AIF Category 3 fund deploying similar investment pays peak marginal rates. The very business case for incorporating an AIF Category 3 fund in India becomes questionable.
Domestic funds are further handicapped by Sebi regulations that restrict leverage and prohibit them from investing in commodities and forex markets. This handicap reduces the amount of capital that can be deployed and returns earned. It creates a unique situation where both an individual investor with limited capital and a corporate house from a non-financial services industry with large treasury operations enjoy far more leverage and risk-taking ability than a professionally-managed fund deploying sophisticated risk capital.
The underdeveloped nature of the debt markets in India also means that domestic funds are restricted to equity markets alone. Foreign funds, on the other hand, can invest in multiple asset categories globally and have lower leverage restrictions. This enables foreign funds to outperform domestic funds while taking lesser overall risks.
It is more attractive to incorporate outside India and invest in India via the FII/FPI route, or in rupee-denominated assets in foreign markets, rather than get an AIF licence and invest in local markets. This results in export of capital and underdeveloped capital markets in India. A significant chunk of the rupee-denominated securities and currency markets has already moved out to Singapore and Dubai and investment capital continues to move out of India to foreign fund managers.
To mitigate the handicaps the fledgling local industry faces, these steps should be immediately taken:
1. Remove the leverage restrictions on AIF Category 3 funds and subject them to the same exchange-based risk management and margin rules that all categories of investors are subject to.
2. Allow domestic funds to invest in commodities and foreign exchange markets starting with non-agricultural commodities.
3. Include investments made by the local AIFs in Section 2(14) of the Income-Tax Act, thereby giving capital asset classification to those investments as was done for FIIs/FPIs.
4. Grant pass-throughs to AIF Category 3 funds as was done for AIF Category 1 and 2 fund assets immediately as an interim measure.
5. Over the longer term, a mutual fund-like regulatory regime for AIFs where the funds are not taxed but the unit holders pay capital gains tax on their units, would be a solution to the current discriminatory regime.
In every country, domestic and foreign capital are treated at par, while in India, foreign capital continues to get far better terms and tax treatment and domestic capital is discriminated against. The time has come for the ‘Make in India’ concept to be also applied to the domestic AIF industry to create a vibrant ecosystem, enabling India to achieve the objective of having a global financial centre located here.
(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr T V Mohandas Pai, ex-CFO, Infosys and Mr V Balkrishnan, Chairman, Exfinity Venture Partners.)
PSUs – Crown Jewels Or Bleeding Ulcers
13 years later, with Mr Jaitley as finance minister, came the news that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is “concerned” over the overall health of Air India. Air India has a debt of Rs 40,000 crore, while the losses stand at a huge Rs 38,000 crore. It is surviving on a bailout package, under which the government is committed to inject Rs 30,000 crore of our money into it in a staggered manner till 2021-22.
Narendra Modi came to power on the promise of a “development agenda”, which would mean “minimum government, maximum governance”. Nobody is still clear what this slogan means. In fact, it seems that this government is committed to the same path of maximum government that all previous governments had taken. What illustrates this well is the strongman approach to “fixing” the loss-making PSUs like Air India.
PSUs came to dominate India’s industrial economy since the fateful Industrial Policy Resolution of April 6, 1948, that conferred monopoly on the state for six basic industries. Jawaharlal Nehru called them “temples of modern India”. The Left calls them family silver. They were expanded further through the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 and Industrial Policy Statement of 1973. Many politicians, the media, some businessmen and managers tended to believe that government-owned companies were gems that needed to be polished and they would dazzle us.
Most PSUs were hardly gems whether dead or alive. In May 2000, a youthful and enthusiastic Mr Jaitley announced that more than Rs. 2 lakh crore was stuck in government units, asserting that the actual value of these assets was “several times more” and, if realised, could pay off the government’s debt. Mr Jaitley is the finance minister now. Can he walk his own talk?
PSUs are overstaffed, capital-guzzlers, tied to the apron strings of ministers and secretaries, who have their own commercial/political agenda of exploiting them. The boards are stuffed with people who are there for the loaves and fish of office, social status or influencepeddling, not to contribute to efficiency. Some people say that the magic wand of autonomy will turn them from frogs into princes, but autonomy without accountability will be even worse, as the government banks have shown.
Meanwhile, tens of thousands of crores have been wasted in keeping loss-making PSUs alive.
It has been clear since the mid-1970s that PSUs were a drain on the exchequer and so the Industrial Policy Statement in July 1980 talked of “revival” of PSUs through a “time-bound programme” in a country where people, events and programmes were always late. Since then, PSU reform has had many well-meaning heroes.
From a fresh-faced and naive Rajiv Gandhi to a shrewd, dyed-in-the-wool politician like Mr Modi, every leader big and small talked of revival (the only exception was Mr Shourie). Surprisingly, the bleeding hearts hand-picked by Sonia Gandhi as members of the National Advisory Council under Manmohan Singh’s government wanted to direct more money towards the poor, but took no interest in the loot and waste in PSUs.
If Mr Modi truly wants to redeem his pledge of minimum government, his best bet is to start with PSUs. PSUs run businesses. Businesses have only one objective — earn a return on capital that is a few points higher than risk-free return on capital. This is impossible to achieve through a minister-secretary-chairman-cum-managing director combine with lots of interference from the sides. The options are clear: to sell off controlling stakes through competitive bidding for the profit-making ones; and to close down the non-functioning units and sell off their assets, including the enormous land value that many are sitting on. And while doing this, to shrink the ministries that have been overseeing them.
If Mr Modi tries to fix PSUs, he may prove a point, but he will keep a false economic thinking alive that has contributed to our economic backwardness.
(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr Debashis Basu, editor of www.moneylife.in, in Business Standard dated 23-03-2015.)
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 95 dated April 17, 2015
This circular provides details of the financial aspects necessary for using the Virtual Private Network (VPN) accounts obtained from National Informatics Centre (NIC) by banks for accessing the e-Biz portal of the Government of India. This e-Biz portal is to be used for reporting of Advanced Remittance Form and FCGPR Form under the FDI scheme.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 94 dated April 8, 2015
With immediate effect, Paragraph 6.2.17.7 of the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2014 dated April 17, 2014 has been amended as follows: –
Consequential changes have been made in Paragraph 6.2.17.2.2(4)(i)(c) of the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2014 dated April 17, 2014 as under: –
Notification under Sch. Entry C-70-Paper VAT 1515/CR 39(2)/Taxation-1 dated 27.3.2015
Govt. of Maharashtra has notified goods which are covered under Schedule Entry 70 of Schedule C – Paper with effect from 1.4.2015.
Circular 183 / 02 / 2015-ST dated 10.04.2015
By this Circular, it has been clarified that the rate of service tax will be 12.36% and not 14% on the value of taxable services provided post 01.04.2015. The rate will change from the date notified by the Central Government after the enactment of the Finance Bill, 2015.
Notification 11/2015 dated 08.04.2015 Benefits linked to Service Export from India Scheme (SEIS) under FTP 2015-2020)
The exemption can be availed if following conditions are complied:
1. T he duty credit in the said scrip is issued to a service provider located in India against export of notified services listed in Appendix 3D of Appendices and Aayat Niryat Forms of Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020;
2. T he imports and exports are undertaken through the seaports, airports or through the inland container depots or through the land customs stations as mentioned in the Table 2 annexed to the Notification No. 16/2015- CUS (N.T.) dated 01.04.2015 or a Special Economic Zone notified u/s. 4 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 (28 of 2005):
Provided that the Commissioner of Customs may within the jurisdiction, by special order, or by a Public Notice, and subject to such conditions as may be specified by him, permit import and export through any other sea-port, airport, inland container depot or through any land customs station.
3. Accordingly, the person claiming exemption benefit should be registered with the customs authorities and should provide services in the taxable territory.
4. The benefit of the scrip would be given after taking into consideration the benefit already availed under Notification 25/2012.
5. T he holder of the scrip presents the scrip debited by the said Customs Authority within thirty days to the said Officer, along with an undertaking addressed to the said Officer, that in case of any service tax short debited in the scrip, he shall pay such service tax along with applicable interest, based on which the officer shall verify and validate.
6. T he said holder of the scrip shall be entitled to avail drawback or CENVAT credit of the service tax so paid by way of debiting the duty scrip duly validated by the said Officer.
Notification 10/2015 dated 08.04.2015 Benefits linked to Merchandise Export from India Scheme (MEIS) under FTP 2015-2020
The exemption can be availed if following conditions are complied:
1. T he duty credit in the said scrip is issued against –
a. exports of notified goods or products to notified markets as listed in Appendix 3B of Appendices and Aayat Niryat Forms of Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020 ;
b. exports of notified goods or products transacted through e-commerce platform as listed in Appendix 3C of Appendices and Aayat Niryat Forms of Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020. In such cases the maximum free on board value, for calculation of duty credit amount, shall not exceed Rs. 25,000 per consignment.
2. The export categories or sectors specified in paragraph 3.06 of the Foreign Trade Policy and listed in Table annexed to Notification 24/2012 – CUS (N.T.) dated 08.04.2015 shall not be counted for calculation of export performance or for computation of entitlement under the Scheme.
3. T he imports and exports are undertaken through the seaports, airports or through the inland container depots or through the land customs stations as mentioned in the Table 2 annexed to the Notification 16/2015- CUS (N.T.) dated 01.04.2015 or a Special Economic Zone notified under section 4 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 (28 of 2005)
4. Accordingly, the person claiming exemption benefit should be registered with the customs authorities and should provide services in the taxable territory.
5. The benefit of the script would be given after taking into consideration the benefit already availed under Notification 24/2012.
6. T he holder of the scrip presents the scrip debited by the said Customs Authority within thirty days to the said Officer, along with an undertaking addressed to the said Officer, that in case of any service tax short debited in the scrip, he shall pay such service tax along with applicable interest, based on which the officer shall verify and validate.
7. T he said holder of the scrip, shall be entitled to avail drawback or CENVAT credit of the service tax so paid by way of debiting the duty scrip duly validated by the said Officer.
[2015] (37) STR 377] (Tri.-Mumbai) GTL Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai
Facts:
Appellant is engaged in creating “Passive Telecom Infrastructure” to be used by Cellular Telecom Operators to provide their “Cellular Telephony Services” and the operations and maintenance thereof, taxable under business auxiliary services. Department objected to availment of CENVAT credit on the parts of Towers, Cabins etc. used for providing Passive Telecom Infrastructure.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that Rule 2(k)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 is relevant as the Appellant id providing output service and Rule 2(k)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 and the Explanation-2 to the said rule are not relevant as it deals with manufacturing. The Appellant is providing a Business Auxiliary service to the cellular operators by creating a passive infrastructure for the transmission of signals and by virtue of Rule 2(k)(i) which allows CENVAT credit on all goods, except petrol and motor vehicles, used for providing any output service, the CENVAT credit is allowed.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 73 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) –Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Rajkot vs. Reliance Ports and Terminals Ltd.
Facts:
Assessee was a provider of port services and availed credit of duty paid on capital goods during the period F.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08. Department denied CENVAT credit on the grounds that capital goods were not installed. Department also disputed CENVAT credit of service tax paid by assessee under reverse charge on the ground that service tax paid u/s. 66A of the Act is not specified under Rule 3 of CCR,2004. Adjudicating Authority decided in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved department filed the appeal before the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal held that as per para 8 of CBEC Circular No. B-4/7/2000 TRU dated 03/04/2000 in the case of capital goods, the CENVAT rules do not provide installation of capital goods as a pre-requisite for taking CENVAT credit. The credit can be taken as and when the capital goods are received in the factory. The Tribunal also observed that, in terms of CBEC Circular No. 267/26/2006-CX-8 dated 28-04-2006, condition of installation for availing CENVAT credit on capital goods was effective till 09- 09-2004 and not thereafter. Relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CCE vs. Ispat Industries Ltd. 2012 (275) ELT 79 (Bom) which held that, when the capital goods are lying in the factory for installation and process of erection is being carried out, the requirement that the goods were in the possession and use of the manufacturer in the year in which the balance credit was availed of can be said to have been fulfilled. Thus the credit on capital goods was allowed in the financial year of receipt and balance in subsequent financial year. As regards dispute on CENVAT credit of service tax paid under reverse charge, it was held that due to retrospective amendment under sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Finance Act, 2011 service tax paid u/s. 66A was eligible for credit from 18/04/2006. Revenue’s appeal was dismissed accordingly.
Gift – Immovable property – Donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her life time did not affect the validity of the gift deed. – Transfer of Property Act, Section 122 & 123, 126.
The appellant, a Hindu woman, executed a registered gift deed in respect of an immovable property in favour of the respondent reserving to herself the right to retain possession and to receive rents of the property during her lifetime. The gift was accepted by the respondent. But subsequently the appellant revoked the gift deed by a revocation deed. The respondent filed a suit assailing the revocation deed and seeking a declaration that the same was invalid and void ab initio. The trial court found that the appellant defendant had failed to prove that the gift deed set up by the respondent plaintiff was vitiated by fraud or undue influence or that it was a sham or nominal document. The gift, according to the trial court, had been validly made and accepted by the respondent plaintiff, hence, was irrevocable in nature. It was also held that since the appellant donor had taken no steps to assail the gift made by her for more than 12 years, the same was voluntary in nature and free from any undue influence, misrepresentation or suspicion. The fact that the appellant donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her lifetime did not affect the validity of the deed. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. The first appellate court and the High Court in second appeal concurred with the findings of the trial court.
The Hon’ble Court observed that sections 124 to 129 deal with matters like gift of existing and future property, gift made to several persons of whom one does not accept, suspension and revocation of a gift, and onerous gifts including effect of non-acceptance by the donee of any obligation arising thereunder. Section 123 calearly provides that a gift of immovable property can be made by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. When read with section 122 of the Act, a gift made by a registered instrument duly signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses is valid, if the same is accepted by or on behalf of the donee. That such acceptance must be given during the life time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving is evident from a plain reading of section 122 of the Act. A conjoint reading of sections 122 and 123 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The Court further observed that section 123 of the T.P. Act is in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, ssection 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of word “transfer must be effected” used by Parliament in so far as immovable property is concerned. In contradistinction to that requirement the second part of section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that in so far as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property no doubt requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. If the intention of the legislature was to make delivery of possession of the property gifted also as a condition precedent for a valid gift, the provision could and indeed would have specifically said so. Absence of any such requirement can only lead to the conclusion that delivery of possession is not an essential prerequisite for the making of a valid gift in the case of immovable property.
