S.D.O. Coil Fabrication vs. C CE 2013 (290) ELT 431 (Tri. Del)
Month: June
Corporate Restructuring – Position under the Companies Bill, 2012
The Companies Act, 1956 (“the Act”) would soon be repealed and replaced with the Companies Bill, 2012 (“the Bill”)
since the Lok Sabha has already approved the Bill. Thus, the Act has
been asked to retire before it reaches a superannuation age of 60 years!
This is quite a welcome feature because Acts in India are infamous for
hanging around for over 100 years in some cases.
As with any new
Legislation, there is a great deal of fascination amongst the business
fraternity and professionals to see whether the Bill is a turbo-charged
version of the old Act or is it merely “Old Wine in a New Bottle”, does
it continue with the “Old Whine with New Throttle”? While there have
been several new concepts which are sought to be introduced by the Bill,
one area which sees a lot of upheaval is that of corporate
restructuring, i.e., mergers, takeovers, slump sales, shareholders’
agreements, etc. Corporate India has always desired a code which
facilitates corporate restructuring. While one can understand the
Regulator’s desire of protecting interest of all stakeholders, it should
not be at the cost of stifling the transaction itself. The words of
Justice D. Y. Chandrachud in the case of Ion Exchange (India) Ltd., 105
Comp. Cases 115 (Bom) in this context are very apt:
“The basic
assumptions which were the foundation of a closely regulated and
controlled economy have altered in the present day society where
corporate enterprise has to gear itself up to a free form of competition
and an open interface with market forces. The fortunes of corporate
enterprise are liable to fluctuate with recessionary cycles. Changes in
economic policy and economic changes affect the fortunes of business as
assumptions and conditions in which corporate enterprises function are
altered. Corporate enterprise must be armed with the ability to be
efficient and to meet the requirements of a rapidly evolving business
reality. Corporate restructuring is one of the means that can be
employed to meet the challenges and problems which confront business.
The law should be slow to retard or impede the discretion of corporate
enterprise to adapt itself to the needs of changing times and to meet
the demands of increasing competition
Let us examine whether the
Bill lives up to the expectations and whether it impedes or expedites
corporate restructuring? We look at some of the key features in this
respect.
Schemes of Arrangement
We may first consider
the provisions which would impact all Schemes of Arrangement, i.e.,
mergers, demergers, reconstruction, etc. Clause 230 of Chapter XV of the
Bill deals with these provisions. Some of the new features of this
Clause as compared to the provisions of the Act are as follows:
(a) Tribunal:
The National Company Law Tribunal (“Tribunal”) would have power to
sanction all Schemes. Thus, instead of the High Court the Tribunal would
be vested with these powers. An Appeal would lie against the order of
the Tribunal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”)
and against the Order of the NCLAT to the Supreme Court. One important
feature of both the Tribunal and the NCLAT is that Chartered Accountants
can appear before them to plead Schemes of Arrangement. Currently, this
is the exclusive domain of Advocates.
(b) Corporate Debt Restructuring:
Any scheme of corporate debt restructuring (CDR) which is a part of a
Scheme must be consented to by not less than 75% of the secured
creditors in value. There must be safeguards for the protection of other
secured and unsecured creditors. The auditor must report that the fund
requirements of the company after the CDR shall conform to the liquidity
test based upon the estimates provided to them by the Board of
Directors. Here the auditor would be well advised to remember the CA
Institute’s warning that he should not become a party to preparing
estimates. One important facet of the CDR is that the Scheme should
include, a valuation report in respect of the shares and the property
and all assets, tangible and intangible, movable and immovable, of the company of a Registered Valuer.
(c)
Valuation Report: Every Notice of a meeting for the Scheme of
Arrangement which is sent to creditors and members shall be accompanied
by a copy of the valuation report, if any, and explaining its effect on
creditors, key managerial personnel, promoters and non-promoter members,
and the debenture-holders and the effect of the Scheme on any material
interests of the directors of the company or the debenture trustees.
Currently, the valuation report is only available for inspection at the
company’s office. An overwhelming majority of the shareholders do not go
to the registered office to inspect the valuation report. Now the
valuation report would come home since it needs to be sent to the
members and creditors. The Bill is silent as to whether the valuation
workings also need to be sent to them? In this context the following
decisions would throw some light:
• Hindustan Lever Ltd., 83
Comp. Cases 30 (SC)/ Miheer Mafatlal vs. Mafatlal Industries, 87 Comp.
Cases 792 (SC): Valuation is a specialised subject best left to experts
and Courts would not interfere in the same.
• Asian Coffee Ltd., 103 Comp. Cases 17 (AP): Shareholders need not be given detailed calculations of share exchange ratios.
(d) Notice to Regulators:
Every notice shall also be sent to the Central Government, Income-tax
authorities, the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange
Board, the RoC, stock exchanges, Official Liquidator, the Competition
Commission of India (CCI) and such other sectoral regulators or
authorities which are likely to be affected by the compromise or
arrangement (e.g., Telecom Regulatory Authority of India for telecom
companies).
Under the Bill, the authorities, to whom Notice has
been sent, can make representations, within 30 days or else it shall be
presumed that they have no representations to make on the proposals.
However, this period of 30 days should be read subject to the time
allowed under any other Statute for approving such Schemes. For
instance, the Competition Act, 2002 allows the CCI a time period of 210
days for passing an order. Therefore, it stands to reason that the
timeline of 30 days will not be applicable to the CCI.
(e) Objection Threshold:
An objection to the Scheme can now be made only by persons holding at
least 10% of the shareholding or having outstanding debt amounting to at
least 5%. This is a welcome move which would prevent frivolous
challenges which lead to undue delays.
(f) Approval: The
resolution for approving the Scheme requires 3/4th majority in value and
can be passed in person, by proxy or through postal ballot. Postal
Ballot has been made applicable to both listed as well as
unlisted/private companies, unlike s.192A of the Act where it applies
only to listed companies.
(g) Accounting Standards: The Scheme shall be sanctioned by the Tribunal only if there is a certificate by the Auditor that the accounting treatment in the Scheme is in conformity with the prescribed accounting standards. Currently, the Listing Agreement contains a similar provision in the case of Listed Companies. The decision in the case of Hindalco Industries Ltd., 94 SCL 1 (Bom) is pertinent in this respect. In this case, the company proposed to write-off the impairment losses and ammortisation loss against the balance standing in the Securities Premium Account by a Scheme of Arrangement. The Scheme was objected to on the grounds that this treatment was in violation of para 58 of AS-28 on “Impairment” since the loss was not routed through the P&L A/c. The High Court over-ruled this objection and held that section 211(3B) of the Act expressly permitted deviation from accounting standards subject to certain disclosures.
The current Accounting Standards are woefully inadequate to address all forms of corporate restructuring, for instance, there are no standards dealing with demergers, reconstruction, reduction of capital, etc. Hence, unless new Accounting Standards are introduced, this would remain an empty formality. In this context Accounting Standard Interpretation (ASI) 11 on AS-14 issued by the ICAI on 1-4-2004 is relevant since it prescribes the stand to be taken in case the accounting treatment specified under the Scheme deviates from the treatment specified from AS-14. Some instances of cases where accounting disputes have been the subject matter of objection to Schemes of Amalgamation/Arrangement, include the following, Gallops Realty, 150 Comp. Cases 596 (Guj); Cairns India Ltd, 101 SCL 435 (Bom); Mphasis Ltd., 102 SCL 411 (Kar); Sutlej Industries Limited, 135 Comp. Cases 394 (Raj),Paramount Centrispun, 150 Comp. Cases 790 (Guj), etc.
(h) Buy-back: A Scheme in respect of any buy-back of securities shall be sanctioned only if the buy-back is in accordance with the provisions of the Bill. For instance, the decisions in the cases of SEBI vs. Sterlite Industries Ltd., (2004) 6 CLJ 34 (Bom); Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd (2004) 6 CLJ 117 (Guj) have held that Schemes of Arrangement need not be in compliance with the buyback provisions of the Act since they operate in different fields. The Court held that the s.77A is merely an enabling provision and the Court’s powers u/ss. 100-104 and 391-394 are not in any way affected. The conditions u/s.77A are applicable only to buyback under that section and the conditions applicable u/ss. 100-104 and 391 cannot be made applicable or imported into a buyback of shares u/s. 77A. There is no reason why a cancellation of shares and consequent reduction cannot be made u/s. 391 read with section 100 merely because a shareholder is given an option to cancel or retain his shares. This position would now be modified by the Bill.
(i) Takeover: Any Scheme which includes a Takeover Offer in the case of listed companies, shall be as per the SEBI Regulations. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd, 121 Com. Cases 523 (Bom) a takeover of shares by Grasim avoided the provisions of the SEBI Takeover Code since it was done under a Scheme of Arrangement. Grasim acquired around a 30% equity stake in Ultra Tech Cement Company Ltd from the public shareholders under the Scheme of Arrangement, around 4.5% stake from L&T. Further, it also sold its holding in L&T to an Employee Trust of L&T. As a result of the Scheme, Grasim ended up owning a 51.1% stake in Ultra Tech without triggering the open offer provisions under the SEBI Takeover Regulations. The Bill aims to plug this method of acquisition of shares€.
(j) Minority Squeeze-out: Provisions have been enacted for minority squeeze-out by majority. Majority shareholders (holding 90% of the equity shares capital) who have acquired the majority stake through amalgamation, share exchange, conversion of securities, any other reason, etc., should notify the company of their intention to buy out the remaining shareholders. The purchase price would be ascertained on the basis of the valuation done by a registered valuer.
Merger Schemes
In addition to the above provisions, which are applicable to all Schemes of Arrangement, the following additional requirements which are applicable to a Scheme of amalgamation/ merger are provided in Cl. 232 of the Bill:
(a) A notice for Merger Schemes must also include a supplementary accounting statement if the last annual accounts of any of the merging companies are more than 6 months old.
(b) A transferee company should not, as result of the Scheme hold any shares in its own name or under a Trust for the benefit of the transferee company or its subsidiary company or associate company. Such treasury shares shall be cancelled or extinguished. In other words, the Bill prohibits creation of treasury stocks. This supersedes the decision in the case of Himachal Telematics Ltd, 86 Comp. Cases 325 (Del) which upheld the creation of treasury stock arising on a merger. Several mergers, such as, ICICI-ICICI Bank, Reliance Petroleum-Reliance Industries, Mahindra & Mahindra, etc., had followed this route of creating treasury stock. In fact, ICICI Bank sold its treasury stock on the floor of the stock exchange for a handsome amount.
(c) In case of a merger of a listed company into an unlisted company the transferee company shall remain an unlisted company until it becomes a listed company. If the shareholders of the transferor company decide to opt out of the transferee company, provision shall be made for payment of the value of shares held by them as per a pre-determined price formula or after a valuation is made.
Thus, this provision negates the back-door/reverse merger route of SEBI under which a listed company can merge into an unlisted company and the unlisted company gets automatic listing. This provision is also available for demerger of a listed company into an unlisted company and listing of the shares of the resulting unlisted company. For instance, Cinemax India Ltd, a listed company demerged its theatre exhibition business into an unlisted company. Subsequently, the shares of the unlisted company got listed without an IPO.
The unlisted company gets the gains of listing without the pains of listing. It also bypasses the requirements of Section 72A of the Income-tax Act if the transferee company is a loss-making/sick company. Thus, the unabsorbed depreciation and carried forward losses of the loss-making company are available as a set-off to the healthy company without complying with the requirements of section 72A and Rule 9C since the transferee company is the loss making company. This route is currently available by virtue of Rule 19(2)(b) of Securities Contract (Regulation) Rules, 1957 read with the SEBI’s Circulars CIR/ CFD/DIL/5/2013 and the earlier SEBI/ CFD/SCRR/01/2009/03/09.
Under the Bill, the shareholders of the transferor company have to be provided with a mandatory exit option in the form of a cash payment. It would be interesting to see what happens if more than 25% of the shareholders of the transferor opt out? In such a situation the conditions of Section 2(1B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are not met since the section requires that at least 3/4th of the share-holders of the amalgamating company become share-holders of the amalgamated company. How would this condition now be met? As a consequence, the merger would cease to be a tax-neutral amalgamation under the Income-tax Act and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Grace Collis, 248 ITR 323 (SC), an amalgamation involves a transfer of capital asset. You can join the dots to understand what happens next.
(d) The Scheme should clearly indicate an Appointed Date from which it shall be effective and the scheme shall be deemed to be effective from such date and not at a date subsequent to the appointed date. Currently, there is no express requirement in the Act but the decision in the case of Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd., 223 ITR 809 (SC) has held that every Scheme of merger must necessarily provide a date with effect from which the transfer will take place and such a date would either be the date specified in the Scheme or the date so specified/modified by the Court while sanctioning the Scheme. An Appointed Date is also relevant from an income-tax perspective. The decisions in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd, 147 ITR 294 (Guj); Amerzinc Products, 105 SCL 682 (Guj), etc. are also relevant in this respect.
(e) The fee paid by the transferor company on its authorised capital shall be available for set-off against any fees payable by the transferee company on its authorised capital enhanced subsequent to the merger. This express provision sets to rest the constant objection of the Regional Director on this issue. Several decisions have supported clubbing of the authorised capital – Hotline HOL Celdings, 121 Comp. Cases 165 (Del); Cavin Plastics, 129 Comp. Cases 915 (Mad); Areva T&D, 144 Comp. Cases 34 (Cal), etc.
(f) Every company in relation to which the Tribunal makes an Order, shall, until the completion of the
Scheme, file a statement in such form and within such time as may be prescribed with the RoC every year duly certified by a CA/CS/CMA indicating whether or not the Scheme is being complied with in accordance with the Orders of the Tribunal.
Fast-track Mergers
Clause 233 provides a new concept of fast-track mergers:
(a) A new concept of fast-track mergers has been introduced for mergers between small companies or between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary without going through the Tribunal Process.
(b) A Small Company is defined to mean a ‘private company’ meeting either of the following requirements:
• Paid up capital does not exceed the sum prescribed which may range from Rs. 50 lakh – Rs. 5 crores.
• Turnover does not exceed the sum prescribed which may range from Rs. 20 lakh – Rs. 2 crore.
It may be noted that a merger between a holding and a 100% subsidiary could also opt for the fast-track route even though the companies are not small companies.
(c) This route is optional and if the companies desire to adopt the conventional route i.e., the Tribunal-approved Route, then they may adopt the same.
Cross-Border Mergers
(a) The Bill provides that a merger of a foreign company incorporated in the jurisdictions of such countries as may be notified from time to time by the Central government into an Indian company is permissible. For instance, Corus Group Plc (now Tata Steel Europe Ltd), UK merging into Tata Steel and Tata Steel issuing its Indian shares to the shareholders of Corus, wherever they may be located. Currently also, mergers of a foreign company into an Indian company is permissible. Any merger involving an Indian Company would be governed by the Companies Act, 1956. Sections 391 to 394 of the Act deal with Mergers of companies. Section 394 of the Act provides for facilitating amalgamation of companies. Section a.394 states that the section only applies to a Transferee Company which is a company within the meaning of the Act, i.e., an Indian Company. However, the Transferor Company is defined to include any Company, whether Indian or Foreign. Hence, the transferor company can be a foreign company. The decisions in the cases of Bombay Gas Co., 89 Comp. Cases 195 (Bom), Moschip Semiconductor Technology Ltd., 120 Comp. Cases 108 (AP), Adani Enterprises Ltd., 103 SCL 135 (Guj); Essar Oil Ltd, Company Petition No. 280 of 2008 (Guj), etc., clearly support this point.
However, Cl. 234 of the Bill now provides that only companies from specified jurisdictions would be permissible. This restriction is not there currently. Probably, the Government wants to limit the scope to those countries which either have a DTAA or a TIEA with India.
(b) Cl. 234 of the Bill also provides for a merger of an Indian company into a foreign company which is currently not possible. S.394 states that the section only applies to a Transferee Company which is a company within the meaning of the Act, i.e., an Indian Company. However, the Transferor Company is defined to include any Company, whether Indian or Foreign. Thus, currently an Indian company cannot merge into a Foreign Company.
The consideration for the merger may be discharged by the foreign company in the form of cash or its Indian Depository Receipts. Thus, the foreign company cannot issue its shares to the Indian shareholders of the transferor company. For instance, if ACC were to merge into Holcim of Switzerland, Holcim cannot issue its shares to the Indian shareholders of ACC. It must issue IDRs or pay cash. Currently, Standard Chartered Bank Plc, UK, is the only foreign company to have issued IDRs in India. One possible reason for this embargo is that under the FEMA Regulations, Indian residents can acquire shares of a foreign company
only under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme, i.e., by paying consideration in cash. There is no provision for a stock swap in the case of an outbound in-vestment by resident individuals. This is one area which could be liberalised by permitting the consideration to be in the form of shares also.
The Bill provides that the prior approval of the RBI would be required for such a merger of an Indian company with a foreign company.
Registered Valuer
Clause 247 of the Bill introduces a new concept of a Registered Valuer. Where a valuation is required to be made in respect of any property, stocks, shares, debentures, securities or goodwill or any other assets or net worth of a company or its liabilities under the provision of this Act, it must be valued by a Registered Valuer. The qualifications and experience for such a person would be prescribed. It may be recalled that a few years ago, the Shardul Shroff Committee had recommended that valuations should be carried out by independent registered valuers instead of the current practice. Would a CA automatically be registered as a registered valuer or would he have to acquire some additional qualification for the same? What happens in case of a partnership firm or LLP of professionals – would all partners need to obtain qualifications? One wonders whether a CA would be the right person to value property, plant and machinery whereas whether a chartered engineer would be able to value shares and goodwill? Does a one-size fits all approach work or is not the current dual system a better approach?
Some of the valuation areas under the Bill which would require a Registered Valuer include:
• Further issue of shares
• Assets involved in Arrangement of Non Cash transactions involving directors
• Shares, Property and Assets of the company under a CDR
• Scheme of Arrangement
• Equity Shares held by Minority Shareholders
• Assets for submission of report by Liquidator.
Reduction of Capital
Clause 66 of the Bill deals with Reduction of Share Capital of a Company:
(a) A reduction of share capital cannot be made if the Company is in arrears in the repayment of any deposits accepted by it or interest payable thereon by it.
(b) Further, an application for the reduction shall not be sanctioned by the Tribunal unless the accounting treatment, proposed by the company for such reduction is in conformity with the prescribed Accounting Standards. This would require framing of Standards on reduction. (c) The Order confirming the reduction shall be published by the company in such manner as the Tribunal may direct. Under the current provision, the Court has discretionary power to order publishing of reasons of reduction and such other information as it thinks fit.
(d) The current discretionary power of the Court to order the addition of words “and reduced” to the names of the company reducing their capital has been withdrawn. Further, The current power of the Court to dispense with the requirement of the consent of the creditors in case of reduction of capital by way of either diminution in any liability in respect of the unpaid share capital or repayment to any shareholder of any unpaid share capital has been withdrawn.
Slump Sale
Currently, under the Act a public company is required to obtain its members’ consent to sell, lease, etc. of the whole or substantially the whole undertaking of the company. Thus, an ordinary resolution of the members is required u/s. 293(1) for a slump sale. In case of a listed company, this consent is to be obtained by a Postal Ballot.
Under Clause 180 of the Bill this provision of Postal Ballot will now be applicable even to a private limited company. Further, the approval of the members is to be obtained by way of a special resolution instead
of an ordinary resolution. Thus, the regulatory arbitrage available in a slump sale over a demerger is sought to be plugged. This would make it more challenging for listed companies to hive-off their undertakings by way of slump sales.
Specific definition of the terms ‘undertaking’ and ‘substantially the whole undertaking’ have been provided under the Bill as follows:
(i) “Undertaking” shall mean an undertaking in which the investment of the company exceeds 20% of its net worth as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year or an undertaking which generates 20% of the total income of the company during the previous financial year.
(ii) “Substantially the whole of the undertaking” in any financial year shall mean 20% or more of the value of the undertaking as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year.
It may be noted that this definition of undertaking is only relevant for the purposes of the Bill. What constitutes an undertaking for determining whether a transaction is a slump sale u/s. 2(42C) of the Income-tax Act, would yet be determined by Explanation-1 to Section 2(19AA) of that Act, which provides as follows:
“For the purposes of this Cl. , “undertaking” shall include any part of an undertaking, or a unit or division of an undertaking or a business activity taken as a whole, but does not include individual assets or liabilities or any combination thereof not constituting a business activity.”
Thus, what may be an undertaking under the Bill may not satisfy the conditions laid down under the Income-tax Act. Distinctions between the two definitions are given in the Table:
Inter-Company Loans and Investments
Clause 186 of the Bill is at par with the current Section 372A of the Act. However, en masse changes have been carried out in this very important provision. Some of the key features of Clause 186 are as follows:
(a) A Company cannot make investment through more than 2 layers of investment companies. The restriction is on 2 layers of investment companies and not operating companies. An Investment Company means a company whose principal business is acquisition of shares, debentures or other securities. This is one of the most important restrictions under the Bill. This prohibition does not apply in two situations:
A company can acquire any foreign company if such foreign company has investment subsidiaries beyond two layers as per the foreign laws. However, the RBI is known to frown upon such multi-layer structures for outbound investment.
• A subsidiary company can have any investment subsidiary for the purposes of meeting the requirements under any Law.
This prohibition is even applicable to NBFCs and Core Investment Companies (CICs) registered with the RBI and to private companies. One would have expected private companies and CICs to be exempted from this restriction.
(b) The main provision of Clause 186 is the same as Section 372A, i.e., a company cannot make a loan/investment/guarantee exceeding 60% of its paid-up capital + free reserves + securities premium or 100% of its free reserves + securities premium, without the prior approval by way of a special resolution. However, the current embargo on a loan/guarantee to any body corporate has been modified to a loan to any person. Thus, loans to individuals/HUF/firm/AOP/Trust, etc., would also be covered.
An NBFC whose principal business is acquisition of shares and securities, shall be exempt from the provision of this clause in respect of subscription and acquisition of securities.
(d) The loan must be given at a minimum rate of interest equal to the prevailing yield of 1/3/5/ 10 years’ Government Security closest to the tenor of the loan. Presently, the minimum rate is the Bank Rate of the RBI, which currently is 8.50%. The 2011 draft of the Companies Bill also pegged the minimum rate at the Bank Rate but the 2012 version has changed it to its current form.
(c) The current exemptions given u/s. 372A of the Act have been done away with. Consequentially:
• Private limited companies will have to comply with this section.
• Loans by a holding company to its 100% subsidiary would have to comply with this section. Thus, interest free loans to a 100% subsidiary will not be possible even for a private company.
• Acquisition by a holding company by way of subscription, purchase or otherwise the securities of its wholly owned subsidiary would have to comply with this section.
• Any guarantee given or security provided by a holding company in respect of any loan made to its WOS would have to comply with this section.
(d) A company shall disclose to the members in the financial statement the full particulars of the loans given, investment made or guarantee given or security provided and the purpose for which the loan or guarantee or security is proposed to be utilised by the recipient of the loan or guarantee or security.
(e) A company which is in default in the repayment of any deposits/interest thereon, shall not give any loan or give any guarantee or provide any security or make an acquisition till such default continues.
(f) Restrictions have been put on SEBI intermediaries, such as, brokers, merchant bankers, underwriters, etc., from accepting inter-corporate deposits exceeding prescribed limits. One fails to see the logic for this provision when the SEBI Regulations do no prescribe any limits.
Shareholders’ Covenants
Currently, Restrictive Covenants forming part of Shareholders’ Agreement, such as, Tag Along, Drag Along, First Refusal, Russian Roulette, Texas Shoot-out, Dutch auction rights, etc., are the subject-matter of great dispute in the case of public companies.
The Supreme Court has held that they are valid against a company only if they are a part of the Articles of Association or else they remain a private contract between shareholders – V.B. Rangarajan vs. V. Gopalkrishnan, 73 Comp. Cases 201 (SC). A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Western Maharashtra Development Corporation vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd., (2010) 154 Comp Cases 593 (Bom), had ruled that a Shareholders’ Agreement containing restrictive Clauses was invalid, since the Articles of a public company could not contain Clauses restricting the transfer of shares and it was contrary to Section 108 of the Act. Subsequently, a two-member Bench of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Messer Holdings Ltd vs. Shyam Ruia and Others (2010) 159 Comp Cases 29 (Bom) has overruled this decision of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court.
The Bill provides that securities in a public company are freely trans-ferrable but a contract in respect of transfer of securities in a public company shall be enforceable. It is
submitted that this express provision sets at rest once and for all whether public companies can contain pre-emptive rights. This would be a big boost for Private Equity/FDI/Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) transactions since they usually come with pre-emptive rights.
Other Important Changes
Some other important changes in the sphere of restructuring include the following:
(a) Infrastructure companies can issue redeemable preference shares having a tenure of more than 20 years provided they give the holders an option to ask for a redemption of a specified percentage every year. Real estate development has been defined as an infrastructure sector along with, air/road/water/rail transport, power generation, telecom, etc.
(b) Prescribed class of companies which comply with accounting standards cannot utilise their securities premium account for paying premium on redemption of preference shares. They must use their profits alone. This is a very important restriction and it would be interesting to see the class which is prescribed. One fails to understand the logic behind this embargo.
(c) Companies which are unable to redeem preference shares can, with the Tribunal’s approval, issue fresh preference shares in lieu of the same and that would constitute a deemed redemption of preference shares.
(d) Prescribed class of companies which comply with accounting standards cannot utilise their securities premium account for buying back shares or for writing-off preliminary expenditure of the company. They must use their profits alone. Again, it would be interesting to see the class which is prescribed.
(e) The time limit between two or more buy-back of securities, whether board approved or shareholder approved, has been made one year. The odd-lot buy-back provision has been dropped as a method of buy-back.
Conclusion
It would be interesting to see what the Rules provide since a bulk of the provisions would be prescribed in the Rules. Hence, the “Devil would lie in the Details (Rules)”. To sum up, there are some laudable amendments, some not so good and some quite serious ones. The Bill is a cocktail of surprises and shocks and corporate India would have to accept both. As Arnold Bennett, the English Author, once said:
“Any Change, even a Change for the Better, is always accompanied by Drawbacks and Discomforts”.
Understanding LBT
In order to abolish this cadaverous practice, the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) decided to replace it with a tax supposed to be more robust and tax payer friendly. As most of us are aware, the GoM finally acted upon its long standing promise of doing away with Octroi and introduce an account based system of tax ‘The Local Body Tax (LBT)’. The tax being based on the philosophy of selfassessment, shall definitely reduce the hassles and inefficiencies caused due to stoppage of vehicles at Octroi check posts.
While most of us are must have become aware of the broad scheme of the Act by way of newspaper and media reports, we need to familiarise ourselves with the legal framework.
The basis of the levy is the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (‘Act’). Section 152P of the Act empowers the Municipalities to levy LBT on items imported into their territory. However, while there is no separate Act, there are a whole new set of rules which essentially govern the levy. All the important provisions are contained in the rules thereby making them more relevant than the Act.
However, the new tax has been welcomed with one of the largest mass movements by the business community in recent times, and the government has been forced to postpone the levy. The reason for the stiff opposition seems to be certain draconian provisions. However, before welcoming or opposing this Act, we need to objectively analyse the provisions of LBT.
Levy: The levy is on import of goods for the purpose of consumption, use or sale. Thus liability to pay LBT generally rests on the person who brings goods within the limits of a municipal corporation. However, when goods are purchased from within the city, it shall be the duty of the purchasing dealer to ensure that the goods are not imported goods. If the goods purchased are imported goods, he shall ensure by way of a declaration in the purchase invoice, that LBT on the same has been paid. In case of lapse of due diligence by the purchasing dealer, he shall become liable to LBT.
It is pertinent to note that, Rule 22 empowers the Commissioner to enquire and satisfy himself that the declaration furnished is true and correct. Thus having regard to this provision, it will not be wrong to extrapolate the verdict of Bombay High Court in the case of Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries ([2012] 051 VST 0001) wherein the Hon’ble High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of Section 48(5) of the MVAT Act, which provides that set-off of Input Tax credit (ITC) shall only be available if tax is actually paid by the supplier into the government treasury. Thus if during the course of assessment proceedings, the officer observes that the selling dealer has not “actually paid” the VAT in full or part, he shall be entitled to deny the claim of ITC made by the purchasing dealer. This is already causing undue hardship to the assessee under VAT.
Lacuna in the definition of LBT: LBT has been defined to mean a tax on the entry of goods into the limits of the city. However, it does not include octroi. This exclusion of octroi from the definition might result in double taxation. As mentioned above, LBT will have to be paid on any goods imported within the city. However, since LBT does not include octroi, those dealers who have imported goods within the city after paying octroi might be asked to pay LBT as well, as payment of octroi shall not tantamount to payment of LBT.
Coverage of one and all: Virtually anyone bringing in goods to the city is proposed to be brought under the ambit of LBT. The definitions of ‘business’ and ‘dealer’ have been kept wide enough to override any decision of the courts granting exclusion to people from VAT. This is because, ‘Business’ has been defined to also include profession and any kind of occasional transaction without regard to its frequency, volume or regularity. The definition of ‘dealer’ includes all kinds of persons including various agents handling goods/documents of title and auctioneers who receive the price for auctioned goods.
Be it small or big traders, professionals, brokers, factors, agents, societies, clubs, etc. or people carrying on temporary business; almost everyone will be covered if he makes purchases of a meagre Rs. 1,00,000/- in a year and brings into the city goods worth Rs. 5,000/-. Even one-time transactions like purchase of car by an individual to render professional services shall be liable to tax.
Registration, returns & maintenance of records: While dealers carrying on regular business within the city are required to obtain make an application for registration within 30 days, dealers carrying on temporary business are required to make an application 15 days prior to commencing a business.
Returns are to be filed at half yearly intervals within 15 days from the end of the period. The first return shall be in Form E1 and shall be for the period of 6 months – April to September. The second return (in form EII) is an annual return i.e. for the full financial year. Thus there is an overlapping of return period. Further, there is also a provision for revision of returns; however the time limit is very short i.e. within a month from due date of filing of the original return.
Payment of tax is to be made on a monthly basis. The Rules also provide for a composition scheme for small dealers having turnover upto Rs. 5 lakh , builders and contractors. The composition scheme provides for a simple way of calculation of taxes irrespective of items imported, which is quite encouraging.
LBT requires issuance of bills in case of any sales amounting to a meagre Rs. 10/- or more and more so preservation of the same for a period of 5 years. Failing to issue an invoice might lead to penalty. However there is a duplicacy in the penalty provisions – Rule 48(1) provides a penalty upto double the tax amount, while Rule 48(7) provides for a penalty of double the invoice amount. Both the provisions provide penalty for not issuing invoice.
Further, the taxability of an item is determined in accordance with rates mentioned in the Schedules. Schedule-A lists the items and rates at which the same shall be taxed. The dealer will need to work out the liability to LBT based on different rates prescribed (ranging from 0% to 7%) and this may become an exercise in itself. Schedule-B lists out the items exempt from tax.
There are very few items which have made it to the coveted Schedule-B and even fruits, vegetables, etc are not covered in the exemption list. Persons dealing in these will have to register as well.
Sweeping powers: Wide powers have been given to the Municipal officers to seize goods, attach any property (and not just bank and debtors as is the case in VAT), stop any vehicle in transit etc. The business community is afraid that these powers will become a cause of harassment. However, it may be mentioned that some of the powers can be exercised only by an officer of the rank of DMC and above.
Further, penalties for most offences are steep and discretionary which might also give an impetus to unsavoury favours sought by officers. For example, (i) Penalty for non-registration may extend upto 10 times of the amount of LBT payable during the period during which the dealer did not have registration; and (ii) Penalty for failing to disclose fully and truly all material facts, claiming an inaccurate deduction or failing to show appropriate liability of LBT in the return may go upto 5 times the amount of LBT payable.
Exemptions & Refunds: Goods sent for job work/ processing outside the city should be received without any change in appearance or condition; failing which LBT will have to be paid afresh on the entire value of goods and not just the value addition on account of processing. What fails to appeal to a rational mind is how processed goods will appear the same as original! The other condition which needs to be complied with is that the goods sent out should be brought back within 6 months.
In case of goods imported into the city for job work, the condition appears a little rational as the words used in the Act are the goods should not change ‘form’, which in my opinion is a little broader than the word ‘appearance’.
Further, LBT shall not be levied on goods exported outside the territory of India.
It is also relevant to note that, in case of goods imported but re-exported to another city, by way of sale or otherwise (i.e. branch transfer), 90% of the LBT paid on import shall be refunded.
Payment of disputed appeal before appeal: The law mandates assessee to deposit the entire amount of the disputed tax before filing an appeal. Considering that the appellate authority is a municipal officer and the despicable disposal rate that Indian judicial system has, in my humble opinion, stay should be granted atleast upto the stage of first appeal.
Appeal against an order passed by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Municipal Commissioner (DMC) shall lie with the DMC while that passed by an officer of the rank of DMC and above shall lie with the Municipal Commissioner. Further, there is no provision for second appeal and hence the only remedy will be approaching the High court.
Interest on delayed payments: The interest rates prescribed for delayed payment of LBT are phenomenally high. Interest rate ranges from 2% p.m. for delay upto 1 year to 3% p.m. (36% p.a.) for delay of more than a year. Interest rates need to be re-visited as no other law requires payment of such high interest rates.
No credit mechanism: No mechanism for input credit of LBT paid has been prescribed in the Rules/ Act, which will lead to a cascading effect on LBT paid. This shall especially affect those dealers who do not directly procure from the manufacturer as more the number of intermediaries, lesser the chances to fix a competitive selling price.
While the law relating to LBT is indeed welcome being more sound in terms of ideology as compared to octroi, it is only apropos that some of the provisions be revisited and watered down so as to inspire confidence within the business community. While all and sundry were under the ambit of octori; the same cannot be the case in LBT in view of administrative difficulties of registration, returns, assessment, etc.
Taking a cue from the above, LBT can be perceived to be akin to VAT. Thus the simpler way for the State could be to collect it alongwith VAT under a separate challan/accounting code.
With the traders demanding abolition of the law, the government has responded by promising to revisit the Act. In principle, the levy is better than octroi – it is accounts based, will avoid delays when goods are in transit. However, the way the Rules have been drafted, it appears to put excessive compliance burden on the trading community. Having to deal with one more authority with potential harassment has made the businesses nervous. It shall not out of context here to remember Benjamin Franklin’s saying “The only things certain in life are death and taxes.” All that one can hope for is, that the law be made simple so that it can be widely and easily adopted!
Determination of Control- Now a Critical Judgement Area under IFRS
IFRS 10 states that ‘an investor controls an investee when it is exposed, or has rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability to affect those returns through its power over the investee’. IFRS 10 requires an investor to assess whether it has power over the relevant activities of the investee. Only substantive rights of the investor are relevant for this purpose and voting and other rights needs to be considered for this assessment. There are additional considerations for assessment of power in the instance of the investor holding less than a majority of the voting rights.
De-facto control is one such consideration. De-facto control is said to exist when an investor’s current voting rights may be sufficient to give it power even though it has less than half of the voting rights. Assessing whether an investor has de-facto control over an investee is a two-step process:
• In the first step, the investor considers all facts and circumstances including the size of its holding of voting rights relative to the size and dispersion of the holdings of other vote holders. Even without potential voting rights or other contractual rights, when the investor holds significantly more voting rights than any other vote holder or organised group of vote holders, this may be sufficient evidence ofpower. In other situations, these factors may provide sufficient evidence that the investor does not have power – e.g. when there is a concentration of other voting interests among a small group of vote holders. In some cases, these factors may not be conclusive and the investor needs to proceed to the second step
• In the second step, the investor considers whether the other shareholders are passive in nature as demonstrated by voting patterns at previous shareholders’ meetings. The investor also considers the factors normally used to assess power when the investee is controlled by rights other than voting rights.
An investor with less than a majority of the voting rights has rights that are sufficient to give it power when the investor has the practical ability to direct the relevant activities unilaterally. When assessing whether an investor’s voting rights are sufficient to give it power, an investor considers all facts and circumstances, including:
a) the size of the investor’s holding of voting rights relative to the size and dispersion of holdings of the other vote holders, noting that:
• the more voting rights an investor holds, the more likely the investor is to have existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities;
• the more voting rights an investor holds relative to other vote holders, the more likely the investor is to have existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities;
• the more parties that would need to act together to outvote the investor, the more likely the investor is to have existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities;
b) potential voting rights held by the investor, other vote holders or other parties
c) rights arising from other contractual arrangements; and
d) any additional facts and circumstances that indicate the investor has, or does not have, the current ability to direct the relevant activities at the time that decisions need to be made, including voting patterns at previous shareholders’ meetings.
When the direction of relevant activities is determined by majority vote and an investor holds significantly more voting rights than any other vote holder or organised group of vote holders, and the other shareholdings are widely dispersed, it may be clear, after considering the factors listed above, that the investor has power over the investee.
Determining whether an investor has de-facto control over an investee is usually highly judgmental: it includes determining the point at which an investor’s shareholding in an investee is sufficient and the point at which other shareholdings’ interests are sufficiently dispersed. It would also be difficult for a dominant shareholder to know whether a voting agreement amongst other shareholders exists.
Applying the above principles poses various challenges. There may be situations in which the dominant shareholder does not know whether arrangements exist among other shareholders, or whether it is easy for other shareholders to consult with each other. The investor should have processes in place to allow it to capture publicly available information about other shareholder concentrations and agreements.
The smaller the size of the investor’s holding of voting rights and the less the dispersion of the holding of other vote holders, the more reliance is placed on the additional factors in Step 2 of the analysis; within these, a greater weighting is placed on the evidence of power.
The ‘voting patterns at previous shareholders’ meetings’ requires consideration of the number of shareholders that typically come to the meetings to vote (i.e. the usual quorum in shareholders’ meetings) and not how the other shareholders vote (i.e. whether they usually vote the same way as the investor). However, how far back should one look for assessing the past trend is a question of judgment. Also, for start-up companies this will particularly be a challenge.
Determining the date on which an investor has de-facto control over an investee may in practice be a challenging issue. In some situations, it may lead to a conclusion that control is obtained at some point after the initial acquisition of voting interests. At the date that an investor initially acquires less than a majority of voting rights in an investee, the investor may assess that it does not have de-facto control over the investee if it does not know how other shareholders are likely to behave. As time passes, the investor obtains more information about other shareholders, gains experience from shareholders’ meetings and may ultimately assess that it does have de-facto control over the investee. Determining the point at which this happens may require significant judgment.
In the backdrop of companies getting capital infusion from private equity investors the assessment of de-facto control will be very challenging. While the investors may not have majority voting rights, they do obtain various rights that include appointment of key managerial personnel, guaranteed return on their investments, right to approve the annual operating plans/ budgets, etc. Such cases will need to be closely looked into for determining whether the investor has a de-facto control on the investee.
Let us consider an example: Company A acquired 45% in Company B (which is a listed company and balance shareholding is widely dispersed). Company B has 6 directors who are appointed by shareholders in their general meeting based on simple majority. Whether Company A needs to consolidate Company B as a subsidiary.
Analysis under AS-21 under Indian GAAP: Under Indian GAAP an investor consolidates the investee company only if it ‘controls’ the investee. Control is defined as
(a) the ownership, directly or indirectly through subsidiary(ies), of more than one-half of the voting power of an enterprise; or
Based on the aforesaid definition of control, in this example Company A does not have control of Company B (either majority voting power or control composition of Board), thus it cannot consolidate Company B as a subsidiary.
Analysis under IFRS: Under IFRS 10, Company A will need to determine whether it has control over Company B. As discussed earlier, the control definition under IFRS is wider and includes de-facto control as well. In the instant case, Company A is the largest shareholder of Company B and it is given that the balance shareholding is widely dispersed. Company A will need to evaluate the following:
(a) Number of shareholders that own the next 45 % shareholding: The higher the number, the greater are the chances that Company A will need to consolidate Company B, for example if the next 45% is held by around 5 shareholders it will be difficult to demonstrate de-facto control as 5 shareholders can get together and vote against Company A. However if the next 45% shareholding is owned by 1,000 shareholders (widely dispersed public shareholding), it can be demonstrated that Company A in effect would control the functioning of Company B as the probability of 1,000 shareholders coming together and vote against Company A will be remote.
(b) History of voting in the past general meetings: Company A will need to evaluate the number of shareholders actively attending the general meetings and participating in the decisions of shareholders. It is important to assess the number of shareholders that attend general meetings and not how they vote. Thus, in case past history reflects that all 100% shareholders attend the general meeting and cast their votes it may be difficult to demonstrate de-facto control, no matter that the balance shareholders voted for decisions in favour of Company A. However, if the total number of shareholders casting their votes in the general meeting are always less than 80%, then it can be demonstrated that de-facto control exists, since Company A has more than 50% voting power of effective votes cast in the general meetings.
(c) Rights of other shareholders: Before concluding whether Company has de-facto control of Company B, it will need to be assessed in any special rights are available to other shareholders or shareholder groups such as their consent is required prior to approving annual business plan or appointment and removal of key managerial personnel. Presence of such rights will impact the ability of Company A to consolidate Company B as a subsidiary.
After considering the above factors, under IFRS Company A may need to consolidate Company B as a subsidiary though it only holds 45% of the voting power in Company B. Under the earlier consolidation standard under IFRS IAS 27- application of de-facto control approach was an accounting policy choice, however under IFRS 10, consideration of de -facto control is mandatory for assessing control.
The requirement to assess control is continuous. De-facto control relies, at least in part, on the actions or inactions of other investors. Therefore, the requirement to assess control on a continuous basis may mean that the investor who is assessing whether it has de-facto control may need to have processes in place that allow it to consider who the other investors are, what their interests are and what actions they may or may not take with respect to the investee on an ongoing basis.
This is an important change for companies, as currently under Indian GAAP, consolidation is more rule driven based on the definition of control under AS -21. Under IFRS 10, companies will need to closely monitor aforesaid factors on a regular basis to determine control over entities and preparation of its consolidated financial statements.
‘Turnover Filter’ in ‘Comparability Analysis’ for Benchmarking
The transfer pricing provisions were introduced in India vide Finance Act, 2001 as a measure to prevent abuse and avoidance of tax by shifting the taxable income to a jurisdiction outside India. These transfer pricing provisions are contained in Sections 92 to 92F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) and Rules 10A to 10E of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (‘the Rules’).
The term “arm’s length price (ALP)” is defined u/s. 92F(ii) as a price which is applied or proposed to be applied in a transaction between persons other than associated enterprises, in uncontrolled conditions. The application of ALP is generally based on a comparison of the price, margin or profits from particular controlled transaction with the price, margin or profit from comparable transactions between independent enterprises. A comparison of transaction between the associated (related) enterprises (known as controlled transaction) with transaction between independent enterprises (known as uncontrolled transaction) is referred to as ‘comparability analysis’, which is at the heart of the application of the principle of ALP.
Rule 10B of the Rules provides for ‘comparability analysis’ wherein a comparison of a controlled transaction is undertaken with uncontrolled transaction. The controlled and uncontrolled transaction are comparable if none of the differences between the transactions could materially affect the factor viz, price, cost charged, profit arising, etc, being examined in the methodology, or if reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such differences. In order to establish the degree of actual comparability and then to make appropriate adjustments to establish arm’s length conditions, it is necessary to compare the attributes of the transactions or enterprises that could affect conditions in arm’s length transactions. Some of the main attributes or comparability factors are as under:
• Characteristics of the property or services transferred;
• Functions performed by the parties (taking into account assets used and risk assumed);
• Contractual terms;
• Economic circumstances of the parties;
• Business strategies by the parties, etc.
While transfer pricing is not an exact science and is itself at a nascent and developing stage in India, therefore, there are bound to be controversies on various aspects of transfer pricing provisions. One of the recent controversies has been in respect of one of these attributes of the comparability analysis between the controlled and uncontrolled transaction, i.e. the relevance of ‘turnover filter’ in comparability analysis for determination of ALP.
‘Turnover filter’ in comparability analysis refers to filtration/truncation of the selected comparables vis-à-vis the company, on the basis of turnover, because the difference in turnover may affect the determination of ALP of the transaction. For instance, Company A with a turnover of Rs. 1,000 crore plus could not be considered as a comparable to Company B who has a turnover of Rs. 1 crore, since Company A shall have higher bargaining power, capacity to execute large contracts, risks assumed, skilled staff, etc vis-à-vis Company B who may not be able to undertake similar transactions. So, for determination of ALP of controlled transaction undertaken by Company B, whether ‘turnover filter’ can be applied in comparability analysis of service companies is the issue.
While the Hyderabad, Delhi and Bangalore benches of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal have taken a stand in favour of the taxpayers allowing ‘Turnover Filter’ in comparability analysis of service companies, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has recently taken a contrary view on the subject.
Capgemini India’s case
In Capgemini India Pvt. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 7861/M/2011) (Mum.) dated 28th February 2013, the Appellant had rendered software programming services to its parent Company in US. The Appellant had applied Transactional Net Margin Method (‘TNMM’) as the most appropriate method for benchmarking this international transaction, which was duly accepted by the AO/TPO. Among the various disputes w.r.t. comparability analysis undertaken by the Appellant Company, the AO/TPO had denied the exclusion of comparables viz, Infosys and Wipro, and thereby refused the applicability of ‘turnover filter’.
It was argued before the Tribunal that even though the Appellant Company had considered these companies in its benchmarking exercise, however, the correct and right approach was to exclude such high turnover companies with turnover exceeding Rs. 13,000 crore, whereas the turnover of the Appellant was only around Rs. 558 crore. It was contended that these comparable companies enjoyed economies of scale and better bargaining power vis-à-vis the Appellant Company. Relying on the financials of these comparable companies, it was specifically submitted that the margins of these companies were exceptionally high vis-a-vis the Appellant Company and therefore, these comparables should have been excluded in the benchmarking exercise. Reliance was placed on the following decisions by the Appellant Company to contend that ‘turnover filter’ should be applied and the comparables viz, Infosys and Wipro should be excluded from the benchmarking exercise for want of high turnovers:
• Addl CIT vs. Frost and Sullivan India Pvt. Ltd. (2012) (50 SOT 517)(Mum);
• Dy CIT vs. Deloitte Consulting India (P) Ltd.(2011) (61 DTR 101)(Hyd)(Tri);
• Aginity India Technologies vs. ITO (ITA No. 3856/ Del/2010)(Del)(Tri);
• Genesis Integrating Systems India P. Ltd vs. Dy CIT (2011) (61 DTR 225)(Bang); and
• Brigade Global Services Pvt. Ltd vs. ITO (ITA No. 1494/Hyd/ 2010)(Hyd.)(Tri)
On the other hand, the Department argued that these comparables should not be excluded even though they have exceptionally high turnover and profit. It was argued that economies of scale is not relevant and applicable in case of service companies and the ‘turnover filter’ is relevant only in case of manufacturing companies.
Reliance was placed on the decision of Symantec Software Services Pvt. Ltd (ITA No. 7894/M/2010) [2011-TII-60-Mum-TP], in which the Tribunal had upheld the non-applicability of turnover filter in case of service companies. Further, reliance was also placed on the chart plotted with margin and turnover of the comparables, which concluded that there was no linear relationship between them.
The Tribunal held that turnover filters cannot be applied in case of service companies, since they do not have any high fixed costs and the employees are the only main assets, whose costs are directly related to manpower utilised. Relying on the chart produced by the Department, the Tribunal held that there was no linear relationship between margin and turnover and so the concept of economies of scale does not apply in case of service industry. As regard the contention of the Appellant w.r.t. skilled employees available with the comparables, the Tribunal held that margins of the comparables and the Appellant were not affected on account of such differences and all the companies and comparables had same level of risk as they operated in same field and similar environment. Referring to Rule 10B(2), the Tribunal observed functions performed, asset used and risks assumed [‘FAR’] by the comparable companies should be compared with the Appellant Company in the benchmarking exercise of the international transaction.
As regards the argument of the Appellant Company w.r.t. low bargaining power, it was held by the Tribunal that since the Appellant is a part of multinational group therefore, it cannot be said to have less bargaining power. The Tribunal therefore upheld the contention of the Department, that no turnover filter can be applied in case of service oriented companies.
