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Gaming or Gambling?

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Introduction

“What’s in a name?” asks Shakespeare.

Apparently a lot, if you are considering whether a particular venture is a ‘gaming venture’ or a ‘gambling venture’. While the two terms sound similar, there is a world of a difference between the two. With India’s online gaming market growing by leaps and bounds, there is a keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in/acquiring Indian gaming companies. Several venture funds/large corporations have invested in gaming ventures in India. For instance, recently Walt Disney Company has acquired 100% stake in Indiagames Ltd. by buying out 42% stake held by the promoters and others for around $ 80 million. Games2Win, one of India’s oldest gaming portals has raised over $ 11 million from various venture funds. Thus, to say that the interest in this sector is large would be an understatement.

In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. There are several laws which are relevant when one considers the nature of a venture. This Article gives an overview of this interesting subject.

Legal ecosystem

Let us first understand the various laws which deal with this subject:

(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.

(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising/ conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.

(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and 7 Union Territories regarding gambling/gaming.

(d) The following are the various laws which regulate/ restrict/prohibit gambling in India:

  • Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central legislation provides for the punishment for public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.

  • Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.

  • Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, Madras Gambling Act, etc. These Acts are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act as the object of these Acts is to ban/restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.

  • Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This Section provides for a punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government.

  • Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’

  • The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions in conducting lotteries.

  • The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 which requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling. ?
  • States which expressly permit gambling:

Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax) Rules, 2002 permit setting up of casinos in Sikkim.

The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008 + Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provide for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.

Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 allows casinos to be set up only at fivestar hotels or offshore vessels with the permission. That is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos at fivestar hotels.

West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in the State of West Bengal, a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.

Public Gambling Act

Since this is a Central Act on which several State Acts have been based, we may examine this Act. Section 1 of this Act has laid down three conditions and all three must be fulfilled in order that a place is treated as a common gaming house:

(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.

It is a moot point whether these definitions can be extended to online gaming ventures.

Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs.200 or an imprisonment for a term up to 3 months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.

Exception u/s.12: Even if all the above-mentioned 3 conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject-matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.

In State of AP v. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill. It held as follows:

  • Rummy was not a game of mere chance like three cards;

  • It requires considerable skill as fall of cards is to be memorised;

  • The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;

  • It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill; and

  • Chance is a factor, but not the major factor.

  • Held, that rummy is not a game of chance, but a game of skill.
In Dr. K. R. Lakshmanan v. State of TN, 1996 2 SCC 226 the Court analysed whether betting on horses is a game of chance or mere skill:

  • Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or skill and chance.

  • In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated, but it depends upon superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of players.

  • A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element.

  • It is the dominant element which determines the character of the game.

  • In horse-racing the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.

  • Horses are given specialised training.

  • Books are printed giving details of the above which persons betting study.

Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance. In Bimalendu De v. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal. 30, Kaun Banega Crorepati aired on Star TV was held not to be a game of chance, but was held to be a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting are missing from this game. Only a player’s skill is tested. He does not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.

In M. J. Sivani v. State of Kar, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or a mixed game of skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not games of mere skill.

Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence, is a game or is it more a game of chance and hence, gambling.

Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887
This Act is similar to the Public Gambling Act in its operation, but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse-races and dog-races in certain cases.

‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject-matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming/proceeds of gaming/winnings or prizes of gaming.

The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:

  •     Betting on rainfall

  •     Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities

  •     Betting on stock-market prices

  •     Betting on cards.

The punishment under this Act is imprisonment up to two years. Police officers have been given sub-stantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.

Indian Penal Code

Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine up to Rs.1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill, then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to come 1st, 2nd, 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill, since filing up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill — Stoddart v. Sagar, (1895) 2 QB 474.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

The PMLA covers any designated business or profession carrying on activities of playing games of chance for cash or kind. Such a business must maintain for 10 years a record of all transactions between it and the clients.

Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients/customers.

FEMA/Foreign Direct Investment Policy

Remittance abroad out of lottery winnings, out of income from racing/ridding or for purchase of lottery tickets, sweepstakes is prohibited under the Foreign Exchange Management Act.

The FEMA Regulations (FEMA 20/2000-RB) and the Consolidated FDI Policy of 2011 issued vide Circular 2/2011, state that Foreign Direct Investment of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting including casinos. Thus, FDI is not allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. Further, foreign technology collaboration in any form, including licensing for franchise, trademark, brand name, management contract is prohibited for lottery businesses and betting/gambling activities.

However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million dollar question — is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.

Role of a CA
Looking at the raging controversy over gaming versus gambling, a CA should alert his clients about the potential dangers of setting up a gambling venture or a venture where there is no clarity over whether it falls under gambling or gaming. Similarly, if he is associated with a fund/investor investing in such a doubtful venture, he should red flag the transaction for his client’s notice. He should recommend that a well-reasoned legal opinion on this aspect should be obtained and only then the transaction should be proceeded with. The risks involved with getting into a gambling venture are very high and could even lead to the arrest/prosecution of the persons involved with it. The old adage of ‘better safe than sorry’ should be the mantra in such a case.

Finally, I have to say that the most surprising aspect has been the speed at which the folks in India adapt to Western practices. They learn fast, really, really fast.

— Sanjay Kumar

Is it fair to Initiate Recovery Proceedings When Tax is Already Deducted?

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The Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides for two modes of collection and recovery of income taxes under Chapter XVII.

One and major mode of collection of tax preferred by the Department is through Tax Deduction at Source — TDS. The other mode is to collect taxes directly from the assessee — this is used where tax deduction is not provided for or TDS is not enough to meet the tax liability — advance tax and other modes of collection prescribed in Chapter XVII. In the recent years the Income Tax Department has pursued vigorously the TDS mode of collection of taxes by extending the areas of Tax Deducted at Source — refer section 192 to section 206 of the Act.

Section 205 grants protection to the deductee assessee. This is a logical step on having adopted ‘Tax Deducted at Source’ mechanism. The section reads as under:

“205. Bar against direct demand on assessee. — Where tax is deductible at the source under (the foregoing provisions of this Chapter), the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from that income.”

The Plain reading of this section makes it clear that whenever and wherever tax is deductible under the provisions of this Chapter and where the tax has been so deducted, no direct demand can be raised on the deductee. This implies that to the extent of TDS, demand cannot be raised on the deductee. For raising demand on the deductor a suitable provision has been inserted in section 201 of the Act. Under this provision whenever there is a default in deducting either the whole tax or part of the tax the deductor is deemed to be an ‘assessee in default’.

Thus there are self-contained foolproof provisions in the Act to protect the deductee under Chapter XVII.

The Act provides for filing of returns of income by individuals, trusts and businesses wherein the assessee has to provide detailed information regarding the name and address of the deductor, along with the TAN of the deductor and the amount of tax deducted at source based on the certificate issued by the deductor in Form 16A. Under the previous rules these certificates were to be attached with the return of income. However, in the present era of computerisation, the tax credits can be viewed under Form 26AS online. These returns of income are also affirmed by the assessee by verification provided in the form of return of income. Thus he is held responsible for claims of tax credits he is making.

After the deductee has filed the return and complied with all the formalities, no demand can be raised against the assessee for the amount of Tax Deducted at Source.

Reality

Having made such a foolproof scheme, in reality the income-tax authorities all over the country are blatantly practising something which is not provided under the Act. This was revealed in the two decisions of the Bombay High Court. The first decision is reported in (2007) 293 ITR 539 (Bom.) in the case of ACIT v. Yashpal Sahani.

In this case the assessee was a salaried employee and the tax deducted at source by his employer was not paid to the Government. Hence even Form No. 16 was not issued to the employee. At the time of assessment the employee produced all the proofs including salary slips to prove that ‘tax was deducted’. The Assessing Officer without paying any attention to the legal provisions u/s. 205 referred above, raised a demand on the employee and even issued order for attaching employee’s bank account. The employee-assessee even wrote letters to Income-tax Officer, TDS circle of the employer to initiate necessary proceedings against the employer. The employee challenged the action of Assessing Officer of attaching his bank account. The Court rightly held that the action of the Assessing Officer was not as per law and even if the credit of the TDS is not available to the petitioner-assessee for want of TDS certificate, the fact that the tax has been deducted at source from salary income of the petitioner would be sufficient to hold that u/s.205 of the Act, the Revenue cannot recover the TDS amount with interest from the employee. While dealing with this judgment the Court also referred and relied upon decisions reported in 242 ITR 638 (Gauhati) and 278 ITR 206 (Kar.).

Without paying any heed to such crucial decisions the Department continues its unlawful actions against thousands of assessees, mostly salaried. As a result, assessees having salary income continue to receive intimations under the section 143(1) with demands calculated along with interest and have to file rectification applications either themselves or through their chartered accountants or lawyers or ITP’s. As is the practice, the Department does not act on these rectification applications and keep on sending illegal demand notices to the employee-assessees, irrespective of the fact that there is bar against raising direct demand on the employee. Unfortunately, at times the professionals involved also do not point out the provisions of section 205. This unlawful practice continues unabated leading to harassment of the assessee and results in corruption. This author has not seen any indirect demand on the employer deductor raised by the Income-tax Department under such circumstances. However, the employees are made to dance to the tune of recovery officers and at times suffer at the half-baked computer system of the Department.

Very recently the matter again came up before the Bombay High Court in writ petition No. 6861 of 2011. The Court vide its order clearly held that the intimation demand is not correct and hence set aside the same.

Although procedural, section 205 grants protection to the employee (deductee) whose tax is fully deducted but unfortunately they are still made to visit incometax offices for no fault of theirs and in blatant violation of the legal provisions. The irony is that even the newly created CPC Bangalore has continued this unlawful practice.

This author has drawn the attention of the regulator i.e., the CBDT to stop this harassment. This step will be in the interest of the Department because of its avowed objective of being ‘assessee friendly’.

In all fairness the author advocates and expects the CBDT to issue proper instructions urgently to its officers to:

  • desist from attaching assets of the deductee.
  • take action against the deductor.
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Judiciary — Maintenance of highest standard of propriety and probity — Rule of Law — Constitution of India Arts. 235 and 233.

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[ Arundhati Ashok Walavalkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 11 SCC 324]

The issue that was raised in the appeal by the appellant was whether the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing on the appellant the punishment of compulsory retirement in terms of Rule 5(1)(vii) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1979 on the ground that the appellant-Magistrate was found travelling without ticket in a local train thrice and on each occasion, the behaviour of the appellant-Magistrate with the railway staff in asserting that the Magistrates need not have a ticket was improper and constituted a grave misconduct.

The inquiry officer held that the appellant was found travelling without ticket at least thrice and her behaviour on each occasion was far from proper and not commensurate with the behaviour of a judicial officer. The disciplinary authority considered her case and took a decision that she was guilty of misconduct and therefore decided to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement which was accepted by the State Government and consequently the impugned order of compulsory retirement was issued against the appellant.

It was submitted by the appellant that the aforesaid punishment awarded was disproportionate to the charges levelled against her and that she should at least be directed to be paid her pension which could be paid to her if she was allowed to work for another two years. It was submitted that the appellant had completed 8 years of service and if she would have worked for another two years, she would have been entitled to pension.

The Court held that it was unable to accept the aforesaid contention for the simple reason that the Court could probably interfere with the quantum of punishment only when it was found that the punishment awarded was shocking to the conscience of the Court. The case was of judicial officer who was required to conduct herself with dignity and manner becoming of a judicial officer. A judicial officer must be able to discharge his/ her responsibilities by showing an impeccable conduct. In the instant case, she not only travelled without tickets in a railway compartment thrice but also complained against the ticket collectors who accosted her, misbehaved with the railway officials and in such circumstances, how could the punishment of compulsory retirement awarded to her be said to be disproportionate to the offence alleged against her. In a country governed by rule of law, nobody is above law, including judicial officers. In fact, as judicial officers, they have to present a continuous aspect of dignity in every conduct. If the rule of law is to function effectively and efficiently under the aegis of our democratic setup, Judges are expected to, nay, they must nurture an efficient and enlightened judiciary by presenting themselves as a role model. A Judge is constantly under public glaze and society expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Judicial office, being an office of public trust, the society is entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and ethical firmness by maintaining the most exacting standards of propriety in every action. Therefore, a Judge’s official and personal conduct must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. Obviously, this standard of conduct is higher than those deemed acceptable or obvious for others. Indeed, in the instant case, being a judicial officer, it was in her best interest that she carries herself in a decorous and dignified manner. If she has deliberately chosen to depart from these high and exacting standards, she is appropriately liable for disciplinary action.

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Public document — Annual return — Liability of directors — Companies Act, 1956 sections 159, 163 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872, section 74.

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The appellant, who was a non-executive Director on the Board of M/s. Lapareil Exports (P) Ltd., resigned from the directorship w.e.f. 31-8-1998. On 20-11-1998, recording the resignation of the appellant, the company filed statutory Form 32 with the Registrar of Companies. A notice dated 10-12-2004 was issued to the appellant regarding dishonour of alleged cheques u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (the Act) by the respondents. The appellant, replied to the said notice informing the respondents that she had resigned from the directorship of the company long back in 1998.

The respondents filed a complaint u/s.138 of the Act against the company arraying the appellant as an accused. It was stated in the complaint that the appellant and the other accused were the directors of the company and were responsible for the conduct of the business and also responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company and that all the accused persons, who were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time the offence was committed shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. The appellant filed a petition before the High Court for quashing the complaint. The High Court held that the annual return dated Sept. 30, 1999, filed by the company was not a public document, and dismissed the petition.

The Supreme Court allowing the appeal held that inasmuch as the appellant’s reply to the statutory notice contained specific information that the appellant had resigned from the company in 1998, the respondent was not justified in not referring to it in the complaint and arraying her as accused in the complaint filed in the year 2005.

Further though the appellant was unable to produce a certified copy of Form 32, as it was not available with the Registrar of Companies, a copy of Form 32 was placed before the High Court. A reading of sections 159, 163 and 610(3) the Companies Act, 1956, makes it clear that there is a statutory requirement u/s.159 of the Companies Act, that every company having a share capital shall file with the Registrar of Companies an annual return which includes details of the existing directors. Section 163 requires the annual return to be made available by a company for inspection and section 610 which entitles any person to inspect the documents kept by the Registrar of Companies. The High Court committed an error in ignoring section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which refers to public documents and s.s (2) thereof which provides that public documents include ‘public records kept in any state of private documents’. A conjoint reading of sections 159, 163 and 610(3) of the 1956 Act, read with s.s (2) of section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, makes it clear that a certified copy of the annual return is a public document and the contrary conclusion arrived at by the High Court could not be sustained.

In view of the fact that the appellant had established that she had resigned from the company as a director in 1998, well before the relevant date, namely, in the year 2004, when the cheques were issued, the criminal complaint in so far as the appellant was concerned was to be quashed.

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Order — Reasons — Failure to give reasons amounted to denial of justice — Karnataka Sales Tax, 1957

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[ Dishnet Wireless Ltd. v. ACCT, Bangalore & Ors., (2011) 45 VST 255 (Karn.)]

The petitioner, an Internet service operator extending services of broadband, web hosting, etc., provided a CD-ROM to its customers in order to access the services and recovered service charges from them. The assessment order passed on the petitioner under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, was challenged in appeal before the Appellate Authority who dismissed the appeal. The proceedings were remitted to the Assessing Officer by the Appellate Tribunal. The Assessing Authority rejected the contention of the petitioner that the internet services did not involve sale of CD-ROM and that the services were subjected to service tax and passed orders of assessments. The said order was challenged in writ petition before the High Court.

The Court observed that the orders impugned ex facie animate non-application of mind, as the Assessing Officer without adverting to the contentions advanced by the petitioner in the objections and recording findings over the same, held the objections untenable. Application of mind means consideration of the contentions advanced by the parties with reference to proved facts and the law applicable to the said facts. It is for the AO to consider all relevant material and eschew irrelevant material to record findings, and conclusions. Recording of reasons is a part of fair procedure. Reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the decision in the controversy and the decision or conclusion arrived at. They substitute subjectivity with objectivity.

Giving of reasons in support of their conclusion by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfariness in the concusion. It is part of fair procedure and failure to give reasons amounted to denial of justice.

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Foreign currency more than US $ 5000 — Legal requirement to make a declaration — Customs Act, 1962 sections 77, 113 and 114.

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[In re: Kanwaljit Singh Bala 2012 (275) ELT 272 (GOI)]

Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was leaving for London on 11-2-2009 from Kolkata Airport. After completing immigration formalities while the appellant was proceeding towards the security area, one of the AIU officers intercepted him. On being asked the appellant declared of having 1500 Euro and IC Rs.5200. Not being satisfied, the person was searched which resulted in the recovery of 5200 Euro, 1000 UK Pounds, and 98 US$, collectively valued at Rs.3,73,609, kept concealed inside the brief worn by him. The appellant could not produce any licit document in support of his legal acquisition, possession and/or exportation of the said currency. Accordingly, the said currency was seized on the reasonable belief that the same was being smuggled out of the country in contravention of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 read with FEMA, 1999 rendering the same liable to confiscation under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962.

The said seized currency was confiscated u/s. 113(d)(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 with an option to redeem the same on payment of redemption fine of Rs.1,50,000. A penalty of Rs.75,000 was also imposed. The applicant preferred an appeal before the jurisdictional Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) who upheld the action taken by the lower authorities but reduced the redemption fine to Rs.1 lakh and penalty to Rs.50,000 only.

The appellant submitted that the foreign currency carried by him was a part of the foreign currency drawn from M/s. Clarity Financial Service Ltd. (RBI authorised money exchange), Kolkata. Due to sudden return to India, the appellant again converted the Malaysian currency into Euro & UK Pound at airport for utilising the same for subsequent visit to UK. In a hurry no money exchange receipt was obtained.

The Revisionary Authority observed that that as per Foreign Exchange Management (Import and Export of Currency) Regulations 2000, Indian National can bring any amount of foreign currency and declaration before the customs is required only if the money value exceeds US $ 5000. The money value of the unspent amount is equivalent to US $ 8500 (approx.) and non-declaration of the same has been due to impression that no declaration is required for unspent money (procured legally in India) on return.

On perusal of Regulations 5, 6 and 7 (with relevant RBI Notifications) as above, it is evident that a compulsory requirement of making a Custom Declaration Form (CDF) is the legal requirement specifically when the impugned foreign currency involved is more than US $ 5000 (or equivalent). In this case the applicant has not made any declaration in CDF. Therefore, any of the plea as made herein that impugned foreign currency is a part of his legally acquired money which was 1st taken out and then brought in after his visit abroad cannot be ‘Independently verified’. Only a proper CDF could be the connecting legal document which is very much missing in this case. In the absence of such a vital link the entire theory/submissions appears to be an after thought and excuse. Therefore taking into account a settled principle of law that ignorance of law is no excuse, the Govt. is of the opinion that the applicant(pax) had not declared the impugned foreign currency to the customs officers in contravention of section 77 of the Customs Act, 1962 and had intentionally attempted to export the same illegally.

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Award — International Commercial Arbitration — Enforcement of Arbitral award in India.

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[ Phulchand Exports Ltd. v. O.O.O. Patriot, (2001) 10 SCC 300

The question raised was whether enforcement of the award given by the International Court of Commercial Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russian Federation, Moscow in favour of the Respondent was contrary to public policy of India u/s.48(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

By a contract between PE Ltd. India and 0.0.0. Patriot Moscow Russia, a transaction relating to sale of India long grain was entered. It so happened that the vessel carrying the goods suffered an engine failure, as a result of which it was declared ‘General Average’ by the Master of the vessel. The entire cargo was sold out to compensate the cost of rescue of the vessel. The buyers lodged claim against the sellers for recovery of amount of USD 285,569.53 in the International Court of Commercial Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. The Arbitral Tribunal did not find any merit in the defences set up by the sellers. It held that the sellers broke the terms of the contract and shipped goods 16 days later than the stipulated time and the vessel freighted by the sellers left the port of Kandla (India) 38 days later than the time of departure stipulated in the contract. The vessel with the cargo had not arrived at the port of Novorossiysk on the date of lodging the claim (as a matter of fact the vessel never reached the port of destination). The Arbitral Tribunal therefore held that there was clear term about the commitment of the sellers to reimburse the amount paid towards goods in case of non-arrival.

The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, split the amount of losses between the parties — buyers and sellers — in equal parts.

The buyers filed Arbitration Petition before the High Court of Bombay for enforcement of the above award. The sellers contested the petition on the ground that subject award was contrary to the principles of public policy and, therefore, the award was unenforceable. The Court did not find any merit in the objections raised by the sellers; and held that the award dated October 18, 1999 could be enforced as a decree of the Court.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that a plain reading of section 74 of the Contract Act would show that it deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. The stipulation for reimbursement in the event stated in last para of clause 4 of the contract is not in the nature of penalty; the clause is not in terrorem. It is neither punitive nor vindictive. Moreover, what has been provided in the contract is the reimbursement of the price of the goods paid by the buyers to the sellers. The clause of reimbursement or repayment in the event of delayed delivery/arrival or non-delivery was not to be regarded as damages. Even in the absence of such clause, where the seller has breached his obligations at threshold, the buyer is entitled to the return of the price paid and for damages.

The transactions covered by section 23 are the transactions where the consideration or object of such transaction is forbidden by law or the transaction is of such a nature that if permitted would defeat the provisions of any law or the transaction is fraudulent or the transaction involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or where the Court regards it immoral or opposed to public policy. Whether particular transaction is contrary to a public policy would ordinarily depend upon the nature of transaction. Where experienced businessmen are involved in a commercial contract and the parties are not of unequal bargaining power, the agreed terms must ordinarily be respected as the parties may be taken to have had regard to the matters known to them. The sellers and the buyers in the present case are business persons having no unequal bargaining powers. They agreed on all terms of the contract being in conformity with the international trade and commerce. It is the precise sum which the sellers are required to reimburse to the buyers, which they had received for the goods, in case of the non-arrival of the goods within the prescribed time.

The appeal was dismissed.

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Sale in course of import vis-à-vis sale from duty-free shop

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As per Article 286 of the Constitution of India, transactions taking place in the course of import and export are made immune from levy of sales tax. In pursuance of the said Article the transactions of sale/ purchase in course of import/export are defined in section 5 of the CST Act, 1956. The transaction of sale in course of import is defined in section 5(2) of the CST Act, 1956. The said sub-section is reproduced below.

“S. 5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export.

(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the Customs frontiers of India.”

It can be seen, from the above, that there are two limbs. As per the first limb, the sale/purchase occasioning the movement of goods from foreign country is considered to be in the course of import. Therefore, the transaction of direct import is covered by this category. In addition to the above, there is scope to cover further transaction also as in the course of import under this limb.

The second limb covers transactions which are effected by transfer of documents of title to goods before the goods cross the Customs frontiers of India.

In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court had an occasion to specify the scope of the above section. Reference can be made to the judgment in the case of M/s. Hotel Ashoka v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & anr., (Civil Appeal No. 2560 of 2010 decided on 3-2-2012).

Facts of the case

The assessee (appellant) was M/s. Hotel Ashoka, a hotel managed by India Tourism Development Corporation Limited (ITDCL). The assessee had duty-free shops at international airports in India. At duty-free shops, the assessee sold several articles including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians going abroad or coming to India by air. The issue arose, under Karnataka Sales Tax Act, in respect of dutyfree shop at international airport at Bengaluru. For sales effected at the said place, the assessee took a stand that no tax was payable under the sales tax laws, as the goods were sold before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the Customs frontiers of India. The sales tax authorities levied sales tax and raised demand. A writ petition was filed before the Karnataka High Court. However, the High Court rejected the writ petition holding it to be not maintainable on the ground of availability of alternative remedies. The matter came before the Supreme Court.

In respect of maintainability the Supreme Court observed that since the SLP was already admitted and the matter pertained to the year 2004-05, it would not be in the interest of justice to relegate the assessee to statutory authorities especially when the legal position is very clear and the law is also in favour of the appellant.

Judgment on merits
On merits, the Supreme Court examined the legal position. In para-18, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“18. It is an admitted fact that the goods which had been brought from foreign countries by the appellant had been kept in bonded warehouses and they were transferred to duty-free shops situated at international airport of Bengaluru as and when the stock of goods lying at the duty-free shops was exhausted. It is also an admitted fact that the appellant had executed bonds and the goods, which had been brought from foreign countries, had been kept in bonded warehouses by the appellant. When the goods are kept in the bonded warehouses, it cannot be said that the said goods had crossed the Customs frontiers. The goods are not cleared from the Customs till they are brought in India by crossing the Customs frontiers. When the goods are lying in the bonded warehouses, they are deemed to have been kept outside the Customs frontiers of the country and as stated by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, the appellant was selling the goods from the duty-free shops owned by it at Bengaluru international airport before the said goods had crossed the Customs frontiers.”

Further in para 23 and 24 the Supreme Court has observed as under:

“23. Looking to the aforestated legal position, it cannot be disputed that the goods sold at the duty-free shops, owned by the appellant, would be said to have been sold before the goods crossed the Customs frontiers of India, as it is not in dispute that the duty-free shops of the appellant situated at the international airport of Bengaluru are beyond the Customs frontiers of India i.e., they are not within the Customs frontiers of India.”

“24. If this is the factual and legal position, in our opinion, looking to the provisions of Article 286 of the Constitution, the State of Karnataka has no right to tax any such transaction which takes place at the duty-free shops owned by the appellant which are not within the Customs frontiers of India.”

The Sales Tax Department contented that the sale, to be in course of import, should take place beyond the territories of India and not within the geographical territory of India. Further, it was also contented that there was no evidence about sale by transfer of documents of title to goods for effecting the sales before the goods have crossed Customs frontiers of India. Both the objections were rejected by the Supreme Court observing as under:

“30. They again submitted that ‘in the course of import’ means ‘the transaction ought to have taken place beyond the territories of India and not within the geographical territory of India’. We do not agree with the said submission. When any transaction takes place outside the Customs frontiers of India, the transaction would be said to have taken place outside India. Though the transaction might take place within India but technically, looking to the provisions of section 2(11) of the Customs Act and Article of the Constitution, the said transaction would be said to have taken place outside India. In other words, it cannot be said that the goods are imported into the territory of India till the goods or the documents of title to the goods are brought into India. Admittedly, in the instant case, the goods had not been brought into the Customs frontiers of India before the transaction of sales had taken place and, therefore, in our opinion, the transactions had taken place beyond or outside the Customs frontiers of India.”

“31. In our opinion, submissions with regard to sale not taking effect by transfer of documents of title to the goods are absolutely irrelevant. Transfer of documents of title to the goods is one of the methods whereby delivery of the goods is effected. Delivery may be physical also. In the instant case, at the duty-free shops, which are admittedly outside the Customs frontiers of our country, the goods had been sold to the customers by giving physical delivery. It is not disputed that the goods were sold by giving physical possession at the duty-free shops to the customers. Simply, because the sales had not been effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods and the sales were effected by giving physical possession of the goods to the customers, it would not mean that the sales were taxable under the Act. Thus, we do not agree with the aforestated submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue.”

Thus, the Supreme Court has finally decided the scope of section 5(2) of the CST Act, 1956.

Conclusion
This judgment can be said to be a comprehensive judgment deciding the scope of section 5(2) of the CST Act, 1956. It has resolved the issue once for all. The judgment will also be useful in respect of sale effected from bonded warehouses.

Dy. Commissioner v. MTZ Polyfilms Ltd. ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5015/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 30-12-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: P. C. Mourya/ Jitendra Jain

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Section 36(1)(iii), section 37(1) and section 43B — Interest paid on unpaid purchase consideration — It was held that such interest is governed by the provisions of section 37(1) and not by section 36(1) (iii) — Further held that the provisions of section 43B are not applicable to such interest.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing of polyester films. It had its manufacturing facilities at GIDC, Gujarat. It was allotted plot of land by GIDC. As per the terms of allotment the assessee was required to pay the purchase consideration of the land in instalments with interest. For the year under consideration the assessee had paid the sum of Rs.99.97 lakh as interest to GIDC and the same was claimed as business expenditure. According to the AO the expenditure was of capital in nature. On appeal the CIT(A) allowed the appeal and held that the expenditure was of revenue in nature.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue supported the order of the AO and further contended that since the interest to GIDC was unpaid, it is not allowable u/s.43B.

Held:
The Tribunal, as per the order of the CIT(A), noted that the fact that the production by the assessee had commenced in October, 1988 was not controverted. Accordingly, it held that the interest paid during the year cannot be considered as capital expenditure. Further, it referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Steam Navigation Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (1953) (56 ITR 52), where the interest paid on purchase consideration of the assets by the amalgamated company was held as allowable as business expenditure u/s. 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act (equivalent to section 37(1) of the 1961 Act) According to the Apex Court, the expression ‘capital’ used in section 10(2)(iii) of the 1922 Act (equivalent to section 36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act), in the context in which it occurred, meant money and not any other asset. The Apex Court further observed that an agreement to pay the balance consideration due by the purchaser did not in truth give rise to a loan. On that basis the Apex Court held that the interest paid was not allowable as deduction u/s.10(2)(iii) of the 1922 Act, but as business expenditure u/s.10(2) (xv) of the 1922 Act. Applying the above ratio, the Tribunal held that the interest paid to GIDC by the assessee was allowable u/s.37(1). It further agreed with the assessee that the provisions of section 43B would also not apply to the facts of the present case, since unpaid sale consideration cannot be said to be monies borrowed.

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(2012) 49 SOT 387 (Delhi) Harnam Singh Harbans Kaur Charitable Trust v. DIT (Exemption) Dated: 16-12-2011

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Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — After omission of proviso to clause (vi) of section 80G(5), existing approval expiring on or after 1-10- 2009 would be deemed to have been extended in perpetuity unless specifically withdrawn.

The assessee-charitable trust’s recognition for exemption u/s.80G expired on 31-3-2011. The assessee made an application in Form No. 10G seeking exemption for the period after 31-3-2011. The Director of Income-tax (Exemption) rejected this application for renewal of exemption and also held that assessee was earning huge money/fees in the name of medical treatment which was nothing but income from commercial activity carried out under the name of medical relief and, accordingly, invoked section 2(15) for withdrawing exemption.

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Proviso to clause (vi) of section 80G(5) has been omitted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009. This proviso imposing the limitation of five years was omitted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009 to provide that the approval once granted shall continue to be valid in perpetuity.

(2) The impact and scope of the omission of proviso to clause (vi) of s.s (5) of section 80G has been explained by the Board in its Circular No. 5, dated 3-6-2010 clarifying that the existing approval expiring on or after 1-10-2009 will be deemed to have been extended in perpetuity unless specifically withdrawn.

(3) Therefore, in the instant case, the filing of an application for renewal of exemption after the expiry of the same on 31-3-2011 by the assessee was not required. Once the exemption granted stands extended in perpetuity by operation of law, merely moving an application by the assessee would not divest it of the assessee’s right to treat the exemption to have been extended in perpetuity, which right had accrued to the assessee in view of the aforesaid Circular and the amendment made in the Act.

(4) Proviso to section 2(15) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2009, provides that the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose if it involves carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application or retention of the income from such activity.

(5) It is clear that this proviso is applicable in respect of charitable institutions engaged in the activity of advancement of any other object of general public utility i.e., the 4th limb of section 2(15). The first three limbs i.e., relief of the poor, education and medical relief are outside the purview of the aforesaid proviso inserted to section 2(15). It has been admitted by the Director of Income-tax (Exemption) himself that the assessee-society has been registered u/s.12A as charitable trust and is running dispensary and health centre, which makes it clear that the charitable purpose for which the assessee-society is established includes medical relief and it is not a case of advancement of any other object of general public utility. Therefore, applying the provisions of proviso to section 2(15) to the instant case by the Director of Income-tax (Exemption) is also totally misplaced and for that reason, the assessee cannot be said to be not eligible for exemption u/s.80G.

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(2012) 49 SOT 312 (Delhi) Dhoomketu Builders & Developers (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 30-11-2011

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Section 28(i) r.w.s. 56 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Participation in tender for sale of land demonstrates that business of real estate development is set up during the year.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee, which was a 100% subsidiary of DLF Ltd., filed its return of income declaring a loss. The assessee company borrowed Rs.186 crore from DLF Ltd. and the paid the same amount as earnest money deposit for a tender for sale of land. This deposit was received back along with interest of Rs.0.62 crore and the assessee, in turn, returned the amount to DLF Ltd. and paid interest of Rs.1.79 crore, resulting in a net loss of Rs.1.17 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed the loss on the ground that the assessee had not commenced any business activity and, therefore, it was not entitled for interest expenses as claimed by it. Similarly, the interest income received by the assessee deserved to be assessed as an ‘income from other sources’ and not as a business income.

