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More Delays in Mergers/ Arrangements – A Recent MCA Circular Prescribes Further Requirements for Schemes

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Synopsis

Section 394A of the Companies Act 1956 requires Central Government [powers delegated to Regional Directors] to prepare report on schemes involving arrangement, mergers, amalgamation, etc. of companies for its submissions to Court. Recently, MCA has issued Circular No. 1/2014 dated 15 January 2014 requiring Regional Directors to also seek the representation of the Income-tax Department and/or other sectoral regulators while preparing the aforesaid Report. The learned author in this article explains the new requirements in the Circular, their impact on the schemes and comparison with the existing requirements under the provisions of the Act/ Rules and Companies Act, 2013.

New prescriptions

Mergers have just got a little more complicated and even more time consuming than earlier. Yet another round of notices/objections by statutory authorities have been added to even otherwise a fairly long existing list. Now, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) requires that the Regional Director should invite, in certain cases, objections to a scheme of amalgamation/arrangement, etc. (Schemes) from other regulators like Income-tax department, SEBI, RBI, etc. – refer circular number F. No. 2/1/2014 dated 15th January 2014.

Abuse of Schemes

Mergers, demergers, schemes of arrangements/ reduction, etc. have often been used, with the incidental or even main object to circumvent various laws, avoid taxes, window dress accounts, etc. Carried forward losses may be made available to other profit making companies to help reduce their taxes. Reserves otherwise not “free” become so after such schemes. Items of expenditure/losses that should have gone to reduce profits are debited to reserves. The rules relating to listing of shares on stock exchanges may also be sought to be bypassed. Even shareholders’ wealth have been found to be expropriated by schemes such as that for forced buybacks of shares and so on.

The impression – and this is only partly correct – is that the ‘scheme’ing parties are often able to convince the court that, since shareholders/creditors have duly approved the scheme and that there is nothing wrong on the face of the scheme, it should be approved. The court is also sought to be persuaded that its role is limited in such cases and, particularly when the interested parties have not objected before the court, the court should sanction the Scheme. Belated objections are also sought to be rejected.

Interestingly, existing provisions for sanction of such schemes already require a series of approvals under direct supervision of the high court. This is without considering several specific approvals/clearances/filings required under other laws. The schemes almost always require approvals of shareholders/creditors at meetings conducted under court’s supervision. Depending upon the type of scheme, a detailed audit is required to be carried out by a specially appointed auditor. A notice has to be served to the Regional Director seeking his comments, on behalf of the Central Government. Finally, the Court has to sanction the scheme. Often, this ends up being a bureaucratic nightmare with the petitioners having to run from the proverbial pillar-to-post to expedite things.

To add to this, now, the MCA has added yet another window of delay and objections from multiple authorities. Let us understand what the new requirement is.

New requirement of inviting objections from other regulators including income-tax authorities

As stated above, a notice has to be served, as required by section 394A, on the Regional Director (RD) of the proposed scheme. The RD acts for this purpose on behalf of the Central Government. The Court is required into consideration the representations, if any, of the RD.

Other regulators/departments such as the Incometax department usually do not have a direct role in the proceedings though of course they may still object directly to the court. Such other regulators/ departments may of course also convey their views to the RD.

However, it was recently found,by the MCA (so the circular states), that the RD ‘did not project the objections of the income-tax department’ in a particular scheme. Considering this, certain obligations have been placed on the RD.

It is now prescribed that the RD should do two things. Firstly, when it receives such a notice of scheme u/s. 394A, it has to invite specific comments from the income-tax department. If no comments are received within 15 days of receipt of communication from the RD, the RD may presume that the Income-tax department has no objections.

Secondly, the RD should also examine the scheme to consider whether feedback from other sectoral regulators should be obtained. If yes, a similar opportunity should be given to them. Though not named, it appears that comments of regulators like SEBI, RBI, etc. may be invited in appropriate cases. It is quite possible that in practice, the RD may routinely send the scheme to various regulators for their comments.

What should the RD do if comments are received? Does it merely forward them like a post office? The answer is, generally, yes. The RD is not required to decide on the correctness or otherwise of the comments and rightly so. However, the RD is still given some discretion. If it has ‘compelling’ reasons to doubt the correctness of the comments, then it is required to make a reference to the MCA. The MCA, in turn, will take up the matter before the concerned other Ministry before taking a final decision on what approach to take before the Court.

Needless to emphasise, the individual regulators/ departments are free to appear directly before the court and make their objections.

However, the objections/comments of the regulators/ departments are binding on the court. The court has wide power and discretion to examine the specific objections on their merits and may accept or reject the same.

Impact on Schemes

In theory, it may appear that the new requirement is beneficial and does not create any fresh hurdle or delay. It ensures that that the interests of various stakeholders whom the regulator represents are taken into account. The 15-days period for submissions of comments may not, in practice, really add to the overall time taken for attaining sanction of the court. The court would also have the benefit of all views before sanctioning the scheme. The applicants may also have to worry less of regulators raising objection later when irrevocable steps of implementing the scheme may have been taken.

In practice, however, it is quite likely that this would add to the delay and possibly make the matter more litigious. Often, a scheme may involve serious tax implications. It will have to be seen whether the Income-tax department promptly replies with all its detailed objections in 15 days. What would happen if the income-tax department (or other regulator) seeks extension of time?

Interestingly (as also discussed later), there already exist specific requirements for inviting comments from certain authorities. For example, in case of certain schemes involving listed companies, the draft scheme has to be filed with the stock exchange 30 days in advance during which they may give their comments. Courts have held that if the stock exchange does not respond within 30 days, the scheme does not have to be held up and the court may still go ahead and sanction it. Thus, it is possible that the parties may represent before the court to go ahead and consider the scheme in case of delay in receipt of comments. Granting of time to a regulator is at the discreation of the court however in practice it is quite likely that extension of time will be granting resulting overall delay particularly in complex cases. One has also to remember that the delay may come from any of the various regulators/department to whom the RD has sent notice.

Existing requirements of approval/NOCs, etc.

As stated earlier, the new requirement is in addition  to the several existing requirements by various authorities/regulators. In fact, there is a contradiction in approach in several provisions. On the one hand, several provisions give exemption if the restructuring is carried out through the court route. The SEBI Takeover Regulations, for example, give exemptions where the acquisition of shares is through specified    schemes.    The     Income-tax    Act,     1961     too    grants exemptions to transfers made through specified Schemes. At the same time, there are provisions for obtaining clearances/approvals or just a notice
in some laws.

For example, under certain circumstances, prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India would be required in    case    of    mergers    of    non-banking    financial    companies. The Listing Agreement requires listed companies, under    certain    circumstances,    to    file    the    proposed    scheme 30 days in advance with stock exchanges. There is even an overriding requirement that schemes should not be used to circumvent securities laws.

However, the new requirement inreases one general layer    of    scrutiny    whereby    a    specific    notice     is     to    be given to Income-tax department and the RD is also required to generally consider whether notice to other regulators should also be given.

Companies Act, 2013

The    provisions    of     this    Act,     though    not    yet    notified in this respect, provide for a generic, though ambiguously worded, requirement of giving notice. Section 230(5) of the Act requires that a notice with prescribed documents would have to be sent to ‘the Income-tax authorities, the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange Board, the Registrar,     the     respective     stock    exchanges,     the    official liquidator, the Competition Commission of India….. and such other sectoral regulators or authorities that    are    likely    to    be    affected    by    the compromise or    arrangement and shall require that representations, if any, to be made by the authorities within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of such notice, failing which, it shall be presumed that they have no representation to make on the proposals’.

The    scope    of    this    prescription    is    different    from    that set out in the circular. It is wider in some aspects but narrower in others. It requires that a notice has to be    given    to all     the    specified    authorities    and    others too    which    are     likely    to    be    affected    by         the    scheme.    It may sound strange that authorities like SEBI are to be    notified    even     in    cases    where     the    companies involved    may    be    unlisted    or    otherwise    not    affected    by regulations governed by SEBI. Perhaps the intention is, as appears from latter words, that only those    authorities.    who    are     likely     to    be    affected    by a     scheme     should    be     so    notified.   

Conclusion

Authorities/regulators like SEBI, MCA, RBI, Income-tax, etc. do have powers to examine the merger and its implications even after the scheme is sanctioned. If the scheme results in violation of any requirements specified    under     the     respective     laws,     they    can     take appropriate action. For example, the Reserve Bank   of    India    can    initiate    action    if    a    non-banking    financial   company is amalgamated in a manner that any of the requirements of the Act/Directions are contravened. Similarly, SEBI/stock exchanges have powers to examine the implications in case of a merger. Thus, it is not as if that a cheme, on approval, would make the provisions of such laws redundant.

However, at the same time, certain schemes may have consequences which cannot be annuled. For example, there have been schemes of forced buyback of shares whereby shares of even dissenting shareholders or those who have not positively consented    have    been    bought    at     specified    price.    Once this is done, it may be too late for the regulators concerned to take corrective action.

Thus, this new requirement gives an opportunity, to the concerned authorities to examine and present their objections before the court, either directly or through the RD. This would/should avoid subsequent action by the Regulators who were given the requisite notice.

Only time will show whether these new requirement will save time and avoid subsequent action. I believe we don’t need more laws – what is required is better administration.

Jointly Acquired Immovable Property

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Synopsis

‘Joint tenancy’ and ‘tenancy in common’ are two apparently similar sounding but diametrically opposite modes of jointly owning immovable property. The Indian Law in this respect is not codified and is derived from English Law and decisions. This Article examines these concepts, their difference, their termination and their use in Hindu Law, Income-tax Act, Succession Law, etc.

Introduction

Immovable Property may be acquired singly or jointly, i.e., two or more persons together acquire the property. While joint owners are commonly referred to as co-owners, when the property is joint, then a question arises whether the purchasers are owning the property as Joint Tenants or as Tenants in Common? Both these terms may appear similar but in Law, there is a vast difference between the two. Depending upon how a property has been acquired the succession to the same would be determined. It may be noted that although the terms may indicate that this applies only to tenanted properties, they are also used for ownership properties. Hence, it becomes very important while acquiring a property that the document very clearly specifies the manner in which it is being jointly acquired. It is very interesting to note that inspite of this being a matter of such significance, neither the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 nor any other Indian enactment deals with these concepts. These are very popular under English Law and hence, we need to refer to English as well as Indian judgments to understand their essence. These concepts have been impliedly or expressly applied in various Laws. Let us examine some of the facets of these two important concepts in Property Law.

Joint Tenancy

A joint tenancy has certain distinguishing features, such as, unity of title, interest and possession. Each co-owner has an undefined right and interest in property acquired as joint tenants. Thus, no coowner can say what is his or her share. One other important feature of a joint tenancy is that after the death of one of the joint tenants, the property passes by survivorship to the other joint tenant and not by succession to the heirs of the deceased coowner. For example, X, Y and Z are owning a building as joint tenants. Z dies. His undivided share passes on to X and Y. Joint Tenancy is generally resorted to in case of a house purchased by a husband and wife. Hence, after the death of the husband, the wife would become the sole owner, and not the heirs of the husband. This is very popular in England. Property owned by a Hindu coparcenary in which rights of family members pass by survivorship is an example of joint tenancy – Bahu Rani vs. Rajendra Bux Singh, AIR 1933 PC 72. In case of a Will, where property is bequeathed to two or more beneficiaries in an undefined share, then it may be treated as a joint tenancy.

Tenancy-in-Common

This is the opposite of joint tenancy since the shares are specified and each co-owner in a ‘tenancy-in– common’ can state what share he owns in a property. On the death of a co-owner, his share passes by succession to his heirs / beneficiaries under the Will and not to the surviving co-owners. If a Will bequeaths a property to two beneficiaries in the ratio of 60:40, then they are treated as ‘tenantsin- common’.

Section 26 of the Income-tax Act provides that where property consisting of building and land appurtenant thereto is owned by two or more persons and their respective shares are definite and ascertainable, then the income under the head House Property shall not be taxed as if it were an AOP but in their individual hands in accordance with their respective shares. The Supreme Court in Indira Balkrishna, 39 ITR 546 (SC) has held that co-widows inheriting property from their husband in equal shares would be assessed u/s. 26. This section is a recognition of the concept of tenancy-in-common. However, for section 26 to apply, the shares must be fixed or clear. In Sh. Abdul Rahman, 12 ITR 302 (Lahore), it was held that due to a litigation it was impossible to determine the shares of co-owners and hence, the provisions of this section could not be applied.

Transfer of Property Act

Section 45 of the Act provides that where immoveable property is purchased two or more persons and the consideration for the same is paid out of a common fund, their share in the property is in the same ratio as their contributions to the funds. This however, is subject to a contract to the contrary. For instance, A and B’s share in common funds is in the ratio of 55:45 for buying a land. Their shares in the land would also be in the same ratio. If they contribute through separate funds then their share would be in the proportion of their funds. However, if there is no indication as to their share in the fund, then they shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property. Thus, if the shares in the funds are not known, then A and B would be presumed to hold the land equally.

However, this section does not yet fully address the issue as to whether the transferees buy as joint tenants or as tenants-in-common. In cases where the property has been acquired out of a common fund and the intention of the co-owners to own the property as joint tenancy, then it may be treated as one. In cases, where their shares in the fund are clear and demarcated, it may be treated as an acquisition by tenants in common.

What Prevails in India?

Unless a contrary intention appears from the Agreement, the Courts in India always lean in favour of tenancy in common and against joint tenancy. This is so whether the acquisition is by way of an Agreement or under a Will. The main clauses must make it very clear that the property is to be held as joint tenants or else the contrary would always be presumed – Mahomed Jusab Abdulla vs. Fatmabai Jusab Abdulla, 1947 BCI (O) 4 (Bom); Konijeti Venkayya vs. Thammana Peda Venkata Subbarao, 1955 AIR 1957 AP 619.

The Supreme Court in Boddu Venkatakrishna Rao vs. Boddu Satyavathi, 1968 SCR (2) 395 has held as follows in relation to a bequest under a Will to more than one beneficiary:

“The principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law, except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family……………………..that there were indications in the will that the intention of the testatrix was that the foster children should take as joint tenants and that this was apparent from the clause in the will which provided that “the entire property should be in possession of both of them and that both of them should enjoy throughout their lifetime the said property and that after their death the children that may be born to them should enjoy the same ……

We do not think that from this one can spell out a joint tenancy which is unknown to Hindu law except as above stated. The testatrix did not expressly mention that on the death of one all the properties would pass to the other by right of survivorship. We have no doubt on a construction of the will that ‘the testatrix never intended the foster children to take the property as joint tenants. The foster children who became tenants in common partitioned the property in exercise of their right.”

The above position of HUF coparcenary property being joint tenancy property is subject to one important exception introduced by section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to this section, any Hindu may dispose of by a Will his undivided interest in the coparcenary property. Under the uncodified Hindu Law, no karta/coparcener could dispose of his undivided share in the coparcenary property. His share passed by survivorship and not by succession (as is the case with all joint tenancies). Now, section 30 permits a coparcener to make a Will even for such joint property – Jayaram Govind Bhalerao vs. Jaywant Balkrishna Deshmukh 2008(3) Bom. CR. 585; CWT vs. Sampatrai Bhutoria & Sons, 137 ITR 868 (Cal). The Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Lal vs. Sanjeev Kumar (2009) 12 SCC 454, has held that:

“…In so far as the question whether under the custom governing the parties, a Will could be executed in respect of ancestral property is concerned, the same is no more res integra. ………in view of section 30 read with section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 a male Hindu governed by Mitakshara system is not debarred from making a Will in respect of coparcenary/ancestral property….”

Even if there is anything contrary in the Act or any other custom, the interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property is capable of being disposed of by way of Will. The bar created by way of custom that the coparcenary property is not capable of being alienated by executing a will by one of the coparceners is    taken    away    and rule    of    survivorship    is    finished    to a limited extent. But the limitation continues to apply in the case of gift and other alienations which are inter vivos – Kartari Devi vs. Tota Ram, 1992(1) SLC 402 (HP).

After the 2005 Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, even daughters who are coparceners can make a Will for their coparcenary property since they are now at par with sons.    
 
The Indian Succession Act, 1925 states that where a legacy under a Will is given to two persons jointly and one of them dies before the person making the Will, then the other legatee takes the property in its entirety. But if the intention of the testator was to give them distinct shares (i.e., as tenants in common), then the surviving legatees gets only his share. These provisions even apply to a Will by a Hindu – Krishnadas Tulsidas vs. Dwarkadas aliandas, 1936 BCI (O) 47. Thus, unless the Will is very clear that the legatees must not have a determinate share, they will get their bequest as tenants in common.

Terminating Joint Tenancy

Joint tenancy can come to an end by any one of the following modes:
(a)   One of the co-owners selling his undivided share to an outsider;
(b)  Mutual Agreement amongst all the co-owners;
(c)   Partition of joint tenancy
(d)   A manner of dealing/conduct by all co-owners which indicates an end of joint tenancy
(e)   Property vesting in the last surviving co-owner after which it becomes his sole property

Termination of joint tenancy by mutual agreement along with termination by conduct require special attention. Various old as well as very recent English decisions have dealt with this issue of termination of joint tenancy. Once joint tenancy comes to an end, the co-owners continue to hold the property as tenants in common.  Some of the landmark English decisions in this respect are as follows:
(a)  Williams vs. Hensman, 1861 EWHC Ch J87 / 70 ER 862 This is the most important decision which has laid down how joint tenancy can be severed. The High Court of Chancery held as follows:

“A joint-tenancy may be severed in three ways: in the first place, an act of any one of the persons interested operating upon his own share may create a severance as to that share. The right of each joint-tenant is a right by survivorship only in the event of no severance having taken place of the share which is claimed under the jus accrescendi. Each one is at liberty to dispose of his own interest in such manner as to sever it from the joint fund –losing, of course, at the same time, his own right of survivorship. Secondly, a joint-tenancy may be severed by mutual agreement. And, in the third place, there may be a severance by any course of dealing sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common………………for it must be borne in mind that a joint-tenancy is a right which any one of the joint-tenants may determine when he pleases; and, if all continue to deal on the footing of their interests not being joint, it would be most inequitable to treat it as a joint-tenancy when all the parties, whether in ignorance or not, have dealt with their interests as several.

I am of opinion, therefore, that the continuance of a joint-tenancy is not reconcilable with the covenant of indemnity to which I have referred; and I must, therefore, hold that all the shares were severed.”

(b)   Rugh Burgess vs. Sophia Rawnsley, (1975) EWCA Civ 2
 In this case, it was held that even if an agreement terminating joint tenancy was not in writing and was not specifically enforceable, yet it was  sufficient     to    effect    a    severance.    All     that     is     required    is a clear evidence of intention by both parties that the property should henceforth be held in common and not jointly.

(c)   Wallbank vs. Price (2007) EWHC 3001  (Ch)
The essence of a joint tenancy in equity is that each joint    tenant    holds    the    whole    of    the    beneficial    interest jointly and holds nothing separately.  In this case a declaration by a mother that her daughters should receive her ‘half share’ either on the disposal of the property or at the discretion of the father, was
treated    as    sufficient    evidence    to    indicate    severance    of joint tenancy.

 (d)    Davis vs. Smith, (2011) EWCA Civ 1603
A married couple intended to serve on each other, a notice of severance of joint tenancy over their marital house, but did not. The Court held that, on carefully examining the correspondence between the parties’ solicitors, their conduct and actions, joint tenancy was severed through their course of dealings. The Court added that the conclusion of a split was inevitable and only appropriate considering the course of dealings between them.  This is a very important decision since it held that even though there was no formal severance, tenancy-in-common can be created.    

Termination of Tenancy in Common
Tenancy in Common can be terminated by any one of the co-owners buying out the shares of the other co-owners. Thus, after this the property becomes sole ownership.  This is usually done by way of a Release Deed, under which the releasers release their share in favour of a co-owner, usually for some consideration.

The decision of the supreme Court in TN Aravinda Reddy, 120 IR 46(SC) dealt with a case of termination    of    a    HUF’s     joint     tenancy    property    by    way    of    a partition.     By    way     of     a     partition     deed,     the    HUF property was held by four brothers as tenants-in-common, with each having a 25% interest in the same. Subsequently, three brothers executed a release deed for their respective 25% share for a consideration in favour of the fourth brother, thereby making him the sole owner. The Court held that the acquisition of the shares by way of a release deed amounted to a purchase u/s. 54 of the Income-tax Act by the fourth brother.  

In Maharashtra, a release deed attracts stamp duty as on a conveyance on the fair market value of the share released. However, if the property released is ancestral property and it is released in favour of     certain    defined     relatives,     then     the     stamp    duty is only Rs. 200. Further, in case of a release of property without consideration, the provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, must also be considered in all cases where the parties are not “relatives” within the meaning of the section. Conversely in cases where release is for consideration, capital gains tax incidence on the releaser must be kept in mind.

Tenancy in common can also be converted into joint tenancy by throwing such a property into the joint HUF    hotchpotch    after    which    date    it    would    be    treated    as    HUF    property    where    no    one    member    would    have  a determinate share. However, in such a case, the clubbing provisions u/s. 64(2) of the Income-tax Act should also be factored.   

Conclusion
The Law in respect of jointly acquired immovable property is quite multi-faceted and complex. Since in India, it is entirely case law made, it becomes all the more unique. It would be advisable that while making an agreement for purchasing a property, making a Will, etc., the provisions relating to manner    of     joint    acquisition     is     very     clearly     specified.     If the intention is, for any reason, to acquire it as joint tenancy, then the wordings should be very clear.

PART A: ORDERS OF CIC & THE HIGH COURT

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Personal Information and larger Public interest: Sections 8(1)(j) and 8(2) of the RTI Act:

• Vide RTI dated 31-08-12, Anil Bairwal had sought certain Information claiming copies of Income tax Returns with other documents of Biju Janata Dal for A.Y. 2002-03 to 2011-12.

CPIO/ITO Ward 1(2), Bhubaneswar, vide letter dated 12-09-12, informed the appellant that the information sought related to a third party, their views were sought and the third party had objected to any information being shared. It was pointed out by the party representative that since they do not receive any grant from the government directly or indirectly, u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act, it is not a “Public Authority” and information regarding the party should not be supplied.

FAA upheld the decision of CPIO and relied on the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Girish Ramchandra Deshpande, [RTIR IV (2012) 216 (SC)], stating that no larger Public Interest is involved. Para of the said decision reads as under:

“14.The details disclosed by a person in his Income Tax Return are ‘personal information’ which stand exempted from disclosure under Clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless it involves a larger public interest……………………………………”

CIC quoted Paras 38 & 47 of its earlier order of 29-4-2008 wherein Biju Janata Dal was also a party. Same reads as under:

“38.The laws of the land do not make it mandatory for political parties to disclose the sources of their funding, and even less so the manner of expending those funds. In the absence of such laws, the only way a citizen can gain access to the details of funding of political parties is through their Income-tax Returns filed annually with Income-tax authorities. This is about the closest the political parties get to accounting for the sources and the extent of their funding and their expenditure. There is unmistakable public interest in knowing these funding details which would enable the citizen to make an informed choice about the political parties to vote for. The RTI Act emphasises that “democracy requires an informed citizenry” and that transparency of information is vital to flawless functioning of constitutional democracy. It is nobody’s case that, while all organs of the State must exhibit maximum transparency, no such obligation attaches to political parties. Given that political parties influence the exercise of political power; transparency in their organisation, functions and, more particularly, their means of funding is a democratic imperative, and, therefore, is in public interest. Insofar as the Income-tax Returns of political parties contain funding details these are liable for disclosure.”

“47. Thus, information which is otherwise exempt, can still be disclosed if the public interest so warrants. That public interest is unmistakably present is evidenced not only in the context of the pronouncements of the Apex Court but also the recommendations of the National Commission for the Review of the Working of the Constitution and of the Law Commission.”

The Commission then ruled:

“In view of the fact that a larger public interest has been established by the Commission in the judgment referred to above, the disclosure of IT Returns of Biju Janata Dal does not fall in the exemption Clause of section 8(1) (j) of RTI Act. The CPIO is directed to provide the information sought within three weeks of receipt of this order.”

[Anil Bairwal vs. ITO, ward 1(2) and JCIT, Range-I, Bhubaneswar: Decided on 24-12-2013 Citation: RTIR I (2014) 58 (CIC)]

• Gurdev Singh had sought details of the Transfer cases and pending cases since 2005 under GPA/SUB GPA

Vide Order dated 4th July, 2013, CPIO informed the appellant that information sought is not specific in nature and is not available in the compiled form. CPIO further offered an opportunity for inspection.

FAA upheld the decision of CPIO. In the second appeal before the Commission, it decided as under:

“Both sides have presented their arguments. Appellant pleaded for disclosure of this information in the larger public interest as he has alleged that the policy benefits were extended in a most arbitrary fashion through pick-and-choose action and that those who were left out were not given any reasons for having been denied the benefits that were extended to other applicants who had applied along side with them thereby putting them unfairly to great disadvantage. This lack of transparency by the Public Authority in the exercise of its powers, it was argued is contrary to the letter and spirit of the RTI Act and breeds corruption. Commission shares the view that transparency is an essential ingredient for good governance. Decisions of the Public Authorities are required to be taken in the larger public interest and must be uniformly administered in a transparent manner. The present case defies these principles and is couched in the dark shade of secrecy. Therefore, as per the provisions of the section 8(2) of the Act, Commission determines that in this case, the disclosure of information outweighs all arguments made in favour of disproportionate diversion of the scare resources of the Public Authority and under the provisions of section 19(8)(a)(iii) requires the Public Authority through the Chairman, Chandigarh Housing Board to establish adequate infrastructure in terms of computers and manpower so that the information sought by the appellant in his RTI application of 17-06-2013 is compiled and placed on the official website of the CHB before 15-06-2014. Commission has given adequate time for completing this exercise as we accept the contention of the respondents that the information sought is maintained in many separate files and will have to be compiled and collated. Commission will review the compliance of the directions held herein above at a later date which will be intimated separately.”

[Gurdev Singh vs. Chandigarh Housing Board, UT Chandigarh: Decided on 11-12-2013: Citation: RTIR (2014) 51 (CIC)]

• FIEM Industries Ltd.:

FIEM industries Ltd. had challenged before the H.C. the Order of SIC, Haryana and Ors. directing PIO to furnish the information sought by the RTI applicant.

The information sought was details of a raid conducted on the petitioner by the VAT authorities and regarding alleged tax evasions by various companies including the petitioner company.

The petition company relied upon the judgment of the SC, in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. CIC and others.

The Court ruled:

“To my mind the judgment could not be strictly applicable to the facts of the present case.” Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

[FIEM Industries Ltd vs. SIC, Haryana and Ors. Decided by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on 18.12.2013: Citation RTIR I (2014)104 (P&H)]

BS/C/2012/000279/3569: RTIR IV (2013) 163 (CIC)]

levitra

Limitation – Sale of Minors property without permission of court – Suit not filed by minor within 3 years from date of attaining majority – Barred by limitation : Limitation Act 1963 and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 section 8(2)(3).

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H.M. Rudraradhya vs. Uma & Ors AIR 2014 Karnataka 2.

The plaintiff after her marriage instituted a suit for declaration that the sale deed is not binding on her interest in the suit property and for partition of her share.

The trial court dismissed the suit holding that it is barred by limitation. It was of the opinion that Article 60 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the suit and it was not filed within 3 years from the date of attaining of majority by the plaintiff.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it is not in dispute that the suit property was gifted to Lingarajamma i.e., the mother of the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3. The father of Lingarajamma, by name Gurusiddappa, had gifted the suit property under the Gift Deed dated 01-04-1975. Therefore, Lingarajamma was the absolute owner of the suit property on the basis of the gift. It is for this reason, it could be safely concluded that the suit land was not a joint family property. Hence, the provisions of sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are not applicable as the said provisions either deal with a joint family property or succession to the property of a male. As Lingarajamma was the exclusive owner of the suit property on the basis of the gift by her father it is general rule of succession in the case of female, Hindu, apply, wherein on the death of Lingarajamma it is her husband, the sons and the daughters are entitled to succeed to her interest in the suit land.

The validity of a sale transaction in respect of the joint family property by ‘Karta’ or ‘adult member’ of a joint Hindu Family depends upon the existence of the legal necessity. At the time of its alienation, though a minor in the joint family has an undivided interest in the property alienated, if a suit is instituted challenging such alienation of a joint family property by a ‘Karta’ or an ‘adult member’ of the joint Hindu family and if it is proved that the same was not for legal necessity, the plaintiff who is not a party to the sale transaction could ignore the alienation and claim her share even in the property alienated. In such circumstances, it is the provisions of Article 109 of the Limitation Act which are attracted and the plaintiff can institute the suit within 12 years from date of alienee takes possession of the property.

Admittedly, the sale of the suit property in favour of the 1st defendant was on 04-06-1987. The suit instituted by the plaintiff is not within 3 years of her attaining the age of majority. Therefore, in view of the provisions of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, the suit was barred by time.

When the sale transaction is voidable transaction and it is for the plaintiff, to sue for possession of the property and it is incumbent upon him to pray for such a relief. Even otherwise, the plaintiff has prayed for a declaration that the Sale Deed is not binding on her interest in the suit property and this relief is similar to setting aside the sale, which is contemplated under Article 60 of the Limitation Act and in the absence of the said relief, the suit itself cannot be maintained.

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Limitation – Acknowledgement of debt – By email – constitutes valid and legal acknowledgement: Information Technology Act, section 4.

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Sudarshan Cargo P. Ltd. vs. M/s. Techvac Engineering P. Ltd. AIR 2014 Karnataka 6.

On account of non-payment of the amounts due under the invoices by respondent to the petitioner there was exchange of correspondence by email between the parties. Respondent company by its email dated 14-01-2010 has informed the petitioner that on account of delay in tie up of its funds payments were not made and respondent has also informed the petitioner that it would be sending its statement of accounts for reconciliation and will make arrangements of funds to pay the dues of the petitioner. Subsequently, on 06-04-2010 there was one more email from respondent to petitioner, whereunder, it has categorically admitted that it is in a position to make a commitment of settling the dues of the petitioner starting from the said month. It is also agreed to, thereunder, that first payment would be made between 10th and 15th of the said month namely April, 2010. Respondent has also categorically stated that it would clear all the dues by the end of May, 2010. Having said so, respondent did not pay the amounts to the petitioner and as such a statutory notice came to be issued by the petitioner on 04-12-2012

The petition was filed u/s. 433(e), (f) and 436 read with section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking winding up of the respondent Company on the ground that it is unable to pay debt due to petitioner.

An objection was raised that alleged debt due to the petitioner by respondent was time barred. It was contended that invoices were raised by the petitioner during September, October and November, 2008 and present petition has been filed in 2013 and as such debt in question is barred by limitation. Elaborating the submissions it was contended that alleged acknowledgement of debt from respondent to petitioner by email dated 06- 04-2010 is not duly signed by respondent and as such it cannot be construed as an acknowledgement of debt since it does not satisfy the criteria prescribed u/s. 18 of The Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to recover the amount alleged to be due from respondent.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the word ‘sign’ or ‘signed’ employed in explanation (b) to section 18(2) has not been defined under the Limitation Act, 1963. Explanation merely says ‘signed’ means either personally or by a agent duly authorised in this behalf. It requires to be noticed that even u/s. 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 the word ‘sign’ has not been defined but has its extended meaning with reference to a person who is unable to write his name to include mark with its grammatical variation and cognate expressions. Undisputedly, an email is a communication addressed to a definite person and it means a person who is intended by ‘originator’ to receive such electronic record as per section 2(b) of IT Act, 2000 and the ‘originator’ would mean a person who sends or transmits any electronic message to any other person as defined u/s. 2(za) of IT Act, 2000. Thus, if an acknowledgment is sent by a ‘originator’ to the ‘addressee’ by email, without any intermediary, it amounts to electronic communication by email which is an alternative to the paper based method of communication. This mode of transaction is legally recognised u/s. 4 of the IT Act, 2000.

A harmonious reading of section 4 together with definition Clauses would indicate that on account of digital and new communication systems having taken giant steps and the business community as well as individuals are undisputedly using computers to create, transmit and store information in the electronic form rather than using the traditional paper documents and as such the information so generated, transmitted and received are to be construed as meeting the requirement of section 18 of the Limitation Act, particularly in view of the fact that section 4 contains a non-obstante clause. Since respondent did not dispute the information transmitted by it is in electronic form to the petitioner by way of message through the use of computer and its network as not having been sent by it to the petitioner, the acknowledgement as found in the emails dated 14-01-2010 and 06-04-2010 originating from the respondent to the addressee namely, petitioner, such emails have to be construed and read as a due and proper acknowledgement and it would meet the parameters laid down u/s. 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to constitute a valid and legal acknowledgement of debt due.

Thus, the Hon’ble Court held that an acknowledgement of debt by email originating from a person who intends to send or transmit such electronic message to any other person who would be the ‘addressee’ would constitute a valid acknowledgment of debt and it would satisfy the requirement of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when the originator disputes having sent the email to the recipient.

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Precedent – Law settled by Supreme Court or Division Bench of High Court – Binding Nature – In case of doubt by another bench, matter to be referred to larger bench: However, the Binding effect will prevail court should not wait for Larger Bench decision:

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Masusmi SA Investment LLC vs. Keystone Realtors P. Ltd. & Ors (2013) 181 Comp Cas. 525 (Bom)

The law laid down by the Supreme Court and the Division bench of the High Court will prevail and is binding on a single judge of the court. An order referring certain issues to be decided by a larger bench does not lay down any law. Only because the correctness of a portion of a judgement has been doubted by another bench, that would not mean that the court should wait for the decision of the larger bench.

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Family Arrangement Document not compulsorily Registrable – Memorandum of family arrangement – Admissible in evidence without being registered or stamped:

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Rasbihart and another vs. The Additional District Judge (Fast Track), Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan & Others.

The plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration and cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 11-08- 2004 and mutation No. 1216 dated 20-08-2004 in favour of Bithaldas and consequential injunction. It was the claim of the plaintiff that the suit property was ancestral in nature and hence their predecessor Ballabhdas, arrayed as defendant No. 1 in the suit, had no right to execute the release deed dated 11-08-2004 in favour of Bithaldas defendant No. 3 in the suit.

The plaintiff claimed that this document was a partitition deed and for want of stamp and registration was inadmissible in evidence. According to the plaintiff, from the language of this document, it clearly emerged that it was not a recording of a past event but partition was effected through the document itself and hence as per the provisions of the Stamps Act and Registration Law, the document ought not only to be liable to be properly stamped but registered as well and as the document fell short of both these mandatory requirements, it was inadmissible for all purposes.

The defendant claimed that the document in question was not a partition deed but merely a memorandum of family arrangement and hence was neither required to be stamped nor registered and was admissible for all purposes. It was further contended that the family arrangement had already been acted upon and consequently a second family arrangement was executed and hence the plaintiff cannot challenge the validity of the document dated 23-09-1972.

The court observed that for a document, to be termed as an instrument of partition, leviable to be stamp duty it must be a document effecting transfer. The title to the property in question has to be conveyed under the document. The document has to be a vehicle for the transfer of the right, title and interest. The document has to be the sole repository for the ascertainment of the rights. Each and every document involving the fact of partition cannot be included within the expression ‘instrument of partitition’. A paper, which is recording a fact or attempting to furnish evidence of an already concluded transaction under which the title has already passed, cannot be treated to be such an instrument.