A similar view has been taken by the Tribunal in the following cases, rejecting the use of turnover filter for comparability analysis of service companies:
• Vodafone India Services P. Ltd vs. DCIT (ITA No. 7140/M/2012) dated 26th April 2013; and
• Willis Processing Services India P. Ltd(ITA No. 4547/M/2012);
Genisys Integrating Systems case
In Genisys Integrating Systems India (P) Ltd vs. DCIT (64 DTR 225), the Bangalore Tribunal was opining on the determination of ALP of software development services provided by the Appellant Company to its AEs outside India. TNMM method which was selected as the most appropriate method for determination of ALP was accepted by the AO/ TPO. On the dispute of turnover filter with a range of Rs. 1 crore at the lower end and Rs. 200 crore at the high end, applied during the course of determination of ALP, the Tribunal upheld the following arguments of the Appellant Company:
• Enterprise level difference is an important facet in determination of ALP. Comparables should have something similar or equivalent and should possess same or almost the same characteristics;
• A Maruti 800 car cannot be compared to Benz car, even though both are cars only. Unusual pattern, stray cases, wide disparities have to eliminated as they do not satisfy the test of comparability;
• Companies operating on a large scale benefit from economies of scale, higher risk taking capabilities, robust delivery and business models as opposed to the smaller or medium sizes companies and therefore, size matters;
• Two companies of dissimilar size therefore, cannot be assumed to earn comparable margins and this impact of difference in size could be removed by a quantitative adjustment to the margins or prices being compared if it is possible to do so reasonably accurately;
• Reliance was placed on the following decisions, wherein turnover/ quantitative filter was approved for determination of ALP:
– Dy CIT vs. Quark Systems (P) Ltd (2010)(38 SOT 307)(Chd)(SB);
– E-Gain Communication (P) Ltd vs. Dy. CIT (2008) (13 DTR 65)(Pune)(Tri);
– Sony India (P) Ltd vs. Dy CIT (114 ITD 448)(Del);
– Dy. CIT vs. Indo American Jewellery Ltd. (2010) (40 DTR 386)(Mum)(Tri);
– Philips Software Centre (P) Ltd vs. Asst. CIT (119 TTJ 721)(Bang.); and
– Asst. CIT vs. NIT (2011)(57 DTR 334)(Del)(Tri)
• Further, reliance was placed on the relevant ex-tracts of Para 3.43 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which are as under:
“Size criteria in terms of Sales, Assets or Number of employees. The size of the transaction in absolute value or in proportion to the activities of the parties might affect the relative competitive positions of the buyer and seller and therefore comparability.”
• NASSCOM also has categorized companies based on turnover, similar to Dun and Bradstreet.
The Tribunal specifically observed that there has to be lower limit and upper limit of range in applying turnover filter, since size matters in business. A big company would be in a position to bargain the price and also attract more customers. It would also have a broad base of skilled employees who are able to give better output. A small company may not have these benefits and therefore, the turnover also would come down reducing profit margin.
The Tribunal therefore approved the use of turn-over filters in comparability analysis of a services company.
A similar view has been taken by the Tribunal, approving the use of turnover filter in comparability analysis of service companies:
• Adaptec (India) (P) Ltd vs. DCIT (2013)(86 DTR 26)(Hyd.)(Tri);
• Asst CIT vs. Maersk Global Services Centre (India) P. Ltd. (133 ITD 543)(Mum.);
• M/s. Patni Telecom Solutions vs. ACIT (1846/ Hyd/2012) dated 25 April 2013;
• Capital IQ Information Systems vs. Dy. CIT (ITA No. 1961/Hyd/2007);
• Brigade Global Services (P) Ltd vs. ITO (supra);
• Triniti Advanced Software Labs (P) Ltd vs. Asst. CIT (2011 TII 92 Tri Hyd-78);
• Agnity India Technologies (P.) Ltd vs. Asst CIT (supra);
• Addl CIT vs. Frost and Sullivan India (P) Ltd (supra);
• Actis Advisors Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT (2012)(20 ITR 138) (Del.)(Tri.);
• Continuous Computing India (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (2012) (52 SOT 45)(Bang)(URO); and
• Centillium India P. Ltd vs. DCIT (2012)(20 ITR 69) (Bang)(Tri.)
Observations
On perusal of the contrary decisions discussed above, in all the cases, TNMM was selected and applied as the most appropriate method for bench-marking. TNMM puts more efforts on functional similarities than on product similarities. Functional analysis seeks to identify and compare the eco-nomically significant activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used and risks assumed by the parties to the transaction. Generally, quantitative and qualitative filters/criteria are used to include or exclude the potential comparables. The choice and application of selection criteria depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Turnover filters are a type of quantitative criteria.
On the touchstone of FAR analysis, the big service companies are generally found providing services to different customers simultaneously, performing additional functions, assuming risks and employing unique intangible assets, unlike small size service companies. Similarly, the goodwill and brands of these companies enjoy premium pricing and due to scale of operations, these companies enjoy economies of scale in lower cost of infrastructural facilities and employees. Employee costs are generally found to be semi-variable in nature, with higher proportion of fixed cost. Further, the big service companies have a capacity and are in a position to execute large service contracts, which may not be possible otherwise for small or medium size service companies. In such a scenario, the bigger companies would also be in a position to have a better bargaining power vis-à-vis other companies.
Economies of scale are the cost advantages that enterprises obtain due to size, with cost per unit of output generally decreasing with increasing scale as fixed costs are spread out over more units of output. Often operational efficiency is also greater with increasing scale, leading to lower variable cost as well. Even though services are different from products, but still they may achieve economies of scale in business operations by using the inputs, viz, process and technology efficiently, which are necessary to render the services. For instance, just as automakers invest in the latest manufacturing processes, service companies can use technology to improve efficiency. A carpet cleaning company may purchase powerful shampooers and vacuums that decrease the time it takes to complete a job by 25 percent, thereby, claiming the cost savings from economies of scale.
Economies of scale should not be confused with the economic notion of returns of scale, which is otherwise sought to be relied by the Department, by proving that there is no linear relationship between margins and turnover and therefore, no economies of scale exist in case of service industry.
Also, the findings of the decision of Symantec Software (supra) which is sought to be relied on by Capgemini India (supra) on the contrary support the applicability of turnover filter, but however, for want of specific facts of the case, it led to opining otherwise against the Appellant Company.
Accordingly, even in case of service oriented companies, if FAR analysis indicates wide disparities in the comparables vis-à-vis taxpayer’s international transaction, then quantitative viz, turnover filter and/or qualitative filters can be applied in comparability analysis for determination of ALP. Therefore, it appears that the ratio of the Mumbai Tribunal decisions requires reconsideration.
A Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has also been constituted by the Delhi Bench in the case of M/s. Fiesecke and Devirent India Pvt Ltd (in ITA No. 5924/Del/2012) on the issue under consideration with the following questions:
“1. Whether for the purposes of determining the Arm’s length Price in relation to the international transactions, quantitative filter of high/low turnover is to be applied and accordingly, high/low turnover companies vis-à-vis the assessee company are to be excluded from the comparable selected for benchmarking the transaction; and
2. If the answer to question no. 1 is in affirmative then what should be the parameter, if any, for the exclusion of high/low turnover companies vis-à-vis the assessee company.”
Social Networking – Privacy Settings in Facebook
This is the third and concluding part of the three part series dealing with security related issues faced when using popular social networking sites. This write-up deals with some of the settings and describes how and when these settings should be activated. While the suggested changes in the security settings may not guarantee that your personal information is not divulged to the unknown persons, it however, would act as a simple barrier to unwanted prying eyes.
Background
The previous two write ups briefly highlighted how social networking sites are a boon as well as a bane. Boon because they help you to reach out to your friends, contacts, etc. They also help you connect with like-minded people. However, what most people don’t realise is that, you may be parting with a lot of personal information, more than you bargained for and as a matter of fact, more that you even know or comprehend. It is a known fact that unscrupulous people can use this information for their own gains. It is a known fact, notwithstanding this, whenever disaster strikes, the people who are affected, more often than not, realise that they were sitting ducks.
Need for privacy
Social media sites, as we all know, permit us to meet /connect with other people on the net. Initially, we start off with close friends and relatives, whom we look up on facebook almost as soon as we open an account. It’s quite likely that they may have asked, you are you on Facebook?? Why aren’t you on Facebook??? You know….. giving you the feeling that everybody had boarded the bus to paradise and you were the only person left behind. So first of all you connect to them. Also you put in all the small–small personal details about yourself such as which school/college/ university, date of birth, locality where you stay/work, your chosen profession, likes & dislikes (yes that too), etc. All this information is careful and meticulously ‘harvested’ in humongous databases (read my write up on Big Data).
The next step in the process of ‘networking” is to ‘connect’ with like-minded people on Facebook. Suddenly, you will start getting prompts, suggesting that such and such person has a similar trait and therefore you may connect. What you don’t know is when you started punching in personal information, an intelligent algorithm was working behind the scene and putting all the pieces together. If not that, it was creating a ‘footprint’ for others to ‘find’ you.
While this seems convenient and intuitive to you, what most people don’t realise is that this very information can be used to ‘target’ you for something nefarious. It is in your interest that you don’t expose yourself to such risks. In order to do that you need to review your privacy settings and tweak them in a manner that permits you to connect with ease, but the same is protecting you from the villains lurking in the shadow.
Privacy settings
Activating or deactivating privacy settings can also be described as drawing a line (something like the proverbial Laxman rekha one might say), a line beyond which you want to keep intruders out. Conversely, one may say that you draw the line also to create a boundary beyond which your personal stuff doesn’t go. Mind you, just like in what has been said in Indian mythology, the villans will try every trick in the book to lure you, it is for you to realise what’s in your own interest.
Very briefly, the security setting (on Facebook) can be used to:
• Manage how you connect with others
• Select the audience with whom you want to share your personal stuff, and
• Manage how others connect with you (mainly photo tagging)
STEP 1: Manage how you connect with people
In order for you to manage, you first need to know:
• Where to find your privacy settings (a bit obvious, I know, but just in case you didn’t know) • Privacy shortcuts
• Controlling who can send you friend requests
• Changing the filter preferences for your messages
• Who can see your profile pictures (reminded me of a scene from Shah Rukh Khan Juhi Chawla starrer….where apro SRK says KKKKKKiran….)
So, first things first:
Where are my privacy settings?
To view and adjust your privacy settings:
1. Click in the upper-right corner of any Facebook page
2. Select Privacy Settings from the dropdown menu
3. Click on a setting (ex: Who can see your future posts?) to edit it, or use the left column to view your other settings
What are my privacy shortcuts?
Your privacy shortcuts give you quick access to some of the most widely used privacy settings and tools. Click at the top right of any Facebook page to see shortcuts that help you manage:
• Who can see my stuff?
• Who can contact me?
• How do I stop someone from bothering me?
This is also where you’ll find the latest privacy updates and other helpful tools. The shortcuts you find here may change over time to reflect the settings and tools that are most relevant.
Controlling who can send you friend requests
By default, anyone on Facebook can send you a friend request. If you’d like to change who can send you friend requests:
1. Click at the top of the page.
2. Click Who can contact me?
3. Choose an option from the dropdown menu below Who can send me friend requests?
Changing the filter preferences for your messages
You can change your filter preferences right from your inbox:
1. Go to your Other Inbox
2. Click Edit Preferences
3. Select Basic or Strict filtering
4. Click Save
Messages that are filtered out of your inbox will appear in your Other folder. If a message you’re not interested in gets delivered to your inbox, select Move to Other from the Actions menu. Keep in mind, anyone on Facebook can send you a message, and anyone can email you at your Facebook email address.
Who can see your profile pictures
When you add a new profile picture, here’s what happens:
• The photo is added to your timeline and appears in your Profile Pictures album.
• A thumbnail version of the photo is made and appears next to your name around Facebook. This helps friends identify your posts and comments on Facebook.
• Your current profile picture is public. You can change who can see likes or comments on the photo.
Step 2: Select the audience with whom you want to share your personal stuff
This includes:
• When I share something, how do I choose who can see it?
• How can I use lists to share to a specific group of people?
• Can I change the audience for something I share after I share it?
• How do I control who can see what’s on my timeline?
• What is my activity log?
When I share something, how do I choose who can see it?
You’ll find an audience selector tool most places you share status updates, photos and other stuff. Just click the tool and select who you want to share something with.
The audience selector also appears alongside things you’ve already shared, so it’s clear who can see each post. If you want to change the audience of a post after you’ve shared it, just click the audience selector and select a new audience.
Bear in mind, when you post to another person’s timeline, that person controls what audience can view the post. Also that, anyone who gets tagged in a post may see it, along with their friends.
How can I use lists to share to a specific group of people?
Lists give you an optional way to share with a specific audience. When writing a post or sharing a photo or other content, use the audience selector to pick the list you want to share it with.
Can I change the audience for something I share after I share it?
Yes, you can use the audience selector to change who can see stuff you share on your timeline after you share it. Keep in mind, when you share some-thing on someone else’s timeline, they control the audience for the post.
• You can share basic information like your home-town or birthday when you edit your timeline. Click Update Info (under your cover photo) and then click the Edit button next to the box you want to edit. Use the audience selector next to each piece of information to choose who can see that info.
• Anyone can see your public information, which includes your name, profile picture, cover photo, gender, username, user ID (account number), and networks.
• Only you and your friends can post to your timeline. When you post something, you can control who sees it by using the audience selector. When other people post on your timeline, you can control who sees it by choosing the audience of the Who can see what others post on your timeline setting.
• As you edit your info, you can control who sees what by using the audience selector.
• Before photos, posts and app activities that you’re tagged in appear on your timeline, you can approve or dismiss them by turning on timeline review. Keep in mind, you can still be tagged, and the tagged content (ex: photo, post) is shared with the audience the person who posted it selected other places on Facebook (ex: News Feed and search).
• Set an audience for who can see posts you’ve been tagged in on your timeline.
• To see what your timeline looks like to other people, use the View As tool.
What is my activity log?
Your activity log is a tool that lets you review and manage what you share on Facebook. Only you can see your activity log.
Step 3: Manage how others connect with you— mainly photo tagging
This includes
• How do I remove a tag from a photo or post I’m tagged in?
• What is timeline review? How do I turn timeline review on?
• How do I review tags that people add to my posts before they appear?
• How do I control who sees posts and photos that I’m tagged in on my timeline?
• How can I turn off tag suggestions for photos of me?
How do I remove a tag from a photo or post I’m tagged in?
Hover over the story, click and select Report/Remove Tag from the dropdown menu. You can then choose to remove the tag or ask the person who posted it to take it down.
You can also remove tags from multiple photos at once,
1. Go to your activity log
2. Click Photos in the left-hand column
3. Select the photos you’d like to remove a tag from
4. Click Report/Remove Tags at the top of the page
5. Click Untag Photos to confirm
Remember, when you remove a tag, that tag will no longer appear on the post or photo, but that post or photo is still visible to the audience it’s shared with other places on Facebook, such as in News Feed and search.
What is timeline review? How do I turn timeline review on?
Posts you’re tagged in can appear in News Feed, search and other places on Facebook. Timeline review is part of your activity log and lets you choose whether these posts also appear on your timeline.
When people you’re not friends with tag you in a post, they automatically go to timeline review. If you would also like to review tags by friends, you can turn on timeline review for tags from anyone:
1. Click at the top right of any Facebook page and select Account Settings
2. In the left-hand column, click Timeline and Tagging
3. Look for the setting Review posts friends tag you in before they appear on your timeline? and click Edit to the far right
4. Select Enabled from the dropdown menu
How do I review tags that people add to my posts before they appear?
Tag review is an option that lets you approve or dismiss tags that people add to your posts. When you turn it on, then anytime someone tags a photo or post you made, that tag won’t appear until you approve it. To turn on tag review:
1. Click at the top right of any Facebook page and select Account Settings
2. In the left-hand column, click Timeline and Tagging
3. Look for the setting Review tags friends add to your own posts on Facebook? and click Edit to the far right
4. Select Enabled from the dropdown menu
When tag review is on, you’ll get a notification when you have a post to review. You can approve or ig-nore the tag request by going to the content itself.
Its important to highlight that when you approve a tag, the person tagged and their friends may see your post. If you don’t want your post to be visible to the friends of the person tagged, you can adjust this setting. Simply click on the audience selector next to the story, select Custom, and uncheck the Friends of those tagged and event guests box.
How do I control who sees posts and photos that I’m tagged in on my timeline?
To choose who can see posts you’ve been tagged in after they appear on your timeline:
1. Click at the top right of any Facebook page and select Account Settings
2. In the left-hand column, click Timeline and Tagging
3. Look for the setting Who can see posts you’ve been tagged in on your timeline? and click Edit to the far right
4. Choose an audience from the dropdown menu
You can review photos and posts you’re tagged in before they appear on your timeline by turning on timeline review. Keep in mind, photos and posts you hide from your timeline are visible to the audience they’re shared with other places on Facebook, such as in News Feed and search.
How can I turn off tag suggestions for photos of me?
To choose who sees suggestions to tag you in photos:
1. Click at the top right of any Facebook page and choose Account Settings
2. Click Timeline and Tagging from the left-hand column
3. Under the How can I manage tags people add and tagging suggestions? section, click Who sees tag suggestions when photos that look like you are uploaded?
4. Select your preference from the dropdown menu
When you turn off tag suggestions, Facebook won’t suggest that people tag you when photos look like you. The template that we created to enable the tag suggestions feature will also be deleted. Note that friends will still be able to tag photos of you.
Well, these were the basics.
If you want to learn more either visit http://www. facebook.com/help/privacy alternatively, you can do a google search and you will find several useful links to help you on this issue (not only for facebook).
Disclaimer: The purpose of this write up is to spread awareness, promote ethical and safe computing practices and share knowledge. This write up does not seek to discredit or malign any particular person, corporation or business in any manner what so ever.
Across the Border
Since its independence, Pakistan has rarely had a stable, democratically elected government. The army in Pakistan has always played an important role and has a significant influence in the affairs of that country, unlike our country where the defence forces are subordinate to the political leadership of the country. Pakistan also has issues of dealing with terrorists and fundamentalists. The government of the day in that country cannot ignore them. In fact, often for a variety of reasons, it has helped these groups. The Economy of Pakistan is not in the best of shape. It also has to mend its relations with Afghanistan.
Both India and Pakistan have been, for decades, obsessed with each other. The Kashmir issue has been a bone of contention since the days of Partition. When faced with turbulence at home, the governments in both the countries deflect the attention of people by raising issues with the other country. However, in recent years, in the campaign for elections in India, the issues have been economic development, progress etc., rather than Pakistan. A similar change was seen in the recently concluded elections in Pakistan. All major parties campaigned on the plank of employment, education, inflation and development — domestic issues that concern the public. This, certainly, is a welcome trend.
It is heartening that democracy is taking roots in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif, after the elections, expressed the hope that relations with India will improve and he will work towards that. It is pointless to be euphoric about the statements made by him. It is too early to expect something dramatic that will change the situation. The army, the fundamentalists and the jihadis will not easily permit any government in Pakistan to succeed in improving relations with India. Their position is threatened if there is political and economic stability in Pakistan and good relations with India. It is also a fact that on an earlier occasion, Nawaz Sharif lost his prime ministership due to his inclination to develop relations with India.
One cannot forget various Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks that India has witnessed, particularly over the past few years. The Kargil War was fought when Nawaz Sharif was the premier of Pakistan. He claims that he was unaware of the exercise of infiltration in the Kargil area carried out by the army and the paramilitary forces. While he cannot escape the responsibility of what happened during his tenure, India cannot ignore it.
In spite of all this, it is in the interest of India that Pakistan (and also Bangladesh) have internal stability and a progressing economy. Just as when a student tastes success in examinations, he is motivated to study more and progress further, similarly when a country tastes economic success and progress, the people as well as the government start working towards further development rather than focussing on unproductive issues. We experienced that when the Indian economy was booming a few years back till the global meltdown and corruption within the country reversed the process.
Political developments in Pakistan are observed by other countries as well. Both the US and China have special interests in Pakistan. While the people of Pakistan have condemned the drone attacks by USA, America will never forget the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre. Yet Pakistan has generally been an ally of USA and in return, Washington has funded Pakistan from time to time.
India will go for elections in 2014 while the new government in Pakistan will be busy in stabilising its position. It is only then, that one really will be able to see progress, if any, in the relations between the two countries.
The experience with Pakistan has been different, yet the hope persists.
Sections 4, 28(i), 36(1) (iii) and 37(1) — Gross interest received from the Income-tax Department and not the net interest remaining after the set-off of the interest paid to the Income-tax Department is to be included in assessable income.
Sandvik asia Ltd. v. Dy. CiT
A.Y.: 1992-93. Dated: 13-9-2011
Sections 4, 28(i), 36(1) (iii) and 37(1) — Gross interest received from the income-tax Department and not the net interest remaining after the set-off of the interest paid to the income-tax Department is to be included in assessable income.
(1) R. N. Aggarwal v. ITO, [ITA Nos. 3913 & 3914 (Delhi) of 1980 and 620 (Delhi) of 1981, dated 21-8-1981].
(2) Cyanamide India Ltd. v. ITO, [ITA No. 4561 (Bom.) of 1982, dated 23-5-1984].
The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim. He was of the view that interest charged on late payment of tax by the Department is not a business expense deductible for the purpose of computing income under the Income-tax Act and, therefore, interest charged by the Department was added to the income of the assessee. The CIT(A) directed the Assessing Officer to tax only the net interest in view of the above Tribunal decisions. Before the Tribunal, there was a difference of opinion between the two Members and the matter was referred to the third Member u/s.255(4). The third Member, did not concur with the decisions of the Tribunal (stated above) and relying on the decisions in the following cases, held that the assessee is assessable to tax on the gross interest received from the Department:
(1) Bharat Commerce and Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1998) 145 CTR (SC) 340/(1998) 230 ITR 733 (SC).
(2) CIT v. Dr. V. P. Gopinathan, (2001) 166 CTR (SC) 504/(2001) 248 ITR 449 (SC).
(3) Aruna Mills Ltd. v. CIT, (1957) 31 ITR 153 (Bom.).
The third Member noted as under:
(1) Interest paid cannot be allowed u/s.36(1) (iii) because there is no borrowing by the assessee. There can be no two opinions on the same.
(2) The interest cannot also be claimed as a deduction u/s.37(1). Thus, the interest paid to the Income-tax Department under the provisions of the Act cannot be deducted while computing the business income of the assessee.
(3) The assessee’s argument based on the theory of real income has to be rejected. The rule of netting does not apply to the instant case and the assessee is assessable on the gross interest.
Sections 80, 139(1), 139(3) and 139(5) — Where the assessee had filed original return u/s.139(1) declaring positive income and claim for carry forward of long-term capital loss was made only in the revised return filed u/s.139(5), carry forward of loss cannot be denied.
Ramesh R. Shah v. ACIT
A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 29-7-2011
This return was processed u/s.143(1) on 15-12-2005. Thereafter, on 28-3-2006, he filed a revised return claiming longterm capital loss Rs.182.27 lakh which he claimed was to be carried forward u/s.74. The Assessing Officer, relying on the decision in the case M. Narendranath (Indl.) v. ACIT, (2005) 94 TTJ 284 (Visakha) and as per the provisions of section 80, declined to allow carry forward of the long-term capital loss.
The CIT(A) upheld the order passed by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the carry forward of the long term capital loss claimed by the assessee in the revised return of income. The Tribunal noted as under:
(1) Correct interpretation of section 80, as per the language used by the Legislature, is that condition for filing revised return of loss u/s.139(3) is confined to cases where there is only a loss in the original return filed by the assessee and no positive income and assessee desires to take benefit of carry forward of the said loss.
(2) Section 80 is a restriction on the right of the assessee when the assessee claims that he has no taxable income but only a loss, but does not file the return of income declaring the said loss as provided in s.s (3) of section 139.
(3) The Legislature has dealt with two specific situations (i) u/s.139(1), if the assessee has a taxable income chargeable to tax, then he has a statutory obligation to file the return of income within the time allowed u/s.139(1) and (ii) so far as section 139(3) is concerned, it only provides for filing the return of loss if the assessee desires that the same should be carried forward and set off in future. As per the language used in s.s (3) of section 139, it is contemplated that when the assessee files the original return, at that time, there should be loss and the assessee desires to claim the said loss to be carried forward and set off in future assessment years.
(4) Ss. (1) and (3) of section 139 provide for the different situations and there is no conflict in applicability of both the provisions as both the provisions are applicable in different situations.
(5) Once the assessee declares positive income in the original return filed u/s.139(1), but he subsequently finds some mistake or wrong statement and files a revised return declaring loss, then he cannot be deprived of the benefit of carry forward of such loss.
(6) In the present case, the assessee filed the return of income declaring the positive income and even in the revised return the assessee has declared positive income since the loss in respect of the sale of shares could not be set off inter-source or inter-head u/s.70 or 71.
(7) As per the provisions of s.s (5) of section 139, in both the situations where the assessee has filed the return of positive income as well as return of loss at the first instance as per the time-limit prescribed and, subsequently, files the revised return, then the revised return is treated as valid return.
(8) In the present case, as the assessee filed its original return declaring positive income and hence, subsequent revised return is also valid return and the assessee is entitled to carry forward of long-term capital loss. Therefore, there is no justification to deny the assessee the carry forward the loss.
Waiver of interest: Section 220(2A) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1989-90: Power to waive should be exercised judiciously: Finding that all conditions for waiver were satisfied: Waiver of part interest is not valid.
For the A.Y. 1989-90, the assessee made an application for waiver of interest of Rs.1,95,570 u/s.220(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Chief Commissioner gave the finding that all the three conditions regarding genuine hardship to the assessee, default in tax being not due to the circumstances attributable to the assessee and the co-operation of the assessee were satisfied. However, the Chief Commissioner limited the waiver to an amount of Rs.24,408 which was the balance amount due from the assessee.
The Kerala High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “
(i) The Commissioner had found that all the three conditions were satisfied. In the order, the Commissioner merely said that “payment of further interest will cause hardship to them” and did not state any reason for limiting or reducing the waiver.
(ii) The discretion has not been properly exercised by the Commissioner. His order was liable to be quashed to the extent it failed to consider waiver of the amounts already paid.
(iii) The Chief Commissioner was to pass fresh order in accordance with the observations.”
Speculative loss: Section 73: A.Y. 1996-97: Service charges Rs.2.25 crore, share trading loss Rs.2.23 crore and dividend income Rs.4.7 lakh: Exception in Explanation to section 73 applicable: Assessee would not be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purpose of section 73(1).
For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee returned an income of Rs.2.25 crore from service charges, share trading loss of Rs.2.23 crore: and dividend income of Rs.4.7 lakh. The assessee claimed that in computing the gross total income for the purpose of Explanation to section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the income from service charges have to be adjusted against the loss in share trading. The Assessing Officer did not accept the claim and disallowed the share trading loss as speculation loss. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Explanation to section 73 is designed to define a situation where a company is deemed to carry on speculation business. It is only thereafter that s.s (1) of section 73 can apply.
(ii) In computing the gross total income the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act must be applied and it is only thereafter, that it has to be determined as to whether the gross total income so computed consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads referred to in the Explanation. In the present case, both the income from service charges of Rs.2.25 crore and the share trading loss of Rs.2.23 crore, would have to be taken into account in computing the income under the head business, both being sources under the same head.
(iii) The assessee had a dividend income of Rs.4.7 lakh. The Tribunal was therefore justified in coming to the conclusion that the assessee fell within the purview of the exception carved out in the Explanation to section 73 and that consequently the assessee would not be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purpose of section 73(1).”
Set-off of loss of EOU: Exemption or deduction: Sections 10B, 70, and 80-IA(5) of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2005-06: Section 10B as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2001 is not a provision for exemption but a provision for deduction: Loss sustained from such an eligible unit can be set off against business income from other units.
In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee’s EOU which was eligible for deduction u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 incurred loss. The assessee claimed the set-off of the said loss against the profits of the other units. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for set-off of the loss holding that the loss sustained by the eligible units cannot be set off against the profits of the other units. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal filed by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Section 10B as it stands after substitution by the Finance Act, 2000 w.e.f. 1-4-2001, is not a provision for exemption, but a provision which enables an assessee to claim a deduction.
(ii) The loss which is sustained by an eligible unit can be set off against the income arising from other units under the same head of profits and gains of business or profession.”
Revision: Section 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1996-97: Limitation: Order of assessment does not merge in orders of reassessment as regards issues not forming subject-matter of reassessment: Limitation for revision of assessment in respect of those issues runs from date of original assessment order and not from date of reassessment orders.
For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessment order u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed on 10-3-1999 allowing the deduction claimed u/ss. 36(1)(vii) and (viia) and the foreign exchange rate difference. Subsequently, a reassessment order u/s.147 was passed on 22-2-2000 reworking the deduction u/s.80M. An appeal against the order u/s.143(3) was decided by the Commissioner (Appeals) on 28-3-2001. Thereafter, another reassessment order u/s.147 was passed on 26-3-2002, for reworking of the deduction u/s.36(1) (viii). On 28-3-2003, the Commissioner passed an order u/s.263 for disallowance u/s.36(1)(vii) and (viia) and in respect of foreign exchange rate difference. The Tribunal set aside the order as barred by limitation.
On appeal by the Revenue, it was contended that when the Assessing Officer passed the reassessment order on 26-3-2002, the Explanation to clause (vii) of section 36(1) had been introduced on the statute book and the Assessing Officer was duty bound to apply the law as amended, which he failed to do, and that Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act having been amended to provide that the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, which has escaped assessment and coming to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings.
The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Where the jurisdiction u/s.263(1) is sought to be exercised with reference to an issue which is covered by the original assessment order u/s.143(3) and which does not form the subject-matter of reassessment, limitation must necessarily begin to run from the order u/s.143(3).
(ii) Neither in the first reassessment, nor in the second reassessment was any issue raised or decided in respect of the deductions u/s.36(1) (vii), (viia) and the foreign exchange rate difference. The order of the Commissioner u/s.263(2) had not been passed with reference to any issue which had been decided either in the order of the first reassessment or in the order of second reassessment, but sought to revise issues decided in first order of assessment u/s.143(3) dated 10-3-1999.
(iii) The order dated 10-3-1999, did not merge with the orders of reassessment in respect of issues which did not form the subject-matter of the reassessment. Consequently, Explanation 3 to section 147 would not alter that position. Explanation 3 only enables the Assessing Officer, once an assessment is reopened, to assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, even an issue in respect of which no reasons were indicated in the notice u/s.148(2). This, however, will not obviate the bar of limitation u/s.263(2). The invocation of the jurisdiction u/s.263(2) was barred by limitation.”
Export profit: Deduction u/s.80HHC: A.Y. 2001-02: Assessee purchasing goods from one foreign country and transporting it to another foreign country: No condition that exports must be from India: Receipt on sale proceeds in convertible foreign exchange: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC.
The assessee was engaged in purchase and sale of non-ferrous metals, etc. The purchases were made from one country and exported to another country at a margin of profit by arranging direct shipment from the selling country to the purchasing country. The bills were settled through Bank of Baroda in India. The proceeds were through convertible foreign currency and payments were made on convertible foreign currency. For the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of such exports. The Assessing Officer and the Tribunal held that the assessee was not entitled to the deduction. The Tribunal held that to be eligible for the benefit of section 80HHC, foreign exchange is to be earned by exporting goods from India.
On appeal by the assessee, the Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Section 80HHC is an incentive to an assessee to carry on export business so that in turn, the country earns foreign exchange. While interpreting this provision, if two views are possible, it is settled law that the view which is favourable to the assessee is to be preferred by the courts.
(ii) Now section 80HHC provides that to an assessee who is engaged in the business of export out of India of any goods or merchandise, to which the section applies deduction to the extent of profits referred to in s.s (1)(b) is allowed. In the entire provision, there are no express words which provide that the export of such goods is to be from India.
(iii) The Explanation read with the main section does not in any way indicate that, to be eligible for the benefit of deduction u/s.80HHC, the goods or merchandise has to emanate from India. In section 80HHE the words used are ‘export out of India’. But to be eligible for deduction under the aforesaid provision mere export out of India is not sufficient. What is to be exported out of India should be from India to a place outside India by any means. Such a wording is conspicuously missing in section 80HHC.
(iv) The stress in section 80HHC is only on earning of foreign exchange, not the goods and merchandise to be exported out of India. They do not necessarily have to be from India. Therefore, the law does not require the goods to be physically exported out of India. There need not be a two-way traffic of bringing the goods from a foreign country into the Indian shores and thereafter exporting those goods from Indian shores.”
Export of computer software: Exemption/ deduction u/s.10A r.w.s 80-I: A.Ys. 1995-96 to 1998-99: No material to show that assessee indulged in arrangement with foreign buyer so as to produce higher profits to assessee: AO not entitled to presume such arrangement and determine reasonable profits.
The assessee company carried on the business of manufacture of hardware and software and exported its products. For the A.Ys. 1995-96 to 1998-99, the assessee claimed exemption u/s.10A in respect of two units. The Assessing Officer took the view that the exemption claimed in respect of the two units involved in creation of software was not merely unusually high in comparison to the assessee’s other business, but having regard to the close relationship between the assessee company and its foreign buyer the provisions of section 80-I(9) were to be applied in terms of 10A(6) of the Act. He, therefore, allowed exemption at the percentage of profit in respect of the entire turnover of the assessee inclusive of the export turnover. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) While there did exist a close connection between the assessee and the foreign buyer the other requirement as to the nature of the arrangement and the manner of rejection of the profits margin due to export sales as inflated profits attributable to export activities, had not been disclosed by the Assessing Officer.
(ii) The finding of the Appellate Authority was that the profit margin as revealed by the assessee was a reasonable profit margin in comparison to other similar units.
(iii) There being no material to indicate that the course of business had been so arranged as to inflate profits, i.e., to show a higher profit margin to the two export units of the assessee, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Assessing Officer could not presume the existence of close connection or arrangement for the purpose of invoking section 80-I(9) of the Act.”
Business expenditure: Section 37(1): A.Y. 1997-98: Expenditure on higher education of two directors: Disallowance on ground that directors are children of managing director: Not proper.
The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacture and supply of automobile components. The assessee sponsored two of its directors for higher education in connection with the specialised intensive training in the field of general management, marketing, finance and information technology, including project strategy, with a condition that after securing higher education, they should serve the assessee as directors. The claim for deduction of the expenditure was disallowed by the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal on the ground that they were the children of the managing director.
On appeal by the assessee, the Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Just because the two directors were the children of the managing director of the company, that could not be the ground for the Assessing Officer to reject the claim of the assessee, until and unless it was established that these two children of the managing director, sponsored to acquire higher education were not connected with the business of the assessee, even though they were directors.
(ii) Since the issue had not been considered by the Assessing Officer and such a mistake was committed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.”
Business expenditure: Bad debts: Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Assessee share-broker: Nonrecovery of amount receivable from clients against purchase of shares: Non-recoverable amount is bad debt deductible u/s.36(1)(vii) r.w.s 36(2).
The assessee was a share-broker. For the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 28.24 lakh representing an amount due to him by his clients on account of transactions of shares effected by the assessee on their behalf, u/s.36(1)(vii) claiming that the amount has become irrecoverable. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. The Revenue filed appeal before the Tribunal and contended that since the assessee had credited only the amount of the brokerage to the P&L a/c, the amount of bad debts claimed was not taken into account in computing the total income of the relevant previous year or any earlier previous year and accordingly, the condition stipulated in section 36(2) was not satisfied. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Brokerage from the transaction of the purchase of shares has been taxed in the hands of the assessee as its business income. Brokerage as well as the value of the shares constitute a part of the debt due to the assessee, since both arise out of the same transaction.
(ii) Value of the shares transacted by the assessee as a stock-broker on behalf of his clients is as much a part of the debt as is the brokerage which is charged by the assessee on the transaction. Brokerage having been credited to the P&L a/c of the assessee, it is evident that a part of the debt is taken into account in computing the income of the assessee. Since both form a component part of the debt, the requirements of section 36(2)(i) are fulfilled where a part thereof is taken into account in computing the income of the assessee.
(iii) The assessee was therefore entitled to deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) if the Act.”
Assessment: Change of status: Validity: A.Y. 1972-73: If the status of the assessee is required to be modified, the only option is to assess the income in the appropriate status, if permitted by law: CIT(A) modifying the status of assessee: Not valid.
For the A.Y. 1972-73, assessment was made in the status of AOP consisting of 3 persons.
In appeal, the CIT(A) modified the status from AOP to BOI comprising 2 persons. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A). On appeal by the assessee, the Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“If the status of the assessee is required to be modified, the only option available to the ITO is to assess the income in the appropriate status, if permitted by law, by issuing a notice to the assessee in that particular status. The CIT(A) was not justified in modifying the status from AOP to BOI.”
Appeal to CIT(A): Additional ground: A.Y. 2001-02: Claim for benefit of proviso to section 112(1) not made in the return: Could be accepted by CIT(A): Assessee is entitled to raise the legal issue before the first Appellate Authority, which possessed co-terminus powers similar to the AO.
For the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee had not made the claim for the benefit of proviso to section 112(1) , while computing the capital gains tax. The claim was first time made before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. By relying on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. v. CIT, (2006) 204 CTR 182 (SC); (2006) 284 ITR 323 (SC) the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the Department and set aside the order of the CIT(A).
On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Needless to mention that the proviso to section 112(1) was introduced w.e.f. 1-4-2000 by the Finance Act, 1999. In other words, it was introduced during the assessment year under consideration and the assessee was not aware about latest amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 1999 w.e.f. 1-4-2000.
(ii) Though ignorance of law has no excuse, but it can be excused in tax matters. It is not expected that the Department shall take the advantage of the assessee’s ignorance as per CBDT Circular No. 14(XL-35) of 1955, dated 11- 4-1955. Even under the bona fide belief, the assessee has shown the long-term capital gain @ 20%, but it was expected from the Assessing Officer to know the latest amendment.
(iii) The mistake might have been corrected by passing an order u/s.154. The question of law which arose from the fact as found by the IT authority and legal issue can be raised at any stage. The assessee was entitled to raise the legal issue before the first Appellate Authority, which possessed co-terminus powers similar to the Assessing Officer.
(iv) The CIT(A) has rightly adjudicated the statutory right of the assessee and directed to allow the longterm capital gain at 10%.”
Export — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Only ninety percent of the net amount of any receipt of the nature mentioned in clause (1), which is actually included in the profits of the assessee is to be deducted from the profits of the assessee for determining ‘profits of the business’ of the assessee under Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC.
For the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee filed a return of income claiming a deduction of Rs.34,44,24,827 u/s.80HHC of the Act. The Assessing Officer passed the assessment order deducting 90% of the gross interest and gross rent received from the profits of business while computing the deduction u/s.80HHC and accordingly restricted the deduction u/s.80HHC to Rs.2,36,25,053. The assessee filed an appeal against the assessment order before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer excluding 90% of the gross interest and gross rent received by the assessee while computing the profits of the business for the purposes of section 80HHC. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal held, relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equip, (2007) 289 ITR 475 (Delhi), that netting of the interest could be allowed if the assessee is able to prove the nexus between the interest expenditure and interest income and remanded the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal also remanded the issue of netting of the rent to the Assessing Officer with the direction to find out whether the assessee has paid the rent on the same flats against which rent has been received from the staff and if such rent was paid, then such rent is to be reduced from the rental income for the purpose of exclusion of business income for computing the deduction u/s.80HHC. Against the order of the Tribunal, the Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court and the High Court has directed that on remand the Assessing Officer will decide the issue in accordance with the judgment of the High Court in CIT v. Asian Star Co. Ltd., (2010) 326 ITR 56 (Bom.) in which it has been held that while determining the profits of the business as defined in Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC, 90% of the gross receipts towards interest and not 90% of the net receipts towards interest on fixed deposits in banks received by the assessee would be excluded for the purpose of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC of the Act.
Against the order of the High Court, the assessee filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court wherein leave was granted. The Supreme Court observed that Explanation (baa) states that ‘profits of the business’ means the profits of the business as computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ as reduced by the receipts of the nature mentioned in clauses (1) and (2) of Explanation (baa). Thus, profits of the business of an assessee will have to be first computed under the heads ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ in accordance with the provisions of sections 28 to 44D of the Act. In the computation of such profits of business, all receipts of income which are chargeable as profits and gains of business u/s.28 of the Act will have to be included. Similarly, in computation of such profits of business, different expenses which are allowable u/s.30 to u/s.44D have to be allowed as expenses. After including such receipts of income and after deducting such expenses, the total of the net receipts are profits of the business of the assessee computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ from which deductions are to made under clauses (1) and (2) of Explanation (baa).
Under clause (1) of Explanation (baa), 90% of any receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar nature included in any such profits are to be deducted from the profits of the business as computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. The expression ‘included any such profits’ in clause (1) of Explanation (baa) would mean only such receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt, which are included in profits of the business as computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’.
The Supreme Court therefore held that only 90% of the net amount of any receipt of the nature mentioned in clause (1), which is actually included in the profits of the assessee is to be deducted form the profits of the assessee for determining ‘profits of the business’ of the assessee under Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC. For this interpretation of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC of the Act, the Supreme Court relied on its judgment of the Constitution Bench in Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 155 ITR 120 (SC).
Since the High Court had set aside the order of the Tribunal and directed the Assessing Officer to dispose the issue in accordance with the judgment of the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Asian Star Co. Ltd., (2010) 326 ITR 56 (Bom.), it examined the reasons given by the High Court in its judgment and noted the fallacies therein.
In the result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to work out the deductions from rent and interest in accordance with this judgment.
[2013] 32 taxmann.com 132 (Mumbai – Trib.) IHI Corporation vs. ADIT A.Y.: 2009-10, Dated: 13-03-2013
Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of Japan. The taxpayer had executed contracts with an Indian company for engineering, procurement, construction and commissioning of certain equipment. The consideration under the contract was segregated into offshore portion and onshore portion. As regards the offshore portion, the taxpayer contended that no income had accrued in India as all activities were undertaken outside India and that the project office in India had no role to play in respect of the offshore services. Further, since the transfer of property in goods and the payments had taken place outside India, no income was taxable in India.
Held:
(i) Position under the Act
a) In an earlier case of the taxpayer, the Supreme Court [Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd vs. DIT (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC)] had held that section 9(1)(vii) of the Act envisages fulfillment of two conditions, namely, the services must be utilised in India and they must be rendered in India.
b) Pursuant to the retrospective amendment to section 9, even if the services are rendered outside India, the consideration will be taxable in India if services are utilised in India. As there was no dispute that the payment received by the taxpayer was in the nature of fees for technical services and further that though the services were rendered outside India, they were utilised in India, the rendition of such services outside India could not now take the income out of the ambit of section 9(1)(vii). Therefore, income from offshore services rendered outside India will be taxable in India u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act.
(ii) Position under India-Japan DTAA
a) In an earlier case of the taxpayer, the Supreme Court [Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd vs. DIT (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC)] had held that Article 7 of India-Japan DTAA is applicable and it limits the taxability to profits arising from the operation of the PE. Since the services were rendered outside India and since they had nothing to do with the PE in India, no income can be attributable to PE in India.
b) As there was no change in this position, income arising from offshore services was not taxable in India.
Recent amendments to MVAT Act, 2002
Amendments are effected in Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act,
2002 and Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 to carryout Budget proposals
announced by the Finance Minister in his Budget Speech.
The gist of important changes can be given as under :
The amendments are effected by the Maharashtra Act No. XII of
2010, dated 29-4-2010. The amendments are in the Maharashtra State Tax on
Professions, Traders Callings and Employment Act, 1975, Maharashtra Tax on
Luxury Act, 1987 and Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002. The changes in
general are applicable from 1-5-2010, except for S. 42(3A) of the MVAT Act,
2002, which comes into operation from 1-4-2010.
Amendments in MVAT Act, 2002 :
(i) S. 18 of the MVAT Act enumerates various occurrences on
happening of which intimation is required to be given to the Sales Tax
Department. By amendment in S. 18 of the MVAT Act, 2002 it is now provided that
the dealer should also give intimation in the following two circumstance, (i) If
there is a change in the nature of business, and (ii) change in bank account.
Vide Circular No. 17T of 2010, dated 17-5-2010, it is
clarified that the change in nature of business means if the activity is shifted
from manufacture to trading or import or vice versa.
Similarly in relation to the bank account it is mentioned
that the details about closing or opening of the bank account should be
intimated.
(ii) S. 23(5) is about transactionwise assessment. Up till
today, only officers of Investigation Branch acting u/s.64 were entitled to
carry out transac-tionwise assessment. By amendment in S. 23(5) it is now
provided that the other sales tax authorities will also be entitled to carry out
transaction- wise assessment in case of tax evasion, etc.
(iii) By amendment in S. 29 the following changes are
effected :
(a) The quantum of penalty u/s.29(6), which relates to
offence about contravention of tax invoice, is enhanced from Rs.100 to
Rs.1,000.(b) The quantum of penalty u/s.29(7), which relates to
offence about non-compliance of notices, is enhanced from Rs.1,000 to
Rs.5,000.(c) U/s.29(11) it was provided that no penalty order should
be passed after 5 years from the end of the concerned year for which penalty
is to be levied. The period of 5 years is now extended to 8 years.
(iv) In Budget speech it was announced that a special 1%
composition scheme will be provided for builders/developers who transfer
immovable property also in the construction contract. An enabling provision is
inserted by way S. 42(3A) to give power to the Government to notify that
composition scheme. However the actual scheme will be known only upon issue of
Notification, which can be effective from 1-4-2010.
(v) Input Tax Credit and refund of excess credit is backbone
of successful VAT implication. Up till today, the position was that the
authorities were bound to grant refund as per amount shown in refund application
in Form 501. However now by amendment in S. 51, a proviso is inserted by which
powers are given to the sales tax authorities to reduce the refund from the
refund amount claimed in the refund application. Simultaneously Rule 55A is also
inserted to implement this proviso, which is discussed subsequently.
(vi) S. 61(3) is about VAT Audit. Till today, the turnover
limit is Rs.40 lakhs and a dealer having turnover of sale/purchase exceeding the
above limit is liable to VAT Audit. By amendment in S. 61(1) the following
changes are made :
(a) The turnover limits for attracting VAT Audit is
enhanced from Rs.40 lakhs to 60 lakhs. This will apply from the year
2010-2011.
(b) It is also provided that if the dealer holds
Entitlement Certificate under the Package Scheme of Incentives, then he
should get VAT Audit done irrespective of any monetary limits of turnovers.
(vii) S. 85 enumerates orders which are not appealable. By
amendment to S. 85, appeals in the following matters are debarred :
(a) Appeals against orders levying interest u/s.30(2)/30(4) :
U/s.30(2) interest is levied for delay in payment of tax as
per return. U/s.30(4) additional interest is levied when the dealer revises his
returns as per contingencies given in the said Section. Appeals against both the
orders are debarred. This will affect the dealers harshly. There are various
circumstances under which interest is not justified or justified at lower
amount. Now the dealers will not have any opportunity to get relief in interest,
though they may deserve the same.
(b) Appeals against Provisional attachment order
u/s.35(1)/(2) :
Provision attachment orders are passed u/s. 35(1)(2).
S. 35(5) provides special mode of appeal against such orders.
The dealer has to file application to the Commissioner of Sales Tax against the
attachment order and if such order is upheld by the Commissioner of Sales Tax,
then to file appeal before the Tribunal. This mode is untouched. However there
was no prohibition to file direct appeal before the Tribunal against attachment
order and in one of the matters the Tribunal held so. Now the specific
prohibition is brought in. Therefore, no direct appeal will be entertained
before the Tribunal and one has to go through the route of application to the
Commissioner of Sales Tax and then to the Tribunal.
(c) Appeals against intimation u/s.63(7) :
Intimation is in nature of proposal. It is issued to convey
findings of business audit with suggestive redressal action on part of
the dealer. Therefore appeal was otherwise also not maintainable, as such
intimation may not be an order. However, now the doubt, if any, is put to rest.
No appeal will be maintainable against such intimation issued u/s.63(7).
(viii) S. 86 — Tax invoice :
S. 86 enumerates requirements of Tax Invoice as well as other
than Tax Invoice. By amendment in S. 86 it is now provided that the selling
dealer while issuing Tax Invoice should also mention the TIN of the purchasing
dealer. Therefore, on the Tax Invoices issued from 1-5-2010 onwards, the selling
dealer should mention TIN of the purchasing dealer.
Accordingly, Tax Invoice can now be issued to registered dealers providing TIN. If no TIN of buyer is provided, Tax Invoice cannot be issued to him and if it is issued it can amount to wrong issue. In case Tax Invoice cannot be issued to buyer due to not having TIN, probably the seller will be required to issue other than Tax Invoice, like only invoice or retail invoice, bill, cash memo, etc. and may not be able to charge tax separately in the same. However in absence of specific prohibition, the seller may charge tax separately in other invoices also, though they are not tax invoices. It is better that the Department clarifies its stand on this issue to avoid future disputes.
For buyers it will be necessary to have Tax Invoice containing his TIN, otherwise set-off will not be eligible in respect of such purchase.