The CIT(A) allowed the adjustment of interest received against the interest paid and determined the net loss of Rs.1.17 crore under ‘Income from Other Sources’, but did not allow carry forward of this loss.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Participation in the tender was starting of one activity which enabled the assessee to acquire the land for development. The actual development of the land is immaterial for construing that business of the assessee has been set up.

(2) The investment of Rs.186 crore was not as a deposit out of surplus funds; rather it was earnest money paid by the assessee for the purchase of land. Thus, the assessee had demonstrated that its business was set up during the accounting period relevant for this assessment year.

(3) Therefore, income of the assessee had to be assessed under the head ‘business income’ and consequently loss computed by the first appellate authority at Rs.1.17 crore deserved to be permitted for carry forward.

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(2012) TIOL 64 ITAT-Bang. Shakuntala Devi v. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 20-12-2011

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Section 22, section 23(1)(a), section 23(1)(c) — Annual value of property which could not be let out throughout the previous year needs to be taken as ‘nil’ in accordance with the provisions of section 23(1)(c).

Facts:
The assessee, a non-resident Indian, owned eight properties in India. During the relevant previous year, four properties were let out, whose annual value was offered for taxation under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Annual value of one property was claimed to be ‘nil’ on the ground that it be regarded as self-occupied property. For the other 3 properties in Mumbai annual value was regarded as ‘nil’ under the provisions of section 23(1)(c) of the Act. Before the AO it was submitted that of these 3 properties — one was old and was not in a habitable condition. The second property was let out in the earlier year and also in the subsequent year. It was contended that despite the best efforts, the assessee could not find a tenant for this property. As for third property it was purchased during the year and was let out in subsequent year. The AO held that since the assessee had not shown any proof regarding the efforts made to let out these three properties, it was quite inconvincible that there can be any hardship faced in letting out since these properties were located in prime localities like Bandra and Andheri (East) in Mumbai. He considered 70% of the rent received in subsequent year for each of the two properties to be their annual value. Accordingly, he added Rs.6,95,555 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the annual value of these properties needs to be computed u/s.23(1)(a) of the Act.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Lucknow ‘B’ Bench has, in the case of Smt. Indu Chandra v. DCIT, (ITA No. 96 (Lkw)/2011, dated 29-4-2011, for A.Y. 2004- 05), following the decision of the Mumbai Bench in the case of Premsudha Exports (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, [110 ITD 158 (Mum.)] decided the issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that the facts involved in the present case are similar to the facts before the Lucknow Bench in the case of Smt. Indu Chandra. Accordingly, following the decision of the Lucknow Bench, the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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(2012) TIOL 63 ITAT-Mum. Savita N. Mandhana v. ACIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 7-10-2011

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Section 28(va), section 55(2)(a) — Consideration received by a shareholder of a company, for transfer of shares of the company, under a share transfer agreement which includes non-compete covenant and the assessee is not actively engaged in business, is chargeable to tax as capital gains.

Facts:
The assessee along with other shareholders of Mandhana Boremann Industries Pvt. Ltd., who were all family members of the assessee, transferred their shares to Paxar BV, a Dutch Company. The shares were acquired by Paxar BV for a consideration of Rs.570 per shares which worked out to Rs.45.60 crore for the shares held by Mandhana family. All the shareholders in Mandhana family entered into an agreement with Paxar BV for the purpose of this transfer of shares, and one of the clauses in the agreement also provided that the transferor shall not carry on, or be interested in, any business which competes with the business of Mandhana Boremann. The AO held that a part of the sale consideration of Rs.570 is attributable to the non-compete covenant and is liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s.28(va). The AO computed the value of shares, by break-up method, at Rs.365. Accordingly, the balance amount of Rs.205 per share was treated as towards non-compete fee and brought to tax u/s.28(va) in the hands of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO in principle, but held that only Rs.41 per share can be attributed to non-compete fees. He also held that the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Homi Aspi Balsara v. ACIT, (2009 TIOL 789 ITAT-Mum.) does not help the assessee as there is specific mention of non-compete obligations in the share sale agreement, and therefore, part of the sale consideration of shares is attributable to the non-compete obligations.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and contended that no part of consideration can be attributed to non-compete fees.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the even in the case of Homi Aspi Balsara there was a specific non-compete obligation and yet the Co-ordinate Bench had taken a view that no part of sale consideration of shares could be attributed to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as business income u/s.28(va).

Following the ratio of the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in Homi Balsara the amounts held to be attributable to non-compete obligations are taxable as capital gains and not as business income. To this extent it reversed the order of the CIT(A). It observed that since the entire consideration was already offered for taxation as capital gains, the bifurcation between consideration attributable to sale of shares and for non-compete obligations is rendered academic and infructuous. It also noted that since it was uncontroverted position that the assessee was not actively engaged in the business it was not necessary to examine the matter any further. The Tribunal upheld the stand of the assessee in treating the entire consideration received on sale of shares as taxable under the head ‘capital gains’.

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(2012) TIOL 65 ITAT-Mum. Tanna Agro Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 29-7-2011

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Section 40(a)(ia), section 194H — Hedging transactions of commodities, if in the nature of derivatives transactions, do not attract the provisions of section 194H.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in export, import and wholesale trade of agro products. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source from payments of Rs. 4,61,769 made towards brokerage on commodities hedging transactions, the AO disallowed the same u/s.40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the payment towards commission or brokerage in respect of transactions in ‘securities’ is not covered by the scope of tax deduction at source requirements and as per Explanation (iii) to section 194H the meaning assigned to the expression ‘securities’ is the same as assigned to it in clause (h) of section 2 of Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act, 1956 which covers transactions of derivatives. It held that hedging transactions of commodities, if in the nature of derivatives transactions, will be outside the ambit of transactions on which TDS requirements come into play. Since this aspect of the matter was not clear from the material on record, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication in the light of the abovementioned observations. The Tribunal also clarified that except in the abovementioned situation, commission paid on transactions of sales and purchases of commodities through commodities exchange are clearly covered by the scope of section 194H.

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(2011) 130 ITD 137/9, Chennai Bench D ACIT v. Harshad Doshi A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 23-4-2011

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Section 2(22)(e) — Advance which carries with an obligation of repayment is covered u/s.2(22) (e). Trade advance/advance given for effecting commercial transaction did not fall under the ambit of section 2(22)(e). Amount advanced by company to its directors under board resolution, for specific business purpose would not fall under the mischief of section 2(22)(e) of the Act.

Facts:
The assessee was managing director in DHL Ltd. The company was engaged in the business of development of property. The company advanced funds to purchase plot of lands in the name of the assessee on understanding that land is to be given to DHL for development. The AO on scrutiny of books of DHL Ltd., discovered that there is advance of Rs.3.59 crore and rental advance of Rs.19.89 lakh issued to the assessee. The AO applied provisions of deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) on these advances. In order to support its contention the AO also relied on the capital gain shown by the assessee in his books.

Appeal was filed by the assessee to the CIT(A). The assessee contended that advance of Rs.3.59 crore was taken to acquire land which was to be developed by DHL. The main intention behind bifurcating ownership of land and development rights was to reduce the cost of stamp duty so that they remain competitive in this fierce market. The CIT(A) deleted the above addition except sum of Rs.39.62 lakh accepting the fact that transaction was motivated by business consideration and commercial expediency.

The CIT(A) also deleted the addition of lease advance of Rs.19.89 lakh accepting holding it to be advance given for lease of building to be used as office by DHL Ltd.

Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the AO filed appeal before the ITAT.

Held:
Trade advance and monies given for business expediency could not be taxed as dividend. In order to bring any advance within the four corners of section 2(22)(e), advance should carry an obligation of repayment.

Advance given by the company to managing director to purchase the land in its name and then transfer the development rights to the company was a business arrangement made with a view to avoid payment of stamp duty twice, first on land and then on proposed construction of flats.

The assessee was well within the law to adopt such practice which would reduce the cost incidence to the ultimate customer. The AO’s contention that bifurcation was done with an intention to circumvent provisions of the Tamil Nadu Stamp Act could not be accepted being for an unlawful purpose.

Also, the project executed by DHL Ltd. does not appear in the capital gain computation of lands as disclosed by the assessee. So there was no direct nexus as alleged by the AO.

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Interest on refund: Section 244A of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Interest u/s.244A is to be calculated from the date of payment of tax till the date of refund and not from the 1st of April of the assessment year or from date of regular assessment.

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[CIT v. Vijaya Bank, 246 CTR 548 (Kar.)]

For the A.Y. 2002-03, the Assessing Officer granted interest u/s.244A of the Act from the date of regular assessment. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that interest should be calculated from the date on which the self-assessment tax was paid by the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Where the assessee is entitled to refund of self-assessment tax, interest u/s.244A is to be calculated from the date of payment of tax till the date of refund and not from the 1st of April of the assessment year or from the date of regular assessment.”

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Export profit: Deduction u/s.10BA of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2005-06: DEPB is a profit derived from export business for the purpose of deduction u/s.10BA.

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[CIT v. Arts & Crafts Exports, 246 CTR 463 (Bom.)]

The Tribunal held that DEPB is a profit derived from export business for the purposes of deduction u/s.10BA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in holding DEPB as a profit derived from export business for the purpose of deduction u/s.10BA ignoring the ratio of decision in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, (2009) 225 CTR (SC) 233; (2009) 28 DTR (SC) 73; (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC) having binding force on facts and circumstances of the case?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Counsel for the Revenue fairly states that though the question has been raised by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, the said decision has no relevance to the facts of the present case. In this view of the matter, the question raised by the Revenue cannot be entertained.”

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Deemed income: Remission or cessation of trading liability: Section 41(1) of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1995-96: Explanation 1 to section 41(1) is prospective and not retrospective: Applies w.e.f. A.Y. 1997-98: Not applicable to A.Y. 1995-96: For A.Y. 1995-96 mere writing back of amounts in relation to unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus and unclaimed suppliers’ and customers’ balances could not amount to cessation of liability: Amounts (uncashed cheques, dividend paid to shareholders, provision<

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[CIT v. Mohan Meakin Ltd., 18 Taxman.com 47 (Del.)]

In the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessee had written back certain amount representing (a) unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus; (b) credit balances unclaimed by the suppliers; (c) credit balances unclaimed by the customers; (d) uncashed cheques; (e) excess dividend; and (f) excess provision made for doubtful debts in its books of account. The Assessing Officer added these amounts as deemed income relying on the provisions of section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal deleted the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the deletion and held as under:

“(i) Salaries, wages and bonus

The contention of the assessee was that there was no cessation or remission of the liability and, therefore, by merely writing back the credit balances in the books of account, which is an unilateral action of the assessee, the liability cannot be said to have ceased.

The concerned assessment year was 1995-96. Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was added by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 with effect from 1-4-1997. The Explanation provides that the unilateral act of the assessee by way of writing off such liability in its accounts would be considered as remission or cessation of the liability. In Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998, which is reported in (1998) 230 ITR (St.) 12, the CBDT has explained the reason behind insertion of the above Explanation. In paragraph 28.3 of the Circular it has further been stated that the amendment will take effect from 1-4-1997 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to A.Y. 1997-98 and subsequent years. The Explanation, therefore, does not have any retrospective effect. It does not, therefore, apply to the A.Y. 1995-96. For this reason, the mere writing back of the loan in relation to unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus cannot amount to cessation of the liability.

(ii) Suppliers’ credit balances and customers’ credit balances

So far as the suppliers’ credit balances and the customers’ credit balances are concerned, the same reasoning is applicable for the year under consideration. Accordingly, those two additions made by the Assessing Officer are also not in accordance with law.

(iii) Uncashed cheques

In the case of the uncashed cheques, the finding of the Tribunal is that there was no claim for deduction in any of the earlier years and, therefore, the amount cannot be added u/s.41(1). It is not in dispute, as it cannot be, that the amount of uncashed cheques was not allowed as deduction in any of the earlier assessment years. As per the assessee this represents the cheques received and remaining on hand on the last day of the accounting period. The Tribunal has accepted this stand. The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) have not stated why the stand of the assessee was not acceptable. The Revenue has also not stated and averred that in the assessment order now passed, this aspect was not considered and examined. In these circumstances, section 41(1) can hardly have any application. Accordingly, the decision of the Tribunal deleting the addition is to be upheld.

(iv) Excess dividend

Dividend paid by a company to its shareholders is not an allowable deduction under the Income-tax Act as it represents an appropriation of the profits after they have been earned. If the dividend is not allowable as a deduction, the excess written back cannot also be assessed as income u/s.41(1).

(v) Excess provision for doubtful debts

The finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) is that the provision was never allowed as a deduction in the earlier years. Since the finding that the provision was not allowed in the earlier year as a deduction is not under challenge, the amount cannot be added u/s.41(1) when it is written back in the accounts. The decision of the Tribunal is to be upheld.”

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Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Airport authority: Expenditure towards removal of encroachments in and around technical area of airport for safety and security: Is revenue expenditure.

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[Airport Authority of India v. CIT, 340 ITR 407 (Del.) (FB)]

The assessee is the Airport Authority managing the airports in India. The assessee incurred expenditure towards removal of encroachments in and around technical area of the airport for safety and security. The assessee’s claim for deduction of the expenditure was disallowed by the Assessing Officer and the disallowance was confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The land belonged to the assessee. In the scheme formulated by the Government for removal of encroachers and their rehabilitation amount was not for acquisition of new assets. The payment was made to facilitate its smooth functioning of the business in a profitable manner and, therefore, such an expenditure was revenue in nature.”

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Deduction u/s.80IB Manufacture: Production of perfumed hair oil by using coconut oil and mineral oil is manufacture: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80IB.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of production of perfumed hair oil using coconut oil and mineral oil as per the requirement of M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80IB was rejected by the Assessing Officer holding that the activity did not amount to manufacture for the purposes of section 80IB. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The finding of fact recorded by the ITAT is that the production of the perfumed hair oil as per the requirement of Hindustan Lever Ltd. constituted manufacture of a product distinct from the inputs used and on the said manufactured product the Central Excise Duty has been paid. The Apex Court in the case of CCE v. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., reported in (2006) 12 SCC 453 has held that addition of perfume to coconut oil to produce perfumed oil constitutes a manufacturing process.

(ii) Moreover, in the present case it is not in dispute that the deduction u/s.80IB of the Act has been allowed to the assessee in the first year of manufacture and that order has attained finality.

(iii) In these circumstances, the decision of the ITAT in holding that the assessee is engaged in manufacturing activity and hence entitled to avail deduction u/s.80IB cannot be faulted.”

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Capital gain: Computation: Section 2(42A) and section 48 Indexed cost: A.Y. 2001-02: Acquisition of capital asset by gift, will, etc.: Indexed cost to be determined w.r.t. the holding of the asset by the previous owner.

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The settler of the assessee-trust had acquired the property before 1-4-1981 and he settled it on trust on 5-1-1996. The assessee-trust sold the property and computed the indexed cost of acquisition on the basis that it ‘held’ the property from the time the settler had held it. The Assessing Officer accepted that the settler’s cost of acquisition had to be treated as the assessee’s cost of acquisition but held that the settler’s period of holding could not be treated as the assessee’s period of holding. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal, followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Manjula J. Shah, 16 Taxman.com 42 (Bom.) and held as under:

“(i) The Department’s contention that in a case where section 49 applies the holding of the predecessor has to be accounted for the purpose of computing the cost of acquisition, cost of improvement and indexed cost of improvement but not for the indexed cost of acquisition will result in absurdities. It leads to a disconnect and contradiction between ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ and ‘indexed cost of improvement’.

(ii) This cannot be the intention behind the enactment of section 49 and Explanation to section 48. There is no reason why the Legislature would want to deny or deprive an assessee the benefit of the previous holding for computing ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ while allowing the said benefit for computing ‘indexed cost of improvement’.

(iii) The benefit of indexed cost of inflation is given to ensure that the taxpayer pays capital gains tax on the ‘real’ or actual ‘gain’ and not on the increase in the capital value of the property due to inflation.

(iv) The expression ‘held by the assessee’ used in Explanation (iii) to section 48 has to be understood in the context and harmoniously with other sections and as the cost of acquisition stipulated in section 49 means the cost for which the previous owner had acquired the property, the term ‘held by the assessee’ should be interpreted to include the period during which the property was held by the previous owner.”

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Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement — While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many principles of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guide-line as to what could be an appropriate manner of interpreting a treaty in Indian context also.

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In a petition filed before the Supreme Court by an organisation called Citizen India based upon media and scholarly reports alleged that various individuals, mostly citizens, but may also include non-citizens, and other entities with presence in India, have generated and secreted away large sums of monies, through their activities in India or relating to India, in various foreign banks, especially in tax havens and jurisdiction that have strong secrecy laws with respect to the contents of bank accounts and the identities of individuals holding such accounts and that the Government of India and its agencies have been very lax in terms of keeping an eye on the various unlawful activities generating unaccounted monies; the consequent tax evasion and such laxity extends to efforts to curtail the flow of such funds out and into, India and seeking the Court’s intervention to order proper investigations and monitor continuously, the action of the Union of India, and any and all governmental departments and agencies in these matters.

In deciding the matter, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany and the Vienna Connection and it made certain observations with respect to the same.

The Supreme Court noted the relevant portions of Article 26 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, which reads as follows:

“1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by this Agreement. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.

2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on Contracting State the obligation:

(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;

(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;

(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process or information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (order public).”

The Supreme Court observed that the above clause in the relevant agreement with Germany would indicate that there is no absolute bar or secrecy. Instead the agreement specifically provides that the information may be disclosed in public court proceedings which the instant proceedings are. The proceedings before it, relate both to the issue of tax collection with respect to unaccounted monies deposited into foreign bank accounts, as well as with issues relating to the manner in which such monies were generated, which may include activities that are criminal in nature also. Comity of nations cannot be predicated upon clauses of secrecy that could hinder constitutional proceedings such as these, or criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court noted that the claim of the Union of India is that the phrase ‘public court proceedings’, in the last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement only relates to proceedings relating to tax matters. The Union of India claims that such an understanding comports with how it is understood internationally. In this regard, the Union of India cited a few treatises. According to the Supreme Court, however, the Union of India did not provide any evidence that Germany specifically requested it to not reveal the details with respect to accounts in the Liechtenstein even in the context of proceedings before it.

The Supreme Court held that in Article 31, ‘General Rule of Interpretation’, of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969, provides that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many principles of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guideline as to what could be an appropriate manner of interpreting a treaty in Indian context also.

The Supreme Court said that in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263 ITR 706; (2004) 10 SCC 1, it approvingly had noted Frank Bennion’s observations that a treaty is really an indirect enactment instead of a substantive legislation, and that drafting of treaties is notoriously sloppy, whereby inconveniences obtain. In this regard this Court further noted that the dictum of Lord Widgery C.J. that the words “are to be given their general meaning, general to lawyer and layman alike . . . . The meaning of the diplomat rather than the lawyer.” The broad principle of interpretation, with respect to treaties, and the provisions therein, would be that the ordinary meanings of words be given effect to, unless the context requires or otherwise. However, the fact that such treaties are drafted by diplomats, and not lawyers, leading to sloppiness in drafting also implies that care has to be taken to not render any word, phrase, or sentence redundant, especially where rendering of such word, phrase or sentence redundant would lead to a manifestly absurd situation, particularly from a constitutional perspective. The Government cannot bind India in a manner that derogates from constitutional provisions, values and imperatives.

The last sentence of the Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, “They may disclose this information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions,” is revelatory in this regard. It stands out as an additional aspect or provision, and an exception, to the proceeding portion of the said Article. It is located after the specification that information shared between the Contracting Parties may be revealed only to “persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to taxes covered by this Agreement.” Consequently, it has to be understood that the phrase ‘public court proceedings’ specified in the last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany refers to court proceedings other than those in connection with tax assessment, enforcement, prosecution, etc., with respect to tax matters. If it were otherwise, as argued by the Union of India, then there would have been no need to have that last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement at all. The last sentence would become redundant if the interpretation pressed by the Union of India is accepted. Thus, notwithstanding the alleged convention of interpreting the last sentence only as referring to proceedings in tax matters, the rubric of common law jurisprudence, and fealty to its principles, leads us inexorably to the conclusion that the language in this specific treaty, and under these circumstances cannot be interpreted in the manner sought by the Union of India.

The Supreme Court while agreeing that the language could have been tighter, and may be deemed to be sloppy, to use Frank Bennion’s characterisation, negotiation of such treaties are conducted and secured at very high levels of Government, with awareness of general principles of interpretation used in various jurisdictions. It is fairly well known, at least in common law jurisdictions, that legal instruments and statutes are interpreted in a manner whereby redundancy of expressions and phrases is sought to be avoided.

The Supreme Court inter alia constituted Special Investigation Team to take over the matter of investigation of the individuals whose names had been disclosed by Germany as having accounts in Liechtenstein; and expeditiously conduct the same.

OffShore Transfer of Shares Between Two NRs Resulting in Change in Control OF Indian Company — Withholding Tax Obligation and Other Implications

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Part-I

Introduction
1.1 With the liberalisation and the history of strong economic growth in the last few years and with the prospects of reasonably sound economic growth, India has become one of the major attractive destinations for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for carrying on business by Multinational Companies (MNC). 1.2 Large amount of FDI has flown to India through Mauritius for various commercial purposes including the tax advantage under Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement entered into by India with Mauritius (Mauritius Tax Treaty).

1.2.1 Under the Mauritius Tax Treaty, one major advantage is with regard to non-taxability of capital gain arising on alienation of shares of the Indian companies. Under the Mauritius Tax Treaty, the right to tax such a gain is only with Mauritius (with some exception with which we are not concerned in this writeup) and as such, the same cannot be taxed in India. For this purpose, Mauritian Company is required to establish that it is tax resident of Mauritius and which can generally be established by producing Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) issued by the Tax Department of Mauritius. Such TRC issued by the Mauritius tax officer is generally regarded as sufficient evidence for that purpose by virtue of the CBDT Circular No. 789, dated 13-4-2000. This legal position is also confirmed by the judgment of the Apex Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 507). There is a historical background to this position, with which also we are not concerned in this write-up.

1.3 For the purpose of withholding tax from the taxable income received by a Non-Resident (NR), section 195(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) provides that any person responsible for paying (Payer) to NR (Payee) any sum chargeable under the Act is liable to deduct tax (TDS) as provided therein. There are some exceptions to this, with which we are not concerned in this write-up. Effectively, under these provisions, the Payer is liable to deduct tax at source (TAS) in such cases and pay the amount so deducted to the Government. Procedural provisions are also made for compliance of these provisions and consequences are also provided for default in compliance of these provisions, with which also we are, effectively, not concerned in this write-up.

1.4 Multinational Groups (MNG) generally operate through various companies in different jurisdictions where such operating companies are directly or indirectly controlled through downstream subsidiaries set up by the main holding company of the MNG. Such holding and subsidiary structures are common in commercial world for various business needs. One of the objectives of putting-up overseas holding and downstream subsidiary structure for FDI is also to provide for easy exit at a later stage when it is decided to withdraw from a business carried on in India through Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created in India. At the time of exit, in such cases, generally shares of overseas company are transferred to the buyer who, in the process, acquires control and management of Indian SPV. Such overseas transaction, many times, takes place between two NR entities.

1.5 In case of a transaction of the nature referred to in 1.4 above, of late, the Revenue Department has taken a stand that on account of transfer of shares of such overseas holding company, there is indirect transfer of underlying assets of the Indian company as the control and management of the Indian company gets indirectly transferred in such cases. Therefore, the capital gain arising in such offshore transaction between two NRs is liable to tax in India by virtue of provisions of section 9(1)(i) which, inter alia, provides that all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly through the transfer of capital asset situate in India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. According to the Revenue, indirect transfer of capital asset situated in India is covered within the scope of this provision.

1.5.1 In view of the above stand of the Revenue, further stand is taken by the Revenue that the Payer NR entity is also required to deduct TAS u/s.195(1) while making payment to the transferor of the share, which is also another NR entity. If such obligation of TDS is not discharged, then the Payer is regarded as ‘assessee in default’ u/s.201 and he would be liable to pay the amount of such tax with interest and will also be subject to other consequences such as penalty, etc. The Payer could also be considered as representative assessee of the Payee u/s.163.

1.6 The issues referred to in paras 1.5 and 1.5.1 are under debate currently in many cases and different views were being taken. The issue became more vital in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone International Holdings B. V. (VIH) reported in 329 ITR Page 126.

1.6.1 Recently, the issues referred to in para 1.6 above, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of VIH and this hotly debated issue got finally decided. Relevant principles of law have been decided/re-iterated in this case and therefore, the judgment becomes more relevant.

1.7 Now, since the Revenue has filed a review petition before the Apex Court for recalling the judgment in Vodafone‘s case, it would also be useful to consider the judgment of the High Court in little greater detail. Various contentions were raised by both the parties before the High Court, as well as Supreme Court. Both the judgments are very long. For the sake of brevity and space constraints, only some of the main contentions are referred to in this write-up. For the same reasons, even the facts of the case are very broadly given in brief. For the sake of convenience, the percentages of shareholding referred to herein at different places are rounded off.

Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. UOI — 329 ITR 126 (Bom.)

Facts in brief
2.1 In 1992, Hutchison group of Hong Kong (HK) acquired interest in Mobile Telecommunication Industry in India, through a joint venture Company in India (JV Co.), Hutchison Makes Telecom Ltd., [subsequently renamed Hutchison Essar Ltd. (HEL)] through its overseas group of companies. In 1998, CGP Investment Holdings Ltd., (CGP) was incorporated in Cayman Islands (CI) of which the sole shareholder was Hutchison Telecommunication Ltd., HK (HTL). The CGP had set up two Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) in Mauritius viz. Array Holdings Ltd. (Array) and Hutchison Telecommunication Services India Holdings Ltd., (HTI-MS).

Array, through its various downstream subsidiaries in Mauritius held 42% shareholdings interest in HEL. Further, 10% shareholding interest in HEL was held by CGP through certain overseas JV companies. HTL-MS had set up WOS in India, namely, 3 Global Services Pvt. Ltd. (3GSPL). The shareholding of HTL in CGP got transferred to another group com-pany [HTI (BVI Holding Ltd.) HTIHL (BVI)], a company incorporated in British Virgin Island (BVI). The HTIHL (BVI) was indirectly WOS of Hutchi-son Telecommunication International Ltd. (HTIL), a company incorporated in CI. HTIL was listed on stock exchange of New York and Hong Kong. As part of group restructuring and consolidation, the structure was further evolved with certain arrangements/ agreements and finally in 2006, the Hutchison group held 52% shareholding in HEL through structural arrangement of holding and subsidiary companies and it had also options to acquire through 3GSPL, a further 15% shareholding interest in HEL from certain Indian companies, subject to relaxation of FDI norms as the Essar group, JV partner, was already hold-ing 22% shareholding through Mauritius companies. Effectively, CGP through its downstream overseas subsidiaries held 42.43% (42%) interest in HEL and it had indirect interest of 9.62% (10%) in the equity of HEL through its pro rata shareholding (indirect) in some Indian companies which had direct/indirect equity interest in HEL. These Indian companies [viz., Telecom Investment India Pvt. Ltd. (TII) and Omega Telecom Holding P. Ltd. (Omega)] belong to (with majority shareholding) its Indian Partners (viz. Mr. Asim Ghosh, Mr. & Mrs. Analgit Singh and IDFC). The structure created was very complex and various commercial arrangements were made between group companies and others for that purpose. The detailed chart of the structure is appearing in the judgment of the High Court at pages 134/135.

2.2 Vodafone International Holdings B. V., Netherlands (VIH) is a company controlled by Vodafone group, UK (Vodafone) . The said VIH acquired the entire shareholding of CGP from HTIHL (BVI) vide transaction dated 11 -2-2007, as a result of which the Vodafone group indirectly acquired the interest of Hutchison group in HEL which that group held through structural arrangement of holding and subsidiary companies (referred to in para 2.1) either through Mauritius-based companies having Tax Residency Certificates (TRCs), or through other entities in which the interest of Hutchison group was held by Mauritius companies. On these facts, the Revenue took a stand that it was a case of acquisition of 67% controlling interest in HEL by VIH from HTIL and since HEL is a company resident in India, such controlling interest is an asset situated in India. Therefore, the capital gain arising from this transaction is taxable in India on the basis that though CGP is not a tax resident in India, it indirectly also holds underlying Indian assets of HEL. The transaction results into indirect transfer of capital assets situated in India. As such, VIH was also under obligation to deduct TAS u/s. 195 from the payment made for acquiring 67% interest of Hutchison group. This was disputed by VIH saying that it agreed to acquire share of CGP and as a consequence, it has direct/indirect control of 52% shareholding of HEL with call options to further acquire 15% shareholding.

2.3 Prior to the above arrangement of transfer of direct and indirect interest of Hutchison group to Vodafone group, certain events took place such as: in December 2006, HTIL had issued a statement stating that is has been approached by various potential-interested parties regarding possible sale of its equity interest in HEL; in December 2006, Vodafone group had made non-binding offer to HTIL for its direct and indirect shareholding in HEL; in February 2007, the offer was revised with binding offer on behalf of VIH for ‘HTIL’s shareholdings in HEL together with inter-related company loans; in February 2007, Bharti Infotel Pvt. Ltd. had also given a letter stating it has no objection to the proposed transaction (as Vodafone had some shareholding in the said company). Ultimately, final binding offer was made by Vodafone group on February 10, 2007 of US $ 11.076 billion.

2.3.1 On 11th February, 2007, Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) was entered into with HTIL [and not with HIHL (BVI) which was holding share of CGP] under which HTIL agreed to procure and transfer to VIH the entire issued share capital of CGP by HTIHL (BVI), free from all encumbrances together with all rights attaching or accruing, and together with as-signment of its loan interests. This was followed by announcement of Vodafone group on February 12, 2007 stating that it had agreed to acquire a controlling interest in HEL via its subsidiary VIH. On February 28, 2007 Vodafone group, on behalf of VIH, addressed a letter to Essar group for purchase of Essar’s entire shareholding in HEL under ‘Tag along rights’ of Essar group under its joint venture with Hutchison group in HEL and so on.

2.3.2 On 28th February, 2007, VIH filed an application with the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) of the Union Ministry of Finance in which, effectively, it was requested to take note and grant approval under Press Note 1 to the indirect acquisition of 51.96% stake in HEL through an overseas acquisition of the entire shareholding of CGP from HTIHL (BVI). HTIL in its filing before US SEC had, inter alia, stated that a combined holding of the HTIL group was 61.88%, which is sought to be transferred. Therefore, on a query being raised by FIPB in regard to the difference in percentage of shareholding mentioned in the application and in the filing with US SEC, it was clarified that the variation is because of the difference in the US GAAP and Indian GAAP declarations that the com-bined holding for US GAAP purpose was 61.88% and for the Indian GAAP purpose it is 51.96% and the Indian GAAP number reflects accurately a true equity ownership and control position. Based on this clarification, FIPB granted a requisite approval. On 15th March, 2007, a settlement was also arrived at between HTIL and set of companies belonging to the Essar group on certain payments on the basis of which the Essar group indicated its support to the proposed transaction between Hutchison group and Vodafone group. For the purposes of running the business of JV with Essar Group, a term sheet agreement between VIH and Essar Group of companies was entered into for regulating various affairs of the HEL and the relationship of shareholders of the HEL. In this term sheet, it was, inter alia, stated that VIH had agreed to acquire the entire indirect shareholding of HTIL in HEL, including all rights, contractual or otherwise, to acquire directly or indirectly shares in HEL owned by others, which shares shall, for the purposes of the term sheet, be considered to be part of holding acquired by VIH.

