Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

Education needed for move to IFRS

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

37 Education needed for move to IFRS



All eyes are on the Securities and Exchange Commission as it
prepares to issue a detailed roadmap this summer for the transition to
International Financial Reporting Standards, but some representatives gave hints
about what might be in that roadmap at a conference held by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board in New York.


FASB Chairman Bob Herz likened the move to IFRS, while
accountants continue to use U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, to
“trying to ride two horses at once.” He said FASB was in the process of updating
its memorandum of understanding with the International Accounting Standards
Board on convergence, but said it was up to the SEC to give a date for the
transition.

AICPA CEO Barry Melancon said a modification of the Tax Code
by Congress would be the best way to handle differences such as the
last-in/first-out inventory method, which is not supported in IFRS. “The LIFO
issue is primarily a tax issue,” he said. He sees growing awareness among
corporate CPAs of the move to IFRS. He believes the time is now to set a date
certain for the transition. “You converge, converge, converge, but at some
point, you have to adopt,” he said.

(Source : Internet wires)

 

levitra

Tax sleuths do some serious networking

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

36 E&Y : Merger volume plunged 30%


 

Total global deal volume weighed in at $ 1 trillion during
the first 19 weeks of 2008, down nearly 30% from $ 1.4 trillion during the same
time last year, according to a new analysis by Ernst & Young LLP’s Transaction
Advisory Services group.

 

Nevertheless, deal activity remains strong in emerging
markets. So far in 2008, total transaction volume surged more than 14%, to
$ 90.7 billion in the so called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China).

 

The infrastructure, financial services, real estate, oil and
gas, media and entertainment and technology sectors lead overall transaction
volume, according to E&Y. Because of their currently undervalued assets, those
sectors also have the biggest chance to stimulate a market rebound, the firm
added.

(Source : CFO.com, 16-6-2008)

 

levitra

E&Y : Merger volume plunged 30%

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

36 E&Y : Merger volume plunged 30%



Total global deal volume weighed in at $ 1 trillion during
the first 19 weeks of 2008, down nearly 30% from $ 1.4 trillion during the same
time last year, according to a new analysis by Ernst & Young LLP’s Transaction
Advisory Services group.


Nevertheless, deal activity remains strong in emerging
markets. So far in 2008, total transaction volume surged more than 14%, to
$ 90.7 billion in the so called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China).

The infrastructure, financial services, real estate, oil and
gas, media and entertainment and technology sectors lead overall transaction
volume, according to E&Y. Because of their currently undervalued assets, those
sectors also have the biggest chance to stimulate a market rebound, the firm
added.

(Source : CFO.com, 16-6-2008)

 

levitra

Are speculative traders parasites or making gold from dross ?

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

34 Are speculative traders parasites or making gold from
dross ?


The global financial market has become ‘a monster,’
responsible for ‘massive destruction of assets,’ according to the President of
Germany and former head of the IMF, Horst Kohler. It ‘grotesquely’ remunerates
its executives, he added.


According to Kenneth Griffin, founder and head of the $ 20
billion Citadel Investment Group — one of the biggest and most successful
American hedge fund companies — international finance has been functioning on
the judgment of ’29-year-old kids’ who ‘control the capital markets of
America . . . young guys right out of business school.’

As a general rule, the margin required to buy an oil futures
contract is 10%. Pledge $ 10,000 and buy $ 100,000 worth of oil. Or why be a
piker ? Put up $ 100,000 and buy a million-dollar contract. The price goes up
one dollar five minutes later and you’ve made a million.

These are not transactions between producers and consumers,
when the classical economic rules would function. These trades, unregulated,
have virtually no useful economic role. They have become a form of parasitical
professional gambling that distorts the transactions between producers and
buyers.

Kohler compared the speculative bankers with alchemists, who
purported to make gold from dross. It is not a bad comparison, and our
contemporaries have, thus far, done better than their medieval counterparts, who
often ended burned at the stake.

(Source : Daily News & Analysis, 25-5-2008)

 

levitra

Ex-UBS staff charged over tax fraud

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

33 Ex-UBS staff charged over tax fraud


Two bankers, including a former employee of UBS, the world’s
leading wealth manager, have been charged by US authorities with helping an
American billionaire evade income taxes on about $200 million of assets
deposited in Swiss and Liechtenstein bank accounts.

(Source : Business Standard, 15-5-2008)

 

The new alchemists

 

levitra

Group Risk Management

Overview :

    ‘Group Risk’ refers to risks that arise to an organisation either internally or externally as part of a ‘group’. The group consists of entities and organisations (mostly companies) under the same management.

    Generally, especially in India, businesses were started and developed by families that are often referred to as ‘Groups’. These companies are under the same management, operating under the same umbrella. They often share the same ideology, may have similar style of management and functioning and may share some common facilities and may even have shared/common employees and consultants. In such a case, risk that affects any one company can spread to others within the group and also to the entire group due to ‘contagion effect’. This risk may pertain to issues like failure of controls and occurrence of fraud, which will result in tainting of the entire group.

    How, to what extent and why the risk will spread within the group and affect it, will depend on the type of risk, the nature and functioning of the group.

    There are certain risks that are self-limiting that will not spread out and affect beyond certain limit, whereas others, especially non physical ones where emotions and sentiments are at play may even spread across the entire group.

    Thus physical risks like flood or fire may affect only those units in the group that share common facilities or infrastructure or physical space and are inter-connected in that sense. Certain non physical risks like image risk may spread easily across the group with a common management.

    The example selected for this month’s case study is that of a group led by a flagship company that makes rubber products and has other companies dealing in construction and real estate, software, consumer goods, travel and tourism, advertising and printing within the group.

    Supreme Rubber Products Ltd. is the flagship company of the Biju group of companies. Biju group was founded and came into prominence during the lifetime of Biju Sirkar, who set up number of units and became a well-known successful first generation entrepreneur about 50 years back, in the post independence era. The group consists of about 20 companies with interests in rubber products, construction, real estate, software, consumer goods, travel and tourism, advertising and printing.

    Some of these companies are listed, others are subsidiaries or closely held, but all of them are under the same management and share a common logo. These companies operate from three main centers in Kolkata, Bhubaneshwar and Hyderabad. They share a common brand and group logo, and organisational and management practices including HR and training facilities.

    Biju is now advanced in age and although the Chairman of the flagship company, is looking for a successor.

    Out of the companies, the flagship company and the consumer goods company are doing extremely well. The travel and tourism, printing, real estate and the construction company are facing difficulties due to economic downturn. The software company however belying expectations and market trends, is doing quite well.

    Biju being advanced in age the pressure of work and handling of diverse businesses is telling on him. His health is a cause of concern as he had a heart problem that was detected a few months back hence he quickly needs to find a successor. There are two major factions in the group. The elder son of Biju — Gopal and the other his nephew Randhir are power centres and each has been running a company. Gopal manages real estate and construction and Randhir the software company. Both have aspiration to head and control the group.

    Although well respected in the market the group has an autocratic style of functioning and relies on discipline and loyalty rather than on professional managers, systems processes, procedures, controls and governance.

    It is rumored that Randhir has aligned himself with the opposition in the state, and the ruling party at the centre has not taken it well.

    There is some anxiety among the employees about Biju’s health. They are concerned as to what will happen to the companies in Biju’s absense. This has unsettled them.

    The real estate and construction company had received a notice of enquiry regarding excess utilisation of FSI and charging that the higher floors in its latest high rise are unauthorised. The media which was generally appreciative of the group had shown some signs of discomfort in the tone of their reporting of this incident.

    There are unrelated developments, for example :

  •         the auditor of the advertising company which had come out with a public issue last year has resigned citing personal reasons.

  •         the consumer goods company that had the largest number of employees in the group is facing worker unrest, as they wanted a raise to gain parity with pay scales of other group companies.

  •         the flagship rubber products company has received a show cause notice from the pollution control board in respect of effluent discharged from its factory near Bhubaneshwar.

The above various aspects and issues involve potential risk to the group as a whole apart from the companies that are involved.

As a risk manager for the group you are expected to deal with the risk and present an action plan at the ensuing group meeting that is even otherwise expected to be stormy due to the power struggle within the group.

The solution:

The suggested strategy is outlined and implemented as below:

Any risk analysis requires that we first identify the nature of the risk and the level to which it may affect the company or its operations. Since all risks identified here (with the exception of the pollution incident) are man-made and internally focussed, the solutions need to be internally directed. The pollution incident is a man-made external event.

The first and foremost risk, in our opinion, is the power struggle within the group that may end up splitting the group. The group has to firstly formulate a succession plan, that would involve identifying the successor. This could be achieved by identifying fixed production/profit targets that need to be achieved (through honorable means) within an agreed timeframe. This would ensure an open and impartial evaluation as to who is best placed to lead the group into the future and would eliminate the need for internal conflicts.

The immediate problem is the incident of pollution control, that too involving the flagship company. It is not only an environment risk, but may also result in the closing down of the company due to legislative controls. The Company has to consider:

  • taking immediate cleaning efforts to mitigate the effects of the pollution.

  • training and sensitisation Company’s management and staff with the environmental regulations.

  • taking steps to implement safe good manufacturing practices And put in place environmental controls.

The other immediate problem is that of labour unrest. The group needs to:

  • identify the differences in salaries and other benefits between companies within the group, and between companies in the same industry.

  • control the labour unrest that would affect productivity.

  •     take corrective action which would help retain the top talent by rationalising salary and pay scales.

  •     develop  cogent and common  HRD practices.

  • develop a system of inter-changing medium level personnel within functions and group companies.

The next risk is to the group’s name/reputation that may result from the malpractices that have been reported in the press regarding the construction company, the labor unrest, and environment issues.

The steps suggested are:

  • the construction company must forthwith undergo a serious examination of all current and past projects to identify questionable practices and take corrective action, if any, required. The group needs to identify a system of internal control that will ensure that transgression of law are avoided.

  • to identify laws which need to be complied by all group companies.

  • to identify laws, rules and regulations to distinctly identifiable business.

  • to put in place processes to ensure compliance with laws.

This exercise may even highlight suspect practices indulged in by the two contenders who wish to head the group.

The group should also have an effective media policy nad have a media manager and public relations expert to project the company viewpoint to the various stakeholders and the public.

Lastly, the company must identify and address  the concerns of the employees regarding the failing health of the group’s patron and the future of the group. This will not only fortify the group’s already failing morale but also help stem the tide of senior personnel who are apparently leaving for personal reasons. Further, as a long term plan the group should consider succession plans for all key personnel within the organisation, to help ensure transparency, a future road map for prospects for promotion, career development and growth for the employees. Such a plan will also ensure continuity of operations for the companies within the group.

The solution is indicative and illustrative in nature and represents the author’s views. The actual solution will vary, as there cannot be a single right or feasible solution or otherwise.

Infringement vs. Passing – off

IPR Laws

This month’s article seeks to explain a fundamental aspect of
the law on trademarks, the distinction between an action for infringement of a
registered trademark and an action for passing off. Whilst the former is a
statutory wrong the latter is a tort under common law. This distinction is
crucial for any trademark owner to strategise the maintenance of their trademark
portfolios.

A trademark is a mark which connects the goods and/or
services of a person with that person in the course of trade and thereby
distinguishes it from the goods and/or services of others. The Trade Marks Act,
1999 (‘the Act’) more specifically defines a trademark, inter alia, as a mark
capable of being represented graphically and which is capable of distinguishing
the goods or services of one person from those of others.1 Therefore,
a mark in order to be a trademark need not necessarily be registered. A
trademark may also either be used or proposed to be used. These factors as to
whether a trademark is used and/or registered are factors relevant for
determining whether an action for infringement of trademark and/or an action for
passing off may be instituted.

I shall initially explain what is meant by infringement of a
registered trademark and passing off, respectively, and then proceed to deal
with the broad distinctions.

Infringement of Registered Trademark :

Chapter IV of the Act deals with the effect of registration
of a trademark. The Act specifically provides that no proceedings for
infringement of an unregistered trademark may be instituted thereby clarifying
that an action for infringement can only be taken in respect of a registered
trademark. In fact, a right granted on registration is the right to take
recourse to infringement proceedings.2 The Act also clarifies that an
action for passing off will not be affected by the Act.3

S. 29 of the Act deals with and identifies the acts that
would constitute infringement of a registered trademark. The Section seeks to
protect a registered trademark and/or a mark deceptively similar thereto from
being exploited and/or used by an unauthorised person so as to defeat the rights
of the registered proprietor of the trademark of being entitled to exclusively
use the registered trademark. The scope and ambit of acts constituting
infringement has been substantially broadened under the present Act by bringing
in concepts like dilution of trademark, erosion of distinctive character of the
trademark, parallel importation and damage to reputation, etc.

The statutory law relating to infringement of trade-marks is
based on the same fundamental idea as the law relating to passing off. But it
differs from that law in two particulars, namely, (1) it is concerned only with
one method of passing off, namely, the use of a trademark and (2) the statutory
protection is absolute in the sense that once a mark is shown to offend, the
user of it cannot escape by showing that by using something outside the actual
mark itself he has distinguished the goods from those of the registered
proprietor.4

In an infringement action, the plaintiff is, ordinarily, only
required to prove that the defendant is using the registered trademark and/or a
mark deceptively similar thereto in respect of the same goods or services cause
that would be enough to show a violation of the rights conferred on the
registered proprietor. Infringement consists in using the mark per se as a
trademark and therefore, any other distinguishing factors that may be employed
by a defendant may not be relevant in an infringement proceeding.

Any person trespassing on the rights conferred by
registration of a trademark infringes the registered trademark. The rights
conferred by registration in a particular case must be determined in the context
of any restrictive conditions or limitations entered on the Register of Trade
Marks at the time of registration of the mark.

Infringement proceedings, thus, enable a registered
proprietor to prevent any unauthorised person from using his trademark and/or
mark deceptively similar thereto in respect of similar goods or services or as
contemplated u/s.29 of the Act.

Passing off :

On the other hand, the object of the law of passing off is to
protect some form of property — usually the goodwill of the plaintiff in his
business or his goods or his services or in the work which he produces. The
trademark represents the reputation and goodwill of a business and/or the goods
and/or the services. For example, the goods sold by ‘Nike’ are considered to be
of superior quality and have an immense reputation in the market. The goods sold
under the trademark ‘Nike’ carry immense value on the basis of the fact that
they bear the ‘Nike’ trademark. If the same goods were sold without the said
trademark thereon, they would not be as valuable.

Passing off is a form of tort of deceit and/or
misrepresentation. To put it in a nutshell, passing off is a tort whereby one
person tries to pass off his goods and/or services as and for the goods and/or
services of another. Passing off in effect is also a form of unfair competition.
It is a common law remedy and has been built entirely on the basis of case law.

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Volume 48, para 144
at page 98, the essentials of the cause of action for passing off, as restated
by the House of Lords in Erven Warnink B. V. v. J. Townend & Sons, 1980 R.P.C.
31, are set out as follows :

“(1) a misrepresentation

(2) made by a trader in the course of trade

(3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers
of goods or services supplied by him

(4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill
of another trader, in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable
consequence, and

(5) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of
the trader by whom the action is brought or, in a quia timet action, will
probably do so.”

The aforequoted dictum of Lord Diplock is the locus
classicus
on the subject and succinctly explains what is meant by the tort
of passing off.