(ix) Changes in entries in the Schedules?:
Entry No. |
Brief description |
New rate/remarks |
Effective |
|
|
|
|
A-4(c) |
Sarki Pend |
Exempted form tax (consequently |
|
|
|
this item is excluded from entry C-30) |
1-5-2010 |
|
|
|
|
A-55(b)/(c) |
Camphor/Dhoop including Loban |
Exempted from tax |
1-5-2010 |
|
|
|
|
A-57 |
Katha (catechu) |
Exempted from tax (consequently |
|
|
|
this item is excluded from entry C-44) |
1-5-2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Entry No. |
Brief description |
New rate/remarks |
Effective |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A-58 |
Handmade laundry soap manufactured |
|
|
|
|
|
|
by ‘Khadi Units’ excluding detergent |
Exempted from tax |
1-5-2010 |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B-4 |
Hair-pins |
Brought to tax at 1% from 4% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
(consequently entry C-51 is deleted) |
1-5-2010 |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C-115 |
Vehicles operated on battery or solar |
|
|
|
|
|
|
power |
Brought to tax at 4% from 12.5% |
1-5-2010 |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Profession Tax Act, 1975?:
S. 7A is inserted in the Act. By this Section the provisions of the Business Audit, as existing in S. 22 of the MVAT Act, 2002, are made applicable to P.T. Act, 1975. Accordingly, the Department can do Audit under Profession Tax Act, 1975 also.
Simultaneously, the provisions in the MVAT Rules, 2005 about Electronic Filing of Returns, Electronic Payment are made applicable to the Profession Tax?Act?also.?However?exact modalities are awaited by specific rules under P.T. Act and Circular.
Luxury Tax Act, 1987?:
|
Particulars |
Rate |
|
|
|
(a) |
Charges up to Rs.750 per residential |
|
|
accommodation. |
Nil |
|
|
|
(b) |
Where the charges are exceeding |
|
|
Rs.750 but are up to Rs.1200. |
4% |
|
|
|
(c) |
Charges exceeding Rs.1200. |
10% |
|
|
|
Under the Luxury Tax Act the change is about increase in threshold limit. The threshold limit for application of the Luxury Tax Act was Rs.200, it is now enhanced to Rs.750. The new slabs from 1-5-2010 and onwards are as under?:
The other change is that the provisions in the MVAT Rules, 2005 about Electronic Fil-ing of Returns, Electronic Payment are made applicable to the Luxury Tax Act also.
Maharashtra Valued Added Tax Rules, 2005?:
The Government has also issued Notification dated 30-4-2010, whereby the MVAT Rules are amended from 1-5-2010. The gist of amendment is as under?:
1) The due date for filing returns in the following categories is extended?:
a) In relation to six-monthly returns, to be filed by retailers under composition scheme, the due?date?is?extend?to?30?days?from?the?present 21 days. The same applies from 1-5-2010 onwards [Rule 17(4)(a)(i)].
b) In case of dealer whose periodicity to file returns is six months (due to tax liability below Rs.1 lakh or refund less than Rs.10 lakhs in previous year), the time limit for filing returns is extended to 30 days from the present 21 days. [Rule 17(4)(b)].
c) New dealers?:
The periodicity for filing returns in case of new dealers is revised. Now they will be liable to file quarterly returns instead of previous position of six-monthly returns.
(2) Conditions of grant of refund?:
Rule 55A has been newly inserted in the MVAT Rules from 1-5-2010. As per the said Rule, Refund will be curtailed in the following two situations?:
i) If tax has not been paid on earlier transactions of sale of goods on which set-off is claimed. The provision will affect innocent buyers harshly. By rule, it appears that simply on ground that tax is not paid earlier, the refund will be curtailed without due process of law. Against the refund order in Form 502, the dealer will be required to file appeal and contest the issue. This will involve long-drawn legal process. This rule is not desirable when general class of dealers is going to be affected.
ii)If C/F forms are not received. The process to claim the refund where forms are received afterwards is required to be clarified by the Department.
3) New Form 604 is inserted, which will be used for giving intimation u/s.63(7) i.e., to convey Business Audit findings.
Input Tax Credit — Applicability of Rule 53(6) —A Few controversies
Value Added Tax System (VAT) has been made applicable for levy of Sales Tax in India from 1.4.2005. Though one of the objects to introduce VAT was to have uniformity in the Taxation Provisions in all the States of India, it is a well known fact that this object has not been achieved and almost all the States have their own levy systems. In Maharashtra, the VAT is being levied under Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act).
Input Tax Credit (ITC, also referred to as set off) is the backbone of VAT system. Therefore the ITC mechanism should be as simple as possible. The VAT system is considered to be ideal for avoiding cascading effect. Therefore dealers should get set off on all the purchases connected with his business. However, as per the current provisions under the MVAT Act, there are many restrictions as well as negative list about set off. In other words, set off is not allowed on all the purchases. Several purchases relating to the business are outside the scope of set off, like: purchases used for erection of immovable properties, purchase of passenger motor car, etc. There are also provisions to restrict setoff under certain circumstances. The reference here is to Rule 53(6) of MVAT Rules, 2005.
Under MVAT Act, section 48 provides for grant of set off to dealers. It also authorises the State Government to draft necessary rules. The State Government, under its authority, made the Rules about grant of set off. The said rules are contained in Rules 52 to 55 of MVAT Rules, 2005. Rule 52 speaks about eligibility to set off, Rule 54 gives negative list on which set off is debarred and Rule 53 provides for reductions from set off. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 53 is one of the most complicated and frequently amended Sub-rules providing for reduction/restriction in set off. The said Sub-rule, which was on the statute book since 1.4.2005, was substituted on 8.9.2006. And it was substituted once again, on 23.10.2008. The second substitution has been made effective from 8.9.2006. Thus, Rule 53(6) is now to be seen in its new form with effect from 8.9.2006. The said rule is reproduced below for ready reference.
53. Reduction in set-off
(A) The set-off available under any rule shall be reduced and shall accordingly be disallowed in part or full in the event of any of the contingencies specified below and to the extent specified. (1) to (5) . . . .
(6) If out of the gross receipts of a dealer, in any year, receipts on account of sale are less than fifty per cent of the total receipts, —
(a) then to the extent that the dealer is a hotel or club, not being covered under composition scheme, the dealer shall be entitled to claim set-off only, —
(i) on the purchases corresponding to the food and drinks (whether alcoholic or not) which are served, supplied or, as the case may be, resold or sold, and
(ii) on the purchases of capital assets and consumables pertaining to the kitchens and sale, service or supply of the said food or drinks, and
(b) in so far as the dealer is not a hotel or restaurant, the dealer shall be entitled to claim set-off only on those purchases effected in that year where the corresponding goods are sold or resold within six months of the date of purchase or are consigned within the said period, not by way of sale to another State, to oneself or one’s agent or purchases of packing materials used for packing of such goods sold, resold or consigned :
Provided that for the purposes of clause (b), the dealer who is a manufacturer of goods, not being a dealer principally engaged in doing job work or labour work, shall be entitled to claim set-off on his purchases of plant and machinery which are treated as capital assets and purchases of parts, components and accessories of the said capital assets, and on purchases of consumables, stores and packing materials in respect of a period of three years starting from the end of the year containing the date of effect of the certificate of registration.
Some important implications of the above rule can be considered as under :
i) If out of the gross receipts, the receipts from the sale of goods are less than 50% of the gross receipts, then this rule will apply. Therefore finding out above ratio is important. The comparison is to be done on yearly basis. This concept of making yearly comparison itself is against the very system of ITC under VAT. The setoff system should have free flow. Normally on entering the purchase in the records, the dealer should be entitled to claim set off of the same. In other words, set off should be eligible as soon as the purchase is entered in the books of account. However, as per above rule, this is not so.
Though the dealer claims the set off on effecting the purchase, he will be required to find out the correctness of the said claim after the end of the year. If the receipts from the sales are less than 50% of gross receipts, then the set off will be restricted to the purchases, as indicated in above rule. Amongst others, in case of dealers other than hotels, the set off will get disallowed on the capital assets as well as expenditure items debited to P & L A/c. Thus the original claim of the dealer will be wrong and such a dealer will be required to recalculate and reduce the setoff already taken by him, after the end of the year. Thus the very purpose of allowing set off as per the date of purchase gets defeated.
An issue again arises that if the set off is to be reduced after the end of the year, due to above application of rule 53(6), then in which returns the reduction is to be made. As per set off Rules the dealer is entitled to claim set off as soon as the purchase is entered into the books of accounts. As per rule 53(8) the reduction in setoff, due to contingency contained in rule 53, is to be given effect in the return period in which such contingency arises. In relation to rule 53(6) the contingency arises after the end of the year. Therefore, at the most, the effect to reduction in light of rule 53(6) can be given in the last return only. Hence the last return of the year can be revised to give effect to the above rule 53(6).
ii) The other issue arises as to the meaning of gross receipts. In the earlier un-amended rule the meaning of gross receipts for the purpose of rule 53(6) was explained by way of Explanation under the Rule. However, the said Explanation is now not appearing in this substituted rule. Therefore, the meaning remains to be ascertained by the dealer. Several issues may arise in this respect.
a) Whether only the receipts of Maharashtra are to be considered or all the activities, including activities in other States, are also to be considered ?
It is an important issue as the receipts from sale will certainly be relating to Maharashtra. The word ‘sale’ is defined in the MYAT Act and as per the said definition ‘sale’ means sale within the state of Maharashtra. Therefore, so far as. the receipts from sales are concerned they will mean only receipts of sales effected in the State of Maharashtra. Though the meaning of ‘gross receipt’ is not given, it is an accepted principle that only comparables can be compared. Therefore, if in relation to sales, receipts from sales effected only in Maharashtra are to be considered, then for gross receipts also receipts only from Maharashtra should be considered. Though this can be a fair interpretation it is better that the law itself provides for the meaning to avoid litigation in future.
b) The other issue in this respect is, what is to be included in gross receipts. One view can be that items appearing on the credit side of Trading A/c. and P & L A/c. should be considered. The other view can be that all receipts, on whatever account, should be considered. As per this view receipts on account of dealing in assets like sale of assets etc. should also be considered for gross receipts. In this respect also a clarification from the department is most welcome to avoid un-necessary debate. Normally, gross receipts should be restricted to receipts appearing on credit side of Trading and P & L Accounts excluding dealings in assets, etc. Receipts from sale of assets forming part of turnover of sales may also be considered for gross receipts. However receipts from sale of assets not covered by MYAT Act like sale of immovable properties or sale of shares etc., cannot get covered in gross receipts. However clarification from the Department on above aspect is necessary.
iii) Another important issue is that if this rule applies then in relation to dealers, other than hotels, set off is eligible only on purchases which are sold within six months from the date of purchase. This will require identification of purchase and sale. This condition also is not as per the spirit of ITC under VAT. Although in case of reseller the issue may not bother much as identification in such a case will normally be available, but in case of manufacturers, this kind of identification may pose several difficulties. The dealer will be required to adopt the system as permissible on the facts and circumstances of the case.
iv) This sub-rule may hit hard, manufacturers. It provides that a manufacturer will be eligible to get set off on plant and machinery etc., even if the sales are less than 50% of the gross receipts. However, this concession is given only for three years from the end of the year in which the registration has been granted. It can be said that this exception is provided for new manufacturing dealers. However, in these initial years existing dealers can also avail the benefit. The MVAT Act has been brought into effect from 1.4.2005. The registration granted under the BST Act, 1959 is deemed to have come to an end on 31.3.2005 due to abolition of the said Act. The registration numbers granted under the BST Act, 1959 continued in the VAT period also because of specific provision to that effect in the MV ATAct, 2002. Reference can be made to section 96 (1) (b) of MVAT Act, 2002, which reads as under.
96. Savings
1) Notwithstanding the repeal by section 95 of any of the laws referred to therein, —
“(b) any registration certificate issued under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, being a registration certificate in force immediately before the appointed day shall, in so far as the liability to pay tax under sub-section (1) of section 3 of this Act exists, be deemed on the appointed day to be the certificate of registration issued under this Act, and accordingly the dealer holding such registration certificate immediately before the appointed day, shall, until the certificate is duly cancelled under this Act, be deemed to be a registered dealer liable to pay tax under
this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to him as they apply to a dealer liable to pay tax under this Act.”
In light of above, it can be said that the continuation of registration granted under BST Act in the MVAT period is as good as grant of new registration under the MVAT Act, 2002. Therefore, in case of existing dealers the three years from the end of the year in which registration is granted, is to be considered from 2005-06. In other words, existing dealers will get the benefit of above exception for three years from 2005-06 i.e. upto 2008-09.
The real difficulty arises after the three years are over. In such cases, inspite of fact that there are purchases of machinery etc., the dealers will not be entitled for any set off of taxes paid on purchase of such machineries. This will certainly be against the very purpose and spirit of the MYAT Act and the scheme of ITC under VAT.
v) One more issue which arises in respect of this sub-rule, is due to retrospective effect to the amended rule. Though the rule is substituted in October 2008, the effect is given from 8.9.2006. For example, a dealer might have claimed set off for the year 2006-07/2007-08 etc. in light of earlier Rule and would have claimed the set off accordingly in the returns. A situation may arise for reducing set off for earlier years in light of substituted rule due to retrospective effect given to it. The issue is who is responsible to carry out such reduction. There can be different situations. If the returns were already filed before the amendment date and VAT Audit was also carried out, then is there a responsibility on the dealer to file revised returns etc. ? The statutory time limit for filing revised returns is only 9 months from the end of the year. Therefore the department cannot insist for revising returns to give effect to retrospective effect after the end of the period for revising returns. There is also no obligation on the dealer to revise the returns after the end of the period for revising the returns, to give effect to the adverse amendment. In the amended rules also, there is no obligation or direction to the dealer to file revised returns to give effect to the amended rule for prior period. Therefore, the dealer is not required to take any action. However, the department can take action and by making assessment, give the due effect.
In fact there are number of such ambiguities in relation to rule 53(6). All are not discussed here for sake of brevity. The above are a few important ones and readers may also come across further issues in relation to above rule. We expect that the Government will come out with proper clarification on various issues, in above rule, keeping into account the prime role of ITC in a successful VAT system.
Filing of Returns and Payment of Taxes
The Government of Maharashtra has recently amended Rules 17,
18 and 81 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005. The forms, procedures
and periodicity in respect of filing of returns and payment of taxes have also
been modified. Certain dealers are now required to file e-returns and others may
find their periodicity changed from monthly to quarterly or from quarterly to
six-monthly. However, every dealer shall file his returns in the new format for
all the periods commencing from 1st April 2008
The amended periodicity, for filing returns may be summarised
as under :
Sr. No. | Category |
Periodicity |
1. |
(a) Newly registered dealers (on or after 1st April 2008) (b) Retailers opted for Composition Scheme
(c) Tax liability in the previous year up to Rs.1 lakh or |
6 monthly |
2. |
(a) Dealers under Package Scheme of Incentive
(b) Tax liability in the previous year exceeds Rs.1 lakh, |
Quarterly |
3. | All other dealers whose tax liability in the previous |
Monthly |
The due date for filing return and for payment of taxes
continues to be the same i.e., within 21 days from the end of the
month, quarter or six months as the case may be.
The monthly returns are required to be filed for each
calendar month, quarterly returns for each quarter of three months (i.e.,
Apr-Jun, Jul-Sep, Oct-Dec and Jan-Mar) and six-monthly returns for the period of
six months (i.e., April to September and October to March).
The term ‘Tax liability’ has been defined in Explanation I to
Rule 17(4) of the MVAT Rules. Accordingly, it means the total of all taxes
payable by a dealer in respect of all of his places of business or as the case
may be, of all the constituents of his business in the State under the MVAT as
well as the CST Act after adjusting the amount of set-off or refund claimed by
him. Thus, for the purpose of calculating the tax liability, the tax payable at
all the places of business or all the constituents of business are to be
considered and the said amount shall be reduced by the amount of set-off or
refund actually claimed by the dealer.
Change in Return Forms and Electronic Filing of Returns :
(Refer : Government Notification dated 14-3-2008,
Commissioner’s Notification dated 14-3-2008, Trade Circular No. 8T/2008, dated
19-3-2008, 10T/2008, dated 3-4-2008, 16T/2008, dated 23-4-2008 and 17T/2008
dated 5-5-2008 :
- The earlier return-cum-challan forms 221, 222, 223, 224 and 225 have been replaced with the new return-cum-challan forms 231, 232, 233, 234 and 235, respectively. The earlier CST return-cum-challan form has also been replaced by new return-cum-challan Form No. IIIE.
- All returns pertaining to the month of April 2008 as well as the return to be filed in respect of periods starting on or after the 1st May 2008 are to be filed in the new forms.
- Dealers whose tax liability in the financial year 2006-07 was equal to or above Rs.1 crore, have to file their return from February 2008 onwards in electronic form.
- Dealers whose tax liability in the previous year, i.e., 2007-08 was equal to or above Rs.10 lakhs, have to file their return for the month of May 2008 onwards in electronic form.
- Dealers eligible to file electronic return under MVAT Act/Rules should file their Central Sales Tax return in Form IIIE electronically.
- Dealers required to file electronic return shall first make payment of tax in Form 210 or Form IIIE (for CST) and then file electronic return.
- The procedure for filing e-returns has been explained on the new website of the Department at (http://www.mahavat.gov.in). A dedicated help desk is also created at Mazgaon Sales Tax Office to answer the queries pertaining to e-returns. In case of need, the dealer / s may contact the help desk at 022-23735621/022-23735816. Further assistance may be taken from the office of Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax (Returns) in Mumbai or the respective Joint Commissioners of Sales Tax in Mofussil Areas.
Note: The Commissioner of SalesTax,vide Circular dated 23rd April 2008has clarified that in the initial period, it is possible that the dealers may face some difficulties in preparing and uploading the electronic return. Considering the difficulties likely to be faced by these dealers, a concession is provided by allowing the dealer to upload the e-return within 10days from the due date for the filing of respective return. This concession shall be only for the return/ s to be filed for month of May 2008 to that of September 2008. The e-return for these months uploaded within 10 days from their due date will not be treated as late, provided the payment of due tax is made on or before the due date for normal filing of paper returns.
The applicability of new return forms may be tabulated as under:
Separate v. Consolidated Filing of Returns:
The provisions for filing separate returns [Rule 17(2) (c)] have been deleted in the recent amendment to the MVAT Rules. As a result, now dealers can’t file separate returns. Thus dealers who are having more than one place of business or who is having more than one constituents of business is required to file only one consolidated return, as per the applicable periodicity, for all the places of business or constituents of business, subject to the following exceptions:
i) If a dealer is holding an Entitlement Certificate and also carrying on other business activity, then he is required to file more than one return in respect of his other activity,
ii) If a dealer is a PSI unit or a notified oil company and also in the business of execution of works contract, transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose or has opted for composition for part of his business, then in addition to return in Form 234 or 235, he shall also I file a separate return in Form no. 233.
Revised Return :
The revised return can be filed before the expiry of the period of nine months from the end of the year containing the period of such return or before the issuance of notice for assessment for that period, whichever is earlier.
As per the provisions of S. 32(3) of the MVAT Act, read with Rule 17(2)(d) of the MVAT Rules, it is specifically provided that, in case of revised return, the dealer shall first pay tax (in Challan Form No. 210) in Government Treasury and attach a self-attested copy of the paid Challan with the revised return, which shall be filed with the appropriate registering authority.
Prescribed Authority:
As per Rule 17 of the MVAT Rules, the prescribed authority, with whom a dealer is required to file his return/ s are as follows:
i) When tax is payable for any period, the return for that period shall be filed in Government Treasury as defined in Rule 2(f) of the MVAT Rules 2005.
ii) When tax payable is NIL or REFUND, then return shall be furnished to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the principal place of business is situated. (In Mumbai, all such returns are to be filed at specific counters provided for the purpose at Vikrikar Bhavan, Mazgaon.)
iii) In case of non-resident dealer, if tax payable is NIL or REFUND, then the return shall be filed with the registering authority, Non-Resident Registration Circle, Mumbai, if the dealer is registered by such authority.
iv) PSI dealer shall file returns with the registering authority having jurisdiction over respective place of business of the dealer, in respect of which he holds a certificate of Entitlement under any PSI covering all the sales and purchases relating to the eligible industrial unit. However, it is provided that if tho dealer is holding two or more Entitlement Certificates, then he must file the returns with the registering authority, which has jurisdiction over the place of business pertaining to the Entitlement Certificate whose period of entitlement ends later.
It may be noted that S. 20 of the MVAT Act requires every registered dealer to file a correct, complete and self-consistent return and Rule 20 of the MVAT Rules clarifies that return/ s shall be deemed to be complete and self-consistent, only if the returns are filed:
- in prescribed form,
- for the specified period,
- within the prescribed time,
- to the prescribed authority, and
- all the columns of the return form are filled properly.
Defect Memo & Fresh Return :
In case of an incorrect/incomplete or inconsistent return, the Sales Tax authority can issue a defect memo, u/s.22 of the MVAT Act. Such defect memo is prescribed in Form No. 212 and it can be issued within four months from the date of filing of the return. On receiving a defect memo, the dealer is required to file a Fresh Return.
The Registered Dealer, to whom such defect memo is issued, shall file a fresh correct, complete and self-consistent return within one month of the service of such defect memo. If the dealer fails to file the fresh return within one month, then such a dealer may be treated as defaulter in filing of return and it will be presumed that the dealer has not filed the original return at all within the prescribed time and thus he may be liable to face penalty provisions. It may be noted that the defect memo issued in Form No. 212 is not challengeable in appeal.
Penalty for Non-filing or Late Filing of Return/s:
The Government of Maharashtra has recently amended S. 29(8) of MVAT Act, 2002, whereby the penalty for non-filing and late filing of return/ s has been enhanced. As per the amendment, (which shall come into force from a date to be notified), if the return is filed before the initiation of the proceedings for levy of penalty, then the penalty shall be levied at rupees five thousand, instead of rupees one thousand as provided earlier. In other cases, the amount of penalty imposable is increased from rupees two thousand to rupees ten thousand.
[2013] 33 taxmann.com 200 (Mumbai – Trib.) (SB) Assistant Director of Income-tax (IT) -1(2) vs. Clifford Chance A.Ys.: 1998-99 TO 2001-02 & 2003-04, Dated: 13-05-2013
Facts:
The taxpayer was a partnership firm of Solicitors in UK, engaged in providing international legal services operating through its principal office in UK and branch offices in certain other countries. During the years under consideration, it had provided legal consultancy services in connection with different projects in India. While it did not have an office in India, some part of the work relating to the projects in India was performed in India by its partners and employees during their visits to India. Relying on Article 15 of the India-UK DTAA, the taxpayer claimed exemption from tax on the ground that short duration test in Article 15 was satisfied as its presence in India was of less than 90 days . However, according to AO the said test was not satisfied and hence, taxpayer had constituted a PE in India as per Article 5 and as the services had been rendered in India, the entire income in respect of Indian projects was chargeable to tax in India under Article 7.
Having regard to the retrospective amendment to section 9 of the Act, issues before the special bench were as follows.
(i) Whether insertion of Explanation to section 9 by way of retrospective amendment changes the position in law?
(ii) Whether on interpretation of the term “directly or indirectly attributable to Permanent Establishment” in Article 7(1) of the India-UK DTAA, it is correct in law to hold that the consideration attributable to the services rendered in UK is taxable in India?
Held
(i) Position under the Act
a) In an earlier case of the taxpayer, Bombay High Court [(2009) 318 ITR 237] had held that Article 15 and section 9(1)(i) of the Act was applicable for determination of its taxable income in India.
b) In DIT vs. Ericsson [2012] 343 ITR 470, Delhi High Court has held that the retrospective amendment in section 9 impacts only special source rule provision applicable to interest, royalty and FTS as contemplated in clauses (v), (vi) and (vii) of section 9(1).
c) Accordingly, as the tax department has not been able to substantiate applicability of section 9(1)(vii) and the earlier proceedings have proceeded on the basis that income derived by the taxpayer from professional services in respect of projects in India was covered u/s. 9(1)(i) of the Act, taxation is to be restricted to income in India to the extent attributable to the services performed in India. Retrospective amendment to special source rule has no applicability to taxation u/s 9(1)(i) and the earlier ruling in case of taxpayer holds good despite the amendment
(ii) Position under India-UK DTAA
a) In terms of Article 7(1), profits “directly or indirectly” attributable to the PE in India are chargeable to tax in India. Article 7(2) explains what constitutes “directly attributable” profits and Article 7(3) explains what constitutes “indirectly attributable” profits. In terms of the treaty only that proportion of the profits of the contract in which PE actively participates in negotiating, concluding or fulfilling contracts is to be treated as “indirectly” attributable.
b) In terms of Article 7(3) in India-UK DTAA “indirectly attributable” profits are to be apportioned in proportion to the contribution of PE to that of the enterprise as a whole and hence, profits apportioned to the contribution of other parts of the enterprise cannot be brought to tax in India.
c) Provisions of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of UN Model convention are materially different from Article 7(3) of India-UK DTAA, which are unambiguous. Hence, reference to Article 7(1) of UN Model convention in Linklaters LLP vs. ITO [2010] 40 SOT 51 (Mum) was misplaced.
If Tomorrow Never Comes
On our last visit, two young articled students from my office expressed their desire to come with us. I cautioned them that it was not a pleasure trip or a picnic. The visit would be hot and tiring. Yet they insisted and I am glad that they came. To my utter surprise and delight, both these young men, though not Gujarati speaking, were completely at ease with the adivasi children. They played and sang with the children, even carried them, and had great fun with them. They were happy with the kids, and the kids were happy with them. My faith in the younger generation got reaffirmed.
I also learned something valuable. One of my articled students made an interesting comment. He said that he would like to commence serving the poor when he was 40. The elder person asked “What if you do not reach 40?” Our young friend decided there and then, that good work cannot wait for tomorrow. What if tomorrow never comes? He has started contributing 50% of his stipend to assist the deserving and needy poor.
This incident took me several years back in time. I remembered a quotation in Gujarati by Father Vallace who, though Spanish by birth, a Roman Catholic and (then) a mathematics professor at St. Xavier’s College, Ahmedabad had mastered the Gujarati language and was also a renowned Gujarat author. He said:
According to him ‘I will do it tomorrow ‘ is a polite way of saying “I will not do it”.
There are two things that can happen when we plan to do something tomorrow. Either tomorrow gets postponed and never comes, or we ourselves may not be there tomorrow! In either case, the work remains undone.
I was speaking at a Rotary club meeting on “Giving”. A gentleman sitting in the very front row expressed his desire to donate Rs. 1 crore. I was elated. Two days later, I was shocked to see his photograph in the obituary column. His “tomorrow” never came! I learned my lesson. The Message is: ’Do not procrastinate’. Tomorrow, like income tax, refund may never come. “tomorrow” never came! I learnt my lesson.
Friends, the worst regret we have in life is not for the wrong things we did, but for the right things we did not do.
The message I am attempting to convey by saying ‘tomorrow never comes’ is not only about ‘giving’ but also about a hundred and one things , which we go on postponing. For example, it may be reading a book, phoning a friend, calling on a sick relative, visiting our aged parents, learning something new, taking a vacation, playing with our children, or sitting by the sea shore watching the waves, admiring a sunrise, gazing at the stars and even, sometimes doing nothing. Let us live like a samurai as if each day is our last one. I conclude by quoting from a Hemant Kumar song:
So friends, let us learn to live today; for tomorrow may never come.
“Life is not about waiting for the storm to pass.
Taxability of Payments for Online Advertisement Charges
E-Commerce has changed the dynamics of doing business. Online advertising is gaining ground against the traditional print media advertising. Fixation of tax liability was easier in case of print media as compared to the online advertising, with virtual presence of the advertising companies on the internet. It is not easy to determine the place of accrual of income in the e-commerce scenario. Trade on the internet, many a time, is fully automated i.e. software driven, for e.g. advertisements are posted, monitored, displayed without human intervention. Even sale of goods, its delivery (e.g. downloading of software, book or a song) and receipt of payment are fully automated. Determination of income becomes complex with location of server, website, advertiser, search engine, internet service provider, buyer, seller and/or advertising company being located in different tax jurisdictions.
Basic Understanding of Online Transactions
Taxability of income would depend upon the place of accrual or source of income. In order to understand the concept of accrual or source of income, let us dissect various parts of a business transaction. Any transaction of services or sale can be dissected as follows:
i) Marketing
ii) Order Placement
iii) Execution of Service/Manufacturing
iv) Delivery
v) Payment
Whether location of all the above aspects of business has any bearing on the source or accrual of income?
Let us understand this with the help of an illustration :
ABC Ltd. of India avails services of XYZ Inc. of USA for a Study Report in Transfer Pricing
Again, the taxability of income in India, in the hands of the service provider (SP), would depend upon the characterisation of such income i.e. whether it is in the nature of business income or royalty or fees for technical services (FTS).
Indian Revenue Authorities hold the view that as long as the service recipient is in India the source of income for the service provider is in India regardless of the place or mode of rendering service or location of the service provider. This view was incorporated by way of amendment to section 9(1) of the Income tax Act, 1961 (the “Act”) to provide that for determining the place of accrual or arising of the income by way of royalty or FTS, the existence or otherwise of the place of business, residence or business connection of a non-resident is of no consequence whatever. Further, it provided that for the purpose of taxability of royalty and FTS, it is not necessary for the non-resident to render services in India.
However, Business Income stands on a different footing. Even though the source of income is in India, Section 9(1) of the Act, plus and the provisions of tax treaties provide that income of a service provider is taxed in the “Source State” only if the source link is powerful enough to establish “Business Connection” (BC): under the Act or “Per-manent Establishment” (PE) under a Tax Treaty.
The above discussion is based on the premise that income in the hands of service provider is neither received nor deemed to have been received in India and therefore, section 5(2)(a) of the Act has no applicability.
Even section 5(2)(b) fastens the tax liability in the hands of the SP if the income accrues or arises in India or deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9 of the Act (as discussed above).
The term “income accruing or arising in India” as provided u/s 5(2)(b) of the Act is not defined in the Act. However, the Supreme Court, in the case of Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd. (2007-TII-02-SC-INTL) inter alia observed as follows:
“……as far as the income accruing or arising in India, an income which accrues or arises to a foreign enterprise in India can be only such portion of income accruing or arising to such a foreign enterprise as is attributable to its business carried out in India. This business could be carried out through its branch(es) or through some other form of its presence in India such as office, project site, factory, sales outlet etc. (hereinafter called as “PE of foreign enterprise”) ……..”
Interestingly, the term PE is restrictively defined in the Act and that is in the context of transfer pric-ing and section 44DA of the Act (special provisions for taxation of royalty and FTS which are effectively connected with PE), otherwise it has its origin in the tax treaties. Definition of a PE u/s 92F (iiia) of the Act is an inclusive one, according to which, PE includes a fixed place of business through which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. Basically, it refers to “fixed place PE” and not to other variants of PE such as “Project PE”, “Dependent Agent PE”, “Service PE” etc. as defined in a treaty . However, the Supreme Court’s observation as mentioned above [which is regarded as “judge made law” and followed in the case of ITO vs. Right Florists Pvt. Ltd. 2013-TII-61-ITAT-KOL-INTL] explains PE on the lines of a treaty definition.
One thing is clear from the provisions of section 9 and interpretation of section 5(2)(b) of the Act by the Apex Court – that in either case of a PE or BC, only so much of income would be taxed in India as is attributable to such a PE or BC in India.
Thus, taxability in India of online services can be summarised as follow:
Characterisation of income in the hands of a service provider – Royalty/FTS vs. Business Income
There are various kinds of online transactions. However, for the sake of simplicity and understanding the principles involved, let us restrict our discussion to the most frequent transaction of “online advertisement” through popular search engines, say, “Yahoo” and “Google”. However, the concepts discussed herein would be applicable to other forms of online business transactions as well.
Payment for online advertisement – Is it Royalty in the hands of the Service Provider?
Royalty and FTS are Business Income essentially. The distinction is carved out only for the purposes of taxation in the hands of the non-residents. If the income is characterised as royalty or FTS, it is taxed on gross basis unless such income is effectively connected with a PE situated in India.
Where such income is not characterised as Royalty/ FTS, it is treated as business income and is taxed in the source state (say, India) only if the foreign enterprise has a PE/BC in India. Such taxability of the business income in the source state is always on net basis i.e. net profits computed as per domestic tax laws of the source state.
Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act deals with royalty income whereas section 9(1)(vii) thereof deals with FTS. In fact, every payment must be examined from the point of view of royalty/FTS under an applicable tax treaty and also under the provisions of the domestic tax laws of the source state (India) such that the taxpayer can opt for the most beneficial provisions out of these.
Let us first examine whether payment for online advertisement can be termed as royalty income in the hands of the service provider?
The definition of royalty under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act is quite exhaustive and inter alia includes payment for computer software and the use or right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Thus, the question arises for consideration is whether payment for online advertisement/ services can be construed as payment for the use or right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment or for computer software?
The payment for online advertisement/services is certainly not for buying or using computer software. Though computer software is used for delivering the services of hosting advertisement or for online selling of services/product, the payment is for ser-vices and not for the underlying computer software. Similarly, one must ask a question as to whether one is paying for the “use” of equipment or for the “services” which are provided by the “service provider” by using equipment in its possession. For example, payment for online advertisement may involve renting an earmarked space by the service provider on the website and server owned by it (i.e. equipment at its disposal and control), but one is paying for the display and advertisement and not for rent of server. The same may well be the case in respect of print media, e.g. when one advertises in a newspaper, one pays for the services of a published advertisement and not for the equipment used by the newspaper for its production.
As far as use of equipment is concerned, the issue was aptly dealt with by the Mumbai Tribunal in the recent decision of Pinstorm Technologies [54 SOT 78] / TS-536-ITAT-2012(Mum). In this case, an Indian company, which is engaged in the business of digital advertising and internet marketing, utilised the internet search engines such as Google, Yahoo etc. to buy banner advertising space on the inter-net on behalf of its clients. The Assessing Officer held that the payment was in the nature of FTS whereas the CIT(A) held that it was in the nature of royalty as Google or Yahoo etc. would allot the space to the appellant company and its clients in their server and that whenever any internet user search for certain web sites, the appellant’s or its client’s name would appear and its contents be displayed on the computer screen.
However, the ITAT observed that the search engine renders this service outside India through internet. Google does such online advertising business in Asia from its office in Ireland. The search engine service is on a worldwide basis and thus is not relatable to any specific country. The entire transaction takes place through the internet and even the invoice is raised and payment is made through internet. The ITAT relying on the decision in case of Yahoo India [140 TTJ 195] / TS-290-ITAT-2011(Mum), held that the amount paid by the assessee to Google Ireland Ltd. for the services rendered for uploading and display of banner advertisement on its portal was in the nature of business profit on which no tax was deductible at source, as the same was not chargeable to tax in India in the absence of any PE of Google Ireland Ltd. in India.
In the case of Yahoo India (supra) the assessee made payment to Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd. [Yahoo Hong Kong] for services rendered for uploading and display of the banner advertisement of the Department of Tourism of India on its portal. The banner advertisement hosting services did not involve use or right to use by the assessee (i.e. Yahoo India) of any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment and no such use was actually granted by Yahoo Hong Kong to the Yahoo India. Uploading and display of banner advertisement on its portal was entirely the responsibility of Yahoo Hong Kong and the Yahoo India was only required to provide the banner advertisement to Yahoo Hong Kong for uploading the same on its portal. Yahoo India thus had no right to access the portal of Yahoo Hong Kong Having regard to all these facts of the case and keeping in view the decision of the Authority of Advance Rulings in the case of ISRO Satellite Centre 307 ITR 59 and Dell International Services (India) P. Ltd. 305 ITR 37, it was held that the payment made by the assessee to Yahoo Hong Kong Ltd. for the services rendered for uploading and display of the banner advertisement of the Department of Tourism of India on its portal was not in the nature of royalty was business profit and in the absence of any PE of Yahoo Hong Kong in India, it was not chargeable to tax in India.
In the case of Dell International Services (India) P. Ltd., it was held by the AAR that the word “use” in relation to equipment occurring in clause (iva) of Explanation to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act is not to be understood in the broad sense of availing of the benefit of an equipment. The context and collocation of the two expressions “use” and “right to use” followed by the word “equipment” indicated that there must be some positive act of utilisation, application or employment of equipment for the desired purpose.
If an advantage was taken from sophisticated equipment installed and provided by another, it could not be said that the recipient/customer “used” the equipment as such. The customer merely made use of the facility, though he did not himself use the equipment. What was contemplated by the word “use” in clause (iva) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act was that the customer came face to face with the equipment, operated it or controlled its functions in some manner. But if it did nothing to or with the equipment and did not exercise any possessory rights in relation thereto, it only made use of the facility created by the service provider who was the owner of the entire network and related equipment. There was no scope to invoke clause (iva) in such a case because the element of service predominated. The predominant features and underlying object of the agreement unerringly emphasised the concept of service. That even where an earmarked circuit was provided for offering the facility, unless there was material to establish that the circuit/equipment could be accessed and put to use by the customer by means of positive acts, it did not fall within the category of “royalty” in clause (iva) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.
Characterisation under a Treaty Scenario
The definition of royalty is narrower in scope in a tax treaty than under the Act (e.g. Computer Software is not explicitly covered under a tax treaty), therefore the above discussion would hold good even under a treaty scenario and the payment in question would not be regarded as royalty in the hands of the Service Provider.
Payment for online advertisement – Is it FTS in the hands of the Service Provider?
Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act defines FTS to mean “any consideration (including any lump sum consideration) for the rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services (including the provision of services of technical or other personnel) but does not include consideration for any construction, assembly, mining or like project undertaken by the recipient or consideration which would be income of the recipient chargeable under the head “Salaries”.
There is no doubt that providing a sponsored search facility, as also placing a banner advertisement on another person’s website would amount rendering of services to the advertiser. There is also no doubt that these services are technical in nature. However, the question here is whether these online advertising services could be covered by the connotation of ‘technical services’ as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act?
The Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) observed that “it is significant that the expression ‘technical’ appears along with expression ‘managerial’ and ‘consultancy’ and all the three words refer to various types of services, consid-eration for which is included in the scope of FTS. The lowest common factor in ‘managerial, technical and consultancy services’ seems to be the “human intervention”. A managerial or consultancy service can only be rendered with human interface, while technical service can be rendered with or without human interface. The Tribunal further observed that as long as there is no human intervention in a technical service, it cannot be treated as a technical service under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. The Tribunal, in reaching this conclusion relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court, in the case of “CIT vs. Bharati Cellular Limited (319 ITR 139) [2008-TIOL-557-HC-DEL-IT) wherein it was held that “the word technical is preceded by the word managerial and succeeded by the word consultancy. Since the expression technical services is in doubt and is unclear, the rule of noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable”. [The Rule noscitur a sociis states that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are to be understood in their cognate sense. They take their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general].
Applying the above principle, the Kolkata Tribunal held that there is no human touch involved in the whole process of actual advertising service provided by Google and therefore receipts for online advertisements by the Google cannot be treated as FTS under the Act.
Characterisation under a Treaty Scenario
Google is a tax resident of Ireland. Definition of the FTS under Article 12(2)(b) of the India-Ireland tax treaty is materially similar to the definition under the Income tax Act and therefore the legal position discussed hereinabove would be equally applicable in the case of India Ireland tax treaty. In some treaties, the scope of FTS is further reduced by provision of the concept called ‘make available’ (e.g. India’s tax treaties with USA, UK, Singapore etc.). Payment to Yahoo USA would be governed by the India-US tax treaty which provides for “make available” concept in the Article on Fees for Included Services. The term “make available” was examined by, inter alia, by the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Raymond Ltd. vs. DCIT (86 ITD 793) [2003-TII-05-ITAT-MUM-INTL] wherein it observed that “Thus, the normal, plain and grammatical meaning of the language employed, in our understanding, is that a mere rendering of services is not roped in unless the person utilising the services is able to make use of technical knowledge, etc. by himself in his business and or for his own benefit and without recourse to the performer of services.” The Tribunal also held that rendering of technical services cannot be equated with “making available” the technical services.
Thus, it can be concluded that receipt for online advertisement is neither royalty nor FTS in the hands of the service provider. Therefore, it would be considered as business income.
Business Income vis-a-vis BC and PE
As stated earlier, business income of the owners of the search engines like Yahoo or Google is taxable in India provided it has a BC or a PE in India. The concept of BC was very well explained in the CBDT Circular 23 dated 23rd July 1969. It clarified that the expression ‘Business Connection’ admits of no precise definition. ‘The question whether a non-resident has a business connection in India from or through which income, profits or gains can be said to accrue or arise to him within the meaning of Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has to be determined on the facts of each case.’ Then the circular went on to illustrate what would constitute BC and what would not. However, the said circular was withdrawn in 2009.
The Supreme Court had an occasion to define BC in the case of CIT vs. R. D. Agarwal and Co. (1965) 56 ITR 20; wherein it held that “Business Connection” means something more than business. It presupposes an element of continuity between the business of the Non-Resident and his activity in the taxable territory, rather than a stray or an isolated transaction”.
The concept of PE was formulated in the twentieth Century prior to the advent of computers. Therefore, the rules for determination of source links through PE do not hold good in today’s virtual world of e-commerce. The need for physical presence in case of e-commerce transactions in the source State (the chief determining criterion for existence of a PE) is totally obviated. Search engines like Google or Yahoo operate through their respective websites which in turn are hosted on a server. So the question arises as to what constitutes a PE, a Website or a Server?
“Website” – Is it a PE?
The OECD commentary on its Model Convention states that “website per se, which is a combination of software and electronic data, does not in itself constitute a tangible property. It, therefore, does not have a location that can constitute “place of business” as there is no “facility such as premises or, in certain instances, machinery or equipment” as far as software and data constituting that website is concerned”.
Therefore website per se cannot constitute a PE. Thus, the traditional tests for determination of PE fail in a virtual world of E-commerce. In order to study the tax impact of e-commerce, CBDT had appointed a High Powered Committee (HPC) in the year 1999. The HPC also observed that applying the existing principles and rules to e-commerce does not ensure certainty of tax burden and maintenance of the equilibrium in the sharing of tax revenues between countries of residence and source. “The Committee, therefore, supports the view that the concept of PE should be abandoned and a serious attempt should be made within OECD or the UN to find an alternative to the concept of PE”.
Interestingly, India has expressed its reservations on the OECD Model Commentary and has taken a stand that website may constitute a PE in certain circumstances. India expressed a view that depend-ing on the facts, an enterprise can be considered to have acquired a place of business by virtue of hosting its website on a particular server at a particular location.
However, the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) held that the reservations of the Indian Government do not specify the circumstances in which, according to tax administration, a website could constitute a PE. Therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the reservations so expressed by India as of now, cannot have any practical impact on a website being treated as a PE.
The Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) concluded that “a website per se, which is the only form of Google’s presence in India – so far as test of primary meaning i.e. basic rule PE is concerned, cannot be a permanent establishment under the domestic law. We are in considered agreement with the views of the HPC on this issue.”
“Server” Is it a PE?
The server on which the website is hosted and through which it is accessed is a piece of equipment having a physical location and such location may constitute a “fixed place of business” of the enterprise that operates that server. However, if the enterprise uses the services of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for hosting website, then the location of such server may not constitute PE for such enterprise, if the ISP is an independent contractor and acting in its ordinary course of business. In such an event even if the enterprise is able to dictate that its website may be hosted on a particular server at a particular location, it will not be in possession or control of that server and therefore, such server will not result into PE. However, if the enterprise carrying on business through a website has the server at its own disposal, e.g., it owns (or leases) and operates the server on which the website is stored and used, the place where that server is located could constitute a PE of the enterprise if the other requirements of the PE Article are met, e.g. location of server at a certain place for a sufficient period of time so as to fulfill the fixed place criterion as envisaged in paragraph 1 of Article 5 of a tax treaty.
Even when server is found to be “fixed”, and results in a PE, it may not result in any tax taxability for the enterprise, if the activities of that enterprise are not carried on through that server or activities so carried on are restricted to the preparatory or auxiliary nature such as (i) provid-ing a communication link, (ii) advertising of goods and services, (iii) relaying information through a mirror server for security and efficiency purposes,
(iv) gathering marketing data and/or (v) supplying information etc.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that search engines, which have their presence through their respective websites cannot constitute PE in India, unless their servers are located in India.
Based on the above discussions, the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) held that “the receipts in respect of online advertising on Google and Yahoo cannot be brought to tax in India under the provisions of the Income tax Act as also under the provisions of India-US and India-Ireland tax treaty”.
Withholding tax obligation
A question often arises as to whether the payer needs to deduct tax at source if the income arising from such payment is not taxable in the hands of the recipient. The question became more serious with the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 209 wherein it was held that the resident payer is obliged to deduct tax at source in respect of any type of payment to a non resident, be it on account of buying/purchasing/acquiring a pack-aged software product and as such, a commercial transaction or even in the nature of a royalty payment. Also the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Transmission Corporation of A. P. Ltd. vs. CIT (infra) was interpreted in a manner that payer has to deduct tax at source whether the income is chargeable to tax in India or not.
However, the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. held that “when recipient of an income does not have the primary tax liability in respect of an income, the payer cannot have vicarious tax withholding liability either.”
All controversies arising out of interpretation of section 195 regarding non-deduction of tax at source, where the income is not taxable in the hands of the recipient, were laid to rest with the decision of the Supreme Court in case of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 327 ITR 456 wherein the Apex Court following Vijay Ship Breaking Corporation vs. CIT [2009] 314 ITR 309 (SC) held that “The payer is bound to deduct tax at source only if the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable, there is no question of tax at source being deducted.”
The decision of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. (supra) assumes special significance as it explained the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Transmission Corporation of A. P. Ltd. vs. CIT [1999] 239 ITR 587 (SC) in the proper perspective. The said decision is often invoked by the Income-tax Department to fasten TDS obligation on the payer on a gross basis even when the income is not chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient thereof. The Apex Court stated that in case of decision of the Transmission Corporation (supra), the issue was of deciding on what amount of tax is to be deducted at source, as the payment was in respect of a composite contract. The said composite contract not only comprised supply of plant, machinery and equipment in India, but also comprised the installation and commissioning of the same in India.
With the above mentioned correct interpretation of the decision in case of Transmission Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Karnataka High Court in case of CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (supra).
Thus, the payer is not obliged to deduct tax at source if the recipient is not chargeable to tax on such income. Secondly, no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(i) on account of non-deduction of tax at source by the payer where the income per se is not taxable in India.
Summation:
Determination of tax liability in an e- commerce scenario is a difficult task as the age old methods of determination of PE/BC do not hold good in the modern ways of doing business. Though existence of a BC or PE has to be case specific, broadly we can conclude that website per se does not constitute either a PE or a BC and the location of server is a determinative criterion for PE. This conclusion is only in relation to fixed place PE, whereas PE/BC may exist in the form of Dependent Agent or otherwise.
As far the withholding tax liability of the payer is concerned, one needs to look at the entire transaction from the recipient’s perspective. As long as the income from such online payment is not taxable in the hands of the non-resident service provider, the payer is not obliged to deduct tax at source. For determining the taxability in the hands of the SP, the characterisation of income is of utmost importance as income in the nature of royalty and FTS can be taxed without any PE or BC in India whereas, business income per se, is not taxable in India unless the SP has a BC/ PE in India.
Even though the taxability and characterisation of income is explained in this article by taking an example of online advertisement through search engines like Google and Yahoo, the underlying principles could help in determination of the taxability of other online transactions such as subscription of online data bases, purchase of videos, books etc.
We do hope that on the lines of recommendations of the HPC, OECD and UN may come out with alternative methods for taxing e-commerce transactions. However, we are fortunate that in absence of clarity, we have Supreme Court decisions – judge made laws, to guide us.
Amnesty Scheme notified Notification No. 10/2013 –ST Dated 13-05-2013 & Circular no. 169/4/2013 – ST dated 13-05-2013
Gist of the Rules is as under:-
(1) Every person who wishes to make a declaration under the Scheme shall take the registration, if not already registered;
(2) The declaration shall be made in respect of Tax Dues under the Scheme in Form VCES-1;
(3) Designated Authority shall issue an acknowledgment in Form VCES-2 within a period of seven working days;
(4) The tax dues shall be paid to the credit of Central Government. However, CENVAT Credit cannot be utilised for payment of service tax under this Scheme;
(5) Designated Authority shall issue an acknowledgment of discharge in Form VCES-3, within a period of seven days from the date of furnishing of details of payment of tax dues in full along with interest, if any.
(6) Beside interest and penalty, immunity would also be available from any other proceeding under the Finance Act, 1994 and Rules made thereunder.
(7) Tax dues in respect of which any show cause notice or order of determination u/s. 72, section 73 or section 73A has been issued or which pertains to the same issue for the subsequent period are excluded from the ambit of this Scheme.
VAT UPDATE
Furnishing Cloth exempted in the course of intere state sale :
CST Notification No. CST /1413/CR 48/Taxation -1 . Dated 30.03.2013
By this notification, sale of furnishing cloth notified under Schedule Entry C-101 of MVAT Act, 2002 , made exempt in the course of interstate sale from CST with effect from 01-04-2013.