2.3.3 In respect of the above transac-tion, a show- cause notice u/s.163 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) was issued by the Revenue to HEL in August 2007 asking it to explain why it should not be treated as a representative assessee of VIH. A notice was issued u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act to VIH in September 2007 asking it to show cause as to why it should not be treated as an ‘assessee in default’ for failure to withhold tax. This action of the Revenue was challenged by VIH before the Bombay High Court in a writ petition in which the jurisdiction of the Revenue over the petitioner for issuing such a notice was challenged. The petition was dismissed by the Bombay High Court (311 ITR 46) declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 in a challenge to the show-cause notice. Against this, a Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed with a direction to Revenue to determine the jurisdictional challenge raised by the petitioner and the right of the petitioner to challenge the decision of the Revenue (if, determined against the petitioner) on this issue was reserved keeping all the questions of law open (179 Taxman 129).

2.3.4 Subsequent to the above events, another show-cause notice u/s.201 was issued by the Revenue in October 2009 on the basis of which, after considering the assessee’s reply, the order was passed u/s.201 upholding jurisdiction of the Revenue on 31st May, 2010. On the same date, a show-cause notice was also issued u/s.163 to VIH as to why it should not be treated as an agent/representative assessee of HTIL. These were challenged by the assessee before the Bombay High Court by a writ petition.

Basic contentions from both the sides

2.4 Before the High Court, on behalf of the petitioner, it was pointed out that the CGP through its downstream subsidiaries, directly or indirectly controlled equity interest in HEL. The transfer of share of CGP has resulted in the petitioner acquiring control over the CGP and its downstream subsidiaries including ultimately HEL and its downstream operating companies. On the passing of downstream companies, commercial arrangements common to such transaction were put in place. The transaction represents a transfer of a capital asset (i.e., share of CGP) situated outside India and hence, any gain arising on such transfer is not taxable in India. Accordingly, there was no obligation on the part of the petitioner to deduct tax u/s.195. It was also pointed out that if the shares held by the Mauritian companies were sold in India, the capital gain, if any arising on such transaction would not be taxable in India in view of the Mauritius Tax Treaty. Section 195 is inapplicable to foreign entity which has no presence in India, not even a branch office, as such entity cannot be subjected to obligation to deduct tax in respect of offshore transaction. It is the recipient who is the potential assessee as he has received the sum chargeable, if any. This by itself, does not create nexus with the Payer who has neither taxable income nor any presence in India. In support of this stand, various submissions were made.

2.5 On behalf of the Revenue, primarily it was pointed out that SPA and other documents establish that the subject-matter of the transaction between HTIL and VIH was a transfer of 67% interest (direct as well as indirect) in HEL. The CGP share is only one of the means to achieve this object. The transaction constitutes a transfer of composite rights of HTIL in HEL as result of the divestment of HTIL’s rights which paved way for VIH to step in the shoes of HTIL. The transaction in question has a sufficient territorial nexus to India and is chargeable to tax under the Act. This is evident from various arrangements made to give an effect to the understanding between the parties including the fact that SPA was entered in to with HTIL and not HTIHL (BVI). The consideration paid was a package for composite rights and not for a mere transfer of a CGP share. It was also pointed out that there is a distinction between proceedings for deduction of tax and regular assessment proceedings. The jurisdiction issue should be legitimately confined to obligation of VIH u/s.195 to withhold tax. Nonetheless, the Revenue made various submissions before the Court with regard to chargeability to tax arising out of the transaction.

2.5.1 The view of the Revenue that the real nature of transaction is with regard to transfer of 67% interest of HTIL in HEL to VIH and not only transfer of one CGP share was based on the premise that on interpretation of SPA and other agreements/documents, it is clear that the form of the transaction is reflected therein. Several valuable rights which are property rights and capital assets of HTIL stand relinquished in favour of VIH under these agreements. These rights are property and constitute capital assets which are situated in India. But for these agreements, the HTIL would not have been able to effectively transfer to VIH, its controlling inter-est in JV Co., HEL, to the extent of 67%. The HTIL’s interest in HEL arose by way of indirect equity shareholding upon agreements; finance agreements, shareholdings agreements, call options agreements, etc. aggregate of which confers a controlling interest of 67% in HEL. All these varied interests did not emerge only from one share of CGP and could not have been conveyed by the transfer of only one equity share of CGP. The parties themselves have treated the transaction as acquisition of one share of CGP, as well as other assets in the form of various rights, and entitlements, which are situated in India.

Settled principles acknowledged

2.6 For the purpose of considering the submissions made by both the parties and the principles on which they have relied, the Court referred to various judicial precedents and the principles emerging therefrom and acknowledged various settled principles in that regard such as: in interpretation of fiscal legislation, the Court is guided by the language and the words used; a legal relationship which arises out of the business transaction cannot be ignored in search of substance over form or in pursuit of the underlying economic interest; the tax planning is legitimate so long as the assessee does not resort to colourable device or a sham transaction with a view to evade taxes; incorporated corporation has a distinct juristic personality and its business is not the business of its shareholders; during the subsistence of corporation, its shareholders have no interest in its assets; a share represents an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights; shares, and rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected; a controlling interest is an incident of the ownership of the shares in a company and the same is not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares; control and management is one facet of the holding of shares; the jurisdiction of a State to tax NRs is based on the existence of nexus connecting the person sought to be taxed with the State which seeks to tax; in certain instances, a need for apportioning income arises where the source rule applies and the income can be taxed in more than one jurisdiction, etc.

2.6.1 Evaluating the contentions of the petitioner with regard to obligation to withhold tax, the Court dealt with the provisions of section 195(1) as well as the relevant precedents and then, the Court formulated the principles governing the interpretation of section 195 which, inter alia, include the position that the Parliament has not restricted the obligations to deduct TAS on a resident and the Court will not imply a restriction not imposed by the legislation.

Analyses of facts and tax implications

2.7 The Court, then, proceeded to analyse the fact of the case on hand to determine the issues raised on the basis of settled principles referred to hereinbefore. For this purpose, the Court noted that essentially the case of VIH is that the transaction was only in respect of the purchase of one share of CGP and that being a capital asset situated outside India, no taxable income arises in India. On the other hand, the case of the Revenue is that the subject-matter of the transaction on a true construction of SPA and other transaction documents is a composite transaction involving transfer of various rights in HEL by HTIL to VIH, which resulted into deemed accrual of Income for HTIL from a source of income in India or through transfer of capital assets situated in India.

2.7.1 To decide the issue, the Court first considered as to how both the parties have construed the transaction. The Court noted that it is revealed from both the interim and final reports of HTIL that the transaction represented discontinuation of its operations in India upon which, it had generated a profit of HK $ 70,502 million. From the proceeds of the transaction, the HTIL also declared special dividend to its shareholders. Accordingly, from HTIL’s perspective, it had carried on in India Mobile Telecommunications Operations, which were to be discontinued as a result of the transaction.

On the other hand, VIH also perceived the transaction as acquisition of 67% interest in Indian JV Co., for an agreed consideration. This is evident from various announcements made by VIH, as well as the arrangements entered into between the parties. The equity value of HTIHL (BVI)’s 100% stake in CGP was computed on the basis of the enterprise value of HEL at US $ 18,250 million and by computing 67% of equity value on that basis. The entire value that was ascribed to its stake in CGP was computed only on the basis of enterprise value of HEL.

The Court then noted that it is in the above background, various documents should be considered and analysed and the effect thereof should be determined.

2.7.2 After considering various clauses of the SPA and the relationship of shareholders of the Company, the Court observed as under (Page 207):

“The diverse clauses of the SPA are indicative of the fact that parties were conscious of the composite nature of the transaction and created reciprocal rights and obligations that included, but were not confined to the transfer of the CGP share. The commercial understating of the parties was that the transaction related to the transfer of a controlling interest in HEL from HTIL to VIH BV. The transfer of control was not relatable merely to the transfer of the CGP share.

Inextricably woven with the transfer of control were other rights and entitlements which HTIL and/or its subsidiaries had assumed in pursuance of contractual arrangements with its Indian partners and the benefit of which would now stand transferred to VIH BV. By and as a result of the SPA, HTIL was relinquishing its interest in the telecommunications business in India and VIH BV was acquiring the interest which was held earlier by HTIL.”

2.7.3 The Court also further noted various other agreements/arrangements made between the parties such as: the term sheet agreement with Essar group to regulate the affairs of HEL and relationship of the shareholders of both the groups, put option agreement with Essar group of companies, a tax deed of covenant for indemnifying various companies in respect of taxation and transfer pricing liabilities, the brand licence agreement, the loan assignment agreements, the arrangement with the existing Indian partners of HTIL (viz. Asim Ghosh, Analjeet Singh and IDFC), etc.

2.7.4 The Court then observed that the facts which have been disclosed before the Court support the contention of the Revenue that the transaction between HTIL and VIH took into consideration various rights, interests and entitlements which, inter alia, include: direct and indirect interest of 52% equity shares of HEL; indirect interest of 15% in HEL through call options held by Indian partners of Hutchison group; right to carry on business through telecom license in India; non-compete in India; management rights of HEL under SPAs; right to use Hutchison brand for a specified period, etc. (the complete details of rights, etc. are appearing on pages 211/212 of the judgment).

2.7.5 The Court then also referred to the FIPB process in the transaction, wherein various queries were raised and clarifications were given by VIH. Referring to one of the clarifications of VIH dated 19th March, 2007, the Court noted that VIH had stated that it had agreed to acquire from HTIL for US $ 11.08 billion interest in HEL, which included 52% equity shareholding (direct/indirect). This price included a control premium, use and rights to use the Hutch brand in India, a non-compete agreement, loan obligations and entitlement to acquire further 15% indirect interest in HEL, subject to the FDI rules, etc. These elements together equated to about 67% of the equity capital.

2.7.6 The above facts clearly establish that it will be simplistic to assume that the entire transaction between HTIL and VIH was only related to transfer of one share of CGP. The commercial and business understanding between the parties postulated what was being transferred was controlling interest in HEL from HTIL to VIH. In its due diligence report, Earnst & Young have also stated that the target structure now also includes CGP which was originally not within the target group. The due diligence report emphasises that the object and intent of the parties was to achieve the transfer of control over HEL and transfer of solitary share of CGP was put in place at the behest of HTIL, subsequently as a mode of effectuating the goal.

2.7.7 The Court further observed that the true nature of the transaction as it emerges from the transactional documents is that the transfer of solitary share of CGP reflected only a part of the arrangement put into place by the parties in achieving to object of transferring control of HEL to VIH. T h e Court, then, held as under (pages 213/214):

“The price paid by VIH BV to HTIL of US $ 11.01 billion factored in, as part of the consideration, diverse rights and entitlements that were being transferred to VIH BV. Many of these entitlements were not relatable to the transfer of the CGP share. Indeed, if the transfer of the solitary share of CGP could have effectuated the purpose it was not necessary for the parties to enter into a complex structure of business documentation. The transactional documents are not merely incidental or consequential to the transfer of the CGP share, but recognised independently the rights and entitlements of HTIL in relation to the Indian business which were being transferred to VIH BV.”

2.7.8 According to the Court, intrinsic to the transaction was a transfer of other rights and entitlements. These rights and entitlements constitute in themselves capital assets within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act.

2.7.9 After concluding that the transaction should be dissected in to various rights and entitlements for which the consideration is paid, the Court, dealing with the issue of apportionment of consideration to such rights and entitlements to determine the taxability thereof, further held as under (page 215):

“The manner in which the consideration should be apportioned is not something which can be determined at this stage. Apportionment lies within the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings. Undoubtedly, it would be for the Assessing Officer to apportion the income which has resulted to HTIL between that which has accrued or arisen or what is deemed to have accrued or arisen as a result of a nexus within the Indian taxing jurisdiction and that which lies outside. Such an enquiry would lie outside the realm of the present proceedings ……..”

2.8 The Court then considered the issue with regard to jurisdiction of the Revenue to initiate pro-ceedings u/s.195 in the case of VIH. In this context, after referring to the provisions of section 195(1) and the relevant judicial precedents, the Court concluded as under (page 221):

“Chargeability and enforceability are distinct legal conceptions. A mere difficulty in compliance or in enforcement is not a ground to avoid observance. In the present case, the transaction in question has significant nexus with India. The essence of the transaction was a change in the controlling interest in HEL which constituted a source of income in India. The transaction between the parties covered within its sweep, diverse rights and entitlements. The petitioner by the diverse agreements that it entered into has nexus with India jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the proceedings which have been initiated by the income-tax authorities cannot be held to lack jurisdiction.”

2.8.1 The Court finally stated that the issue of juris-diction has been correctly decided by the Revenue for the reasons already noted above and the VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making payment to HTIL.

2.8.2 This judgment of the High Court is now reversed by the Apex Court (of course, subject to outcome of the review petition filed by the Revenue) which we will consider in the next part of this write-up.
(To be continued)

Aplicability of Explanation to Section 73

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Section 73 of the Income-tax Act prohibits set-off of losses of speculation business except against profits and gains of another speculation business. The Explanation to section 73 extends the meaning of speculation business for the purposes of such set-off, by deeming any part of the business of a company which consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies to be a speculation business.

There are however two exceptions to this deeming fiction — one is for a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on Securities’, ‘Income from House Property’, ‘Capital Gains’ and ‘Income from Other Sources’ and the second is for a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or the granting of loans and advances.

The Explanation to section 73 reads as under:

“Where any part of the business of a company (other than a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on Securities’, ‘Income from House Property’, ‘Capital Gains’ and ‘Income from Other Sources’, or a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or the granting of loans and advances) consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies, such company shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be carried on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares.”

Two issues have arisen before the Courts, in the context of the first fiction, above, as to how the composition of the gross total income is to be looked at for the purpose of considering the applicability of this Explanation. One issue has been as to how negative income (loss) has to be considered — whether in absolute terms ignoring the negative sign, or to be taken as lower than a positive figure, for determining the majority composition of the gross total income. The second issue has arisen as to whether, for considering the applicability of this Explanation, the deemed speculation business loss is to be set off first against the other business profits, and only the net business income after such set-off is to be considered as ‘included’ in the gross total income and that it is such net business income, so included, that is to be compared with the income from the other heads of income to determine the composition of the gross total income. Naturally, the income under the other heads of income shall gain a higher share in composition of the gross total income where the business income is first set off against the losses of the deemed speculation business.

Considering the second issue, the Calcutta High Court has taken the view that for considering the applicability of the Explanation, the share trading loss is not to be set off against other business profits by adopting the ratio of its earlier decisions in the context of the first issue, the Bombay High Court has held that only the net business income after setting off the share trading loss against other business profits is to be considered as included in the gross total income.

Park View Properties’ case
The issue first came up before the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Park View Properties P. Ltd., 261 ITR 473.

In this case, the assessee-company had incurred a loss of Rs.8,98,799 in share trading, and had other business profits of Rs.12,32,469, the net business profits being Rs.3,33,670. The assessee had income from other sources and dividend income (which was taxable at that point of time) of Rs.5,73,701. The gross total income, determined after set-off of the share trading loss, was therefore Rs.9,07,371.

The Assessing Officer denied the benefit of the exception to the Explanation to section 73, denying set-off of share dealing loss on the ground that such losses were to be deemed as the loss of a speculation business, on application of the said Explanation. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee, holding that the main source of income of the assessee consisted of income from interest on securities and income from house property. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), allowing set-off of the share trading business loss without treating the same as a speculation loss.

The Calcutta High Court noted that the Tribunal had allowed the benefit of the exception to the Explanation to section 73 by setting off the share trading loss against the profits of other business for the purposes of determining whether the said Explanation was applicable or not. The Court did not approve the approach of the Tribunal. According to the Calcutta High Court, in order to ascertain whether an assessee would be covered by the Explanation to section 73, it had to be first examined whether the assessee came within the exception provided to the Explanation. This, according to the Court, was to be done by taking into consideration only the business profits, excluding the share trading loss, as could be gathered from the expression ‘gross total income consists mainly of income chargeable under the heads . . . . .’ used in the Explanation that was clear and unambiguous, and reflected the intention of the Legislature.

The Calcutta High Court noted that while computing the gross total income, loss was also to be taken into account, since loss was treated as a negative profit. The Calcutta High Court noted that in the case of Eastern Aviation and Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 208 ITR 1023, the Calcutta High Court had held that the explanation to section 73 could be applied before the principle of deduction was applied, namely, after computing the gross total income.

Applying this principle, the Court observed that if the loss in the share dealing account of Rs.8,98,799 was treated as a negative profit, then definitely the income from other sources and dividend income of Rs.5,73,701 was lower. Therefore, according to the Calcutta High Court, the main income consisted of the business of share trading, which was the main object of the assessee. The Calcutta High Court expressed the view that the business income computed after setting of the loss in share trading of Rs.3,33,670 did not represent the business income, since it was arrived at after applying the benefit of the explanation to section 73, namely, setting off the speculative income.

The Calcutta High Court therefore held that the case did not fall within the exception in the explanation to section 73, and the loss incurred on share trading was to be treated as speculation loss and could not be set off against other income.

Darshan Securities’ case
The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Darshan Securities Pvt. Ltd., (ITA No. 2886 of 2009, dated 2-2-2012 — available on www. itatonline.org).

In this case, the assessee had an income from service charges of Rs.2,25,04,588, and share trading loss of Rs.2,23,32,127, besides a taxable dividend income of Rs.4,79,325. The assessee claimed that in computing the gross total income for the purposes of the Explanation to section 73, the share trading loss had to be first adjusted against the income from service charges.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the set-off of the share trading loss, holding it to be a speculation loss. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the assessee’s claim that the case of the company was covered by the first exception to the said Explanation to section 73, as did the Tribunal.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued before the Bombay High Court that in computing the gross total income for the purposes of the Explanation to section 73, income under the heads of profits and gains of business or profession must be ignored. Alternatively, it was urged that where the income from business included a loss in trading of shares, such loss should not be allowed to be set off against income from any other source under the head of profits and gains of business or profession.

The Bombay High Court analysed the provisions of section 73 and the Explanation thereto. It noted that the Explanation to section 73 was a deeming fiction applying only to a company and extending only for the purposes of that section. It noted that the bracketed portion of the Explanation carved out an exception.

The Bombay High Court noted that ordinarily income which arose from one source, which fell under the head of profits and gains of business or profession could be set off against the loss, which arose from another source under the same head. Section 73(1) however set up a bar to setting off a loss which arose in respect of a speculation business against the profits and gains of any other business. Consequently, such speculation loss could be set off only against the profits and gains of another speculation business.

According to the Bombay High Court, the explanation provided a deeming fiction of when a company is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business. If the Department’s submissions were accepted, it would lead to an incongruous situation, where in determining as to whether a company was carrying on a speculation business within the meaning of the explanation, section 73(1) would be applied in the first instance. According to the Bombay High Court, this would not be permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation, as the explanation was designed to define a situation where the company was deemed to carry on speculation business. It is only thereafter that section 73(1) can apply. Applying the provisions of section 73(1) to determine whether a company was carrying on speculation business would reverse the order of application, which was impermissible and not contemplated by Parliament.

The Bombay High Court observed that in order to determine whether the exception carved out by the Explanation applied, the Legislature had first mandated a computation of the gross total income. Further, the words ‘consists mainly’ were indicative of the fact that the Legislature had in its contemplation that the gross total income consisted predominantly of income from the 4 heads referred to therein. Obviously, according to the Bombay High Court, in computing the gross total income, the normal provisions of the Act must be applied, and it was only thereafter that it had to be determined as to whether the gross total income so computed consisted mainly of income which was chargeable under the heads referred to in the Explanation.

The Bombay High Court followed the ratio of its earlier decisions in the cases of CIT v. Hero Textiles and Trading Ltd. , (ITA No. 296 of 2001 dated 29-1-2008) and CIT v. Maansi Trading Pvt. Ltd., (ITA No. 47 for 2001 dated 29-1-2008). It also noted that it had dismissed Notice of Motion No. 1921 of 2007 in ITA (Lodging) No. 852 of 2007 for condonation of delay against the Tribunal Special Bench decision in the case of Concord Commercial Pvt. Ltd., which decision had been followed by the Tribunal in this case.

The Bombay High Court therefore held that since the net business income of Rs.1,72,461 was less than the dividend income of Rs.4,79,325, the assessee was covered by the exception carved out in the Explanation to section 73, and would not be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purposes of section 73(1).


Observations

The Calcutta High Court seems to have placed reliance on its decision in the case of Eastern Aviation and Industries Ltd. (supra) in arriving at its conclusion. In particular, it followed the view taken in that case that negative profits are also income and are to be considered in the absolute sense (ignoring the positive or negative signs) for the purpose of the exception carved out in explanation to section 73(1). The Calcutta High Court, however, failed to appreciate that Eastern Aviation’s case dealt with a situation where there was a negative speculation income and negative share trading income, but no other profits from any other business. The question of set-off of share trading loss against any other business profit, therefore, did not arise for consideration in that case. In that case, the gross total income itself also was a negative figure. The reliance placed on the ratio of that decision, therefore, seems to have been misplaced.

Even assuming that the ratio of Eastern Aviation’s case that even negative incomes should be considered in the absolute sense were correct, what needs to be considered is the net position of the income under each head of income, and not the net position of each source of income. In Darshan Securities’ case, the net position of the income under the head business or profession was a positive figure, which was lower than the income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. Therefore, even applying Eastern Aviation’s case, the ratio of Darshan Securities’ case seems justified.

As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court, one cannot start with a presumption that the explanation applies and that the loss is a loss from speculation business for determining whether the explanation applies. One would therefore have to compute the gross total income without applying the explanation for finding out the applicability of the explanation. In doing so, one would have to apply the normal provisions for computation of gross total income ignoring the explanation to section 73, i.e., by setting off the share trading loss against other business profits, which would normally have been the position in the absence of the explanation. It is only then if it is determined that the explanation applies, as the case falls outside the exception to the explanation, that the prohibition on set-off of the loss would apply.

The view taken by the Bombay High Court that the share trading loss is to be set off against other business income for determining whether explanation to section 73 applies, is therefore the better view of the matter.

War Against Offshore Tax Evasion — Will Tax Information Exchange Agreements Work?

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In the recent crackdown against errant taxpayers, the Income-tax Department has initiated action against many Indians who had stashed their wealth in the HSBC bank in Geneva. This is similar to the action it had taken earlier against the Indian account holders in LGT Bank in Lichtenstein. Similarly, proceedings are also expected to be initiated against many tax evaders on the basis of more than 10,000 pieces of information reportedly received from the different countries. This news may be comforting to the majority of taxpayers who honestly pay their taxes and believe that the Government ought to severely punish tax evaders.

This development gives hope that such trickle would turn into a flow of information to bring back Indian black money stashed abroad after the Indian Government has entered into Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) with the tax havens. India has so far signed TIEAs with Bermuda, Bahamas, Isle of Man, British Virgin Island, Cayman Island, Liberia, and Jersey and more TIEAs are under negotiation. India is also seeking to amend its 75 existing Double Taxation Agreements with the countries to provide for effective exchange of tax information.

However, sceptics feel that Tax Information Exchange Agreements are unlikely to make any meaningful contribution in fight against tax evasion, more particularly against offshore tax evasion. Their scepticism is because of several reasons. However, before discussing their views it may be necessary to go through a bit of background to understand the issues involved in TIEAs.

Background

The global financial crisis triggered TIEA drive. One of the fallout of the global financial crisis was that of growing realisation among the governments on the menace of tax evasion, particularly offshore tax evasion, which has resulted in massive revenue loss hitting developing countries harder, which need more funds for their development and poverty eradication. Various agencies and organisations have estimated the magnitude of the problem. For example, a non-profit organisation, ‘Global Financial Integrity’ in its report published in January 2009, has estimated that the developing countries lost between $ 858 billion to $ 1.06 trillion in illicit financial outflows in 2006. ‘Oxfam’, another non-profit organisation in a study carried out in March 2009 found that at least $ 6.2 trillion wealth of the developing countries is held offshore, depriving them annual tax receipts between $ 64-124 billion. Therefore, considering the sheer size of the revenue loss, the governments are looking to collect tax from the funds deposited in the offshore accounts, on which tax was not paid.

Role of a tax haven

Critical role played by tax havens in offshore tax evasion is well known, which often ignore and many a time aid tax evasion taking place in their jurisdiction. Tax evaders find tax havens attractive because many tax havens have developed ‘liberal’ systems, such as simple registration of a company with bearer shares, minimum capitalisation, nominal reporting requirements, provide ease of funds transfer and offer possibility of keeping ownership anonymous. Such rules make tax evasion easier. More importantly, tax havens are attractive to tax evaders because of lack of transparency and little exchange of information apart from the fact that it levies nominal tax or no tax on them. On the other hand, for a tax haven, on-going financial activity in its jurisdiction is beneficial for its survival and prosperity. It is win-win situation for both: the tax haven and the tax evaders.

OECD response
Tax administrations cannot function beyond their country’s jurisdiction, although globalisation of economy and growing international business require tax administrations to operate internationally. Tax administrations find it difficult to detect tax evasion involving tax haven because of the lack of adequate information on such transactions. Therefore, ‘Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development’ (OECD) decided to tackle two critical elements — which make a jurisdiction a tax haven — lack of transparency and lack of or little exchange of information. The OECD, strongly supported by the G20 Nations, has aggressively promoted international co-operation in tax matters through exchange of information by promoting TIEAs with tax havens.

The OECD started its campaign in 1998 with the publication of the report ‘Harmful Tax Competition: Emerging Global Issue’ emphasising the need for effective exchange of information. Subsequently, the OECD developed a model ‘Tax Information Exchange Agreement’ which is largely followed by all nations. The OECD also devised a compliance standard for the tax havens to ensure that each of them sign and effectively implement TIEAs. This compliance standard required each tax haven to sign TIEAs with minimum 12 nations other than tax havens. As standards for monitoring their compliance, the OECD also calls for willingness on part of the tax haven to continue to sign agreements even after reaching threshold and insists on effective implementation of the TIEAs.

The ‘Global Forum’ created by the OECD member countries has devised a system to monitor jurisdiction’s standards on transparency and exchange of tax information by carrying out phase-wise peer reviews by other jurisdictions. Peer review assesses jurisdiction’s legal and regulatory framework on criteria of 10 key elements in 1st Phase of review and in Phase 2 review, examines effective implementation of exchange of tax information after a jurisdiction removes deficiencies identified in its legal and regulatory framework. The peer reviews assess the availability of ownership, accounting and bank information and authorities’ power to access as well as capacity to deliver information along with rights and safeguards and provisions of confidentiality.

So far various countries world over have signed more than 700 TIEAs. The tax havens have signed these agreements to come out of the OECD’s ‘grey list’ to avoid possible sanctions imposed on them if they fail to comply with the stipulated standard of signing minimum 12 TIEAs with the countries other than tax havens.

TIEA

TIEAs provide for exchange of requested information even in the cases in which the conduct of the taxpayer does not constitute crime in the jurisdiction of the requested country (Tax haven). The country is also required to provide requested information which is not in its possession by gathering it. Most importantly, the TIEAs provide for obtaining information from the banks and the financial institutions regarding ownership of companies, partnerships, trusts including ownership information of the persons in the ownership chain and also information on the settlers, trustees, and beneficiaries. This is one of the most important provisions of the agreement, which make it possible, at least theoretically, to unravel ultimate beneficiaries of the tax haven bank accounts. It is too well known that beneficiaries of the tax haven bank accounts are often shielded by a deliberately created complex ownership structure consisting of a maze of entities. It is also important to note that TIEA does not place any restrictions on information exchange caused by the bank secrecy or domestic tax interest requirements.

Why TIEAs cannot be effective

Despite having the well-designed provisions in the TIEA and seriousness of the OECD and governments in dealing with tax evasion, many professionals believe that the TIEAs will not work. There are various reasons for this negative sentiment.

Firstly, there is a conflict of interests among tax haven and non-tax haven countries. Secrecy jurisdictions are hardly interested in sharing information about their customers.

In many jurisdictions, ownership and beneficial ownership information is protected by domestic law.

From the OECD’s Progress Report Tax Transparency of 2011, it becomes clear that making legal and structural changes in secrecy jurisdictions is going to be a time-consuming affair. So far, out of total 81 peer reviews launched, Global Forum has adopted 59 reports. Out of the 59 reviews completed, 42 are Phase 1 reviews and 17 are combined reviews (reviews of both the Phases conducted simultaneously). Nine Jurisdictions will move to Phase 2 after they fix the deficiencies pointed out in the peer reviews. Thus, jurisdictions have to do considerable work to enable them to exchange tax information effectively. Moreover, one of the conclusions of the Report is that the information exchange is too slow.

Secondly, there is no automatic exchange of information. The TIEA requires that for getting information on a taxpayer, the applicant country has to provide specific information of the taxpayer such as (a) the identity of the taxpayer under examination or investigation; (b) the period for which information is requested; (c) the nature of the information requested and the tax purpose for which the information is sought; (d) grounds for believing that the requested information is present in the requested country or is in the possession of a person within the jurisdiction of the requested country; (e) to the extent known, the name and address of any person believed to be in possession of the requested information; (f) a statement that the request is in conformity with the law and administrative practices of the applicant country, that if the requested information was within the jurisdiction of the applicant country, then the applicant country would be able to obtain the information under the laws of the applicant country or in the normal course of administrative practice and that it is in conformity with this agreement; (g) a statement that the applicant country has pursued all means available in its own territory to obtain the information, except which would give rise to dispro-portionate difficulties. Thus, very high amount of information is required to be furnished for making a request meaning that the tax administration should already have substantial evidence against the taxpayer rather than gathering evidence against a taxpayer to make a case of tax evasion. Very often, furnishing such information before the completion of investigation is like putting a cart before the horse.

Thirdly, a taxpayer can move his deposits from the bank account of one tax haven to another before developing of an enquiry making tax administration’s efforts futile. Lastly, experiences of some of the countries indicate little usefulness of TIEAs as they have sparingly used it for the information exchange.

It may be recalled here that the information on the basis of which the Income-tax Department has recently initiated action was not received under the TIEA. The information on Indian account holders in LGT bank Lichtenstein was provided by Germany, which in turn had bought it from the disgruntled employee of the Bank, whereas France reportedly passed on the information on the account holders of the HSBC Bank, Geneva.

Responses by other countries

Probably considering the limitations of the TIEA, some of the countries have adopted multi-pronged strategy to counter offshore tax evasion. On the one hand, US, Germany and Australia had offered Voluntary Income Disclosure Scheme and on the other, some of them have enacted specific legislations to deal with it.

The US has strengthened domestic legislation by enacting specific laws to counter offshore tax evasion by creating additional sources of information gathering.

The US introduced ‘Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act’ (HIRE) providing tax incentives for hiring and retaining unemployed workers also imposes 30% withholding on payment made to foreign financial institution, unless such institution agrees to adhere to certain reporting requirements with respect to US account holders. It has also enacted legislation — FATCA (the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) which is to be implemented from 2013 requiring non-US banks to report the accounts of US clients to the US Internal Revenue Service. There is also a proposal in the US for enacting additional law, ‘Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’ strengthening FATCA and plugging specific offshore tax evasion schemes. Similarly, UK’s new law introduced in 2010 provides for higher penalty at 200% on offshore tax evasion.

In addition, many countries have stepped up their counter offensive by allocating more work force to investigate the cases of offshore tax evasion. It is reported that the IRS of the US had placed more than 1400 agents on a project to investigate the merchants who were directly depositing credit card sales in their offshore accounts.

Conclusion

The real challenge to willingness to exchange of information comes from the difference in the tax laws and law on confidentiality along with conflicting interests among countries. Therefore, there is a need to take additional measures along with the TIEAs. However, the measures for information gathering which may work for the countries such as the US, Germany or the UK because of their political and economic clout may not work for India. India will have to supplement its measures — legislative as well as administrative — for information gathering in its battle against tax evasion leveraging at the international level its position of a giant emerging market.

On a positive note, the biggest contribution of the TIEAs is providing legal instrument in an environment against tax evasion. With the result, tax evaders are now increasingly realising that there will be no safer havens in near future for their tax evaded funds, which is the fundamental requirement in a fight against tax evasion.

(2011) 130 ITD 219 (Cochin) (TM) Dy. CIT, Circle 2(1), Range-2, Ernakulam v. Akay Flavours & Aromatics (P.) Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 20-9-2010

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Section 10B, r.w.s. 32 and section 72 — For hundred percent export-oriented unit eligible for deduction u/s.10B, set-off of unabsorbed depreciation and business loss brought forward from relevant assessment year in which deduction was so claimed for the first time up to A.Y. 2000-01, will be allowed against business income or under any other head of income including ‘income from other sources’, for all assessment years up to assessment year in which deduction was last claimed (i.e., during the tax holiday period).