Therefore, it may be noted that in order to enable the owner
of a trademark to sue for passing off, he would be required to show in the first
instance that the trademark is associated by members of the trade and public
solely and exclusively with the services rendered and/or goods sold by him and
that some other person by using an identical and/or deceptively similar mark in
respect of similar services and/or goods is trying to pass off his goods and/or
services as and for the goods and/or services of the owner. Confusion and
deception in the course of trade would be essential to an action in passing off.

It is common understanding that an action for passing off cannot be instituted in respect of an unused trademark, however the same is incorrect. For in a given situation passing off may even be instituted in respect of a trademark which has not been used in the market, but which has acquired reputation and goodwill on the basis of other factors such as publicity, advertisements, etc. and has therefore, come to be associated solely with the owner of the trademark.5

Distinction :

The distinction between an infringement action and a passing off action is important. As explained above, both operate in different spheres. Hence, to illustrate there could even be a situation where a registered proprietor (Plaintiff) files a suit for infringement and the defendant files a suit for passing off against the same plaintiff. This would happen in a case the defendant has a prior user of the trademark but a subsequent registration.

The issues involved in an action for infringement and an action for passing off are different and distinct. In an action for infringement the basic issue would generally be whether the registered trademark and the infringing mark are identical and/or deceptively similar and whether or not they are being used in respect of similar goods and/or services. However, in an action for passing off, in the first instance the plaintiff would have to show that the said trademark is associated solely and exclusively with his services and/or goods and that use by the defendant of such mark would cause confusion and/or deception in the course of trade and thereby people would end up buying and/or procuring the goods and/or services of the defendant thinking they were of the plaintiff. Such acts would cause wrongful loss and harm to the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court has succinctly highlighted major differences between the two remedies and the approaches involved in an action for infringement and an action for passing of in the landmark judgment of Ruston Hornsby v. Zamindara Engineering, AIR 1970 SC 1649, wherein it has laid down, inter alia, as under :

“It very often happens that although the defendant is not using the trademark of the plaintiff, the get-up of the defendant’s goods may be so much like the plaintiff’s that a clear case of passing off would be proved. It is on the contrary conceivable that although the defendant may be using the plaintiff’s mark, the get-up of the defendant’s goods may be so different from the get-up of the plaintiffs goods and the prices also may be so different that there would be no probability of deception of the public. Nevertheless, in an action on the trademark, that is to say, in an infringement action, an injunction would issue as soon as it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the plaintiff’s mark.

The action for infringement is a statutory right. . . . .
On the other hand the gist of a passing off action is that A is not entitled to represent his goods as the goods of B, but it is not necessary for B to prove that A did this knowingly or with any intent to deceive. It is enough that the get-up of B’s goods has become distinctive of them and that there is a probability of confusion between them and the goods of A. No case of actual deception, nor any actual damage need be proved.”

Another important factor of distinction is the fact that under the Act, a registered proprietor is granted an additional right to institute an action for infringement of trademark where the plaintiff’s office is situate. This provision was introduced to enable the registered proprietors take appropriate proceedings against infringers without having to follow them to every corner of the country. On the other hand, however, passing off being a common law remedy, the jurisdiction of a Court to take cognizance of the same would be in accordance with the normal rules of jurisdiction as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and/or the relevant Letters Patent i.e., either where the defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action has arisen, etc.

To illustrate the above points of distinction, take a situation where a trader in pens is the registered proprietor of a trademark ‘KODAK’ (word per se) and has been using the same for the last decade on a yellow and red background in respect of his pens. The defendant is using the trademark ‘TODAT’ in respect of his pens on a white and green background. In such a case for the purposes of an infringement action the Court would only consider whether the trademarks KODAK and TODAT are identical and/ or deceptively similar, since the goods are identical. On the other hand, for the purposes of an action of passing off, the Court would have to consider the entirety of the package including the difference in colour schemes, nature of consumers, packaging, etc. and consider whether on an appraisal of the entire evidence it can be proved that the consumers would be confused and/or deceived into buying the pens of the defendant on the belief that they were somehow connected with the plaintiffs.

In the aforesaid illustration let us assume that the pens are sold by both traders on a red and yellow background but the trademarks involved are the registered trademark KODAK (word per se) and the unregistered trademark PILOT. In such a case even though the trademarks per se are different, an action in passing off may still lie if by colour scheme, packaging, trademark being written in small letters, etc. the consumer and general public would be confused and/or deceived into buying the defendants pens on the belief that they emanate from the plaintiff.

A perusal of the above would evince the fact that the two wrongs are different. Therefore, it is essential for owners of trademarks to understand that even if their trademark is not registered, they may still maintain an action in passing off. In fact, in a given case a trader who may not have used the trademark in the Indian market, but whose trademark has acquired a transborder reputation in India may maintain an action in passing off. A situation may also arise where even if a trademark is registered, use of the same may be restrained by a prior user of the trademark.

Therefore, there can be no general answer as to which proceeding is better and/or preferred and the course of action and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Financial black holes : Financial Misstatements

fiogf49gjkf0d

SAP

Accounts manipulation is the deliberate misreporting or
concealment of facts in order to create profit or loss in the current period; to
defer profit or loss to a subsequent period; or to misreport performance
statistics and management information. Under both the common and the statutory
law, this is treated as fraudulent activity. In case of deliberate misreporting,
the possibility of repetition of the event is higher, since they are intentional
and for a specific fraudulent purpose. In such a situation, the organisation in
question needs to be more vigilant and stringent with their policies as well as
people. It is, however, important to recognise that financial misstatement can
also happen because of error or systematic problems. In either case, it can
leave an organisation exposed to both the market forces and the regulatory
challenges.

In this article, I have set out some danger signs to look for
and provide an overview of actions to consider in the event that such misconduct
is discovered. I hope this helps to ensure that the ‘modesty’ of many
organisations continues to be preserved.

The potential impact :

The shockwaves caused by accounts manipulation can be severe
and invariably spread far wider than the organisation concerned; the sector as a
whole may be affected or at a larger level, the economy may be hit as well. The
demise of Enron is an obvious example. Another case in point is Satyam, where
the stakeholders are shocked at the size as well as the duration of time for
which the fraud went unnoticed.

The discovery of accounts manipulation will inevitably have a
far-reaching impact, even if it has not caused the victim organisation an actual
cash loss. Loss of reputation is a bigger loss than cash loss, as this loss is
not quantifiable and has far-reaching effects on the organisation as a whole.
The management will be distracted from effective operational stewardship; time
and focus will be lost as they seek to determine the facts of the manipulation,
and then develop and execute a communication and remediation strategy with
various stakeholders. Management credibility is also likely to suffer, the event
has come to light ‘on their watch’ irrespective of where the blame actually lies
— a robust response is a good start in this battle (the related elements are
discussed further
below).

Stakeholders in the outcome of any investigation and
remediation are numerous, and will include the organisation’s lenders and
shareholders and may also include regulators and law enforcement agencies. Any
restatement of the financial statements may lead to, or indicate, lending
covenants being breached, with the consequence that finance lines are withdrawn
or renegotiated. In the current lending environment, this is to be taken very
seriously. Shareholders, especially ‘active’ or institutional investors, may
take the view that their investment decisions have been taken on the basis of
misleading information and commence court action. The potential for the share
price to suffer is also high.

The cost and impact of regulatory and law enforcement
involvement is also significant due to the need to involve external lawyers and
accountants. This is especially relevant if the organisation is a listed entity.
Not only will the share price fall, but it will also adversely affect the
capability of the organisation to raise further capital from public in future.
Even non-listed companies would be adversely affected in terms of their future
listing capabilities. Individual management, the staff as well as the
organisation itself may be targets, with criminal as well as civil sanctions
available.

One impact that is often given less consideration is that the
perpetrators may be in senior positions in the organisation. Through their
dismissal, the
organisation may suffer a shortage of skills or experience, with a likely period
of flux as their replacements bed down into their new roles.

Drivers, risk areas and red flags :

What then, are the indicators that one should be vigilant
for ? In this section, I will examine three areas : the organisational factors
that could put an organisation at risk; the areas within financial statements
that are vulnerable to manipulation; and the signs that something may already be
wrong.

Drivers :

Many cases of accounts manipulation have their roots in
organisational change within the victim organisation. Many organisations choose
decentralisation as a key strategy and encourage the staff to be more
competitive and entrepreneurial. Normally, the empowered local management team
is rewarded on performance, particularly by reference to profitability and the
achievement of budgets. The stakes are also rising, with many more layers of
management now receiving a material proportion of pay linked to performance
targets. Decentralisation can often be accompanied by much of the control
function at head office being removed; as well as division of profile leading to
specialisation. This will result in the lessons learnt in one part of a business
being no longer
effectively communicated across the business as
a whole. Not surprisingly, this combination can make an organisation vulnerable
to accounts
manipulation.

Where accounts manipulation has been orchestrated by the
senior group management and
key management personnel, it can be difficult to detect and investigate, often
involving
either the collusion of a number of senior staff or a very dominant personality
who commands fear within the organisation. The organisation’s
control environment is also a vital factor : it is likely to be weak; or, in the
case of senior
management orchestration, capable of being overridden and window dress the
financial statements. Fraud motivation at this level can be
varied, and is usually more complex than simply financial gain.

Risk areas :

Experience gained through assisting clients, as well as my
observations of other reported events has shown that certain items within the
financial statements are especially prone to manipulation. These, together with
the forms that the manipulation can take, are illustrated in the figure below :


(An illustrative list only)

Red flags :

Warning signs are usually present in the financial
information of a subsidiary, division, joint venture or a group; and, can
sometimes be painfully obvious with hindsight. While the precise signs are
dependent on the sector or industry in which the organisation operates, I have
highlighted a few generic indicators as shown below : (an illustrative list
only
)


‘Red Flags’ — A few Classic Examples

Reported results are consistently in line with the budget. This may be accompanied by soft accruals to align the actuals with the budget

Areas of low scrutiny or lack of clarity of accountability for some costs, often accompanied by a failure to perform reconciliations or maintain adequate control accounts

Items within the profit and loss account are based on judgment rather than hard data

High levels of manual journals and accruals without automatic adjustment

Unusual fluctuations in sales or forward purchase orders, particularly around the year end

Revenue and profit trends appear inconsistent with other known information

Profits do not appear to be converted into cash
Poor quality or patchy management accounts, which typically comprise only a profit and loss account

Undue concern about audit visits

Employees feeling of lack of job security in the organisation without proper reasoning from the higher management

No proper basis regarding the provisions made in the financial statements.

Auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection?: Stakeholders of the companies and the general public rely on the auditors for unearthing indications of financial statement fraud. We have observed in recent times how the competencies of the auditors have been questioned for not being able to detect the signals of fraud early enough. Although audit is not a fact-finding exercise, but rather a review of the financial statements, yet it is possible to detect the warning signals by adopting appropriate procedures. Some of these are discussed below?:

Professional Skepticism?: Auditors need to overcome some natural tendencies — such as over reliance on client representations — and approach the audit with a skeptical attitude and questioning mind. They should set aside past relationships and not assume that all clients will be totally transparent.

Discussion among engagement personnel?: Extensive brainstorming among the engagement teams at different stages of the engagement about the client’s susceptibility to fraud will help to identify the critical areas for audit.

Identification and assessment of fraud risk?:
Identify the fraud risk and perform an assessment of the identified risks to determine where the client is most vulnerable to material misstatement due to fraud, the types of frauds that are most likely to occur and how those material misstatements are likely to be concealed.

Developing audit procedures to mitigate the identified fraud risks?: The key to designing effective audit tests is to perform an effective synthesis of the identified risks. Appropriate procedures should be developed so as to detect any indication of fraud.

Considering client’s anti-fraud programmes and controls?: Review client’s anti-fraud programmes and controls that mitigate or exacerbate the identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud. Such review will help the auditor to identify potential control weaknesses.

Risk of management override of internal controls?: Auditor should be aware of the fact that executives can perpetrate financial reporting frauds by overriding established control procedures and recording unauthorised or inappropriate journal entries or other post-closing modifications (for example, consolidating adjustments or reclassifications). To address such situations, auditor should test the appropriateness of journal entries recorded in the general ledger and other adjustments.

Retrospective review of accounting estimates?:
Accounting estimates are particularly vulnerable to manipulation, because they depend heavily on judgement and the quality of the underlying assumptions. Auditors should perform a retrospective review of prior-year accounting estimates for the purpose of identifying bias in management’s assumptions underlying the estimates.

Business rationale for significant unusual transactions?: Many financial reporting frauds have been perpetrated or concealed by using unusual transactions that are outside the normal course of business. Auditor should use his knowledge about the client and the industry to recognise any unusual transactions. Auditor should then obtain appropriate business rationale for such unusual transactions.

Evaluating audit evidence?: Auditor should evaluate the evidence gathered through analytical and substantive procedures to assess whether such evidence indicate any indication of misstatement that was not considered earlier.

Last but not the least, the auditor should demonstrate highest standard of professional integrity and must be independent not only in spirit, but must also appear as independent to all reasonable persons.

How to respond effectively??

Corporate Governance may be defined as ‘A set of systems, processes and principles which ensure that a company is governed in the best interest of all stakeholders.’

It ensures commitment to values and ethical conduct of a business, transparency in business transactions, statutory and legal compliance, adequate disclosures and effective decision-making with a view to achieving corporate objectives.

Clause 49 of the SEBI guidelines on Corporate Governance (which came into effect from 31st December 2005) has made major changes in the definition of independent directors, strengthening the responsibilities of audit committees and improving the quality of financial disclosures, including those relating to related-party transactions and proceeds from public/rights/preferential issues, which call for CEO/CFO certification, the adoption of a formal code of conduct by the Boards and the improvement of disclosures to shareholders. Certain non-mandatory clauses like a whistle-blower policy and the restriction of the term of independent directors have also been included.

According to the Internet, the revised version of Clause 49 has come into effect since 1st Jan. 2006.

In the event that an instance of accounts manipulation is uncovered, it is imperative that the organisation responds both effectively and robustly. A dedicated committee (containing requisite financial expertise) should be considered to oversee the response. Convening such a body not only enables the management to remain operationally focussed, but also ensures that the response is independently managed and free of any perception of conflict of interest.

The committee should aim at rapidly mobilising an investigation team to identify the root cause and quantum of the problem. This will help determine the immediate measures that will need to be taken to mitigate the impact on the business and should also assist in a complete identification of stakeholders.

The latter exercise will enable the reporting and ongoing communication needs of each issue to be assessed and a strategy to be developed. The importance of a credible engagement with the stakeholders at the earliest opportunity cannot be underestimated.

The next stage is to consider whether and to what extent the organisation wishes to utilise external professional advisors. Often, forensic accountants and lawyers are key resources who can contribute with their rich experience and perspective from previous investigations, as well as strategic and investigative input, including assistance with the capture of data to the standards required by regulators or the courts.

Ensuring that the relevant hard and soft copy data is gathered in an evidentially sound manner is a vital element of the response. This will require some preliminary consideration of the accounts affected — for example, customer and supplier details may be kept in a different module from financial statement data. An organisational chart will help identify individuals who process and manage data in the affected area. This will inform the custodians about which employee data needs to be analysed. The organisation should also consider issuing a data preservation notice to all relevant employees.

Conclusion?:

Economic indicators suggest that the current climate is likely to persist for the next couple of years. It is challenging in a business context, both in terms of the trickling effect from the recession in the US and current lack of resources. At the same time, the costs of inputs have been rising. Organisations continue to be under pressure to produce growth and returns for shareholders and to comply with lenders’ covenants. This environment may provide a stimulus for accounts manipulation to take place and organisations would be well advised to be vigilant.

