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China avalanche stokes fears of global recession

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An avalanche of dollars exiting China threatens to smother all emerging markets (EMs), including India, and cause a global recession. Almost $ 600 billion have exited China in the last six months, a mammoth $100 billion per month. This would have emptied the forex reserves of almost any other country , but China still has $3.3 trillion left. However, it cannot afford a continuing outflow at this rate.

Its government placed curbs on stock markets to combat crashing values, but withdrew these when they proved ineffective. It is committed to making the yuan a reserve currency like the dollar. But this obliges it to allow capital to enter and exit reasonably freely, and hence risks further capital flight. For decades the Communist Party has firmly controlled the economy . But no more.

The Chinese avalanche has helped accelerate dollar outflows from all EMs (emerging markets). The Sensex is down from 30,000 to 24,400. The rupee has gone from Rs 62 to Rs 67.70 to the dollar. Yet India is the best EM performer: others are truly battered. Worse, the prices of oil and other commodities keep falling, a recessionary portent.

China has been slowing for two years. Pessimists like Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley have long worried that total debt in China, induced by government stimuli, has shot up from 150% of GDP to 250%. History suggests that this will end in tears. The pessimists sneer at official Chinese figures showing almost 7% growth. Using alternative indicators like electricity consumption and rail freight, they argue that true growth could be just 4-5%.

However, optimists like Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute say China is simply rebalancing its economy. Earlier, growth was driven by industrial exports and investment. But now China wants, correctly, to switch to an economy driven more by domestic consumption and services. This means slower GDP, but 6-7% growth is very respectable for an economy that in PPP terms is now the largest in the world. The optimists say indicators like rail freight and electricity may suggest slowing industry, but that is exactly what the Chinese government aims for by emphasizing services. So, the optimists say, there is no crisis, just sensible rebalancing.

Six months ago, one could take either view. But now the Chinese are voting for the pessimist’s version through capital flight. Individuals can remit $50,000 a year abroad. Some Chinese companies are investing abroad. But over half the outflow has a political explanation.

The fleeing billions are probably the ill-gotten gains of former Communist Party officials and their super-brats (often called “princelings”). They are being targeted by Communist Party chief Xi Jinping for corruption. Former security chief Zhou Yonkang and his colleagues have been arrested. Xi’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, and his two sons have been placed “under control”, suggesting they may eventually be arrested. Xi is perhaps targeting the entire top leadership of the Jiang era. The resulting political struggle could have serious economic consequences.

Meanwhile Global Economic Prospects (GEP), the World Bank report on the world economy , has flagged the risk of a coming recession. The bank is too political (all its members are governments) to actually predict a recession. So, GEP forecasts world GDP growth rising from 2.4% in 2015 to 2.9% in 2016, and says the chances of a recession are low.But it then admits that EM growth has fallen below forecast levels for years. It says that if in 2016 the EMs underperform as much as in 2010-14, and if financial panic like the “taper tantrum” of summer 2013 recurs, then global growth could collapse to just 1.8%. This will be below the 2% widely used to benchmark a global recession.

Ultra-low interest rates in advanced economies have in recent years led trillions of dollars to flow to EMs in search of higher yields. A return to normal interest rates in advanced countries could induce a huge reverse flow out of EMs. That process seems to have begun with the raising of US interest rates.

In the 2000s, China accounted for half of all incremental world demand for commodities. Its slowing has caused the global demand for -and price of -commodities to collapse. Oil is now under $30barrel, one-third of its rate in 2014. Commodity exporting economies are in dire straits.Brazil and Russia are in recession. Many Asian manufacturing economies are part of global value chains using China as an assembler, and have also been hard hit by China’s slowdown. India has been a resilient exception since it is a net commodity importer, and is not part of world value chains. But if the world falls into recession, India will be dragged down too.

(Source: Article by Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar in The Times of India dated 17-01-2016.)

A carrot and stick approach to reform bureaucracy is essential to improve governance

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A palpable reality for all Indian citizens is the extraordinary power the bureaucracy has over our lives. It is therefore essential for the bureaucracy to function effectively, and for the political executive to get it to do so. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative, Pragati, is a stab in this direction. During a recent review, he called for tough action against officials facing repeated complaints. Modi’s approach deserves support. If his government is to fulfil its promise of better governance, bureaucracy needs to do better.

Existing laws provide the political executive with the means to make bureaucrats more accountable and efficient. To illustrate, the All India Service Rules provide for compulsory retirement of substandard bureaucrats after 15 years of service. This provision rules out the pitfalls which come with a guaranteed job for life, but unless it is utilised deadwood will stay on. A government which utilises this provision can invoke the support of the judiciary. The Supreme Court concluded, as far back as 1980, that compulsory retirement “is undoubtedly in the public interest and is not passed by way of punishment”. Similarly, successive pay commissions have pointed out that performance must influence pay for bureaucrats. The Seventh Pay Commission recommended the introduction of performance related pay for all categories of government employees.

If lifetime guarantees of a job and pay make for poor incentives, so do threats of prosecution for the wrong reasons. A considerable extent of developmental activity initiated by government is carried out through the private sector. Presumably, no private firm will bid for a contract unless there is profit. In this background, the existing law to prevent corruption needs an overhaul. According to the Prevention of Corruption Act, taking a decision which benefits somebody can be deemed an act of corruption even in the absence of evidence of a quid pro quo. This is a draconian provision which deters decision making and incentivises inaction. Bureaucrats who pursue their task with sincerity are not protected from irresponsible investigations long after retirement.

Since 2013, governments have tried to amend the law by bringing it into consonance with contemporary reality. It should not be difficult to pass this amendment as Congress and BJP are on the same page. Today there are sticks for good performance and carrots for poor performance. Turn babudom around by ensuring just the reverse is the case.

(Source: Editorial in The Times of India dated 29-01-2016)

India’s SEZs need top-class facilities, not tax breaks

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India’s exports have been declining for 13 months.

To reverse the trend, the commerce ministry wants to exempt exporters in special economic zones (SEZs) from all corporate taxes, including the minimum alternative tax (MAT). This is a bad idea. It goes counter to finance minister Arun Jaitley’s welcome proposal to abolish most tax exemptions, and have a uniform low rate that does not arbitrarily favour this unit or that region.

Favouring SEZs leads to not just a big loss of tax revenue but to cronyism (several SEZ land allocations became scams), and waste (units will shift to SEZs despite big expense and loss of productivity, just to get the tax break). Many companies that would be exporting from traditional bases anyway will shift to SEZs for the tax break. SEZ exports may look big, but may not represent additional exports or policy success. They may simply represent policy failure through export diversion and revenue loss.

India has an export problem right now but not a balance of payments problem. So there’s no need for panic or emergency measures. The current account deficit is well under control at barely 1% of GDP, since imports have fallen along with exports. China’s slowdown has led to a global export slowdown. Almost all Asian countries are suffering from falling exports, and many have suffered steeper declines than India.

In such dismal global conditions, tax breaks are irrelevant for export buoyancy. We must instead raise our competitiveness through better logistics, skills and procedures. Only then will exports boom sustainably. We cannot have lousy facilities and yet become world-class exporters through tax breaks. Ideally, the whole of India should have world-class facilities. Since resources are limited, a start can be made in SEZs.

Between 1965 and 2005, India built eight tiny export processing zones, with very limited success. By contrast, China and some other countries succeeded by creating massive SEZs. Shenzen in China covers four small districts. Chinese SEZs have world-class power, water, ports and airports, and have become world-class manufacturing clusters.

India in 2006 adopted a new SEZ policy. Units in SEZs would pay no tax for five years (not even MAT), get a 50% tax break for the next five years, and a further five-year tax break for reinvested profits. SEZ developers would also get a tax holiday for 10 years.

Instead of creating massive SEZs, this policy encouraged hundreds of small SEZs in every state. These amounted to tax shelters and a grab for land rather than world-class enclaves. No less than 564 proposals for SEZs were approved, but of these only 204 are actually functioning. Mukesh Ambani’s giant SEZ in Navi Mumbai is largely vacant. Most operating SEZs are small IT establishments that are little more than tax havens.

The 2006 Act provided that the minimum size for information technology, jewellery and biotech parks should be just 10 hectares, smaller than even some schools. Size limits were kept especially low for hilly areas, where flat land is scarce. This was a classic case of making SEZs an end in themselves rather than a means to improve competitiveness. China does not create tiny SEZs in the Gobi desert or Tibetan mountains: it creates large ones in areas with the best logistics, infrastructure, financial and transport facilities.

Exports from Indian SEZs rose from $5 billion in 2005-06 to $81 billion in 2013-14. This looks very impressive. But a lot of it is simply trade diversion. Many top IT and jewellery companies shifted their operations to SEZs for the tax break. Since units outside the SEZs continued exporting at a good rate, it is unclear whether the SEZs achieved additional exports or just diverted exports.

Because of such factors, MAT and the dividend distribution tax was imposed on SEZs in 2011-12. Industries protested that this discouraged additional investment. True, but would this fresh investment have been for export diversion or export addition? The operating profit margins of software companies often exceed 20%, so they hardly need tax breaks. Old export units in areas from textiles to engineering, many having very slim operating margins, get no tax breaks. Why should they be discriminated against?

To be competitive, India needs both competitive facilities (in and outside SEZs) plus competitive tax rates with very few exemptions. India has a corporate tax rate of 30%, and with cess and surcharge this comes to 34.5%, one of the highest in Asia. Finance minister Jaitley rightly seeks to cut this to a competitive 25 %, while removing today’s myriad exemptions so that he does not lose tax revenue. This is a laudable, far-sighted reform. It should not have holes punched in it by demands for tax breaks from SEZs or other interest groups.

(Source: Article by Shri Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar in The Times of India dated 30-01-2016.)

Reinventing Indian secularism – The old consensus on majority and minority communities no longer fits reality

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Should 21st century citizens of the world’s largest democracy live in
fear of committing the medieval crime of blasphemy? This is the question
raised by the violent rampage earlier this month in West Bengal’s
Muslimmajority district of Malda, where an enraged mob ransacked a
police station, torched two dozen vehicles, and burned shops and homes.

The
mob was protesting an obscure Hindu activist’s allegedly derogatory
comments about the Prophet Muhammad a month earlier in Uttar Pradesh.
Though UP police quickly arrested the activist, Kamlesh Tiwari of the
Hindu Mahasabha, this did not stop demonstrations from erupting across
the country. At times numbering tens of thousands, protests have roiled,
among other places, Rampur, Bhopal, Purnea and Bengaluru. Many
protestors demanded the death penalty for Tiwari.

Such
bloodcurdling displays of piety belong in a theocracy, not in a
pluralistic democracy. Their scale, spread and intensity ought to
concern anyone who cares about Indian pluralism. So must the backgrounds
– engineers, software developers, corporate executives – of many of
those arrested recently for alleged links with Islamic State.

Bluntly
put, the Indian model of secularism is floundering. It needs to be
replaced by an approach that relies less on the well-worn pieties of the
past and more on the reality of the world we live in today. The answer
does not lie with Hindu extremists, who cannot distinguish between
ordinary and radicalised Muslims. It lies in an updated secularism based
on individual rights and equality before the law.

Traditional
Indian secularism implicitly rests on three assumptions that may have
made sense 60 years ago, but are hopelessly outdated today. First, that extremists from the Hindu majority pose a greater threat than those from the Muslim minority. Second, that Indian Muslims are always victims and never victimisers. Third, that only Muslims can legitimately champion legal, social and cultural reform within their community.

In
the 1950s, the heyday of the Nehruvian project, each of these
assumptions was easily defensible. At the time, only one in ten Indians
was Muslim. The secular impulse – to protect a small community in a
defensive crouch after Partition – appealed to the best instincts of a
newly independent nation. In a rapidly modernising world, the bet that
over time Muslims would discard obscurantist ideas such as blasphemy,
and would themselves demand an end to practices such as polygamy and
triple talaq divorce appeared reasonable.

Today’s reality is
starkly different. According to the Pew Research Center, today about one
in seven Indians is a Muslim. And though the vast majority of Indian
Muslims are peaceful, the hoped for march towards secularisation
–replacing attitudes rooted in religion with those rooted in reason –
has stalled. Where once a uniform civil code for all Indians was delayed
by the majority’s forbearance, today it is blocked as much by the
minority’s intransigence.

The consequences of both shifting
demographics and patchy secularisation play out every day in public
life. Often supposedly secular politics boils down to pandering to the
most fundamentalist elements of Muslim society. Think of Mamata
Banerjee’s concerted bid to woo clerics in West Bengal, or Digvijaya
Singh’s ugly insinuation that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh plotted
the 26/11terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

Meanwhile, for the first
time since Partition, an aggressive new breed of Muslimfirsters has
risen to prominence. To differing degrees, Azam Khan in Uttar Pradesh,
Badruddin Ajmal in Assam and Hyderabad’s Owaisi brothers represent this
trend. Both the panderers and the Muslimfirsters share a commitment to
defending Muslim personal law and extending special rights for the
community to new areas such as reservations in government jobs.

At
the same time, the international landscape has changed dramatically. In
the 1950s, secularists dominated the Muslim world – Sukarno in
Indonesia, Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Kemal Ataturk’s heirs in
Turkey. But over the past 40 years a fountain of Gulf petrodollars,
tenacious religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the
Cold War American policy of pitting hardline Islam against communism,
tipped the balance of ideological power towards Islamists, those
striving to impose sharia law on both the state and society.

Closer
to home, Pakistan evolved in a way few would have predicted in the
1950s when a relatively Westernised elite held sway. The journalist
Zahid Hussain estimates that the number of madrassas shot up from 137 in
1947 to more than 13,000 today. In the Pakistan army and its notorious
spy agency –Inter-Services Intelligence – India faces a foe long
committed to using jihadist terrorism to keep India off balance.

What
is to be done? For starters, India should replace the shaky pillars of
the traditional secular consensus with something sturdier.

First, this means accepting that all extremists – not only the Hindu variety – threaten pluralism. Second,
it requires recognising the complexity of inter-religious conflict.
Sometimes – such as in the awful murder of Mohammad Akhlaq in Dadri –
Muslims are indeed victims. At other times, such as in Malda or the
Srinagar valley, they are the victimisers. Third, Indian
political and intellectual elites need to start treating the reform of
ideas rooted in sharia – such as a violent response to so-called
blasphemy – as a national concern, not just a narrowly Muslim concern.

In
the end, secularism makes India stronger. To save it, India needs an
updated approach rooted not in sentimentalism but in reality.

(Source:
Article By Shri Sadanand Dhume, a resident fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, in The Times of India dated
29-01-2016.)

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52 dated February 11, 2016

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Regulatory Relaxations for Startups – Clarifications relating to Issue of Shares

This circular, with respect to facilities available to start-ups, clarifies as follows: –

1. Issue of shares without cash payment through sweat equity

Indian companies can issue sweat equity under a scheme drawn either in terms regulations issued under: –

a. The Securities Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 in respect of listed companies; or
b. The Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 notified by the Central Government under the Companies Act 2013 in respect of other companies.

2. Issue of shares against legitimate payment owed

Indian companies can issue equity shares against any other funds payable by the investee company (e.g. payments for use or acquisition of intellectual property rights, for import of goods, payment of dividends, interest payments, consultancy fees, etc.), remittance of which does not require prior permission of the Government of India or RBI under FEMA, 1999 and complies with the FDI policy and applicable tax laws.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51 dated February 11, 2016

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Regulatory relaxations for start-ups – Clarifications relating to acceptance of payments

This
circular clarifies that a start-up with an overseas subsidiary, which
has a appropriate contractual arrangement between itself, its overseas
subsidiary and the customers concerned, is permitted to: –

1. O pen foreign currency account abroad to pool the foreign exchange earnings out of the exports / sales made by it.

2.
Pool its receivables arising from the transactions with the residents
in India as well as the transactions with the non-residents abroad into
the said foreign currency account opened abroad in its name.

3.
Avail of the facility for realising the receivables of its overseas
subsidiary or making the above repatriation through Online Payment
Gateway Service Providers (OPGSPs) for value not exceeding US $ 10,000
or such limit as may be permitted by RBI from time to time.

Balances
in the said foreign currency account that are due to the Indian
start-up must be repatriated to India within a period as applicable to
realisation of export proceeds (currently nine months).

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50 dated February 11, 2016

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Compilation of R-Returns: Reporting under FETERS This circular proposes the following changes, which have to be implemented not later than April 1, 2016: –

1. Web-based data submission by AD banks
With regards to reporting under the Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting System (FETERS) the following changes will come into effect with respect to transactions that are to be reported from April1, 2016: –

a. The present email-based submission will be replaced by web-portal based data submission.
b. Nodal offices of banks will have to access the webportal https://bop.rbi.org.in with the RBI-provided login-name and password, to submit the required data.
c. Banks have to download RBI-provided validator template from this portal on their computer and perform off-line check of their FETERS data-file for error, if any, before its submission on the portal.
d. On uploading validated files, banks will get acknowledgment.
e. Banks can report addition of AD code and update AD category for incorporation in the AD-master database with RBI.
f. With the discontinuation of ENC.TXT and SCH3to6. TXT files in FETERS, the purpose codes P0105 [Export bills (in respect of goods) sent on collection – other than Nepal and Bhutan] and P0107 [Realization of NPD export bills (full value of bill to be reported) – other than Nepal and Bhutan] have become defunct and are, therefore, discontinued.

2. Revision in Form A2

Transactions relating to the Liberalized Remittance Scheme (LRS) in FETERS and On-line Return Filing System (ORFS), must now be reported under their respective FETERS purpose codes (e.g. travel, medical treatment, purchase of immovable property, studies abroad, maintenance of close relatives; etc.) instead of reporting collectively under the purpose code S0023. The revised purpose codes are as under: –

Revised Form A2 introducing a check-box for LRS transactions as well as clubbing the ‘Application cum Declaration for purchase of foreign exchange under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of USD 250,000’ is Annexed to this circular.

3. Online submission of Form A2 by the remitter

Banks offering internet banking facilities to their customers must allow online submission of Form A2 and also enable uploading/submission of documents, if and as may be necessary, to establish the permissibility of the remittances. Remittances that do not require any documentation (e.g. certain transactions under the LRS) must be put through on the basis of Form A2 alone.

To start with, remittances on the basis of online submission alone will be available for transactions with an upper limit of USD 25,000 (or its equivalent) for individuals and USD 100,000 (or its equivalent) for corporates.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49 [(1)/18(R)] dated February 4, 2016

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Notification No. FEMA. 18(R)/2015-RB dated December 29, 2015

Post Office (Postal Orders / Money Orders), 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 18/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to Post Office (Postal Orders / Money Orders).

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48 [(1)/15(R)] dated February 4, 2016

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Notification No. FEMA.15(R)/2015-RB dated December 29, 2015

Definition of “Currency”, 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 15/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to the Definition of “Currency”.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 47 [(1)/11(R)] dated February 4, 2016

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Notification No. FEMA.11(R)/2015-RB dated December 29, 2015

Foreign Exchange Management (Possession and Retention of Foreign Currency) Regulations, 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 11/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to Foreign Exchange Management (Possession and Retention of Foreign Currency) Regulations, 2000.

DIGITAL TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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Let me begin by quoting a few statistics from a recently published report of the Ministry of Human Resource Development (HRD).

Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), which is the ratio of total enrolment in Higher Education in the 18-23 years age group, as a percentage of the eligible population in that age group, has moved up to 23.5 % in 2014-15 from 21.5 % in 2012-13. For men, the ratio is 24.5 % and it is 22.7 % for women.

There were 33.3 million students enrolled in 757 universities in 2014-15, as against 32.3 million enrolled in 723 universities in 2013-14.

While the numbers can become overwhelming, it is easy to see that these statistics augur well for the country. If this trend continues, it is possible for the country to achieve the target of 30 % GER by 2020. The next target would be a GER of around 45 per cent, which is prevalent in most developed countries.

The target may be ambitious, but there are a host of issues, which need to be addressed as well – access, quality, shortage of teachers, outdated curriculum etc. In this maelstrom, will digital technology make a significant impact?

There has been a paradigm shift in the thinking process of the role of digital technology in higher education. Traditionally, it was meant to provide IT infrastructure and support all the process and routine functions. Its role has changed and it is now seen as critical for providing a digital learning experience to students.

“Student-centricity” and “delighting the student” with an amazing learning experience in the lifecycle of higher education are the new mantras of digital solutions and service providers. This fundamentally means that technology is no longer in the foreground and the centre of attention is the “learner”.

With this rapidly shifting landscape, there are three broad trends, which will make a significant impact on higher education:

1. Personalisation
2. Big Data
3. Mobility

PERSONALISATION
The traditional learning methodology was by prescription and adherence. Students were given a prescribed curriculum and had to study within the boundaries of the path laid down by the various subjects to ultimately obtain a degree.

With the use of digital resources, personalisation allows creation of custom pathways for learning. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has experimented with breaking its courses down into modules and then enabling students to reassemble the modules into a personalised educational pathway.

It is akin to creating a “playlist” in iTunes.

Before the opening of the iTunes store on April 28, 2003 the only choice for a music lover was to buy an entire CD of songs, even if the music lover wanted to listen to only one song. iTunes allows music lovers to pick and choose songs from various albums, to create a personalised playlist. Within a decade of its launch, Apple had announced that more than 25 billion songs were downloaded and by now, probably, more than 50 billion songs have been downloaded. This is a staggering number and has truly shaken up the music industry, giving consumers a unique listening experience. One of the clear indications of this churn is the recent press report suggesting that the iconic music store of Mumbai, “Rhythm House” will shut down soon.

Like a playlist, why can’t a student formulate a customised, multi-institutional pathway to a degree? Can a student do one subject from H.R. College, another from N.M. College and a third from St. Xaviers’ College? Or, can a student do one subject from Mumbai University, another from Delhi University and a third from Bengaluru University? And, eventually, can a student do multiple subjects from universities across the world?

Traditionally, the learning process and the eventual conferring of a degree happened in a single institution. But now, with all the digital possibilities, students should have the ability to aggregate and disaggregate subjects and courses. And more importantly, they should be able to control the pace of learning by accelerating or decelerating, depending on their individual requirements. When all of this coalesces, a student will have complete “personalisation” of his learning path to a degree.

BIG DATA
Big Data is large volume of data, structured and unstructured, which is difficult to process using traditional databases and software. A lot of IT investment in the corporate sector is going into Big Data computing, which reveals patterns, trends and associations.

There is an enormous amount of data, which gets generated in higher education institutions and the time is ripe to use Big Data techniques to mine this information and come up with meaningful patterns and trends.

Big Data can create customised reports for all the stakeholders in higher education – personalised assistance to students, dashboards to the teachers on the learning paths, reports to the heads of institutions and compliance charts to the regulators. The broad institutional goals and targets can be measured and analysed periodically. Importantly, analytics of a student’s learning path can enable intervention at an early stage.

Big Data can do the unthinkable – homework assignments that learn from students; courses tailored to fit individual students and textbooks that talk back. This is beyond online courses and MOOCs that are currently on offer. We are now looking at the education landscape of tomorrow, powered by Big Data.

A seminal work on the power of Big Data is a book written by Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, titled “Learning with Big Data – The Future of Education”. The authors have articulated how the ever-increasing amounts of data and its analysis will have an influence on the conduct of higher education. They have also stated how the fascinating changes are happening in measuring students’ progress and how data can be used to improve education for everyone, in real time, both online and offline.

MOBILITY
The mobile phone is now a ubiquitous device. It is with everyone and everywhere, doing multiple tasks from listening to songs to taking pictures. Talking on phone is only one of its myriad functions, and certainly not the main one.

In India, the number of mobile phone subscribers has crossed 1 billion, making it only the second country after China to have achieved this landmark. The launch of cheaper smartphones, low call rates and intense competition has accelerated the pace of growth. Interestingly, the number of smartphones has crossed 170 million and is growing at 26 per cent CAGR.

Technology, which immerses the mobile phone as its centerpiece, will become a key piece of technology in learning and teaching. Mobile technology gives unprecedented freedom to students and teachers from the constraints of the IT campus of the Institution. Now learning can happen beyond the precincts of the institution at a time and pace convenient to the learner.

There is an enormous amount of online content now available on the Internet. A teacher can make available a properly curated content to a learner and then measure and track progress. Similarly, the learner can supplement or even substitute his classroom learning, collaborate with other learners and communicate with the teacher – all of this without the constraint of time and place – on his mobile phone.

With the advent of 4G and deeper penetration of smartphones, mobile based learning is likely to make a big impact on higher education. Starting with a blended model, it will eventually keep increasing its sphere of impact and influence.

An interesting case study on the application of digital technology to higher education is the launch of the Minerva Project by Ben Nelson. Minerva Project (www. minerva.kgi.edu) is a for-profit company founded by Ben Nelson, whose goal is to provide Ivy League education at a faction of the price. The tuition fee at Minerva for an undergraduate course (called “graduate” course in India) is USD 10,000, which is a fourth of the tuition fees at Ivy League Institutions like Harvard and Columbia.

In this four-year course, the first year is at San Francisco, followed by the other years in seven cities across the world. There is no physical campus for learning. Each class has less than 20 students and lessons are delivered online in an interactive manner and are recorded. All students are visible onscreen. Professors are prohibited from droning for more than 5 minutes. Students are evaluated not only on how they participate, but also how effectively they think. There are no exams.

Ben Nelson has proclaimed, “We are building a perfect university. That’s our goal” .

Digital trends have made a huge impact on the corporate world. Sectors like banking have embraced the digital medium like a “fish takes to water”. In contrast, the education sector has been a laggard, particularly higher education. With the rapid pace of change, it is an opportune time for higher education to leapfrog its adoption and make a significant impact on the learning process and the learner.

ACCOUNTING FOR COURT SCHEMES UNDER IND-AS & ON TRANSITION DATE

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Accounting for business combinations under Indian GAAP is significantly different to that under Ind-AS. Retrospective application of Ind-AS 103 Business Combinations may be difficult and in certain cases impossible, for past business combinations. Against this background, the business combinations exemption in Ind-AS 101 First Time Adoption of Indian Accounting Standards is probably the most important exemption, as it provides a firsttime adopter of Ind-AS an exemption from restating business combinations prior to its date of transition to Ind-AS, subject to certain requirements.

A first-time adopter choosing to apply this exemption is not required to restate business combinations to comply with Ind-AS 103, if control was obtained before the transition date. A first-time adopter taking advantage of this exemption will not have to revisit past business combinations to establish fair values and amounts of goodwill under Ind-AS. However, the application of the exemption is complex, and certain adjustments to transactions under Indian GAAP may still be required.

A first-time adopter may also choose not to use the exemption and restate previous combinations in accordance with Ind-AS 103. If a first-time adopter restates any business combination prior to its date of transition to comply with Ind-AS 103, it must restate all business combinations under Ind-AS 103 which occur after the date of that combination. In simple words, a first time adopter may choose a date and restate all business combinations from that date. Business combinations before that date are not restated by using the exemption.

Using the exemption not to restate business combinations under Ind-AS 103, does not mean that the entire accounting under Indian GAAP is kosher. The exemption is only with respect to fair value accounting. Thus, if a proper asset or liability was not recognised or written off in Indian GAAP, then the same will have to be properly accounted at the transition date and on a go forward basis in the Ind AS financial statements.

On 16th February 2015, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) notified the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 laying down the roadmap for application of IFRS converged standards (Ind-AS). As per general instructions in the MCA notification, notified Ind AS’s are intended to be in conformity with the provisions of applicable laws. However, if due to subsequent amendments in the law, a particular Ind AS is found to be not in conformity with such law, the provisions of the said law will prevail and the financial statements will be prepared in conformity with such law. Therefore, as per the Framework, law shall override the provisions of Ind-AS, unless clarified otherwise.

With the above background, let us consider two simple scenarios, for an acquirer company that is in phase 1, and has a transition date of 1st April, 2015. Prior to this transition date, the acquirer has made three acquisitions of businesses. Only Acquisition 2 was under a court scheme, in which two accounting concessions were made by the court. Acquisition 2 happened in 2009; when SEBI requirement to comply with accounting standards in a court scheme was not yet legislated. Since those acquisitions were of business divisions, rather than acquisition of an investment, those were accounted in the separate financial statements of the acquirer. The two scenarios are as follows:

1. Acquirer does not wish to restate past business combinations.

2. Acquirer wants to restate business combinations starting from acquisition 1.

Commentary on Scenario 1: Acquirer does not wish to restate past business combinations There is no issue with Acquisition 1 & 3. However, the question is with respect to Acquisition 2. Can the accounting ordered by the court be retained as it is both at the transition date and on a go forward basis? View 1 Yes, the court order is supreme and therefore it will trump the requirements of Ind-AS 101 and Ind-AS 103. Thus indefinite life intangible assets will not be resurrected in Ind-AS financial statements and impairment losses will be adjusted against reserves under Ind-AS on transition date and on a go forward basis. The court order is applicable to all statutory financial statements prepared under Indian law; and would be applicable to both Indian GAAP and Ind-AS financial statements. View 2 The court scheme was applicable to Indian GAAP financial statements and hence is not relevant for the purposes of preparing Ind AS financial statements. Therefore, on transition date the company will have to recognize intangible assets under Ind AS. Further any future impairment losses will be adjusted to P&L a/c rather than directly to reserves.

Commentary on Scenario 2: Acquirer wants to restate business combinations starting from acquisition 1

View 1
The acquirer can restate Acquisitions 1, 2 & 3. Though acquisition 2 was under a court scheme it can be restated under Ind-AS. This is on basis that the court scheme applied to Indian GAAP financial statements and not Ind-AS financial statements. When Acquisition 2 is restated in accordance with Ind AS 103, the accounting concessions provided by the court will have to be disregarded.

View 2
The acquirer can restate Acquisitions 1 & 3. However, Acquisition 2 cannot be restated because it is under a court scheme, and the court mandated accounting cannot be changed. This is on the basis that the court scheme is applicable to all statutory financial statements, and it does not matter whether those are prepared under Indian GAAP or Ind-AS.

View 3
The acquirer cannot restate acquisition 2, because it is under a court scheme. As a result, restating of Scquisition 1 is also tainted. This is because under Ind AS 101, if a first-time adopter restates any business combination prior to its date of transition to comply with Ind-AS 103, it must restate all business combinations under Ind-AS 103 which occur after the date of that combination. Therefore the acquirer can only restate acquisition 3. Acquisition 1 & 2, along with the court concession on the accounting will have to be retained under Ind AS.

Conclusion
The author believes that the current drafting of Ind AS and the MCA circular, provides a flexibility in the views that can be taken. However, the ICAI along with MCA may provide a more clear guidance and way forward on this major dilemma.

TS-724-ITAT-2015(DEL) ITO vs. Santur Developers P. Ltd. A.Y.: 2006-07, Date of Order: 24.07.2015

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Article 26(4) of India USA DTAA – In absence of similar provision for withholding taxes on payment to a resident Taxpayer on sale of land, there is no requirement to withhold taxes on sale consideration paid to Non-resident (NR) pursuant to non-discrimination Article of India- USA DTAA .

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian company, entered into an agreement to purchase a piece of land jointly owned by three parties. One of the co-owner of the land was a citizen of USA and a NR in India. The agreement was executed by an Indian resident who was holding the general power of attorney for the other owners.

The sale consideration was paid to the Indian resident constituted attorney in Indian rupees. The Taxpayer did not withhold taxes on such payment. The Tax authorities contended that the Taxpayer was required to withhold taxes u/s. 195 of the Act and hence, levied penalty for failure to withhold taxes.

The Taxpayer contended that since the agreement as well as payment was made to a resident in India, provision of section 195 of the Act did not apply. Further, section 195 applies only to remittance made in foreign currency, whereas in the present case since payment was made in Indian currency, tax was not required to be withheld under Act. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it was contended that in absence of any provision relating to withholding of taxes where sale proceeds of an immovable property are paid to a resident person, there should not be any withholding requirement on payments to NRs applying the non-discrimination clause of India-USA DTAA

Held
The Tribunal did not rule on the applicability of section 195 as it was not contested before it.

In absence of a provision requiring Taxpayer to withhold tax on payment of sale proceeds to a resident, pursuant to non-discrimination article of the DTAA, Taxpayer was not required to withhold taxes on payment made to NRs.

TS-28-ITAT-2016(DEL) ACIT vs. NEC HCL System Technologies Ltd. A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 22nd January, 2016

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Section 9(1)(vii) of Act – Outsourcing fees paid by Japanese branch office of an Indian company to a non-resident (NR) and used for business development activities outside India, cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in India

Facts
The Taxpayer is a joint venture between an Indian Company (Indian JV Partner) and a Japanese Company (Japan JV Partner). The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of providing offshore software engineering services and solutions to F Co and its group companies.

The Taxpayer set up a branch office in Japan (Japan BO). The Japan BO was engaged in undertaking extensive sales and marketing activities in addition to bidding for projects and obtaining work from the customers from Japan and outside Japan (business development activities).

The Taxpayer entered into a framework agreement with Indian JV Partner and its group entity in Japan. The framework agreement was to facilitate sub-contract of software development work by Japan BO if the same could not be serviced by the taxpayer or Japan BO. During the relevant financial year, Japan BO paid certain outsourcing fee to another Japanese Company, which was group entity of Indian JV partner, without withholding taxes thereon.

The Tax authority contended that Japan BO was merely an extension of The Taxpayer and the outsourcing was undertaken by Taxpayer from India. Thus, outsourcing fee paid to Japanese Company is deemed to accrue or arise in India and the payment is therefore taxable in India. Hence, it is liable to tax withholding. Consequently, tax authority disallowed such payments made to Japanese Company in the hands of the Taxpayer for failure to withhold taxes on outsourcing fee.

The Taxpayer contended that Japan BO has an independent existence and carries on independent business in Japan. Thus, the outsourcing services are utilised by Japan BO in business carried on in Japan. Therefore, fee for such services cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s. 9(1)(vii)(c) and hence, no withholding is to be done on the payment of outsourcing fees.

Held
Taxpayer has a BO in Japan which carries on business outside India. Therefore, Japan BO creates a permanent establishment (PE) of the Taxpayer in Japan.

Japan BO had five employees as sales manager for carrying out sales and marketing activities and two managers for general administrative affairs of the company who possessed the technical skills required to understand the requirements of the projects. From the details provided about the employees in Japan and their job profile, it was clear that such employees were engaged in business development activities of Japan BO in Japan. Some of the projects obtained by Japan BO were outsourced by Japan BO as per its own business needs.

Merely because the financial statement of Japan BO is incorporated in the financial statements of the Taxpayer, the same does not conclude that the expenses are borne by the Taxpayer and not it’s Japan BO.

Payments for fee for technical services borne by the Japan BO shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India and hence was not taxable in India. Therefore, there was no liability to withhold taxes on such outsourcing fees.