Abatement rate in Construction Activity Services amended :
By this Notification the existing Notification No. 26/2012 ST dated 20-06-2012 has been amended to remove the ambiguity prevailing on the rate of abatement of service tax on construction of residential units, to provide the rate of abatement in the case of construction of a complex, building, civil structure or a part thereof in the following manner:
(a) Service tax has to be paid on 25% value of a residential unit if the following two conditions are fulfilled cumulatively : (i) the carpet area of the unit is less than 2,000 sq. ft.; and (ii) the amount charged for the unit is less than Rs. 1 crore;
(b) In other cases, service tax will be paid on 30% of the value of a complex, building, or civil structure.
It is also reconfirmed that the above abatement would be available only if the (1) CENVAT credit on inputs used for providing the service has not been availed & (2) the value of land is included in the amount charged to the Service recipient.
Due date for Return ST-3 for the period October 2012 to March 2013 extended :
The above referred date has been extended from 25th April, 2013 to 31st August, 2013.
Exemption to Exporters against Focus Product Scheme Scrips, Focus Market Scheme, Vishesh Krishi & Gram Udyog Yojana :
To promote exports from India, the Government of India had announced certain schemes like Focus Market Scheme, Focus Product Scheme and Vishesh Krishi and Gram Udyog Yojana under the Foreign Trade Policy. Under these schemes, export incentives are allowed to eligible exporters in the form of duty credit scrip at prescribed percentage of the value of goods and services exported.
Vide these notifications, exemption has been provided to services provided or agreed to be provided against duty credit scrip by a person located in taxable territory to a scrip holder subject to certain conditions specified therein.
These duty credit scrips were earlier used only for procuring duty free goods from overseas or domestic market subject to available duty credit. However, now these duty credit scrips can be used for payment of service tax on procurement of services within the legal framework of the aforesaid service tax exemption notifications. Further, a holder of the scrip shall be entitled to avail of drawback or CENVAT credit of the service tax debited in the scrips as per the rules specified in the aforesaid notifications.
Westwell Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Tripura and Others, [2011] 44 VST 114 (Gau)
Introducer Who Signed on Application For Registration – Later Withdrawing – Duty of Department – To Inform Dealer – Failure to Inform – Refusal of Registration- Not Improper—S/s. 2(18), 18(1), 19(3) of The Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 – R. 11(VII) of The Tripura Value Added Tax Rules, 2005.
Facts
The dealer company applied for registration under The Tripura Value Added Tax Act and CST Act. The Superintendent of Taxes rejected the applications for registration on the ground that the company failed to produce requisite Pollution Clearance Certificate, registered deed of lease and certificate of incorporation of change in address of the company and that the introducer of the dealer, in it’s application in form 1, had withdrawn on 31st December, 2010. The dealer company filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court against the said order refusing to grant registration under the VAT and CST Act.
Held
The basic object behind the enactment of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is to levy and collect tax. Registration of dealers enables the State authorities to keep track of assessable transactions and also of persons who indulge in such assessable transactions so that levy and collection of tax can be effectively ensured. If a dealer is not registered, it may be difficult for the State to know about, and/or keep track of, each of the assessable transactions, which the dealer may have entered into, and the value of the taxable goods, which the dealer sells. A dealer is not required to be compulsorily registered unless he becomes liable to pay tax.
A careful reading of section 19(3) of the 2004 Act shows that the enquiry which may be conducted by the authorities concerned, is such as is required to satisfy the authorities concerned that the application for registration is in order, meaning thereby that by such an enquiry, the authority concerned has to ascertain as to whether the particulars required to be furnished in an application for registration have or have not been furnished by the applicant. The enquiry cannot, however, be in the nature of a judicial enquiry. The enquiry, thus, must be confined to the ascertainment of the fact as to whether the information given, and/or particulars furnished, by a dealer, seeking registration are correct or not. The satisfaction, to be arrived at by the authorities concerned, has to be relevant to the objects sought to be achieved by means of such registration.
The satisfaction to be reached by the authority concerned has to be, therefore, based on such materials, which are required under the relevant Acts and the Rules framed thereunder, and only those materials can be regarded as relevant, which have nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by way of registration of dealer. Material which has no nexus whatsoever with the objects sought to be achieved by way of registration would be irrelevant and the dealer applying for registration cannot be refused registration on the ground of failure on the part of the dealer, to furnish such irrelevant information/particulars. If the authority seeks to obtain any information which is not relevant within the ambit of the 2004 Act read with the 2005 Rules, and/or the 1956 Act, read with the 1957 Rules, the refusal to grant registration to the petitioner, as a dealer, would not be sustainable in law.
The failure to produce the pollution clearance certificate was a totally irrelevant consideration and ought not to have been taken into account by the Superintendent of Taxes for the purpose of reaching his satisfaction as contemplated by section 19(3). Rejection of the petitioner’s application for registration, on such a ground, was not sustainable.
The sales tax authorities had nothing to do with whether a lease deed was or was not registered, when the place of the business of the petitioner had been disclosed and the petitioner, being a company, had its principal place of business at its registered office. The Superintendent of Taxes could not have rejected the application seeking registration for the purpose of trading in coal in as much as the petitioner had submitted a registered lease deed of its stockyard enabling it to trade in coal.
The rejection of the petitioner’s applications seeking certificate of registration under the 2004 Act and the 1956 Act, on the ground of failure to furnish the certificate of incorporation of change of address of the petitioner-company was bad in law in as much as there was, admittedly, only one Registrar of Companies at Shillong for the North Eastern States, therefore section 17A of the Companies Act, 1956, had no application.
Form A of the Rules of 1957 relating to the grant of registration under the 1956 Act does not require any introducer for obtaining registration as a dealer and, hence, the application seeking registration under the 1956 Act, could not have been rejected on the ground that its introducer had withdrawn.
As far as the VAT Rules were concerned, form 1 thereof requires signature of a registered dealer or a responsible person as an introducer. This requirement was complied with by the petitionercompany on 27th November, 2010, at the time of submission of the application seeking registration. The application having been acted upon by the authorities, the need of the introducer’s signature became irrelevant. This apart, even if the signature of the introducer ought to have remained present all through it was the bounden duty of the authorities to inform the petitioner-company about the withdrawal of the signature by the introducer so that the petitioner could remove the defect.
In any case, the certificate of incorporation ought to have been treated as a conclusive evidence of all the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956, having been complied with by the petitionercompany. The requirement, therefore, of an introducer, in the case of an incorporated body does not arise at all. The requirement of a registered dealer or a responsible person introducing a person for being registered under the 2004 Act is a requirement meant for persons other than an incorporated body.
It would, thus, be transparent that the Superintendent of Taxes had taken into account an extraneous and irrelevant factor into consideration for rejecting the petitioner’s application for registration. The action disclosed malice in law. This was a fit case for a direction for payment of reasonable costs to the petitioner. Accordingly the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the company with cost of Rs. 10,000. The Department was directed to grant registration certificate in accordance with law without any further delay.
S.S. Photographic Lab Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Assam and others [2011] 44 VST 39 (Gauhati)
for Processing Exposed Photographic Film Rolls and Negatives – Not Works
Contract
Goods – Exposed Photographic Film Rolls and Negatives –
No Marketable Value – Not Goods – S/s. 2(15), (33), (38)(Iv), 8(1)(E) ;
Sch. VI, Entry 24 of The Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993— Art.
366(12), (29A) of the Constitution of India.
Facts
The
dealer carried on the business of developing exposed photographic film
rolls into negatives and then processing the negatives into positive
photographs. They also processed negatives received from customers into
positive photographs. The developing and processing was done on a
job-work basis. Demands for sales tax under the Assam General Sales Tax
Act, 1993 were raised against the appellants and were affirmed in
appeals. The appellants filed writ petitions which were dismissed by the
single judge. The dealer filed appeal before the division bench of the
High Court against the judgment of the single judge.
Held
The
question that required to be answered was whether the transactions
entered into by the appellants are works contracts (that is composite
contracts having both a service element and a sale element) with deemed
sales or mutant sales of goods for the purposes of liability to sales
tax.
If there is an agreement both for transfer of property in
goods and for processing or otherwise treating or adapting any goods,
then the agreement is a works contract involving a sale, otherwise not.
Therefore, three ingredients are necessary:
(i) the existence of goods,
(ii) the transfer of property in those goods,
(iii) the processing or treating or adapting of those goods.
To
qualify as “goods” as defined in section 2(15) of the Act an item must
have some utility and must be marketable. Exposed photographic film
rolls and negatives are not goods per se they have absolutely no utility
for anyone—not even for the owner. It is only when they are developed
or processed that they have some personal value for the owner of the
photographs.
Therefore, if exposed photographic film rolls and
negatives are not “goods” they cannot be the subject-matter of a works
contract which concerns itself with the processing or otherwise treating
or adapting any goods as defined in section 2(38)(iv) of the Act.
Alternatively, if the transactions entered into between the appellants
and their customers are not works contracts, would the utilisation of
chemicals in developing exposed photographic film rolls into negatives
and then processing the negatives into positive photographs be a “sale”
of such chemicals?
To be a sale, there must be a transfer of
property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract.
Assuming that the chemicals used in developing exposed photographic film
rolls into negatives and then processing the negatives into positive
photographs are “goods”, these chemicals are not used in the execution
of a works contract. Therefore, there was no “sale” of chemicals within
the meaning of section 2(33) of the Act.
Since exposed
photographic film rolls and negatives are not “goods” the provisions of
sections 7, 8 of the Act and Schedule VI thereto do not come into play
at all. When a customer goes to the appellants to have his exposed
photographic film rolls developed or negatives processed, there may be
an agreement for the transfer of property in the chemicals used in the
processing or otherwise treating or adapting the exposed photographic
film rolls and negatives. But since they are not “goods” within the
meaning of the Act, the question of taxing the “sale” of the chemicals
does not at all arise. The conversion of exposed photographic film rolls
into negatives and then into positive photographs or the conversion of
negatives into positive photographs is nothing but a rendering of
service specific to a customer and was a matter of skill and expertise
of the developer – it was not a works contract.
The High Court
further held that the case of the appellants is fully covered in their
favour by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Ltd. [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeals and the judgment and order
of the learned single judge was set aside.
2013 – TIOL – 675 – CESTAT – AHM – M/s Ultratech Cement Ltd. vs. CCE, Bhavnagar.
Facts:
The Appellant filed refund claim under Notification No.17/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009 for January-March, 2010 wherein refund of service tax was granted for specified input services used for exports on submission of documentary evidence as specified. Appellant’s refund claim was partially rejected on the ground that the input services under the head of technical testing & analysis service or custom house agent’s service were not in relation to export of goods. Appellant contended that the service provider had discharged the service tax under the above categories and thus entitled to refund. The Appellant also relied on the cases of (i) 2012-TIOL-1305-CESTAT–Ahm, Akansha Overseas, Rachana Art Prints Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Surat and (ii) 2012-TIOL-1264-CESTAT-MUM, Jollyboard Ltd. vs. CCE, Aurangabad.
Held:
It is a settled law that classification of service is to be done at the service provider’s end and not in the hands of the recipient. Thus, the classification as provided on the invoices of the service provider should be accepted and refund be granted in view of the decisions of Akansha Overseas and Jollyboard Ltd. (supra).
2013-TIOL-580-CESTAT-DEL – M/s Jubilant Life Science Ltd. vs. CCE, Noida
Facts:
Appellant appointed J. P. Morgan Securities Ltd., UK as the lead manager for issuance of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCB) and also the underwriter of the issue. The services were provided by a person outside India to a person in India and hence the provisions of reverse charge mechanism were attracted. Audit was conducted agreeing that lead manager’s services were covered under “Banking & Financial Services” and underwriting services were covered under “Underwriting Services” and thus service tax was payable on “Banking & Financial Services” under reverse charge mechanism and it was paid by the Appellant. Later, on investigation conducted by the Director General of Anti-Evasion, New Delhi it was contended by the department that both the services were provided as bundled services and thus, service tax was applicable on the entire amount under reverse charge mechanism under the category of “banking & financial services”. Further, the respondent also filed an appeal in the matter of levying service tax under reverse charge on services received from outside India prior to 18-04-2006.
Held:
Dispute arises since under reverse charge mechanism, “banking & financial services” is liable to tax in respect of the location of the recipient (in the present case India) and “underwriting services” is liable to tax if performed in India (in the present case outside India) and it is the question of classification. It was held that underwriting services cannot be classified as banking & financial services as (a) underwriting services are incidental to lead manager’s services as both are totally different in nature and the remuneration is also separately fixed for both the services, (b) underwriting services are not to be provided only by the merchant bankers and thus to be considered as composite service, (c) dominant nature of the service is not the lead manager’s service and (d) underwriter’s service was covered since 1998 before the introduction of banking & financial services and hence as per section 65A(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 it will be considered as underwriter’s services only. Since underwriter’s service is subjected to tax u/s. 66A of the Act and considering that it is performed outside India, in terms of Rule 3 of the Import Rules, service tax cannot be levied.
Even on the ground of limitation, Appellant’s case is strong as the department was aware of the issue during the audit and initially the department had agreed upon the contention of the Appellant and the tax paid under the head lead manager’s service was reflected in the ST3 returns also.
Further, the services relating to FCCB were provided prior to 18-04-2006. The department’s appeal for levy of tax on services prior to 18-04-2006 would not survive in view of the ratio laid down in 2008-TIOL-633-HC-Mum-ST Indian National Shipowners Association vs. UOI which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
2013-TIOL-575-CESTAT-Mum – Central Railway vs. CCE & C, Nagpur.
Facts:
The appellant, Central Railways is engaged in providing taxable services of renting of immovable property services, sale of space or time for advertisement services and mandap keepers services. The Appellant contended that it was not liable to pay service tax as ‘person’ was not defined in the Finance Act, 1994 and the fact that it was introduced vide amendment in the Finance Act, 2012 in sub-clause (37) of section 65B of the Act had prospective effect only and meant that the Appellant was not liable for period earlier to 1st July 2012.
Held:
The Hon’ble CESTAT relied on the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sea Customs Act AIR 1963 SC 1760 and held that Government is liable to pay indirect taxes for taxable activities undertaken by the Government and even though the decision was in relation to excise and customs duty it will equally apply to service tax. The Hon’ble CESTAT further held that as per section 38 of the Finance Act, 1994, all the rules made there under are also placed before the Parliament, and as the Rule 2(d) being part of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 has been approved by the Parliament the ‘person’ as specified therein will include Government also. Further, in regard to the invocation of extended period of time it held that evasion of tax or suppression can not be presumed.
2013-TIOL-566-CESTAT-MUM M/s Vodafone Essar Cellular Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune – III
Facts:
The appellants provided telecom services and entered into agreements with international telecom operators to provide services to the inbound roamers in India. The appellant contended that the service recipients are the international telecom operators and not their subscribers. Further, as the international telecom operators were located outside India and they had received the consideration in convertible foreign exchange, the appellant’s services constituted export of services as the conditions under Rule 3(1)(iii) and Rule 3(2) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 were satisfied. The Appellants relied on the following:
(i) Case of 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT-Del, Paul Merchants Ltd vs. CCE, Chandigarh, wherein it was held that the recipient of service was Western Union and not the persons receiving the money facts of the said case being similar to that of the appellant.
(ii) Circular no.111/5/2009-ST dated 24-02-2009 for the clarification of the expression service provided from India and used outside India and contended that it provided services outside India as the service recipient was located outside India and the benefit of the services provided accrued outside India.
(iii) UK VAT Circular VATPOSS15100, wherein it is stated that place of supply of telecommunication services is where they are used and enjoyed when supplied and when they are provided by a non-EC provider to a UK customer the effective use and enjoyment takes place in UK (such element being subject to UK VAT Act).
The Respondent relied on the Circular No.141/10/2011- TRU dated 13-05-2011 and contended that the accrual of benefit is to be determined on the basis of use and enjoyment of services.
Held:
It was held that the benefit of services accrues to the foreign telecom service provider who is located outside India in view of the Circular No.111/2009-ST dated 24-02-2009. The Hon’ble CESTAT also explained that when an Indian subscriber of MTNL/BSNL goes abroad and uses roaming facility, it is MTNL/BSNL who invoices the subscriber even though the services are provided by foreign telecom service provider. Further, the Hon’ble CESTAT also relied on the decision of Paul Merchants (supra) wherein it was held that the service recipient is the foreign company and not the service recipient. Thus, the services provided by the appellant to foreign telecom services are considered as export of services and no service tax is payable.
2013 (30) STR 92 (Tri- Del.) Soni Classes vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-1.
Facts:
The appellant was registered with the service tax department as provider of taxable services under the category “commercial training or coaching centre”. They supplied study material to its students and cost of such material was 50% of the fees charged to students. The appellant purchased the study material from the Institute run by the Appellant’s wife on the same premises. The Revenue contended that the consideration for running the coaching centre was artificially divided into two parts, one for providing coaching and the other showing sale of text books in the name of the Institute. The appellant relying on Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 for exclusion of the value of the goods and materials, contended that the study material, test papers, magazines like competition success review etc. which was sold by the Institute was not forming part of the value of coaching services.
Held:
It was observed that only with a malafide view to save the service tax, bifurcation of the consideration was made into two different parts and diverted a part of the consideration to the sale of the study material. Providing study material, text books was a part of coaching service and was required to be included in the value. It was observed that it was only the extra text books or extra material, which was admittedly being sold to the students and which was also available for sale to outsiders would not form part of the taxable coaching services. Since the appellant consciously diverted part of the value of the services to M/s. Soni Patrachar and as such indulged in misstatement and suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty, the appeal for allowing benefit of Notification No.12/2003-ST including plea for longer period was rejected.
Fees received by non-resident for performing services in India through a PE are taxable in accordance with Article 7 of DTAA. If Article 7 applies, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D and S. 115A would not apply.
International Tax Decisions
12 Rio Tinto Technical Services v.
DCIT [Unreported]
[ITA No. 3399/Del./2002, 5372/Del./2003& 4742/Del./2004]
Article 7, India-Australia DTAA; S. 5, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D, S. 115A, Dated :
19-3-2010
Counsels : Salil Kapoor & Ors. (for taxpayer)
Y. S. Kakkar & Other (for Revenue)
Fees received by
non-resident for performing services in India through a PE are taxable in
accordance with Article 7 of DTAA. If Article 7 applies, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D
and S. 115A would not apply.
Facts :
The taxpayer was
PE in India of an Australian Company (‘AusCo’). AusCo had entered in to contract
with an Indian Company for evaluation of coal deposit and feasibility study for
transportation of extracted coal. The taxpayer received approval of RBI for
establishing a project office in India. After completion of that project, AusCo
entered into another contract with another Indian company for evaluation of iron
ore deposit and feasibility study for transportation of iron ore. The taxpayer
received approval of RBI for establishing project office for this contract.
The PE received
consideration for performing the services under the contracts. The AO held that
the consideration was in nature of fees for technical services. The AO
considered it to be subject to S. 9(1)(vii) and accordingly, he taxed it @20% of
the gross receipts of the PE. In appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.
The Tribunal
perused the agreement between AusCo and Indian Company and noted that the
services to be provided were not simple technical and consultancy services, but
specific activities required to be done on site. Hence, AusCo had established a
PE in India.
Held :
When taxing a
non-resident, it should be first ascertained whether income is taxable u/s.5 or
9. If it is so taxable, and if the taxpayer qualifies to access DTAA, the option
would be with the taxpayer whether to prefer to be governed by provisions of
DTAA or the Income-tax Act.
Income of the PE
was taxable u/s.5(2) and AusCo had opted to be taxed as per India-Australia DTAA.
Income of the PE was ‘Business Profits’. Hence, Article 7 would apply. Article
7(2) provides that the PE should be treated as a distinct and independent
enterprise, and Article 7(3) provides that deductions in accordance with the
Income-tax Act shall be allowed. Since Articles 7 applies, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D,
S. 115A would not apply.
Execution of a contract for transportation and installation work for mineral oil exploration platforms—Whether receipts for services outside India, taxable in India u/s 44BB. Presumptive income can be taxed only if it is otherwise taxable under Income-tax
International Tax Decisions
11 DCIT v. J Ray McDermott Eastern
Hemisphere Ltd.
(2010) TII 41 ITAT (Mum.-INTL)
S. 44BB
Execution of a contract for transportation and
installation work for mineral oil exploration platforms—Whether receipts for
services outside India, taxable in India u/s 44BB. Presumptive income can be
taxed only if it is otherwise taxable under Income-tax Act.
Facts :
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax
resident of, Mauritius (‘MCo’). MCo was engaged in the business of designing,
fabrication, construction and installation of platforms, docks, pipelines,
jackets and other similar services which are used in the exploration and
production of mineral oil. MCo undertook and executed a contract for
transportation and installation work for certain well platforms to be used in
mineral oil exploration. While furnishing its tax return, MCo did not offer for
tax receipts pertaining to activities carried on outside India.
S. 44BB provides for presumptive taxation @10% of
the gross receipts in respect of the services that are used in prospecting,
extraction or production of mineral oil. The AO concluded that u/s.44BB, income
is computed on presumptive basis, w.r.t. all receipts and therefore the
distinction between activities carried on in India and those carried on outside
India is not relevant. He accordingly applied presumptive rate to entire gross
receipts of the contract for determining taxable income.
The CIT(A), accepted contentions of the taxpayer.
Before the Tribunal, MCo contended that the income
pertaining to installation and transportation activities carried on outside
India is not taxable under the Income-tax Act. Alternatively, the income
pertaining to such activities or work carried on outside India cannot be
attributable to a PE in India.
Held :
The Tribunal referred to the following decisions
wherein it was held that before computing income on presumptive basis, it should
be ensured that such income falls within the scope of charging provisions :
-
Saipem SPA v. DCIT,
(2004) 88 ITD 213 (Delhi) -
McDermott ETPM Inc v.
DCIT, (2005) 92 ITD 385 (Mum.)
The Tribunal held
that only the income which is reasonably attributable to operations carried on
in India is taxable in India. Therefore, income computed on presumptive basis
can be taxed in India only if such income is otherwise chargeable to tax under
general provisions of the Income-tax Act.
Mauritius company executing 3 contracts in India. Whether the duration of each contract should be considered separately or should be aggregated —DTAA applied test of PE to each construction site separately—The 3 contracts were not inextricably interconnec
International Tax Decisions
10 ADIT v. Valentine Maritime Mauritius Ltd. (2010)
TIOL 195 (ITAT-Mum.)
Article 5(2)(i), India-Mauritius DTAA
A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 5-4-2010
Mauritius company executing 3 contracts in India.
Whether the duration of each contract should be considered separately or should
be aggregated —DTAA applied test of PE to each construction site separately—The
3 contracts were not inextricably interconnected and interdependent—Hence, the
duration of 3 sites cannot be aggregated—Since none of the contracts exceeded
the threshold period, there was no PE.
Facts :
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in
Mauritius (‘MCo’). The Mauritius tax authority had issued tax residency
certificate to MCo, which qualified MCo to access India-Mauritius DTAA (‘the
DTAA’). MCo was engaged in the business of marine and general engineering and
construction. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer executed the
following three different contracts in India :
Contract | Activity | Duration |
1. |
Replacement of main deck with temporary deck |
100 days |
2. |
Charter of barge for accommodation |
137 days |
3. |
Charter of barge for power project together with technical personnel |
225 days |
In respect of contract 2, the taxpayer had applied
for lower withholding of tax order u/s.197. The AO considered the hire charges
as income u/s.44B. Accordingly, the taxpayer accepted the liability @7.5% on
gross basis.
Subsequently, the taxpayer contended that in terms
of Article 5(2)(i) of the DTAA, a building site or a construction or assembly
project or supervisory activities in connection therewith, would constitute a PE
(Construction PE), only if it continues for a period of 9 months. Since income
from the contracts was ‘business profits’ of MCo, under Article 7 of the DTAA,
such income could be taxed in India only if MCo had a PE in India. As none of
the 3 contracts continued for more than 9 months, no Construction PE of MCo was
constituted in India. Accordingly, the profits from the execution of the 3
contracts were not taxable in India.
The AO concluded that to determine existence of a
Construction PE, time spent on all contracts should be aggregated. As aggregate
time spent on the 3 contracts was more than 9 months, MCo had a PE in India and
its income from all the contracts was taxable in India.
The CIT(A), however, held that to determine the
existence of a Construction PE, the time spent on each contract should be
separately considered.
The main issue before the Tribunal was, whether MCo
had a Construction PE in India.
The Tribunal considered the relevant provisions of
the DTAA, OECD Commentary and various case laws.
Held :
As regards ‘fixed place PE’ :
To constitute a fixed place PE, there must be a
fixed place through which business of the enterprise is carried on. The business
of MCo is that of giving barge on hire and business activity is not carried on
at the barge hired out. Since the business is not carried on at a fixed place,
the barge cannot be held to be a PE of MCo.
As regards relationship between ‘fixed place PE’
and ‘Construction PE’ :
In terms of the specific treaty provision, PE,
inter alia, includes a building or construction project if such project
continues for a period of more than 9 months. Thus, the ‘duration test’ for a
Construction PE limits the general principle of permanence under the fixed place
PE rule.Hence, even if a PE is constituted under the fixed place PE rule, if the
activity is that specified in Article 5(2)(i), the PE would not be constituted
if the specified activity does not cross the prescribed time threshold.
As regards ‘duration test’ for a ‘Construction PE’
:
For the following reason, activity of each
site/project should be considered separately and all the activities in a country
are not to be aggregated :
-
Reference to
Construction PE is in singular and the DTAA does not specifically provide for
aggregating number of days spent on all sites/projects. Also, activities of
MCo at different locations are not so inextricably interconnected that they
should be viewed as a coherent whole. -
Large number of India’s
DTAAs specifically provide for aggregation of sites/projects for computing
threshold time period under ‘duration test’. -
If DTAA does not
specifically mention aggregation principle, the same cannot be inferred or
applied. -
Both OECD and UN Model Commentaries provide for application of ‘duration
test’ to each site/project.-
OECD Commentary recognises possible abuse of duration test by
splitting of one contract into several parts. However, the onus is on the tax
authorities to establish artificial splitting of contract.
-
OECD Commentary recognises that even if a building site is based on
several contracts, it should be regarded as a single unit if commercially and
geographically it forms a coherent whole.
The test of geographical coherence and commercial coherence are only
vague tests. They cannot be applied universally or conclusively due to various
ambiguities. They are also unworkable in practical situation.The true
test is, (in addition to geographical proximity and commercial nexus,)
interconnection and interrelationship.The Tribunal did not
find that the 3 contracts were inextricably interconnected, interdependent or a
coherent whole in conjunction with each other. Hence, it held that as the
duration of the 3 contracts executed by MCo cannot be aggregated for
determining the existence of a PE, no PE of MCo in India was constituted. -
GAP in GAAP Accounting for Warranty Obligations
accounting for revenue and warranty obligations subjects itself to
multiple possibilities. Consider a construction company that executes a
long term contract, which takes 2 years to complete and which comes with
a warranty period of 2 years. The question is, how does the contractor
account for revenue and warranty costs in accordance with (AS) 7,
‘Construction Contracts’ and other accounting standards. Let us take an
example. The total contract value is 120.
View 1
Paragraph
11 and 14 of Accounting Standard (AS) 29, ‘Provisions, Contingent
Liabilities and Contingent Assets’, states as follows:
“11. An
obligation is a duty or responsibility to act or perform in a certain
way. Obligations may be legally enforceable as a consequence of a
binding contract or statutory requirement. Obligations also arise from
normal business practice, custom and a desire to maintain good business
relations or act in an equitable manner.”
“14. A provision should be recognised when:
(a) an enterprise has a present obligation as a result of a past event;
(b) it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation; and
(c) a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation.
If these conditions are not met, no provision should be recognised.”
In
the extant case, let us further assume that the contractor is bound to
rectify, rework and compensate any defects, short supplies, operational
problems of the individual equipment already supplied/ work already done
under construction contracts. In other words, the contractual
obligation in respect of warranty coexists from the date of first supply
and not from the date of completion of contract. Thus, there exists a
contractual/customary present obligation in respect of warranty service,
which will require out-flow of resources embodying economic benefits to
settle the obligation. Therefore a provision in respect of warranty
service should be recognised.
As far as timing of recognition of
provision is concerned, the following relevant paragraphs 15, 16 and 21
of AS 7, are reproduced below:
“15. Contract costs should comprise:
(a) costs that relate directly to the specific contract; …
16. Costs that relate directly to a specific contract include: …
(g) the estimated costs of rectification and guarantee work, including expected warranty costs; and …”
“21.
When the outcome of a construction contract can be estimated reliably,
contract revenue and contract costs associated with the construction
contract should be recognised as revenue and expenses respectively by
reference to the stage of completion of the contract activity at the
reporting date. …”
Based on the above, it may be argued that the
estimated warranty cost is a contract cost which is directly related to
the specific contract. When the outcome of a construction contract can
be estimated reliably, contract revenue and contract costs associated
with the construction contract should be recognised as revenue and
expenses respectively by reference to the stage of completion of the
contract activity at the balance sheet date. Accordingly, following the
percentage of completion method, the contract costs, including provision
for expected warranty costs should be recognised by reference to stage
of completion of the contract activity at the reporting date. Thus, the
present obligation in respect of contractual warranty as per the
provisions of AS 29 arises from the performance of a contract activity
in respect of which contract cost is recognised even during the progress
of the contract and as such, the proportionate warranty cost can be
included as ‘cost incurred’ to determine the stage of completion for
recognition of revenue as per the principles of AS 7.
This view
is also aligned to the current practice with respect to sale of goods
which contains a warranty obligation. The current practice is to
recognise the entire revenue when the goods are sold, and make a
provision with respect to warranty costs.
View 2
It
is questionable whether the warranty on the project commences as each
equipment in the project is installed. Generally the warranty is on the
entire project, and it commences on the handover of the project to the
customer. The activities involved in ensuring that the equipments are in
working condition during the construction of the project are more in
the nature of a project activity rather than a warranty activity. If
this be the case, then the warranty provisions and the corresponding
revenue would be recognised at the end of Year 2. Therefore the only
difference in view 1 and 2 is the timing of the recognition of the
warranty provisions and the corresponding revenue.
View 3
Paragraph
26 of AS 7 states as follows, “A contractor may have incurred contract
costs that relate to future activity on the contract. Such contract
costs are recognised as an asset provided it is probable that they will
be recovered. Such costs represent an amount due from the customer and
are often classified as contract work in progress”.
Since the
warranty activity is a future activity, any provision for the
contractual obligation on the warranty should also be correspondingly
recognised as an asset. However, no revenues/costs are recognised when
the contract is in progress with regards to warranty. Once the project
is commissioned and the warranty commences, revenue and cost with
respect to warranty is recognised. For sake of simplicity, the margins
on the contract activity and warranty activity in the above example have
been maintained at the same level. However, in practice the margins may
differ.
Conclusion
The author believes that each of the above views may be tenable under current Indian accounting standards.
[2013] 32 taxmann.com 250 (Delhi – Trib.) Zeppelin Mobile System GmbH vs. ADIT A.Y.:2007-08, Dated: 12-04-2013
Facts:
The taxpayer was a German company, and also a tax resident of Germany. The taxpayer had a closely held shares of unlisted subsidiary company in India. During the year under consideration, the taxpayer sold a portion of the shares held by it in the subsidiary to another unrelated Indian company @ Rs. 390 per share. AO assessed capital gain taking selling price of Rs. 400 per share on the ground that the value of the said shares was Rs. 400 per share as per the guidelines prescribed by RBI, and observing that since the transfer of shares was from non-residents to residents, RBI guidelines were binding. The DRP confirmed the addition made by the AO.
Held:
Perusal of guidelines shows that they are addressed to the Authorised Dealer banks and hence, they are required to examine the compliance and to take appropriate action for non-compliance. However, RBI had accorded its approval for transaction. Since lower authorities had not brought any adverse material on record, the DRP was not justified in confirming the addition.
[2013] 33 taxmann.com 23 (Mumbai – Trib.) KPMG vs. JCIT A.Y.: 2004-05, Dated: 22-02-2013
Facts
The taxpayer had paid professional fee and had reimbursed expenses to ‘V’ who was the sole proprietor of a professional firm in UAE without withholding tax at source, since the payee had not stayed in India for more than 183 days and he did not have a fixed base in India in terms of Article 14 of India-UAE DTAA.
According to the AO, under Article 4(1) of India- UAE DTAA, only a person who paid tax in UAE could be treated as a resident of UAE and since ‘V’ was not liable to pay tax in UAE, he cannot be treated as resident of UAE and hence, he disallowed the payments under section 40(a)(i) of the Act.
Held
a) The term “liable to tax” in the contracting State does not necessarily imply that the person should actually pay the tax in that contracting State. Right to tax on such person is sufficient.
b) Taxability in one country is not sine qua non for availing relief under DTAA. What is necessary is that a person should be liable to tax by reason of domicile, residence, place of management, place of incorporation or any other similar criterion which refers to fiscal domicile of such person. If the fiscal domicile of a person is in the contracting State, he is to be treated as resident of that contracting State irrespective of whether that person is actually liable to pay tax in that country.
c) Since fiscal domicile of ‘V’ in UAE has not been doubted, he should be treated as resident of UAE.
Consideration paid by Indian Company to American Company under assignment agreement was not capital gains but business profits – Since American Company did not have PE in India, consideration not chargeable to tax in India. Payer not required to withhold
International Tax Decisions
9 Laird Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
(2010) 323ITR598(AAR)
Article 7, India-USA DTAA; S. 195
Dated : 18-2-2010
Consideration paid by Indian Company to American
Company under assignment agreement was not capital gains but business profits –
Since American Company did not have PE in India, consideration not chargeable to
tax in India. Payer not required to withhold tax u/s.195.
Facts :
The applicant Indian Company (‘IndCo’) was a group
company of a UK company (‘UK Co’). USCo was another group company of UK Co.
IndCo was engaged in the business of design and manufacture of antenna and
battery packs for mobile phones. USCo was a globally known designer and
manufacturer of antenna, etc. USCo had entered into a global Product Purchase
Agreement (‘PPA’) with Nokia for supply of products in respect of Nokia’s
requirements. Inter alia, PPA stipulated that “neither party shall assign any of
its rights or obligations under this agreement without prior written consent of
the other party”. USCo and IndCo entered into an Assignment Agreement under
which, USCo assigned all its beneficial rights, title, interest, obligations and
duties under PPA in favour of IndCo for a period of 5 years for certain lump sum
consideration.
IndCo applied to AAR for its ruling on the
following issues :
-
Whether amount received
by USCo as assignment fee from IndCo was taxable under the Income-tax Act or
under India-USA DTAA ? -
Whether IndCo was
required to withhold tax even if the assignment fee was not taxable in the
hands of USCo ?
Held :
The AAR ruled as follows :
As regards taxability as capital gains :
An inference could not be
drawn that Nokia had consented to ratify the Assignment Agreement, nor was it
known whether Nokia was apprised of all the terms of Assignment Agreement.
Further, mere fact of Nokia accepting goods from IndCo would not lead to the
inference that assignment had approval of Nokia. Therefore, there was no valid
assignment in the eyes of law.
In the absence of any
valid assignment, the contention of IndCo that there was legal transfer of
capital asset and that consideration should be deemed to be capital gain cannot
be accepted. However, the fact remained that IndCo paid certain amount to USCo
which was received by USCo in its bank account. Thus, irrespective of the
validity of the Assignment Agreement, amount received by USCo can be examined
for ascertaining tax implications for USCo. Amount received on assignment was
business profits of USCo.
As regards constitution of PE :
There was nothing on
record that USCo had any role to play in regular manufacturing and business
activities of IndCo. IndCo did not constitute USCo’s PE in India. As per facts
on record, fixed place of PE of USCo is ruled out. USCo was not in picture after
IndCo started manufacture and supply of goods. The tax authorities did not
elaborate in what manner IndCo was dependent on USCo and hence, that contention
is not sustainable.
In absence of agency or
fixed rule PE, business income is not taxable in India.
As regards taxability and withholding tax :
As USCo had not derived
any income chargeable in India, IndCo was not required to withhold tax u/s.195
of the Income-tax Act.
ITO vs. M/s. Kirtilal Kalidas Diamond Exports (Mumbai) (Unreported). [ITA No 1868/Mum/2005].
Part C — International Tax Decisions
-
ITO vs. M/s. Kirtilal Kalidas Diamond Exports
(Mumbai) (Unreported). [ITA No 1868/Mum/2005].
A.Y. : 2001-2002
Sections
40(a)(i), 195, I T Act; India-UK DTAADtd. : 30th
September 2008
Issue
Commission paid to non-resident agent for purchase of raw materials is not
taxable in India, either under I T Act or under India-UK DTAA.
Facts
The
assessee was engaged in the business of export of cut and polished diamonds.
For its business, it was importing rough diamonds. During the relevant year,
it imported rough diamonds through a non-resident agent and paid commission to
that agent. While making payment of commission to the non-resident agent, the
assessee did not deduct any tax at source.
Before the AO, the assessee contended that: the non-resident had rendered the
services outside India; the assessee had paid commission outside India; the
non-resident did not have any establishment in India; and hence, the income of
the non-resident was not chargeable to tax in India.The
AO held that the assessee was required to deduct tax at source under Section
195 of the Act and since it failed to deduct such tax, provisions of Section
40(a)(i) of the Act were attracted. Accordingly, the AO disallowed the
commission while computing the income of the assessee.On
appeal the CIT(A) deleted the disallowance.
Held
The
Tribunal observed that the Department had not countered the facts, namely :
(i)
the services were rendered outside India;
(ii) the assessee had paid commission outside India;
(iii) the non-resident did not have any establishment in India. On these
facts, it held that no income accrued to the non-resident in India.
Even under India-UK
DTAA, business profits, cannot be charged to tax in India in absence of
permanent establishment in India.
Worley Parsons Services Pty. Ltd. 312 ITR 317 (AAR)
Part C — International Tax Decisions
-
Worley Parsons Services Pty. Ltd. 312 ITR 317 (AAR)
Article 5 (3) and Article 12 of
India-Australia DTAA
Dtd. : 23rd April, 2009
Issue
- In the facts of the applicant’s case, for the
purpose of determining threshold under the service PE, presence in respect of
all the contracts is to be taken into account.
- The services involving preparation of technical plan amounts to royalties
within the meaning of Article XII of India-Australia treaty.
The services involving review of the designs prepared by the third party,
assisting in the bid process, making suggestion on optimisation of resources,
etc., do not meet the test of ‘make available’, etc., and is therefore not
royalty within the meaning of Article XII of India Australia treaty.
Facts
Worley Parson, a company registered in Australia,
(AUSCO) is engaged in the business of providing professional services
including engineering, procurement and project management services to various
players engaged in the business of energy and resource industry.AUSCO entered into six separate service contracts
with ONGC. The contracts were entered into in respect of two offshore projects
of ONGC. One of the six contracts (contract no.5) involved the work of
preparing design, provide lay out and cost optimisation scheme along with the
process designs for the new process platform of ONGC. The consideration paid
pursuant to contract no.5 was admitted to be the payment in the nature of
royalty as it involved consideration for development and transfer of technical
plan.In respect of the balance 5 contracts, the
applicant provided the following services :
1. Reviewing the design and engineering
documents prepared by the third party consultants engaged directly by ONGC.2. Reviewing technical and commercial bid
document floated by ONGC for the purpose of inviting tender from the
interested parties.3. Reviewing the proposals of optimisation and
cost savings presented by ONGC.4. Reviewing the existing facilities and making
recommendations.5. Assisting ONGC in procurement phase of one
of the offshore projects.
Services in respect of these contracts were
rendered partly in India and partly in Australia. The aggregate presence of
employees pursuant to various contracts (other than contract no. 5) exceeded
period of 90 days in 12-month period reckoned for two financial years.Before the AAR, the applicant claimed that :
- The services rendered under the various contracts except contract no. 5
cannot be regarded as royalties as defined in the treaty.
- For the purpose of determining the service PE trigger threshold, each
contract should be viewed separately;
- There was no service PE trigger except under contract 6 since in each of the
contracts seen individually the time spent by the employees of the applicant
did not exceed the threshold of 90 days in 12-month period provided in the
treaty.
- Relying on SC decision in the case of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
Industries Ltd. vs. DIT, (288 ITR 408), it was submitted that offshore
services cannot be taxed in India even in respect of contract no. 5.
The Department contended that the entire amount was taxable as royalty and
hence no distinction is required for onshore & offshore services. Further all
the contracts should be seen together in order to ascertain whether service PE
has emerged or not.
Held :
The AAR held :
- Consideration for contract no. 5 was taxable as royalty income. For the
purpose of determining number of days of presence for service PE, the
presence of employees pursuant to contract no.5 is to be excluded in view of
specific provisions of Article V(3)(c) of the treaty.
- Services rendered pursuant to other contracts were not royalty within the
meaning of Article XII of the treaty. The services rendered pursuant to the
contracts had a technical content and recommendation for use by ONGC.
However, the services and the input did not result in the recipient of
service getting equipped with the knowledge and expertise of the applicant.
The services were project specific and ONGC could not make use of such
services for unrelated project to the exclusion of the applicant. The
services therefore did not make available technology to ONGC so as to be
regarded as royalty within the meaning of Article XII(3)(g) of the treaty.
- The AAR also rejected the contention of the Department that the services of
reviewing designs of third party and suggesting recommendations thereon
resulted in development of technical plan or design for transfer by the
applicant. The AAR observed that the payment was not royalty as the
applicant did not evolve and transfer plan or design to ONGC.
Mahindra and Mahindra Limited (M&M) vs. DCIT [ITA Nos. 2606, 2607, 2613 and 2614/Mum/2000] (Mumbai SB).
Part C — International Tax Decisions
-
Mahindra and Mahindra Limited (M&M) vs.
DCIT [ITA Nos. 2606, 2607, 2613 and 2614/Mum/2000] (Mumbai SB).
A.Y. : 1998-99
Section 9(1)(vii), 191, 195,
200, 201 of the Income- tax Act and Article 13 of India-UK DTAA
Dtd. : 9th April, 2009
Issue
(1) Proceedings under Section
201 are akin to assessment/reassessment and time limit available for
initiating and completing assessment/reassessment proceedings are as equally
applicable to it.
(2) In terms of Section 195, a
payer is required to withhold taxes only where the payment includes a sum
chargeable to tax in India.
(3) No order treating a person
as an assessee in default can be passed if the Department has not taken any
action against the recipient to treat the income as taxable.
Facts
M&M had come out with 2 Euro issues in November
1993 and July 1996. In this connection, M&M had availed services of Lead
Managers (LM) of UK. M&M was obliged to pay management, underwriting and
selling commission to LM. In addition, certain expenses of LM were also
reimbursed by M&M. LM had retained their commission from out of proceeds of
the issue. No taxes were withheld in respect of payments retained by LM.The Department had initiated action against the
payer (M&M) for failure to withhold taxes and treated M &M to be assessee in
default.The primary contention of M&M was that there was
no obligation to withhold tax as the payment was not towards technical
services but was for subscription of capital. In any case, the fees were
retained by the service provider and there was no separate remittance so as to
attract obligation of TDS.By way of an additional ground, M&M raised the
aspect of applicability of time limit to S.201 proceedings; it also challenged
the validity of proceedings by contending that :
.
Section 201 (1)/ 201 (1A) proceedings apply only where taxes are withheld
but have not been remitted to the Government. The proceedings had no
application where the payer had not withheld taxes..
The payer cannot be treated as an assessee in default unless the Department
has assessed or initiated action for assessment of income in the hands of
the recipient..
As no time limit has been prescribed for initiating action, the proceedings
need to be exercised within a reasonable time. As judicial precedents have
held that 4 years is a reasonable time for initiating and completion of the
proceedings under Section 201(1)/(1A), the same needs to be adhered to. In
the present case, since this limitation period was crossed, no action can be
taken against the payer for not withholding taxes.
As
against the above, the Department contended :
–
Services offered by LM were in the nature of FTS and hence taxable in India.
Retention of amount by LM in effect amounted to making of payment.–
M&M did not file any application to the Department for determination of the
amount to be withheld on its payments to LM. In absence of lower/nil tax
deduction certificate, taxes were necessarily required to be withheld by
M&M.–
Section 201(1)/201(1A) proceedings apply to both the categories of
defaulters, i.e., one who has withheld taxes but not remitted it to
the Government and also to those who have not withheld taxes from the
payment.–
Assessment of recipient is not a pre-condition for enforcing a withholding
tax liability on the payer. The withholding tax provisions are separate and
operate independent of the assessment proceedings of the recipients. For
this, the Tax Department relied on provisions of Sections like 115A , 115AC,
115BBA, 115G, etc. to support the proposition that under certain situations,
the recipients have no obligation of filing the return if there is suitable
tax withholding.–
Where no provision for limitation is present in a statute, the Courts cannot
artificially introduce a limitation.
Held
The Special Bench admitted the additional ground on the question of limitation
which was raised for the first time before it. It held that the issue involved
a question of law and needed no fresh investigation of facts.
Canora Resources Ltd. In re 313 ITR 2 (AAR) Section 45(3), 10(2A), 92, 184, 245R of the Income-tax Act and Article 24 of India-Canada DTAA.
Part C — International Tax Decisions
-
Canora Resources Ltd. In re 313 ITR 2 (AAR)
Section 45(3), 10(2A), 92, 184, 245R of the Income-tax Act and Article 24 of
India-Canada DTAA.
Dtd. : 23rd
April, 2009Issue
^ A foreign
partnership can be assessed as a partnership firm under the Indian Income-tax
Law.^ Provisions
of Transfer Pricing Regulations override provisions of Section 45(3) of the
Act. Capital gains in respect of contribution of asset to a partnership firm,
if in the nature of international transaction, attracts tax liability w.r.t.
fair market value.^
Nationality non-discrimination provision cannot be invoked for claiming non
applicability of transfer pricing provisions which are based on residential
status of the parties.
Facts
Applicant, a
company registered in Canada, is engaged in the business of exploration and
production of petroleum and natural gas. In India, applicant held
participating interest (PI) in three oil blocks. Amongst others, it held 60%
PI in Amguri development block (Amguri block). The Amguri block had good
commercial prospects and had known commercial discovery while the other two
blocks were at nascent stage.The
applicant proposed to restructure its business in India with a view to
attracting investments in Amguri block and with a view to holding Amguri block
in a separate entity. It proposed to transfer its PI in Amguri block to a
partnership firm (Firm) to be formed in Canada. The Firm was proposed between
the Applicant and its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary as partners.
Before the
AAR, the applicant raised the following contention.
a) The
Canadian firm should be assessed to tax as a ‘firm’. The applicant furnished
copy of the partnership Act of Alberta, Canada to show that the provisions
of that Partnership Act were almost at par with the provisions of the Indian
Partnership Act. It was explained that the Act of Alberta recognised the
principle of agency between partners; the liability of partners was joint
and several; properties of the firm belonged to the partners collectively;
the firm had no separate legal personality of its own, etc.b) It is
enough that the mechanism of sharing is described or defined on a certain
basis; it is not necessary to express or set out the fractional or other
shares, so as to enable the entity to be assessed as firm in compliance with
Section 184 of the Act.c) The
capital gains income, if any, arising from transfer of PI to the proposed
firm should be computed as per provisions of Section 45(3) of the Act by
adopting contribution value. In view of the special provisions of charging
Section of Section 45(3), the transfer pricing provisions cannot be applied.
As against
that, the Tax Department contended :
a) The
application deserved to be rejected having regard to the provisions of
Section 245R(2) of the Act as the transaction was for avoidance of
Income-tax. The proposed restructuring was merely a ruse for avoidance of
tax and the applicant had failed to substantiate how its object of
attracting investments was sub-served. The proposal was prone to tax
avoidance since the proposed restructuring would facilitate the applicant to
exit from Amguri block by transferring its stake in the firm without payment
of tax in India.b) A
partnership firm can be assessed as a firm under the Act only if it is a
partnership firm as understood under the Indian Law. The proposed
partnership firm would have characteristic of a company or a corporation and
should be taxed in India as a foreign company. For this purpose, the Tax
Department sought to place reliance on features like managing partner of the
firm having power akin to that of a managing director, likely feature of
payment of dividend, etc.c) The
proposed partnership deed was so worded that it failed to specify the
individual shares of the partners in the instrument of partnership and hence
also the firm cannot be assessed as a partnership firm under the Act in view
of provisions of Section 184 of the Act.d) The
transaction between the applicant and the firm is in the nature of
international transaction between two associated persons. Therefore, the
transfer pricing regulations would require that the capital gains income is
computed with reference to the arm’s-length price.