Some thoughts on working late

LIGHT ELEMENTS

The President of the Society had in his column in the March
2010 issue of the BCA Journal, brought the attention of readers to some of the
rare qualities of CA Aditya Puri (the Managing Director of HDFC Bank who had
recently won a prestigious award), particularly his time management skills which
help him to leave his office every day at 5.30 p.m. The President had requested
readers to apply their thought on that aspect, considering the fact that
Chartered Accountants — both in practice and in employment — are generally prone
to working late. Taking the cue, the author tries in a lighter vein to analyse
the culture of working late which has now spread to almost all sectors of
commercial activity in the country.

Globalisation has brought many things to India, and working
late is one among them. Not that we Indians are not used to late working hours.
We do work late when need arises. What is new is the culture of regularly and
compulsively working into the late hours of night. Those working in today’s
so-called sunrise sectors are always seen working well past sunset. For them
apparently the sun only rises, it never sets.

Some are sceptical — and sometimes even a bit suspicious — of
people working late. Probably they carry such thoughts out of their past
experiences. When there are different views on the virtues and weaknesses (not
necessarily vices !) of working late, it will be good examining the different
aspects of late working.

The common impression that a person working late — or an
organisation that encourages employees working late — conveys is that they are
so busy and overloaded with work that they cannot complete their work without
putting in longer hours. But on closer scrutiny one often finds that this is not
true. Organisations which follow the modern (read American) management-style
employ less people than what is required, so that they can pay higher
remuneration to employees without increasing their total wage bill. As a result,
their limited number of employees are forced to slog it out. It is with this
aspect in mind that management schools train their students to study and work in
sleep-deprived environment without losing their senses. Most business
enterprises are not bothered by studies that show that deprivation of sleep
adversely affects the productivity of employees.

Even in the modern business organisation where the office is
always open late into the night, and all employees are present, it is
questionable whether everyone is actually working. When employees working in
frontline IT companies say that everyday they work from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. and so
on, one is naturally a bit curious. If one asks an employee, in confidence, what
exactly is the work that is done late into the night one can expect a reply
somewhat like this : “I actually work for 3 or 4 hours maximum. The rest of the
time I am awaiting my senior’s instruction to start working with him. My senior
is always doing something unrelated to work, and mostly roaming around.
Everyday, right from morning, I ask him at intervals of a couple of hours ‘Shall
we start ?’, but every time he replies, ‘No, wait’. Finally, by 8 p.m. or so, he
asks me to join him, and we start working. No wonder we will reach somewhere
only by 11 p.m.” This is found to be the case with many people working in the
so-called emerging businesses. The blogs of employees in the Internet too
confirm this.

Even if it is not the policy of an organisation to make every
employee regularly work overtime, employees do sit up late for different
reasons. The obvious reason is to impress the bosses. But there are less obvious
reasons too.

For some habitual late workers — whether employed or
self-employed — their work-place is not their ‘second home’ but ‘first home’
itself. These unfortunate guys do not get peace of mind in their homes for some
reason, and so they remain in offices as long as possible to minimise time spent
at home. What they do at their offices in the after-hours is anyone’s guess —
chatting with friends on or off phone or net, partying (with or without booze),
reading and sending out unnecessary emails, browsing the net or taking a nap. If
possible, they encourage lot of visitors to their offices after office-hours,
thus converting the office into some kind of a club. Some carry the idea of
‘home’ to such an extent that they actually have a bed too in their offices. In
such cases, the public cannot be blamed for suspecting something.

The accounting profession is famous for continuing to work
after everyone else has gone home. But accountants working late are sometimes
viewed with suspicion too. There is the story of a chief accountant in an
organisation who was working well past midnight everyday. The accounts were,
however, very much in arrears. The late sitting was also justification for the
accountant to come late — by late afternoon — everyday. He thus reached the
office when everyone was preparing to leave, and he was working all alone
(presumably) all through night. When there was a change of management, he was
told to follow regular working hours, and an inquiry was made into the accounts
being maintained by him. As skeletons started falling from every cupboard, the
chief accountant was fired.

To be fair to those working late, all of them must not be
equated with the accountant in the above story. Not everyone is doing illegal or
unnecessary things — or entertaining themselves — while burning midnight oil.
One of the reasons is that not everyone is competent enough to handle different
types of work during normal working hours. Many bank managers, for instance,
cannot gather the mental concentration required to scrutinise loan applications
or monitor their non-performing parties during normal hours when they are
attending to customers. They therefore sit up late to do those jobs. Such
employees deserve sympathy, not scorn.

Some others overburden themselves, as they do not delegate
work. For many in this category, the problem is that they do not trust any of
their subordinates. For some others, it is a way of making themselves
indispensable. They follow the age old maxim : ‘Keep things pending, so that the
pending will keep you’.

At the other extreme there are those who do not trust themselves but trust their juniors completely. They delegate all their work and go about doing practically nothing. They will, nevertheless, be present in office until everyone leaves so that their enviable style of working will always remain a best kept secret. How do they kill their abundantly surplus time?? They devise all sorts of ingenious methods. Presiding over or participating in endless meetings is a time-tested trick. Meetings are now referred to as training sessions, presentations, seminars, workshops and so on. Whatever the nomenclature, they serve the purpose of the wandering late worker by consuming his surplus time. The worst part of these workshops is that they take away a lot of time of the productive employees too. Sometimes, to keep the subordinates engaged, the inefficient senior makes them do dummy projects without saying so, or ask them to submit several lengthy reports on work already done.

In today’s IT-enabled environment, working late within one’s office is not always necessary. For the Chief Executive and other senior executives, there is no such thing as ‘working hours’ as they have to be available on call on a 24/7 basis. In the case of the lower-rung executive too, he can work from home or anywhere else — while on the move too. Even team assignments can now be carried out by persons sitting at different places. That being the environment now, regularly working late in one’s seat in office has become practically unnecessary. Not surprisingly, a few organisations have started discouraging late working — disabling computer servers, ordering closure of offices and switching off of mains at a specific time to push out die-hard late sitters.

Having thought of some of the aspects of late working one can only warn both individuals who work late, and organisations that encourage employees working late, to determine whether the late working is really necessary, productive and economical. If it is not, then trying to merely create an image through late working will not be rewarding in the long run.

CFO — the new horizon

fiogf49gjkf0d

CFO

Introduction :


Organisations in the recent years are struggling to withstand
pressures from various quarters like compliance, auditors, capital markets,
shareholders and so on. These are over and above the usual day-to-day business
pressures. Take the case of US companies. The southward-moving economies,
mounting oil prices, falling currency, and increasing cost pressures have
already put US managements under tremendous stress. To top it, the hanging sword
of SOX coupled with obsessed auditors is making every quarter a strained
experience for the whole organisation.

Noticeably Chief Financial Officer — CFO — is at the centre
of all this stress and strain. The expectations from the CFO have undergone a
sea change in the last decade. While internal expectations are at the same
intensity, the external pressures from regulators and capital markets are
growing day by day and quarter by quarter. Just beyond crunching numbers, all
these internal and external stakeholders expect a CFO to deliver lot more value
for the organisation. While these dynamics are changing dramatically, the CFOs
have to handle their own financial organisations, who like other parts of the
business, resist any changes that are needed to face these pressures and
challenges. Looking at the various global organisations, I feel, the success of
the CFOs lies in how they handle these external and internal expectations and
how do they bring about the transformation within their own financial
organisations to cope with these changes.

Obviously, this means that the business requires not only a
competent leader heading the finance function, but also a competitive leader to
lead the business activities. The finance organisation is uniquely positioned to
direct some of the uncomfortable activities that the current regulatory and
external stakeholders expect because otherwise no one will do them.

Value creation :

In the given era, the business, externally and internally
expects the CFO to create huge and unique value for the company. The value, as
widely understood, gets created by having effective capital structure, setting
expectations for the investors, setting stretch goals for revenues and
profitability, so that the business meets its all long-term aspirations.
However, this happens not only under dynamic but sometimes volatile
circumstances.

The decisions on capital structure in the past used to be
long-term decisions. But in the given era, with globalisation and capital and
debt markets becoming smart and open, one has to keep a constant check on the
optimisation of capital structure. In a country like India where the laws reduce
the flexibility of such decisions (like buyback and issue of own equity, etc.),
the role of CFO gets tougher as the competition faced is of a global nature.
Thus in given constraints and framework the CFO has to perform more skillful and
non-standard financial engineering models to ensure that the business gets
optimum capital structure at all the times.

The same situation is faced on managing investors’
expectations. The capital markets around the world are coming closer and the
investors’ expectations are becoming almost similar from a business in the USA
and the one from India. The investors, if are giving higher multiple to your
company than a similar one in the USA or Europe, they have to be convinced about
the reason for such higher valuation of your business.

This brings the growth story. In IT industry, or now I would
now name it as Knowledge Industry (KI), the 30% growth story is impressive all
along to the global FIs, but to sustain these growth numbers at a billion $ +
top lines is a different challenge that no CFOs in India had faced before. The
CFOs are expected to create these values.

While doing that role, internally, the CFO has to maintain an
effective rhythm in the business thru participation in business planning and
review sessions. During this process, the CFO has to expose the areas of
underperformance in the business to ensure that overall growth and value do not
have a drag. This requires a lot of political and tactical skills. Weeding out
the dead log from the organisation in the current era is very critical and
crucial for survival of the organisation and the CFO has a lot of value to add
in this area.

Creating competitive edge :

As I said earlier, in the given volatile situation of the
markets and economy, every CFO has to ensure that the finance organisation that
he or she leads, has to have competent people that will give the business
competitive advantage. This needs attracting and retaining people with excellent
financial skills who are good at numbers and also technically sound. With all
kinds of GAAPs and clarifications and commentaries coming on such principles,
the CFO’s life has become more complicated. The hand-tied auditors and audit
committees add more complexities by their indecisiveness and tendency of keeping
themselves guarded in any eventuality. The CFO is truly trapped within business
objectives, regulatory interpretations and illusive shackles created by others.

This needs the CFO to benchmark each of the finance function
constantly. The basic benchmarks should be on performance on delivering
reasonable and adequate returns on capital deployed to the stakeholders.
Unfortunately, there are only few metrics available today to judge and measure
the quality and competency of finance personnel. Still, one has to form its own
metrics for the quality of the people in the finance organisation. As CFO, I
would always see if my people are in demand in the market. If one of the senior
persons leaves and joins as a CFO of another company at double the salary, I
take it as a benchmarking exercise of the quality of my people. They must be
good if one of them goes as a CFO of another organisation at double the pay !

Another way to judge the quality of output is to encourage people to participate in awards. Say, Institute of Chartered Accountants’ award for best-presented annual report. Such competitions provide an urge to improve quality of the output like annual report of the company.

Highest integrity of each finance team member is also one of the critical factors to achieve competitive edge. In the current environment, it is important that there should be zero tolerance for non-compliance. Controls are not only needed in substance but also in form. For example, if you have internal review meetings, the minutes of the same need to be recorded and circulated, action items must be tracked and completed to ensure that all the adequate controls are in place and are followed adequately.

No surprises:

This is the dream that every CFO has and wants to achieve. Business and markets give you enough surprises. What you hate to have is more surprises coming from your own organisation, from auditors and from the audit committee. Thus constant liaison with auditors and the audit committee has no substitute. Every non-business as usual (BAU) matter must be informed to these entities immediately to avoid last minute surprises to either side. This ensures a healthy relationship between all the stakeholders !

Internally, anticipating issues before they arise is essential. The CFO must have a list of peculiar transactions that may give rise to any non-BAU issues. Such issues need to be attacked on a war footing in time to avoid the quarter-end surprises. If you have number of subs in multiple countries reporting their numbers in different currencies and GAAPs, your responsibility goes up multifold as each of such sub, its GAAP and reporting currency has many surprises stored at the time of consolidation. The interpretation of GAAP provisions and their respective treatments in books can vary so much that quarter-end consolidation can become truly a nightmare! This requires a tight forecasting schedule and ability of the business to forecast accurately. In spite of spending hours on calls with the business people on forecast numbers, outlooks and budgets almost every week, there is a huge scope for a surprise and one has to have a plan to deal with such situations wisely and sometimes bravely. Revenue recognition or impairment of intangibles or compensated leave provision are some of the areas that can give last-minute surprises in US GAAP. Foreign Exchange Accounting has its inheritant element of surprise on the last date of a quarter. The CFO has to learn to pass thru these situations.

Complex life:
While the CFO is busy adding value to business and creating competitive advantage to the business and avoiding surprises, the ever-changing laws and demanding auditors and audit committees (especially those coming under laws like SOX !) makes life of the CFO and his organisation more complex. Indian companies are going global, and preparing accounts with different reporting currencies, different GAAPs, consolidations under Indian GAAP and also mostly US GAAP, and lastly every quarter with ‘deadlines’, Most of my CFO friends truly experience the meaning of ‘Dead’ line! Truly, life has become too complex.

I think it is time to question what is the value of publishing the quarterly numbers. Modern businesses are too complex to be evaluated on just one-quarter numbers and get in to enormous discussions on QoQ and YoY numbers, LTM numbers and so on. Other than audit firms and TV business channels and media, no one (especially investors/shareholders) stands benefited! It loses quality and adds complexity of numbers at the heavy cost of health of finance/accounts organisation of each listed company. Further, we add to our complexity by giving guidance for the next quarter and try to achieve it or beat it with no regards to global market dynamics (not capital markets) of our own Industry.

I think all of us bring of the same fraternity should make a serious attempt, to see that we get a stable set of GAAP rules which do not have multiple interpretations, leave some space for the CFOs’ integrity and discretion, rather than asking auditors to interpret GAAP rules (AS) (as if they are Vedas and only the auditors have right to interpret them! !); stop this quarterly business and make it half-yearly and move as early to IFRS to have common rules for global subs and consolidations of accounts. There are number of areas where the same transaction gets treated differently in different parts of the world. Even OECD countries do not have common understanding of the accounting treatment of similar transactions. Compensated leave, intagibles, ESOP accounting are some of such areas. IFRS, I believe, will bring these complexities and confusions to an end. In the USA, number of multinationals have found a solution otherwise! They have started publishing ‘Non-GAAP’ numbers with a management statement that these numbers are not audited but the management feels that they represent ‘true picture’ of the business !

The problem that I see is, in all this intellectual exercises and professional egos, all of us have forgotten that the main purpose of the reporting is to elucidate the current shareholders and prospective investors about the affairs of the company and allow them to have more educated judgment on the future performance of the company they have invested in or want to invest. In the bargain, not only have we made our lives complicated, but also made these numbers almost indecipherable to all stakeholders.

I feel, this is not impossible, though difficult.What we need is to put brains of professional accountants, CFOs, and regulators together to see how we ultimately help to create a value for our business, how we bring competitive advantage to our business without making life unnecessarily complex by bringing some common standards and compatible accounting practices that give all global stakeholders some same and meaningful information at reasonable intervals. I can only hope, we will reach there one day and it may not be just Utopia!