TS-72-ITAT-2016(Mum) Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (IT) A.Y.: 2011-12, Date of Order:12th February, 2016

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Article 13 of India Mauritius DTAA – Buyback transaction cannot be treated as colorable device for avoidance of tax – Buyback results in capital gain and is exempt from taxes in India under Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA .

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian resident company, is a whollyowned subsidiary of a Mauritian company (FCo). The Taxpayer undertook a buyback on account of which shares were bought back at a value higher than its face value.

The Tax Authority contended that the buyback transaction was a colorable transaction to avoid payment of dividend distribution tax (DDT). Therefore, Tax authority regarded such buyback as capital reduction and considered the excess payment over face value of shares as distribution of accumulated profits to shareholders i.e., F Co. It was further held that, since the Taxpayer had not paid DDT, dividend received by FCo would not be eligible for exemption under the Act. Accordingly, Taxpayer was held liable to withhold taxes at the rate of 5% on gross payment to FCo under Article 10 of the DTAA. Since the Taxpayer had failed to withhold taxes, the Taxpayer was held to be an assessee in default and interest was also levied for such failure apart from recovery of tax.

The Taxpayer however contended that the amount remitted under the buyback transaction was in the nature of capital gains which was exempt from taxation in India under India-Mauritius DTAA. Accordingly, neither any tax was deductible nor was there any default in withholding of tax.

Held
Buyback of shares cannot be equated with capital reduction as they are two entirely different concepts as discussed and held in the Bombay High Court (HC) decision of Capgemini India Pvt. Ltd. (Company Scheme Petition No. 434 of 2014).

CBDT Circular No. 779 dated 14th September 1999 specifically states that shareholders would not be subjected to dividend tax but taxed under capital gains provisions upon buy back of shares.

It is true that buyback transactions are subject to Income distribution tax pursuant to amendment by the Finance Act 2013. However, as the transaction under consideration pertained to a period prior to this amendment, there is no ambiguity that those provisions will not apply for buyback under consideration. Hence, the said transaction could not be regarded as deemed dividend but should be subjected to tax as capital gains.

Since Article 13 of the DTAA specifically exempts such transaction from tax in India, the Taxpayer is not liable to withhold tax under the Act. Even if the payment was considered as dividend, the requirement to pay DDT would make the payment exempt in the hands of the shareholder. Accordingly, withholding tax provisions should not apply.

By placing reliance on the observations of the Bombay HC ruling of Capgemini (supra), the Tribunal ruled that if the Taxpayer entered into a transaction which did not violate any provision of the Act, the transaction cannot be termed as a colorable device just because it results in non-payment or lesser payment of taxes in that particular year. The whole exercise should not lead to tax evasion. Non-payment of taxes by an assessee in given circumstances could be a moral or ethical issue.

2016 (41) STR 183 (Chattisgarh) CCE & C., Raipur vs. General Manager, Telecom District, BSNL

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If both the parties have preferred appeal, the Tribunal should pass a reasoned and speaking order and should discuss reason of acceptance of one appeal and rejection of appeal of another.

Facts
Appeal before the Tribunal was made by both i.e. the assessee and the department against the order of Commissioner. The Tribunal considered and discussed the contentions of the assessee only and no consideration or discussion was made whatsoever of the appeal filed by the department.

Held
Though both the appeals were disposed of, there was no discussion on department’s appeal while allowing the appeal of the assessee. Consequently, the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal to pass a reasoned and speaking order after hearing both the parties and without taking into consideration the earlier order passed by the Tribunal but discussing both appeals and the reasons for acceptance of one and the rejection of the other.

2016 (41) STR 11 (Bom) Quality Fabricators and Erectors vs. Dy. Dir. DGCEI, Mumbai

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Demand alleged to be due as per SCN without its adjudication cannot be recovered by issuing notice to banks and debtors

Facts

On the basis of investigation, a Show Cause Notice (SCN)was issued which was replied to by the Appellant denying the allegation. Without giving an opportunity of personal hearing and passing the adjudicating order, recovery proceeding was initiated by sending account freezing notices to banks. On initiation of said action, partial service tax was deposited and the said action was challenged before the High Court.

Held

The High Court observed that until and unless there is crystallisation of demand by proper adjudication, recovery action cannot be initiated when all allegations were denied in the reply filed. Accordingly, the recovery notices were set aside.

2016(41) STR 3 (All) Kunj Power Project Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India.

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The action of attaching bank accounts without giving opportunity of hearing is gross violation of prescribed rules and such order is required to be quashed

Facts
The Appellant engaged in fabrication, erection and installation of power sub-stations availed CENVAT credit for discharging service tax. The Respondent during an enquiry gave an oral direction to reverse the credit which was not adhered to. Therefore, a Show Cause Notice was issued. Before submission of the reply, bank accounts were attached and this action is challenged before the High Court.

Held
The High Court observed that while proceeding for attachment of property, procedure specified in Service Tax (Provisional Attachment of Property) Rules, 2008 and C.B.E. & C. Circular No. 103/6/2008-S.T. dated 01/07/2008 should be followed. It was further noted that as per Rule 3(2) of the said Rules, prior notice is required to be given specifying the reasons for initiation of action of attachment and details of property to be attached and opportunity for hearing is required to be provided within 15 days from service of notice. Since the Respondent has failed to issue such notice and grant an opportunity of hearing before attaching the accounts and also no cogent reasons were provided justifying the said action, the order attaching bank accounts was quashed and cost of Rs.25,000/- was ordered to be paid to Appellant.

2016 (41) STR 168 (Mad) CCE, Chennai- III vs. Visteon Powertrain Control Systems (P) Ltd.

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CENVAT credit of outdoor catering services, cost of which is borne by the assessee, shall be allowed for the period upto 31st March, 2011.

Facts
CENVAT credit was availed on outdoor catering services provided in the factory premises to its employees during the period prior to 1st April, 2011. The department contended that the service could not be treated as “input service” as it was neither used in or in relation to manufacture or clearance of final product nor is an activity relating to business. Adjudicating authority allowed CENVAT credit considering the services to be in relation to manufacture. Following Larger Bench decision in GTC Industries Ltd. 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB), the Tribunal in the department’s appeal allowed CENVAT credit considering the services to be relating to business. In some cases, the Tribunal relied upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. vs. CCE 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC) and disallowed CENVAT credit. The department argued that Notification No. 3/2011-ST dated 1st March, 2011 has substituted the definition of input service and therefore, should be applied retrospectively and therefore outdoor catering services were excluded from the definition of “input service” even for the period prior to such substitution. Relying upon Bombay High Court’s decision in Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (260) ELT 369 (Bom), the Appellants pleaded that CENVAT credit be allowed on the ground of mandatory statutory requirement to provide canteen facility to employees. It was also argued that the effective date of notification was 1st April, 2011 only and therefore, for prior period, CENVAT credit should be available.

Held
All contentions raised by the revenue have been elaborately considered by the Bombay High Court in case of Ultratech Cement Ltd. (supra), including Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. (supra), wherein CENVAT credit was allowed except in case the cost of food is borne by the employee. Further the plea of retrospective application of exclusion to definition of “input service” was rejected on account of amendment clearly specifying the date of its enforcement to be 1st April, 2011. Thus, relying on the aforesaid decisions CENVAT credit on outdoor catering services prior to 1st April, 2011 was allowed.

Inter-State Transfer for Job work vis-à-vis Requirement of ‘F’ forms

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Introduction
Section 6A of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act) requires that, if there is any inter-state transfer to branch or agent or principal, as the case may be, then ‘F’ form is required to be obtained from transferee. If such form is not obtained, it will be deemed to be inter-state sale for all purposes of CST Act.

Section 6A refers to inter-state branch transfer or to agent/ principal (collectively referred to as ‘branch transfer’). However, in addition to branch transfer of stock, there is also inter-state branch transfer for job work. Like, a dealer in Gujarat may send his goods for processing to its job worker in Maharashtra. Job worker will complete the processing and send processed goods to its employer i.e. the dealer who had sent him goods for process.

In this case, there are two transfers, one from Gujarat to Maharashtra and again from Maharashtra to Gujarat.

Difference between Branch Transfer and Job Work Transfer
The stark difference between branch transfer and job work transfer is that the branch transfer is to oneself. However, in case of job work transfer the transfer is to independent job worker. The relationship is of principal to principal and job worker charges its own processing charges for the same. In other words, the relationship in job work transactions is like seller and buyer. If any goods are involved in the process, which gets transferred to principal then job worker may be liable to discharge works contract liability on such processing charges.

Though ‘F’ form is required for inter-state branch transfers, it was not contemplated in relation to job work transfer. In fact the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State has issued circular bearing no.16T of 2007 dated 20.2.2007 explaining the above position and stating that F forms not required for job work transfers.

Judgment of Hon. Allahabad High Court in case of Ambica Steel Ltd . (12 VST 216)(All).
The requirement of obtaining of F forms again came in light when the Hon. Allahabad High Court had an occasion to decide a similar issue. In that case, the dealer challenged the requirement of ‘F’ forms for job work transfer.

The Hon. Allahabad High Court ruled that F forms are necessary for job work transfer and also upheld validity of the requirement.

The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, again issued circular bearing no.5T of 2009 dated 29.1.2009 reiterating its earlier view that inspite of above judgment of the Hon. Allahabad High Court, legally F forms are not required for job work transfer.

However, M/s. Ambica Steel Ltd. went to the Supreme Court against the Allahabad High Court judgment. In the Supreme Court, the dealer did not contest the legality of requirement of F forms as per section 6A but got case remanded back on premises that it will be producing forms before assessing authority.

The Hon. Supreme Court accordingly disposed of the matter vide judgment reported in case of Ambica Steel Ltd. (24 VST 356)(SC).

Based on the above Supreme Court judgment, the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, again issued circular bearing no.2T of 2010 dated 11.1.2010 withdrawing earlier circulars and advising for obtaining ‘F’ forms for job work transfers also. One more circular bearing no.12T of 2010 dated 22.3.2010 was issued stating that the withdrawal is prospective i.e. from 11.1.2010.

Based on the above circulars, the sales tax authorities have started levying tax under CST Act when F forms are not available for inter-state job work transfers.

The Bombay High Court on the above issue
Based on one such assessment order, the issue was contested before the Hon. Bombay High Court in case of Johnson Matthey Chemicals India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (W.P.No.7400 of 2015 along with W.P.No.7934 of 2015). The said writ petition was decided vide judgment dated 16.2.2016.

The facts in case of this writ petition are narrated by the High Court as under:

“4) The Petitioner holds a registration number as set out in para 4 of the Petition. It is claimed that the Petitioner is manufacturer and job worker, engaged in the manufacture of different grades of support catalyst, including activated charcoal support. It is stated that this is predominantly a process resulting in the production of recharged catalyst from spent catalyst. It is stated that the Petition relates to job work transactions. The Petitioner receives a specified quantity of spent catalyst from its customers from within as well as outside the state of Maharashtra. The Petitioner undertakes job work of converting the spent catalyst received from the customers into support catalyst and sends back the recharged support catalyst to such customers.”

The basic arguments of the petitioner were as under:
i) The intention of insertion of section 6A was to refer to branch transfers, as there were chances of evasion.
ii) Only branch transfers are covered by Section 6A as clear from language used in section 6A.
iii) No provision in Act/Rules to obtain ‘F’ forms where transactions are between principal to principal.
iv) Section 6A(1) will operate when there is actual interstate sale and failure to bring F form, and not otherwise.
v) Section 6A will aid section 6 to levy tax on otherwise completed inter-state sale, but not otherwise.

The Respondents argued that section 6A applies to all non sale inter- state movements and it is merely rule of evidence.

Having noted arguments from both sides, the Hon. Bombay High Court has concurred with the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in case of Ambica Steel Ltd. (12 VST 216)(All). The observations of the Hon. Bombay High Court are as under:

“46) We do not think that there is any ambiguity in the legal position. Further, we do not see anything ambiguous or vague in the circular issued by the State of Maharashtra after this judgment in the case of Ambica Steels Limited (supra) by both, the Allahabad High Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. We are of the firm view that furnishing and scrutiny/verification of the declaration in that form is a requirement in law and if that is fulfilled, the burden on the dealer is taken to be discharged. If that declaration is not furnished, then, the consequences follow. The goods might have been dispatched for job work and not as and by way of sale, but that is the plea or case of the dealer. If that is the case and the burden is on him to prove it, then, he has to obtain the declaration. If the declaration is not being issued by some States in the form prescribed, namely form ‘F’ and the dealer made all the efforts to obtain it but failure to produce it is not his fault, then, he may, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India clarifies, request the Assessing Officer to take that circumstance into consideration. If that request is made, the Assessing Officer can, depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, pass such orders as are permissible in law. Therefore, we do not agree that the circular of 2010 misinterprets the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. It neither misreads nor misinterprets the judgment of the Allahabad High Court.

Throughout ,the understanding is that the burden is on the dealer and he has to discharge it in the manner prescribed in law. If the burden has to be discharged in the manner set out, then, no other mode or manner is permissible. Therefore, all that the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarifies is that if some States are not issuing ‘F’ form, then, that approach of a particular State should be brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer in the dealer’s State. That the Assessing Officer should be convinced that the dealer made all efforts, but for no fault of his, he could not obtain the ‘F’ form. Thereupon and pursuant to the liberty given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the dealer raising the plea, the Assessing Officer, while taking note of it, would consider the peculiar facts and circumstances and may pass requisite orders.

Even that is not the rule but an exception. The requirement is not displaced necessarily and as urged. We do not, therefore, see any merit in the contentions of Mr. Sridharan and while challenging the circular of 2010.” (underlining ours)

TRANSFER OF USE OF INTANGIBLES: IS RIGHT TO USE ALWAYS TRANSFERRED?

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Introduction:
Intangible or incorporeal rights such as patents, trademarks, computer software etc. are characterised as goods. It was observed in Vikas Sales vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (1996) 102 STC 106 (SC) that since incorporeal rights are capable of transfer and transmission they are movable property and therefore included in the ambit of goods. In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Duke & sons Pvt. Ltd. (1999) 112 STC 370 (Bom), upholding applicability of sales tax, the Court held, “the manner of transfer of the right to use the goods to the transferee would depend upon the nature of the goods…… For transferring the right to use the trademark it is not necessary to handover the trademark to the transferee or give control and possession of trademark to him, it can be done merely by authorizing the transferee to use the same in the manner required by the law as has been done in the present case. The right to use the trademark can be transferred simultaneously to any number of persons” Also in SPS Jayam & Co. vs. Registrar, Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal & Others (2004) 137 STC 117, it was held that trademark is intangible goods which is subject matter of transfer. Giving permission to use trademark for a particular period while also retaining this right to use such trademark for self-use or to be able to grant license to some other person simultaneously is only a transfer of right to use and not merely a right to enjoy. It was observed that simply by retaining the right for oneself to use the trademark while granting permission to others to use the trademark, it would not take away the character of the transaction as one of transfer of right to use. This view was also echoed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT that levy of tax under Article 366-(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India is not on the use of goods but on the transfer of right to use goods which accrues only on account of transfer of such right. Transfer of Right is sine qua non for the right to use any goods and such transfer takes place when a contract is executed under which the right is vested in the lessee. G.S. Lamba (supra) however involved providing tangible goods on hire.

Nevertheless, considering a significant tax potential in the transactions involving intangible goods, the Central Government incorporated section 66(55b) in the Finance Act, 1994 from September 10, 2004 in terms of which “intellectual property service” was defined as one which means a) transferring whether (permanently or otherwise) amended from 16/06/2005 as temporarily or (b) permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property right”. This category of service in its new version under the negative list based taxation in force from 01/07/2012 appears as declared service in section 66E(c) as “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property right.”

At this point, it must be noted that mutual exclusivity of VAT and service tax has been envisaged in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) by the Supreme Court. So also, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. vs. UOI & Others 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), it was held that value of service cannot be included in the sale of goods or the price of goods in the value of service. Further, in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra), a test was laid down to determine whether a transaction is for transferring right to use goods as provided below:

“Para 97
To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

(a) There must be goods available for delivery;

(b) There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

(c) The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee;

(d) For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statue – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods;

(e) Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others”. (emphasis supplied)

Thus the test of exclusivity is laid down by the Supreme Court. This criteria is followed in a large number of decisions. However, the Courts have distinguished in a few others leading to a controversy whether the transaction involves transfer of right to use and thus a deemed sale liable for sales tax/VAT tax or a service liable for service tax.

Key Rulings of the Courts: Test of Exclusivity
In the case of Nutrine confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 21Taxmann.com 555 (Andhra Pradesh), the petitioner allowed the right to use a trademark on non-exclusive basis, against payment of royalty. The dispute related to whether or not there was transfer of right to use goods. Relying on State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (2002) 126 STC 114 (SC) it was observed that ‘assignee’ was free to make use of the trademark and logo and had full control over such use. The petitioner did not in any manner regulate the use of trademark or logo by the assignee and also used trademark for its own use. These facts did not mitigate in favour of the petitioner. Distinguishing the BSNL’s case, the Court observed, “BSNL dealt with a case of mobile connections. It is not a case of transfer of trademark or logo. The contract for providing a mobile connection invariably contains a clause that the licensee shall use a mobile connection exclusively for himself/herself and nobody else would use. In the case of trademark, the same can be used by an assignee without any exclusive right. This itself does not remove the transaction under the agreement outside the purview of section 5E” and therefore liable for sales tax (VAT). (Note: Section 5E of the GST Act overrides all other provisions of the said Act when it is the case of transfer of right to use any goods). Not in line with this, a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer (2013) 35 Taxmann. com 569 (Kerala) while analysing an agreement for franchise followed the dictum of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.’s case (supra) after considering various cases including Rashtriya Ispat Nigam (supra), Duke & Sons Pvt. Ltd. (supra), SPS Jayam & Co. (supra) and even the above Nutrine’s case (supra). In this case, the assesse engaged in the business of marketing, trading etc. of gold and diamond jewelery under the brand “Malabar Gold”, received royalty under a franchise agreement containing various clauses including permitting the use of trademark. The assessee paid service tax on royalty receipts under franchise service. The VAT department considering the use of trademark as transfer of right to use trademark demanded VAT . The clauses in the franchise agreement were examined in detail by the Court. In spite of the revenue’s heavy reliance interalia on the above Nutrine’s case (supra), the facts were distinguished observing that Nutrine’s case was decided because of applicability of section 5E of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and the Court held that the test laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) squarely applied as there were no deliverables at any stage and the right was not transferred to the exclusion of the franchisor, who could transfer the same right simultaneously to others and thus the test laid down in BSNL judgment was not satisfied. The Court also distinguished two earlier decisions of Kerala High Court itself viz. Jojo Frozen Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2004) 24 VST 327 (Ker) and Kareem Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 333(Ker.) on the ground that in these cases, there was no occasion to consider either Entry 97 of LIST-I under the 7th Schedule of the Constitution or the service tax provision u/s. 65(105)(zze) of the Finance Act,1994 in respect of franchise service brought in the law from 2003, as the cases were of pre-2003 period and service tax is correctly paid as the transaction is of franchise service. Yet in another case relating to franchise viz. Vitan Departmental Stores & Industries Ltd. vs. The State of Tamilnadu 2013-TIOL-897-HC-MAD-CT, the agreement related to granting exclusive right to operate departmental store for a specified period. The High Court held that the transaction was not a mere license or mere right to enjoy but a transfer of right to use intangible goods as the right was provided to operate the store on exclusive basis. In a recent decision of Tata Sons Limited & Another vs. The State of Maharashtra 2015-TIOL-345-HC-MUMCT, the decision in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra) was distinguished observing that the controversy dealt with in this case related to telephone service and not similar to issue of trademarks and held that in relation to intangibles such as trademarks, the transfer of right to use need not be exclusive and unconditional and such transaction is capable of multiple transfers and transferor continuing to use goods such as trademarks would constitute sale exigible to the State value added tax.

Thus the question that arises is whether the test laid down by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case (supra) is required to be followed even in the case of intangible goods or whether it applies only to the transfer of right to use tangible goods and distinguishable for determination of transfer of right to use intangible goods. Consequently, the issue is whether it is simply on account of the inherent nature of the intangible goods which allows simultaneous use by multiple persons that a transaction cannot be treated as sale or simply because the service tax law now contains provisions to tax the transaction as ‘service’, the transaction is held as service and not as deemed sale. In this context, it is apposite to discuss one more decision in AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (32) STR 129 (Mad) wherein validity of provisions of section 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act,1994 (dealing with the service of temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any copyright) was examined. In this case, a service provided by producer/distributor/exhibitor was challenged on the ground that transfer of right to use the goods amounted to sale and not service. The High Court followed BSNL’s case (supra) to contend that ”the temporary transfer of copyright did not satisfy principles laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) and it is neither a sale nor a deemed sale. Service tax is a levy on “temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment” of the copyright as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. In the case of Sales Tax Act, there would be “transfer of right to use goods” whereas under the Service Tax Act what is levied is temporary transfer/ enjoyment of the goods. The pith and substance of both enactments are totally different. “Temporary Transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment of the copyright is not within the State’s exclusive power under Entry 54 of List-II.”

Conclusion:
The issue thus remaining open is whether the test of exclusivity laid down in BSNL’s case is applicable to intangibles or is the decision distinguishable for transfer of right to use intangibles. Also whether there is a difference between granting permission to use and transfer of right to use. If transfer of use necessarily involves transfer of right to use whether the goods are tangible or intangible, the levy of service tax has no place. When any of the matters reaches Supreme Court, it would have to decide these issues among others. In the interim, the Courts would have other cases to decide with new perspective to the controversy when the facts are different and therefore in spite of paying one of the two taxes, the assessee may have to face litigation initiated by the other authority.

Welcome GST VAT (GST) in the European Union (Part II)

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[This is the second and concluding part of write up on VAT in the European Union (‘EU’)]

The previous write up discussed the background of Value Added Tax (‘VAT’) regime currently in force in the European Union (EU). It briefly described inter alia the authority and scope of the tax, the internal coordination between various Member States, the value added tax principles and the mechanics of tax regime. The current write up deals with some important concepts and procedural aspects of the EU VAT .

Branch Transfer (also known as intra-community acquisitions):

Generally, a transfer of goods between branches of the same legal entity (i.e. transfer of goods from a factory to a warehouse owned by the same company within the same Member State) is not considered as a supply for VAT purposes. However, this general rule will not apply in situations where an entity transfers its own goods across borders within the EU. Such transfers are also known as intra-community supplies / acquisition. A taxable person is deemed to make an intra-community supply and an intra-community acquisition if the person transfers goods between different parts of a single legal entity located in different Member States. In such cases, the transferring entity may need to register for VAT in both i.e. the Member State of dispatch and the Member State of arrival. Member States are authorised to prescribe their own registration requirement and business entities need to refer to the relevant Member State’s requirements before transferring goods across borders.

Exceptions to the above (Transfers deemed not to be acquisitions).
It is pertinent to note that not all intra-community movements of own goods are treated as acquisitions.The following cross border transfers are not treated as intracommunity transfers:

Goods to be installed or assembled for a customer in another Member State
Goods transported to another Member State under the distance selling rules
Goods meant for export outside the EU from another Member State or dispatched to another Member State (i.e. the goods are temporarily transferred from one Member State to another and thereafter exported from the second Member State)
Goods sent to another Member State for processing (provided that the goods are returned after processing)
Goods temporarily used in another Member State for a supply of services made there
Goods used temporarily (i.e. for less than two years) in another Member State

Taxable person:
The EU VAT directive defines ‘Taxable person’ to mean any person who, independently, carries out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. Such a person may be an individual, partnership, company or other forms of business which supplies taxable goods and services in the course of business.

Economic activity conducted ‘independently’ shall exclude activities of employee and other persons from VAT in so far as they are bound to an employer by a contract of employment or by any other legal ties creating the relationship of employer and employee as regards working conditions, remuneration and the employer’s liability.

Exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purposes of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis is regarded as an economic activity. In addition to this, any person who, on an occasional basis, supplies a new means of transport, which is dispatched or transported to the customer by the vendor or the customer, or on behalf of the vendor or the customer, to a destination outside the territory of a Member State but within the territory of the Community, shall be regarded as a taxable person.

States, regional and local government authorities and other bodies governed by public law are not regarded as taxable persons in respect of the activities or transactions in which they engage as public authorities. This is so, even where they collect dues, fees, contributions or payments in connection with those activities or transactions. However, as an exception to the general rule, when State / regional / local government authorities engage in such activities or transactions, they shall be regarded as taxable persons in respect of those activities or transactions where their treatment as non-taxable persons would lead to significant distortions of competition. Annexure I appended to the EU VAT directive provides a list of activities (i.e. supply of water / electricity / gas, warehousing, organisation of public fares and trade exhibitions, etc.), in respect of which bodies governed by public law are regarded as taxable persons, provided that those activities are not carried out on such a small scale as to be negligible.

VAT rates:
The EU law only requires that the standard VAT rate must be at least 15% and the reduced rate at least 5% (for supplies of goods and services referred to in an exhaustive list). Actual rates applied for this purpose may vary between Member States and between certain types of products. There is a provision for super reduced rate also.

The most reliable source of information on current VAT rates for a specified product in a particular Member State is that country’s VAT authority. Nevertheless, it is possible to get an overview of the different rates applied from the VAT rates in the European Union information document.

Valuation:
For the purpose of levy of VAT on supply of goods or services, the taxable amount includes everything which constitutes consideration obtained or to be obtained by the supplier, in return for the supply, from the customer or a third party, including subsidies directly linked to the price of the said supply.

Inclusions:
The taxable amount shall include the following factors:

(a) taxes, duties, levies and charges, excluding the VAT itself;

(b) incidental expenses such as commission, packing, transport and insurance costs, charged by the supplier to the customer.

For the purposes of incidental expenses, Member States are allowed to regard expenses covered by a separate agreement as incidental expenses.

Exclusions:
The taxable amount shall not include the following factors:
(a) price reductions by way of discount for early payment;
(b) price discounts and rebates granted to the customer and obtained by him at the time of the supply;
(c) amounts received by a taxable person from the customer, as repayment of expenditure incurred in the name and on behalf of the customer, and entered in his books in a suspense account.

The taxable person must furnish proof of the actual amount of the expenditure in respect of reimbursements claimed and may not deduct any VAT which may have been charged.

Packing material:
As regards the costs of returnable packing material, Member States may take one of the followings:
(a) exclude them from the taxable amount and take the measures necessary to ensure that this amount is adjusted if the packing material is not returned;
(b) include them in the taxable amount and take the measures necessary to ensure that this amount is adjusted if the packing material is in fact returned.

EXEMPTIONS:
Member States grant exemptions in respect of certain activities in the interest of public at large. A snapshot of activities which are currently exempted from EU VAT is given below:

Supply by the public postal services, of services and the supply of goods incidental thereto.

Hospital and medical care and closely related activities undertaken by bodies governed by public law.

Provision of medical care in the exercise of the medical and paramedical professions as defined by the Member State concerned.

Supply of human organs, blood and milk.

Supply of services by dental technicians in their professional capacity and the supply of dental prostheses by dentists and dental technicians.

Supply of services by independent groups of persons, who are carrying on an activity which is exempt from VAT or in relation to which they are not taxable persons, for the purpose of rendering their members the services directly necessary for the exercise of that activity, where those groups merely claim from their members exact reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses, provided that such exemption is not likely to cause distortion of competition

Supply of services and of goods closely linked to welfare and social security work, including those supplied by old people’s homes, by bodies governed by public law or by other bodies recognised by the Member State concerned as being devoted to social wellbeing.

Supply of services and of goods closely linked to the protection of children and young persons, by bodies governed by public law or by other organisations recognised by the Member State concerned as being devoted to social wellbeing.

Provision of children’s or young people’s education, school or university education, vocational training or retraining, including the supply of services and of goods closely related thereto, by bodies governed by public law having such as their aim or by other organisations recognised by the Member State concerned as having similar objects.

Tuition given privately by teachers covering school or university education.

Supply of staff by religious or philosophical institutions with a view to spiritual welfare.

Supply of services, and the supply of goods closely linked thereto, to their members in their common interest in return for a subscription fixed in accordance with their rules by non-profit-making organisations with aims of a political, trade union, religious, patriotic, philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature, provided that this exemption is not likely to cause distortion of competition.

Supply of certain services closely linked to sport or physical education by non-profit-making organisations to persons taking part in sport or physical education.

Supply of certain cultural services and the supply of goods closely linked thereto, by bodies governed by public law or by other cultural bodies recognised by the Member State concerned.

Supply of services and goods, by organisations whose activities are exempt in connection with fund-raising events organised exclusively for their own benefit, provided that exemption is not likely to cause distortion of competition.

Supply of transport services for sick or injured persons in vehicles specially designed for the purpose, by duly authorised bodies.

Activities, other than those of a commercial nature, carried out by public radio and television bodies.

Certain financial services / transactions such as insurance / reinsurance transactions and related broking services, granting and negotiation of credit, negotiating of or dealings in credit guarantees and management of credit guarantees, acceptance of deposit / current accounts, banking transactions: payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable instruments, but excluding debt collection, transactions in money, etc.

Invoicing:
Taxable persons doing business in the EU are subject to a single set of basic EU-wide invoicing rules1 , and in certain areas, national rules set by the individual EU country. Businesses are free to issue electronic invoices subject to acceptance by the recipient. National tax authorities cannot require businesses to provide any notification or to receive authorisation. However, e-invoicing will become obligatory in public procurement. Businesses can outsource invoicing operations to a third party or to the customer (i.e. self-billing), in some circumstances.

Businesses are generally free to store invoices where and how they like (paper/electronic, in a different EU country to where they are based, etc.).

An ‘invoice’ is required for VAT purposes, under EU rules, in case of business-to-business (B2B) supplies and certain business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. In some cases, there are specific national rules on transactions which require businesses to issue an ‘invoice’.

Apart from the usual Information required in an Invoice such as date of invoice, serial number, customer’s VAT identification number, supplier’s and customer’s full name and address, description of quantity & type of goods supplied or type & extent of services rendered, VAT rate applied, VAT amount payable, breakup of VAT amount payable by VAT rate or exemption unit price of goods or services – exclusive of tax, discounts or rebates (unless included in the unit price), some extra information is also required in some cases. Specific instance of the same are as follows:

Exempt transactions – a reference to the appropriate (EU or national) legislation exempting it, or any other reference indicating it is exempt (at the choice of the supplier).

Customer liable for the tax (i.e. under the reversecharge procedure) – the words ‘Reverse charge’.

Intra-EU supply of a new means of transport – the details specified in Article 2(2)(b) of the VAT Directive (e.g. for a car, its age and mileage).

Applicability of margin scheme – a reference to the particular scheme involved (e.g. ‘Margin scheme — travel agents’).

Self-billing (customer issues invoice instead of supplier) – the words ‘Self-billing’.

Person liable for tax is a tax representative – their VAT identification number, full name and address.

Supplier is operating a cash-accounting system – the words ‘Cash accounting’.

Once an invoice includes all the required information (depending on the case, and the EU country), it serves as sufficient proof to allow a right to deduct VAT in whichever EU country the person is concerned. No EU country will prevent this by requiring any extra information, prior confirmation, etc.

EU filings:

Intrastat
Intrastat is a system for reporting intra-community transactions made by taxable persons. This system was first introduced on 1st January 1993 with a view to allow the collection of statistical information on intra-community trade in the absence of customs controls at the borders. EU businesses are required to submit information on a periodic basis to the VAT authorities if they make either intra-community supplies or acquisitions of goods in excess of specified limits.

Taxable persons making intra-community supplies are also required to submit EU Sales Lists (ESLs) to the VAT authorities on a quarterly basis. Failure to comply (delays, errors or omissions) can lead to penal consequences. Effective from 1st January 2010, a new requirement has been introduced whereby businesses are also obligated to file Intrastat returns for cross-border services provided to business customers in other EU Member States.

VAT returns:
Currently, all business registered for EU VAT purposes are obligated to file VAT returns as per their respective counties requirements i.e. National VAT returns. As a result, business intra- community supply / acquisition are required to file VAT returns in more than one jurisdiction (in different forms and with varying reporting requirements) and leads to an extra administrative burden on the business. A proposal has been moved by the European Commission (on 23rd October 2013) whereby all business within the EU will be required to file a standard VAT return. The standard VAT return, which will replace national VAT returns, will ensure that businesses are asked for the same basic information, within the same deadlines, across the EU.

The purpose of the standard VAT return is to reduce administrative burdens for businesses, ease of tax compliance and make tax compliances across the EU more efficient. The proposal also envisages a simplified and uniform set of information that businesses will have to provide to tax authorities when filing their VAT returns, regardless of the Member State of submission. The Commission envisages that once the proposed directive is adopted by the Council, after consultation with the European Parliament, it will enter into force on 1st January 2017.

Parting words:
Undoubtedly, the EU VAT legislation is unique in many ways when compared to the VAT legislations of other countries. Success of the EU VAT regime rests largely on the effectiveness of the European Commission and co-operation of the Member States. They are indeed a fine example to emulate (various countries, having diverse political and economic interest, coming together and administering the tax laws with such a smooth and satisfactory procedure).

Our country, which has borrowed several concepts from the EU VAT legislation while designing the ‘place of supply rules’ and the ‘point of taxation rules’, etc., can also take some inspiration from the Member States and their spirit of co-operation and trust while designing Indian Goods and Services Tax system.

Mangal Keshav Securities Limited vs. ACIT ITAT “B” Bench, Mumbai Before Joginder Singh (J. M.) and Ashwani Taneja (A. M.) ITA No.: 8047/Mum/2010 A.Y.:2006-07, Date of Order:29th September, 2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Nishan Thakkar & Prasant J. Thacker / J. K. Garg

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Explanation to Section 37(1) – Fines, penalties paid for procedural non-compliances to regulatory authorities are compensatory in nature hence allowable as business expenditure.

Facts
The assessee is a closely held company engaged in the business of share/stock broking and is a member of BSE, NSE and is a DP for CDSL & NSDL and Mutual Fund Distribution.

During the course of assessment proceedings, it was noted by the AO from the Tax Audit Report that the assessee had paid penalty/fine levied by the Stock Exchange amounting to Rs.9.08 lakh. According to the assessee the fines, penalty etc. were paid for some procedural non-compliances, inadvertently done by the assessee and it had neither undertaken any activities which were in ‘violation’ or ‘offence’ of any law, nor has conducted any activities which were prohibited by law. But the AO was not satisfied and he disallowed the said amount by invoking Explanation to section 37. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the impugned amount was paid on account of minor procedural irregularities, in day- today working of the assessee. The assessee’s business involved substantial compliance requirements with various regulatory authorities e.g. BSE, NSE, CDSL, NSDL, & SEBI etc. According to it, in the regular course of the assessee’s business certain procedural non-compliances were not unusual, for which the assessee is required to pay some fines or penalties.