In the present case, the execution of registered gift deed and its attestation by two witnesses is not in dispute. It has also been concurrently held that the donee had accepted the gift. The recitals in the gift deed also prove transfer of absolute title in the gifted property from the donor to the donee. What is retained is only the right to use the property during the lifetime of the donor which does not in any way affect the transfer of ownership in favour of the donee by the donor.
There is indeed no provision in law that ownership in property cannot be gifted without transfer of possession of such property. As noticed earlier, section 123 does not make the delivery of possession of the gifted property essential for validity of a gift.
The High Court was in that view perfectly justified in refusing to interfere with the decree passed in favour of the donee. The appeal was hereby dismissed.
Co-operative Society- Right of Membership- Society has the right to refuse membership.
The Petitioner-Society is a Tenant Cooperative Society, as contemplated under Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Rules, 1961. The Respondent No. 5 applied for the transfer of shares and suit flat from the name of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4th members of the Petitioner Society on 24th January 2004. Respondent No. 3 was the Director of Respondent No. 5 and also the Secretary of Petitioner Society. The Society refused the said transfer for want of sufficient stamp and registration. The Society never accepted the payment on behalf of Respondent No. 5, and even through Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and communicated their inability to transfer the suit flat. The Application filed by Respondent No. 5, was therefore rejected and the flat remained, so also the membership, in the name of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The Society returned the amount paid to it. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, on 15th August 2008, filed an Application for transfer of the suit flat and shares from Respondent No. 5 to them. On 26th August 2008, the same was rejected as Respondent No. 5 was not the owner of the suit flat in the above background. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, therefore, invoked section 23(1) of MCS Act, 1960 before the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 13th April, 2009. The Registrar directed that they be admitted as members in respect of the suit shares and the suit flat. The Petitioner Society therefore, preferred a Revision Application and challenged the above order. Respondent No.1 the Divisional Joint Registrar by impugned order dated 15th December 2009, rejected the Revision Application, therefore, the Writ Petition was filed by the Society.
The Hon’ble Court observed that the MCS Act and Rules made there under makes provisions for members and membership and various classes of the same and the procedure to be followed for getting such membership. Mere filing of Application for getting membership is not sufficient. The Society is governed and run by the byelaws, which is basic requirement to consider to grant and/or refuse such membership. Normally, the Society, needs to grant membership if all other requisite elements and/or qualifications are satisfied. Even for rejection, the Society must give sufficient reason and/or must show the grounds for such refusal of admission. In the present case, for the above stated case, the Society refused to accept the membership Application.
The basic scheme and procedure so prescribed under the MCS Act referring to “Member”/”Membership”. Section 2(19)(a) provides the concept of “member”. The concept “deemed member” as provided in sections 22(2) and 23 is not defined. Section 22(2) deals with the members who became members and section 23 provides a procedure for open membership. For deciding the membership issue, the aspect of restriction on transfer or charge of share or interest, as contemplated u/s. 29 is also relevant, so also to maintain the register of members as contemplated u/s. 38 of the MCS Act. Rule 38 of the byelaws provides that the Society needs to follow the byelaws, which binds the Society, as well as, its members. Rule 19 deals with the conditions before admission for the membership. This also provides the detailed procedure to be followed by all the parties. Rule 24 deals with the procedure for transfer of shares, as no transfer of shares shall be effective unless the condition so provided under the Rules and the Act are fulfilled.
Thus for transfer of membership and/or shares, the concerned parties need to follow the various procedure and the supporting material and documents. The Society needs to apply its mind to the law, as well as, the related record before granting and/or refusing admission. The statutory Authorities are also under obligation to consider this, if the Society refused the membership and/or any challenge is made to grant such admission. These, are essential elements before considering the rival case, as well as, the contentions at every stage of admission of members and/or granting membership.
Merely because someone has claimed membership, a Society is not under obligation to grant the same. The lawful occupation, their rights, title and interest in the property, permissible transfer of shares and/or property and/or interest as per the byelaws and all related aspects, just cannot be overlooked by the concerned parties, including the Society, as well as, the Registrar/Authorities.
The Society having refused to grant admission with reasoned order, the interference by the Respondent Authority in the present facts and circumstances of the case and specifically by not giving the reasons in support of their reversal order as contemplated and by overlooking the provisions and procedures of the orders passed by the Authorities are unsustainable, therefore, required to be interfered with.
Thus, the Hon’ble Court held that the fact that Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have purchased the property and are in occupation of the same since 2008; their entitlement based upon the said transaction and/or related agreements need to be reconsidered in accordance with law by the concerned Authorities afresh, by giving full opportunity to all the parties concerned. Further, the jurisdiction of Registrar u/s. 23, though nowhere contemplated to determine the validity and/or legality of the documents, which are executed in favour of the parties, but still the basic elements as contemplated under the scheme and the provisions as referred above, right from the byelaws of the Society, need to be looked into before granting and/ or refusing membership. The serious issue of validity and/ or legality of the documents may be the matter of trial and/ or inquiry before the appropriate forum, but that itself is not sufficient to deny the membership, if all requirements are prima facie satisfied.
Advocate – Relationship between the Advocate and the client depends upon the trust between the parties – When the client wants to engage another Counsel, the earlier Lawyer has got no option, except to recuse himself from the case – Advocates Act section 30.
The appellant was the counsel for the 2nd respondent in a matter before the Magistrate Court. The 2nd respondent for the reasons known to him substituted the appellant with some other counsel. The subsequent counsel had filed his vakalatanama in the matter. The appellant sent a letter to the 2nd Respondent stating that his action is against the rule of law. The said letter was followed by filing Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellant submitted that his fundamental right to practice as a Lawyer has been infringed. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate ought not to have noted the change of vakalath filed without following the required procedure.
The Hon’ble Court observed that during the proceedings, a vakalath had been filed on behalf of the second respondent by another Advocate. Admittedly, the consent of the appellant had not been obtained.
The relationship between the Advocate and the client is strictly professional. It depends upon the trust between the parties. The legal profession is not only a service but also a calling. Therefore, when the client wants to engage another counsel, the earlier Lawyer has got no option, except to recuse himself from the case. Acting as a Lawyer to a client is different from any other disputes inter se including the payment of fees etc.
The Court further observed that the any fundamental right of the appellant has not been infringed. It is not as if the appellant has been debarred from doing his profession. It is purely a personal dispute between the appellant on the one hand and the second respondent on the other hand. It is not the case of the appellant that the vakalatanama has not been signed by the second respondent. On the contrary, it is the case of the appellant that the learned X Metropolitan Magistrate, ought to have conducted an enquiry as the change of vakalatanama has been filed without obtaining his consent. Assuming, that the permission of the court is required that aspect, at the best, can be termed as a procedural one. The duty of the Magistrate is to conduct the case before him and not to resolve the inter se between the Lawyer and the party. The Petition was accordingly dismissed.
Basics of Board Evaluation
In a typical public
company, the ownership and control are separated and the shareholders
extensively rely on the Board of Directors to represent their interests.
Whilst the Board of Directors is not running the company on a day-today
basis, which is the responsibility of the management, its involvement
in the form of timely decisions, guidance, direction and oversight plays
a key role in the effective functioning of the company. The way in
which the Board discharges its duties would go a long way in defining
the governance model of the company. These aspects underscore the fact
that the Board must, in addition to reviewing the performance of the
organisation and the management, also review its own performance to make
sure they are doing their duty diligently and effectively. Behavioural
psychologists and organisational learning experts agree that people and
organisations cannot learn without feedback. No matter how good a Board
is, it is bound to get better if it is reviewed intelligently. In view
of the importance attached to the Board, the Indian Companies Act, 2013
requires the evaluation of the performance of the board to add value to
the stakeholders and corporates.
Legal Requirement
The
Companies Act, 2013 has recognised the long felt need for having a
structured process for evaluation of the performance of the Board of
Directors. Section 178(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates that the
Nomination and Remuneration Committee constituted by the Board shall
carry out an evaluation of the performance of every Director. In
addition, the Code for Independent Directors mandates that the
Independent Directors of a Company shall hold at least one meeting, in
which the performance of the non-independent directors and the Board as a
whole, shall be reviewed. Further, the quality, quantity and timeliness
of the flow of information between the Management and the Board shall
be evaluated. The performance of the independent directors shall also be
done by the entire Board excluding the director being evaluated. Based
on such evaluation, the Board’s report shall contain a statement
indicating the manner of evaluation and the conclusions thereof.
Evaluation Process
Typically,
the performance evaluation of the Board would be on the basis of a
benchmark which could be decided upfront and used for the purpose of
this exercise. The evaluation can also be carried out on specific
matters relating to each committee and those which would apply only at a
Board level as well.
With respect to the evaluation of the
individual directors, the performance evaluation could be done on the
basis of the following macro aspects:
-Allocated Roles and Responsibilities
-Strategic Thinking
-Risk Management
-Core Governance and Compliance Management
-Independence & Ethics
-Corporate Culture
-Compliance with the Code of Conduct of Directors
-Industry/Entity Knowledge
-Talent Management
-Leadership Style
-Unbiased Approach
-Effectiveness of Decision Making
-Entity Performance
In addition, the following specific aspects could also be considered for performance evaluation:
-Attendance and contribution to the meetings
-Application of financial/technical/legal/treasury/other expertise on specific matters
-Quality of debate
-Extent of communications with executive management
-Relationship with other Board members
-Personal eminence and the reputation
-Quality of the feedback provided to the management
The
Act does not stipulate the timing or the period for evaluation of the
Board. Hence, a company could either decide to do the evaluation on an
annual basis similar to the policy followed for its employees or deal
with it by having any other review period on a systematic basis. Each
company needs to assess the specific aspects applicable to it and then
consider the frequency/ periodicity of the evaluation. The review could
be done at a pre-determined frequency or could be performed on an “as
needed” basis. The “as needed” approach may work in situations where the
Board has a clear policy on the triggers that would prompt an
evaluation. However, in situations where such guidelines are not
available, then it is possible that the need for performance evaluation
may be overlooked. Performing the evaluation on an annual basis is the
most common frequency as this in line with the annual planning cycle
and, therefore, useful in adapting the performance expectations with the
strategic needs of the organisation. However, a predictable frequency
could result in the evaluation becoming mundane and routine.
On
an overall level, the performance evaluation should be an ongoing
process and not just an annual event. One of the best practices is to
devise other mechanisms in addition to the annual review to ensure
ongoing performance improvement. Irrespective of the period chosen, the
same may be followed in letter and spirit and on a consistent basis.
Attributes
of a Successful Governance Oversight Model Identifying an appropriate
governance oversight model is the basic starting point for having a
robust evaluation platform. All the subsequent activities will be driven
by this. In general, a successful governance oversight model should
encompass the following attributes:
-Competence – skills required for the Board to effectively execute its responsibilities
-Understands corporate governance and its application to Board structure, operations, processes, and procedures
-Understands the organisation, its businesses, and underlying drivers
-Has relevant, recent experience in the industry, adjacent industries and markets, or competitors
-Has knowledge of the interests and priorities of stakeholders
-Process – processes required for the Board to both understand and properly oversee the activities of the entity
-Understands the risks inherent in the organization’s governance programmes
-Selects qualified, independent Board members, aligning overall Board composition with the organization’s strategy
-Establishes and periodically reaffirms Board leadership
-Establishes and ensures compliance with Board operating principles and governance policies
-Designs and implements a committee structure that complements and enhances the work of the Board
-Assesses and continually improves the Board, its leaders, and committees
-Engages with stakeholders
-Oversees public disclosures related to Board operations
-Information – information required by the Board adequate to support effective oversight and decision making
-Receives verbal and/or written feedback and development plans resulting from periodic assessments
-Receives Board governance documents and related tools (e.g., Board calendars, planning tools) for review and improvement
-Receives thought leadership or continuing education related to Board governance developments
-Behaviour – Board’s behaviour to support and reinforce strong oversight
-Displays ownership and commitment to governance excellence and continuous improvement
-Creates a culture of collaboration, engagement, and healthy tension among Board members
-Holds Board members accountable for their behaviour.
Techniques of Evaluation
The
evaluation can be done by using qualitative techniques such as
interviews, feedbacks, etc. or through quantitative techniques such as
surveys, scorecards, questionnaires etc. A typical questionnaire/
scorecard would cover the aspects indicated under “what will be
evaluated?” and in particular the following aspects:
–
Composition and Quality
-Understanding the business and risks
-Process and procedures
– Oversight of the financial reporting process and internal controls
– assessing related party transactions
– understanding competitive landscape
– understanding risks relating to management override, including significant judgements, assumptions and estimates.
– fair compensation.
– Communication with employees, vendors and customers
– adequacy and effectiveness of Board initiated/ monitored mechanisms such as Code of Conduct, Whistle Blower Policy, PTR, CSR Policy, etc.
– oversight of the audit function
– ethics and compliance
– monitoring activities
– Strategy effectiveness
– management relationship
– Succession Planning & training.
Further, this could be done through face to face discussions, telephonic conversations, e-mails, web based scoring modules etc. Irrespective of the evaluation technique used, due care should be taken in documenting the process and the conclusions reached.
The next step in the process is to decide who will perform the evaluation – whether internally (by the nomination and remuneration Committee) or using specialist consultants or external experts. the decision regarding the same will need to be taken after considering the following factors:
– autonomy of the Board
– Board Culture and dynamics
– Confidentiality
– Perception of Bias
– need for transparency and objectivity
– Skills and experience of Performing evaluations
– time and Cost.
The general process to be followed could be to obtain the self-evaluation from the individual directors about the individual and also about the Board which forms the basis for an independent evaluation by the designated person/ committee/authority.