Chartered Accountants in the 21st Century

fiogf49gjkf0d
Chartered Accountants in the 21st Century“It’s not the strongest of the
species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but those most responsive to
change”

The 21st century will be unique as we will see the balance of
economic power shift to Asia from the western world which has dominated the
previous 400 years. With India and China growing at over 9%, for the first time
in human history, we will see 40% of the world population experiencing growth at
this level with multiple ramifications in every sphere. Asia will also reap the
benefits of a demographic transition as it has a very young population, with
lesser dependence, growing in a high-growth ecosystem. At the same time, the
developed world is seeing the rise of an ageing population, with increased
dependence and social security costs.

Advances in technology, creation of the World Wide Web,
massive reduction in costs of telecommunications and the democratisation of
travel is creating linkages, totally shaking up national markets. Transnational
flow of capital has reduced the ability of nations to control their currency and
their own economy, creating an interdependence never seen before. Free flow of
capital has led to the rise of giant transnationals, which today make up 60% of
global trade and command huge resources. Because of the wide diversity of
ownership and business, the world has become much smaller than we can imagine.
Cross-border movement of national persons is creating new risks and new
opportunities. In a world driven by innovation, the only true competitive
advantage would be the capability and talent of the human resources that every
nation or business entity can command.

The global economy is being driven by the knowledge
revolution. Knowledge transcends boundaries, while businesses transform from
being multinational to transnational. The world has now become a global village.
Collaboration, networking, mergers, consolidation, and partnerships, all are
creating an interdependent world.

In this knowledge era, our success depends on what we know
and what we do with what we know and in what we need to excel. Those who are
able to take advantage of these changes will pioneer the creation of wealth and
the advent of new business models.

Changing Indian scenario :

So, welcome to change and welcome to growth.

India has led this change globally, growing at 9% p.a. for
the last four years. The rapidity of the change, and the opportunities that it
has thrown up, has tremendously increased opportunities for every profession and
also created a global market for services. The demand for Chartered Accountants
(CA) both in the profession and in industry has led to shortages with massive
increases in compensation. The profession needs to reflect on the opportunities
and take full advantage of growth. Because of the global nature of the change,
one also needs to scan the globe for trends and prepare oneself in terms of
increasing competence levels.

Industry is in need of complex specialised services and is
being forced to look elsewhere and this is becoming a matter of concern. The
growth of the BPO/KPO sector providing global services, has brought in massive
use of technology to deliver services and over a period of time created a large
pool of talent, unheard of anywhere else. In the short run, this has led to a
severe shortage of talent and large increases in compensation, creating room for
other professionals to run in. Professional practice is suffering with over 85%
of new members joining industry and large-scale flow of talent out of the
system. This, along with the increased demand from industry would lead to
consolidation of practices and reshape the profession. Small enterprises are
deprived of the services of CAs, impeding their growth, calling for new policy
responses. Welcome to the 21st century.

CAs are also becoming CEOs of local and transnational
enterprises, creating role models of the future.

The Chartered Accountant is India’s best known and most
widely respected professional. It represents years of business studies, work
experience, and the highest standards of professional ethics and objectivity.
But it is based on the model of yesterday and needs to reshape to meet the needs
of tomorrow. It should not be a profession of historic glory, but rather should
write its own history in this new era.

Role of CA :

Because of globalisation CAs are providing specialised
services in all areas that their global compatriots in developed nations
deliver, such as International Accounting, International Taxation, Business
Valuation, Cross-border structuring and Mergers and Acquisition, Investment
analysis, etc.

Some areas which are in great demand are discussed below.

(1) Financial Analysis :


Analysis of routine and non-routine transactions and
preparing analyst’s reports for various equity research firms, provide inputs
for the credit rating agencies, creating the basis for merger/business
combination decisions, etc.

CAs having a sound financial knowledge and analytics, and a
deep understanding of generally accepted accounting principles, are able to
comprehend transactions including benchmarking the policies adopted by the
company against the best in industry.

(2) International Tax and Domestic Management :


As companies globalise rapidly, demand for international tax
services and use of DTT’s is growing multifold. Domain expertise in
international tax laws is becoming a hygiene factor. Such services are becoming
the basis of determining business outcome in firms and have moved away from
playing the role of a traditional interface. Specialisation in complex areas
such as Transfer Pricing is of great value.

In the domestic area, reduction of tax rates and advent of
technology have changed the face of traditional tax planning. With exponential
growth in the services sector, complexities in indirect taxes such as service
tax are on the increase calling for tax strategies to drive business.

(3) Risk Assessment :


Risk management has become the prime focus in Boardrooms round the world. The recent sub-prime crisis has demonstrated the need for more stringent risk management practices and elevated the practitioners to a much higher level. CAs have become reviewers of system design, indentifying deficiencies and advising management on more efficient systems.

International regulations like SOX compliance have opened an area of services, from designing of internal control processes, mapping risks, establishing benchmarks and indentifying processes to mitigate them. Internal Auditors have been empowered through strong corporate governance practices to report directly to the Audit Committee, post-discussion with management, which provide them with the authority together with the responsibility to carry out their functions in the truest sense.

(4)    Experts in International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS):

The world is moving rapidly to a single set of high-quality global standards for accounting, increasing access to capital and enhancing comparability of performance. CAs have to rapidly enhance their expertise in accounting to prepare themselves. The advent of a global IFRS would expand the market for services, with the entire globe being the playfield. Most countries in the world are short of specialised accounting talent and unable to cope with the growth of their economies and are sourcing talent from outside. The transition to a single IFRS globally also creates unprecedented opportunities to our CAs.

(5)    Management   Accounting:
The drive to use real-time information for business decision-making has exponentially increased demand for management accounting in firms. With the capital markets becoming increasingly short-term and analysts’ attention focussed on quarterly results, this area is expected to grow rapidly in future. Budgeting, performance evaluation, cost management, and asset management to increase returns are creating a pull factor. Management accountants have become part of executive teams involved in strategic planning or development of new products.

(6)    International Finance and Currency Management:
With the increasing convertibility of the rupee, firms are borrowing globally to reduce cost of capital and to grow more rapidly. Capital has ceased to become a constraint and exposure to international finance, capital markets and currency management is determining success of CAs. This is also driving the need to have competency in compliance and reporting, as capital is raised from different markets and the regulatory need increases.

(7) Investment Banking and Financial  Services:

Investment banking is dominating the financial services landscape. Never has the world seen such a surfeit of capital and such low interest rates. Developed countries are forced to have low interest rates to keep their consumption going, increasing liquidity and thereby opportunities for investment banking. Sadly, the best global talent is gravitating to this area, reducing innovation in the sciences. The growth of hedge funds has increased volatility in the commodities markets, increasing costs for ordinary people. As this industry offers a fascinating and fast-paced growth to CAs, a change in outlook is called for. The traditional financial services area including financial consultancy services, advice and negotiation with regard to mergers and acquisitions, formulation of nursing programmes and rehabilitation packages for revival of sick units is also seeing growth.

(8) Corporate Finance and  Control:

Corporate finance and control is fast emerging as a specialised function in many companies and the routine accounting function is being delinked from the finance function. Role of CA in corporate finance revolves around mobilisation and utilisation of financial resources for short-term and long-term purposes from domestic and overseas markets through a proper mix of debt and equity, with the goal of optimising returns. Treasury management has become an integral part of corporate finance.

(9) Investment Management:

With low interest rates and increased liquidity, the capital markets and the money markets have witnessed the introduction of new instruments and intense interplay of demand and supply which have increased the volume of activity. Investors increasingly entrust their funds to mutual funds, creating demand for portfolio managers. A portfolio manager’s job is very challenging since it involves the balancing of risks and rewards through skillful shuffling of the portfolio and maximising the return on investment. With significant growth of the mutual fund industry, the demand for portfolio managers will further escalate.

(10) Functional Specialists and Partners in Information Technology:

Multinational companies with globally dispersed operations require enterprise resource planning (ERP) solutions for optimising their organisational functions. These include designing efficient supply-chain management systems, designing financial systems to obtain information across the organisation seamlessly. A CA with his financial expertise can partner with software engineers in designing and customising these systems to cater to each client’s requirement. This is a high-demand emerging area with global opportunities.

(11) KPO/BPO and  ITES :

In a country that has become the breeding ground for the BPO industry, finance and accounts (F&A) outsourcing is fast attracting CAs. While BPOs are cashing in on the Indians’ affinity to numbers, a global work culture, coupled with a much better remuneration, is luring accounts graduates and CAs towards the offshoring wave.

The potential applications of KPOs tend to be much more advanced and wider than Information Technology or Business Process Outsourcing. Compared to other business models, KPOs require high domain expertise. Speed of response is also very important, without compromising the quality of products or services.

The key areas that are outsourced in KPO include business analytics, asset accounting management, financial analysis, payroll management and financial research & investigations. It is evident that there  are a number  of lucrative opportunities for CAs who are willing to take advantage of this market.

It is worthy of mention that the US has developed an xml-based language for financial reporting language called eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL),which provides a tag with a standardised definition to each data element in the financials. This would also bring in KPa opportunities for India.

The BPO/KPO industry has the potential to create a further shortage of accounting skills in India, as their exposure to the global market makes India the accounting office of the world.

Skills & competencies:

Indian CAs have proven themselves to be amongst the best in the class globally. The Institute has developed a Competency Framework to map the full range of competencies expected of a Chartered Accountant at the point of admission to membership.

CA Competencies = Skills + Knowledge + Attitudes

These competencies have been developed by Indian CA profession over many years and have recently been revised to reflect the needs of the public and the profession for the 21st century.

The CA Competency Map defines the level proficiency candidates must demonstrate in each of the competency areas to qualify for their designation. The new CA Competency Map sets out specific expectations for CAs in competency areas of specific domain competencies and personal attributes.

CAs cannot stop learning upon obtaining their degree and attaining membership to the profession. The responsibility to deliver and keep one-self competent to deliver starts from that day. Their responsibilities include :

(1) Being    innovative:

In today’s world knowledge is power. Success will go to those who survive downturns through constant innovation. Hence, the learning process will have to be continuous. CAs have to ensure effective continuous professional learning.

(2)  The power of technology:

Adopting newer technology is a pre-requisite to faster and accurate processing. A CA cannot afford to waste time in performing mundane functions as such businesses are looming under the threat of obsolescence. With the e-revolution in the financial sector, audits have gone online, internal controls are being tested off-site, desk-top due diligence is being done and thus the profession has to evolve new strategies for analysing the potential weakness in each of these systems for tackling many of the white-collar crimes that could be part of an automated society.

(3) Specialisation :

Specialisation is the need of the hour. CAs will have to distinguish themselves with their skills. They can build their expertise in areas such as taxation, auditing, cyber laws, IS audit, corporate finance, international taxation and international accounting standards.

(4) Building soft skills:

Acquiring soft skills such as communication skills, interpersonal skills and managerial expertise has become very critical for being a good CA. CAs need to have good negotiation skills to communicate financial implications with clarity at strategic t level.

(5) Leadership:

New members of the profession are the leaders of tomorrow. They need to groom themselves to take business decisions and should not restrict themselves to financial areas. They should build themselves as well as the profession towards a truly world-class standard.

Role of ICAI:

ICAI, as the professional body for Indian CAs, would need to reshape its role to playing a more global role in changing the global financial architecture. It has to focus more on preparing its members to the new challenges, take the lead in developing the profession in the emerging markets and participate in global forums to set standards.

Certain areas where ICAl can play a pivotal role in enhancing the quality of members are :

  • Intensive courses and certifications in the areas of international accounting standards, XBRL, international taxation, business valuation and other specialised areas. These should be conducted by eminent persons in the profession.

  • Internal activities of ICAI including the project being undertaken should be available on the ICAI website. Minutes of the meeting should be well documented and comments received on draft publications should also be available on the website.

  • ICAI should encourage exchange programme for members of different countries to share ex-periences and learn from global practices.

  • Tie-ups should be made with all international bodies for enabling members to access international research materials, publications and global best practices.

  • Provide executive education courses for non-finance professional in areas of common interest.

  • Raise sufficient funds for research for matters which are issues faced by a large number of entities.

  • Involve in extensive collaborations  with global corporations for placement with lucrative offers to make this a very covetable profession.

  • ICAI should enter into reciprocity arrangements with other countries for global acceptance of the degree.

Last but not the least, Indian CAs should be looked upon as the best accounting professionals of the world. To achieve this goal, ICAl has to market its potential in the global markets, convincing global corporations to receive their accounting and au-diting services from India.

Conclusion:

India’s GDP is expected to grow from US $ 1.2 trillion to US $ 2.5 trillion in the next ten years and to US $ 5 trillion by 2028. It is a time of unprecedented growth and opportunity. Every year India itself needs at least 25,000 new chartered accountants and the number will only grow further as the economy grows. The entire globe is looking to India to get the accounting talent to lubricate the global markets. All of us should be prepared for the global markets with skills comparable to the best in the world. CAs have to lead India in this century. Posterity will not judge us kindly if we do not rise to the occasion.

As Peter Drucker once said “One cannot manage change. One can only be ahead of it”.

The decade ahead

fiogf49gjkf0d

The decade ahead

In the period of more than fifty years that has elapsed since
I qualified as a Chartered Accountant, the only constant has been change.
However, what has not been constant is the rate of change which has been
accelerating at an ever faster rate. More significant developments have taken
place in the world of the accountant in the last decade than in the preceding
four decades and it is reasonable to assume that this rate of change will
accelerate even more in the coming decade.


It is not easy to predict change, but those who do not
anticipate change and plan accordingly, do so at their peril. While we may not
be able to identify the exact nature of the changes which will take place in the
coming decade, it is possible to identify some of the underlying trends which
will cause change and consider their possible consequences.

The first and perhaps the most significant trend is the all
pervasive impact of information technology. IT changes not merely the methods by
which financial information is produced, but can significantly influence the
content of that information, its form and its frequency of presentation, as also
the role of the auditor.

Information technology makes it possible for information to
be produced, analysed and collated very fast and this will generate demands for
financial information to be prepared and presented to shareholders on an
on-line, real-time basis. The annual general-purpose financial statement as now
produced in the form of the annual report may well disappear. In fact we are
very fast reaching the stage where, as a cynic when referring to the annual
report put it, “Analysts do not need it and shareholders don’t read it”.
Electronic filing of myriad statutory reports with regulatory authorities will
also become the order of the day and audit firms will have to increasingly
embrace automation in their auditing processes totally to handle this.

There will be a fundamental shift in the objective of audit.
Arithmetical accuracy of data generated through electronic systems will be taken
for granted and emphasis will shift to the validity of the input data and the
meaningful evaluation of the outputs generated. Higher level skills will
therefore be needed to make the resultant value judgments.

The development of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language
(XBRL) will be greatly accelerated. XBRL assigns a tag to each individual data
item in financial information containing contextual information such as
accounting period, company name, currency of use, etc. This makes it possible to
identify, extract, exchange, manipulate and report data quickly and easily. XBRL
will revolutionise financial reporting by making it possible for anyone who
wants to use financial information to analyse it, re-use it and exchange it in
any desired form. This can improve the transparency of financial statements and
returns filed with regulatory authorities and XBRL filings will become
mandatory. Already in the UK, XBRL filings have been made mandatory for all
corporate tax returns by 2011.

Significant progress has already been made in the development
of XBRL software throughout the world. The International Accounting Standards
Committee Foundation has developed IFRS-GP and software has been developed to
tag companies’ reported data and to validate the accuracy of self-tags for SEC
filings in the US. In India also, the project for XBRL development has been
assigned to a sub-committee of SEBI’s Standing Committee on Disclosure and
Accounting Standards (SCODA).