It further observed that these routine fines or penalties were “compensatory” in nature; these were not punitive. These fines were generally levied to ensure procedural compliances by the concerned authorities. Their levy depended upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and peculiarities or complexities of the situations involved. It further observed that under the income tax law, one is required to go into the real nature of the transactions and not to the nomenclature that may have been assigned by the parties. Further, relying upon the judgment of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007-08 in ITA No.121/Mum/2010 dated 04.11.2010, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Neela S. Karyakarte vs. ITO ITAT “B” Bench, Mumbai Before Joginder Singh (J. M.) and Ashwani Taneja (A. M.) ITA No.: 7548/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2005-06, Date of Order:28th August, 2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K. Shivaram / Vijay Kumar Soni

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Section 54EC: The period of six months available for making investment means six calendar months and not 180 days. Payment by cheque dates back to date of presentation & not date of encashment

Facts
The assessee sold a row house on 27.04.2004 for Rs.18,50,000/-. After indexation, the assessee earned long term capital gain of Rs.10,90,176/-. The assessee invested this capital gain in NHB Capital Gain Bonds 2006 on 31st December, 2004 and claimed exemption u/s 54EC. However, the AO found that the assessee was not eligible for exemption u/s 54EC, since the investment was not made by the assessee within six months from the date of transfer of original asset, as per requirement of section 54EC. The AO observed that the sale of row house was executed on 27.04.2004, as per the registered sale agreement, whereas the assessee has invested the amount in NHB Bonds on 31.12.2004. Thus, as per AO, it was beyond the period of six months as stipulated in section 54EC. Accordingly, it was held by the AO that benefit of deduction u/s. 54EC was not allowable to the assessee.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) who after considering all the submissions and evidences placed by the assessee held that going by the date of full and final settlement, the date of transfer would be 29th June, 2004. However, according to him, since the assessee made investment in the bonds on 31.12.2004, it fell beyond the period of six months from the date of transfer and therefore, the assessee was not eligible for deduction u/s. 54EC.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has held that the date of transfer of the original asset was 29th June, 2004 and the same is not disputed by the revenue. The Tribunal further took note of the decisions of the Special Bench of Ahmedabad in the case of Alkaben B. Patel (2014) (148 ITD 31) and the Mumbai Bench of Income Tax Tribunal in the case of M/s. Crucible Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 5994/Mum/2013 dated 25.02.2015) where the term “6 months” have been interpreted to mean 6 calendar months and not 180 days. Further, it also took note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (1954) 25 ITR 529, where it was held that the cheques not having been dishonoured but having been cashed, the payment relates back to the dates of the receipt of the cheques and as per the law the dates of payments would be the date of delivery of the cheques. As per the facts, the assessee had filed an application with National Housing Bank on 23.12.2004 along with the cheque of even date. Thus, it was held that the assessee had clearly made investment within the period of 180 days also. Thus, the Tribunal held that viewed from any angle it can be safely said that the assessee has made investment within the period of six months. In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

2016-TIOL-303-ITAT-KOL Apeejay Shipping Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 761/Kol/2013 A.Y.: 2004-05, Date of Order: 20th January, 2016

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Sections 153(2A), 153(3), 254 – If the Tribunal has set aside or cancelled the assessment, then the fresh order of assessment by the AO shall be passed within the period as prescribed u/s. 153(2A). The provisions of section 153(2A) are absolute and they impose a fetter on income-tax authorities to make a set-aside assessment after the expiry of periods mentioned in this sub-section. This is a statutory fetter which is not for the assessee to relax or waive or vice-versa. The power to make assessment lapses complete upon the expiry of the periods mentioned in the section.

Facts
The assessee company filed its return of income for assessment year 2004-05 on 29.10.2004. The original assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act was completed by the AO on 15.12.2006 rejecting the claim of the assessee u/s 33AC of the Act on the ground that the assessee had not specified the amount transferred to reserve in the P & L Account for the relevant year.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the claim of the assessee vide his order dated 29.8.2007.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide its order dated 25.7.2008 set aside the issue and restored the matter back to the file of the AO to decide the same afresh.

The AO while giving appeal effect, framed assessment u/s. 254/143(3) and also u/s. 263/143(3) vide order dated 8.12.2011 and disallowed the deduction u/s. 33AC of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it contended that the order dated 8.12.2011, passed by the AO, was beyond the period of limitation. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal noted that it had vide its order dated 25.7.2008 set aside the appeal and restored the matter back to the file of the AO to decide the matter afresh. It also noted that the order dated 8.12.2011 passed to give effect to the order of the Tribunal read as under:

“In pursuance of the Hon’ble ITAT, `A’ bench, Kolkata’s order in ITA No. 98/Kol/2008 dated 28.7.2008, a notice u/s. 142(1) was issued to the assessee on 16.11.2010, requiring clarification on the details of Reserves & Surplus as on 31.3.2004 …..”

The Tribunal noted the decision of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of McNally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT in CO No. 12/Kol/2011, arising out of ITA No. 98/Kol/2011 for AY 2002-03 dated 9.10.2015 on identical proposition of law.

Following the ratio of the decision of the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in the case of McNally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT (supra), the Tribunal held that no assessment is possible after the expiry of period of limitation, the provisions of section 153(2A) are absolute and they impose a fetter on income-tax authorities to make a set-aside assessment after the expiry of the periods mentioned in this sub-section. This is a statutory fetter which is not for the assessee to relax or waive or vice-versa. The power to make assessment lapses completely upon the expiry of the periods mentioned in the section. It observed that in the present case, the Tribunal had completely set aside the assessment on the abovementioned issue and directed the AO to reframe the assessment afresh. It held that the assessee’s case fell in 2nd proviso to section 153(2A) of the Act.

The Tribunal set aside the assessment and held that the assessment made after expiry of limitation in terms of section 153(2A) of the Act is invalid.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

2016-TIOL-306-ITAT-MAD ACIT vs. Encore Coke Ltd. ITA No. 1921/Mds/2015 A. Y.:2010-11.Date of Order: 22nd January, 2016

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Sections 28, 40(a)(ia) – Prior period expenses can be allowed as a deduction in the previous year in which tax is actually deducted and remitted to the Government.

Facts
The assessee company had incurred certain expenditure in earlier years but the actual payments were made to the parties in the financial year relevant to the assessment year under consideration after deducting and remitting necessary TDS. The assessee had, in its accounts, reflected this expenditure as prior period expenditure since it had not claimed this expenditure in the earlier years when it was incurred.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed this expenditure on the ground that it was prior period expenditure.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal observed that in the present case though the expenditure related to earlier period, actually TDS was paid in the assessment year under consideration and therefore, in view of the second limb of section 40(a) (ia), since the tax was deducted and paid during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the same is allowable in the assessment year under consideration.

The Tribunal noted that the same view has been taken by the Cochin Bench in ITA No. 410/Coch/2014 dated 12.12.2014 in the case of M/s. Thermo Penpol Ltd. vs. ACIT.

Following the decision of the Cochin Bench of the Tribunal as well as considering the provisions of the Act, the Tribunal dismissed the ground of appeal filed by the Revenue.
The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

TDS – Sections 194C and 194J

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i) Supply of material under turn key project – Section 194C would not apply in respect of payment made against the supply of materials included in composite contracts for executing turn key projects
ii) Bill management services are not professional or technical services – It is a service contract – Section 194C will apply and not 194J

CIT vs. Executive Engineer, O&M Division(GESCOM); 282 CTR 138 (Karn):

The following two questions were raised by the Revenue in the appeal filed before the Karnataka High Court:

“i) Whether the provisions of section 194C would be attracted on the payments made against the supply of materials included in composite contracts for executing turn key projects?

ii) Whether bill management services are professional or technical services? Whether section 194J would apply or section 194C?”

The High Court held as under:

“i) In respect of payments made in respect of supply of materials included in composite contracts for executing turn key projects, provisions of section 194C would not apply.
ii) Services rendered by the agencies towards bill management services are not professional services and section 194J is not attracted. The contract was rightly held to be service contract by the Tribunal. Section 194C is attracted.”

Reassessment – Sections 147 & 148 – A.Y. 2002- 03 – Information received from ED – AO set out information received from ED – He failed to examine if that information provided the vital link to form the ‘reason to believe’ that income of the assessee has escaped the assessment for the A.Y. in question – Reopening of the assessment is not valid

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CIT vs. Indo Arab Air Services: 283 CTR 92 (Del):

The assessment for the A. Y. 2002-03 was reopened on the basis of the information received from the enforcement directorate. The Tribunal held that the reopening is not valid.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer set out the information received from the Enforcement Directorate but he failed to examine if the information provided the vital link to form the ‘reason to believe’ that the of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment for the assessment year in question.

ii) While the Assessing Officer had referred to the fact that the Enforcement Directorate gave the information regarding cash deposits being found in the books of the assessee, the Assessing Officer did not state that he examined the returns filed by the assessee for the said assessment year and detected that the said cash deposits were not reflected in the returns.

iii) Further, information concerning payments made to third parties, which were unable to be verified by the Enforcement Directorate, also required to be assessed by the Assessing Officer by examining the returns filed to discern whether the said transaction was duly disclosed by the assessee.
iv) Consequently, no error was committed by the Tribunal in the impugned orders in coming to the conclusion that the reopening of the assessment was bad in law.”

Presumptive tax – Section 44BB – A. Y. 2008- 09 – Assessee non-resident – Prospecting for or production of mineral oils – Service tax collected by the assessee is not includible in gross receipts for the purposes of computation of presumptive income

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DIT vs. Mitchell Drilling International Pvt. Ltd.; 380 ITR 130 (Del):

Assessee is a non resident. For the A. Y. 2008-09, the income of the assessee was assessable u/s. 44BB. For computing the income the assessee did not include the service tax received by it. The Assessing Officer included the service tax. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) For the purpose of computing the presumptive income of the assessee for the purpose of section 44BB the service tax collected by the assessee on the amount paid to it for rendering services was not to be included in the gross receipts in terms of section 44BB(2) r.w.s. 44BB(1).

ii) The service tax is not an amount paid or payable, or received or deemed to be received by the assessee for the services rendered by it. The assessee only collected the service tax for passing it on to the Government.”

Manufacture – Exemption u/s. 10B – A. Ys. 2003- 04 and 2004-05 – Assembling of instruments and apparatus for measuring and detecting ionizing radiators amounts to manufacture – Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 10B –

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CIT vs. Saint Gobain Crystals and Detectors India P. Ltd.; 380 ITR 226 (Karn):

The assessee was in the business of assembling instruments and apparatus for measuring and detecting ionizing radiators. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 10B. For the relevant years, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the assessee had not manufactured or produced articles or things as required u/s. 10B(1). The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the process carried out by the assessee in getting the final product, showed that the assessee was engaged in manufacture or production of an article or thing.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The finished product which was sold by the assessee, was different from the materials which were procured for making such a finished product. A series of processes were carried out and a new product emerged. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 10B.”

Limitation – Amendment – Increased limitation period of 7 years u/s 201(3) as amended by Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 w.e.f.1.10.2014 shall not apply retrospectively to orders which had become timebarred under the old time-limit (2 years/6 years) set by the unamended section 201(3). Hence, no order u/s. 201(i) deeming deductor to be assessee in default can be passed if limitation had already expired as on 1-10-2014 –

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Tata Teleservices vs. UOI; [2016] 66 taxmann.com 157 (Guj)

Pursuant to the amendment of section 201(3) by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 w.e.f.1.10.2014, extending the period of limitation to 7 years the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 201(1) for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09. The notices were challenged by the assessee by filing writ petitions. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petitions, considered the retrospectivity and the applicability of the amendment of section 201(3) and held as under:

“i) Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, to the facts of the case on hand and more particularly considering the fact that while amending section 201 by Finance Act, 2014, it has been specifically mentioned that the same shall be applicable w.e.f. 1/10/2014 and even considering the fact that proceedings for F.Y. 2007-08 and 2008- 09 had become time barred and/or for the aforesaid financial years, limitation u/s. 201(3)(i) of the Act had already expired on 31/3/2011 and 31/3/2012, respectively, much prior to the amendment in section 201 as amended by Finance Act, 2014 and therefore, as such a right has been accrued in favour of the assessee and considering the fact that wherever legislature wanted to give retrospective effect so specifically provided while amending section 201(3) (ii) as was amended by Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1/4/2010, it is to be held that section 201(3), as amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014 shall not be applicable retrospectively and therefore, no order u/s. 201(i) of the Act can be passed for which limitation had already expired prior to amended section 201(3) as amended by Finance Act No.2 of 2014.

ii) Under the circumstances, the impugned notices / summonses cannot be sustained and the same deserve to be quashed and set aside and writ of prohibition, as prayed for, deserves to be granted.”

Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Section 32(1)(iia) – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 – Plant and machinery set up after 1st October 2006 but before 31st March 2007 – Half of additional depreciation of 20% is allowable in A. Y. 2007-08 and the balance half allowable in A. Y. 2008-09

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CIT vs. Rittal India Pvt Ltd.; 380 ITR 423 (Karn): 282 CTR 431 (Karn):

The assessee acquired and installed new plant and machinery in the F. Y. 2006-07 after 1st October 2006. The assessee therefore claimed additional depreciation of 10%, in the A. Y. 2007-08, being half of the 20% allowable u/s. 32(2)(iia) and the same was allowed. The balance half was claimed in the A. Y. 2008-09 which was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The beneficial legislation should be given liberal interpretation so as to benefit the assessee. The intention of the legislature is absolutely clear that the assessee shall be allowed certain additional benefit, which was restricted by the proviso to half being granted in one assessment year, if certain condition was not fulfilled. But that would not restrain the assesee from claiming the balance of the benefit in the subsequent assessment year.
ii) The Tribunal had rightly held that the additional depreciation allowed u/s. 32(1)(iia) is a onetime benefit to encourage industrialisation and the provisions related to it have to be construed reasonably, liberally and purposively, to make the provision meaningful while granting the additional allowance. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

[2016-TIOL-374-CESTAT-DEL] M/s Umax Packaging Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Jaipur-II

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In absence of any proof of evidence of any suppression, misstatement and collusion with intent to evade payment of duty invocation of longer period of limitation and penalties for normal period not justified.

Facts
Appellant, a manufacturer of excisable goods availed CENVAT credit on certain disputed goods which was objected by the department and was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) by invoking extended period of limitation.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the dispute regarding eligibility of CENVAT credit of the goods had not attained finality and there were conflicting decisions on the issue and therefore the Appellant could have entertained a reasonable belief that credit was allowable. Further in absence of any evidence brought on record to prove suppression, misstatement, collusion etc. extended period cannot be invoked. The demand is confirmed for the normal period along with interest setting aside penalty.

[2016-TIOL-400-CESTAT-MUM] PrecisionMetals vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad

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The goods manufactured on job work basis is exempted under notification 214/86 on the ground that the excise duty is charged on the full value of the final product including the value of job work goods, the job work goods cannot be said to be exempted goods.

Facts
The Appellant, a job worker availed CENVAT credit on the inputs used in the manufacture of goods on job work basis. Exemption of excise duty was availed under Notification No. 214/86-CE as the principal supplier had undertaken to discharge excise duty either on the job work goods or on the final product in which job work intermediate goods is used. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand @ 10% of the value of the goods manufactured for reversal of credit in terms of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 on the ground that exempted goods were manufactured.

Held
The Tribunal relying upon various judicial pronouncements held that Notification No. 214/86 provides that the principal supplier of raw material undertakes to discharge excise duty either on the job work goods or on the final product in which the job work goods is used. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the job work goods are exempted from payment of excise duty. Even if any duty is charged at the job worker’s end the same shall be available as CENVAT credit to the principal supplier and only for procedural convenience, Notification was issued. Therefore, Rule 6(3)(b) which is applicable only on the clearance of exempted goods shall not apply and accordingly the demand is set aside.

[2016-TIOL-399-CESTAT-MUM] Arbes Tools P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II

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When the imported material was used for manufacturing final product, credit taken on a photocopy of courier bill of entry was allowable.

Facts
The Appellant imported inputs and utilized the same in manufacture of the final product which was cleared on payment of duty. The lower authorities denied the benefit of CENVAT credit stating that original bill of entry was not produced and photocopy of a courier bill of entry is not a valid document under Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Held
The Tribunal noted that there is no dispute that the material on which credit is taken was imported and used for manufacturing the product. Therefore CENVAT credit cannot be denied on mere technical grounds and the appeal was allowed.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 88 (Ahmedabad-CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Surat vs. Miranda Tools

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Mobile services and courier services are entitled to CENVA T credit, since they are used in different ways in relation to manufacture of final product.

Facts
The Issue before the Hon’ble Tribunal was whether mobile services and courier services availed by the manufacturer for the period April 2008 to June 2011 would be available as input services in term of Rule 2(I) of CCR, 2004 so as to enable CENVAT credit thereof.

Held
The Tribunal concurred with the view taken by Commissioner (Appeals) and decided the matter in favour of the assessee. Commissioner (Appeals) had decided that mobile phones were provided by the company to its senior executives so that they can carry out business activities/job performance easily. The mobile services were utilised/consumed in or in relation to performance of their duties such as purchasing/procurement of inputs or capital goods or consumables, accounting of materials, manufacture of the finished goods, clearance of finished goods, export of finished goods, marketing of goods manufactured, sales promotion etc. Further, the mobile connections were also in the name of the company and hence the bills were raised by the service providers in the name of the company which paid such bills. Therefore, CENVAT credit of mobile services was allowed. As regards, courier services, it was found that assessee received courier services for dispatch of various business correspondence to the supplier/customer/branch office/ agents office etc. including sending various bills and other related documents to the head office for accounting and internal audit purposes and also for procurement of raw materials, export of the finished goods and for domestic sale and for sending samples of the finished goods to the customers. Commissioner (Appeals) therefore held that in different ways, the courier services were used in or in relation to manufacture of the final products. Therefore, CENVAT credit of courier services was also allowed.

2016] 65 taxmann.com 196 (Mumbai-CESTAT) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-II vs. MMS Maritime (India) (P.) Ltd

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After 01/04/2011, CENVA T credit of “rent-acab” service is not allowed due to specific exclusion of the same from definition of input services in terms of Rule 2(I)(B) of CENVA T Credit Rules, 2002, although it is essential for providing output services, but all other services essential for providing output services are to be allowed.

Facts
The Appellant is the provider of manpower supply services to foreign clients which is export of service. It filed refund claim for unutilised CENVAT credit in respect of input services, which was used in respect of export of output services. Such services included inter-alia rent-acab services used for conveyance of employees, courier services, communication services, renting of immovable property services and short term accommodation services used in relation to training. The refund claim was rejected on the ground that such services do not qualify as input services for providing output services.

Held
The Tribunal held that any service whether it is used for providing output services or otherwise, cannot be decided in isolation but it is necessary to see what the output service is and accordingly it can be decided whether the service is input service for providing a particular output service. Having regard to nature of output service i.e. manpower supply service, it was held that, all the services mentioned above, are essential for providing output service and hence would qualify as input services and CENVAT credit of the same are allowable/refundable. However, in light of amendment to Rule 2(I)(B) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 with effect from 01/04/2011, on account of specific exclusion, “rent-a-cab” services would not qualify as input services even though the same are used for conveyance of staff.

[2016-TIOL-403-CESTAT-MUM] Applied Micro Circuits India Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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Credit of service tax paid on outdoor catering services, life insurance services after 01/04/2011 being services received for personal use of employees cannot be allowed.

Facts
CENVAT credit is denied to the Appellants on service tax charged on outdoor catering and life insurance services received after 01/04/2011 contending that after the amendment to the definition of input service, services used primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee are specifically excluded and therefore credit cannot be allowed. It was argued that such services were in relation to the business activity and were included in the value of service rendered by them. Reliance was placed on the decision of Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [2014]-TIOL-2460-CESTAT-MUM] (digest provided in BCAJ February 2015).

Held
The Tribunal however, distinguished the decision of Hindustan Coca Cola (supra) by holding that the services of outdoor catering and life insurance are essentially for the personal use or consumption of the employees and therefore could not be allowed. It was also categorically provided that if outdoor catering services are used for an annual conference of dealers or shareholders meet etc., it would be eligible for credit since then it is not primarily for personal use of employees. Similarly, life insurance is also for the personal use of the employee as its benefit goes to the employee or his family. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

[2016-TIOL-382-CESTAT-MUM] DSP Meryll Lynch Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Introduction of new entry and inclusion of certain services in that entry would presuppose that there was no earlier entry covering the said services and accordingly merchant banking and advice on mergers and acquisition can be taxed only under Banking and Financial Services with effect from 16/07/2001 and are not covered under management consultancy service.

Facts
The Appellant provided various financial services viz. advisory services, retainership for providing opinions, advisory for mergers and acquisitions, merchant banking services etc. Their income included fees for these services as well as management fees earned by their subsidiary, fees for underwriting Government securities and other miscellaneous income. The department contended that all services except underwriting services are covered under “management consultancy service”. However it was argued that interalia as regards M&A services the entry of management consultancy should be interpreted in contextual manner and M&A advisory is technical and restrictive and does not relate to running of an organization. Merchant banking services are regulated under SEBI Rules and Regulations and that the services rendered were liable only from August 2001 under the category of “banking and financial services” which was brought into the service tax net from 16/07/2001. In the present case the period involved is April 2000 – December 2001.

Held
The Tribunal relying on the decision of Indian National Shipowners Association [2008-TIOL-633-HC-MUM-ST] wherein the High Court held that introduction of a new entry and inclusion of certain services in that entry would presuppose that there was no earlier entry covering the said services held that the service of banking and financial service was introduced with effect from 16/07/2001 incorporating the various entries viz. merchant banking, mergers and acquisition etc. and thus the services were not liable under management consultancy service prior to the said date. It was noted that the definition of management consultancy remained the same even after introduction of banking and financial service and thus the service was brought to tax only after introduction of the new entry. Further, it was held that the term management consultancy refers to consultancy regarding the affairs of an organisation and does not relate to activities of mergers and acquisition which is highly technical and restrictive term. Accordingly, the demand of fees received in relation to mergers and acquisition, merchant banking and retainership was set aside. As regards fees received by the subsidiary company it was held that the same related to services provided by the subsidiary which was a separate legal entity and cannot be considered as income of the Appellant merely because the income is shown in the consolidated financial statement which is a mere statutory requirement. Further, it was held that underwriting of Government securities was not taxable by virtue of Board Circular No. 126/8/2010 dated 10/08/2010. Further in relation to the miscellaneous income, it was held that the same are in the nature of adjustments of expenses/debt etc. and there is no service involved in these activities. Thus the entire demand was set aside.

[2016-TIOL-105-HC-MUM] Mercedes Benz India Pvt. Limited vs. The Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune

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To determine the method of apportionment of input credit on common input services attributable to manufacturing and trading activities prior to 01.04.2011, the matter remanded to the Tribunal.

Facts
The Appellant, a manufacturer of motor vehicles also imported motor vehicles and sold them in domestic markets and therefore was a manufacturer as well as a trader. The Revenue contended that credit of service tax paid on common input services attributable to the activity of import and sale of cars viz. trading activity which is an exempted service is not available which is not contested. The question is about the true and correct method of quantifying the credit relatable to the trading activity for reversal. The Tribunal held that the method prescribed for arriving at the value of trading of goods vide clause (c) of Explanation-1 for the purpose of reversal under rule 6(3) of the CENVAT credit Rules, 2004 being the difference between sale price and cost of goods sold or 10% of the cost of goods sold, whichever is more is not retrospective in nature since the same was issued on 01/03/2011 and it came into force on 01/04/2011. Accordingly, it was held that service tax paid on common input services should be apportioned in the ratio of trading turnover to total turnover (trading as well as manufacturing turnover). Aggrieved by the same the present appeal is filed.

Held
The High Court held that the Tribunal has misdirected itself completely when it has concluded that clause (c) of Explanation 1 inserted w.e.f. 01/04/2011 has been adopted to encourage the trading of the goods rather than the manufacturing of the goods (otherwise criterion should have been same viz. Based upon turnover or value addition) and thus the common input services before such date should be apportioned in the same ratio as the turnover of manufactured and traded cars. The court held that firstly the Tribunal should refer to the substantive Rule as operative prior to 01/04/2011 and then arrive at a conclusion in relation to the explanation introduced with sub-clauses with effect from 01/04/2011. Accordingly for determination of the fraction/percentage to be applied to apportion the input credit relatable to the trading activity, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal.

ITA No. 1625/Mum/2014 Morgan Stanley Mauritius Company v. DCIT (IT) A.Y.: 2007-08, Date of Order – 29th January, 2016

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Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Additional consideration received for delay in making open offer, being an integral part of share transfer is a part and parcel of sale consideration, is covered by Capital Gains Article of the DTAA . Such payment does not constitute interest income in absence of a debtor- creditor relationship.

Facts
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Mauritius held the shares of an Indian Company (ICo). The Taxpayer transferred ICo’s shares to a Mauritius Company (FCo) under a scheme of open offer.

Together with the consideration for sale of shares, the Taxpayer also received additional consideration for delay in processing of open offer by FCo. As per the letter of open offer, it was clear that the initial offer price of the shares for transfer of each share was increased due to the delay in making the open offer. The Tax authority contended that such consideration was received for delay in making payment. Hence, it represented interest and was not part of sale consideration for the open offer. Accordingly, such additional payment would qualify as interest under the India-Mauritius DTAA and liable to source taxation in India.

However, the Taxpayer argued that as FCo had not provided any loan to Taxpayer, additional consideration cannot be said to be received in respect of any monies borrowed or for use of money. In absence of a debtorcreditor relationship between the Taxpayer and FCo, such additional consideration cannot be treated as interest.

Held
It is a fact that the regulatory authority i.e., SEBI, had approved the transaction. Further, since the transaction could not be completed in time due to certain reasons, FCo revised the offer price. The Taxpayer had no control over the decisions of FCo. Business decisions are governed by their own rules and laws and if considering the time factor, FCo agreed to increase the share price, it has to be taken as part of sale.

The Taxpayer owned shares of ICo and in response to the open offer by FCo, the Taxpayer agreed to sell the shares of ICo. It was a pure and simple case of selling of shares by the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer did not enter into any negotiations with FCo and transferred shares as per a scheme approved by SEBI.

Further, there was no debtor-creditor relationship between the Taxpayer and FCo. The Taxpayer had not advanced any sum to FCo and has not received any interest for the delayed repayment of principal amount. Reliance in this regard was placed on the Tribunal decision in the case of Genesis Indian Investment Company (ITA /2878/Mum/2006 dated 14th August 2013) wherein it was held that where the interest is received for delay in processing of buy back of shares in open offer after announcement of the intention of acquiring shares, such additional amount shall form part of consideration towards shares tendered in open offer.

Thus, the additional consideration received is part and parcel of total consideration and cannot be segregated under the head ‘original sales consideration’ and ‘penal interest’. Such additional consideration is not taxable in India by virtue of Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA .

TS-15-AAR-2016 Dow AgroSciences Agricultural Products Date of Order : 11th January, 2016

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Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ) -Transfer of shares of an Indian company (ICo) by the applicant to its Singapore group entity (SCo) upon re-organisation, not a tax avoidant transaction

Facts
The Applicant is part of a large MNE group (Group) and a company resident and incorporated in Mauritius. The Applicant held majority (nearly 99.99%) of the shares of Indian Co (ICo) which was acquired by it in various tranches over a period of 10 years from 1995 to 2005.

The Group had presence all over the world and was divided into various regions based on their geographical locations. The Applicant belonged to the European region, while ICo belonged to the India, Middle East and Africa (IMEA) region. In the past, the IMEA region was dismantled and entities were realigned with other regions as per the geographical convenience. As a result of this realignment, ICo became a part of the focused Asia-Pacific region.

In order to achieve the objective of operational excellence, better control and administrative convenience, it was proposed to realign the holding of ICo and shift it to an entity in the Asia- Pacific region. Accordingly, it was proposed that Applicant would transfer the shares of ICo to its group entity in Singapore i.e., SCo.

Issues before the AAR were as follows:
Whether the entire arrangement of transfer of ICo’s shares in favor of SCo was a scheme to avoid taxes in India?

Whether the Applicant had a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India?

Whether income arising from such a transfer was taxable in India?

Held
On the issue of whether the arrangement was a tax avoidance transaction For the following reasons, it was held that the transaction of transfer ICo’s shares to SCo by the Applicant was not a tax avoidance transaction –

The Applicant had acquired shares of ICo in various tranches over a 10 year period. Such share acquisition which was carried out around 20 years ago for a substantial cost cannot amount to a scheme to avoid payment of taxes in India. ? T he Applicant had been operating for more than 10 years in Mauritius and hence, it cannot be said to be a shell company. Investment in ICo’s shares was carried out with prior approval of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion and Reserve Bank of India. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that shares were acquired with a view to sell them in future.

The need for realignment of the Group arose upon dismantling of the IMEA group in 2010. As a result, and in order to ensure better control, ICO’s holding was shifted to Asia-Pacific region. SCo was an upcoming entity in the Asia-Pacific region and, hence, it was proposed to realign the holding of shares of ICo from the Applicant to SCo. Additionally, all the shares of ICo were acquired five years prior to the present proposed re-organisation of the group. Hence, the proposed transaction is for sound business consideration.

On the issue of PE
It was a stated fact that the Applicant did not have an office or employees or agents in India. Neither did it have any activities in India. A tax residency certificate from Mauritius was also furnished by the Applicant. Further nothing was brought on record to show that Applicant had a PE in India. Therefore, it was held that the Applicant does not have a PE in India. On the taxability of transfer of shares of ICo

Considering the accounting treatment, intention, as also quantum of the transaction, the equity shares held by the Applicant in ICo should be considered as capital asset and not stock-in-trade.

The shares of ICo were held for a very long period of time (10-20 years). The objective of acquiring ICo’s shares as stated by the Applicant was not to trade in them but to hold them as investments. In fact, there was no trading in ICo’s shares by the Applicant, except for the proposed transfer. Hence, the shares of ICo would constitute capital asset in the hands of Applicant. Consequently gains from transfer of shares of ICo would result in capital gains in the hands of the Applicant. Such capital gains are taxable in India under the provisions of the Act

Gains on transfer of ICo’s shares would be covered by Article 13(4) of the DTAA which exempts gains from tax in India.

Taxation of Artistes and Sportsmen

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1. Overview
In recent years, it has been observed that various
International sporting events like Formula 1 Race, Indian Premier
League (IPL), Indian Super League (ISL) and I-League etc. are being
successfully held in India year after year. It is worth noting that
India has largest number of very keen cricket fans in the world viewing
various cricket matches. Similarly, there are various Indian films &
advertisements where international artistes are featuring. Many foreign
filmmakers have been shooting films in India such as Life of Pi, The
Bourne Supremacy, Slum Dog Millionaire etc. On various occasions,
concerts by non-resident entertainers are regularly held in India e.g.
concerts/performances by Metallica, Lady Gaga, Katy Perry etc. In
addition, performances by International Artistes & entertainers are
increasingly becoming a part of big Indian theme parties, wedding
extravaganzas and Reality shows etc.

Taxation of such
non-resident Artistes and Sportsmen, corporates and sports
associations/bodies involved in organising, managing and regulating such
events, concerts or performances is gaining increasing importance in
view of huge sums by way of fees and other contract amounts involved. In
this Article, we have attempted to give an overview of the taxation
provisions under the Income-tax Act and various model Tax Treaties.

2. Taxability under the Domestic Law

The relevant provisions and circulars under the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] are as follows:
Section 5 r.w.s. 9 will determine taxability of income of Artistes etc. in India
Section 115BBA – Tax on non-resident sportsman or sports association
Withholding tax provisions u/s. 194E
CBDT Circular No. 787 dated 10.02.2000

2.1 Section 115BBA of the Act reads as follows:
“Tax on non-resident sportsmen or sports associations. 115BBA. (1) Where the total income of an assessee, –

a) being a sportsman (including an athlete), who is not a citizen of India and is a non-resident, includes any income received or receivable by way of –
i. participation in India in any game (other than a game the winnings wherefrom are taxable under section 115BB) or sport; or
ii. advertisement; or
iii. contribution of articles relating to any game or sport in India in newspapers, magazines or journals; or

b) being a non-resident sports association or institution, includes any amount guaranteed to be paid or payable to such association or institution in relation to any game (other than a game the winnings wherefrom are taxable u/s. 115BB) or sport played in India; or

c) being an entertainer, who is not a citizen of India and is a non-resident,
includes any income received or receivable from his performance in
India, the income-tax payable by the assessee shall be the aggregate of —

i. the amount of income-tax calculated on income referred to in
clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) at the rate of twenty per cent;
and
ii. the amount of income-tax with which the assessee would have
been chargeable had the total income of the assessee been reduced by the
amount of income referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c):

Provided that no deduction in respect of any expenditure or allowance shall be allowed under any provision of this Act in computing the income referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c).

2) It shall not be necessary for the assessee to furnish under sub-section (1) of section 139 a return of his income if—
(a)
his total income in respect of which he is assessable under this Act
during the previous year consisted only of income referred to in clause
(a) or clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1); and

(b) the tax deductible at source under the provisions of Chapter XVII-B has been deducted from such income.”

(Emphasis supplied)
2.2 Analysis of Section 115BBA
It applies only to a non-resident and a person who is not a citizen of India

Who is a sportsman (including athlete) and

Earns income from
• Participation in India in any game or sports
• Advertisement
• Contribution of article in newspaper, magazine or journals relating to any game or sport in India

Applies to a non-resident sports association or institution

Who earns income from
• Guarantee money in relation to any game or sport played in India
• Except games referred to in section 115BB

Applies only to a non-resident and a person who is not a citizen of India
• Who is an entertainer and
• Earns income from his performance in India
• Applicable tax rate is 20% on gross income
• Deduction of any expenditure incurred for earning such income is not allowed
• No need to file return if tax deductible at source has been deducted from such income.

3. CBDT Circular No. 787 dated 10-02- 2000 – Income of artists, entertainers, sportsmen etc.

The salient features of the said circular are as under:

Income derived from event or show for entertainment or sports includes:
• Sponsorship money;
• Gate money;
• Advertisement revenue;
• Sale of broadcasting or telecasting rights;
• Rents from hiring out of space, etc.
• Rent from caterers.

Article on “Artistes and Sportsman” will apply to
• Income from personal activities of sportsman or artist in India
• Advertising income and Sponsorship income, if it is related directly or indirectly to performance or appearance in India.

Article on “Royalty” will apply to
• Royalty payment for recorded performance

Article on “Other income” will apply to
• Guarantee money earned by Sports association
• E.g. Tax treaty with U.S, U.K., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, France etc.

Illustrations given in the Circular
Income not taxable in India
• Artist performing in India gratuitously without consideration.
• Artist performing in India to promote sale of his records without consideration.
• Consideration paid to acquire the copyrights of performance in India for subsequent sale or broadcast or telecast abroad.

Income taxable in India
• Consideration for the live performance or simultaneous live telecast or broadcast in India.
• Consideration paid to acquire the copyrights of performance in India for subsequent sale or broadcast or telecast in India.
• Endorsement fees (for launch or promotion of products, etc.) which relates to the artist’s performance.