The AAR Held
(1) In the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 706),
the Supreme Court has approved the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to
resort to a legal method available to him to plan his tax liability. The AAR
noted that it may reject the application, provided it relates to a
transaction which is designed prima facie for avoidance of tax. The
expression ‘prima facie’ can be understood as ‘at first sight’; ‘on
first appearance’; ‘on the face of it’; etc. The future possibility of the
applicant’s exit from Amguri block by transferring PI to someone cannot by
itself be a ground to conclude that the arrangement was, on the face of it
to avoid tax.
India-Australia DTAA; S. 9(1)(vii) — Receipts for monitoring and supervision of project work — Not royalties — Business income, chargeable to the extent attributable to PE
10 WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd. (AAR)
(Unreported)
Articles 5, 7, 12 of India-Australia DTAA; S. 9(1)(vii)(b) of
the Act
A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 30-4-2008
Issue :
Characterisation of receipts for monitoring and supervision
of project work.
Facts :
The applicant was an Australian company, which was tax
resident of Australia. It was in the business of providing professional services
such as engineering, procurement and object management. It executed a contract
with an Indian company for monitoring a gas pipeline project as project
monitoring consultant. The applicant had to carry out various responsibilities
that were set out in the tender document under the section titled as
“consultant’s scope of work”.
The AAR considered the following issues :
(a) Whether the receipts under the contract were
‘royalties’ in terms of Article 12 of India-Australia DTAA ?
(b) If answer to (a) is in negative, whether such receipts
were to be taxed as business profits taxable in India in terms of Article VII
of India-Australia DTAA and if so, to what extent ?
The applicant had submitted that most of the services
relating to the work assigned to it were performed in India; its employees were
present in India for 165 days during the relevant year; nearly 90 to 95% of the
work related to the contract was performed in India; and hence, it should be
deemed to have have construction supervisory PE in India within the meaning of
Article 5(2)(k) of India-Australia DTAA. The applicant also contended that the
payments received by it under the contract were not in the nature of royalty
under Article 12 of India-Australia DTAA, but were attributable to its PE and
taxable as business profits in terms of Article 7 of India-Australia DTAA — a
contention not disputed by the Department.
The AAR then referred to the definition of ‘royalties’ in
Article 12(3) of India-Australia DTAA. In particular, AAR referred to clause (g)
of Article 12(3), in terms of which payment made as consideration for “the
rendering of any services (including those of technical or other personnel),
which make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or
processes or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or
design” ‘royalties’. The AAR observed that monitoring and supervision of project
work with a view to ensure its timely completion within the approved cost does
not amount to ‘making available’ technical knowledge, experience, etc. which can
be subsequently used by the Indian company on its own. Hence, by rendering the
services the applicant had not ‘made available’ any technical knowledge,
experience, skill or know-how to the Indian company.
The Department had contended that the contractual receipts
were in the nature of fees for technical services in terms of S. 9(1)(vii)(b) of
the Act. The AAR rejected this contention on the ground that the receipts cannot
be taxed under the Act in derogation of DTAA provisions and since the income
could be brought within the purview of Article VII, which deals with business
profits, only that provision was relevant. The AAR noted that in its reply, the
Department had admitted the applicability of Article 7(1) of India-Australia
DTAA. Further, no Article other than Article 12 dealt with ‘fees for technical
services’. Hence, the receipts of the applicant were business profits and since,
admittedly, the applicant carried on its business through a PE, profits
attributable to that PE were taxable in India in terms of Article 7.
The AAR then referred to Article 5(2)(k) and agreed with the
applicant’s contention that it constituted a PE in India in terms of Article
5(2)(k), since the activities were carried on in India for more than six months
during financial year 2003-04.
Held :
(i) The applicant’s receipts under the contract were not
‘royalties’ in terms of Article 12(3)(g) of India-Australia DTAA, since
monitoring and supervision project work does not amount to making available
technical knowledge, experience, etc.
(ii) The applicant had construction supervisory PE in India
in terms of Article 5(2)(k) of India-Australia DTAA.
(iii) Since the payment is not covered by specific Article 12
dealing with royalties, it is business income to be taxed in terms of Article 7
of India-Australia DTAA, but only to the extent of the profits attributable to
the applicant’s PE in India and in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Mutual concern — Income of the association of flat owners is not taxable on the principle of mutuality, despite the fact that most of the flats are let out and tenants are paying the contribution — Interest earned from bank on surplus funds deposited in t
(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are
available at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that
the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)
9 Wellington Estate Condominium v. ITO
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Delhi
Before R. P. Tolani (JM) and A. K. Garodia (AM)
ITA No. 2846/Del./2007
A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 16-10-2009
Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ved Jain & V. Mohan/Anusha
Khurana
Mutual concern — Income of the association of flat owners is
not taxable on the principle of mutuality, despite the fact that most of the
flats are let out and tenants are paying the contribution — Interest earned from
bank on surplus funds deposited in the bank is also not taxable on the principle
of mutuality.
Per A. K. Garodia :
Facts :
The assessee was an AOP formed by Residents’ Welfare
Association of the residents of Wellington Estate, DLF City, Phase V, Gurgaon
which consisted of 555 flats, out of which 505 flats were sold out by DLF
Universal Ltd. (Developer) and 51 unsold flats remained in possession of the
developer. The association was registered with The Registrar of Societies,
Haryana on 1-10-2002 and hence this was the first year of operation of the
assessee.
The association claimed itself to be a mutual concern and
claimed that its income is not taxable. The AO rejected the claim of the
assessee and assessed the total income at Rs.25,95,060 as against returned
income of Rs.14,180.
The CIT(A) rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground
that (i) most of the flats were rented out to tenants who were paying various
charges to the association and tenants are not the members of the association;
(ii) the assessee is receiving money on account of various charges from
non-members as per rules; (iii) profits on account of excess charges were
refundable to the members which indicates the profit making purpose of the AOP
and distribution of profits amongst members; and (iv) there is no identity
between the contributors and participators which is essential element of mutual
concern.
The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held :
The Tribunal noted that clause 18(b) of the bye-laws of the
assessee regarding winding up or dissolution of the society provide that any
surplus remaining after satisfaction of its debts and liabilities shall not be
paid to or distributed among the members of the society at the time of
dissolution, but shall be given or transferred to some other institution having
objects similar to the objects of the society to be determined by the members of
the society at the time of dissolution. It also noted that clause 2 and 4 of the
bye-laws provided that the assessee could invest or deposit money and could let
out suitable portion of the common areas to outsiders for commercial purposes
and to accumulate the common profit for building up reserve fund.
The Tribunal observed that the Delhi Bench of Tribunal has in
the case of Standing Conference of Public Enterprise (SCOPE) v. ITO in ITA No.
5051/Del./2007, dated 31-3-2008 dealt with the situation where as per bye-laws
the surplus was not required to be distributed amongst the members on
dissolution of the society and the Revenue had denied mutuality on this ground.
Clause (xvi) of the bye-laws of SCOPE was identical to clause 18(b) of the
bye-laws of the assessee. The Tribunal after considering the decision of Apex
Court in the case of Bankipur Club (226 ITR 97) (SC) rejected the argument of
the Revenue. Further, in the case of SCOPE, interest income was earned from
surplus funds and rental income was received from non-members also. Therefore,
letting out of suitable portion of common area to outsiders for commercial
purposes and accumulation of common profit for building up reserve fund could
not be a reason for denying mutuality. As regards interest income the Tribunal
has in the case of SCOPE held that this issue is covered in favour of the
assessee by the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of All India
Oriental Banking Commerce of Welfare Society (184 CTR 274) (Del.).
As regards the allegation of the CIT(A) that when flats are
rented out, maintenance charges are received by the assessee from non-members,
the Tribunal held that liability of payment of maintenance and other charges is
of the member i.e., the owner and even if the same is paid to the society by the
tenant of the members, it cannot be said that the society is receiving it from
non-members because in case of default the assessee can collect the same from
members only and not from tenants. The Tribunal observed that as per clause 4(b)
of the bye-laws all the owners are obliged to pay monthly assessment imposed by
the association to meet all expenses relating to Wellington Estate Condominium,
which may include an insurance premium for a policy to recover repair and
reconstruction work in certain cases. The Tribunal held that payments made by
tenants of the members are to be considered as received from members since the
liability to pay the amount is of the member and the tenant is making the
payment to the assessee for and on behalf of the member. The Tribunal held the
assessee to be a mutual concern and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.
Educational Institution: Exemption: Section 10(23C)(vi): A. Y. 2008-09: Rejection of approval for exemption on the ground of defect in admission procedure: Rejection not just:
During the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2008-09, the admission to the college run by the assessee-trust were not on the basis of the system approved by the medical council of India and Rajasthan University. The Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court held that the admission was illegal. A Special Leave Petition filed by the assessee was pending before the Supreme Court. The Chief Commissioner rejected the application of the assesee for approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding as under:
“In the institution’s case, the Hon’ble High Court has held that the admissions made for the academic year 2008-09 were illegal. The purpose of education would not be served, if the education is for students who have been illegally admitted. The purpose of education as contemplated in the section would be served only if the students have been legally admitted and not otherwise. The spending of funds on education of students who have been admitted illegally will not amount to application of income for the purpose of education. In the trust’s case, neither the condition regarding existence for the purpose of education nor the application of funds for the objects, are being fulfilled.”
However, an order granting approval was passed for the A. Y. 2010-11 and onwards.
On a writ petition challenging the order of rejection, the Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court (352 ITR 427) set aside the order of rejection for fresh disposal and observed as under:
“The sanction was to be granted within the parameters laid down u/s. 10(23C) which are relevant and not the admission procedure undertaken by the assessee.”
On appeal by the Revenue, the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge and held as under:
“i) U/s. 10(23C)(vi) and (via), what is required for the purpose of seeking approval is that the university or other educational institution should exist “solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit”. It was nowhere the case or the finding of the Chief Commissioner that on account of the defect in the admission procedure, the assessee ceases to exist solely for educational purposes or it existed for the purpose of profit. Further, it was not the case of the Revenue that the students who were admitted were not imparted education in the college in which they were admitted or the admissions granted were fake or non-existent or that the income generated by admitting the students was not used for the purpose of the assessee.
ii) The emphasis on the part of the Chief Commissioner that the purpose of education would not be served if the education is for students who have been illegally admitted and the purpose of education as contemplated in the section would be served only if the studentshave been legally admitted and not otherwise, went beyond the requirements of the section.
iii) Of course, the requirement of an educational institution to provide admission strictly in accordance with the prescribed rules, regulations and statute need to be adhered to in letter and spirit, but violation could not lead to its losing the character as an entity existing solely for the purpose of education.
iv) Therefore, there is no interference with the order of the Single Judge.”
Capital gain: A. Y. 2007-08: Family settlement: Principle of owelty: Payment to assessee to compensate inequalities in partition of assets: Amount paid is immovable property: No capital gain arises:
In the course of the assessment for the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer found that the assessee (Group A) had received compensation from group B at the time of partition of properties of the group of HSL and that the amount had been kept in fixed deposit receipts in accordance with the orders passed by the High Court and by the Supreme Court. The Assessing Officer considered the family settlement and found that 8.56% of Rs. 24 crore of compensation was the share of the assessee and levied long term capital gains on the amount. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the distribution of assets including the sum of Rs. 24 crore was not complete during the relevant year as the matter was subjudice and the assessee was not allowed to use the money by the order of this court, and therefore, the sum of Rs. 24 crore transferred to the assessee and the other members of the Group A did not accrue to the income of this group including the assessee. The Tribunal upheld this decision.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:
“i) The payment of Rs. 24 crore to the assessee was to equalize the inequalities in partition of the assets of HSL. The amount so paid was immovable property. If such amount was to be treated as income liable to tax, the inequalities would set in as the share of the recipient would diminish to the extent of tax.
ii) Since the amount paid during the course of partition was to settle the inequalities in partition, it would be deemed to be immovable property. Such amount was not an income liable to tax.
iii) Thus, the amount of owelty, i.e. compensation deposited by group B was to equalise the partition and represented immovable property and would not attract capital gains.”
Capital gain: Section 50C: A. Y. 2005-06: Amendment by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 01/10/2009 is prospective: Amended provision not applicable to transactions completed prior to 01/10/2009:
In the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee had transferred a property to a third party under an agreement for sale. Physical possession was given to the buyer but the agreement was not registered. The assessee computed the capital gain without applying the provisions of section 50C. The Assessing Officer applied section 50C and adopted the guideline value given by the stamp valuation authority as the sale consideration instead of the consideration admitted by the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that section 50C can be invoked only when the property was transferred by way of registered sale deed and assessed for stamp valuation purposes. The Tribunal held that section 50C could not be invoked as the property was not transferred by way of registered sale deed.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The insertion of the words “or assessable” in section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, w.e.f. 1st October, 2009, is neither a clarification nor an explanation to the existing provision and it is only an inclusion of new class of transactions, namely, the transfer of properties without or before registration.
ii) Before the amendment, only transfer of properties where the value was adopted or assessed by the stamp valuation authority were subjected to section 50C application. However, after introduction of the words ”or assessable” such transfers where the value is assessable by the valuation authority are also brought into the ambit of section 50C. Thus such introduction of a new set of class of transfer would certainly have prospective application only. The amendments have been made applicable w.e.f. 1st October, 2009 and will apply only in relation to transactions undertaken on or after such date.
iii) Since the transfer in the assessee’s case was admittedly made prior to the amendment, section 50C, as amended w.e.f. 1st October, 2009, was not applicable.”
Business expenditure : Section 37(1) : A. Y. 2008-09: Software development and upgradation expenditure: Is allowable revenue expenditure:
In the relevant year, the assessee claimed deduction on account of software development and upgradation expenditure. The Assessing Officer held that software development and upgradation would give the assessee an enduring benefit and such expenditure should be treated as capital expenditure. Accordingly, he disallowed the claim. The Tribunal allowed the assesee’s claim. On appeal by the Revenue , the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The assessee had entered into contract with a company, which had agreed to provide certain services. These services, thus, essentially were in the nature of maintenance and support services providing essentially backup to the assessee, who had procured software for its purpose. These services, thus, essentially did not give any fresh or new benefit in the nature of a software to be used by the assessee in the course of the business but were more in nature of technical support and maintenance of the existing software and hardware. For example, the service provider had to provide technical support to the employees of the company and to maintain the computers and the laptop, had to supply security service for controlling the data theft and providing checks on access by unauthorised persons to the data etc.
ii) In essence, these services, therefore, were in nature of maintenance, back up and support service to existing hardware and software already installed by company for the purpose of its business. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly held that the expenditure was revenue in nature.”
Business expenditure : Section 37(1) : A. Y. 2003-04: Landlord incurred expenditure on construction as per assessee’s requirements: Compensation paid to landlord for nonoccupation of premises, in lieu of withdrawing all claims against assessee: Was in the course of business and was allowable as revenue expenditure:
The assessee had contracted with a landlord to take premises on lease for opening its branch, but no formal agreement was entered into. The landlord started the construction of the premises as per assessee’s requirements. However, before completion of construction, assessee came to know of the proposed construction of an overbridge over the said property which would cause hindrance to conduct its business and services. The assessee, therefore, terminated the understanding with the landlord and paid compensation to the landlord for the work done, in lieu of withdrawing all claims against the assessee. In the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed such amount paid as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance as the compensation was paid in the course of business and for the purpose of business, to protect the assessee’s interest and in lieu of the claims that could have been raised by the landlord.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The Tribunal referred to the case of J.K. Woollen vs. CIT [1969] 72 ITR 612 (SC) in which it was held, that in applying the test of commercial expediency for determining whether an expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business, reasonableness of the expenditure has to be adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and not of the IT department.
ii) No question of law arises. Tax appeal is, therefore, dismissed.”
Assessment giving effect to order of Tribunal: Section 254, r/w. s. 154 : A. Y. 2001-02: Tribunal restored proceeding back to AO for fresh examination of nature of share transaction: AO passed an order giving effect to order of Tribunal: Subsequently, successor AO recomputed loss and passed a fresh order: Fresh order is without jurisdiction:
For the A. Y. 2001-02, the assessee filed return of income claiming loss of Rs. 16.82 crore which included a loss from share transactions of Rs. 13.63 crore. An assessment order was passed u/s. 143(3) determining a total loss of Rs. 3.13 crore after disallowing the loss from the share transactions. The Tribunal restored the assessment proceeding back to Assessing Officer for fresh examination of the nature of the share transactions in view of SEBI guidelines and to decide the matter. The Assessing Officer passed an order giving effect to the order of the Tribunal and recomputed the total loss at Rs. 16.83 crore. Subsequently, the successor in office of the Assessing Officer passed another order computing the loss at Rs. 3.19 crore.
The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:
“i) Once the Assessing Officer had given effect to the order of the Tribunal, his successor-in- office had no jurisdiction to pass a fresh order. The impugned order of the successor-in-office in fact reflects his awareness of the earlier order which was passed by the predecessor in order to give effect to the order of the Tribunal became the successor Assessing Officer has, in his computation, commenced with a total income as computed in the order of the predecessor Assessing Officer (viz., a loss of Rs. 16.83 crore). The successor Assessing Officer has not purported to exercise the jurisdiction u/s. 154.
ii) Once effect was given to the order of the Tribunal by the passing of an order u/s. 254 that order could have been modified or set aside only by following a procedure which is known to the Act. What the Assessing Officer has done by the impugned order is to conduct a substantive review of the earlier order of the predecessor which was clearly impermissible. Since the order of the successor Assessing Officer is clearly without jurisdiction, there was no reason or justification to relegate the Petitioner to the remedy of an appeal.
iii) Therefore, the instant petition was allowed and the assessment order passed by the successor Assessing Officer was quashed and set aside.”
Exemption – Trust issuing a receipt on 31st March, 2002 for the cheque of donation dated 22nd April, 2002 – No Violation of provisions of section 13 since the Trust had shown the amount as donation receivable in the Balance Sheet and the donor had not availed the exemption in accounting year 2001-02 but claimed it in 2002-03 only.
During the relevant accounting year 2002-03 of the respondent-assessee had, by way of donation, received two cheques for a sum of Rs.40 lakhs each from M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd. One of the cheques was 22nd dated April, 2002, and yet it was given in the accounting year 2001-02, i.e., before 31st March, 2002.
In the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2002-03, the Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that with an intention to do undue favour to M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd., the cheque dated 22nd April, 2002, given by way of donation for a sum of Rs. 40 lakh had been accepted by the respondentassessee and receipt for the said amount was also issued before 31 March, 2002, i.e., in the accounting year 2001-02. According to the Assessing Officer, many of the trustees of the assessee-trust were related to the directors of M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd., and as to give undue advantage under the provisions of section 80G of the Act, the cheque had been accepted before 31st March, 2002, although the cheque was dated 22nd April, 2002.
In the opinion of the Assessing Officer, this was clearly in violation of the provisions of section 13(2)(d), (h) and as such exemption u/s. 11 and 12 could not be allowed to the assessee. The assessment was made in the status of an association of persons.
The appeal which was filed against the assessment order was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).
The second appeal filed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by the respondent-assessee was however allowed. The Tribunal held that there was no violation of the provisions of sections 13(2)(b) and 13(2)(h) of the Act and the assessee-trust had not acted in improper and illegal manner.
The Tribunal noted the fact that the amount of donation, i.e., Rs. 40 lakhs received by way of a cheque dated 22nd April, 2002, was treated as donation receivable and, accordingly, accounting treatment was given to the said amount. The said amount was not included in the accounting year 2001-02 as donation but was shown separately in the balance-sheet as amount receivable by way of donation. Moreover, M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd., had also not availed of the benefit of the said amount u/s. 80G of the Act during the accounting year 2001-02 but had availed of the benefit only in the accounting year 2002-03, the period during which the cheque had been honoured and the amount of donation was paid to the assessee-trust.The High Court dismissed the appeal to the Revenue observing that the Tribunal found that it was only a post-dated cheque and it could not be said to be an amount which was made available for the use of the drawer of the cheque and, therefore, the provisions of section 13(2)(b) of the Act did not apply.
Also, no service of the assessee was available to the drawer of cheque and, therefore, the provisions of section 13(2)(d) also did not apply.
In the civil appeal filed by the revenue the Supreme Court noted certain undisputed facts. It was not in dispute that though the assessee-trust has issued receipt when it received the cheque dated 22nd April, 2002, for Rs. 40 lakh in March 2002, it was clearly stated in its record that the amount of donation was receivable in future and, accordingly, the said amount was also shown as donation receivable in the balance-sheet prepared by the assess-trust as on March 31, 2002. It was also not in dispute that M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd., did not avail of any advantage of the said donation during the accounting year 2001-02. Upon a perusal of the assessment order of M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd., for the assessment year 2002-03, it was clearly revealed that the cheque dated 22nd April, 2002, was not taken into account for giving benefit under section 80G of the Act as the said amount was paid in April 2002, when the cheque was honoured.
Looking into the aforestated undisputed facts, and the view expressed by the court in the case of Ogale Glass Works Ltd. [(1954) 25 ITR 529 [(SC)], the Supreme Court was of the view that no irregularity had been committed by the assesseetrust and there was no violation of the provisions of section 13(2(b) or 13(2)(h) of the Act. The fact that most of the trustees of the assessee-trust and the directors of M/s. Apollo Tyres Ltd., were related was absolutely irrelevant. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal.
Principle of mutuality – Interest earned on surplus funds placed by the members club with members bank not covered by mutuality principle, liable to be taxed in the hands of the club.
The Bangalore Club (“the “assessee”), an unincorporated association of persons, (AOP), in relation to the assessment years 1990-91, 1993-94, 1994- 95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1999-2000, had sought an exemption from payment of incometax on the interest earned on the fixed deposits kept with certain banks, which were corporate members of the assessee, on the basis of the doctrine of mutuality. However, tax was paid on the interest earned on fixed deposits kept with non-member banks.
The Assessing Officer rejected the assess’s claim, holding that there was a lack of identity between the contributors and the participators to the fund, and hence, treated the amount received by it as interest as taxable business income. On appeal by the assessee, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal) reversed the view taken by the Assessing Officer, and held that the doctrine of mutuality clearly applied to the assessee’s case. On appeal by the Revenue, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal affirmed the view taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).
The High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and restored the order of the Assessing Officer holding that on the facts of this case and in the light of the legal principles it was clear to us what has been done by club is nothing but what could have been done by a customer of a bank. The principle of ‘no man can trade with himself’ is not available in respect of a nationalised bank holding a fixed deposit on behalf of its customer.
On appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, the Supreme Court observed that the assessee was an association of persons. The concernedbanks were all corporate members of the club. The interest earned from fixed deposits kept with non-member banks was offered for taxation and the tax due was paid. Therefore, it was required to examine the case of the assessee, in relation to the interest earned on fixed deposits with the member banks, on the touchstone of the three cumulative conditions.
The Supreme Court held that: Firstly, the arrangement lacks a complete identity between the contributors and participators. Till the stage of generation of surplus funds, the setup resembled that of the mutuality; the flow of money, to and fro, was maintained within the closed circuit formed by the banks and the club, and to the extent, nobody who was not privy to this mutuality, benefited from the arrangement. However, as soon as these funds were placed in fixed deposits with banks, the closed flow of funds between the banks and the club suffered from deflections due to exposure to commercial banking operations. During the course of their banking business, the members banks used such deposits to advance loans to their clients. Hence, in the present case, with the funds of the mutuality, member bank engaged in commercial operations with third parting outside of the mutuality, rupturing the ‘privity of mutuality’, and consequently, violating the one to one identity between the contributors and participators. Thus, in the case before it the first condition for a claim of mutuality was not satisfied.The second condition demands that to claim an exemption from tax on the principle of mutuality, treatment of the excess funds must be in furtherance of the object of the club, which was not the case here. In the instant case, the surplus funds were not used for any specific service, infrastructure, maintenance or for any other direct benefit for the member of the club. These were taken out of mutuality when the member banks placed the same at the disposal of third parties, initiating an independent contract between the bank and the clients of the bank, a third party, not privy to the mutuality. This contract lacked the degree of proximity between the club and its members, which may in a distant and indirect way benefit the club, nonetheless, it cannot be categorised as an activity of the club in pursuit of its objectives. The second condition postulates a direct step with direct benefits to the functioning of the club. For the sake of arguments, one may draw remote connections with the most brazen commercial activities to a club’s functioning. However, such is not the design of the second condition. Therefore, it stood violated.
The facts at hand also failed to satisfy the third condition of the mutuality principle, i.e., the impossibility that contributors should derive profits from contributions made by themselves to a fund which could only be expended or returned to themselves. This principle required that the funds must be returned to the contributors as well as expended solely on the contributors. In the present case, the funds do return to the club. However, before that, they are expended on non-members, i.e., the clients of the bank. Banks generate revenue by paying a lower rate of interest to club-assessee, that makes deposits with them, and then loan out the deposited amounts at a higher rate of interest to third parties. This loaning out of funds of the club by banks to outsiders for commercial reasons, snaps the link of mutuality and thus, breached the third condition.
The Supreme Court further observed that there was nothing on record which showed that the banks made separate and special provisions for the funds that came from the club, or that they did not loan them out. Therefore, clearly, the club did not give, or get, the treatment a club gets from its members; the interaction between them clearly reflected one between a bank and its client.
According to the Supreme Court, in the present case, the interest accrued on the surplus deposited by the club like in the case of any other deposit made by an account holder with the bank.
The Supreme Court further observed that the assessee was already availing of the benefit of the doctrine of mutuality in respect of the surplus amount received as contributions or price for some of the facilities availed of by its members,before it was deposited with the bank. This surplus amount was not treated as income; since it was residue of the collections left behind with the club. A façade of a club cannot be constructed over commercial transactions to avoid liability to tax. Such setups cannot be permitted to claim double benefit of mutuality.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, unlike the aforesaid surplus amount itself, which is exempt from tax under the doctrine of mutuality, the amount of interest earned by the assessee from the banks would not fall within the ambit of the mutuality principle and would, therefore, be exigible to income-tax in the hands of the assessee-club.
Section 50C the Income-tax Act, 1961 —Substitution of full value of consideration in case of transfer of capital assets — Transfer of factory building by exchange of letter sans execution of agreement —Whether the AO justified in applying the provisions o
ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai.
Before D. K. Agarwal (J.M.) and D. Karunakara Rao (A.M.)
ITA No. 1785/Mum/2007
A. Ys. 2004-05. Decided on 6.5.2009
Counsel for assessee/Revenue : A. R. Shah/L. K. Agrawal
Per D. Karunakara Rao
Section 50C the Income-tax Act, 1961 —Substitution of full
value of consideration in case of transfer of capital assets — Transfer of
factory building by exchange of letter sans execution of agreement —Whether
the AO justified in applying the provisions of Section 50C — Held : No.
Facts :
The assessee was engaged in the business of cosmetics. In
view of huge debts payable to one of its suppliers amounting to Rs. 69.63 lacs,
the assessee transferred its factory building along with other assets like
plant and machinery, receivables, investments, etc. to the said supplier in
full and final settlement of its dues. The book value of the factory building
which was transferred, was Rs. 1.10 lacs. During the assessment proceedings,
the AO invoked the provisions of Section 50C and also made a reference to DVO
u/s. 50C(2) for valuing the said factory building. Based on the valuation made
by DVO, the AO made an addition of Rs. 14.95 lacs and taxed it as short-term
capital gains. The CIT(A) on appeal refused to accept the contention of the
assessee that the provisions of Section 50C are not applicable and upheld the
order of the AO.
Before the Tribunal the assessee highlighted the fact that
the said factory building was transferred by ‘exchange of letters’ and there
was no formal agreement executed between the assessee and the transferee. The
Revenue on the other hand contended that since the provisions of Sections 50
and 50C contain a reference to Section 48, the same were applicable to a case
of transfer of depreciable assets such as factory building. It was also
contended that the transfer of immovable properties require registration.
Held :
According to the Tribunal, for invoking the provisions of
Section 50C there must exist :
/ The
adoption or assessment by any authority of a State Government i.e.,
stamp valuation authority, for the purpose of payment of stamp duty in
respect of such transfer; and
/ The
consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer by an
assessee of a capital asset, being land or building or both, was less than
the value so adopted or assessed.
The Tribunal noted that in the case of the assessee the
transfer of the factory building was by way of book entries. There was neither
a sale deed not there was any adoption or assessment by any authority viz.,
stamp valuation authority for the purpose of payment of stamp duty. Under
these circumstances, it held that there was no case for application of the
provisions of Section 50C. For the same reason, it held that the provisions of
Section 50C(2) also does not apply. According to the Tribunal, the decision of
the Jodhpur Bench in the case of Navneet Kumar Thakkar supports the case of
the assessee.
Case referred to :
Navneet Kumar Thakkar (2007) 110 ITD 525 (Jodhpur).
Note :
All the decisions reported above are selected from the website
www.itatindia.com
Section 10A of the Income tax Act, 1961 —Exemption to new undertaking in FTZ — (i) Whether receipt by way of reimbursement of expense eligible for exemption — Held : Yes
ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai.
Before D. K. Agarwal (J.M.) and D. Karunakara Rao (A.M.)
ITA Nos. 6041 & 6568/Mum./2002
A. Ys. 2003-04 & 2004-05. Decided on 6.5.2009
Counsel for assessee/Revenue : A. R. Shah/L. K. Agrawal
Section 10A of the Income tax Act, 1961 —Exemption to new
undertaking in FTZ —
(i) Whether receipt by way of reimbursement of expense
eligible for exemption — Held : Yes
(ii) Whether AO justified in denying the exemption in a
case where export proceeds received after 6 months but within the period of
one year — Held : No.
Section 2(24) r.w. Section 36 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Taxability of
delayed payment of employees’ contribution to ESIC — Held it is taxable as
business income and not under the head ‘Income from other sources’.
Per Karunakara Rao
Facts :
The issues before the Tribunal were as under :
1. The assessee was denied exemption u/s. 10A in respect
of Rs. 0.35 lac received from Export Promotion Council by way of
reimbursement of exhibition participation costs. The corresponding expense
was incurred by the assessee in the earlier year. According to the AO, the
receipt cannot be said to have been derived from export activity, hence the
claim for exemption u/s. 10A qua the said receipt was denied by him.
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order holding that the proximate
source of the receipt was the grant and was not the export proceeds.
2. Whether the delayed payments towards the employees’
contribution to ESIC u/s. 2(24) r.w. Section 36 were chargeable under the
head ‘Income from other sources’ as held by the AO or as business income as
claimed by the assessee.
3. The assessee was denied exemption u/s. 10A in respect
of the sum of Rs. 21.16 lacs since, the same was received beyond the
specified period of 6 months.
Held :
1. The Tribunal relied on the Delhi Tribunal decision in
the case of Perot System TSI Ltd. It noted that the said decision was in the
context of reimbursement by the EXIM bank. According to the Tribunal, the
decision had generated the legal principle viz., where the expenses
which were reimbursed had direct link with the business of the assessee’s
undertaking, the same were eligible for exemption u/s. 10A. Applying the
said proposition, the Tribunal held that the reimbursed amount received from
Export Promotion Council was directly linked to the business of the
assssee’s undertaking and therefore, entitled to deduction u/s. 10A.
2. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee’s reasoning that
when the contribution was made in time, such payments were allowed as
business expenditure, accordingly, the disallowance if any made in this
regard could only give rise to business income. Accordingly, it was held
that the delayed payments towards the employees’ contribution to ESIC was
taxable as business income.
3. The Tribunal noted that as per Section 10A(3) below
Explanation 1, the RBI was authorised to grant extension to the said period
of 6 months. Accordingly, relying on the Circular No. 28 of 30.3.2001 and
Circular No. 91 of 1.4.2003, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee that for
the unit in the SEZ, the RBI has granted extension period of one year.
Hence, it was held that the export proceeds realised within the extended
period were eligible for exemption u/s. 10A.
Case referred to :
Perot System TSI Ltd. (2007) (16 SOT 350) (Delhi).
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 254 — Whether an order of the Tribunal can be recalled on the ground that it has been passed without considering decision cited in the course of hearing — Held : Yes.
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai.
Before M. A. Bakshi (VP) and Abraham P. George (AM)
MA No. 814/M/08 arising out of ITA No. 68/Mum/2004 and CO
166/Mum/07
A.Y. : Block Period 1.4.1989 to 14.9.1998.
Decided on : 2.4.2009.
Counsel for assessee/Revenue : Dharmesh Shah/R. S.
SrivastavaIncome-tax Act, 1961 — Section 254 — Whether an order of
the Tribunal can be recalled on the ground that it has been passed without
considering decision cited in the course of hearing — Held : Yes.
Per Abraham P. George :
Facts :
The assessee had filed an appeal to the Tribunal against
the block assessment order passed in his case. The two issues raised by the
assessee and the direction of the Tribunal thereon were as under :
The first issue was that the notice issued u/s. 158BD gave
the assessee less than 15 days time to file the return and therefore was
invalid. For this proposition the assessee had relied on the decision of
Special Bench (SB) in the case of Manoj Aggarwal. The Tribunal decided this
issue against the assessee by relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court
in the case of Shirish Madhukar Dalvi, where it was held that technical
defects mentioned in a notice u/s. 158BC would stand cured by S. 292B. The
second issue was that a notice u/s. 143(2) was not issued and therefore the
assessment was invalid. For this proposition reliance was placed on twelve
decisions. The Tribunal in its order dealt with only one of the decisions
viz. decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Bandana Gogoi and
found it to be contrary to the decision of the Special Bench in Navalkishore &
Sons. It set aside the assessment and remitted it back to the AO for
completing it after observance of procedural law relating to issue of various
notices under the Act.
The assessee filed a miscellaneous application requesting
the Tribunal to recall its order on both the issues. On the first issue the
assessee submitted that the decision of SB in the case of Manoj Aggarwal had
made a distinction between the provisions of S. 158BC and S. 158BD and also
that the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shirish Madhukar Dalvi dealt
with S. 158BC. On the second issue the assessee submitted that the Tribunal
had not considered the other decisions relied upon by the assessee. According
to the assessee, non-consideration of the decisions cited constituted an error
apparent from record. For this proposition reliance was placed on the decision
of the Bombay High Court in the case of Stanlek Engineering Pvt. Ltd. The
assessee vide this miscellaneous application requested that the order passed
by the Tribunal be recalled.
Held :
On the first issue the Tribunal, after noting that there
was an amendment to the provisions of S. 158BD and that the present case was
for a period before amendment of S. 158BD, held that there was a mistake
apparent on record in not considering the correct position of law and the
decision of SB in Manoj Aggarwal’s case in the correct perspective. On the
second issue the Tribunal noted that it had considered only one of the
decisions relied on by the assessee. Following the ratio of the decision of
the Bombay High Court in the case of Stanlek Engineering it held there was an
apparent mistake in the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal recalled its order
and directed hearing the appeal afresh.
Cases referred :
1 Stanlek Engineering Pvt. Ltd vs. CCE 229 ELT 61
(Bom)(2008).
2 Manoj Aggarwal vs. DCIT 113TTJ 377 (Del)(SB).
3 Shirish Madhukar Dalvi vs. DCIT 287 ITR 242 (Bom).
4 Bandana Gogoi vs. CIT 289 ITR 28 (Gau.)
5 Navalkishore & Sons Jeweller vs. DCIT 87 ITD 407
(Lucknow)(SB).
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 2(22)(e) — Whether in a case where a shareholder holding more than 10% of the shareholding in a company in which public are not substantially interested is a debenture holder of such a company and also has current account wi
ITAT ‘A-1’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and Abraham P. George (AM)
ITA No. 6481/Mum/2007
A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : April, 2009.
Counsel for assessee/Revenue : Madhusudhan Saraf & Rajiv
Khandelwal/R. S. SrivastavaIncome-tax Act, 1961 — Section 2(22)(e) — Whether in a
case where a shareholder holding more than 10% of the shareholding in a
company in which public are not substantially interested is a debenture holder
of such a company and also has current account with such a company, while
considering whether such a shareholder has taken a loan or advance from the
said company aggregate of balance in debenture account and also current
account needs to be considered —Held : Yes. Whether share premium account
forms part of accumulated profits for the purpose of S. 2(22)(e) — Held : No.
Per Abraham P. George :
Facts :
The assessee was a shareholder of Star Synthetics Pvt. Ltd.
(SSPL) having more than 10% of its shareholding. The assessee had also
subscribed to 4% non-secured convertible debentures issued by SSPL of
Rs.50,00,000. The Board resolution which approved the issue of debentures
provided that a debenture holder could have a current account with the
company, provided that the debit balance in current account could not exceed
the amount of debentures subscribed by the debenture holder. The Assessing
Officer (AO) noted that the assessee had two accounts with SSPL — one in his
individual name and another in the name of his proprietory concern. The
aggregate amount of loans taken by the assessee and his proprietary concern
from SSPL was Rs.23,65,000. SSPL had reserves of Rs.64,28,793. The AO regarded
the aggregate of amounts borrowed by assessee and his proprietary concern as
deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e).Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where he submitted that the AO ought to have considered the balance in
debenture account alongwith the balance in the current account of the assessee
and his proprietary concern, and if so considered the assessee did not owe any
amount to SSPL. He also submitted that while considering the amount of
accumulated profits of SSPL, the balance of share premium should not be
considered as forming part of accumulated profits. The CIT(A) was of the
opinion that since debentures are for a fixed period and bear a fixed rate of
interest, their nature is different from that of an unsecured loan. He
confirmed the addition made by the AO.Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.
Held :
The Tribunal after considering the meaning of the term
‘debenture’ as per various dictionaries and judicial precedents held that
debenture account is only a loan account and that while considering the amount
of loan taken by the assessee from SSPL the AO ought to have considered all
the three accounts viz. the debenture account, the assessee’s personal
account and the account of his proprietary concern and then concluded whether
the assessee has received any loan from SSPL.Since upon consideration of the balance in all the three
accounts in aggregate the assessee did not owe any money to SSPL, the addition
made by AO and confirmed by CIT(A) was deleted by the Tribunal.As regards inclusion of share premium in computation of
accumulated profits, the Tribunal found the issue to be covered in favour of
the assessee by the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Maipo India.
Cases referred :
1 DCIT vs. Maipo India Ltd., (116 TTJ 791)(Del.)
2 Narendra Kumar vs. UOI, (1960)(47 AIR 0430)(SC).
S. 37(1) : Expenditure pertaining to earlier year period claimed by assessee in the year when demand for same received allowed
(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)
13 ITO v. Premier Automobiles Ltd.
ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai
Before K. C. Singhal (JM) and
Abraham P. George (AM)
ITA No. 2049/Mum./2005
A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 17-1-2008
Counsel for revenue/assessee : S. C. Gupta/
Jayesh Dadia
S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Business expenditure —
Year of allowability — Expenditure pertaining to the earlier year period claimed
by the assessee in the year when demand for the same received — On the facts
expenditure claimed was allowed.
Per Singhal :
Facts :
During the year under consideration, the assessee had claimed
deduction of Rs.9.4 crore being compensation paid to Fiat India Pvt. Ltd. for
the use of the business premises and certain other facilities by the assessee
during the period from 1-0-1997 to 31-12-2000. According to the AO, the expense
related to earlier years, hence he disallowed the sum of Rs.8.78 crores,
allowing part of the expenditure which related to the year under appeal. On
appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.
Held :
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had transferred its
entire premises to Fiat India, who in turn had allowed the assessee to use
certain portion of the premises as well as certain other services like supply of
power, water, etc. Under the agreement no consideration was fixed for the use of
these facilities. Thus, according to the Tribunal, it cannot be said that any
liability arose under the agreement and consequently, the assessee could not
make any provision in the earlier years. The liability arose only when Fiat
India decided to charge the assessee in respect of the said premises and the
facilities used by the assessee. Therefore, it was held that liability accrued
only in the year under consideration and accordingly, the order of the CIT(A)
was upheld.
S. 30 : Expenditure on glass wall for better look of hotel is revenue expenditure
(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)
12 Fition Hotel v. ITO
ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai
Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and
Sushma Chowla (JM)
ITA No. 7035/Mum./2003
Decided on : 8-3-2007
Counsel for assessee/revenue : K. Shivaram/
K. Kamakshi
S. 30 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expenditure incurred on
construction of glass curtain wall for better look of hotel building — Whether
allowable as revenue expenditure — Held, Yes.
Per Sushma Chowla :
Facts :
The assessee was engaged in the business of running a hotel.
During the year under consideration it had spent a sum of Rs.7.06 lacs on
construction of glass curtain wall on the front side of the hotel, which was in
addition to the existing building wall. The assessee claimed that the entire
expenditure was revenue in nature which was incurred to improve the look of the
existing building and for trendy and better look to attract customers. According
to the AO, the work done was of enduring nature and held the same to be capital
in nature. On appeal, the CIT(A) observed that the expenses incurred by the
assessee resulted in creation of new assets, as it was an addition to the
existing hotel building.
Held :
According to the Tribunal, the glass curtain did not bring
into existence any new assets. The expenditure incurred was towards the
improvement of the look of the existing building which was about 20 years old.
The Tribunal further noted that the enhancement in the look of the building was
essential, as the assessee was in the business wherein customers are to be
attracted. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that there was no merit in holding
such expenditure as capital in nature and it allowed the expenditure claimed as
current repair.
S. 2(24) : Amount received in consideration of right to telecast films in five years is taxable equally in five years
(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)
11 Molly Boban v. ITO
ITAT Cochin Bench
Before N. Barathwaja Sankar (AM)
ITA No. 01 /Coch./2007
A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 11-3-2008
Counsel for assessee/revenue : R. Sreenivasan/
T. R. Indira
S. 2(24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Income — Year of
taxability — Amount received in consideration of right to telecast films for
five years — Whether assessee justified in claiming that the amount received is
taxable equally in each of the five years — Held, Yes.
Facts :
The assessee, an individual, was the world satellite telecast
right holder of certain feature films. In consideration for transfer of
exclusive rights to transmit, broadcast, etc. of four feature films to Asianet
for the period of five years, she was paid a sum of Rs.4 lacs. According to the
assessee, since the agreement was for the period of five years, the sum of Rs.4
lacs should be taxed over the said period of five years. However, the AO,
relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tuticorin Alkali
Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd., brought to tax the entire sum of Rs.4 lacs in the
year under appeal. The CIT(A) on appeal upheld the order of the AO and held that
the income was in the nature of royalty.
Held :
The Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee that she
had transferred/sold her rights in the said pictures for a period of five years,
which according to it, showed that the entire sum of Rs.4 lacs was the
consideration for the exercise of the rights by Asianet for a period of five
years. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee that
the sum of Rs.4 lacs had to be assessed in five years and not in the year under
appeal alone.
Case referred to :
Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd. v. CIT, 227
ITR 172 (SC)
Two-Day Orientation Workshop specially designed for fresh Articled Students, 26th & 27th April 2013, at the M.C. Ghia Hall, Fort, Mumbai
Workshop specially designed for fresh Articled Students, 26th & 27th
April 2013, at the M.C. Ghia Hall, Fort, Mumbai
L to R – Mr. Bharatkumar Oza, Mr. Mayur Nayak, Ms. Nina Kapasi, Ms. Smita Acharya
In
this workshop organised by the Human Resources Committee, the following
learned faculties imparted learning to the articled students, on the
topics mentioned below:
Press Conference, 29th April 2013, at the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, Mumbai
A Press Conference was organised by the BCAS Foundation to discuss and explain the 97th Amendment to the Constitution of India dated 13th January 2012 wherein under Article 19, the term “Co-operative Societies” has been inserted. As per the legal opinion of Senior Advocate Firoze Andhyarujina released at this Press Conference, “After the Constitutional Amendment and the status granted to the co-operative societies of self-governance, the RTI Act would be applicable to the Co-operative Society, more particularly after it being self-governed by the Maharashtra State Ordinance of 2013, laying down the by-laws, rule, regulations, procedure and modalities”. However, as per the opinion of the former Central Information Commissioner Shailesh Gandhi, who was the chief guest at the occasion, the Right to Information Act would not be applicable to co-operative societies of any kind, including co-operative housing societies. Leading luminary Mr. Julio Rebeiro, and Mr. Narayan Varma, Trustee, BCAS Foundation, also discussed the implications of this amendment. The conclusion at the meeting was, that the applicability of RTI Act to co-operative societies would have to be tested by filing some RTI applications to housing societies, and pursuing the matter in appeal until it reaches the High Court.
mPower Summit, 10th & 11th May 2013, at the West End Hotel, Mumbai
The mPower Summit, held on 10th & 11th May, 2013 at the West End Hotel, Mumbai, was designed to help professional firms focus on “Mergers, Managing Growth and Mentoring Talent”.
The 2-day Summit, attended by over 50 participants, was unique in many ways – the speakers were drawn from 4 cities and the participants from 11 cities. Most of the participants represented the leadership team of their professional firms.
The keynote speaker, Ketan Dalal, connected well with the audience as he took them through his journey from a family firm to the leadership team of a Big-4. His talk was candid and inspiring as he not only opened up the windows of opportunities, but also cautioned on the hurdles along the way. His strongest message to the forum was that managing people is the key to a professional services firm, no matter what the size may be. In his charismatic and emphatic way, he concluded “remember, people leave people, people do not leave organisations….
When you see talent walking out of your door, introspect on how you are nurturing your human capital”.
The first day had interesting sessions. Sundeep Gupta, Chartered Accountant from Delhi explained the merger process, the science and art of engaging with another professional firm and the need to ensure a cultural match prior to merging. Sujal Shah, Chartered Accountant played the devil’s advocate and explored the possibility of separating out a niche practice when the firm is considering a merger. He presented the audience with the ecstasy of creating one’s own institution built on one’s values and belief system and nurturing a niche area as opposed to becoming a part of a large set up having multiple service lines.
The first day concluded with a session by the Committee Chairman Ameet Patel, Chartered Accountant who awakened the audience to the need for innovation in the professional services firm – he stressed on the need for providing innovative solutions for clients as also for the internal functioning of the firm. He smartly presented the pressing need for professional services firms to shift focus from delivery to discovery – from execution to innovation – from time based billing to value pricing.
The highlight of the Summit was the uplifting session by Padmashri T. N. Manoharan, Chartered Accountant where he spoke of the role of the senior partners in creating an institution. With anecdotes and real life examples, he touched the hearts of the audience as he explained that “we are all mortal individuals with the power to create lasting institutions”. His humility reflected in his participating in the entire 2-day Summit as a quiet observer and his leadership reflected in the values and vision that he rolled out in his talk.
The next session, by Nandita Parekh, Chartered Accountant, Convenor of the Committee and the co-architect of the Summit, spelt out the formula for “living happily ever after” post a professional merger. She emphasised the need for a Code of Conduct, succession plan for the leadership of the firm and strategy for nurturing and retaining talent. Her illustrated presentation drove home the points with ease, as also added some colour to the event.
The next session by Sagar Shah, Chartered Accountant from Pune, rolled out a strategy for growth through geographic spread and networking. Young and energetic, he showed the participants the wonders that can be achieved with a clear focus, with a well-defined strategy and with mastering technology. He shared the HR initiatives taken by his firm to ensure excellence, excitement and energy at all levels. A very interesting remark by him about how unimportant one’s own name was in the context of overall growth of one’s firm was an eye opener for the participants.
The last session, “Of the Participants, By the Participants, For the Participants” ably anchored by Ameet Patel, Chartered Accountant provided a grand finale to an Empowering Summit where each of the participants shared their key ‘take aways‘ from the Summit.
The mPower Summit, a third in the series of Power summits, has been successful in taking forward BCAS image as an innovator and as an organisation which addresses the need of its members even before they become a necessity. The vision of the committee in identifying the need and designing the Summit year after year has provided a legacy that needs to be continued. May the Power summit of the BCAS be the meeting place for future partners and the starting point for lasting relationships!
Half-day training workshop on Empathy, 16th April 2013, at the Navinbhai Thakkar Board Room, Vile Parle, Mumbai
The Human Resources Committee organised this workshop as a continuation of the leadership camp conducted earlier with the theme of “Living in Harmony”. The learned faculty Shri M. K. Ramanujam guided the participants on Empathy and discussed various connected issues such as Feeling, Emotions, Understanding and Empathising. The learned faculty also discussed Triggers of Anger and shared tips on Anger Management. The workshop received very good response and participants gained immensely from the wealth of knowledge and experience shared by the speakers.
Difficulties being Faced by Charitable Organisations on account of the first proviso of s.2(15)
To
The Chairperson,
Central Board of Direct Taxes,
New Delhi.
Madam,
representation
Re: Difficulties being Faced by Charitable Organisations on account of the first proviso of s.2(15)
We wish to draw your attention to the harassment and difficulties being caused to genuine charitable organisations in Mumbai on account of the farfetched interpretation being adopted by assessing officers on the provisions of the first proviso to section 2(15).
