ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 264 is one of the important provisions under the Act beneficial to the assessee, whereunder the higher authority has been given the power to revise any order passed by the lower authority and pass a revisionary order in favour of the assessee. The CIT or PCIT or CCIT or PCCIT (referred to as CIT hereafter) may, either of his own motion or on an application made by the assessee in this regard, revise any order passed by any authority which is subordinate to him. The CIT has to pass an order as he thinks fit, which cannot be prejudicial to the assessee.
Section 264 reads as under:
“Revision of other orders.
264. (1) In the case of any order other than an order to which section 263 applies passed by an authority subordinate to him, the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may, either of his own motion or on an application by the assessee for revision, call for the record of any proceeding under this Act in which any such order has been passed and may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made and, subject to the provisions of this Act, may pass such order thereon, not being an order prejudicial to the assessee, as he thinks fit.
(2) The Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner shall not of his own motion revise any order under this section if the order has been made more than one year previously.
(3) In the case of an application for revision under this section by the assessee, the application must be made within one year from the date on which the order in question was communicated to him or the date on which he otherwise came to know of it, whichever is earlier:
Provided that the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within that period, admit an application made after the expiry of that period.
(4) The Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner shall not revise any order under this section in the following cases—
(a) where an appeal against the order lies to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or to the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals) or to the Appellate Tribunal but has not been made and the time within which such appeal may be made has not expired, or, in the case of an appeal to the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals) or to the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee has not waived his right of appeal; or
(b) where the order is pending on an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals); or
(c) where the order has been made the subject of an appeal to the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals) or to the Appellate Tribunal.
(5) Every application by an assessee for revision under this section shall be accompanied by a fee of five hundred rupees.
(6) On every application by an assessee for revision under this sub-section, made on or after the 1st day of October, 1998, an order shall be passed within one year from the end of the financial year in which such application is made by the assessee for revision.
Explanation.—In computing the period of limitation for the purposes of this sub-section, the time taken in giving an opportunity to the assessee to be re-heard under the proviso to section 129 and any period during which any proceeding under this section is stayed by an order or injunction of any court shall be excluded.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (6), an order in revision under sub-section (6) may be passed at any time in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order of the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court.
Explanation 1.—An order by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner declining to interfere shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed not to be an order prejudicial to the assessee.
Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) shall be deemed to be an authority subordinate to the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner.”
Thus, the assessee has been provided the benefit of seeking revision of the order passed by the AO under Section 264, but with the condition that such order should not be appealable, or if appealable, then no appeal should have been filed against such order.
Quite often, the issue has arisen as to whether an ‘intimation’ issued under Section 143(1) can be regarded as an ‘order’ for the purposes of Section 264 and can, therefore, be the subject matter of revision under Section 264. The Delhi and Bombay High Courts have taken a view that the order referred to in Section 264 would include an intimation issued under Section 143(1) and, therefore, can be revised. However, the Gujarat, Kerala and Karnataka High Courts have taken a contrary view.
EPCOS Electronic Components SA’s Case
The issue had come up for consideration by the Delhi High Court in the case of EPCOS Electronics Components SA vs. UOI [WP (C) 10417/2018, 10th July, 2019].
In this case, the assessee filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2014–15 by offering tax @20 per cent on its earnings for the provision of management services to its associated enterprise, EPCOS India Pvt. Ltd. in terms of Article 13 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement entered into between India and Spain. The AO by an intimation dated 10th March, 2016, under Section 143(1) processed the said return of income. Later, the assessee realised that it had failed to claim the lower rate of tax it was eligible for, by virtue of Clause 7 of the Protocol appended to the India-Spain DTAA. Another mistake committed by the assessee was that it paid a surcharge and cess on the tax, which was not required to be paid, as the tax rate under the DTAA was a final rate inclusive of surcharge and cess. This led the assessee to file a revision petition under Section 264 on 16th January, 2017, before the CIT, seeking to revise the order under Section 143(1), claiming it to be prejudicial to the assessee’s interest.
The CIT rejected the application filed by the assessee under Section 264 on the grounds that no amount was payable by the assessee in terms of an intimation under Section 143(1), and therefore, no prejudice was caused to the assessee in terms thereof. Alternatively, the CIT held that the assessee should have filed a revised return claiming the relief so claimed by it in the revision application. Further, it was held by the CIT that Section 264 could not be invoked to rectify the assessee’s own mistakes, if any. Against the said order, the assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court.
The question before the High Court was whether a revision petition under Section 264 was maintainable to rectify the mistake committed by the assessee while filing its return, which had been accepted by the Department by issuing an intimation under Section 143(1). Before the High Court, the assessee relied upon the decision in the case of Vijay Gupta vs. CIT 386 ITR 643 (Delhi) and the revenue relied upon the decision in the case of ACIT vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. 291 ITR 500 (SC) to urge that an intimation under Section 143(1) could not be treated as an ‘order’ and, therefore, no petition under Section 264 could be maintained against such intimation.