4. Relevant Case Laws – Section 115BBA and 194E
Some of the important case laws are as under:

4.1 International Merchandising Corporation vs ADIT [2015] 57 Taxmann.com 179 (Delhi-Trib)

Issues:
i. Payment made to Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP), whether liable to Tax u/s. 115BBA?
ii. Whether section 194E does not apply as AT P is just a governing body of sport and not a sports association?

Held:
a) 194E read with section 115BBA apply to payments made to a non-resident sports association or an institution.
b)
ATP is undisputedly a governing body of the world wide men’s
professional Tennis Circuit responsible for ranking of its players and
co-ordinating the Tennis tournament in the world.
c) ATP is a
non-resident sports institution and therefore section 194E applies to
the payments made by the assessee to the AT P.

4.2 PILCOM vs. CIT [2011] 198 Taxman 555 (Cal.)
In this case, it was held as follows:
a)
Section 115BBA is completely independent from other sections such as
section 5(2) or section 9 and it has got nothing to do with the accrual
or assessment of income in India as mentioned in section 9.
b) Non-resident individual has to pay the tax, the moment he participates in India in any game or sport.
c)
Once the payment is made to non-resident sports association or
institution or it becomes payable in relation to any game or sports
played in India, there is accrual of income in India.
d) Section 115BBA is to be applied irrespective of place of making payment.
e)
Payment received by any sports association or personalities for the
matches not played in India is not taxable or liable for withholding
tax.
f) Department’s contention that source of payment is from India irrespective of place of game is overruled.

4.3 Indcom vs. CIT (TDS) [2011] 11 taxmann.com 109 (Cal.)

Issues:
Whether
tax will be deductible on amounts paid to foreign teams for
participation as prize money or administrative expenses, is deemed to
accrue in India u/s. 115BBA?

Whether the match referees and umpires will be considered as sportsmen?

Held:
The
amount paid to the foreign team for participation in the match in India
in any shape, either as prize money or as the administrative expenses,
was the income deemed to have accrued in India and was taxable u/s.
115BBA and, thus, section 194E was attracted.

The payments made
to the umpires or match referees do not come within the purview of
section 115BBA because the umpires and match referee are neither
sportsmen (including an athlete) nor are they non-resident sports
association or institution so as to attract the provisions contained in
section 115BBA. Therefore, although the payments made to them were
‘income’ which had accrued in India, yet, those were not taxable under
the aforesaid provision and thus, the liability to deduct u/s. 194E
never accrued.

The umpires and the match referee can, at the
most, be described as professionals or technical persons who render
their professional or technical services as umpire or match referee. But
there is no scope of deducting any amount u/s. 194E for such payment.

The
reader may also refer to the decision in the case of Board of Control
for Cricket in India vs. DIT (Exemption) [2005] 096 ITD 263 (Mum), on
the subject.

5. Scope of the Article 17 of OECD Model Tax Convention

Salient features of Article 17 are as under:
• Primary taxing rights is with the State of Source / State of performance
• It overrides Article 7, 14 and 15.
• It applies to entertainer, sportsperson or any other person

6. Article 17 (1)

6.1 Model Conventions – A Comparison

6.2 Scope of Article 17(1)
a. A pplies to Individual resident of one of the contracting state.
b. I ndividual is either an entertainer or a sportsperson.
c. He derives income from personal activities.
d. Word “personal activities” suggests “public appearance” is necessary.
e. Personal activities/performance are exercised in the source State i.e. country of performance.
f. Performance should be in public or recorded and later produced for an audience.
g. Performance must be artistic and entertaining.
h. Entertainer or sportsperson must be present in the state of source during the performance.
i. It is not necessary to remain present in the Source State for any minimum period.
j. Person performing even for a single event is covered.
k. Person involved in a political, social, religious or charitable nature is covered, if the entertaining character is present.
l. It covers both professional activities and occasional activities.
m. Source State gets right to tax income earned in that state.

6.3 Meaning of ‘Entertainer’
a. There is no precise definition of the term in Model convention or in treaty.
b. Dictionary meaning of “Entertainer”
i.
“A person whose job is amusing or interesting people, for example, by
singing, telling jokes or dancing” – Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary
ii. “A person, such as a singer, dancer, or comedian, whose job is to entertain others” – Oxford Dictionary of English
iii. “A person who entertains; a professional provider of amusement or entertainment” – Shorter Oxford Dictionary
c.
Term ‘Entertainer’ includes the stage performer, film actor or actor
(including for instance a former sportsperson) in a television
commercial.
d. Entertainer or sportsperson includes anyone who acts as such even for a single event.

6.4 Meaning of “artiste” and “artist”
a. There is no precise definition in Model convention or in treaty.
b. Dictionary meaning of “Artiste” is:
i. “An artist, especially an actor, singer, dancer, or other public performer” Random House Webster’s Dictionary
ii.
“A public performer who appeals to the aesthetic faculties, as a
professional singer, dancer, etc. also one who makes a ‘fine art’ of his
employment, as an artistic cook, hair dresser, etc. Oxford English
Dictionary
iii. “A professional entertainer such as singer, a dancer or an actor” Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary

c. Difference between the word “artiste” and “artist”:
i. “Artist” has a broader meaning compared to “artiste”
ii. Artist includes those who create work of art, such as painter, sculptors etc.
iii. Artist is a person whose creative work shows sensitivity and imagination
iv. A rtiste is restricted to performing arts.
v. Artiste is a person who is a public performer or skilled performer.
vi. A rtiste is the one who has an entertaining character
vii. The word “entertainer” seems to cover the lighter versions of the performing arts.

6.5 Relevant decisions regarding meaning of ‘Artist’ given in the context of Section 80-RR of the Act

a. Sachin Tendulkar vs. CIT [2011] 11 taxmann. com 121 (Mum).
The
Mumbai Tribunal in case of Sachin Tendulkar held that Sachin should be
regarded as an artiste while appearing in advertisements and
commercials, modeling etc. and hence is entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

b. Amitabh Bachchan vs. CIT [2007] 12 SOT 95 (Mum)
The
Mumbai Tribunal held that both Amitabh Bach chan receiving income for
acting as an anchor for a TV programme and Shahrukh Khan receiving in
come from endorsement of performance where he has to give photographs,
attend photo sessions, video shoots, etc. are entitled to deduction u/s.
80RR.

The reader may also refer to the following decisions on the subject:

Tarun Tahiliani-[2010] 192 Taxman 231(Bom)
Harsha Ahyut Bhogale vs. ACIT – [2008] 171 Taxman 108 (Mum) (Mag)
David Dhawan vs. DCIT – [2005] 2 SOT 311 (Mum)
Anup Jalota – [2003] 1 SOT 525 (Mum)

6.6 Meaning of ‘Sportsperson’
a. There is no precise definition is given of the term “sportspersons”.
b.
N ot restricted to participants in traditional athletic events (e.g.
runners, jumpers, swimmers). Also covers e.g. golfers, jockeys,
footballers, cricketers and tennis players, as well as racing drivers.
c.
A lso includes activities usually regarded as of an entertainment
character such as billiards, snooker, chess and bridge tournaments
d.
Since sportsperson is grouped with entertainer, Article 17 will apply
only to those who perform in public. Therefore, mountaineers or scuba
divers are not covered.
e. Sportsperson also covers the one whose
activities includes advertising or interviews that are directly or
indirectly related to such an appearance.
f. Sportsperson does not include managers or coaches of the sports team.
g.
Merely reporting or commenting on a sports event in which the reporter
does not participate is not an activity as a sportsperson.
h. Owner
of a horse or a race car is not covered under Article 17 unless the
payment is received on behalf of the jockey or car driver.

6.7 Meaning of “Athlete”
A person who is trained or skilled in exercises, sports, or games requiring physical strength, agility or stamina

Dictionary meaning is one who is engaged in sport more specifically in the field and track events

6.8 Persons covered under Article 17 and regarded as performing entertainers or artistes

6.9 Persons not covered under Article 17 and not regarded as performing entertainers or artistes

6.10 Article 17(1) – Illustrative types of Income covered:

a. Income derived from performance.

b. Income connected with performance such as awards
i. Payment received by a professional golfer for an interview given during a tournament in which he participates.
ii. Payment made to a star tennis player for the use of his picture on posters advertising a tournament in which he will participate.

c. Advertising and sponsorship fee directly or indirectly related to performance in source country

i. Payments made to a tennis player for wearing a sponsor’s logo, trade mark or trade name on his tennis shirt during a match.

d. Income generated from promotional activities of the entertainer during his presence in source country.

e. Payments for the simultaneous broadcasting of a performance by an entertainer or sportsperson made directly to the performer or for his or her benefit (e.g. a payment made to the star-company of the performer).

f. Income from combined activities (for e.g. Steven Spielberg directing and acting in a movie – Predominantly performing nature – Article 17 would apply – Performing element negligible – entire income out of Article 17).

g. Performance based fees/remuneration such as participation fees, share in gate receipts.

h. Income from writing a column in daily newspaper or journals related to performance.

i. Salary income of a member of an orchestra or troupe for his performance.

j. Entertainer earning salary as an employee is liable to pay tax in source country in proportion to his salary which corresponds to his performance.

k. Income of one person company belonging to entertainer if domestic law of Source State permits “look through” approach.

l. Illustration:
• Film actor is performing in India where a film is shot. Article 17 will apply to the income of the film actor.
• If the film is released worldwide except India, Article 17 will apply to the income of Film actor irrespective of where the film is released.

6.11 Article 17(1) – Illustrative types of Income not covered

a. Payments received upon cancellation of a performance are not taxable under Article 17(1).

b. Royalties for intellectual property rights will normally be covered under Article 12 i.e. Income to third party holding IPR for broadcasting rights.

c. Income received by impresarios etc. for arranging the appearance of an entertainer or sportsperson is outside the scope of the Article, but any income they receive on behalf of the entertainer or sportsperson is of course covered by it.

d. Income received by administrative or support staff (e.g. cameramen for a film, producers, film directors, choreographers, technical staff, road crew for a pop group, etc.

e. Income from speaking engagement in conferences.

f. Income as reporter or commentator h. Promoters involved in production of event i. Guest judge in singing competition

j. Income not attributed to performance in source state.

6.12 Items of Income Covered by Other Articles

Taxation of the following types of income is governed by other Articles of a Tax Treaty:

a. Income for Image rights not closely connected with performance

b. Sponsorship and advertising fees not related to performance

c. Merchandising income from sale which is not related to performance

d. Income against the cancellation of performance, since it is compensation for income lost due to cancellation of performance and not associated with performance.

e. Income from restrictive covenants

f. Income earned by a former sportsperson providing commentary during the broadcast of a sport event or reporting on sport event in which he is not participating.

g. Income from repeat telecast

h. Fees for interview with music channel not closely connected with performance.

6.13 Aspects which are not relevant while applying Article 17

a. Location or residence of Payer

b. Number of days stay in the source country

c. Having PE or fixed base of the entertainer in the source country

d. Entertainer or sportsperson performing as an employee or independently on contract

e. Entertainers present directly on the stage or through radio or TV.

f. One time performance or regular performance

g. Indian Treaty examples
i. India-Egypt tax treaty provides time threshold of 15 days during the relevant fiscal year.

ii. India-USA tax treaty – Exception provided where net income derived does not exceed USD 1,500.

6.14 Foreign Judicial Precedents

a) Agassi vs. Robinson – UK Judicial Precedent
• Mr. Andre Agassi, a US-tax resident visited UK for short duration to play in various tournaments and in particular at Wimbledon.

• He controlled a US corporation (Andre Agassi Enterprises Inc) through which he negotiated endorsement contracts with manufacturers of sporting equipment including Nike and Head, neither of which had a tax presence in UK.

• Revenue authorities assessed Andre Agassi for tax in connection with the sponsorship income received by the non-resident corporation.

• UK House of Lords upheld the extra-territorial applicability of the UK domestic tax law provisions and held that endorsement income paid by non-resident UK sponsors to non-resident corporation is liable to tax in UK.

b) Canadian decision in Cheek vs. The Queen (2002 DTC 1283 (Tax Court of Canada))

• Issue: Whether a “radio broadcaster” of baseball games would fall under Article XVI (Artistes and Athletes) of the 1980 Canada–United States Income Tax Convention?

• The radio broadcaster Thomas Cheek, had been the commentator of the Toronto Blue Jays together with a partner-commentator.

• Thomas Cheek was resident in the United States, was not an employee and did not have a fixed base in Canada that would have made him taxable under Article XIV (Independent Personal Services).

• In a baseball game of three hours, only 16-18 minutes are actual “motion”, the rest is “down time”. The challenge facing the broadcaster is to hold the attention of the radio audience, even when there is no activity on the field.

• The court stated that professional sports in itself is entertaining, but doubted whether the broadcaster could be seen as an entertainer, that is, as a “radio artiste”, such as for example the late Bing Crosby. The baseball fan who turns on the radio to hear a particular baseball game wants to know how the players are performing on the field.

• The broadcaster may be able to hold the attention of the fan with his “down time” commentary but he is not the reason why the fan turns on the radio. Therefore the court decided that Thomas Cheek was not a radio artiste, although he was a very skilful and experienced radio journalist.

c) NL: HR, 7 May 2010, 08/02054 (Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD)

• A football player who was resident in Sweden was transferred by a Swedish club to a team resident in the Netherlands.

• He took up residence in the Netherlands after the transfer.

• Pursuant to the terms of his contract with the Swedish club, he received a share of the transfer price paid by the Dutch club;

• He received this payment when he had already become a resident of the Netherlands.

• The taxpayer claimed that this payment related to his past employment activity with the Swedish club and was covered by Article 15 (Income from employment) of the treaty.

• Conversely, the Dutch tax authorities maintained that the payment was within the scope of Article 17 (allowing Sweden the primary right to tax and double taxation should in that case be relieved in the Netherlands via a credit under Article 24(4).

• Held – The payment was clearly related to the past activities of the taxpayer as football player for the Swedish team and that, therefore, Article 17 doubtlessly applied. As a consequence, the taxpayer had to include this payment in his income for Dutch tax purposes and then ask a credit for the taxes paid to Sweden upon that same income.

7.2 India’s DTAA s – Article 17 (2)

• India’s treaties with Egypt, Libya, Syria and Zambia provide that income accrued to another person is not taxable in source country.

• India’s treaty with Zambia provides for deemed PE if the enterprise carries on business of providing the services of public entertainer

• India’s treaty with USA provides that income accrued to another person is not taxable if entertainer establishes that neither the entertainer or athlete nor persons related thereto participate directly or indirectly in the profits of that other person in any manner, including the receipt of deferred remuneration, bonuses, fees, dividends, partnership distributions, or other distributions.

• Paragraph applies when income from personal activities exercised by an entertainer or a sportsperson accrues to another person and not to an entertainer or sportsperson.

• Another person could be a corporate or non-corporate entity

• Such entity may be owned by the performer himself

• Even if another person and entertainer are tax resident of different countries, paragraph applies

• Source state may tax such income.

• It overrides the provisions of Article 7 (Business profit) and 15 (Income from employment).

7.3 Article 17 (2) – Anti Avoidance Rule
• Another person i.e. entity could be a Management Company, team, troupe, orchestra or “renta- star” company.

• “Rent a star” company is controlled by the performer or artist and performer would be the beneficiary of maximum profit of the company

• Income for the performance of entertainer in the source state is received by such entity and not by the entertainer.

• An entertainer or sportsperson is either hired or employed by such entity for the entertainment program to be held in Source State.

• Such entity may pay nominal amount or modest salary to the performer.

• Such entity, in the absence of Permanent Establishment or business connection, may avoid tax in the Source State.

• Income does not accrue to the performer, hence paragraph 1 of Article 17 will not apply.

• Individual performer/entertainer may avoid tax for non-application of Article 15 or may pay tax on modest salary.

• Paragraph 2 deal with such an arrangement and gives taxing rights to the Source State.

7.4 Article 17(2) – Important Points

a. Para 2 does not apply to Prize money that the owner of a horse or the team to which a race car belongs, derives from the results of the horse or car during a race or during races, taking place during a certain period.

b. Does not cover the income of all enterprises that are involved in the production of entertainment or sports events, e.g.:

i. income derived by the independent promoter of a concert from the sale of tickets; and

ii. allocation of advertising space is not covered by paragraph 2.

c. Computation Mechanism – as per the domestic laws of the Source country.

7.5 Computation and rate of tax
Approach for computing income
• Treaty does not provide for method of computing income

• Income is to be computed as per domestic law of the source state (e.g. section 115 BBA of the Act)

• Domestic law may tax only company or the entertainer or both on their respective income

• Non-resident may choose to be governed by the treaty law or the domestic law.

Rate of tax
• Rates are generally not provided in the treaty

• Domestic law may provide for tax on gross income or give an option to be taxed on net income (@20% u/s. 115 BBA of the Act).

7.6 Taxation of Team Performance

A team performance is defined as the exercise of personal activities by more than one entertainer or sportsperson who come together as a group ? Group entity may or may not be a resident or have a permanent establishment in the state of source ? Each team member is classified as entertainer or sportsperson or support staff based on the nature of services rendered

Entertainer or sportsperson of the team are taxed in the state of performance

Support staff, technical personnel and all employees other than artistes or sportsmen are governed by Article 15.

Tax treatment in the state of source is as under:

Payments attributable to entertainer and sportsperson is taxed under Article 17(1)

• Profit earned by the team is apportioned between profit attributable to the performance of entertainer or sportsperson and profits attributable to activities of non-performing members

• Profit attributable to the performance of entertainer or sportsperson is taxed under Article 17(2)

7.7 Relevant Case Law re Article 17(2)

Wizcraft International Entertainment Private Limited vs. ADIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 24 (Bombay)

• Commission paid to the UK agent was not for services of entertainers/artists.

– The UK agent had not taken any part in the events, nor performed any activities in India. Hence, it was not covered by Article 18 of India- UK DTAA .

• The UK agent did not have any PE in India [Carborandum Co. vs. CIT, (1977) 108 ITR 335 (SC) and CBDT Circular Nos. 17 dated 17.07.1953 and 786 dated 07.02.2000], commission paid to the UK agent was not taxable in India and no obligation on Indian Co to deduct tax at source.

• Reimbursement of expenses – The law is well settled that reimbursement of expense not chargeable to tax and hence, no obligation to deduct tax at source [DIT (IT) vs. Krupp UDHE Gmbh (2010) 38 DTR (Bom) 251 following own decision in CIT vs. Siemens Aktiongesellschaft 220 CTR (Bom) 425].

• Reliance was placed on Circular No. 786 dated 7 February 2000 in respect of non-taxability in India of export commission payable to non-resident agents rendering services abroad.

Note: The aforementioned Circular No. 786 dated 7 February 2000, is withdrawn by Circular No. 7/2009 dated 22nd October, 2009. However, the ITAT and the courts in various cases have held that even after the withdrawal of said circular, export commission payable to non-resident agents rendering services abroad, is not taxable in India.

8. Additional Consideration relating to paragraph 1 & 2 of Article inserted as Article 17(3) in many India’s DTAAs

Article 17 ordinarily applies when the entertainer or sportsperson is employed by a Government and derives income from that Government. However, certain conventions contain provisions excluding entertainers or sportspersons employed in organisations which are subsidised out of public funds from the application of Article 17.

Some countries may consider it appropriate to exclude from the scope of the Article events supported from public funds.

This has been provided as additional consideration in Commentary to Model Convention July 2014 with modifications.

8.1 Such provisions are existing in most of India’s DTAA s and are inserted as paragraph (3) or (4) of Article 17.

8.2 A rticle 17(3) in some of the India’s DTAA s
India – Armenia and India – Japan tax treaty Income taxable only in the resident state, if the event is for approved cultural or sports exchange program.

India – Australia, India – Belgium, India – Indonesia, and India – Mauritius tax treaty Income taxable only in the resident state, if the event is supported by public funds of resident state.

India-Brazil and India – Bangladesh Tax Treaties

Paragraph 1 and 2 will not apply if the activity is wholly or mainly or substantially supported from the public funds of the other contracting state.

9. Conflicts

It is important to note that all the income of the Artistes and Sportsmen may not in all cases be covered by Article 17. It is nature of income which will determine whether the same would fall within the scope of Article 17 or the same would be covered by Article 18 relating to Pensions or Article 19 relating to remuneration in respect of government service.

Conflicts between Article 17 and 18
• Remuneration derived from the entertainment show is governed by Article 17.

• Pension received after termination of performance activity will fall under Article 18.

• Golden handshakes are payment linked to employment and not to the performance, hence does not fall under Article 17.

Conflicts between Article 17 and 19

In case Artists or Sportsperson renders service to Government and receives remuneration then normally Article 17 applies if the activity of the Government is in the nature of business, otherwise Article 19 will apply.

The above article provides just a bird’s eye view of the subject. To gain an in-depth understanding of the subject, the reader would be well advised to study the commentaries on Article 17 of various model conventions and the relevant judicial pronouncements.

AMP: A CONTROVERSY FAR FROM OVER

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Background
Over the past decade, Indian Revenue has been the centre of global attention for its positions on controversies surrounding tax and transfer pricing. In the last few rounds of Transfer Pricing assessments, taxpayers promoting international brands in India have been scrutinised for the level of Advertising, Marketing and Promotion (‘AMP’) expenses incurred by them. These issues largely affected multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’) in consumer durables, electronics, automotive and media sectors. The controversy snowballed, leading to constitution of a three-member Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (‘Appellate Tribunal’), for expert examination of the issues involved. Dissatisfied taxpayers later escalated the issue to the High Court and the same is now pending with the Indian Supreme Court. The most interesting aspect of the AMP controversy is the manner in which this issue has evolved in the judicial hierarchy. While some contentious issues are gradually dwindling as they move up the appellate forums, some issues remain unresolved and with each resolution come new challenges in practical implementation. In the next few paragraphs, we have attempted to summarise the controversy, the evolving judicial elucidation and some unresolved issues.

AMP in the Indian landscape
Under a typical license/distributor arrangement, the Indian entity of a MNE group uses the international brand/ trademark to sell its products in India. For doing so, the Indian entity would pay royalty for using such brand/ trademark. In order to spread awareness of the products and increase/maintain the market share of the products manufactured or distributed by them in India, the Indian entity would incur expenses on advertising, marketing and promotion of such brand/trademark.

During the course of Transfer Pricing assessments, the Indian Revenue has consistently been taking a position that the Indian entity of the MNE group provides assistance to the overseas affiliate, legal owner of the brand/trademark, by enhancing or building the international brand/trademark in India. According to the Revenue, AMP expense beyond the level of expense incurred by comparable businesses (termed as ‘Bright Line Test’ or ‘BLT ’) is non-routine and the same results in creation of marketing intangibles for the legal owner of the brand. Transfer Pricing adjustments have been made on the premise that the Indian entity ought to recover the excess costs along with an appropriate mark-up for such assistance.

Advent of the AMP controversy
The issue of AMP came to limelight in 2010, when the Delhi High Court pronounced a ruling in response to a writ petition filed by Maruti Suzuki1 challenging the show cause notice issued by the Transfer Pricing Officer. The High Court remarked that if the intensity of AMP expenses (defined by a ratio of AMP expense to sales) by the Indian taxpayer is more than what a comparable company would incur, the Indian taxpayer should be compensated at arm’s length, particularly when the use of trademark or logo of the foreign affiliate is obligatory on the part of the Indian taxpayer. With a shot in the arm, the Revenue Authorities made several transfer pricing adjustments in cases of distributors, licensed manufacturers, service providers, etc. using international brands. Without appreciating the difference in functional characterisation, business model and industry life-cycle of the Indian taxpayers, the Indian Revenue painted everyone with the same broad brush and made transfer pricing adjustments for excess AMP expenses.

The Indian Revenue seems to have taken inspiration from the US Tax Court ruling in the year 1998 in the case of DHL2, which was subsequently reversed by Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeal3. In the case of DHL, the Tax Court asked the taxpayer to prove that it incurred more than routine AMP expenses outside US, in order to substantiate that it was the developer of the non-US rights of trademark/brand. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the approach of the Tax Court holding that there was no such requirement of comparing the AMP expenses incurred by the taxpayer with comparable companies under 1968 Regulations.

Evolution of Transfer Pricing Jurisprudence on AMP in India:
As the Delhi High Court ruling on Maruti Suzuki’s writ petition led to a plethora of transfer pricing adjustments for AMP spends, affected taxpayers filed appeals to challenge their legality. The Appellate Tribunal, in one such case, deleted the transfer pricing adjustment on the technical ground that the Transfer Pricing Officer had no jurisdiction to assess any transaction which was not specifically referred by the tax officer assessing the case. The Revenue challenged this technical ground before the High Court but failed, with no discussion being recorded on merits of the transfer pricing adjustment. To overturn this defeat in 2012, the Indian Government amended the transfer pricing provisions through Finance Act, 2012. In the amended provisions, the term ‘intangible property’ was defined to include, inter alia, ‘marketing related intangible assets’, such as trademarks, trade names, brand names, logos, etc. Further, Transfer Pricing Officers were bestowed with the right to test transactions even if not specifically referred by the tax officer. After these amendments, the Appellate Tribunals started adjudicating the AMP issue on merit. However, a disparity in the decisions in different cases created uncertainty around the transfer pricing implication of AMP expenses. Considering the conflicting decisions, the importance and the complexity of the issue, a three-member special bench was constituted by the Appellate Tribunal to adjudicate on the transfer pricing aspects of AMP expenses.

Special Bench Ruling in the case of LG Electronics India Private Limited4 (LG India):

The appeal before the Special Bench of the Appellate Tribunal was led by LG India, while other Indian taxpayers5 also affected by the issue joined as interveners to the case. The key findings of the Special Bench were as under:

AMP expenses incurred by an Indian taxpayer result in creating and improving marketing intangibles for the overseas affiliates

Expenses for the promotion of sales directly lead to brand building, the expenses incurred directly in connection with sales are only sales specific

In addition to promoting its products through advertisements, LG India simultaneously promoted the foreign brand

The concept of economic ownership does not find place under the Indian tax law. It is the legal owner of the brand who is benefitted

If the level of AMP expenses incurred by the Indian taxpayer is in excess of that of comparables, the excess AMP ought to be recovered by the Indian taxpayer from the overseas affiliate along with appropriate mark up

Selling expenses which do not lead to brand promotion do not form part of AMP expenses and hence to be excluded for the purpose of benchmarking.

Subsequent to the decision of the Special Bench, most cases pending before the Appellate Tribunal were sent back to the Transfer Pricing Officers with specific direction to follow the principles laid down by the Special Bench in the LG India case. This resulted in transfer pricing adjustments in many cases, barring some relief on account of exclusion of routine sales expenses from the ambit of AMP spends.

Delhi High Court rulings

In the case of Sony Ericsson:
Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunals following the decision in LG India, taxpayers (including consumer electronics and consumer durables giants like Daikin, Haier, Reebok, Canon and Sony) appealed before the High Court. While adjudicating the case of Sony Ericsson, the High Court laid out the following broad principles:

Upholding the decision in LG India, AMP expenses were treated as an international transaction with associated enterprise (‘AE’) and thus subject to Transfer Pricing Regulations in India

Excess AMP expenses incurred by Indian taxpayers warrant a compensation, but BLT is not well suited for computing the same

Distribution and marketing are intertwined functions and should be analysed in a bundled manner for determining arm’s length remuneration, unless need for de-bundling is adequately demonstrated

If under bundled approach, the gross margins or net margins of the Indian taxpayers are sufficient to cover the excess AMP expenses, then a separate remuneration for such excess from the foreign affiliate is not required

If the distribution and marketing functions are to be debundled then the taxpayer should be allowed a set-off for additional remuneration in one function against a shortfall in the other function

In order to apply bundled approach using an overall Transactional Net Margin Method (‘TNMM’) / Resale Price Method (‘RPM’), it must be ensured that the level of AMP functions in comparables should be similar to that of the Indian taxpayer or the tested entity

An attempt be made to find comparables with similar level of AMP functions and if such comparables cannot be found then proper adjustment be made to even out the differences

All the AMP may not necessarily result in brand building

The concept of economic ownership of intangibles was recognised.

The High Court also suggested that the Appellate Tribunals try to adjudicate the pending cases (rather than remitting the same to the Transfer Pricing Officer) following the broad principles laid down in the case above. However, the Appellate Tribunals have been remitting the issue back to the Transfer Pricing Officer on the ground that no analysis has been carried out in respect of comparability in the level of AMP functions.

In the case of Maruti Suzuki
The case of Maruti Suzuki was also made a part of the appeals heard by the Delhi High Court along with that of Sony Ericsson (supra). However, as against the other appellants alongside Sony Ericsson, who were primarily distributors of their AEs’ products, Maruti Suzuki was a manufacturer. The appeal of Maruti Suzuki was thus de-linked and heard separately by the High Court. In its ruling, the High Court clearly distinguished the facts of the case from its earlier decision in Sony Ericsson. The High Court’s observations were made taking into consideration the specific profile of a manufacturer in the AMP scenario. Further, the High Court re-examined the applicability of Chapter X of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’) to the AMP issue, since the existence of an international transaction was specifically questioned by the taxpayer. The observations of the High Court were as under:

The Court noted that Chapter X of the Act makes no specific mention of AMP expenses as one of the items of expenditure which can be deemed to be an international transaction.

Even if the same is considered to be covered under “any other transaction having a bearing on its profits, incomes or losses”, for a transaction to exist there has to be two parties. Therefore, the onus is on the Revenue authorities to show that there exists an ‘agreement’ or ‘arrangement’ or ‘understanding’ between Maruti Suzuki and its AE, whereby Maruti Suzuki is obliged to spend excessively on AMP in order to promote its AE’s brand8.

A transfer pricing adjustment envisages substitution of price of an international transaction with ALP. An adjustment is not expected to be made by deducing that an international transaction exists based on difference between AMP expenses of the taxpayer and comparable entities.

By applying BLT , the Revenue Authorities had deduced the existence of an international transaction on excessive AMP spend of Maruti Suzuki, and then added back the excess expenditure as transfer pricing adjustment. This was contrary to the High Court’s approach, which required the Revenue Authority to examine an international transaction. The High Court observed that the very existence of an international transaction cannot be matter for inference or surmise.

 In the absence of international transaction involving AMP spend with an ascertainable price, neither the substantive nor machinery provisions of Chapter X of the Act are applicable to the transfer pricing adjustment exercise.

In the cases of Honda Siel9 and Whirlpool10

The Maruti Suzuki ruling has apparently set the precedence for the interpretation of AMP spend in the case of manufacturers. Subsequent rulings have followed the distinct perspective of the High Court and questioned the existence of an international transaction merely on account of excessive AMP expenditure:

In the case of Honda Siel:

  •  The High Court observed that the Revenue Authorities ascertained existence of an International transaction only by applying the BLT. Accordingly, the High Court distinguished the case from its earlier Sony Ericsson ruling.

  • The High Court also observed that mere existence of a license for use of the AE’s brand name would not ipso facto imply any further understanding or arrangement between the taxpayer and its AE regarding the AMP expense for promoting the brand of the foreign AE.

  • Further, the High Court also noted that since the taxpayer was an independent manufacturer, it was incurring AMP expenses for its own benefit and not at the behest of the AE.

  • In the absence of any categorical evidence provided by the Revenue Authorities, the High Court followed the Maruti Suzuki decision and ruled out the existence of an International transaction.

In the case of Whirlpool:

  • The High Court observed that the provisions under Chapter X of the Act do envisage a ‘separate entity concept’. Therefore, there cannot be a presumption that since the taxpayer is a subsidiary of the foreign AE, its activities are dictated by the AE.

  • Once again, the High Court put the onus on the Revenue Authorities to factually demonstrate through some tangible material that the two parties acted in concert, and further, that there was an agreement to enter into an International transaction concerning AMP expenses.
  • Regarding the deductibility of AMP expenses u/s. 37 of the Act, the High Court ruled in favour of the taxpayer and held that merely because the AE is also benefitted by the AMP expenses, their allowability is not precluded.


Subsequent cases

The Delhi High Court as well as the Appellate Tribunal have been speedily disposing cases covering AMP issues by following the ratio laid down in the Sony Ericsson and Maruti Suzuki rulings. An unspoken trend seems to have been set in the pattern of disposal – while the Sony Ericsson ruling is being followed in the case of appellant who are distributors, the Maruti Suzuki ruling is being followed in the case of manufacturers.

  • In the case of Haier Appliances11, the Appellate Tribunal observed that for application of RPM, it is necessary to examine the comparability of the AMP functions performed by the Appellant with those of the comparables. In the absence of adequate information to this effect, the case was remanded back to the Revenue Authorities for fresh consideration. However, the Appellant being a distributor, the presence of an international transaction was not negated (following the ruling in Sony Ericsson case).

  •  Similarly, in the case of Johnson & Johnson12, the Appellate Tribunal held that the Revenue Authorities are duty bound to apply the existing methods under the Act (as against BLT, which has been rejected in the Sony Ericsson ruling).

  • The case of Yum Restaurants13, was remitted back by the High Court for further examination of the franchise marketing model in question. The Sony Ericsson ruling was followed in this case as well. However, here the High Court held that once a transfer pricing adjustment has been made for AMP expenses, the said expenses cannot be disallowed again u/s.40A(2)(b) of the Act.
The case of Bausch & Lomb14 involved manufacturing as well as trading activities. Here, the High Court ruled out the existence of an international transaction, following the Maruti Suzuki ruling. Further, the High Court also observed that ‘function’ needs to be distinguished from ‘transaction’ and that every expenditure forming part of a function cannot be construed as a ‘transaction’.

Is It The End Of The AMP Controversy?
The year 2015 witnessed disposal of several cases by the Delhi High Court and various benches of the Appellate Tribunal. While moving steadily ahead in its appellate journey, the AMP controversy still seems to be far from over.

A special leave petition (‘SLP’) has been filed before the Indian Supreme Court by affected taxpayers challenging the ruling of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sony Ericsson. The coming months are likely to reveal the taxpayers’ and Revenue’s responses to the other rulings of the High Court.

The High Court has not negated the existence of an international transaction where there is excessive AMP spend by Indian distributors. In such cases, the High Court has emphasised the need for comparability of the level of AMP function between the taxpayer and the independent comparable companies. If companies with comparable AMP functions cannot be found, the High Court directed necessary adjustment to even out the difference in the AMP functions. However, neither the High Court nor the Appellate Tribunals have provided any guidance on determining the level of AMP function or computing adjustment for difference in AMP functions. In absence of clear guidance, another round of litigation seems inevitable.

In the case of manufacturers, the existence of an International transaction has been ruled out in absence of specific provisions under Chapter X of the Act. The High Court has also explicitly expressed the need for a clear statutory scheme to check arbitrariness and address existing loopholes. In view of the same, one could expect some legislative amendments in the transfer pricing provisions in the upcoming budget.