In the instant case, the writing in question was merely a memorandum of family arrangement and not an instrument of partititon requiring levy of stamp duty or required to be compulsorily registered. The property involved was the joint family property of ‘B’ and his three sons and the said fact was admitted in the writing. So, the rights of sons were not created for the first time through this document. The document was not the vehicle for transfer of rights. By the mere fact that the document contained the word like ‘today’ does not make it an instrument of partition, therefore, the writing has held to be a memorandum of family arrangement and admissible in evidence without it being stamped or registered.

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Authorisation Notice not served – Chartered Accountant received the notice on behalf of assessee without authorisation:

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ABG Infralogistics Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors Writ Petition (L) No. 2935 and 2936 of 2013 Bombay HC dated 25-11-2013

The Petitioner has raised various contentions including the contention that the petitioner was never served with the notice for the relevant years and that the petitioner or its representative had never appeared before the AO and still the impugned assessment order refers to a Chartered Accountant having attended on 24th June, 2011 and requesting the Assessing Officer for adjournment and considering his request the said Chartered Accountant was called on 26th June 2013, but he did not appear till the date of passing of the asst. order nor any communication was received from him. Hence, the orders were passed u/s. 23(2) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act.

The respondents opposed the petition and submitted that the representative of the petitioner did appear before the Assessing Officer on 24th June, 2013 as mentioned in the ‘roznama’ for the aforesaid two asst. years, 2005-06 and 2008-09, and has therefore received the notice for the asst. years 2005-06 and 2008-09.

The Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that those two authorisations for the asst. years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were purportedly issued on 28th June 2013, but according to the AO, the said Chartered Accountant appeared for the petitioner on 24th June, 2013 without any authorisation having been produced at the hearing before him.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the petitions involve serious disputed questions of fact as well as questions of law on merits of the controversy and, therefore, it would be appropriate for the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy of filing appeal before the Dy. Commissioner of Sales tax (Appeals). The court directed the petitioner to file appeals before the Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Appeals) within 2 weeks and directed the appellate authority to entertain the appeals and examine all contentions without raising the plea of limitation as far as the filing of appeals was concerned and decide the appeals in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.

The court further directed that till the appellate authority decided the appeals, the impugned demand notices shall not be implemented or enforced.

As regards the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner had not received any notice for the aforesaid years and had not issued any authorisation in favour of the concerned Chartered Accountant, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the authorisation issued by the petitioner in favour of the said Chartered Accountant for the asst. years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that since the Chartered Accountant was appearing for the petitioner for those two years, the AO proceeded on the basis that the same Chartered Accountant was appearing for the petitioner for the two years under consideration, i.e., 2005-06 and 2008-09.

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Gaps in GaAp – Presentation of Changes in Accounting Policies in Interim Periods

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Synopsis

In this article, the author has touched upon a case of prevailing inconsistencies in the Indian GAAP and the listing agreement. The question raised here is whether changes in accounting policies should be disclosed by way of restatement of results of the earlier periods, while presenting quarterly financial results prepared as per the listing agreement requirements. This question has been analysed by taking into account AS-5, AS-25 and Clause 41 of the Listing Agreement. Read on for the analysis made by the author and a brief comparison with IFRS.

Question

How are changes in accounting policies (other than those required on adoption of new accounting standards) presented in the quarterly financial results prepared as per the listing agreement requirements? Is the impact of change in accounting policy on earlier periods disclosed as a one line item in the current interim period or reflected by restating the financial results of the prior interim periods? Response Let us first consider the requirements of various standards.

AS 5 – Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies

Paragraph 32

Any change in an accounting policy which has a material effect should be disclosed. The impact of, and the adjustments resulting from, such change, if material, should be shown in the financial statements of the period in which such change is made, to reflect the effect of such change.

Paragraph 33

A change in accounting policy consequent upon the adoption of an Accounting Standard should be accounted for in accordance with the specific transitional provisions, if any, contained in that Accounting Standard.

AS 25 Interim Financial Reporting

Paragraph 2

A statute governing an enterprise or a regulator may require an enterprise to prepare and present certain information at an interim date which may be different in form and/or content as required by this Standard. In such a case, the recognition and measurement principles as laid down in this Standard are applied in respect of such information, unless otherwise specified in the statute or by the regulator.

Paragraph 16

An enterprise should include the following information, as a minimum, in the notes to its interim financial statements, if material and if not disclosed elsewhere in the interim financial report:

(a) a statement that the same accounting policies are followed in the interim financial statements as those followed in the most recent annual financial statements or, if those policies have been changed, a description of the nature and effect of the change……..

Paragraph 42

A change in accounting policy, other than one for which the transition is specified by an Accounting Standard, should be reflected by restating the financial statements of prior interim periods of the current financial year.

Paragraph 43

One objective of the preceding principle is to ensure that a single accounting policy is applied to a particular class of transactions throughout an entire financial year. The effect of the principle in paragraph 42 is to require that within the current financial year any change in accounting policy be applied retrospectively to the beginning of the financial year.

Stock Exchange Listing Agreement Clause 41

Clause 41 IV (i)

Changes in accounting policies, if any, shall be disclosed in accordance with Accounting Standard 5 (AS 5 – Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies) issued by ICAI/Company (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006, whichever is applicable.

Discussion Paper on “Revision of Clause – 41 of Equity Listing Agreement”

Paragraph 4.13

Disclosure of impact of change in accounting policy: If there are any changes in the accounting policies during the year, the impact of the same on the prior quarters of the year, included in the current quarter results, shall be disclosed separately by way of a note to the financial results of the current quarter, without restating the previously published figures.

IV h

Changes in accounting policies, if any, shall be disclosed in accordance with Accounting Standard 5 (AS 5 – Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies) notified under the Company (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006 (as amended) / issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), as applicable. If there are any changes in the accounting policies during the year, the impact of the same on the prior quarters of the year, included in the current quarter results, should be disclosed separately by way of a note to the financial results of the current quarter without restating the previously published figures. Where the impact is not quantifiable a statement to that effect shall be made.

Executive Summary

1. AS-5 requires the cumulative effect of changes in accounting policies to be disclosed in the current period. The current period could be a financial year or an interim period.

2. AS-25 requires changes in accounting policies to be reflected by restating the financial statements of prior interim periods of the current financial year. Interestingly, AS-25 allows restatement of only prior interim periods of the current financial year. In other words, interim periods of previous financial year are not restated. Therefore under AS-25 results are comparable only with respect to current financial year but not with respect to previous financial years.

3. The appropriate standard for quarterly accounts is AS-25 and not AS-5. However, AS-25 clearly states that regulations will have an overriding effect.

4. The listing agreement and the discussion paper on clause 41 clearly articulate that changes in accounting policies in interim periods are reflected in the current interim period. Comparative interim periods are not restated.

5. In the author’s opinion, clause 41, which is the regulation, will have to be followed. In other words, the cumulative effect of changes in accounting policies is reflected in current interim periods. Comparative interim periods are not restated.

Author’s suggestion

The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require comparative interim periods to be restated when accounting policies are changed. However unlike AS-25, they require even previous financial year’s interim period to be restated. Even in annual financial statements, IFRS requires previous year results to be restated to give effect to change in accounting policy. This ensures complete comparability.

Restatement of previous period financial statements is a better presentation of changes in accounting policies as it provides comparable numbers based on the new accounting policy. In India, we need to align AS-5, AS-25 and the listing agreement to enforce this comparability in line with IFRS (IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors & IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting).

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TS-76-AAR-2014 Booz & Company (Australia) Pvt. Ltd. Dated: 14-02-2014

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Provision of Technical and professional employees to the Indian affiliate company (ICo) results in a Permanent establishment (PE) in India; Factors such as interdependency and nature of services rendered considered in arriving at the conclusion.

Facts:
The Booz & Co. Group (Group entities) is a global network of group companies. With the intention of optimising its global business network and expertise, entities within the Group provided as well as availed services from each other.

Accordingly, the Group entities received payments from ICo (Indian affiliate of Group) for provision of technical and professional personnel (personnel).

Features of the arrangement between the Group entities and ICo as appearing in the application and also emphasised by the tax authorities are as follows:

• All projects won by the Group were catered to by a common pool of personnel.

• ICo executed its projects through its own employees and to the extent required, procured the services of personnel of the relevant Group entity.

• The personnel were under the control and supervision of ICo in respect of ICo’s project. However they were bound by the employment agreement entered with, and overall control of, the relevant Group entity. Thus the relevant Group entity had the power to recall and replace its personnel.

• The relevant Group entity provided on-the-job training to such personnel, was answerable to third party claims for infringement of any rights by such personnel.

• The expertise of the relevant Group entities in giving consultancy in the fields that the Group operates, the brand equity the Group enjoys, the capabilities the Group has developed across the globe and services from the Group professionals and experts is needed for ICo to optimally function.

• The Group’s business is manpower-centric in which the only important asset is human resource.

The Group entities contended that in the absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) of the relevant Group entity in India, the fee received from ICo cannot be taxed as business income in India but should be taxed as Fee for technical services (FTS).

The Tax Authorities contended that ICo is exclusively dependent on Group entities in getting the services of capable personnel as well as their on-the-job training, in order to achieve optimal efficiency. This dependency of ICo on the Group entities blurs the identity of individual entities and thus, ICo constitutes a dependent agent of the Group entities. Additionally, the number and high level of qualification of personnel deployed by the Group entities to ICo clearly establishes that ICo constitutes a service PE. The access given by ICo’s client/ICo to the personnel deployed to ICo in a given space also renders that place a fixed place PE of the relevant Group entities.

Held:
On Fixed Place PE:

Under a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), one of the sine qua non of a fixed place PE is that, the fixed place of business through which the business is carried on should be ‘at the disposal’ of the relevant Group entity.

Conducting trading operations generally requires a fixed place which the taxpayer uses on a continuous basis. However, taxpayers rendering service usually do not require a place to be at their constant disposal and therefore application of ‘disposal test’ is generally more complex in such cases.

In some jurisdictions the ‘disposal test’ is satisfied by the mere fact of using a place. In other jurisdictions, it is stressed that something more is required than a mere fact of use of place.

Various factors have to be taken into account to decide a fixed place PE which, inter alia, includes a right of disposal over the premises. No straight jacket formula applicable to all cases can be laid down.

Generally, the establishment must belong to the foreign enterprise and involve an element of ownership, management and authority over the establishment. Principles were derived from the following decisions on the ‘disposal test.’

• Rolls Royce Plc. [339 ITR 147]
• Seagate Singapore International Headquarters Pvt. Ltd. [322 ITR 650 (AAR)] –
• Motorola Inc. [147 Taxman 39 (SB)] –
• Western Union Financial services [104 ITD 34]

On Service PE:

In terms of the DTAA a service PE is triggered if services are provided in a source State and such services are provided through employees or other personnel. In case of deputation of employees, if the lien over such employees is retained by the deputing company and the employees continue to be on the payroll of the deputing company, a Service PE emerges.

Where a business of a group cannot be carried on exclusively without intervention of another entity, normally that entity must be deemed to be the establishment of the group in that particular country.

On Agency PE:

On the issue of Agency PE, the relevant question is ‘business connection’. The essential features of ‘business connection’ are as follows:

• A real and intimate relation must exist between the activities carried out outside India by nonresident (NR) and activities within India;
• Such relation must contribute directly or indirectly to earning of income by the NR in his business;
• A course of dealing or continuity of relationship and not a mere isolated or stray nexus between the business of the NR outside India and the activity in India, would furnish a strong indication of ‘business connection’ in India.

Apart from the fact that the requirements of agency are satisfied, the facts fulfil the above essential features of ‘business connection’.

On the basis of the above, the AAR ruled that the fact pattern of the Group entities and ICo, a PE of the Group entities does exist in India. Therefore, incomes received by them from ICo are taxable as business profit under Article 7 of the respective DTAAs. Where there is no DTAA, it is taxable under the provisions of the Act.

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TS-78-ITAT-2014(Bang) IBM India Private Limited vs. DIT A.Ys: 2009-2012, Dated: 24-01-2014

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S/s. 9(1)(vii), 195 – Absence of Fee for technical services (FTS) article in the DTAA, does not result in the income being taxed as per the domestic laws in terms of Article 24 of India-Philippines DTAA; Services provided in the course of business covered by business income article; Not taxable in absence of a PE in India; other Income article does not cover such income.

Facts:
The Taxpayer is an Indian Company (ICo) engaged in the business of providing information technology services. The Taxpayer made certain payments to a Philippines Co. (FCo) for certain business information services, work force management, web content management and human resource accounting services without withholding tax at source.

The Taxpayer contended that in absence of FTS Article in India- Philippines DTAA, Article 7 on ‘business profits’ should be applicable, and payment made to FCo is not chargeable to tax in absence of PE in India.

However, the Tax Authorities contended that in the absence of an FTS article in the DTAA, the same should be taxable as per the domestic laws by virtue of Article 24(1) of the DTAA, which provides that the laws of the contracting states shall continue to govern the taxation of income except where provisions to the contrary are made in the DTAA.

Held:
On Applicability of Article 24:

If Article 24(1) is interpreted as conferring right to tax ‘FTS’ in accordance with the domestic laws of a contracting state, then Article 23 dealing with other income and granting exclusive right of taxation to country of residence would become redundant as Article 23 will then cease to be an omnibus clause covering the residuary income.

It is a well settled principle that a clash is to be avoided while interpreting the provisions of a treaty. Hence the scope, context and setting of the articles have to be understood in their proper perspective.

Article 24(1) does not confer a right to invoke the provisions of domestic laws for classification or taxability of income covered by other articles of the DTAA. Article 24 is limited to elimination of double taxation and operates in the field of computation of doubly taxed income and tax thereon in accordance with the domestic laws and is not part of treaty Articles which deal with the classification of income.

On interplay between Article 7 and Article 23:

The services rendered by FCo are in the course of its business and hence covered under Article 7 of the DTAA and not other income Article. Further in the absence of PE in India of FCo, the amount paid is not chargeable to tax in India.

Even assuming that the payments made to FCo are covered by Article 23, the same should also not be taxable in India, by virtue of exclusive taxation rights being provided to the country of residence.

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TS-15-ITAT-2014(Del) Brown & Sharpe Inc. vs. DCIT A.Ys: 2003-2006, Dated: 17-01-2014

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Income attributable to the Liaison office (LO) engaged in promoting sales in India on behalf of its head office is taxable in India.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a US company, has set up an LO in India with the RBI approval. The RBI approval was granted on the condition that the LO will not render any services, directly or indirectly, in India.

The Tax Authority contended that the LO was not merely a communication channel but it was also promoting the Taxpayer’s product brands in India, which was evident from the fact that the performance incentive of LO’s employees was calculated on the basis of number of orders received by the Taxpayer.

The Taxpayer contended that LO was established only as a communication channel between the Taxpayer and its customers or prospective customers in India. The LO did not render any service for the procurement of order or sale of the product in India. Hence, there was no income earned in India. In this regard, the Taxpayer referred to various decisions like Angel Garment Ltd. [287 ITR 341 (AAR)], U.A.E. Exchange Centre Ltd. [313 ITR 94], and K. T. Corporation [181 Taxman 94 (AAR)] etc.

Furthermore, the payments made to the LO were merely reimbursement of expenses incurred by the LO on behalf of the Taxpayer. Hence, it cannot be liable to tax in India.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
The LO was engaged in promoting the Taxpayer’s product and brands in India. Other than the Chief Representative Officer, the LO had also appointed a Technical Support Manager. The employees of the LO were offered sales incentive plan as per which they were to be provided with remuneration, based on the achievement of the sales target of the Taxpayer in India.

The Taxpayer was registered with the Registrar of Companies for carrying on business in India. It had also, on its own volition, filed a return of income declaring loss under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession.’ Thus, the Taxpayer itself has taken a stand that it derives income from business in India.

The decisions relied on by the Taxpayer involved, the activities of preparatory and auxiliary nature. Such as:

• LO downloading information contained in the main server located in the UAE; (UAE Exchange Centre (supra))
• LO collecting information and sample of garments and textiles which was passed on to its HO and LO acted as a communication channel between the HO and its customers; (Angel Garment Ltd. (supra))
• LO was merely holding seminars, conferences, receiving trade enquiries, collecting feedbacks and advertising the technology used by its HO (K.T. Corporation (supra)).

However, in the present case, the employees were promoting the sale of the Taxpayer’s goods in India. Thus, income attributable to LO is taxable in India.

Though reimbursement of expenses cannot be treated as income, the receipt, in excess of expenses actually incurred has to be treated as income.

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TS-613-ITAT-2013(Coch) Device Driven (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO A.Y: 2009-2010, Dated: 29-11-2013

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Section 195 – Assistance in securing orders and in identifying markets, arranging meeting with prospective clients, etc., are not ‘pure’ commissionbased services but are technical services under the Act; Since the service provider (SP) is also the director of the Taxpayer, his office can be treated as a ‘Fixed base’ regularly available to the SP and taxable as per Independent Personnel Service (IPS) Article of the India–Switzerland DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the development and sale of software. The Taxpayer paid export commission to the SP who was tax resident of Switzerland, and claimed the same as deduction against its taxable profits.

The scope of work for the export commission, as decided between the Taxpayer and the SP covered the following:

• Facilitate marketing of the services and provide support as well as sales expertise for projects to be executed at customer site.
• Generate leads and initiate interaction with end customers in the relevant competency areas of the Taxpayer.
• Support in evaluating the Taxpayer’s presentations and other collateral proposals and contracts.
• Review proposals of the Taxpayer for target prospects and provide advice and assistance, to help securing projects.
• Hold periodic meetings with the Taxpayer to track project progress and status.

The Taxpayer contended that (i) the services rendered by the SP were for marketing assistance/ support and guidance for securing orders from overseas clients and not for rendering any technical expertise/services. (ii) Pure export commission earned by a person for rendering services outside India would not be taxable in India.

The Tax Authority contended that the SP is technically qualified and highly experienced in the software business. Considering the vast experience and technical knowledge, the services rendered by the SP were technical in nature and beyond what a normal commission agent would have rendered. Accordingly, the same was taxable under the Act as Fees for Technical Services (FTS).

Also, as the SP was required to hold regular meetings for monitoring the progress and status of the projects undertaken by the Taxpayer in India, the Taxpayer would have provided a fixed base in the form of office to the director, which triggered tax under IPS Article of the DTAA.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
The nature of responsibilities and obligations placed on the director is significantly higher than what would have been placed upon a pure commission agent working in normal business transactions.

Customised software is a highly technical product, which is developed in accordance with the requirements of the customers. Even after the development, it requires constant on-site monitoring so that necessary modifications are carried out in order to make it suitable to the requirements.

Unlike sale of commodities, the role of the commission agent is not limited, but vast technical knowledge and experience is required to understand the needs of the clients, to procure orders, to identify markets, making introductory contacts, arranging meeting with prospective clients, assisting in preparation of presentations for target clients, monitor the status and progress of the project etc. Accordingly, the services rendered are technical in nature.

As the SP is a director of Taxpayer and also the sole foreign marketing agent, he has the responsibility to take care of business interests of the Taxpayer. Director, the SP has every right to look into and is also required to take care of the affairs of the Taxpayer. Further, the certificate/affidavit given by the Taxpayer confirming that it has not provided any fixed base to the SP cannot be of any help due to the closeness of the SP with the Taxpayer. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the Tax Authority’s view that the Taxpayer must have provided a ‘fixed base’ to the SP.

Hence, the office of the Taxpayer can conveniently be treated as a fixed base for the SP. Accordingly payment to the director is taxable in India and warrants withholding.

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Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)

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Synopsis

Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), a term coined by OECD, proposes 13 action plans to address important issues which the world is facing and/or may face in the field of international taxation and transfer pricing in this decade. BEPS refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to make profits ‘disappear’ for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations where there is little or no real activity but taxes are low resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. The learned authors vide this article provide insights on BEPS, its action plans and impact on India.

“Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) is a buzz term or expression these days in the arena of International Taxation. What is BEPS? Why do we need to study it? How does it affect us? Why G20 Nations vigorously pursue it? What is the role of OECD in BEPS? These and many other questions naturally arise in readers’ mind. This write-up attempts to put across the concept of BEPS and recent developments in this regard.

Introduction
Developments in national tax laws have not kept pace with developments in global businesses and technology. Physical presence based taxation in traditional ways is simply not adequate to cover all situations of business where the determination of source of income and the tax residence of an entity itself is a challenge. E-commerce or digital economy has changed the ways in which we used to transact businesses. Today, we live in a virtual global village. This, coupled with skewed development of the world economy, where developed countries are worried about the erosion in their tax base, whereas developing countries are more concerned about investments, technology and job creations, compel countries to adopt different tax systems or rules. Differences in tax systems pose challenges to Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) as well as provide an opportunity for tax planning. Proliferation of tax havens and low-tax jurisdictions over the past few decades have only helped MNEs to lower their tax incidence further.

In February 2013, OECD published its report ‘Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ which has been a subject matter of much discussion on this topic.

BEPS
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (BEPS) in simple words means either erosion of base by claiming dubious allowances/deductions or shifting of profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction/ tax haven by using gaps in the tax laws of the high tax jurisdiction. The FAQ on the OECD website on BEPS gives following meaning:-

“Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to make profits ‘disappear’ for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations where there is little or no real activity but the taxes are low resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid.”

Thus, BEPS poses serious questions concerning fairness and equity as MNEs are able to reduce their tax liability through various means, whereas individuals or SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) bear the brunt of higher taxes. This discourages voluntary compliance on the part of both individuals and SMEs.

It is said “tax” is an obligation in the home country and a cost in the host country. MNEs try to reduce cost to increase profitability. If MNEs pay the full rate of tax in one country, then also it may not be of much concern, but in reality “some multinationals end up paying as little as 5% in corporate taxes, when smaller businesses are paying up to 30%”. Even though MNEs may be resorting to legal ways to exploit gaps in tax systems of home and host countries, resulting in BEPS, it creates wider economic risks as resources of countries are depleted which may be used for generating employment and other social projects.

BEPS and OECD

BEPS is the result of aggressive tax planning. The OECD has been providing solutions to tackle aggressive tax planning for years. According to OECD, BEPS is not a problem created by one or more specific companies (barring some cases of blatant abuse of tax laws) but is a result of inefficient tax rules. BEPS is the result of gaps arising due to interaction of domestic tax systems of different countries and therefor, unilateral action by any one country will not be able to solve the problem. Therefore, OECD has put in place “BEPS Action Plan” with a view to provide a consensusbased plan to address the issue.

BEPS Action Plan by OECD

OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS will address the issue in a comprehensive and co-ordinated way. These actions will result in fundamental changes to the international tax standards and are based on three core principles, namely, (i) coherence (ii) substance and (iii) transparency. OECD plans to work towards elimination of double non-taxation through BEPS Action Plan and also elimination of double taxation through and including increased efficiency of Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) and Arbitration.





BEPS and G20 Nations

OECD’s initiative and work on BEPS has been strongly supported by G20 Nations. Key member countries of G20 which are not part of OECD (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) were also involved in work related to BEPS, as they all participated in the meeting of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs where the Action Plan was adopted. In order to facilitate greater involvement of non-OECD economies in the ‘BEPS Project’, G20 countries who are not OECD Members will participate in the BEPS project on an equal footing. Other non-G20 and non-OECD members may be invited to participate on an ad hoc basis. The idea seems to be to make the BEPS Action Plan as broad-based as possible so that the Plan becomes effective and practical. India is part of G20 Nations as well as an observer country at OECD and it has actively participated in BEPS Project so far.

BEPS and Double Non-taxation

Countries enter into bilateral agreements with each other in order to avoid double taxation of income and to prevent tax evasion. However, more often than not, MNEs are able to structure their affairs in a manner that the income is not taxed either in home or in a host country and goes totally taxfree resulting into “Double Non-taxation.” Double non-taxation could be a result of aggressive tax planning, hybrid mismatches etc. The focus of BEPS Project is on avoidance of double non-taxation. Double non-taxation may be a result of interaction of domestic tax laws and international tax laws. It may be perfectly legitimate as well. For example, a Mauritius Company deriving dividend income from India or earning capital gains on sale of securities in India would not be paying any tax in India and generally not taxed Mauritius. It would be interesting to see how BEPS Action Plan tackles such issues.

BEPS and India

In India whether tax treaties can result in ‘double non-taxation’  is  an  issue  debated  over  a  number of years. As stated earlier, tax can be a powerful tool for attracting foreign investments. India being a developing country, its priority is to attract for- eign investment and technology for its economic development.  Section  90  of  the  Income-tax  Act, 1961  [the  Act]  was  amended  vide  the  Finance Act,  2003  with  effect  from  1st  April  2004  to  pro- vide that the Central Government may enter into agreement with foreign governments to promote mutual economic relations, trade and investment. These  objectives  are  also  in  line  with  objectives of  bilateral  tax  conventions  as  laid  down  by  the United  Nations.

Keeping in mind the above objectives, it appears that India’s tax treaties with UAE, Malta, Kuwait, Cyprus, Luxembourg etc. have been entered for the purpose of attracting foreign investments than avoiding double taxation. In M.A. Rafik’s case AAR No. 206 of 1994, 213 ITR 317 which related to India- UAETax  Treaty,  the  Authority  for  Advance  Ruling (AAR) observed that “India is also in the process of looking out for foreign countries interested in investing  in  India  and  must  have  considered  the DTAA as providing an opportunity to improve the economic  relations  between  the  two  countries and to encourage the flow of funds from Dubai”. In  its  subsequent  Rulings,  applicability  of  India- UAE  Tax  Treaty  to  UAE  residents  was  upheld  by AAR.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  case  of  UOI  (Union of India) vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2003) 263 ITR 706, held that ‘the preamble to the Indo-Mauritius Double  Tax  Avoidance  Convention  (DTAC)  recites that it is for the encouragement of mutual trade and  investment’  and  this  aspect  of  the  matter cannot  be  lost  sight  of  while  interpreting  the treaty  provisions.  These  observations  were  very significant,  whereby  the  Apex  Court  upheld  the economic considerations as one of the objectives of  a  Tax  treaty.

The dissenting judgement by AAR in case of Cyril Pereira (1999) 239 ITR 650 stated that DTAA is not a  device  for  evasion  of  the  only  tax  imposed  by a  country  on  the  income  of  the  person  resident in the another country. In other words, provisions of  DTAA  cannot  result  in  Double  Non-Taxation. However, the said argument was discarded by the Supreme Court in its subsequent ruling in case of Azadi  Bachao  Andolan.  Recently,  the  Apex  Court in  case  of  Vodafone  followed  the  approach  of ‘look  at  rather  than  look  through’  any  transaction  and  interpreted  provisions  of  the  Income Tax  Act  more  liberally  in  favour  of  the  taxpayer. In  essence,  it  gave  weightage  to  the  ‘form’  of  a transaction/entity  rather  than  ‘substance’of  it.  In India, presently, the issue under debate is ‘whether one  needs  to  look  at  the  moral  aspects  while interpreting  tax  laws’.  The  opinion  seems  to  be divided  on  the  issue.

Coming to the trends in the Indian tax treaties, we find India encouraged tax sparing/exemption method by its treaty partner countries (developed nations) in respect of income arising to their resi- dents in India. This was done keeping in mind, that India is a net capital importing country. However, there is a perceptible change in India’s recent tax and treaty policy. India has introduced Article on Limitation of Benefits (LOB) in many of its tax treaties (for e.g. UAE, Singapore, etc.) to prevent their abuses. It is gathered that India is in the process of signing LOB articles with many other countries. Recently, India notified Cyprus as a non co–operative jurisdiction denying treaty benefits to residents of Cyprus. Recent tax treaties signed by India do not carry provisions of Tax sparing.

On  the  domestic  tax  front,  India  amended  the definition  of  section  9  of  the  Act,  pertaining  to royalty  with  retrospective  effect  from  1st  June 1976  to  bring  in  ‘computer  software’  within  its ambit.  It  further  amended  the  definition  of  section 9 to tax the indirect transfer of shares where the underlying value of shares were derived from the  assets  situated  in  India(to  nullify  the  effect of Vodafone decision). India has tightened its tax policy of giving effect to tax treaties by providing mandatory  submission  oftax  residency  certificate for  claiming  treaty  benefits.  Section  206AA  has been  introduced  making  it  mandatory  to  obtain PAN  by  non-residents.  The  domestic  tax  rate  for royalty  and  FTS  is  substantially  increased  from 10  %   to  25  %.  India  proposes  to  introduce  GAAR provision with effect from 1st April 2016. From the above discussion, one can conclude that the Indian Government  has  taken  several  steps  to  prevent BEPS. However, Indian judiciary have been liberal in  giving  benefit  to  the  tax  payers  for  what  may be  called  permissible  tax  avoidance  within  four corners  of  the  law.

Conclusion
There is no doubt that BEPS is not good for any country. However, as pointed out by OECD, BEPS arises due to a variety of reasons and often, unintentional and/or due to legitimate tax planning. When developing countries resort to lower tax rates to attract foreign investment and technology, they are blamed to be supporting BEPS. On the other hand, certain low tax jurisdictions or so called tax heavens, are ruled by Developed Countries. Advocating home truths but not implementing the same in letter and spirit, is self-defeating and cannot promote a healthy order of growth and development.

Perhaps, we have to strike a balance between growth and taxation.

2014 (33) STR 105 (Tri-Mumbai) KPIT Cummins Infosystems Ltd vs. CCE, Pune-I

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Whether services provided by foreign branches
outside India to overseas customers would be subjected to service tax
u/s. 66A of the Finance Act?

Facts:
Appellant was
engaged in providing various services such as Information Technology
Service, Business Support Service, Business Auxiliary Service, Renting
Service etc. Appellant had branches in foreign countries which are
Permanent Establishment abroad. These foreign branches provided
‘Software Development & Consultancy services’ in foreign countries
to various overseas customers. These foreign branches issued invoices
for services rendered and consideration for such services were received
from overseas customers. Excess of income over expenditure was remitted
by these foreign branches to the Appellant. Service tax was demanded on
the entire amount received by these foreign branches under ‘Business
Auxiliary Services’ alleging the

Appellant had rendered the
services. Appellant also remitted certain amounts to these foreign
branches as the Appellant’s personnel had incurred certain expenditure
such as rentals, telephone, insurance charges, conference, event
management etc., while rendering services abroad to overseas customers.
Respondent also issued SCN demanding service tax on amount remitted
overseas under reverse charge.

Held:
Since services
were rendered outside India to overseas customers and also the
consideration was received in foreign currency, these would be treated
as ‘Export of Services”’ and accordingly service tax would not be
applicable. More so, as Appellant was contending that, the said revenue
had already suffered GST/VAT in respective foreign countries. The entire
activities were carried out and consumed outside India and only
reimbursement for certain payments was made from India without receipt
of these services in India. Since the Respondent while passing the
impugned Order did not consider all aspects of the matter, appeal was
allowed by way of remand and stay application was disposed of.

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2014 (33) STR 86 (Tri-Mumbai) Bharati Tele-Ventures Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III

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a) Whether sale of SIM cards by mobile service provider is exigible to sales tax or service tax?
b) In a case where payment for service is received in advance and if the rate of service tax is increased at the time of provision of services, which rate will apply – old or new?
c) Whether extended period of limitation will apply where records have been audited by the department?

Facts:
Appellant was a cellular (mobile) service provider. For failure to pay service tax on the gross amount received on the issue of SIM cards to its customers during the period July, 2002 to March, 2006, the demand was confirmed against the Appellant. Appellant discharged the service tax on the value of services involved in the SIM cards and claimed deduction for the value comprising the sale component of the said SIM cards under Notification No. 12/2003 ST. Appellant relied on the Bombay High Court’s decision on identical issue in case of Vodafone India Ltd vs. Commissioner 2013 (30) STR J18 wherein the case was remanded for considering the applicability of Notification No. 12/2003-ST in case of sale of SIM cards. Appellant received certain advances against the services to be provided at a later date. Appellant have discharged the service tax at the rate prevailing at the time of receipt of advance. Later on the service tax rate was increased and at the time of provision of services the service tax rate was increased. Service tax was demanded at the increased rate.

Held:
• Tribunal observed that the issue of inclusion of SIM card value in the taxable value for telecommunication service has already been decided by the Kerala High Court in Commissioner vs. Idea Mobile Communication Ltd. 2010 (19) STR 18 (Kerala) and Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of AP vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 2012 (25) STR 321 (AP) wherein High Courts held that SIM card is the device through which the customers gets connection from mobile towers. Therefore, SIM card is an integral part required to provide mobile services to customers. SIM card has no intrinsic value or purpose other than use in mobile phone for receiving mobile telephone service from service provider. SIM cards are never sold as goods independent of the services provided, SIM cards are considered part and parcel of services provided and dominant intention is to provide the services and not to sell SIM cards. In view of the observations made in these judgements, it was held that SIM cards are not goods but services and service tax alone can be levied and the Bombay High Court’s judgement in case of Vodafone should be treated as ‘per incuriam’, since the above stated judgments were not brought before its consideration.

• Combined reading of section 66 and section 65(105) of the Finance Act makes it clear that it is the provision of the service which attracts the levy at the rate prescribed in section 66. Only collection of tax is to be done as per rules prescribed. Therefore, service tax is applicable at the time of provision of services and not at the time of receipt of money. While deciding this, Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of CCE vs. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. 2009 (14) STR 146 (Guj) and the Kerala High Court’s decision in case of Kerala Colour Lab Association vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 554 (Ker).

• Since the audit of records of the Appellant were carried out in the past, where no allegation of suppression was being made, demand beyond the period of limitation and levy of penalties were held unsustainable.

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2014 (33) STR 81 (Tri-Mumbai) Swagat Freight Carriers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Comm. of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether freight forwarding activity would be classifiable under “Clearing & Forwarding Agency” service?

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in the business of freight forwarding and collected charges for services rendered to its customers by way of documentation charges, transport charges, shipping bill charges etc. The Respondent demanded service tax on the said charges under ‘C & F agent’s services’. This resulted into an impugned order which also levied penalties. According to the Appellant, the said freight forwarding activities did not classify under ‘C & F Agent’s services’ and relied on various decisions and also further stated the period of dispute was prior to 01-07-2003 and they began paying service tax 01-07-2003 onwards under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’.

Held:
Freight forwarding activity is distinct and different from C & F agent’s activities and in the light of Gudwin Logistics vs. CCE, Vadodara 2012 (26) STR 443 (Tri-Ahmd) and other decisions, the same could not be classified as C & F agent’s services and accordingly the appeal was allowed.

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2014 (33) STR 65 (Tri-Mumbai) Suzlon Windfarm Services Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune

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Whether activity of operation, maintenance and security of a windmill would be classifiable under “Consulting Engineering Service”?

Facts:
Appellant entered into an agreement with M/s. Suzlon Energy Limited (SEL) for operation & maintenance of the windmills sold by the said SEL to its customers. As per the sale contract entered between SEL and its customers, SEL would be looking after operation, maintenance & security of the windmills free of cost for the first 5 years from the date of purchases and thereafter with charges. SEL assigned the said operation and maintenance activity to the Appellant for an agreed consideration. The agreement also required them to provide round-the-clock security, monitoring the performance of the windmills, collection & compilation of the data relating to wind speed, energy generation & liaisoning and coordination with various Government departments. Demand of service tax was confirmed under “Consulting Engineering Service” along with imposition of penalties u/s. 76, 77 & 78 of the Finance Act.