Facts:
The assessee is a hundred percent export-oriented unit and is eligible for deduction u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act. The first relevant assessment year for which deduction u/s.10B claimed was A.Y. 1996- 97 and therefore the last assessment year for which the deduction will be available to assessee will be A.Y. 2005-06. During the assessment of return of income for A.Y. 2004-05, the AO noticed that the assessee had claimed set-off brought forward unabsorbed depreciation up to A.Y. 2000-01 against income computed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. The AO disallowed the claim of deduction under grounds of provision of section 10B(6) and while computing the income of the assessee during the assessment, the AO, first set off the brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation against the income from the export unit and balance income was considered for deduction u/s.10B. Thus the AO neutralised the claim of deduction u/s.10B by setting off the brought forward loss and unabsorbed depreciation first and disallowed the assessee’s claim of set-off against income under the head ‘Income from other sources’.

The assessee, against said order of the AO, preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) reversed the order of the assessing officer and upheld the claim of the assessee. The CIT(A) opined that reading of provision u/s.10B(6)(ii) clearly states that set-off of unabsorbed depreciation and business loss brought forward up to A.Y. 2000-01 will not be allowed to be carried forward beyond the tax holiday period. In the instant case, the last year of claim of deduction u/s.10B was A.Y. 2005-06, whereas the assessment year for which appeal was referred is A.Y. 2004-05, therefore the view of AO could not be upheld and the assessee’s claim was allowed.

Aggrieved the Revenue appealed before the ITAT.

Held:
(1) On simple reading of section 32 with section 72, it is apparent that unabsorbed depreciation can be set off against business income or under any head of income including ‘Income from other sources’. There is no provision in law which prohibits set-off of unabsorbed depreciation from income computed under head ‘Income from other sources’.

(2) The benefit given u/s.10B is deduction and not an exemption and is evident from the wordings of the said provision which states that only 90% of the business profits are allowed as deduction. Thus the balance 10% has to be treated only as business income. The perusal of section 10B(1) clearly reveals that deduction under the section from profits and gains derived by undertaking from the export has to be made first while computing income under the head ‘Income from business’ and not at a later stage of computation of the gross total income of the assessee.

(3) Provision of section 10B(6)(ii) states that no loss insofar as it relates to the business of the undertaking including unabsorbed depreciation, so far it relates to any relevant assessment year up to A.Y. 2000-01 shall be carried forward for set-off while computing income for any assessment year subsequent to the last relevant assessment year in which deduction under this section is claimed i.e., after the tax holiday period. Therefore, setoff of such brought forward business loss or unabsorbed depreciation can be made in accordance with provisions of section 32, section 71 and section 72 while computing the total income of the assessee for assessment year within the tax holiday period.

(4) Thus, set-off of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation up to A.Y. 2000-01 cannot be disallowed for A.Y. 2004- 05, where the last year of claim for deduction u/s.10B was A.Y. 2005-06 as the assessment year in consideration falls within the tax holiday period. Thus Revenue’s appeal stood dismissed and the view taken by the CIT(A) was upheld.

levitra

TDS: Interest: Section 2(28A) and section 194A of Income-tax Act, 1961: Interest on amount deposited by allottees on account of delayed allotment of flats: Interest on account of damages: Tax need not be deducted at source.

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[CIT v. H. P. Housing Board, 340 ITR 388 (HP)]

The assessee, the Himachal Pradesh Housing Board, floated a self-financing scheme for sale of house/ flats wherein the allottees were required to deposit some amount with the assessee and construction was to be carried out out of these amounts. One of the conditions of the terms of allotment was that in case the possession of the house/flat was not given to the allottee within a particular time frame, the assessee was liable to pay interest to the allottees on the money received by it. There was a delay in construction of the houses and thereafter the assessee paid interest at the agreed rate to the allottees in terms of the letter of allotment. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on payment of such interest u/s.194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that section 194A was not applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The amount which was paid by the assessee was not payment of interest, but was payment of damages to compensate the allottee for the delay in the construction of his house/ flat and the harassment caused to him.

(ii) Though compensation had been calculated in terms of interest, this was because the parties by mutual agreement agreed to find out a suitable and convenient system of calculating the damages, which would be uniform for all the allottees. The allottees had not given the money to the assessee by way of deposit, nor had the assessee borrowed the amount from the allottees.

(iii) The amount was paid under a self-financing scheme for construction of the flats and the interest was paid on account of damages suffered by the claimant for delay in completion of the flats.”

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GAPs in GAP — Foreign Exchange Differences — Capitalisation/Amortisation

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The Central Government has notified two amendments dated 29 December 2011 to AS-11 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates. Given below is a brief overview of these two amendments, practical issues arising thereon and the author’s perspective.

Overview of the first amendment The first amendment extends the sunset date for the use of option given in paragraph 46 of AS-11 whereby a company can opt to capitalise/amortise exchange difference arising on longterm foreign currency monetary items. It substitutes the words ‘in respect of accounting period commencing on or after 7 December 2006 and ending on or before 31 March 2012,’ in paragraph 46, by the words ‘in respect of accounting periods commencing on or after 7 December 2006 and ending on or before 31 March 2020.’

Overview of the second amendment The second Notification inserts a new paragraph, viz., paragraph 46A, in AS-11. This paragraph deals with accounting for both companies which had exercised option given in paragraph 46 of AS-11 as well as any other company which had not exercised that option. According to this paragraph, a company may choose to adopt the following treatment in respect of accounting periods commencing on or after 1 April 2011:

(i) Foreign exchange differences arising on longterm foreign currency monetary items related to acquisition of a fixed asset are capitalised and depreciated over the remaining useful life of the asset.

(ii) Foreign exchange differences arising on other long-term foreign currency monetary items are accumulated in the ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Item Translation Difference Account’ and amortised over the remaining life of the concerned monetary item.

The option once elected is irrevocable. Like paragraph 46, paragraph 46A also does not apply to exchange differences arising on long-term foreign currency monetary items that in substance form part of a company’s net investment in non-integral foreign operation.

Main issues There are numerous questions on the interplay of these two amendments and the manner in which they would work in consonance with each other. Lets us understand what is clear and what is confusing.

What is clear?
(1) Those companies that were hitherto amortising/ capitalising exchange differences can continue to do so till 2020.

(2) Those companies that were hitherto not amortising/capitalising exchange differences can avail of the new option in paragraph 46A. Such an option is available on a prospective basis for the remaining life of the loan and is not restricted to 2020.

What is confusing?
(1) Those companies that were hitherto amortising/capitalising exchange differences can continue to do so till 2020 under paragraph 46. The amortisation was done restricting the amortisation period to 2012. If the company wishes to continue with paragraph 46, the amortisation period is extended because of the extension from 2012 to 2020. It is not clear whether the amortisation on the loan is calculated on a retrospective basis or on a prospective basis over the balance amortisation period.

(2) Can a company, which had earlier exercised the option given in paragraph 46, now opt out of that exemption on the grounds that it chose the option because it was restricted to 31-3-2011 and not 31- 3-2020? Hence, can it start recognising exchange differences on foreign currency monetary items, including long-term items, immediately in profit or loss?

(3) It is not clear if companies that were amortising/ capitalising exchange differences under paragraph 46 can switch over to paragraph 46A. How the two paragraphs (46 & 46A) will work in consonance with each other? Let us assume that a company has taken a foreign currency loan, not related to acquisition of fixed asset, whose term extends till 31 March 2025. Will the company amortise exchange differences arising on such loan till 31 March 2020 or till 31 March 2025? The manner in which paragraph 46A is drafted appears to allow both existing option users and new option users to capitalise/amortise exchange differences on a prospective basis. If that is true, what is the relevance of paragraph 46?

(4) In paragraph 46, the sunset date has been used at two places: one for the date range during which the option given can be used and the second to specify the period up to which the balance in the ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Item Translation Difference Account’ needs to be amortised. The Notification dated 29 December 2011 has extended the sunset date to 31 March 2020 at the first place. However, a similar change has not been made with regard to the second date. The strict legal and technical interpretation of the paragraph suggests that a company can continue using the option given in paragraph 46 till accounting periods ending on or before 31 March 2020. However, there cannot be any balance in the ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Item Translation Difference Account’, created for exchange differences arising on long-term monetary items not related to acquisition of a depreciable capital asset, post 31 March 2011. In practical terms, this means that after 31 March 2011, a company will be able to use the option given in paragraph 46 only for capitalisation of exchange differences arising on long-term monetary item related to acquisition of a depreciable asset. Other exchange differences will be immediately recognised in the P&L Account. Whilst this may be the strict legal interpretation of the paragraph, certain companies may question whether it really reflects the intention of the regulator. They may also argue that the amendment intends to extend the option given in its entirety. Hence, they can also amortise any balance in the ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Item Translation Difference Account’ till 31 March 2020. Many companies are taking this approach.

The MCA or the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, will need to clarify the above issues.

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Crowdsourcing

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About this article:
This write-up is (in a manner of speaking) a continuation of the previous write-up on mass collaboration. The basic idea remains the same: there is a large problem, capable of being broken into several small manageable parts. The task, though simple to humans, is difficult for computers to achieve (as yet). This idea is applied differently to achieve a variety of objectives. Some are commercial and then there are others which contribute to the growth of society as a whole.

Background:
The term ‘crowdsourcing’ as you may have already guessed, is a derivative of the words ‘crowd’ and ‘sourcing’. While this phrase was first coined by Jeff Howe in June 2006 Wired magazine article, you may be surprised to know that this concept was being commonly applied for several years before that. Few examples which have become huge:

  • Wikipedia
  • Captcha and recaptcha

Some lesser known examples:

  • Brooke Bond/Lipton runs a slogan contest, the winner of the slogan gets a cash reward (and Brook Bond gets 1000+ new catchy slogans for future marketing — virtually for free);

  • An ad agency organises photography contest. Contestants use their own cameras and film. They are given themes/concepts and come up with innovative ideas/snaps. The ad agency spends on promoting the event and some refreshments for the contestants. Post the contest the ad agency retains all the photos (1000’s of ideas — virtually for free);

  • Very recently, two leading business houses in India announced in newsprint and media that they would invest in start ups. They invited entrepreneurs all over the country (and abroad) to register and share their ideas (basic idea, sample model, estimates for commercials). Everyone would be given the opportunity to make an ‘elevator’ pitch. Once again 1000+ ideas virtually for free.

And then there are some blacksheep . . . . . .

  • Remember Speak Asia . . . . if you do some digging you may find that similar schemes were floated in the African continent . . . . very successful . . . . all stakeholders made money. Somehow the idea didn’t click in India.

  • If you have seen Die Hard 4 — the villan uses the skill of amateur hackers to develop a code, this code is used to disrupt systems.

If you look at any of the above-mentioned ideas, you may agree that all of them were simple ideas, brilliantly executed.

What is crowdsourcing and how does it work:

Simply put, crowdsourcing is a distributed problem solving and production model. Typically, a problem is broadcast to an unknown group of solvers in the form of an open call for solution. The ‘users’ or the crowd (i.e., the online community) comes together and submits solutions. Yet another crowd sifts through these solutions and finds the more acceptable/better solutions. These solutions are then owned by the broadcasting agency (i.e., the crowdsourcer). The winning solutions are sometimes rewarded, sometimes monetarily, sometimes with a prize or recognition (i.e., the contributors are paid crumbs and the broadcaster keeps the cake).

Advantages of crowdsourcing:
Without getting in to the ethical aspect of the subject, one needs to appreciate that there are certain advantages that crowdsourcing can offer :

  • Problems can be explored at a comparatively small cost, often very quickly.

  • Possible to achieve a win-win proposition sans monetary compensation — best example is Luis von Ahn’s Recaptcha and the efforts to translate wikipedia’s German version.

  • Crowdsourcing makes it possible to tap a wider range of talent (or prospective customers) than normally feasible — best example — auto industry has been using social media to source ideas from prospective customers — ideas about car design, features, accessories, etc.
  • Resultant rewards have potential of spurring activities — more entrepreneurship, growth in business, investments, employment, etc.

Criticism about crowdsourcing:

  • Once the crowd starts contributing, somebody has to sort and sift through the information. This is a costly affair, unless the right resources are used the costs outweigh the benefits;

  • Given that there is no monetary compensation, increases the likelihood of the project failing. Without money one may face problems with fewer participants, lower quality of work, lack of personal interest in the project/results, etc.;

  • Barter may not always be possible;

  • Risks mitigation through contracts may not be possible since there are no written contracts, non-disclosure agreements or for that matter non-transparency about how the information will be used;

  • Difficulty in managing and maintaining a working relationship with the crowd throughout the duration of the project;

  • Susceptibility to faulty results and failure is still too high.

Though there are several pros and cons, so far the perception has been positive. With the success of ideas like recaptcha and the translation project, people have started believing in crowdsourcing’s potential to balance global inequalities. A rather tall statement, but its still a wait-and-watch situation.

I would like to end this write-up by sharing my experience with crowdsourcing. Sometime ago, I downloaded a free app on my phone called Waze. At the time I didn’t know that it was a crowdsourcing app. However after using the app, I have (kind of) started leaning in favour of crowdsourcing and hope to see more developments in this field.

Waze app:

Waze is a free iPhone app which tries to crowdsource real-time traffic and navigation data. The application has advantages because it provides information which is ‘almost’ real-time and updated. It is quite different from your navigation/GPS systems because apart from providing you information about routes, Waze also provides information about traffic, speed at which the traffic is moving (it’s been a mixed experience for me), information about roads under construction (this is based on user inputs and quite accurate) — if there is a obstruction or an accident and the road gets blocked, users can send an instant update and all users will be pinged instantly.

The best part is that most of the time the user simply has to switch on the application and leave it on. The software keeps tracking your speed (using GPS and your GPRS/3G bandwidth) and broadcasts this information to other users. If your car slows down the app sends you a prompt asking if you are stuck in traffic. The information is broadcast almost instantly (have noted that it is broadcast in 5-10 seconds).

I have been using the app intermittently and have found it quite useful to avoid traffic. Have benefitted from updates quite a few times and that’s why I rate it as a pretty good ‘time-saving app’. While the app is free, there is a downside — the constant tracking can drain your battery and unless you have a good data plan, it will also drain your wallet.

That’s all for this month. Next month is likely to be dominated with the budget proposals, but I promise that I will have some interesting ideas and stories to share with you.

Cheers.

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MTV Asia LDC v. DDIT ITA No. 3530/Mum/ 2006 (unreported) A.Ys.: 2002-03 to 2005-06. Dated: 31-1-2012 Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) & N. V. Vasudevan (JM) Counsel for taxpayer/revenue: A. V. Sonde/ Malathi Sridharan

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Article 7 of India-Singapore DTAA

Despite payment of arm’s-length remuneration to the agent, further profit could be attributable to the PE in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in Cayman Islands and conducted its business operations from Singapore. Singapore tax authority had issued tax residency certificate to the taxpayer confirming that its control and management was exercised from Singapore. During the relevant years, the taxpayer was conducting its entire TV channel activities for Asia-Pacific Region from Singapore.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noted as follows.

  • The taxpayer had appointed an Indian company (‘IndCo’) as its agent in India.

  • IndCo was entitled to 15% commission on the gross advertisement revenue from India.

  • The income of the taxpayer comprised only the advertising time sold by IndCo.

  • IndCo also collected the payments and remitted them to Singapore.

The AO, therefore, held that the taxpayer had an agency PE in India. The AO further held that even if the taxpayer paid arm’s-length remuneration to the agent, further profits could be attributed to the agency PE. The AO, accordingly, attributed profits at 40, 30, 25 and 25% for the relevant years. The CIT(A) upheld the further attribution of profits, but reduced the quantum.

The issue before the Tribunal was about proper profit attribution to the PE in India. Held:

The Tribunal held as follows:

  • The audit of the accounts of the taxpayer was completed subsequently. Further, the taxpayer had not maintained separate accounts for the Indian operations. Hence, application of Rule 10(i) read with Rule 10(iii) was proper.

  • The tax computation filed by taxpayer with the Singapore tax authority in respect of its global operations reflected losses. Hence, margin attributed by the AO was on the higher side.

  • Transponder charges and programme charges cannot be said to be only for Indian operations since the satellite footprint also covered neighbouring countries.

  • The erstwhile CBDT Circular No. 742 of 1996 provided for presumptive taxation of 10% of the advertisement revenue of foreign telecasting companies as their income. Hence, even though the said Circular was withdrawn, as there was no change in the business model of the taxpayer, attribution of 10% of the advertisement revenue earned by the taxpayer from India was reasonable.
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SEPCO III Electric Power Construction Corporation, In re AAR No. 1008 of 2010 (unreported) Dated: 31-1-2012 Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) & V. K. Shridhar (Member) Counsel for applicant/revenue: N. Venkataraman, Satish Aggarwal, Akil Sambhar, Nageswar Rao & Atul Awasthi/Vivek Kumar Upadhyay

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Article 7 of India-China DTAA Section 9 of Income-tax Act On facts, since the sale transaction was concluded outside India, payment made for offshore supplies was not taxable in India.

Facts:
The applicant was a Chinese company engaged in the business of supplying equipment for electric power projects. An Indian company awarded contract to the applicant for offshore supply. The scope of the work required the applicant to carry out design, engineering, procuring and transportation of the equipment for a thermal power plant to the port of loading.

The applicant contended that the supply of the equipment was made outside India and hence, the payment received by it was not taxable under Income-tax Act or India-China DTAA. In support of its contention, the applicant claimed:

  • As per the contract, title to the equipment was passed at the port of loading, which was located outside India.

  • The shipping documents showed the Indian company as the owner of the equipment.

  • The transit insurance was obtained in the name of the Indian company.

  • The payment was to be made in foreign currencies.

  • The payment was to be received outside India by the applicant by electronic funds transfer.

The applicant also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries v. DIT, (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC) and AAR’s ruling in LS Cable Ltd., In re (2011) 337 ITR 35 (AAR).

The tax authority contended that the contract was not merely a supply contract and the applicant had done considerable work in India, such as testing of equipment during project commissioning, coordination with other contractors for precommissioning activities, etc. Further, the applicant was required to provide assistance and support to the other contractors for 90 days after provisional completion of the unit. Also, the contract was indivisible. Therefore, the applicant had PE in India and consequently, the payment was taxable in India.

Held:
The AAR held as follows:

The question raised is only on offshore supply of equipments and not on other activities. On perusal of the contract, the conduct of the parties which is apparent from the shipping documents and taking of transit insurance in the name of the Indian company, the transaction is that of an offshore sale. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries v. DIT, (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC), the transaction cannot be considered as one and indivisible. Hence, the tax authority does not have the jurisdiction to tax payment made outside India for offshore supplies.

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Shell India Markets Pvt. Ltd. AAR No. 833 of 2009 (unreported) Dated: 17-1-2012 Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) & V. K. Shridhar (Member) Counsel for applicant: Rajan Vora, G. V. Krishna Kumar and Gaurav Bhauwala

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Article 13.4 of India-UK DTAA; Section 9 of Income-tax Act

(i) Since provision of services required special knowledge and human intervention, they were consultancy services.

(ii) As the applicant was free to utilise the knowhow/ intellectual property generated from services and independent of service provider, service can be regarded as ‘made available’.

(iii) Even if the provision of services does not have any element of profit, the consideration was taxable, both under Income-tax Act and under India-UK DTAA.

Facts:

The applicant was an Indian company and a member of Shell Group. The applicant entered into Cost Contribution Agreement (‘CCA’) with a Shell Group Company in UK (‘UKCo’) for providing Business Support Services (‘BSS’). BSS were primarily in the nature of management support services. UKCo was providing BSS to other Shell Group Companies also. Under CCA, UKCo provided services at cost and without charging markup.

Before the AAR, the applicant contended as follows:

The services excluded R&D, technical advice and services. Hence, they were only managerial services, which were excluded from Article 13.4(c) of India-UK DTAA.

Services were provided at cost, which was reimbursed by Group Companies. Hence, no income had arisen to UKCo in terms of certain judicial decisions1.

Due to cost contribution, the contributing companies became economic owners of knowhow/ intellectual property. Hence, question of UKCo granting right to use such intellectual property to applicant did not arise.

UKCo did not have a PE in India. In absence of any chargeable income, payment received by UKCo should not be taxable in India.

The issues before the AAR pertained to the nature of services provided by UKCo; whether the services were ‘made available’ in the context of India-UK DTAA; and whether any income accrued even if there was no element of profit.

Held:

The AAR ruled as follows:

Nature of services:

Advice given for taking a commercial decision is technical or consultancy services. The services provided by UKCo were of specialised nature. Consultancy services require special knowledge or expertise and human intervention. Provision of services through staff visits and interchanges was important ingredient under CCA which indicated that they were consultancy services. Certain services may not have been such services. However, since all the services were bundled and cannot be segregated, services as a whole would be consultancy services.

Make available under India-UK DTAA:

In Perfetti Ven Melle Holding BV (AAR No. 869 of 2010), the AAR has held that ‘make available’ means recipient should be in a position to derive enduring benefit and to utilise the knowledge or know-how in future on its own. In case of BSS, UKCo closely works with employees of the applicant and advises them. Further, as the applicant’s own averment, the applicant is able to use know-how/intellectual property generated from BSS independent of the service provider and hence services can be regarded as ‘made available’ to the applicant. Also, since a DTAA relates only to the rights and duties of subjects/citizens of respective States, one cannot rely on the meaning assigned to ‘make available’ under India-USA DTAA.

Income accruing and CCA:

The AAR held2 that even if the provision of services do not have any element of profit, the consideration would be taxable. Hence, the consideration was taxable as FTS, both under the Income-tax Act and India-UK DTAA and the applicant was obliged to deduct tax at source.
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ADIT v. Ballast Nadam Dredging ITA No. 999/Mum./2008 (unreported) A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 30-12-2011 Before B. R. Mittal (JM) & Pramod Kumar (AM) Counsel for taxpayer/revenue : Kanchan Kaushal & Dhanesh Bafna/Malati Sridharan

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Retention money received pursuant to furnishing of bank guarantee is not taxable until successful completion of the contract and expiration of the guarantee.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a Dutch company. The taxpayer was engaged in execution of a contract awarded by the Government of India. The contract pertained to the construction of breakwaters, dredging and land reclamation. As per the contract, 5% of the amount was to be held as retention money. When retention money reached 2% of the contract price, the taxpayer could ask for release of 1% of the retention money by furnishing bank guarantee.

The taxpayer received certain payments by way of release of retention money by furnishing bank guarantee. The taxpayer did not offer the same for taxation in the year of release. It contended that the payments would be taxable in the year when the taxpayer satisfactorily completed the work and removed the defects. However, the AO held that the payments had accrued to the taxpayer and accordingly, taxed the same.

The CIT(A) held that since the taxpayer did not have an absolute right over the payments, they were not taxable.

Held:

The Tribunal held as follows: As long as performance guarantee remains and is enforceable without notice to the taxpayer, the retention money received cannot be recognised as income and have to be excluded while computing the income until successful completion of the contract and expiration of the guarantee.

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Taxation of Commission Payments to Non-Residents

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Taxability of commission paid to a non-resident agent has become a contentious issue especially after withdrawal of the celebrated CBDT Circular No. 23 of 1969, dated 23rd July 1969 and Circular No. 786, dated 7th February 2000 on 22nd October 2009. Many issues arise in characterisation as well as taxability of commission income in light of provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and under the provisions of a Tax Treaty. This Article discusses various such issues.

1. Provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’)

Indian exporters and/or businessmen avail services of foreign agents for a variety of purposes, such as securing export orders, sourcing of raw materials and plant & machinery, participation in exhibitions, buying or selling of properties and so on. When a non-resident receives commission for rendering such services outside India, from an Indian payer, whether it is taxable in India? Whether resident payer needs to deduct tax at source u/s.195 of the Act?

We will discuss various issues arising in this context such as:

  • Whether taxability of the commission income received by a non-resident depends upon the nature of the underlying transaction?

  • Whether commission income of a non-resident agent is taxable u/s.5 or u/s.9(1)(i), being source of income in India or u/s.9(1)(vii) as Fees for Technical Services (FTS)?

  • What is the impact of withdrawal of CBDT Circulars (No. 23 of 1969 and 786 of 2000) dealing with taxability of commission income of foreign agents of Indian exporters?

  • Whether the payment of commission to non-resident agent be taxed as ‘Other Income’ under Article 21 of a Tax Treaty relating to Other Income?

Let us first examine provisions of the Act in this regard.

(i) Section 5 r.w. Section 9 of the Act deals with this situation. Section 5 defines the scope of total income according to which, income of a nonresident is taxed in India if it is received, accrue or arise or deemed to be received, accrue or arise in India. Section 9 of the Act deals with Income deemed to accrue or arise in India. Inter alia it covers any income accruing or arising to a non-resident, directly or indirectly, through or from (i) any business connection (BC) in India and (ii) any asset or source of income in India.

(ii) Explanation to 2 to section 9(1)(i) defines the term ‘business connection’ (BC). The analysis of the said Explanation would show that any business activity in India carried out by a broker, general commission agent or any other agent having an independent status in his ordinary course of business will not constitute a BC in India and conversely that of a dependent agent will constitute a BC.

Thus, commission income of a foreign agent will not be taxed in India unless that agent has a BC in India. In absence of a BC, can it be construed that ‘source’ of commission income is in India as the payer is a tax resident of India?

(iii) In this connection, it is interesting to note the relevant contents of the CBDT Circular 23 of 1969 (since withdrawn), which is as follows:

“. . . . . . (4) Foreign agents of Indian exporters — A foreign agent of Indian exporter operates in his own country and no part of his income arises in India. His commission is usually remitted directly to him and is, therefore, not received by him or on his behalf in India. Such an agent is not liable to income-tax in India on the commission.” (Emphasis supplied)

The above position was reaffirmed by the CBDT vide its Circular No. 163, dated 29-5-1975.

(iv) In this connection, it is interesting to note the observations of the AAR in case of SPAHI Projects (P.) Ltd. (2009) 183 Taxman 92 (AAR), wherein it held that “irrespective of the existence or otherwise of the business connection of ‘Z’, in India, since no business operations are carried out in India by ‘Z’, the attribution in terms clause (a) of the Explanation 1 is not possible and, therefore, no income can be deemed to accrue or arise in India merely because ‘Z’ promotes the business of the applicant in South Africa.”

Here the AAR held that even if it is assumed that there exists a BC in India, only so much of income as is attributable to that BC in India would be taxable in India as provided in Explanation 1 to section 9(1) of the Act, which reads as follows:

“Explanation 1 — For the purposes of this clause

— (a) In the case of a business of which all the operations are not carried out in India, the income of the business deemed under this clause to accrue or arise in India shall be only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in India;”

Therefore, in a case where there exists a BC, but commission is paid in respect of services which are rendered outside India only, then no income can be said to accrue or arise in India.

(v) The Supreme Court in the case of Carborandum Co. v. CIT, (1977) 108 ITR 335, has held that “the carrying on of activities or operations in India is essential to make the non-resident have business connection in India in order that he may be liable to tax in respect of the income attributable to that business connection”.

(vi) In case of CIT v. Toshoku Ltd., (1980) 125 ITR 525 the Apex Court, while dealing with the issue of taxation in India of commission paid to a nonresident agent, held that “the assessees did not at all carry on any business operations in the taxable territories and as such the receipt in India of the sale proceeds of tobacco remitted or caused to be remitted by purchasers from abroad, did not amount to an operation carried by the assessees in India as contemplated by clause (a) of the Explanation to section 9(1)(i). The impugned commission could not, therefore, be deemed to be income which had either accrued or arisen in India”.

1.1 Applicability of TDS provisions u/s.195 on commission paid to non-resident

The Income-tax Department vide its Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000 clarified that “the deduction of tax at source u/s.195 would arise if the payment of commission to the non-resident agent is chargeable to tax in India. In this regard attention to CBDT Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July, 1969 is drawn where the taxability of ‘Foreign Agents of Indian Exporters’ was considered along with certain other specific situations. It had been clarified then that where the non-resident agent operates outside the country, no part of his income arises in India. Further, since the payment is usually remitted directly abroad it cannot be held to have been received by or on behalf of the agent in India. Such payments were therefore held to be not taxable in India. The relevant sections, namely, section 5(2) and section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 not having undergone any change in this regard, the clarification in Circular No. 23 still prevails. No tax is therefore deductible u/s.195”.

Many decisions wherein taxability of Commission paid to foreign agents was examined are rendered in the context of deductibility of tax at source u/s.195 of the Act.

The Tribunals, AAR and Courts in following cases held that provisions of section 195 of the Act are not applicable in case of commission payments to foreign agents of Indian entities as the said income is not taxable in India in the hands of the recipient.

(i) CIT v. Cooper Engineering Ltd., (1968) 68 ITR 457 (Bom.)

(ii) CIT v. Toshoku Ltd., (1980) 125 ITR 525 (SC)

(iii) Ceat International S.A. v. CIT, (1999) 237 ITR 859 (Bom.)

(iv) Indopel Garments Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, (2001) 72 TTJ 702

(v) Ind. Telesoft (2004) 267 ITR 725 (AAR)

(vi) DCIT v. Ardeshir B. Cursetjee & Sons Ltd., (2008) 24 SOT 48 (Mum.) (URO)

(vii) Jt. CIT v. George Williamsons (Assam) Ltd., (2009) 116 ITD 328 (Gau.)

(viii)    Dr. Reddy Laboratories Ltd. v. ITO, (1996) 58 ITD 104 (Hyd.)

(ix)    SOL Pharmaceutical Ltd. v. ITO, (2002) 83 ITD 72 (Hyd.)

(x)    Eon Technology (P) Ltd. v. DCIT, (2011) 11 tax-mann.com 53 (Del.)

(xi)    ACIT v. Meru Impex, (2011) 16 Taxmann.com 219 (Mumbai ITAT)

(xii)    ITO v. Asiatic Colour Chem Ltd., (2010) 41 SOT 21 (Ahd.) (URO)

(xiii)    ACIT v. Tamil Nadu Newsprints and Papers Limited, (2011 TII 215 ITAT Mad.-Intl.)

(xiv)    DCIT v. Divi’s Laboratories Ltd., (2011 TII 182 ITAT Hyd.-Intl.)/(2011) 12 taxmann.com 103

(xv)    ADIT (IT) v. Wizcraft International Entertain-ment (P.) Ltd., (2011) 43 SOT 470 (Mum.)

(xvi)    DCIT v. Mainetti (India) (P.) Ltd., (2011) 12 tax-mann.com 60 (Chennai)

All controversies arising in respect of interpretation of section 195 regarding non-deduction of tax at source were put to rest by with decision of the Supreme Court in the case of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 327 ITR 456 wherein the Apex Court following Vijay Ship Breaking Corporation v. CIT, (2009) 314 ITR 309 (SC) held that “The payer is bound to deduct tax at source only if the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable, there is no question of tax at source being deducted”.

The decision of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. (supra) assumes special significance as it explained the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Transmission Corporation of A. P. Ltd. v. CIT,(1999) 239 ITR 587 (SC) in proper perspective. The said decision is often invoked by the Income-tax Department to fasten TDS obligation on the payer on a gross basis and even when the income is not chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient thereof. The Apex Court stated that in the case of decision of the Transmission Corporation (supra), the issue was of deciding on what amount of tax is to be deducted at source, as the payment was in respect of a composite contract. The said composite contract not only comprised supply of plant, machinery and equipment in India, but also comprised the installation and commissioning of the same in India.

With the above-mentioned correct interpretation of the decision in the case of Transmission Corporation (supra), the Apex Court set aside the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 209 wherein it was held that resident payer is obliged to deduct tax at source in any type of payment to a non-resident be it on account of buying/purchasing/ acquiring a packaged software product and as such a commercial transaction or even in the nature of a royalty payment. Applying the ratio of this decision the Income-tax Department used to disallow any payment to a non-resident where tax was not withheld, irrespective of the fact that the corresponding income was not chargeable to tax in the hands of a non-resident.

The CBDT vide circular 7/2009 [F. No. 500/135/2007-FTD-I], dated 22-10-2009 withdrew all three Circulars, namely, (i) 23 dated 23-7-1969 (ii) 163 dated 29-5-1975 and (iii) 786 dated 7-2-2000 which is giving rise to many controversies.