The key issue that needs consideration and deliberation is whether the Indian taxpayers have incurred the AMP expenses in their capacity as service providers or as entrepreneurs on their own account. The issue of compensating for AMP function at arm’s length would arise only in case where the Indian taxpayer is incurring AMP expenses in the capacity of a service provider. The answer to this may lie in the functional analysis and conduct of the Indian tax payer and the overseas affiliate. Further, indicative facts like exclusivity, longevity of contract, premium pricing and increase in the market share, etc. could be used to demonstrate the economic ownership of the brand. Documentation by the MNE group would play the key role in helping the MNE find answers, determine the course of action and/or build appropriate defense.

Consideration also needs to be given to the mode of remunerating such service. In place of recovering the AMP expenses from the overseas affiliates, MNEs could consider remunerating the Indian taxpayers by way of higher gross margin to cover the AMP expenses. Lastly, while the MNE groups evaluate their value chains in the wake of BEPS, it may be worthwhile to consider the above implications while aligning ownership of intangible property, compensation and related structures.

1. Maruti Suzuki India Limited vs. Addl. CIT TPO [W.P.(C) 6876/2008] [2010] 328 ITR 210 (Del)

2. DHL Corporation & Subsidiaries vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (T.C. Memo.1998-461, December 30, 1998)

3. DHL Corporation & Subsidiaries vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Ninth Circuit Court ruling, April 11

4. L.G. Electronics India Private Limited vs. Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax (ITA No. 5140/Del/2011)

5. Haier Telecom Pvt. Ltd; Goodyear India; Glaxo Smithkline Consumer India;
Maruti Suzuki India; Sony India; Bausch & Lomb; Fujifilm Corporation; Canon
India; Diakin India; Amadeus India; Star India; Pepsi Foods India

6. Sony Ericsson Mobile Communication India Pvt. Ltd vs. Com-missioner of Income-tax (ITA No. 16/2014) (Del)

7. Maruti Suzuki India Limited vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (ITA 110/2014; ITA 710/2014) (Del)

8. With reference to meaning of ‘international transaction’ u/s. 92B(1) if the Act and meaning of ‘transaction’ u/s. 92F(v) of the Act

9. Honda Siel Power Products Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2015] 64 taxmann.com 328 (Delhi)

10. Commissioner of Income-tax – LTU vs. Whirlpool of India Limited [2015] 64 taxmann.com 324 (Delhi)

11. Haier Appliances India Limited vs. DCIT, OSD, CIT-IV [2016] 65 taxmann.com 74 (Delhi – Trib.)

12. Johnson & Johnson Limited vs. Addl. CIT – LTU (ITA No. 829/M/2014)

13. Yum Restaurants (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer [2016]
66 taxmann.com 47 (Delhi)

14. Bausch & Lomb Eyecare (India) (p.) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [2016] 65 taxmann.com 141 (Delhi)

M/s. Southern Refineries Ltd. vs. State of Kerala and others, [2013] 64 VST 25 (Ker)

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Sales Tax – Scheme of Rehabilitation – Directing State to Grant Exemption From Payment of Tax- State not Granting It – Dealer Relying on Scheme and Not Collecting Tax – State Directed to Consider the Matter for Exemption, The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.

FACTS
The appellant company, a Medium Scale Industries fell sick due to initial problems, could not avail one third of the sales tax exemption limit. BIFR declared the company sick and approved the rehabilitation scheme which provided for specific relief to the company in the form of sales tax exemption and concessional rate of CST.

This was circulated to all concerned. Accordingly the company had claimed exemption from payment of tax and not collected any tax. At the same time, CST was paid at concessional rate of 2%. The company approached the Government to extend the exemption of KGST and concessional rate of CST till March, 31, 2005 as contemplated in the Sanctioned Scheme. However, the tax department issued pre-assessment notices and demanded tax without extending the benefits of exemption under SRO as also the concessional rate of CST at the rate of two per cent. The company filed writ petition before the Kerala High Court to quash the order passed by the Government, as well as, notices and also soughtfor the benefit of exemption and concessions as per sactioned scheme by the BIFR.

HELD
In the present case, the respondent State participated in the proceedings before the BIFR. Taking note of the reluctance by the sales tax authorities to extend the relief envisaged by the sanctioned scheme, BIFR, issued revised directions u/s. 22A of the Act. The State did not prefer any appeal u/s. 25 of the Act. If order and notices allowed to stand, the same would put things out of gear and the entire efforts taken so far by the BIFR for reviving the appellant company from sickness would terribly be watered down, The burden is heavily on the Government to establish that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise on account of public interest. The State was unable to establish overriding public interest which made it inequitable to enforce the estopple against them.

The High Court upheld the plea of promissory estoppels raised by the appellant company. The High Court allowed the appeal and order as well as notices were quashed and directed the respondent State to reconsider the matter and guided by the directions in Sanctioned Scheme by BIFR.

State of Kerala vs. Balsara Hygiene Products [2013] 63 VST 535 (Ker) Sales Tax “Odonil” – Room /Cup Board Freshener Not Taxable As “Shampoo Talcum Powder, Perfumeries and Cosmetics” or As “Repellent”- Taxable Under Residuary Entry.

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Sales Tax – Second Sale by Holder of TradeMark – Not a Resale – Taxable as First Sale, Section 5(2) and Entry 85 and 127 of Schedule I of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

FACTS
The Company engaged in sale of consumer products like toothpaste, Moth repellants, etc. within the State and also holder/owner of trademark claimed second sale in respect of sale of its products like “Promise” “Meswak” “Odonil” etc. being purchased from registered dealer. The company paid tax @8% on sale of “Odonil” moth repellant under entry 85 of Schedule I the Act. The assessing authority disallowed the claim of resale u/s. 5(2) of The Act being sale of goods by trade mark Holder/Owner and levied tax thereon.

Further, the assessing authority levied tax @20% on sale of “Odonil” as the same is an “Air Freshener” would be classified as “perfumery” coming within entry 127 of the schedule I of the Act.

The Tribunal held in favour of the company for levy of tax @8% on sale of “Odonil”. The Tribunal also allowed the claim of resale of the assessee company. The State filed appeal before the Kerala High Court against the said decision of Tribunal.

HELD
The entry 127 of Schedule I covers goods like “shampoo”, “Talcum Powder” etc. The item so specifically mentioned are all relating to items which are used on the human body for beautification, grooming and having cosmetic qualities or properties. By including the specific items, the expansions to include other perfumeries and cosmetics would also be restricted to such items which would answer the description of the specific items mentioned in the entry. The principle of “ejusdemgeneris” would compel to understand the meaning of a word from the meaning of the works employed together with it. The product “Odonil” which is admittedly a room/ cup-board fresher cannot be brought under the description of perfumery in entry 127. As regards claim of the company for levy of tax at 8% under entry 85 of Schedule-I, as “Mosquito Repellents”, the court held that the predominant function is not descernible from the records. The wrapper of products indicates that it is an air freshener and also a moth repellant. The fragrance provided is projected as masking the bad odour of chemical and also avoiding bad odour in rooms /covered space. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the dominant use of the product is that of a moth repellant and the same would fall under residuary entry of schedule I of The Act. Accordingly, the High Court held it covered by residuary entry of the Schedule I of the Act.

In respect of the second issue of claim of resale, the High Court held that u/s. 5(2) of the Act sale of goods under a trademark or name, by the brand name holder or trademark holder within the State shall be the first sale for the purpose of this Act. In this case, the company is a trademark/brand name holder of certain products more specifically tooth paste and toothbrush sold in the trade name “Promise” and “Meswak”. The company had purchased the said goods from M/s. Besta Cosmetics Limited who manufactured said goods under grant of license by the assessee company to manufacture under the said trade name. Section 5(2) of the act is an anti evasion measure and it contemplates the liability to be at that point of sale in case sale of manufactured goods other that tea, within the State:-

i) Made under a trademark or brand name,
ii) By a trademark / brand name holder

The sale hence would be not only by a trademark / brand name holder, but it should also be under trademark / brand name. The first sale by the manufacturer to the assessee company is of course sale by a trademark/brand name holder but, not a sale under trademark/brand name. Hence the second sale effected by the assessee company being again a sale by a trade mark / brand name holder and also a sale under trademark / brand name, is liable to tax u/s. 5(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the order of Tribunal allowing the claim of resale of the assessee company was set aside and the order of first appellate authority levying tax was confirmed.

2016 (41) STR 191 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Surat –II.

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Commission paid to distributors for selling goods does not amount to sales promotion. Therefore, CENVA T credit was held inadmissible.

Facts
Adjudicating authority disallowed CENVAT credit on commission charges paid to the distributors/consignment stockist following Hon’ble Gujarat High Court’s decision in Cadila Healthcare Limited 2013 (30) STR 3 (Guj). It was contested that the case was factually different as the agreement was not only for sale of the products but it also included sales promotion activities. Department contested on the ground that the contract did not provide for any monetary consideration for the sales promotion activity and therefore, the entire consideration was held to be for sale of goods based on the value of the goods sold.

Held
After analysing the agreement, the Tribunal observed that sales promotion activity was not required to be carried out by distributors on behalf of the appellant. Even though display photographs, brochures and sales promotion material were provided, no consideration was towards such activity. Relying upon jurisdictional High Court’s decision in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. (supra), it was held that activities undertaken by the distributors of the appellant were purely distribution/ sales and had no element of sales promotion and hence, CENVAT credit was held inadmissible. However, since it was a debatable issue, penalty was set aside.

2016 (41) STR 123 (Tri-Chennai) SRF Ltd vs. CCEx., Trichy

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Penalty u/s. 77 cannot be imposed on the ground of non-endorsement of new service in registration certificate.

Facts
The Appellant was registered under category of GTA as a receiver of service for payment of service tax and was paying tax under that category. Subsequently, it has received BAS services from abroad and accordingly discharged service tax under BAS. However penalty u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 was imposed for not amending its registration certificate which is challenged before the Tribunal.

Held
The Appellant was a registered assessee and there was no default in payment of tax under the new category though endorsement was not done at that point of time. Since there was no deliberate default to evade the tax, penalty was waived.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 282 (Mumbai-CESTAT) Lupin Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Mumbai

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Even if exemption to education cess or secondary & higher secondary education cess are not specifically mentioned in notification, they are also eligible for exemption/refund in addition to basic excise duty.

Facts
Refund of Education Cess (EC) and Secondary & Higher Education Cess (SHEC) paid in cash claimed under Notification No. 56/2002-CE dated 14/11/2012 (area based exemption) was denied to the appellant on the ground that said notification exempts only basic excise duty. Appellant’s plea that its issue was squarely covered by Bharat Box Factory Ltd. vs. CCE 2007 (214) ELT 534 which was initially rejected by Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that revenue has filed SLP in Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Held
The Tribunal held that since revenue could not obtain stay from Hon’ble Supreme Court and status of case is still shown as pending, mere filing of SLP should not result in denial of applying the ratio of a case which is in favour of appellant. In Bharat Box Factory Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal had held that when for operationalizing exemption, exempted amount of duty is required to be refunded, there was no question of levying education cess and hence it is also required to be refunded. Following the same, it was held that appellant should be entitled to refund of EC & SHEC paid on clearances of goods under Notification No. 56/2002-CE. Decision of Cyrus Surfactants (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE 2007 taxmann.com 806 (New Delhi – CESTAT) was also relied upon.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 128 (Ahmedabad-CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad- II vs. Nova Petrochemicals Ltd.

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Recovery under Rule 14 of CENVA T credit Rules cannot be initiated merely because instead of making transfer through ST-3 return, manufacturer-cum-service provider assessee availed input service tax credit directly in ER-1 return.

Facts
The Assessee, a manufacturer availed service tax credit which was utilised for making payment of excise duty. The credit was directly claimed in ER-1 return without reflecting the same in ST-3. Department issued SCN for recovery of alleged wrong utilisation of CENVAT credit by invoking Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules read with proviso to section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and confirmed by adjudication. Commissioner (Appeals) decided the matter in favour of assessee, relying upon verification report of the department where the credits taken were verified and found in order. Aggrieved by the same, the department filed appeal before the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that assessee was required to enter the credit of said amount in relevant ST-3 return and put a remark of transfer of the said credit in the ER-1 return utilised for payment of excise duty. Instead, input service tax credit was debited from the CENVAT account register and utilised in ER-1 return and it was not reflected in ST-3 return. However, it was noted that amount taken and utilised in ER-1 return of the respective month was deducted from total credit balance and only the balance amount was shown in respective column of ST-3 return and therefore the department’s appeal was dismissed.

Capital or revenue receipt – A. Y. 2009-10 – Money to be used in purchase of plant and machinery temporarily placed in fixed deposits – Inextricably linked with setting up of plant – Interest on fixed deposits is capital receipt

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Princ. CIT vs. Factor Power Ltd.; 380 ITR 474 (Del):

In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee received an amount of Rs. 70,75,843/- from the bank as interest on fixed deposits but did not declare that amount in the return. Instead the assessee reduced the interest amount from the capital work-in-progress. The assessee claimed that it is a capital receipt and not income. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee and made an addition of Rs. 70,75,843/- as “income from other sources”. The Tribunal allowed the assesee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The test that is required to be employed is whether the activity which is taken up for setting up of the business and the funds which are garnered are inextricably connected to the setting up of the business.

ii) The findings of fact had been returned by the Commissioner(Appeals) and had been confirmed by the Tribunal to the effect that the funds were inextricably connected with the setting up of the power plant of the assessee. The Revenue had also not been able to point out any perversity in such finding and, therefore, the factual findings had to be taken as those accepted by the Tribunal which is the final fact finding authority in the income-tax regime.

iii) Thus, the revenue generated on account of interest on the fixed deposits would be in the nature of capital receipt and not a revenue receipt.”

Business expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 2003-04 – Year in which allowable – Project abandoned as unviable at capital-work-in-progress stage – No claim made in earlier year – Expenses allowable in the year of write-off

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Binani Cement Ltd. vs CIT; 380 ITR 116 (Cal):

In the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed deduction of the expenditure on a project which had been abandoned when it was found to be unviable. The expenditure was not claimed or allowed earlier as business expenditure and was written off as capital-work-in-progress in the relevant year. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that when construction/acquisition of a new facility was abandoned when it was found to be unviable at the work-in-progress stage, the expenditure did not result in an enduring advantage and such expenditure, when written off, had to be allowed u/s. 37. The Tribunal reversed the order of the Commissioner(Appeals) holding that the expenditure incurred in the earlier years could not be deducted in the A. Y. 2003-04.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“There was no challenge on the finding of the Commissioner(Appeals) on the facts before the Tribunal or even the appeal. There would have been no occasion to claim the deduction if the work-in-progress had completed its course. Because the project was abandoned the workin- progress did not proceed any further. The decision to abandon the project was the cause for claiming the deduction. The decision was taken in the relevant year. Thus the expenditure arose in the relevant year. The question is answered in favour of the assessee.”

ALP – International transaction – Sections 92CA and 144C – A. Y. 2012-13 – Amount in dispute exceeding Rs. 5 crore – Matter has to be referred to TPO

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Carrier Race Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO; 380 ITR 483 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2012-13, the assessee had entered into international transactions. The international transactions were certified to be at arm’s length, based on the transactional net margin method as defined. The transfer pricing report and the transfer pricing documentation had been filed. The Assessing Officer computed the arm’s length price on his own and completed the assessment which resulted in an addition of more than Rs. 5 crore.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Under the CBDT Instruction dated 20/05/2003, once the disputed value crosses a sum of Rs. 5 crore, necessarily the assessing authority has to refer the matter to the Transfer Pricing Officer so as to proceed further.
ii) Since the provisions of the Act make it clear that u/s. 92CA the only option was to place the matter before the Transfer Pricing Officer, and that option had not been followed, the assessment order was not valid and had to be set aside.”

Business Income – Special Deduction – Proceeds generated from sale of scrap not includable in “Total turnover” for the determining the admissible deduction u/s. 80HHC.

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Mahavira Cycle Industries vs. CIT & Anr. [2015] 379 ITR 357 (SC)

The assessee-firm was dealing in trading and manufacturing of cycle parts. It claimed that the scrap was bi-product of manufacturing which was not part of the total turnover. On November 29, 1999, the assessee filed its original return for the assessment year 1999-2000 declaring a total income as nil. The assessee claimed deduction of Rs.1,73,53,957 u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The return was processed u/s. 143(1)(a) on March 21, 2001. The case was reopened u/s. 148 of the Act. During the assessment proceedings, it was found that the assessee had made sale of scrap amounting to Rs.79,25,489. According to the view point of the Revenue, the sale proceeds of the scrap was a part of the total turnover though the assessee had ignored to include the amount of sale of scrap while computing the deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. At the same time, the Assessing Office excluded the profit on sale of scrap from the profit of the business on proportionate basis for the purposes of calculation of deduction u/s. 80HHC. The Assessing Officer, thus, vide order dated July 10, 2006, modified the deduction admissible u/s. 80HHC.

The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (for short “the CIT(A)”). The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) held that the Assessing Officer fell in legal error by including the sale of scrap in the total turnover for the purpose of computation of deduction u/s. 80HHC. It was also clarified that the sale of scrap shall not be considered while computing the profits of the business and, accordingly, by its order dated September 25, 2006, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal.

The order giving effect to the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was passed on October 3, 2006 by the Assessing Officer wherein the total income was assessed at nil. However, later on the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that while giving effect to the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), a mistake apparent on the face of the record had occurred as the scrap sales amounting to Rs.79,25,489 had to be excluded from the total turnover as well as from the profits of the business for computing deduction u/s. 80HHC. The Assessing Officer rectified its earlier order giving appeal effect by exercise of the powers under section 154 of the Act, vide order dated November 28, 2006 and recomputed the deduction by excluding the entire turnover of sale of scrap from the profits of the business. The assessee again filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) challenging the order dated November 28, 2006 of the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), however, dismissed the appeal, vide order dated December 28, 2007, in the light of its earlier order dated September 25, 2006, holding that u/s.154 the Assessing Officer was competent to initiate proceedings to exclude the turnover of sale of scrap from the profit of business for the purpose of computation of deduction u/s. 80HHC. The assessee further took the matter in appeal before the Tribunal, impugning the orders passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated December 28, 2007, and September 25, 2006. The main submission that was raised on behalf of the assessee was that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had erred in holding that the entire turnover of sale of scrap was to be excluded from profits of business while computing the deduction u/s. 80HHC.

The Tribunal vide order dated September 29, 2008, held that the deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act should be computed after excluding the profit on sale of scrap from the profit of business and the sale of scrap also would not form part of the total turnover, for the purpose of calculation of deduction u/s. 80HHC and dismissed both the appeals of the assessee.

The High Court held that the question regarding the inclusion of profit on sale of scrap in calculating business profit u/s. 80HHC had come up for consideration before the Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Kar Mobiles Ltd.’s case (311 ITR 478) where after examining the provisions of section 80HHC and Explanation (baa)(1) attached thereto, it was held that the profits arising from the sale of scrap shall form part of business profits referred to in the formula for determining admissible deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. It was also recorded that the sale of scrap shall also form part of the total turnover of the assessee.

Before the Supreme Court, the Revenue acknowledged that the controversy in hand has been adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries (364 ITR 144), in which it was held that sale proceeds of scrap were not includible in turnover.

The Supreme Court therefore allowed the application of the assessee and disposed of the civil appeals in terms of the judgment in CIT vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries.

Penalty u/s. 271E -When the original assessment is set aside, the satisfaction recorded therein for the purpose of initiation of penalty proceeding would not survive – Penalty imposed on the basis of original order cannot be sustained.

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CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (2015) 379 ITR 521 (SC)

In respect of the assessment year 1992-93, assessment order was passed on February 26,1996, on the basis of the CIB information informing the Department that the assessee was engaged in a large scale purchase and sale of wheat but it was not filing income–tax return. Ex parte proceedings were initiated, which resulted in the aforesaid order, as per which the net taxable income of the assessee was assessed at Rs. 18,34,584. While framing the assessment, the Assessing Officer also observed that the assessee had contravened the provisions of section 269SS of the Act and because of this, the Assessing Officer was satisfied that penalty proceedings u/s. 271E of the Act were to be initiated.

The assessee carried out this order in appeal. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal and set aside the assessment order with a direction to frame the assessment de novo after affording adequate opportunity to the assessee.

After remand, the Assessing Officer passed a fresh assessment order. In this assessment order, however, no satisfaction regarding initiation of penalty proceedings u/s. 271E of the Act was recorded.

It so happened that on the basis of the original assessment order dated February 26, 1996, show-cause notice was given to the assessee and it resulted in passing the penalty order dated September 23, 1996. Thus, this penalty order was passed before the appeal of the assessee against the original assessment order was heard and allowed thereby setting aside the assessment order itself. It is in this backdrop, a question arose as to whether the penalty order, which was passed on the basis of the original assessment order and when that assessment order had been set aside, could still survive.

The Tribunal as well as the High Court held that it could not be so for the simple reason that when the original assessment order itself was set aside, the satisfaction recorded therein for the purpose of initiation of the penalty proceeding u/s. 271E would also would not survive. According to Supreme Court this was the correct proposition of law stated by the High Court in the impugned order.

The Supreme Court observed that, in so far as the fresh assessment order was concerned, there was no satisfaction recorded regarding the penalty proceeding u/s. 271E of the Act though in that order the Assessing Officer wanted penalty proceeding to be initiated u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. The Supreme Court thus held that in so far as penalty u/s. 271E was concerned, it was without any satisfaction and, therefore, no such penalty could be levied. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue.

Business Expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital cannot be disallowed in a case where advances are made to subsidiary out of such borrowed capital due to business expediency.

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Hero Cycle P. Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 379 ITR 347( SC)

In the income-tax return filed by the assessee for the aforesaid assessment year, the assessee, inter alia, claimed deduction of interest paid on borrowed sums from bank under the privisions of section 36(1)(iii) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The aforesaid deduction was disallowed by the Assessing Officer, vide his assessment order dated March 26, 1991, on the following two points:

(1) The assessee had advanced a sum of Rs. 1,16,26,128 to its subsidiary company known as M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. and this advance did not carry any interest. According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee had borrowed the money from the banks and paid interest thereupon. Deduction was claimed as business expenditure but substantial money out of the loans taken from the bank was diverted by giving advance to M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. on which no interest was charged by the assessee. Therefore, he concluded that the money borrowed on which interest was paid was not for business purposes and no deduction could be allowed.

(2) In addition, the assessee had also given advances to its directors in the sum of Rs. 34 lakh on which the assessee charged from those directors interest at the rate of 10%, whereas interest payable on the money taken by way of loans by the assessee from the banks carried interest at the rate of 18%. On that basis, the Assessing Officer held that charging of interest at the rate of 10% from the abovementioned persons and paying interest at much more rate, i.e., at the rate of 18% on the money borrowed by the assessee could not be treated for the purposes of business of the assessee.

The assessee had claimed deduction of interest in the sum of Rs. 20,53,120. The Assessing Officer, after recording the aforesaid reasons, did not allow the deduction of the entire amount and re-calculated the figures, thereby disallowed the aforesaid claim to the extent of Rs. 16,39,010.

The assessee carried the matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

In so far as the advance given to M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. was concerned, the case put up by the assessee even before the Assessing Officer was that it had given an undertaking to the financial institutions to provide M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. the additional margin to meet the working capital for meeting any cash losses. It was further explained that the assessee-company was the promoter of M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. and since it had the controlling share in the said company that necessitated giving of such an undertaking to the financial institutions. The amount was, thus, advanced in compliance with the stipulation laid down by the three financial institutions under a loan agreement which was entered into between M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. and the said financial institutions and it became possible for the financial institutions to advance that loan to M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd., because of the aforesaid undertaking given by the assessee. No interest was to be paid on this loan unless dividend was paid by that company.

On that basis, it was argued that the amount was advanced by way of business expediency. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the aforesaid plea of the assessee.

In so far as the loan given to its own directors at the rate of 10 % was concerned, the explanation of the assessee was that this loan was never given out of any borrowed funds. The assessee had demonstrated that on the date when the loan was given, that is on March 25,1987, to these directors, there was a credit balance in the account of the assessee from where the loan was given. It was demonstrated that even after the encashment of the cheques of Rs. 34 lakh in favour of those directors by way of loan, there was a credit balance of Rs. 4,95,670 in the said bank account. The aforesaid explanation was also accepted by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) arriving at a finding of fact that the loan given to the directors was not from the borrowed funds. Therefore, the interest liability of the assessee towards the bank on the borrowing, which was taken by the assessee had no bearings because otherwise, the assessee had sufficient funds of its own which the assesse could have advanced and it was for the Assessing Officer to establish the nexus between the borrowings and advancing to prove that the expenditure was for non-business purposes which the Assessing Officer failed to do.

The Revenue challenged the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the aforesaid view of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and, thus, dismissed the appeal preferred by the Revenue.

The appeal of the Revenue before the High Court filed u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, however, was allowed by the High Court, by simply following its own judgment in the case of CIT vs. Abhishek Industries Ltd. (286 ITR 1).

The Supreme court applying the ratio of its decision in S. A. Builders vs. CIT (288 ITR 1) to the facts of this case and referring to the decision of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Dalmia Cement (B) Ltd. (254 ITR 377) which was approved in S. A. Builders (supra), held that it was manifest that the advance to M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. became imperative as a business expediency in view of the undertaking given to the financial institutions by the assessee to the effect that it would provide additional margin to meet working capital for cash losses.

The Supreme Court noted that, subsequently, the assessee-company had off-loaded its shareholding in the said M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. to various companies of the Oswal group and at that time, the assessee-company not only got the back the entire loan given to M/s. Hero Fibres Ltd. but this was refunded with interest. In the year in which the aforesaid interest was received, the same was shown as income and offered to tax.

In so far as the loans to the directors was concerned, the Supreme Court observed that it could not be disputed by the Revenue that the assessee had a credit balance in the bank account when the said advance of Rs. 34 lakh was given. Further, as observed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in his order, the company had reserve/surplus to the tune of almost 15 crore and, therefore, the assessee-company could in any case, utilise those funds for giving advance to its directors.

In view of above, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal thereby setting aside the order of the High Court and restoring that of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

Note:- The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S. A. Builders was analysed in the column ‘ Closements’ of BCAJ in the month of February, 2007.

Obligation of Foreign Company to File Return of Income where Income Exempt under DTAA

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The obligation to file a return of income under the Income -tax Act, 1961 arises by virtue of section 139 of that Act. Section 139(1) provides that every person, being a company or a firm, or being a person other than a company or a firm, having total income exceeding the maximum amount not chargeable to income tax during the previous year, shall file a return of income in the prescribed manner. The provisos to this s/s. and s/s.s (4A) to (4F) of this section, require filing of returns of income by various entities, even where these entities’ income may not be chargeable to tax.

The 3rd proviso to section 139(1) provides that every company or firm shall furnish its return of income or loss before the due date in every previous year. The 4th proviso further requires every person, who is resident and ordinarily resident and who otherwise is not required to furnish a return of income, and who holds any foreign asset as a beneficial owner or otherwise, or who is a beneficiary of any foreign asset, to file a return of income. Sub-section (4A) applies to charitable or religious institutions claiming exemption u/s.s 11 and 12, s/s. (4B) applies to political parties, s/s. (4C) applies to research associations, news agencies, profession regulatory bodies, educational institutions, hospitals, mutual funds, securitisation trusts, venture capital funds, trade unions, infrastructure debt funds, etc., s/s. (4D) applies to research organisations, s/s. (4E) applies to real estate investment trusts and infrastructure investment trusts, while s/s. (4F) applies to alternative investment funds.

A foreign company may at times have income which is chargeable to tax in India under the provisions of the Act, but which may be exempt from tax by virtue of the provisions of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (“DTAA”). The issue has arisen before the Authority for Advance Rulings (“AAR”) as to whether such a foreign company, whose entire Indian income is not taxable in India by virtue of a DTAA, is required to file its return of income in India. There have been conflicting rulings of the AAR on this issue, at times holding that there is no such obligation to file a return of income in India, while at times holding that a return of income has necessarily to be filed in India by a foreign company, irrespective of the fact that its income is not liable to tax in India.

Castleton Investment Ltd ’s case
The issue had arisen before the AAR in the case of Castleton Investment Ltd, in re, 348 ITR 537.

In this case, the assessee was a Mauritius company, part of a multinational group, which held shares of a listed company in India, amounting to 3.77% of the paid-up capital of the listed company. As a part of the reorganisation of the group structure, it proposed to transfer the shares held by it in the listed company in India to another group company based in Singapore, either through a transaction on a recognised stock exchange on which the shares were listed, or through an off market sale.

It filed an application for a ruling before the AAR, as to whether the capital gains arising from transfer of the shares of the listed company would be subjected to tax in India, or whether such capital gains would be exempt from tax by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the India Mauritius DTAA . It also raised the question as to whether the provisions of section 115JB, relating to Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) was applicable to it. One of the other questions raised by it in the application was that if the transfer of shares of the listed company was not taxable in India, whether it was required to file any return of income u/s. 139.

The authority held that the capital gains arising to the assessee was not chargeable to tax in India by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the DTAA between India and Mauritius. As regards the issue of whether the assessee was under an obligation to file the return of income, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that since the income was not taxable in India under the Act read with the DTAA, there was no obligation on the assessee to file a return of income u/s. 139. On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that whatever may be the position under the DTAA , the applicant was bound to file a return of income as mandated by section 139.

The AAR, analysing the provisions of section 139, observed that every person, being a company, firm or a person other than a company or firm, had to file a return of income if its/his total income exceeded the maximum amount which was not chargeable to income tax. If an assessee had income which was chargeable under the Act, or after claiming the benefit of a DTAA, if it had chargeable income exceeding the maximum amount not chargeable to tax, it was bound to file a return as per the language of section 139.

The Authority observed that a person claiming the benefit of the DTAA could do so by invoking the provisions of section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act to claim such benefit. In other words, a person earning an income that was otherwise chargeable to tax under the Act had to make a claim by invoking section 90(2) of the Act for getting the benefit of a DTAA in order to enable him to be not liable to payment of tax in India. According to the AAR, even if a person was entitled to a relief under the DTAA , he had to seek it, and that would be during the consideration of his return of income or at best, while filing the return of income. The AAR accordingly was of the view that the obligation u/s. 139 did not simply disappear merely because a person was entitled to claim the benefit of a DTAA.

Addressing the argument that a DTAA overrides the Act, and was not the same as claiming an exemption under the Act, the AAR observed that surely, in terms of section 90(2), it had to be shown that the benefit of a DTAA was being claimed, that the claimant was eligible to make that claim, and that the DTAA was more beneficial to the claimant than the Act. According to the AAR, that had to be shown before the assessing authority, and this emphasised the need to file a return of income to claim such a relief. The AAR therefore held that the assessee had an obligation to file a return of income in terms of section 139. Incidentally, in this case, the AAR also held that the provisions of section 115JB relating to MAT on book profits, applied to the assessee.

A similar view had been taken by the AAR in the cases of VNU International BV, in re 334 ITR 56, SmithKline Beecham Port Louis Ltd., in re 348 ITR 556, ABC International Inc., in re 199 Taxman 211, and XYZ/ABC Equity Fund, in re 250 ITR 194, in all of which cases, the income was taxable in India under the Act, but exempt under the DTAA . In XYZ/ABC Equity Fund’s case, a case where business profits earned in India were held not liable under the DTAA in absence of a permanent establishment in India, a view has been taken that:

“‘Total income’ is to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act. According to section 5, total income of a non-resident includes all income from whatever source derived which is received or is deemed to be received in India in a given year or accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to the non-resident in India during such year. Therefore, if the income received by or on behalf of the non-resident exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax, a return of income has to be filed. It may be that in the final computation after all deductions and exemptions are allowed, it will turn out that the assessee will be not liable to pay any tax. The exemptions and deductions cannot be taken by the assessee on his own. He is obliged to file his return showing his income and claiming the deductions and exemptions. It is for the Assessing Officer to decide whether such deductions and exemptions are permissible or allowable. The assessee cannot be allowed to pre-judge the issues and decide for himself not to file the return, if he is of the view that he will not have any taxable income at all.”

Even in the case of Deere & Co, in re 337 ITR 277 (AAR), where the transaction of gift of shares to another group company was not chargeable to capital gains tax at all even under the Act, as well as under the DTAA , the AAR has taken the view that the assessee was under an obligation to file its return of income, following its earlier rulings.

FactSet Research System’s case
The issue had also come up before the AAR in the case of FactSet Research Systems Inc, in re 317 ITR 169.

In this case, the assessee was a US company, which maintained a database of financial and economic information, including fundamental data of a large number of companies worldwide, at its data centres located in the USA. The databases contained the published information collated, stored and displayed in an organised manner, which facilitated retrieval of publicly available information in a shorter span of time and in a focused manner by its customers, who were mostly financial intermediaries and investment banks. The customers paid a subscription to access the database.

Besides seeking a ruling from AAR as to whether such subscription received from customers in India would be taxable in India under the Income-tax Act or under the DTAA between India and the USA, the assessee also raised the question of whether it was absolved from filing a tax return in India under the provisions of section 139 with regard to the subscription fees, assuming that it had no other taxable income in India.

The AAR held that the payment of the subscription fees did not constitute royalty either under the Act [as it then stood before the retrospective amendment to section 9(1)(vi)] or under the India USA DTAA. While examining whether the subscription fees was taxable as business income under the DTAA , the AAR took note of the assessee’s submissions that the Mumbai office of a group subsidiary provided marketing and support services to its customers in India, but that, after initial discussions with the prospective customers, the contract was signed by the customer and by the assessee, and that the Mumbai office did not have the authority to conclude contracts with customers. The AAR accepted the assessee’s submission, but left it open to the Department to make enquiry as to the existence or otherwise of an agency PE, and as to the attribution of income to such PE.

As regards the question of obligation to file a return of income, based on its finding that there was no royalty income and on the facts stated by the assessee that there was no PE in India, the AAR held that there was no obligation on the assessee to file the return of income in India.

A similar view had been taken by the AAR in the case of Venenburg Group BV, in re (2007) 289 ITR 462, where the AAR observed that the liability to pay tax was founded upon sections 4 and 5 of the Act, which were the charging sections. Section 139 and other sections were merely machinery sections to determine the amount of tax. According to the AAR, relying on the decision in the case of Chatturam vs. CIT (1947) 15 ITR 302, there would be no occasion to call a machinery section to one’s aid, where there was no liability at all. Therefore, the assessee was not required to file any tax returns, though the capital gains from the proposed transaction would be chargeable to tax under the Act, but would be exempt under the DTAA .

Observations
Section 139(1) requires a filing of return of income by a person other than a company or a firm if income exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax. Clause(a) provides for filing of return of income by a company or a firm and in doing so does not expressly limit the requirement to the cases of income exceeding the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. This may be on account of the fact that a company or a firm does not have any maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax, since it is liable to pay tax on its entire chargeable income at a flat rate of tax.