A second significant trend which can be identified is the
impact of globalisation in general and the development of international
standards of accounting and auditing in particular. India’s emergence as one of
the fastest growing members of the world economy carries with it the necessity
that it should rapidly align its financial systems with international practices.
Adoption of international accounting standards by 2011, as announced, is an
essential step in that direction. However, there are certain
aspects of this decision which need to be considered.

First, there is the oft-repeated complaint that accounting
standards are increasingly becoming too academic and divorced from practical
considerations. It is said that because of this approach, financial outputs are
often at odds with economic reality. It is also claimed that accounting
standards are becoming more complex. That there is merit in this claim is
obvious from the fact that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
itself has recognised the need for reducing complexity in some standards. Thus,
it has recently issued a discussion paper on ‘Reducing complexity in reporting
financial instruments’. This paper argues that the many ways of measuring
financial instruments may be one main cause of complexity and while the
long-term goal should be measuring all types of financial information in the
same way, there will have to be an intermediate approach which must (a) provide
relevant and easily understood information; (b) be consistent with the long-term
measurement objective of fair value; (c) increase the number of financial
instruments measured at fair value; (d) not increase complexity, and (e) be
significant enough to justify the costs of the change.

Second, there is the growing debate between principle-based standards as proposed by IASB and rule-based standards as in US-GAAP. Both carry certain risks. The SEC in the U.S. argues that principle-based standards carry the risk of poor judgments which could be second-guessed by hindsight, whereas rule-based standards provide clarity and ensure risk. However the Enron, Worldcom, etc. debacles clearly show that rule-based standards are not free from risk as they can be easily circum-vented. The more -fundamental objection to rule-based standards, however, is their unsuitability as a basis for international standards. Rule-based standards are derived in the context of the environment in which they are developed and a rule which is appropriate in one jurisdiction may be wholly inappropriate in another jurisdiction with a different environment. In order to develop a single international standard, IASB and FASB are progressing along the road of convergence of IFRS with US-GAAP, but there is increasing concern that what may finally emerge willbe principle-based standards with rules.

But by far the most important  area of concern  is the growing trend towards ‘fair-value’ accounting in international standards. As a long-term goal, the concept of ‘fair-value’ accounting is unexceptional. It significantly enhances the role of financial information as a tool for making investment decisions and it obviates the ‘movement’ errors which occur when the values of assets and liabilities change over a period of time. However, there are significant difficulties in determining fair value and when fair value is based on estimation and guesswork, ‘measurement’ errors can occur.

IASB has in November 2006 issued a discussion paper titled ‘Fair Value Measurement’ which incorporates a definition of fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date”. This borrows the definition used in a standard issued by FASB two months earlier, but the important difference is that whereas the term ‘fair value’ is used restrictively in US-GAAP to cover financial instruments and business combinations, it is used more extensively in IFRS to cover most assets and liabilities.

The big problem is that in practice, and certainly in developing countries like India, there often does not exist a market in which orderly transactions can take place between participants. Therefore ‘fair value’ will have to be estimated by the preparers of financial information and these values would be subject to the significant risk of ‘measurement’ errors, both deliberate and in good faith. Auditors also could become more dependent on managements’ judgment and as Warren Buffet has so aptly put it, marking to market could well become marking to myth.

Globalisation also will have an impact on the regulatory framework of the auditing profession. In the U.S., the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is required to exercise oversight over overseas audit firms which audit U.S. listed companies or their subsidiaries wherever located. PCAOB teams have already started examination of audit firms in India. In a recent interview, the Head of Audit Regulation of the European Commission has said that the Commission is consulting on how to deal with auditors from non-EU jurisdictions – ‘third countries’ – who audit third-country entities listed in EU regulated markets. The question is whether third-country auditors should be subject to registration requirements and over-sight by EU member states or whether reliance could be placed on the third-country audit registration and oversight authorities. Clearly in making that decision, an important consideration will be the level of public oversight in the regulation of the profession and pressure will mount for this oversight to be by a public regulator and not by the Institute.

A third significant trend which can affect the profession is the growing importance of corporate governance and its impact on the role of audit. The failure of major corporations like Enr on , Worldcom, etc. in the U.S., Royal Ahold in the Netherlands, Parmalet in Italy, etc. has highlighted the fact that corporate responsibility is the central issue which business needs to address. While this has resulted in a spate of regulatory pronouncements and statutes whereby policy makers seek assurance that business delivers sustainable and responsible outcomes, it also demands that business policies are supported by accurate and reliable information and the systems, processes and strategies that produce that information and that there is independent assurance in this area. This is a growing concern which will provide both future risk and opportunity for the profession and also re-define  the role of audit.

An auditor has two roles, first, to provide assurance regarding the reliability of financial information as the basis of investment decisions, and second, to give an opinion on the stewardship performance of the management. Traditionally the profession has given prominence to the first role and largely ignored the second. However in the changed environment, the roles will reverse. Auditors will be required to increasingly give assurance to shareholders on the ‘stewardship’ aspect rather than on the ‘decision usefulness’ aspect. This will mean that shareholders will want greater information and assurance on the risks and uncertainties that affect numbers in the financial statements arising from subjective judgments by management regarding revenue and cost recognition. Therefore, emphasis will shift from an opinion merely on the true and fair aspects of financial statements to value judgments on the existence and adequacy of controls and the relationship between finance and risk.

Risk management willbecome a major area of concern for managements and consequently for the auditor. He will need to examine and evaluate the methods by which managements identify risk, and devise and administer methods by which risks are controlled, managed and reported. He will no longer be able to avoid responsibility for failure to detect high-level collusive fraud and will need to devise new approaches to deal with it. He will need to be more pro-active, that is, identify work which is needed and do it before being asked to and will need to ensure that the work he does is relevant and valuable to the client. Managements will also have to accept greater Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) including in areas of sustainable growth and the auditor will need to audit and monitor these initiatives. All of this will mean that auditors will have to possess wider skills, greatly increase their productivity and create multi-disciplinary firms.

A final trend which we need to recognise is the impact of restructuring in the profession. There are two major themes which will inevitably change the structure of the profession. The first is the growing process of consolidation within the profession, and the second, the continued ability of the profession to attract talent.

The decade which has ended has seen a process of consolidation within the profession whereby the Big-8 have become the Big-4 and a second level of international firms have grown significantly in size. In this process, smaller firms have found it difficult to continue independent existence and have scrambled to join the international firms. The growing dominance of these big international firms and particularly the Big-4 has raised concerns of regulators in many countries. In a recent survey of the investor community in the UK, 25% of the respondents were concerned that the lack of competition could be risking audit quality. However, a third of the same respondents also said that if there was a switch away from a Big-4 firm, they would review their investment decisions.

There have been demands for regulation to restrict this dominance, but clearly that is not the answer. The solution appears to be for second-tier firms to consolidate into larger entities and offer meaningful competition to the Big-4. To create this ‘reputational competition’ they need a better understanding of what constitutes a ‘great firm’. It has been claimed that the outstanding characteristics of a great firm are :- (a) significant sustainable profitable growth; (b) the right type of client base providing the right type of work at the right fees; and (c) the ability to attract and retain quality people. It is also claimed that to acquire these characteristics, these consolidated second-tier firms will need to address certain fundamental issues, namely, (a) the need for a well-planned strategy for the future; (b)    acquisition  and retention  of high-quality staff; (c)    leadership at all levels within the firm; (d) concentration on service lines in which the firm excels and avoidance of service lines where it does not; and (e) understanding client expectations and surpassing them.

An equally important aspect is a change in mindset. The profession must give up its dependence on work where it has a protective position and must no longer expect work as a matter of right. Rather it must be willing to sustain its business development through competition, both within and without the profession. Only then will it force itself to take steps to acquire a ‘reputational’ advantage through a track record of first-rate work.

The most crucial factor which will affect the profession’s future will however be its ability to attract and retain talent. With globalisation and a fast growing economy, one of the major constraints for the economy will be the shortage of talent and the resultant competition for it. Institutes in other countries have already addressed this issue and taken proactive action. Thus in the UK, the English Institute introduced some time back a system whereby training for an associate who is not in practice is extended to employers in several countries, including a proposed extension to India. In March 2006, it launched the Pathway Programme which enables professionals with other accountancy qualifications and five years experience also to obtain an associate qualification after passing an ‘examination of experience’. Finally, it has modified its examinations syllabus to enable entrants to take the examination in phases. Many other Institutes may follow this example and the ‘articleship’ system as we know it may no longer remain as the only vehicle for entry into the profession and audit experience may soon become an optional requirement.

If the profession has to address adequately the challenges created by the trends we have identified, the two key drivers which will be needed in the coming decade will be quality and integrity.

The Financial Reporting Council in the UK recently published a paper on ‘Promoting Audit Quality’ and a framework which admirably summarises the key drivers of audit quality. These are (a) culture within the firm; (b) skills and personal qualities of – 1 partners and staff; (c) effectiveness of the audit process; (d) reliability and usefulness of audit reporting; and (e) ability to respond to factors outside the control of auditors affecting audit quality.

Confidence in the auditor’s integrity is fundamental to his work. To inspire this confidence, he must be seen to be honest, truthful and fair, compliant with the concept of social responsibility, open and concerned with the interests of all stakeholders and demonstrative of taking corrective action where necessary. Integrity has to be underpinned by moral values and demonstration of scepticism, per-severance and ability to withstand pressure in the face of opposition.

As I look back over the last fifty years, I share a feeling of satisfaction that I have been part of a profession which has grown so fast and with so much success. It has done so because it has recognised early and been able to adapt better and faster than many other professions to the changing aspects of business and to exploit the opportunities which this changing aspect has offered. I have no doubt that in the coming decade, we will continue to remain the most dynamic seekers of new business opportunities if we continue to exhibit the qualities which have made this possible, namely, continually updated skills, integrity, social responsibility and strong regulation which protects the ‘brand equity’ of the Chartered Accountant.

Role of the Professional in the 21st Century

fiogf49gjkf0d

Role of the Professional in the 21st Century

The Society which was born in the middle of the 20th century
has, in the beginning of the 21st, very appropriately dedicated the next issue
of its very popular and informative magazine to the ‘Role of the professional in
the 21st Century.’ One often speaks of a person being professional in his work.
This would normally denote particular efficiency in handling the matter
entrusted to him. However, one sometimes speaks of a person as being a ‘true’
professional and by this, one refers to him as a role model, not only in
experience, learning and dedication which he displays in handling professional
assignments, but also his character, rectitude, honesty, fairness and impeccable
integrity. At a time like the present when newspaper reports speak about a
professional having allegedly bribed a member of the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal and the two having been detained, it is these latter qualities which
assume great importance.


Of course, there is another way of looking at the subject and
interpreting it as referring to the very wide role which a professional plays
today on account of the various opportunities before him — opportunities which
were non-existent, say, 20 years ago. The role of the Chartered Accountant has
become all pervasive and he is a vital link in the businessman’s operations. He
is no longer just an auditor but advises him on management and business
practices, computerisation and concluding large business deals. Indeed, auditing
is today looked upon as the less preferred alternative. This is perhaps because
it requires great courage on the part of the Chartered Accountant to certify
that what the client has done or proposes to do is not in keeping with the law
or good accounting practice. On the other hand, in other fields of his practice
he helps the client whilst as an auditor he looks after, inter alia, the
interest of the shareholder. So also with the advocate — appearance in Courts,
which was the mainstay of his professional practice is no longer so. Advice on
day-to-day matters relating to business and personal affairs of clients as well
as drawing up or settling complicated deeds to provide for the ever increasing
needs of business and arbitration proceedings have overtaken Court practice. In
this writer’s opinion there is, however, nothing so challenging and satisfying
as persuading a Bench to accept your client’s view, particularly if it is an
unorthodox view. However, it all depends on an individual’s approach. Everybody
does not relish a steak !

The ultimate test of the role of a professional is the
standing and the respect he commands and the value which people put on the way
he handles matters and not the number of matters he handles. In England,
previously they had amateurs and professionals playing the game of cricket and
the annual match at Lords used to be called ‘Gentlemen v. Players’, the
amateurs being the gentlemen. The captain of the English team would invariably
be a cricketer who qualified as an amateur (gentleman). (Len Hutton, later Sir
Leonard Hutton, was the first exception just about the time that the Society
started functioning.) This is no longer so. The annual match is discontinued.
One wonders whether this is because the gentleman has gone out of the game! In
my view a professional attains his ultimate role if he qualifies as a gentleman
professional and not just a successful or prominent professional.

In one way of looking at it, the qualities which a
professional must possess to discharge his role with distinction have remained
the same over time. After all, the Ten Commandments do not change from time to
time. They are enduring and of universal application. Nevertheless times are
changing — the 20 : 20 culture has replaced the flavour of a test match in
popular thinking. So also the general concept of a professional has undergone a
change. Advertising by a professional was, and is taboo in India. However, it is
rampant in the United States of America where one may find at a department store
handouts which one can pick up about the achievements of a lawyer and I presume
also of an accountant. At some international airports one finds posters or
hoardings with a photograph of the leading professional in a professional firm
who has achieved success and prominence in his field. Even in the UK today,
barristers are permitted to bring to the notice of the public their speciality
of practice but not a reference to cases won by them. The rule against
advertising in India is so strict that Rule 36 of the Code of Conduct framed by
the Bar Council of India specifically provides that the stationery of a lawyer
should not indicate that he is or has been a President or a member of the Bar
Council or any association or that he has been associated with any person or
organisation or any particular cause or matter or that he specialises in any
type of work or that he has been a judge or an advocate-general. Strictly
speaking therefore, the letterhead cannot state ‘formerly a judge of . . .’ The
Chartered Accountant is subject to equally stringent condition against
advertising. The classic view is that the client must seek out the professional
and not that the latter fishes for clients.

The other malaise is the publicity which professionals seek
by constantly voicing their views in the press in response to mobile requests.
The views are often based on newspaper reports or TV announcements without
having actually seen in black and white what they comment upon. This is, of
course, less reprehensible than the case of the politician who recommends
banning of a publication which he admits in a blase manner that he has not
read !

A prevalent practice today is for a professional to make
presentations to would be clients to show his particular expertise and sometimes
with a view to the client retaining him or his firm at the expense of the
professional currently working for him. This to me appears unsavoury. Of course,
the other point of view is that the client is a customer and it is proper that
he be made aware of the alternatives available just as a businessman advertises
the superior quality of his products.

It is urged in defence that a new entrant in the profession cannot get known unless he is permitted some degree of advertisement. Insofar as the presentations are concerned, the truth is that it is not the new and junior member who indulges in them, but the well-established and seasoned professional even though he does not have to fish for clients! Insofar as the junior and new entrant is concerned, there are several avenues open to him to get himself known. He can write articles in the professional as well as in the lay press, he can accept speaking engagements and he may even take up an assignment as a lecturer, all of which will give his image an exposure. This is particularly applicable to professionals practising in the ( fields of accountancy, law, management, etc. Indeed, the Society is a great place for a new entrant to have his voice heard. The Society as well as several other professional bodies encourage new and budding professionals by offering them speaking and writing engagements. In life there is always a right and a wrong way of doing things.