Held:
The Tribunal after observing the terms of the agreement entered between Appellant and SEL and the activities carried out by the Appellant, held that an advice, consultancy or assistance in any field of engineering would be classifiable under ‘Consulting Engineering Service’ and not activities which are in the nature of execution. Executory services do not come within the purview of ‘Consulting Engineering Service’ as decided in Rolls Royce Industrial Power (I) Ltd. vs. CCE, Visakhapatnam 2006 (3) STR 292. Further, in the case of Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CCE, Allahabad 2007 (7) STR 431, the Supreme Court while rejecting department’s appeal held that, since department had not challenged Rolls Royce decision before it, the said decision had attained finality and the appeal thus was allowed.

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Right of Cross Examination – A Crystallised Right

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Synopsis
A question on sellers’ genuineness, leading to nonallowance of Input Tax Credit (ITC) to the buyers, has been frequently faced by sales tax payers. No opportunity for cross examination is afforded to the buyer to test or rebut the evidences used against him for such disallowance. Author throws light on the recent decision of Madras High court on this issue wherein it has been held that right of cross examination is the most essential right and the same cannot be denied to the buyer.

Introduction

There are a number of situations where the Revenue Departments rely upon material collected from opposite/third parties. For example, at present under Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, the sales tax department is disallowing Input Tax Credit (ITC) to the buyers on the ground that the seller is non genuine dealer. The department for this purpose relies upon statement of the vendor, as well as his affidavit etc.

It is a common experience that no opportunity for cross examination of the adverse material used, is given to the concerned buying dealer. Further, no opportunity for personal cross examination of the vendor is given.

The issue which arises is whether such procedure is acceptable in the eyes of law?

Recent Madras High Court judgment in case of Thilagarathinam Match Works vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tirunelveli (295) E.L.T. 195 (Mad.)

The issue as to whether granting of opportunity for cross examination is necessary or not had arisen in above case.

The facts were that the petitioners in writ petitions challenged orders passed by the Enquiry Officer, rejecting their request for cross-examination of certain officers and persons in an enquiry, in pursuance of the show cause notices, issued u/s. 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. In the annexure to the show cause notices, the authorities relied upon the reports of the Energy Auditor as well as the statements of some officers and witnesses. The petitioner made a request for the cross-examination of those officers and witnesses.

Before the High Court, the Excise Authority took objection to the request of the petitioners for cross-examination on following grounds:

(i) that the petitioners prolonged the issue even without submitting an explanation to the show cause notices for more than one and half years;
(ii) that the petitioners have not adduced any reasons for cross-examination of those persons; and
(iii) that none of the witnesses have retracted from their original statements.

Based on above facts, the Hon. High Court held that even if the petitioners had never submitted any explanation to the show cause notices, the conduct of an enquiry becomes necessary and the cross-examination of the officers, who are authors of the statements, crystallises into a right for the petitioners. Thus, the first objection to the request for cross-examination was rejected.

About second objection to the request for crossexamination that the petitioners had not stated any reason for cross-examination of those persons, the Hon. High Court held that no reason need be stated by any person for requiring crossexamination. In an enquiry, a person gets two kinds of rights. The first set of right revolves around the right to peruse the documents relied upon by the department and the right to crossexamine the witnesses on whose statements the enquiry or prosecution is based. The second set of right revolves around the right to produce the witnesses and documents in defence. If a person facing an enquiry seeks to summon some persons to be examined in his defence or seeks to summon some documents to be produced in support of his defence, it is open to the enquiry officer to ask the delinquent to justify such a request by adducing reason. But, insofar as cross-examination is concerned, no justification need be provided in the form of reasons by a delinquent. The very fact that some statements of some officers are relied upon is good enough reason for permitting cross-examination. The very fact that the right of cross-examination is part of the most essential rights is sufficient to grant the request. But, the enquiry officer cannot test the request for cross-examination on the strength of the reasons. Therefore, the second ground on which the request of the petitioners is rejected, also cannot be sustained, held the Hon. High Court.

In respect of the third ground on which the request of the petitioners was rejected was that none of the witnesses had retracted from their original statements. Retraction from an early statement would normally occur only during the course of the enquiry. In the course of the enquiry, witnesses had not been examined. In other words, the respondents have presumed that the right to cross-examine would arise only in cases, where witnesses retract from their early statements. That is a wrong presumption or understanding of the law. The purpose of cross-examination is only to disprove the statements given by the witnesses. If the witnesses had already retracted from their original statements, the petitioners would have been well advised not to ask for cross-examination at all. This aspect has not been appreciated by the respondents, held the Hon. High Court. Therefore, it was held that the third objection also was not sustainable.

Conclusion
The law on the issue of right of cross examination is thus clear. The above principle duly applies to sales tax department. Assuming that the sales tax department may be correct in its investigation, still the department is under obligation to grant opportunity of cross examination as per the law laid down above, as well as to comply with the principles of natural justice. It thus transpires that disallowing ITC without above opportunity is bad in law.

There are two aspects about ITC. If transaction is non-genuine, ITC cannot be allowed even though seller might have paid tax. However, this fact requires to be established by following the above principle of law.

The truth whether transaction was genuine or not, can get established only upon providing an opportunity of cross examination.

The other aspect is that the transaction is genuine but tax is not paid by concerned vendor. In such case disallowing ITC to buyer will be incorrect. The concerned vendor should be first assessed as he is first in sequence. The recovery should be made from him. Without assessing him, jumping upon next buyer will be inappropriate and cannot withstand the legal position.

Hence ascertainment of correct position of transaction is very much necessary and for that purpose cross examination opportunity is mandatory.

Therefore, the one way process adopted today by the sales tax authorities can not be said to be correct as per law. The buyers can expect justice in due course of appeal at higher forum.

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Remuneration to Partners: Whether Payment to a Different Person is Taxable?

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Synopsis

To consider the applicability of
Service Tax on remuneration paid to partner, the authors have analysed
the definition of ‘Service’ defined in Section 65B (44) of Finance Act
2012 alongwith various provisions of Partnership Law, Income Tax law and
considered the various judicial precedents. The authors have also
referred to the relevant case laws on the subject and concluded that
services provided by partners to the firm and remuneration received
thereof from the firm cannot be subjected to Service Tax.

Preliminary
Partnership
continues to be one of the more prominent forms in which businesses are
carried out in the country. Further, it is a very common practice that,
partners are paid salary (either on a fixed basis monthly/annually or
on a basis which is linked to profits earned by the firm). Further,
under the income tax law, salary paid to partners is allowed as
deduction subject to certain specified limits.

The scope of
service tax has been substantially expanded, post introduction of
Negative List based Taxation of Services with effect from 01-07-2012.
The taxability of salary paid by the firm in the hands of partners under
service tax has been a matter of extensive deliberation since
01-07-2012. An attempt is made hereafter to discuss this issue,
considering the provisions of partnership law & income tax law, in
addition to the provisions of service tax law effective 01-07-2012.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

Extracts from Finance Act, 1994 – as amended (FA 12) effective 01/07/2012.

(A) Section 65 B (44) of FA 12

‘Service’
means any activity carried out by a person for another for
consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

(a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii)
Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a
sale within the meaning of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the
Constitution; or

iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim;

(b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

…………………………….

Explanation 2

– For the purpose of this Clause, transaction in money shall not
include any activity relating to the use of money or its conversion by
cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to
another form, currency or denomination for which a separate
consideration is charged.

Explanation 3
– for the purposes of this Chapter, –

(a)
an unincorporated association or a body of persons, as the case may be,
and a member thereof shall be treated as distinct persons;

(b)
an establishment of a person in the taxable territory and any of his
other establishment in a non – taxable territory shall be treated as
establishments of distinct persons.


Explanation 4
– A
person carrying on a business through a branch or agency or
representational office in any territory shall be treated as having an
establishment in that territory;

(B) Section 65B (37) of FA 12

“Person includes –
(i) an individual, juridical
(ii) a Hindu undivided family,
(iii) a Company,
(iv) a Society,
(v) a limited liability partnership,
(vi) a firm,
(vii) an association of persons or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
(viii)Government,
(ix) a local authority,
(x) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub – Clauses

(C) Charge of Service tax – Section 66 B of FA 12

There
shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at
the rate of twelve per cent on the value of all services, other than
those services specified in the negative list, provided or agreed to be
provided in the taxable territory by one person to another and collected
in such manner as may be prescribed.

Relevant extracts from TRU Circular dated 20/6/12 – “Taxation of Services – An Education Guide” issued by CBEC

Guidance Note 2 – What is Service?

‘Service’ has been defined in clause (44) of the new section 65B and means –

• any activity
• for consideration
• carried out by a person for another
• and includes a declared service.

The said definition further provides that ‘service’ does not include –


any activity that constitutes only a transfer in title of (i) goods or
(ii) immovable property by way of sale, gift or in any other manner


(iii) a transfer, delivery or supply of goods which is deemed to be a
sale of goods within the meaning of Clause (29A) of article 366 of the
Constitution

• a transaction only in (iv) money or (v) actionable claim

• a service provided by an employee to an employer in the course of the employment.

• fees payable to a Court or a Tribunal set up under a law for the time being in force
………….

Activity

What does the word ‘activity’ signify?

‘Activity’
is not defined in the Act. In terms of the common understanding of the
word activity would include an act done, a work done, a deed done, an
operation carried out, execution of an act, provision of a facility etc.
It is a term with very wide connotation.

Activity could be
active or passive and would also include forbearance to act. Agreeing to
an obligation to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or a
situation has been specifically listed as a declared service u/s. 66E of
the Act.

………………….

Activity for a consideration

The
concept ‘activity for a consideration’ involves an element of
contractual relationship wherein the person doing an activity does so at
the desire of the person for whom the activity is done in exchange for a
consideration. An activity done without such a relationship i.e.
without the express or implied contractual reciprocity of a
consideration would not be an “activity for consideration” even though
such an activity may lead to accrual of gains to the person carrying out
the activity.

Thus, an award received in consideration for
contribution over a life time or even a singular achievement carried out
independently or without reciprocity to the amount to be received will
not comprise an activity for consideration.

There can be many
activities without consideration. An artist performing on a street does
an activity without consideration even though passersby may drop some
coins in his bowl kept after feeling either rejoiced or merely out of
compassion. They are, however, under no obligation to pay any amount for
listening to him nor have they engaged him for his services. On the
other hand, if the same person is called to perform on payment of an
amount of money then the performance becomes an activity for a
consideration

Provision of free tourism information, access to
free channels on TV and a large number of governmental activities for
citizens are some of the examples of activities without consideration.

Similarly,
there could be cases of payments without an activity though they cannot
be put in words as being ‘onsideration without an activity’
Consideration itself presupposes a certain level of reciprocity. Thus
grant of pocket money, a gift or reward (which has not been given in
terms of reciprocity), amount paid as alimony for divorce would be
examples in this category.

However, a reward given for an activity performed explicitly on the understanding that the winner will receive the specified amount in reciprocity for a service to be rendered by the winner would be   a consideration for such service. Thus, amount paid in cases where people at large are invited to contribute to open software development (e.g. Linux) and getting an amount if their contribution is finally accepted will be examples of activities for consideration.

By a person for another

What is the significance of the phrase ‘carried out by a person for another’?

The phrase ‘provided by one person to another’ signifies that services provided by a person to self are outside the ambit of taxable service. Example of such service would include a service provided by one branch of a company to another or to its head office or vice-versa.

Are there any exceptions wherein services provided by a person to oneself are taxable?

Yes.  Two  exceptions  have  been  carved  out  to the  general  rule  that  only  services  provided  by a  person  to  another  are  taxable.  These  exceptions,  contained  in  Explanation  3  of  Clause  (44) of  section  65B,  are:

  • an establishment of a person located in taxable territory and another establishment of such person located in non-taxable territory are treated as  establishments  of  distinct  persons.  [Similar provision  exists  presently  in  section  66A  (2)]

  •  an  unincorporated  association  or  body  of  per- sons and members thereof, are also treated as distinct  persons.  [Also  exists  presently  in  part as  explanation  to  section  65].

Implications of these deeming provisions are that inter-se provision of services between such persons, deemed to be separate persons, would be taxable. For example, services provided by a club to its members and services provided by the branch office of a multinational company to the headquarters of the multinational company located outside India would be taxable provided other conditions relating to taxability of service are satisfied.

a)Brief analysis of provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932

Some relevant provisions are as under:

  •  the ‘partnership’ is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of  a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually ‘partners’ and collectively a ‘firm’ and the name under which their business is carried on is called ‘the firm’s name.” [section 4].

  •  a partner is not entitled to receive remuneration for taking part in the conduct of business of the firm subject to a contract between the partners. [section 13(a)]

a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of business of the firm. [section 18]

  •  any act of the partner which is done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the kind carried on by the firm, binds the firm. [section  19]

  • every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners  and  also  severally,  for  all  the  acts  of the firm done while he is a partner. [section 25]

b)    Some judicial considerations

  •  under  partnership  law,  a  partnership  firm  is not  a  legal  entity,  but  only  consists  of  the  individual  partners  for  the  time  being.  It  is  not a  distinct  legal  entity  apart  from  the  partners constituting it and equally, in law, the firm, as such,  has  no  separate  rights  of  its  own  in  the partnership assets. When one talks of the firm’s property or the firm’s assets, all that is meant is property or assets in which all partners have a  joint  or  common  interest.  [Malabar  Fisheries Co.  vs.  CIT  [1979]  120  ITR  49   (SC);  in  CIT  vs. Dalmia Magnesite Corpn. [1999] 236 ITR 46 (SC).]

  •  a partnership concern is not a legal entity like a company. It is a group of individual partners [Comptroller  &  Auditor  General  vs.  Kamlesh Vadilal  Mehta  [2003]  126  Taxman  619  (SC   –  3 Member  Bench).]

  •  law has extended only a limited personality to a  partnership  firm.  A  firm  is  not  an  entity  or a  ‘person’  but  is  an  association  of  individuals, and a firm’s name is only a collective name of those  individuals  who  constitute  the  firm.  A partnership  firm  cannot  enter  into  partnership with another partnership firm. HUF or individual [Dulichand Laxminarayan vs. CIT (1936) 29 ITR 535 (SC  –  3  member  Bench); Mahabir Cold Storage vs. CIT  [1991]  188  ITR  91  (SC).]

  •  a partnership is not a legal entity. Partners are the  real  owners  of  assets  of  the  partnership firm. Firm is only a compendious name given to partnership  for  the  sake  of  convenience.  Each partner is owner of assets to the extent of his partnership  [N.  Khadervali  Saheb  vs.  N.  Gudu Sahib  [2003]  129  Taxman  597  (SC  –  3  Member Bench).]

c)    Other important & relevant Judicial Views

  •  The  Honorable  Supreme  Court  in  the  case of  Champaran  Cane  Concern  vs.  State  of  Bihar [1964]  2  SCR  921,  has  pointed  out  that  in  a partnership  each  partner  acts  as  an  agent  of the  other.  The  position  of  a  partner  qua  the firm  is,  thus,  not  that  of  a  master  and  a  servant  or  an  employer  and  an  employee,  which concept  involves  an  element  of  subordination but  that  of  equality.  The  partnership  business belongs to the partners and each one of them is an owner, thereof. In common parlance the status  of  a  partner  qua  the  firm  is,  thus,  different from employees working under the firm. It  may  be  that  a  partner  is  being  paid  some remuneration for any special attention which he gives  but  that  would  not  involve  any  change of  status  and  bring  him  within  the  definition of  an  employee.

  •  The  Honorable  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of CIT vs. R. M. Chidambaram Pillai  [1977]  106  ITR 292  has  held  as  under  :

“Here the first thing that we must grasp is that a firm is not a legal person even though it has some attributes of personality. Partnership is a certain relation between persons, the product of agreement to share the profits of a business. “Firm” is a collective noun, a compendious ex- pression to designate an entity, not a person. In Income-tax law a firm is a unit of assessment, by special provisions, but is not a full person which leads to the next step that since a contract of employment requires two distinct persons, viz. the employer and the employee, there cannot be a contract of service, in strict law, between a firm and one of its partners. So that any agreement for remuneration of a partner for taking part in the conduct of the business must be regarded as portion of the profits being made over as a reward for the human capital brought in. Section 13 of the Partnership Act brings into focus this basis of partnership business.”

“…It is implicit that the share income of the partner takes in his salary. This telling test is that where a firm suffers loss, that salaried partner’s share in it goes to depress his share of income. Surely, therefore, salary is a different label for profits, in the context of a partner’s
remuneration.”

“…The matter may be looked at another way too. In law, a partner cannot be employed by his firm, for a man cannot be his own employer. A contract can only be bilateral and the person cannot be a party on both sides, particularly in a contract of personal employment. A supposition that a partner is employed by the firm would involve that the employee must be looked upon as occupying the position of one of his own employers, which is legally impossible. Consequently, when an arrangement is made by which a partner works and receive sums as wages for services rendered, the agreement should in truth be regarded as a mode  of adjusting the amount that must be taken to have been contributed to the partnership’s assets by a partner who has made what is really a contribution in kind, instead of contribution in money.”

  • The  Honorable  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of Regional  Director,  Employees  State  Insurance Corpn.  vs.  Ramanuja  Match  Industries  [1985]  1 SCC 218 while dealing with the question, wheth- er there could be a relationship of master and servant  between  a  firm  on  the  one  hand  and its partners on the other, indicated that under the  law  of  partnership  there  can  be  no  such relationship as it would lead to the anomalous position  of  the  same  person  being  both,  the master  and  the  servant.

Brief analysis of provisions under income tax law

Under the Income-tax Act, 1961, some relevant provisions which need to be noted, are as under:

  •  A partnership firm (registered or unregistered) is taxed as a separate entity. Share of income of the partner in income of the firm is not included in computing total income of the partner (as it has already been taxed in the hands of partnership firm).

  • In addition to share of income of the firm, working partners can draw salary commission or remuneration from the partnership firm as per provisions of section 184, read with section 40(b). This is allowed as deduction from income of the firm (subject to certain limits) and is treated as an income of the partner for income-tax purposes.

  • According to section 2(23), a firm, partner and partnership  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  the Partnership  Act,  1932.

  •  Explanation   2   to   section   15   specifically states  that  any  salary,  bonus,  commission  or remuneration,  by  whatever  name  called,  due to or received by a partner of a firm from the firm  shall  not  be  regarded  as  ‘salary’.

  • Section 28(V) specifically states that any interest, salary, bonus, commission or remuneration, by  whatever  name  called,  due  to  or  received by a partner of a firm from such firm shall be treated as income chargeable to tax under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession.’

  • Provisions  of  TDS  (Section  192)  are  not  applicable to salary paid by the firm to its partners.

Partnership is a “person” by legal fiction for taxation

Though  partnership  is  not  a  legal  person,  yet  a firm  has  been  defined  as  a  ‘person’  u/s.  2(31) of  the  Income-tax  Act,  1961  and  section  65B(37) of  FA  12  effective  01-07-2012,  by  creating  a  legal fiction.  Hence,  once  a  legal  fiction  is  created  by law,  it  has  to  be  taken  to  its  logical  end.  Accordingly, partnership firm and the partners have to  be  ‘deemed’  as  two  different  persons  and  a partner should be deemed to be employee of the partnership  firm.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the following proposi- tions emerge :

  • there is a specific exclusion in the definition of ‘service’ for services provided by an employee to an employer in course of or in relation to his employment. However, there is no relationship of an employee and an employer between the partners and the partnership firm;

  • any agreement for remuneration of a partner for taking part in the conduct of the business is nothing but an additional share of profit remuneration is a different label for profits, in the context of a partner’s remuneration paid by firm to its partners. For services rendered by the partners, to the firm, would have oth- erwise got additional share of profit instead of remuneration.

  •  the partners act as agents of their firm and render the services to themselves,

  • the partnership business belongs to the partners and each of them is an owner thereof, and, hence, the services are rendered by partners to themselves.

Based on the above, it can be reasonably concluded that, since the services are rendered by the partners to themselves and not by one person to another and since services provided by partners to the firm is not covered by the two specific exceptions  in  Explanation  3  to  section  65  B(44)  of  FA 12,  services  provided  by  the  partners  to  the  firm would not constitute “any activity carried out by a person for another” in terms of the definition of ‘service’ u/s. 65B(44) of FA 12, Hence, service tax would not be applicable to remuneration received by  a  partner  from  the  partnership  firm.  Alterna- tively, by deeming fiction if a partner is treated as a different ‘person’ under tax laws overriding the provisions of the partnership law, then a partner would be deemed to be an employee of the firm. If that be the case, services provided by partners to  the  Partnership  firm  would  be  excluded  from the  definition  of  ‘service’  in  terms  of  clause  (b) of section 65 B(44) of FA 12. Hence, the question of  any  liability  to  service  tax,  on  remuneration received  by  partners  from  the  partnership  firm, would  not  survive.

CBEC’s confusing clarification regarding Form VCES-3 and CENVAT credit

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Background
During the nascent period of the commencement of the Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (‘VCES’), the industry and taxpayers were doubtful as regards their eligibility to avail CENVAT credit in respect of the tax dues paid under the VCES, i.e., paid under the reverse charge mechanism and against supplementary invoices raised by their service providers. The CBEC sought to put this uncertainty to rest by issuing clarification in the form of a Circular [No. 170/5/2013-ST dated 08-08-2013] (on issues pertaining to the VCES). In the aforesaid Circular Q. No. 18 (or FAQ No. 22 of the CBEC’s booklet on Frequently Asked Questions relating to VCES issued on 08-08-2013) dealt with the issue of eligibility of CENVAT credit to the recipient of service in respect of the tax dues paid under a supplementary invoice or under reverse charge.

At that time, it was clarified that apart from the restriction imposed by rule 6(2) of the Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Rules, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘VCES Rules’), relating to utilisation of CENVAT credit for payment of tax dues under the VCES, all issues relating to admissibility of CENVAT credit shall be determined in terms of the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (‘CCR’). It was also clarified that the admissibility of CENVAT credit of; (i) service tax paid by a service recipient under an invoice or a supplementary invoice issued by a service provider for the amount of tax dues paid under VCES, and (ii) tax dues paid by a service recipient under reverse charge mechanism under VCES; shall be determined in terms of rule 9(1)(bb) and 9(1)(e) respectively of the CCR.

Recent clarification
Despite the above, a large section of the tax payers (and declarants under the VCES) felt that the issue was needed more clarity was needed on this issue. Accordingly, clarifications were pursued by trade and industry mainly related to the timing for availment of such CENVAT credit, i.e., whether the credit would be available immediately upon payment of first installment of tax dues or only after payment of tax dues in full and receipt of acknowledgement of discharge in Form VCES-3. In response, recently, the CBEC, vide its Circular No. 176/2/2014-ST dated 20-01-2014 has indicated that CENVAT credit shall be available only upon full payment of tax dues and receipt of Form VCES-3, stated as under:

“3. It would be in the interest of VCES declarants to make payment of the entire service tax dues at the earliest and obtain the discharge certificate within 7 days of furnishing the details of payment. As already clarified in the answer to question No.22 of FAQ issued by CBEC dated 08-08-2013, eligibility of CENVAT credit would be governed by the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

4. Chief Commissioners are also advised that upon payment of the tax dues in full, along with interest, if any, they should ensure that discharge certificate is issued promptly and not later than the stipulated period of seven days.”

Through the above clarification, the CBEC has briefly, professed that, (i) the eligibility for availment of CENVAT credit shall be determined in terms of the CCR and (ii) CENVAT credit shall be available only after full payment of tax dues and receipt of acknowledgement of discharge in Form VCES-3.

Brief Analysis
While the prescribed time permitted under the VCES for payment of tax dues is 30th June, 2014 and 31st December, 2014 with interest, the CBEC has entreated the declarants to earnestly deposit the balance tax dues in order to avail CENVAT credit. Further, the CBEC has maintained that the eligibility of CENVAT credit would be governed by the CCR. In this regard, the CBEC has also urged the Chief Commissioners to ensure that the issuance of acknowledgement of discharge in Form VCES-3 is concluded within the stipulated period of seven days of receipt of information regarding full payment of declared tax dues.

Confusing clarification
Generally, a circular or clarification is issued to put to rest any doubts that may exits on a particular issue. However, it appears that the aforesaid Circular has created more doubts instead of clarifying the existing ones. Here’s why this Circular has created more confusion than clarification.

The CCR allow availment of CENVAT credit on the basis of either (i) an invoice, a bill or challan issued by a provider of input service or (ii) a supplementary invoice, bill or challan issued by a provider of output service, in terms of the provisions of Service Tax Rules, 1994 subject to certain exceptions or (iii) a challan evidencing payment of service tax, by the service recipient as the person liable to pay service tax.

A thorough reading of the relevant Rules in CCR with the aforesaid clarification from a service recipient’s perspective, the following fact situations emerge:

1. Where a supplementary invoice is raised by the service provider for collection of service tax – In terms of the Clarifications stated above, the eligibility to CENVAT credit in such a case shall be determined in terms of rule 9(1)(bb) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which permits CENVAT credit availment except where the additional amount of tax became recoverable from the provider of service on account of non-levy or non-payment or short-levy or short-payment by reason of fraud or collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of the Finance Act or of the rules made thereunder with the intent to evade payment of service tax. Hence, where fraud, suppression etc., with intent to evade payment of tax does not exist, CENVAT credit may be availed on the basis of receipt of a supplementary invoice.

The question, whether the department can allege fraud, suppression etc., with intent to evade payment of tax in respect of VCES declarations, where the declarants have voluntarily disclosed their tax dues, it is still unclear and open for deliberation as this has specifically not been clarified by the department till date.

2. Where an invoice has not been issued by the service provider at the time of rendering service and an invoice is issued for the first time – The present Circular No. 176/2/2014-ST dated 20-01- 2014 as also the Circular No. 170/5/2013-ST dated 08-08-2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Clarifications’) clarify that the eligibility to CENVAT credit shall be determined in terms of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; specifically rule 9(1)(bb) or rule 9(1) (e). Where an invoice is issued for the first time, CENVAT credit can be taken on the basis of the invoice, challan or bill issued in terms of rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and the provisions under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 do not impose any restriction similar to that under rule 9(1)(bb) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 for such availment.

Under normal circumstances, the service recipient is eligible to take CENVAT credit immediately upon receipt of the invoice (subject to the condition that the service provider is paid within the specified period). The case of a service recipient would be no different is the service provider has issued an invoice with the service tax component for the first time. In this scenario, can the service provider be restricted from availing CENVAT on the basis of such invoice? The circular is conspicuously silent on this aspect.

3. Where tax dues have been partially paid under reverse charge – In such a situation, rule 9(1) (e) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 provides that CENVAT credit may be availed immediately on the basis of a challan evidencing payment of service tax by the service recipient as the person liable to pay service tax without laying down any additional conditions.

This situation is similar to (2) above. Generally, the service recipient becomes eligible to claim CENVAT as soon as he deposits the service tax, on the basis of the tax paid challan.

The circular seems to suggest that even in case of a service recipient having deposited 50% of tax, would not be permitted to avail CENVAT credit unless and until the entire liability declared under the VCES is cleared. Whether such a restriction can be imposed by way of a clarification is open issue.

The CBEC has by virtue of the clarification, put the service recipients into an irrational situation, i.e., they would be entitled to CENVAT credit only after the issuance of acknowledgement of discharge to the declarants, which has till date been at the mercy of the department; more so in the case where the entire amount of tax dues have been paid by the declarant (service provider/recipient, as the case be) but acknowledgement of discharge has not been is- sued within 7 days of intimation to the department. Such a condition for postponement of availment of CENVAT credit is unwarranted on the part of CBEC.

The CBEC has also failed to consider the fact that, except in case of payment of tax dues arising out of reverse charge, the declarants and person entitled to CENVAT credit are different. The payments made by declarants under the VCES, continue to be ‘tax dues’ irrespective of the conclusiveness of the declaration made. The documentary trail showing the collection of service tax by the service provider should meet the requirement of law and the service recipients are not expected to produce any evidence to show that the service provider is actually deposited the dues with the Government.

It is quite likely that to this extent, the aforesaid Circular may be challenged as being ultra vires the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, VCES and VCES Rules. It is doubtful that this confusing and overstepping clarification by CBEC, will help the declarants in away in getting swift receipt of the acknowledgement of discharge.

Shree Cement Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Jaipur Bench, Jaipur Before Hari Om Maratha (J.M.) and N.K. Saini (A.M.) ITA No. 503/JP/2012 Assessment year: 2007-08. Decided on 27th January, 2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: D.B. Desai/A.K. Khandelwal

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Section 80IA(8) – Where more than one market value/Arm’s Length Value is available and the assesse is entitled to adopt the market value of its choice. Section 2(24) – Receipt on account of Carbon credit is capital receipt not liable to tax.
(1) Re: Claim u/s. 80IA:

Facts:
The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80IA in respect of its Power generation undertaking. Power generated by the power undertaking is predominantly used by the assessee captively at its cement unit. For computing the profitability of the power captively consumed, in terms of provisions of section 80IA(8), the assessee considered the market value or Arm’s Length Value being the value at which independent power supplier had sold power to Power Distribution Companies (DISCOMs) in the State of Rajasthan. While the AO applied the rate at which power is supplied by the State Electricity Grid to assessee’s cement unit and accordingly, re-computed the deduction eligible u/s. 80IA. The CIT(Appeals) upheld the action of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities on the grounds amongst others, that:

• the assessee has adopted market price of its choice in computing the transfer price and such discretion cannot be allowed to the assessee;
• On the point of selection of price from the basket of market values, it submitted that there is no such provision in the act which gives assessee such prerogative.
• Since, the assessee itself is drawing power from the State grid on regular basis, Grid rate is the best market price available which should be adopted for computing deduction u/s. 80IA.

Held:
According to the tribunal, the issue before it is where there are two or more market values available and if the assessee has adopted a ‘value’ which is ‘market value’, whether it is permissible for the Revenue to still replace the same by another ‘market value’. The tribunal, on perusal of section 80IA(8) noted that the statute provides that the assessee must adopt ‘Market Value’ as the transfer price. In the open market, where a basket of ‘Market Values’ are available, the Act does not put any restriction on the assessee as to which ‘Market Value’ it has to adopt. It is purely assessee’s discretion. As long as the assessee has adopted a ‘Market Value’ as the transfer price, that is sufficient compliance of law. Even if assessee’s cement unit has purchased power, also from the Grid or that assessee’s Power Unit has also partly sold its power to grid or third parties that by itself, does not compel the assessee or permit the Revenue, to adopt only the ‘grid price’ or the price at which the Eligible Unit has partly sold its power to grid or third parties, as the ‘market value’ for captive consumption of power to compute the profits of the eligible unit. Any such attempt is clearly beyond the explicit provisions of section 80IA(8) of the Act. The above principles are also supported by the decision of Special Bench of Bangalore Tribunal in Aztec Software & Technology Services Ltd. vs. ACIT 107 ITD 141 as well as Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of ACIT vs. Maersk Global Service Centre (I) Pvt. Ltd. 133 ITD 543. Since the assesse had adopted a rate at which actual transactions had been undertaken by the unrelated entities and the volumes of transaction as relied upon were also substantial, the appeal filed by the assesse on this ground was allowed.

Re: Receipt from Carbon Credit is capital receipt or revenue receipt:

Facts:
The assessee’s project ‘Optimum Utilisation of Clinker’ had generated CER or Carbon Credit by reducing emissions from clinkerisation and from power generation. The said project generated CERs against which the assessee received Rs. 16,02 crore which has been claimed as ‘capital receipt’. In the assessment order, the Assessing Officer held that cost of acquisition of Carbon Credit is NIL & the entire receipt is taxable as capital gain. However, in the computation, it has been added as Business income. The CIT (Appeals) on appeal held that the receipt was in the nature of benefit arising from the business of the assessee and is taxable as ‘Business Income’ u/s. 28(iv) of the Act.

Before the tribunal the revenue submitted that the receipt on account of carbon credit was related to the business of the assessee and the assessee had undertaken activities which had resulted in the receipt on account of carbon credits. Hence, the amount so received had to be considered as related to the business of the assessee and should either be considered as revenue receipts chargeable to tax as business income, or the net amount after deduction of expenditure if any, incurred for the same should be considered as chargeable to tax under the head capital gains.

Held:
The tribunal relied on the decisions of the Hyderabad Tribunal in the case of  My Home Power Ltd.  vs.  DCIT 151 TTJ 616 (Hyd), the Chennai Tribunal in the cases of Sri Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT 40 taxmann.com 141  and  Ambika Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. DCIT I.T.A. No. 1836/Mds/2012 and held that receipt on account of Carbon Credit is capital in nature and neither chargeable to tax under the head Business Income nor liable to tax under the head Capital Gains.  In its above view, the tribunal also drew support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone International Holdings vs. UOI 341 ITR 1 wherein the Supreme Court held that     treatment     of     any     particular     item     in     different    manner in the 1961 Act and DTC serves as an important guide in determining the taxability of said item. Since DTC by virtue of the deeming provisions specifically    provides    for    taxability    of    carbon    credit    as    business receipt and Income Tax Act does not do so, the tribunal held in favour of the assessee and the addition made by the AO was deleted.

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(2014) 98 DTR 281 (Hyd) Fibars Infratech (P) Ltd. vs. ITO A.Y.: 2007-08 Dated: 03-01-2014

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Section 2(47)(v): Under the development agreement, since no construction activity had taken place on the land in the relevant previous year, it cannot be said that the transferee has performed or was willing to perform its obligation under the agreement in the relevant year and, therefore, provisions of section 2(47)(v) did not apply.

Facts:
During the F.Y. 2006-07, the assessee company transferred certain property for development to M/s MAK Projects (P) Ltd. The development agreement was executed on 15th December, 2006. As per the development agreement, the assessee was entitled to receive 16 villas comprising 9,602 sq. yards of plotted area along with 58,606 sq. ft. of built up area.

However, there was no development activity until the end of the previous year ending 31st March, 2007. Commencement of building process had not been initiated as the building approval was provided only on 6th March, 2007. The Assessing Officer alleged that the transaction under development agreement was a transfer u/s. 2(47)(v) as on the date of entering into the agreement.

Though possession of the property was handed over to the developer, the assessee contended that since there is no amount of investment by the developer in the construction activity during the F.Y. 2006-07, it would amount to non-incurring of required cost of acquisition by the developer. Hence, no consideration can be attributed to the F.Y. 2006-07. As there is no quantification of consideration to be received by the assessee, section 2(47)(v) would not apply.

Held:
The handing over of the possession of the property is only one of the conditions u/s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, but it is not the sole and isolated condition. It is necessary to go into whether or not the transferee was ‘willing to perform’ its obligation under these consent terms. When transferee, by its conduct and by its deeds, demonstrates that it is unwilling to perform its obligations under the agreement in this assessment year, the date of agreement ceases to be relevant. In such a situation, it is only the actual performance of transferee’s obligations which can give rise to the situation envisaged in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

In the given case, nothing is brought on record by the authorities to show that there was development activity in the project during the assessment year under consideration and cost of instruction was incurred by the developer. Hence, it is to be inferred that there was no amount of investment by the developer in the construction activity during the assessment year in this project and it would amount to non-incurring of required cost of acquisition by the developer. The developer in this assessment year had not shown its readiness in making preparations for the compliance of the agreement. On these facts, it is not possible to hold that the transferee was willing to perform its obligations in the financial year in which the capital gains are sought to be taxed by the Revenue. This condition laid down u/s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was not satisfied in this assessment year. Consequently, section 2(47) (v) did not apply.