The definition of “company” u/s. 2(17) includes a body corporate incorporated by or under the laws of the country outside India and a foreign company would be subjected to the provisions of the Act provided its activities has some connection with India. Obviously, every company in the world cannot be required to file its return of income in India, if it does not have any source of income in India keeping in mind the fact that the scope of the Act as envisaged in section 1(2) is restricted to India and the intention is to charge income, which has some connection with India.

Section 5 of the Act in a way spells out the connection with India which creates a charge to tax, when read with section 4. For a non-resident, the charge to tax is of income received or deemed to be received in India, or income accruing or arising or deemed to accrue or arise in India.

Section 90(2) of the Act spells out the overriding nature of DTAA s. It provides that where a DTAA has been entered into by the Central Government with the Government of any country outside India for granting relief of tax or avoidance of double taxation, in case of an assessee to whom the DTAA applies, the provisions of the Act will apply to the extent that they are more beneficial to the assessee. Therefore, the provisions of the DTAA or the Act, whichever is more beneficial to the assessee, would apply. The DTAA would therefore override all the provisions of the Act, except chapter X-A relating to General Anti-Avoidance Rules, as provided in section 90(2A).

It must be remembered that the charge to tax u/s. 4 is on the total income, and the total income is computed under the Act, after various exemptions and deductions, including those available under the DTAA . If income of an assessee is completely exempt from tax, there is no charge to tax at all. Similarly, if the income does not accrue or arise or is not deemed to accrue or arise or is not received or deem to be received in India, it does not fall within the scope of total income, and there is no charge to tax of such income. Given the fact that there is no charge to tax, can the other machinery provisions relating to filing of return, computation of tax, etc. apply?

The AAR in Venenburg Group’s case (supra) rightly referred to the decision of in Chatturam’s case. In that case, the assessee was a resident of a partially excluded area, and received a notice to furnish his return of income. His assessment was completed, and his appeals to the tribunal were dismissed. A notification was issued after he had filed his return, but before completion of his assessment, directing that certain income tax laws would apply to that area where the assessee was a resident retrospectively. The Court, while holding that the assessments were validly made on the assessee, observed as under:

“The income-tax assessment proceedings commence with the issue of a notice. The issue or receipt of a notice is not, however, the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to make the assessment or of the liability of the assessees to pay the tax. It may be urged that the issue and service of a notice under Section 22(1) or (2) may affect the liability under the penal clauses which provide for failure to act as required by the notice. The jurisdiction to assess and the liability to pay the tax, however, are not conditional on the validity of the notice. Suppose a person, even before a notice is published in the papers under Section 22(1), or before he receives a notice under Section 22(2) of the Income-tax Act, gets a form of return from the Income-tax Office and submits his return, it will be futile to contend that the Income-tax Officer is not entitled to assess the party or that the party is not liable to pay any tax because a notice had not been issued to him The liability to pay the tax is founded on Sections 3 and 4 of the Income tax Act, which are the charging sections. Section 22 etc are the machinery sections to determine the amount of tax. Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1926] AC 37; 10 Tax Cas 88 stated as follows:—”Now, there are” three stages in the imposition of a tax. There is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment, that ex hypothesi has already been fixed. But assessment particularizes the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay”. In W.H. Cockerline & Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1930] 16 Tax Cas 1, at p. 19, Lord Hanworth, M.R., after accepting the passage from Lord Dunedin’s judgment quoted above, observed as follows:—”Lord Dunedin, speaking, of course, with accuracy as to these taxes was not unmindful of the fact that it is the duty of the subject to whom a notice is given to render a return in order to enable the Crown to make an assessment upon him; but the charge is made in consequence of the Act, upon the subject; the assessment is only for the purpose of quantifying it He quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Sargant, L.J., in the case of Williams Not reported: —” I cannot see that the non-assessment prevents the incidence of the liability, though the amount of the deduction is not ascertained until assessment. The liability is imposed by the charging section, namely, Section 38 (of the English Act) the words of which are clear. The subsequent provisions as to assessment and so on are machinery only. They enable the liability to be quantified, and when quantified to be enforced against the subject, but the liability is definitely and finally created by the charging section and all the material for ascertaining it are available immediately”. In Attorney-General v. Aramayo and Others [1925] 9 Tax Cas 445, it was held by the whole Court that there may be a waiver as to the machinery of taxation which inures against the subject. In India these well-considered pronouncements are accepted without reservation as laying down the true principles of taxation under the Income-tax Act.”

These observations of the Court, when applied to provisions of section 139, clarifies that the machinery provisions cannot be divorced from the charging provisions.

There are various persons whose income is exempt from tax, and which were earlier not required to file a return of income u/s. 139, on account of the fact that the total income was exempt from tax. Wherever the legislature thought fit that such persons should file their returns of income, the law has been amended by insertion of various sub-sections to section 139, from time to time, being s/s.s (4A) to (4F) referred to earlier. There has been no such amendment requiring foreign companies whose total income is exempt under a DTAA to file their returns of income, in spite of the fact that the AAR has held as far back as 2007 that foreign companies need not do so.

As regards the argument that the availability of the exemption under the DTAA needs to be examined, and therefore the return of income needs to be filed, taking the argument to its logical conclusion, can one say that every agriculturist in India is required to file his return of income, even though he has only agricultural income, on account of the fact that, whether his income is agricultural or not and whether the exemption u/s. 10(1) is available or not, needs to be examined by the assessing officer?

Interestingly, this aspect of examination of the availability of exemption has also been a matter of controversy between the High Courts in the context of assessees exempt u/s. 10(22), with the Bombay High Court holding, in the case of DIT(E) vs. Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical Centre (2001) 250 ITR 488, that the return of income was required to be filed for such examination of whether exemption was available, and the Delhi High Court, in the case of DIT(E) vs. All India Personality Enhancement & Cultural Centre For Scholars Aipeccs Society 379 ITR 464, holding that there was no such requirement to file return of income if the income was exempt u/s. 10(22).

A DTAA cannot be read in exclusion, but has to be read in conjunction with the Act. In particular, a DTAA does not create a charge to tax, but modifies the charge to tax created by the Act. The fact that DTAAs override the Act implies that, by virtue of the provisions of a DTAA , an income which would otherwise have been chargeable to tax under the Act, may not be chargeable to tax on account of the beneficial provisions of the DTAA. In such a case, one cannot take the view that the income is chargeable to tax in India under the Act, even though it is exempt from tax, since the DTAA takes such income outside the purview of sections 4 and 5 of the Act.

Given this background, the liability to file returns by a foreign company can perhaps be viewed by looking at the different possible situations relating to tax liability of a foreign company in India.

The first would be a situation where the income is chargeable to tax under the Act, as well as under the DTAA . In such a case, there is no doubt that the foreign company is liable to file its income tax return in India.

The second would be a situation where the income is exempt under the Act, as well as under the DTAA. In such a case, since even under the Act, there is no income chargeable to tax, the machinery section, section 139, cannot be brought into play, since it would serve no purpose. Therefore, in such a case, there would be no obligation to file the return of income in India.

The third will be the situation where the income is chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act, but is exempt from tax by virtue of the DTAA beneficial provisions. In such a case, as discussed above, the better view would be that there is again no obligation to file the return of income in India, in the absence of a specific provision containing such requirement.

The fourth will be the situation where the foreign company has no activity in India and its income cannot be taxed in India under the Act and therefore, it is under no obligation at all to file its return of income under the Act, in India.

A House divided

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As this issue reaches you, the Finance Bill 2016 would have been tabled in the Parliament. Before the presentation of the budget, Parliament has seen a heated debate on the concept of nationalism. It has been triggered by two unfortunate events occurring in two universities in the country. The first was a suicide by a Dalit student, and the second was the agitation in the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). The way the politicians of all hues have attempted to take benefit of the situation, and politicise both the events causes deep anguish.

One must note that 68 years after we became an independent nation the Parliament is debating the concept of nationalism. Expectedly most of the speeches were politically motivated though some were really thought provoking. In many of the speeches persons were criticised for what they had said at some point of time but the context was not explained. All of us tend to label, very quickly a person by the thoughts, beliefs and sentiments that he echoes. We treat him as national, antinational, patriotic, traitor, secular, pseudo secular, etc. What we must appreciate is that the person may and is entitled to hold various beliefs. We may not agree with all of them. The right to express dissent has been the cornerstone of any democracy. We have had a number of transitions of power in the recent past, which have taken place in a virtually non-violent manner due to this strong foundation of democratic beliefs.

It is in this context that, the events in both educational institutions are disturbing. The entire world is talking of the demographic dividend that India will enjoy on account of its young population. It is in these universities that, the youth of India develop their academic skills which they will use when they step out to earn their bread in this highly competitive world. The diversity of thought makes them mature, and discerning. They learn to accept that there would be people of their own breed who hold different views; at times the diametrically opposite from theirs. Healthy debate and exchange of thoughts shapes their destiny.

It is equally true that, events in these institutions need to be looked at carefully. The youth who are the future do have impressionable minds and therefore one needs to tread with caution. One feels that meeting verbal violence, with some strong action like arrests, detention could have been avoided. Instead it may be more appropriate to reason with the students. They are after all our future. It was painful to see that fisticuffs were exchanged in an arena where thoughts should be.

As for nationalism, it has many hues. History tells us that those who fought in the freedom struggle had serious differences amongst them over the manner in which freedom was to be achieved. All of them contributed their mite, and it would be unfair calling one more patriotic and the other one less.

The same holds good for the array of thoughts and expressions of the youth. It is not necessary that one has to be in total agreement with all the thoughts of the other person. It is possible that one may have serious differences with some of his beliefs. Educational institutions are the ideal place where after a stirring debate, one may be able to change the other person’s beliefs or come around to accepting them. If they are suppressed, this process can never happen.

We as responsible citizens must try and ensure that, purity and sanctity of these educational institutions should be protected. Politicians and other elements will always try to take advantage of the situation and score some brownie points. It would be better if, the discontent is permitted to be expressed. Let the powers that be, give the youth the freedom to commit mistakes as long as those are not fatal to our national fabric. I believe that we have a rich heritage and our nationalism is strong and not brittle, and it will not crumble with a few slogans or posters.

Many times when we interact with youth we find a degree of disappointment with a number of issues. They are restless with the slow pace of development, decision-making etc. It is their youthful energy that makes them restive. Let Parliament debate as to how these expectations can be met rather than making an attempt to define nationalism. I hope this happens. Otherwise, we might be left with the lines of a soulful melody of Guru Dutt’s film “ Jinhe naaz hain hind par woh kahan hain!”

DUTY

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‘He only thought of duty done’ Sadhu Vaswani

1. Right from our childhood our parents talked of `Duty’. So did our leaders like Tilak, Gandhi and others. The only `right’ Tilak talked about was our right to `swaraj’. Let us look at how society looks at `duty’. To list a few: there is duty to parents, teachers, spouse, children, society, country and above all duty to `oneself’ – because unless one looks after oneself it would not be possible – nay impossible – to discharge any or all other duties.

2. Further :

Business owes a duty to its customers and suppliers. Corporates owe a duty to all its stakeholders and society as society is one of the stakeholders – it is for the first time in the world that duty to society has been codified in India. Corporates are now expected to spend 2% of their net profits in the discharge of their `social responsibility’.I believe this is a mandate, though initially it is being treated as somewhat optional.

We professionals owe a duty to our clients – to render a service to the best of our ability and never feel shy of seeking help where we need it. We also have a duty to those articled with us to train them to be good professionals.

The government owes a duty towards its citizens for being fair and transparent and citizens have a corresponding duty of living according to the code of conduct and paying our taxes. There is a good old saying `yield to ceaser what is due to him’.

The sage owes a duty to the seeker as much as the seeker owes a duty to the sage by following his preceptor with faith.

3. Moreover, in life `following’ is as much a duty as the `duty’ to lead – for every one of us without exception is both a leader and a follower.

4. Duty to society, per se, includes duty to obey laws, both natural and manmade. Hence, if one discharges one’s duties – he favours no one as doing one’s duty is discharging an obligation. As a matter of fact, one should not even seek appreciation or a `thank you.’ If it comes it comes as a `bonus’ in accounting language.

5. Duty to oneself is not only looking after one’s body but includes taking care of our mind and emotions. Hence in management parlance, it is in this sense that it is said that E.Q. is as important as I.Q. if not more – because if one cannot take care of one’s emotions – how will one discharge one’s duty with care and compassion. However, doing one’s duty is not easy – difficulties will arise but difficulties don’t deter the doer of duties. He faces the difficulties with faith and courage – faith in himself – and overcomes them with the guidance of his preceptor and help of God. Living upto one’s duty, though not easy, develops harmony.

6. However, the irony is that we have moved from `duties’ to `rights’ and the result is–strife, commotion, intolerance and uneasiness prevails at home, workplace and in society. We have forgotten that if all of us discharge our duty, there would be peace and harmony. Mahatma Gandhi advises :

  • The true source of rights is duty; if we all discharge our duties, rights will not be far to seek’.
Maulana Wahiduddin Khan opines :

  • The best society is a duty-conscious society,

           the worst society is a rights-conscious society’.

7. The issue is, can we once again live by the concept of duty’.

8. I believe we can and it will happen, for it is the only way to bring peace, harmony and happiness in one’s life and in society. Doing our duty sets us free. Charles Bandclair declares :

  • the habit of doing one’s duty drives away fear’.
Let us not forget that it is the individual who creates the environment at home and in the society. In conclusion I would say, let us understand what Mark Twain says on duty :

Duties are not performed for duty’s sake,
but because their neglect would make
us uncomfortable’.
So to have a happy life – let us think and do our duty.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 130 (Ahmedabad-CESTAT) Sunflag Filaments Industries vs. Commissioner, Central Excise & Service Tax, Vapi

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Where exemption is granted subject to nonavailment/ non-utilisation of CENVA T credit, utilisation of CENVA T credit which was to lapse in terms of Rule 11(3) of CENVA T Credit Rules would not result in denial of exemption, but would only result in action under Rules 14 & 15.

Facts
The Appellant opted for Exemption Notification No. 30/2004-CE for duty free clearances of their finished product on 01/08/2005 which was on the condition of nonavailment of CENVAT credit of duty on inputs or capital goods. Therefore, credit on inputs available in stock on that date was reversed and duty was paid on clearance of finished goods in stock on 01/08/2005. However, they also had excess credit in CENVAT account which pertained to the credit of duty on inputs which were already utilised in the manufacture of the finished goods which were cleared on payment of duty before the said date. In the absence of any clarification regarding treatment for such excess, the same was not reversed.

Subsequently, Rule 11(3) of CENVAT credit Rules, 2004 was inserted from 01/03/2007 providing lapsing of such excess CENVAT credit available on date of opting exemption notification. The Appellant did not allow such credit lying in their account as on 01/03/2007 to lapse and utilised portion of it for payment of duty for some other purposes. The Adjudicating authority held that because of this utilisation of excess credit as on 01/03/2007, the benefit of exemption notification was not available.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the Appellant fulfilled the conditions of the notification on the date of their opting for the same and thereafter. However, the only lapse was that they had not expunged the excess credit they had in their account when Rule 11(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules 2004 was introduced on a subsequent date. In such circumstances violation of Rule 11(3) should invite necessary action under Rules 14 & 15 of CENVAT Credit Rules 2004 only and cannot be extended to the extent of denying the benefit of the substantial notification for that mere reason.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 79 dated February 18, 2015

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Guidelines on Import of Gold by Nominated Banks / Agencies This circular clarifies the operational aspects of the guidelines on import of gold consequent upon the withdrawal of 20:80 scheme as under: –

1. The obligation to export under the 20:80 scheme will continue to apply in respect of unutilised gold imported before November 28, 2014, i.e., the date of abolition of the 20:80 scheme.

2. Nominated banks are now permitted to import gold on consignment basis. All sale of gold domestically will, however, be against upfront payments. Banks are free to grant gold metal loans.

3. Star and Premier Trading Houses (STH / PTH) can import gold on DP basis as per entitlement without any end use restrictions.

4. While the import of gold coins and medallions will no longer be prohibited, pending further review, the restrictions on banks in selling gold coins and medallions are not being removed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 78 dated February 13, 2015

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings: Foreign Currency (FCY) – INR Swaps

Presently, eligible residents who have entered into FCY-INR swaps to hedge their exchange rate and / or interest rate risk exposure arising out of long-term foreign currency borrowing or to transform long-term INR borrowing into foreign currency liability are not permitted to rebook or reenter into the swap once it is cancelled.

This circular permits residents borrowing in foreign currency to re-enter into a fresh FCY-INR swap to hedge the underlying after the expiry of the tenor of the original swap contract that had been cancelled, in cases where the underlying is still surviving.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 77 dated February 12, 2015

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Foreign Direct Investment – Reporting under FDI Scheme on the e-Biz platform

This circular states that on and from February 19, 2015 recipients of FDI can now file the following returns using the e-Biz portal with RBI: –

1. Advance Remittance Form (ARF) – used by the companies to report the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow to RBI.

2. FCGPR Form – which a company submits to RBI for reporting the issue of eligible instruments to the overseas investor against the above mentioned FDI inflow.

This online reporting on the e-Biz platform is an additional facility provided to Indian companies to undertake their ARF and FCGPR reporting and the manual system of reporting will also continue till further notice.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 76 dated February 12, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Import of Goods into India

This circular states that importers are henceforth not required to submit Form A-1 to their banks at the time of making payments to their overseas suppliers for imports into India. However, banks need to obtain all the requisite details from the importers so as to satisfy themselves about the bonafides of the transactions before effecting the remittance.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74 dated February 9, 2015

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Delay in Utilization of Advance Received for Exports

This circular requires banks to: –
1. Follow up with their exporter customers to ensure that export performance (shipments in case of export of goods), in cases where advances have been received for exports from overseas buyers, are completed within the stipulated time period.
2. Undertake proper due diligence so as to ensure compliance with KYC and AML guidelines so that only bonafide export advances flow into India. Doubtful cases and instances of chronic defaulters must be referred to Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) for further investigation.
3. Submit a quarterly statement indicating details of doubtful cases and chronic defaulters (as per Annex) to the concerned Regional Offices of RBI within 21 days from the end of each quarter.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73 dated February 6, 2015

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Foreign investment in India by Foreign Portfolio Investors This circular clarifies the queries received by RBI with respect to investment by Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI). The queries and the respective clarifications are as under: –

a. Query: The applicability of the directions to investment by FPIs in commercial papers (CPs). Clarification: In terms of the aforesaid directions, any fresh investments shall be permitted in any type of debt instrument in India with a minimum residual maturity of three years. Accordingly, FPIs shall not be allowed to make any further investment in CPs.
b. Query: The applicability of these guidelines on debt instruments having maturity of three years and over but with optionality clause of less than three years. Clarification: FPIs shall not be allowed to make any further investments in debt instruments having minimum initial / residual maturity of three years with optionality clause exercisable within three years.
c. Query: The applicability of these guidelines on amortised debt instruments having average maturity of three years and above. Clarification: FPIs shall be permitted to invest in amortised debt instruments provided the duration of the instrument is three years and above.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 72 dated February 5, 2015

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Foreign investment in India by Foreign Portfolio Investors

This circular permits, with immediate effect, Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) to invest in government securities the coupons received by them on their existing investments in government securities. These investments will be outside the current limit of US $ 30 billion available for investments by FPI in government securities.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 71 dated February 3, 2015

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Foreign investment in India by Foreign Portfolio Investors

This circular clarifies that, with immediate effect, in case of investment by Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI): –

1. All future investments within the limit for investment in corporate bonds will have to be in corporate bonds with a minimum residual maturity of three years.

2. All future investments against the limits vacated when the current investment runs off either through sale or redemption, will have to be in corporate bonds with a minimum residual maturity of three years.

3. No further investment can be made in liquid and money market mutual fund schemes.

4. There will be no lock-in period and FPI can sell the securities (including those that are presently held with less than three years residual maturity) to domestic investors.

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15-TIOL-318-CESTAT-MUM] CCE vs. M/s Jay Iron & Steel Industries Ltd.

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As long as duty payment is accepted on output, benefit of credit cannot be denied on flimsy grounds like suspicion or presumption.

Facts:
The Respondent, a manufacturer availed CENVAT Credit on various inputs. CENVAT Credit was denied on the ground that the dealers did not supply any scrap but only issued invoices.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Respondent made full payment of duty indicated in the invoice by cheque, the transaction and the payments are properly recorded in the books of Account and therefore the onus under Rules 9(2), 9(3), 9(4) and 9(7) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which requires to ensure that appropriate duty of excise on inputs paid was discharged. Further the suppliers were registered with the department and thus their identity and address were never in doubt and thus the benefit of CENVAT credit being a substantial benefit granted by law cannot be denied on flimsy grounds.

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[2015-TIOL-360-CESTAT-MUM] M/s. ABL Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd vs. CCE

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No infirmity in paying service tax under works contract (Composition Scheme) when a new contract was entered into on 05/06/2007 and the contract for construction was terminated on 31/05/2007.

Facts:
Appellants were executing the contract of Commercial or Industrial Construction Service. Due to dispute, the contract was terminated and thereafter fresh bids were evaluated and the contract was again awarded to the Appellants and a new contract was executed with effect from 05/06/2007. Various documents viz. tender documents; affidavits regarding the entire sequence of events were placed on record to establish that the work was executed under the new contract.

Held:
On verification of the documents, the Tribunal held that it is apparent that two contracts are different in factual details and thus it was concluded that a fresh contract was executed with effect from 05/06/2007 and thus there is no objection to classify the service rendered in this contract as Works Contract Service. It was also held that the Appellants are eligible for the composition scheme as paying service tax at the composition rate in the returns filed is enough indication and sufficient compliance with Rule 3(3) of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 424 (New Delhi – CESTAT)-Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-I vs. Hero Honda Motors Ltd.

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CENVAT Credit on duty paid on mirror assembly, sari guard and tool kit used in manufacture of motorcycle are parts of motorcycle is allowed as these products are cleared along with the motorcycle.

Facts:
Assessee, a manufacturer of motor cycles, took CENVAT Credit of mirror assembly, sari guard and tool kit treating them as ‘inputs’. The Commissioner allowed the CENVAT Credit. The revenue filed the appeal on the ground that the said items are not used in or in relation to the manufacture of the motor cycle and therefore are not eligible to be called inputs as per the law prevailing prior to 01/03/2011.

Held:
Tribunal observed that, it is not disputed that all three impugned items are cleared along with the motor cycle and the value thereof is included in the assessable value of the motor cycle. The Tribunal relied upon the decision in the case of CCE vs. Honda Motorcycle & Scooter India (P.) Ltd. 2014 (303) ELT 193 (P&H) wherein it was held that the final product cannot be given restricted meaning so as to mean as the engine of the vehicle or the chassis but all things which are necessary to make the final product marketable. Thus, for motor vehicle, the tool kit and the first aid kit has to be part of the vehicle before the same can be put to use. Applying the said ratio in respect of sari guard and rear view mirror assembly, the Tribunal dismissed Revenue’s appeal.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 268 (New Delhi – CESTAT)-Coca Cola India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi.

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Where service tax is paid by service provider under one category of taxable service, the same cannot once again be demanded from service receiver, under RCM by changing the category of service.

Facts:
The appellant entered into a contract with an agreement with KPH Dream Cricket Pvt. Ltd. for sponsoring cricket team Kings XI Punjab. On the said contractual consideration, service tax was collected by M/s. KPH from the appellant and deposited with the Central Government under Business Auxiliary Service. However, revenue contended that the agreement between the parties falls under the category of sponsorship service and as such, the tax liability falls on the appellant under reverse charge basis.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that, in Hero Motocorp Ltd. vs. CST [2013] 38 taxmann.com 182, cricket has been held to be not covered by the sponsorship service. Further, the service tax on the same transaction already stands deposited by service provider under the category of Business Auxiliary Services. Demand of service tax in respect of the same transaction under a different category cannot be held justifiable.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 206 (New Delhi – CESTAT)- Jai Mahal Hotels (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

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Prior to 01/07/2010 – Renting of buildings used for purpose of accommodation including hotels, meaning thereby, renting of a building for a hotel, is not liable for service tax under “Renting of Immovable Property Services”.

Facts:
The assessee entered into a joint venture agreement with M/s. IHCL whereby the assessee was to lease its building for running hotel business therein and therefore to share the profits and losses alike. One of the issues for consideration before the Tribunal was whether the arrangement is taxable since under sub-clause (d) under Exclusions to Explanation-1 to section 65(105)(zzzz), a building or buildings used for hotels falls outside the purview of the taxable service. The lower authorities while taxing the transaction recorded a reasoning that, the legislative intent in respect of sub-clause (d) is explicit and clear, not to tax immovable property used (not meant) for accommodation which includes hotels; only the service of accommodation provided by a hotel is outside the purview of the taxable service.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the reasoning given by the lower authorities in taxing the transaction is fundamentally flawed. On a true and fair construction of provisions of the exclusionary clause under Explanation 1 to section 65(105)(zzzz); and in particular sub-clause (d) thereof, renting of buildings used for the purpose of accommodation including hotels, meaning thereby renting of a building for a hotel, is covered by the exclusionary clause and does not amount to an “immovable property”, falling within the ambit of the taxable service in issue.

Note: The above judgment is in respect of the period prior to 01/06/2010, i.e., before insertion of clause (v) in inclusion part of explanation 1 to section 65(105)(zzzz)

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2015 (37) STR 185 (Kar.) E. M. Mani Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India

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Writ petition cannot be entertained by High Court against a SCN issued by the authority against whom refund claim is filed.

Facts:
The petitioner had filed refund claim of service tax paid on exempted services by mistake. The appropriate authority issued a SCN directing the petitioner to show cause as to why the claim should not be declined and if found to be eligible, why the same should not be appropriated against the arrears of service tax. It was argued that the SCN was issued in a pre-conceived manner and no purpose would be served in relegating the petitioner to go before the authority since the grounds given in SCN indicated the minds of the authority.

Held:
Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot be invoked unless the High Court is satisfied that the SCN was totally non est in the eyes of law for absolute want of jurisdiction to investigate into the facts, writ petitions should not be entertained.

SCN do not impose any penalty but discloses the prima facie findings so as to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth their contentions.

The petitioner has invoked the power of refund under a specific statutory provision. Therefore, theHigh Court refrained from interfering with the proceedings.

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2015 (37) STR 172 (All.) H. M. Singh and Co. vs. Commissioner of Customs, C. Ex. & Service Tax

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Penalty not leviable if service tax with interest paid before issuance of adjudication order.

Facts:
The appellants engaged in providing taxable services of “manpower recruitment and supply of agency services” was reimbursed provident fund in respect of manpower supplied and no service tax was discharged on this amount. It was contended that gross amount charged included provident fund component which was a statutory liability of service provider. Service tax with interest was paid before issuance of adjudication order. There was mass unawareness on the subject matter in view of various such notices floated by department. Whether the penalty u/s. 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 should be levied when they were under a bonafide belief regarding nonapplicability of service tax on reimbursement of provident fund amount, there was no case of fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts. Accordingly, the penalties should be dropped.

Held:
Having regard to the circumstances of the case and relying on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decisions in case of Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. 2005 (188) ELT 149 (SC) and Padmini Products 1989 (43) ELT 195 (SC), it was observed that there was no intention to evade tax, in view of payment of service tax with interest before issuance of adjudication order. Further, since the amount involved was trivial, the matter was not remanded back and was answered in favour of the appellants.

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2015 (37) STR 41 (Ker.) Kerala Non-Banking Finance Com vs. UOI

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Service Tax levy on equipment leasing and hire purchases upheld.

Facts:
The appellant, an association of non-banking financial companies have filed writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of section 137 of the Finance Act, 2001 by which Service Tax was introduced on “banking and other financial services” which includes ‘equipment leasing and hire-purchase’. It was contended that the Parliament has no authority to legislate on hire- purchase and leasing transactions since the State has such powers in this regard under Entry 54 of List II of seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. After the 46th Constitutional Amendment and as per Article 366 29A (c) & (d), States were authorised to levy sales tax on hire-purchase and leasing transactions.

The transaction of leasing goods between the financier and the Hirer is almost similar to the hire purchase agreement. In case of leasing of goods, machinery/ other articles required by the lessee are identified and the purchase terms with the manufacturers/dealers are finalised. Thereafter, lessee approaches financier who advances the loan under the lease agreement executed. After finance is arranged, supplier raises invoice on the Financier and delivers the goods. While the financer continues to be the owner of the goods, lessee enjoys the right to use the goods and as and when installments of loan and other charges are paid, lessee either becomes owner or has option to purchase the goods by paying balance price.

Appellants have not denied that they were not collecting anything other than installments of loan and interest thereon and they were not collecting any charges for services rendered in the leasing arrangement. It was argued that the decision of the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case would be applicable in as much as levy of sales tax is possible on sale of goods involved in the transaction while service tax can be levied on the service charges received in the transaction.

Held:
The High Court after observing that a Hire purchase was for the vehicles and vehicles for this purpose were purchased from manufacturers/dealers after agreement between the Financers and price in part or full was advanced by the financier as a loan under agreement. Further, the vehicle was purchased in the name of the hirer and in the certificate of registration under the Motor Vehicles Act, hire purchase/hypothecation in favour of the financier was endorsed. Besides Appellants collected charges under various heads including interest etc. under hire purchase agreement.

Appellants could not deny or dispute that hire purchase agreement involves only sale of goods and no service was rendered by them. Admittedly they rendered services and service charges were also collected along with interest on loan advanced. In fact, hire purchase agreement between the financier and the hirer of the vehicle did not affect sales tax liability, whether it was payable at the point of sale of vehicle from the manufacturer or dealer to the financier or to the hirer or whether it was payable on delivery by the financier to the hirer under the Hire purchase agreement etc.

It was further observed that even if financier retained ownership under the hire purchase agreement, still sales tax was payable on delivery of vehicle. Therefore it was held that there was no conflict between the levy of sales tax on the sale/deemed sale of vehicle and the service tax payable on services rendered by the financier under the hire purchase agreement. Since interest was excluded through Notification, the incidence of service tax does not fall on interest on loan advanced.

Accordingly, the incidence of service tax was held to be not on sale/deemed sale of goods pertaining to leasing and hire purchase transactions covered by the said Article 366(29A) (c) and (d), the levy was upheld.

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2015 (37) STR 6 (Bom.) P C JOSHI vs. UNION OF INDIA

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Service Tax on legal services provided to business entities held to be constitutionally valid.

Facts:
Appellant, an advocate claimed to be affected by the service tax levy on advocates u/s. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Finance Act, 1994. It was argued that they are engaged not only for aid and advice but also for appearance and representation of a case in the Court. Administration of justice, a sovereign and legal function of the State and Advocates were part of the same, could not be said to be rendering any services under the Act. Legal profession had not been understood as a profit making activity or venture. It was not a business or trade. It was a solemn duty which was performed for the litigants including the State who were major stakeholders in the judicial system. The levy of service tax imposed a heavy additional burden on litigants and also disabled them from approaching the Court. The amendment violated Article 14 of the Constitution as it discriminates between representation made on behalf of an individual and a business entity. The purpose to exempt representation and arbitration on behalf of individual seems to be to cater to the need of Article 39A of the Constitution. Equal treatment be given if the services are provided to Corporations/ Partnership firms.

Held:
The High Court after observing the amendment to the definition u/s. 65(105)(zzzzm) held that service tax was levied on Advocates providing service to business entity. However, service provided to individual by individual advocate continues to be exempted as legal advice, aid and assistance should be available to poor and needy section at lower cost In making this distinction, legislature was reasonable and did not overlook constitutional guarantee as envisaged in preamble and Article 14, 21 and 39A of Constitution of India. It was not a case where un-equals were treated equally. Such classification cannot be termed as arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair, unreasonable and unjust. As burden of service tax was on receiver of service and not on advocates, there was no violation of Article 19(1)(g) ibid. Also, Notification No. 25/2012 ST exempted services provided by individuals as advocate or a partnership firm of advocates by way of legal services to any person other than business entity or business entity with turnover up to Rs.10 lakh in preceding financial year. Hence small businessmen, petty traders and persons carrying on business in individual capacity would be able to afford services of individual of individual advocates or partnership firm of advocates.

Service tax on Advocates providing service to business entity does not mean that legal profession has been treated on par with commercial or trading activities or dealings in goods and services. Like any other service provider advocates are pushing themselves by rigorous marketing and advertisement, branding themselves as specialists in Corporate Law, Intellectual, Matrimonial and Family Laws, etc.

Notification No. 30/2012-ST shifting burden of paying service tax to litigants cannot be given retrospective effect because Legislature has decided to grant exemption and shift burden on to recipient from particular date, viz. prospectively and not retrospectively which does not mean that doctrine of equality has been violated. In matter of taxation-legislature has wide choice in taxation whereby it can include/exclude from tax bracket persons or classes of persons, decide cutoff date, and legislate retrospectively.

Accordingly, High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the constitutional validity of service tax on legal service.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 24 (Calcutta)- McleodRussel (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India

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Security services provided by ASIF to tea
plantation estate owner whether amounts to “support services” liable
under RCM – High Court quashed the notice of demand but did not answer
the issue – leaves it for adjudication to decide following the
adjudication procedure u/s. 71 of the Act
.

Facts:
The
Petitioners had tea plantation estates in the State of Assam located in
a disturbed and highly volatile area at which there was a constant
threat of damage to the estate. The consortium of owners of tea gardens
approached the Government of Assam for protection. A force-ASIF was
created by the Assam Government comprising of policemen as well as home
guards. The administrative control rested with the Director General of
Police and Commandant General of Home Guards, Assam. As per the MOU
signed with the Government, the force was deployed in the area to
protect planters and their property. The members of the force are
servants of the State of Assam. Their appointment, management,
discipline and pay are controlled by that State. It does not have power
to carry out any investigation. In case they detect the commission of
any cognisable offence they have to report it to the nearest police
station. For providing the service, the Assam Government charged a fee.
In other words, they ask the tea plantation owners to reimburse them of
the salary they have to disburse to the force. The Superintendent of
Service Tax wrote that the above service provided by the Assam
Government to the writ petitioner would be considered as a security
service and to be more specific a support service exigible to service
tax “in the hands of service receiver” and issued notice of demand.
Aggrieved by the same, Petitioners filed writ

Held
The
department contended that these personnel private security guards
provided by the State to the tea plantation owners for protection of
their persons and property and their functions were limited and
personalised. They had no police power or power of investigation. Hence,
it was “support services” provided by Government to business entity
liable under reverse charge in hands of the assessee. According to
petitioners, the service rendered are a part of the sovereign functions
of the State covered under list II entry1 of the 7th schedule to the
Constitution of India as the State has obligations to maintain law and
order, peace, prevention of crime in the tea growing and manufacturing
area of the State. Thus, discharging sovereign functions by the State
cannot be equated with providing support services by it. The High Court
observed that the basic foundation of the case that the force employed
by the State in the tea plantations discharges the sovereign function of
the State of maintaining peace and security in the region has not been
specifically denied in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the
department and therefore the Court did not take into account any
statement made from the bar. On that basis, the Court held that, the
statement of the writ petitioner that the appointments to this force,
its management, control, finance, discipline etc., are regulated by the
Government is uncontroverted. That the nature of its function is to
protect the plantations and the personnel working therein against
unlawful acts is also uncontroverted. Therefore, prima facie there is
every indication that the service rendered by this force is sovereign
and hence not a “support service”.