1.2    What is the impact of withdrawal of CBDT Circulars mentioned above?

Even though the above Circulars stand withdrawn, principles contained therein still hold the ground. Circular 23 of 1969 provided certain clarification regarding taxability in India in respect of certain transactions by a non-resident with an Indian resident, for example, sale of goods to India by a non-resident exporter, commission income of foreign agents of Indian exporters, purchasing of goods by a non-resident from India, sale of goods by non-resident in India either directly or through agents, etc. The Circular clarified about various situations that would not result in any business connection in India. One of the clarifications pertained to commission income earned by foreign agents of Indian exporters where the Circular clearly stated that no income shall deem to accrue or arise in India. In essence the said Circular interpreted provisions of section 9 of the Act whereby the underlying principles propounded were that the commission income of a foreign agent cannot be taxed in India if there exists no business connection in India and the income is not received in India. The subsequent amendments to section 9 of the Act, which relates to clarification of business connection in case of dependent/independent agent and taxability of Fees for Technical Services, do not alter the legal position. Therefore, even post withdrawal of impugned CBDT Circulars, commission earned by foreign agents of Indian exporters would not be taxable in India provided all services are rendered outside India (i.e., the foreign agent does not have any BC in India) and the income is not received in India.

This position has been upheld in DCIT v. Divi’s Laboratories Ltd., 2011 TII 182 ITAT Hyd.-Intl./(2011) 12 taxmann.com 103, wherein the Tribunal held as follows:

“We have considered the submissions of both the parties and perused the relevant material available on record. The moot question that arises out of these appeals is whether the payment of commission made to the overseas agents without deduction of tax is attracted disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act or not. Whether the payment in dispute made by way of cheque or demand draft by posting the same in India would amount to payment in India and consequently whether mere payment would be said to arise or accrue in India or not? First we will take up the issue whether the payment of commission to overseas agents without deduction of tax is attracted disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act or not. We find that the CBDT by its recent Circular No. 7, dated 22-10-2009 withdrawn its earlier Circular Nos. 23, dated 23-7-2009, 163 dated 29-5-1975 and 786, dated 7-2-2000. The earlier Circulars issued by the CBDT have clearly demonstrated the illustrations to explain that such commission payments can be paid without deduction of tax. Thus, the main thrust in such a situation is whether the commission made to overseas agents, who are non-resident entities, and who render services only at such particular place, is assessable to tax. Section 195 of the Act very clearly speaks that unless the income is liable to be taxed in India, there is no obligation to deduct tax. Now, in order to determine whether the income could be deemed to be accrued or arisen in India, section 9 of the Act is the basis. This section, in our opinion, does not provide scope for taxing such payment, because the basic criteria provided in the section is about genesis or accruing or arising in India, by virtue of connection with the property in India, control and management vested in India, which are not satisfied in the present cases. Under these circumstances, withdrawal of earlier Circulars issued by the CBDT has no assistance to the Department, in any way, in disallowing such expenditure. It appears that an overseas agent of Indian exporter operates in his own country and no part of his income arises in India and his commission is usually remitted directly to him by way of TT or posting of cheques/demand drafts in India and therefore the same is not received by him or on his behalf in India and such an overseas agent is not liable to income-tax in India on these commission payments. This view is fortified by the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Toshoku Ltd. (supra).”

Thus, in respect of payment of commission to non-resident agent by a resident in respect of services rendered outside India, it is clear that withdrawal of the aforesaid CBDT Circulars would not affect the existing settled position in law that the same would not be taxable in India.

1.3    Can the withdrawal of aforesaid CBDT Circulars have retrospective effect?

In Satellite Television Asia Region Advertising Sales BV v. ADIT, (2010 TII 58 ITAT Mum.-Intl.) the Mumbai Bench, in the context of payment for sale of advertising time, held that though the Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July, 1969 was withdrawn on 22nd October, 2009, the withdrawal is prospective in nature. Since for the year under consideration, the Circular was in force, the Circular was still applicable to the case under consideration.

The Mumbai ITAT reiterated the same view in the case of DDIT v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 2010 TII 09 ITAT Mum.-Intl.

1.4    Can commission paid to an individual be classified as salaries?

Can a commission payment be classified as salaries if the same is paid to a non-resident individual who represents an Indian entity was a question examined by the Mumbai Tribunal in case of ACIT v. Meru Impex, (2011) 16 Taxmann.com 219. In this case the Assessing Officer held that the appointment as agent to represent the assessee before foreign buyer was sham and not genuine; and that even assuming said payment to be genuine, the same was in nature of salary. However, the Tribunal ruled that the said payment cannot be classified as salaries in absence of employer-employee relationship.

1.5    Can commission be classified as fees for technical services?

In the case of Wallace Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. (2005) 278 ITR 97 (AAR), on the facts of the case the AAR held that “though Penser is a tax resident of USA, it has rendered consultancy services in India and as the consultancy fee payable in respect of services utilised is not in connection with a business or profession carried on by the applicant outside India for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source outside India, the consultancy fee would be deemed income of Penser in India. In addition to the monthly consultancy fee under the agreement, Penser is also entitled to 10% commission on the orders procured by it. The commission will also be deemed income arising to Penser in India.”

It appears that since the commission was linked to monthly consultancy fees, the AAR considered it at par with the consultancy fees, notwithstanding the fact that services, inter alia, included promotion of Wallace’s products in the USA. Ironically, provisions of India-US DTAA were not considered/applied in this case. If the provisions of India-US DTAA were considered, probably the conclusion of the AAR would have been different due to existence of ‘Make Available’ clause in Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA. Also if Penser had no PE in India, it would also not be taxable under Article 7 of the DTAA.

The AAR in case of SPAHI Projects (P.) Ltd. (2009)183 Taxman 92 (AAR) held that there could possibly be no controversy that the non-resident will not be rendering services of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature and, therefore, the liability to tax cannot be fastened on it by invoking the provisions dealing with fee for technical services.

However, in case of DCIT v. Mainetti (India) (P.) Ltd., (2011) 12 taxmann.com 60 the Chennai Tribunal held that “No doubt technical service would definitely include managerial services. However, canvassing of orders abroad could not be regarded as managerial services, nor could it be said to be for any consultation. Thus, definitely technical services as per Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act would have no application.”

2.    Taxability under a tax treaty

Under the provisions of a tax treaty, the income is taxed under different sub-heads with each having a separate set of distributive rules and definition. For example, profits from operation of ships and aircrafts, royalties and Fees for Technical Services (FTS) are dealt by separate articles though essentially they are all part and parcel of business activities. Under domestic tax law, they are all taxed under the same head of business profits. Therefore, difficulty arises about characterisation of income under a treaty scenario.

Under a tax treaty, business profits earned by an enterprise resident of one country are taxed only in its country of residence unless it has a Permanent Establishment (PE) in the source country. However, royalties and FTS can be taxed in a source country even if there is no PE.

Another difference is that whereas business profits are taxed on a net basis (that too only to the extent they are attributable to the PE in the source country), royalties and FTS are taxed on gross basis, albeit at a concessional rate.

In the treaty context the following situations arise:

2.1    Commission income treated as business income

Ideally, commission income should be classified as business income as it is neither royalty nor fees for technical services. In such a scenario, taxability in India would depend upon whether the foreign agent has a PE in India or not. If the foreign agent has a PE in India, then commission income which is attributable to it would be subject to tax in India. Usually, foreign agents of Indian exporters operate outside India and therefore there will not be a PE in India. In such a scenario, commission earned by them would not be taxed in India.

In SPAHI Projects (P.) Ltd. (supra), the AAR held that income received by the non-resident on account of commission paid by the resident is not chargeable to tax in India by virtue of Article 7 of the India-South Africa Tax Treaty and therefore the payer is not obliged to deduct tax at source u/s.195 of the Act.

2.2    Can commission paid to a non-resident be classified as Professional Fees?

In case of ACIT v. Meru Impex (supra) the assessee claimed benefit of Article 15 of the India-USA Tax Treaty which provides that income of a USA tax resident from the performance in India of professional services or other independent activities of a similar character shall be taxable only in the USA as the non-resident agent did not have a fixed base in India, nor did his stay in India exceeded 90 days. Incidentally India-USA treaty requires two conditions to be satisfied to claim exemption from tax in the State of source, which are:

(i)    non-existence of fixed base, and
(ii)    stay of 90 days or less in the relevant taxable year, in the State of Source.

The assessee relied on the term ‘other independent activities of a similar character’ to classify commission income into professional income and claimed exemption in India. However, the Mumbai Tribunal rightly observed that though the definition of ‘Professional Services’ is not exhaustive, it contemplates existence of professional skill and performance of such professional skill for which they receive payments. In absence of relevant details, the matter was remanded back to the AO for fresh determination. Interestingly, the CIT (Appeals) had granted benefit of Article 15 to the NR agent on the ground that he did not have a fixed base in India.

2.3    Can commission paid to a non-resident be classified as ‘Other Income’ falling under Article 21?

Almost every tax treaty contains a residuary clause, namely, ‘Other Income’ which gives right of taxation to both the countries (as per majority of Indian tax treaties). This Article covers income not dealt with in any other Articles of the concerned tax treaty.

In Rajiv Malhotra’s case (2006) 284 ITR 564 (AAR) the overseas agent rendered services abroad in respect of an exhibition to be organised in India. On the facts of the case, the AAR held that “though the agent rendered services abroad and pursued and solicited exhibitors there, the right of the agent to receive the commission arose in India only when the exhibitor participated in the Food and Wine Show to be held in India and made full payment to the applicant in India. The commission income would, therefore, be taxable in India, as income arising from a ‘source of income’ in India in view of the specific provisions of section 5(2)(b) read with section 9(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The facts that the agent rendered services abroad in the form of pursuing and soliciting participants and that the commission was to be remitted to him abroad were wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining the situs of the income”.

Surprisingly, AAR applied Article 23 on ‘Other Income’ to commission income instead of Article 7 on Business Profits and held that “paragraph 3 of Article 23 of the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation between India and the French Republic was at par with the provisions of section 5(2) read with section 9(1) and did not grant any further benefit”.

In our humble opinion, with due respect, this decision needs reconsideration. In any case, being advance ruling, it is case specific and therefore it does not render any binding precedent.

2.4    Taxability of commission paid to a non-resident for events held in India

CBDT Circular Nos. 23 of 1969 and 786, dated 7-2-2000 dealt with commission paid to foreign agents of Indian exporters. Therefore, a question often arises as to their applicability to payment of commission otherwise than for exports. However, in the case of ADIT(IT) v. Wizcraft International Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., (2011) 43 SOT 470 (Mum.), the Mumbai Tribunal held that “Though, the above Circular (i.e., Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000) is issued in the context of commission paid to foreign agent of Indian exporters, it applies with equal force to commission paid to agents for services rendered outside India”.

In this case one Mr. Colin Davie, a resident of UK earned commission from co-ordinating an entertainment event which was performed in India. The Mumbai Tribunal held that no income is deemed to accrue or arise in India in view of the fact that the services were rendered outside India. The Tribunal also rejected the argument of the Income-tax Department that the income of Mr. Davie be taxed under Article 18 of the India-UK Tax Treaty (dealing with income of ‘Artists and Athletes’) as Mr. Davie neither took part in events during the dates of engagements, nor did he exercise any personal activities in India. It further observed that the income of Mr. Davie by way of commission does not relate to the services of entertainer/artiste. The Tribunal held that the commission income was in the nature of Business Income and was not taxable in India in absence of a PE.

3.    Whether written agreement is crucial to establish commission payment and to get deduction thereof

In ACIT v. Meru Impex, (2011) 16 taxmann.com 219, the Mumbai Tribunal held that “if the services rendered are established, then the assessee would be entitled to claim deduction on account of commission paid. The existence or non-existence of written agreement would not be fatal to claim deduction on account of expenditure on account of commission. Therefore, the finding of the Assessing Officer with regard to the agreement being a sham document cannot be sustained and in any event, they are irrelevant”.

4.  Conclusion

The law on taxability of commission income of foreign agents of Indian exporters does not seem to have altered with withdrawal of the CBDT Circulars. In view of the clear provisions of the Act as well as decisions of Tribunals, Courts and AAR one can conclude that carrying on of business operation in India is crucial to result in a BC and in case of foreign agents where services are rendered outside India, commission cannot be said to be accruing or arising in India [refer the Supreme Court’s observations in case of Carborandum Co. at para 1.1 (v) (supra)]. In fact, even in a case where the event had taken place in India [refer the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Wizcraft International Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. at para 2.4 (supra)], no income was deemed to accrue in India as long as services were rendered outside India.

The AAR has recently rendered a Ruling dated 22.02.2012, in the case of SKF Boilers and Driers Pvt. Ltd. (AAR No. 983-983 of 2010), wherein the AAR has held that such Export Commission is taxable in India u/s 5(2)(b) r/w Section 9(1)(i) of the Act. As the Applicant was not present and the Ruling was rendered in absentia, the correct position in Law as discussed above and the catena of decisions favourable to the Assessee (listed in Para 1.1 above) could not be presented and considered by the AAR, which followed its own Ruling in Rajiv Malhotra [284 ITR 564 (AAR) refer Para No. 2.3 above] but ignored its Ruling in SPAHI Projects (P.) Ltd. [2009] 183 TAXMAN 92 (AAR) discussed in Para Nos. 1(iv) and 1.5 above. In our humble opinion, if the correct position in Law and the relevant favourable case laws were presented and considered by the AAR, the Ruling could have been different.

As far as applicability of provisions of section 195 are concerned, the Supreme Court [in the case of GE India Technology, para 1.1 (supra)] has held that they are applicable only if income is chargeable to tax. The taxpayer can refrain from deducting tax at source if according to him the income is not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-residents.

Acountability in governance

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As the financial year draws to a close, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, institutions, push themselves to achieve targets. This year is no different. Normally targets are quantitative and not qualitative, and very rarely does one look at the manner in which these goals are achieved.

The Vodafone judgment was a huge jolt to the government and the already elusive direct tax target now looks impossible. Pressure from the ministry coupled with statements that future postings of taxmen would depend on the collection they achieved, galvanized them into action. In the past month or so, we have seen stringent , at times coercive action for recovery of taxes. While one accepts that the government must collect the tax that is due, and it is the duty of every citizen to pay the same, it cannot be forgotten that the law prescribes a process for ascertaining what tax is “due”. Much before the first appeal is heard an assesse is expected to pay 50% of the tax as per the assessment order. It is a well established judicial principle that when collecting such tax before the final stage of its determination one has to see the balance of convenience. This is very rarely done. Going by the number of cases that go in the assessee’s favour at the various stages of appeal, particularly at the tribunal, this interim collection becomes refundable. In these situations collecting officials must take responsibility and be accountable for coercive collection of taxes. What is required is humane approach in recovery matters.

While this form of active recovery is not new to tax payers, the “indirect” recovery by way of adjustment of refunds, is like an epidemic that has spread to all parts of the country. The culpability for this lies entirely with the Income tax department. The computerized processing centre ‘CPC’ where all electronically filed returns are processed is accessing a data base which is totally different from the one being used by assessing officers in the field. In these cases the errors in assessment orders have been rectified or effects of appeal have been given by the assessing officers and in some cases consequential refunds have also been issued. However the data base furnished to the CPC has not been updated. The result is an unwarranted adjustment of refunds due against non-existing demands. When one tries approaching one authority to get the error committed by the other rectified, the blame game starts with each justifying its action. It is like two different doctors prescribing two different therapies based on two distinct reports pertaining to the same patient. The consequence is unbearable pain and anguish for the patient. It will be of little solace to him that it was the two different reports and not the skill or ability of the medico that was to blame. It is here that those responsible must be held accountable.

The illustration in the paragraphs above is regarding tax authorities because we, as professionals, interact with them every day. However, this attitude of those who enjoy power either as government officials or as elected representatives of the people pervades every walk of life. When one complains of the poor state of roads, we find one authority blaming the other. When a pedestrian falls into a ditch and loses a limb it is of little concern to him whether the Mumbai Municipal Corporation or the Mumbai Metropolitan Road Development Authority is responsible. What he requires are walkable and motorable roads.

In this context one really envies the position of the Indian bureaucrat. This is because once he joins the service he enjoys virtual immunity from any punitive or disciplinary action. Even when such action is taken it takes an unduly long time for any disciplinary action to reach its logical conclusion. We tend to criticise politicians but they have to face the public in every election and can be held accountable at that time. While saying that one must hold the politicians responsible, it is necessary that citizens do their mite. It was extremely disappointing to note that after a campaign by the government as well as efforts by NGOS, the voting percentage in the recently concluded municipal election in Mumbai was approximately, an abysmal 50%. During a number of discussions and debates the refrain of a large number of educated voters was that they did not vote because they did not find any candidate worthy of their vote. Though I personally do not subscribe to this thought process, I think it will be worthwhile to give the voter the option of rejecting all the candidates. This will enable the electorate to express their disapproval of the candidates put up by political parties.

If this situation is to undergo a change the process of investigation must become transparent and that of dispensing justice must be expedited. It is only when citizens demand from authorities an account of their performance and erring authorities are held accountable, will democracy be strengthened. It is disturbing to note that many a relevant document or paper which will be material evidence goes “missing“ from government records. This has become a regular feature with the missing papers in the Adarsh scam being a recent example. Even if a person does not get justice on this planet he can expect it in life beyond. One only hopes that the greatest accountant of them all Chitragupt, keeps his books and record safe and secure, for no one can underestimate the reach of the wily Indian politician and bureaucrat!

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Standards and Structures

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Order in Society exists because of ‘standards and structures’. Without standards we would be in chaos and anarchy will rule. We accountants are aware of the importance of standards. Accounting standards are required to usher in clarity, comparison and accountability — the three ingredients fundamental to economic decisions. We accountants also have our ‘code of conduct’. Violation of the code leads to censure and punishment.

Similarly, social conduct has its own code. Our social code of conduct is not codified though laws are nothing but codification of behaviour — violation of which leads to punishment. All religions and religious practices are also nothing else but codes of behaviour — though non-observance or violation of these normally do not in today’s environment entail even social censure.

‘Standards and structures’ are in the interest of both the rulers and the ruled. They bring into focus accountability and these should be the basis of our decisions and actions. ‘Standards and structures’ build society. On the other hand lack of standards destroy and cut at the very roots of stable society. The basis of the French revolution was moving away from normal standards. The current LokPal crisis in India is because our rulers have probably unwittingly moved away from ethical standards and encouraged actions which have increased corruption — Satyam happened because standards were violated.

The issue is: Are standards immutable? Except for certain standards like living in truth with love, having compassion and living an ethical life, no standards are immutable. They are nothing but hypotheses and represent the current environment. We must never forget that the present keeps changing hence the social standards also keep changing — for example — live-in relationships were not accepted — today they are accepted and even the courts have approbated this relationship.

Another issue is: What is the duty of doubt in establishing standards and creating structures? Doubt plays an important role in establishing standards. It is to avoid doubt, unpredictability, uncertainty and unaccountability that standards are required. Doubt is the basis of all standards with the object of bringing clarity — clarity in our thinking and behaviour.

To live a happy life — whether social or professional, let us respect ‘standards and structures’ and live by and within them.

I would conclude by quoting Reinhold Wiebuhur:

“Grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference”.

If we practice this, there will be no anxiety and peace and happiness will prevail and pervade our lives.

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Search and seizure: Section 132 and section 153A of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2009-10: Warrant of authorisation: Satisfaction must be based on information coming into possession of Department: Absence of new material with authorities: Search and consequent notice unsustainable.

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[Spacewood Furnishers Pvt. Ltd. v. DGIT, 340 ITR 393 (Bom.)]

Search operations u/s.132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were carried out in the case of the petitionercompany and its two directors. The petitioner filed writ petition and challenged the validity of the search action and the consequent notice u/s.153A of the Act. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“(i) When the satisfaction recorded is justiciable, the documents pertaining to such satisfaction may not be immune and if appropriate prayer is made, inspection of such documents may be required to be allowed.

(ii) The mode and the manner in which all the satisfaction notes were prepared showed the absence of any relevant material with the authorities which would have enabled them to have ‘reason to believe’ that action u/s.132 was essential. No new material as such had been disclosed anywhere. No document or report of alleged discreet inquiry formed part of these notes. The entire exercise had been undertaken only because of the high growth noted by the authorities.

(iii) The material like high growth, high profit margins, the contention in respect of or doubt about international brand and details thereof was available with the authorities. It was not their case that they had obtained any other information which was suppressed by the petitioners.

(iv) The effort, therefore, was to find out some material to support the doubt entertained by the Department. The exercise had not been undertaken as required by section 132(1) in transparent mode. The satisfaction note contemplated therein must be based upon contemporaneous material, information becoming available to the competent authorities prescribed in that section. Its availability and the nature and also the time factor must also be ascertainable from relevant records containing such satisfaction note.

(v) Loose satisfaction notes placed by the authorities before each other could not meet the requirements and the provision. The necessary live link and availability of relevant material for considering it had not been brought before the Court. Therefore, the authorisation issued u/s.132(1) was bad and unsustainable. Consequently, the exercise of search undertaken in consequence thereof was illegal. Notice action u/s.153A was also bad in law. The same were accordingly stand quashed and set aside.”

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(2011) 130 ITD 296 (Pune) Maharashtra Rajya Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. ITO, Ward 1(2), Pune A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated: 30-4-2011

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Section 10(23C)(iiiab) — Where the Government legislates law to provide for compulsory contribution by the member societies to an ‘education fund’ which was set apart to be the source of finance for educational institution engaged in the co-operative movement in India, which constitutes indirect financing by the Government, are entitled for exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act.

Facts:
The assessee was a co-operative society registered under the Maharashtra State Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. By virtue of section 68 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, every other membersociety was to mandatorily contribute annually towards the education fund of the assessee as per the sums prescribed in the Notification issued by the State Government. The assessee filed his return of income for A.Y. 2003-04 claiming exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act. The Assessing Officer, while assessing the total income rejected the assessee’s claim holding that it failed to fulfil conditions prescribed u/s.10(23C) (iiiab) with regard to expression ‘financed by the Government’.

On appeal, it was submitted that such supply of finance indirectly by way of mandatory contributions by member co-operative societies met requirement of expression ‘financed by the Government’ used in section 10(23C)(iiiab). The CIT(A) however rejected the claim of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the following case laws:

(1) Small Business Corpn., In re (2008) 173 Taxman 452 (AAR — New Delhi)

(2) Dy. DIT (Exemptions) v. Indian Institute of Management, (2009) 120 ITD 351 (Bang.)

The Tribunal noted that in the provisions of section 10(23C)(iiiab), the Legislature has not used the words such as ‘directly or indirectly’ anywhere, meaning thereby the indirect financing by the Government is also a possibility not ruled out by the Legislature.

Further, the decision of the Department to reject the benefits of tax exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiab) to the institution merely in view of the absence of inflow of the finance directly from the funds of the Government and ignoring the alternate financing mechanisms provided by the Government by legislative enactment, tantamount to narrow interpretation of the expression in the said clause.

In such circumstances and considering the peculiarity of the co-operative movement, governmental role in financing such educational institution rightly should stop with the role as a facilitator by providing requisite legislation for enabling the member societies to contribute to the assessee and contribute mandatorily. Therefore, it is the case of indirect financing of the educational institution of the co-operative movement by the Government and it is evolved in order to promote participation of the members and respect the financial independence of the movement in general and institution in particular.

In the light of the above discussion, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and allowed the claim by the assessee of being entitled to exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act.

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Govt. Launches Portal To Better Biz Climate.

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The government flagged off the second phase of its ambitious eBiz project, an integrated eBiz portal which would make doing business in India a lot easier.

The portal allows potential entrepreneurs to do most of the formalities online — submitting forms, making payments, among others. They can also track the status of their requests through the portal.

However, the ministries crucial for clearance of projects like the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF) are yet to become part of the project, raising questions on how the hassles in doing businesses would be addressed.

Launching the project, commerce and industry minister, Anand Sharma, said his ministry would soon approach the Cabinet Committee on Infrastructure (CCI) to bring resisting ministries such as the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF), on board.

The project, which was supposed to have been launched in August 2013, is facing stiff opposition from the Central Board of Excise and Customs and the Central Board of Direct Taxes, apart from MoEF.

The eBiz project, first announced in 2009, looks to improve the country’s ease of doing business quotient. According to a recent World Bank ranking, India stood at 134th among 189 countries in terms of ease of doing business.

A commerce ministry statement said the eBiz platform enables a transformational shift in the government’s service delivery approach from being department-centric to customer-centric.

The first phase of the project, which provided information on forms and procedures, was launched on 28th January, 2013. The second phase, launched on Monday, has added two services from the Department of Industrial policy and Promotion – industrial licences and industrial entrepreneur’s memorandum – along with operationalising the payment gateway by the Central Bank of India.

The government has inked a 10-year contract with Infosys Ltd., where a total of 50 services (26 central + 24 states) are being implemented across five states – Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Haryana, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu – in the pilot phase. Five more states – Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal – are expected to be added over the second and third years.

According to Raghupathi C. N., head of India business at Infosys, the project is slightly delayed due to several departments’ resistance to change. “The project is slowly nibbling away at the resistance; some stability in the political environment is also expected to improve the situation.”

Raghupathi said the departments are used to running their services in the offline and manual way for several decades now. He said the implementation is “slower than expected” because it is tough to expect departments to completely change their modus operandi overnight. “While there are some easy adopters, there are others who clearly do not see the benefit of it.”

The portal will not only create a single-window for all registrations and permits, but will also provide investors with a checklist.

“So far, there was never a checklist, and people were forced to go from department to department filling forms, never knowing what was remaining,” said Raghupathi. “Only 50-60 % of the services were digital, everything else was manual,” he added.

The government hopes to bring online over 200 services related to investors and businesses over the next 10 years on the portal.

(Source: Business Standard, dated 21-01-2014)

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Sale of minors property by defecto guardian – Sale without legal necessity void or voidable. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, section 6, 11 & 12.

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Kanhei Charan Das vs. Ramakanta Das & Ors. AIR 2014 Orissa 193

The undisputed facts are that, the land appertaining to the plots was the ancestral land of one Krutibas Das and stood recorded in his name. After the death of Krutibas and his wife, the property devolved on his two sons, namely, Banamali and Ramakanta as joint owners thereof, both having 50% share each. Ramakanta being a minor was being looked after by his major brother Banamali, who was managing the joint family properties including the undivided interest of Ramakanta. By registered sale deed, Banamali sold the entire disputed land of 40 decimals on behalf of himself and also as brother guardian in favour of one Agani Dash. Agani in his turn sold the disputed land to one Sanatan and the present petitioner, Kanehei by registered sale deed.

During the consolidation operation, the disputed land was recorded in the name of Sanatan Dash and Petitioner Kanehei. Ramakanta, the present opposite party No.1, filed objection claiming to record his half share in the disputed land in his name on the ground that his brother Banamali had no right to alienate his share.

The Hon’ble Court observed that, where the de facto guardian of a minor is also the Karta or Manager or an adult member of the joint family including the minor himself, for sale by him of the joint family property including the undivided interest of the minor in such property, no permission of the court is necessary. Such sale shall be governed by the uncodified Mitakshara School of Hindu law, according to which sale by the Karta or Manager of the Hindu Joint Family Property without any legal necessity or benefit of estate shall be voidable at the option of the minor with regard to his undivided interest.

Thus, the sale of the minors’ property, in contravention of section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 Act, is void and invalid must be applicable to all properties of the minor except where the sale is by a Karta or Manager of a joint Hindu Family of the undivided interest of the minor in the joint family property. The voidability of the sale transaction could only be decided by the Civil Court and not the consolidation Authorities.

The finding of the Consolidation Authorities in the impugned orders that the sale of Ramakanta’s undivided interest in the disputed joint family property by Banamali was void and invalid being in contravention of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 cannot be sustained.

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Issuing of Tax Clearance Certificates:

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43 i. Issuing of Tax Clearance Certificates:

Trade Circular No.1T of 2010, Dated 05/01/2010

By this Circular procedure for applying and obtaining Tax
Clearance Certificates under the MVAT Act, CST Act, Profession Tax Act, etc. has
been standardized and explained.

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Keyboard Short cuts for BlackBerry Devices

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TECH UPDATE

This article is about simple keyboard short cuts for
BlackBerry devices. Keyboard short cuts help in improving our typing speed and
in many cases, navigating between applications. The tips mentioned in this
write-up would apply for 8800 series and later devices; these may or may not
work on the older devices.

Everybody likes short cuts :

In general, we are all lazy in one way or another. If one
were to be told that he could do the same task with lesser effort (and without
compromising on the output), the first question he will ask is ‘How do I do
that’ and the answer would be ‘Use a short cut’. While keyboard short cuts like
CTLR+C and CTLR+X and others used extensively, this article is about short cuts
for your BlackBerry devices. Yes ! ! ! ! There are keyboard short cuts for
BlackBerry devices also (i.e., beyond the standard short cuts for copy,
paste and send). Here are some instances, which you may find useful :

Rapidly switch back and forth between BlackBerry applications :

The average desktop or for that matter a laptop contains a
smart chip. The chip is called smart because it contains ‘multiprocessors’. As
the name suggests, these are capable of performing several tasks and executing
processes simultaneously. Among other things, the multiprocessor allows a user
to switch from one task to another without compromising on the speed. The switch
is almost instantaneous when you use a desktop or a laptop. This agility,
however, is not available on your BlackBerry. The explanation is simple; the
BlackBerry device (like the other competing smart phones) uses a simple
processor.

So how does one get around this handicap ?

Simple . . . . . Use a short cut.

The most basic way to switch from one BlackBerry application
to another is to repeatedly hit the ‘ESCAPE’ key while inside a programme until
you get back to your icon screen. From there, you’d scroll your track ball or
wheel to find the next application you want and then click to launch it.

A quicker and more efficient way to go from an active program
to another program is to use a short cut. While inside an application, hold down
the ‘ALT’ key which is directly below the letter ‘A’ key and then click ‘ESCAPE’
the key with an arrow reversing directions and to the right of your trackball on
8000 series devices. While holding down ‘ALT’, you can scroll left or right
between apps, and you need only release the ‘ALT’ key to select a program. (For
this, you need to be using a program i.e., a program needs to have been opened
recently or still running
). You can always access your Home Screen,
BlackBerry browser, Options, Call Log, Messages and a few other applications
depending on your device settings.

Using the event log :

Your BlackBerry’s Event Log displays your system’s recently
run events and processes. If you’re experiencing a problem with your BlackBerry
or having an issue with a specific application or service, information from the
Event Log can be helpful for troubleshooting. And it can be a good BlackBerry
hygiene to clear out the log, to keep your device running smoothly.

To access your Event Log, go to your Home Screen, hold down
the ALT key and then type ‘LGLG’. The Event Log will appear, and you can click a
specific event for more information or hit your BlackBerry MENU key more
options. (The MENU key has seven dots in the shape of the letter B, and it’s
found directly to the left of BlackBerry devices with a trackball). You can copy
event information using the MENU key and tailor your settings to log only the
specific types of events.

Freeing up some memory space :

You can also free up some valuable device memory to help your
device run faster by
clearing your Event Log. To delete your list of events, hit the BlackBerry MENU
key while any event is highlighted and then click ‘Clear Log’. A dialogue box
will pop up asking if you’re sure you want to delete the log. Once you confirm
the deletion, your log will be cleared. (Don’t worry, if your IT Department is
running device management software along with its BlackBerry Enterprise Server,
your company probably has its own record of this event log.)

Reboot your BlackBerry without removing the battery :

Any BlackBerry veteran knows that sometimes it is necessary
to reboot your device after installing a new application, to solve performance
problems, refresh your Smartphone’s memory or fix other minor issues. One way to
do so is to remove your battery door and pull the power pack. After the battery
is returned to the device, your BlackBerry reboots. This gets the job done, but
it’s time consuming to power down the device and then remove and replace the
battery and your battery door won’t fit as snugly if you’re constantly taking it
off.

The quickest and easiest way to reboot is via another
BlackBerry keyboard short cut. To reboot, simply hit ‘ALT’, ‘RIGHT SHIFT’ and
‘DELETE’. (The RIGHT SHIFT key is found on the bottom right corner of the
BlackBerry keyboard and DELETE key is also on the right hand side and has the
letters ‘DEL’ on its face) You might say this is the BlackBerry version of
CTRL+ALT+DEL. After pressing these three keys in tandem, your device powers
down, your LED indicator turns red for a few seconds and the reboot process
commences.