Further, it cannot be said that there is any sale in terms of section 2(47)(i). To say that there is an exchange u/s. 2(47)(i) both the properties which are subject matter of the exchange in the transaction are to be in existence at the time of entering into the transaction. It is to be noted that at the time of entering into development agreement, only the property i.e., land pertaining to the assessee is in existence. There is no quantification of consideration or other property in exchange of which the assessee has to get for handing over the assessee’s property for development.

It cannot be said that the assessee carried on the adventure in the nature of trade so as to bring the income under the head ‘Income from business’. This is so, because the assessee has not sold any undivided share in the property to the developer in the year under consideration. The assessee remains to be the owner of the said property and the land was put for development for the mutual benefit. Even if the transaction is considered as business transaction, it would be taxed only when the undivided share in the land is transferred.

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(2013) 96 DTR 220 (Del) ACIT vs. Meenakshi Khanna A.Y.: 2008-09 Dated: 14-06-2013

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Section 56(2)(vi): Lump sum alimony received by a divorcee as a consideration for relinquishing all her past and future claims is not chargeable u/s 56(2) (vi).

Facts:
During A.Y. 2008-09, the assessee received lump sum alimony from her ex-husband. The divorce agreement between the assessee and her exhusband was made in the F.Y. 1989-90. Pursuant to this agreement, the ex-husband of the assessee was required to make monthly payments to his wife over a period of time. However the ex-husband did not pay the same and hence the assessee threatened to take legal action against him. The exhusband, therefore, paid a lump sum amount as full and final settlement in lieu of assessee’s past and future claims. The Assessing Officer held that exhusband was not covered under the definition of relative as provided in exceptions to section 56(2) (vi). He, therefore, treated the amount received by the assessee as income from other sources taxable under the provisions of section 56(2)(vi) and added the same to the income of the assessee. The assessee however contended that she had received the amount against consideration of extinguishing her right of living with her husband. It was further argued that the amount was a capital receipt.

Held:
Though the assessee was to receive monthly alimony which was to be taxable in each year from conclusion of divorce agreement, but the monthly payments were not received and, therefore, were not offered to tax. The receipt by the assessee represents accumulated monthly installments of alimony, which has been received by the assessee as a consideration for relinquishing all her past and future claims. Therefore, there was sufficient consideration in getting this amount. Therefore, section 56(2)(vi) is not applicable. Secondly, amount was paid by way of alimony only because they were husband and wife and the assessee was spouse of the person who has paid the amount and, therefore, payment received from spouse did fall within the definition of relative. Moreover even if it is accepted that the monthly payments of alimony are liable to tax then also in the present case the amount received represents past monthly payments and hence cannot be taxed in the year under consideration. Therefore, it was held that amount received was a capital receipt and not liable to tax.

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The Missing Link between Action and Purpose

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Human beings act out of reason. We do not dig holes and refill them for no reason. The reasons behind our actions are our goals. For most of us, these are ‘unwritten goals’ within the narrow context of our physical and emotional needs. Very few of us have ‘clear written goals’. Mark H. McCormack has given details of a study in his book “What they don’t teach you at Harvard Business School.” The study was conducted at Harvard between 1979 and 1989. The Harvard graduates of 1979 were asked whether they have set clear, written goals for their future and whether they have made plans to achieve them. The responses were: 3% had clear and written goals; 13% had goals, but they had not written them; the majority 84% had no specific goals. After ten years, they found that the 13% earned on an average twice as much as the 84% and the rest 3% were earning 10 times the other 97% put together. The only difference was clear and written goals.

Clarity and purpose is more important than intelligence. An average person who is clear about what he wants is set to achieve more than a confused genius. Goals are derived from our dreams and they direct our actions. Many of us have never defined our goals. We, thus, live without direction and dreams. As needs get satisfied, the ‘unwritten need based goals’ lose their power to motivate. Once we are dry of motivation, we suppose that we have achieved whatever was necessary. It is similar to a situation where your car runs out of fuel and you declare that you have reached your destination.

Frustration, boredom and fatigue are thus inevitable in our lives, and we try to dodge them with sloppy entertainment and possessions. We may have accomplished many ‘unwritten goals’, but we lack the harmony among different roles we play. Our homes are filled with things, but we are unfulfilled within. Our achievements are termed ‘great’, but we are cramped with regrets. We ‘exist’ but have stopped ‘living’– result: a life of ‘unaware mediocrity’. Without an aim we are like a leaf at mercy of the winds.

Goal setting’ process is much more than merely a prerequisite for achieving more. It makes you think for yourself. This is the rationale for setting goals – goals define both our needs and purpose. This process shifts our attention from the question “What I want?”, to “Why I want it?”. This shift opens the doors for introspection. You are compelled to answer the question: “What is it that I truly want in life and why”? Your conscience is stirred in the process.

Swami Vivekananda said, “The greatest religion is to be true to your own nature. Have faith in yourselves.” Goal setting is the first step towards authentic thinking about our own self. This process temporarily upsets you from within till you arrive at your own answer. But once the process starts, rest assured, the answer will come. The moment you arrive at something original, that moment is the moment of your rebirth. Your first birth was from the womb of your mother, the rebirth is from the womb of wisdom.

This new ‘YOU’ has found its purpose. Now, instead of being tossed around by life, you take control of life. You transform from bewilderedness to clarity. You now shine with clarity and purpose. You have dropped society’s definition of success, and arrived at your own definition. This sets a new zeal in you. It is a shift from knowledge to wisdom.

Unless our goals are ‘purpose-driven’, they, over a period of time, cease to have either meaning or motivation. Purpose is beyond needs. It is the ardour in you to make a difference. Higher the purpose deeper the depth from which your abilities and capacities be pulled out. Isn’t it sad to go to your grave without knowing what you were born for?

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Income: Deemed profit: Section 41(1): A. Y. 2007-08: Unclaimed liabilities of earlier years which are shown as payable in the accounts are not taxable as income u/s. 41(1) even if the creditors are untraceable and liabilities are non-genuine:

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CIT vs. Bhogilal Ramjibhai Atara (guj); tax appeal no. 588 Of 2013 dated 04-02-2014:

For the A. Y. 2007-08, in the return of income, the assessee had shown an amount of Rs. 37,52,752/- as outstanding debt and the same was shown in the accounts as payable. The Assessing Officer summoned all the creditors and questioned them about the alleged credit to the assesee. In the assessment order he gave a finding that a number of parties were not found at the given address, many of them stated that they had no concern with the assessee and some of them conveyed that they did not even know the assessee. On the basis of such findings and considering that the debts were outstanding since several years, the Assessing Officer applied section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and added the entire sum as income of the assessee. The Assessing Officer held that liabilities have ceased to exist within the meaning of section 41(1) and therefore, the same should be deemed to be the income of the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We are in agreement with the view of the Tribunal. Section 41(1) of the Act would apply in a case where there has been remission or cessation of liability during the year under consideration subject to the conditions contained in the statute being fulfilled. Additionally, such cessation or remission has to be during the previous year.

ii) In the present case, both elements are missing. There was nothing on record to suggest that there was remission or cessation of liability that too during the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2007-08 which was the year under consideration.

iii) It is undoubtedly a curious case. Even the liability, itself, seems under doubt. The Assessing Officer undertook the exercise to verify the records of the so-called creditors. Many of them were not found at all in the given address. Some of them stated that they had no dealings with the assessee. In one or two cases, the response was that they had no dealing with the assessee nor did they know him. Of course, these inquiries were made ex parte and in that view of the matter, the assessee would be allowed to contest such findings. Nevertheless, even if such facts were established through bi parte inquiries, the liability as it stands perhaps holds that there was no cessation or remission of liability and that therefore, the amount in question cannot be added back as a deemed income u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

vi) This is one of the strange cases where even if the debt itself is found to be non-genuine from the very inception, at least in terms of section 41(1) of the Act there is no cure for it. Be that as it may, insofar as the orders of the Revenue authorities are concerned, the Tribunal not having made any error, this Tax Appeal is dismissed.”

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Income: Accrual in India: Non-resident: Fees for technical services: Section 9(1)(vii): A. Y. 1991-92: Sale of design and engineering drawings outside India: Sale of plant: Income does not accrue in India: Not taxable in India:

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DIT vs. M/s. Nisso Lwai Corporation, Japan (AP); ITA No. 612 of 2013 dated 04-02-2014:

The assessee is a non-resident company and it is represented by RINL Visakhapatnam. The assessee company had provided design and engineering services, manufacture, delivery, technical assistance through supervision of erection and commissioning etc., to establish compressor house-I for RINL. The payments were made by RINL separately for each of the services/ equipments provided/supplied by the assessee. It, inter alia, included payment made towards supply of design and engineering drawings. The assessee company claimed that the said payment is not taxable in India as the transaction was of a sale of goods outside India. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and assessed it as income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim, deleted the addition and held as under:

“We are of the view that the amount received by the assessee for supply of design and engineering drawings is in the nature of plant and since the preparation and delivery has taken place outside Indian territories, the same cannot be taxed in India.”

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It appears, the learned Tribunal, on fact, found that there has been no accrual of income in India and this accrual of income has taken place in Japan. As such, the Income-tax Act, cannot be made applicable.

ii) We feel that the decision is legally correct and we do not find any element of law to be decided in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Power to call for information – Powers u/s. 133(6) are in nature of survey and general enquiry to identify persons who are likely to have taxable income and whether they are in compliance with provisions of Act – The notice seeking information from a cooperative Bank in respect of its customers which had cash transactions on deposits of Rs. 1,00,000 and above for a period of three years without reference to any proceeding or enquiry pending before any authority under the Act was valid.

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Kathiroor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. CIT (CIB) & Ors. [2014] 360 ITR 243 (SC)

The appellant-assessee before the Supreme Court was a service co-operative rural bank. The Incometax Officer (CIB), Calicut, issued a notice on 2nd February, 2009 to the assessee u/s. 133(6) of the Act calling for general information regarding details of all persons (whether resident or non-resident) who have made (a) cash transactions (remittance, transfer, etc.) of Rs. 1,00,000 and above in any accounts and/or (b) time deposits (FDs, RDs, TDs, etc.) of Rs. 1,00,000 or above for the period of three years between 1st April, 2005 and 31st March, 2008. It was expressly stated therein that failure to furnish the aforesaid information would attract penal consequences. The assessee objected to the said notice on grounds, inter alia, that such notice seeking for information which is unrelated to any existing pending proceedings against the assessee could not be issued under the provisions of the Act and requested for withdrawal of the said notice.

The assessing authority addressed to the objections raised by the assessee and accordingly rejected them by letter dated 5th March, 2009. The assessing authority relied on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in M.V. Rajendran vs. ITO [(2003) 260 ITR 442 (Ker) ] wherein it was held that the Department is free to ask for information about any particular person or to call for general information in regard to any matter they consider necessary. Section 133(6) does not refer to any enquiry about any particular person or assessee, but pertains to the information in relation to ‘such points or matters’ which the authority issuing notices needs. This clearly shows that information of a general nature can be called for and names and address of the depositors who hold deposits above a particular sum is certainly permissible. In fact, as the section presently stands, section 133(6) is a power of general survey and is not related to any person and no banking company including a nationalised bank is entitled to claim any immunity from furnishing such information.

The assessee, aggrieved by the aforesaid, filed Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the notice dated 2nd February, 2009. The learned single judge held that the impugned notice was validly issued under the provisions of the Act and, therefore, dismissed the said petition.

Thereafter, the assessee approached the Division Bench of the High Court by way of Writ Appeal questioning the said notice on grounds, inter alia, that the issuance of such notice u/s. 133(6) was bad in law as section 133(6) only provides for power to seek information in case of pending proceedings under the Act and does not contemplate the powers to seek fishing information which is unrelated to any existing proceedings or which may enable the assessing authority to decide upon institution of proceedings under the Act. The Division Bench has observed that the questions raised therein was no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. Secretary Government of India [2002] 9 SCC 106, and, accordingly dismissed the said appeal.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the assessee went before the Supreme Court in appeal.

The Supreme Court observed that before the introduction of amendment in section 133(6) in 1995, the Act only provided for issuance of notice in case of pending proceedings. As a Consequence of the said amendment, the scope of section 133(6) was expanded to include issuance of notice for the purposes of enquiry. The object of the amendment of section 133(6) by the Finance Act, 1995 (Act 22 of 1995), as explained by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in its circular showed that the legislative intention was to give wide powers to the officers, of course with the permission of the Commissioner of Income-tax or the Director of Investigation to gather particulars in the nature of survey and store those details in the computer so that the data so collected can be used for checking evasion of tax effectively.

The assessing authorities are now empowered to issue such notice calling for general information for the purposes of any enquiry in both cases: (a) where a proceeding is pending, and (b) where proceeding is not pending against the assessee. However, in the latter case, the assessing authority must obtain the prior approval of the Director or the Commissioner, as the case may be, before issuance of such notice. The word ‘enquiry’ would, thus, connote a request for information or questions to gather information either before the initiation of proceedings or during the pendency of proceedings; such information being useful for or relevant to the proceeding under the Act.

The Supreme Court referred to its decision in Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. Secretary, Government of India [2002] 9 SCC 106, wherein it had examined the proposition whether a notice us/. 133(6) could be issued to seek information in cases where the proceedings are not pending and construed section 133(6) of the Act.

In that case, it was held that it was not necessary that any inquiry should have commenced with the issuance of notice or otherwise before section 133(6) could have been invoked. It is with the view to collect information that power is given u/s. 133(6) to issue notice, inter alia, requiring a banking company to furnish information in respect of such points or matters as may be useful or relevant. The second proviso makes it clear that such information can be sought for when no proceeding under the Act is pending.

In view of the aforesaid, the Supreme Court held that the powers u/s. 133(6) were in the nature of survey and a general enquiry to identify persons who are likely to have taxable income and whether they are in compliance with the provisions of the Act. It would not fall under the restricted domains of being ‘area specific’ or ‘case specific’. Section 133(6) does not refer to any enquiry about any particular person or assessee, but pertains to information in relation to “such points or matters” which the assessing authority issuing notices requires. This clearly illustrated that the information of general nature could be called for and requirement of furnishing names and addresses of depositors who hold deposits above a particular sum is certainly permissible.

In the instant case, by the impugned notice the assessing authority sought for information in respect of its customers which had cash transactions or deposits of Rs. 1,00,000 or above for a period of three years, without reference to any proceeding or enquiry pending before any authority under the Act. The notice was issued only after obtaining approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Cochin. The Supreme Court therefore held that the assessing authority has not erred in issuing the notice to the assessee-financial institution requiring it to furnish information regarding the account holders with cash transactions or deposits of more than Rs. 1,00,000.

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Search and Seizure – Section 132B(4)(b) as it stood dealt with pre-assessment period and there is no conflict between this provisions and section 240 or 244A which deals with post-assessment period after the appeal – Assessee is entitled to interest for the period from expiry of period of six months from the date of the order u/s. 132(5) to the date of the regular assessment order in respect of amounts seized and appropriated towards tax but which became refundable as a result of appellate orde<

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Chironjilal Sharma HUF vs. Union of India & Ors. [2014] 360 ITR 237 (SC)

In the search conducted in the house of the appellant on 31st January, 1990, a cash amount of Rs. 2,35,000 was recovered. On 31st May, 1990, an order u/s. 132(5) came to be passed. The Assessing Officer calculated the tax liability and cash seized from appellant’s house was appropriated. However, the order of the Assessing officer was finally set aside by the Tribunal on 20th February, 2004. The Revenue accepted the order of the Tribunal. Consequently, the appellant was refunded the amount of Rs. 2,35,000 along with interest from 4th March, 1994 (date of last of the regular assessments by the Assessing Officer) until the date of refund.

The Appellant (assessee) claimed that he was entitled to interest u/s. 132B(4)(b) of the Act which was holding the field at the relevant time for the period from expiry of period of six months from the date of order u/s. 132(5) to the date of regular assessment order. In other words, the order u/s. 132(5) of the Act having been passed on 31st May, 1990, six months expired on 30th November, 1990, and the last of the regular assessment was done on 4th March, 1994, the assessee claimed interest u/s. 132B(4)(b) of the Act from 1st December, 1990 to 4th March, 1994.

The Supreme Court observed that close look at the provisions of section 132(5) and 132B, and, particularly, clause (b) of u/s. 132B(4) of the Act showed that where the aggregate of the amounts retained u/s. 132 of the Act exceeded the amounts required to meet the liability u/s. 132B(1)(i), the Department is liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 15% on expiry of six months from the date of the order u/s. 132(5) of the Act to the date of the regular assessment or reassessment or the last of such assessments or reassessments, as the case may be. The Supreme Court noted that though in the regular assessment done by the Assessing Officer, the tax liability for the relevant period was found to be higher and, accordingly, the seized cash u/s. 132 of the Act was appropriated against the assessee’s tax liability but the order of the Assessing Officer was overturned by Tribunal finally on 20th February, 2004 and in fact, the interest for the post-assessment period, i.e., from 4th March, 1994, until refund on the excess amount was paid by the Department to the assessee. The Department denied the payment of interest to the assessee u/s. 132B(4)(b) on the ground that the refund of excess amount was governed by section 240 of the Act and section 132B(4)(b) had no application. According to the Supreme Court, however, section 132B(4)(b) dealt with pre-assessment period and there was no conflict between this provision and section 240 or for the matter section 244A. The former dealt with pre-assessment period in the matters of search and seizure and the latter deals with post-assessment period as per the order in appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the view of the Department was not right on the plain reading of section 132B(4)(b) of the Act as indicated above.

The Supreme Court, accordingly, allowed the appeal and set-aside the impugned order holding that the appellant was entitled to the simple interest at the rate of 15% p.a. u/s. 132B(4)(b) of the Act from 1st December, 1990 to 4th March, 1994.

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‘Income’ includes ‘loss’ – a revisit

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‘Income includes loss’ is a phrase found in various judicial precedents in the context of Indian Incometax laws, although commercially ‘income’ and ‘loss’ have always been understood to be antonyms. The gap between the commercial and tax-understanding is intentional. In this context, it is important to know the meaning of the terms ‘income’ and ‘loss’ (along with difference between them).

Income is a term though commonly used; is seldom understood. It has always triggered more questions rather than answers. It cannot be understood with recourse to some accepted tenets, beliefs and established class of propositions. To limit income exclusively to one or any specific sphere would be an unjustified arrest of its reach. Possibly, this is the reason that Income-tax statute also has left the definition of income open-ended.

There are various principles concerning ambit of ‘income’. One among them is ‘income includes loss’. A number of decisions including the Apex Court ruling in the case of CIT vs. J.H. Gotla (1985) 156 ITR 323 (SC) and CIT vs. Harprasad & Co. Pvt. Limited (1975) 99 ITR 118 (SC) has flagged this canon. The attempt in this write-up is to revisit and discern the meaning of the phrase ‘income includes losses’. In this journey, the write-up touches upon various instances in the Act when this principle ‘appears’ to be inapplicable or unworkable. The write-up attempts to initiate a thought whether this principle is to be applied in every situation or this has a restricted application?

Definition of income in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’)

Section 2(24) of the Act provides an inclusive definition of the term ‘income’. It does not define ‘income’ per se. Section 2(24), if paraphrased, would read as under:

(24) “income” includes

• profits and gains
• dividend
• voluntary contributions received by a trust
• the value of any perquisite or profit in lieu of salary taxable
• any special allowance or benefit, other than perquisite included under sub-Clause (iii), specifically granted to the assessee
any allowance granted to the assessee either to meet his personal expenses at the place where the duties of his office or employment of profit are ordinarily performed or to compensate him for the increased cost of living
• the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, obtained from a company or by a representative assessee
any sum chargeable to Income-tax under Clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 28 or 41 or 59
• any sum chargeable to Income-tax under Clause (iiia) of section 28(iiia)/ (iiib)/ (iiic)
• the value of any benefit or perquisite taxable under clause (iv) of section 28
• any sum chargeable to Income-tax under clause (v) of section 28
• any capital gains chargeable u/s. 45
• the profits and gains of any business of insurance carried on by a mutual insurance company or by a co-operative society
• the profits and gains of any business of banking (including providing credit facilities) carried on by a co-operative society with its members
• any winnings from lotteries, crossword puzzles, races including horse races, card games and other games of any sort or from gambling or betting of any form or nature whatsoever
• any sum received from employees towards ESIC contribution
• any sum received from Keyman Insurance policy
Gifts or receipts for inadequate consideration.

Section 2(24) enlists various instances of income. First among them is ‘profits and gains’. The terms ‘profits’ and ‘gains’ have not been defined in the Act. It is trite to state that in the absence of statutory definition one could place reliance on the dictionary meaning or normal connotation of term(s). If dictionary meanings are referred, ‘profits’ means excess of revenue over expenditure and ‘gains’ as an increase in amount, degree or value. These twin concepts are indicative of a positive figure. There are judicial precedents to indicate that gains include ‘negative gains’ and we would keep these judicial precedents aside for the time being [and restrict ourselves to terminologies used in the Act].

Other terms used in the definition are ‘received’, ‘granted’, ‘winnings’, ‘obtained’. All these terms also have an element of ‘positivity’ inbuilt in them. Can these terms be used along with ‘losses’? A loss is something different. It is not something which is received or won or granted or obtained. It comes ‘ab-extra’ from outside. The term ‘loss’ generally accompanies verbs such as ‘incurred’, ‘sustained’, ‘computed’, ‘suffered’ etc. The use of these terms in section 2(24) appears to indicate that the law does not visualise any losses to be listed therein. This becomes more evident on a reading of the remaining instances in the definition which confine themselves to incomes which are chargeable to tax. These are obviously not concerned with losses. To conclude, although section 2(24) is an inclusive definition, the instances listed therein do not seem to accommodate ‘losses’ within its stride.

Although section 2(24) is an inclusive definition and its normal meaning should not be curtailed by various items listed therein in its inclusive sweep, it is interesting to observe that the legislature has consciously not included a ‘single’ instance to suggest that income may possibly include a negative face also.

Scope and charge of total income

Section 4 is the charging provision under the Act. The charge is in respect of the total income of a person for any year. The scope of total income is outlined by section 5 which has two sub-sections – one, dealing with residents and other with nonresidents. It enlists incomes which are includible in total income. It recognises those incomes which are to be included in total income on ‘receipt’ or ‘accrual’ or ‘deemed accrual’ basis. Cumulatively, these sections seek to include income within the scope of total income to levy a charge of tax. The question is whether losses can be charged to tax? Can losses be accrued or received or deemed so? The answer is negative in my view.

This is because, the term(s) ‘accrue or arise’ connotes ‘legal right to receive’. It is generally a stage prior to actual receipt (except for advances). The gap between accrual and actual receipt is only a matter of timing difference. It needs no explanation to state that losses cannot be ‘received’. When they cannot be received; how can there be a right to receive them? – Readers may deliberate.

Provisions of clubbing of income

Explanation 2 to section 64 reads – ‘For the purposes of this section, ‘income includes loss.’ This explanation was inserted by Finance Act 1979 whose objective is explained by Circular No. 258, dated 14-06-1979; relevant portion of which is as under:

“17.2 Under the provisions of section 64, the income of the specified persons is liable to be included in the total income of the individual in certain circumstances. The Finance Act, 1979 has inserted a new Explanation 2 below section 64(2) to provide that the term “income” for the purposes of section 64 would include a loss. Hence, for example, where the individual and his spouse are both partners in a firm carrying on a business and the firm makes a loss, the share of loss attributable to the spouse will be included in determining the total income of the individual.”(emphasis supplied)

The intention of the aforesaid amendment/insertion was to include losses in determining total income of the person in whose hands the income gets clubbed.  The inclusion was, therefore, sought to be made in ‘total income’ determination.  Losses of one person (whose income/loss get clubbed) were sought to be set-off against the income of another person (in whose hands the income is getting clubbed).  The explanation seeks to enable set-off of losses of one person in another’s hand. To effectuate this principle the legislature inserted explanation 2 WHEReby income for the purposes of this section includes loss. The important aspect here is the limited scope of this explanation.  The content of this explanation is limited to the context of section 64 only.  It does not travel beyond this. The explicit mention of such an aspect goes on to substantiate that under general principles income does not include losses.  This is a unique provision with a special purpose.

Some of the circulars on the aspect of considering losses for the purpose of set-off against income provide some insight into the purpose of such leg- islation.  In addition to Circular 258 dated 14-06-1979 (referred above) one may refer the C. B. R. Circular No. 20 of 1944 – C. No. 4(13)-I.T/ 44 dated the 15TH July, 1944 which reads as under:
Subject : Section 16(3)(a) – Loss incurred by wife or minor child – Right of set off under section 24(1) and (2).

Attention is invited to the Boards Circular No. 35 of 1941, on the above subject. It was laid down therein that where the wife or minor child of an individual incurs a loss which if it were income would be includ- ible in the income of that individual u/s. 16(3), such loss should be set-off only against the income, if any, of the wife or minor child and if not wholly set-off should be carried forward, subject to the provisions of section 24(2). The Board has reconsidered the question and has decided that, although this view may be tenable in law, the other and more equitable view is at least equally tenable that such loss should be treated as if it were a loss sustained by that individual. Thus, if the wife or minor child has a personal income of Rs. 5,000 which is not includible in the individuals income and sustains a loss of Rs. 10,000 from a source the income of which would be includible in the income of the individual, the loss should be set-off against the income of the individual under section 24(1), and if not wholly set-off should be carried forward u/s. 24(2). The wife or the minor child, would, therefore, be assessable on the personal income of Rs. 5,000. If, in any case, the wife or minor child claims a set-off of the loss against the personal income, it should be brought to the notice of the Board. Boards Circular No. 35 of 1941 is hereby cancelled.” (emphasis supplied)

Thus, losses are included to enable set-off against income. The inclusion is in the total income computation and not in income as such. The inclusion is for the limited purpose of computation. The Direct Tax Law Committee 1978, in its final report, also made some observations on this provision:

“The provisions for aggregating income of the spouse under clause (i) of section 64(1) has led to a dispute in regard to the treatment of losses which may fall to the share of the spouse from the partnership. The Gujarat High Court in Dayalbhai Madhavji Vadera vs. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 551 has ruled that the section contemplates inclusion of income and, accordingly, the share of loss arising to the spouse cannot be set-off against the total income of the other spouse. The Karnataka High Court in Kapadia vs. CIT [1973] 87 ITR 511 has dissented from this view and has held that income in this section includes a loss. On general principles, income from membership in a firm would include a loss and the context of clause (i) of sub-section (1) does not warrant the contrary construction. The liability to assessment cannot alternate from year to year between the individual and the spouse depending on whether there is a profit or a loss…” (emphasis supplied)

The Committee has categorically said that income ‘in this section’ includes loss. To state negatively, otherwise (or under normal circumstances) income does not include loss. The reason for such inclusion is to ensure consistency in the process of aggre- gating the profit or loss with the spouse’s income. It does not indicate income to include loss in all circumstances.

The scope of clubbing section is limited. It provides for clubbing of one’s income in the total income of another. By defining income to include loss, it is suggesting that loss of one person (along with income) may also be included in the total income of another person. The inclusion of loss is expanding the scope of ‘clubbing’ and not ‘income’.

Set-off and carry forward of losses

Chapter VI of the Act deals with aggregation of income and set-off of loss. Section 70 provides for set off of ‘loss’ from one source of income against ‘income’ from another source under the same head. If the losses cannot be fully set-off against income under the same head, they may be set-off against incomes under other heads (section 71). The balance losses remaining after set off against the incomes computed under other heads is carried forward to the succeeding years as per the relevant provisions of the Act. Thus, the Act recognises loss to be different from income. Loss has an effect of reducing income in the process of set-off against income. An increase in loss would reduce the income. They are inversely proportional. The opening portion of section 70 and 71 is broadly similar language which is reproduced below:

Section 70

(1) Save
as otherwise provided in this Act,
where the net
result for any assessment year
in respect of any source
falling under any
head of income, other
than “Capital gains”, is a loss,
the assessee shall
be
entitled to have
the amount of such loss
set-off against his
income from any other
source under the
same head.

Section 71

(1) Where
in respect of
any assessment year
the net result of the computation under any
head of income, other than “Capital gains”, is
a loss and the assessee has no income
under the head “Capital gains”,
he shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, be entitled to have
the amount of such loss
set-off against his
income, if any, assessable
for that assessment year under any other head.


to absorb the costs/expenditures/ other outlays; an assessee ends up with a situation of unabsorbed costs/ expenditures. This event of income falling short of outflows is called ‘loss’. Can such a situation be termed as ‘in- come’? Loss and Income are names of opposite fiscal situation(s) and cannot be equated with one another. Both the sections deal with set off of loss against income. The legislature itself recognises income and loss to be different and distinct. They are different outcomes having opposite characters. They cannot co-exist. This being the case, can one say that income includes loss?

The term ‘include’ means – ‘to comprise or contain as part of a whole’. Say for instance, if A includes B, then, A either consists of B wholly or partially. On the contrary, if the presence of B negates or diminishes the existence of A, then can we say that A includes B? In the context of clubbing, the legislature required losses (of one person) to be clubbed along with income (of another). This clubbing is to facilitate total income computation. Thus, the inclusion is only ‘quantitative’ and not ‘qualitative’. This being the case, such limited quantitative inclusion of the legislature cannot be understood to be ‘qualitative’ to paint all the incomes with such understanding.

In the context of section 70 and 71, ‘loss’ is a mere outcome in the process of computing income. This is apparent from the language used in these twin sections which read – ‘where the net result….’. Loss is a net result or consequence. The other alternative outcome is ‘income’. To elucidate further, one may look at the structure of the Income-tax Act.

Section 4 creates a charge on total income.  Section 5 (read with section 7 and 9) outline the scope for such total income.  While computing total income certain incomes are excluded by section 10 (along with 11).  Section 14 classifies income into 5 heads for the purpose of total income computation (and charge of Income-tax).  Sections 15 to 59 compute incomes under various heads.   Section 60 to 64 include (or club) certain incomes to assessee’s total income.  The focus is thus on total income computa- tion since the charge u/s. 4 is on it.  While making such computation, when the income is insufficient ‘Loss’ is conceptually different from income.  It is not defined in the Act.  Black’s law dictionary de- fines ‘loss’ as – ‘An undesirable outcome of a risk; disappearance or diminution in value; usually in an unexpected or relatively unpredictable way’.  The definition appears to reflect attributes of involuntary happening.  Although Companies Act of 1956 does not define ‘loss’ there is an indirect inference one could draw from section 210(2) therein which reads :

(2)IN the case of a company not carrying on business for profit, an income and expenditure account shall be laid before the company at its annual general meeting instead of a profit and loss account, and all references to “profit and loss account”, “profit” and “loss” in this section and elsewhere in this Act, shall be construed, in relation to such a company, as references respectively to the “income and expenditure account”, “the excess of income over expen- diture”, and “the excess of expenditure over income”. (emphasis supplied)

The meaning of loss has been explained to be ‘excess of expenditure over income’. It is a differential between expenditure and income. It is an outcome when income is unable to absorb all the expenditure/ costs. In other words, unabsorbed cost is loss. The interplay between income and expenditure results in loss. While computing income, loss could arise if the income falls short of expenditure. Loss is thus a status or situation wherein expenditure exceeds income. It is not a part of income. Something to be included in income, it should be a part of it. Income (net) or losses are two alternatives. They are outcomes. One denotes surplus and other is an epitome of deficit. From an Income-tax standpoint, marriage of these two extremes is impossible sans specific situations such as clubbing or set-off provi- sions (referred above).

Accounting standards also differentiate the two. Accounting Standard 22 [Disclosure and computation of deferred tax] defines taxable income (tax loss) as the amount of the income (loss) for a period, determined in accordance with the tax laws, based upon which Income-tax payable (recoverable) is determined.  Income and loss have been recognised as alternatives.  Loss is an antonym of income.  The question is whether such parallel and unlike concepts overlap under the Income-tax regime?

As stated in the beginning of this write-up, various courts held that income includes ‘losses’. It appears to be a fairly settled proposition. Whether this proposition is applicable in every situation?  Does ‘income’, which is inherently positive, include losses?

In my opinion, the term ‘income’ is not a polymor- phous term having an open texture. Income which indicates ‘coming in’ is an embodiment of positivity. It signifies pecuniary enrichment or accumulation. Loss is indicative of opposite emotions (to income). Loss may take various forms but would always result in deterioration. Indian tax provisions (keeping the judicial precedents aside) actually do not seek to hold these contradictory terms synonymous in every situation. At best, loss can be defined to be ‘loss of income’ and not ‘loss includes income’.

Having gone through the various instances and indications in the Act, the question still persists. The mystery around relationship between income and loss still lingers. Can these instances in the statute shake the law of land (Apex Court rulings)? Readers may deliberate whether INCOME REALLY INCLUDES LOSS?

If this proposition is accepted, can a daring attempt be made to claim that ‘losses emanating from sources of income which are exempt can be set-off against other income?’  Although this proposition is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Harprasad & Co. Pvt. Limited (1975) 99 ITR 118 (SC), the attempt is to just explore an alternate school of thought:

Loss is not a part of total income

Section 2(45) defines total income to mean total amount of income referred to in section 5 and computed in the manner laid down in the Act. The definition thus contains two limbs which are
as follows:

(a)    The income includible in total income must be ascertained as per section 5; and

(b)    The income must be computed as per provisions of the Act.

‘Total income’ defined in section 2(45) presupposes an existence of ‘income’ referred to in section 5. For the reasons mentioned above, section 5 does not appear to cover losses.   Therefore, section 2(45) can never include loss (since they cannot be ascertained as per section 5).  Section 10 seeks to exclude certain incomes from total income.  When a loss is never included in total income, how can section 10 exclude something which never existed?

Section 10 can never exempt a loss

Section 10 contains provisions for exemption of certain incomes.  It never exempts a loss.  Infact, courts have held that exemptions provided by the legislature itself may furnish an infallible clue to the income character of a particular receipt [Refer All India Defence Accounts Association, In re: Shailendra Kumar vs. UOI (1989) 175 ITR 494 (All)]; although not conclusive.

The apex court in the case of UOI vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Another 263 ITR 706 (SC) held that the ‘liability to tax’ is a legal situation; whereas ‘payment of tax’ is a fiscal fact.   A taxing statute does not always proceed to charge and levy tax.  Exemption provisions provide exemption from payment of tax.  One among them is section 10.  The incomes enumerated therein exclude income from the total income.  However, it does not annul the charge of tax.  An exemption cannot dispense with the very levy created under the Act [Refer B.K. Industries vs. UOI (1993) 91 STC 548].  Support for this proposi- tion can be drawn from the Apex Court decision in the case of Peekay Re-Rolling Mills vs. Assistant Commissioner – 2007 (219) ELT 3 (SC) – In this case, the court observed:

“In our opinion, exemption can only operate when there has been a valid levy, for if there is no levy at all, there would be nothing to exempt. Exemption does not negate a levy of tax altogether.” “Despite an exemption, the liability to tax remains unaffected, only the subsequent requirement of payment of tax to fulfill the liability is done away with.” (emphasis supplied)

Taking cue from the aforesaid decision (although rendered in the context of central excise), one could argue that exemption section could operate on only those income which can come within the ambit of Income-tax levy. Loss can never be subject to Income-tax levy; so there is no occasion to take relief of exemption provisions. Moreover, it is a settled principle that exemption provisions have to be construed liberally.  The tax relief granted by a statute should not be whittled down by importing limitations not inserted by the legislature [Refer CIT vs. K E Sundara Mudaliar (1950) 18 ITR 259 (Mad) and others].