The Court held that the value
of sovereign functions of a State is not taxable in the hands of the
citizens. Support services rendered by the Government are taxable.
Whether the service in question is taxable or not is a question of fact.
Leaving the matter to the judgment of the department to determine
whether the petitioner received support services or otherwise, the
notice was quashed and set aside. However, it was left open to the
department to adjudicate following an appropriate procedure as to the
matter being exigible to tax.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 445 (Chhattisgarh)- Union of India vs. Raj Wines.

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Reimbursement received for incentive paid on behalf of its principal by a commission agent, to various retailers selling products of its principal is not includible in value of BAS.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in marketing and promoting various kinds of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL). It received consideration from the beer manufacturer under various heads like Primary Claim/Retail Scheme, commission, merchandise expenses, fixed office expenses, other expenses. Department was of the view that service tax be levied on the entire consideration received by the assessee under “Commission Agent” (Business Auxiliary Services). The Commissioner (Appeals) held that service tax would be levied only on commission. In department’s appeal before the Tribunal, it was held that assessee is also liable to pay service tax on merchandise expenses, fixed office expenses and certain part of the other expenses excluding expenses of registration and transportation. Department further preferred appeal before the High Court contending that amount received under the head Primary claim/Retailer scheme is also liable to service tax

Held:
The High Court held that the head of primary claim/retailer scheme is the amount which the service provider gave to retailers on behalf of manufacturer for achieving certain quota of sales. It was then reimbursed to it. Rule 5(2) qualifies the conditions under which fixed expenses or costs incurred by the service provided is to be excluded. It was observed that Commissioner (Appeals) after discussing the material on record recorded a finding that this was the expense that was done by the assessee as a pure agent and this finding has also been upheld by the Tribunal. Therefore, Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 209 (Rajasthan)-Union of India vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd.

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CENVAT – Cement used for the purpose of building construction, cannot be said to be an input – foundation made of cement does not fall under the category of “capital goods”.

Facts:
Assessee, a manufacturer took credit of inputs namely, cement, explosive, lubricant oil and grease used in mining area treating them as inputs. Department argued that cement was used by assessee for purpose of filling gaps in form of cut and fill for excavation of ores; and obviously, cement had been used as a construction material so as to provide safety to roof of mining area and was, therefore, ineligible for credit

Held:
The High Court observed that the matter is squarely covered in favour of the revenue in the case of Union of India vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 2008 (225) ELT 183 (Raj) where it was held that cement, being a building material used for the purpose of building construction, cannot be said to be an input used for manufacturing of final product and hence, no CENVAT Credit is available so far the cement is concerned. Further, that the foundation made of cement does not fall under the category of “capital goods” in terms of Rule 2(b) of the Rules of 2002; and therefore cement cannot be said to be ‘inputs’ in terms of Explanation-II to Rule 2(g) of the Rules of 2002. Relying upon the same, department’s appeal was allowed.

Note: Readers may also read decision in the case of Lloyds Metal & Engineering Ltd. vs. CCE 2008(226) ELT 599 (Mum- Tri) in which the above judgment of Hindustan Zinc 2008 225 ELT 183 is distinguished interalia on the ground that the issue of eligibility to CENVAT Credit on steel and cement themselves as capital goods being component or accessories or spare parts of specified capital goods was not under the consideration of the High Court. Also Refer CCE vs. APP Mills Ltd. 2013 (291) ELT 585 (Tri- Bang.) distinguishing Vandana Global Ltd vs. Commissioner 2010 (253) ELT 440 (Tri- LB)

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[2015-TIOL-408-HC-MUM-ST] Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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Delay of 579 days in filing appeals before CESTAT on the ground of depleted staff strength condoned upon imposition of costs.

Facts:
Appellant, a Government department had vacancy in the position of Junior Manager and there was none attending to the files pertaining to accounts and financial matters. On appointment of a competent officer appeal was filed before the CESTAT .

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that Government departments are working with depleted staff strength and vacancy in the post of Finance and Accounts Manager being a vital factor, delay in filing appeals condoned upon imposition of cost.

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Nature of Lease Transaction, contradictions

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Introduction
By deeming clause in
Article 366 (29-A) of the Constitution, the transaction of “Transfer of
Right to Use Goods” (Lease transaction) are made taxable under Sales Tax
Laws. The nature of lease transaction is not defined in the
Constitution or in any Act. The interpretation is done in light of
various judicial pronouncements.

Important judgment on interpretation on nature of lease transaction
Though there are several judgments, reference can be made to the followings:

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd .(145 STC 91)(SC)
The
issue in this case was about levy of lease tax on services provided by
Telephone Companies. The Supreme Court held that no sales tax is
applicable as the transaction pertains to service. While holding so, one
of the learned judges on the Bench, observed as under in para 98 about
taxable lease transactions:

“98. To constitute a transaction for
the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have
the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;
b. There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;
c.
The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods –
consequently all legal consequences of such use including any
permissions or licenses required therefore should be available to the
transferee;
d. For the period during which the transferee has such
legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the
necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a
“transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the
goods;
e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the
period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again
transfer the same rights to others.”

Based on above parameters,
there are further judgments at various forums where the nature of lease
transaction is decided. Reference can be made to following judgments:-

Smokin’ Joe’s Pizza Pvt. Ltd . (A 25 of 2004 dt.25.11.08)(MSTT)
The
facts in this case were that the dealer was holding the registered
Trade mark “Smokin’Joe’s” and allowed its use to its franchisees. The
franchise agreement provided for non exclusive right to use the
registered Trade mark. The agreement also provided for providing various
services to Franchisee. The lower authorities held the transaction as
taxable lease transaction. The Tribunal held that it is not a lease
transaction as it is not exclusive. This judgment is now before the
Bombay High Court by way of Reference.

Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd . vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Kozhikode (58 VST191)(Ker)
This
judgment is of the Kerala High Court. In this case also, the
transaction was about granting of franchise right on non-exclusive
basis. The Hon. High Court has held that when the grant of franchise is
non exclusive it is not lease transaction and not liable to VAT.

On the other hand, there are a few contrary judgments as discussed below:

Nutrine
Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (40 VST
327)(A.P). In this case, the transaction was for allowing use of the
trade mark. The said use was also on non-exclusive basis. Still, the
Hon. A.P. High Court has held that the transaction is a lease
transaction. The Hon. High Court felt that the judgment of BSNL about
exclusive use cannot apply in relation to intangible goods like trade
mark.

Latest Judgment of THE Hon. Bombay High Court
Latest
in the series, there is a judgment from the Bombay High Court in case
of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (W.P.No.2818 of 2012 with
Notice of Motion (L) No.214 of 2013 dt.20.01.2015).

In this
case, the use of brand name was allowed on nonexclusive basis. Before
the Hon. Tribunal, judgments including in case of Smokin’ Joe’s was
relied upon for nonliability. However, the Tribunal has confirmed the
liability. Therefore, this matter came up, before the Hon. Bombay High
Court, on behalf of the assessee. After referring the facts and various
judgments including in case of BSNL, the Hon. Bombay High Court has held
that even if use of right is given on non-exclusive basis, still it
will be a lease transaction. The observations of the Hon. Bombay High
Court are as under:

“50. Para 98 is relied upon by Mr. Chinoy.
However, that cannot be read in isolation and out of context. It must be
read in the backdrop of the underlying controversy, namely,
relationship between a telephone connection service provider and its
customer. Such a transaction is essentially of service.

51. It
is in relation to such a controversy that the observations, findings and
conclusions must be confined. We do not see as to how they can be
extended and in the facts and circumstances of the present case to the
enactment that we are dealing with. Going by the plain and unambiguous
language of the Act of 1985, we cannot read into it the element of
exclusivity and a transfer contemplated therein to be unconditional.
Therefore, the tests in para (d) and (e) cannot be read in the Act of
1985. 58. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal did not act perversely
or committed an error apparent on the face of record in rejecting the
petitioner’s appeals. May be the Tribunal could have rendered a detailed
finding and conclusion. However, upon perusal of the order passed by
the Tribunal we find that it referred to the facts. It has also adverted
to the contentions of the parties. It also referred to its own
conclusions rendered in the case of M/s. Smokin’ Joe’s etc. However, it
concludes that the facts and circumstances in the present case are not
identical to the cases dealt with by it and of the above franchisees. We
do not express any opinion as to whether the Tribunal’s conclusions in
the case of M/s. Smokin’ Joe’s (supra) and M/s. Diageo India (supra) are
accurate or correct. We are informed that separate proceedings in that
regard are pending in this Court. However, the Tribunal did not err in
holding that the cases which have been dealt with by it including the
Supreme Court judgment in the case of BSNL (supra) are on distinct
facts.”

Conclusion
Thus, the controversy is
increasing day by day. There is uncertainty in the mind of assessees as
to which is the correct tax applicable, whether service tax or VAT. In
fact, this has led to double taxation ultimately resulting in enhanced
cost to the assessees and correspondingly to the consumers. It is
expected that finality be brought to the above burning issue either by
legislative interference or by judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court.

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IVF Advisors Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before N. K. Billaiya (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM) ITA No. 4798 /Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 13th February, 2015. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Kanchan Kaushal, Dhanesh Bafna and Ms. Chandni Shah/Azghar Zain

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Section 43(5) – Derivatives include foreign
currency and call/put option are transactions of derivative markets and
cannot be termed as speculative in nature.

Facts:
The
assessee, an investment management consultant, filed its return of
income for assessment year 2009-10 returning a total income of Rs. Nil.
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO)
noticed that the assessee has claimed a loss of Rs. 93,63,235 on account
of foreign currency futures. The AO disallowed the loss of Rs.
93,63,235 by considering it to be a speculative transaction in view of
the provisions of section 43(5) r.w.s. 2(ac) of the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A) who observed that the assessee is not in the
manufacturing and merchanting business, and is also not a dealer or
investor in stocks and shares and therefore the loss on foreign currency
futures is not in the nature of hedging loss and that such loss was not
incurred in the course of guarding against loss through future price
fluctuation in respect of contract for actual delivery of goods
manufactured or in respect of stock of shares entered into by a dealer.
He held that the provisions of clause (d) of the proviso to section
43(5) were not applicable. He, accordingly, confirmed the order passed
by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The
Tribunal considered the provisions of section 43(5) of the Act and
observed that clause (d) of the proviso to section 43(5) excludes the
transaction of trading in derivatives referred to in section 2(ac) of
the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 carried out on a
recognised stock exchange from the purview of the definition of the term
`speculative transaction’. Considering the definition of the term
`derivative’ in section 2(ac) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation)
Act, 1956, it observed that derivatives also includes securities. It
noted that the Madras High Court has in the case of Rajashree Sugar
& Chemicals Ltd. vs. Axis Bank Ltd. AIR (2011), Mad 144 has defined
the term derivative to include foreign currency as underlying security
of the derivative. It also noted the meaning of the term `derivative’ as
explained in the section `Frequently Asked Questions’ on the website of
SEBI. On going through the copies of the contract notes, it found that
the assessee had entered into either a call option or a put option and
on the settlement day, the transaction has been settled by delivery.
Either the assessee has paid US Dollar on the settlement day or has
taken delivery of the US Dollar.

The Tribunal held that there
remains no doubt that the transaction of the assessee cannot be treated
as a speculative transaction. Derivatives include foreign currency and
call/put option are transactions of derivative markets and cannot be
termed as speculative in nature. The Tribunal held that the transactions
entered into by the assessee were not speculative transaction and
therefore, the loss incurred had to be allowed.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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[2014] 151 ITD 490 (Delhi – Trib.) Soham For Kids Education Society Centre vs. DIT (Exemptions)

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Section 12A, read with section 12AA – Mere non-carrying on of the vigorous activities of trust at the time of registration per se cannot be detrimental for registration of the trust u/s. 12A when the objects are charitable and there is no adverse comm ent about them.

FACTS
The assessee, a registered society, applied for registration u/s. 12AA.

The DIT (Exemption) mentioned that the provisions of section 12AA stipulates the following conditions for registration u/s. 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 :

(i) The objects of the society should be of charitable in nature;

(ii) The activities of the society should be genuine. The DIT (Exemption) noticed that life members and general members had not paid admission fee to assessee till date, the assessee had not been able to raise funds from public nor from amongst themselves and that no activities had been started yet by assessee.

The DIT (Exemption) thus observed that applicant had not done any charitable activity, and the genuineness of the activities could not be established. Therefore, one of the conditions for granting registration u/s. 12AA is also not satisfied.

Accordingly, the application filed by the applicant for grant of registration u/s. 12AA was rejected.

On appeal:

HELD
From the DIT (Exemptions)’s order, it emerges that no dispute has been raised about the charitable nature of the objectives of the trust as per the memorandum. The adverse inference has been drawn on possible intention, activities, i.e., the issues, which are not germane at the time of grant of registration of trust u/s. 12A , more so when the assessee’s objects are not held to be non-charitable.

Apropos the income and expenditure, it has been accepted by the assessee that it had created a website for the trust which also is one of the activities to promote the objects of the trust, the fact which is not denied by the DIT (Exemptions) or the Departmental representative. Therefore, the adverse inference has nothing to reflect on this aspect. Apropos time to raise the funds and donations it is the discretion of the society that can be undertaken in due course, may be the issue of section 80G registration which is consequent to section 12A registration may be important.

Thus mere non-carrying on of the vigorous activities of trust at the time of registration per se cannot be detrimental for registration of the trust u/s. 12A when the objects are charitable and there is no adverse comment about them.

Thus, the order of the DIT (Exemptions) is reversed and the assessee is held to be eligible for registration u/s. 12A.

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Notification of the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 and applicability of Indian Accounting Standards (IND AS)

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On July 10,2014, the FM, while presenting the budget
for 2014-15 in para 128 has announced that: “There is an urgent need to
converge the current Indian Accounting Standards with International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). I propose for adoption of the new
Indian Accounting Standards (Ind. AS) by the Indian Companies from the
financial year 2015-16 voluntarily and from the financial year 2016-17
on a mandatory basis…………”

Pursuance to above announcement, the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs announced a revised roadmap for
implementation of the new set of Indian Accounting Standards (Ind – AS)
converged with IFRS on 16th February 2015. The revised roadmap does not
cover banking and insurance companies and NBFC’s. The important
provisions of the the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules,
2015 are discussed below and these Rules are effective from 1st April
2015

– Voluntary Compliance of these Rules by companies– F.Y.2015-2016
Any company can voluntarily comply with IND AS for its financial statements for the mentioned f inancial year

First Phase – Mandatory from F. Y. 2016/17

a.
Companies whose equity or debt securities are listed or are in the
process of being listed on any recognized stock exchange in India or
outside India and with a net worth of Rs. 500 crores or more and;
b. Companies other than those covered above having a net worth of Rs.500 crores or more;
c. the holding, subsidiary, joint venture or associate companies of the aforementioned companies; –

Second Phase: – Mandatory from F. Y. 2017/18 a.
a.
Companies whose equity or debt securities are listed on a recognized
stock exchange in India or outside India and whose net-worth is less
than Rs.500 crores;
b. Unlisted companies whose net worth is more than Rs.250 crores but less than Rs.500 crores;
c. the holding, subsidiary, joint venture or associate companies of the aforementioned companies;

Exemption:
However,
companies that are listed or in the process of being listed on SME
Exchange are exempt referred to in Chapter XB or on the Institutional
Trading Platform without initial public offering in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter XC of the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009.

On
February 16, 2015 the following Companies (Indian Accounting Standards)
Rules, 2015 have been notified by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs

Overview of the impact of the Indian Accounting Standard


Objective of the Standards: The objective of IFRS is move from a rule
based method of accounting to principle based method of accounting.
Hence during the initial period there is bound to be significant
volatility in the financial statements.
– Benefits: The Key benefits for Indian Companies with the applicability of Ind – AS include:

i) Improved access to Global Markets:
Majority
of the Stock Exchange globally require financial information as per
IFRS. The need to prepare multiple financial statements for different
requirements is eliminated.

ii) Lower cost of capital:
Convergence
with IFRS means the Indian companies need not prepare two sets of
Financial Statements comply with the requirements abroad and this would
lead to lower cost of administration and minimise the risk premium. Thus
pricing could be comparable and companies can approach any market for
capital.

iii) Benchmarking with Global Peers:
Preparing
accounts as per IFRS will give better understanding of performance in
relation to the Global benchmarks. Targets and milestones will be set
based on the global business environment.

iv) True Value of
acquisition: I n Indian GAAP except for few exceptions net assets
acquired are recorded at its carrying value instead of fair value. Hence
its true value is not reflected. IFRS overcomes this flaw as it
mandates accounting of business combinations at fair value.

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Is internal audit function relevant in a financial statement audit?

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In a financial statement audit, amongst the various factors that an external auditor considers in his risk assessment and in determining the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures to be performed, one of the very relevant factors is the existence and operation of a competent and effective internal audit function. Internal audit is an appraisal activity which may be constituted as a function within a company or may be outsourced to an external service provider.

The internal audit function is most likely to be relevant for the external auditor if the responsibility assigned to the internal auditor is related to the entity’s financial reporting and other internal control related processes on which the external audit will rely while conducting his audit. Certain internal audit activities may not be relevant to an audit of the entity’s financial statements, for example, the internal auditors’ procedures to evaluate the efficiency of certain management decision-making processes are ordinarily not relevant to a financial statement audit.

While determining whether the work of the internal auditor is relevant and adequate for the purpose of the audit, the external auditor has to evaluate parameters set out in the table below:


The external auditor would need to consider the materiality of the account balances or classes of transactions which were covered by internal audit, the risk of material misstatement of the assertions related thereto and the degree of subjectivity involved in the evaluation of the audit evidence gathered in support of the assertions. As the materiality of the financial statement amounts increases and either the risk of material misstatement or the degree of subjectivity increases, the need for the auditor to perform his or her own tests of the assertions increases. Where an auditor elects to use the work of internal audit, audit documentation prepared by him should include the auditor’s evaluation of internal audit, the nature and extent of the work used and the basis for that decision, the audit procedures performed by the auditor to evaluate the adequacy of the work used, and an overall evaluation of the evidence obtained. The nature and extent of the procedures the auditor would perform when making this evaluation is a matter of judgment. Ordinarily, an external auditor should not use the work of internal audit when performing procedures related to controls that have a higher risk of failure (e.g., internal controls intended to address assertions where a significant judgment or a risk of fraud has been identified).

Unlike in situations of branch audits or audits of subsidiaries for the purpose of consolidation where an external auditor has the latitude of using and relying on the work of other independent auditors, he does not have the same autonomy as far as using the work of internal auditors is concerned. The external auditor remains solely responsible for the audit opinion issued on the financial statements audited by him. At the same time, it is not obligatory for the auditor to rely on the work performed by internal audit.

We will consider two case studies to understand the above concepts:

Case Study 1 – Relevance of Internal Audit function to the External Auditor

Background

LMN Private limited is a company which is engaged in the business of travel and tourism. The management has constituted an in-house internal audit function. The scope of internal audit as decided by the management includes the following:

1) Monitoring the controls over bookings from customers and recording of revenue in the ERP system.
2) Review of the monthly, quarterly and yearly financial statements prepared by the company and. verifying that these comply with the financial reporting framework
 3) Verifying the process of pre-departure formalities necessary to be completed like insurance and visa application to ensure compliance with the processes set out in the procedure manual of the company.
4) R eview of contracts entered into with the vendors who provide services to the company including hotels and coordinators for transfers. Ensure that the standard operating procedures for vendor selection as set by the management have been followed.
5) Verifying the process of background verification of the employees joining the company.

PMR and Associates (PMR) have been appointed as the statutory auditors of the company. Which of the above would be relevant and adequate to the work conducted by PMR?

Analysis
As per SA 610 ‘Using the work of the internal auditors’, the external auditor may use the work performed by the internal auditor if he considers it relevant to his audit. Some procedures performed by the internal auditor may impact the nature or timing or extent of the work performed curtailing his planned work for a particular area during the course of audit. In the given scenarios, factors that could be considered in evaluating the relevance of the scope of internal audit function have been explained below.

1) T he work performed by the internal audit function could be used by the external auditor to understand the process over tour bookings and revenue recognition. If there are significant internal control issues identified by the internal auditor, these could be factored in by the external auditor to modify the procedures that he would perform to test revenue. The external auditor may examine some of the controls or transactions that the internal auditors examined or examine similar controls or transactions not actually examined by the internal auditors. In reaching conclusions about the internal auditors’ work, the auditor should compare the results of his tests with the results of the internal auditors’ work.

2) Though the review of the monthly, quarterly and yearly financial statements by the internal audit team is directly related to the financial reporting process, the external auditor cannot merely rely on the work performed by the internal auditor. His review of the financial statements and assurance of compliance with financial reporting framework remains independent of the review performed by the internal auditor. However, the external auditor should be wary of control lapses in the accounts closing process, if any, which have been identified by the internal auditor and ensure that the risk of possible misstatements emanating therefrom is adequately addressed, for e.g., if the internal auditor has commented about the lack of robustness in the he process for provision for expenses for pending bills, the external auditor would need to more skeptical in verifying the completeness of provisions for expenses. He would need to enlarge the sample size, perform a more robust testing of expense booking/payments in the subsequent period, trend analysis etc.

3) One of the objectives of the internal audit function is to test the orderly conduct of business operations consistent with the processes set by the management. Verifying whether the process of completion of predeparture formalities would ensure compliance to the service standards of the company however this is not likely to have any direct impact on financial reporting, as such, may not be relevant from a financial statement audit perspective.

4)    The external auditor can use the observations made in the internal audit reports on vendor contracts entered during the period under audit and evaluate whether these have any impact on reporting on internal controls or financial reporting – for e.g., any onerous terms entailing provision/disclosures etc. the internal audit reports could also possibly highlight non-compliance with standard operating procedures in selection and awarding  of  vendor  contracts.  The  external  auditor would be in a position to evaluate whether such non- compliance is indicative of fraud. Internal audit function can act as a good checkpoint for fraud prevention and reporting.

5)    Background verification of employees would prevent the company from hiring fraudulent employees or employees  with  malicious  intent.    Though  there  is no direct implication of this on the financial reporting of the company, the procedures performed by the internal auditor may help the external auditor address the  risk  of  fraud  over  employee  hiring.  The  auditor based on his assessment of internal audit could use their work in this area to re-engineer the substantive work necessary to be performed by him audit for addressing fraud risk.

 Case study 2- Adequacy and use of work performrd by the Internal Auditor

background
ABC limited has appointed M/s. XYZ and Co. (XYZ) as   their   internal   auditors.   The   statutory   auditors   of the  company  –  M/s.PQR  &  associates  (PQR)  need  to evaluate the adequacy of the work performed by XYZ. Consider the following scenarios:

1)    XYZ is a reputed firm of chartered accountants with a  sizeable  client  portfolio.    the  recruitment  policy of the firm specifies that only qualified Chartered accountants or students pursuing Chartered accountancy course can be recruited in the internal audit department. The firm follows a policy of training new joiners in accordance with XYZ’s audit manual which helps new joiners understand the audit methodology to be followed while conducting internal audits. XYZ also ensures that the team composition on any client comprises of at least one experienced member with relevant industry knowledge.  The work performed by the internal audit team goes through various levels of reviews by partners and managers before the final reports are issued to the clients. As far as relationship with ABC limited is concerned, XYZ occupies an independent status and reports directly to the board of directors of ABC Limited. XYZ presents its observations in the monthly operations meeting of the company and the line managers of the company are responsible to take corrective action within an agreed timeline. XYZ organises meetings with the external auditors – PQR on a monthly basis to discuss their findings and also to assess the requirements of the external auditors if any, when planning their scope for the year. Determine whether the work performed by the internal auditor can be considered as adequate for the purpose of the audit by the external auditor

2)    Assume that for the year ended 31st march 20X0, XYZ has performed a comprehensive review of revenue cycle of ABC Limited. There were no adverse findings. in view of the background information given in (1) above,  mr.  Khanna,   audit  manager  –  PQR  decided not to perform any work on revenue as this area was extensively covered by XYZ. Mr. Khanna elected to rely on the work already performed by XYZ and was contemplating requesting XYZ to provide them with a copy of their report as well as work papers for his audit file documentation.

Analysis
1)    In the given scenario, the internal audit function comprises of a highly prestigious firm with set procedures  and  hierarchy  of  reviews.  The  internal audit division has qualified accountants and trainees. New recruits are provided adequate training. It  is also ensured that at all times there is at least once experienced member in the engagement team due to which the entire team gets the requisite guidance. The internal auditor enjoys an independent position with ABC Limited. Internal audit reports directly to the board which is indicative of minimal interference by operating management. Management takes cognizance of internal audit findings and has in place a mechanism to address these in a time bound manner. Internal auditors communicate the observations emanating from their audits with the external auditors. Internal auditors take cognizance of the requirements and expectations of the external auditors from the internal auditors. These are indicators of effective implementation of internal audit function within the organisation. In such an environment, the external auditors – PQR may be able to conclude that the internal audit function is effective and may undertake to modify the extent of testing for that they would undertake on those account captions which have been subjected to internal audit.

2)    (a) It would not be appropriate for mr. Khanna to conclude that no work should be performed on the revenue cycle. Given that revenue is presumed to have fraud risk, the auditor should not entirely rely on the work of internal audit when performing procedures related to controls that are intended to address assertions which are susceptible to fraud risk. Mr. Khanna would need to devise his own testing plan, he may consider modifying the testing approach in terms of controls testing and substantive procedures. Given the existence of a robust internal audit system, he may elect to test fewer key controls, rationalize the sample size, undertake substantive procedures which are less time consuming etc.

(b)    In the indian context, the Code of ethics provides that a chartered accountant in practice would be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct if he discloses information acquired in the course of his professional engagement to any person other than his client. As such, XYZ would not be in a position to share their work papers with PQR without prior consent from the Company.

(c)    Even   considering   a   scenario   where   PQR provides access to XYZ access to its work papers (after prior approval from the company), it would be incumbent upon PQR to test or re-perform the work performed by XYZ by obtaining evidence directly  from the management of the Company supporting the samples verified by XYZ as opposed to reviewing the documentation provided by XYZ. PQR may exercise its judgment as to whether all samples tested by XYZ should  be  tested  again  by  PQR  or  whether  PQR should select an entirely new sample. Mere reliance on the documentation provided is not sufficient.

   Closing Remarks
Using the work of an internal auditor could assist the external auditor in performing a more efficient and effective audit. However, the external auditor would continue to be solely responsible for the audit opinion.

The   Companies   act,   2013   has   re-emphasied   the importance of a robust internal financial control environment by casting specific responsibility on the Board of directors of a company to establish internal financial controls and ensuring that these are adequate and they operate effectively. internal audit will play a very significant role in providing a comfort to the Board  in this regard. Statutory auditors are also required to comment in their report, whether the company has an adequate internal financial controls system in place and the operating effectiveness of such controls. The statutory auditors too would need to take cognisance of the work performed by internal auditors on testing of controls. This will entail increased cohesiveness between internal and external auditors however, the external auditor would continue to be responsible for his opinion on the design and operative effectiveness of internal controls.

GAPs in GAAP Contingent Consideration From Seller’s Perspective

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Buyers and sellers of businesses in recent times are coming up with innovative deal structures that use contingent consideration and other instruments that allow the buyer and seller to share the economic risks for a period of time. When buyers and sellers cannot agree on the value of a business, contingent consideration arrangements are a common way to close the deal. In these arrangements, part of the purchase price is contingent on future events or conditions. Contingent consideration arrangements often depend on the acquiree meeting certain financial targets, such as revenues, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) or net income. It may also depend on other events, such as achieving a technical milestone (e.g., drug or patent approval).

Question

How does a seller of a business account for the contingent consideration?

Analysis
There is no direct guidance on accounting for contingent consideration under Indian GAAP from a seller’s perspective. Guidance is available under AS 14 Accounting for Amalgamations with respect to contingent consideration for the purposes of acquisition accounting. The provision relating to AS 14 Accounting for Amalgamations is set out below.

AS 14 Accounting for Amalgamations

15. Many amalgamations recognise that adjustments may have to be made to the consideration in the light of one or more future events. When the additional payment is probable and can reasonably be estimated at the date of amalgamation, it is included in the calculation of the consideration. In all other cases, the adjustment is recognised as soon as the amount is determinable.

It may also be worthwhile to consider guidance in AS 9 Revenue Recognition though AS 9 applies to goods and services and not to sale of a business.

AS 9 Revenue Recognition

9.1 Recognition of revenue requires that revenue is measurable and that at the time of sale or the rendering of the service it would not be unreasonable to expect ultimate collection.

9.4 An essential criterion for the recognition of revenue is that the consideration receivable for the sale of goods, the rendering of services or from the use by others of enterprise resources is reasonably determinable. When such consideration is not determinable within reasonable limits, the recognition of revenue is postponed.

11. In a transaction involving the sale of goods, performance should be regarded as being achieved when the following conditions have been fulfilled:

(i) the seller of goods has transferred to the buyer the property in the goods for a price or all significant risks and rewards of ownership have been transferred to the buyer and the seller retains no effective control of the goods transferred to a degree usually associated with ownership; and

(ii) no significant uncertainty exists regarding the amount of the consideration that will be derived from the sale of the goods.

The guidance in AS 29 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets can also be applied by analogy.

AS 29 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets
Definition of a contingent asset: A contingent asset is a possible asset that arises from past events the existence of which will be confirmed only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future events not wholly within the control of the enterprise.

32. Contingent assets are not recognised in financial statements since this may result in the recognition of income that may never be realised. However, when the realisation of income is virtually certain, then the related asset is not a contingent asset and its recognition is appropriate.

Author’s point of view

All the three standards viz., AS-9, AS-14 and AS-29 seem to uphold the concept of probability in recognition of revenue or gain. A careful analysis of AS-29 definition of contingent asset also indicates that if recovery is probable then it is an asset and not a contingent asset. Contingent asset is a possible asset and not a probable asset. Therefore recognition of contingent asset requires the use of virtual certainty principles.

Whether a seller of a business should recognise gain from contingent consideration will depend upon the nature of the contingent consideration itself. Where contingent consideration is based on normal revenue targets which are easily achievable, it may be highly probable that it would be received. In such circumstances contingent consideration should be recognised by the seller. If it appears that the set targets are unachievable, then it may not be appropriate to recognise contingent consideration. Rather they should be treated as contingent asset.

At other times, it may so happen that the contingent consideration is determined at each level of performance. As a result it is highly probable that a minimum amount of consideration is always received. Any excess of expected consideration over the minimum amount recognised is only possible and hence a contingent asset not to be recognised in the financial statements. For example, a seller will receive a contingent consideration of Rs. 1 million, if the following year performance is equal to previous year, and another half a million if the performance improves by 40%. In this case, the seller recognises one million consideration if it is probable that performance will be atleast as good as the previous year. However, the extra half a million will not be recognized if it is not probable (though possible) that it will be received. The said amount is a contingent asset and hence not to be recognised under AS 29. The standard also prohibits the disclosure of contingent assets.

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TS-55-ITAT-2015(Mum) Swiss Re-insurance Company Ltd vs. DIT A.Y: 2010-2011, Dated: 13.02.2015

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Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – Income from re-insurance business not taxable in India in the absence of a business connection or a PE in India; Subsidiary performing outsourced functions does not create a PE in India

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a Swiss company engaged in the reinsurance business, earned income from various cedents in India. Further, an Indian Company (I Co), wholly owned subsidiary of Taxpayer, entered into a service agreement with the Singapore branch of the Taxpayer, for obtaining risk assessment services, marketing of insurance and administrative support in India and was remunerated at cost plus basis.

The Taxpayer contended that in the absence of a PE, income from re-insurance business is not taxable in India. However, the Tax Authority contended that taxpayer had a business connection in India owing to its regular and continuous stream of income in India. Further since I Co renders core and technical reinsurance services to the Taxpayer, it would constitute a Dependent Agent PE (DAPE) for the Taxpayer in India. Alternatively as the Taxpayer remunerated ICo on cost plus basis, I Co’s employees were de-facto employees of the Taxpayer.

The tax authority’s contentions were upheld by the Dispute resolution Panel (DRP). Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:

Under the Act
A business connection is defined to include any business activity carried on by a NR through a person who habitually concludes contracts in India on behalf of the NR, maintains stock in India and regularly delivers goods on behalf of the NR or secures orders in India for the NR.

On the facts of the case, I Co does not carry on any such activity on behalf of the Taxpayer in India. Thus there is no business connection in India.

Under the DTAA
Establishing a subsidiary in the other treaty country would not, in itself, result in creating and establishing a PE of a foreign holding company in the said country. Reliance in this regard was placed on the Delhi High Court ruling in E-Funds IT Services (266 CTR 1)

Further, to create a Service PE in India, the Taxpayer has to furnish services through employees or other personnel in India. Additionally, such services must be furnished to third parties on behalf of the Taxpayer and not to the Taxpayer itself to create a Service PE. The employees of ICo are not rendering services as if they were employees of the Taxpayer and hence the above condition is also not satisfied.

Moreover, reinsurance is specifically excluded from the ambit of the PE definition under DTAA. Accordingly, the income from re-insurance service is not taxable in India.

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TS-38-ITAT-2015(Del) Aithent Technologies Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y: 2005-06 and 2006-07, Dated: 03.02.2015

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Sections 92A, 92B(1) – Transactions between a branch and head office cannot be considered as “international transaction” under the Act.

Facts:
Taxpayer, an Indian Head office, rendered software development and consultancy services to its branch situated in Canada. The taxpayer contended that the transactions with branch office were not in the nature of transactions with associated enterprises (AEs) as branch cannot be treated as a separate entity and hence should not be treated as international transaction under the Act.

However the Tax authority treated this transaction as international transaction and proceeded to calculate the arm’s length price. Aggrieved the taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
Section 92B(1) of the Act provides that an International transaction means a transaction between two or more AEs. Thus for treating any transaction as an international transaction, it is sine qua non that there should be two or more separate AEs.

From a bare reading of section 92B(1) and section 92A of the Act which provides the meaning of AEs it clearly transpires that in order to describe a transaction as an ‘international transaction’, there must be two or more separate entities.

The Taxpayer has consolidated the financial results of the head office as well as the Canada branch and offered the aggregated income to tax. The fact that the office in Canada is Taxpayers branch office and not a distinct entity was specifically argued before the Tax Authority which was not negated by the Tax Authority. Thus it is clear that the branch office is not a separate entity.