The High Court observed that the decision in Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was in the context of Sections 147 and 148. If the original assessment was under Section 143(3), then the proviso to Section 147 would be attracted, and the procedure prescribed thereunder for re-opening an assessment would have to be followed. On the other hand, if the return had been accepted by the Department by a mere intimation under Section 143(1), then a different set of consequences would ensue, and there would be no requirement for the department if it were to re-open the assessment to follow the procedure it would have had to had the assessment order been passed under Section 143(3). The context of the case before the High Court was totally different. It was not an attempt by the Revenue to re-open the assessment by invoking Sections 147 and 148 but was of the assessee realising the mistake made by it while filing the return of paying a higher rate of tax.
In such a context, the intimation received by the assessee from the AO accepting the return under Section 143(1) would partake the character of an order for the purpose of Section 264, though in the context of Sections 147 and 148, it might have had a different connotation. However, the consistent view of the High Court, as expressed in Vijay Gupta (supra) and the other decisions which have been cited therein, has been that for the purposes of Section 264, a revision petition seeking rectification of the return accepted by the Department in respect of which intimation is sent under Section 143(1) was indeed maintainable.
On this basis, the High Court disagreed with the view expressed by the CIT and held that a revision petition under Section 264 would be maintainable vis-à-vis an intimation under Section 143(1).
A similar view has also been expressed by the Bombay High Court in the cases of Diwaker Tripathi vs. Pr CIT 154 taxmann.com 634 (Bom),Smita Rohit Gupta vs. Pr CIT 459 ITR 369 (Bom) and Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed vs. ACIT, W.P. (L) NO. 6096 OF 2021 dated 8th April, 2021.
Gujarat Gas Trading Co. Ltd.’s Case
The issue again came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Gas Trading Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (Special Civil Application No. 2514 of 2011, order dated 7th September, 2016).
In this case, for the Assessment Year 2003–04, the assessee company filed its return of income declaring income of ₹3.31 crores, which included a sum of ₹1.87 crores pertaining to expenses on account of commission which had been disallowed wrongly. These expenses were disallowed under the mistaken belief that the assessee was allowed to claim a deduction of these expenses only upon payment. The return of income of the assessee company was accepted by the AO under Section 143(1) without scrutiny, and the refund claimed was issued.
Having realised the error in not claiming the deduction of expenditure on accrual basis while filing the return, the assessee filed a petition before the CIT under Section 264 on 29th December, 2008, seeking revision of the intimation / order under Section 143(1). In response, the assessee was called upon to produce necessary evidence in support of the date of receipt of the intimation under Section 143(1). Instead of replying, the assessee filed a fresh petition for revision on 13th April, 2009, which was rejected by an order dated 3rd December, 2009, inter-alia, on the grounds that the revision petition was filed after a lapse of about six years. The assessee approached the High Court against the order of dismissal mainly on the ground that it was not provided any opportunity to explain the delay. The High Court directed the CIT to decide the matter afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
In the revision proceeding which was initiated afresh, the CIT rejected the revision petition on the grounds of delay as well as maintainability. The CIT held that the intimation was not a revisable order. He relied upon the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Avasaraja Automation Ltd. vs. DCIT 269 ITR 163 in which it was held that the petition under Section 264
against intimation was not maintainable in view of the deletion of Explanation to Section 143 with effect from 1st June, 1999. The assessee challenged the order of the CIT on both counts by filing a petition before the High Court.
Before the High Court, with respect to the issue of maintainability, the assessee argued that, under Section 264, any order is subject to revision and not only an order of assessment. Even acceptance of assessment without scrutiny and intimation thereof in terms of Section 143(1) was an order of assessment, may be without scrutiny. The assessee also placed reliance upon the following decisions:
i. C. Parikh & Co. vs. CIT 122 ITR 610 (Guj)
ii. Assam Roofing Ltd. vs. CIT 43 taxmann.com 316 (Gauhati)
iii. Ramdev Exports vs. CIT 251 ITR 873
iv. Vijay Gupta vs. CIT (supra)
The revenue contended that the intimation under Section 143(1) was neither an order of assessment nor an order which was capable of revision under Section 264. It was merely an administrative action of intimating the assessee that his return was accepted. The revenue relied upon the amendment made in Section 143(1) with effect from 1st June, 1999, when the explanation was dropped and submitted that, prior to 1st June, 1999, the AO had the power to make prima facie adjustments. Due to this, the intimation under Section 143(1) was deemed to be an order of assessment for the purpose of Section 264. The revenue also relied upon the following decisions where it had been held that an intimation was not capable of being subject to revision under Section 264:
i. CIT vs. K. V. Mankaram and Co. 245 ITR 353 (Ker)
ii. Avasaraja Automation Ltd. vs. DCIT 269 ITR 163 (Kar)
The High Court held that the assessee had failed to explain the delay and, therefore, the order of the CIT not condoning the delay was upheld. The High Court also accepted the view of the CIT that against the intimation under Section 143(1), the revision petition was not maintainable for the following reasons:
• ‘Any order’ referred to in Section 264 was not meant to cover even mere administrative orders without there being any element of deciding any rights of the parties.