With utmost respect for the Apex Court decision in the case of Harprasad & Co. Pvt. Limited case and many other cases which have concurred or followed this proposition, the aforesaid write-up is an attempt to take a deeper insight into these landmark judgments and may be challenge the obvious.

Delays in public life, can the problem be addressed?

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More than two decades after the event, the ghastly assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was once again an issue of discussion and debate. The occasion was the judgement of the Supreme Court to grant a reprieve, to the assassins or those who were part of the conspiracy. This was followed by the controversial decision of the Tamil Nadu government to free the convicted persons. While the unseemly haste with which the Tamil Nadu government acted was uncalled for and was definitely with a collateral purpose, there was no denying the fact that the Supreme Court was reacting to the inordinate delay that was caused in disposing of the mercy petitions of those who were to be sent to the gallows. If an authority with which discretion is vested declines to exercise its discretion either way and leaves a petition undecided for a period of 20 years, then the petitioner is entitled to succeed.

Let us take the case of the unfortunate accident involving two young officers on the naval submarine Sindhuratna. The media reports suggest that there is enormous delay in taking decisions with regard to acquisition of arms and modernising the armed forces. This has resulted in our armed forces operating with ageing equipment. If we are so callous about national security then one shudders to think what must be the fate of other files that gather dust in government departments. The irony is that a government which has been dilly-dallying in regard to acquisitions of arms and material was quick to lay the blame at the door of the Naval Chief, and accepted the Naval Chief’s resignation with alacrity.

Delay has become a part of public life. What is the reason for the snail’s pace in government functioning? Is it that all our bureaucrats are inefficient? I do not think so. While corruption has certainly affected administrative machinery, we do have a fair number of competent and upright public officers. Unfortunately, there seems to be a tendency to judge every decision of a bureaucrat in hindsight. If any incident occurs pursuant to an action of a public officer, the immediate response of a politician is to order an enquiry. By doing so the politician has satisfied public anger but the career of an official may be seriously affected. Consequently, the tendency of many officers is not to take any decision at all. Things have come to such a pass that if an authority acts in time and disposes of matters expeditiously this is looked upon with suspicion. It is almost as if, prompt action is taken only if there is a vested interest. While one must necessarily hold public officials accountable, we must learn to accept honest bonafide mistakes and stop hounding people for committing them. If that happens then decisions will be taken and delays will reduce.

Crossing timelines has become a norm particularly where a government official is involved. If we are to become an economic superpower which we aspire to be, and certainly deserve to be, this issue of delays needs to be addressed on a war footing. There will be a change if the attitude of those at the helm of affairs undergoes a change. If ministers stop brushing inconvenient problems under the carpet and start taking a firm view on various matters, things will change. Once this percolates downstream there will be greater accountability. One way would be to apply the law of limitation in favour of the applicant. If a decision on a petition or application is not taken within the time specified, that application or petition would be deemed to have been granted. Another solution could be that if the approval of a higher authority is pending on a decision taken by his junior, after a certain lapse of time, decision of the junior should be treated as having become final. There will have to be checks and balances when these approaches are incorporated in a statute or regulations but I think they can be built in.

While we are critical of government for the inordinate delays in decision making, we are not free from blame. Very recently I was the speaker at a program which was delayed to accommodate a politician. This resulted in delay of an hour, and apart from the inconvenience it caused me, one hour of more than 200 people in the audience was wasted which meant a loss of 200 man-hours. We must learn to respect the time of others which is an accepted norm the world over. I felt really sad when organising an international conference call, my colleague, warned me that the call was to take place at a schedule time and not ‘Indian Standard Time.’ While many of us do try to adhere to timelines, there are still others who treat the clock with disdain. While they are certainly entitled to their preferences in their private life, while interacting with others in public, delays should be a strict no-no.

And while we are on delays and timelines I realise that I have taken enough time of my readers. I will therefore stop here and return to my professional duties. After all time is money!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor

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[2013] 154 ITD 455 (Pune – Trib.) Bharat Forge Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT A.Y. 2007-08 & 2008-09 Date of Order : 31st January, 2013

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Section 194J – A.Y.2007-08 & 2008-09 – Provisions of section 194J do not apply to sitting fees paid to directors. However, provisions of section 194J(1) (ba) w.e.f. 1st July, 2012 will apply to sitting fees paid to Directors.

Facts
The assesse had paid sitting fees to its resident directors on which no tax was deducted. The assessee had deducted tax from salary and commission paid to non-executive directors and contended that provisions of section 194J are not applicable to sitting fees paid to directors. The AO held that 194J would be applicable on such payments since director is also manager under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and therefore, a technical personnel and thus sitting fees paid to him shall be liable to TDS.

Held
As per Explanation to section 194J, professional services mean services rendered by a person in the course of carrying legal, medical, engineering or architectural profession or the profession of accountancy or technical consultancy or interior decoration or advertising or such other profession notified by the Board. Therefore, sitting fees paid to directors do not amount to fees paid for any professional services mentioned in explanation to section 194J. Further, section 194J(1)(ba), effective from 1st July, 2012 states that TDS should be deducted on any remuneration or fees or commission by whatever name called, other than those on which tax is deductible u/s. 192, paid to a director of a company. However, these provisions shall not apply to A.Y. 2007-08 & 2008-09. Thus, no tax is required to be deducted u/s. 194J out of such directors sitting fees for AY 2007-08 & 2008-09.

Tax on payments made by assessee towards testing and inspection charges will be covered u/s. 194C and will not be considered as professional services as per section 194J.

Facts
The assessee had incurred testing and inspection charges on which TDS was done u/s. 194C. The charges were paid for getting the jobs done like testing, inspection of materials, etc., and were in the nature of material and labour contract. However, according to AO, the assessee should have deducted TDS u/s. 194J since the services rendered by the said parties are in the nature of technical/professional service. The CIT(A) upheld the action of AO.

Held
It was held that the nature of expenditure made by the assessee cannot be considered as payment for technical consultancy. The Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. ITO [2011] 48 SOT 643/15 taxmann.com 163 has held that any payment for technical services in order to be covered u/s. 194J should be a consideration for acquiring or using technical know-how simpliciter provided or made available by human element. There should be direct and live link between the payment and receipt/use of technical services/information. If the conditions of 194J r.w.s. 9(1), Explanation 2 Clause (vii) are not fulfilled, the liability under this section is ruled out. Therefore, it was held that payment by the assessee towards testing and inspection charges cannot be considered as payments towards professional services as per provisions of section 194J and the assessee has rightly deducted tax u/s. 194C.

Payments made for the use of cranes (cranes provided along with driver/operator) is covered under 194C and not under 194-I.

Facts
The assessee had made payments for hire of cranes for loading and unloading of material at its factory. The cranes were provided by the parties along with driver/operator and all expenses were borne by the owners only. The assessee had deducted the tax under 194C. The assessee contended that the hire charges are paid in terms of a service contract and do not amount to rent contract. The AO argued that definition of rent u/s. 194I means ‘any payment, by whatever name called, under any lease, sublease, tenancy or any other agreement or arrangement for the use of (either separately or together) any machinery, plant, equipment, fittings whether or not any or all of the above are owned by the payee’. Thus, AO held that the assessee should have deducted tax u/s. 194I and not 194C. The same was upheld by the CIT(A).

Held
Section 194C of the Act makes provision for deduction of tax at source in respect of payments made to contractors whereas section 194I makes provision for deduction of tax at source in respect of income by way of rent.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in cases of CIT (TDS) vs. Swayam Shipping Services (P.) Ltd. [2011] 339 ITR 647/199 Taxman 249 and CIT vs. Shree Mahalaxmi Transport Co. [2011] 339 ITR 484/211 Taxman 232/ (Guj.), held that provisions of section 194C should be applicable and not section 194I.

Payment towards windmill operation and maintenance, being comprehensive contract, will attract TDS u/s. 194C of the Act and not u/s. 194J.

Facts
The assessee company had made payments towards maintenance of windmill, replacement of parts, implementing safety norms, conduct of training programmes, prevention of damage, etc. at windmill site. The contract was a comprehensive contract for material and labour services required. The AO held that the operation and maintenance of windmill requires technical skills and knowledge and is covered u/s. 194J. The CIT(A) held that the assessee had correctly deducted tax u/s.194C.

Held
The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A). Mere fact that technical skill and knowledge was required for rendering services, did not render the amount paid by the assessee company for a comprehensive contract as ‘fees for technical services’. The said payment was of the nature of payment for a comprehensive contract on which the appellant company had rightly deducted tax u/s. 194C and not section 194J. This view is also supported by the decision of Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Gujarat State Electricity Corpn. Ltd. vs. ITO [2004] 3 SOT 468 (Ahd.) wherein it was held that a composite contract for operation and maintenance would come within the ambit of 194C and not 194J.

Payments towards annual maintenance contract (AMC) for software maintenance attracts TDS u/s. 194C and not 194J.

Facts
The assessee had made TDS u/s. 194C on payments for annual maintenance contracts. The AO held that these payments were towards technical, managerial and professional services and hence TDS u/s. 194J will be applicable. The CIT(A) decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

Held
As per the CBDT Circular No. 715, dated 8th August, 1995 routine/normal maintenance contract including supply of spares covered u/s. 194C. Following the decision of Ahemdabad Tribunal in case of Nuclear Corpn. of India Ltd. vs. ITO [IT Appeal No. 3081 (Ahd.) of 2009, dated 30-09-2011] and CBDT circular, the Tribunal held that payments made for AMC cannot be considered as fees for technical services within the meaning of section 194J.

Also refer decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in case of Skycell Communications Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2001] 251 ITR 53/119 Taxman 496 (Mad.)

Training and seminar expenses do not fall under definition of professional services and hence tax to be deducted u/s. 194C and not 194J.

Facts
The assessee had made payments towards training programmes and seminars organised by various entities including CII towards attending training and seminars by its employees. The assessee had deducted tax at source u/s. 194J. The AO held that the payments made on this account are covered u/s. 194J as the employees were getting training from experts in various fields having professional knowledge to give training and lectures to the employees for the benefit of the company. The CIT(A) held that training and seminar expenses do not    fall    under    the    definition    of    professional    services and accordingly decided the issue in favour of of the assessee.

Held
It was held that the payments made to various organisations towards attending seminars by the
employees of the assessee company cannot be considered as towards rendering of professional services by those training institutes as per the provisions of section 194J. Thus the order of CIT(A) was upheld.

Transfer pricing: International transaction: Arm’s length price: A. Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06: Marketing services to associated enterprise: Different from services in nature of engineering services rendered by four companies taken as comparables by TPO: Functionally different and not comparable: Addition made by AO on basis of adjustment made by TPO not justified:

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CIT vs. Verizon India Pvt. Ltd.; 360 ITR 342 (Delhi):

The assessee company had entered into a service agreement with its associated enterprise in Singapore for rendering marketing services. The Assessing Officer referred the matter to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) for determining the arm’s length price. TPO compared the services provided by the assessee to its associated enterprise with four companies rendering engineering services for determining the arm’s length price and made adjustments which resulted in the Assessing Officer making additions in respect of both the years. CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that the two services, that is, marketing services and engineering services, were functionally different and were, hence, not comparable and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The services rendered by the assessee to its associated enterprise were in the nature of marketing services which were entirely different from the set of services in the nature of engineering services rendered by the four comparables.

ii) Consequently, the adjustment arrived at by the TPO and the additions made by the Assessing Officer could not be sustained on the basis of the transfer pricing study with regard to the four companies which were clearly functionally not comparable.

iii) So, no question of law arises for our consideration. The appeals are dismissed.”

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Speculative transaction: Loss: Set off: Section 73: A. Y. 1991-92: Loss on account of purchase and sale of shares from solitary transaction: Transaction not constituting business carried on by assessee: Loss can be set off against profits from other sources:

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CIT vs. Orient Instrument P. Ltd.; 360 ITR 182 (Del):

The assessee company was engaged in the business of trading in crafts paper, installation, job work, consultancy and commission. In the relevant year it incurred loss of Rs. 5,53,500/- on account of a transaction whereby it purchased and sold shares. The assessee claimed set off of the said loss against other income. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for set off of the loss holding that the loss is speculation loss. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The transaction whereby the assessee purchased the shares and incurred loss on account of fall in the value of the shares was a solitary one.

ii) The finding of the Tribunal that the transaction did not constitute the business carried on by the assessee, could not be termed perverse and unreasonable. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Speculative transaction: Speculative loss: Section 43(5)(c): Share trading business on own behalf is “jobbing”; Jobbing is not speculative in view of proviso(c) to section 43(5): Loss from jobbing business is not speculative loss:

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CIT vs. Ram Kishan Gupta; [2014] 41 taxmann.com 363 (All):

The assessee is a Member of the U.P. Stock Exchange Association Ltd., and is registered as Stock Broker and carries on the purchase and sale of shares and securities. On scrutiny of the trading profit and loss account filed along with the return of income of Rs. 81,050/-, the Assessing Officer found that a sum of Rs. 8,53,030/- is debited for which the claim of the assessee was that it incurred loss in respect of transactions done by him on the floor of stock exchange with other brokers. The Assessing Officer rated the same as speculation loss as the loss of Rs. 8,53,030/- was on account of transactions for which there was no physical delivery. The assessee submitted before the Assessing Officer that the delivery had been effected on net basis as per the Stock exchange guidelines and no forward trading was allowed therefore there was no question of any speculation loss. The assessee’s plea was also that otherwise the assessee’s transaction was covered u/s. 43(5)(c) of the Income-tax Act , therefore, the transaction carried out by the assessee were specifically exempted to be treated as speculative transactions. However, the Assessing Officer disallowed the loss of Rs. 8,53,030/- treating the same to be speculative loss. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the allegation that transactions were settled without actual delivery was not fully established by the Revenue. It was held that if the system provides settlement at net basis in respect of jobbing and the appellant-assessee had been found paying turnover fee on such transactions ever since 1991-92 the assessee’s entire business was of non-speculative nature. The Tribunal also relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Shri Sharwan Kumar Agrawal; 249 ITR 233 (All) wherein it was held that the assessee who was a share broker was entitled for the exception covered by proviso (c) to section 43(5).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We have already observed that purchase or sale of shares periodical or ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery is a speculative transaction as provided u/s. 43(5). The assessee’s categorical case is that losses were suffered on account of non-delivery transactions. Whether the assessee is still entitled to protection under proviso (c) to subsection (5) of section 43, which transactions are non delivery transactions and what is the scope of the proviso in context of speculative transaction have to be examined.

ii) The Tribunal having returned finding that the details of each and every transaction were disclosed by the assessee which were part of the paper book. No discrepancy in any of the transactions can be pointed out by the Assessing Officer nor the bonafide of the transactions were doubted, the transaction thus carried out were part of the ‘jobbing’ within the meaning of proviso (c) to section 43(5).

iii) We are thus of the view that the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeal of the assessee is to be upheld although confined to the ground that the losses suffered by the assessee cannot be termed to be speculative loss by virtue of proviso (c) to section 43(5).”

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Refund: Section 237: A. Y. 2004-05: Belated revised return filed on 08-09-2011 claiming refund on basis of CBDT Circular dated 08- 05-2009: Condonation of delay: Delay to be condoned:

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Assessee entitled to refund: Devdas Rama Mangalore vs. CIT; [2014] 41 taxmann.com 508 (Bom)

The
petitioner, who was an employee of RBI had opted for the Optional Early
Retirement Scheme and had received an amount as per the Scheme in the
year 2004. The RBI had deducted TDS of Rs. 1,64,117/- treating the said
payment as taxable. In the return of income for the A. Y. 2004-05 filed
on 15th October 2004 the petitioner did not claim any refund of tax as
TDS paid by RBI on his behalf nor was the credit on tax utilised to
discharge tax payable on any other income.

On 08-05-2009, CBDT
issued a Circular clarifying that the employees of RBI who had opted for
early retirement scheme during the year 2004-05 would be entitled for
benefit of exemption u/s. 10(10C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
Supreme Court also in Chandra Ranganathan and Ors. vs. CIT; (2010) 326
ITR 49 (SC) held that the amounts received by retiring employees of RBI
opting for the scheme are eligible for exemption u/s. 10(10C) of the
Act. In view of the above, the petitioner filed a revised return of
income on 08-11-2011 claiming benefit of exemption available to the
Scheme u/s. 10(10C) of the Act which consequently would result in refund
of Rs.1.64 lakh paid by RBI as TDS. However, there was no response to
the above revised return of income from the respondent-revenue. The
petitioner in the meantime, also, filed an application with the CIT u/s.
119(2) (b) of the Act seeking condonation of delay in filing his
application for refund in the form of revised return of income for A. Y.
2004-05. The CIT by an order dated 04-02-2013 dismissed the application
u/s. 119(2)(b) of the Act on the ground that in view of Instruction No.
13 of 2006 dated 22nd December, 2006 by the CBDT an application
claiming refund cannot be entertained if the same is filed beyond the
period of 6 years from the end of the assessment year for which the
application is made. In the affidavit in reply dated 19th November 2013
the Commissioner of Income Tax states that he is bound by the above
instructions issued by the CBDT and consequently the claim for refund
cannot be considered.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)
It is not disputed by the respondent revenue that on merits the
petitioner is entitled to the benefit of refund of TDS as the payment
received under the scheme is exempted u/s. 10(10C) of the Act. The
decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Chandra Ranganathan and Ors.
(supra) concludes the issue. This is also the view of the revenue as
clarified in CBDT Circular dated 8th May, 2009. The application u/s.
119(2)(b) of the Act is being denied by adopting a very hypertechnical
view that the application for condonation of delay was made beyond 6
years from the date of the end of the A. Y. 2004-05. In this case, the
revised return of income filed on 8th September, 2011 should itself be
considered as application for condonation of delay u/s. 119(2)(b) of the
Act and refund granted.

ii) It is to be noted that the
respondent revenue does not dispute the claim of the petitioner for
refund on merits but the same is being denied only on hypertechnical
view of limitation. It will be noted that on 8th May, 2009 the CBDT
issued a circular clarifying and reviewing its earlier decision to
declare that the employees of RBI who opted for early retirement scheme
under the Scheme will be entitled to the benefit of section 10(10C) of
the Act. Soon after the issue of circular dated 8th May, 2009 by the
CBDT and the decision of the Apex Court in Chandra Ranganathan (supra)
the petitioner filed a revised return of income on 8th September, 2011
seeking refund of TDS paid on his behalf by RBI.

iii) In the above view, we allow the petition and direct respondent-revenue to grant refund due to the petitioner.”

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Reassessment: TDS: S/s. 143(3), 147 proviso and 148: A. Y. 2005-06: Disclosure in return of cancellation of assessee’s banking licence: Assessment u/s. 143(3): Reopening of assessment beyond four years on the ground that the assessee was no longer in the banking business is not valid: No failure to disclose truly and fully material facts:

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Charotar Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 360 ITR 373 (Guj):

The petitioner is a co-operative bank in liquidation. For the A. Y. 2005-06, the petitioner had filed its return of income on 31-10-2005, declaring a total loss of Rs. 7,95,82,108/-. Assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an order dated 27-12-2007 accepting the returned loss. On 15-03-2012, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 for treating the loss of Rs. 7,95,82,108/- as non-business loss on the ground that the assessee’s banking licence was cancelled by the RBI on 30-07-2003.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of notice u/s. 148 and held as under:

“i) The fact that the assessee’s licence had been cancelled by the RBI was clearly and in no uncertain terms was brought on record in the return filed by the assessee. The assessee, in fact, asserted that in view of such cancellation of the licence, the banking activities of the assessee were carried out only for the purpose of recovery of advances and payment to the depositors. It was further conveyed that in view of such facts, the profit and loss account was prepared on certain conditions and guidelines indicated therein.

ii) Apart from the declaration and disclosure on the part of the assessee, in the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer also, he started with the narration, “on verification of the case records, it was found that the assessee’s banking licence was cancelled by the RBI on 30-07-2003”. Thus the Assessing Officer gathered this fact from the verification of the case record and not from any other source.

iii) The crucial fact that the banking licence of the assessee had been cancelled by the RBI was disclosed in the original return itself. Thus, there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. The averment of the Revenue that despite such cancellation of the banking licence, the assessee lodged a false claim, even if it were to be corrected, would not per se indicate that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. As long as this requirement was satisfied, it was simply not open for the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment beyond the period of four years from the relevant assessment year.

iv) In the result, the impugned notice is quashed and set aside.”

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Method of accounting: System of accounting: Cash basis: Section 145: Block period 1987-88 to 1995-96: Assessee maintaining accounts on actual receipt basis: Interest income must be taken on receipt basis:

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CIT vs. Dr. K. P. Singh; [2014] 41 taxmann.com 406 (All):

The assessee was following the cash method of accounting. Accordingly, he offered the interest income on FDRs on receipt basis. The Assessing Officer assessed the interest on accrual basis. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and directed the Assessing Officer to assess the interest on receipt basis.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We find no infirmity in the Tribunal’s order, where the Tribunal observed that the interest income must be taken on receipt basis shown by the assessee from the F.D.Rs., Sahara and L.I.C. mutual funds. The assessee is maintaining the accounts on actual receipt basis and he is not maintaining any account on mercantile basis, as appears from the record.

ii) When it is so, then the answer to the substantial question of law is in favour of the assessee and against the Department.”

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Income: Capital or revenue: A. Y. 1985-86: Subsidiary of Government company receiving subsidy from holding company to protect capital investment of parent company: Subsidy is capital receipt and not income:

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CIT vs. Handicrafts and Handlooms Export Corporation of India Ltd.; 360 ITR 130 (Del):

The assessee, a Government company was a subsidiary of the State Trading Corporation of India. It operated as channelising agency for sale of handicrafts and handlooms abroad. In the relevant year, it received subsidy of Rs. 25 lakh from its holding company. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee that the receipt is a capital receipt and not income. He held that it is income assessable to tax. The Tribunal held that it was a capital receipt.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The sum of Rs. 25 lakh was not paid by a third party or by a public authority but by the holding company. It was not on account of any trade or a commercial transaction between the subsidiary and the holding company. The holding company was a shareholder and the shares were in the nature of capital. Share subscription received in the hands of the assessee was a capital receipt.

ii) The intention and the purpose behind the payment was to secure and protect the capital investment made by the holding company in the assessee. The payment of the grant by the holding company and receipt thereof by the assessee was not during the course of trade or performance of trade, and could be categorised or classified as a gift or a capital grant and did not partake of the character of trading receipt.”

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Interest on refund of tax: Section 244: A. Ys. 1982-83 to 1990-91: Whether whole of interest taxable in the year of grant – No: Has to be spread over the respective AYs to which it relates:

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Shri M. Jaffer Saheb(Decd) vs. CIT (AP); R. C. No. 127 of 1997 dated 19-12-2013:

For the A. Y. 1982-83 the Assessing Officer made additions and raised a demand which the assessee paid. The Tribunal deleted the additions. The Assessing Officer gave effect to the order of the Tribunal and refunded the tax paid by the assessee together with interest of Rs. 79,950/- for the period from 30- 10-1985 to 31-08-1989. The Assessing Officer brought to tax the whole of the interest amount in the A. Y. 1990-91 ignoring the claim of the assessee to spread over the said amount over the respective years. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim but the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The stand of the Department that interest u/s. 244(1A) accrues to the assessee only when it is granted to the assessee along with the order issued u/s. 240 is not correct. Interest accrues on a day to day basis on the excess amount paid by the assessee.

ii) The entitlement of interest is a right conferred by the statute and it does not depend on the order for the refund being made. An order for the refund is only consequential order which in law is required to be made more in the nature of complying with the procedural requirement, but the right to claim interest of the assessee is statutory right conferred by the Act. Accordingly, interest has to be spread over and taxed in the respective years.”

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TDS UNDER SERVICE TAX?

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A proposal of the Government:

A Study Group was appointed by the Government to examine the feasibility of introducing TDS provisions under service tax law. Comments were invited on the following aspects from the affected parties:
  • The feasibility of the introduction of TDS as a method of tax collection in service tax.
  • Whether this method should be applied uniformly to all taxable services or to certain specific/sensitive taxable services, and if only selectively, then to which categories of service providers/services receivers.
  • The extent to which service tax collections would be augmented by adopting the TDS method of tax collection.
  • The modalities of implementation of TDS method of tax collection.
  • The changes necessary in the present legal and administrative framework, to adopt the TDS method of service tax collection.
Government’s rationale behind the proposal:
Some of the reasons, for the introduction of TDS under service tax cited by the Government are as under:
  • Despite the fact that there are 14 lakh registered service providers, only 6 lakh service providers are paying tax.
  • According to a study carried out by the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence, there is a 70% increase in the service tax evasion in the last two years; and
  • TDS system followed under Income tax is found to be a very efficient way of collecting tax. Hence, the same needs to be replicated for service tax to achieve efficient tax collections.

TDS provisions under service tax neither desirable nor administratively feasible:
It would neither be desirable to introduce TDS provisions under the service tax law, nor would it be administratively feasible to do so for various reasons set out hereafter.
No justification for introducing TDS provisions after introduction of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules):
Hitherto, service providers had to deposit the service tax only after receipt of payment from the service receiver. As a result, the payment of service tax to the Government was postponed until and contingent upon the actual receipt of payment from the service receiver. However, after the introduction of POT Rules, the trigger for payment of service tax has shifted to the point of taxation as specified in the POT Rules, irrespective of realisation from clients. Thus, once an invoice is issued, the service provider has to deposit the tax with the Government by the 5th day of the following month/quarter, whether he receives the payment from the service receiver or not.
It is pertinent to note that despite the introduction of POT Rules, unlike income tax, there are no provisions under the service tax law permitting adjustments in case of bad debts (either fully or partly). This has an adverse impact on the service providers who have to bear the burden of tax in addition to the loss caused due to non-realisation.
Further, in cases where advances are received by a service provider, service tax is to be collected at the point of receipt of advance. This position continues even after introduction of POT Rules.
Therefore, there is no postponement in payment of tax to the Government in the existing structure. However, this appears to be one of the principal objectives behind the proposal.
As a matter of fact, the proposed introduction of TDS provisions would only bring about unnecessary complications and hardships for service providers as well as service receivers without any corresponding increase in Government collections.
Adequate powers under the service tax law to enforce recovery:
Under the present service tax law, there are stringent provisions to penalise tax evasions, delay in payment of tax to Government by a service provider and recovery of tax. Some of the more important provisions are as under:

Provision under service tax law

Section

 

of
the Finance

 

Act,
1994

 

 

Recovery of service tax not levied/

 

paid or short-levied/short-paid

 

or erroneously refunded.

73

 

 

Service tax collected
from any

 

person required to be deposited

 

with the Government.

73A

 

 

Interest on amount collected

 

in excess.

73B

 

 

Provisional
attachment to protect

 

revenue in certain cases.

73C

 

 

Interest on delayed
payment of

 

service tax to Government

 

at 18% p.a.

75

 

 

Penalty for failure to pay service

 

tax.

76

Penalty for suppressing value of

 

taxable services.

78

 

 

Power to search premises.

82

 

 

Recovery of any
amount due to

 

Government.

87

 

 

Prosecution provisions.

89

 

 

Further, the service tax registration (which is PAN-based) and filing of returns in all cases is now required to be carried out electronically. This is introduced essentially to bring efficiency in tax administration under service tax.

In light of the foregoing, there is no justification whatsoever for introduction of TDS provisions under service tax, on the ground that there is a widespread evasion. Instead, efforts ought to be made by the Government to bring efficiency in tax administration and strengthen intelligence machinery.

TDS provisions have no place in the context of a Value Added Tax (VAT) such as service tax:

Service tax, like VAT levied on the sale of goods, is an indirect tax, meaning that the ultimate burden of the tax is to be borne by the consumer, i.e., the service receiver. This fact marks a crucial distinction between the service tax and income tax, which is the only tax under which TDS provisions are applicable. In the case of other indirect taxes such as Central Excise, VAT, etc., TDS provisions are not generally prevalent.

However, under some of the State VAT laws in India, there are TDS provisions in regard to payments made to contractors for works contracts. These provisions are essentially made, considering the fact that under the peculiar nature of the business, sub-contractors are existing in large numbers in the unorganised sector and are scattered and widespread across the country.

In the context of service tax, it has been clarified by the Government and it is reasonably settled that sub-contracted service providers are to be treated as independent service providers and their taxability determined accordingly. Further, with CENVAT credit mechanism in place, service tax charged by a sub -contractor can be availed as credit by the main contractor subject to satisfaction of conditions. Hence, large section of sub-contractors are now charging service tax to avoid possibilities of demands in future with interest and penalties.

Since service tax is an indirect tax, the ultimate burden is borne by the service receiver. If the liability of depositing the same is also imposed on service receivers, there will be a dual burden of compliance on trade and industry, in that both service receivers and service providers will have to face the burden of procedural formalities in relation to service tax simultaneously for the same transactions.

Especially in those cases in which the price is cum duty, service receivers will also be hard put to arrive at the stand -alone value of the services for the purposes of complying with TDS provisions, which will result in additional administrative difficulties.

Furthermore, since service tax is leviable at each level of value addition, this will result in a duplication of work for the Government and the assessees.

International practices:
The VAT/GST regimes in most progressive countries worldwide do not contain TDS provisions. Given that the transition to GST is in the offing, the Indian indirect tax regime should be aligned as far as possible with international practices which have been developed over decades of experience. On this ground, introduction of TDS provisions under service tax does not appear to be meaningful.

CENVAT Scheme is a self-policing mechanism:
In the context of service tax, it is wholly unnecessary to introduce TDS, considering that in view of the CENVAT credit mechanism in place, the payment of service tax has a self-policing mechanism. There is a clear and established paper trail required to be maintained for each and every transaction and it is already in the interest of service providers as well as service receivers to charge the service tax as applicable and have it paid to the Govern-ment so that credit can be availed.

There are stringent provisions of interest, penalties and prosecution for wrong availment/utilisation of CENVAT credit. Further there is regular scrutiny/ audits by the Service Tax Department as well. Hence, mechanism itself ensures that onus is clearly on the persons availing credits to establish entitlement/correctness should the need arise.

Under this backdrop, introduction of TDS system under service tax is totally unjustified and unwarranted.

TDS provisions with a CENVAT credit mechanism will result in huge accumulations of credit:

As TDS will be calculated on gross turnover, this will create an additional pool of tax credit for service providers. As the actual tax payable by a service provider is to the extent of value addition made by him which is ensured by the CENVAT credit mechanism, which permits a service provider to avail credit on his input side and utilise the credit to pay tax on his output liability.

TDS provisions will result in accumulation of huge credits and consequent blockage of funds. This will increase costs of businesses and hence, have adverse impact on the trade and industry generally.

Refunds:
Presently, there is a threshold limit of 10 lakh under service tax. This is basically done to ensure that efforts of tax administration are focussed on high tax potential taxpayers. If TDS provisions are introduced, service providers availing threshold exemption would get covered in the tax net. They would have to get registered to claim refunds. This would adversely impact small-scale services sector.

TDS system would result in a service provider availing credit of taxes paid on inputs/input services as well as TDS credits. In cases where the value addition is low, depending on the TDS rate, it would result in large refund claims by service providers.

After the introduction of POT Rules as stated earlier, since the entire tax would have already been paid before the TDS is made, the same would lead to anomalous situations and service providers will have to seek for refunds in large number of cases.

As seen in the case of income tax, claiming refunds from the Tax Department invariably creates hardships/difficulties to taxpayers. If TDS provisions are introduced under service tax, service providers will have to face severe hardships in getting their refunds, which involves cumbersome procedural compliances. This would again result in blockage of funds and increase business costs.

Administrative difficulties, procedural compliances and increase in transaction costs:

Many service recipients are individuals/households/ small businesses who are not conversant with tax compliance. Introduction of TDS provisions will result in unnecessary administrative difficulties, especially for such service recipients, without any increase in revenue to the Government.

As seen in the case of income tax, assessees are required to file TDS returns, thereby requiring each business to make the deductions and deposit the tax, as well as complete other related formalities. Even thereafter, assessees often face difficulties in terms of objections raised for technical infractions. If TDS provisions are introduced under service tax law, all these issues would come into play for service receivers as well.

Hence, TDS provisions would substantially increase additional compliances for all the three parties i.e., service providers, service recipients and the tax authorities without any benefit as is being perceived by the Government.

Further, introduction of TDS provisions under service tax would increase transaction costs of conducting business.

Potential for tax evasion:

Given the extent of paperwork that would be generated due to the introduction of TDS, administrative difficulties may pose a risk to the revenue, as there is possibility of evasion of service tax through false TDS credits being claimed. These risks could substantially outweigh the benefits of speedy tax recovery as perceived by the Government.

Additional litigations:

If TDS provisions are introduced, both service providers and service recipients will be required to analyse whether the service rendered is a taxable service, classification thereof, etc. This will result in multiple litigations which will increase costs for businesses and for the Revenue.

Reverse-charge mechanism:

There are provisions under the present service tax law, wherein the service recipient/person making the payment is made liable to comply service tax provisions instead of the service provider. The aforesaid provisions are existing in the following cases:

  •     All instances of services provided from outside India.
  •    Commission payments to agents by insurance companies.
  •    Specified persons making payment to a Goods Transport Agency (GTA).
  •    Mutual fund or asset management company making payments to mutual fund distributors or agent.
  •     Payments made by body corporate of firms availing sponsorship service.

These provisions were specifically introduced for GTA, keeping in mind the high potential of tax evasion, inasmuch as the said services providers exist in large numbers in the unorganised sector across the country.

Compared to TDS system, reverse-charge mechanism is an easier system to administer inasmuch as under reverse charge only the service receiver is liable for tax compliances, whereas under TDS system both the service providers as well as service receivers would be saddled with compliances and paperwork associated therewith.

Since, reverse charge mechanism is already in place under the present service tax law, instead of introducing TDS provisions, it may be desirable to consider expansion in the scope of this mechanism in regard to services where tax evasion is apprehended by the Government.

Conclusion:

If TDS provisions are introduced under service tax, it would substantially increase compliance burdens at the end of service providers/service recipients, increase transactions costs, result in blockage of funds and generally have adverse impact on trade and industry without any benefit as perceived by the Government.

All trade and professional bodies need to collectively voice their protest, in case the Government decides to go ahead with the introduction of TDS provisions under service tax, either fully or partially.

Annual Statement to be filed by liaison offices — Notification No. 5/2012, dated 6-2-2012.

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The Finance Act, 2011 has directed all liaison offices to submit an annual statement to the Tax Department in the prescribed form and manner. The CBDT has inserted a new Rule 114DA vide Income-tax (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2012 wherein a Form 49C has been prescribed for filing such annual statement within 60 days from the end of the financial year. This Form needs to be verified by a CA or a person authorised by the non-resident to sign such form. It needs to be furnished electronically, digitally signed and the related rules shall be formed by the DGIT (Systems).

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Direct Tax Instruction No. 1/2012, dated 2-2- 2012 — F.No. 225/34/2011-ITA.II — Instructions for processing returns for A.Y. 2011-12 (reproduced).

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The issue of processing of returns for the A.Y. 2011- 12 and giving credit for TDS has been considered by the Board. In order to clear the backlog of returns, the following decisions have been taken:

(i) In all returns (ITR-1 to ITR-6) where the difference between the TDS claim and matching TDS amount reported in AS-26 data does not exceed Rs.1 lac, the TDS claim may be accepted without verification.