Evaluation Feedback
The feedback to the Board could be provided not only by the members of the Board, but to make it more transparent and comprehensive, the participant base could be extended to cover the internal and external stakeholders as well. Typically, the internal participants who could be consulted for obtaining the feedback on the performance of the Board could be the CEO and other key managerial personnel who interact with the Board on various matters. Similarly, the external participants could range from the shareholders, key customers & suppliers, internal & external auditors. Whilst the internal participant could provide a more specific feedback, the external participants could provide a general feedback about the company/culture which would reflect the performance of the Board.
The Board should agree upfront the required actions that it can take to improve governance. the performance assessment of the Board would typically be discussed by the Board collectively. With respect to the performance assessment of the individual director, generally the same will be discussed by the Chairman of the Board with the concerned member/director. The practice of releasing the summary of the results of the Board’s performance to the entire organisation is also considered as one of the best practices in connection with the Board evaluation process worldwide.
Whilst section 134 (3)(o) of the Companies act, 2013 requires only a statement indicating the manner in which the formal annual evaluation has been made by the Board of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors and the results of the individual evaluation, distribution of the results of the evaluation to stakeholders would be decided by each company based on various factors including the governance model followed, expectations, complexities, culture etc. Irrespective of the method adopted and the regulatory provisions, the Board should keep in mind that the process of performance evaluation, providing the required feedback and the extent of sharing such feedback with others would reflect its commitment to the entire governance process!
Conclusion
Performance evaluation is very important for the Board for not only in meeting the regulatory requirement but also in setting the right tone at the top. This is one of the key mechanisms for the Board to demonstrate its commitment to continuing improvement. It would be a great value multiplier tool for the company, directors and all those stakeholders who will be impacted by the functioning of the company.
When the Board recognises the importance of this process and attributes sanctity and importance to this process, and implements it with all vigour, this would help in building a sound corporate structure which can avert governance failures. Whilst the process is new to india, the experience gained in implementation would help Indian corporates in fine-tuning it on a continuous basis.
To Consolidate or not to Consolidate
Section 129(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, requires a company having one or more subsidiaries, to prepare consolidated financial statements (CFS), in addition to separate financial statements. The second proviso to this section states that the Central Government may provide for the consolidation of accounts of companies in such manner as may be prescribed.
Rule 6 in the Companies Accounts Rules deal with manner of consolidation of accounts. The rule states that “The consolidation of financial statements of the company shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III of the Act and the applicable accounting standards.”
The MCA has recently amended the Company Accounts Rules whereby a new proviso has been added in the Rule 6. The proviso states that “Provided also that nothing in this rule shall apply in respect of consolidation of financial statement by a company having subsidiary or subsidiaries incorporated outside India only for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2014.”
Question 1
Whether the above proviso exempts companies from preparing CFS or the exemption relates only to manner of preparing CFS?
Author’s View
The exemption relates only to the manner of preparing CFS and not the preparation of CFS itself. To support this view, the following two arguments can be made:
• The requirement to prepare CFS is arising from the Companies Act 2013. Rule 6 deals only with the manner of preparing CFS, i.e., preparation of CFS as per notified AS and Schedule III. Hence, the exemption relates only to the manner of preparation of CFS. Thus, a company covered under the above proviso can prepare CFS as per any acceptable framework, say, IFRS, instead of CFS as per notified accounting standards/Schedule III. A company covered under the proviso can also prepare CFS as per any other GAAP (other than Ind AS where the dates are those prescribed by the roadmap) say, US GAAP for filing with the Registrar of Companies (ROC). But if the company also needs to comply with the listing agreement requirements, they permit either Indian GAAP or IASB IFRS.
• Hence, for a listed company, in order to meet both ROC requirements and listing requirements, the option is either Indian GAAP or IASB IFRS (for one year). However, a company cannot avoid preparing CFS.
• Presently, there are few companies who are currently preparing IASB IFRS CFS as per the option given in the listing agreement. If these companies are required to prepare Indian GAAP CFS for year ended March 2015, they will have to transit from IASB IFRS to Indian GAAP for March 2015. In March 2016, these companies will move to Ind AS (i.e., IFRS converged standards) once Ind AS become voluntarily applicable for financial years beginning on or after 1st April 2015. It is understood that the MCA has added this proviso in the rules to avoid this flip flop.
Question 2
Whether the exemption discussed above is available for companies which have overseas subsidiaries only or a company having both Indian and foreign subsidiaries can also use this exemption?
Author’s View
The proviso is based on companies having one or more overseas subsidiaries. It does not matter whether a company has Indian subsidiary or not. In other words, this proviso can be used both by companies having (a) only foreign subsidiary/ies and (b) companies having both Indian and foreign subsidiary/ies.
Question 3
Whether the exemption is available only for one year or it will be available going forward also?
Author’s View
The proviso uses the words “only for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2014.” Hence, this exemption is available only for one year, for example financial year ending 31st March 2015 or 31st December 2015.
Question 4
Section 129(3) of the 2013 Act requires that a company having one or more subsidiaries will, in addition to separate financial statements (SFS), prepare CFS. Hence, all companies, including non-listed and private companies, having subsidiaries need to prepare CFS. Whether the comparative numbers need to be given in the first set of CFS presented by an existing group?
Author’s View
Schedule III states that except for the first financial statements prepared by a company after incorporation, presentation of comparative amounts is mandatory. In contrast, transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt presentation of comparative numbers in the first set of CFS prepared even by an existing group.
One view is that there is no conflict between transitional provisions of AS 21 and Schedule III. AS 21 gives one exemption that is not allowed under the Schedule III. Hence, presentation of comparative numbers is mandatory in the first set of CFS prepared by an existing company. This interpretation is taken on the basis that when there are two legislations; one of which imposes a more stringent requirement, the stringent requirement would apply.
The other view is that Schedule III is clear that in case of any conflict between Accounting Standards and Schedule III, Accounting Standards will prevail over the Schedule III. Hence, exemption given under AS 21 can be availed by an existing group which prepares CFS for the first time. In other words, an existing Group preparing CFS for the first time need not give comparative information in their first CFS prepared under AS 21.
Both the views appear acceptable.
Question 5
Consider that a non-listed company is preparing CFS in accordance with AS 21 for the first time. It has acquired one or more subsidiaries several years back. Is the company required to go back at the date of acquisition of investment for calculating goodwill/ capital reserve on acquisition?
Authors view
Goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition of subsidiary should be calculated with reference to the date of acquisition of investment in subsidiary. Thus, determining goodwill for an acquisition that took place many years ago may be very challenging. The transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt a company, which is preparing CFS for the first time, from presenting comparative information. There is no exemption from the requirement to determine goodwill/ capital reserve. Hence, any goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition should be determined at the acquisition date.
Let us assume that a company has acquired a subsidiary more than 10 years back, which should have resulted in goodwill arising on the acquisition. Under Indian GAAP, a company is allowed to amortise goodwill over its useful life, say, 5 to 10 years. Alternatively, the company may only test the goodwill for impairment. In this case, the company may argue that in the past, it has amortised goodwill over its useful life, say, 5 to 10 years. Consequent to amortisation, the net carrying value of goodwill on the date of first preparation of CFS is zero. The corresponding impact of goodwill amortisation has gone into profit or loss of the earlier periods and impacts the cumulative retained earnings at the date of first preparation of CFS. The application of this view obviates the need to go back in history for computing goodwill arising on acquisition. However, it impacts the amount of retained earnings and net worth on the transition date. If a company does not wish to have such impact and desires to disclose goodwill amount, it needs to go back in the history for calculating goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition.
In the case of acquisitions made in recent history, say, in past 3-4 years, it may not be possible to take a view that the goodwill is fully amortised. In this case, the company will need to go back in history to determine goodwill arising on acquisition. The amount of goodwill reflected in the first CFS will depend on the company’s policy for goodwill amortisation with respect to past years.
To ensure that goodwill is not carried at amount higher than its recoverable amount, the company will have to test if goodwill is impaired at the transition date in accordance with AS 28 Impairment of Assets.
[2015] 54 taxmann.com 377 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) ITO vs. Heubach Colour Pvt. Ltd A.Y: 2007-08, Dated: 23.01.2015
Facts:
The Taxpayer an Indian Company, engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of colour pigments and fine chemicals, purchased a particular line of business of a foreign company (NR Co) and certain payments were made towards knowhow.
The Taxpayer contended that the payments made to NR Co. were for outright purchase of capital assets.However, the Tax Authority contended that payments made by the Taxpayer were Royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act, therefore treated the Taxpayer as assessee-in-default for failure to withhold taxes u/s. 195.
Held:
The agreement between the Taxpayer and NR Co indicates that the taxpayer had purchased knowhow, trademarks and goodwill from NR Co.
NR Co was the owner of manufacturing processes, formulae, trade secrets, technology, analytical techniques, testing procedures, processes and all documents and literature pertaining to manufacturing. NR Co sold, assigned conveyed and transferred to Taxpayer its entire right, title, interest and ownership in such rights. Thus, NR Co ceased to have right, title, interest and ownership in such rights from the date of transfer.
The Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. (332 ITR 340) observed that royalty refers to transfer of “rights in respect of property” and not transfer of “right in the property”. The two transactions are distinct and have different legal effects. In the first category, the rights are purchased which enable use of those rights by the purchaser, while in the second category, no purchase is involved, only right to use has been granted.
The definition of term ‘royalty’ in respect of the copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work, patent, invention, process, etc. does not extend to outright purchase of right to use an asset.
Since nothing was brought on record by the tax authority to show that the payment was not for the purchase of technical knowhow, they were not in the nature of royalty.
[2015] 54 taxmann.com 300 (Mumbai-Trib.) Mckinsey Business Consultants Sole Partner LLC vs. DDIT (IT) A.Y: 2011-12, Dated: 13.02.2015
Article 3, 17 of India – Greece DTAA – Where DTAA does not have a specific article on FTS the services would be taxable as business profits and not as other income under the DTAA.
Facts:
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Greece entered into a transaction of providing certain services to an Indian branch of one of its associate entity. The Taxpayer did not offer to tax income received in respect of such services in India. The Taxpayer was of the view that income for services would fall under business income article of the DTAA . In absence of a PE in India, such business profits would not be liable to tax in India.
However, the Tax Authority contended that the services were in the nature of FTS under S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as the DTAA .
On appeal before the dispute resolution panel (DRP), it was held that if DTAA is silent on certain source of income the same should be taxable as per the provisions of the Act. Aggrieved the taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.
Held:
A bare reading of Article 17 (other income article) of India- Greece DTAA indicates that it deals with residual items of income which are not covered by any of the articles of the DTAA .
However, in this case the assessee has earned income by rendering the services in the course of its business and therefore, it is nothing but business profit which is covered under business profits article viz, Article 3 of the treaty. Admittedly the assessee does not have PE in India and hence, as per the express provision of Article 3 of the DTAA, business profit cannot be taxed in India.
TS-70-ITAT-2015 (Del) Qualcomm incorporated vs. ADIT A.Y: 2005-09, Dated: 20.02.2015
taxable in India if it is paid in respect of patents used for the
purpose of carrying on business in India or for earning any income from a
source in India. On facts and in the context of CDMA technology , where
it can be shown that royalty is paid for license used in manufacturing
products specific to India, such license may be treated as used in
carrying on business in India.
Facts:
The
Taxpayer, a company incorporated in the US, was engaged in the business
of designing, developing, manufacturing and marketing digital wireless
communication products and services based on “Code Division Multiple
Access” (CDMA) technology. The Taxpayer owned certain patents pertaining
to CDMA technology.
The Taxpayer granted a non-transferable and
non-exclusive, worldwide patent licence to NR Original Equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) outside India to manufacture and sell CDMA
handsets/ infrastructure equipment (CDMA products).
For
exploitation of patent license, OEMs were required to pay a
non-refundable licence fee and an on-going royalty based on sale of CDMA
products. Royalties were to be computed as a percentage of the selling
price of the products manufactured by the OEMs. As per the agreement
between the taxpayer and OEM, royalty would become due as and when the
CDMA product was invoiced, shipped, sold, leased or put to use,
whichever was earlier.
OEMs manufactured CDMA products outside
India and sold them to telecom operators/service providers (SP)
worldwide, including India.
The issue before the Tribunal was
whether the royalty paid by NR OEMs to the Taxpayer (relating to
handsets /equipment sold/ used by OEMs in India) were taxable in India.
In other words, whether the royalty payment will be taxable in the
jurisdiction where the handsets/equipment are manufactured or in the
jurisdiction where they are used.
Held:
Under the Act
The
determining factor in royalty taxation is the place where the
intellectual property (IP) is used. i.e., the emphasis is on the situs
of use of the IP.
In connection with the patents, the event
triggering taxation is (i) granting of a right, licence or sub licence
in a patent, or (ii) sharing of information concerning use or working of
a patent. It is thus taxation of income of the person owning the
patents and it is taxation in the jurisdiction of end use of patents.
The emphasis is on the “situs of use” of the patent rather than “situs of the entity” making payment for the royalty.
If
a patent is used in a manufacturing process, royalty taxation should be
in the jurisdiction where manufacturing takes place. However, where
patent is used by the end consumer and the manufacturing is only a
conduit for collection of royalty for use from the end customer, it
should be taxable in end use jurisdiction.
As per the royalty
source rule u/s. 9(1)(vi), the situs is in India if the usage of patent
is for the purpose of (i) carrying on business or profession in India
(first limb) or (ii) earning income from a source in India (second
limb).
On carrying on a business or profession in India
Carrying
on business wholly in India or exclusively in India is not a sine qua
non for attracting taxability u/s. 9(1) (vi)(c). Even when business is
partly carried out in India but the royalties are payable in respect of
such part of the business as is carried on in India, it would be taxable
in India.
When an entity has a PE in a jurisdiction it would
imply that such an entity is carrying on business in the jurisdiction in
which such PE is situated.
Where the core manufacturing
activity with respect to CDMA products is carried out in one
jurisdiction but the sales and marketing activity in respect of the same
product is carried out in another jurisdiction (India), it cannot be
said that the business is not carried on in that other jurisdiction
(India).