Various charitable organisations running educational institutions and carrying on various other forms of charity, including relief of poverty, have been denied the exemption under section 11 by assessing officers, on the ground that the first proviso to section 2(15) applies to them. This is notwithstanding the fact that the CBDT has clarified vide its circular number 11 of 2008 dated 19.12.2008, that the first proviso to section 2(15) does not apply to the first 3 limbs of the definition of “charitable purpose” under section 2(15), and only applies to the last limb, advancement of any other object of general public utility.
We would like to draw your attention to the fact that this is likely to lead to substantial litigation, locking up of money intended for charitable purposes in payment of taxes pending disposal of appeals, resulting in the ultimate beneficiaries of such charities losing out on the benefits that they would otherwise have got from such charitable organisations. A significant impact is already being felt on the charitable activities being carried out, with many trusts having decided to scale down their activities, due to their funds being locked up in tax litigation.
In fact, earlier also, the definition of “charitable purpose” included the words “not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit” from 1961 till 1983. At that time as well, there had been substantial litigation on this aspect, including various decisions of the Supreme Court and many high courts. It was with the purpose of putting an end to this litigation that these words were omitted by the Finance Act, 1983 with effect from 1st April 1984. Reintroducing such provisions in the form of the first proviso to section 2(15) has again revived this litigation, which surely cannot be the intention behind this amendment.
It is submitted that the business carried on by a charitable trust could be of 3 kinds –
(a) where the business itself is the main object of the trust,
(b) where the business is incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, and
(c) where the business is in no way connected to the objects of the trust, but is a property held upon trust.
In businesses of type (a) above, if carrying on of the business itself is the main object, the trust would not be regarded as charitable, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust 101 ITR 234, as the charitable purpose itself would be merely a sham. This was the position even prior to the insertion of the first proviso to section 2(15).
In businesses of type (b) above, the provisions of section 11(4A) would apply, and the trust was entitled to exemption of such income if separate books of accounts were maintained, prior to the insertion of the first proviso to section 2(15). This position continues for trusts engaged in activities other than that of the advancement of any other object of general public utility, and it is only trusts engaged in this residuary object of advancement of any other object of general public utility, which should lose the benefit of exemption after the insertion of the first proviso to section 2(15).
In businesses of type (c) above, the provisions of section 11(4) read with section 11(4A) applied prior to the insertion of the first proviso to section 2(15). Even after the amendment, such businesses continue to enjoy the benefit of exemption where the objects of the trust are not those of advancement of any other object of general public utility.
The purpose of the amendment was to ensure that trusts do not carry on business in the garb of charity. However, the amendment made by insertion of the first proviso to section 2(15) is unfortunately being interpreted by assessing officers as a blanket prohibition on carrying on of businesses by all charitable trusts. Again, assessing officers are treating all types of activities as business, including activities of mere letting of premises, conduct of educational courses, etc. This results in denial of exemption to a large number of genuine charitable organisations, which certainly does not seem to have been the intention behind the amendment.
It is therefore strongly suggested that the following amendments be carried out:
1. Both the provisos to section 2(15) be deleted;
2. Section 11(4) be amended to provide that “property held under trust” shall not include a business undertaking so held; and
3. Section 11(4A) be amended by inserting a proviso to that subsection to the effect that a business shall not be regarded as incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust merely on account of the fact that the income from such business feeds the charitable purposes.
These amendments will ensure that in all cases where business carried on by a trust is unrelated to its objects, the business income would be subjected to tax, and the trust would not lose exemption in respect of its other income which is actually utilised for its charitable purposes. As mentioned earlier, where the main object itself is the carrying on of a business, in any case, the trust would not be entitled to exemption, as the object would not be regarded as charitable, in light of the Supreme Court decision in Loka Shikshana Trust.
This amendment will also ensure that genuine charitable trusts do not suffer the harassment of efforts to treat charitable activity carried on by such trusts as business activity, and will not be denied exemptions on that ground.
We trust you will make efforts to implement our suggestions at the earliest, so as to enable charitable trusts to focus on their charitable activities, rather than on tax litigation.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully
Coalgate – Hysteria over individual culpability at the expense of institutional change is futile
Take the coal scam. What precisely is the scam? Once a framework of state monopoly in coal mining is taken for granted, as also that monopoly’s incapacity to mine sufficient quantities to meet the demand, it makes sense to allow those who use coal as a vital input to have their own captive mines. In this framework, the sources of government revenue are royalty on the mined coal and taxes on the profits generated from the use of coal. These accrue, regardless of the identity of the captive miners. So, the malfeasance in allocating captive mines to cronies lies not so much in loss of revenue for the government as in some entities arguably more entitled to the mines losing them to those less deserving.
Two things make access to domestic coal scamworthy: state monopoly in coal leading to shortages and repressed pricing at a discount to imported coal. Remove these two features, and auction coal mines to whoever offers the highest lease rental/ royalty/revenue share, there would be no more coal scams. But such institutional remedies are not on anyone’s mind. The closest thing to a policy remedy on the agenda is auctioning captive mines, which is a flawed, suboptimal solution. Differential importance of coal in different industries calls for separate, industry-wise auctions of captive mines. Instead of holistic policy remedies, the entire debate is on fixing culpability at individual and political levels. Such arbitrary grant of mines and other patronage have been part and parcel of the default mode of funding politics in India — through the proceeds of corruption. The systemic solution is to institute complete transparency as to the source of every paisa collected and spent by politicians and political parties. This interests few.
And the few institutional reforms that are in vogue are horrendous. Take the demand to make the CBI autonomous of the government, implicit in the criticism of the agency sharing its draft status report on coal allocation with officials in the Prime Minister’s Office, the coal ministry and the law minister. Can the CBI get clarity on intricate policy details without interacting with the concerned officials? And what is wrong if its report is vetted for accuracy by the same officials who have been helping the CBI formulate its report, before submission to the court? Will not any attempt to manipulate the findings be exposed before the courts? The only guarantee against police/investigative agencies going rogue is multiple lines of accountability to different institutions, the government, the courts, a committee of Parliament and the human rights watchdog.
Freeing the parrot – Govt cannot brazen out Supreme Court’s observations
The Court also addressed itself to the central question of the CBI’s investigation, making explicit a threat that it had earlier made implicitly – that if the government does not legislate proper independence for the CBI, the SC will step in and do something. This is a warning that the government cannot afford to overlook. There would be legitimate concerns about an unaccountable super-cop, but the situation is such that the government must work post-haste on legislative safeguards for the CBI against political interference. Naturally, controls for the CBI will have to be worked in to any solution, but it is clear that the current system is not working and that the SC’s patience, like that of the public, is at an end. The SC on this occasion chose to drag former CBI DIG Ravi Kant Mishra back from the Intelligence Bureau to head the investigation into coal-block allocations.
Politically, the Court’s strictures could not have been worse; the SC has found impropriety in the actions of both the law minister and of the bureaucrats of the coal ministry and the prime minister’s office. Before the SC spoke, the prime minister said in Parliament that he was “seized of the issue” and that “action would be taken”. That action should include a clear accounting of guilt, as well as the dismissal of the law minister and the Attorney General. And, finally, a draft for statutory independence of the CBI must be prepared.
Vested interest has a say in India’s policy making: Shell
Citing Paul Krugman’s three ‘I’s—ignorance, interests and ideology — that do not let things happen when they should rationally be happening, Bentham said he had added two more to these —institutional inadequacy and inertia. According to him, all five factors were present in India.z
Bentham’s comments come at a time when India’s energy sector is mired in controversies around pricing and contractual and allocation issues.
“As a business, we cannot do with an energy ministry. We have issues fragmented across different departments, each of which has its different agenda, which is not very well joined up here,” he told Business Standard in an interview.
The presence of such elements brings up the question whether “transitional changes are trapped and is there a room to maneuver”. Bentham later presented to an industry audience the ‘New Shell Scenarios’, which looks at the trends in the economy, politics and energy as far ahead as 2100.
The first scenario, labelled “mountains”, sees a strong role for the government and introduction of firm and far-reaching policy measures. These help develop more compact cities and transform the global transport network. New policies unlock plentiful natural gas resources, making it the largest global energy source by the 2030s, and accelerate carbon capture and storage technology supporting a cleaner energy system.
The other scenario is of “oceans”, a more prosperous and volatile world. Energy demand surges due to strong economic growth. Power is more widely distributed and governments take longer to agree to major decisions. Market forces, rather than policies, shaped the energy system: oil and coal remain part of the energy mix but renewable energy also grows. By the 2070s, solar becomes the world’s largest energy source.
Bentham said India was developing more “oceancentric” and was growing economically. He said India needed to look more into developing of infrastructure to deal with the supply and demand issues in the energy sector.
“On supply, India is already a significant component in the global energy consumption and is going to be 10-15 per cent of global energy in the decades ahead. For that, you need to have infrastructure.”
That not only enables “supply investments”, but also ports and the railways participating in global economy. On the demand side also infrastructure questions are there. Important here is to develop cities in a planned way.
He indicated the country should look more into how it could participate in the energy scenario of South Asia and Asia Pacific. “It has to look into how to take advantage of the developments in global shale gas? Not only necessarily in encouraging production here, but also opening up opportunities globally,” he added.
Scope of Revision of orders by the Commissioner u/s.263
Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) corresponding to section 33B of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (‘the 1922 Act’) was inserted in the statute with the main objective of arming the Commissioner of Income-tax (‘CIT’) with the powers of revising any order of the Assessing Officer (‘AO’), where the order is erroneous and resulted in prejudice to the interest of the Revenue. Prior to the introduction of section 33B in the 1922 Act, the Department had no right of appeal against any order passed by the AO and therefore, it was necessary to provide the CIT with the powers of revision.
While the power is not meant to be a substitute for the power of the AO to make assessment, the same can certainly be exercised when the order of the AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Whether or not the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue has to be decided from case to case.
The relevant provisions of section 263 reads as under:
“263(1) The Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the Assessing Officer is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and making or causing to made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment . . . . .”
The controversy discussed here revolves around the scope of revisional power of the CIT — whether it extends to issues examined by the AO but not discussed in the assessment order.
The Karnataka High Court recently had an occasion to deal with this issue, wherein the Court held that an assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, if the AO has not given any conclusion and finding on the ground of revision in the assessment order, thereby, justifying the exercise of powers of revision u/s.263. In deciding the issue, the Karnataka High Court dissented with the earlier findings of the Bombay and Delhi High Courts on the subject.
Gabriel India’s case
Upon completion of assessment, the CIT issued notice u/s.263 on the ground that there was an error in the order of the AO in allowing the deduction of the amount, as it was capital in nature. The CIT did not accept the contention of Gabriel that there was proper application of mind by the AO, before allowing the claim of expenditure as revenue in nature.
On appeal by Gabriel to the Tribunal, the Tribunal concluded that the action of the CIT was not in accordance with the provisions of section 263.
Being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the Revenue appealed to the High Court. The High Court, after the considering the facts of the case and perusing the orders of lower authorities, opined that the power of suo moto revision u/s.263(1) was in the nature of supervisory jurisdiction and could be exercised only if the circumstances specified therein existed.
Two circumstances must exist to enable the CIT to exercise power of revision u/s.263:
— The order of AO must be erroneous; and
— By virtue of the order being erroneous, prejudice is caused to the interest of the Revenue.
The High Court held that if the AO acting in accordance with law makes certain assessment, it cannot be termed as erroneous by the CIT simply because according to him the order should have been written more elaborately. The section does not visualise a case of substitution of judgment of the CIT for that of the AO, who has passed the order, unless the decision is held to be erroneous.
The High Court further observed that the AO had exercised the quasi-judicial power vested in him in accordance with law and arrived at a conclusion. Such a conclusion could not be termed as erroneous simply because the CIT did not feel satisfied with the conclusion. In such a case, in the opinion of the CIT, the order may be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, but it cannot be held to be erroneous for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s.263. According to the Court, for an order to be erroneous, it must be an order which is not in accordance with the law or which has been passed by the AO without making any inquiry in undue haste. The Court noted that though the words ‘prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue’ have not been defined, but it must mean that the orders of assessment challenged are such as are not in accordance with law, in consequence whereof the lawful revenue due to the State has not been realised or cannot be realised. [Following Dawjee Dadabhoy & Co. v. S. P. Jain & Anr., (31 ITR 872) (Cal.) and Addl. CIT v. Mukur Corporation, (111 ITR 312) (Guj.)]
The High Court also observed that for re-examination and reconsideration of an order of assessment, which had already been concluded and controversy about which had been set at rest, to be set again in motion, must be subject to some record available with the CIT and should not be based on the whims and caprice of the revising authority. The High Court made the following specific observations as regards the issue under consideration to uphold the contention of the Tribunal, which is as under: “The ITO in this case had made enquiries in regard to the nature of expenditure incurred by the assessee. The assessee had given detailed explanation in that regard by a letter in writing . . . . . Such a decision of the ITO cannot be held to be ‘erroneous’ simply because in his order he did not make elaborate discussions in that regard . . . . . Moreover, in the instant case, the CIT himself, even after initiating proceedings for revision and hearing the assessee, could not say that the allowance of the claim of the assessee was erroneous . . . . . He simply asked the AO to re-examine the matter. That in our opinion is not permissible.”
Ashish Rajpal case
The issue under consideration had also come up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Ashish Rajpal, (320 ITR 674). In that case, in the course of scrutiny, several communications were addressed by the assessee to the AO, whereby the information, details and documents sought for, were adverted to and filed, which were subject to grounds of revision u/s.263. On challenge before the Tribunal by the assessee of the powers of revision of the CIT, the Tribunal held that the assessee had filed all the relevant details and there was due application of mind by the AO on the grounds of revision. Therefore, merely because the assessment order did not refer to the queries raised during the course of the scrutiny and the response of the assessee thereto, it could not be said that there was no enquiry and that the assessment was therefore erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
On appeal by the Revenue before the High Court, similar conclusions were arrived at and the exercise of the revisional power of the CIT, on the ground that there was lack of proper verification by the AO, was found to be unsustainable. Further, the High Court, after considering the decisions on the subject, explained the meaning of the expression ‘erroneous’ and ‘prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue’ as under:
“…..(iii) An order is erroneous when it is contrary to law or proceeds on an incorrect assumption of facts or is in breach of principles of natural justice or is passed without application of mind, that is, is stereotyped, inasmuch as, the AO, accepts what is stated in the return of the assessee without making any enquiry called for in the circumstances of the case, that is, proceeds with ‘undue haste’. [See Gee Vee Enterprises v. ACIT, (99 ITR 375) (Del.)]
(iv) The expression ‘prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue’, while not to be confused with the loss of tax, will certainly include an erroneous order which results in a person not paying tax which is lawfully payable to the Revenue. [See Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (243 ITR 83)]”
Infosys Technologies’ case
The issue under consideration came up recently before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd., (341 ITR 293).
Infosys had claimed certain deductions for A.Y. 1995-96 and A.Y. 1996-97 towards its tax liability on account of tax deducted at source (‘TDS’) from payments received in respect of its business activities in Canada and Thailand. The aggregate tax relief as claimed as per Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (‘DTAA’) under India-Canada tax treaty and India-Thailand tax treaty for A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97 were Rs.18,12,897 and Rs.48,59,285, respectively. The AO, during the course of original assessment proceedings, after considering the submissions and records of Infosys duly allowed the tax relief as claimed by it under the respective treaties.
However, the CIT, on a consideration of non-speaking order of the AO on the aforesaid tax relief so allowed and in light of Article 23(2) of the India-Canada DTAA and Article 23(3) of the India-Thailand DTAA, was of the view that the order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The CIT exercised his powers u/s.263 of the Act and remanded the matter to the file of the AO to ascertain the exact tax relief to which Infosys was entitled under respective tax treaties.
On appeal by Infosys before the Tribunal, the revisional orders of the CIT u/s.263 were set aside by the Tribunal vide a common order, on the ground that the orders passed by the AO were not shown as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue by the CIT.
The Revenue, aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, appealed to the Karnataka High Court. After considering the arguments of the respective sides and perusing the orders of the lower authorities, the High Court accepted the fact that the CIT in his order does not anywhere explicitly show as to how the order of the AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The High Court held that the object of section 263 is to raise revenue for the state. The said provision is intended to plug leakage of revenue by erroneous orders passed by the lower authorities, whether by mistake or in ignorance or even by design.
Reference was made by the Karnataka High Court to the observations of the Supreme Court in the cases of Electro House (82 ITR 824) and Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (supra) to hold that since the AO had not disclosed the basis on which the tax reliefs were arrived at in the assessment order, which being important for determination of tax liability, there was definitely a possibility of the order being both erroneous and prejudicial. The ratios of the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of Gabriel India (supra) and the Delhi High Court in the case of Ashish Rajpal (supra) were referred to but were considered as not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Court held that the argument that the materials had been placed before the AO and therefore, the AO had applied his mind to the same could not be accepted to restrict the power of the CIT to revise the orders u/s.263.
Further, the following specific findings were made by the High Court as regards the issue under consideration to uphold the exercise of revisional power of the CIT u/s.263:
“We are of the clear opinion that there cannot be any dichotomy of this nature as every conclusion and finding by the assessing authority should be supported by reasons, however brief it may be, and in a situation where it is only a question of computation in accordance with the relevant articles of a DTAA and that should be clearly indicated in the order of the assessing authority, whether or not the assessee had given particulars or details of it. It is the duty of the assessing authority to do that and if the assessing authority has failed in that, more so in extending a tax relief to the assessee, the order definitely constitutes an order not merely erroneous but also prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue…….”
Further the AO, pursuant to the directions of the CIT u/s.263, had re-examined the tax reliefs, resulting in some reduction of tax relief to Infosys. On appeal by the assessee before the CIT(A) and further before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had set aside the fresh assessment on the ground that the revisional jurisdiction of the CIT u/s.263 had been set aside at that point in time and the appeal against such fresh assessment by Infosys was accordingly allowed with necessary tax reliefs. Aggrieved by this Tribunal order, the Revenue had appealed against this order to the High Court, which appeal was clubbed with the appeals against the orders u/s.263. The High Court, on taking cogni-zance of these facts, set aside the matters to the file of the Tribunal, for deciding the issue on merits and in accordance with law.
Observations
Recently, the Full Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of CIT v. Jawahar Bhattacharjee, (67 DTR 217), after extensively considering the legal decisions and precedents on the subject, explained the expression ‘erroneous’ assessment in context of section 263 is an ‘assessment made on wrong assumption of facts or on incorrect application of law or without due application of mind or without following the principles of natural justice.’ Though the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of Gabriel India Ltd. (supra) and the Delhi High Court in the case of Ashish Rajpal (supra) were not specifically referred to in the aforesaid decision, the ratio of these judgments were accepted by the Full Bench in the decision.
The Karnataka High Court in the case of Infosys Technologies Ltd. (supra) has held that the AO should record reasons for his conclusions and findings in the assessment order, irrespective of whether the issue has been accepted or not by the AO. In case the assessment order does not contain the reasons for his findings and conclusions, then it may be construed as an order which is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, whereby the action of revision by the CIT shall be justified u/s.263.
This interpretation would subject the concluded assessments of the assessees to revision by the CIT for want of duty not performed by the AO in recording reasons for his findings and conclusions in his orders. In other words, the assessees may be penalised for want of non-performance of the duty by the AO. If one were to construe the provisions of section 263 in such a manner, then all settled issues which are concluded at the assessment stage after due application of mind by the AO, may also be subject to revision by the CIT. Such a construction of the expression ‘erroneous order and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue’ by the Karnataka High Court is clearly in contradiction to the Full Bench of the Gauhati High Court and other High Courts as referred to above.
In addition to the above, the following decisions have also held that merely because the AO should have gone deeper into the matter or should have made more elaborate discussion could not be a ground for exercising power u/s.263:
- CIT v. Development Credit Bank Ltd., (323 ITR 206) (Bom.);
- CIT v. Hindustan Marketing and Advertising Co. Ltd., (341 ITR 180) (Del.);
- CIT v. Ganpati Ram Bishnoi, (296 ITR 292) (Raj.);
- CIT v. Unique Autofelts (P) Ltd., (30 DTR 231) (P&H);
- Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT, (263 ITR 437) (P&H); and
- CIT v. Goyal Private Family Specific Trust, (171 ITR 698) (All.).
Further, from the limited facts as understood from the order, the Karnataka High Court also failed to appreciate that the material as filed by Infosys during the course of assessment before the AO for the claim of tax relief was also available for consideration before the CIT. However, the CIT, instead of considering the materials on record and then reaching the necessary conclusions, chose to remand the matter to the file of the AO for re-examination without giving any reasons and findings for satisfaction as to how the tax relief so claimed by the assessee was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The CIT, in that case, seems to have relied on the text of the impugned Articles of the DTAAs to remand the matter to the file of the AO for re-examination, without taking cognizance of the material filed by the assessee before the AO for claim of tax reliefs or pointing out any specific defects in the application of the impugned articles. The CIT has also in his order seems to have neither opined, nor demonstrated how the conditions provided under the respective tax treaties were not fulfilled by the assessee or satisfied only for a particular amount out of the total tax relief claimed. Under similar circumstances on different issues, the Bombay High Court in the case of Gabriel India Ltd. (supra), after elaborate discussions as reproduced above, had set aside the revisional order of the CIT.
Though it may sound paradoxical, the Karnataka High Court while expecting the AO, being a quasi-judicial authority, to record the reasons and conclusions for the findings in the assessment order, it allowed the CIT, also a quasi-judicial authority, to exercise the revisional power, though the satisfaction and reasons were not recorded for holding the order of the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The powers of revision had been exercised by the CIT merely on the ground of a doubt that the AO had not properly applied his mind in carrying out the procedural aspect of allowing the tax relief as per the impugned Articles under consideration and because the assessment order did not discuss the issue.
While one appreciates that the CIT u/s.263 is never required to come to a firm conclusion before exercising his powers of revision, it is equally true that the CIT being a quasi-judicial authority, is also required to satisfy himself and give reasons before invoking the powers of revision. This legal proposition is also approved in the following decisions rendered in the context of section 263:
- CIT v. T. Narayana Pai, (98 ITR 422) (Kar.);
- CIT v. Associated Food Products, (280 ITR 377) (MP);
- CIT v. Jai Mewar Wine Contractors, (251 ITR 785) (Raj.);
- CIT v. Duncan Brothers, (209 ITR 44) (Cal.) — an order of the CIT not bringing any cogent materials on record and based only on certain hypothesis is unsustainable;
- CIT v. Kanda Rice Mills, (178 ITR 446) (P&H);
- CIT v. Trustees, Anupam Charitable Trust, (167 ITR 129) (Raj.) — the error envisaged in this section is not one which depends on possibility or guesswork, it should be actually an error either of fact or of law; and
- CIT v. R. K. Metal Works, (112 ITR 445) (P&H);
Without prejudice to the aforesaid discussions, it would be relevant to mention that in the case of Infosys Technologies (supra), the reference to the observations of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Electro House (supra) and Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) may not help the case for justification of exercise of revisional power by the CIT u/s.263. While the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Electro House (supra) dealt with the question of whether it is necessary to issue notice to the assessee before assuming jurisdiction u/s.33B of the 1922 Act (corresponding to section 263) vis-à-vis requirements of issue of notice u/s.34 of the 1922 Act (corresponding to section 148, section 149 and section 150), the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) had a specific finding of fact that the AO had undertaken assessment in absence of any supporting material and without making any inquiry, which does not seem to be the case in Infosys Technologies matter (supra).
In light of the above, the findings of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Infosys Technologies Ltd. (supra) may require reconsideration. Otherwise, practically, considering the manner in which orders are passed by the AOs, wherein the reasons for the conclusions and findings are only spelt out with regard to the issues where the claims of the assessees are not accepted, such a view may give a free hand to the CIT to exercise powers of revision u/s.263 in almost all cases and revise all such settled assessments, which is unwarranted.
Further, judicial propriety and judicial discipline required that the case of Infosys Technologies Ltd. (supra) should have been referred to a Larger Bench of the Karnataka High Court, particularly considering that the same High Court in the case of T. Narayana Pai (supra) had decided otherwise regarding want of satisfaction and recording of a finding by the CIT in the context of section 263.
The view taken by the Bombay and Delhi High Courts, that revision cannot be resorted to in cases where the relevant information has been examined by the Assessing Officer, though not recorded in the assessment order, therefore seems to be the better view.
GAAR — are safeguards adequate?
Now, the discussion on the issue as to whether or not India should have GAAR has become irrelevant after its introduction in the Finance Bill. At this moment arguably, pertinent discussion could be about whether or not GAAR has enough safeguards that address the concerns of the taxpayers. Common concerns of the most taxpayers are that GAAR gives too much power to the tax authorities; it will also hit genuine tax planning schemes and it creates uncertainty as it cannot be predicted as to which arrangements will be hit by GAAR.
Many countries such as Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, South Africa, and Spain among others have safeguards in varying degrees in their GAAR responding to the similar concerns expressed in their jurisdictions. This article discusses the safeguards in the Indian provisions and particularly, the safeguard provided by Australia, Canada, and UK on Panel akin to the Approving Panel in Indian GAAR.
- Safeguards in the Indian GAAR GAAR has now the following safeguards after the amendments to the Finance Bill, 2012: The burden of application of GAAR rests with the tax authority.
- Assessing Officer (AO) can invoke GAAR only after obtaining the approval of the Approving Panel.
- The Approving Panel will have an ‘Independent Member’.
- AO can pass Order only after the approval of the Commissioner.
- Taxpayer can avail the facility of the Advance Ruling on GAAR.
The Government has also formed a committee for drafting and recommending the Rules and the Guidelines for the implementation of GAAR. The Guidelines are almost certain to specify a monetary threshold for invoking GAAR and may incorporate the Parliamentary Committee’s recommendation that the AO should record the reasons before applying GAAR.
Burden of proof is on the Department
The earlier version of GAAR had one of the most criticised provision under which the taxpayer was responsible for proving that the GAAR is not applicable to it. In the amended Bill, this particular provision is deleted to bring it in line with other tax charging provisions. Now, the burden of proving the applicability of the GAAR in a particular case rests with the tax authority.
Approving Panel
GAAR has provided one more safeguard in the form of the Approving Panel. The provision on the Approving Panel in the clause 144BA of the Finance Bill is as under:
- The AO has to make a reference to the Commissioner for invoking GAAR.
- The Commissioner shall provide an opportunity of being heard to the taxpayer on receipt of the reference. He shall refer the matter to the Approving Panel if he is not satisfied by the reply of the taxpayer and is of the opinion that GAAR provisions are required to be invoked. The Commissioner shall also decide as to whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement or not when the taxpayer does not object or reply.
- The Approving Panel after providing an opportunity to be heard to the taxpayer has to dispose of the reference within six months after examining material and if necessary, after getting further inquiry conducted. The disposal could be either by declaring an arrangement to be impermissible or by declaring it to be not impermissible.
The AO will determine the consequences of such declaration of an arrangement as ‘impermissible avoidance arrangement’.
- Every direction of the Approving Panel shall be binding on the AO and the AO shall complete the proceedings in accordance with the directions only after the approval of the Commissioner.
- The period taken by the proceedings before the Commissioner and the Approving Panel shall be excluded from the time limitation for the completion of assessment. l The Approving Panel shall comprise of minimum three members. Out of which, two members would be of the Income-tax Department of the rank of Commissioner or above and third ‘independent’ member would be from the Indian Legal Service not below the rank of Joint Secretary.
- The Board may make rules for the procedure, for efficient working of the Panel and for expeditious disposal of references.
This proposed Section is largely based on the provision under UK’s draft law on GAAR2. For appreciating the issues involved in Approving Panel, it might be worthwhile to peruse the information on similar panels formed by Australia and Canada as well as proposed Panel of UK for the application of GAAR.
Role of the Approving Panel
Australia3 (GAAR Panel) and Canada4 (GAAR Committee) have non-statutory, advisory or consultative body to assist tax officers in administration of GAAR and to ensure consistency in approach in application of GAAR. In both the countries, although the Tax Officer finally decides as to whether or not to apply GAAR, he considers the advice given by the Panel before taking the decision. Similarly, UK’s proposed statutory Advisory Panel also shall give only its opinion as to whether there is reasonable ground for the application of GAAR5. The Indian Approving Panel neither is an advisory in nature, nor is mandated to assist the AO on the application of GAAR. Neither the clause 144BA elaborate, nor the ‘explanatory notes to the Finance Bill’ explain the role of the Approving Panel. This ambiguity can create different expectations among taxpayers as it has happened in the case of the ‘Dispute Resolution Panel’ (DRP).
Many taxpayers see the DRP as an adjudicating body on a dispute between the taxpayer and the Department. This expectation is because of the words ‘dispute resolution’ used for the Panel along with the lack of clarity on its role. On the other hand, many Departmental officers perceive DRP as an administrative safety mechanism to prevent inappropriate application of law against a taxpayer. Their justification is based on the argument that, the Law does not intend to have an appellate level between the AO and the Tribunal even before the order is passed. Moreover, DRP cannot be an adjudicating body, as it does not have necessary powers to function as an Appellate Court.
The role of the Approving Panel appears to be of an administrative in nature for ‘approving’ or ‘disapproving’ applicability of GAAR, a function similar to that of the Range head (Additional Commissioner) who approves some of the AO’s orders6. However, in absence of clarity, officers on the Panel may consider that it is their job to ensure successful invoking of GAAR in deserving cases. Therefore, they also may give directions to strengthen the case of the Department. On the other hand, the taxpayer would like to have a neutral body in which the panel should decide against the Department in weak cases rather than the Panel issuing directions to strengthen the Department’s case. Therefore, elaboration of the Panel’s role will help all in its functioning.
Composition of the Panel
The Parliamentary Standing Committee has recommended that the Departmental body should not review application of GAAR but an independent body should review it. The Committee has suggested that the Chief Commissioner should head the reviewing body and it should have two independent technical members. However, the Government has decided to form a Panel consisting of the senior Tax Officers and an Officer of Indian Legal Service as against the arguments for having non-Governmental independent members. Now the composition of the Panel appears to be more balanced than what was previously proposed, although taxpayers would have preferred to have non-Governmental independent member on the Approving Panel.
The Australian GAAR Panel consists of senior tax officers, businessmen and professional experts. The Panel is headed by a senior Tax Officer7. UK’s Advisory Panel is proposed to be to be chaired by an independent person and will have a tax officer and an independent member having experience in area relevant to the activity involved in the arrangement8. Whereas, the Canadian GAAR Committee consists of the representatives from the different departments of the Government such as Department of Legislative Policy, Tax Avoidance and Income-tax Rulings. The Committee also has lawyers and representatives from the Department of Finance of the Government.9
Presence of the non-governmental independent members on the Approving Panel gives more confidence to taxpayers in its decisions. Tax-payers perceive such a panel to be fair and unbiased. It also results in external review of the Departments’ work on GAAR and makes the Department some-what accountable to external systems.
However, having independent non-governmental member in the Committee raises different issues, such as such member’s eligibility criteria, transparency in selection process, tenure, etc. Having non-Governmental independent members on the Panel also raises the issue of protection of taxpayers’ confidentiality. Not many taxpayers would prefer their affairs becoming known to other professionals or businesspersons. Again, non-Governmental independent members have conflict of perception and occasionally may have conflict interest. Unlike in many developed taxation systems, it is doubtful as to how many independent members in India would take an adverse view of the arrangement devised by a fellow professional or a businessperson. Further, a non-Governmental independent member on a Panel also may lead to the issue of his accountability, especially when the Panel’s decision is not advisory but is binding on the tax authority under the present law. Moreover, eminent independent persons may not be easily available for the Approving Panel work due to pressure on their time. Constituting a Panel with eminent independent persons is easier said than done and therefore, a Panel consisting of independent members also may not solve the problem.
Powers and procedure of the Panel
Both, the Australian GAAR Panel and the Canadian GAAR Committee do not investigate or find facts or arbitrate disputed contentions. They advise on the basis of the facts referred by the tax officer and by the taxpayer. The Panel may suggest tax officer to make additional enquiries if the facts are disputed. As against this, Indian Panel is armed with more powers and it can direct the Commissioner to get necessary enquiries conducted as the Panel’s role is not advisory in its nature.
The Australian GAAR Panel may extend invitation to the taxpayer to make oral as well as concise written submission before it. The Canadian GAAR Committee does not afford taxpayer right to represent before it, but they may file written submissions before it. The taxpayers are not entitled to have copies of the reports and other submissions made by the authorities or experts in their case before the Committee. However, they will receive the copy of the Committee’s decision along with the reasons of the decision. The Australian Tax office releases the decision of the Panel in the form of either taxation ruling or in the form of the summarised decision on issue to be followed by the tax officers as the official tax office position on that issue.
Working of the Panel
The statistics of Australia and Canada show that these bodies have recommended application of GAAR in majority of the cases referred to it. In a period from 1st July 2007 to 30th June 2011, the Australian Panel advised application of GAAR in 64% of cases, called for further information in 17% of cases, whereas it decided not to apply GAAR only in 19% of the cases referred to it10. Whereas, as on 31st March 2011, the Canadian Committee approved application of GAAR in 73% cases referred from the date since GAAR was first introduced in Canada in 198811. Based on this statistics, one can expect similar trend in India on approval of GAAR references.
The statistics of the decisions of these Panels are available in public domain in Australia and in Canada. Australia also releases the decisions of the Panel in form of taxation rulings or in form of decisions to be followed as a precedent. UK’s draft law also proposes publication of a synopsis of each opinion (without revealing the identity of
taxpayer to protect confidentiality) and publication of regular digests of such opinions.12 It might be good to release statistics of the decisions of the Approving Panel for transparency.13
Purposive interpretation of GAAR
One relevant issue, which is not a safeguard but requires consideration for ensuring effectiveness of GAAR is of having a legal provision on interpretation of GAAR.
The Indian Courts have largely applied the rule of literal construction to the interpretation of taxing statutes. This approach is based on the following two principles:
- Legislation should be strictly interpreted on the basis of the words used and legislative purpose should not be presumed and
- If the words of a provision are found to be ambiguous, the ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the taxpayer.
This approach creates problem when taxpayer pay lesser taxes by using a legal construction or transaction based on a gap or a loophole in law which will place him outside reach of the law.14 Therefore, the Courts of Australia, UK and Canada more often use purposive interpretation on provisions of tax avoidance as narrow interpretation of the legal provisions could result in injustice. Purposive interpretation of taxing statute seeks to interpret the provision according to the object, spirit, and purpose of the tax provision. This approach is sum marised in the case of the Pepper v. Hart, (1993) 1 All ER 42, HL(E) as under:
“The object of the Court in interpreting legislation is to give effect so far as the language permits to the intention of the Legislature….. Courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted.”
Purposive interpretation is also justified on the ground of fundamental principle of taxation statute, which seeks to treat similarly placed taxpayers similarly. In absence of purposive interpretation, arrangement of one taxpayer may be treated as tax avoidance, but similar arrangement of other taxpayer may not be treated as tax avoidance due to some minor insignificant difference. Therefore, Australia15 and New Zealand16 have enacted a specific legal provision to ensure that the provision is interpreted according to purpose and object of the statute. Other provision permits them to use extrinsic aids to overcome the problem of gathering the purpose and object of the law17.
Tax laws deal with the transactions taking place in changing economic circumstances. Tax avoidance schemes are carefully devised so that legal provision may not catch them. Purposive interpretation could be helpful on such occasions. Therefore, clarification in the proposed Guidelines may help in ensuring uniformity in the judicial approach on interpretation of the GAAR.
Conclusion
The Indian Approving Panel is statutory and non-advisory body and its directions are binding on the AO. It is sufficiently empowered to carry out its function effectively by getting further enquires conducted. The Indian Panel is the most powerful when compared to similar Panels in other jurisdictions. Therefore, legally, the Indian GAAR has the strongest safeguard on this ground among all.
However, industry’s apprehensions on GAAR may be arising out on implementation of such tax laws in India. It is a fact that many of these concerns are because of the huge trust deficit between the Department and taxpayers. Improving their relationships is an uphill task in a country which has massive tax evasion leading to various estimates of the size of parallel economy. For the Government, raising more revenue by plugging revenue loss taking place due to tax evasion schemes is a matter of high priority when less than 3% of its population bears the burden of paying taxes. Therefore, there is no going back from GAAR. Now, one can only hope that, GAAR and its procedure will gradually evolve for better with the feedback of the stakeholders.
2 Section 14, ‘Illustrative draft GAAR’, ‘GAAR Study’, Report by Graham Aaronson, QC, at p-52
3 PS LA 2005/24, 13th December 2005, Australian Taxation Office.
4 William Innes, Patrick Boyle and Joel Nitikman, ‘The essential GAAR manual: Policies, principles and procedures’, CCH Canadian Ltd. (Toronto: 2006) pp- 1-296, at p-90.
5 Para 61, See note-2, at p-72
6 Search Assessment Orders, some of the penalty orders under Chapter-XXI.
7 Para 23, see note-3.
8 Para 66, see note-2, at p 73
9 See note-4, at p 90
10 Out of total 55 cases, GAAR application was advised in 35, declined in 10 and decision deferred for various reasons in 9. Source- GAAR Panel Report, NTLG Minutes, March 2008, September 2008, September 2009, March 2010, October 2010, March 2011 and September 2011, Australian Taxation Office, Australia website.
11 Lynch Paul, ‘GAAR Committee Update-March 31 2011’ Canadian Tax Adviser, May 24,2011, http://www.kpmg. com/Ca/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/ CanadianTaxAdviser/CTA_Uploads/
12 Para 5.25, see note 2, at p 34.
13 “We are working on an easy and transparent mechanism to implement GAAR, but more specifics will be notified once the Finance Bill is passed,” Shri R. Gopalan, Secretary, Economic Affairs, 16th April 2010, moneycontrol.com
14 Vanistendael Frans, ‘Legal framework for taxation’, Tax Law Design and Drafting, Vol-1, (ed, Victor Thuronyi), International Monetary Fund (1996), Washington DC, at p 45.
15 Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, Australia. section 15AA — Regard to be had to purpose or object of the Act.
“(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.”
16 Interpretation Act, 1999, Section 5(1) “The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose.”
17 Australia section 15AB of Acts Interpretation Act, 1991 and New Zealand section 5(1) and 5(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1999.
Colour of Money
Finance Minister had promised a white paper on black money. He presented
the paper in the recently concluded budget session, one of the few
promises he has managed to keep. The paper was welcomed or criticised by
members of parliament depending upon which side of the political divide
they belonged to. I was amused by the title of the paper. As one
matures one realises that there is nothing spotlessly white or totally
black in life and there are only shades of grey. There was a great
temptation to comment on or analyse the white paper, but then I realised
that such an analysis, in the limited length of an editorial could have
been described by the same dress that the former finance minister used
to describe the white paper. I therefore decided to restrict myself to a
few observations and share my thoughts on a related topic.
The
paper describes money as white or black. Whatever the colour most of us
strive to possess it. Whether one likes it or not it is the driving
force, for individuals, families, and yes, nations as well. Recently I
read a book titled the “Ascent of money” by Niall Ferguson, British
historian. The book traces the financial history of the world. Money in
the form of currency as we know today is a creation not more than few
centuries old, but since its discovery it has pervaded human life. The
standard definition of money is that it is a medium of exchange. To
function optimally it has to be durable, fungible, portable and
reliable. Modern day money whether it is paper, plastic or electronic
has all these attributes except the last one; reliability. The book
quotes with approval Jacob Bronowoski who said that the ascent of money
has been essential to the ascent of man. Many would dispute the
correctness of that statement.
The singularly distinctive
quality of modern day money is its ability to be stored for any length
of time for future use and consumption. This may be the cause or at
least the catalyst for some of the problems that the world faces today.
To illustrate, in 2007, the year in which one of the worst financial
crisis that continues to plague the world commenced, the CEO of Goldman
Sachs received$ 73.7 million as remuneration. In the same year George
Soros, the veteran speculator made $ 2.9 billion. All this at a time
when more than 1 billion people around the world earned less than $ 1 a
day. In this scenario, is the development of money synonymous with the
development of the human race? It is a question that is difficult to
answer since financial scams and scandals occur frequently enough to
make money appear to be a cause of poverty rather than prosperity.
We
strive to give our next generation good health, the best education and
enhanced security. None of this can be bought with money. We teach our
children, ethics, morality and the innumerable sterling qualities that a
human being must possess but when the child steps out into the world
the singularly significant assessment parameter is the money he makes,
the money he would leave for his future generations. We make a
distinction between what we practice and what we preach and seek to
justify the same. We as professionals tell our students that there is a
great difference between theory and practice. There certainly is but
should that difference be as wide as white and black? While accepting
the exalted status that money has we must be conscious and make our
future generations aware of its most serious limitation that it is only a
medium. When society evaluates the financial health of a person, the
questions to be asked are “how” he earned money and thereafter “how
much”? The order should not be reversed.
Before readers mistake
this editorial for a philosophical discourse, let me make a few
observations on the white paper. The paper states that black money is
the result of two categories of activities. The first category is that
of crime, drug trade, terrorism and corruption. In the second category
which according to the paper is the more likely reason of generation of
black money is the intent to defraud the public exchequer. It is
difficult to agree to this categorisation. Undoubtedly hard core crime,
drug money and terrorism are social and political problems which give
rise to unaccounted money; they can be controlled or contained by an
intolerant attitude of the state and participation of all its
enforcement agencies. Corruption must fall into a different category.
The
real problem is the second category. We must decide whether we want to
equate avoidance with evasion. Those who avoid taxes remaining within
the corners of law cannot be treated as generators of black money. In a
majority of the cases it is post compliance harassment that forces
people to side step regulation. Archaic, multiple laws and regulation,
coupled with uncontrolled discretion and lack of accountability on the
part of the bureaucrats and politicians leads to corruption. There is
thus a vicious circle of evasion of statutory obligations, and enjoyment
of the largesses under the benevolent eye of the corrupt authorities.
In the first category, the “black” money generated by crime is
distributed, however inequitable the distribution. In the second the
proceeds of evasion of statutory dues and particularly corruption are
siphoned off. Often they are then laundered with the blessings of the
corrupt authorities.
In the first category the money generated,
will give rise to violence and will maim citizens and the country but
the second is like a deadly cancer that will cause total decay of the
moral fabric.
The white paper discusses various methods by which
to curb the menace of unaccounted money. In this regard the government
must consider three requirements essential to ensure success in its
endeavour. Firstly there must be total transparency in regard to
thinking of the government. If the authorities consider certain action
of business or industry as contrary to legislative intent it must make
this fact known expeditiously. Secondly it needs to integrate inter
agency and intra agency databases, before increasing reporting
requirements an aspect that the white paper recognises, but one hopes
there will be follow up action. Thirdly before introducing a measure
like NOC for real estate transactions which the white paper
contemplates, past experience must be analysed otherwise the measure
will have limited effect.
We need fair, simple laws fairly and
humanly administered. What worries the nation is not the fiscal deficit,
because that will hopefully be corrected, but the trust deficit. When a
representative of the government stands on the floor of the house and
makes a statement it should be treated with the sanctity that it
deserves. We all know that today “black” money dominates our economy.
The endeavour must be to see that the generation of black money reduces.
Along with deterrent punishment for violators there should be an
incentive for compliance. In any economy compartmentalisation of “black”
and “white” money is virtually impossible. It is also irrational to
believe that black money will disappear from the landscape. The attempt
must be to gradually change the proportion. The proportion is such that
today the economy is a chequered one. The proportion of black should
reduce so much that it becomes an adorable beauty spot on flawless
beauty!
GIVING — LESSONS FROM LIFE
(1) His name is Dhairya, age about 7 months. I have not even seen him. But he is in my list of Gurus! His mother is a C.A. One morning she called me, and conveyed that they are opening a bank account for Dhairya; and that the first cheque to be issued from his account will be for charity! Dhairya has taught me that one is never too young to start giving! I learnt that one can start giving at any age. The mother also taught me how children should be given sansakaras.
(2) Her name is Naseema Hurzuk. They fondly call her Naseemadidi. She became a paraplegic when she was barely 17. She must be 61 years old now. In spite of the terrible tragedy, she courageously built up her own strength and decided to help other handicapped persons. Her organisation is called ‘Helpers of the Handicapped’. She has by now helped over 8000 persons. Her autobiography ‘NASEEMA — THE INCREDIBLE STORY’ brings tears in one’s eyes. What touched me most is that even when she was in that dire state, she started donating blood! I learnt from Naseemadidi, that one’s handicap is no handicap in helping others. One only needs courage and, of course, the grace of God.
(3) His name was Behramjibhai Irani. He died several years ago. A middle-aged Irani musician, who played mandolin in film orchestras. I walked into his house on 2nd floor in an old building at Grant Road uninvited. I wanted to learn to play mandolin from him. He was making his living by playing in film orchestras, and earning only 30/40 rupees per day as and when he was called to play. I went to him for a few years, but anytime I asked him for his fees, the answer was “Go out of the house and down the stairs! I am not teaching people for making money.” What was extraordinary about Behramjibhai was — he was totally blind. Here was a blind musician, making a living by playing in orchestras, but teaching me a young man from well-to-do family and several other students free of charge and refusing any fees.
I learnt from Behramjibhai that even a blind person can make you ‘see’ and give you a vision of life.
(4) His name is Pandubhai Maganbhai Mahala. He is an adivasi. He lives in a small village located far away in Dharampur, a backward area on Gujarat-Maharashtra border — on the bank of a river. A few persons from Sarvoday Parivar Mandal were dreaming of putting up a school there. The question was of getting resources for buying land. Pandubhai — a poor adivasi very graciously gave away his land! Despite being poor, giving came effortlessly to him! I learnt from Pandubhai that one need not have lot of money in order to give. One only needs richness of the heart.
I cannot help recalling an article called ‘Madhuri and Pushpa’ about two girls seven years of age. It is my favourite one, because it is written by Mahatma Gandhi, ‘The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi’ (Vol. 23 : 6 April 1921-July, 1921 pp.330-333) and also because Madhuri in this episode is my mother. It is a great example of how during our freedom struggle even children contributed wholeheartedly. This is also a reminder to the present generation as to how millions of selfless sacrifices of young and old, rich and poor, were given in the fight for our independence. Readers can view the article on:
Through the hands of such as these God speaks, and from behind their eyes He smiles upon the earth . . . .”
2013 (30) S.T.R. 176 (Tri- Del) Sharwan Kumar vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I.
Facts:
The appellant was undertaking certain jobs within the factory of JCBL Ltd. which was manufacturing bus bodies falling under Chapter-8707 of the Central Excise Tariff. The revenue was of the view that, the above activity amounted to “production or processing of goods for, on behalf of the client” as specified under the definition of “Business Auxiliary Service” and service tax was payable. The contention of the appellant was that the appellant was doing the activity in the factory of the manufacturer of excisable goods and these activities being incidental and ancillary to manufacture was covered by the definition of manufacture and such processes are specifically defined to be ‘manufacture’ in Section Note 6 of Chapter XVII of the Central Excise Tariff Act (CETA). Alternatively, they were eligible for exemption from service tax on such activity under Notification 8/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005 which provides exemption to job-workers doing processes when the principal manufacturer pays excise duty on the goods so produced. In the present case, JCBL paid excise duty on the bus bodies.
Held:
The JCBL’s factory manufactured bus bodies. The process of denting and painting were essential for completion of manufacture of bus bodies and the Tribunal did not find any reason to hold that these processes cannot be considered to be part of manufacturing activity within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Tribunal observed that Note 6 of Chapter XVII of CETA, these processes were essential for transforming the semi finished bus body into a complete and finished article. So if the process done by the appellant alone was seen, then also the argument of Revenue fails. The respondents denied the claim of the appellant for exemption under Notification 8/2005-ST on the reasoning that the appellant did not produce any evidence of duty payment of goods manufactured by JCBL Ltd. which was also not acceptable as they did these jobs within the factory of JCBL who regularly submitted excise returns to the excise department which also administers service tax levy. In absence of department establishing anything to the contrary, the appellant could not be penalised. Appeal as such was allowed.
2013 (30) STR 184 (Tri- Del) Kota Pensioners Hitkari Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. C.C.E. Jaipur-I.
Facts:
The Appellant is a co-operative society of retired Central/State Government servants. Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. (JVVNL) authorised the Appellant to collect electricity bills raised on its consumers and for such services commission was paid to the Appellant. The Appellant was not paying any service tax on such commission received. Revenue’s view was that the service rendered by the Appellant to JVVNL was taxable as business auxiliary service. Whereas the Appellant was not registered and did not pay service tax, the demand was confirmed and penalties were also levied. The Appellant contended that, during the period prior to 01-05-2006 only services rendered by a “commercial concern” was taxable under entry 65(105)(zzb) and the co-operative society formed by retired military personnel cannot be considered as commercial concern. They also contended that it provided services to JVVNL and not to the customers on behalf of JVVNL. Therefore, the activity cannot be classified within the clause “any customer care service provided on behalf of the client” or under the clause “provision of service on behalf of client” and therefore the activity was not taxable under Business Auxiliary Service. The Revenue relied on the decision in the case of Punjab Ex-servicemen Corporation vs. UOI 2012 (25) S.T.R. 122 (P & H) wherein the Hon. Court held that a co-operative society of ex-servicemen run without any profit motive had to be considered a commercial concern for the purpose of levy of service tax under the Finance Act, 1994.