(ii) Where there is zero TDS matching, TDS credit shall be allowed only after due verification. However, in case of returns of ITR-1 and ITR-2, credit may be allowed in full, even if there is zero matching, if the total TDS claimed is Rs.5000 or lower.

(iii) Where there are TDS claims with invalid TAN, TDS credit for such claims are not to be allowed.

(iv) In all other cases, TDS credit shall be allowed after due verification.

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Akber Abdul Ali v. ACIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 5538/Mum./2008 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 28-12-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: N. R. Agarwal/P. K. B. Menon

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Section 40(a)(ia) r.w. section 194A — Disallowance of interest for failure to deduct tax at source — Payment of disputed amount with interest as per the Court order — Interest paid without deduction of tax at source — Whether AO justified in disallowing the same — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee was liable to pay the sum of Rs.68.54 lakh to one of its creditors. On account of his failure to pay, the suit for recovery was filed by the said creditor. The Court passed the decree settling the amount at Rs.55 lakh, which also included the sum of Rs.18.5 lakh towards interest.

In the return of income filed by the assessee, the amount paid by way of interest was claimed as deduction. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source, the AO disallowed the claim u/s.40(a)(ia). The CIT(A) on appeal upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that the amount was paid in accordance with the decision of the High Court. The interest payable under the decree of the Court was a judgment debt, therefore, he was not obliged to deduct tax at source.

Held:

In view of the ratio laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of Madhusudan Shrikrishna v. Emkay Exports, (188 Taxman 195), the Tribunal agreed with the assessee and held that the assessee had no obligation to deduct tax at source on the interest amount of Rs.18.5 lakh paid to the creditor.

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HV Transmissions Ltd. v. ITO ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. V. Easwar (President) and P. M. Jagtap (AM) ITA No. 2230/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2001-02. Decided on : 7-10-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Dinesh Vyas/ Goli Sriniwas Rao

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Section 147 — Even an assessment completed u/s.143(1) cannot be reopened unless there is fresh material

Facts:
The assessee company, engaged in the business of manufacturing heavy gear boxes, filed its return of income, on 31-10-2001, declaring a loss of Rs. 73,57,95,273. This return of income was processed u/s.143(1) on 28-1-2003. The assessee filed a revised return of income on 27-3-2003 declaring a loss of Rs.74,22,78,281 after revising its claim u/s.35DDA in respect of employee separation cost. The AO, from the balance sheet filed by the assessee along with its return of income observed that the assessee had incurred expenses towards ERP software amounting to Rs.95,14,000 and although 20% of the said expenses were only debited in P&L account, the entire amount of Rs.95,14,000 was claimed as a deduction in computation of total income. He, accordingly, entertained a belief that to this extent income has escaped assessment and the assessment was reopened by issuing a notice u/s.148 on 3-3- 2006.

In an order passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147, the AO assessed the loss to be Rs.50,17,47,153 after making addition inter alia on account of disallowance of expenses incurred on ERP software treating the same as of capital nature. He also disallowed claim for depreciation at 100% in respect of pollution control and energy saving devices at 100% valued at Rs.29.27 crore holding that the same had been earlier used by sister concern of the assessee-company.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) challenging the validity of the said assessment and also the various additions/disallowances made therein. The CIT(A) upheld the validity of reassessment proceedings and also the addition on account of disallowance of expenses incurred on ERP software treating the same as capital in nature. He, however, allowed relief in respect of depreciation at the rate of 100% on pollution control and energy saving devices.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging inter alia the validity of the assessment on the ground that initiation of reassessment proceedings was bad in law.

Held:
The Tribunal on perusal of the reasons recorded by the AO noted that there was no new material coming to the possession of the AO on the basis of which the assessment completed u/s.143(1) was reopened. The Tribunal also noted that in the case of Telco Dadaji Dhackjee Ltd. v. DCIT, (ITA No. 4613/ Mum./2005, dated 12th May, 2010) (Mum.) (TM), the Third Member, had relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kelvinator of India, (256 ITR 1) (SC), held that while resorting to section 147 even in a case where only an intimation had been issued u/s.143(1)(a), it is essential that the AO should have before him tangible material justifying his reason that income has escaped assessment. The Tribunal held that the TM decision of the Tribunal in the case of Telco Dadaji Dhackjee Ltd. (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. Following this decision, it held that the initiation of reassessment proceedings by the AO itself was bad in law and reassessment completed in pursuance thereof is liable to be quashed being invalid.

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DCIT v. Pioneer Marbles & Interiors Pvt. Ltd. ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 1326/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 17-2-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: Amitava Roy/ J. N. Gupta

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Section 271AAA — Immunity u/s.271AAA cannot be denied only because entire tax, along with interest, was not paid before filing of income-tax return or, for that purpose, before concluding the assessment proceedings.

Facts:
The assessee was subjected to search u/s.132 of the Act on 30-8-2007. During the course of the search, the assessee declared Rs.50,00,000 as undisclosed income. This sum was included in the return filed by the assessee after the search. The Assessing Officer (AO) initiated penalty proceedings while finalising the assessment u/s.143(3) on the ground that the assessee has not paid full taxes and interest on disclosure made u/s.132(4).

In the penalty proceedings, the assessee submitted that while filing the return of income due to an inadvertent error, the assessee had not computed interest u/s.234C, as a result self-assessment tax was underpaid by Rs.46,132 and this shortfall was paid within the time mentioned in notice of demand issued u/s.156 of the Act. This contention was rejected by the AO. He levied penalty u/s.271AAA.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the penalty levied by the AO.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that under the scheme of section 271AAA there is a complete paradigm shift so far as penalty in respect of unaccounted income unearthed as a result of search operation carried out on or after 1st June, 2007 is concerned. Section 271AAA levies penalty @ 10% of undisclosed income. This levy, unlike section 271(1)(c), is without any reference to findings or presumptions of concealment of income or the findings or presumptions of furnishing of inaccurate particulars. S.s (2) grants immunity from levy of penalty u/ss (1), subject to satisfaction of conditions mentioned therein. While payment of taxes, along with interest, by the assessee is one of the conditions precedent for availing the immunity u/s.271AAA(2), there is no time limit set out for such payments by the assessee. Once a time limit for payment of tax and interest has not been set out by the statute, it cannot indeed be open to the AO to read such a time limit into the scheme of the section to infer one. The Tribunal held that there is no legally sustainable basis for the stand of the AO that in a situation in which due tax and interest has not been paid in full before filing of the relevant income-tax return, the assessee will not be eligible for immunity u/s.271AAA(2).

Section 271AAA does not require any subjective satisfaction of the AO to be arrived at during the assessment proceedings, and, therefore, the outer limit of payment before the conclusion of assessment proceedings will not come into play.

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Vijay Corporation v. ITO ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and R. K. Panda (AM) ITA No. 1511/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on : 20-1-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Ashok J. Patil/ Shantam Bose

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Section 143(3), section 292B — Assessment order without AO’s signature is void. The omission to sign the order of assessment cannot be explained by relying on the provisions of section 292B of the Act.

Facts:

The assessment of total income of the assessee-firm was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act by making various additions. While the notice of demand, computation form, etc. attached with the assessment order were signed, the assessment order was not signed by the AO.

The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) challenging the additions and also raised a ground that the order of assessment is not valid in law since the AO did not sign the same. On this objection the CIT(A) called for the remand report from the AO. The AO did not dispute the fact that the assessment order was not signed. The CIT(A) observed that the notice of demand, computation form, etc. attached along with the assessment order were signed and carried proper stamp and seal of the AO. He held that the omission in signing the order cannot invalidate the order and the irregularity is curable in terms of the provisions of section 292B of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The case of the assessee is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Kilasho Devi Burman (219 ITR 214) (SC), in favour of the assessee. In the absence of a signed order of assessment, the assessment is invalid. The provisions of section 292B cannot come to the rescue of the Revenue. Provisions of section 143(3) contemplate that the AO shall pass an order of assessment in writing. The requirement of signature of the AO is therefore a legal requirement. The omission to sign the order of assessment cannot be explained by relying on the provisions of section 292B of the Act. Tax computation is a ministerial act as observed by the SC in the case of Kalyankumar Ray v. CIT, (191 ITR 634) (SC) and can be done by the office of the AO if there are indications given in the order of assessment. But the notice of demand signed by the office of the AO without the existence of a duly signed order of assessment by the AO cannot be said to be a omission which was sought to be covered by the provisions of section 292B of the Act. If such a course is permitted to be followed, then that would amount to delegation of powers conferred on the AO by the Act. Delegation of powers of the AO u/s.143(3) of the Act is not the intent and purpose of the Act. An unsigned order of assessment cannot be said to be in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. The Tribunal held the order of assessment to be invalid.

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Introduction to the New Revenue Recognition Standard Issued by IASB

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The IASB issued the first exposure draft of the new revenue recognition standard in June 2010. This new standard is a joint project of the IASB and FASB to clarify the principles for recognising revenue from contracts with customers. It intends to provide a single revenue recognition model which integrates the numerous revenue recognition guidances under US GAAP and the broader principles provided under IFRS to improve comparability over a range of industries, companies and geographical boundaries. The revenue recognition model under this exposure draft is a step-by-step analysis of contracts focussing on control i.e.,

  • identify the contract with the customer;

  • identify separate performance obligations in the contract;

  • determine and allocate the transaction price; and

  • recognise revenue when or as each performance obligation is satisfied by transferring control of a good or service to the customer.

Nearly thousand comment letters were received in response to this exposure draft. Considering the representations, the IASB issued a revised exposure draft in November 2011. One of the principles that the revised draft clarifies is on distinguishing when control of a good or service is transferred over a period of time or at a point in time. This article focusses on this aspect of the revised exposure draft in relation to its implications on revenue recognition for real estate companies.

Implications of IASB’s revised revenue recognition exposure draft for real estate companies

One of the most debated matter in India’s convergence with IFRS was point of revenue recognition from sale of real estate, more commonly known as the application of IFRIC 15 principles. The assessment of IASB’s IFRIC 15 principles which deals with agreements for the construction of Real Estate would lead to most real estate companies in India accounting for sale of apartments/flats as sale of goods and recognising revenue on completion of the contract i.e., transfer of physical possession of the units to the customer as opposed to accounting for these as construction contracts using the percentage completion method. This would have a major impact on the performance measures of real estate companies. Consequently, when Ind AS were issued in February 2011, the Ind AS on construction contracts had a carve-out from the IASB principles to include development of real estate as a construction contract and accrue revenues using the percentage completion method.

IFRIC 15 principles have been debated internationally. Malaysia and Philippines had also deferred applicability of IFRIC 15 when they adopted IFRS while Singapore decided to issue a modified IFRIC 15 providing specific guidance in the context of legal situations prevailing in that country. The issue under debate was that IFRIC 15 principles were leading to a completed contract method of accounting sometimes due to the legal framework of a country for instance, continuous transfer of legal title of the work in progress was legally not allowed in many jurisdictions and hence leading to a completed contract method of accounting although that was not the substance of these transactions. In that case, the profit and loss account of the developers will not truly reflect the performance of the business, as during the years the real estate project development continues, no revenue will be recognised and all revenue will be recognised in the year when possession is given.

IFRIC 15 principles were incorporated in the original exposure draft of revenue recognition standard. However, based on the representations and comment letters received, the IASB in its revised exposure draft has changed criterion for determining whether performance obligations are being satisfied over a period of time impacting the timing of revenue recognition from the sale of real estate.

The earlier principles of IFRIC 15 allowed the percentage completion method when either the unit is based on a customer-specific design or it could be demonstrated that there is a continuous transfer of units while construction progresses which is evidenced:

— if construction activity takes place on land owned by the buyer;
— the buyer cannot put the incomplete property back to the developer;
— on premature termination the buyer retains the work in progress and the developer has the right to be paid for the work performed; or
— the agreement gives the buyer the right to take over the work in progress during construction.

These criterions have been changed significantly under the revised exposure draft. Under the revised exposure draft, performance obligations of the company can be met over a period of time if the entity:

(a) creates or enhances an asset (for example, work in progress) that the customer controls as the asset is created or enhanced. Or

(b) does not create an asset with an alternative use to the entity and at least one of the following criteria is met:

(i) the customer simultaneously receives and consumes the benefits of the entity’s performance as the entity performs or

(ii) another entity would not need to substantially re-perform the work the entity has completed to date if that other entity were to fulfil the remaining obligation to the customer, or

(iii) the entity has a right to payment for performance completed to date and it expects to fulfil the contract as promised.

Most typical Indian real estate contracts for sale of apartments are for specific unit sales to customers, require progress payments based on completion of work and are intended to be fulfilled which would fall under the above criterion of satisfying performance obligations over time.

The following example illustrates the above criterion:

Example 1: 

Company Z is developing residential real estate and starts marketing individual units (apartments). Z has entered into the minimum number of contracts that are needed to begin construction. A customer enters into a binding sales contract for a specified unit that is not yet ready for occupancy. As per the contract, the customer pays a non-refundable deposit at inception of the contract and agrees to make progress payments throughout the contract. Those payments are intended to at least compensate Z for performance completed to date and are refundable only if Z fails to deliver the completed unit.

Z receives the final payment on delivery of possession of the unit to the customer. To finance the payments, the customer borrows from a financial institution that makes the payments directly to Z on behalf of the customer. The lender has full recourse against the customer. The customer can sell his or her interest in the partially completed unit, which would require approval of the lender but not Z. The customer is able to specify minor variations to the basic design, but cannot specify or alter major structural elements of the unit’s design. The contract precludes Z from transferring the specified unit to another customer.

The apartment created by the Z’s performance does not have an alternative use to Z, because it would lead to breach of contract with the customer. Z concludes that it has a right to payment for performance completed to date, because the customer is obliged to compensate Z for its performance rather than only a loss of profit if the contract is terminated. In addition, Z expects to fulfil the contract as promised. Hence, Z has a performance obligation that it satisfies over time.

The new rules are more pragmatic and will enable percentage completion method for real estate where the criterions are met. This essentially means that Indian real estate companies need to reassess the implications of revenue recognition under the revised exposure draft to understand whether their contracts would meet the conditions of satisfying performance obligations over time. It is important to analyse in which exact cases the new principles would allow percentage completion method. This would also then eliminate the need for a carve-out under Ind AS. Comment period for this exposure draft is open until 13 March 2012. This should be regarded as an opportunity to voice out any concerns or clarifications to the IASB so that the standard achieves global acceptance.

DAY 4

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After breakfast participants discussed the paper written by Himanshu Kishanadwala on Case studies in Accounting and Auditing. The Group Discussion was followed by a precise presentation on the subject. He dealt with some burning issues affecting the CA’s in practice as well as industry. He analyzed all issues in great detail. His command over the topic and flawless analysis resulted in participants giving him a very patient hearing.

This session was chaired by K. C. Narang, Past President of the Society.

In concluding session Uday Sathaye, Chairman Seminar Committee took an overview of the RRC and recognized the contribution made by everybody, Pradip Thanawala, President of Society thanked everybody for making the RRC memorable. Participants departed after lunch to their respective destinations with a promise to meet again next year at the 46th RRC.


K.C. Narang, Chairman Addressing Participants. Also seen from L to R – Yatin Desai, Himanshu Kishnadwala, Paper Writer and Nitin Shingala

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DAY 3

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After the breakfast the participants discussed the paper written by S. Thirumalai on “Important Aspects of CENVAT credit & POT Rules.”

Thereafter Yogesh Thar Chartered Accountant presented paper on “TDS- Some important issues”. His liking and mastery over the subject made his presentation very informative and useful.


Yogesh Thar, Paper Writer Addressing Participants. Also seen from L to R – Bharat Oza, Rajesh Shah, Chairman and Krishna Kumar Jhunjhunwala.

This session was chaired by Rajesh Shah, Past President of the Society

Shri S. Thirumalai dealt with his paper and made his presentation very interesting and satisfied the participants by resolving issues raised during Group Discussion. Service Tax today is gaining importance with more services being added under the Service Tax net. Issues raised by him were of real significance to all. His depth of knowledge in Service Tax and masterly analysis was indeed a treat for the participants

This session was chaired by in his unique style by Govind Goyal, Past President of the Society.


S. Thirumalai, Paper Writer Addressing Participants. Also seen from L to R – Narayan Pasari, Govind Goyal, Chairman and Naresh Sheth.

The day ended with Gala Dinner and Musical Evening.

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DAY 2

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The
participants discussed the paper written by Dr. Pravin P. Shah on
Business Structuring/ Restructuring some important issues. The Group
Discussion was followed by a marvelous presentation paper by
Chandrashekhar N. Vaze who presented his views on Code of Ethics –
Practical Issues. His command over subject and presentation skills made
the session very lively. This session was chaired by Padamshri Shri T. N
Manoharan, Past President of the ICAI. The salient features of the
paper were explained by rapporteur Shri Jayant Gokhale member of the
central council of ICAI.


Padmashree T.N. Manoharan Addressing Participants. All seen from L to R – Manmohan Sharma, Chandrashekhar Vaze, Paper Writer, Jayant Gokhale, Rapertoire and Rajeev Shah.

Thereafter Dr. Pravin P. Shah dealt
with his paper and analyzed the implications and rationale of various
Tribunal, High Court, and Supreme Court Judgments. He explained that
every decision of the judgment forum is with respect to a set of facts
and it is important for reader to appreciate these facts before using
the judgment for any purpose. He answered brilliantly all the queries
raised by the participants.

Dr Pravin Shah, Paper Writer Addressing Participants. Also seen from L to R – Ashok Dhere, Chairman, Saurabh Shah and Mukesh Trivedi.

This session was chaired by Ashok Dhere,
Past President of the Society. In the afternoon participants visited
Ramoji Film City. Participants were made aware about the technicalities
in making the Film. Participants took keen interest and enjoyed the
unique experience. In the evening an additional session was held for the
benefit of all the participants on the burning topic “Revised
schedule-VI” Himanshu Kishanadwala did a masterly analysis of the
important changes which are relevant to a Chartered Accountant , whether
he is performing the accounting or audit function. The session was
effectively chaired by Uday Sathaye, Past President of the Society.

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DAY 1

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The RRC began with the Group Discussion on paper written by T. S. Ajai on Case Studies in Taxation.

In
the inaugural function which was held in the evening, Pradip Thanawala
President of the Society welcomed the members. For the benefit of the
outstation members attending RRC he gave an overview of Society’s
activities which are conducted through out the year.

Uday
Sathaye Chairman of Seminar Committee highlighted activities of the
Seminar Committee which are gaining popularity , like study tours in the
form of interactive meetings with Industries all over the Country. He
mentioned about the rationale behind the subjects chosen for the RRC and
thanked all paper writers for giving justice to the subjects and
delivering the papers well within committed time frame.

RRC was
inaugurated by Chief guest Shri N. Chandra Babu Naidu, Leader of
opposition, Andhra Pradesh, Guest of Honour G. Ramaswamy, President ICAI
and Jaydeep Shah, Vice-President ICAI, by lighting of lamp.
Shri. N.
Chandrababu Naidu is a very acclaimed, learned and senior professional
politician. He expressed his views in regard to various issues which
have arisen on account of the current trend of giving importance to
technological changes, Governance

Uday Sathaye, Chairman, Seminar Committee delivering Welcome Address. Also seen from L to R – Krishna Kumar Jhunjhunwala, Pradip Thanawala, N. Chandrababu Naidu, G. Ramaswamy, Jaydeep Shah, Deepak Shah and Rajeev Shah.

and values in life. He felt that even
though change is an accepted part of life, departure from certain age
old principles is unwarranted. In his opinion, while one should welcome
the good things from the new generation,


T.S. Ajai, Paper Writer Addressing Participants. All seen from L to R – Mandar Telang, Anil Sathe, Chairman and Manish Sampat.

one should also respect Indian
Ethos. His views on Indian Economy impressed everyone present . Shri G.
Ramaswamy, President ICAI updated members about the development and
initiatives taken by the ICAI for the benefit of members. Shri Jaydeep
Shah, Vice President ICAI addressed the participants about the various
programs run by ICAI.

Krishna Kumar Jhunjhunwala Convenor of the Seminar Committee proposed a hearty Vote of Thanks.

After
the inaugural session T. S. Ajai covered in his presentation all the
case studies.. His clinical analysis on the controversies and his
forthright views were unique and of immense benefit to the participants.

This session was ably chaired by Anil Sathe, Past President of the Society.

The day ended with tasty dinner being served

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What happens when one spends beyond one’s means?

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If you have Rs.100 in your pocket, then you cannot spend Rs.200. It’s very logical, right? The good news is that today’s world is no longer logical! It’s indeed very easy to spend more than what you have. But it’s equally important to analyse the cost of this extravagance.

A country spending way beyond its means will surely have a far greater impact than a school kid overshooting his pocket money. As the scale of this lavishness increases, the following two distinct trends are observed:

(1) The system of financing the gap becomes more and more complex

(2) The person spending gets more and more distant from the one paying for it.

Let us now see a few examples to understand fully how this evil system works.

A child and his pocket money
A school-going child has Rs.1,000 as pocket money savings and wishes to buy a video game DVD worth Rs.2,000. In a normal scenario, the child will comfortably make a gullible puppy face in front of the elders (technically may be called ‘financers’) and get the money. The advantage of being a child is that he rarely has to return it back. The amount involved is relatively negligible and the ones affected are close family members, pretty harmless.

Credit card — The prodigal’s best friend
Generally, anyone who wants to spend, what he is yet to earn uses a credit card. No doubt, when used wisely, a credit card is a wonderful source of free credit, but sadly, not all are wise. According to RBI, 1 in every 10 credit card holders defaults on payment. As of March 2011, there were 1.8 crore credit cards with average spending of Rs.41,862. Thus, we can estimate the defaults, at 10% of spending, to be Rs.7,536 crore.

Now, who pays for these? For the defaults made good by the customers, he pays a whopping 36% interest. But if he is unable to pay, the bank has to write them off. The real pinch is felt by the private shareholders of these banks and the government in case of nationalised banks. Not to forget, the management where the remuneration is linked to the profits, also feels the heat.

I owe you money? . . . Oh! Sorry, it just went down the drain . . .

Jean Paul Getty said, “If you owe the bank $100, that’s your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that’s the bank’s problem.”

No statement explains the paradox better! When huge corporations do business with others’ money, it’s not them but the lenders who have to worry about the state of business. One of the most recent examples is of a ‘reputed’ airline company. According to a leading broker’s estimate, the debt exposures of that particular airline company maybe a whopping Rs.10,000 crore. Using the corporate veil, the management will safely escape from the liability they have created. So, the ones ultimately shelling out Rs.10,000 crore may include banks, shareholders and creditors. Imagine thousands of crores going down the drain, in times of monstrous rise in cost of living and record high interest rates!

Banks going bust!
It’s not always that the banks that are on the losing side. Some clever devils in dark suits manage to pass on their mistakes to unsuspecting investors. Since banks are traditionally considered conservative, and people like you and me, easily fall for such dud schemes. And soon the bubble bursts, in turn, making everyone burst into tears. Take the example of the most monumental fall of recent times, the Lehman Brothers. With a debt equity ratio of 35 to 1, it was a ticking time bomb. Its debt was close to US $613 billion at the time of default. The damage does not end there. Bail-outs and stimulus packages followed the 2008 crisis from which the world has still not fully recovered. The total impact of the whole global economic crisis has cost trillions of dollars, millions of jobs and countless hungry stomachs. Consider this; the family of a jobless daily labourer has to go hungry while the ones responsible for overshooting their means enjoy barbeque parties in lavish bungalows! The ones suffering include creditors, shareholders, governments, taxpayers, citizens and the list goes on.

What is bigger? Bankrupt countries!

Greed has no limit. What happens when governments spend beyond their means? Countries go bankrupt! Some casualties include Argentina, Zimbabwe and the latest one, Greece. Greece had pushed very hard to enter the European Union so that it could use the Euro to borrow cheaply. The interest rate it used to pay on its borrowings before joining EU was 10-11% which fell to 3-4% immediately after adopting Euro. So, it kept mounting debt. Before it could repay the old one, it took a new, bigger loan. The proceeds were not always used to repay the old loan, but to fund their spending spree. It should be noted that the pension entitlement in Greece is around 92% of last salary that too at a time when Greece has a very fast ageing population. Since the adoption of Euro, the average wage of public sector workers doubled. These, along with large-scale tax evasion are some of the reasons for the mess this country finds itself in. Portugal, Spain and Italy too are sitting ducks. The impact of this looming crisis shall be more than anyone can ever fathom. Ripples of this crisis shall affect billions of people and deeply hurt the global economy.

Conclusion
Credit is the reason any business or economy runs. However, if you cross your limits, the impact will be felt at places and by people beyond your imagination. The only way to prevent such damage is by knowing your limits. We should not confuse limits with restrictions, no one likes restrictions! However, by setting budgetary limits we can ensure no one suffers. For articles like us, it has to start by managing the whole month’s expenses within the stipend earned. Being a disciplined money manager is not the job of the faint hearted! The whole marketing world is conspiring to raid our wallets. It is for us to protect it and keep the spending within limits. Yes, tough task!!

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Sanction for prosecution: SC order brings cheer to beleaguered CVC.

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The Central Vigilance Commission welcomed Supreme Court order setting a timeline for giving prosecution sanction in cases against public servants.

“Sanctioning of prosecution by competent authority within a timeframe of four months will be a big help in fighting corruption, and will expedite action against corrupt public officials,” CVC Pradeep Kumar told TOI.

The CVC’s response came in the wake of the Supreme Court saying that “delay in granting such sanction has spoilt many valid prosecution and is adversely viewed in public mind that in the name of considering a prayer for sanction, a protection is given to a corrupt public official as a quid pro quo for services rendered by the public official in the past or may be in the future and the sanctioning authority and the corrupt officials were or are partners in the same misdeeds”.

The CVC has been at the receiving end of delaying tactics adopted by various departments to stall prosecution of officials against whom corruption proceedings are pending. As of December 2011, prosecution sanction was pending in at least 24 cases for more than four months.

In November, there were 28 cases pending with 17 ministries for over four months. The highest, of 10 pending cases, was with the Finance Ministry — four of them before the Central Board of Direct Taxes and four of them before the Central Board of Excise and Customs.

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Their birth right! (right or wrong?) judge for yourself!

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Patrick French’s recent book, India: A Portrait, offered this startling revelation about the Indian Parliament: “Every MP in the Lok Sabha under the age of 30 had in effect inherited a seat, and more than two-thirds of the 66 MPs aged 40 or under were HMPS (Hereditary Members of Parliament). In addition, this new wave of Indian lawmakers would have a decade’s advantage in politics over their peers, since the average MP who had benefited from family politics was almost 10 years younger than those who had arrived with ‘No Significant Family Background’. In the Congress, the situation was yet more extreme: every Congress MP under the age of 35 was an HMP. If the trend continued, it was possible that most members of the Indian Parliament would be there by heredity alone, and the nation would be back to where it had started before the freedom struggle, with rule by a hereditary monarch and assorted Indian princelings.”

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Majority wins: Bombay High Court paves way for redevelopment.

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Dissenting members who deliberately skipped housing society meetings have ‘no right’ to object to a resolution favouring redevelopment passed by majority of the members, observed a Cooperative Court recently. The Court upheld a resolution passed by majority of the members to redevelop a four-storey building in Khar (W).

The ruling is significant as it seals the fate of the dissenting few and holds that the resolution, if passed at a meeting held legally, will be binding on all members of a cooperative housing society.

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Schooling not enough.

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Higher spending on education is not improving dismal outcomes India came 72nd of 73 nations in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) competition, despite fielding students from its best states, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. The dismal quality of Indian education is confirmed by the latest Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Throwing money (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan) and legislation (Right to Education Act) at education has produced no quality gains at all. Abhiyan spending is up from Rs.7,166 crore in 2005-06 to Rs.21,000 crore last year, yet parents are shifting wholesale from free government schools to private options (schools and tuition). In the last five years, private school enrolment has gone from 18.7% to 25.6% of the total, with Kerala already at 54%. The shift has not, however, improved dismal learning outcomes. Half the Class V children cannot read Class II texts, and 40% of Class V children cannot solve a two-digit subtraction. This represents a fall in outcomes, especially in Government schools in the Hindi belt. Higher spending by the Government and parents has not yielded better outcomes. Many studies suggest that private schools have better outcomes, but the shift to private education has not achieved that at a macro-level. In 13,000 schools visited by surveyors, student absenteeism was 50% and teacher absenteeism 45%: neither seem motivated.

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SC tells HCs not to stay corruption probes unnecessarily.

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Expressing serious concern over High Courts staying investigations in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has directed the Higher Courts to exercise such powers with due caution and circumspection.

“Unduly long delay has the effect of bringing about blatant violation of the rule of law and adverse impact on the common man’s access to justice,” said a Bench comprising Justice A. K. Ganguly and Justice T. S. Thakur in its judgment.

The Bench said, “a person’s access to justice is a guaranteed fundamental right under the Constitution and particularly Article 21. Denial of this right undermines public confidence in the justice delivery system and incentivises people to look for shortcuts and other fora where they feel that justice will be done quicker. In the long run, this also weakens the justice delivery system and poses a threat to Rule of Law”.

Taking into account that such pendency were related to HC orders putting on hold the trial/ investigations into the criminal cases, the SC said, “the power to grant stay of investigation and trial is a very extraordinary power given to High Courts and the same power is to be exercised sparingly only to prevent an abuse of the process and to promote the ends of justice”.

The Bench passed a slew of directions to the HCs to reduce such pendency like disposing of such proceedings as early as possible, preferably within six months from the date its stay order, etc. The SC also asked the Law Commission to inquire into the issue and submit a report on it.

The Bench took into account that the pendency in criminal cases related to murder, rape, kidnapping and dacoity in different High Courts, varies from 1 to 4 years. Out of 201 cases, 34 such cases out were pending in Patna High Court and 33 out of 653 cases in Allahabad High Court were pending for eight or more years.

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Sting of Transfer Pricing

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The philosophy of transfer pricing is fairly old under which a country attempts to tax a fair share of revenue arising in the course of cross-border transactions. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which the United States and other major developed countries are members, had formulated some guidelines about transfer pricing by 1979. The US led the development of the detailed comprehensive transfer pricing guidelines with a White Paper in 1988 and with proposals in 1990-1992, which ultimately became regulations in 1994. In India, The Finance Act, 2001 substituted section 92 with new sections 92 to 92F with effect from 1st April, 2002, Rules 10A to Rule 10E of the Income Tax Rules were notified and that marked the beginning of the transfer pricing era. Over the last 10 years, the interpretation of the relevant provisions has gradually evolved in India. In the last few years the tax administration has suddenly become very aggressive in respect of transfer pricing additions termed as adjustments, as they find it to be a very lucrative tool for meeting their ever-increasing revenue targets. The provisions on transfer pricing are fairly subjective and can be interpreted and implemented with flexibility. There are no safe harbour rules for transfer pricing in India. As the provisions in the Act are subjective and open to diverse interpretations, the tax authorities interpret them in a way beneficial to the Revenue and thereby demand higher taxes from assessees who have entered into international transactions with their associate enterprises. This is posing a major risk to foreign multinationals doing business in India, as well as Indian multinationals having businesses in foreign countries.

The Income-tax Act has given a liberal time frame of 31 months to the tax authorities to determine the Arm’s- Length Price (ALP) from the end of a financial year. By 31st October, 2011, the tax authorities determined the ALPs for the year ended 31st March, 2008. For the year ended 31st March, 2008, they have assessed transfer pricing additions of a staggering amount of Rs.44,500 crore. Such additions were only to the tune of around Rs.22,000 crore for the F.Y. 2006-07 and just around Rs.10,000 crore for the F.Y. 2005-06. The phenomenal increase in the adjustments over the last few years clearly indicates how eager and aggressive the Tax Department is to mop up revenues on account of transfer pricing additions. The Finance Ministry also seems to be very supportive to these efforts of the income-tax authorities as it is usually lagging on controlling budgetary deficits and wants to be innovative in its efforts of mopping up more tax without apparently affecting the common man. However, a balanced approach is the need of the hour.

Multinational companies having presence in various parts of the world with different tax laws and tax rates, try to take advantage of those differences to boost their post-tax profits for maximising shareholders’ value. Transfer pricing mechanism was initially introduced by the developed countries for enhancing their tax revenues from such multinationals. These countries realised that tax on some part of the revenues which could have been taxed in their jurisdiction was being siphoned off to low-tax jurisdictions by such companies. They made various laws for protecting the tax on these revenues. Encouraged by the revenue gains realised by these countries pioneering transfer pricing regulations, many other countries gradually introduced transfer pricing provisions in their tax laws. Over the years, their implementation is becoming aggressive and at times beyond justification.

The multinational companies, who had great moneymaking run till the end of the 20th century, have realised that the times are changing. Their global presence makes them deal with number of countries and their respective diverse laws. There is an increased possibility that two or more countries may tax the same profit by trying to justify that it was earned in their respective jurisdiction or such profit being even otherwise taxable under their tax laws. In such a situation, a multinational entity faces grave risk of being subject to duplicity of taxation.

Today, many multinationals are encouraged to come to India considering the huge market, skilled labour and technical and managerial talent that India offers. Multinationals already present in India are further encouraged by the growth of their businesses in India, in spite of the worldwide recession. Many of these companies are today suffering due to the aggressive stands on issues regarding transfer pricing by the Income Tax authorities. The Government needs to be mindful and cannot be oblivious to the fact that these multinationals can create employment and can also increase exports, which are the two critical needs of Indian economy. In the zeal of increasing the revenue, one should not slay the hen that lays golden eggs. India should not just copy the attitude of some developed countries in respect of transfer pricing as it may harm the economy and destroy some stable sources of revenue.

The brunt of transfer pricing provisions in India is equally faced by Indian companies expanding their business footprints outside India. The regime is also affecting the ambitions of Indian industry to set up Greenfield operations abroad or to acquire foreign businesses. They are not able to support the operations of their foreign subsidiaries through interest-free lending or giving bank guarantees for their borrowings, which is extremely important for the survival and sustainability of their operations. Genuine business efforts are adversely affected by the aggressive transfer pricing additions. The action of the tax authorities may be within the provisions of law but can be very harmful for a developing country like India. Indian policy makers as well as the policy implementers need to take the cognizance of the facts before it is too late. It also needs to urgently notify and implement the ‘safe harbour rules’.

Some of the major reasons of additions made on account of transfer pricing provisions in India are as follows:

  • Recommendation of higher margin at net operating level.

  • Disallowance of fees paid to associate enterprises for use of intangibles.

  • Payment for inter-company services to associated enterprises disallowed.

  • Indian company treated as creator of intangible assets owned by associated enterprises, thereby making addition on account of notional income.

  • Notional fees being attributable to corporate guarantees given by Indian companies.

  • Notional interest on advances given or outstanding of recoverable reimbursements by an Indian company to its associated enterprises.

  • Notional fees being attributable to pledge of shares given as security to lender by Indian companies for the borrowings made by its associated enterprises.

The list is not exhaustive but only indicative and it is expanding year after year with the novel ideas of the income-tax authorities.