Change your signal strength display from bars to numeric :

Most modern cell phones offer up some form of ‘five-bars’ to
display user’s wireless signal strength, and the BlackBerry default mode is no
different. But if you want more precision than bars can offer, you can change to
the numeric signal strength display mode. The numeric mode shows wireless signal
strength in decibels per mill. watt (dBm), a ratio measured power in decibels
(dB), referenced to one mill. watt (mW).

To switch from bars to numbers, navigate to your BlackBerry
home screen, hold the ‘ALT’ key and enter in ‘NMLL’. The signal display will
then automatically display a dBm value. In general, a reading from -45 to -85 is
considered very strong. Any reading that’s lower than -85 — for instance, -100 —
is weaker. To switch back to bar mode from numeric, just hit ALT again and
retype ‘NMLL’.

The numeric display can be helpful to determine accurately on
how much a wireless signal degrades as you move from place to place. (It’s also
geek chic to read your cellular signal strength in dBm instead of boring old
bars.)

Bring up ‘Help Me’ screen for device, system data:

Your device’s ‘Help Me’ screen displays useful device and system information such as your vendors ID, the version of BlackBerry platform, OS version, your PIN, the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc. While most of this information is available at various locations throughout your BlackBerry Options, the Help Me offers a simple way to access all the data on a single screen.

To pull up the Help Me screen, navigate to your Home screen and then press ‘ALT’, either ‘SHIFT’ key and the letter ‘H’. To return to your Home screen, hit ESCAPE or open the MENU and select Close.

That’s all for this month. You can email your feedback to me on sam.client@gmail.com. Do look forward to my next write-up on the topic of cloud computing.

Press Release by the Press Information Bureau, Government of India, dated February 11, 2010

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55 Press Release by the Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, dated February 11, 2010

Review of cases requiring prior approval of the
Foreign Investment Promotion Board

The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA)
has taken the following decisions with regard to cases of foreign investment
requiring prior government approval.

Presently, proposals with total project cost of up
to Rs. 600 crores require approval from the Finance Ministry, and proposals with
total project cost of up to Rs. 1,200 crores require approval from the CCEA.
Henceforth, only proposals involving total foreign equity inflow of more than Rs.
1,200 crores will require CCEA approval. And the Finance Ministry, based on the
recommendations of the FIPB, will consider proposals with total foreign equity
inflow of up to Rs. 1,200 crores.

In the following cases where prior approval of FIPB / CCEA
for making the initial foreign investment was taken, fresh approval will not be
required to be obtained from the FIPB / CCEA:

1. Cases of entities whose activities had earlier required
prior approval of FIPB / CCFI / CCEA, and who had, accordingly, earlier obtained
prior approval of FIPB / CCFI / CCEA for their initial foreign investment but
subsequently where such activities/sectors have been placed under the automatic
route.

2. Cases of entities whose activities had sectoral caps
earlier and who had, accordingly, earlier obtained prior approval of FIPB / CCFI
/ CCEA for their initial foreign investment, but subsequently where such caps
were removed or increased and the activity placed under the automatic route.

3. Cases where prior approval of FIPB / CCFI / CCEA had been
obtained with reference to activities / sectors requiring prior approval and
also from the angle of provisions of Press Note 18/1998 or Press Note 1 of 2005.


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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 33, dated February 09, 2010

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54 A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 33, dated
February 09, 2010

External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy –
Liberalisation

Presently, any change in the terms and conditions
of ECB after obtaining Loan Registration Number (LRN) requires prior permission
from the RBI.

This circular has delegated powers to authorized
banks, with immediate effect, to approve requests for changes in the following
cases, subject to specified conditions:

a) Changes / modifications in the drawdown /
repayment schedule

Changes / modifications in the drawdown / repayment
schedule of the ECB already availed, both under the approval and the automatic
routes, may be permitted subject to the condition that the average maturity
period, as declared while obtaining the LRN, is maintained. The changes in the
drawdown / repayment schedule should be promptly reported to the DSIM, Reserve
Bank through Form 83. However, any elongation / rollover in the repayment on
expiry of the original maturity of the ECB would require the prior approval of
the Reserve Bank.


b) Changes in the currency of borrowing

Change in the currency of borrowing, if so desired,
by the borrower company, in respect of ECB availed of both under the automatic
and the approval routes, may be permitted subject to all other terms and
conditions of the ECB remaining unchanged. Designated AD banks should, however,
ensure that the proposed currency of borrowing is freely convertible.

c) Change of the AD bank

Change of the existing designated AD bank by the
borrower company for effecting its transactions pertaining to the ECB may be
permitted subject to a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) from the existing
designated AD bank, and after due diligence.

d) Changes in the name of the borrower company

Changes in the name of the borrower company may be
permitted subject to production of supporting documents evidencing the change in
the name from the Registrar of Companies.


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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30, dated February 01, 2010

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53 A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30, dated
February 01, 2010

Export and Import of Currency

Notification No. FEMA 195 / 2009-RB, dated July 7,
2009

Presently, a resident individual who is going on a
temporary visit outside India (other than to and from Nepal and Bhutan) is
permitted to take or bring back Indian currency notes issued by the Government
of India or RBI not exceeding Rs. 5,000.

This circular has raised this limit to Rs. 7,500.
Accordingly, a resident individual who is going on a temporary visit outside
India (other than to and from Nepal and Bhutan) is permitted to take or bring
back Indian currency notes issued by the Government of India or RBI not
exceeding Rs. 7,500.


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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28, dated January 25, 2010

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52 A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28, dated
January 25, 2010

External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy

Presently, eligible borrowers in the
telecommunications sector can avail of ECB for the purpose of payment for
spectrum allocation, under the automatic route.

This circular has made a one-time relaxation in the
end-use conditions of the ECB policy. As a result, successful bidders can
initially pay for spectrum allocation out of Rupee funds and can subsequently
avail ECB under the approval route to refinance the Rupee payments. This is
subject to the following conditions:

1. The ECB should be raised within 12 months from
the date of payment of the final instalment to the government.

2. The designated AD – Category I bank must
monitor the end-use of funds.

3. Banks in India cannot provide any form of
guarantees.

4. All other conditions of ECB, such as eligible
borrower, recognized lender, all-in-cost, average maturity, etc., will have to
be complied with.


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Procedure for allowing refund of excess credit to exporters made friendly :

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51 Procedure for allowing refund of excess credit to
exporters made friendly :

Circular No. 120/01/2010-ST dated the 19th January, 2010

By this Circular, procedure for granting refund of excess
credit has been made easy and the Department has been instructed to dispose all
pending claims in accordance with instructions contained in this Circular.

In the background, this Circular gives details of feedback
and representations received at meetings held with the refund sanctioning
authorities about the causes of delays in granting refund of excess credit to
exporters and the manner in which existing Notification No. 5/2006-CE(NT) dated
14.03.2006 is implemented by the Department and thereafter on consideration of
such feedback by this Circular instructions have been issued as follows :

(1) There cannot be different yardsticks for establishing
the nexus for taking of credit and for refund of credit. Even if different
phrases are used under different rules of CENVAT Credit Rules, they have to be
construed in a harmonious manner. The phrase “used in” mentioned in the
Notification to show nexus should be interpreted in a harmonious manner. The
test to be applied to check whether nexus exists or not is that in case the
absence of input/input service adversely impacts quality and efficiency of
provision of service exported, it should be considered as eligible input or
input service for taking credit.

(2) To address similar problems of co-relation and scrutiny
of a large number of documents faced in another scheme, Finance Act, 2009
(Notification No. 17/2009-ST) had provided for the procedure of
self-certification of invoices about the co-relation and nexus between
inputs/input services and exports by the exporter or by the Chartered
Accountant. To follow similar procedure here also, the exporters are also
advised to provide a duly certified list of invoices and the departmental
officers are only required to make a basic scrutiny of the documents and, if
found in order, sanction the refund within one month.

The exporter should, along with the refund claim, file a
declaration in the prescribed manner as notified in this Circular.

(3) Sometimes, it is possible that during certain quarters,
there may not be any exports and therefore the exporter does not file any
claim though he receives inputs/input services during this period. In this
regard, the Board has clarified that since no bar is provided in the
notification, there should not be any objection in allowing refund of credit
of the past period in subsequent quarters.

(4) In case of incomplete invoices, the Department should
take a liberal view in view of various judicial pronouncements by Courts i.e.
invoices are incomplete but are complying with Rule 5 which provides, (i) so
far as the nature of the service which has been received by the exporter can
be ascertained; (ii) tax paid therein is clearly mentioned; and (iii) other
details as required under rule 4(a) are mentioned, the refund should be
allowed if the input service has a nexus with the services/goods exported as
discussed earlier.


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Electronic Payment under MVAT Act, 2002 and CST Act, 1956:

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50 viii. Electronic Payment under MVAT Act, 2002 and CST Act,
1956:

Circular No.8T of 2010. Dated 06/02/2010

Procedure for optional E-payment of MVAT and CST has been
explained and the same is also placed on the Website of the Department.

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Clarification regarding Schedule Entry C-70 – Paper:

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49 vii. Clarification regarding Schedule Entry C-70 – Paper:

Circular No.7T of 2010. Dated 03/02/2010

Scope of Schedule Entry C-70 was earlier clarified by
Circular No.35-T of 2005 and Circular No. 1-T of 2006 but in consideration of
representations now, the said Circulars are withdrawn and from the date of
issuance of this Circular, the Scope of the said Schedule Entry C-70 covering
various types of papers has been clarified.

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Penalty w.r.t. Revised Return under MVAT Act :

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48 vi. Penalty w.r.t. Revised Return under MVAT Act :

Circular No.6T of 2010. Dated 02/02/2010

Since as per the periodicity determined by the Department,
date of filing of revised return has been extended from 31st January, 2010 to
15th March, 2010. Therefore, if the revised return is filed by 15th March, 2010,
penalty u/s.sec 29 (8) of MVAT Act, 2002 will not be levied.

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Extension of date for Submission of Audit Report for the year 2008-09:

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47 v. Extension of date for Submission of Audit Report for
the year 2008-09:

Trade Circular No.5T of 2010 Dated 28/01/2010

The last date for submission of Audit Report in Form-704 for
the period 2008-09 has been extended from 31st January, 2010 to 31st March, 2010
and statement of submission along with requisite documents would have to be
submitted by 10th April 2010.

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Filing of Audit Report in Form-704 for the periods 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08:

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46 iv. Filing of Audit Report in Form-704 for the periods
2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08:

Trade Circular No.4T of 2010. Dated 18/01/2010

Earlier by Circular No. 27T of 2009 filing of MVAT Audit
Report after 01/10/2009 for any period was to be by E-Form and in new Form No.
704 only. By this Circular, it has been clarified that the dealer will have an
option to file Audit Report in Form – 704 in old format physically for the
periods 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08.

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Refund under MVAT and Bank Guarantee:

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45 iii. Refund under MVAT and Bank Guarantee:

Trade Circular No.3T of 2010, Dated18/01/2010

Parameters to be applied to different categories of dealers
willing to submit bank guarantee for early refund have been revised by this
Circular.

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Tax Treatment of Goods sent to other States:

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44 ii. Tax Treatment of Goods sent to other States:

Trade Circular No.2T of 2010, Dated 11/01/2010

Referred Trade Circulars issued explaining scope of section
6A of CST Act, 1956

In view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment in case of M/s
Ambica Steels Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (24 VST 356) upholding
applicability of mandatory F Forms to non-sale transactions like job work even
in respect of transactions from principal to principal basis, it is now
clarified by this Circular that F forms are mandatory for all transactions of
inter-state transfers (not by way of sale), including job work and goods return.
Consequently, Trade Circular 16T of 2007 dated 20th February 2007 and Trade
Circular 5T of 2009 dated 29th January 2009 are withdrawn.

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Implications of non-availability of PAN of the payee with effect from 1 April 2010 – Press Release No.402/92/2006-MC (04 of 2010) dated 20 January 2010

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40 Implications of non-availability of PAN of the payee with
effect from 1 April 2010 – Press Release No.402/92/2006-MC (04 of 2010) dated 20
January 2010


CBDT re-iterates the amendment with effect from 1 April 2010
pertaining to TDS at higher rate in absence of PAN of the payee. Further, the
certificate for lower / non deduction of tax at source would not be given
without PAN mentioned in the application. The law will apply to all including
non-resident assessees. PAN needs to be quoted in all the correspondences,
bills, vouchers and other documents sent to each other by deductor and deductee.

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Advance Fringe Benefit Tax paid to be treated as advance income tax for the FY 2009-2010 – Press Release No. 402/92/2006-MC (07 of 2010) dated 29 January 2010

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39 Advance Fringe Benefit Tax paid to be treated as advance
income tax for the FY 2009-2010 – Press Release No. 402/92/2006-MC (07 of 2010)
dated 29 January 2010


The CBDT has clarified vide the aforementioned Press Release
that advance tax paid in respect of fringe benefits would be treated as advance
income tax and accordingly, can be adjusted against the advance income tax
liability. The additional FBT advance tax if paid, can be claimed as a refund
while filing the tax return.

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Sanction and disbursement of Industrial Promotion Subsidy (IPS) to Mega Projects and Non-Mega Projects under PSI-2001 & PSI-2007, Reconciliation of IPS by Sales Tax Department & Procedure to be followed by the Department.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


51 Sanction and disbursement of Industrial
Promotion Subsidy (IPS) to Mega Projects and Non-Mega Projects under PSI-2001 &
PSI-2007, Reconciliation of IPS by Sales Tax Department & Procedure to be
followed by the Department.

Trade Circular 8T of 2009, dated 7-2-2009 :


  • In this Circular detailed procedure has been laid down for sanction and
    disbursement of the IPS as per two Government Resolutions No.
    PSI-2108/CR-36/Ind-8, dated the 3rd December 2008 and No.
    PSI-2108/CR-s278/Ind-8, dated the 4th December 2008.


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Take evidences to the bank while making payments.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


50 Take evidences to the bank while making
payments.

Trade Circular 7T of 2009, dated 5-2-2009 :

Dealers should carry photocopies of TIN Certificate/TIN
Allotment Letter/E-services Enrolment Acknowledgment/Certificate of Registration
/Certificate of Enrolment/Courtesy Letter/Any Order issued by the Department
along with the returns/challans henceforth for verifying the relevant details
before recording entries.

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Mandatory Filing of E-returns.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


49 Mandatory Filing of E-returns.

 

Trade Circular 6T of 2009, dated 30-1-2009 :

It has been now made mandatory for all dealers to file VAT
returns electronically. The Commissioner has advised dealers to file fresh,
revised returns for the previous defaulting period in the electronic form.

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Tax Treatment of Goods sent to other States.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


48 Tax Treatment of Goods sent to other
States.

Trade Circular 5T of 2009, dated 29-1-2009 :




  • It appears that the question whether S. 6A deals only with transactions
    between agent and principal or whether it deals with transactions which are on
    a principal-to-principal basis was not raised before the decision dated 17th
    August 2007 in the case of M/s. Ambica Steels Ltd. v. the State of Uttar
    Pradesh
    (All.) It is, therefore, decided that in such cases, declaration
    in Form F will be issued as per normal procedure.



  • There is no change in the views expressed in Trade Cir. 16T of 2007, dated
    20th February 2007 that S. 6A will have no application as regards transactions
    on principal-to-principal basis.



  • In the aforesaid Trade Circular dated 20th February 2007, a view has been
    taken that when goods are sent to another State for job work or for
    manufacturing, etc., the transaction will normally be on a principal to
    principal basis with an independent operator and not on a principal to agent
    basis.



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Enrolment for E-services.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


47 Enrolment for E-services.

 

Trade Circular 4T of 2009, dated 23-1-2009 :




  • E-enrolment has been made mandatory for all dealers.



  • Copy of the acknowledgement of E-enrolment generated by computer system will
    have to be submitted to the Department.



  • Procedure for E-enrolment is explained in this Circular.



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Submission of Audit Report — Form No. 704 for the year 2007-08 extended up to 2-3-2009.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


MVAT CIRCULARS

46 Submission of Audit Report — Form No. 704
for the year 2007-08 extended up to 2-3-2009.

Trade Circular 3T of 2009, dated 23-1-2009 :




  • Extension is given for submission of Audit Report in respect of the period
    2007-08 up to 2nd March 2009 with a condition that the dealer will have to
    submit copy of an acknowledgement of e-enrolment along with Audit Report.



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Procedure for online submissions for the statutory Forms C/F/H/E I/E II under the CST Act, 1956 : Trade Circular 2T of 2009, dated 23-1-2009 :

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


MVAT CIRCULARS

45 Procedure for online submissions for the
statutory Forms C/F/H/E I/E II under the CST Act, 1956 : Trade Circular 2T of
2009, dated 23-1-2009 :




  • Online applications for CST Declarations C/F/H/E I/E II made applicable
    to all locations of Central Repository Offices in the State from 2nd February
    2009.



  • The new procedure provides time-bound programme for decisions of approval,
    rejection, etc. via e-mail or sms within 7 working days and thereafter the
    dealer should get declaration in another 10 days by post or courier. The new
    procedure is available for the declarations pertaining to period from 1-4-2008
    onward.



  • Applications for prior periods would be administered as per the existing
    manual system and such application shall be made prior to 31-3-2009.
    Declarations for prior periods shall not be issued after 31-3-2009.



  • No change in the procedure for cancellation, rectification and issuance of
    duplicate declarations.



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Adjudication of cases by Chief Commissioners Central Excise — Notification No. 6/2009 — Service Tax, dated 30-1-2009.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


SERVICE TAX UPDATE

44 Adjudication of cases by Chief
Commissioners Central Excise — Notification No. 6/2009 — Service Tax, dated
30-1-2009.

The powers exercisable by the Central Board of Excise and
Customs under the provisions of S. 83A read with the Notification of the
Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) No.
16/2007-ST, dated 19th April 2007 [G.S.R. No. 303(E) dated the 19th April 2007],
shall also be exercised by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise for the
purpose of assigning the adjudication of cases, under the provisions of the said
Finance Act or rules made thereunder, within his jurisdiction.

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Service Tax Return Preparer Scheme —Notification No. 7/2009 — Service Tax dated 3-2-2009.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


SERVICE TAX UPDATE


43 Service Tax Return Preparer Scheme
—Notification No. 7/2009 — Service Tax dated 3-2-2009.




  •  Service Tax Preparer Scheme has been launched by this Notification.



  • An individual who has successfully completed education up to senior secondary
    level, under 10+2 education system and above the age of 35 years on the 1st
    October immediately preceding the day on which applications are invited and
    Income Tax Return Preparer shall be eligible to become a Service Tax Return
    Preparer.



  • The age restriction shall not apply to any person who has
    superannuated/retired from the Department of Customs and Central Excise. This
    Notification also gives the Scheme details.




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Service Tax on Builders.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


SERVICE TAX UPDATE

42 Service Tax on Builders.

 

Circular No. 108/02/2009-ST, dated 29-1-2009 :

A developer/builder/promoter selling a dwelling unit in a
residential complex at any stage of construction or even prior to that and
providing services in connection with construction of residential complex till
the execution of sale deed would be in the nature of ‘self-service’ and
consequently would not attract service tax. All pending cases to be disposed of
accordingly with the exception for decision by the Advance Ruling Authority in a
specific case.

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Manner of utilisation of the information collated by the Department from AIR — Instruction No. 1/ 2009, dated 12-2-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


41 Manner of utilisation of the information
collated by the Department from AIR — Instruction No. 1/ 2009, dated 12-2-2009.

Brief summary of instructions for utilisation of AIR
information for financial year 2007-08 (assessment year 2008-09) and subsequent
years :

Sr. No.
 
Category
Method of selection

Remarks
1. AIR
Transactions
with PAN where
returns are filed

(i) Running of CASS by the respective RCCs

(ii) Depending upon feedback on scrutiny assessment in a case for a
particular assessment year, the AOs may resort to proceedings u/s.148 for
earlier assessment years


Action as prescribed
2. AIR
Transaction with PAN where there is no information of return filed
(i)
CIT(CO) to generate list of non-filers
(ii) Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to issue query letters to all
non-Government non-filers
(a)
If the letter is returned unserved, Assessing Officers to refer the cases to
CIT(CIB)
(b) If return has been filed before the date of issue of letter, then deal
as at SI. No. 1
(c) If return is filed after issue of letter/notice, compulsory scrutiny by
the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction. (for details refer to para 3)
(d) If return is not filed or there is no response to the served query
letter, notice to be issued u/s. 142(1)/148 and the case to be assessed
u/s.143(3)/144/147.
3 AIR
Transactions without PAN

Designated Assessing Officers to issue query letters in non-Government cases
(a)
If return has been filed before the issue of letter, then refer to
jurisdictional Assessing Officer for action as at Sl. no. 1
(b) If return is filed after the issue of letter, the case shall be taken up
for compulsory scrutiny by the designated or the jurisdictional Assessing
Officer as the case may be.
(c) If there is no response to the served query letter, notice to be issued
u/s.142(1)/148 and the case to be assessed u/s.144/147/143(3) as per due
process of law.
(d) If the letter is returned unserved, designated Assessing Officer to
refer the case to CIT(CIB)
(e) The designated Assessing Officer shall intimate PAN to CIT(CIB) on the
basis of replies received.

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Wealth Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification No. 16/2009, dated 13-2-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


40 Wealth Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009
— Notification No. 16/2009, dated 13-2-2009.

Rule 3A of the Wealth Tax Rules has been amended. This rule
decides the jurisdiction of valuation officers, which is based on the asset
value declared by the assessee in the wealth tax return. There are three levels
of Valuation Officers as prescribed in the aforementioned Rule. The new
jurisdiction based on the valuation is as under :

Prescribed value
of the asset either declared in the return of net wealth or not declared,
but believed by the AO to be of such value
Jurisdictional
Valuation officer

If the asset value exceeds Rs.300 lakhs

District Valuation officer

If the asset value exceeds Rs.40 lakhs, but not exceed Rs.300 lakhs

Valuation officer

If the asset value does not exceed Rs.40 lakhs

Assistant Valuation officer

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Wealth Tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification No. 15/2009/F.No.149/144/2008-TPL, dated 30-1-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


39 Wealth Tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2009
— Notification No. 15/2009/F.No.149/144/2008-TPL, dated 30-1-2009.

The CBDT has substituted Rule 8C of the Wealth Tax Rules,
1957 which prescribe the scale of fees to be charged by a valuer for valuation
of any asset for wealth tax purposes with effect from 1st April 2009. The
changes are summarised in the table below :

Pre-amended version

On the first Rs.50,000 of the
asset as valued
2 % of the value
On the next
Rs.1 lakh of the asset as valued
3 % of the
value
On the balance
of the asset as valued
c % of the
value
On the first Rs.5,00,000 of
the asset as valued
2 % of the value
On the next
Rs.10 lakhs of the asset as valued
2 % of the
value
On the next
Rs.40 lakhs of the asset as valued
2 % of the
value
On the balance
of the asset as valued
2 % of the
value

Further when two or more assets of an assessee are to be
valued by the valuer, then they would constitute single asset for calculating
the aforementioned fees. The minimum fees prescribed are Rs.500.

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Exemption to certain companies u/s.211(3) for Public Financial Institutions.

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Part D : company
law

 

80 Exemption to certain companies u/s.211(3) for
Public Financial Institutions.

MCA vide Notification No. S.O. 300(E), dated
8th February 2011 has u/s.211(3) exempted Public Financial Institutions as
specified u/s.4A of the Companies Act, 1956 from disclosing Investments as
required under paragraph (1) of Note (1) of Part-I of Schedule VI in their
balance sheet, subject to fulfilment of the following conditions, namely :

(i) the Public Financial Institutions shall make
the complete disclosures about investments in the balance sheet in respect of
the following, namely :

(a) immovable property;

(b) capital of Partnership firms;

(c) all unquoted investments, and;

(d) investments in subsidiary companies.

(ii) the Public Financial Institutions shall
disclose the total value of quoted investments in each of the following
respective categories, namely :

  •   Government and trusts
    securities;


  •   shares


  •   debentures;


  •   bonds; and


  •   other securities.

(iii) in each of the above categories referred to
in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), investments where value exceeds two percent of
total value in each category or one crore rupees, whichever is lower, shall be
disclosed fully, provided that where disclosures do not result in disclosure
of at least fifty percent of total value of investment in a particular
category, additional disclosure of investments in descending order of value
shall be made so that specific disclosures account for at least fifty percent
of the total value of investments in that category;

(iv) the Public Financial Institutions shall also
give an undertaking to the effect that as and when any of the shareholders ask
for specific particulars, the same shall be provided;

(v) all unquoted investments shall be separately
shown;

(vi) the company shall undertake to file with any
other authorities, whenever necessary, all the relevant particulars as may be
required by the Government or other regulatory bodies;

(vii) the investments in subsidiary companies or
in any company such that it becomes a subsidiary, shall be fully disclosed.


2. This Notification shall be applicable in respect
of balance sheet and profit and loss accounts prepared in respect of the
financial year ending on or after the 31st March, 2011.

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Exemption to certain Companies u/s.211(3).

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Part D : company
law

 

79  Exemption to certain Companies u/s.211(3).

MCA vide Notification No. S 301, dated 8th February
2011 has in public interest, exempted the following classes of companies from
disclosing in their profit and loss account the information mentioned under
column (3), against each class of companies mentioned under column (2) of the
table given below subject to fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in
paragraph 2 of this Notification, namely :

SI.
No.


Class of companies


Exemptions from paragraphs of Part-II of Schedule VI

1

Companies producing
defence equipments including space research;

paragraphs 3(i)(a),
3(ii)(a), 3(ii)(d), 4-C, 4-D(a) to (e) except (d).

2

Export-oriented
company (whose export is more than 20% of the turnover);

paragraphs 3(i)(a),
3(ii)(a), 3(ii)(b), 3(ii)(d).

3

Shipping companies
(Including airlines);

paragraphs 4-D(a) to
(e) except (d).

4

Hotel companies
(including restaurants);

paragraphs 3(i)(a)
and 3(ii)(d)

5

Manufacturing
companies/multi-product companies;

paragraphs 3(i)(a)
and 3(ii)(a)

6

Trading companies;

paragraphs 3(i)(a)
and 3(ii)(b).

Balance sheets of subsidiaries

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Part D : company
law

 

78 Balance sheets of subsidiaries.

1. MCA vide General Circular No.
2/2011No.:51/12/2007-CL-III issued on 8th February 2011, has given general
exemption u/s.212(8) of the Companies Act provided certain conditions as follows
are fulfilled.

The Central Government hereby directs that
provisions of section 212 shall not apply in relation to subsidiaries of those
companies which fulfil the following conditions :



(i) The Board of Directors of the company has by
resolution given consent for not attaching the balance sheet of the subsidiary
concerned;


(ii) The company shall present in the annual
report, the consolidated financial statements of holding company and all
subsidiaries duly audited by its statutory auditors;


(iii) The consolidated financial statement shall
be prepared in strict compliance with applicable Accounting Standards and,
where applicable, Listing Agreement as prescribed by the Security and Exchange
Board of India;


(iv) The company shall disclose in the
consolidated balance sheet the following information in aggregate for each
subsidiary including subsidiaries of subsidiaries : (a) capital (b) reserves
(c) total assets (d) total liabilities (e) details of investment (except in
case of investment in the subsidiaries) (f) turnover (g) profit before
taxation (h) provision for taxation (i) profit after taxation (j) proposed
dividend;


(v) The holding company shall undertake in its
annual report that annual accounts of the subsidiary companies and the related
detailed information shall be made available to shareholders of the holding
and subsidiary companies, seeking such information at any point of time. The
annual accounts of the subsidiary companies shall also be kept for inspection
by any shareholders in the head office of the holding company and of the
subsidiary companies concerned and a note to the above effect will be included
in the annual report of the holding company. The holding company shall furnish
a hard copy of details of accounts of subsidiaries to any shareholder on
demand;


(vi) The holding as well as subsidiary companies
in question shall regularly file such data to the various regulatory and
Government authorities as may be required by them;


(vii) The company shall give Indian rupee
equivalent of the figures given in foreign currency appearing in the accounts
of the subsidiary companies along with exchange rate as on the closing day of
the financial year;

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Amendments to Schedule XIII

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Part D : company
law

 

77 Amendments to Schedule XIII.

MCA vide Circular dated 8th February 2011, have
made the following amendments in Schedule XIII to Companies Act, 1956 :

In the Schedule XIII, in Part II, in S. II :

(i) in sub-para (C), in third proviso, after the
word, ‘scale’ occurring at the end, the following words shall be inserted,
namely :

“if the company is a listed company or a
subsidiary of a listed company”;

(ii) for Explanation IV, to the S. II, the
following Explanation shall be substituted, namely : For the purposes of this
Section, ‘Remuneration Committee’ means :

(i) ‘in respect of a listed company, a committee
which consists of at least three non-executive independent directors including
nominee director or nominee directors, if any; and

(ii) in respect of any other company, a
Remuneration Committee of Directors’;

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Easy Exit Scheme, 2011

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76 Easy Exit Scheme, 2011.

MCA vide General Circular No. 1/2011, F. No.
2/7/2010-CL V, dated the 3rd February 2011 in continuation to its Circular No.
6/2010, dated 3-12-2010 thereon decided to extend the Scheme for another three
months i.e., up to 30th April, 2011. Further all the terms of Circular
No. 6/2010, dated 3-12-2010 remain the same.

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Managerial remuneration in unlisted companies having no profits/inadequate profits

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75 Managerial remuneration in unlisted companies
having no profits/inadequate profits.

MCA vide Press Release No. 4/2011, dated 8-2-2011
has exempted public limited companies (listed and unlisted) with no
profits/inadequate profits, so long as the conditions specified in Schedule
XIII, including special resolution of shareholders and absence of default on
payment to creditors, from the requirement of approaching the Ministry for
approval in those cases where the remuneration of directors/equivalent
managerial personnel exceeds certain limits. The matter has been re-examined in
the light of the evolving economic and regulatory environment.

Accordingly, Schedule XIII of the Companies Act,
1956 is being amended to provide that unlisted companies (which are not
subsidiaries of listed companies) shall not require Government approval for
managerial remuneration in cases where they have no profits/inadequate profits,
provided they meet the other conditions stipulated in the Schedule.

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Impotentia excusat legam

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The

Law does not compel one to do that which one cannot
possibly perform
. Where the law creates a duty or charge and circumstances
make it impossible to be performed for no fault of his, the law will, in
general, excuse him. The principle is expressed in the Latin maxim
‘impotentia excusat legam’
literally meaning ‘law excuses impossibility’.
The maxim is referred to in English judgments as ‘lex non cogit ad
impossibilia’
and is akin to Roman maxim ‘nemo tenetur ad impossibilia’.

2. As per Broom’s Legal Maxims “Where the law creates a duty
or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him,
and has no remedy over there, the law will in general excuse him, and though
impossibility of performance is in general no excuse for not performing an
obligation which a party has expressly undertaken by contract, yet when the
obligation is one implied by law, impossibility of performance is a good
excuse”.

3. Broom distinguishes obligation undertaken by the party
under a contract and one which is cast on him or implied by law. While the
former is not excused unless so provided expressly, the latter i.e.,
obligation implied by law stands excused by a supervening or other impossibility
beyond the control of the person obliged. The application of maxim in legally
implied obligation is illustrated by the case in which consignees of cargo are
prevented from unloading a ship promptly by reason of a dock strike. In the
absence of an express agreement to unload in a specified time, there was implied
obligation to unload within a reasonable time and the performance having become
impossible, the maxim ‘lex non cogit ad impossibilia, execuses it.

4. In Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Spinning
and Weaving Mills,
(2002) INSC 201, the Supreme Court was seized with the
question as to whether the guarantors of loan advanced by the plaintiff to the
respondent were discharged from their obligation on nationalisation of the
respondent’s undertaking and consequent vesting of its properties, which were
given as security, with the Government. Reliance was placed from the side of
guarantors on the provision of S. 141 of the contract Act under which a surety
is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the
principal debtor and, if the creditor loses or without the consent of the surety
parts with the security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of
the security. The plea of ‘impotentia excusat legam’ from the side of the
plaintiff was sought to be countered on behalf of the sureties and it was argued
that loss of securities by the creditor will cover both voluntary and
involuntary act or acts of the creditor which will discharge the sureties from
their obligation to the extent of their value. After extensive discussion, the
Supreme Court held recourse to the principle of impossibility as misplaced and
held that despite vesting of properly in the government consequent to
nationalisation the contract of guarantee being an independent contract
unaffected by nationalisation and consequences thereof has, in all fairness, to
be honoured to fulfil the contractual obligation.