As per the principle of mutuality, no person can transact with himself in common parlance. As such, one cannot earn any profit or suffer loss from oneself. Even if Tax authority’s contention that the Taxpayer has earned an income from his branch is accepted then such profit earned would constitute additional cost to the Branch. On the aggregation of the annual accounts of the HO and branch, such income of the head office would be set off with the equal amount of expense of the Branch, leaving thereby no separately identifiable income.

Inter se dealings between HO and branch cease to be commercial transactions in the primary sense. In such a case it cannot be contended that such transaction should be treated as an international transaction.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 70 dated February 2, 2015

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Notification No.FEMA.334/2015-RB dated January 9, 2015, Foreign Direct Investment in Pharmaceuticals sector – Clarification

This circular states that in terms of Press Note No.2 (2015 Series) dated January 6, 2015 a special carve out has been made for medical devices. As a result: –

a. 100% FDI is permitted in the manufacture of medical devices.
b. Conditions applicable to both green field as well as brown field projects in the Pharmaceuticals Sector will not be applicable to FDI in manufacture of medical devices.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 367(Hyderabad-Trib) Anil Bhansali. vs. ITO A.Y: 2007-2008, Dated: 21.01.2015

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Section 5(1), 9(1)(ii) – Stock awards vesting to a person not ordinarily resident in India is taxable in India only to the extent it relates to services rendered in India

Facts:
Taxpayer, a resident but not ordinarily resident (RNOR) in India,, was currently employed by an Indian Co (ICo). Taxpayer had received certain stock awards for services rendered by him to his past employer, an USA company (FCo). The Taxpayer had rendered services to FCo both in USA as well as in India. During the relevant financial year, Taxpayer received transfer proceeds of Stock Options which were granted to him by FCo.

Taxpayer contended that out of the total stock awards vested in him, certain portion was attributable to services rendered in USA and certain portion was attributable to services rendered in India. Accordingly, he offered to tax only that portion of stock awarsds which related to services rendered in India.

Further, Taxpayer had sold the stocks to broker appointed by US Co in the year of grant and he received only the final instalment of stock award sale in the year under consideration. However, Tax Authority contended that the entire income from stock awards is taxable in India as the same was received in India.

On appeal the First Appellate Authority upheld the Tax Authority’s contentions. Aggrieved the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
It is not in dispute that u/s. 6(6) of the Act, Taxpayer qualifies as a person who is not ordinarily resident of India. Thus as per section 5(1) of the Act, income which accrues or arises outside India to a person who is not ordinarily resident in India shall not form part of his total income taxable in India, unless it is derived from a business controlled in or profession set up in India. Further, section 9(1)(ii) specifically provides that salaries shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India if it is earned in India towards services rendered in India. Article 16(1) of India-USA DTAA also provides that salary derived by a resident of USA in respect of an employment exercised in USA shall be taxable in USA.

Thus stock awards can be apportioned towards services rendered in India depending on number of days of stay in India and only that portion of stock award can form part of total income of the Taxpayer.

Merely because stock awards were treated as part of salary by I Co, it cannot be concluded that entire stock award is taxable in India.

I Co has clarified that the stock award which was received by Taxpayer in India was allotted to him when he was under employment by FCo and was sold by the Taxpayer in USA. What was received in India was only the last instalment of such sale. Therefore, without ascertaining the portion of stock awards which is attributable to services in India, the entire amount cannot be made taxable only because the money was received in India.

Thus the taxpayer being RNOR, only that portion of stock awards which is attributable to services in India can form part of total income.

As the above facts were not considered by the Tax Authority or by the First Appellate Authority, the matter was remitted to decide the taxability of stock awards in light of the above observations.

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TS-41-ITAT-2015(Mum) Flag Telecom Group Limited. vs. DCIT A.Y: 1998-99 to 2000-01, Dated: 06.02.2015

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Sections 9(1)(i), 9(1)(vii) – Transaction of
acquisition of full ownership rights and obligations in respect of
capacity purchased in the cable system is ‘sale’ and not ‘royalty’;
payment not taxable in the absence of business connection; fee for
standby facility, which does not involve actual rendering of services,
does not amount to FTS under the Act.

Facts:
Taxpayer,
a company incorporated, controlled and managed from Bermuda, was set up
to build a high capacity undersea cable for providing telecommunication
link between the UK and Japan. For this purpose, it had entered into an
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 13 parties world over, including
an Indian Company (I Co), for planning and implementation of the said
telecommunication link cable system linking western Europe (starting
from the UK), Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia and Far East
(ending in Japan).

ICo accordingly entered into a Cable Sales
Agreement (CSA) and thereafter into a Construction and Maintenance
Agreement (C&MA) with the Taxpayer. Pursuant to these agreements,
ICo purchased certain capacity in the said cable system for a lump sum
consideration. The C&MA was for a period of 25 years, which
coincided with the life of the cable system.

Further, as per the
terms of C&MA, the Taxpayer had agreed to arrange for maintenance
to keep the cable system in proper working condition at all times. One
of the maintenance activity involved providing of standby cover, i.e.,
having the cable ships on standby to repair any breaks or damages in the
submarine cable.

The Taxpayer argued that the payment for
standby maintenance was not in the nature of FTS. The Taxpayer further
claimed that its receipt from ICo for cable capacity purchase is a sale
transaction that was executed outside India on a principal to principal
basis and, hence, was not taxable in India in absence of business
connection in India. The Tax Authority argued that the payment by ICo is
for “right to use” in the cable, hence, taxable as “Royalty” in India.

The
First Appellate Authority agreed with the Taxpayer that the payment for
cable capacity was a sale transaction. However, the payment for standby
maintenance was held to be FTS. Aggrieved, both the Taxpayer as well as
the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
Whether payment for telecom capacity is a transaction of ‘sale’ or ‘royalty’? Held that the transaction is a sale.

Transaction
of sale is a fact based exercise which can be only ascertained from the
intention of the parties concerned as evidenced by written agreements
between them in light of the facts and circumstances. For determining
whether the telecom capacity agreement is for provision of “right to
use” or “sale” of a capacity in the cable network, one needs to examine
whether the owner had retained ownership control and possession of the
property.

From the terms of the clauses given in CSA and
C&MA, it is clear that ICo has got all the ownership rights and
obligations in respect of the capacity purchased in the cable system.
Further, it was provided that the management committee which also
included ICo would make all decision on behalf of the signatories to
implement the purpose of the agreement. ICo, therefore, had unrestricted
right to transfer its assigned capacity, though such a transfer had to
be with the consent of each signatory/telecommunication entity to whom
such capacity was assigned.

It was also clear that the benefit
and burden of ownership had shifted from the seller (i.e. the Taxpayer)
to the buyer. ICo had all the risks and rewards attached to ownership;
ICo not only had the exclusive domain on the rights to use but also
right to resale or transfer its interest in the capacity in the cable
system. Thus under the C&MA, ICo satisfied the characteristic of an
“owner” and “ownership” in respect of the capacity in the cable system.
Further, ICO has treated the capacity as “Fixed Asset” in its books and
had claimed depreciation, indicating that it had treated the capacity
purchased as an asset owned by it. All these points lead to the
conclusion that the intention of the parties to the agreement was sale
and purchase of capacity. Accordingly, the payment is in the nature of
sale.

In case of a “royalty” agreement, the complete ownership
is never transferred to the other party. What is envisaged is that there
should be transfer of rights, or imparting of any information in
respect of various kinds of property, or use of rights to any equipment
etc. If the consideration has been received for transferring ownership
with all rights and obligations then such payment cannot be treated as a
“royalty” payment. In the present case, capacity has been transferred
to ICo along with complete ownership. Accordingly the payment is not in
the nature of royalty.

Is there a business connection? Held No.

The
term business connection connotes some type of establishment, agency or
subsidiary or dependent agent or the like. The connection in India must
be in the form of any concern in the nature of trade, commerce or
manufacture by which the NR earns income.

In the facts of the
present case, there is no asset of the Taxpayer that is situated in
India. The assets in India (landing station) belong to ICo. Further,
once the Taxpayer sells the capacity in the cable system, it also
belonged to ICo. The capacity thus sold, is no longer an asset that
belongs to the Taxpayer. Hence, there is no income accruing or arising
though or from asset of the Taxpayer in India.

The sale of
capacity in the cable system does not arise through or from business
connection in India, because sale has been made to ICo which is an
independent entity and on a principal to principal basis. Thus, there is
neither a business connection of the Taxpayer in India, nor is there
any asset or source of income of the Taxpayer in India. Therefore, the
Taxpayer is not taxable in India on the sale transaction.

Whether nature of payment for standby maintenance is FTS? Held No.

For
a payment to be classified as FTS there needs to be “rendition” of
services in the nature of “managerial”, “technical” or “consultancy”
Rendering services means actual performance of service. The standby
charges paid are not for performance of service. In case the Taxpayer is
providing some kind of repair services, it can be termed as “technical”
in nature and hence falling within the purview of FTS. However, if
there is no actual rendering of services, but mere collection of an
annual charge to recover the cost of standby facility, then it cannot be
said that the payment is for providing technical services. Therefore,
the payment for standby maintenance charges does not qualify as FTS and
hence is not taxable in India.

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TS-789-ITAT-2014(Bang) Vodafone South Ltd. vs. DDIT A.Ys: 2008-09 to 2012-13, Dated: 30.12.2014

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Section 9(1)(vi) – Payment towards interconnect usage charges and capacity transfer for provision of bandwidth amounts to “process royalty” under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act) and the relevant DTAA

Facts:
Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in providing international long distance services to its subscribers. For such services Taxpayer availed the assistance of non-resident (NR) telecom operators (NTO ) located in different jurisdictions and payments were made to NTOs without withholding taxes on the same.

The Tax Authority contended that the payments made to NTO ’s are in the nature of royalty/Fee for Technical services (FTS) under the provisions of the Act as also the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ) and hence held the Taxpayer to be an assessee in default for failure to withhold taxes at source.

On appeal, the First Appellate Authority upheld the Tax Authorities contention. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:

Under the Act
Under the Act, the term “royalty” includes any payment for the use of a process. The term process has also been defined under the Act to include transmission through cable, optic fibre etc., whether or not such process is secret. Further the Act provides that royalty shall include consideration in respect of a right or property whether or not the possession or control of the right is with the payer and whether or not the right or property is used directly by the payer.

On a combined reading of the above it can be understood that there is no requirement to ‘transfer’ a right to use. The condition of use or right to use would be satisfied even without having a direct control or a physical possession on the activity. Any other interpretation would lead to defeating the intention of the provision.

Thus in the present case, Taxpayer made payment to NTO for the use of a “process,” and hence, the payment qualifies as “process royalty” under the Act.

Under the DTAA
The “royalty” definition under the DTAAs includes use of, or the right to use, any copyright, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. However, the term “process” has not been defined under DTAAs.

The Madras HC in Verizon Singapore Pte Ltd1 dealt with an identical issue and held that the definition of the term “process” under the Act should be read into DTAA while evaluating royalty taxation under the provisions of DTAA . The facts in the case of Taxpayer are identical to the facts before the Madras HC. Various other decisions such as Viacom 18 Media (P) Ltd2 and Cognizant Technology Solution3 have followed the Madras HC ruling while dealing on a similar issue.

Thus, the decision of the Madras High Court is accordingly followed and any process, whether secret or not, falls under the ambit of royalty even under the DTAA . Therefore payment for inter connect charges amounts to royalty for the use of process.

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Authority for Advance Rulings – Important aspects and issues

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In this article, the authors, besides giving a brief overview of the
advance ruling process, have also discussed various important technical
issues which confront an applicant seeking an advance ruling from the
AAR, such as meaning of words/phrases ‘proposed transaction’, ‘pending
before any income tax authority’, AAR’s discretionary powers to reject
an application and grounds for judicial review etc.

A. Introduction & Objective

The
scheme of advance ruling was introduced from 1st June 1993 in Chapter
XIX-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the benefit of non-residents to
enable them to obtain an advance ruling from the Authority for Advance
Ruling [AAR] so that they are relieved of uncertainty with regard to
taxability of income arising out of their business /investment,
activities or transaction undertaken or proposed to be undertaken in
India.

This provisions has now been extended to residents with
regard to taxability of income arising out of one or more transactions
valuing Rs. 100 crore or more.

The most striking feature of the
Indian system is that the proceeding is adversarial (in most countries,
proceedings are negotiated), which makes the decision binding on the
applicant and the revenue authorities. In most countries, the advance
rulings are delivered by the revenue authorities and not by a judicial
or quasi-judicial body. Therefore, these rulings are largely considered
to be nonbinding. However, in India the AAR has been set up as a
high-level quasi-judicial authority, which has been granted statutory
recognition. Owing to the binding nature of rulings on the applicant as
well as the revenue, this scheme is intended to significantly faster
dispute resolution process as compared to normal litigation process.

Constitution
The AAR is an independent quasi-judicial body. An AAR Bench, generally, comprises of three members:

The Chairman, who is a retired judge of the Supreme Court or the Vice-Chairman who has been a Judge of a High Court;

One
Revenue member from the Indian Revenue Service who is a Principal Chief
Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or
Director General of Income-tax; and

One Law member from the Indian Legal Service who is an Additional Secretary to the Government of India.

Scope of Advance Ruling
Generally, applicants may raise any question which relates to tax liability –

Both ‘questions of law’ as well as ‘questions of fact’ can be raised before the AAR.

Questions can pertain to both concluded transactions as well as anticipated transactions.

Hypothetical questions cannot be raised before AAR.

Applicant can raise more than one question in one application.

The
questions may relate to any aspect of the applicant’s liability
including international aspects and aspects governed by the Double Tax
Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAA ’).

Advantages of AAR
Assurance to non-resident investors to obtain the ruling without undue delay and with certainty regarding its tax implications.

Best suited to sort out complex issues of taxation including those concerning interpretation of the applicable DTAA .

Rulings
binding on the applicant as well as the revenue, not only for one year
but for all the years unless there is a change in facts/ law.

Facility to modify or reframe the questions, agreements or projects till the time of hearing.

Confidentiality of proceedings is maintained.

Protracted hearing of the application is avoided.

Significantly faster dispute resolution process as compared to the normal litigation process.

The
AAR is by law mandated to pronounce its ruling within 6 months as
compared to more time involved even at the second level appellate
tribunal level.

B. Some Important Issues

1. Meaning of Advance Ruling – Section 245N

U/s. 245N(a)(i), a non-resident applicant can seek a ruling in relation to
a transaction undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by a non-resident
applicant. U/s. 245N(a) (ii), a resident applicant can seek a ruling in
relation to determination of the tax liability of a non-resident
arising out of a transaction undertaken or proposed to be undertaken
with such non-resident.

The words ‘tax liability’ has not
been a part of subclause (i) as compared to sub-clause (ii) & (iia)
of section 245N. While deciding on maintainability of application u/s
245N, a doubt had arisen as regards admissibility of application in case
of Umicore Finance [2009] 184 Taxman 99, since, on facts, it
appeared prima facie that the determination sought by the non-resident
applicant was in relation to the tax liability of an Indian Company. The
AAR held in favour of the assessee, as follows:

“6. It seems to us that the application is maintainable having
regard to the wider language of sub-clause (i) of section 245N(a) in
contrast with the language employed in sub-clause (ii). There is no
specific requirement in sub-clause (i) that determination should relate
to the tax liability of a non-resident.
Going by the averments of
the applicant, it is clear that the capital gain tax issue arising in
the case of the acquired Indian company has a direct and substantial
impact on the applicant’s business in view of the stipulations in share
purchase agreement. Subclause (i) has to be construed in a wider sense and moreover a remedial provision shall be liberally construed.
We are, therefore, of the view that the question raised by the
applicant falls within the definition of ‘advance ruling’ under section
245N(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the application is allowed under
section 245R(2) and posted for hearing on merits on 11-8-2009.”

Previously, in case of Connecteurs Cinch, S.A. [2004] 138 Taxman 120, the application was rejected u/s. 245N(a), since the applicant sought ruling on tax liability of its Indian subsidiary,
which was considered as not a consequence of the transaction undertaken
or proposed to be undertaken by the non-resident applicant.

However, while interpreting the words ‘proposed transaction’
in case of Trade Circle Enterprises LLC [2014] 42 taxmann.com 287
(AAR), it has been held that the ruling of Umicore Finance is not
applicable. The AAR while rejecting the application as incompetent, held
as follows:

“…. In order to bring in the question within the
scope of section 245N of the Act, there has to be either a transaction
undertaken or proposed transaction to be undertaken by the non-resident
applicant. This is not the case in the present application. “Transaction” or “proposed transaction” are not the same as mere intention.
In this case the applicant intends to invest in a 100 per cent
subsidiary company in India which in turn intends to set up a consortium
by way of partnership firm with the Indian company and the partnership
firm propose to acquire the undertaking of the Indian company which is
stated to be eligible for deduction u/s 80IA of the Income-tax Act,
1961. We are of the view that the 100 per cent subsidiary company has to
exist in reality and the partnership firm has to be set up in order to
make transaction or proposed transaction of the applicant with the
Indian company/subsidiary. The question relates to proposed setting
up of the subsidiary and the partnership firm with the Indian company
and as to whether the subsidiary or the partnership firm will be
eligible to 100 per cent deduction u/s 80IA of the Income-tax Act. The
ruling of this Authority in the case of Umicore Finance, In re [2009]

Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act

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FATCA
FATCA is the acronym for Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which was introduced in the United States (US) legislature in October 2009. The US Congress did not approve this as standalone legislation but its provisions were later enacted as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act on March 18, 2010. The broad provisions of FAT CA are found in Sections 1471 to 1474 of the (US) Internal Revenue Code, 1986 as amended from time to time and under regulations issued.

FATCA was the US Government response to a series of investigations into US tax evasion scandals in or around 2006. Those interested may refer to report released in August 2006 titled ‘Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools and Secrecy’ and to the report titled ‘Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues with respect to Offshore Accounts and Entities’ released in March 2009. In substance, these reports conclude that US taxpayers were not necessarily reporting their correct offshore incomes in their US tax returns.

FATCA is intended to increase transparency with respect to US taxpayers investing or earning income through non- US institutions and non-US investment entities. There is the underlying assumption that the US institutions are not encouraging tax evasion by US persons owing to the obligations that the Internal Revenue Code casts upon US institutions and US taxpayers are not omitting from their tax returns details of investments made or income earned through US institutions. It may be noted that US institutions have been subject to significant US regulations in so far as their transactions with US persons are concerned.

Obligations under FATCA
FATCA creates a tax information reporting regime under which financial institutions (FIs), both US (USFIs) and foreign (FFIs) are expected to report certain financial information in respect of a US taxpayer (generally referred to as a ‘US person’). If an FI does not report such information, the FI could be subject to 30% withholding in respect of its own US sourced income. The provisions of FAT CA and the regulations issued initially in February 2012 generated a lot of debate. The original implementation date was pushed back and FAT CA came into effect in two stages on July 1, 2014 and on January 1, 2015.

The global financial community questioned both subtly and overtly, the perceived extra-territorial nature of the FAT CA regulations. Even while this was happening, the enquiry into the nature of business models especially followed by certain businesses came under scrutiny by various Governments around the world. In the US, there were enquires into the US corporations keeping profits outside the US or restructuring themselves under ‘inversion’ structures to get out of the tax rigours applicable to US corporations. In the UK, there were enquires into the way some of the new technology product companies had large sales in the UK but were based out of Ireland. Closer home, the revelation of Indians having accounts in Swiss banks and the directive of the Supreme Court to appoint a Special Investigation Team (SIT) meant that a new era of global transparency in respect of financial transparency was arriving. The G20 endorsed the need for transparency and the OECD even mooted the idea of a multi-lateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA).

The FATCA regime allowed for the US Internal Revenue Service to enter into agreements with other governments for sharing of information either on reciprocal basis or on unilateral basis. These are called Inter-Governmental Agreements (IGAs) on Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. Since completing negotiations with governments and signing agreements was time consuming, the approach taken was to agree to broad terms i.e. to arrive at an agreement ‘in substance’ with the intent to sign the final agreement by end of December 2014. This approach addressed several objections of various governments and of the financial institutions. In November 2014, the US IRS announced that the agreement in substance would be treated as being in force till the final agreement had been signed. India worked out an agreement ‘in substance’ in April 2014.

FFIs and US person
As stated earlier, FATCA requires reporting by FFIs in respect of certain financial transactions of US persons. The term ‘foreign financial institution’ is very broadly defined and encompasses a number of entities that have not traditionally been considered to be financial institutions. An FFI is any entity organised in a country (including a US possession) other than the US that:

Accepts deposits in the ordinary course of banking or similar business; or

As a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account of others; or

Is an investment entity; or

Is an insurance company (or the holding company of an insurance company) that issues or is obligated to make payments with respect to a cash value insurance or annuity contract; or

• Is an entity that is a holding company or treasury centre that is part of an expanded affiliated group that includes a depository institution, a custodial institution, a specified insurance company or an investment entity or is formed in connection with (or availed of by) a collective investment vehicle, mutual fund, exchange traded fund, private equity fund, hedge fund, venture capital fund, leveraged buyout fund or similar investment vehicle.

As we can see above, the coverage is quite wide and the definition quite complex. There are certain exclusions e.g. group entities that are non-financial foreign entities (NFFEs) and non-financial start-up companies for the first 24 months after the latter type of entities are organised. We now turn to who or what is a US person. The term ‘US person’ means:

An individual who is a US citizen or resident of the US; or

A partnership created or organised under the laws of the US or a State of the US; or

A corporation created or organised under the laws of the US or a State of the US; or

An estate of the decedent, who is a US person; or

Any trust if:

1. A court within the US is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust (i.e. the “Court test”); and

2. One or more US persons have the authority to control all substantial decisions of the trust (i.e. the ‘Control test”); or

The Government of the US, any State, municipality or other political subdivision, any whole owned agency or instrumentality of such governments.

Registration of FFI and FFI
Agreement

An FFI is, on application to be made electronically, allotted a ‘Global Intermediary Identification Number’ (GIIN). The GIIN is 20 character identification unique to each FFI. An FFI, whose application for GIIN is under process with the IRS, may provide a Form W-8 to its counterparty and state that it has ‘applied for’ against the GIIN field. Such a Form W-8 will be valid for 90 days during which it is expected that the FFI will be granted the GIIN.

An FFI will agree with the IRS to undertake, amongst others, account holder due diligence, reporting and withholding. The nature of the obligations of the FFI varies depending upon whether the FFI is located in an IGA country or outside.

An FFI which agrees to sign (or signs) the agreement with the US IRS is called a participating FFI (PFFI) and one which does not do so in non-participating FFI (NPFFI). A PFFI may also agree that it will do the FAT CA reporting on behalf any other FFI within the group.

Account Holder Due Diligence most FIS have historically never captured data which reveals the tax residency of the account holder. Generally, Know your Customer (KYC) norms have focussed on proof of identity, proof of address, nature of business. more recently, KYC norms tied in with anti- money laundering (AML) initiatives meant that FIs require information about nature of business of the account holder although there may be no loan or credit facility given to the account holder. this is now being further enhanced to capture information about whether the account holder is  a  US  person.  While  FATCA allows  for  FIS  to  accept customer self-declarations, the institution is expected to make sufficient due diligence in respect of new accounts (nadd) opened after the coming into force of FATCA.  it also requires the institutions to do due diligence in respect of pre-existing accounts (Padd). in particular, the due diligence has to focus on uS indicia appearing in the data relating to accounts of individuals. Generally, US indicia in the context of individual accounts are one or more of the following viz.,

  •    US citizenship

  •     Lawful permanent resident of  the  uS  (i.e.  a  non-uS citizen with a ‘green card’)

  •    US place of birth

  •     Residence address or correspondence address in the US (this could include a US post box office)

  •     US telephone number with no non-uS telephone number associated with the account

  •     Standing instructions to transfer funds to an account in the uS

  •     Current  power  of  attorney   or   signatory   authority granted to a person with a uS address
  •     Care of’ mailing address is the sole address for the account or ‘hold mail’ instruction applies in respect of the account.

In such cases, the institution has to exercise additional due diligence and obtain appropriate ‘cure’ documentation, which differs on the basis of the nature of the defect. For example, uS citizenship cannot be ignored unless the uS certifies that the individual concerned has given up his US citizenship. in the absence of cure documentation, it is presumed that the account holder is a uS person. For non-individuals, the nadd, Padd focuses on whether the entity is an FFI or it is non-financial foreign entity (NFFE). An FFI will have to provide its GIIN     whereas an  NFFE  will have to provide information about its ownership in particular whether it has uS person(s) having substantial i.e. greater than 10% interest in the nFFe.

    An account holder with a PFFI

  • Who or which is not an FFI and who fails to comply    with reasonable requests for information necessary to determine if the account is held by a US person; or
  •    Fails to provide a valid self-declaration of being a US person (Form W-9); or
  •     Fails to   provide   the   correct   name   and   (US)  tax Identification Number (TIN) combination; or
  •     Fails to waive the secrecy law which would prevent the participating FFI from reporting information required to reported under FATCA; or

    Is an NFFE which fails to provide the required certification regarding substantial US owners or lack of such ownership; or
 

  •   Has a dormant account is treated as a ‘recalcitrant account holder’.

There  are  a  few  peculiar  situations  that  arise  owing  to difference in US law and indian law. For example, a company incorporated under indian law could still be treated as a US person under US tax law. Similarly, the US law does not have any specific provision to address a hindu undivided Family (HUF), which is a traditional family institution peculiar to india.

Reporting
A PFFI will have to report, with respect to the financial accounts of uS persons, the following information in various stages viz.

1.    for the period from july 1, 2014 to december 31, 2014
– name, address, uS tin, account balance for such accounts;

2.    for 2015 – in addition to the information at 1 above, the income associated with such accounts;

3.    for 2016 – in addition to the information at 1 and 2 above, gross proceeds from securities transactions.

The reporting is in all cases required to be done after the end of the calendar year. For FFIs located in countries with an IGA, the reporting deadline is September.

Withholding

As stated earlier, non-compliance with FatCa may result in a FatCa withhold being imposed on an FFI. A PFFI will not be subject to FATCA withholding. FATCA withholding would be imposed in respect of withholdable payments made to NPFFIs, non-compliant NFFE and recalcitrant account holders. after december 31, 2016, withholding may also extend to foreign pass-through payments.

a withholdable payment is a payment of uS  source  fixed or determinable, annual or periodical (FDAP) income.  the  term  FdaP  refers  generally  to  income other than gains from the sale or disposition of property.

It includes interest (discount on issue of debt securities is treated as ‘interest’), dividends, substitute payments (quasi dividends not treated as employment income), royalties, payments on notional principal contracts (derivatives) and annuities.

In addition, from january 1, 2017, gross proceeds from sale or other disposition of property that can produce US source interest or dividend income could subject to FATCA withholding.

The US law treats an FDAP as being US source income on the basis of residence of the obligor. For example, interest paid to an account holder on uS treasury bond or where the borrower is a US corporation is a withholdable payment. in the same manner, dividend in respect of US stocks is a withholdable payment. After december 31, 2016, sale proceeds of stock of a US corporation or of US treasury bond or a bond where the borrower is a US corporation could be treated as withholdable payment.

The complex rules of foreign passthru payments are not discussed here. In the next part of the write up, we will touch upon the local regulatory aspects covering FatCa compliance in india.

Summary

FATCA  is  not  a  tax  but  a  mechanism  adopted  by  the US Government to get information about US persons’ financial accounts with FFIs. It requires due diligence in respect of financial account holders, obtaining relevant documentation and reporting certain information about the US persons financial accounts with the FFI.

Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt. Ltd vs. State of Assam and Others, [2012] 56 VST 452 (Gauhati)

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VAT- Entry in Schedule-Rate of Tax- Sale of Harpic and Lizol – Falls Under Pesticides – Sale of Dettol- Falls Under Drugs and Medicine- And Not As Toilet Articles, Entries 1 of Sch. I, 19 of Part A of Sch. II and 21 of Sch. IV of The Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Facts
The petitioner company engaged in the business of various household products, sold “Harpic and Lizol”; “Dettol” and paid tax @ 4% being covered by schedule entries relating to pesticides and drugs and medicine respectively. The vat authority in assessment levied higher rate of tax of 12.5% being covered by residual entry. The petitioner company filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court against the impugned assessment order.

Held
The products “Harpic and Lizol” are admittedly disinfectants. By giving broader meaning of the term pesticides, disinfectants which primarily kill germs and bacteria would be covered within the meaning of “pests” and therefore liable to tax @ 4% under entry 19 of Pat A of Schedule II relating to pesticides. As regards sale of “Dettol” the High Court held that the main purpose of use of “Dettol” is to prevent infections which may occur due to minor cuts, injuries, abrasions, grazes, insect bites, etc. Thus by applying “users test”, it would be squarely falling under the definition of “Drugs’ as defined in Drugs and Cosmetics Act, as well as under the definition of Section of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duty ) Act, 1955. The “Dettol” cannot be considered to be a cosmetic substance because the purpose of use of “Dettol” is to prevent infection and for sanitation because of its therapeutic and prophylactic properties. Accordingly, it was held as “Drugs and Medicine” covered by the entry 21 of the Schedule IV of the act and will not fall within the excluded category relating to cosmetic and toilet preparations under the Explanation. The High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner company and set aside the assessment orders passed by the department with direction to take consequential actions in accordance with law.

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State of Tamil Nadu vs. Steel Authority of India, [2012] 56 VST 441 (Mad)

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Central Sales Tax Act-Sale in Course of Import – Contract for Supply of Coin Blanks to Government of India – Not Occasioned Import of Goods In to India – Where Under Another Independent Contract Coin Blanks are Converted and Supplied By Foreign Supplier to the respondent – In turn Supplied To Government of India Under Independent Contract – Not Exempt from payment of Tax, section 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 M/S. Cheema Paper Ltd. vs. Commissioner Trade Tax, (2012) 55 VST 473 Entry Tax- Rate of Tax – Duplex Board – Ordinarily Used As Packing Material-Made out of Paper – Not Covered by Entry “ Paper of All Kinds”, section 4 of The Uttar Pradesh Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007

Facts
The respondent company entered into a contract with foreign supplier for conversion of still strips to blank coins at Italy. Thereafter, the company entered in to contract with Government of India for manufacture and supply of blank coins. The company claimed sale, to the Government of India, of blank coins as sale of goods in the course of import and exempt from payment of tax u/s. 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Tribunal allowed the appeal against which the tax department filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court. 

Held
In order to earn exemption from payment of tax as sale in the course of import of goods into India u/s. 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, the goods must move from the foreign country to India in pursuance of condition of contract of sale between the foreign supplier and the local purchaser. In present case, the goods were imported from foreign country in pursuance of the contract between the foreign supplier and the first respondent. A conjunct reading of both agreements would make it clear that these two agreements are independent to one another and are different entities. The first respondent entered in to these agreements for import of goods for its own purpose and there is no privity of contract between the local purchaser, the Government and the foreign seller. Therefore the sale of goods by the respondent company to the local purchaser i.e. the Government of India is not exempt from payment of tax as sale in the course of import under section 5(2) of the act. The High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition filed by the department and the order of the Tribunal allowing the claim was set aside.

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M/S. National Aluminum Company Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bhubaneswar III, Circle, Khurda, [2012] 56 VST 68 (Orissa)

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VAT- Input Tax Credit- Purchase of Coal, Alum,
Caustic Soda etc.- Used in Generation of Power- Used for Manufacturing
of Goods- Are Input- Eligible for Input Tax Credit, sections 2(25),(26),
(27), 17,20(8)(k),42 and 43(2) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004

Facts
The
petitioner a Central Government public sector undertaking filed VAT
returns under the Orissa Vat Act and claimed input tax credit in respect
of tax paid on purchase of coal, alum, caustic soda, consumables used
on its captive power plant for generation of electricity which in turn
is used in continuous process of aluminum. The vat department in
assessment disallowed the input tax credit claimed by the company on
purchase of such goods that are used for generation of electricity,
which itself is a final product and exempt from payment of tax, and as
such no input tax credit is available under the act. The Company filed
writ petition before the Orissa High Court against such assessment
order.

Held
U/s. 17 of the act sale of goods
specified in Schedule A is exempt from payment of tax. Sale of
electricity appearing in item no. 13 of Schedule A is exempted from
payment of vat under the act. Consequently, no input tax credit is
allowed on purchases of input used in producing or manufacturing of
electrical energy in terms of section 20(k) of the act. Admittedly, the
company is not selling electrical energy but has used it in
manufacturing aluminum which is taxable under the act. Under the Act,
input tax credit is available on purchase of inputs either for resale or
for use in execution of works contract, or for manufacture and
processing against the output tax payable on sale of any taxable goods.
Power/energy is one of the primary and essential commodities which has a
direct relation in the manufacturing process. The purchase of inputs
used in generation of electrical energy which in turn is used for
manufacturing of aluminum taxable are “input” as defined in section
2(25) of the act and tax paid on purchases thereof is eligible for input
tax credit against output tax payable on sale of aluminum etc.

Accordingly,
the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the company and
quashed the assessment order disallowing input tax credit on purchase of
such inputs.

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2015 (37) STR 238 (Tri.-Mum.) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai vs. Toyo Engineering Corporation Ltd.

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Interest to accrue till the date of debit in CENVAT Credit Account notwithstanding balance lying in CENVAT Credit Account on due date.

Facts:
The respondents discharged service tax liability by way of utilisation of CENVAT Credit. However, debit in CENVAT Credit account was done belatedly. The department demanded interest for the period of delay vide section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 from the due date for payment of tax to the actual payment of tax i.e. till the date of debit in CENVAT Credit Account. It was argued that there was sufficient balance in CENVAT Credit Account and only debit entry was passed belatedly. Accordingly, interest liability should not arise.

Held:

It was held that tax can be paid either in cash or by debiting in CENVAT Credit account or by both. If the tax is paid through CENVAT Credit, the date of debit in the CENVAT account should be considered to be the date of payment. Therefore, interest arises from the due date of payment of tax to the actual date of payment, i.e., the date of debit in CENVAT Credit Account in the present case.

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2015 (37) STR 286 (Tri.-Mum) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai – I vs. Vodafone India Ltd.

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Telecom services provided to international
roamers travelling in India should be treated as export of services vide
Export of Service Rules, 2005.

Facts:
The
respondents provided roaming facility to international roamers
travelling in India. Whether the services were export of services in
terms of Export of Service Rules, 2005 or not.

Held:
It
was undisputed fact that the respondents provided services to customers
of foreign service provider and the consideration was received in
convertible foreign currency and therefore, following the ratio of
Tribunal’s own decision in respondent’s case (2013) 33 taxmann. com 358
(Mumbai-CESTAT ) and earlier precedents on the subject matter, service
tax paid in respect of such transactions was allowed.

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