It is also to be borne in mind that a professional is not in the business of selling goods. Sethi J. observed in Saxena v. Sharma, 2000 7 SCC 264,  “The professional obligations of a lawyer are to be distinguished from the business commitments followed by the trading community.” Vivian Bose J. in the case of Mr. G, a Senior Advocate of the Su-preme Court, AIR 1954 SC 557, pithily observed that the restraints which a lawyer is subjected to are a part of the price he pays for the privilege of belonging to a close and exclusive club, their integrity, dignity and honour shall be above the breath of scandal. There is a very important, firm and distinct line between a business and a profession, a line which unfortunately gets blurred as time passes. Some observations of the Supreme Court – would appear to make this line vanish. In Barendra Prasad Ray v. ITO, 129 ITR 295, the Supreme _ Court equated a business connection as also covering a professional connection. To the same effect is the observation of Rowlatt J. in Christopher Barkar & Sons v. IRe, (1919) 2 KB 222 wherein he observed that “All professions are businesses, but all businesses are not professions.” The observations have to be read in context and bearing in mind the issue involved. For example, in the Supreme Court case the issue was whether an Indian solicitor had a business connection with the barrister engaged by him. It would indeed be a sad day if no distinction is visible between a businessman and a professional. What distinguishes a profession from a business is that a profession has a code of conduct to which its members are subject and breach whereof would result in a disciplinary action. However, no written code of conduct could possibly cover all contingencies. Ultimately, the question to be asked is whether the conduct in question is that of a true gentleman. Often adherence to the unwritten code of conduct is more important because the written code is there for all to see. As very pithily observed in an old film ‘Seven Brides for Seven Brothers’, one has to honour an unwritten contract because the written contract can always be enforced.

Bose J. stated in AIR 1954 SC 557 that a professional “is expected at all times to comport himself in a manner befitting his status as ‘an officer and a gentleman.’ In the Army it is a military offence to do otherwise … though no notice would be taken of ungentlemanly conduct under the ordinary law of the land and none in the case of a civilian. So here, he (the advocate) is bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession to whose privileges he has been admitted; and if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action.” It is for this reason that S. 21(3) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 imposes a punishment not only for professional but also for ‘other’ misconduct.

In business, the driving force is money. That ought not to be the case in a profession.  In the Preamble to the Standards  of Professional  Conduct  and Etiquette formulated  by the Bar Council of India and reported in the journal  section  of 68 Bom.  L.R. 72 it is stated “An advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a privileged member of the communitp, and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be improper for an advocate. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation, an advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client, and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned contain canons of conduct and etiquette adopted as general guides, yet the specific mention thereof shall not be con-strued as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative though not specifically mentioned.”
 
What applies to a lawyer equally applies to any other professional. The introduction to the publication on code of conduct issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India sets out that the overriding motto has to be pride of service in preference to personal gain.

An illustration which may bring out the difference that there should be in the approach of a professional and of a businessman is provided by what should be their respective reactions to the fact that a particular act or transaction which has scope to yield monetary gain may be visited with a penalty if held to be impermissible. The businessman may ask what is the extent of the penalty and if factoring in the quantum thereof would still make the transaction acceptable from the business point of view, then he may take the penalty in his stride. On the other hand, the professional would (should 7) say that a penalty would imply a breach of the law and an act which imposes a penalty must be avoided even though financially viable. My views may, of course, be regarded by the new and not so new entrants to the profession as archaic, but then I have been brought up in a culture where it was considered improper for Counsel to carry visiting cards and certainly not proper to distribute them to all and sundry at professional meetings. Today, this is regarded as essential ‘networking.’ Indeed, in some large and well-known firms abroad and perhaps in India also, the senior-most partner essentially confines his activities to client nursing and client development rather than client attendance. The worth of a partner is judged by the money he pulls in and not the quality of his work.

By saying that in the 21st century money is the measure of success, I do not mean that a profes-sional must not charge what he feels is his proper remuneration for the time spent by him and the effort put in by him over a period of years in attaining excellence. After all, he devotes his time and there is no mechanism by which the time ordained to him in this world can be extended. At the same time if a matter deserves his attention, he should not refuse the assignment because the client is not in a position to pay his fee or that he only accepts work from corporate clients.

Most unfortunately,  it is not wholly unknown that the professional may tell a client or accept the sug-gestion of a client to raise his fees or perhaps even gross up the fees for the component thereof which is to be used to bribe on behalf of the client. The client assumes the role of an ‘innocent abroad’ as his accounts only show the payment of a profes-sional fee. I may be pardoned for saying that it is like a businessman who retains an assassin to get rid of a competitor and does not pull the trigger himself. Of course, this ‘refinement’ does not have to be practised where the client or the professional has access to the other type of money !

It is also unfortunate that sometimes in India one reads in magazines interviews with professionals where they flaunt the success achieved by them in handling certain cases, even revealing the names of the clients. Confidentiality of the client’s affairs is equally important in the 21st or even in the 25th century as in the earlier times.

Today, the aspect of a contingent fee has assumed importance. The rules governing the American Bar clearly permit the charge of a contingent fee i.e., a fee based on success. In India, this is not per-mitted both to the chartered accountant and the lawyer. One must, of course, recognise that the charge of a contingent fee does serve a purpose as it enables an indigent person to avail of professional services without himself being out of pocket. The main reason for discouraging the levy of a contingent fee is that it gives to the professional a personal interest in the litigation which may lead to his not being fair to the Court, Tribunal or Authority before whom he appears or to his adversary. This breeds the class of ambulance lawyers – who chase an ambulance to offer their services to the injured in an accident or to the heirs of the deceased! As in all things in life, one has to balance two competing viewpoints. Old-fashioned as I am, I would vote for ‘no contingent fee,’ which is also the view clearly expounded by the Supreme Court of India in AIR 1954 SC 557 referred to above.

Over the last 15 years, a sea change has taken place in the quantum of the professional fee charged. This is in line with the globalisation of the Indian economy because foreign professionals charge a fee infinitely more than do their Indian counterparts. It is not as if the calibre of the foreign professional is any superior to that of the Indian. One result of this is that the problem of ‘kick back’ has unfortunately increased. The kickback could be to the employee of a corporation or an employee in a professional firm or even to a partner in a professional firm. This is undoubtedly unethical. It is however, not just a recent development as even in the old days it was not unknown that budding I counsels shared their fee with the managing clerk in an attorney’s office, who had the disposing power over a brief. An interesting issue is posed by Clause (2) of Part I in the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 which enumer-ates as a misconduct the payment directly or indirectly of any share or commission in the fees or profits of a chartered accountant to any person other than a member of the Institute. Obviously, the permissive payment is to a member of the Institute who does professional work for the chartered accountant. I do not know whether as worded it would permit payment of a simple kick-back to a member of the Institute! I am sure, it would not as it would come within the all-embracing principle of conduct not becoming a professional (Chartered Accountant). I may only add that though the fees charged have multiplied, the professional must not overlook that there are several cases where free counsel and work is necessary.

In order to fulfil his role of being a good professional, the person must maintain his total independence. If the professional is on the Board of Directors of a company, he should not perform professional services for the company as one does not know when there may be a conflict of interest in his role as a professional and his role as a director of the company who has to look after the interest of the shareholders. In the USA, strict rules of the Sarbanes Oxley Legislation are meticulously applied. Insofar as the legal profession is concerned, Rule 8 of the Code of Conduct prescribed by the Bar Council of India provides that a lawyer who is a director shall not appear for the company of which he is a director. Unfortunately, these rules are sometimes flouted even by the highest. Sometimes they are skirted by putting forward a dummy professional as being in charge!

There is a misconception in the mind of the lay public that a professional ought not to accept an assignment on behalf of a person who in public perception is perceived to be guilty of the charge levied against him. This is totally wrong. The function of a professional is to put forward without mis-representation of facts the case of his client. The professional is supposed to be better suited by training to articulate his client’s view. He should not bend to the public diktat not to appear for a particular person. The person may have a perfectly good defence though at first blush it may seem improbable. The only exception where he may decline to appear is where there is some conscientious objection to his canvassing a particular point of view and not because he feels the client is guilty of the misdemeanour he is charged with, unless, of course, the client has confessed to the profes-sional his wrongdoing. In our system it is for the judge to adjudicate.

One must also distinguish between a professional person’s argument in a matter and his opinion.
The opinion has to be what he feels is the correct position on facts and in law. His arguments  have to be what  is most  advantageous   to his client without factual misrepresentation.  He cannot be a judge and decline to urge a point which he feels may not be acceptable.  On the  other  hand,  his opinion  has to be what it is stated to be, namely, his view of the correct position in law on the given facts. The ultimate tribute is when, say, an officer says that  the  assessee  should  obtain  an opinion from XYZ as his opinion  will really be what  he believes to be true.

A very important professional development in the r 20th century insofar as India is concerned is the advent of foreign professional firms. As per present regulations, neither in the field of chartered accountancy nor of law can a foreign professional, who does not have the necessary Indian qualification or a foreign qualification recognised by the concerned apex body, practise in the field of chartered accountancy or law. The view is that to practise a profession does not merely mean ap-pearance in the Court or before an authority, but also performing any function which the said pro-fessional can perform. The writer feels that the right of a foreign professional to practise should be completely on a reciprocal basis. If the Indian professional can practise in that foreign country, then the professional of that country should be allowed to practise in India under the same terms and conditions. With the opening up of the economy, this is an issue which has assumed considerable importance. Here again one sometimes regrettably sees a surrogate practice being carried on. A fallout of increasing globalisation is that if a foreign company has an Indian associate, the audit of the associate company sooner or later gets transferred to the associate concern of the foreign company’s auditor. The homebred auditor is replaced not because he is less efficient or wanting in professional attainment, but because he does not have the necessary ‘connection.’ This is an unfortunate development per se. The defence, of course, is that this practice encourages uniformity of audit approach.

There is only one further aspect of the matter which requires to be considered. What are the special skills which the 21st century dictates for the professional? The first one which comes to mind is that one must train one’s memory to remember the relevant case law and facts. When one is arguing a matter before an authority and a question is put, it is in that split second that the professional must be able to provide the answer. This is particularly so when arguing before the Tribunal or a Court. Such response is possible if he has trained his memory to recall at pleasure the relevant case law on the subject. It is the 21st century computer mania which is a strong deterrent to the cultivation of a memory. Why should I strain myself when the information is available on the click of a button? A similar situation is reflected in the inability of the present generation to total mentally three sets of figures. The calculator is a great crutch. The other attribute which is required to be developed is the ability to put the argument in a succinct form. Gone are the days when judges had time at their disposal to hear lengthy arguments. One has to hit the target in the shortest possible time. Above all, one has to develop intuition and a sense of the moment. With the increasing workload one must know what to look for and what to ignore. As an auditor, a Chartered Accountant should learn by instinct to determine which aspects of a client’s accounts require particular scrutiny. Again a speedy reaction to a question is often called for. A client rings up with a question and expects a prompt response. One should be careful not to commit oneself if one is not sure of the position as later the response given by him may be held against the professional if it turns out to be inaccurate. Particular care has, therefore, to be taken in furnishing opinions, specially in writing, as years later what has been opined may be referred to and commented upon adversely. This is the reason why furnishing a written opinion is so much more difficult than arguing a matter. It is also more time-consuming than preparing for an appeal. Above all in the present era of tension and fast living, the professional must develop a sense of detachment and humour. He should not get carried away by ful-some praise showered on him. He must remember that it is only as long as he delivers that the client will hanker after him.

It is a wise man who said that if you want to find out how important you are, take a bucket and fill it with water, put your hand in it up to your elbow, pull it out and the ‘hole’ that remains is the measure of how you will be missed. You may splash all you please when you enter, but stop and you will find in a minute that it looks just the same as before!

I have, in this article, confined myself to the professions of accountancy and law as these are matters of prime interest to readers of this magazine. However, there is the profession of medicine which perhaps affects all of us intimately in our personal life. (Classically the three learned professions are the professions of divinity, law and medicine.) The doctor is the last resort when it is a matter of life and death. It appears to me to be unfortunate that today in the medical field there is over-specialisation. For every limb in the human body there is a specialist and sometimes he looks at the matter only from his point of view and not from a holistic point of view. Very soon we may have a specialist for the thumb or the little finger! Today pathological and mechanical tests have overtaken the innate diagnostic skill which the physician of old possessed. Of course, this is an offshoot of mal-practice litigation fears – fears to some extent fuelled by members of the legal profession. The great role of the doctor is that he administers to human beings and not to corporates as do high-flying members of the other two professions and this is also reflected in their respective professional fees !

In the ultimate analysis in determining whether a professional has fulfilled his role, one has to determine what he has contributed to the profession. His individual brilliance is undoubtedly to be complimented, but what is to be admired is how he passes on the knowledge which he acquired to another and trains him to enrich the profession. Unlike in the case of a businessman, a professional himself trains his article clerks, or juniors, as the case may be, to be independent and there is nothing so satisfying for the true professional as to see those whom he has trained shine in the profession and preferably even outshine him! The profession gives us much and the only way one can repay the debt is by putting others in the field. To be labelled a successful professional is not necessarily a compliment, but to be called a true professional is !

Real Estate Laws : Recent developments — Part II

Laws and Business

1. Introduction :


Last month, we examined some of the recent developments
pertaining to real estate in Mumbai and in India. This Article examines some
more developments which would have a far-reaching impact on property
transactions.

2. ULCRA repeal :


2.1 A few months ago, the State Government of Maharashtra
finally repealed the dreaded Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation Act (ULCRA).
Estimates say that this would release as much as 30,000 acres of land in Mumbai
alone. Several large land owning trusts are expected to benefit. Several lands
owned by mills such as NTC are expected to benefit.

2.2 The Government was under pressure to repeal ULCRA, since
the Centre had set a deadline of March 2008 to do so or else it could not access
over Rs.17,600 crore of funds under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal
Mission.

2.3 The Government is now toying with the idea of replacing
ULCRA with a vacant property tax. One can only hope such legislations do not see
the light of the day.

3. Increase in FSI in suburbs :


3.1 The State’s Finance Minister has in his budget speech
announced that the base FSI in the Mumbai suburban district would be increased
from 1 to 1.33 and brought on par with the FSI permissible in the island city.
The additional 0.33 FSI would have to be purchased as per the ready reckoner
rate for the area. Thus, instead of a developer constructing a building in the
suburbs by using 1.00 FSI and loading another FSI of 1.00 by buying Transfer of
Development Rights (TDR) from the market, as per the new proposal, the builder
would buy lesser TDR by 0.33%. Thus, builder can now purchase 1.33% from the
Government as FSI and only the balance 0.67% as TDR. This means more funds to
the Government. The maximum cap of FSI 2 for projects in the suburbs still
remains.

3.2 From a developer’s perspective, the cost advantage is
negligible, since the FSI rates are more or less comparable with TDR rates.
Further, the overall cap of 2.00 does not increase the overall supply of land,
it only substitutes one source (TDR) for another (FSI).

4. NOC for rented flats


4.1 The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Mont Blanc
Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. has upheld the constitutional validity of the
State Government’s Notification dated 1st August 2001 that Non-Occupancy Charges
(NOC) levied by a society cannot exceed 10% of the service charges. Thus, a
housing society cannot charge more than 10% of the service charges in case of a
flat which has been rented out by its member. This was a vexed issue with
societies levying NOCs based on their own whims and fancies. In several areas
such as South Mumbai, the societies collected exorbitant amounts for flats
rented to consulates and corporates. For instance, in some case if the monthly
rent was Rs.10,000 and the maintenance charges were Rs.1,000, the Society
demanded 20% of that or Rs.2,000 as NOC. This was even higher than the
maintenance charges levied by the society.