Thus even where OEM do not manufacture CDMA products in
India, but makes India-specific products and carries out a part of his
business operation in India, it would be sufficient for section
9(1)(vii) to apply.
The principle that sale to customers in
India would amount to business with India and not business in India (as
observed in earlier ruling of ITAT ) would hold good only where there
was no material to suggest that any activity is carried on in India.
Thus by analogy even where NR has some operations in India, it can be
said to carry on business in India.
Thus, whether or not the OEMs carried on business in India would depend on two questions;
-Whether the CDMA handsets were made India specific and
-Whether OEM, as a part of his business, was carrying on any operations in India.
The
Andhra Pradesh High court (HC) in the case of Asifuddin [(2005)
Criminal Law Journal 4314 AP] had examined the working of the CDMA
technology and concluded that CDMA handsets are service provider
specific. However, it was argued by the Taxpayer that the CDMA handsets
sold in India were not service provider specific.
The issue was
remanded back to Tax Authority for a fresh examination on the aspects of
whether the OEMs made India specific products, whether OEMs had PE in
India.
On earning income from a source in India
The
expression ‘for the purpose of making or earning any income from any
source in India’ not only involves active earnings such as a business in
India but also a passive earning by exploiting an asset (both tangible
and intangible) in India.
The taxation of royalties for use of a
patented technology will have the situs where the technology is used.
Accordingly, when the royalty is for use of a technology in
manufacturing, it is to be taxed at the situs of manufacturing the
product, and, when the royalty is for use of technology in functioning
of the product so manufactured, it is to be taxed at the situs of use.
In
the present case, taxpayer owns the patent and royalty is for use of
patented technology, while the point of its collection, as a measure of
convenience and in consonance with the industry practice, is from
manufacturer when the patented product is put into use by sale.
Whether
or not patents are used in the manufacturing of the handset or for the
use of the patented technology embedded in the CDMA handsets is a highly
technical aspect requiring opinion of technical expert. The matter was
remitted back to Tax Authority for further examination.
Under the DTAA
Article
12(7)(b) of the India-USA DTAA provides that royalty shall arise in
India if it relates to the use of or the right to use the right or
property in India.
Patents can be said to be used in India only
when royalty is paid for the use of patents in CDMA products sold in
India and not for the use of CDMA technology for the manufacture of CDMA
products outside India.
The Tribunal abstained from ruling on
Article 12(7)(b) as this issue was remanded back for consideration based
on opinion of technical expert.
TS-147-ITAT-2015 (PAN) ACIT vs. Ajit Ramakant Phatarpekar and Neelam Ajit Phatarpekar A.Y: 2010-11, Dated: 16.03.2015
Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian resident, made payments to nonresident (NR) parties for monitoring, supervision of discharged cargo, undertaking draft survey, joint sampling of such discharged cargo, photographs, sample preparation, sealing of samples, analysis of grade etc. The services were rendered outside India by the NR.
The Taxpayer did not withhold tax on payments made to NR in the belief that payments made to NR did not constitute FTS under the Act and further that income from services rendered outside India did not accrue or arise in India as NR did not have a Permanent establishment (PE) in India and services were rendered outside India.
Tax Authority contended that by virtue of retrospective amendment to Explanation to section. 9, income of NR is deemed to accrue or arise in India irrespective of whether NR has a place of business in India or whether services are rendered in India. Hence, such income is taxable in India under the Act.
Held:
The Tribunal did not analyse the nature of payments made by the Taxpayer and held that once the payment is in the nature of Fee for technical services (FTS), Explanation to section 9 becomes applicable. Explanation to section 9 introduced by the Finance Act, 2010 (retrospectively with effect from 1st June 1976) provides that FTS will be deemed to accrue and arise in India whether or not NR has residence or place of business or business connection in India or the NR has rendered services in India.
It is undisputed that NR does not have a place of business or business connection in India and neither does NR render services in India. Thus, income from services to Taxpayer accrues or arises outside India. However, by virtue of Explanation to section 9, the same is regarded as deemed to accrue or arise in India.
In the present facts, payments were made by the Taxpayer before the retrospective amendment to Explanation to section 9. Thus at the time of payment, there was no provision under the Act, deeming FTS to accrue or arise in India and hence, the Taxpayer was not liable to withhold taxes on payments made to NR. The Tribunal held that the law prevailing at the time of payment has to be kept in mind. Since at the time of payments, income was not regarded as accruing or arising in India, there was no need to withhold taxes at the time of making payments.
Some US Tax Issues concerning NRIS/US Citizens Part II
Introduction
In the USA, complying with the tax laws can be very challenging as the same is fraught with complications. Indian Citizens who have moved to the US for employment or for better prospects and in the process have become residents of the US or Green Card Holders should understand the nuances of local tax laws very carefully and start strictly complying with the same from day one. Non compliance or non awareness of taxability of certain income in US can be a very costly affair, as the US has one of most stringent laws with respect to interest and penalty provisions for non compliance.
If you are a tax resident (even if a non citizen i.e. resident alien) in the US, then you are taxed on your worldwide income, just as in case of a Citizen of the USA. In other words, you are taxed on your worldwide income in US2 during the period u you are tax resident of the USA. In the US, the income is basically categorized in two types of Income i.e.,
Trade or business income or
Passive Income (Capital Gains, Dividends, Rental Income etc.) In this article, we would discuss the nuances regarding the taxability of passive income of the US tax residents from outside the USA (i.e., from India) both in the US and India. We would also touch upon the taxability (in both jurisdictions) of passive income arising to Indian Residents from the US.
Capital Gains from Sale of Immovable Property situated in India
1. How capital assets are defined for “Resident Alien”3 in the US and how their cost is determined? Whether a “Resident alien” in US is required to declare his capital assets located in India?
Capital Assets in the US are defined to mean almost everything one owns and uses, for personal or investment purposes. Examples include a home, personal-use items like household furnishings, car and stocks or bonds held as investments.
The US IRS (Internal Revenue Service) uses the term “Basis of Assets” for the cost. Basis is the amount of investment in asset for tax purposes. The basis is the amount one pays for it in cash, debt obligations, and other property or services. It includes sales tax and other expenses connected with the purchase. For stocks or bonds, basis is the purchase price plus any additional costs such as commissions and recording or transfer fees. Basis is increased to incorporate cost of improvements and decreased to consider depreciation, non dividend distribution on stock/stock splits etc.
“Resident Alien” in the US is required to report capital assets wherever located while filing his tax return in Form 8938 or FBAR as may be applicable. Thus, it can be seen that the definition of “Capital Asset” under the US tax law is quite similar to the Indian tax laws.
2. What are the provisions pertaining to Long term capital gains on sale of Immovable properties located in India and pertaining to the US resident alien?
In India, sale of Immovable property is considered as long term, if it is sold 3 years after its date of acquisition. Long Term Capital Gains from immovable property situated in India is taxed @ 20% plus 3% Education Cess + Surcharge, as may be applicable. However, as per the US Tax law, the time period for computing “Long term asset” is one year. In US, the tax rate on Long term Capital Gains depends upon the ordinary income tax bracket of an individual.
3. Can a NRI (Who is Resident Alien in the USA) claim exemption in India of Capital gains earned from sale of Immovable Property situated in India?
Section 54 to 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contains provisions regarding exemptions/relief from Long Term Capital Gains in India. These exemptions/reliefs are subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Exemptions are available if capital gain earned is invested in a residential house situated in India or some specified bonds in India. These sections restrict the exemption to an individual and HUF. The exemption is not dependent on the residential status or citizenship of the seller/assessee. Thus a NRI residing outside India can claim exemption [as per provisions of section 54 to section 54F] in respect of the sale proceeds/capital gains arising from transfer of a long term capital asset.
Further as per section 54 and 54F, capital gains are exempted if NRI invests in a new house property. As per the recent Amendment in the Income Tax Law4, the location of the new house property should be in India.
4. H ow Capital Gains earned in India by a NRI (who is a “Resident Alien” of US) are taxed in USA? Can he claim tax exemption in the US for the property sold in India?
Capital Gains arising in India in the hands of a NRI, who is a Resident tax Alien in the US, will be computed in the US as per the US tax laws, irrespective of the tax treatment that gains suffered in India. As per the US tax laws, Long term Capital Gains on sale of a main home, is exempted up to $ 2,50,000/5- subject to certain conditions. Exemption of $ 250,000/6 – for sale of a property depends on the ownership requirement and use requirement.
However, when the US resident alien files his tax return in the US, he/she has to take into account the difference in the time period for calculating long term capital gain, the exemption available as per the tax laws of US and treat his Indian capital gains as per the time period specified in the US law.
NRI can claim a foreign tax credit in his/her US tax return as per India – USA DTAA .
To elucidate the matters more clearly, let us consider an example (it will be not possible to cover and analyse all types of situations that may arise in real life situations) which is given below in Q 5.
5. Mr. Rich, a NRI and “US Resident Alien” owns a house in New York, USA (being his Main Home) and a Flat in Mumbai. He sells the Flat in Mumbai for Rs. 75 lakh and earns Rs. 55 lakh as Long term Capital Gains. Can he invest Rs. 50 lakh in REC/NHAI Bonds u/s. 54EC? What would be implications under the US Tax Law? What are the Implications under India – US DTAA?
As per the India US DTAA , Capital Gains are taxed in India as well as USA in accordance with the provisions of the respective domestic tax laws. Therefore, the capital gains arising from the sale of flat in Mumbai would be taxable in India.
As explained above a NRI residing outside India can claim exemption under section 54 to section 54F of the Incometax Act, 1961. Thus, out of the capital gains arising from transfer of a flat i.e. long term capital asset the investment under 54EC is permissible.
Mr. Rich being a US resident will pay taxes on Capital Gains of Rs. 55 lakh as per the US Law. As his house in New York is the “main home” (satisfies the ownership and the user requirement of the main home), he will be not able to take the benefit of the exclusion provided as per the US Laws for the Mumbai Flat7 . Though, as per India – US DTAA he would be allowed credit for the taxes paid in India against the taxes payable in US.
6. What are the provisions relating to Capital gains arising from shares, debentures and Bonds in India? Can a NRI claim exemption from Capital gains u/s. 10(38) of the Income-tax Act earned from sale of equity shares of Indian Companies?
Taxability in india
Profits and gains earned on sale of any shares, debentures, mutual funds and other securities are taxed under the head of “Capital Gains” under the income-tax act, 1961.
Gains on shares, debt or balanced schemes of mutual funds, are defined as Long term capital Gain if the same are held for more than 12 months.
Short term Capital Gains on sale of shares or mutual funds which are debt oriented are taxed at normal rate of tax along with other taxable income. However, Short term Capital Gains on sale of equity shares or units of an equity oriented fund on which STT is paid, is taxed at the rate of 15% plus 3% education cess plus curcharge as may be applicable.
Long term Capital Gains (LTCG) from sale of equity shares or unit of equity oriented mutual fund listed in india on which Stt is paid, is exempt u/s. 10(38) for both residents and non-residents. However, LTCG from unlisted securities shall be taxed at 10%. LTCG on Listed Securities on which Stt is not paid is taxed @ 10% without indexation, whereas taxed @ 20% with indexation plus 3% education cess plus curcharge as may be applicable.
7. How Capital gains earned in India by a NRI, who is a US Resident Alien, are taxed in USA?
Taxability in the USA
In the US, the tax rates on Long term and Short term Capital Gain will depend on tax brackets of the ordinary income of an individual. Given below is the table of various
Tax rates applicable8 to an individual depending upon his/ her tax bracket:-
tax Brackets |
ordinary |
long term capital Gain rate |
Short term capital |
$0 – $9075 |
10% |
0% |
10% |
$9076 – $36900 |
15% |
0% |
15% |
$36901 – $89350 |
25% |
15% |
25% |
$89351 – $186350 |
28% |
15% |
28% |
$186351 – $405100 |
33% |
15% |
33% |
$405101 – $406750 |
35% |
15% |
35% |
$406751 & Above |
39.6% |
20% |
39.6% |
Mr. Rich, a NRI and US Resident Alien, owns Rs. 10 crore worth of shares of listed Indian Companies. he sells all the shares and earns long term Capital gains of Rs. 5 crore and Short Term Capital gains of Rs. 1 crore. What are the implications under India and US Tax law? Whether such Capital gains would be taxable in the US? Can Mr. Rich claim tax credit in US of taxes paid in india?
Implications as per Income-Tax Act, 1961
As per section 5 of the income-tax act, any income arising in india will be taxable in india. however, Long term Capital Gains on sale of equity Shares is exempt u/s. 10(38) of the act. Though, Short term Capital Gains arising from sale of equity shares would be taxable at the rate of 15% (plus 3% education Cess and applicable surcharge) u/s. 111a of the act. Hence in the given example, Mr. rich would be exempt from tax on Long term Capital Gains but would be taxed at 15% (plus 3% education Cess and applicable Surcharge) on Short term Capital Gains.
Implications under US Tax Laws:-
Mr. rich would be taxed on his worldwide income in the uS and hence, he would be taxed on the Capital Gains arising in india. however, as per article 25 of india – US DTAA, he can avail foreign tax credit of the taxes paid in india against the uS taxes.
Long term Capital Gains and Short term Capital Gains arising on sale of shares will be taxable as per the tax brackets of Mr. Rich. even though Long term Capital Gains from sale of equity are exempt from tax in india, such gains will be taxable in the US. Short term Capital Gains are taxed in the US as per the ordinary income tax rates, whereas the Long term capital gains are taxed at a concessional rate depending upon the ordinary income tax bracket. The table of tax rates for both short term and long term capital gains is given above for reference.
Taxation of Dividend Income
8. What are the implications under Indian and US Tax laws for a US Resident receiving Dividends from indian Companies?
In india, the recipient of dividends is not liable to pay any tax on dividend received/accrued as the company distributing the dividend is liable to pay dividend distribution tax at the rate of 15% plus surcharge and education Cess. Thus, a US tax resident receiving dividends from the indian company which has paid dividend distribution tax is not subjected to tax in india. However, such dividend would be taxed in US as per the normal income tax rates.