5. Even though the application of doctrine of impossibility
was considered not relevant, the IFCI decision (supra) makes in-depth
discussion of the doctrine. Even in matters of contractual obligation
distinction is to be drawn between cases where the event which causes the
impossibility was or might have been anticipated when the promisor, by an
absolute contract bound himself or where the impossibility arises from the act
or default of the promisor and cases where it cannot reasonably be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract
was made. In the latter case the principle of impossibility will apply.
It
is for this reason that an act of God, in some cases, excuses the breach of
contract. It is not, however, uncommon in large contracts to incorporate a
force majeure
clause providing for circumstances in which the performance
will be excused.

6. In Appeal No. 95/2007 decided on 17-3-2007 in the matter
of M/s. CSL Securities (P) Ltd v. Securities and Exchange Board of India,
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) relied on the doctrine of impossibility
as explained in the case of IFCI (supra) and held that if on
corporatisation, the erstwhile proprietor shareholder could not continue to be a
whole-time director for the required period of three years under Para 4 of
Schedule III of SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-brokers) Rules 1992, the company
will not be liable to pay the fees for the period for which the founder
shareholder has already been paid.

7. There are situations of impossibility sometimes in legal
provisions also. The maxim of ‘impotentia excusat lagam’ requires
application of legal provision keeping in view the impossibility of
implementation so as not to insist on application of that part of the provision
which is not capable of application. In Standard Chartered Bank v. the
Directorate of Enforcement,
(2005) 4 SCC 50, the applicability of the
provision prescribing punishment of imprisonment and fine for an offence came to
be considered in the context of offence by corporations which, being juristic
persons, are incapable of being imprisoned. While both the majority as well as
minority judgments relied on the maxim ‘Lex non cogit ad impossibilia,
they differed on whether the entire provision is to be ignored or the same is to
be modified so as to remove the impossibility. Delivering the minority judgment
Srikrishna, J observed that the application of the maxim could persuade the
Court to ignore the language of the statutory provision in the case of juristic
person, there being no warrant for dissecting of the Section and treating only
one part as capable of implementation when the mandate of the Section is to
impose the whole of the prescribed punishment. K.J. Balkrishnan J, on the other
hand, delivering the majority decision, quoted from Bennions Statutory
Interpretation and observed that if an enactment requires what is legally
impossible, it will be presumed that Parliament intended it to be modified so as
to remove the impossibility element.

8. The principle also known as doctrine of frustration
finds
expression in the Contract Act. As per Lord Radcliffe, “Frustration
occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either party a
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed, because the
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing
radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract” (Davis
Contractors v. Fareham UDC,
1956AC696) S. 56 of the Contract Act provides
that an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.
It further provides that a contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. Impossibility renders the act unlawful and therefore unenforceable.

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 10A, section 155(11A) — Once the assessee has complied with all formalities and the request of the assessee for extension of time is not rejected, it could be presumed that after reasonable time, the extension of time has be

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46 (2011) TIOL 113 ITAT-Mum.

Mphasis Software & Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA Nos. 704 & 705/Bang./2010

A.Ys. : 2003-2004 & 2004-2005. Dated : 31-1-2011

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 10A, section 155(11A)
— Once the assessee has complied with all formalities and the request of the
assessee for extension of time is not rejected, it could be presumed that after
reasonable time, the extension of time has been granted in respect of the amount
realised and brought into India in convertible foreign exchange. Assessee is
entitled to deduction u/s.10A on the amount which was not realised within the
due date of filing of income-tax return but for which an application was made to
the prescribed authorities and the amount was realised before the assessment was
made. Powers conferred upon an AO by section 155(11A) w.e.f. 13-7-2006 do not
refer to any particular assessment year and the AO can w.e.f. this date amend
the assessment for any assessment year, provided the assessee applies within a
period of four years from the end of the previous year in which the export
proceeds are received in India.

Facts:

For A.Y. 2003-2004 (for A.Y. 2004-05 facts were identical and
hence not given here). The assessee-company, engaged in the business of
providing software development and call-centre services, had set up units at
Mumbai and Pune which were registered as Software Technology Park (STP units).
In respect of these units, the assessee was eligible for exemption u/s.10A. For
A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee filed return of income on 25-11-2003 declaring a
total income of Rs.3,89,69,030 after claiming relief u/s.10A amounting to
Rs.8,46,49,114. While computing the claim u/s.10A the assessee had considered
unrealised export revenue of Rs.14,44,50,338 as part of export turnover. Out of
Rs total unrealised export proceeds of Rs.14,44,50,338 an amount of
Rs.6,72,97,027 was realised subsequent to 30th September, 2003 till the
completion of the assessment. The balance unrealised export proceeds of
Rs.7,71,53,311 were not considered by the AO as part of export turnover while
calculating deduction u/s.10A on the ground that the assessee had not been able
to furnish the approval of the competent authority granting extension of time.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and
contended that in view of the ratio of the Mumbai Bench of the ITAT in the case
of Morgan Stanley Advantage Services (P) Ltd. v. ITO, 30 SOT 1, approval
for extension shall be deemed to have been granted if communication
accepting/rejecting the application was not received after a reasonable time and
in view of the provisions of section 155(11A), the order passed by AO needs to
be rectified by considering the export proceeds realised by the assessee as
export turnover. The CIT(A) did not adjudicate upon the first contention and
rejected the second contention on the ground that the assessment years under
consideration are for a period prior to insertion of section 155(11A).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee complied with all the
formalities and had applied for extension to competent authority vide letters
dated 2-9-2003 and 5-11-2003. It held that once the assessee has complied with
all formalities and the request of the assessee for extension of time is not
rejected, it could be presumed that after reasonable time, the extension of time
has been granted in respect of the amount realised and brought into India in
convertible foreign exchange. It observed that section 155(11A) was introduced
to enable rectification of assessments. It held that section 15(11A) is a
provision which permits amendment of assessments already completed due to
subsequent developments taking place and power was given to the AO to carry out
such amendments w.e.f. 13-7-2006. The Tribunal held that in the view nature of
things, this date (13-7-2006) cannot refer to any particular assessment year and
the power having been conferred upon the AO from this date, the assessment for
any assessment year can be amended provided the assessee applies within a period
of four years from the end of the previous year in which the export proceeds are
received in India. The Tribunal noted the findings of the Bangalore Bench of the
ITAT in the case of Nous Info-systems (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, (2009 TIOL 14
ITAT-Bang.).

The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO to determine
the amount realised in convertible foreign exchange and to grant the benefit of
deduction in respect of the sum so realised and recomputed the deduction u/s.10A
of the Act.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 244A — Assessee is entitled to interest on delayed payment of interest. Whenever there is a delay in granting refund to the assessee, the Department has to pay compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of amou

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45 (2011) TIOL 91 ITAT-Mum.

Multiscreen Media Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 6602/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 19-11-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 244A — Assessee is entitled to
interest on delayed payment of interest. Whenever there is a delay in granting
refund to the assessee, the Department has to pay compensation by way of
interest for the delay in payment of amount lawfully due to the assessee, which
are withheld wrongly and contrary to law.

Facts:

The Tribunal vide its order dated 4-3-2004 decided the appeal
filed by the assessee and granted certain reliefs to the assessee. The AO on
23-4-2004 passed an order giving effect to the order of the ITAT and determined
the amount of refund due to the assessee at Rs.3,26,48,225 (this included
interest of Rs.18,22,490). A part of the refund due to the assessee was adjusted
against the demand for A.Y. 2001-02 in July 2004 and the balance amount of
Rs.1,34,70,662 was paid to the assessee in August 2004. The assessee vide letter
dated 21-9-2004 moved an application u/s.154 of the Act on the ground that
computation of interest u/s.244A was erroneous and there was a short grant of
interest to the extent of approx Rs.42 lakh. On 26-9-2006, the AO passed an order u/s.154 and determined the balance refund due
to the assessee at Rs.42,15,279 and a further sum of Rs.13,16,576 was determined
as due to the assessee on account of MAT credit brought forward from A.Y.
1998-1999. Of the total amount of Rs.55,31,855 due to the assessee Rs.1,77,531
was adjusted against demand for A.Y. 2001-02 and balance Rs.53,54,324 was
adjusted on 4-12-2006 against demand for A.Y. 2003-04.

The assessee vide letter dated 9-11-2006 requested the AO to
rectify the mistake of short grant of interest on refund and for grant of
further interest on delayed payment of interest of Rs.42,15,279 for the period
from September 2004 to December 2006. The AO vide letter dated 3-1-2007 rejected
the contention of the assessee on the ground that there is no provision in the
Act for granting interest on delayed payment of interest.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
held that Sandvik Asia is a case where there was an inordinate delay and the SC
had taken serious exceptions to such delay. The case of Sandvik Asia was an
exceptional case and the ratio of the said decision would apply to such
exceptional cases. He was of the opinion that the case of the assessee did not
fall in the category of the Sandvik Asia case. He dismissed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Sandvik Asia (280 ITR 643) (SC) and did not find any merit
in the observations of the CIT(A) that the case of Sandvik Asia is an
exceptional case and the said decision would apply only to such exceptional
cases. It held that whenever there is a delay in granting refund to the
assessee, the Department has to pay compensation by way of interest for the
delay in payment of amount lawfully due to the assessee, which is withheld
wrongly and contrary to law. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to
interest u/s.244A on delayed refund of Rs.42,15,279 for the period from
September 2004 to December 2006. It directed the AO to pay interest u/s.244A to
the assessee as per law.

The appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — In the absence of any contrary material brought by the Revenue Authorities that the assessee has received professional fees more than what has been declared by him, no addition should have been made by the AO on account of non-furni

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44 (2011) TIOL 87 ITAT-Mum.

S. Ganesh v. ACIT

ITA No. 527/Mum./2010

A.Y. : 2006-2007. Dated : 8-12-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — In the absence of any contrary
material brought by the Revenue Authorities that the assessee has received
professional fees more than what has been declared by him, no addition should
have been made by the AO on account of non-furnishing of partywise details of
professional fees received during the year and non-reconciliation of
professional fees received with AIR information.

Addition on account of unexplained investment cannot be made
in the hands of the assessee, on the basis of AIR information, when the assessee
was only the second owner of the units of mutual funds and the identity of the
first owner was established and they are assessed to income-tax.

Facts:

The Assessing Officer asked the assessee to furnish partywise
details of professional fees received during the year and also to reconcile the
professional fees received by him with AIR information. The assessee in his
reply stated that all professional fees are received by way of cheques and all
such cheques received are deposited in one bank account only; professional
receipts disclosed by the assessee are more than the receipts shown in AIR
information and accordingly, there is no discrepancy. He also expressed his
inability to furnish partywise details of professional fees received during the
year under consideration. The AO added a sum of Rs.47,37,000 to the total income
of the assessee. This sum represented 40 items of receipts which, in the opinion
of the AO, were not disclosed by the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
sustained the addition of Rs.47,37,000 made by the AO on account of
non-reconciliation of professional fees with AIR information. He decided this
ground against the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the submissions of the assessee were
not controverted by the AO and that the professional income declared by the
assessee far exceeded the professional fees as per AIR information. The Tribunal
held that in the absence of any contrary material brought by the Revenue
Authorities that the assessee has received amount more than the professional
fees than what has been declared by him, no addition should have been made. It
observed that there may be so many reasons such as low deduction of tax,
non-deduction of tax, deduction on account of reimbursement of expenses, etc.,
for which the figure of AIR may not tally with the income declared by the
assessee on account of professional fees from various clients. It also noted
that the categorical statement of the assessee viz. that it was not practically
possible to give detailed party-wise break-up of fees received was accepted in
the past in scrutiny assessment and no addition made. It deleted the addition
made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.

Facts II:

The AO asked the assessee to reconcile the source of
investments in mutual funds and reconcile the same with AIR information as well
as co-relate the payments with the assessee’s bank account. The AO held that the
assessee failed to explain the source of investment in units of mutual funds
totalling Rs.4.75 crores. He added this amount to the total income of the
assessee as unexplained investment.

Aggrieved the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) where he
filed additional evidence in the form of further statements got by him from
mutual funds. The AO in the remand report accepted Rs.4 crores as explained and
submitted that the two amounts aggregating to Rs.75 lakh remained unexplained.
The CIT(A) reduced the addition of unexplained investment from Rs.4.75 crores to
Rs.75 lakh.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held II:

In respect of the two amounts of Rs.50 lakh and Rs.25 lakh
regarded as unexplained investment of the assessee, the Tribunal noted that the
investment of Rs.50 lakh was in the name of the father of the assessee as the
first holder and assessee was the second holder. Similarly the investment of
Rs.25 lakh was in the name of the mother of the assessee as the first holder and
the assessee was the second holder. The Tribunal also noted that both these
persons were assessed to tax and the AO had written to the AO having
jurisdiction over these persons to take necessary action at their end. The
Tribunal was of the view that since the identity of these persons is established
and they are assessed to income-tax, therefore, addition, if any, could have
been made in their hands only on account of unexplained investment and not in
the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) on
this ground and directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs.75 lakh.

The appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 40(a)(ia), section 194C — The provisions of section 194C are not applicable to a case where the transporters are hired by the vendors of the goods, who directly made supplies to the factory of the assessee and charged the am

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43 (2011) TIOL 38 ITAT-Mum.

Chang Hing Tannery v. DCIT

ITA No. 1921/Kol./2009

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 16-12-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 40(a)(ia), section 194C — The
provisions of section 194C are not applicable to a case where the transporters
are hired by the vendors of the goods, who directly made supplies to the factory
of the assessee and charged the amount of transportation separately in their
bill to the assessee.

Facts:

The assessee purchased raw material consisting of hide and
chemicals with the understanding that goods will be delivered at the factory of
the assessee by the supplier. Freight charges were to be paid by the assessee in
some cases against bill raised by the supplier of goods along with the value of
goods and in some cases separately on production of bills by the transporters.
There was no agreement between the assessee and the transporters as the
transporters were arranged by the suppliers themselves. The Assessing Officer
(AO) disallowed, u/s.40(a)(ia), a sum of Rs.23,70,881 out of freight charges on
the ground that the assessee failed to deduct TDS u/s.194C.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal found that the submissions of the assessee viz.
that the goods were supplied by the suppliers at the factory of the assessee was
not disputed by the Revenue. The Tribunal held that there could not have been
any agreement either written or oral between the assessee and the transporters
as transporters were arranged by the suppliers themselves to bring the goods at
destination. The Revenue did not bring anything on record to suggest the
contrary. Since there was no contract between the assessee and the transporters,
provisions of section 194C of the Act were held to be not applicable and
consequently the assessee was held to be not liable to deduct tax on such
payments u/s.194C. The addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) was
deleted.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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University established and adopted by Assembly of State and with the character of a body corporate as per the relevant Act, will fall within the definition of person in section 2(31)(vii).

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42 (2010) 127 ITD 164 (Delhi)

O. P. Jindal Global University v. CIT, Rohtak

Dated : 28-5-2010

Section 2(31) read with section 12AA :

 

1. University established and adopted by Assembly of State
and with the character of a body corporate as per the relevant Act, will fall
within the definition of person in
section 2(31)(vii).

2. University charging high fees from the students and not
meant for the benefit of people at large, however satisfying the conditions of
section 2(15) of imparting education i.e., systematic instruction, schooling
or training given to the youth to prepare them for works of life is eligible
for registration as a charitable institution u/s.12AA.

Facts:

The assessee was a university incorporated under the Haryana
Universities Act, 2006. As per the relevant Section of the Haryana Universities
Act, the assessee shall be a body corporate and shall have perpetual succession
and common seal. It shall have the power to sue and to be sued in its name.
However, it is not registered u/s.25 of the Companies Act and also not
registered under the Cooperative Societies Act. The assessee had applied for
registration u/s.12AA of the Act as a charitable institution.

The Ld. D.R. argued that, based on the facts, the university
was not a separate entity and was just an activity carried on by the sponsoring
body and therefore would not constitute a person u/s.2(31)(vii).

Held:

It was held by the Tribunal that the university established
and adopted by Assembly of State and with the character of a body corporate as
per the relevant Act, though not registered u/s.25 of the Companies Act or
though not registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, will fall within the
definition of person in section 2(31)(vii) i.e., an artificial juridical person.

Facts:

The next question after being satisfied that the
assessee-university is person u/s.2(31)(vii) is whether it qualifies for
registration as a charitable institution u/s.12AA.

The Ld. A.R. argued that the assessee-university was engaged
in imparting education in the field of law and administration. Objects of the
assessee-university were primarily aimed at awarding diplomas and degrees
granting fellowships and scholarships.

The definition of charitable purpose which existed at the
relevant point of time was in an inclusive manner to include education as one of
the many activities. The Ld. A.R. also relied on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust, which restricted the
meaning of education to impart instruction, schooling and training to prepare
the youth for the works of life.

The Commissioner argued that the assessee university was
charging higher fees and was not meant for the benefit of people at large.

Held:

The University satisfied the condition of imparting education
and should be thus granted registration u/s.12AA. If the purpose is education,
the requirement will be fully satisfied even if an activity for profit is
carried on in the course of actual carrying out the primary purpose.



Note : The other issues, being minor ones, have been ignored
while reporting the above decision.


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Section 4 — Compensation awarded for loss of income earning apparatus is in the nature of capital receipt. However interest awarded on delay in receipt of compensation is revenue in nature and is to be treated as income.

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41 (2010) 127 ITD 153 (Mum.)

Spaco Carburettors (I) (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT,

Range 5(3) Mum.

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 16-3-2009

 

Section 4 — Compensation awarded for loss of income earning
apparatus is in the nature of capital receipt. However interest awarded on delay
in receipt of compensation is revenue in nature and is to be treated as income.

Facts:

1. The assessee-company was engaged in the business of
manufacturing different types of carburettors. It entered in a Technical
Collaboration Agreement (TCA) with a Japanese company. As per the relevant
clause of the TCA, the assessee was entitled to use any improvement made in
technology of carburettors by the Japanese company. The Japanese company
developed a new product, in respect of which they refused to give any advice
to the assessee company.

2. Subsequently the matter was referred to the
International Court of Arbitration and the said Court awarded compensation and
interest in favour of the assessee-company.

3. The assessee-company claimed the same as capital receipt
and therefore not taxable. However the Assessing Officer treated the same as
revenue and charged to tax.

4. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that the compensation was in
the nature of capital receipt, hence out of the purview of tax. However
interest received on the compensation is revenue in nature and therefore
chargeable to tax.

5. The Ld. AR of the assessee submitted before the Tribunal
that the compensation awarded was in respect of the extinction of a source of
income and profit-earning apparatus and was not awarded for breach of a
contract of revenue nature. Hence it was capital in nature. Similarly interest
on compensation received by the assessee-company was attached to the
compensation awarded by the Court, hence it partakes the character of the
compensation.

6. Whereas Ld. DR argued that compensation was awarded for
non-existing income i.e., for future loss which is nothing but revenue in
nature.

Held:

1. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) in
respect of the compensation awarded to the assessee-company and treated the
same as capital receipt.

2. In respect of interest, the Tribunal held that it is a
well-settled principle that interest always bears the character of revenue
unless it is awarded as profit. Since interest received is for the loss to the
assessee for delay in receipt of compensation which the assessee was entitled
to receive in the year in which the breach occurred, it was of revenue nature
and consequently the Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) in respect of
interest on compensation.

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Section 48 — Actual value of sale consideration cannot be substituted by fair market value without any evidence.

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40 (2010) 127 ITD 127 (Delhi)

Moral Trading & Investment Ltd. v. DCIT

A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 30-4-2010

Section 48 — Actual value of sale consideration cannot be
substituted by fair market value without any evidence.

Facts:

The assessee acquired 8,91,181 shares of Hotel HQR in 2002
for a consideration of Rs.12.82 crore (i.e., for Rs.143. 85 per share).
Subsequently, a further subscription of shares was made by the assessee in 2004
and 2005 for Rs.10 per share. All the shares were then transferred to Shri R. P.
Mittal (a majority shareholder in the assessee company) at the rate of Rs.20 per
share. The AO held that transfer of shares was a colourable device to mitigate
tax. He further worked out fair market value of the shares at Rs.185.68 per
share. Capital gains was worked out on the basis of this amount as sale
consideration.

Held:

The hotel was not functional and was under repairs since
quite a long time. As per the valuation done by authorised valuer, the value per
share was coming to Rs.3.19. The Department has not brought any evidence to
rebut the valuation by the authorised valuer. Further, for the shares acquired
in 2004 and 2005 at Rs.10 per share, the assessee had earned profit. Hence, sale
of shares by the assessee to its majority shareholder is not a colourable device
to avoid tax. Hence, the actual value of sale consideration cannot be
substituted by some presumed fair market value.

Note : The other issues, being minor ones, have been ignored
while reporting the above decision.

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Medical reimbursement does not constitute fringe benefit as defined in section 115WB

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39 (2011) 49 DTR (Mum.) (Trib) 202

Godrej Properties Ltd. v. Additional CIT

A.Y. : 2006-2007. Dated : 3-12-2010

Medical reimbursement does not constitute fringe benefit as defined in
section 115WB.

Facts :

The assessee-company filed its return of fringe benefit
declaring the value of fringe benefit at Rs. 14,48,890. The Assessing Officer,
however, assessed the value of fringe benefit by holding that salary paid to
employee in form of medical reimbursement was liable to Fringe Benefit Tax
(FBT). The CIT(A) held the same to be a perquisite liable to FBT on the ground
that in the given case the amounts of expenditure reimbursed to the employee
were not part of salary package and were in the nature of reimbursement.

Held:

The proviso clause (v) of section 17(2) treats expenditure
actually incurred by the employee on medical treatment for himself or his family
and which is paid by the employer in excess of Rs.15,000 as perquisite taxable
as salary. Thus, reimbursement of medical expense is not taxable as perquisite
if amount does not exceed Rs.15,000 per annum. section 115WB(3) explicitly
excludes perquisites in respect of which tax is paid or payable by the employee.
In the Memorandum explaining the Provisions to the Finance bill it was stated
that perquisites directly attributed to the employees will continue to be taxed
in their hands in accordance with provisions of section 17(2). Also, the Budget
Speech (Paragraph 160 — 194 Taxman 1) categorically stated that ‘At present
where the benefits are fully attributable to the employee, they are taxed in the
hands of the employee; that position will continue’.

From the above, it was held that where benefits which are
fully attributable to employee and are taxed in their hands, would be continued
to be taxed u/s.17(2). Only in case where the benefits are enjoyed collectively
by employees and cannot be attributed individually shall be taxed in employers
hands.

In the case on hand, only where bills have been produced by
the employee to the employer it was a case of reimbursement and to the extent of
the benefit given in section 17(2) proviso (v) the employee need not pay tax.
This is not a case where the attribution of personal benefits directly to an
employee poses problem or a case where it is not feasible to tax the benefit in
question in the hands of the employee. It is only a case where a benefit above a
certain specified amount only is liable to be taxed in the hands of employee.
Such case does not constitute fringe benefit as defined in section 115WB of the
Act.

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Exemption u/s.10B — Expenses incurred on on-site development of computer software outside India cannot be excluded from the export turnover for computing deduction u/s.10B — Export proceeds retained abroad in accordance with RBI guidelines is to be includ

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38 (2011) 49 DTR (Chennai) (SB) (Trib.) 1

Zylog Systems Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y.: 2003-2004. Dated: 2-11-2010

 

Exemption u/s.10B — Expenses incurred on on-site development
of computer software outside India cannot be excluded from the export turnover
for computing deduction u/s.10B — Export proceeds retained abroad in accordance
with RBI guidelines is to be included while computing deduction u/s.10B.

Facts:

The assessee was a company engaged in the business of
development of software both by way of on-site development and offshore
development and it has a branch in the USA. It being 100% EOU, had claimed
deduction u/s.10B in respect of the exports of software made. During the
assessment proceedings, the AO had observed that the assessee had total export
turnover of Rs.28.61 crores and out of this amount, the assessee had utilised
the export proceeds to the tune of Rs.15.14 crores in the USA for the purpose of
carrying on export activities. The AO was of the view that since the said amount
had not been received in convertible foreign exchange in India within the
prescribed time u/s.10B(3), the said amount utilised in the USA cannot be
treated as a part of export turnover for computing deduction u/s.10B.

Further, the assessee had incurred expenses of Rs.3.33 crores
in foreign currency on account of payroll, etc., which were claimed to have been
incurred in connection with staff of the foreign branch in foreign country. The
AO also excluded Rs.3.33 crores incurred by the assessee outside India in
foreign exchange considering it as expenses in providing technical services,
while computing deduction u/s.10B. The AO placed reliance on the definition of
‘export turnover’ given in
Explanation 2(iii) to section 10B which excludes expenses incurred in foreign
exchange in providing technical services outside India from export turnover.

The first Appellate Authority allowed the asses-see’s appeal
in respect of inclusion of Rs.15.14 crores in export turnover for computing
deduction u/s.10B, whereas he rejected the claim of the assessee in respect of
inclusion of Rs.3.33 crores incurred by the assessee outside India in providing
technical services.

Held:

The Department had not brought anything on record to show
during the hearing, that the assessee-company was involved in rendering any
managerial consultancy services at foreign country. Also it was not brought on
record that the company was involved in providing the technical services to
other personnel or any outside agency. All the services rendered by the company
were to its staff located at New Jersy for the fulfilment of objects, namely,
development of software. A person cannot provide services to self. Whatever
expenditure has been incurred on foreign soil in a sum of Rs.3.33 crores was
incurred in connection with development of software by the employees of the
assessee-company at foreign branch and nothing has been incurred on managerial
or technical services rendered to outsider in foreign soil and therefore, the
same cannot be excluded from the export turnover.

Regarding the export proceeds of Rs.15.14 crores retained
abroad, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Boda & Co. (P)
Ltd
. 223 ITR 271 would apply to this case also, even though the said
decision was on section 80-O wherein it was held that “two-way traffic of
receiving foreign exchange here and sending it back is a ritual which is
unnecessary”.

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Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deferred sales tax liability being difference between payment of net present value and future liability credited by assessee to capital reserve account in its books of account would be a capital receipt and cann

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37 (2010) 42 SOT 457 (Mum.) (SB)

Sulzer India Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA Nos. 2944 & 2871 (Mum.) of 2007 &

1317 (Pn.) of 2007

A.Ys.: 2003-2004 & 2004-05. Dated: 10-11-2010

 

Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deferred sales
tax liability being difference between payment of net present value and future
liability credited by assessee to capital reserve account in its books of
account would be a capital receipt and cannot be termed as remission/cessation
of liability and, consequently, no benefit would arise to assessee in terms of
section 41(1)(a).

The assessee obtained incentive by way of sales tax deferral
scheme under the package scheme of incentive 1983 (the 1983 scheme) and the
package scheme of incentive 1988 (the 1988 scheme) notified by the Government of
Maharashtra. The aggregate deferral amount under 1983 and 1988 schemes was
Rs.752.01 lakh. The total amount of sales tax collected by the assessee for 7
years from 1-11-1989 to 31-10-1996 was to be paid after 12 years in 6 annual
instalments. However, by an amendment to the Bombay Sales Tax Act in 2002, if
the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred tax as prescribed was paid, then the
deferred tax was deemed, in public interest, to have been fully paid. The
assessee, following the aforesaid amendment, made repayment of Rs.337.13 lakh on
30-12-2002 as per NPV of the deferred tax as prescribed under Circular No. 39T
of 2002 of Trade Circular dated 12-12-2002. The assessee claimed Rs.414.87 lakh,
being the difference between the deferred sales tax Rs.752.01 lakh and its net
present value amounting to Rs.337.13 lakh, as capital receipt and credited it in
the books of account of the assessee to the capital reserve account. However,
the Assessing Officer, keeping in view that the assessee had obtained the
benefit of payment of whole amount of Rs.752.01 lakh as deduction u/s.43B (in
view of CBDT’s Circular No. 496, dated 25-9-1987) brought the difference of
Rs.414.87 lakh to tax u/s.41(1). The CIT(A) upheld the addition made by the
Assessing Officer.

The Special Bench deleted the addition. The Special Bench
noted as under :


    (1) The aggregate deferral amount under 1983 and 1988 schemes of Rs.752.01 lakh was to be paid by the assessee after 12 years in six equal annual instalments.

    (2) As per the amendment of 2002 to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the assessee was allowed to prematurely pay the entire amount of the deferred sales tax at the Net Present Value (NPV) as prescribed and, on making such payment, the deferred tax shall be deemed to have been fully paid.

    (3) The amount paid by the assessee was determined and prescribed by SICOM (which was the implementing agency of the State Government.).

    (4) The amount paid by the assessee represented the NPV of the future sum and there had been no remission or cessation of liability by the State Government.

    (5) Had the State Government accepted a lesser amount after 12 years or reduced the number or amount of the annual instalments, then it could have been a case of remission or cessation.

    (6) Therefore, such payment of net present value of a future liability could not be classified as remission or cessation of the liability so as to attract the provisions of section 41(1)(a) since no benefit arose to the assessee in terms of section 41(1)(a).

Section 234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Once assessee’s bank account was put under attachment, the amount therein is to be considered to be lying with the Department which would indicate constructive payment of advance tax and, therefore, interest u/s.

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36 (2010) 134 TTJ 457 (Del.)

S. M. Wahi v. Asst. DIT

(International Taxation)

ITA No. 2779 (Delhi) of 2008

A.Y.: 2007-2008. Dated: 30-4-2009

 

Section 234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Once assessee’s
bank account was put under attachment, the amount therein is to be considered to
be lying with the Department which would indicate constructive payment of
advance tax and, therefore, interest u/s.234B is not chargeable.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
charged interest u/s.234B. The assessee submitted that a sum of Rs.4 crores was
received by the assessee on 3rd January 2007. His bank account was attached on
12th January 2007. The amount was lying with the Department. In such
circumstances, the assessee cannot make the payment of advance tax and interest
u/s.234B cannot be imposed upon him. He relied upon the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in the case of CIT v. K K Marketing, (2005) 196 CTR (Del.)
611/(2005) 278 ITR 596 (Del). The CIT(A) held that charging of interest u/s.234B
is mandatory. The Assessing Officer has no discretion to charge or not to charge
the interest. He further observed that the assessee did not apply to the
Assessing Officer for permitting him to limited operation of bank account for
payment of advance tax.

The Tribunal, following the Delhi High Court’s decision in
the above-referred case, held that in the present case, for all practical
purposes the amount of Rs.4 crores was considered to be lying with the
Department which would indicate constructive payment of advance tax. Therefore,
interest u/s.234B cannot be imposed.

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Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) would arise only when return of income is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer and he finds some more items of income or additional income over and above what is declared in return.

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35 (2010) 42 SOT 48 (Ahd.)

Dy. CIT v. Dr. Satish B. Gupta

ITA No. 1482 (Ahd.) of 2010

A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 6-8-2010

 

Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) would arise only when return of income is scrutinised by the
Assessing Officer and he finds some more items of income or additional income
over and above what is declared in return.

A survey u/s.133A was carried out at the premises of the
assessee who was a practising doctor. During the course of the search he
declared unaccounted income of Rs.32.84 lakh. Thereafter, he filed a return of
income declaring income of Rs.37.57 lakh wherein, apparently, the assessee
disclosed unaccounted income of Rs.32.84 lakh which was declared by him during
the course of survey. The assessment was finally completed on an income of
Rs.38.12 lakh after making minor additions. The Assessing Officer also levied
penalty u/s.271(1)(c) in respect of the sum of Rs.32.84 lakh declared during the
course of survey. On appeal, the CIT(A) set aside the penalty order.

The Tribunal, following the decision of the Allahabad High
Court in the case of Smt. Govinda Devi v. CIT, (2008) 304 ITR 340/173
Taxman 370, upheld the CIT(A)’s order deleting the penalty. The Tribunal noted
as under:


    (1) As per clause (c) of the Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c), tax sought to be evaded means the difference between tax on the total income assessed and tax that would have been chargeable on such total income reduced by the amount added.