Newly set up businesses outside India have their own teething problems like a new-born child. They are subjected to brutal global competition and need to withstand it in order to survive. They need to be aptly supported by their parents till they take off and are able to sustain on their own. The support given by the parent in the form of interest-free/low-interest loan, corporate guarantees, preferential pricing, longer credit period, technology support and even manpower support is looked at by the transfer pricing authority as unfair practices and notional income from such practices are added as adjustments. While doing so, adequate cognizance of the gain that the parent makes by being full or part owner or being an economic beneficiary of the associated enterprise is not taken.

It seems that the time has come for the Government to review the provisions of transfer pricing in India and also to do introspection of the methodology of the implementation of the provisions for the health and faster growth of Indian businesses. The current attitude will not only dampen the interest of foreign multinationals to do business in India, but it will also damage the enthusiasm of Indians to fare overseas in search for opportunities. India is trying to project herself as a service hub to the global community. It is trumpeting the skill of its manpower and its cost advantage to the developed world in service-orientated businesses. If the aggression in implementation of transfer pricing does not subside to a reasonable level, India will fast gain a reputation of being an unfriendly and high-risk tax jurisdiction. The advantage which India gathered over the last couple of decades in the service sector may vanish overnight. In case of such an unfortunate situation, other developing nations who are waiting in the wings to compete with India in the service sector will have the last laugh and India may have one more story of a lost opportunity to tell.

Though various countries may have their points of view and justification for taxing an income which is also taxed in the other country, it can make the taxpayer suffer. To give respite to such a harassed taxpayer, Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA) between many countries provide for ‘Mutual Agreement Procedures’. A taxpayer who gets torn between the taxation laws and transfer pricing regimes of two countries in respect of the same income, may make an application under the procedure. In such cases, the authorities of the two countries try to provide a solution which is acceptable to both the countries so that the taxpayer does not get into a double jeopardy of being made liable to pay double tax on the same income. However, if they fail to agree, the poor taxpayer may suffer tax in both the countries.

For the speedy resolution of transfer pricing disputes between the tax authorities and taxpayers in India, the Finance Act, 2009 introduced the provisions relating to Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). Though the process was expected to speedily resolve the transfer pricing disputes, the response of the taxpayers, based on their recent experience of the panel is not very encouraging. Today, many taxpayers stung by the transfer pricing additions are not inclined to take advantage of these provisions as they are fairly certain of not getting relief, even in deserving cases. Such thinking amongst the taxpayers is harmful for speedy settlement of tax disputes, as the normal appeal process takes a long time. The delays increase the uncertainty of the taxpayers and also negatively affect the due tax collections by the authorities. To make DRP more assessee-friendly and meaningful, it is essential that the members of DRP are assigned the duty on a full-time basis and they should be as independent as possible.

The methodology used for implementation of transfer pricing regulations has far-reaching ramifications on an economy. The Indian Government as well as the authorities should not lose sight of the fact that business in India needs support and encouragement to achieve the targeted growth rate. They need to take a holistic view. At the same time businesses have to realise that attempt to artificially accrue income in low-tax jurisdiction is not beneficial in the long term.

Further extension for filing half-yearly return —Order No. 1/2012 — Service Tax dated 9-1-2012.

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By this Order due date for submission of half yearly return for the period from April 2011 to September 2011, has been further extended from 6th January, 2012 to 20th January, 2012

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Further extension of last date for filing of e-return and e-refunds application — Trade Circular No. 2T of 2012, dated 24-1-2012.

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Due to non-availability of website from 27-12-2011 to 30-12-2011, due date for filing monthly return for the month of November 2011 and refund application in Form e-501 for the period from 1-4-2009 to 31-3-2010, earlier extended up to 31-12-2011 is further extended to 7-1-2012.

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(2011) 40 VST 240 (SC) Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. v. Varun Beverages Ltd.

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Exemption certificate — Fixed capital investment — Essential apparatus, equipment or components — For establishing and running factory — Bottles are essential for manufacturer of soft drinks — But not crates — Sections 4A and 4B of U.P. Trade Tax Act (15 of 1948).

Facts:
The dealer was engaged in manufacture and sale of soft drinks and beverages, and applied for an eligibility certificate u/s.4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, in relation to inclusion in fixed capital investments also of amounts invested towards purchase of bottles and crates. The Department filed appeal before Supreme Court against judgment of the High Court allowing writ petition filed by the dealer to include purchase of bottles and crates in fixed capital investment.

Held:
So far as bottles were concerned, they were an essential part of the components and equipment necessary for the running of the factory. Therefore the value of such investment would form part of the fixed capital investment and would be entitled to the exemption.

Whereas crates were used by the dealer only for the purpose of marketing, as such the value of crates would not form part of ‘fixed capital investment’ as defined u/s.4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948.

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Reassessment: Sections 143(2), 143(3), 147 and 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2003- 04: Assessment u/s.147 cannot be made within the time available for issuing notice u/s.143(2) and for completion of assessment u/s.143(3).

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[CIT v. ABAD Fisheries, 246 CTR 513 (Ker.)]

For the A.Y. 2003-04, the Assessing Officer accepted the returned income u/s.143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, even before the expiry of the period for issuing the notice u/s.143(2) for completing the assessment u/s.143(3) the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 holding that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and passed an assessment order u/s.147. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and cancelled the assessment and held that within the time provided for regular assessment u/s.143(3) after issuing notice u/s.143(2), no reassessment u/s.147 is permissible under the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Reassessment u/s.147 cannot be completed within the time available for issuing notice u/s.143(2) and for completion of assessment u/s.143(3).

(ii) Similar view taken by the Madras and the Delhi High Courts remains unchallenged by the Department. The Departmental appeal is dismissed.”

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(2012) 25 STR 184 (SC) — Union of India v. IND-SWIFT Laboratories Ltd.

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The company, a manufacturer availed CENVAT credit on duty paid on material — Investigation indicated that CENVAT was taken on fake invoices — The company filed for settlement of proceedings — Paid entire duty/demand on wrongful availment. Consequently, appropriate interest liability under Rule 14 also was calculated by the revenue — The assessee contended that interest even if calculated cannot be from the date of availment of the credit but from the date of utilisation of the same — Held, No relief be given to the assessee — Interest be charged from the date of wrong availment — Orders passed by the Settlement Commission should not be intervened by High Court.

Facts:
The assessee-company was engaged in manufacture of bulk drugs, and availed CENVAT credit on the duty paid on inputs and capital goods. However, investigation conducted determined that such credits were availed on fake invoices and hence, duty was payable with interest. The duty was paid as directed by the settlement commission. However, the assessee objected to pay interest levied from the date of availment contending that interest if at all leviable, be levied from the date of utilisation. In short, interpretation of Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (Credit Rules) was the issue involved for determining the date from which the interest was leviable.

Held:
It was held that interest be levied from the date of availment of credit because once the credit is taken, the beneficiary is at liberty to utilise the same immediately thereafter, subject to rules. Also, it was held that the High Court had no authority to reject the order issued by the settlement commission and hence, the High Court should not have substituted its own opinion against the opinion of the Settlement Commission. As regards interpretation of Rule 14 of Credit Rules, the Apex Court observed that the High Court proceeded by reading down Rule 14 to interpret that interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that CENVAT credit was wrongly taken, as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. The Court further observed that it is not permissible to import provisions in a taxing statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency. Rules of reading down to be used for limited purpose of making particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. In the instant case, the attempt of the High Court is erroneous. The Revenue’s appeal was thus allowed.

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(2012) 25 STR 78 (Tri-Mum.) — Indoworth (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur.

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Appellant engaged in manufacture — Exported such goods to various countries — Filed refund under port services — Refund was rejected on ground that service provider registered under Business Auxiliary Services — Held, Once service tax is paid, the same cannot be disputed — Revenue cannot withdraw the refund — Refund allowed.

Facts:
The appellant engaged in manufacture of various types of textile worsted yarn and also exported the said products to various countries. By seeking benefit under Notification 41/2007-ST, the appellant claimed refund of the service tax paid by them on various specified services used in relation to export of goods. The refund claim so filed was rejected on the ground that when tax is collected considering the services as port service, refund cannot be granted considering it otherwise.

Held:
It was held that once the service tax paid on the eligible specified services and used the same for export, verification of registration certificate would not be required. Hence, the Revenue cannot withdraw the refund and appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

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(2011) 25 STR 68 (Tri.-Del.) — Em Pee Motors v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh.

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Em Pee Motors provided BAS services — Promoted vehicle loans provided by ICICI — Commission received for the same — Out of commission received, appellant distributed incentives to customers opting for loan (subventions). Books of account reflected total of receipts against which payment is shown — This procedure followed due to inconvenience caused to banks as then they would have to issue TDS certificates to every customer — Credit of total amount claimed by appellant — However, service tax paid only on amount net of subventions — Held — Procedure followed to pay less tax — Service tax payable on gross amount.

Facts:

The appellant acted as an agent for ICICI bank and provided BAS services by promoting vehicle loan given by ICICI bank. Bank paid commission for the same. Out of the said commission, the appellant gave incentives to the customers for opting for the said loan scheme; this incentive is known as subvention. The appellant paid service tax on the amount net of subvention. The appellant argued that banks directly paid the incentive to the customers and the appellant never received the same. They contended that it was unjustified to pay service tax on the amount they never received. At the same time, banks did not issue TDS certificates to the customers opting for loans, rather issued it to the appellant. As a consequence of which the appellant could claim credit of the total amount from the Income-tax authority and paid service tax on the amount net of subvention.

Held:

Mere fact that the appellant chose to make payment out of the gross receipts cannot alter the gross amount received by them. It was held that service tax has to be paid on the gross amount received and reflected in the books. Hence, the order of the lower authorities was upheld.
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(2012) 25 STR 46 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Parekh Plast (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vapi.

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CENVAT credit of the service tax on invoices raised in the name of head office — Head office not registered as input service distributor — Defect in invoices — Procedural defect — Totally curable and condonable — Denial not justified — Also demand barred by limitation — Appellant cannot be impeached alleging misstatement or suppression of fact when no column for the fact to be disclosed in ER 1 itself.

Facts:
The assessee engaged in manufacture of excisable goods availed CENVAT credit of Rs.5,43,200. The Revenue contended that invoices issued by the service provider were in the name of head office. Such availment of credit was held unjustified as head office was not registered as input service distributor. The authority also alleged suppression for the fact that the information was not disclosed in ER 1 Form in order and justified invocation of longer period of limitation.

Held:

It was held that since the law itself does not require the assessees to disclose the above facts, failure to disclose the same cannot be equated with any suppression or misstatement. Invoices issued by the service provider in the name of head office are eligible documents for the purpose of claiming credit.

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(2012) 25 STR 39 (Tri.-Del.) — Bhootpurva Sainik Society v. Commissioner of Central Excise, & Sales Tax, Allahabad.

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Appellant an association of ex-servicemen — Registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 — Engaged in welfare of ex-servicemen — E.g., assisting them in finding employment, etc. — Entered into an agreement with Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. — Whereby monthly amount was paid by them for services of security guards — Revenue demanded service tax on the security agency services provided by appellant prior to 18-4-2006 — Old definition in force with term ‘commercial concern’ — Reference of various judgments considered — Held, Appellant not a commercial concern — Service tax not payable.

Facts:
The appellants were registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 acting for the welfare of ex-servicemen who were members of the society. They were engaged in various causes like helping ex-servicemen to get a job, assist them and make efforts to help families of deceased ex-servicemen, etc. For the said purpose, the society entered into an agreement with Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. for the services of security guards. The Revenue issued a show-cause notice on 21-9-2004 demanding service tax of Rs.26,494 for the period April, 1999 to December, 2003. The appellants pleaded that the old definition of security agency services was applicable to them and not being a commercial concern they were not covered. However, as the term ‘commercial concern’ was not defined in the Finance Act, 1994 the Revenue applied the popular meaning of commercial concern. Decisions in Sikar Ex-Servicemen Welfare Co-op. Ltd., (2006) 4 STR 303 (Tri.) and BCCI v. CST, Mumbai (2007) 7 STR 384 (Tri.) were relied upon by the appellants and hence, it was contended that they cannot be referred to as a commercial concern.

Held:
It was held that the appellant did not carry any of its activities with an intention of earning profits, nor were they considered as commercial concern and hence, were not liable to pay service tax.

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(2012) 25 STR 36 (Tri.-Del.) — Hind Tele Links v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jalandhar.

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Appellant providing promotion and marketing services to M/s. Bharti Cellular Ltd. — Taxable as BAS — Failed to pay service tax — Did not contest the demand and paid it as soon as it was brought to notice — Penalties imposed u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78 for the non-compliance — Prayed for reduction in penalties imposed under different sections for the same offence — The option to deposit 25% of penalty within a period of 30 days granted — Penalty u/s.76 set aside.

Facts:
he appellant provided services relating to marketing and promotion to M/s. Bharti Cellular Ltd. taxable under the category of business auxiliary services. It was noted that the appellant did not contest the amount of service tax confirmed by the authority. However, the appellant prayed for reduction in the penalties imposed u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78. Appellant pleaded for the option of payment of 25% of penalty within 30 days, which was not made available to the them before.

Held:
It was observed that penalties under two different sections for the same offence were not justified and hence, penalty u/s.76 was set aside. Penalty imposed u/s.78 was upheld with modification that only 25% of the amount to be deposited only if paid within 30 days from the receipt of the order. Lastly, penalty for non-filing of the return etc. u/s.77 was not interfered with.

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(2012) 25 STR 30 (Tri.-Delhi) — Agrim Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi.

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Appellant engaged in provision of service classifiable as ‘Commercial or industrial construction service’ from time to time and availed benefit under Notifications No. 15/2004-ST and 1/2006-ST and availed abatement of 67% — Revenue of the opinion that the value of Free of Cost (FOC) materials should be included in the gross value before availing such abatement — Held that only value of materials supplied should be included and value of FOC material not to be included in gross value on which abatement of 67% is granted — Stay of pre-deposit granted.

Facts:
The appellant provided ‘Construction service’/ ‘Commercial or industrial construction service’ and availed benefit under Notification No. 15/2004-ST and Notification No. 1/2006-ST for respective period of time. The Revenue contested that appellant provided completing and finishing services and hence abatement under Notification 1/2006-ST could not be availed. Also, it was argued that in order to avail such abatement, the gross value of revenue should include Free of Cost (FOC) materials before availing abatement of 67%.

Held:
It was held that the appellant was eligible to claim exemption under the said Notification and a complete waiver of the demand before the appeal was allowed and a stay order was sustained on collection of all demands arising out of the order during the pendency of the appeal.

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(2012) 25 STR 24 (Tri.-Del.) — Fiitjee v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi.

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Valuation of study material for commercial training or coaching services — Appellant denied exemption claimed under Notification No. 12/2003 — Held that study material issued forms integral part of the coaching services — Notification No. 12/2003 relates to works contract — Commercial coaching cannot be brought under definition of works contract — Appellants were directed to make a pre-deposit of 13 lakh — Partial stay granted.

Facts:
The appellant provided commercial training or coaching services. Along with such services, a consideration for the study material issued to the enrolled students was also collected and claiming exemption under Notification No. 12/2003, no service tax was paid thereon. According to the Revenue, the study material is integral part of the coaching which becomes meaningful and complete only with the aid of such study material. They also pointed out the decision in Cerebral Learning Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, (2009) 15 STR 343 (Tri.) wherein pre-deposit was ordered.

Held:
It was held that the issue of study material and the coaching services are inseparable. Also, no evidence brought to the notice of the authority to suggest that the study material could be sold as text books to the book sellers. At the same time holding that the exemption Notification relied upon by the appellant related to works contract and commercial coaching could not be called as works contract, the appellant was directed to make a pre-deposit of Rs.13 lakh.

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(2012) 25 STR 122 (P&H) — Punjab Ex- Servicemen Corporation v. Union of India.

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Appellant is a security agency service provider — Refused to pay tax on the ground that profit is not the motive behind the business – respondent disagreed and contended that service tax would be payable — Absence of profit motive was not a valid reason for non-payment.

Facts:
The appellant a statutory corporation under the provisions of the Punjab Ex-Servicemen Act, 1978 is providing Security Agency Service. Accordingly, the appellant contended that it was not liable to pay service tax as there was no profit motive to carry on the business. Further, since the notice was not sent within 1 year, dispute was also raised on limitation ground. The Revenue contended that service tax was payable as absence of profit motive is not a determinant factor for imposition of liability.

Held:
U/s. 65(94) service provider should be engaged in the business rendering specified service. There is no warrant for reading therein requirement of profit motive. Applicability of limitation law — Statutes of limitation are retrospective in so far as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after their operation for enforcing causes of action accrued earlier — But they neither have the effect of reviving a right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on that date — Assessee’s appeal is dismissed.

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(2012) 25 STR 16 (Kar.) — Essar Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India.

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Appellant providing infrastructure services of erection and construction of towers to cellular telephone companies — Inclusive of operating and maintenance — Registered with service tax authority for the payment of service tax — Amounted to transfer of right to use the erected telecom network towers and other related equipments — VAT authority opined — The appellant liable to pay VAT as there is transfer of right to use the said goods — Mere fact that equipments are attached to earth in order to enable it to function does not detract the applicability of VAT — Treated as movable — Held appellant bona fide believed activity to be service — Paid service tax regularly — State directed to recover it through separate proceeding — VAT payable for subsequent period — No liability to pay penalty and interest.

Facts:
The petitioner was engaged in erecting and constructing tower sites and leased the same to various telecom operators such as BSNL, Airtel, and Vodafone, etc. According to the petitioner, the said structure was considered as immovable, as they are embedded in the earth and cannot be shifted without damage. Further, the act of dismantling the structure from the site would render them non-saleable. However, after the study of the agreement entered by them with various operators, the Revenue opined that there was a transfer of right to use the leased capacity and the consideration received by them was in the nature of monthly lease rentals.

Held:
It was held that the structure erected by the appellant was movable for the reason that on the expiry of the agreement or the termination of it, the same could be detached and fixed somewhere else. Having concluded that, it was held to attract VAT. However, the petitioner bona fide believed impugned activity to be service and paid service tax regularly on the same. In para 22 of the judgment, the Court held to the effect that upon the determination of VAT liability, the amount previously paid as service tax would be adjusted and it is for the State to seek recovery of the amount paid by the petitioner to the Central Government through a separate proceeding based on this judgment. However. No penalty or interest would be imposed.

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(2012) 17 Taxmann.com 47 (Kar.) — CCE v. Tata Advanced Material Ltd.

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Assessee availed CENVAT credit of duty paid on capital goods on clearing goods — Capital goods destroyed in fire — Insurance company compensated assessee for the loss including duty — Revenue directed assessee to reverse the credit in respect of lost goods and confirmed demand — Issue, whether payment by insurance company renders regular credit as irregular — Held, No provision in Rules which empower reversal except in the cases when credit is taken irregularly.

Facts:
The assessee availed CENVAT credit of excise duty paid on capital goods bought and used in manufacturing excisable goods. About five years later, they were destroyed in a fire accident. Based on purchase invoice of new capital goods, a claim was put before the insurance company for reimbursement in terms of the policy taken. The reimbursed amount also included excise duty paid on the newly bought capital goods. The Department on getting such information directed the assessee to reverse the credit taken earlier on the lost goods. The assessee challenged it. The Tribunal held that the assessee had legally availed CENVAT credit. There is no legal provision which empowers the authorities to reverse CENVAT credit otherwise than in case of wrongful availment. The claim of the Department that assessee attained double benefit was also found without basis. The substantial question of law before the Court therefore was whether the impugned order amounted to encouraging unjust enrichment and whether or not credit can be claimed on goods lost in fire and for which they received compensation.

Held:
There is no provision in the Rules providing for reversal of credit except when it is irregularly taken and that was not the Revenue’s case. Merely because the assessee was compensated by the insurance company would not render legally taken credit irregular and it does not confer right on the authorities to demand reversal of credit. The assessee paid premium and covered the risk. It is not the case of double payment and the Department has no say in the matter.

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(2011) 40 VST 141 (MP) Fairdeal Corporation v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Others

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Sales Tax — Rate of tax — Entries in Schedule — ‘Fan covers’ and ‘Terminal Boxes’ — Used for manufacture of monoblock pump sets — Accessories of pump sets — Not an accessories to electric motors — Sch. I — Entry 89, Sch. II, — Part IV — Entry 7 of Madhya Pradesh Vanijya Kar Adhiniyam, 1994 (5 of 1995).

Facts:
The dealer manufactured and supplied fan covers and terminal boxes according to specification for use as accessories in monoblock pumps. The question before the High Court was whether the fan covers and terminal boxes, manufactured and supplied by the dealer, to be used for manufacture of monoblock pump sets used for irrigation purposes, were covered by Entry 7 of Part IV of Schedule II to the Madhya Pradesh Vanijya Kar Adhiniyam, 1994 as parts and accessories of the electric motor, or under Entry 89 of Schedule I to the Act as accessories of pumping sets.

Held:
The electric motors on which these two items were fixed are an integral part of the monoblock pump and not separable from the pump. The items in question could be used as accessories to the electric motor, but when the electric motor itself was an integral part and inseparable from the monoblock pump, the items in question would not be accessories of the electric motor but accessories of the monoblock pump.

In the monoblock pump the electric motor has no separate existence as independent item, therefore, the items in question could not be said to be an accessories to electric motor when used in monoblock pump.

When these items are used as accessories to the monoblock pump sets of less than 10 horse-power capacity they are covered by Entry 89 of Schedule I and not by Entry 7 of Part IV of Schedule II which is a general entry in respect of electric machine, its part and accessories. However, if the same items were sold by the petitioner for use as accessories or otherwise to some other main item, then they would be taxed according to the relevant entry covering such items and accessories.

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(2011) 16 Taxmann.com 209 (Chennai-CESTAT) — Safety Retreading Co. P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem.

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Appellant retreaders of tyres — Paying service tax under maintenance and repair services on labour charges — Material cost benefit under Notification No. 12/2003-ST, dated 20-8-2003 claimed — As per Revenue, under the notification benefit available for actual sale of material and not raw material consumed during course of provision of service available — Held, There is no evidence of sale of material in rendering maintenance and repair service — ‘Deemed sale’ relevant only in case of services under works contract and not in respect of maintenance and repair service — Satisfaction of conditions under Notification 12/2003-ST not proven — Hence benefit denied.

Facts:
The appellant is engaged in retreading of used tyres and thus providing repairs and maintenance service and paying service tax on the component labour charges involved. The tread rubber patches, bonding gum, etc. are purchased and used for redoing treading on them. The invoices for this job are prepared by indicating separately the actual cost of material used. Due VAT as per the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006 is paid on this. Also filed returns with sales tax authorities which are duly assessed. The Revenue held that only in the case of actual sale of material, benefit of Notification 12/2003 is available and not in case of consumption of raw material during the course of providing service.

The Bench referred to many relevant decisions on the subject matter which inter alia included Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. UOI, (2008) 200 STR 161 (SC), Rainbow Colour Lab. v. State of MP, (2000) 2 SCC 385, Shilpa Colour Lab, (2007) 5 STR 423 (Tri.-Bang.), Speedway Tyre Service v. CCE, (2009) 18 STT 293 (Delhi), PLA Tyre Works v. CCE, (2009) 19 STT 362 (Chennai), Idea Mobile Communication Ltd., (2011) 23 STR 433 (SC) and Aggarwal Colour Advance Photo System (2011) 23 STR 608 (Tri.-LLB), etc.

The two Members of the Bench differed in their views. The points of difference placed before the Third Member.

The Third Member recognised that the issue related to interpretation of Notification 12/2003-ST as well as benefit of deduction of cost of raw materials available considering the tread rubber patches and bonding gum used as ‘deemed sale’ on which VAT is paid.

Held:
There is no evidence of sale of material in rendering service of maintenance and repair.

The concept of ‘deemed sale’ relevant only in respect of services under the category of ‘works contract’ for service tax purpose.

‘Maintenance and repairs’ being a specific service cannot be treated as service under ‘works contract’ for service tax purpose.

The assessee did not prove that conditions under Notification 12/2003-ST were satisfied and therefore they are not entitled to the benefit under the said Notification.

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(2012) 25 STR 206 (Tri-Bang.) — Lanco Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tirupathi.

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CENVAT credit availed and utilised on irregular basis — Such credit reversed before issuance of show-cause notice — Interest charged from the date of availment up to the date of reversal — Argued that interest if at all leviable — Should be from date of utilisation — Penalty — Imposed for suppression of facts in order to avail inadmissible credit — Penalty for irregular availment of inadmissible credit — Held, Appellant liable to pay interest on CENVAT credit irregularly availed — Penalty for suppression of facts set aside — Penalty for availment of inadmissible credit upheld.

Facts:
The appellant made wrongful/irregular availment and utilisation of CENVAT credit and voluntarily reversed the same. However, they were directed to pay interest under Rule 12/14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002/2004 for the period till the date of reversal. The appellant pleaded that the major part of the credit was not utilised. According to the appellant, interest was not payable for the fact that they had already reversed the credit before the issuance of the show-cause notice and against the allegation of suppression, the appellants argued that they had already disclosed all the material facts to Department through ER-1.

Held:
With regards to the interest payable on the wrong availment of credit it was held that reversal of credit before issuance of show-cause notice cannot take away the liability. Hence, appellant was held liable to pay the interest. However, it was concluded that there was no suppression of facts by the appellant and penalty on this count was withdrawn thus retaining penalty for wrong availment of credit.

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(2012) 25 STR 196 (Tri-Del.) — Praveen Jain & Co. Pvt Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi.

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Appellant availed CENVAT credit prior to making payment to service provider — Order confirming demand of duty by denying CENVAT credit of Rs.25,51,699 and imposition of penalty of Rs.10,000 — Appellant contended that it was mistake that happened and payment subsequently made to service providers — Denial of credit and demand of duty not justified — Claimed that it was clear violation of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 — However taking into account subsequent payment, denial of the credit was set aside — However, interest was held payable for the period of wrong availment along with penalty of Rs.10,000.

Facts:
The appellant availed credit on input services prior to making payments to the service provider. However, it made payments before the issuance of the show-cause notice. The appellants argued that it was a mistake from their end and subsequent regularisation of the deficiency of the documents can be condoned. As per the Revenue, the payment of price and duty to the supplier of inputs and input services is different. Making the payment to the supplier of inputs was not a pre-condition for availing the credit. However, credit of the input services cannot be availed unless and until payment has been made to the service provider.

Held:
Held that the appellant had enjoyed monetary benefit and hence, was liable for the payment of interest and penalty. On the other hand, taking into account the subsequent payment made to the service provider denial of the credit was set aside.

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(2012) 25 STR 178 (Tri-Ahmd.) — Rahul Trade Links v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Rajkot.

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Penalty — Non-payment of service tax — Separate penalties imposed u/s.76 and u/s.78 — Finding that assessee not having requisite mens rea — Tax paid with interest and penalty — Commissioner rightfully reduced penalty — No infirmity in the impugned order.

Facts:
The appellant was inter alia engaged in distribution for Tata Teleservices Ltd. on a commission basis. The assessee failed to pay service tax for the services rendered. The adjudicating authority confirmed the penalty and interest u/s.76 and u/s.78, but reduced the penalty. The appellant challenged the order and vehemently argued that equivalent penalty u/s.78 is not attracted.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that the penalties imposed under the abovementioned sections are clearly distinct even if the offences are carried out in the same transaction. The Tribunal dismissing the appeal held that the finding of the adjudicating authority was not shown to be perverse in any manner.

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(2012) 25 STR 167 (Tri-Mum.) — Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad.

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Appellants manufacturing unit located in Raigad District — Input services for the maintenance of windmill located in Satara District — Electricity so generated was consumed for the manufacture of the final product — Such credit rendered ineligible — Proceedings initiated against appellant —As per appellant, there was no mandate in definition of input service that services be used in manufacturing factory alone — Maintenance of windmills — Eligible input credit — Appeal allowed.

Facts:
The appellant was a manufacturing unit engaged in manufacture of excisable good situated at Raigad. They took credit on maintenance services received for their windmill situated in Satara District and consumed electricity generated out of it for the production of final product. The credit taken for above-mentioned input service was disallowed. According to the revenue there was no nexus between the said input services and the final product manufactured by them and they placed reliance on the Tribunal’s decisions in the case of Rajhans Metals Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Rajkot, (2007) 8 STR 498 (Tri.-Ahd) and Indian Rayon Industries Ltd., (2006) 4 STR 79 (Tri.) wherein it was held that services used at the site of windmills cannot be considered as input services by unit situated at some other place.

Held:
Held that the input services were rendered for the maintenance of windmills for generation of electricity cannot be brought into dispute. Further, after the study of the input service definition, it was concluded that the said service falls under the definition of input service. As regards input service used at different place was concerned, it was pertinent that there was no mandate in law that it should be used in the factory. The cited decisions were distinguished stating that the decision in the case of CCE, Nagpur v. Ultratech Cement Ltd., (2010) 20 STR 577 (Bom.) was not available before the Tribunal including in the case of Rajhans (supra). Hence, appeals allowed.

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(2012) 25 STR 136 (Tri-Bang.) — Sobha Developers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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CENVAT credit — Appellant service provider to SEZ units/developer — Issue — Appellant of the opinion that provision of service to SEZ units is export of service and cannot be considered as exempted service — Demand raised on ground that service provided was exempted service and the availment of CENVAT credit of input service credit would fall under restriction/ demand under Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 — Noted that supplies to SEZ were free of all the taxes considering them at par with exports — Appeal allowed with consequential relief.

Facts:
The appellant provided services to SEZ units/ developers and contended that services provided should be considered as export of service and the demand raised through impugned orders should be set aside. Whereas, according to the Revenue the two basic conditions to hold a service as exports are that service should be provided outside India and payment for such services be received in convertible foreign exchange are not fulfilled. The appellant relied upon the decision in the case of Shyamraju & Co (I) Pvt. Ltd. V. UOI, 2010 (256) ELT 193 (Kar) wherein it was clearly noted that provision of services to SEZs are free of all taxes and this could be done by treating them at par with exports. In this case the issue does not, relate to whether the tax is to be levied or not but to decide whether the appellant is eligible to utilise CENVAT credit and whether they are eligible to pay an amount equal to 8% for the period prior to 1-4-2008.

Held:
By applying ratio of the decisions laid down in the various cases cited which inter alia included Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. Collector, (1994) 69 ELT 122 and Steelite Industries Ltd., (2009) 244 ELT A89 (Bom.), it was held that the provisions of service to SEZ units were to be made applicable either on payment of tax or without tax and which cannot be equated with exempted services. Also, that services provided to SEZ units were covered by Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, and hence, there stood no inconsistency between the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 and the Finance Act, 1994. Therefore, considering all the arguments it was held that the restriction under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, would not apply and services would be considered at par with exports and all the appeals were allowed.

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Non-availability of information from foreign branches

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Punj Lloyd Ltd. (31-3-2012)

From Notes to Accounts The company’s branch at Libya has fixed assets (net) and current assets aggregating to Rs. 9,909,622 thousand as at March 31, 2011 in relation to certain projects being executed in that country. Due to civil and political disturbances and unrest in Libya, the work on all the projects has stopped, the resources have been demobilised and necessary intimation has been given to the customers. The company has also filed the details of the outstanding assets with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Pending the outcome of the uncertainty, the aforesaid amounts are being carried forward as realisable.

From Auditors’ Report 6. As stated in Note 19 of schedule ‘M’ to the financial statements, due to civil and political disturbances and unrest in Libya, the work on all the projects in Libya has stopped. There are aggregate assets of Rs.9,909,622 thousand, aggregate revenues of Rs.1,954,565 thousand, profits before tax of Rs.96,816 thousand and cash flows of Rs.1,803,620 thousand for the year then ended in Libya Branch, which have been audited by another auditor in Libya. However, we were unable to perform certain procedures that we considered necessary under the requirements of Statement on Auditing SA600 (Using the work of another auditor) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, including obtaining corroborative information and/or audit evidence, in relation to certain components of financial statements of Libya Branch. The ultimate outcome of the above matters cannot presently be ascertained in view of the uncertainty as stated above. Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the consequential effects of the foregoing on the financial statements.

In our opinion, proper books of account as required by law have been kept by the company so far as appears from our examination of those books and proper returns adequate for the purposes of our audit have been received from branches and unincorporated joint ventures not visited by us except to the extent stated in paragraph 6 above. The branches and unincorporated joint ventures auditors’ reports have been forwarded to us and have been appropriately dealt with;

Without considering our observations in paragraph 6 above, the impact whereof on the Company’s profits is not presently ascertainable, in our opinion and on consideration of reports of other auditors on separate financial statements and on the other financial information and to the best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, the said accounts give the information required by the Companies Act, 1956, in the manner so required and give a true and fair view in conformity with the accounting principles generally accepted in India . . . .

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Issues arising on migration to an ERP software.

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Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (31-3-2011)

From Notes to Accounts
The Company being a shipping company, its activities are based both in shore and in floating ships. The Company has implemented three different ERP packages to take care of both shore and the ship-related transactions and they have gone live from 28-2-2011. The accounts for the period 1-4-2010 to 31-1-2011 (i.e., for ten months) are prepared in the legacy system and for the period 1-2-2011 to 31-3-2011 (i.e., for two months) are prepared in the new system. With all efforts, the system has been implemented and the accounts for the 4th quarter and year ending 31-3-2011 are for the first time prepared under the new system.

In addition to the above, supporting documents for income and expenses are not received by the Company from the agents and transactions have been recorded based on the amount of the advance released/data received from the agents for the month of March 2011.

Necessary accounting effects to rectify the migration errors have been carried out by the management wherever the instances have been observed and the exercise is continuing and the necessary rectification will be made appropriately.

Further to the above, the company is unable to make certain adjustment in respect of the following due to issues arising on migration and uploading of data in the new system:

(i) Translation of certain balances as per policy No. 8(c), wherever rectification entries have been passed post revaluation of the balances of the assets and liabilities,

(ii) The segmental results disclosed segment report may consist certain inter-segment compensating issues,

(iii) In some of the assets, depreciation is accounted where instances of classification in inter-assets class is noticed and date of capitalisation is taken based on best available information,

(iv) Certain transactions relating to payments, etc. reflected in the bank reconciliation statements could not be incorporated,

(v) During the current year aggregate Net Credit balance of Rs.25375.49 lakhs in vendor and accounts payable are shown as Sundry creditors and other liabilities, which up to previous year were disclosed vendor-wise debit and credit separately,

(vi) The foreign currency revaluation effects of various assets and liabilities are included in the debtors, instead of grouping the same with the respective assets and liabilities,

(vii) The second phase of audit by the Comptroller & Auditor General of India, has not been completed due to limitation of time.

The impact of items stated in para (i) to (iv) is not material on the result of the Company. Further the matters stated in para (iv) to (vi) relates to assets and liabilities and grouping thereof under the various heads of the Balance sheet.

From Auditors’ Report

(f) Attention is invited on:

Note. No. 1, Schedule-25 Notes on Accounts, regarding various errors and omissions have been made by the Company during the process of migration/uploading of data post migration in the new accounting software ERP-SAP, in respect of accounting of the income and expenses, assets and liabilities for which necessary rectification has been carried out by the Company.

Further there remain certain items where the company is unable to make appropriate adjustments and the effects of errors and adjustments, if any, as might have been determined to be necessary in the data migrated/uploaded in the accounting software post migration.

It has been further noticed that the Company has:

(i) Not accounted the income and expenditure in respect of unfinished voyages as per accounting policy No. 2(c), having no impact on the profit for the year.