Held:
It was held that in view of the decision in the case of Punjab Ex-servicemen Corporation (supra), Appellant could not get out of the tax net on pleading that they were not a commercial concern. The services provided was covered by the expressions “any customer care service provided on behalf of the client” and also under the clause “provision of service on behalf of client” and hence taxable. However, in view of the earlier Tribunal decision which was in favour of the Appellant for some time, it held that the extended period was not invokable and penalties also were deleted.
2013 (30) STR 31 (Tri- Bang) Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur vs. Varun Motors.
Facts:
The Respondent, an authorised distributor for ‘Bajaj’ two and three wheelers operated from Vijayawada for 19 zones in the District to undertake sales and servicing of the vehicles. The respondent registered themselves as “Input Service Distributor” (ISD) in respect of their office premises at Vijayawada. It was held that it being a sales office could not be treated as service provider and therefore could not be granted registration as ISD and revoked the registration. Consequent upon the revocation, a credit of Rs. 48,143/- distributed as service tax credit to one of the authorised service stations was denied and ordered to be recovered. Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) was allowed and therefore revenue filed the present appeal.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that the definition of the “Input Service Distributor” as defined in Rule 2(m) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 reads: “Input Service Distributor” means an office of the manufacturer or producer of final products or provider of output service, which receives invoices issued under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 towards purchases of input services and issues invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan for the purpose of distributing the credit of service tax paid on the said services to such manufacturer or producer or provider, as the case may be.” The reading of the definition clearly indicates that it is to be an office of the manufacturer or producer of final products. The sales office of the respondent was also undisputedly an office of the assessee/ service provider and therefore, there should be no objection to the said premises being treated as premises of “ISD”. Rejecting the revenue’s appeal, the credit distributed by ‘ISD’ was also held as regular.
S. 9(1)(vii), 40(a)(i), 195 — Payments made for purchase of Internet bandwidth and TDS — Not FTS, not subject to TDS
v. M/s. Estel
Communications Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi ITAT) (Unreported)
S. 9(1)(vii), S. 40(a)(i), S. 195
of the Act
A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 10-3-2008
Issue :
Disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) of the Act for
non-deduction of tax u/s.195 of the Act from payments made for purchase of
internet bandwidth and TDS.
Facts :
The assessee-company had entered into a reseller
agreement with a non-resident company. In terms of the agreement, the
non-resident company was to provide various internet services on non-exclusive
basis to the assessee-company for resale of these services to the end-user
customers in the territory. The Internet services pertained to provisions of
bandwidth with certain minimum performance speed. The privity of contract was
between the assessee-company and the non-resident company and there was no
privity of contract between the non-resident company and the end-user customers.
In terms of the agreement, the assessee-company had made certain payments to the
non-resident company. While making the payments, the assessee-company had not
deducted any tax at source. According to the AO, the assessee-company was
required to deduct tax u/s.195 of the Act, but since it had not deducted the
tax, he disallowed such payments u/s.40(a)(i) of the Act.
In the assessee-company’s appeal before him, the
CIT(A) observed that the issue was identical to the decision in Wipro Ltd. v.
ITO, (2003) 80 TTJ 191 (Bang). In that case, the Bangalore Tribunal had held
that the agreement was for use of standard facility and standard services; the
payments were for utilisation of customer-based circuits; the payments were not
fees for technical services u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act and were not subject to
deduction u/s.195 of the Act. The CIT(A) therefore held that the payments were
not subject to TDS u/s.195 of the Act and that the disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) of
the Act was not warranted.
The Department preferred an appal to the Tribunal
against the order of the CIT(A). The Tribunal referred to several clauses of the
reseller agreement and observed that the assessee-company was not paying any
fees for technical services but making payment for the purchase of internet
bandwidth. Even though sophisticated equipment was being used and though the
Internet connectivity was through satellite link, the assessee-company cannot be
said to be availing technical services. Further, the Tribunal also noted that in
the assessee-company’s case for A.Y. 2001-02, the Tribunal had considered
similar issue of disallowance and held in favour of the assessee.
Held
Following the order of
the Bangalore Tribunal in the aforementioned case, the Tribunal upheld the Order
of the CIT(A) and held that :
(i) The payment made
by the assessee-company was not towards rendering of any managerial, technical
or consultancy services, but was merely for use of Internet access facility
and accordingly, the payment was not subject to tax u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act.
(ii) As such the
assessee-company was not required to deduct tax at source u/s.195 of the Act.
(iii) Since there was
no liability to deduct tax u/s.195 of the Act, the amount could not be
disallowed u/s.40(a)(i) of the Act.
S. 195 — Reimbursement of expenses incurred by non-resident promoters outside India — Not subject to TDS.
International Airport Ltd. v.
ITO (2008) 6 DTR (Bang.) (Trib.) 15
S. 195 of the Act
A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated :
17-12-2007
Issue :
Whether reimbursement of expenses incurred by
non-resident promoters prior to their participation in joint venture company is
subject to tax deduction u/s.195 of the Act ?
Facts :
The assessee-company was a joint venture company
established for development of international airport at Bangalore, having equity
participation from certain non-resident companies, which were also the promoters
of the assessee. The non-resident promoters had incurred various expenses
towards technical and other consultations. These consultations were undertaken
outside India prior to the award of the contract to the non-resident promoters
and payments were also made by the non-resident promoters outside India. The
shareholders’ agreement pertaining to the assessee-company provided for
reimbursement of development cost to the promoters. In pursuance thereof, the
Board of Directors of the assessee-company passed a resolution to the effect
that “The offshore expenses shall be advanced by private promoters. All
expenses will be reimbursed and capitalised after financial close“. The
reimbursement of the expenses was to be limited to 50%. Accordingly, the
assessee-company reimbursed 50% of the expenses to the non-resident promoters.
In his order u/s.195 of
the Act, the AO had accepted the fact that the amount was being paid much after
the incurring of the expenses by the promoters. However, since the expenses
included element of technical services and since they were incurred after the
execution of shareholders agreement, he was of the opinion that tax should have
been deducted or should be deducted. In this context, the assessee-company
brought to the attention of the AO the decision in Hyder Consulting Ltd., In
re (1999) 236 ITR 640 (AAR) and also contending that reimbursement of
expenses in no way involves any element of profit and further since the expenses
were incurred by the non-resident in respect of services rendered by another
non-resident outside India, TDS provisions were not attracted. The AO, however,
did not accept this contention and concluded as follows and proceeded to compute
the tax to be withheld by the assessee-company.
(a) The foreign
shareholders of the applicant company had provided certain services to the
applicant company.
(b) The contention
that part of these services were obtained from other parties is of no
consequence.
(c) All these services
which are proposed to be paid for by the applicant company now, have been
utilised by the applicant company in India.
(d) All these services
called by the applicant as ‘consultancy services’ fall squarely within the
meaning of fees for technical services, as provided for in Article 12 of both
the relevant DTAAs as also the IT Act.
(e) Thus, the
consideration payable for such services is chargeable to tax, even if its
nomenclature is ‘reimbursement’, as the income is deemed to accrue or arise in
India.
(f) Hence, withholding
provisions of S. 195 are clearly invoked.
(g) The rate of
withholding tax is 10% as per the respective DTAAs, in view of the fact that
it is the rate beneficial to the payees.
(h) The above
conclusions, based on the facts and information as provided by the applicant,
are to be seen in the context of S. 195 of the IT Act. The provisions of S.
195 are necessarily summary and are only for the purpose of determining the
issue and quantum of withholding tax. It follows that the said tentative
conclusion is subject to the test of final determination at the stage of
assessment.
In appeal by the assessee-company, the CIT(A) noted
the agreement and arrangement between the share-holders and also the arguments
of the assessee-company. CIT(A) did not dispute assessee-company’s claim of it
being a case of reimbursement of expenses and also that the reimbursement was
only to the extent of 50% of the actual expenses. However, observing as follows,
he held that the AO was justified in his conclusions :
(i) The nature of
services are such as would be prima facie covered by the definition of
FTS in IT Act as well as respective DTAAs.
(ii) Adequate support
in respect of quantification of costs reimbursed has not been furnished by the
appellant.
In appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal noted that the expenses were incurred by the non-residents out of India in their capacity as promoters and at the relevant time, S. 5 or S. 9 was not applicable, since it was not a payment by a resident to a non-resident. The payment by the assessee-company to the non-resident promoters was a case of reimbursement of expenses incurred and such reimbursement was limited to 50%, which could not be equated to amount paid for technical services. As such it would not involve any profit element. The expenses were incurred to ascertain the feasibility and viability of the project for the promoters to decide whether to participate in the project. One of the bidders whose bid was not accepted had also incurred certain expenses, 50% of which were reimbursed and the Department had permitted such reimbursement without any TDS. The Tribunal noted that there was no difference between the bidder whose bid was not accepted and the bidder whose bid was accepted.
Held:
The Tribunal held that on facts and circumstances, the reimbursement of 50% of the expenses incurred by the non-resident promoters outside India did not attract provisions of S. 195(2) of the Act.
India-USA DTAA — Examination fee paid to US Company — Not taxable
Limited, In re
(AAR) (unreported)
Articles 1, 4, 5, 7 of India-USA DTAA;
Sections 4, 5, 9, 195 of the Act
Dated : 30-4-2008
Issues :
(i)
Examination fee
collected in India by resident on behalf of American professional
organisations and remitted to them outside India — Taxability thereof :
(a) in terms of
the Act; and
(b) in terms of
India-USA DTAA.
(ii)
Characterisation of the income mentioned in (i) above.
(iii)
TDS obligations of the resident
in respect of the income mentioned in (i) above
Facts :
The applicant was an Indian company which had
entered into agreement with an American entity for promotion of professional
certification programmes and examinations conducted by the American entity. It
was also in the process of entering into agreement with another American entity
for the same purpose. Under both the agreements, the applicant was to act as
their agent. The applicant would carry out promotional and marketing activities;
collect registration forms and fees from candidates in India desirous of
enrolling for the programmes/examinations; and remit the fees to the American
entities after deducting certain administration expenses and commission. The
American entities would conduct examinations either through the applicant or
through other entities in India; evaluate answer sheets; award certificates to
the candidates; forward these certificates to the applicant; and the applicant
would in turn distribute them to the candidates.
The AAR considered the
following questions :
1. (a) Whether
examination fees collected by the applicant in India on behalf of the
American entities and remitted to them were their ‘income’ liable to tax in
India ?
(b) If answer to (a)
is in affirmative, how should that income be classified — as business
income, royalty or fees for technical services ?
2. Whether the
applicant was required to deduct tax at source in respect of the remittances
and if so, at what rate ?
The AAR first examined the questions in light of S.
5 of the Act and observed that in terms of S. 5(2), income of a non-resident
includes income which accrues, arises or is received in India, or which is
deemed to accrue, arise or to be received in India, from any source in India. In
this context, the AAR referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions in CIT v.
Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co., (1950) 18 ITR 472 (SC), CIT v. Ashokbhai
Chimanbhai, (1965) 56 ITR 42 (SC) and Seth Pushalal Mansinghka (P) Ltd.
v. CIT, (1967) 66 ITR 159 (SC) and observed that while the income did not
accrue or arise, nor was it deemed to accrue or arise in India, it was received
in India as an agent of the American entities in India. It further observed that
the income was in the nature of business income. The applicant was receiving
income in India on behalf of the American entities as their agent. Hence, in
terms of S. 4 and S. 5 of the Act, the examination fee collected by the
applicant on behalf of the American entities would be taxable in India.
The AAR then considered the questions in light of
India-USA DTAA. The applicant had stated in his application that the American
entities were non-profit organisations, which were determined by American tax
authorities as ‘tax exempt organisations’. In response, the Department had
contended that since these were ‘tax exempt organisations’, they could not be
regarded as tax residents of the USA and consequently, provisions of India-USA
DTAA could not apply. For this purpose, the Department relied on the provisions
of Articles 1 and 4 of India-USA DTAA. The Department also contended that
partnerships, trusts, etc. were regarded as ‘transparent entities’ in the USA
and were not liable to pay tax there. In response, the applicant filed
additional documents and submissions to prove that the American entities were
corporations incorporated in the USA; were not ‘transparent entities’; were
liable to pay tax in the USA; but being in certain specified category, were
exempted from payment of tax. The AAR, therefore, held that they were tax
residents of the USA and provisions of India-USA DTAA would apply.
The Department also put forth the argument that the
applicant should be treated as PE in India of the American entities. After
examining the provisions of Articles 7 and 5 of India-USA DTAA, the AAR found
that the applicant did not conclude any contract on behalf of the American
entities and the admission of candidates for programme/examination was solely
done by them. Further, the applicant did not carry on any of the other
activities mentioned in Article 5 (such as storage of goods, etc.); on facts, it
could not be considered as dependent agent; it had liberty to have similar
relationship with others; it was not wholly or substantially dependent on the
American companies; it appeared to carry on promotion in the ordinary course of
its business; and it was not subject to any control of the American entities
with regard to the manner of carrying on it.
Co-operative society : Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1995-96 : Society engaged in procuring raw silk and marketing to its members: Interest received from members for supplying materials on credit : Entitled to deduction.
-
Co-operative society : Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of I.
T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1995-96 : Society engaged in procuring raw silk and
marketing to its members: Interest received from members for supplying
materials on credit : Entitled to deduction.
[CIT vs. Tamil Nadu Co-operative Silk Producers Ltd.;
311 ITR 224 (Mad)].The assessee was a cooperative society engaged in the
business of procuring raw silk and twisted silk and marketing it to its
members. The assessee received interest from its members in respect of
material supplied on credit. For the A. Y. 1995-96 the Assessing Officer
rejected the claim of the assessee that the interest so received from the
members is deductible u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
Assessing Officer held that the activity of the society in procuring and
supplying raw silk and twisted silk on credit to its members could not be
considered as “carrying on the business of banking or providing credit
facilities within the meaning of section 80P(2)(a)(i)”. The Tribunal allowed
the assessee’s claim.On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held that the assessee co-operative society was
eligible for the benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in respect of the
interest received from its members for supplying the materials on credit.
Salary — Perquisite — Stock option issued subject to conditions is not a ‘perquisite’ — Law amended by insertion of S. 17(2)(iii)(a) in the Act w.e.f. 1-4-2000 is not retrospective.
10 Salary — Perquisite — Stock option issued
subject to conditions is not a ‘perquisite’ — Law amended by insertion of S.
17(2)(iii)(a) in the Act w.e.f. 1-4-2000 is not retrospective.
[CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd., (2008) 297 ITR 167
(SC)]
The respondent-assessee, a public limited IT company based in
Bangalore, to implement the Employees’ Stock Option Scheme (‘the ESOP’), created
a trust known as Technologies Employees’ Welfare Trust and allotted 7,50,000
warrants at Re.1 each to the said trust. Each warrant entitled the holder
thereof to apply for and be allotted one equity share of the face value of Rs.10
each for a total consideration of Rs.100. The trust was to hold the warrant and
transfer the same to the employees of the company under the terms and conditions
of the scheme governing the ESOP. During the A.Ys. 1997-98, 1998-99 and
1999-2000, warrants were offered to the eligible employees at Re.1 each by the
Trust. They were issued to the employees based on their performance, security
and other criteria. Under the ESOP scheme, every warrant had to be retained for
a minimum period of one year. At the end of that period, the employee was
entitled to elect and obtain shares allotted to him on payment of the balance
Rs.99. The option could be excised at any time after 12 months, but before the
expiry of the period of five years. The allotted shares were subject to a
lock-in period. During the lock-in period, the custody of the shares remained
with the trust. The shares were non-transferable. The employee had to continue
to be in service for 5 years. If he resigned or if his services be terminated
for any reason, he lost his right under the scheme and the shares were to be
re-transferred to the trust for Rs.100 per share. Intimation was also given to
the BSE that 7,34,500 equity shares were non-transferable and would not
constitute good delivery. Till September 13, 1999, all the shares were stamped
with the remark ‘non-transferable’. Thus the said shares were incapable of being
converted into money during the lock-in period.
For the A.Y. 1999-2000, the Assessing Officer held that the
total amount paid by the employees, consequent to the exercise of option was
Rs.6.64 crores, whereas the market value of those shares was Rs.171 crores. He
held that the ‘perquisite value’ was the difference between the market value and
the price paid by the employees for exercise of the option. He, therefore,
treated Rs.165 crores as ‘perquisite value’ on which TDS was charged at 30%. It
was held that the respondent-assessee was a defaulter for not deducting TDS
u/s.192 amounting to Rs.49.52 crores on the above perquisites value Rs.165
crores. Similar orders were also passed by the Assessing Officer for the A.Y.s
1997-98 and 1998-99. These orders were confirmed by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals). No weightage was given by both the authorities to the
lock-in period. Both the authorities took into account the ‘perquisite value’ as
on the date of exercise of option. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions, the
respondent-assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal, which took the
view that the right granted to the employee for participating in the scheme was
not a ‘perquisite’ u/s.17(2)(iii) of the Act. This decision of the Tribunal
stood confirmed by the judgment delivered by the Karnataka High Court on
December 15, 2006. On civil appeals by the Department, the Supreme Court noted
that during the A.Ys. 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000, there was no provision in
the Act which made the benefit by way of ESOP taxable as income specifically. It
became specifically taxable only with effect from April 1, 2000, when S. 17(2)(iii)(a)
stood inserted. However, the issue before it was not with regards to the
taxability of the perquisite, but was with regards to the value of perquisite.
The Supreme Court held that a warrant is a right without an obligation to buy.
Therefore, a ‘perquisite’ cannot be said to accrue at the time when warrants
were granted. The same would be the position when options vested in the
employees after a lapse of 12 months, as it was open to the employees not to
avail of the benefit of option. It was open to the employees to resign and there
was no certainty that the option would be exercised. Further, the shares were
not transferable for a period of 5 years (lock-in-period). If an employee
resigned during the lock-in-period the shares had to be retransferred. During
the lock-in-period, possession of the shares remained with the trust. The shares
were not transferable and it was not open to hypothecate or pledge the said
shares during the lock-in-period. During the said period, the shares had no
realisable value, hence, there was no cash inflow to the employees on account of
mere exercise of options. On the date when the option was exercised, it was not
possible for the employees to foresee the future market value of the shares.
Therefore, the benefit, if any, which arose on the date when the option stood
exercised was only a notional benefit whose value was unascertainable. The
difference in the market value of shares on the date of exercise of option and
the total amount paid by the employees consequent upon exercise of the said
option therefore cannot be treated as perquisite. The Supreme Court further held
that S. 17(2)(iii)(a) inserted by the Finance Act, 1997 w.e.f. 1-4-2000 was not
clarificatory and retrospective in operation because till 1-4-2000, in the
absence of the definition of ‘cost’, the value of the option was
unascertainable. The Supreme Court held that the Department was not justified in
treating Rs.165 crores as the perquisite value for the A.Y.s 1997-98 to
1999-2000 and the assessee was not in default for not deducting tax thereon.
Export — Deduction u/s.80 HHC — Export profits in the business of growing, manufacturing and exporting of tea — Deduction u/s.80 HHC to be computed after apportionment, only against 40% of proportionate income
8 Export — Deduction u/s.80 HHC — Export
profits in the business of growing, manufacturing and exporting of tea —
Deduction u/s.80 HHC to be computed after apportionment, only against 40% of
proportionate income.
[CIT v. Williamson Financial Services & Ors., (2007)
297 ITR 17 (SC)]
Rule 8(1) of the Rules provides that 40% of the composite
income from sale of tea, grown and manufactured, arrived at on making of the
apportionment “shall be deemed to be income liable to tax”.
The assessee exported tea in the accounting year. They were
entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC, in respect of the export. They were in the
business of growing and manufacturing tea. Since they earned composite income,
their case stood covered by Rule 8(1). In the returns, the assessee claimed S.
80HHC deduction against the entire composite income before application of Rule
8(1). This working was rejected by the Assessing Officer who took the view that
the deduction u/s.80HHC can be allowed after the 60 : 40 apportionment as 40%
income was the gross total income. However, in appeal, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer by holding
that the Assessing Officer should have first granted the S. 80HHC deduction
against the entire tea income before applying Rule 8(1). Against the said
decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the matter was carried in
appeal to the Tribunal who took the view that the Assessing Officer was right in
allowing S. 80HHC deduction only against part of the income from tea, which was
taxable under the 1961 Act, namely, 40% of the income. This view of the Tribunal
stood reversed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
‘Agricultural income’ falls in the category of exempted income. It is neither
chargeable nor includible in the total income. On the other hand, deduction
under Chapter VI-A is for ‘income’ which forms part of total income but which is
tax-free. Rule 8(1) segregates agricultural income which is exempted income from
business income which is chargeable to tax. Therefore, to the extent of 40% only
the income is chargeable and computable. In this view of the matter, the
assessee cannot claim S. 80HHC(3)(c) deduction u/s.80HHC(3)(a) against the
entire tea composite income and can claim only against proportionate income.
Export — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Amendment made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991, in S. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with effect from April 1, 1992, to the effect that for the purpose of the special deduction thereunder business profits will not inclu
9 Export — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Amendment
made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991, in S. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
with effect from April 1, 1992, to the effect that for the purpose of the
special deduction thereunder business profits will not include receipts by way
of brokerage, commission, interest, service charges, etc., is only prospective
in nature.
[K. K. Doshi & Co. v. CIT, (2008) 297 ITR 38 (SC)]
The Bombay High Court in CIT v. K. K. Doshi & Co.,
(2000) 245 ITR 849 (Bom.) had held that amendment in law from the A.Y. 1992-93
that the business profits would not include receipts by way of brokerage,
commission, interest, rent charges or any other receipt of a similar nature was
clarificatory in nature and therefore retrospective in operation. On an appeal,
the Supreme Court following its decision in P. R. Prabhakar (2006) 284 ITR 548
(SC) held that the amendment in question was prospective in nature.
Charitable Trust — For claiming benefit u/s.11(1)(a), registration u/s.12A is a condition precedent.
7 Charitable Trust — For claiming benefit
u/s.11(1)(a), registration u/s.12A is a condition precedent.
[U.P. Forest Corporation & Anr. v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 297
ITR 1 (SC)]
The U.P. Forest Corporation, the appellant, was constituted
by a Notification issued u/s.3 of the U.P. Forest Corporation Act, 1974. In the
year 1977, the Income-tax authorities issued a notice to the corporation to file
its return of income for the A.Y. 1976-77. The corporation challenged the said
notice by filing writ petition which was disposed of by the High Court by
holding that the corporation was a local authority u/s.10(20) of the Act and was
entitled to claim exemption. Since the said order was not challenged by the
Revenue, the same became final and remained in force till a contrary view was
taken by the Supreme Court in respect of the A.Ys. 1977-78, 1980-81 and 1984-85
in the case of CIT v. U.P. Forest Corporation, reported in (1998) 230 ITR
945.
For the A.Y. 1977-78, the corporation’s income was assessed
by making some additions of income and deleting some deductions claimed in the
return of income. On an appeal being filed, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld
that the corporation was exempt from paying tax, on the ground that it was a
‘local authority’ within the meaning of S. 10(20) of the Act. Insofar as the
relief sought regarding additions of income and deleting of deductions is
concerned, the Commissioner declined to decide the said issue. The Tribunal set
aside the said order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the corporation
was not a ‘local authority’ and remanded the appeals to the Commissioner
(Appeals) for rehearing on the merits on the issue of grant of relief relating
to additions/deductions. Since the corporation was also assessed for the A.Y.
1984-85 as was assessed for the A.Y. 1977-78, the corporation preferred writ
petition before the High Court of Allahabad which was accepted, and the High
Court declared that the corporation was a ‘local authority’ and was entitled to
exemption u/s.10(20) of the Act. It was held that it was entitled to exemption
u/s.11(1)(a) of the Act being a charitable institution.
Aggrieved by the said order, the Department chose to file
special leave petition before the Supreme Court, wherein leave was granted and
ultimately the appeals were accepted and order passed by the High Court was set
aside. It was held that even though S. 3(3) of the U.P. Forest Corporation Act
regards the corporation as being a local authority for the purpose of the Act,
it would not, in law, make the corporation a local authority for the purpose of
S. 10(20) of the Act. On the question whether the corporation was to get itself
registered u/s.12A of the Act for invoking the provisions of S. 11(1)(a) of the
Act to claim exemption being a charitable institution, it was held that since
the question had not been raised before any of the authorities below, the High
Court should have remanded the case back to either the assessing authority or
the Tribunal for a decision. The Supreme Court, under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, directed the assessing authority to consider the
claim of the appellant-corporation as to whether the appellant was not liable to
be taxed in view of the provisions of S. 11(1)(a) of the Act as a charitable
institution.
In the meantime, following the decision of the High Court in
W.P., the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeals of the corporation in
respect of the A.Ys. 1977-78 and 1980-81 allowing exemption u/s.10(20) and S.
11(1)(a) of the Act.
The appellant-corporation, on July 11, 1988, moved an
application before the competent authority for being registered u/s.12A of the
Act, which was rejected after a gap of nine years on March 18, 1997.
Against the said rejection, the corporation filed writ
petition before the High Court during the pendency of which the corporation
filed another application for the purpose on May 4, 1998. The High Court allowed
the writ petition and set aside the order of the competent authority rejecting
the application of the corporation for registration, on the ground that the
Commissioner had passed an order in violation of the principles of natural
justice inasmuch as the appellant-corporation had not been given an opportunity
of hearing and directed the Commissioner to redecide the corporation’s
application for registration after giving an opportunity of hearing to the
corporation. The Commissioner decided against the corporation against which
order an appeal filed by the corporation before the Tribunal at Lucknow is
pending decision.
After the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court in the
case of CIT v. U.P. Forest Corporation, (1998) 3 SCC 530, the assessing
authority held that the appellant was not a charitable institution and assessed
the income in respect of the A.Ys. 1977-78, 1980-81 and 1984-85 to tax. The
Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeals of the appellant-corporation
granting some relief on issues of additions/deductions. The
appellant-corporation as also the Revenue filed appeals against the said order
before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue and
set aside the relief granted to the corporation on the issue of
additions/deductions, on the ground that this Court had remanded the matter only
to decide one issue. Being aggrieved, the corporation filed an appeal u/s.260A
of the Act before the High Court. The High Court remanded the matter to the
Tribunal for considering the matter afresh. Aggrieved by the said order, the
corporation filed appeal before the Supreme Court. The Revenue also filed an
appeal against the said order. The Revenue also challenged a subsequent order
passed by the High Court, wherein the above question had not been decided in
view of the pendency of the aforementioned appeals. The Supreme Court held that
for claiming benefit u/s.11(1)(a), registration u/s.12A is a condition
precedent. Unless and until an institution is registered u/s.12A of the Act, it
cannot claim the benefit of S. 11(1)(a) of the Act. Keeping in view the fact
that the appellant-corporation had not been granted registration u/s.12A of the
Act, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to claim exemption from
payment of tax u/s.11(1)(a) and u/s.12 of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed
the appeals filed by the corporation without deciding the merits of the dispute.
In view of the dismissal of these appeals, the appeals filed by the Revenue were
also dismissed. However, in order to protect the interest of the assessee as
well as the Revenue, the Tribunal was directed to take up the matter on priority
basis and decide the same as expeditiously as possible without being influenced
by any of the findings recorded by the High Court in its order.
Full adoption of Accounting Standard 30 Strides Arcolab Ltd. (31-12-2008)
From Accounting Policies
Financial Assets, Financial Liabilities, Financial Instruments, Derivatives and Hedge Accounting
1. The Company classifies its financial assets into the following categories: financial instruments at fair value through profit and loss, loans and receivables, held to maturity investments and available for sale financial assets. Financial assets of the Company mainly include cash and bank balances, sundry debtors, loans and advances and derivative financial instruments with a positive fair value.
Financial liabilities of the Company mainly comprise secured and unsecured loans, sundry creditors, accrued expenses and derivative financial instruments with a negative fair value. Financial assets/liabilities are recognised on the balance sheet when the Company becomes a party to the contractual provisions of the instrument. Financial assets are derecognised when all of risks and rewards of the ownership have been transferred. The transfer of risks and rewards is evaluated by comparing the exposure, before and after the transfer, with the variability in the amounts and timing of the net cash flows of the transferred assets.
Available for sale financial assets (not covered under other Accounting Standards) are carried at fair value, with changes in fair value being recognised in Equity, unless they are designated in a Fair value hedge relationship, where such changes are recognised in the Profit and Loss account.
Loans and receivables, considered not to be in the nature of Short-term receivables, are discounted to their present value. Short-term receivables with no stated interest rates are measured at original invoice amount, if the effect of discounting is immaterial. Non-interest bearing deposits, meeting the criteria of financial asset, are discounted to their present value.
Financial liabilities held for trading and liabilities designated at fair value, are carried at fair value through profit and loss. Other financial liabilities are carried at amortised cost using the effective interest method. The Company measures the short-term payables with no stated rate of interest at original invoice amount, if the effect of discounting is immaterial.
Financial liabilities are derecognised when extinguished.
2. Determining fair value
Where the classification of a financial instrument requires it to be stated at fair value, fair value is determined with reference to a quoted market price for that instrument or by using a valuation model. Where the fair value is calculated using financial markets pricing models, the methodology is to calculate the expected cash flows under the terms of each specific contract and then discount these values back to a present value.
3. Derivative financial instruments
The Company is exposed to foreign currency fluctuations on foreign currency assets and liabilities. The Company limits the effects of foreign exchange rate fluctuations by following established risk management policies including the use of derivatives. The Company enters into forward exchange financial instruments where the counterparty is a bank. Changes in fair values of these financial instruments that do not qualify as a Cash flow hedge accounting are adjusted in the Profit and Loss.
4. Hedge Accounting
Some financial instruments and derivatives are used to hedge interest rate, exchange rate, commodity and equity exposures and exposures to certain indices. Where derivatives are held for risk management purposes and when transactions meet the criteria specified in Accounting Standard 30, the Company applies fair value hedge accounting or cash flow hedge accounting as appropriate to the risks being hedged.
5. Fair value hedge accounting
Changes in the fair value of financial instruments and derivatives that qualify for and are designated as fair value hedges are recorded in the Profit and Loss Account, together with changes in the fair value attributable to the risk being hedged in the hedged assets or liability. If the hedged relationship no longer meets the criteria for hedge accounting, it is discontinued.
From Notes to Accounts
6. Adoption of Accounting Standard-30 : Financial Instruments : Recognition and Measurement, issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
Arising from the Announcement of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) on March 29, 2008, the Company has chosen to early adopt Accounting Standard (AS) 30 :
‘Financial Instruments : Recognition and Measurement’. Coterminous with this, in the spirit of complete adoption, the Company has also implemented the consequential limited revisions in view of AS 30 to AS 2, ‘Valuation of Inventories’, AS 11’ The Effect of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’, AS 21 ‘Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries in Separate Financial Statements’, AS 23 ‘Accounting for Investments in Associates in Consolidated Financial Statements’, AS 26 ‘Intangible Assets’, AS 27 ‘Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures’, AS 28 ‘Impairment of Assets’ and AS 29 ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’ as have been announced by the ICAI.
Consequent to adoption of AS 30 and the transitional provision under the standard :
The Company has changed the designation and measurement principles for all its significant financial assets and liabilities existing as at January 1, 2008. The impact on account of the above measurement of these is as described below :
6.1 Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs or Bonds)
On adoption of AS 30, the FCCBs are split into two components comprising (a) option component which represents the value of the option in the hands of the FCCB-holders to convert the bonds into equity shares of the Company and (b) debt component which represents the debt to be redeemed in the absence of conversion option being exercised by FCCB-holder, net of issuance costs. The debt component is recognised and measured at amortised cost while the fair value of the option component is determined using a valuation model with the below mentioned assumptions.
Assumptions used to determine fair value of the options:
Valuation and amortisation method – The Company estimates the fair value of stock options granted using the Black Scholes Merton Model and the principles of the Roll-Geske-Whaley extension to the Black Scholes Merton model. The Black Scholes Merton model along with the extensions above requires the following inputs for valuation of options:
Stock Price as at the date of valuation – The Company’s share prices as quoted in the National Stock Exchange Limited (NSE), India have been converted into equivalent share prices in US Dollar terms by applying currency rates as at valuationates. Further, stock prices have been reduced by continuously compounded stream of dividends expected over time to expiry as per the principles of the Black-Scholes Merton model with Roll Geske Whaley extensions.
Strike price for the option – has been computed in dollar terms by computing the redemption amount in US dollars on the date of redemption (if not converted into equity shares) divided by the number of shares which shall be allotted against such FCCBs.
Expected Term – The expected term represents time to expiry, determined as number of days between the date of valuation of the option and the date of redemption.
Expected Volatility – Management establishes volatility of the stock by computing standard deviation of the simple exponential daily returns on the stock. Stock prices for this purpose have been
6.1 Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs or computed by expressing daily closing prices as Bonds) quoted on the NSE into equivalent US dollar terms. For the purpose of computing volatility of stock prices, daily prices for the last one year have been considered as on the respective valuation dates.
Risk-Free Interest Rate – The risk-free interest rate used in the Black-Scholes valuation method is assumed at 7%.
Expected Dividend – Dividends have been assumed to continue, for each valuation rate, at the rate at which dividends were earned by shareholders in the last preceding twelve months before the date of valuation.
Measurement of Amortised cost of debt component:
For the purpose of recognition and measurement of the debt component, the effective yield has been computed considering the amount of the debt component on initial recognition, origination costs of the FCCB and the redemption amount if not converted into Equity Shares. To the extent the effective yield pertains to redemption premium and the origination costs, the effective yield has been amortised to the Securities Premium Account as permitted under section 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The balance of the effective yield is charged to the Profit and Loss Account.
Consequent to change in policy for accounting of FCCBs,
a) Rs.934.71 Million being the previously accrued Debenture Redemption Reserve out of the Securities Premium Account has been credited back to Securities Premium Account.
b) Rs.124.68 Million being the amount of FCCB issue expenses previously debited to Securities Premium Account has been reversed.
c) Rs.443.20 Million and Rs.546.41 Million has been debited to Securities Premium Account as at December 31, 2007 and during the year 2008, respectively towards the amortised interest attributable to the effective yield pertaining to the redemption premium and FCCB issue expenses.
d) Rs.202 Million being the excess of amortised interest chargeable to Profit and Loss Account as per the policy adopted by the Company over the previously recognised interest cost upto December 31, 2007 has been debited to General Reserve Account.
e) Interest expense for the year debited to Profit and Loss Account is higher by Rs.216.48 Million, and Profit Before Tax for the year is lower by the corresponding amount.
f) The difference between the fair value of the option component on the date of issue of the FCCBs and December 31, 2007 amounting to Rs.427.10 Million has been credited to the General Reserve Account.
g) Rs.452.21 Million being the difference in the carrying amount of the option component between December 31, 2008 and December 31 2007 has been credited to the Profit and Loss Account of the year.
h) Rs.63.31 Million being the incremental exchange difference upto December 31, 2007 arising out of the accounting treatment of FCCBs described above has been debited to General Reserve Account. Exchange loss on restatement of FCCBs is lower and Profit Before Tax for the year is higher by Rs.101.54 Million.
6.2 Consequent to change in policies for accounting for External commercial borrowings (another financial liability), excess of amortised interest cost of Rs.0.53 Million and Rs.0.79 Million chargeable to Profit and Loss Account as per the policy adopted by the Company over the previously recognised interest cost for the period upto December 31, 2007 and for year ended December 31, 2008, respectively, has been debited to General Reserve Account and the Profit and Loss account respectively.
6.3 The financial assets and liabilities arising out of issue of corporate financial guarantees to third parties are accounted at fair values on initial recognition. Financial assets continue to be carried at fair values. Financial liabilities are subsequently measured at the higher of the amounts determined under AS 29 or the fair values on the measurement date. At December 31,2008, the fair values of such financial assets are equal to such liabilities and have been set off in the financial statements.
6.4 As required under the Companies Act, 1956, Redeemable Preference Shares are included as part of share capital and not as debt and dividend on the preference shares will be accounted as dividend as part of appropriation of profits and have not been accrued as interest cost. Further, due to inadequate profits, the Company has not accrued dividend of Rs. 29.50 Million each for the year ended December 31, 2007 and December 31, 2008, and the related Dividend distribution taxes.
6.5 Fully convertible debentures are considered as borrowings and are not disclosed as part of shareholder funds, and interest thereon of Rs.24.73 Million is debited to the Profit and Loss Account as interest cost as required under the Companies Act, 1956 and has not been treated as dividend.
Hedge Accounting:
The Company had prior to December 31, 2007 designated its investments in Starsmore Limited, Cyprus, Strides Africa Limited, British Virgin islands and Akorn Strides LLC, USA, whose functional currency is US dollars as hedged items in a fair value hedge and to the extent of the hedge items, designated FCCB’s availed in US dollars as hedging instruments, to hedge the risk arising from fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate between the Indian Rupee and the US dollar. The carrying values of the designa ted hedged iterns and the hedging instruments as at December 31, 2008 is USD 100.55 Million and USD 69.20 Million as at December 31, 2007.
Accordingly, applying the fair value hedge accounting principles, the exchange gains/ losses on the hedging instrument is recognised in Profit and Loss Account along with the associated exchange gains/losses on the restatement of the designated portion of the investments. The impact of exchange loss arising on restatement of designated portion of the USD investments as of December 31, 2007 amounted to Rs. 120.42 Million and has been debited to the General Reserve Account.
The exchange gains arising on restatement of designated portion of the USD investments for the year ended December 31, 2008 amounting to Rs. 923.40 Million has been treated as an effective fair value hedge since the loss arising on the dollar loans designated as hedging instruments amounted to a similar amount and such gains have been credited to the Profit and such gains have been credited to the Profit and Loss account for year ended December 31,2008.
Prior to the adoption of the AS 30 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’, and the limited revisions to AS 21 ‘Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries in Separate Financial Statements’, investments in subsidiaries were valued at cost less diminution in value that was other than temporary as per the provisions of AS-13 ‘Accounting for Investments’ that was notified under section 21l(3C) of the Companies Act, 1956. As a result of above change in accounting policy, carrying value of investments as at December 31, 2008 is higher by Rs. 802.98 Million, profit for the year is higher by Rs. 923.40 Million and General Reserve is higher by Rs. 802.98 Million.
6.7 The Company has availed Bill Discounting facility from Banks which do not meet the de-recognition criteria for transfer of contractual rights to receive cash flows from the Debtors since they are with recourse to the Company.
Accordingly, as at December 31, 2008, Sundry Debtor balances include such amounts and the corresponding financial liability to the Banks is included as part of short term secured loans.
6.8 All the open derivative positions as on January 1, 2008 not designated as hedging instruments have been classified as held for trading and gains/losses recognised in the Profit and Loss Account. The incremental negative fair value of such derivatives over and above provision carried was Rs. 100.92 Million as at December 31,2007 which has been debited to the General Reserve Account. Incremental negative fair value of the open derivatives position as at December 31, 2008 amounting to Rs. 346.08 Million has been debited to Profi t and Loss Account for the year.
From Notes to Accounts (con’td.)
33. Disclosures relating to Financial instruments to the extent not disclosed elsewhere in Schedule P
Breakup of Allowance for Credit Losses is as under:
Details on Derivatives Instruments & Unhedged Foreign Currency Exposures
The following derivative positions are open as at December 31, 2008. While these transactions have been undertaken to act as economic hedges for the Company’s exposures to various risks in foreign exchange markets, they have not qualified as hedging instruments in the context of the rigour of such classification under Accounting Standard 30. Theses instruments are therefore classified as held for trading and gains/losses recognised in the Profit and Loss Account.
i. The Company had entered into the following derivative instruments:
a . Forward Exchange Contracts [being a derivative instrument), which are not intended for trading or speculative purposes, but for hedge purposes, to establish the amount of reporting currency required or available at the settlement date of certain payables and receivables.
The following are the outstanding Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company as on December 31, 2008.
- b) Interest Rate Swaps to hedge against fluctuations in interest rate changes: No. of contracts: Nil (Previous year: No. of contracts: 3, Notional Principal: USD 20 Million).c) Currency Swaps (other than forward exchange contracts stated above) to hedge against fluctuations in change in exchange rate.of contracts: Nil (Previous Year: No of contracts 6, Notional Principal: USD 80 Million).ii. The year end foreign currency exposures that have not been hedged by a derivative instrument or otherwise are given below:
iii. Derivative Instruments (causing an un-hedged foreign currency exposure) : Nil (Previous Year USD 8 Million – Sell)
iv. Losses on forward Exchange Derivate contracts (Net) included in the Profit and Loss account for year ended December 31, 2008 amount Rs.454.27 Million.
Categories of Financial Instruments
a) Loans and Receivables:
The following financial assets in the Balance Sheet have been classified as Loans and Receivables as defined in Accounting Standard 30. These are carried at amortised cost less impairment if any. The carrying amounts are as under:
In the opinion of the management, the carrying amounts above are reasonable approximations of fair values of the above financial assets.
b) Financial Liabilities Held at Amortised Cost
The following financial liabilities are held at amortised cost. The Carrying amount of Financial Liabilities is as under:
- c) Financial Liabilities Held for Trading
The option component of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) has been classified as held for trading, being a derivative under Accounting Standard 30. Refer Note B.6 of Schedule P on FCCBs. The carrying amount of the option component was Rs.134.20 Million as at December 31,2008 and Rs.586.42 Million as at December 31, 2007. The difference in carrying value between the two dates, amounting to Rs.452.21 Million is taken as gain to the Profit and Loss Account of the year in accordance with provisions of Accounting Standard 30.
The fair value of the option component has been determined using a valuation model. Refer to Note B.6 above on FCCBs for detailed disclosure on the valuation method.
d) There are no financial assets in the following categories:
o Financial assets carried at fair value through profit and loss designated at such at initial recognition.
o Held to maturity
o Available for sale
o Financial liabilities carried at fair value through profit and loss designated as such at initial recognition.
Financial assets pledged
The following financial assets have been pledged:
Financial Asset | Carrying value Dec. 31, 2007 | Carrying value Dec. 31, 2007 | Liability/Contingent Liability for which
pledged as collateral |
Terms and conditions
relating to pledge |
|||||||
I. Margin Money with Banks | |||||||||||
A. Margin Money for
Letter of Credit |
80.89 | 82.87 | Letter of Credit | The Margin Money is
interest bearing deposit with Banks. These deposits can be withdrawn on the maturity of all Open Letters of Credit. |
|||||||
B. Margin Money for | 26.31 | 6.29 | Bank Guarantee | The | Margin | Money | is | ||||
Bank Guarantee | interest | bearing | deposit | ||||||||
with | Banks. | These | |||||||||
Deposits | are | against | |||||||||
Performance | Guarantees. | ||||||||||
Theses can be withdrawn | |||||||||||
on the satisfaction of the | |||||||||||
purpose | for | which | the | ||||||||
Guarantee | is | provided. | |||||||||
C. Other | Margin Money | 11.82 | Margin Money | The | Margin | Money | is | ||||
as Guarantee for | interest | bearing | deposit | ||||||||
Loan to | with | Banks. | This | Deposit | |||||||
Subsidiary | is against | Guarantees | for | ||||||||
Loan | advanced | to | |||||||||
Subsidiary. | This | deposit | |||||||||
has | been | withdrawn | on | ||||||||
the | repayment | of | the | ||||||||
Loan | by | the | Subsidiary. | ||||||||
II. Sundry | debtors | 974.61 | 651.61 | Bills discounted | The | Bills discounted with | |||||
Banks are secured by the | |||||||||||
Receivable. |
Nature and extent of risk arising from financial instruments
The main financial risks faced by the Company relate to fluctuations in interest and foreign exchange rates, the risk of default by counterparties to financial transactions, and the availability of funds to meet business needs. The Balance Sheet as at December 31, 2008 is representative of the position through the year. Risk management is carried out by a central treasury department under the guidance of the Management.
Interest rate risk
Interest rate risk arises from long term borrowings. Debt issued at variable rates exposes the company to cash flow risk. Debt issued at fixed rate exposes the company to fair value risk. In the opinion of the management, interest rate risk during the year under report was not substantial enough to require intervention or hedging through derivatives or other financial instruments. For the purposes of exposure to interest risk, the company considers its net debt position evaluated as the difference between financial assets and financial liabilities held at fixed rates and floating rates respectively as the measure of exposure of notional amounts to interest rate risk. This net debt position is quantified as under:
Particulars | 2008 | 2007 | |
Fixed | |||
Financial | Assets …………………. | 301.02 | ……… 745.74 |
Financial | liabilities ……….. | (7,123.32) | …. (7,665.91) |
(6,822.30) | …. (6,920.17) | ||
Floating | |||
Financial | Assets …………………. | 229.20 | ……… 196.26 |
Financial | liabilities ……….. | (3,717.10) | …. (2,961.78) |
(3,487.90) | …. (2,769.52) | ||
Credit risk
Credit risk arises from cash and cash equivalents, financial instruments and deposits with banks and financial institutions. Credit risk also arises from trade receivable and other financial assets.
The credit risk arising from receivable is subject to concentration risk in that the receivable are predominantly denominated in USD and any appreciation in the INR will affect the credit risk. Further, the Company is not significantly exposed to geographical distribution risk as the counter-parties operate across various countries across the Globe.
Liquidity risk
Liquidity risk is the risk that the Company will not be able to meet its financial obligations as they fall due. The Company’s approach to managing liquidity is to ensure, as far as possible, that it will always have sufficient liquidity to meet its liabilities when due, under both normal and stressed conditions, without incurring unacceptable losses or risking damage to Company’s reputation. liquidity risk is managed using short term and long term cash flow forecasts.
The following is an analysis of undiscounted contractual cash flows payable under financial liabilities and derivatives as at December 31, 2008 :
Financial
Liabilities |
Due within | ||||||||||
1 year | 1 and | 2 and | 3 and | 4 and | |||||||
2 years | 3 years | 4 years | 5 years | ||||||||
Bank Borrowings | 2,860.74 | 369.43 | 279.97 | 182.59 | 91.29 | ||||||
Interest payable
on borrowings |
0.08 | – | – | – | – | ||||||
Hire
Purchase liabilities |
2.48 | 2.23 | 0.41 | 0.13 | – | ||||||
Other
Borrowings |
– | 2,306.64 | – | 4,744.43 | – | ||||||
Trade
and other payables not in net debt |
1,985.95 | – | – | – | – | ||||||
Fair Value
of Options embedded in FCCBs |
– | 11.06 | – | 123.15 | – | ||||||
Fair value
of Forward exchange derivative contracts |
174.12 | 165.61 | – | – | – | ||||||
Total | 5,023.37 | 2,689.36 | 280.38 | 5,050.30 | 91.27 | ||||||
For the purposes of the above table, undiscounted cash flows have been applied. Undiscounted cash flows will differ from fair values. Foreign currency liabilities have been computed applying spot rates on the Balance Sheet date.
Foreign exchange risk
The Company is exposed to foreign exchange risk principally via:
o Debt availed in foreign currency
o Net investments in subsidiaries and joint ventures that are made in foreign currencies.
o Exposure arising from transactions relating to purchases, revenues, expenses etc to be settled in currencies other than Indian Rupees, the functional currency of the respective entities.
The Company had designated its investments in certain subsidiaries whose functional currency is US dollars as hedged items in a fair value hedge and certain loans availed in US dollars as hedging instruments to hedge the risk arising from fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate between the Indian Rupee and the US dollar. The carrying values of the financial liabilities designated as hedging instruments as at December 31, 2008 is Rs.4,897.97 Million.
The loss arising on the dollar loans designated as hedging instruments recognised in the Profit and Loss Account for the year ended December 31, 2008 is Rs.923.40 Million. The gain arising from investments in certain subsidiaries designated as hedged items as much as is attributable to the hedged foreign exchange risk recognised in the Profit and Loss Account for the year ended December 31, 2008 is Rs.923.40 Million.
Sensitivity analysis as at December 31, 2008
Financial instruments affected by interest rate changes include Secured Long term loans from banks, Secured Long term loans from others, Secured Short term loans from banks and Secured Short term loans from banks. The impact of a 1% change in interest rates on the profit of an annual period will be Rs.108.29 Million assuming the loans as of December 31, 2008 continue to be constant during the annual period. This computation does not involve a revaluation of the fair value of loans as a consequence of changes in interest rates. The computation also assumes that an increase in interest rates on floating rate liabilities will not necessarily involve an increase in interest rates on floating rate financial assets.