    (2) Since, in the instant case, the Assessing Officer had not made any addition to the returned income, the question of working out any tax sought to be evaded would not arise.

    (3) In general, where a case does not fall within clause (a) or clause (b) of Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c) there cannot be any ‘tax sought to be evaded’ if there is no addition to the returned income.

    (4) The assessee would be liable for an action u/s.271(1)(c) in respect of such items only which are discovered by the Assessing Officer on the scrutiny of return of income or after carrying out an investigation and discovering some more items of income not found declared or mentioned in the return of income. Prior to the filing of return of income there is no concept of concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

    (5) ‘Proceedings’ as used in section 271(1)(c) are statutory proceedings initiated against the assessee either by the issuance of a statutory notice or after filing of return of income. Survey u/s.133A or a search u/s.132 or issuance of a notice u/s.133(6), for example, are only means of collecting evidence against the assessee and are not equivalent to statutory proceedings. Another criterion for finding out whether a particular action is a statutory proceeding or not is to see whether it can be brought to a legal conclusion against the assessee by determining his right to liability.

    (6) Merely carrying out a survey u/s.133A does not create any liability against the assessee which is created only through assessment proceedings or through penalty proceedings. Therefore, the Revenue was not correct in its submission that the survey was a ‘proceeding’ and the Assessing Officer having discovered concealment during survey, the assessee would be liable for penalty u/s.271(1)(c).

    (7) The act of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars should be viewed by the Assessing Officer as done with respect to return of income. The omission or commission or contumacious conduct has to be viewed from the return of income and if certain thing has not been disclosed or has not been furnished therein, only then it can be said that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of his income. Prior to this the assessee cannot be said to have done any contumacious conduct on which penalty could be levied.

    (8) Merely because certain receipts were not recorded in the books of account or receipts were not issued to the patients, but income therefrom was finally declared in the return of income, there would be no contumacious conduct. For not maintaining books of account or not issuing receipts to the patients for the amount received by the assessee, at best, the books can be rejected by invoking provisions of section 145(3) and income can be estimated in accordance with section 144. Where, however, the Assessing Officer had accepted the income declared in the return of income, then the assessee could not be charged for any contumacious conduct.

When neither any deduction is claimed nor any charge is made to the profit and loss account of any tax or duty, there is no question of disallowing the amount u/s 43B.

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60 [2009] 121 ITD 461 (Chennai) (TM)

Dynavision Ltd. vs ACIT, Central Circle – II (1), Chennai

A. Ys.: 1990-91 to 1992-93. Date of order: 26.05.2009

 

When neither any deduction is claimed nor any charge is made
to the profit and loss account of any tax or duty, there is no question of
disallowing the amount u/s 43B.

Facts:


The assessee showed gross receipts of Rs. 46.10 crore in its
profit and loss account. Against this, the
assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 31.30 crore towards raw material consumed. Out
of the total amount of customs duty of Rs. 15.82 crore, Rs. 4.59 crores
represented the provision made for customs duty in respect of goods lying in a
bonded warehouse. This amount was provided to the raw material purchases
account. Since the imported goods were not released from the bonded warehouse,
they were shown as closing stock in hand and the customs duty payable was
included in this closing stock. The AO made addition on the basis that the
customs duty was not paid but was charged to profit and loss account. On appeal
to Tribunal, the Accountant Member upheld the order of AO while the Judicial
Member held otherwise. Hence, the matter was referred to Third Member.


Held:


The Third Member upheld the order of the Judicial Member. It
was held that section 43B can be invoked only when the assessee claims any tax
or duty. There was no dispute regarding accrual of liability. Even the assessee
accepted that the liability to pay customs duty had accrued. However, the fact
that the element of customs duty was made a part of closing stock had to be
considered. Since the customs duty was included in closing stock, it could not
be said that the assessee claimed the deduction of customs duty. Hence,
provisions of section. 43B could not be invoked and no disallowance u/s 43B was
warranted.

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Payments for hiring of trucks does not come within the purview of “works contract”—Hence, provisions of section 194C are not applicable.

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59 (2010) 122 ITD 35 (Asr.)

DCIT, Hoshiarpur Range, Hoshiarpur vs Satish Aggarwal & Co.

A. Y.: 2005-06. Date of order: 28.11. 2008

 

Payments for hiring of trucks does not come within the
purview of “works contract”—Hence, provisions of section 194C are not
applicable.

Facts:

The assessee made payments worth Rs. 17,40,000/- towards
hiring charges of trucks. No tax was
deducted on the said payments. The AO disallowed the expenditure u/s 40(a)(ia)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the tax was deductible u/s 194C,
as the payments were having the character of “work” as defined in Explanation
III to s. 194C. The contention of the assessee was that there was no contract
between the appellant and the truck owners for carrying goods or passengers;
hence tax was not deductible u/s 194C and no disallowance was warranted.

Held:

Following the decision of Poompuhar Shipping Corpn. Ltd., the
Tribunal held that there was no contract between the assessee and the owners of
the trucks for carrying out any work. The assessee simply hired the trucks and
they were utilised in his business of civil construction. For carrying out any
work, manpower is the sine qua non, and without manpower, it cannot be said that
work has been carried out. Merely providing trucks without any manpower cannot
be termed as carrying out work by the truck owners, for which payment was made
by the assessee. Section 194I was also not attracted as its provisions became
applicable on payments made for the use of capital assets with effect from
1.6.2007. Hence, entering into a contract for carrying out work is not
equivalent to contract for hiring trucks. Consequently, there was no need to
deduct tax u/s 194C, and disallowance
u/s 40(a)(ia) was deleted.

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Block of assets, s. 32, 38(2) — Under the scheme of block of assets, (i) Depreciation cannot be disallowed on the ground that some of the assets contained in the block have not been used for the purpose of the business; (ii) the user of an individual asse

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58 2010 TIOL 78 ITAT MUM

Swati Synthetics Ltd. vs ITO

A.Y.: 2001-02. Date of order: 17.12.2009


 



Block of assets, s. 32, 38(2) — Under the scheme of block of
assets, (i) Depreciation cannot be disallowed on the ground that some of the
assets contained in the block have not been used for the purpose of the
business; (ii) the user of an individual asset for the purpose of business needs
to be examined only in the first year when the asset is purchased; (iii)
existence of individual assets in the block itself amounts to use for the
purpose of business. However, proportionate disallowance of depreciation can be
made if an individual asset contained in the block has been used for purposes
other than business
.



Facts:

The assessee was carrying on two businesses with one division
at Dombivli and the other in Surat. Though the Surat division had closed down,
the assessee continued to claim depreciation on its assets. The Assessing
Officer (AO) disallowed the proportionate amount of depreciation attributable to
the assets of the Surat division, on the ground that the assets of the Surat
division were not used for the purpose of business. Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal discussed in detail the meaning of the term
`depreciation’, considered various statutory provisions which have been amended
consequent to the insertion of the concept of block of assets and also Circular
No. 469, dated 23rd September, 1986 issued by CBDT. It also considered various
judicial pronouncements, examined the principle of commercial expediency and
also examined in detail how the scheme of depreciation on block of assets works,
and held as follows:

(i) Depreciation allowance u/s 32 is a statutory allowance
not confined expressly to diminution in value of the asset by reason of wear
and tear;

(ii) Main objective of introducing the block of assets
concept was only to reduce time and effort spent in detailed record
maintenance;

(iii) If the asset has neither been used for business nor
for non-business purposes, but remained in block of assets, the provisions of
S. 38(2) are not applicable;

(iv) The ratio of the decision of the SB of the Chandigarh
Tribunal in the case of Gulati Saree Centre vs ACIT 71 ITD 73 (Chd)(SB) does
not apply to the present case, since in the case before the SB, the cars owned
by the assessee firm were being used for personal purposes by the partners,
whereas in the present case, assets remained in block of assets and were not
used for non-business purposes like personal use, etc.;

(v) The condition/requirement `used for the purpose of
business’, as provided in s. 32(1) for the concept of depreciation on block of
assets can be summarized as: (a) Use of individual asset for the purpose of
business can be examined only in the first year when the asset is purchased;
(b) In subsequent years, use of block of assets is to be examined. Existence
of individual assets in the block of asset itself amounts to use for the
purpose of business;

(vi) The judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Dineshkumar Gulabchand Agarwal vs CIT & Anr 267 ITR 768 (Bom) is not
applicable to the facts of the present case, since the issue in the case under
consideration is whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
assessee is entitled to depreciation on the assets of the closed unit. The
decision of the Bombay High Court has been distinguished by the ITAT in the
case of G R Shipping Ltd (ITA No. 822/Mum/05 order, dated
17.7.2008)(2008-TIOL-729-ITAT-Mum) by observing that in that case, the asset
in question was not at all put to use.


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Section 10A — Section 10A grants a deduction and not an exemption, and section 80AB is not applicable to s. 10A—Deduction u/s 10A is to be allowed while computing income under the head `Profits and gains of business or profession’ and not under `Gross tot

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57 2010 TIOL 69 ITAT MAD SB

Scientific Atlanta India Technology Pvt. Ltd. vs ACIT

A.Y.: 2003-04 & 2004-05. Date of order: 05.02.2010

Section 10A — Section 10A grants a deduction and not an
exemption, and section 80AB is not applicable to s. 10A—Deduction u/s 10A is to
be allowed while computing income under the head `Profits and gains of business
or profession’ and not under `Gross total income’. Deduction u/s 10A is to be
computed without setting off the losses of non-eligible units against profits of
an eligible unit.

Facts :

During the previous year which was relevant to A.Y. 2003-04,
the assessee had two units: one in Chennai and one in Delhi. The unit in Chennai
was engaged in development of software and its profits were eligible for
deduction u/s 10A. The unit in Delhi was engaged in the business of trading.
During the year under consideration, the unit in Delhi had suffered a loss and
the unit in Chennai had earned profits. The assessee claimed deduction u/s 10A
in respect of its entire profits from the unit in Chennai, without setting off
the loss suffered by the unit in Delhi.

The Assessing Officer (AO) did not accept the computation of
the assessee on the ground that after the amendment of s. 10A, w.e.f. 1.4.2001,
a deduction was to be allowed from the “total income”, and consequently, the
loss suffered by the Delhi unit had to be taken into account.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who
upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
A special bench was constituted to dispose of the appeal as well as to
adjudicate upon the following question of law:

“Should the business losses of a non eligible unit, whose
income is not eligible for deduction under section 10A of the Act, have to be
set off against the profits of the undertaking eligible for deduction under
section 10A, for the purposes of determining the allowable deduction under
section 10A of the Act?”

Held:



(i) Even though s. 10A falls under Chapter III, it has been
mentioned in the section itself that what is to be given is only a deduction
and not exemption. A deduction in respect of profits eligible under s. 10A is
required to be made at the stage of computing the income under the head
“Profits and gains of business and profession” and not from the gross total
income;

(ii) Section 80AB applies to deductions mentioned in
Chapter VI-A. Section 10A does not fall in Chapter VI-A, and hence, s. 80AB
cannot be applied to s. 10A;

(iii) It can be noticed from the language of s. 10A (1)
that a deduction of such profits and gains that are derived by “an”
undertaking, qualify u/s 10A for deduction from the total income. In case the
assessee has more than one undertaking, one has to consider the profits and
gains of that “particular undertaking” which qualifies for deduction u/s 10A.
Again,
s. 10A (4) uses the words “profits and gains of the business of the
undertaking” and not total profits of the business of the assessee. The
distinction between the “undertaking” and the “assessee” is well-known and has
also been noted by the CBDT in Circular F. No. 15/563, dated 13.12.1963. The
deduction u/s 10A attaches to the undertaking and not to the assessee;

(iv) The losses of a unit which is not eligible for
deduction u/s 10A cannot be set off against the profits of the unit which is
eligible for deduction u/s 10A. The loss of the non-eligible unit can be set
off against other incomes or may be carried forward;

(v) If there is more than one undertaking which is eligible
for deduction u/s 10A, and if some of the units have profit and other units
have loss, it would be an entirely different case from the present one. The
decision rendered in this case would not be applicable to such cases.

The Special Bench decided the appeal in favour of the
assessee.

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Section 54EC and Circular No. 142/9/2006 TPL, dated 30.6.2006 — Non-availability of bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC is a reasonable cause for not purchasing the bonds within the time specified in s. 54EC—Since the assessee purchased the bonds as s

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56 2010 TIOL 60 ITAT (Mum)

Cello Plast vs DCIT

A. Y.: 2006-07. Date of order: 19.01.2010

 

Section 54EC and Circular No. 142/9/2006 TPL, dated 30.6.2006
— Non-availability of bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC is a reasonable
cause for not purchasing the bonds within the time specified in s. 54EC—Since
the assessee purchased the bonds as soon as the same were available, it was
eligible to claim deduction u/s 54EC.

Facts:

During the year, the assessee sold its factory building which
formed a part of its block of assets. The capital gain of Rs. 49,36,293 arising
from the sale of the factory building was claimed to be deductible u/s 54EC. The
bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC were not available and as a result of
various representations, the CBDT had extended the time period for subscribing
the bonds upto 31.12.2006, vide its Circular No. 142/9/2006 TPL, dated
30.6.2006. Before filing the return of income, the assessee had deposited Rs. 50
lakh through a fixed deposit with the State Bank of India and had in a letter
intimated to the banker that the fixed deposit would be encashed as soon as the
bonds were available. Along with the return of income, the assessee had appended
a note explaining the factual position and stating that it will subscribe to the
bonds as soon as the same were available. The bonds were available on 22.1.2007
and the assessee applied for them on 27.1.2007, whereupon the bonds were
allotted to him on 31.1.2007.

The Assessing Officer held that since the capital asset
transferred formed a part of the block of assets,
s. 50 deems the gain arising on transfer thereof to be a short-term capital gain
arising from the transfer of a short term capital asset. He also held that
though the circular extended the time period up to 31.12.2006, the bonds had
been purchased on 31.1.2007 which was beyond the due date specified. He,
therefore, disallowed the claim of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A),
who held that following the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in
the case of Ace Builders P. Ltd. 281 ITR 210 (Bom), the assessee was entitled to
deduction u/s 54EC, subject to satisfaction of conditions stated therein. Since
the bonds were not subscribed to by the due date extended by the CBDT circular,
the assessee was held not to be entitled to deduction u/s 54EC.

Held :

On the basis of facts, the Tribunal held that it was an
impossible task for the assessee to comply with the time period laid down u/s
54EC. The delay in purchase due to non-availability of the bonds was held to be
a reasonable cause, and the assessee was held to be entitled to exemption u/s
54EC. The Tribunal also noted that in the case of Ram Agarwal 81 ITD 163, on
similar facts, it had been held by the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled
to claim deduction u/s 54EC. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If an order passed by the Tribunal is not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court or that of the jurisdictional High Court rendered prior to or subsequent to the impugned order, the same constitutes a

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55 (2009) 34 SOT 541 (Mum.)(TM)

Kailashnath Malhotra vs Jt.CIT

Block period 01.04.1987 to 15.12.1997. Date of order:
12.10.2009.

 

Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If an order passed
by the Tribunal is not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court or
that of the jurisdictional High Court rendered prior to or subsequent to the
impugned order, the same constitutes a mistake as apparent from records and
capable of rectification u/s 254(2).

Certain additions made by the Assessing Officer were
confirmed by the Tribunal. One miscellaneous application filed by the assessee
u/s 254(2), seeking rectification of the Tribunal’s order was dismissed by the
Tribunal. The assessee once again moved another miscellaneous application u/s
254(2) seeking rectification of the Tribunal’s order.

Facts:

The Judicial Member of the Tribunal, in light of the judgment
of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of P.R.Metrani vs CIT [2006] 287 ITR
209 / 157 Taxman 325, recalled the order of the Tribunal on merits. However, the
Accountant Member did not agree with the Judicial Member and dismissed the
miscellaneous application on the ground that successive miscellaneous
applications were not permissible and, further, the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of P.R.Metrani (supra) was not applicable. In view of the
difference of opinion between the members of the Tribunal, the matter was
referred to the Third Member.

Held:


The Third Member held as follows:

1. It is evident that the scope of sub-section (2) is
restricted to rectifying any mistake in the order which is apparent from
records and does not extend to reviewing of the earlier order.

2. It is well-settled that the scope of proceedings u/s
254(2) is confined to rectifying any mistake which is apparent on the very
face of it. If the point needs to be proved on the strength of different
facets of reasoning, the same would become debatable. Once a particular point
falls in the realm of “debatable issue”, it automatically goes out of the
domain of sub-section (2) of section 254.

3. If two views are possible on a particular point and the
Tribunal has preferred one view over the other, no rectification application
lies for impressing upon the Tribunal to choose the other possible view in
preference over the one already adopted by it.

4. If, however, the order passed by the Tribunal is not in
conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court or that of the
jurisdictional High Court, rendered prior to or subsequent to the impugned
order, the same constitutes a mistake apparent from records and capable of
rectification u/s 254(2).

5. Similarly, it will be an error apparent from records, if
the order is not in conformity with the retrospective amendment carried out to
the statutory provision covering the period and point in dispute, subject to
the fulfilment of other conditions prescribed in the Act such as limitation
period, etc.

 


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Section 40(b) — Since section 40(b) uses the term “authorise” and not “quantify”, salary to partners cannot be disallowed merely because amount of salary is not quantified in partnership deed.

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54 (2009) 34 SOT 495 (Pune)

Asst.CIT vs Suman Construction

A.Ys.:1999-2000 and 2000-01.

Date of order: 31.12.2008.

 

Section 40(b) — Since section 40(b) uses the term “authorise”
and not “quantify”, salary to partners cannot be disallowed merely because
amount of salary is not quantified in partnership deed.

Section 119 — CBDT has no jurisdiction to substitute the term
“authorise” occurring in section 40(b) by the term “quantify” in its Circular
No.739, dated 25.03.1996.

Facts:

The salary paid to partners by the assessee firm for A.Ys.
1999-2000 and 2000-2001 was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground
that in the partnership deed filed along with the return of income for
A.Y.1998-99, neither the salary payable to the partners was quantified nor the
manner in which such quantification had to be done was prescribed. By referring
to the CBDT Circular No.739, dated 25.03.1996 [1996] 131 CTR (St.) 53, the
Assessing Officer was of the view that since there was no specified
quantification, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.40(b) in respect
of the salary.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled to claim the
deduction for remuneration paid to the partners since the payment of salary to
the four partners was authorised by the partnership deed.

Held:

The Tribunal, upholding the CIT(A)’s order, noted as follows:

1. On reading this section it becomes clear that it does
not make it mandatory to quantify the amount of salary in one of the clauses
of the partnership deed, mainly because of the reason that the monetary limit
or ceiling is otherwise prescribed in the statute itself. The statute has used
the term “authorise” and not the term “quantify”.

 

2. In respect of the CBDT Circular No.739
(supra) relied upon by the Assessing Officer, the Tribunal clarified that the
CBDT cannot issue a circular u/s 119 which tantamounts to detracting from the
provisions of the Act. While interpreting the clause of a statute, there is no
scope for importing into the statute some other words which are not there or
to exclude words which are there.

 

3. It was also not a case that the impugned taxing
provisions were ambiguous and, therefore, capable of more than one
interpretation. Since there was no ambiguity, there was no question of a
beneficial interpretation to either side. Therefore, the words contained in
the provision must be given a natural meaning as commonly understood in the
legal parlance.

 


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Section 40(a)(i), read with section 2(28A) — Discounting charges paid, cannot be treated as interest in terms of section 2(28A) and, therefore, such amount is not liable for TDS u/s.195.– Also, the same cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).

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53 (2009) 34 SOT 424 (Delhi)

Asst. CIT vs Cargill Global
Trading (I) (P.) Ltd.

A.Y.: 2004-05. Date of order: 09.10.2009

 

Section 40(a)(i), read with section 2(28A) — Discounting
charges paid, cannot be treated as interest in terms of section 2(28A) and,
therefore, such amount is not liable for TDS u/s.195.– Also, the same cannot be
disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).

Facts:

The assessee company discounted its export sales bills with a
company in Singapore. The discounting charges were disallowed by the Assessing
Officer u/s 40(a)(i) on the ground that the assessee did not deduct tax at
source u/s 195 on the discounting charges which were in the nature of interest
in terms of section 2(28A). The CIT(A) held that the discounting charges paid by
the assessee were not interest, as neither any money was borrowed nor any debt
was incurred. Therefore, no tax was required to be deducted at source from such
payments. He, accordingly, deleted the disallowance.

Held:

The Tribunal, upholding the CIT(A)’s order, noted as
hereunder:

1. As per section 2(28A), interest means sum payable in
respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred. In the instant case, there was
no debt incurred or money borrowed. In fact, it was a case where the assessee
had merely discounted sale consideration receivable on sale of goods.

2. The word `interest’ defined u/s 2(28A) does not include
the discounting charges on discounting of bill of exchange.

3. Though Circular No.65 was issued in relation to
deduction of tax u/s 194A, yet in respect of payment to a resident, the same
would be relevant even for the purpose of considering whether the discount
should be treated as interest or not. The CBDT had opined that where the
supplier of goods makes over the usance bill / hundi to his bank which
discounts the same and credits the net amount to the supplier’s account
straightaway, without waiting for realisation of the bill on due date, the net
payment made by the bank to the supplier is in the nature of price paid for
the bill. Such payment cannot technically be held as including any interest
and, therefore, no tax need be deducted at source from such payment by the
bank.

4. Hence, the assessee was not under obligation to deduct
tax at source u/s 195. Accordingly, the same amount could not be disallowed by
invoking section 40(a)(i).

 


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S. 201(1A) — When no tax is payable by payee, no interest can be charged from payer

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47
(2008) 304 ITR (AT) 338 (Jodhpur)

ITO v. Emrald Construction Co. P. Ltd.

ITA No. 357 and 370/Jdpr./2002

A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 201(1A) — In case no tax is payable by the payee, no
interest u/s.201(1A) can be charged from the payer.

 

The assessee-company had made payment to three companies in
the nature of interest and contractor’s payment, but without TDS on the same.
The Assessing Officer levied interest u/s.201(1A) till the date of assessment
order. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contested that no tax was payable qua
contract or interest payments (incomes) or qua any other incomes of the
recipients, so the question of loss to the Revenue does not arise. Hence, no
interest was leviable u/s.201(1A). The CIT(A) upheld the levy of interest, but
restricted it till the date of assessment order of the recipients. On cross
appeals by the assessee and the Revenue, the ITAT held that

1. The interest to be charged u/s.201(1A) is not a penalty,
but a compensation of revenue loss for the delay in the payments of tax. The
rigours of S. 201 are flexible and not rigid as would not admit any sort of
explanation with regard to non-deduction at source.

2. The charging of interest u/s.201(1A) is definitely
mandatory, but this ‘mandatory’ nature has to take colour from the main charge
of the deduction of tax at source u/s.201. So to say, when the ‘tax’ which was
to be deducted u/s.201 was not payable at all, it would be unjust to conclude
that, in all eventualities, come what may, interest u/s.201(1A) is to be
charged from the deductor.

3. It is certain that the interest is chargeable from the
date on which the tax is due for deduction. The starting point has been
envisaged in the Act but not the end point. The ‘benchmark’ of the end point
is to be decided after taking into consideration various factors. The question
of charging interest up to framing of assessment orders in the hands of the
recipients would not arise, because ‘no tax dues’ are found against them and
as such there was no loss of revenue. Interest cannot be charged for the sake
of charging of interest only, it has to be charged in accordance with a
provision.

4. The interest is chargeable on the amount of tax to be
deducted. In case the chargeable tax at source increases or decreases, the
interest amount varies accordingly. But, in a case where the tax was not
payable at all, then in that case no interest can be charged. The word
‘compensatory’ clearly suggests this conclusion.

 


Cases relied upon :



(i) Vikrant Tyres Ltd. v. ITO, (1993) 202 ITR 454
(Kar.)

(ii) CIT v. Rishikesh Apartments Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd.,
(2002) 253 ITR 310 (Guj.)

(iii) Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Mrs. V. P. Damle,
(1986) 157 ITR 812 (Bom.)

(iv) Karimtharuvi Tea Estate Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1966) 60 ITR
262 (SC)

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S. 115JA — AO has no power to scrutinise accounts except as per Explanation — No addition can be made due to reduction in value of inventory and obsolescence loss.

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46 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 123 (Ahmedabad)

Deepak Nitrate v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 1646 and 1748/Ahd./2004

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 9-4-2007

S. 115JA — Assessing officer has no power to scrutinise the
accounts except as provided in Explanation to S. 115JA and hence no addition can
be made by him on account of reduction in value of inventory and obsolescence
loss for computation of book profit in terms of S. 115JA of the Act.

 

According to the Assessing Officer the two amounts viz.
(i) provision made for obsolescence loss, and (ii) reduction due to change in
method of inventory valuation should be added back in computation of the book
profits as per S. 115JA. He therefore added the said amounts to the income of
the assessee invoking the provisions of S. 154. The CIT(A) upheld the addition
no. (i) and deleted the addition no. (ii).

 

On cross appeals by the assessee and Revenue, the Tribunal
observed as under :

(1) Diminution in value of asset is not a provision for any
liability and consequently it would not be a case of reserve.

(2) As per the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, an
amount set apart to become a provision has to be either (i) provision for
depreciation, renewals, or diminution in value of asset, or (ii) provision for
any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial
accuracy. However, the Income-tax Act has included only one part of this
definition for increasing the net profit to determine the book profits and
that is provision for meeting liability other than ascertained liability.
Hence provision for diminution in the value of asset cannot be added back
u/s.115JA.

(3) The change in method of valuation of inventory was
adopted by the assessee being more scientific and was consistently followed.
Even otherwise, it would be a diminution in value of inventories and since
these items had not been found to be wrong by any authorities under the
Companies Act, the Assessing Officer did not have the jurisdiction under the
provisions of the Act to add back such items for calculating book profits.

 


Case relied upon :



(i) Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 255 ITR 273
(SC)



levitra

I. By holding shares, assessee entitled to exercise rights of owner of flat — Whether entitled to depreciation — Held, Yes. II. Forfeiture of application money on non-payment of call money on issue of debentures —Held, Capital receipt

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

45 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 167 (Mumbai)

Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd.
v.
DCIT

A.Ys. : 1997-98 to 2001-2002. Dated : 21-9-2007



I. By virtue of holding the shares, assessee entitled
to exercise the rights of owner in respect of a flat — Whether entitled to
depreciation on flats — Held, Yes.



S. 32 — The assessee purchased the shares of YIL on the
basis of which it got an exclusive right to use and occupy certain flats and
claimed depreciation on the same which was disallowed by the Assessing
Officer, but the same was allowed by the CIT(A) relying on the provisions of
S. 2(47)(vi), S. 27(iii), S. 269UA(d)(ii) and also relevant Supreme Court
judgments.

 

The Tribunal observed as under :

1. The articles of association of a company engaged in
the business of real estate may provide that a shareholder of particular
shares would be entitled to exercise the rights of owner in respect of
properties owned by the company. Such mode of transfer is duly recognised by
the Legislature in provisions of S. 2(47)(vi), S. 27(iii), and S.
269UA(d)(ii)


2. The meaning of the term ‘owner’ for the purpose of S.
32 although not defined in the Income-tax Act, a reference to Supreme
Court’s decision in various cases can be construed so as to include a person
who can exercise the rights of the owner not on behalf of the owner but in
his own right. The term ‘owned’ as occurring in S. 32(1) should be assigned
a wider meaning. The provisions of this Section are for the benefit of the
assessee and the intention of the Legislature should be interpreted
accordingly.


 


The Tribunal accordingly allowed the assessee’s claim :

 

Cases relied upon :



(a) CIT v. Podar Cement P. Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR
625 (SC)

(b) Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 239 ITR
775 (SC)

(c) R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala (1971) 82 ITR 570 (SC)

 

II. Forfeiture of application money on non-payment of
call money on issue of debentures —Held, Capital receipt.

The assessee issued partly convertible debentures and
received application money. On non-payment of call money, certain amount was
forfeited by the assessee. The assessee claimed it to be capital receipt not
liable to tax, which was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The CIT(A) deleted
the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

 

On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT held that :

1. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. V.
Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd., 222 ITR 344 relied upon by the assessee, is
not relevant because the amount received is not a trading receipt of the
assessee.

2. Since the amount received was in respect of debentures
issued, it is a capital receipt not chargeable to rax.

 


Cases relied upon :



(1) CIT v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2003) 261
ITR 501 (Bom.)

(2) Prism Cement v. Joint CIT, (2006) 285 ITR (AT)
43 (Mumbai)

 




levitra

Set-up date of business is question of fact and depends upon circumstances involved.

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New Page 1

44 302 ITR (AT) 1 Pune


Styler India Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT 2008

SS ITA 1961 S. 28, S. 37

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 8-4-2008

When business can be said to be set up is a question of fact
and would depend upon the circumstances involved in a particular case.

The assessee-company was set up as a 100% sub-sidiary of S of
Austria with the aim to make available technical expertise to the Indian
industry in three main areas — technical design and con-sultancy services,
systems supplier with respect to vehicle components and parts, sourcing of
vehicle components and parts from India for the global market.

 

The assessee filed a return for the A.Y. 1998-99 showing a
receipt of Rs.3,91,780 as interest on fixed deposit with the banks and claiming
expenses of Rs.49,27,336 as administrative and selling expenses as against the
receipt. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that expenses of Rs.17,92,600
were capital in nature and that exhibition and launch expenses of Rs.15,65,239
should be disallowed as preliminary expenses.

 

The assessee explained that repairs, improvement and
innovation expenses were incurred for carrying on the business which was done by
obtaining long lease and in regards to exhibition and launch expense of
Rs.15,65,239, these were incurred after the company was formed on September 15,
1997.

 

For substantiating its claim, the assessee stated that it had
attended an exhibition in January 1998 at Expo ’98 at Delhi and it had taken a
stall and participated in the exhibition to promote the business interest of the
company and to increase its visibility in the eyes of Indian automotive
industry. The Assessing Officer held that interest income was liable to be
assessed under the head ‘Other Sources’ and expenses claimed amounting to
Rs.49,27,336 were not admissible and were to be disallowed.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that there was no sufficient
proof to hold that the business had commenced, that all expenses were incurred
by the assessee before setting up of the business and
were not permissible. He upheld assessment of interest income under the head
‘Other Sources’ and did not allow any expenses against the above receipt.

 

On appeal to the Appellate Tribunal :

 

Held :



1. That there were details of various activities handled by
the Managing Director during his stay in India and the corporate offices he
visited to carry on discussion with different persons. Even the names of the
persons he met were given. The assessee had also furnished the detailed
qualification of the general manager, marketing, who had met various
prospective clients and given a summary of various activities carried on by
the employee. The assessee had placed on record correspondence exchanged with
various manufacturers of automobiles.

2. The expenditure clearly showed that the assessee had a
building on which rent of Rs.3,10,400 was incurred. It further carried on an
advertisement related to the business it had set up and other miscellaneous
expenses connected with the consultative services the assessee intended to
provide.

3. The assessee participated and took a stall in ‘Auto
Fair’ held in Delhi with the objective of advancing the assessee’s business of
consultancy. The assessee had a place of business; it had qualified people who
could give advice on automobile industry. There was material to show that the
assessee contacted various clients who entered into agreement with the
assessee in the subsequent years and paid fees for consultation to the
assessee.

4. Merely because actual receipts were not shown, it could
not be said that the assessee did not set up its business. When the assessee
was ready to offer advice on matters and problems indicated in the
correspondence with the clients, it was im-material that no fees for the
consultancy were received in the year under consideration. The assessee had an
office from which advice could be given in the automobile industry. All the
correspondence was addressed to a particular address in Pune. The assessee had
machinery to render advice in the technical field. On the above facts, it
could not be held that the assessee did not set up business in the relevant
period.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Sarabhai Management Corporation Ltd.,
(1991) 192 ITR 151 (SC) (para 84)

(ii) Neil Automation Technology Ltd. v. Deputy CIT,
(2002) 120 Taxman 205 (Mum.) (Tribunal) (paras 4,18, 31, 57, 59, 62)

(iii) Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. v. CIT,
(1954) 26 ITR 151 (Bom.) (paras 4, 10, 13, 17, 29, 35, 52, 59, 60, 61, 75, 77,
81, 85, 92) and many more.