Taxation of Rental Income
9. Mr. Rich, a NRI, residing in the US. he has given his residential house in India on rent. What will be the implications of the rental income received by Mr. Rich under the US tax law?
Rental income received by mr. rich will be taxed both in india and uS. article 6 of the india – uS dtaa provides that rent from immovable property (real property) may be taxed in the country where it is situated. thus, mr. rich has to pay tax on rental income in india as the property is situated in india and he has to pay tax in the uS also, being taxed on worldwide income. the major difference in india and uS is that in india mr. rich would get a standard deduction of 30% whereas in uS taxation only actual expenses incurred would be deducted from such rental income. following deductions will be allowed against such income:
– mortgage Property taxes
– insurance
– utilities
– depreciation – allowed for building; any furnishings; appliances (except land).
However, the taxes paid in india would be available as foreign tax Credit under indian – US DTAA.
Taxation of Interest
10. how is interest income of a NRI (who is resident alien in USA) taxed in India and US?
As per the india – US dtaa, the right of taxing interest primarily lies with the Country of residence of the person earning it. However, article 11 does give right of taxation to the source country but the maximum rate at which it can get taxed is capped at 15%. 9
Taxation of Income of Non-resident Aliens (i.e. Indian residents) in US
So far we have discussed taxability of nris settled in USA who (mostly regarded as resident alien or uS Citizen) have sources of income in india. Let us now turn to a situation where indian tax residents have sources of income in USA.
11. A resident Indian sells an immovable property in US (acquired 2 years ago) and earns a capital gain of $15,000/-. What would be implications under the US Tax law and the Indian IT Act? What is the India – US Tax Treaty implications on the same?
In the given case, since the property was held for two years, the capital gains would be treated as Long term Capital Gains in the US. The net capital gain is normally taxed at the appropriate10 graduated tax rates. however, if withholding tax is applicable, then tax is deducted by the purchaser at the rate of 10% of the gross sale proceeds. Resident Indian would therefore be required to file income tax return in the US and pay appropriate capital gains tax, subject to exemption of $ 2,50,000/-, if gains arise on sale of main home. In certain cases, subject to certain filings and fulfillment of conditions withholding of tax can be avoided.
Resident Indian while filing his income tax return in India would have to treat such capital gains as short term capital gains as the period of holding is less than three years. however, as per the india – US DTAA, resident indian will be able to claim the foreign tax credit for the taxes paid in the US while filing his tax return in India.
12. A resident Indian has earned Capital gains on sale of a foreign property (long term capital asset) which was held for more than three years, Will he be able to claim capital gains exemption as per the IT Act by investing in a residential house in india or NHAI bonds in india?
A resident indian can avail exemption u/s. 54eC and 54f upon fulfillment of certain conditions if the investment made from transfer of a long term capital asset. The exemption is available irrespective of the fact that the capital asset is situated outside india.
13. What are the implications under Indian and US Tax laws for an Indian Resident receiving Dividends from US Companies?
In the US, dividends are considered as part of passive income. Generally, tax at the rate of 30% or lower treaty rate (i.e. 25% as per india – US DTAA) is withheld by a uS Corporation on the dividends distributed to a non-resident.
In india, such dividends would be taxed in the following manner
(i) If dividend is received by an indian Company from its Wholly owned subsidiary in uS, then it is taxed @15%; and
(ii) In all other cases, at the applicable tax rate.
The tax withheld by the US Corporation would be available as foreign tax credit against the tax payable in india.
14. What will be the implications under the US tax law for the rental income received by Indian resident from renting of property in US?
As per the US Laws, tax rates depends on whether a non- resident alien is able to choose to treat all income from real property as effectively/not effectively connected with a trade or business.
If the rental income is in connection with any trade or business in USA, then the tax would be levied on a graduated applicable tax rates, otherwise tax would withheld @ 30% on gross rental. The taxpayer i.e. an indian resident has to make appropriate declaration by exercising choice at the time of filing his tax return.
Epilogue
The US tax law is a complex subject. one cannot possibly cover all aspects in a short write-up. The intention of few FAQs mentioned herein above is to highlight some of the nuances of US & indian tax laws on passive income in india pertaining to nris in the USA (resident alien or uS Citizen) & passive income in the uSa of indian tax residents.
Mah. Amendment Act No. XVII of 2015
Few important amendments in MVAT are as follows:-
• Definition of “Purchase price” and “sale price” amended to exclude Service Tax if separately collected.
• Late Fee for delayed return filed before thirty days reduced to Rs.1,000/- from Rs.2,000/-.
• Application u/s.23(11) for cancellation of assessment order also provided for order passed u/s. 23(5). • Dates for working of interest for filing annual revised return provided.
• Schedule Entry C-4 amended to include embroidery thread in category of sewing thread with effect from 1.4.2005.
• Notification under Schedule Entry C-54 amended to include white butter in relation to “Desi Loni” with effect from 1.4.2005.
• Schedule Entry C-91 amended so that spices shall include spices in all forms of varieties and mixtures of any of the spices with effect from 1.4.2005.
Amendment in Professional Tax Act :
Female Employee getting salary less than Rs. 10,000/- per month : Employee Professional Tax will be Nil.
Amendments to Schedule ‘A’ and ‘C’ of MVAT Act VAT 1515/CR 39(1)/Taxation-1 dated 27.3.2015
[2015] 37 STR 963 (Ker.) E. M. Mani Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Cus. & S.T., Cochin
Facts:
During the hearing of stay application, the learned counsel for the appellant was not present and adjournment was requested. However, the Tribunal proceeded with the hearing and passed a stay order with the condition of payment of entire service tax with interest along with 50% penalty. Subsequently, the modification application of the appellant also was rejected. Therefore, the present appeal is filed.
Held:
Since the Counsel for the appellant did not remain present, the order was passed without hearing the appellant. Further, while the order rejecting modification application, the Tribunal focused on its limit on jurisdiction in review applications. Therefore, both the orders were passed without having regard to the merits of the case. Accordingly, in view of the above and having regard to the huge quantum of service tax demand ordered to be deposited, the matter was remanded for fresh hearing and stay order.
Lease vis-à-vis Service, Supremacy
By now there are a number of judgments and it can be said that the situation is very fluid in as much as there are contradictory judgments including from the Hon’ble High Courts.
Quippo Oil and Infrastructure vs. State of Tripura (77 VST 547) (Trip)
This is one of the latest judgments from the High Court of Tripura deciding on the controversy as referred to above. There were a number of petitions, but the facts as noted by the Hon. High Court in one of the cases, can be referred to as under:
The petitioner companies in this case entered into a contract with the ONGC for digging directional wells. As per the petitioners, digging directional wells has many components including Drilling Rig, Logging Services, Cementing, Mud Engineering, Directional Drilling etc. Directional drilling is one of the components of digging a directional well. According to the petitioners they have entered into a service contract providing service of directional drilling, and therefore, they are paying service tax to the Central Government. The petitioners contend that the contract does not amount to sale and no VAT can be levied on the same.
Based on above facts, the Hon. High Court has discussed the issue at length. The rival submissions are noted by the Hon. High Court by observing as under:
“The case of the State is that since a tax on the sale or purchase of goods includes in terms of sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29A) tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose the petitioners are liable to pay value added tax on such transfer of right to use goods. The contention of the petitioners is that they have entered into a service contract and only the Union can levy tax on services and not the State. The petitioners have also urged that they are paying service tax to the Central Government under the provisions of law and since they are paying service tax, if there is conflict between the Central Law and the State Act the Tripura Value Added Tax Act must necessarily give way to the provisions which provide for imposition of service tax in the Finance Act of 1994.”
The Hon. High Court has referred to a number of citations, and, after full discussion arrived at the following conclusion:
“[33] As has been held by the Apex Court either a transaction shall be exigible to sales tax/VAT or it shall be exigible to service tax. Both the taxes are mutually exclusive. Whereas sales tax and value added tax can be levied on sales and deemed sales only by the State, it is only the Central Government which can levy service tax. No person can be directed to pay both sales tax and service tax on the same transaction. The intention of the parties is clearly to treat the agreement as a service agreement and not a transfer of right to use of goods. We are also clearly of the view that it is impossible from the terms of the contract to divide the contract into two portions and since the petitioners have paid service tax they cannot be also asked to pay value added tax. As held by the Delhi High Court in Commissioner, VAT , Trade and Taxes Department vrs. International Travel House Ltd. (supra), if there is a conflict between the Central law and the State Act then the Central law must prevail. The petitioners cannot be burdened with two different taxes for the same transaction.
[34] After carefully going through the contracts we are of the view that the contracts are mainly for hiring of services. There may be a very small element of transfer of right to use goods but according to us the pre-dominant portion of the contract relates to hiring of services and not to transfer of right to use the goods. We are aware that the dominant nature test is not to be used in composite contracts falling within the ambit of Article 366(29A) but from the reading of the contract it is more than apparent that the intention of the parties was to treat the contract as a contract for hiring of services. Moreover, it is impossible to divide the contract into two separate portions. Every element of the digging directional wells and Mobile Drilling Rig service contains a major element of provisions of services. In such an eventuality it is virtually impossible to divide the contract. It is not possible to work out the value of the right to use goods transferred under the contract. In cases, where the contracts are easily divisible or where the parties have by agreement clearly indicated what is value of the service part and what is value of the transfer of right to use goods part, the contract may be divided. We are in agreement with the Delhi High Court that when the contract cannot be divided with exactitude then the Central Law must prevail.
[35] Parties have also been paying service tax and if the State is allowed to tax any portion of the value of the contract then there has to be a proportionate refund of the service tax to that extent. This cannot be done without hearing the Union of India. If there is any dispute between the State or the Union of India then they must resolve it between themselves. The petitioners or the ONGC cannot be made liable to pay both the taxes for the same transaction.
[36] In view of the above discussion, we are clearly of the view that in all the cases the transactions do not amount to sale within the meaning of the TVAT Act, 2004. Therefore, all the writ petitions have to be allowed. The State is not entitled to levy any sales tax or Value Added Tax on the transactions in question. It is, therefore, directed that the amount of tax, already deducted and received by the State shall be refunded to the petitioners along with statutory interest latest by 28th February, 2015. In case the amount is not refunded by that date then the State shall be liable to pay interest @12% per annum with effect from 1st January, 2015.”
Conclusion
The above judgment is one of the determinative judgments which is very clear in its verdict. The laws laid down by the Hon. High court will certainly be guiding law for time to come. The businesses, at present, are very much under pressure due to an attempt by both the authorities to levy Service tax as well as VAT . The nature of transaction is to be decided by its dominant nature and if it is for providing services, then even if some element of leasing of instrument etc. is involved, it cannot be enforced by State Authorities. The Service Tax should prevail over Sales Tax/VAT . We expect that taking note of the above judgment, the sales tax department will not ask to pay sales tax where Service Tax is already paid as well as if at all the transaction attracts sales tax then the departments will make adjustment of payment inter-se and not ask the dealer to discharge double tax. This will be a real relief to the dealers.
Drilling Rigs on Time Charter – A Service of Hiring of Tangible Goods?
As against this claim, the revenue’s submission was that the issue involved was covered by the Hon. Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (INSA) 2009 (14) STR 289 (Bom). The High Court examined the scope of SOTG service in the context of supply of offshore vessels to carry out various jobs like anchor handling, towing of vessels, supply of rigs or platform, diving or safety support, crane support etc., in designated or non-designated areas. The question before the High Court in the case of INSA (supra) was whether various independent services provided by the members of the association were in the nature of mining services defined under entry (zzzy) or the later entry (zzzzj) defining SOTG in section 65(105) of the Act. Since these activities were independently carried out by various and separate vendors, it was held that the services are liable to be classified as SOTG, when the right of possession and effective control of goods was not transferred as they did not carry out mining activity.
Statutory provisions:
For facilitating easy reference, both the relevant definitions of section 65(105) of the Act are reproduced below:
[zzzy]:
“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to mining of mineral, oil or gas”.
{zzzzj}:
“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.”
Scope of the contract:
The Tribunal on detailed examination of the contract between the parties inter alia found that the contract:
Was for a firm period of three years from the commencement date.
The compensation was based on per day of operation and only slightly lower compensation was payable (about 95%) even for a non-operation day. Similarly, even for the day when rigs were moved from one location to another, the lower rate of about 95% of the daily rate was still applicable to non-operation day.
The scope included provision of complete drilling rig and equipment as per technical specification.
Provision of capable and experienced rig crew.
The appellant was fully responsible for mobilisation of personnel, equipment and material and their safety.
Loss or damage to the drilling unit was on account of the appellant.
For undertaking any drilling, the appellant was entitled to additional charges.
Training the crew also was appellant’s responsibility.
The Tribunal on examining the definition of SOTG found that only two conditions were required to be covered by SOTG service viz. there should be supply of tangible goods and there should not be any transfer of right of possession and effective control. Whereas, the appellant’s contention that they did not transfer possession and control to ONGC was not relevant to determine liability under the category of SOTG.
Perusal of the ingredients of the contract in the light of the legal provisions, the Tribunal observed that the equipment and crew were of the appellant and therefore possession and effective control was of the appellant and the consideration was also expressed on per day basis. Thus, all the elements put together showed that there was no transfer of right or possession by the appellant to ONGC and therefore appellant’s contention that they should have transferred possession of goods to come within the scope of the taxing entry of SOTG was not tenable. On examining Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (supra), the Tribunal concluded that the appellant’s service merited classification as SOTG. In support of its decision, the Tribunal also relied on the decisions of:
Atwood Oceanic Pacific Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2013 (32)STR 756 (Tribunal Ahmd)
Shipping Corporation of India 2014 (33 STR 552 (Tri.- Mum)
Srinivasa Transports 2014 (34) STR 765 (Tri.-Bang)
The Tribunal on concluding also noted that even on assuming that service was a composite service consisting of mining service and SOTG, the essential character of the service was SOTG service since 95% of the consideration was attributed for supply of tangible goods.