(ii) Non-accounting of foreign currency transactions at the rates as stipulated in accounting policy No. 8(a) for the months of January 2011 and February 2011, instead the same have been accounted at the exchange rates applicable for the month of March 2011.71

(g) Note No. 17 of Schedule-25 ‘Notes to the Accounts’ in respect of balances of Sundry Creditors, Debtors, Loans & Advances and Deposit which are subject to confirmation.

In our opinion and to the best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, subject to our comments in para 4(f) above, the said accounts.

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Disclosure regarding support/comfort letters given for subsidiaries.

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Tata Communications Ltd. (31-3-2011)

From Notes to Accounts

Note 4: As on 31 March 2011, the Comfort for the credit facility agreement in respect of various subsidiaries:

The Company has undertaken to the lenders of TCTSL and TCIPL that it shall retain full management control so long as amounts are due to the lenders.

Note 5: The Company has issued a support letter to Tata Communications International Pte. Limited (TCIPL), regarding providing financial support enabling, in turn, TCIPL to issue such support letter to certain subsidiaries having negative net worth as at 31 March 2011 aggregating Rs.1,245.71 crore (2010: Rs.1,508.41 crores) in various geographies in order that they may continue to be accounted for as going concern.

The letters of comfort/support mentioned in 4 and 5 above have been provided in the ordinary course of business and no liability on the Company is expected to materialise in these respect.

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Interest on refund: Section 244A of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Period for interest: Period of delay caused by assessee: Assessee’s belated claim for deduction allowed by CIT(A): No delay caused by assessee: Interest payable from beginning of relevant A.Y.

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[CIT v. South Indian Bank Ltd., 340 ITR 574 (Ker.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee’s belated claim for bad debts was rejected by the Assessing Officer for failure to establish the claim. The claim was allowed by the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer denied interest on refund u/s.244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the delay was attributable to an additional claim of deduction which was allowed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest from 1-4-1999.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Assessing Officer had not established that the assessee had caused any delay in issuing the refund order. There was no decision by the Commissioner or Chief Commissioner on this issue. The assessee was eligible to get interest from 1-4-1999, till the date of refund.”

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Falling BRIC — India’s macro numbers are harming its global image.

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It has been more than ten years since the term ‘Bric’ was coined. The Bric nations — Brazil, Russia, India and China — were supposed to be the engines of global growth, the new poles of the world economy as Europe and North America slipped slowly into twilight. Yet Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs, the man leading the team that coined the phrase in 2001, has been quoted as saying that “there are important structural issues about all four, and as we go into the 10-year anniversary, in some ways India is the most disappointing”.

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BMC elections — Dance of democracy

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1. I am very disappointed that the voter turnout in the city is so low. We have no right to call ourselves educated and enlightened if we don’t come out to vote. We cannot expect things to change then. Voting is not just a fundamental right, it is our duty. If we fail to vote, we have no right to make comments about the state of affairs in the city. The quality of life is deteriorating and desperate measures are needed. Mumbai is the most important city in the country and generates a huge amount of revenue. It also has the largest number of urban problems. We want the elected leaders to fight for the city and get funds.

— Deepak Parekh, HDFC Chairman

2. The BMC is one of the richest corporations in the country. Despite this, the condition of Mumbai is pitiable. People should not consider voting day as a holiday, but as a day to do their duty. We can talk about responsibility only when we talk about duty. People should cast their vote. Not casting your vote is a crime.
— Anupam Kher, Actor 3.

It is very sad that a lot of people have not come out to vote. If you don’t vote, you have no right to complain. They are not contributing to the society. You are getting what you deserve . . . you are harming society and the country.

— Priya Dutt, Congress MP,

Mumbai North-Central 4. Times View — Another election, another low turnout in Mumbai. Is it apathy, or cynicism? Do we not care? Or do we believe that both sides are equally unworthy of our vote, that there’s nothing to choose from? Either which way, it doesn’t bode well for the city. The more affluent, it would appear, have mentally seceded from the city.

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FDI — The cost of caprice

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Serious economies cannot behave irresponsibly. That is the lesson to be drawn from the international fallout of our domestic telecom scandal. Within a week of the Supreme Court cancelling 122 telecom licences because of how they were issued, Bahrain Telecommunications Company has pulled out its investment in S Tel, and Etisalat of the UAE has written off investment of $ 827 million in Etisalat DB, in which it holds a 45% stake. A Norwegian Minister has come calling, to protect the interests of Telenor (which is majority-owned by the Norwegian Government), and you can rest assured that the Russians are not going to meekly accept the loss of Sistema’s majority stake in Sistema Shyam TeleServices, especially when Sistema owner Vladimir Yevtushenkov is closely linked to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. So how much damage has been done internationally to the country’s standing and goodwill, because Mr. Raja was allowed to get away with his antics while the Prime Minister and Finance Minister fiddled?

Our capricious politicians are only dimly aware of the international fallout of their domestic dance. All too often, the operating assumption within the country is that the Government can do pretty much what it wants since most serious businessmen don’t want to be in court against it. That is not how it works around the world. So Devas has dragged Antrix to arbitration in Paris, after the government woke up one day and cancelled their contract. Cairn has accepted the Government’s unilateral rewriting of its contract with the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, but only because it needed the Government’s approval for a change in shareholding control, and you can be sure that others in the energy space have been watching. Indeed, who is to tell how much damage was caused by the Enron-Dabhol fiasco in the 1990s, in terms of lost investment? While the collapse of Enron saved India some blushes, subsequent overseas investment in Indian power generation has been barely $ 5 billion (about the cost of one ultra-mega power project).

As it is, the country makes life hard for businesses, or it would not figure embarrassingly low in the World Bank’s list of countries ranked on the ease of doing business (132nd in a list of 183 countries; six years ago it was 116th out of 155 countries). Why add to the headaches with poor contractnegotiation, then second thoughts and unilateral action? This is not to argue that the country should not get out of bad deals; rather, the issue is of avoiding capricious conduct in an economy that hopes to be the fourth largest in the world by the end of the decade. If you want to get there, you have to start behaving like a serious economy, not invite comparisons with banana republics.

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Clarifications on filing of conflicting returns by contesting parties.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No. 1/2012, dated 10th February 2012 issued clarification to Circulars No. 19 and 20 issued on 2-5-2011 regarding the filing of conflicting returns pertaining to the change of directors or their appointment.

In order to avoid such eventualities wherever there is a management dispute, the company is now required to mandatorily file the attachment relating to the cause of cessation along with Form 32 with the ROC concerned irrespective of the ground of cessation viz.

(a) Retirement
(b) Disqualification
(c) Death
(d) Resignation
(e) Vacation of office u/s.283 or 313 or 260
(f) Removal u/s.284 or withdrawal of nomination by appointment authority
(g) Absence of reappointment

Aggrieved director can file complain in ‘Investor Compliant Form’ and ROC will take efforts to settle the same amicably. Till such dispute is settled, the documents filed by the company and by the contesting groups of directors will not be approved/ registered/recorded and will thus not be available in the registry for public viewing. Full Circular can be viewed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ General_Circular_No_01_2012.pdf

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 80, dated 15-2-2012 — Export of goods and services — Simplification and revision of Softex procedure.

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This Circular has revised the procedure for submission of SOFTEX Forms for software exporters having annual turnover of Rs.1,000 crore or who file at least 600 SOFTEX forms annually. The new form and revised procedure for submitting the same are annexed to this Circular.

As per the revised procedure, the eligible software exporter has to

(1) File a statement in Excel format giving all particulars along with quadruplicate set of SOFTEX form to the nearest STPI.

(2) STPI will then verify the details and decide on a percentage sample check of the documents in details.

(3) Software companies will have to submit all the documents on demand to STPI within 30 days of their advice or any reasonable/ extended time.

(4) STPI will certify the statement and SOFTEX forms in bulk on the ‘Top Sheet’ regarding the values, etc.

(5) STPI will forward the first copy of the revised SOFTEX format to the concerned Regional Office of RBI, the “duplicate copy along with bulk statement in Excel format to Authorised Dealers for negotiation/collection/settlement. The third copy to the exporter and the last copy will be retained by STPI for its own record”.

(6) Exporters, using the revised procedure, will have to provide information about all the invoices including the ones lesser than US $ 25,000, in the bulk statement in Excel format.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 79, dated 15-2- 2012 — Clarification — Purchase of immovable property in India — Reporting requirement

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A non-resident who has set up a branch, office or other place of business In India (other than a liaison office), and who has acquired any immovable property in India has to file a declaration in form IPI with RBI within 90 days from the date of such acquisition. However, no such declaration has to be filed by an NRI or PIO when he acquires any immovable property in India.

Form IPI has been modified to reflect this position and the amended Form IPI is annexed to this Circular.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 76, dated 9-2-2012 — Clarification — Establishment of project offices in India by foreign entities — General permission.

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Presently, general permission has been granted to a foreign entity for setting up a Project office in India, subject to certain conditions.

This Circular clarifies that despite the general permission, citizens of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iran or China, cannot establish in India, a branch office or a liaison office or a project office or any other place of business by whatever name called, without the prior permission of RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 75, dated 7-2- 2012 — External Commercial Borrowings — Simplification of procedure.

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Presently, approval of RBI is required for:

(a) Reduction in amount of ECB.
(b) Changes in the drawdown schedule where the original average maturity period is not maintained.
(c) Reduction in the all-in-cost of the ECB after obtaining LRN. This Circular has granted powers to banks to approve changes in respect of the above i.e., reduction in all-in-cost, subject to certain conditions and changes in the drawdown schedule when original maturity period is not maintained.

(a) Reduction in amount of ECB

Banks can approve reduction in loan amount in respect of ECB availed under the Automatic Route, provided

(i) Consent of the lender for reduction in loan amount has been obtained;

(ii) Average maturity period of the ECB is maintained;

(iii) Monthly ECB-2 returns in respect of the LRN have been submitted to the Department of Statistics and Information Management (DSIM); and

(iv) There is no change in the other terms and conditions of the ECB.

(b) Changes/modifications in the drawdown schedule when original average maturity period is not maintained

Banks can approve requests for changes/modifications in the drawdown schedule resulting in the original average maturity period undergoing change in respect of ECB availed both under the Automatic and Approval Routes. However, any elongation/ rollover in the repayment, on expiry of the original maturity of the ECB, will continue to require the prior approval of RBI.

The approval can be granted provided:

(i) There are no changes/modifications in the repayment schedule of the ECB;
(ii) Average maturity period of the ECB is reduced as against the original average maturity period stated in the Form 83 at the time of obtaining the LRN;
(iii) Reduced average maturity period complies with the stipulated minimum average maturity period as per the extant ECB guidelines;
(iv) Change in all-in-cost is only due to the change in the average maturity period and the ECB complies with the extant guidelines; and
(v) Monthly ECB-2 returns in respect of the LRN have been submitted to DSIM.

(c) Reduction in the all-in-cost of ECB Banks can approve requests for reduction in allin- cost, in respect of ECB availed both under the Automatic and Approval Routes, provided

(i) Consent of the lender has been obtained and there are no other changes in the terms and conditions of the ECB; and

(ii) Monthly ECB-2 returns in respect of the LRN have been submitted to DSIM.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74, dated 1-2-2012 — Deferred Payment Protocols dated April 30, 1981 and December 23, 1985 between Government of India and erstwhile USSR.

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With effect from January 20, 2012 the Rupee value of the Special Currency Basket has been fixed at Rs.71.456679 as against the earlier value of Rs. 73.923372

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73, dated 21-1- 2012 — Opening of Diamond Dollar Accounts (DDAs)

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Presently, banks are permitted to open and maintain Diamond Dollar Accounts (DDA) of eligible firms and companies, subject to certain terms and conditions.

This Circular requires banks to submit a statement giving the data on the DDA balances maintained by them on a fortnightly basis within 7 days of close of the fortnight to which it relates, to the Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Foreign Exchange Department, Reserve Bank of India, Trade Division, 5th Floor, Amar Building, Mumbai-400001.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 70, dated 25- 1-2012 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Infrastructure Finance Companies (IFCs).

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Presently, Non-Banking Finance Companies (NBFC) categorised as Infrastructure Finance Companies (IFC) by RBI are permitted to avail of ECB, including the outstanding ECB, up to 50% of their owned funds under the Automatic Route. ECB by IFC above 50% of their owned funds are considered by RBI under the Approval Route.

This Circular requires banks to certify the leverage ratio (i.e., outside liabilities/owned funds) of IFC desirous of availing ECB under the Approval Route at the time of forwarding the proposal to RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 69, dated 25- 11-2012 External Commercial Borrowings — Simplification of procedure.

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Presently, approval of RBI is required for:

(a) Cancellation of Loan Registration Number (LRN); or
(b) Change in permissible end-use for an existing ECB

This Circular has granted powers to banks to approve changes in respect of the above i.e., cancellation of LRN and change in permissible end-use, subject to certain conditions.

(a) Cancellation of LRN

Banks can directly approach DSIM for cancellation of LRN for ECBs availed, both under the automatic and approval routes, provided

(i) No draw-down for the said LRN has taken place; and
(ii) Monthly ECB-2 returns till date in respect of the LRN have been submitted to DSIM.

(b) Change in the end-use of ECB proceeds

Banks can approve requests for change in end-use in respect of ECB availed under the Automatic Route, provided

(i) The proposed end-use is permissible under the automatic route;
(ii) There is no change in the other terms and conditions of the ECB;
(iii) ECB is in compliance with the extant guidelines; and
(iv) Monthly ECB-2 returns till date in respect of the LRN have been submitted to DSIM.

However, RBI approval will be required for change in the end-use of ECB availed under the Approval Route.

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REPORTING OF HOLDINGS OF PROMOTERS — SAT Decides on The Recurring Issue of Non-Compliance of Reporting

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Reporting of Promoters’ shareholding under various SEBI regulations seems to be a chore that is best done away quickly. Most of it is routine since Promoters shareholding often remains static. Even where there are changes, the milestones of reporting are seemingly well defined. Nevertheless, issues often crop up and SEBI initiates proceedings for non-compliance. The penalties for noncompliance are, as is well known, substantial and hence an area of concern. SEBI’s consistent stand, based on certain Court decisions including that of the Supreme Court, is that non-compliance of reporting does not require mens rea to be proved and once there is a simple failure to comply, levy of penalty logically follows.

The law relating to reporting of shareholding is complicated as it is spread out over several overlapping and at times contradictory regulations or having differing requirements. For example, reporting is required under the Takeover Regulations, the Insider Trading Regulations, the Listing Agreement, etc. The timing, the persons who have to report, the information to be disclosed and the prescribed form for reporting, etc. tend to differ.

For concerns that are understandable, the definition of terms under certain regulations is fairly broad and/or are defined in a broad way prescribing other parameters under different regulations. For example, the Takeover Regulations define acquirer in a fairly broad way and the acquisitions by an acquirer mandate reporting under certain circumstances. Under the Insider Trading Regulations, however, the reporting is by a slightly different group of people and at different times.

The point is that though the reporting may be made under one set of Regulations or even by one or more persons, it may not be strictly in conformity with the provisions of other regulations. This is despite the fact that the information that is required to be placed in the public domain is duly placed, though not exactly in the manner required by law. In such a case, the issue of penalty may arise. Similarly, even though such information may be duly reported by one person, the question may remain whether non-furnishing by another person of the same information tantamounts to a violation.

A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal [O. P. Gulati v. SEBI, (2012) 111 SCL 454] highlights such a concern even though the decision is in favour of the promoters. It shows the vagaries not only of law but of practice of SEBI. Hence, there is need to take a pragmatic approach to avoid needless proceedings and litigation.

The facts as provided in the decision can be quickly summarised as follows. The promoters of a listed company consisting of husband/wife had acquired certain shares beyond the minimum percentage and thus an obligation to report arose. It may be mentioned that the acquisition was over a long period of time. It was accepted that in the initial several years, there was no requirement to report and the issue before the Tribunal was only acquisition during the later years and hence this discussion focusses on the reporting for the later years.

Regulation 7(1A) of the Takeover Regulations (‘the Regulations’) requires that if an acquirer acquires 2% or more shares, he shall report the same in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time. The acquirer admittedly had acquired more than 2% shares and this acquisition was not reported in the prescribed manner. SEBI initiated proceedings against the acquirer and persons acting in concert which as stated above consisted of the husband and wife. The interesting point was that though the husband and wife were acting in concert, only the husband had acquired the shares while the wife had not acquired even a single share. SEBI initiated proceedings against both of them based on the finding that the prescribed reporting was not made and levied a penalty of Rs.1 lakh on each of them.

The acquirers appealed to the SAT essentially making two sets of contentions. As regards nonreporting by the husband, it was contended that it was inadvertent and a technical error and deserves condonation. However, as regards the wife, the issue raised was that though the wife was a person acting in concert with the acquirer, since she had not acquired any shares, there was no requirement of reporting by her.

The SAT rejected the argument stating that inadvertent/technical errors in reporting do not deserve to be condoned and upheld the penalty of Rs.1 lakh on the husband. As regards the wife, SAT noted that:

(1) the husband and wife fell within the definition of acquirer,
(2) the wife had not acquired any shares, and
(3) the reporting requirement was on the acquirer.

Hence, it was held that as there was no rationale in double reporting, particularly by a person who did not acquire any shares. The levy of penalty on the wife was not warranted and reversed.

It is worth considering the observations of the SAT before further comments and conclusions can be made.

“The appellant-acquirers had contended that:

(1) disclosures were made with bona fide intention though late
(2) there was no suppression of fact
(3) there was no intention to violate
(4) default, if any, was purely technical in nature, and
(5) deserves to be accepted as a bona fide inadvertent mistake.”

Against this contention, SEBI “supported the orders passed by the adjudicating officer stating that any acquirer, whether he has acquired the shares or voting rights of the company or not, if he falls within the definition of the acquirer under Regulation 2(b) of the takeover code or is a ‘person acting in concert’ within the meaning of Regulation 2(e), is required to file a declaration under Regulation 7(1A) of the takeover code. Indra Gulati, being wife of O. P. Gulati and also a promoter of the company, falls within the definition of ‘person acting in concert’ and hence an ‘acquirer’ within the meaning of Regulation 2(b) of the takeover code”.

Whilst annulling the penalty on the wife, SAT observed:

‘A person who may fall within the definition of acquirer under the takeover code but has not acquired the shares and is not a person acting in concert with the person acquiring the shares is not obliged to make disclosure under Regulation 7(1A) of the takeover code. In a given case, suppose there are 20 persons in a target company who may fall within the definition of ‘acquirer’ under the takeover code and say only two of them have purchased or sold shares aggregating two per cent or more of the share capital of the target company and these two persons are not acting in concert with any of the other eighteen persons. If the argument of learned counsel for the respondent Board is accepted, then all the twenty persons who fall within the definition of ‘acquirer’ are required to make disclosure to the company as well as to the concerned stock exchanges. Such additional disclosure by eighteen persons who have neither purchased nor sold shares, nor are persons acting in concert with the two acquirers, serves no purpose.

The fact that Indra Gulati did not acquire any share of the target company during the period in question is not in dispute. The adjudicating officer has not recorded any finding that there was any understanding or agreement, direct or indirect between O. P. Gulati and Indra Gulati to acquire the shares of the target company. In the absence of any such finding or material on record, we are of the view that the adjudicating officer erred in holding Indra Gulati guilty of violating Regulation 7(1A) of the takeover code.”

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above decision:

Firstly, the concern over multiple reporting under various regulations of information that is essentially the same though required of different people, at different stages and of different nature is justified. It is presumably settled by the observation that such multiple reporting does not serve a point except that SEBI may be obliged to initiate action. One hopes that this decision helps in a case where a person has reported under one regulation but inadvertently failed to report under another regulation would not be burdened with dual consequences.

Secondly, this decision gives some clarity on the issue that often comes up, viz., when there are numerous persons in a Promoter Group, who should report and whether all should report or whether reporting is required by only those who acquire. The above decision should be the basis for arguing that if the lead promoter reports the information required, on behalf of all those who have acquired multiple reporting is not required.

Thirdly, this case highlights the point that unlike other laws, SEBI has powers to levy huge penalties for seemingly routine and unintended non-compliances. The author believes that whilst using this power SEBI should have a pragmatic approach.

PART D: RTI & SUCESSS STORY

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RTI success story of Vinita Deshmukh, Pune:

The controversial Dow Project in Pune — at Shinde- Vasuli village in Chakan came to a grinding halt in 2010. In fact, unable to sustain vociferous local protest against the establishment of its chemical plant in the heart of the village, Dow voluntarily walked out of Pune district. I couldn’t believe what I heard . . . .

Since then, the site wears a deserted look. Much of the construction material too has been lifted by the Dow people, say villagers. cement bags lie torn, construction pillars with jutting out iron rods wait hopelessly and most of the makeshift offices too have been flattened. Two security guards stroll around and dare not defy clicking photographs. The land still belongs to Dow confirms the MIDC official in Pune and MPCB Pune says no directive has been given by it to the shift base. According to news reports, Dow has voluntarily decided to move out, stung by the hostility of the local residents. Well, but there are no sympathies for this turn of events.

Like they say, as you sow, so shall you reap.

When I called up the then District Collector Chandrakant Dalvi, he confirmed that “Dow is now out of Pune district.’’ It is the intense campaign by villagers taken forward by the Warkari community of entire Maharashtra that eliminated Dow from Pune. I, in the capacity of the editor of ‘Intelligent Pune’, a weekly tabloid, played a pivotal role in accessing crucial information under RTI. Inspection of files u/s.4 of the RTI Act at the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board (MPCB), Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) and Secretary, Environment office at the Mantralaya, Mumbai revealed shocking details.

When Dow was given a whopping 100 acres of land, it began construction sometime late 2007. Villagers were in the dark about it, they were not even told the name of the company. Former Sarpanch Panmant recollects that suddenly a 4,000 strong labour force was put to work day and night. When they tried getting information from the collector’s office, they were stonewalled. It was only in January 2008 that the company put up the board on site, namely, ‘Dow Chemicals International Ltd.’.

Sometime in January 2008 Justice (retd.) B. G. Kolshe Patil visited the village for a public programme. When he found the name ‘Dow Chemicals International Ltd.’ on the board, he asked the villagers whether they were aware of what was coming to their village. He enlightened them that it is the same company which was responsible for the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and that villagers should not allow this company to set up home here.

Thus, villagers began their agitation. They first stopped the water connection that they had willingly given to the company premises and then halted any company vehicle from entering their village. For this, they dug up superficial trenches. Newspapers reported about the warpath taken by the villagers.

I decided to find out more about permissions given to Dow. When I called up Member Secretary, MPCB, he answered that, “I have no documents. If you want, you can invoke the RTI Act.’’

I did so and literally opened up a Pandora’s Box. I broke the story in ‘Intelligent Pune’ in the 7th March cover story. It shocked Puneites and armed villagers of Shinde-Vasuli where the Dow Chemicals plant was coming up, with hardhitting ammunition in the form of the truth in black and white.

The Maharashtra Pollution Control Board (MPCB) is the prime body to give environmental clearance for such a project. The Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) is the body which provides land. Both are required to scrutinise the proposal of this nature thoroughly since the outfit, even if it is an R&D centre, is of a chemical nature. I carried out inspection of files u/s.4 of the RTI Act at the MIDC, Pune office. I also invoked the RTI at the MPCB office to know what kind of consent DOW had applied for and what kind of consent had the MPCB given.

Though we procured crucial correspondence, which took off the lid of DOW’s claim that it was primar-ily a research and development centre and not a manufacturing unit, vital documents pertaining to NOCs from the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MOEF) and Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum (IEM) — both mandatory for establishment of a chemical plant were either missing or not submitted at all. “We do not have these documents in Pune — you may try in Mumbai’’ was the chorus of the regional officers of the MIDC and MPCB.

Inspection of files at MIDC, Pune on 28th February, 2008:

Information was gathered u/s.(4) of the RTI Act wherein this writer and RTI activist, Vijay Kumbhar, undertook inspection of the file containing correspondence between MIDC and DOW. Some of the file notings reveal the hurry in which the proposal was given a green signal. The correspondence also reveals that what DOW was setting up was not primarily a research and development centre. Many files were inspected. Hereunder are the observations:

19th October, 2007: In his letter dated 19th October, 2007, Sanjay Khandare, member secretary of the MPCB has granted Dow Chemicals International Pvt. Ltd. (plot no A-1, MIDC Chakan, Phase II, Taluka Khed, District. Pune) the consent for the manufacture of the following chemical products: Polymers — 2,000 kgs per month; Catalyst organic/inorganic — 1,000 kgs per month; Surfactants — 200 kgs per month; Aliphatic organic compounds — 500 kgs per month; Aromatic organic compounds — 500 kgs per month; Inorganic salts — 500 kgs per month.

In case of accidents, the MPCB expects DOW to do a clerical post-accident action — “Whenever due to any accident or any other unforeseen act or even, such emissions occur or apprehended to occur in excess of standards laid down, such information shall be forthwith reported to Board, concerned police station, officer of director of health services, Department of Explosives, Inspectorates of factory and local body. In case of failure of pollution control equipments, the production process connected to shall be stopped.’’

Maj. Gen. SCN Jatar (retd.), a petrochemical expert and RTI activist stated that, “The authorities should not have given final approval until the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report is made. The report should be made by a well-known agency and local representatives of the citizens should be associated with its preparation.”

Pollution control board experts who scrutinised the consent by the MPCB, commented:

“The list of chemicals given which are likely to be used at the Chakan plant includes hazardous and dangerous gases as well as chemicals such as (1) gases — SO2, Acetylene, HCL. (2) Solvents — Acetone, ether, nitrite compounds, halogenetic solvents, and inorganic acids. Thus the safety-related issues arising out of handling, accidents and incidents involving above chemicals require proper storage, handling and emergency procedures. For this an environmental management plan should have been asked by the Board of Government of India’s MSIHC (manufacturing, storage, import and handling of hazardous chemicals rules 1989) as notified in the EPA Act same does not seem to have been adhered to. There does not seem to be adherence of the Chemical Accidents & Emergency Preparedness (Rules 2000) for which the company needs to submit onsite and off site disaster management plan and that includes education to the neighbourhood residents. It is the fundamental right to know what is happening in the neighbourhood.”

As a precautionary principle, environmental impact analysis should have been done by the company on its own when they claim they are a responsible corporate. Neither the board has asked for it.

I informed the villagers regarding the kind of chemical manufacturing plant and that it was not just a research centre which was coming in their neighbourhood. Bandya Tatya Kharadkar, the Warkari leader successfully led a state-wide agitation as the Indrayani river is close to the heart of this community. What makes me feel overwhelmed is the fact that it was RTI that could move a colossal multinational company which flexes its muscles in countries like India based on money power. RTI can even drive away such a powerful business enterprise!

PART A : Decision of the CIC

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Public Authority u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act: Public-Private Partnership
A very important order is made by CIC, Shailesh Gandhi on above subject i.e. bodies under publicprivate partnership (PPP).

The applicant had sought information from the Public Health Foundation of India, New Delhi (PHFI). While PHFI provided all the information sought, it stated that it is not a ‘public authority’ as defined under the RTI Act and it is a completely autonomous institution.

The applicant wanted the Commission to rule on this point, i.e., whether PHFI, (a PPP body) is covered under the RTI Act or not.

The Commission noted as under: “From a plain reading of the section 2(h), it appears that PHFI is not covered under clauses (a), (b), (c) & (d)(ii) of section 2(h) of the RTI Act. Therefore, the issue which remains to be determined is whether PHFI gets covered under clause (d)(i) of section 2(h) or not. The said clause reads: body owned, controlled or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.”

It appears that PHFI is not ‘owned’ by the appropriate Government. As regards being ‘controlled’ by the appropriate Government, the said term has not been defined under the RTI Act. There are various forms in which the Government exercises control over an entity, which is relevant in determining whether the latter is a public authority. On perusal of the information about PHFI’s governing board, the Commission noted that amongst its 30 Board members are:

1. Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of India;

2. P. K. Pradhan, Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India;

3. Vishwa Mohan Katoch, Secretary, Department of Health Research, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research;

4. T. K. A. Nair, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of India; and

5. Dr. R. K. Srivastava, Director General Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India.

Thus, at least one-sixth of the members of the governing board of PHFI consist of senior public servants. At the hearing held on 24-1-2012, the respondent claimed that most of the Government officials on the board of PHFI were occupying such positions in ‘private capacity’.

This Bench is of the view that such a claim is untenable. It is difficult to assume that senior public servants can be on the board of an organisation like PHFI — which has numerous interactions with the Government, in private capacity. In fact, this would necessarily imply a conflict of interest. The Commission can only assume that such public servants must necessarily be acting on behalf of the Government — when they are required to take executive decisions as members of the board in a public-private partnership (PPP) such as PHFI. Any other conclusion would be an improper slur on their integrity. It is not possible that India’s leading public servants could be acting in any manner, but as representatives of the Government when they are on the board of PHFI. It is also true that significant funding is provided by the Government to PHFI. Hence, it is presumed that the five officials on the board of PHFI are discharging their duties as public servants.

The RTI Act does not specify ‘complete control’ in section 2(h). As per P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, ‘The Law Lexicon’ (2nd Ed., Reprint 2007 at p. 410), the term ‘control’ means — ‘power to check or restrain; superintendence; management . . . . . . .”. It appears that the presence of senior Government servants on the board may check or ensure that decisions taken in PHFI are in consonance with the Government’s avowed objectives. Therefore, the presence of a fair degree of Government control on the decisions of PHFI cannot be ruled out. It follows that PHFI is ‘controlled’ by the appropriate Government. This may not be complete control, but five top public servants would exercise some degree of control, which would be significant.

The respondent had doing the hearing also admitted receiving Rs.65 crore from the Government. In this regard, reliance may also be placed on the complainant’s contention that in the 20th Report of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare submitted to the Rajya Sabha (2007), it was noted that “The Government of India is contributing Rs.65 crore, approximately one-third of the initial seed capital required for kickstarting the PHFI and for establishment of two Schools of Public Health. The remaining amount (approximately Rs.135 crore) is being raised from outside the Government, namely, Melinda & Bill Gates Foundation (Rs.65 crore) and from high net-worth individuals. PHFI is managed by an independent governing board that includes 3 members from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare viz. Secretary (H&FW); DG ICMR and DGHS. T. K. A. Nair, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister, Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia, Vice-Chairman, Planning Commission; Sujata Rao, AS&PD, NACO, Ministry of Health; Dr. Mashelkar, DG CSIR are also members of the governing board. The presence of the officials from Government would ensure that the decisions taken in PHFI are in consonance with the objectives for which PHFI has been supported by Government of India. It is expected that all members of the Governing Board would ensure the functioning of the Foundation as a professional organisation and with complete transparency.” (emphasis added). Thus, the Parliamentary Standing Committee also assumed that the Vice- Chairman of the Planning Commission, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and other public servants were ensuring that decisions of PHFI were in consonance with the Government’s objectives and complete transparency. PHFI’s refusal to accept it is coverage by the RTI Act seems at variance with this.

Further, though the term ‘financed’ is qualified by ‘substantial’, section 2(h) of the RTI Act does not lay down what actually constitutes ‘substantial financing’. It is akin to ‘material’ or ‘important’ or ‘of considerable value’ and would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The funding sources of PHFI are foundations, private donors and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India (MH&FW). At the hearing held on 24-1-2012, the respondent stated that PHFI was set up in 2006 with an initial fund corpus of Rs.200 crore (at present Rs.219 crore), out of which Rs.65 crore were provided as grant by MH&FW. It follows that Government funding in PHFI is to the tune of 30%, which cannot be considered as insubstantial. Moreover, even if taken on absolute terms, a grant of Rs.65 crore given by the Government from its corpus of public funds cannot be considered as insignificant and would render PHFI as being ‘substantially financed’ by funds from the Government.

Citizens have a right to know about the manner, extent and purpose for which public funds are being deployed by the Government. Having said so, not every financing of an entity in the form of a grant by the Government would qualify as ‘substantial — but certainly a grant of over Rs.1 crore would constitute ‘substantial financing’ rendering such entity a public authority under the RTI Act.

Furthermore, the respondent also stated that PHFI is a public-private partnership. It is relevant to mention that PPPs are in the nature of legally enforceable contractual agreements between public authorities and private organisations with clearly laid out terms and conditions, and rights and obligations. PPPs, by their very nature, stipulate certain contributions by the Government such as giving land at a concessional rate, grants, mo-nopoly rights, etc. In cases such as grants, direct funding by the Government can be easily calculated. In cases such as giving monopoly rights or land at a concessional rate, etc., value(s) must be attached and the same would tantamount to indirect financing by the Government. In other words, PPPs envisage a partnership with public funds — directly or indirectly — and therefore citizens have a right to know about the same.

As a consequence of being a public-private partnership, PHFI has received a substantial grant of Rs.65 crore from the Government initially. Further, as per the complainant’s contention — PHFI has been receiving free land and handsome financial grants from state governments for setting up ‘Indian Institutes of Public Health’ (IIPHs) as part of the public-private partnership. For instance, the Andhra Pradesh Government provided PHFI with 43 acres of land in Rajendra Nagar area of Hyderabad free of cost and Rs.30 crore in financial grant for setting up IIPH. The Gujarat Government provided 50 acres in Gandhinagar and Rs.25 crore as grant. The Orissa Government provided 40 acres near Bhubaneswar and the Delhi Government spent Rs.13.82 crore on acquiring 51.19 acres of Gram Sabha land in Kanjhawala village for PHFI to set up IIPH. Hence, there appears to be substantial financing both directly and indirectly by the Government. It follows from the above that PHFI is controlled and substantially financed by the Government.

Therefore, this Commission rules that PHFI is a public authority u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act.

I may note that PHFI subsequent to the hearing, itself agreed to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the RTI Act and the Commission further noted as under:

“It may not be out of place to mention that in recent years, there has been an emergence of multitude of public-private partnerships in different sectors. As described above, PPPs envisage an arrangement between the Government and private entities with clearly laid down rights and obligations. By their very nature, PPPs stipulate certain contributions from the Government, which may be monetary as well as non-monetary — to which values can be attributed. Moreover, PPPs envisage a certain degree of Government control in their functioning so that the decisions taken are in accordance with the objectives for which the partnership was set up. Given the above, PPPs would come within the ambit of ‘public authorities’ as defined in the RTI Act, thereby enabling citizens to know/obtain information about them. At present, most PPPs do not even accept the applicability of the RTI Act to them and wait for the issue to be adjudicated upon at the Commission’s level. For this some citizen has to pursue this matter. Such practices are required to be brought to a minimum and PPPs must comply with the provisions of the
RTI Act.”

In this instance the Commission notes with some dismay that the highest levels of public servants in India did not accept the citizen’s enforceable Right to Information in PHFI, despite the Government substantially funding it and exercising some control.

This strengthens the plea by the Commission that all public-private partnership agreements must have a clause that they are substantially funded by the appropriate Government and hence accept that they are public authorities as defined in the RTI Act. Without this, even an Institution like PHFI which has a distinguished board tries to refuse the Indian citizen his enforceable fundamental right. Finally, the Commission ruled:

“PHFI is public authority u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act and directed the chairman of PHFI to appoint a Public Information Officer and a First Appellate Authority — as mandated under the RTI Act before 15 March 2012 and also ensure compliance with section 4 of the RTI Act.”

[Kishan Lal v. Director (Development & Strategy) Public Health Foundation of India, New Delhi, decision No. CIC/SG/C/2011001273/17356 complaint No. CIC/SG/C/2011/001273, decided on 14-2-2012]