• In the case of Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court observed that acknowledgement under Section 143(1) is not done by an AO, but mostly by ministerial staff. It could not be stated that by such intimation, the assessment was done.
• An Explanation was added below Section 143 by the Finance Act, 1991, with effect from 1st October, 1991, which provided that an intimation sent to the assessee shall be deemed to be an order for the purpose of Section 264. This explanation came to be deleted with effect from 1st June, 1999, when Section 143 itself underwent major changes. It could, thus, be seen that during the period when, under subsection (1) of Section 143, the AO had the power of making prima facie adjustments, the legislature provided for an explanation that an intimation sent to the assessee under subsection (1) would be deemed to be an order for the purposes of Section 264. Once, with the amendment of Section 143, such powers were rescinded, a corresponding change was, therefore, made by deleting the explanation and withdrawing the deeming fiction.
The High Court also dealt with each of the decisions which was relied upon by the assessee and distinguished it. The decision in the case of C. Parikh & Co. (supra) was held to be focusing on the question of whose mistake can be corrected by the CIT in revisional powers, whether of the assessee or the AO and did not concern the question whether an intimation was open to revision or not. Similarly, in the case of Ramdev Exports (supra), the question of maintainability of a revision petition against a mere intimation under Section 143(1) did not arise. In the case of Vijay Gupta (supra), before the Commissioner, the assessee had not only challenged the intimation under Section 143(1) but also the rejection of application under Section 154. Thus, these decisions relied upon by the assessee were held to be distinguishable.
OBSERVATIONS
Section 264 is a beneficial provision whereunder the higher authorities have been empowered to pass a revisionary order, not being prejudicial to the assessee, revising the order passed by the lower authorities. The objective of this provision is also to provide a remedy to an assessee when he is aggrieved by any order passed against him, whereby he can approach the higher authority within the given time limit requiring it to pass the revisionary order not prejudicial to him.
The whole controversy under consideration revolves around only one issue, i.e., whether the intimation issued under Section 143(1) upon processing of the return of income filed by the assessee can be considered to be an order. The issue is whether the word ‘order’ used in Section 264 should be interpreted so strictly so as to exclude any other intimation which has not been termed as ‘order’ under the relevant provision of the Act, although it has been generated and issued by the AO, and more particularly when it otherwise determines the total income and tax liability of the assessee.
Firstly, it needs to be appreciated that the term ‘order’ is not defined expressly in the Act. The simple dictionary meaning of the term ‘order’ is an authoritative command or instruction. When the intimation is issued under Section 143(1) upon processing of the return of income filed by the assessee, it is nothing but an official instruction which is issued under the authority of the AO determining the amount of total income and tax liability of the assessee after incorporating necessary adjustments, if any, to the return of income filed. Merely because it has been referred to as ‘intimation’ and not ‘order’ under Section 143(1), it cannot be considered as not falling within the purview of Section 264.
By relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the revenue has attempted to argue that the intimation is not an assessment order and, therefore, there is no application of mind by the Assessing Officer when such intimation is issued. However, it needs to be appreciated that the provision of Section 264 does not only bring the ‘assessment order’ within its purview but it brings all types of orders within its purview. Therefore, to examine the applicability of Section 264, it is irrelevant to consider the fact that the intimation issued under Section 143(1) is not an assessment order. What is relevant is that it bears all the characteristics of an order, although it is not an assessment order.
The Gujarat High Court has heavily relied upon the omission of Explanation to Section 143 with effect from 1st June, 1999, which had provided that the intimation shall be deemed to be an order for the purpose of Section 264. It has been observed that since the power to make the prima facie adjustment while processing the return of income had been removed, the intimation was no longer regarded to be an order for the purpose of Section 264. However, it needs to be appreciated that in various cases, the Courts have also allowed the assessees to raise fresh claims under Section 264 which were never raised by them in the return of income. Therefore, it was not only prima facie adjustments in respect of which relief could have been sought under Section 264.
Besides, Section 143(1), as amended by the Finance Act 2008 with effect from 1st April, 2008, now permits certain adjustments to be made under six circumstances referred to in clause (a) thereof. The Gujarat High Court decision was rendered for AY 2003–04, at a point of time when no adjustments were permissible under Section 143(1). Therefore, by the logic of the Gujarat High Court itself, an intimation should now be regarded as an order.