While analysing the above decision of the hon. tribunal, the fact of the matter to be noted is that the limited issue before the Bench was to examine and classify the activity under one or the other classification as the dispute raised in the show cause notice was in relation to classification. Similarly, when the hon. Bombay high Court examined the case of INSA (supra), the trigger point for filing writ petition on behalf of members of the Shipowners’ association was that various offshore support vessels, construction barges, tugs etc., were provided by members for exploration operations on time charter basis. This summarily may be described as marine logistics services. The revenue initiated action to recover service tax on the said activity under the entry of mining service under the above sub-clause (zzzy). Vide this entry actually all the activities relating to mining were consolidated by the finance act, 2007. The category of SotG was introduced later from 16th may 2008. Therefore, in the case of INSA (supra) to put an end to dispute relating to taxability under the entry of mining service, the argument was advanced that the later entry of SOTG was the relevant classification. However, the scope of this taxing entry in (zzzzy) or taxability under the entry was per se not examined vis-à-vis a contract for hiring of equipment in detail as there did not arise such question before the high Court. As a matter of fact, the decisions relied upon above by the tribunal in Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra) viz. Shipping Corporation (supra), atwood oceanic (supra) etc., also, the dispute involved was limited to different classifications vis- à-vis SOTG and/or fact prior to the date of introduction of SOTG the service was not taxable.
Are Most Hiring Contracts Not of “Deemed sale”?:
On closely perusing the scope of the entry of SOTG one may find that only those hiring or leasing contracts would be covered by the scope of this entry whereunder, there is no transfer of right of possession and effective control over the equipment provided on hire. hiring contracts where such right is transferred are liable as “deemed sale” under the Vat laws of the States. To examine whether a contract contains transfer of such right to use the goods or not, a test is laid down in the benchmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) which provides direction in the matter and which is also followed by various high Courts as listed below:
? There must be goods available for delivery.
? There must be consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods.
? The transferee should have legal right to use the goods
– consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permission or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee.
? For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion of the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods.
? Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.
If all the above ingredients are present, the contract is one of “deemed sale” in terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution and exigible to Vat and therefore cannot be held as SOTG service. It may be noted at this point that under the negative list based taxation applicable from 01-07-2012, the said service of SOTG is included in the list of “declared Services” in section 66e of the act in clause (F) as “transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods”. While explaining the negative list based provisions, the Government in the education Guide dated 20-06-2012 has referred to the above test and has cited a few illustrations with reference to some judgments to advance its own interpretation. (readers may refer para 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 of the said education Guide). The said test referred above was followed interalia in another important decision of the andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT involving contract of hiring of commercial vehicles and the aspect of transfer of right to use has been exhaustively analysed (refer BCAJ november 2012 issue under hiring of goods: declared Service or deemed Sale). An extract of a few important observations made in the said decision of G. S. Lamba (supra) is provided below:
“The right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods and that the transfer of right is the sine quo non for the right to use any goods”.
“Effective control does not mean physical control and even if the manner, method, modalities and time are decided by the lessee, it would be general control over goods”.
“Article 366(29A) would show that the tax (i.e. VAT in the instant case) is not on the delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when and whether goods are delivered for use. This is subject to the condition that goods are in existence for use.”
“The entire use in the property in goods is to be exclusively utilized for a period under contract by lessee.”
Similar decision has also been pronounced by the Gauhati high Court in Deepaknath vs. ONGC (2010) 31 VST 337 (GAU) and Orissa High Court in K. C. Behra vs. State of Orissa (1991) 83 STC 325 (Orissa). On going through the terms of contract in the instant case of Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra), one may find that the contract satisfies the test laid down by the Apex Court in BSNL’s case (supra) and conforms with all the observations made by andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba’s case (supra). Yet, paradoxically, the contract is subjected to service tax.
Conclusion:
There may exist several conflicting decisions for a common situation. Similarly, view of professionals also may differ. yet the test laid down by BSNL seems a decisive factor for the situation discussed above. Following principles laid down thereunder, the above contract does not appear to be a contract for service at all. However, since this aspect was not presented before the tribunal for the reasons best known to the appellant, the contract seemingly of “deemed sale” is held as service of supply of tangible goods liable for service tax. Entire service sector and professionals eagerly await the arrival of GST legislation in the hope of bringing an end to the battle between the aspect of ‘sale’ and ‘service’ in a transaction.
Income computation and Disclosure Standards notified: Notification No. 33/2015 F.No. 134/48/2010 – TPl, dated 31 March 2015
CBDT has notified income computation and disclosure standards applicable to all assessees following the mercantile system of accounting, for computing income chargeable to income-tax under the following heads:
(i) “Profit and gains of business or profession”
(ii) “Income from other sources”.
The Notification is effective from April 1, 2015 and will apply to Assessment Year 2016-17 and subsequent Assessment Years.
17. Roll back of Advance Pricing Agreements (APA): Notification no. 23/2015 dated 14.3.15 and Notification no. 33/2015 dated 1.4.2015
The Board vide Income tax (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015 had issued rules for roll back of application of APA as well as APA vide Rule 10 MA. These Rules allow retrospective application for roll back up to four years.
The dates prescribed in the said rules has been amended vide Income tax (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 2015. Currently, an application filed before 31 March 2015 can be rolled back by filing prescribed Form 3CEDA along with additional fee before 30 June 2015 or the date of entering the APA whichever is earlier. Similar provisions apply for APAs’ entered before 31 March 2015.
18. No capital gain arises on roll over of Mutual Funds under Fixed Maturity Plans as per SEBI norms – Circular No. 6 dated 9 April 2015
19. Amendment in Rule 114 to provide procedure for application of PAN/Tax deduction Account No./Tax collection Account No. for company not registered under the Companies Act, 2013, Certain additional documents (like Aadhar card, election card etc.) permitted as proof of date of birth in case of individuals – Income tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules 2015 – Notification no. 38/2015 dated 10 April 2015
20. Rule 2BB amended to increase amount of Transport allowance for blind or handicap employee from Rs. 1600/- to Rs. 3200/- and for other employees from Rs. 800/- to Rs. 1600/- per month – Income tax (Sixth Amendment) Rules 2015 – Notification no. 39/2015 dated 13 April 2015
21. New tax returns forms notified – Notification no- 41/2015 [S.O. 1014(E) dated 15 April , 2015 – Income tax (Seventh amendment) Rules, 2015
New forms SAHAJ (ITR-1), ITR-2, SUGAM (ITR-4S) and ITR-V” have been notified. Further Rule 12 has been amended with effect from 1 April, 2015
22. Chargeability of Interest on Self-Assessment tax under the Wealth tax Act, 1957 – Circular no. 5 dated 9 April 2015
As notified for income tax purposes, the Board now clarifies that no interest u/s. 17B will be charged on self assessment tax paid before the due date of filing the return, while computing the tax liability under the Wealth tax Act for delay in filing the return of net wealth.
23. CBDT Instructions on claim of treaty benefits by FIIs – File :F.No.500/36/2015-FTD-1 dated 24 April 2015 (reproduced hereunder)
It has come to the notice of the Board that several Foreign Institutional Investors receiving income from transactions in secrutities claim such income as exempt from tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act)’, by availing benefit provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAAs’) signed between India and their respective countries of residence.
Since the issue involved in such cases is limited, such claims should be decided expeditiously. Accordingly it has been decided that in all cases of Foreigh Institutional Investors seeking treaty benefits under the provisions of respective DTAAs, the decision may be taken within one month from the date such claim is filed.
This may be brought to the notice of all concerned with strict compliance.
Jupiter Construction Services Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Ahmedabad `A’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM) ITA No. 2850 and 2144/Ahd/11 Assessment Year: 1995-96 and 1996-97. Decided on: 24th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Tushar P. Hemani / Subhash Bains
Facts:
There was a different of opinion between the members of Division Bench while deciding the appeal of the assessee relating to levy of penalty. The difference was referred to the Third Member who agreed with the Accountant Member and confirmed the levy of penalty.
At the stage of Division Bench giving effect to the order of the Third Member, the assessee claimed that the order of the Third Member could not be given effect to as it was unsustainable and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents. The assessee claimed that the matter of whether effect could be given to such an order was required to be referred to a Special Bench.
Held:
Post the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vallabhdas Vithaldas 56 taxmann.com 300 (Guj) the legal position is that the decisions of the division benches bind the single member bench, even when such a single member bench is a third member bench.
A larger bench decision binds the bench of a lesser strength because of the plurality in the decision making process and because of the collective application of mind. What three minds do together, even when the result is not unanimous, is treated as intellectually superior to what two minds do together, and, by the same logic, what two minds do together is considered to be intellectually superior to what a single mind does alone. Let us not forget that the dissenting judicial views on the division benches as also the views of the third member are from the same level in the judicial hierarchy and, therefore, the views of the third member cannot have any edge over views of the other members. Of course, when division benches itself also have conflicting views on the issues on which members of the division benches differ or when majority view is not possible as a result of a single member bench, such as in a situation in which one of the dissenting members has not stated his views on an aspect which is crucial and on which the other member has expressed his views, it is possible to constitute third member benches of more than one members. That precisely could be the reason as to why even while nominating the Third Member u/s. 255(4), the Hon’ble President of this Tribunal has the power of referring the case “for hearing on such point or points (of difference) by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal”. Viewed from this perspective, and as held by Hon’ble Jurisdictional high Court, the Third Member is bound by the decisions rendered by the benches of greater strength. That is the legal position so far as at least the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court is concerned post Vallabhdas Vithaldas (supra) decision, but, even as we hold so, we are alive to the fact that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court had, in the case of P. C. Puri vs. CIT 151 ITR 584 (Del), expressed a contrary view on this issue which held the field till we had the benefit of guidance from the Hon’ble jurisidictional High Court. The approach adopted by the learned Third member was quite in consonance with the legal position so prevailing at that point of time.
At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it cannot normally be open ot the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. In the case of dissenting situations on the division bench, the process of judicial adjudication is complete when the third member, nominated by the Hon’ble President, resolves the impasse by expressing his views and thus enabling a majority view on the point or points of difference. What then remains for the division bench is simply identifying the majority view and dispose of the appeal on the basis of the majority views. In the course of this exercise, it is, in our humble understanding, not open to the division bench to revisit the adjudication process and start examining the legal issues.
ACIT vs. Ramila Pravin Shah ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 5246 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2010-11. Decided on: 5th March, 2015. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Love Kumar / Bhupendra Shah
Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee has made purchases from certain parties whose names appeared in the list of parties provided by the sales-tax department who allegedly provide accommodation entries. The AO considered statements taken by the sales-tax department from some of the parties. The Inspector deputed to serve notices to these parties reported that these parties were not available at the given address.
The AO asked the assessee to submit delivery challans and stock register to prove the movement of stock and also to produce these parties. The assessee failed to furnish the details called for. Placing reliance on the statements given by these parties before the sales-tax authorities the AO took the view that purchases to the tune of Rs. 28.08 lakh have to be treated as unexplained expenditure. He added this amount to the total income of the assessee u/s. 69C of the Act.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A). The CIT(A) in his order noted that the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Nikunj Exim Enterprise Pvt. Ltd (ITA No. 5604 of 2010) has held that once sales are accepted, the purchases cannot be treated as ingenuine in those cases where the appellant had submitted all details of purchases and payments were made by cheques, merely because the sellers/suppliers could not be produced before the AO by the assessee.
He mentioned that he has also gone through the judgment in the case of Balaji Textile Industries (P) Ltd. vs. ITO 49 ITD 177 (Bom) which was made as long back as 1994 and which still holds good.
He took into consideration the G.P. Ratio/G.P. Margin of the assessee in the previous assessment year as well as subsequent assessment year and observed that if the addition made by the AO is accepted, then the GP ratio of the assessee during the previous year will become abnormally high and therefore, that is not acceptable because the onus is on the AO by bringing adequate material on record to prove that such a high GP ratio exists in the nature of business carried on by the assessee.
He further observed that it has to be appreciated that (i) payments were made through banking channel and by cheque; (ii) notices coming back does not mean those parties are bogus, they are just denying their business to avoid sales tax/VAT , etc, (iii) statement by third parties cannot be concluded adversely in isolation and without corroborating evidences against appellant; (iv) no cross examination has been offered by AO to the appellant to cross examine the relevant parties (who are deemed to be witness or approver being used by AO against the appellant) whose name appear in the website ww.mahavat. gov.in and (v) failure to produce parties cannot be treated adversely against the appellant.
He held that considering the facts and the binding judicial pronouncements of the jurisdictional ITAT Mumbai Bench as well as Mumbai High Court and other legal precedents the addition made by the AO cannot be sustained.
Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had properly analysed the facts prevailing in the instant case. It extracted the relevant portion of the order of the CIT(A) and held that it did not find any infirmity in the same.
The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.
Heranba Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `H’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 2292 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 8th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Rashmikant C. Modi / Jeetendra Kumar
Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in manufacture of pesticides, herbicides and formulations. It filed its return of income for assessment year 2009-10 returning therein a total income of Rs.1.49 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that during the previous year under consideration, the assessee had received share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh. He asked the assessee to furnish details with supporting evidences. In response, the assessee expressed its inability to provide the necessary details and stated that in order to buy peace, it agreed to offer the share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh as its income.
The AO added Rs. 89.50 lakh to the assessee’s income u/s. 69A and also levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, at the very first instance, surrendered share application money with a request not to initiate any penalty proceedings. Except for the surrender, there was neither any detection nor any information in the possession of the department. There was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the AO had not brought any evidence on record to prove that there was concealment. No additional material was discovered to prove that there was concealment. The AO did not point out or refer to any evidence to show that the amount of share capital received by the assessee was bogus. It was not even the case of the revenue that material was found at the assessee’s premises to indicate that share application money received was an arranged affair to accommodate assessee’s unaccounted money.
The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh Chandra Mittal 251 ITR 9 (SC) has observed that where assessee has surrendered the income after persistence queries by the AO and where revised return has been regularised by the Revenue, explanation of the assessee that he has declared additional income to buy peace of mind and to come out of vexed litigation could be treated as bonafide, accordingly levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was held to be not justified.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of any material on record to suggest that share application money was bogus or untrue, the fact that the surrender was after issue of notice u/s. 143(2) could not lead to the inference that it was not voluntary.