4.2 The Supreme Court has granted temporary
relief to the Mont Blanc Society, allowing them to col-lect non-occupancy
charges at the rate of 10% of gross earnings of members till the final disposal
of the petition. All other societies in Maharashtra will have to adhere to the
Notification, and charge not more than 10% of the service charges, excluding BMC
taxes. The Notification had been issued u/s. 79A of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960.

5. Stamp Duty proposals :


5.1 The Maharashtra Government has once again decided to milk
its favourite cash cow, the Stamp Act. As per the revised estimates for 2007-08,
the Government is expected to net Rs.8,000 cr. from stamp duties alone and this
figure is estimated to cross Rs.9,600 crores for the year 2008-09.

5.2 Currently, development agreements and power of attorney
for development attract Stamp Duty @1% of the fair market value of the property
involved. Now Stamp Duty on these documents would be levied on rates as
applicable on a conveyance, i.e., @ 5%. Thus, the Government is equating
development agreements with conveyance deeds. It is submitted that this is not a
welcome amendment, since a DA cannot be equated with a conveyance.

5.3 Earlier, any power of attorney authorising the holder to
sell immovable property, if not given for a consideration, was chargeable with
Stamp Duty only at Rs.100. Now any power of attorney authorising the holder to
sell immovable property, whether or not given for a consideration, is
chargeable with Stamp Duty @ 5% of the market value of the property. A rebate of
this duty paid would be given while calculating the Stamp Duty on a conveyance
executed pursuant to the power of attorney between the donor and the holder of
the power.

An exception has been made for a power of attorney given to
close relatives, such as parents, spouse, children, grand children, siblings,
etc., authorising them to sell immovable property. In such cases, the duty would
be restricted to Rs.500. Hence, consider a situation where the owner of a
property is a non-resident in London. He has no family members in Mumbai and
wants to sell his property and hence, gives a power of attorney to his friend in
Mumbai. Obviously, this would be without consideration. This would now attract
duty @ 5% of the market value of the property. Is this fair ?

5.4 Presently, if after purchasing a flat from a developer it
is resold within 3 years of the date of agreement then while paying the duty on
the second agreement, credit is given of the duty paid on the first agreement.
Now this concessional period has been reduced to one year. Hence, now, if after
purchasing a flat from a developer it is resold within a period of one year of
the date of agreement, only then while paying the duty on the second agreement,
credit would be given of the Stamp Duty paid on the first agreement.

5.5 As a consequential amendment to the deemed conveyance amendment (see para 5.2 above), it is proposed to introduce an amnesty scheme in order to provide for concessional Stamp Duty on the conveyance of the underlying land, since if the building has been purchased some time back, then it would be unjust to collect Stamp Duty at present rates. Details of this amnesty scheme would be notified soon.

5.6 Like in other taxes, e-payment would soon be possible for Stamp Duty also. An e-Payment Gateway would be made available to the taxpayers. This will enable them to pay taxes conveniently at any time and from anywhere through Internet. The amendments which are required to be made to the rules under different tax laws, will be carried out in this year.

6. Sale of stilt  parkings:

6.1 The Bombay High Court recently in the case of Panchali Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. at Dahisar held that the builder, NL Builders Pvt. Ltd., had no right to sell stilt parking areas in the society to outsiders. The Court dismissed the builders’ petition claiming that his right in the property developed by him is absolute. The builder had claimed that he had a right to sell that portion of the property that remained unsold, i.e., some of the stilt parking slots.

The Court held that as per the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963, once the builder conveys the property to the society, and it is registered, the property belongs to the society.

6.2 This judgment settles an important principle regarding the rights of a society and a builder.

7. MOFA:    Sale on carpet area basis:

7.1 The latest amendment in the real estate laws is a change to the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA). Builders would now no longer be able to sell flats to buyers on the basis of the super built-up area. The amendment provides that builders must sell flats on the basis of the carpet area.

7.2 Builders normally sell flats on the basis of super built-up area or built-up area. The differences between the three types of areas are as follows:

Carpet Area : It is the internal area of a flat. It is the wall-to-wall area of the flat.

Built-up Area: It covers  walls  and balcony  also.

Super Built-up Area: It includes the lobby, passage, elevators, fire fighting area along with the total utility. In other words, it covers common areas too. Sometimes, even the garden is included.

In some cases, the built-up area is 20% of the carpet area and the super built-up area is as high as 40% of the carpet area. However, these figures are subjective and vary from builder to builder and in some cases even building to building. Thus, there is a great deal of confusion in the flat purchasers’ minds who are often unable to understand the exact difference between carpet area, built-up area and super built-up area of a flat. The amendment would remove all such ambiguities. Any violation of this act can mean a 3-year imprisonment for the builder/promoter, proposed as per S. 13(A) of the Act.

7.3 While the amendment provides that developers can “sell the flat on the basis of the carpet area only”, they may separately charge for the common areas and facilities in proportion to the carpet area of the flat. Hence,  they  can continue  to charge  for common  areas  and  facilities  like staircases,  lobby and lift as per the super  built-up area concept.  The only caveat is that the buyer must be made aware of the cost of the carpet area, which is the net usable wall-to-wall area of the flat.

8. Reverse    mortgage    scheme:

8.1 A few months ago, National Housing Bank (NHB), the housing finance regulator, announced the final operational guidelines on reverse mortgages. A reverse mortgage product seeks to monetise the house as an asset and specifically the owner’s equity in the house. The scheme involves senior citizen borrowers mortgaging their property to a lender, who makes periodic payments to borrowers during their lifetime.

8.2 A senior citizen who is living in his own house may obtain a reverse mortgage loan (RML) and have a recurring income by mortgaging his house to banks or other financial institutions. He can also be a joint borrower with his spouse, provided at least one of the borrowers is above 60 years. Thus, the minimum age limit for availing this scheme is 60 years.

The draft guidelines provided that in case of married couples being eligible as joint borrowers, both of them must be above the age of 60 years, but that has now been relaxed to include those couples where at least one of the borrowers is 60.

8.3 In the event of the death of the husband who may be the owner of the property, the wife – who may be a co borrower but not co-owner – will receive income. The lender will not evict the wife, but will modify the cash flow.

8.4 The recent Finance Act, 2008 has clarified that any transfer of a capital asset under a scheme of reverse mortgage would not be chargeable as capital gains. Further, the loan amount received by the borrower will not be included in the total income. The changes made in respect of ‘reverse mortgages’ have clarified doubts and has made the scheme workable.

Shops & Establishments Act

Laws and Business

1. Introduction :


1.1 The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (‘the
Act’
) regulates the conditions or work and employment in shops, commercial
establishments, residential hotels, restaurants, theatres, other places of
public amusement or entertainment. It applies to the whole of Maharashtra.

1.2 The Act operates in municipal areas specified in Schedule
I to the Act. However, the State Government has power u/s.4 to exempt all or any
of the provisions of the Act to any establishment, employees or other persons.

2. Definitions :


2.1 Establishment — A shop, commercial
establishment, residential hotel, restaurant, theatre, other place of public
amusement or entertainment to which the Act applies and any other establishment
which is notified by the State Government.

2.2 Commercial establishment — It means an
establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in
connection with or incidental or ancillary thereto. The following establishments
are included within the definition of the term commercial establishment :

  • Legal practitioner —
    However, the same has been held to be invalid and has been struck down by the
    decision in the case of N. K. Fuladi v. State of Maharashtra, 1985 1 LLJ 512 (Bom.)


  • Medical practitioner


  • Architect


  • Engineer


  • Accountant — However, the
    same has been held to be invalid and has been struck down by the decision in
    the case of A. F. Ferguson & Co. v. State of Maharashtra (Bom.)


  • Tax consultant


  • Any other technical or
    professional consultant


2.3 Employer — means a person having owning or having
ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment.

3. Registration :


3.1 Every establishment to which the Act applies must apply
for registration with the inspectors designated under the Act within the
specified time. The application must be made in the prescribed form along with
the prescribed fees.

3.2 The inspector would on being satisfied about the
application, register the establishment and issue a certificate of registration
to the employer. This certificate needs to be renewed every year.

3.3 Any change in the particulars submitted while making the
application must be communicated to the inspector by the establishment. Further,
within 10 days of closure of the establishment, the employer must communicate
such fact to the inspector and get his certificate cancelled.

4. Regulation of establishments :


4.1 The Act lays down the opening and closing hours of shops
and commercial establishments. For instance, no commercial establishment can be
opened earlier than 8.30 a.m. and close later than 9.30 p.m. It also empowers
the State Government to modify the same for different classes of shops and
commercial establishments. Offices which work “It also specifies that no
employee can be made to work for more than 9 hours per day and 48 hours in any
week.

4.2 Every shop and commercial establishment must remain
closed for one day in a week, e.g., a Sunday. The employee cannot be called for
work on this day and must be paid his salaries as if he has attended office on
that day.

4.3 The Act also prescribes similar rules for residential
hotels, restaurants, theatres or other places of public amusement or
entertainment.

4.4 Anybody who is between 15 and 17 years of age is
considered to be a young person. No young person can be required or allowed to
work, whether as an employee or otherwise, in any establishment

(a) after 7.00 p.m.

(b) for more than 6 hours in any day; and

(c) if the work involves danger to life, health or morals.





Women cannot be allowed to work in any establishment after
9.30 p.m.

4.5 Every employee, who has worked for at least 3 months in a
year, shall be entitled to leave of 5 days for every 60 days of service during
the year. However, if he has worked for at least 240 days in a year, then he is
entitled to 21 days leave. Further, he would be entitled to additional holidays
on certain days, such as 26th January, 15th August, etc. An employee is
prohibited from working when he is given a holiday or is on leave as per the
provisions of the Act.

4.6 If an employer wants to terminate the services of any
employee who has been working for a continuous period of one year or more, then
he needs to give him a notice period of 30 days. If this is not done, then the
termination is bad in law and the employee can claim reinstatement with full
wages. However, this provision would not apply in case of a termination due to
misconduct.

4.7 It should be remembered that the State can, on an
application, exempt the operation of the above provisions to any establishment
or employee. For instance various 5-star hotels have got exemptions from the
provisions of S. 33 which mandate that women cannot work after 9 p.m. However,
various conditions have been imposed while granting such an exemption.
Similarly, BPOs have got exemptions from some of the provisions pertaining to
working hours, etc.

5. Application of other laws :


5.1 The State Government may prescribe that the Payment of
Wages Act, 1936 shall apply to any class of establishments or employees to which
this Act applies.

5.2 The provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 apply to any establishment to which this Act applies as long
as it employs more than 50 employees.

5.3 The State Government may prescribe that the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 would apply to any establishment to which this Act applies.

    6. Health & Safety :

6.1 Every establishment shall be kept clean and have proper ventilation. It must be sufficiently lit during all working hours. The Act prescribes standards for the same.

6.2 Every establishment must take precautions against fire. Further, certain types of establishments must also maintain a first-aid kit.

    7. Registers & inspection :

7.1 The Act requires establishments to maintain such registers and records and display such notices as may be prescribed. The rules framed under the Act require every establishment’s name board to be in Marathi in addition to any other language. However, the lettering of the Marathi script should be of the same size as that of the other language.

7.2 The inspectors appointed under this act have power of entering and inspecting any establishment, examine the prescribed registers and records, take evidence of any persons he considers necessary.

7.3 The Act prescribes various penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act. For instance, S. 52 lays down the penalties for contravening a majority of the provisions of the Act. It specifies a penalty of Rs.1,000 to 5,000 for each offence. There is also an enhanced penalty for repeat offenders who have already been convicted under the Act.

    Role of a CA :

A CA can make his clients about the provisions of this Act and enlighten them about the requirements of compliance with the Act. This would be a value-added service which he can provide to his clients. He can also undertake a compliance audit for his clients. By broadening his peripheral knowledge, a CA can add value to his services.

Renting of immovable property — A dilemma for property owners

Sale of flats not being a ‘service’, builders not liable for registration and payment of Service Tax

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 2

Sale of flats not being a ‘service’, builders not liable for
registration and payment of Service Tax :



Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008
TIOL 321 HC GUW ST)

1. The petitioner, a builder, promoter and developer engaged
in the business of development and sale of immovable property received a notice
from the Superintendent to register as service provider of commercial and
residential construction services. Challenging the authority to issue such
notice, the present writ petition was filed.

2. The petitioner constructs buildings and sells
premises/flats in such buildings. The petitioner pleaded that the transaction
between the petitioner and a flat purchaser is a transaction for sale of
premises and cannot be treated as contract for rendering service. The
consideration for the sale of premises is often paid in instalments though the
terms correlate more or less with the stage of development of construction. The
agreement for sale of such flats is stamped as ‘sale of flats’ for the entire
consideration. The agreement for sale is registered by the petitioner. The
agreement contains several details including price, area of the unit, price for
common areas, other facilities concerning the flat, etc.

3. The petitioner engages various reputed contractors for
various construction-related services, yet the construction activity is carried
out for their own purposes and not for anyone else. In some cases where land is
owned by a different person and not the petitioner, an agreement is entered into
with the land owner and this in common parlance is known as development
agreement. After acquiring all the rights of development and raising
construction thereon, constructional or developmental activity is carried out by
the petitioner for its own benefit and not for any other person. The flats are
sold in the same manner as in the case when the land is owned by the petitioner.

4. According to the Department’s affidavit, the activity
undertaken by the builders is for and on behalf of prospective buyers for
consideration of cash or deferred payment and is covered under ‘works contract’
and not ‘sale’. The Department argued that the builder has to enter into
agreement for sale before accepting money as advance/deposit when building/flat
is found only in specifications of the agreements. The saleable products not
being existent at the time of making agreement, construction is the essential
obligation of the petitioner and therefore the petitioner is to be treated as
service provider of construction of complex to the parties in compliance with
the agreements against the advance received according to the statutory
provisions provided in S. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994, which are wide
enough to include estate builders such as the petitioner. Since the agreement is
executed prior to the completion of work of construction, it is nothing else but
‘works contract’ and as such, the petitioner is liable to pay Service Tax and
the advance received makes the petitioner work for and on behalf of prospective
buyer.

5. The Court noted that the moot question in the petition
related to whether the petitioner worked as a service provider for prospective
buyers with whom the agreements were entered into OR the petitioner constructs
flats for the purpose of sale to those with whom the agreements are entered into
and proceeded to scrutinise the relevant clauses of the said agreements which
mainly contained details of instalments, the obligation of prospective buyer to
pay stamp duty and registration fee as per applicable laws, etc., the probable
time of handing over possession and the condition that possession would be
provided only after full payment of the sale price and that after payment of all
dues, a sale deed would be registered in favour of the prospective buyer as per
prevailing Stamp Act, Registration Act, Property Transfer Act, etc.

6. The Court observed that the combined reading of various
clauses of the agreement for sale made it clear that the transaction relates to
purchase and sale of premises and not for carrying out any constructional
activity on behalf of the latter. The flat purchasers are entitled for specific
performance of the contract and non-performance may lead to refund of advance
with interest by the petitioner. They also have an obligation to register the
agreement. Further, the registering authority also treats these documents as
agreement for sale/purchase of premises and not relating to construction
activity and as such, stamp duty is levied on the sale consideration.