An intimation under Section 143(1) is also now an appealable order under Section 246(1)(a) as well as Section 246A(1)(a) with effect from 1st July, 2012. Though it is appealable only if an assessee objects to the adjustments made, the very fact that it is placed at par with other orders clearly brings out the fact that an intimation is now an order.
The heading of Section 263 also refers to “Revision of Other Orders”, and the section itself refers to any order other than an order to which Section 263 applies. This is broad enough to cover an intimation under Section 143(1).
In CIT vs. Anderson Marine & Sons (P) Ltd 266 ITR 694 (Bom), a case relating to AY 2009–10, a year in which adjustments under Section 143(1) were not permissible, the Bombay High Court held that sending of an intimation, being a decision of acceptance of self-assessment, is in the nature of an order passed by the AO for the purposes of Section 263. If so, the same logic should apply to Section 264 as well.
The Delhi High Court in Vijay Gupta’s case rightly pointed out that Circular No.14(XL-35) of 1955, dated 11th April, 1955, which required officers of the Department to assist a taxpayer in every reasonable way, particularly in the matter of claiming and securing reliefs, and Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which prohibited the arbitrary collection of taxes stating that ‘no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law’, had not been considered by the CIT while rejecting the revision petition. If this is taken into account, the assessee should not be denied a deduction rightfully allowable in law, merely because it is not claimed in the return of income, on the grounds that the assessee has no remedy under Section 264 against an intimation.
Further, an intimation issued under Section 143(1) is amenable to rectification under Section 154. Therefore, consider a case where the order of rectification has been passed under Section 154, rectifying the intimation issued under Section 143(1), either suo moto or upon an application made by the assessee in this regard. In such a case, the rectification order would fall within the purview of Section 264, it being an ‘order’, upon taking such a strict interpretation, whereas the intimation itself which has been rectified by the said order would not fall within its purview. Thus, such an interpretation leads to an absurd result, which needs to be avoided.
Therefore, at least as the law now stands, thebetter view is that taken by the Delhi and Bombay High Courts considering the intimation issued under Section 143(1) to be in the nature of ‘order’ for the purpose of Section 264.




Lecture Meeting on Important Income-tax Decisions of 2014 on 29th January 2015


Programme on Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) & Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) on 7th February 2015






In the first session CA. Mayur Nayak effectively explained, many important points aptly punctuated with humour. He explained the importance of clarity of goal, attitude to win, discipline, consistency, effective time management and how to overcome distractions. He guided them to have Balanced food, effective study and relaxation. He emphasised that harmony of physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual alignment would help them to face any challenges in life including that of exams.
In the second session CA. Shrinivas Joshi focused on CA exams. He explained at length as to how to prepare with qualitative studies for exams including use of appropriate reference materials. He shared the information that excellent study materials and faculties are available freely to clarify and guide on a variety of subjects covered in the syllabus. He explained at length as to what the examiner expects from the students and also cleared their doubts on misinformation and wrong impressions in the minds of the students about the ICAI exams and its results. He shared the important tips as to how to write the papers and manage time of three hours in exams. He answered all questions raised by the students. 
The Seminar on Media and Entertainment Industry was conducted by the International Taxation Committee of the BCAS on 12 February 2016 at St. Regis Hotel (Palladium Hotel). This seminar was organized jointly with Accounting & Auditing Committee and Indirect Taxation Committee. The speakers at the seminar and the topics covered were as under:
Mr. Jehil Thakkar on Know the industry – current issues – Business models, cash flows, vehicle for investments, etc. (Industry overview and typical situations)
Mr. Utkarsh Sanghvi on Indirect tax issues in media and entertainment industry, including: Service tax, VAT and customs.
The seminar was attended by more than 50 participants. The seminar became very informative and provided an overview of industry as a whole and detailed technical analysis on taxation, accounting and auditing aspects. The Seminar provided an insight into the industry and focused on the issues faced in the industry and the current trends in respect of the Media and Entertainment industry. The sessions at this seminar were all interactive and generated good amount of debate among the participants and the presenter.
Lecture Meeting on Important Case Laws of 2015 on Indirect Taxes held on Wednesday, 17th February 2016 at IMC Hall Churchgate Shri. K. Vaitheeswaran dealt with various important case laws of 2015 on Indirect Taxes. He discussed and deliberated upon case laws in the field of Central Excise, Customs, Service Tax and Sales tax. He dealt with intricacies of the cases with an impact analysis.
Lecture Meeting on Important Income Tax Decisions of 2015 was held on Wednesday, 24th February 2016 at the Jaihind College Auditorium. 
