The amount was included in the total income only on the basis of the surrender by the assessee. It held that in these circumstances it cannot be held that there was any concealment. When no concealment was ever detected by the AO, no penalty was imposable. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars was simply a mistake and not a deliberate attempt to evade tax. The Tribunal did not find any merit in the levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).
The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
DCIT vs. Aanjaneya Life Care Ltd. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “A” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (V. P.) and Sanjay Arora (A. M.) ITA Nos. 6440&6441/Mum/2013 Assessment Years: 2010-11 & 2011-12. Decided on 25.03.2015 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Asghar Zain / Harshavardhana Datar
Facts:
Due to financial crunch the assessee was not able to pay the self-assessment tax within the stipulated period. However, according to the AO, the assessee could not prove its contention with cogent and relevant material. Further, he observed that substantial funds were diverted to related concerns. He therefore levied penalty u/s. 221(1) of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the penalty imposed.
Held:
According to the Tribunal, the Revenue was unable to show that the assessee had sufficient cash/bank balance so as to meet the tax demand. Secondly, it also could not show if any funds were diverted for non-business purposes at the relevant point of time so as to say that an artificial financial scarcity was created by the assessee. In view of the same the tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and upheld the order of the CIT(A).
Dy. Director of Income Tax vs. Serum Institute of India Limited Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Pune Bench “B”, Pune Before G.S. Pannu (A. M.) and Sushma Chowla (J. M.) ITA Nos. 1601 to 1604/PN/2014 Assessment Year: 2011-12. Decided on 30-03-2015 Counsel for Revenue / Revenue: B. C. Malakar / Rajan Vora
Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of vaccines. In the course of its business activities, assessee made payments to non-residents on account of interest, royalty and fee for technical services. The assessee deducted tax at source on such payment in accordance with the tax rates provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTA – As) with the respective countries. It was noted by the AO that in case of some of the non-residents, the recipients did not have Permanent Account Numbers (PANs). As a consequence, Revenue treated such payments, as cases of ‘short deduction’ of tax in terms of the provisions of section 206AA which require that the tax shall be deductible at the rate specified in the relevant provisions of the Act or at the rates in force or at the rate of 20%. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that where the DTAA s provide for a tax rate lower than that prescribed in 206AA , the provisions of the DTAA s shall prevail and the provisions of section 206AA would not be applicable. Therefore, he deleted the tax demand raised by the Revenue relatable to the difference between 20% and the actual tax rate provided by the DTAA s.
Before the Tribunal, the Revenue contended that section 206AA would override section 90(2) and therefore, the tax deduction was liable to be made @ 20% in absence of furnishing of PANs by the recipient non-residents.
Held:
The Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Azadi Bachao Andolan and Others vs. UOI, (2003) 263 ITR 706, CIT vs. Eli Lily & Co. (2009) 312 ITR 225 and the case of GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (2010) 327 ITR 456 upheld the order of the CIT(A) and held that where the tax had been deducted on the strength of the beneficial provisions of DTAAs, the provisions of section 206AA cannot be invoked by the AO having regard to the overriding nature of the provisions of section 90(2).
2015-TIOL-408-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. JKD Capital & Finlease Ltd. ITA No. 5443/Del/2013 Assessment Year : 2005-06. Date of Order: 27.3.2015
Facts:
In the case of the assessee, proceedings for levy of penalty u/s. 271E were initiated in assessment order dated 28th December, 2007. Aggrieved by the assessment order the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) on various grounds. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed by the CIT(A). Upon dismissal of the appeal filed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer (AO) referred the matter regarding levy of penalty u/s. 271E to the Ad ditional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner passed an order levying penalty u/s. 271E on 20th March, 2012.
Aggrieved by the levy of penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who quashed the order levying the penalty on the ground that it is barred by limitation.
Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd. 269 CTR 444 (Del) held that section 275(1)(c) will apply to cases of penalty for violation of section 269SS. The Tribunal held that the date on which CIT(A) had passed order in quantum proceedings had no relevance as it did not have any bearing on the issue of penalty. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly held that the penalty order passed by the AO was barred by limitation as the penalty order was passed beyond six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings were initiated in the month of December 2007 and penalty order was thus required to be passed in before 30th June, 2008 whereas the penalty order was passed on 20th March, 2012.
2015-TIOL-419-ITAT-AHM Dashrathbhai V.Patel vs. DCIT MA No. 174/Ahd/2014 arising out of CO No. 177/Ahd/2009 Block Period : 1.4.1989 to 16.11.1999. Date of Order: 23.1.2015
Facts :
In the case of the assessee, the assessment of undisclosed income was completed and the amount of tax payable was computed @ 67.2% i.e. applying the rate of 60% plus surcharge thereon @ 12% as per proviso to section 113.
In the course of appellate proceedings before CIT(A), the assessee took an additional ground and contended that the proviso to section 113 was introduced by the Finance Act, 2002. Till 31st May, 2002 section 113 did not have a proviso levying surcharge on income-tax. The assessee contended that the proviso is prospective and does not apply to his case where search was carried on 16.11.1999. Accordingly, the assessee is not liable to pay surcharge levied by proviso to section 113. Reliance was placed on the Special Bench decision in the case of Merit Enterprises vs. DCIT 101 ITD 1 (Hyd)(SB). The CIT(A) decided the case against the assessee by following the decision of Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta 297 ITR 322 (SC) wherein it held that the proviso was clarificatory and curative in nature. The assessee did mention that in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. 314 ITR 338 (SC) the issue had been referred by the Division Bench to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court.
Before the Tribunal, while arguing the Cross Objection filed by the assessee, it was pointed out that the issue has been referred to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court. However, the Tribunal following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta (supra) decided the issue against the assessee.
Subsequently, the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. 49 taxman. com 249(SC) reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta and held that the proviso was prospective and not clarificatory. The assessee filed Miscellaneous Application requesting the Tribunal to correct the view taken while deciding the Cross Objection by relying on a Supreme Court decision decided after the Cross Objection was decided.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. (supra) was pronounced after the decision of the Tribunal. However, it observed that the order of the Supreme Court laid down the law of the land as it existed since the inception of the enactment. It noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange 305 ITR 227 (SC) held that even a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court is binding on the Tribunal and if the decision of the Tribunal is contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court such decision of the Tribunal gives rise to a mistake apparent which needs to be rectified.
The Tribunal allowed the application filed by the assessee.
2015-TIOL-416-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Bhupendra Singh Monga ITA No. 3031/Del/2013 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 30.3.2015
Facts :
While assessing the total income of the assessee, an individual, the Assessing Officer (AO) held that the assessee had not properly explained the source of cash deposits. He, accordingly, made certain additions on account of cash deposits.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.
Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The tax effect of the appeal filed was less than Rs. 4,00,000. The appeal was filed on 15.5.2013. Vide CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2014 the threshold limit for filing appeal to Tribunal was fixed at Rs. 4,00,000. The Bench noticed that the Revenue ought not to have filed the appeal since the tax effect was less than Rs. 4,00,000. The DR argued that the appeal was filed before issuance of Instruction No. 5 of 2014, and therefore, the said instruction is not applicable to the present case.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that section 268A has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1.4.1999. It also noticed that CBDT has vide Instruction No. 5 of 2014 fixed the threshold of tax effect for filing appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal to be Rs. 4,00,000. Accordingly, it held that the circular is applicable for pending cases also and therefore, the Revenue should not have filed the appeal before the Tribunal. It fortified its decision by the following decisions of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court:
1 CIT vs. Oscar Laboratories P. Ltd. (2010) 324 ITR 115 (P & H)
2 CIT vs. Abinash Gupta (2010) 327 ITR 619 (P & H)
3 CIT vs. Varindera Construction Co. (2011) 331 ITR 449 (P & H)(FB)
It also noted that the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Delhi Race Club Ltd. in ITA No. 128/2008, order dated 3.3.2011 has following its earlier order dated 2.8.2010 in ITA No. 179/1991 in the case of CIT Delhi-III vs. M/s P.S.Jain & Co. held that such circular would also be applicable to pending cases.
The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
[2015] 152 ITD 533 (Jaipur) Asst. DIT (International taxation) vs. Sumit Gupta. A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated- 28th August 2014.
Income cannot be said to have deemed to accrue or arise in India when the assessee pays commission to non-resident for the services rendered outside India and the non-resident does not have a permanent establishment in India. Consequently, section 195 is not attracted and so the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS from the said payment.
FACTS
The assessee exported granite to USA and paid commission on export sales made to a US company but it did not deduct tax u/s. 195.
The Assessing Officer held that the sales commission was the income of the payee which accrued or arose in India on the ground that such remittances were covered under the expression fee for technical services’ as defined u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b). He thus held that the assessee was liable deduct tax u/s. 195 and he was in default u/s. 201(1) for tax and interest.
On Appeal, CIT (Appeals) held that commission does not fall under managerial, technical or consultation services and therefore, no income could be deemed to have accrued or arisen to the non-resident so as to attract provisions of withholding tax u/s. 195.
On Appeal-
HELD THAT
The order of CIT(A) was to be upheld as the non-resident recipients of commission rendered services outside India and claimed it as business income and had no permanent establishment in India. Thus, provisions of section 9 and section 195 were not attracted.
Reference- High Court- Question of Law- The legal inferences that should be drawn on the primary facts is eminently a question of law.
Business Expenditure – The High Court rightly reversed the order of the Tribunal allowing the claim of deduction of commission paid to agents to co-ordinate with the retailers and State Corporation which were exclusive wholesalers of alcoholic beverages based on primary facts.
The appellants were engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer and other alcoholic beverages. Certain States like Kerala and Tamil Nadu had established marketing corporations which were the exclusive wholesalers of alcoholic beverages for the concerned State whereby all manufactures had to compulsorily sell their products to the State Corporations which, in turn, would sell the liquor so purchased, to the retailers. It was pleaded by the appellants that manufacturers of beverages containing alcohol had to engage services of agents who would co-ordinate with the retailers and State Corporations to ensure continuous flow/supply of goods to the ultimate consumers. And on that ground they sought deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.
The claim made by the assessee in the facts noted above was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. The said order of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The assessee had moved the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench against the aforesaid orders. The learned Tribunal took the view that the assessee was entitled to claim for deduction. The said view of the learned Tribunal was reversed by the High Court in the Reference made to it u/s. 256(2) of the Act.
Before the Supreme Court, three propositions were advanced on behalf of the appellants. The first was whether the High Court could have reframed the questions after the conclusion of the arguments and that too without giving an opportunity to the assessee. The answer to the above question, according to the appellant, was to be found in M. Janardhana Rao vs. Joint CIT (237 ITR 50) wherein the Supreme Court had held that questions of law arising in an appeal u/s. 260A of the Act must be framed at the time of admission and should not be formulated after conclusion of the arguments.
The second issue raised was the jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside the order of the Tribunal in the exercise of its reference jurisdiction. According to the appellants, the point was no longer res integra having been settled in C.P. Sarathy Mudaliar vs. CIT (62 ITR 576) wherein the Supreme Court had taken the view that setting aside the order of the Tribunal in exercise of the reference jurisdiction of the High Court was inappropriate. It had been observed that while hearing a reference under the Income-tax Act, the High Court exercises advisory jurisdiction and does not sit in appeal over the judgment of the Tribunal. It had been further held that the High Court had no power to set aside the order of the Tribunal even if it is of the view that the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal is not correct.
The third question that had been posed for an answer before the Supreme Court was with regard to the correctness of the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in the present case, namely, that the evidence on record had been re-appreciated by the High Court with a view to ascertain if the conclusions recorded by the Tribunal were correct. Reliance had been placed on paragraph 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sudarshan Silks and Sarees vs. CIT (300 ITR 205, 213).
The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the High Court while hearing the reference made u/s. 256(2) of the Act had set aside the order of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that undoubtedly, in the exercise of its reference jurisdiction the High Court was not right in setting aside the order of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court, however, on reading the ultimate paragraph of the order of the High Court found that the error was one of form and not of substance inasmuch as the question arising in the reference had been specifically answered in the following manner: “We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal and uphold that of the Commissioner (Appeals) and answer the questions in favour of the Revenue by holding that the assessee had not discharged the burden that it is entitled to deductions under section 37 of the Income-tax Act. Reference is answered accordingly.”
The Supreme Court observed that a reading of the questions initially framed and subsequently reframed showed that what was done by the High Court was to retain three out of twelve questions, as initially framed, while discarding the rest. Some of the questions discarded by the High Court were actually more proximate to the questions of perversity of the findings of fact recorded by the learned Tribunal, than the questions retained. The Supreme Court held that from a reading of the order of the High Court it was clear that the High Court examined the entitlement of the appellant assessee to deduction/ disallowance by accepting the agreements executed by the assessee with the commission agents; the affidavits filed by C. Janakiraman and Shri A. N. Ramachandra Nayar, husbands of the two lady partners of R.J. Associates and also the payments made by the assessee to R.J. Associates as well as to Golden Enterprises. The question that was posed by the High Court was whether acceptance of the agreements, affidavits and proof of payment would debar the assessing authority to go into the question whether the expenses claimed would still be allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. This was a question which the High Court held was required to be answered in the facts of each case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (No.1) (63 ITR 57) and Lachminarayan Madan Lal vs. CIT (86 ITR 439, 446). The High Court had noted the following observations in Lachminarayan (supra):
“The mere existence of an agreement between the assessee and its selling agents or payment of certain amounts as commission, assuming there was such payment, does not bind the Income-tax Officer to hold that the payment was made exclusively and wholly for the purpose of the assessee’s business. Although there might be such an agreement in existence and the payments might have been made. It is still open to the Incometax Officer to consider the relevant facts and determine for himself whether the commission said to have been paid to the selling agents or any part thereof is properly deductible under section 37 of the Act.”