Financial instruments affected by changes in foreign exchange rates include FCCBs, External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs), investments in subsidiaries, loans in foreign currencies to erstwhile subsidiaries and loans to subsidiaries and joint ventures. The company considers US Dollar and the Euro to be principal currencies which require monitoring and risk mitigation. The Company is exposed to volatility in other currencies including the Great Britain Pounds (GBP) and the Australian Dollar (AUD).
For the purposes of the above table, it is assumed that the carrying value of the financial assets and liabilities as at the end of the respective financial years remains constant thereafter. The exchange rate considered for the sensitivity analysis is the Exchange Rate prevalent as a December 31, 2008.
In the opinion of the management, impact arising from changes in the values of trading assets (including derivative contracts, trade receivable, trade payables, other current assets and liabilities) is temporary and short term in nature and would vary depending on the levels of these current assets and liabilities substantially from time to time and even on day to day basis and hence are not useful in an analysis of the long term risks which the Company is exposed to.
This is the first year of adoption of Accounting Standard 3D, consequently comparative figures relating to 2007 in respect of disclosures under Accounting Standard 30 have been provided only where such information is available.
From Auditors’ Report
d) The Company has early adopted Accounting Standard 30 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’, along with the limited revision to Accounting Standard 2 ‘Valuation of Inventories’, Accounting Standard 11 ‘The Effect of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’, Accounting Standard 21 ‘Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investment in Subsidiaries in Separate Financial Statements’, Accounting Standard 23 ‘Accounting for Investments in Associates in Consolidated Financial Statements’, Accounting Standard 26 ‘Intangible Assets’, Accounting Standard 27 ‘Financial Reporting of Interest in Joint Ventures’, Accounting Standard 28 ‘Impairment of Assets’, and Accounting Standard 29 ‘Provisions, Contingent Assets and Contingent Liabilities, arising from the announcement of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India on 29 March 2008, as stated in Note B.6 of Schedule P to the financial statements. Pursuant to the above, as detailed in note B.6.6 of Schedule P to the financial statements, certain US Dollar investments in subsidiaries and joint ventures have been designated as hedged items in a fair value hedge for changes in spot rates and have been restated at the closing exchange rate at December 31, 2008 and a credit of Rs. 923.40 Million has been recognised in the Profit and Loss Account, as compared to the earlier policy of valuing these investments at cost less diminution that is other than temporary, as required under Accounting Standard 13 ‘Accounting for Investments’, notified under section 211 (3C) of the Companies Act, 1956.
e) read with our comments in paragraph (d) above, in our opinion, the Balance Sheet, the Profit and Loss Account and the Cash Flow Statement dealt with by this report comply with the Accounting Standards referred to in sub-Section (3C) of Section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956.
From Management Discussions and Analysis
Early adoption of Accounting Standard 30 and IFRS convergence
The Company has early adopted Accounting Standard 30 : Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and the consequential limited revisions to other applicable Accounting Standards as have been announced by the ICAI. Accordingly, the Company has changed the designation and measurement principles for all its significant financial assets and liabilities including FCCBs and ECBs. In case where there are conflicts between provisions of AS 30 and Companies Act, 1956, provisions of Companies Act, 1956 have been followed.
Detailed disclosures in this regard have been made in Note 1.11 of Part A, Note 6 and 33 of Part B of Schedule – ‘P’ to the financial statements forming part of the Annual Report.
Accounting Standards 30, 31 and 32 are new accounting Standards, to be made mandatory from April 01, 2011. These are global standards in line with IAS 39, as a prelude to IFRS Convergence. By adopting Accounting Standard 30 the company is progressing towards IFRS convergence.
Wipro Ltd.
WIPRO LTD. —
(31-3-2008) (consolidated)
From Accounting Policies :
Foreign currency transactions :
The Company is exposed to currency fluctuations on foreign
currency transactions. Foreign currency transactions are accounted in the books
of accounts at the average rate for the month.
Transaction :
The difference between the rate at which foreign currency
transactions are accounted and the rate at which they are realised is recognised
in the profit and loss account.
Translation :
Monetary foreign currency assets and liabilities at
period-end are translated at the closing rate. The difference arising from the
translation is recognised in the profit and loss account.
Derivative instruments and Hedge accounting :
The Company is exposed to foreign currency fluctuations on
foreign currency assets and forecasted cash flows denominated in foreign
currency. The Company limits the effects of foreign exchange rate fluctuations
by following established risk management policies including the use of
derivatives. The Company enters into forward exchange and option contracts,
where the counterparty is a bank. Since March 2004, based on the principles set
out in International Accounting Standard (IAS 39) on Financial Instruments’ the
Company has designated forward contracts and options to hedge highly probable
forecasted transactions as cash flow hedges. The exchange differences relating
to these forward contracts and gains/losses on such options were being
recognised in the period in which the forecasted transactions were expected to
occur. The exchange differences relating to forward contracts/options, other
than designated forward contracts/ options, were recognised in the profit and
loss account as they arose.
Effective April 1, 2007, based on the recognition and
measurement principles set out in the Accounting Standard (AS) 30 on Financial
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, the changes in the fair values of
forward contracts and options designated as cash flow hedges are recognised
directly in shareholders’ funds and are reclassified into the profit and loss
account upon the occurrence of the hedged transaction. The gains/losses on
forward contracts and options designated as cash flow hedges are included along
with the underlying hedged forecasted transactions. The changes in fair value
relating to the ineffective portion of the cash flow hedges and forward
contracts/options not designated as cash flow hedges are recognised in the
profit and loss account as they arise. The Company has also designated forward
contracts and options as hedges of net investment in non-integral foreign
operation. The portion of the changes in fair value of forward contracts and
options that is determined to be an effective hedge is recognised in
shareholders’ fund and would be recognised in profit and loss account on the
disposal of foreign operation. The portion of the changes in fair value of
forward contracts and options that is determined to be an ineffective hedge is
recognised in the profit and loss account.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has
recently issued an announcement ‘Accounting for Derivatives’ on accounting for
derivatives and early adoption of AS 30. The Company has already been applying
the principles of AS 30 in accounting for derivative instruments and the
announcement did not have any impact on the Company.
Integral operations :
In respect of integral operations, monetary assets and
liabilities are translated at the exchange rate prevailing at the date of the
balance sheet. Non-monetary items are translated at the historical rate. The
items in the profit and loss account are translated at the average exchange rate
during the period. The differences arising out of the translation are recognised
in the profit and loss account.
Non-integral operations :
In respect of non-integral operations, assets and liabilities
are translated at the exchange rate prevailing at the date of the balance sheet.
The items in the profit and loss account are translated at the average exchange
rate during the period. The differences arising out of the translation are
transferred to translation reserve.
From Notes to Accounts :
The Company designated forward contracts and options to hedge
highly probable forecasted transactions based on the principles set out in
International Accounting Standard (IAS 39) on Financial Instruments :
Recognition and Measurement. Until March 31, 2007, the exchange differences on
the forward contracts and gain/loss on such options were recognised in the
profit and loss account in the periods in which the forecasted transactions were
expected to occur.
Effective April 1, 2007, based on the recognition and
measurement principles set out in the Accounting Standard (AS) 30 on Financial
Instruments : Recognition and Measurement, the changes in the derivative fair
values relating to forward contracts and options that are designated as
effective cash flow hedges are recognised directly in shareholders’ funds until
the hedged transactions occur. Upon occurrence of the hedged transactions the
amounts recognised in the shareholders’ funds would be reclassified into the
profit and loss account along with the underlying hedged forecasted
transactions. During the year ended March 31, 2008 the Company has reclassified
net exchange gains of Rs.951 Million along with the underlying hedged forecasted
transaction. In addition, the Company also designates forward contracts as
hedges of the net investment in non-integral foreign operations. The changes in
the derivative fair values relating to forward contracts and options that are
designated as net investments in non-integral foreign operations have been
recognised directly in shareholders’ funds within translation reserve. The
gains/losses in shareholders’ funds would be transferred to profit and loss
account upon the disposal of non-integral foreign operations.
Infosys Technologies Ltd.
— (31-3-2008)
From Accounting Policies :
Foreign currency transactions :
Revenue from overseas clients and collections deposited in
foreign currency bank accounts are recorded at the exchange rate as of the date
of the respective transactions. Expenditure in foreign currency is accounted at
the exchange rate prevalent when such expenditure is incurred. Disbursements
made out of foreign currency bank accounts are reported at the daily rates.
Exchange differences are recorded when the amount actually received on sales or
actually paid when expenditure is incurred, is converted into Indian Rupees. The
exchange differences arising on foreign currency transactions are recognised as
income or expense in the period in which they arise.
Fixed assets purchased at overseas offices are recorded at
cost, based on the exchange rate as of the date of purchase. The charge for
depreciation is determined as per the company’s accounting policy.
Monetary current assets and monetary current liabilities that
are denominated in foreign currency are translated at the exchange rate
prevalent at date of the balance sheet. The resulting difference is also
recorded in the profit and loss account.
Forward contracts and options in foreign
currencies :
The company records the gain or loss on effective hedges in
the foreign currency fluctuation reserve until the transactions are complete. On
completion, the gain or loss is transferred to the profit and loss account of
that period. To designate a forward contract or option as an effective hedge,
management objectively evaluates and evidences with appropriate supporting
documents at the inception of each contract whether the contract is effective in
achieving off-setting cash flows attributable to the hedged risk. In the absence
of a designation as effective hedge, a gain or loss is recognised in the profit
and loss account.
From Notes to Accounts :
Forward contracts outstanding :
Reliance Petroleum Ltd.
— (31-3-2008)
From Accounting Policies :
Derivative Transactions :
In respect of Derivative Contracts, premium paid, provision
for losses on restatement and gains/losses on settlement are recognised along
with the underlying transactions and charged to Profit and Loss Account/Project
Development Expenditure Account.
From Notes to Accounts :
Financial and Derivative Instrument :
(a) Nominal amount of derivative contracts entered into by
the Company for hedging currency and interest rate related risks and
outstanding as on 31st March 2008 amounts to Rs.77330187080 (Previous year
Rs.47122063440). Category wise break-up is given below :
In Rupees
Particulars |
As at 31-3-2008 |
As at 31-3-2007 |
1 Interest rate swaps |
44132000000 |
10867500000 |
2 Currency swaps |
14470737830 |
10500000000 |
3 Options |
12053125000 |
24114330450 |
4 Forward Contracts |
6674324250 |
1640232990 |
(b) All financial and derivative contracts entered into by
the Company are for hedging purposes only.
(c) In respect of outstanding derivative contracts which
are stated in para ‘a’ above, there is a net unrealised gain as on 31st March,
2008 which has not been recognised in the books, considering the principles of
prudence as enunciated in Accounting Standard 1 “Disclosure of Accounting
Policies” notified in the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules 2006.
(d) Foreign currency exposures that are not hedged by
derivative or forward contracts as on 31st March 2008 amounts to
Rs.108075292858 (Previous year Rs.43470000000).
Tata Consulting Services Ltd.
CONSULTING SERVICES LTD.
— (31-3-2008) (Consolidated)
From Accounting Policies :
Foreign currency transactions :
Income and expenses in foreign currencies are converted at
exchange rates prevailing on the date of the transaction. Foreign currency
monetary assets and liabilities other than net investments in non-integral
foreign operations are translated at the exchange rate prevailing on the balance
sheet date. Exchange difference arising on a monetary item that, in substance,
forms part of an enterprise’s net investments in a non-integral foreign
operation are accumulated in a foreign currency translation reserve.
Premium or discount on forward contracts and currency options
are amortised and recognised in the profit and loss account over the period of
the contract. Forward contracts and currency options outstanding at the balance
sheet date, other than designated cash flow hedges, are stated at fair values
And any gains or losses are recognised in the profit and loss account.
For the purpose of consolidation, income and expenses are
translated at average rates and the assets and liabilities are stated at closing
rate. The net impact of such change is disclosed under Foreign exchange
translation reserve.
Derivative instruments and hedge accounting :
The Company uses foreign currency forward contracts and
currency options to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency
fluctuations relating to certain firm commitments and forecasted transactions.
The Company designates these hedging instruments as cash flow hedges applying
the recognition and measurement principles set out in the Accounting Standard 30
‘Financial Instruments : Recognition and Measurement’ (AS-30).
The use of hedging instruments is governed by the Company’s
policies approved by the board of directors, which provide written principles on
the use of such financial derivatives consistent with the Company’s risk
management strategy.
Hedging instruments are initially measured at fair value, and
are re-measured at subsequent reporting dates. Changes in the fair value of
these derivatives that are designated and effective as hedges of future cash
flows are recognised directly in shareholders’ funds and the ineffective portion
is recognised immediately in profit and loss account.
Changes in the fair value of derivative financial instruments
that do not qualify for hedge accounting are recognised in profit and loss
account as they arise.
Hedge accounting is discontinued when the hedging instrument
expires or is sold, terminated, or exercised, or no longer qualifies for hedge
accounting. At that time for forecasted transactions, any cumulative gain or
loss on the hedging instrument recognised in shareholder’s funds is retained
there until the forecasted transaction occurs. If a hedged transaction is no
longer expected to occur, the net cumulative gain or loss recognised in
shareholders’ funds is transferred to profit and loss account for the period.
From Notes to Accounts :
Derivative financial instruments :
TCS Limited, in accordance with its risk management policies
and procedures, enters into foreign currency forward contracts to mange its
exposure in foreign exchange rates. The counter party is generally a bank. These
contracts are for a period between one day and eight years.
During the year ended March 31, 2008, TCS Limited has
re-evaluated its risk management program and hedging strategies in respect of
forecasted transactions. Upon completion of the formal documentation and testing
for effectiveness, TCS Limited has designated certain foreign currency options
in respect of forecasted transactions, which meet the hedging criteria, as Cash
Flow Hedges:
TCS Limited has following outstanding derivative instruments
as on March 31, 2008 :
(i) The following are outstanding Foreign Exchange Forward
contracts, which have been designated as Cash Flow Hedges, as on :
The following are outstanding Currency Option contracts, which have been designated as Cash Flow Hedges, as on :
Net loss on derivative instruments of Rs.21.83 crores recognised in Hedging Reserve as on March 31, 2008 is expected to be reclassified to the Profit and loss account by March 31, 2009.
The movement in Hedging Reserve during period ended March 2008, for derivatives designated as Cash Flow Hedges is as follows:
In addition to the above cash flow hedges, the Company has outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts and currency option contracts aggregating Rs.2,141.90 crores (previous year: Rs.2062.61 crores), whose fair value showed a loss of Rs.4.46 crores as on March 31, 2008 (previous year: gain of Rs.9.22 crores) to hedge the future cash flows. Although these contracts are effective as hedges from an economic perspective, they do not qualify for hedge accounting and accordingly these are accounted as derivatives instruments at fair value with changes in fair value recorded in the Profit and Loss Account.
Exchange gain of Rs.283.96 crores (previous year gain of Rs.45.13 crores) on foreign currency forward exchange contracts have been recognised in the period ended March 31, 2008.
Taxing times — IFRS and Taxation
On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA)
in India issued a press release setting out the roadmap for International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) convergence in India.
It is now a widely held view that in addition to accounting
issues, transition to IFRS would trigger implications under various
legislations, including taxes, corporate laws and other regulations.
Through this article we aim to bring to light a few key
direct tax issues that are likely to arise when companies transition to IFRS.
Potential additional areas of differences between book
profits (per IFRS) and taxable profits :
Accounting policies and practices for many transactions will
change on convergence with IFRS. The discussion below provides an illustrative
listing of items involving a change in accounting, where the tax implications of
the change need to be evaluated. Several additional changes may require a
similar assessment from a taxation perspective.
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Treatment of dividend and premium on redemption of preference shares :
Currently preference shares are treated as part of share
capital, consequently the dividend on preference shares is charged to the
profit and loss appropriation account. Under IFRS, preference shares will be
treated as a financial liability and dividend thereon will be in the nature of
a finance expense. Under Indian GAAP, the premium or discount on redemption of
preference shares is adjusted from the securities premium account. IFRS
requires such premium or discounts to be charged to the income statement.Presently, dividend and premium on redemption of preference
shares is considered to be capital in
nature and hence not tax deductible.The Government would need to clarify whether such costs
charged to income statement would be allowed as a tax deductible expense.Also, this would lead to reduction in the tax liability of
a company under MAT provisions. The Government would need to clarify whether
this would be acceptable from a tax perspective.
-
Stock compensation cost :
Under Indian GAAP, the employee stock options are
recognised at their intrinsic value. IFRS requires the stock options to be
recognised at their fair value. The impact of the same will be in the employee
cost.The Government would need to clarify whether the employee
costs resulting from fair valuation of the stock option will be a deductible
expense.Cost of stock options granted by a related entity to
employees of the reporting entity would need to be recorded e.g. : companies
would need to accrue for notional compensation cost for options granted by
parent to subsidiary employees with a corresponding impact on the cost of
investments or dividend distribution, respectively.The Government would need to consider the deductibility of
such compensation cost in the hands of the entity receiving the grant and
impact on cost of acquisition for tax purposes to compute capital gain tax or
tax impact on dividend distribution in the hands of the entity giving the
grant.
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Unrealised gains and losses :
IFRS requires all financial assets and liabilities to be
measured initially at fair value. Subsequent measurement of the financial
instrument would depend on their classification. This accounting treatment
results in unrealised gains and losses in the income statement. For instance —
all derivatives will have to be fair valued at each reporting date and the
gain or loss on such fair valuation is charged to the income statement (unless
hedge accounting is followed).The Government would need to clarify whether the unrealised
gains and losses will be taxable in the reporting period in which they arise.
This may pose difficulty to entities, given that they may not have the
liquidity to settle the tax dues on these unrealised gains. Alternatively, the
Government could tax these instruments based on the actual realised gains or
losses.Further, the Government would also need to consider the tax
implications of unrealised gains/losses on financial instruments which are
permitted to be adjusted directly in the reserves without impacting the income
statement. For example : Unrealised gains/losses related to available for sale
(AFS) securities and effective portion of cash flow hedges are recognised
through other comprehensive income within equity.
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Taxation of notional gains and expenses :
In many instances, the accounting treatment envisaged by
IFRS could result in recognition of notional gains and expenses. The following
are examples of instruments which could give rise to notional gains or
expenses :(1) Low interest or interest-free loans to employees —
Loans given to employees at lower than market interest rates should be
measured at fair value which is the present value of anticipated future cash
flows discounted using a market interest rate. Any difference between the fair
value of the loan and the amount advanced shall be a prepaid employee benefit.
The Government will need to consider implication of tax deducted at source on
salaries.(2) Inter-group loans, advances and deposits at
concessional interest rates — If low interest/interest-free loans and
deposits have been forwarded among group entities, the loan or deposit is
initially measured at fair value using market rate of interest. Thus, where
the parent has granted a loan to the subsidiary, in the separate financial
statements of the parent, the difference between the nominal value and fair
value of the loan should be recognised as an additional investment in the
subsidiary and notional interest income is recognised by the parent and
corresponding interest expense by the subsidiary during the loan period. On
the other hand, where a loan has been given by the subsidiary to the parent,
in the separate financial statements of the subsidiary, the difference shall
be accounted for as dividend distribution to the parent and notional interest
income is recognised by the subsidiary and interest expense by the parent
company.The Government will need to consider the taxation aspects of these notional interest and expenses and also implications on provision for tax deducted at source for such interest. Authorities will also need to consider impact on cost of acquisition for tax purposes to compute capital gain tax or tax impact on dividend distribution in the hands of the entity giving the loan at concessional interest rate.
Interest-free security deposit on leasing arrangements — If an interest-free deposit is given as part of leasing transaction, the interest-free deposit will have to be discounted at the market rate and the difference will be treated initially as prepaid rent. The prepaid rent will be amortised to the income statement over the life of the lease.
The Government will have to clarify the tax treatment for such notional gains and expenses. Also the Government will need to consider implications on provision for tax deducted at source on rent.
Revenue recognition :
Some of the revenue recognition principles under IFRS are different and will need to be carefully evaluated from tax perspective. For example :
Under IFRS, if a contract contains multiple elements which have stand-alone value to the customer, the contract will have to be split and only revenue relating to the delivered component will be recorded in the reporting period. Further, the split of revenue between components will have to be done based on their relative fair values. For instance, if an entity sells machinery along with operations and maintenance services (O&M) for the machinery, the entity can recognise the fair value of the machinery in the reporting period in which the risk and rewards of the machinery are transferred to the buyer and the revenue from operations and maintenance will be deferred and recognised over the life of the O&M contract. The Government would need to clarify whether the entity will be taxed upfront only on the revenue recognised in a reporting period, or also on the deferred portion of the contract or will the tax impact of the deferred income also be deferred and taxed in the year in which such income is recognised in the accounts.
In some cases two or more transactions may be linked so that the individual transactions have no commercial effect on their own. In these cases, IFRS requires that the combined effect of the two transactions together is ac-counted for. For instance a telecom company may sell mobile subscription to the customer and charge them the activation fees and talk time separately. However, in practice, these are linked transaction and the activation fee does not have any stand-alone value to the customer (in absence of the talk time or subscription agreement). Thus the telecom operator cannot recognise the activation revenue upfront and will have to defer it over the average life of the subscription agreement. The Government would need to clarify the method of taxation in such cases and consider to defer the tax implications in consonance with the deferral of revenue.
IFRS provides guidance on accounting treat-ment of service concession agreements. For concession agreements, the contractor recognises certain profit (unrealised) dur-ing the construction phase and the balance during the operations phase when realised e.g., Company incurs cost of Rs.1,000 for construction of road and in consideration for the same has received a right to charge toll of Rs.30 on all vehicles plying on that road for 30 years (after which the road is handed over to the Government body). Under Indian GAAP, Company would capitalise Rs.1,000 as a fixed asset and depreciate it over 30 years.
However under IFRS, Company would need to accrue a notional margin on the construction activity as well and the cost of Rs.1,000 plus 10% margin (assumption) i.e., Rs.1,100 will be accounted as an intangible asset and amor-tised over 30 years. Although the manner of accounting will not result in any change in the total amount of profit or loss from the contract during the concession period (since the notional gain of 10% margin is offset by higher amortisation charge over the concession period), the proportion of the profit or loss over different reporting periods within the concession arrangement may differ.
The Government would need to consider the method of taxation in such cases. In this in-stance, entities may need to recognise profit margins upfront, though they would not have received cash inflows from the customers, thus entities may not have sufficient liquidity to settle tax dues, in case tax is charged based on the net profit reported in the financial statements.
Minimum Alternate Tax (‘MAT’) :In case companies in India do not have sufficient taxable profits in India, as per the Income-tax Act companies are required to pay MAT as a specified percentage of book profits. Further, the new direct tax code proposes to charge MAT as a specified percentage of the total assets of the company.
Various differences discussed above and in particular the fair value implications and notional gains/ losses would have substantial impact on the reported profits or reported assets by companies.
The Government would need to assess the implications of such impacts on the tax liability arising due to provision of MAT, given that companies may find it difficult to pay tax dues (actual cash outflow) on unrealised gains which have not yet resulted in cash inflows for the company.
Further the proposal to charge MAT as a percentage of asset poses the following challenges for companies converging with IFRS, which need to be considered by tax authorities in formulating appropriate provisions :
IFRS provides an option to account for its property, plant and equipment and investment properties at fair value at each reporting date. This could also result in increase in tax liability without any cash inflow to the company.Under IFRS, companies may need to account for certain embedded leases in normal sale/ purchase transactions e.g., Company has contracted to buy the entire output from suppliers production line and also given a minimum commitment to reimburse the fixed cost including capital cost of the supplier (these arrangements are commonly used as take or pay arrangement), in such cases, companies will need to account the production plant of the supplier as its own plant. This would increase the gross asset base of the Company and the corresponding MAT liability.
The above, being notional accounting aspects would cause significant issues for companies, if these are considered for taxing the entities and result in potential cash outflows.
The taxation model needs to be framed to ensure that companies that are required to follow the IFRS converged standards are not at a disadvantage as compared to other entities that are not required to follow the IFRS converged standards from April 1, 2011.
Matters for consideration by the Government :
Overall the Government will need to consider how to incorporate the implications of IFRS in the tax rules to be applied by companies, such that they do not result in unintended difficulties and adverse cash flow implications for companies.
The options to be considered to manage this transition :Option 1 — Taxation based on current Indian accounting standards :
Require companies to prepare reconciliation of profit reported/assets reported under IFRS with profits and assets per the current accounting standards. Taxation based on such reconciled profits, assets and book balances. This is also generally followed in many of the European countries where taxation is determined based on the GAAP of the respective countries. For example : Germany, Spain.Option 2 — Taxation based on IFRS with additional differences between IFRS financial statements and taxable income :
IFRS financial statements as a starting point for taxation. However, tax laws to be modified to identify additional areas where taxation (both current taxation and MAT) will be different from the basis used in the IFRS financial statements. These areas may be limited in number, and would not necessarily cover all differences that arise due to transition from current accounting standards to the IFRS converged standards. Additionally, under Option 2, the Government would need to determine how the one-time adjustments recorded in the books of accounts to transition to IFRS are treated for tax purposes.
It is important to note that the Income-tax Act in India applies to all entities i.e., corporate, partnership firms, trusts, individuals, etc. and IFRS will be applicable from 1st April 2011 only for a limited number of companies covered by Phase 1. If Option 2 is followed, this would result in different IFRS-based taxable models for some entities and a different model for other entities (that are not required to converge with IFRS immediately).
While Option 1 appears to be attractive, it poses challenges relating to maintaining two sets of records — one under IFRS and the other under current accounting standards. The benefits and costs of each of these options may need to be further debated to decide the best option from an Indian perspective.
Business Combinations (IFRS 3) — Accounting to reflect the economic substance
Interest : S. 234B of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Ys. 1989-90 to 2000-01 : Interest u/s. 234B is compensatory in nature: Interest not leviable where there is no loss of revenue to Government.
-
Interest : S. 234B of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Ys. 1989-90
to 2000-01 : Interest u/s. 234B is compensatory in nature: Interest not
leviable where there is no loss of revenue to Government.
[CIT vs. Anand Prakash; 179 Taxman 44 (Del)].
In 1989, the assessee’s land was acquired by the State
Government. Order enhancing compensation was passed on 04/04/2000. Enhanced
amount included interest relatable to A. Ys. 1989-90 to 2000-01. Interest was
assessed in the respective years by invoking the provisions of section 147 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer also levied interest u/s. 234B
on the ground of short payment of advance tax. The Tribunal observed that at
the time when the assessee filed his return of income for all the relevant
years, there was no order for grant of interest on additional compensation and
the right to receive additional sums came to the assessee’s knowledge by the
order dated 04/04/2000 which was much later than the dates of completion of
the assessments. The Tribunal held that chargeability of interest was in the
nature of quasi punishment and, therefore, should not be imposed
retrospectively. The Tribunal accordingly, deleted the interest so charged.On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court held as
under :
“i) The levy u/s. 234B is compensatory in nature and is
not in the nature of penalty.ii) Although the conclusion of the Tribunal with regard
to the levy of interest u/s. 234B being penal in nature was not correct, yet
the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal could not be interfered
with, because interest u/s. 234B is clearly by way of compensation. What the
revenue proposed to do in the facts and circumstances of the case was to
charge interest for the default in payment of advance tax in the years in
question. It can only justify such levy of charge if it has suffered a loss.
This follows from the conclusion that the levy of interest u/s. 234B is
compensatory in nature.iii) The fact remained that no money belonging to the
Government was withheld by the assessee in the years in question. In fact,
the interest payable on account of the enhanced compensation was not even in
the knowledge of the assessee till completion of the assessments. The
assessee could not be expected to have paid advance tax on something which
had not been received by him and which would not have been in his
contemplation. In other words, the assessee could not have included the
interest received on enhanced compensation in the A. Y. 2001-02 while
estimating his income for the purpose of calculation of advance tax for the
relevant years.iv) It is a well-known principle that the law cannot
compel any one to do the impossible. The Government, itself, on the one
hand, delayed the payment of compensation to the assessee and on the other
hand, it expected to levy interest on the assessee for having allegedly
defaulted in making payment towards the advance tax. The revenue had not
suffered any loss and, therefore, there could be no question of levying
interest u/s. 234B”.
Writ petition — Even if small fraction of cause of action accrued within the territories of a State, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction
16 Writ petition — Even if small fraction of cause of action
accrued within the territories of a State, the High Court of that State will
have jurisdiction
[Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R. K. Mishra, Addl. CIT,(2010) 320
ITR 1 (SC)]
Investigation — When the bona fides of a passenger carrying
an unusually large sum, and his claims regarding the source and legitimacy have
to be verified, some delay and inconvenience is inevitable. The inspection and
investigating officers have to make sure that the money was not intended for any
illegal purpose. In such a situation, the rights of the passenger will have to
yield to public interest. Any bona fide measures taken in public interest, and
to provide public safety or to prevent circulation of black money, cannot be
objected to as interference with the personal liberty or freedom of a citizen.
The appellant, a computer engineer, who was lucratively
employed in the United States of America for more than ten years, returned to
India with his earnings and took up employment in Hyderabad in the year 2006. He
wanted to buy a property at Chennai. But his attempts were not fruitful. He was
advised that if he wanted to buy a good plot, he must be ready to pay
considerable part of the sale price in cash as advance to the prospective
seller. When the appellant ultimately identified a prospective seller, he wanted
to go to Chennai with a large sum and finalise the deal. He contacted the
Reserve Bank of India, ICICI Bank (his banker) and the airport authority to find
out whether he could carry a large sum of money in cash while travelling. He was
informed that there was no prohibition. Thereafter, he drew Rs.65 lakhs from his
bank. He travelled by air from Hyderabad to Chennai on June 15, 2007, carrying
the said cash. At the Hyderabad airport, he disclosed to the security personnel
who checked his baggage that he was carrying cash of Rs.65 lakhs along with a
bank certificate certifying the source and withdrawals. After the contents of
his bags were examined by the security personnel, he was allowed to board the
aircraft without any objection. But when the flight reached Chennai, some police
officers and others (who were later identified as officers of the Income-tax
Investigation Wing) rushed in, and loudly called out the name of the appellant.
When the appellant identified himself, he was virtually pulled from the aircraft
and taken to an office in the first floor of the airport. He was questioned
there about the money he was carrying. The appellant showed them the cash and
the bank certificate evidencing the withdrawals and explained as to how the
amounts formed part of his legitimate declared earnings which were drawn from
his bank’s account. He also explained to them the purpose of carrying such huge
amount. The officers recorded his statement. After a few hours, the second
respondent came in and asked the appellant to sign some papers without allowing
him to read them and without furnishing him copies. It became obvious to the
appellant that the officers of the Income-tax Department were suspecting him of
carrying the money illegally. They even attempted to coerce him to admit that
the amount was being carried by him for some illegal purpose. Having failed,
they seized the entire amount under a mahazar, gave him a receipt and permitted
him to leave. In this process, he was detained for about 15 hours without any
justifiable reason. To add insult to the injury, the Tax Intelligence Officers
prematurely and hurriedly informed the newspapers that they had made a big haul
of Rs.65 lakhs in cash, making it appear as though the appellant was illegally
and clandestinely carrying the said amount, and they had successfully caught him
while he was at it. The next day all three leading Tamil newspapers (Daily
Thanthi, Dinamalar, Dinamani) as also an English daily — The Hindu, prominently
carried the news of the seizure from him. The news reports disclosed his name,
profession, his native place in Tamil Nadu, his place of employment. The news
report also stated that he was not able to satisfactorily explain the source of
the amount and that the officials had found discrepancies between what was drawn
by him from the bank and what he was carrying. Ultimately, two months later,
after completing the investigation and verification, as nothing was found to be
amiss or irregular, the seized money was returned to him, but without any
interest.
The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court
listing the following four acts on the part of the income-tax officials as
objectionable and violative of his fundamental rights : (i) his illegal
detention for more than 15 hours at the Chennai airport; (ii) illegal seizure of
the cash carried by him despite his explanation about the source and legitimacy
of the funds with supporting documents; (iii) failure to return the seized
amount for more than two months without any justification; and (iv) prematurely
and maliciously disclosing to the media a completely false picture of the
incident. The said acts, according to him, tarnished his reputation among his
friends, relatives and acquaintances, by being dubbed as some sort of a
criminal. The said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground
that no part of the cause of action arose within Andhra Pradesh.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court did not
examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2)
of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of
the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to
sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that
State will have jurisdiction. In this case, the genesis for the entire episode
of search, seizure and detention was the action of the security/intelligence
officials at Hyderabad airport (in Andhra Pradesh), who having inspected the
cash carried by him, alerted their counterparts at the Chennai airport that the
appellant was carrying a huge sum of money, and required to be intercepted and
questioned. A part of the cause of action, therefore, clearly arose in
Hyderabad. The Supreme Court also noticed that the consequential income-tax
proceedings against the appellant, which he challenged in the writ petition,
were also initiated at Hyderabad. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the
writ petition ought not to have been rejected on the ground of want of
jurisdiction.
Considering the facts of the case, the Supreme Court
requested Mr. Gopal Subramanium, the learned Solicitor General to take notice
and suggest a solution. He agreed to have the matter examined as to whether
there was a need for issue of guidelines. Taking note of the issue, the Central
Board of Direct Taxes, Ministry of Finance issued a Circular dated November 18,
2009, setting out the guidelines to be followed by Air Intelligence Units or
Investigation Units while dealing with air passengers with valuables at the
airports of embarkation or destination, to avoid any undue convenience to them.
The Supreme
Court observed that when the bona fides of a passenger carrying an unusually
large sum, and his claims regarding the source and legitimacy have to be
verified, some delay and inconvenience is inevitable. The inspection and
investigating officers have to make sure that the money was not intended for
any illegal purpose. In such a situation, the rights of the passenger will have
to yield to public interest. Any bona fide measures taken in public interest,
and to provide public safety or to prevent circulation of black money, cannot
be objected to as interference with the personal liberty or freedom of a
citizen. According to the Supreme Court the actions of the officers of the
investigation wing in detaining the appellant for questioning and verification,
and seizing the cash carried by him, were bona fide and in the course of
discharge of their official duties and did not furnish a cause of action for
claiming any compensation.
The Supreme Court however held that the appellant’s grievance in
regard to media being informed about the incident even before completion of
investigation, was justified. The Supreme Court there is a growing tendency
among investigating officers (either police or other departments) to inform the
media, even before the completion of investigation, that they have caught a
criminal or an offender. Such crude attempts to claim credit for imaginary
breakthroughs should be curbed.
The Supreme
Court however was of the view that the bona fides of the intelligence wing
officials at Chennai was not open to question, though their enthusiasm might
have exceeded the limits when they went to press in regard to the seizure.
Impounding of documents : Scope of power u/s.131(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Document does not include passport : Passport cannot be impounded u/s.131.
Reported :
25 Impounding of documents : Scope of power u/s.131(3) of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Document does not include passport : Passport cannot be
impounded u/s.131.
[Avinash Bhosale v. UOI, 322 ITR 381 (Bom.)]
In a writ petition challenging the authority of impounding of
the passport with reference to S. 131(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Bombay
High Court held as under :
“(i) In Suresh Nanda’s case (2008) 3 SCC 674, the Supreme
Court was dealing with power of a Court to impound a document and, in that
context, held that ‘document’ does not include a passport.
(ii) If by an interpretative process the Supreme Court held
that even a Court cannot impound a passport, then, it would be highly
inappropriate to interpret the term ‘documents’ used in S. 131(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, so as to enable the executive authorities to impound the
passport.
(iii) A passport cannot be impounded u/s.131 of the Act.”
Assessment : Validity : Block period 1-4-1990 to 20-8-2000 : Copies of seized material not provided to assessee, nor assessee given opportunity to cross-examine person whose statement AO relied upon : Fatal to proceedings : Addition cannot be sustained.
Reported :
23 Assessment : Validity : Block period 1-4-1990 to
20-8-2000 : Copies of seized material not provided to assessee, nor assessee
given opportunity to cross-examine person whose statement AO relied upon : Fatal
to proceedings : Addition cannot be sustained.
[CIT v. Ashwani Gupta, 322 ITR 396 (Del.)]
In an appeal against the block assessment order the
Commissioner (Appeals) found that the Assessing Officer had passed the
assessment order in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as
he had neither provided copies of the seized material to the assessee, nor had
he allowed the assessee to cross-examine the person on the basis of whose
statement the addition was made. He therefore held that the entire addition made
by the Assessing Officer was invalid and accordingly deleted the addition. The
Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :
“(i) The Revenue had accepted the findings of the Tribunal
on facts as also the position that there had been a violation of the
principles of natural justice. However, its plea was that the violation of the
principles of natural justice was not fatal so as to jeopardise the entire
proceedings.
(ii) The Tribunal correctly held that once there was a
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as seized material was
not provided to an assessee, nor was cross-examination of the person on whose
statement the Assessing Officer relied upon, granted, such deficiencies would
amount to a denial of opportunity and, consequently, would be fatal to the
proceedings.
(iii) No substantial question of law arose.”
Business expenditure : Expenditure on prospecting, etc. of minerals : Applicability of S. 35E of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Assessee in business of prospecting or exploration of ores and minerals and not in business of mining ores and minerals
Reported :
24 Business expenditure : Expenditure on prospecting, etc. of
minerals : Applicability of S. 35E of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 :
Assessee in business of prospecting or exploration of ores and minerals and not
in business of mining ores and minerals : No possibility of commercial
production : S. 35E not workable : S. 35E not applicable : Assessee entitled to
deduction of entire expenditure.
[CIT v. ACC Rio Tinto Exploration Ltd., 230 CTR 383
(Del.)]
The assessee company is engaged in the business of
prospecting and exploring ores and minerals. For the A.Y. 2001-02, the Assessing
Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the expenditure on the ground that
the provisions of S. 35E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were applicable to the case
of the assessee and that the expenditure will be allowable in the year of
commercial production. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the
assessee that the provisions of S. 35E are not applicable since the assessee is
engaged in the business of exploring and prospecting of ores and minerals and
that it was not engaged in commercial production of any mineral. The CIT(A)
found that the activity of exploration constituted a separate activity by itself
as different and distinct from commercial production and allowed the assessee’s
claim. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).
On the appeal filed by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :
“(i) Upon a plain reading of the provisions of S. 35E, it
is apparent that unless and until there is commercial production, the
provisions of S. 35E(1) would be unworkable. The expression ‘year of
commercial production’ referred to in S. 35E(2) is defined in S. 35E(5)(b).
Unless and until there is actual commercial production, the phrase ‘year of
commercial production’, appearing in S. 35E(2), would be rendered meaningless.
(ii) The Tribunal has, on facts, come to the conclusion
that the assessee-company’s objects did not include mining of ores or minerals
or commercial production, in the sense understood within the meaning of S.
35E. Consequently, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee’s contention that
there would never be commercial production of any mineral or ore as a part of
the activities of the assessee.
(iii) Consequently, the provisions of S. 35E would not be
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as there was no
possibility of any commercial production.”
Revision : S. 197 and S. 264 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : An order rejecting application u/s.197 for lower rate for deduction of tax is an order which can be revised u/s.264.
Unreported
22 Revision : S. 197 and S. 264 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : An
order rejecting application u/s.197 for lower rate for deduction of tax is an
order which can be revised u/s.264.
[Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Anr. (Bom.), W.P.(L) No. 694
of 2010, dated 28-4-2010]
On 29-10-2009, the petitioner had made an application to the
Assessing Officer u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for issuing a certificate
authorising MMRDA to deduct tax at source at a lower rate of 0.11% from the
payments made by it to the petitioner under a contract. The application was
rejected by the Assessing Officer. The petitioner therefore preferred a revision
petition u/s.264 to the Commissioner. The Commissioner rejected the application
inter alia on the ground that when the Assessing Officer rejects an
application u/s.197, he does not pass an ‘order’ as envisaged in S. 264 and
consequently, a revision u/s.264 is not maintainable.
The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner challenging the order of the Commissioner and held as under :
“(i) The Commissioner is manifestly in error when he holds
that the rejection of an application u/s.197 by the Assessing Officer does not
result in an order and that the revisional power which is vested in the
Commissioner u/s.264 would not be attracted.
(ii) The Assessing Officer when he rejects an application
is bound to furnish reasons which would demonstrate an application of mind by
him to the circumstances which are mandated both by the statute and by the
Rules to be taken into consideration. Hence, it would be impossible to accept
the view that the rejection of an application u/s.197 does not result in an
order.
(iii) The expression ‘order’ for the purposes of S. 264 has
a wide connotation. The Parliament has used the expression ‘any order’. Hence,
any order passed by an authority subordinate to the Commissioner, other than
an order to which S. 263 applies, is subject to the revisional jurisdiction
u/s.264. A determination of an application u/s.197 requires an order to be
passed by the Assessing Officer after application of mind to the circumstances
which are germane u/s.197 and the rules framed U/ss.2A.
(iv) The Commissioner was, therefore, manifestly in error
when he held that there was no order which would be subject to his revisional
jurisdiction u/s.264.”
Reported :
23 Assessment : Validity : Block period 1-4-1990 to
20-8-2000 : Copies of seized material not provided to assessee, nor assessee
given opportunity to cross-examine person whose statement AO relied upon : Fatal
to proceedings : Addition cannot be sustained.
[CIT v. Ashwani Gupta, 322 ITR 396 (Del.)]
In an appeal against the block assessment order the
Commissioner (Appeals) found that the Assessing Officer had passed the
assessment order in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as
he had neither provided copies of the seized material to the assessee, nor had
he allowed the assessee to cross-examine the person on the basis of whose
statement the addition was made. He therefore held that the entire addition made
by the Assessing Officer was invalid and accordingly deleted the addition. The
Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :
“(i) The Revenue had accepted the findings of the Tribunal
on facts as also the position that there had been a violation of the
principles of natural justice. However, its plea was that the violation of the
principles of natural justice was not fatal so as to jeopardise the entire
proceedings.
(ii) The Tribunal correctly held that once there was a
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as seized material was
not provided to an assessee, nor was cross-examination of the person on whose
statement the Assessing Officer relied upon, granted, such deficiencies would
amount to a denial of opportunity and, consequently, would be fatal to the
proceedings.
(iii) No substantial question of law arose.”
Reassessment : S. 147, S. 148 and S. 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reason to believe : Where the AO has option to rectify the assessment order u/s.154, reopening of assessment u/s.147 is not justified.
Unreported
20 Reassessment : S. 147, S. 148 and S. 154 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reason to believe : Where the AO has option to
rectify the assessment order u/s.154, reopening of assessment u/s.147 is not
justified.
[Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Bom.), W. P. No.
85 of 2009, dated 1-4-2010]
In the case of the petitioner, the assessment for the A.Y.
2004-05 was completed by an order dated 27-12-2006 passed u/s.143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued a notice
u/s.148, dated 7-4-2008 for reopening the assessment. Briefly, the reasons given
for reopening the assessment are as under :
“(i) The following deductions have been wrongly allowed in
the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act :
(a) Deduction of Rs.10,84,07,449 as loss of plantation
division, being 40% of the loss on sale of tea is wrongly allowed. Rule 8
applies to income and not for loss.
(b) Deduction of Rs.3,07,50,000 u/s.54EC has been
wrongly allowed since the transfer of the asset is on 29-9-2003 and the
date of allotment of the bond is 31-3-2004, which is beyond the prescribed
period of six months.
(c) Loss of Rs.1,33,49,654 of a unit eligible for
deduction u/s.10B has been wrongly allowed to be set off against normal
business income and this has resulted in excessive deduction u/s.10B to
that extent.
(ii) Deduction of loss of Rs.10,84,07,449 from
plantation division has been allowed twice and as such there is
computation error.
The Bombay High Court quashed the notice u/s. 148, dated
7-4-2008 and held as under :
“(i) Loss from plantation division : Rule 8 creates
a legal fiction, as a result of which the income which is derived from the
sale of tea is to be computed as if it is income derived from business. In the
present case, the Assessing Officer, while issuing a notice for re-opening the
assessment, observed that the provisions of Rule 8 are applicable ‘only in the
case of income’ and the claim of the assessee to set off 40% of losses against
normal business profits could not be allowed. On this basis the Assessing
Officer has formed the opinion that the loss of Rs.10.84 crores attributable
to the business activity of the assessee involving the manufacture and sale of
tea was liable to be disallowed. It is on the basis of Rule 8 that the
Assessing Officer seeks to postulate that the loss attributable to the
business activity of the assessee would have to be disregarded on the ground
that it is not allowable expenditure. This inference which is sought to be
drawn by the Assessing Officer is contrary to the plain meaning of the
charging provisions of the Act; and to Rule 8, besides being contrary to the
position in law as laid down by the Supreme Court. The assessee was lawfully
entitled to adjust the loss which arose as a result of the business activity
under Rule 8.
(ii) Deduction u/s.54EC : The assessee transferred
the asset on 29-9-2003. The period of six months was due to expire on
28-3-2004. The assessee invested an amount of Rs.3.07 crores on 19-3-2004. A
receipt was issued on that date by the National Housing Bank. A debit was
reflected in the bank account of the assessee to the extent of the sum
invested on 19-3-2004. The certificate of bond was issued by the National
Housing Bank on 9-6-2004, which refers to the date of allotment as 31-3-2004.
For the purpose of the provisions of S. 54EC, the date of the investment by
the assessee must be regarded as the date on which the payment was made and
received by the National Housing Bank. This was within a period of six months
from the date of the transfer of the asset. Consequently the provisions of S.
54EC were complied with by the assessee. There is absolutely no basis in the
ground for re-opening the assessment.
(iii) Loss incurred by eligible unit u/s.10B : While
re-opening the assessment, the Assessing Officer has proceeded on the basis
that S. 10B provides an exemption and that in respect of the Crab Stick Unit
the assessee had suffered a loss of Rs.1.33 crores. The Assessing Officer has
observed that since the income of the unit was exempt from taxation, the loss
of the unit could not have been set off against the normal business income.
However this was allowed by the assessment order and it is opined that the
assessee’s income to the extent of Rs.1.33 crores has escaped assessment. The
Assessing Officer while re-opening the assessment ex-facie proceeded on
the erroneous premise that S. 10B is a provision in the nature of an
exemption. Plainly, S. 10B as it stands is not a provision in the nature of an
exemption, but provides for a deduction. The provision as it earlier stood was
in the nature of an exemption. After the substitution of S. 10B by the Finance
Act, 2000, the provision as it now stands provides for a deduction.
Consequently, it is evident that the basis on which the assessment has sought
to be re-opened is belied by a plain reading of the provision. The Assessing
Officer was plainly in error in proceeding on the basis that because the
income is exempted, the loss was not allowable. All the four units of the
assessee were eligible u/s.10B. Three units had returned a profit, while the
Crab Stick Unit had returned a loss. The assessee was entitled to a deduction
in respect of the profits of the three eligible units, while the loss
sustained by the fourth unit could be set off against the normal business
income. In the circumstances, the basis on which the assessment is sought to
be re-opened is contrary to the plain language of S. 10B.
(iv) Computational error : The other ground on which
the assessment is sought to be re-opened is the computational error in the
assessment order resulting in the deduction of the loss from plantation
division of Rs. 10.84 crores twice. There can be no dispute about the position
that the computational error that has been made by the Assessing Officer in
the present case is capable of being rectified u/s.154(1). Where the power to
rectify an order of assessment u/s.154(1) is adequate to meet a mistake or
error in the order of assessment, the Assessing Officer must take recourse to
that power as opposed to the wider power to re-open the assessment. The
assessee cannot be penalised for a fault of the Assessing Officer. The
provisions of the statute lay down overlapping remedies which are available to
the Revenue, but the exercise of these remedies must be commensurate with the
purpose that is sought to be achieved by the Legislature. The re-opening of an
assessment u/s.147 has serious remifications. Therefore, before recourse can
be taken to the wider power to reopen the assessment on the ground that there
is a computation error, as in the present case, the Assessing Officer ought to
have rectified the mistake by adopting the remedy available u/s.154 of the
Act.
All statutory powers have to be exercised
reasonably. Where a statute confers an area of discretion, the exercise of that
discretion is structured by the requirement that discretionary powers must be
exercised reasonably. The remedies which the law provides are tailored to be
proportional to the situation which the remedy resolves. Where the statute
provides for several remedies, the choice of the remedy must be appropriate to
the underlying basis and object of the conferment of the remedy. A simple
computational error can be resolved by rectifying an order of assessment
u/s.154(1). It would be entirely arbitrary for the Assessing Officer to reopen
the entire assessment u/s.147 to rectify an error or mistake which can be
rectified u/s.154. An arbitrary exercise of power is certainly not a
consequence which the Parliament contemplates. We, therefore, hold that in this
case the Revenue has an efficacious remedy open to it in the form of a
rectification u/s.154 for correcting the computational error and that
consequently recourse to the provisions of S. 147 was not warranted.
For all the aforesaid
reasons, we are of the view that the Assessing Officer could not possibly have
formed a belief that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within
the meaning of S. 147.”