The Supreme Court held that there were certain Government circulars which regulated, if not prohibited, liaisoning with the government corporations by the manufacturers for the purpose of obtaining supply orders. The true effect of the Government circulars along with the agreements between the assessee and the commission agents and the details of payments made by the assessee to the commission agents as well as the affidavits filed by the husbands of the partners of M/s. R.J. Associates were considered by the High Court. The statement of the managing director of tamil nadu State marketing Corporation Ltd. (taSmaC Ltd.), to whom summons were issued u/s. 131 of the Act, to the effect that M/s. Golden Enterprises had not done any liaisoning work with taSmaC Ltd. was also taken into account. the basis of the doubts regarding the very existence of R. J. Associates, as entertained by the Assessing Officer, was also weighed by the high Court to determine the entitlement of the assessee for deduction u/s. 37 of the act. In performing the said exercise the high Court did not disturb or reverse the primary facts as found by the learned tribunal. Rather, the exercise performed was one of the correct legal inferences that should be drawn on the facts already recorded by learned tribunal. The questions reframed were to the said effect. the legal inference that should be drawn from the primary facts, as consistently held by the Supreme Court, was eminently a question of law. No question of perversity was required to be framed or gone into to answer the issues arising. the questions relatable to perversity were consciously discarded by the High Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, could not find any fault with the questions reframed by the high Court or the answers provided.
Recovery of tax – Stay application – A. Y. 2011-12 – Authority to prima facie consider merits and balance of convenience and irreparable injury – Authority to record reasons and then conclude whether stay should be granted and if so on what condition – No examination and no consideration – Order rejecting stay is not valid –
For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee challenged the assessment order filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) The assessee also filed stay application which was initially granted on the condition that the assessee furnished a bank guarantee but subsequently, as the bank guarantee was not furnished, the application was dismissed.
The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the dismissal order. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:
“The Revenue had not been able to show any reasons which had weighed the authority for passing the order. When the question of grant of stay against any demand of tax is to be considered, the authority may be required to prima facie consider the merits and balance of convenience and also irreparable injury. These had neither been examined nor considered. The authority was required to record the reasons and then reach an ultimate conclusion as to whether the stay should be granted and if so on what condition. In the absence of any reasons, the order rejecting the stay application could not be sustained.”
Penalty – Sections 271D, 271E and 273B – A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 – Loan or deposit in cash exceeding prescribed limit – Payments from partners in cash – Firm and partner are not different entities – Penalty cannot be imposed u/s. 271D –
The
assessee firm was involved in the business of banking. The Assessing
Officer found that the firm had accepted payments firm the partners,
during the relevant years corresponding to the A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99
in cash. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 271D of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the advances made to the
firm by its partners could not be regarded as loans advanced to the
firms and deleted the penalty.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i)
The transaction effected could not partake the colour of loan or
deposit and neither section 269SS nor section 271D of the Act would come
into play.
ii) It was an undisputed fact that the money was
brought in by the partners of the assessee firm. The source of money had
also not been doubted by the Revenue. The transactions are bonafide and
not aimed at avoiding any tax liability.
iii) The
creditworthiness of the partners and the genuineness of the transactions
coupled with the relationship between the “two persons” and two
different legal interpretations put forward could constitute a
reasonable cause in a given case for not invoking section 271D and
section 271E of the Act. Section 273B of the Act would come to the aid
and help the assessee. Penalty could not be levied.”
[2015] 55 Taxmann.com 111 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Deshmukh Services vs. CCE & ST.
Facts:
The appellant undertook job work activities in the nature of mixing of soap bits provided by the supplier company and returning the same in 50 kg. or bigger bags as per company’s instruction and multi-piece packing for which they received consideration. The department contended and confirmed the demand considering the activities as business auxiliary service.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that as per section 2(f)(iii) of the CE Act, 1944 ‘manufacture’ includes any process which in relation to the goods specified in the 3rd Schedule involves packing or re-packing of such goods in a unit container or labeling or re-labeling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment to the goods to render the products marketable to the consumer and soaps were covered under Serial No. 40 of the said 3rd Schedule. Therefore, multi-piece packaging would fall under the category of “packing or re-packing of goods” and would be an activity of ‘manufacture’. The department’s contention that soap is already in packed condition and hence manufacture is said to be completed was not accepted by the Tribunal on the ground that, multi-piece packaging is done on the soaps already packed and therefore, it would amount to repacking and accordingly the activity would be covered under the definition of ‘manufacture’ u/s. 2(f)(iii). It was further held that if the soap noodles are sold as such after mixing and packing/re-packing, then the activity undertaken by the appellant would amount to ‘manufacture’. On the other hand, if they are not sold as such, but are subject to further processes, since the goods are moved under Rule 4(5)(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 it will be an intermediary process in the course of manufacture of soaps and since such movements are permitted without payment of excise duty, the question of levy of service tax would not arise at all in terms of Notification No.8/2005-ST dated 01/03/2005. However, since there was no finding in the order except that the appellant did not contest the duty, the matter was remitted back to give specific finding as to why the activity of the appellant did not amount to manufacture and if it does not amount to manufacture, why benefit of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be extended.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 245 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Malhotra Distributors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE
Facts:
The Appellant received commission from manufacturer of goods for rendering assistance in the marketing of goods, by obtaining orders and also ensuring that the goods are sold at the terms and discounts specified by the manufacturer. The Appellant contended that the activities are taxable under Clearing and Forwarding services.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that in terms of agreement between the parties, the Appellant has to only procure the orders from the stockists and forward them to manufacturers and ensure that the goods are sold at the terms and discounts specified in writing by the manufacturer. For the services so rendered, commission at prescribed percentage on the net sale value was receivable. Therefore, having regard to the terms of agreement and relying upon various cases including Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2006] 4 STT 231 (New Delhi) the Tribunal held that the Appellant did not deal with the goods at all as is expected in the case of clearing & forwarding Agent and he was liable for service tax as commission agent.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 526 (Mumbai CESTAT) Behr India Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune.
Facts:
The Appellant purchased goods from vendor in India and sold the same to its principal foreign entity abroad at a markup of 3% of the purchase price. The goods were shipped abroad directly by the vendor, however invoices for the same were made on Indian entity and VAT was discharged on the same. The Appellant raised export invoice on the foreign entity and received the export proceeds from their foreign principal as evidenced from the bank realisation certificate and the proceeds were credited to the Appellant’s accounts. However, in the books of accounts the markup in the transaction was reflected as ”commission income”. Department contended that markup of 3% shown as commission is liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Services provided to Indian vendor.
Held:
After going through the purchase order and sales invoice issued by the Indian vendor and observing that VAT liability was discharged and also noting that the Appellant has issued export invoice to foreign entity and also realised proceeds, the Tribunal held that transaction is that of purchase and sale of goods on principal-to-principal basis and not as agent of anybody else.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 72 ( New Delhi – CESTAT)- Rako Mercantile Traders vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Lucknow
Facts:
Appellants, manufacturers of excisable goods availed CENVAT credit of duty on inputs. Fire occurred in factory and finished goods, stock in process and raw material got destroyed. Department denied CENVAT credit on inputs which were in stock and in process since these goods were not used in the manufacture of dutiable final products and that fire occurred due to negligence on part of assessee.
Held:
The Revenue’s explanation that fire has occurred on account of negligence on the part of assessee was not appreciated by the Tribunal inasmuch as nobody invites fire. Inputs which were issued from inputs store section to be used in manufacture of final products are eligible for CENVAT credit and no reversal is required. As regards to the inputs lying in store, relying upon Panacea Biotech Ltd. vs. CCE 2013 (297) ELT 587 (Tri-Del), the Tribunal held that mere receipt of the inputs will not entitle the assessee to avail the credit, when such inputs are destroyed “as such” in the store section itself. Thus, credit in respect of inputs in process was allowed whereas those stock in stores was not allowed.
[2015] 55 Taxamnn.com 69 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Crest Premedia Solutions (P) Ltd. vs. CCE
Facts:
The appellant regularly filed refund claims under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules in terms of unutilised credit on input services, used in the output services which were exported. For the disputed period, it did not claim the refund but filed a rebate claim in terms of Notification No.12/2005-ST dated 19/04/2005. A declaration required in terms of the said notification was filed much after the date of export along with condonation of delay for late filing. The rebate claim was rejected on the ground that the declaration was to be filed prior to expiry of one year from the date of export of services.
Held:
The Tribunal held that it is undisputed that conditions prescribed in the said notification have been followed in the present case. However, the procedure was not followed to the extent that declaration was filed after the export of service. It was noted that the contents of the declaration are not such, as cannot be verified from the records maintained. Further, records such as invoice on which input tax credit is availed and records indicating export of services will not reveal any information which is not verifiable later. Having regard to the same and after satisfying itself that the assessee has not claimed CENVAT credit under Rule 5 and the said notification simultaneously, held that the contravention of not following the procedure of filing the declaration is indeed a procedural formality, for contravention of which substantial justice cannot be denied. Accordingly rebate was sanctioned and appeal was allowed.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 4 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs. Parabolic Drugs Ltd.
Facts:
Assessee manufactured capital goods wherein the MS pipes, channels, angles, grinders and bars were used. The Assessee took CENVAT credit on the said items on the premise that certain goods are “capital goods” and certain goods are used as ‘inputs’ for capital goods. Department denied the credit on the ground that these goods are not capital goods and cannot be regarded as inputs as the same were used for construction of the structures and fixtures. The Commissioner (Appeals) decided in favour of the Assessee, aggrieved by which the revenue filed the appeal.
Held:
The Tribunal affirming the Commissioner (Appeals) Order held that it is not disputed that items hereinabove were used by the Assessee in manufacturing of capital goods and hence CENVAT credit cannot be denied. Relying upon CCE vs. India Cements Ltd. 2014 (305) ELT 558 (Mad HC), it was also observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) has given a finding regarding actual use of the impugned goods in the factory premises of the appellant in technical structures of machines/machinery which are capital goods, based on details of their description and actual photographs submitted by the Assessee. Thus, Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.
[Note: In Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. 2010 (255) ELT 481 (SC), applying the “user test” the Court held that, CENVAT credit of items used for manufacture of product which is used as integral part (i.e. component) of the capital goods are also regarded as capital goods. However in Vandana Global Ltd. 2010 (253) ELT 440 (Tri-LB) it was held that the foundations and supporting structures can neither be considered as capital goods nor as part or accessory to capital goods. Hence, the items used in fabrication of such supporting structures cannot be regarded as inputs used for manufacture of capital goods. Further relying upon Maruti Suzuki Ltd. 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC), the Tribunal held that, in the absence of nexus such items cannot be regarded as inputs for final product. However subsequently, the Madras High Court in the case of India Cements Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 341 held that CENVAT credit is available. Relying on this judgment, the Tribunal in the case of A.P.P. Mills Ltd. case 2013 (291) ELT 585 (Tri-Bang) disapproved Vandana Global (supra). Recently, the Calcutta High Court in stay matter in the case of Suryla Alloy Industries Ltd. vs. UOI 2014(305) ELT 47 (Cal) taking note of the same has granted waiver of pre-deposit to the Assessee. However, with effect from 07/07/2009, ‘inputs’ does not include cement, angles, channels, Centrally Twisted Deform bar (CTD) or Thermo Mechanically Treated Bar (TMT) and other items used for construction of factory shed, building or laying of foundation or making of structures for support of capital goods and with effect from 01/03/2011 any goods used for laying of foundation or making of structures for support of capital goods have been excluded from definition of input].
2015] 55 taxmann.com 274 (Bangalore- CESTAT)-Shirdi Sai Electricals Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Bangalore
Facts:
Appellant, a registered ser Stay – In the absence of any indication, mere use of the expression,
“inclusive of taxes” in the contract does not mean that tax is
collected from customer.vice provider of Management, Maintenance or Repair Service and Erection, Commissioning and Installation service discharged service tax on service portion of contract. The department demanded service tax on the entire contracted value including value of material, as the rates collected as per the contract were inclusive of all taxes. During adjudication Appellant relied upon Notification No. 45/2010 ST and Notification No.12/2003-ST to contend that, service of distribution of electricity was exempt upto 21-06-2010 and that value of material is not to be added in computation of service tax. Copies of VAT paid documents were duly submitted to justify that service tax is not applicable on the value of material. However, on the single ground of non-disclosure of material value in the ST-3 returns the authority contended that service tax is to be paid on the entire contracted value.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that the rates collected in the contract were inclusive of all taxes and there was nothing in the said contract to suggest that service tax was separately charged by the appellant from their customers. It was held that, the expression “inclusive of taxes” only means that there would be no further rise in the value of the contracts in case any demand stands raised against the service provider by the Revenue. In absence of any indication that service tax stands collected by the appellant from their customers, the above observation of the adjudicating authority cannot be appreciated. As regards, non-inclusion of value of material in discharging service tax, the Tribunal observed that Contract Value clearly reflected value of material and service separately and that copies of the VAT documents showing that VAT stands paid by them in respect of such materials is also on record. It was further held that mere non-mention of the Notification in the ST-3 Returns, does not give a reason to deny the benefit of the same, without otherwise examining the applicability of Notification in question. Since the Notification was applicable, unconditional stay granted.
[2015-TIOL-538-CESTAT-MUM] Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III.
Facts:
Employees of Appellant incurred travel expenses while providing output service. Invoices issued separately indicated service charges and actual charges for travelling and due service tax was discharged on the service charges. Show Cause Notices were issued demanding service tax on the travelling expenses on the ground that as per section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, gross amount which is charged for rendering of services which includes travelling expenses should be the value for the purpose of service tax.
Held:
Relying on the decision of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excises, Rajkot [2008-TIOL- 1106-CESTAT-AHM] which is upheld by the apex Court held that the reimbursable expenditure shall not form part of the value of the taxable service.
[2015-TIOL-667-CESTAT-DEL] M/s. Nidhi Metal Auto Components Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-IV.
Facts:
Inquiries were conducted at the end of various manufacturers and dealers, who submitted that they had issued invoices without delivery of goods. Show Cause Notices were issued denying CENVAT credit as merely invoices were issued. The Appellant contended that they had received the goods through tractor trolley along with invoices which were used in the manufacture of final products and payments were made through account payee cheques. It was submitted that no cross examination was granted and the statements did not name the Appellant.
Held:
It is impractical to require the Appellant to go behind the records maintained by the dealer/manufacturer. No investigation has been conducted, moreover there is no discrepancy in the invoices issued and all payments are made through account payee cheques and therefore the appeal is allowed.