7. The ‘selective approach’ for taxing services under Service
Tax provisions and the relevant enabling provisions of the Indian Constitution
were discussed at length by the Court. Similarly, the provisions of the Finance
Act, 1994 relating to charge of Service Tax, payment of Service Tax,
registration, relevant provisions of ‘taxable service’ and in particular S.
65(30a), S. 65(25b), S. 65(91a), S. 65(105)(zzq) and 65(105(zzzh) were
discussed. The Court further noted that the term ‘service’ is not defined by the
Finance Act, 1994 by way of any explanation or otherwise or by the rules framed
thereunder. The Court therefore examined the definition of service under the
Income-tax Act, 1961, under the MRPT Act, 1969 as well as under the Consumer
Protection Act and under the FEMA and concluded that one can safely define
‘service’ as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful,
rendering assistance or help, service does not involve supply of goods;
‘service’ rather connotes transformation of goods/user of goods as a result of
voluntary intervention of ‘service provider’ and is an intangible commodity in
the form of human effort. To have service, there must be a ‘service provider’
rendering services to some other person(s), who shall be recipient of such
‘service’.

8. Under the Finance Act, 1994,Service Tax is levied on taxable service only and not on service provider. According to the Court, the relevant legal provisions of Service Tax did not support the view that the petitioner provided any service to anyone and that the activity carried out by a person for his own benefit cannot be termed as service rendered. The Court took note of Circular No. 80/10/2004, dated September 17, 2004, which clarified that estate builders constructing buildings/premises for themselves were not covered within the ambit of construction service. Further, the decision in the case of K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 5 SCC 162 was discussed and was distinguished by noting that this decision was rendered on the facts of its own case. The Court emphatically stated that until the time the sale deed is executed, the title and interest, including the ownership and possession in the construction made remained with the petitioner company. The fact of payment of advance and instalments does not lead to the inference that petitioner company is making construction for and on behalf of the probable allottees. The Court also stated that the decision of the Apex Court in K. Raheja’s case (supra) considered the issue relating to Sales Tax and not relating to Service Tax. According to the Court, as distinguished from the facts of K. Raheja (supra) in the present case, there was no material to show that the petitioner company constructed the premises on behalf of the prospective allottees and also stated that similar view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Assotech Realty Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 8 VST 738.

9. Further, importantly reliance was made on Circular No. 332/35/2006-TRU, dated August 01, 2006 which clarified that the builder/promoter/developer undertaking construction activity on one’s own account did not have relationship of service provider and service recipient with anyone and therefore the question of providing taxable service did not arise. Citing extracts from CIT v. Aspinwall & Co. Ltd., (1993) 204 ITR 225, Keshavji Raoji & Co. v. CIT, (1990) 183 ITR 1 and a catena of other decisions, the binding nature of the circular was affirmed by the Court and it finally contended that the aforementioned Circular dated August 01, 2006was binding on the Department which in more than abundant terms made it clear that a builder /promoter / developer undertaking construction activity for its ownself did not provide any taxable service. The material placed by the petitioner clearly showed that the activity undertaken by them is their own work and they only sold the completed construction work to the buyers. Any advance/deposit received was against consideration of sale of the flat/premises and not for obtaining service from the petitioner.

Note: The above decision is in complete contrast to the Authority for Advance Ruling’s (AAR) decision in case of Hare Krishna Developers 2008 (10) STR 341 (AAR) reported in June 2008 issue under this feature on almost identical facts and clauses of the agreements under both the cases. The ruling of the AAR being binding only on the applicant, the decision of the High Court assumes significant importance. Major contrasting features of the two decisions pronounced by the two separate judicial authorities are provided below:

1. In both the cases, the agreement with the prospective buyer relates to SALE OF UNITS. However, in Hare Krishna’s case (supra), it is contended by the authority that the point of time at which the ownership gets transferred will not be determinative of applicant’s liability to pay Service Tax. The words ‘in relation to’ used in the context of ‘construction of the complex’ are of widest import and are capable of encompassing builders/developers. AAR noted that “package of services is necessarily involved in the activity viewed as a whole”. Not merely construction part of the activity that matters, the co-related and incidental services are all embraced within the scope of the definition and the builder / developer does everything to honour its commitment to the customer (booker) from whom it receives valuable consideration in instalments. As against this, in case of Magus narrated above, distinguishing features are as follows:

  • Sale of units/premises to be subject matter of the transaction between the builder and prospective buyer.

  • Advance and instalment received are looked upon as a convenient method of payment. The judgment further brought out the contention that until the execution of sale deed, the title, interest and ownership and possession of construction remains with the builder and therefore, no construction is done on behalf of probable allottees.

  • A good amount of stress is laid on registration by registering authorities as agreement of sale/purchase of flats and the relevant stamp duty levied thereon. (In Hare Krishna’s case, this aspect is not touched upon).

  •  An overall inference of ‘sale’ aspect is drawn rather than laying stress on details of facilities mentioned in various clauses while interpreting ‘sale of flat’ from combined reading of the clauses of the agreement and concluding that no construction activity is carried out for buyers.

  • A lot of effort is put in to distinguish ‘service’ from ‘service provider’ vis-a-vis statutory provisions to contend that there being no ‘service’ in the transaction of sale of flats, the builder is not a service provider for his own business activity where there is no recipient of service present.

2. In case of Hare Krishna, the Department’s reliance on Raheja’s case [2006 (3) STR 337 (SC)], as alternative contention was not discussed or considered while delivering for judgment, as chief reliance was placed on the fact that transaction was regarded as that of construction services in terms of clause (zzzh) and in terms of Classification Rules, ‘construction service’ was the correct classification entry even if the service could be classified as works contract service as per K.Raheja’s case (supra) and therefore, alternative contention was not gone into. As against this, Gauhati High Court distinguished K. Raheja’s decision on two counts: Firstly, the judgment was given on its own facts and secondly, that it related to SalesTaxand not ServiceTaxand therefore was not considered relevant.

3. In Hare Krishna’s case, the Board’s Circular dated August 23, 2007only was considered. Further, the said Circular was interpreted to be distinguishing the applicant’s case from the person/builder who sells flat after completing the entire construction on his own and then selling the same. Whereas in Magus’s case, the Circular No. 80/110/2004 of September 17,2004as well as the Circular of August 01, 2006 were discussed and the latter Circular was heavily analysed and relied upon. These Circulars were not referred to in the former’s case.

Compounding/settlement mechanism

The prescribed procedure

fiogf49gjkf0d
New Page 2

3. The prescribed procedure :



  • The declaration in respect of Service Tax/interest/penalty and the amount
    payable is required to be made in a prescribed form viz. Form 1, to be
    furnished in duplicate and to be signed by the declarant or his authorised
    representative and to be submitted to the designated officer (an officer not
    below the rank of Assistant Commissioner) notified by the jurisdictional
    Commissioner for the purpose of the scheme, between July 01, 2008 and
    September 30, 2008.



  •  The designated officer is required to verify the submitted declaration and
    upon such verification, is required to issue an order in specified format
    within 15 days of the date of receipt of the declaration. The order would
    indicate the amount to be paid by the declarant for resolution of dispute
    under the scheme.



  •  The declarant is required to pay the sum determined by the designated
    authority vide the order described above within 30 days and intimate such
    payment along with the proof of payment. The declarant is also required to
    produce evidence of withdrawal of petition pending before any High Court or
    the Supreme Court, if any.



  •  The payment under this scheme is to be made in cash only.


à
On receipt of the proof of payment determined in accordance with the order and
the proof of withdrawal of petition, if any, to any Court, the designated
authority would be required to issue a certificate in a prescribed form
viz.
Form 2 certifying full and final settlement of the amount in dispute.

levitra

The Scheme

fiogf49gjkf0d
New Page 2

2. The Scheme :




  •  The scheme comes into force on July 01, 2008 and will close on September 30,
    2008, meaning thereby that immunity under the scheme would be available only
    to those cases in respect of which declaration is made under the scheme
    between the stated period.



  • The scheme is open to persons in dispute for Service Tax, interest or penalty
    leviable under the Finance Act, 1994, but not paid prior to March 01, 2008 and
    where a show-cause notice has been issued on or before March 01, 2008 or an
    order has been issued.



  • The scheme is open to cases where service tax in dispute does not exceed
    Rs.25,000. The scheme is not open to cases where service tax is not paid after
    collecting the same from the recipient of service for which a notice u/s.73A
    of the Finance Act, 1994 has been issued.

[It may be noted that no limit is prescribed for the amount
of interest or penalty in dispute].


  • The order passed under the scheme would be final and non-appealable. Any
    pending appeal shall stand withdrawn by virtue of the said order. In case of a
    writ petition pending before any High Court or the Supreme Court, the person
    opting for the scheme is required to withdraw such petition.



  •  The amount paid under the scheme is non-refundable under any circumstances.



  • The Central Government is empowered to remove difficulties for implementation
    of the scheme.



levitra

Background

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 2

1. Background :


The much publicised and hyped Dispute Resolution Scheme 2008
was notified vide Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 1994. The Government has now
issued Notification No. 28/2008-ST, dated June 04, 2008 whereby the rules called
the Dispute Resolution Scheme Rules 2008 have been prescribed. Further,
guidelines in respect of the scheme have been provided vide Circular No.
102/5/2008-ST, dated June 04, 2008. The operation of the scheme, the procedure
to be followed and settlement mechanism is provided below :

levitra

Interview – Justice Ajit P. Shah

InterviewJustice Ajit P. Shah recently
retired as Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court after a term of 2 years. Prior
to that, he was Chief Justice of the Madras High Court for over 2 years and a
judge of the Bombay High Court for almost 13 years. He is regarded as one of the
finest judges. During his long tenure as a judge, he passed various landmark
judgments pertaining to right to information, rights of disabled, environment
and homosexuals. Hailing from a family of lawyers and judges, he is known for
his forthright and progressive views. In interaction with the BCA Journal, he
dwelt upon a variety of issues pertaining to law and the legal system.

Challenges before Judiciary :


BCAJ
What are the major problems and challenges faced by the judiciary (and judges
in particular) today
?



APS Our legal system and judicial apparatus suffer from a
number of ailments. Our courts at all levels are burdened with dockets that are
bursting at seams. Around three crore cases are pending in the lower courts and
the High Courts. Our procedures tend to convert every litigation into a process
which puts more stress on the form rather than on the content. Our tools and
techniques of court management, docket management and case management continue
to be archaic and still depend on the advice of ‘generalists’ rather than
managerial expertise. Alternative Dispute Resolution system we all love to talk
about also seems to be reducing into more tokenism rather than becoming a potent
tool to make a real impact. Criminal justice administration perhaps remains the
most neglected area where the truth is (more often than not) the casualty and
where reform or rehabilitation seems to be the last priority. The courts are
able to dispose of on an average only 19% of the pending criminal cases. Around
two lacs undertrials are actually in prisons. The state of the prisons and
lock-ups is a cause of grave concern. Overcrowding in prisons is a rule rather
than an exception. These are some ground realities that cannot be brushed under
the carpet. They individually and collectively point to our failure at some
levels in discharging our obligation to provide good governance through an
effective legal system.


BCAJ The Government as well as the judiciary has been
talking about backlog of cases. What are the causes of delay ? Is the main cause
inadequate number of judges ? How far are the advocates and lawyers responsible
for delaying the proceedings ?



APS Yes, we have been talking about backlog of cases for
a long time but unable to find a solution to this gigantic problem. There are
many causes for delay and one of the main causes is certainly the lack of
adequate number of judges. The Law Commission in its 120th Report recommended
that the strength of judges per million population may be increased from 10.5 to
50 judges. The present judge strength in India is 14 per million population
(approx.). The Vision Paper published by the Law Ministry talks of appointment
of 15000 ad hoc judges in the subordinate courts and running courts in three
shifts. More than eight months have passed but no progress has been made. The
idea of appointment of 15000 ad hoc judges at one go and running the courts in
shift system is basically flawed and is impracticable and unworkable. The
establishment of Gram Nyayalayas has not made much progress due to lack of
support from the State Governments. The need of the hour is to plan gradual
increase in the strength of judges. The infrastructure provided to the judges in
most of the States is inadequate and in some places it is virtually
non-existent. There is a need for firm commitment of the Central and the State
Governments for making available the necessary infrastructure and financial
resources to the judiciary.

No amount of reforms would be meaningful unless the Bar joins
as partners in the stakes involved. Unfortunately, willingness of the lawyers to
embrace reforms seems to be amiss. Kathryn Hender from the Law School University
of Wisconsin posed a very serious question in an article begging for an answer
in the title itself as to whether the legal community represents ‘gentlemen of
change or unchanging gentlemen’. Professor Madhava Menon writes about the fear
psychosis in the judiciary or political class when it comes to confronting the
Bar which is vastly responsible for the major ill of the system, namely, delay,
cost and corruption. Adjournment culture, strikes and boycotts by the lawyers
have virtually paralysed the judicial system. There should be a concerted effort
from the Bench and the Bar to eliminate this menace. Administration of justice
is a joint venture in which lawyers and judges are equal participants. This is
all the more reason why both must take the stick for the ills that plagued the
judicial system and why they must share the responsibility for reforms.


BCAJ In your opinion, what steps need to be taken to
address the delay in disposal of matters ?



APS The first and foremost priority is to increase the
number of courts. This could be achieved in a phased manner in the next four or
five years. Secondly, as suggested by the Jagannadha Rao Committee it would be
necessary to assess the impact of every new legislation in terms of the burden
it would put on the judicial system. The burgeoning load of cheque bouncing
cases is a glaring example of lack of planning. In Delhi out of the pendency of
9 lac criminal cases, more than 6 lac cases are u/s.138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act. In 2009, Delhi Courts disposed of around 1.6 lac such cases, of
which only 400 were disposed of through a trial and the rest were disposed of
either by settlement or withdrawal. Perhaps these cases can be tried in shift
system even by appointing ad hoc judges. The Government should also consider
taking out petty criminal cases from the regular judicial system, so that judges
can concentrate on more serious cases pertaining to the law and order.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has been the buzzword for the past two decades. Mediation is now increasingly used as an adjunct to the litigation system in the US and in several other western countries. This is not a marginalised phenomenon, but has been introduced as a case management imperative. Unfortunately, after the build-up of a positive public opinion and securing general cooperation of the Bar (which was originally very resistant) for the past few years, there is a downslide trend which is very disturbing. Mediation centres were set up through missionary zeal of judges who also developed a cadre of trained mediators to run them. Latest statistics signal waning enthusiasm on the part of the judges reflected in steadily declining references and the rate of settlements (For example, the Bombay High Court and the Madras High Court). The Delhi High Court is one of the few courts where mediation policies are being successfully implemented. Especially District Court Mediation Centres are doing extremely well with reported success rate of 15 to 20% of the total filing.

One of the important tools of ADR in use for many years now is the forum of ‘Lok Adalat’. The problem with this forum is that the proceedings are dominated by judges both as organisers and presiders. Correspondingly, the role of lawyers is notably diminished, compared to regular courts. There is a need to revamp the Lok Adalat organisation making it more participative including the robust support from the Bar.

Reforms in many fields remain incomplete unless they also utilise modern technology. It is not right to run the court system in the 21st century using a system which is developed in the 19th century. The courts must take advantage of the new technologies and adapt new ways of working. However, full potential of computers has not been fully and optimally tapped. There is no thought about reaping the real benefits of computerisation by redefining our needs and re-engineering our processes. The entire case information system ought to aim for providing a comprehensive management to exploit the available human resources fully.

The Delhi High Court has achieved significant success in full utilisation of information technology and at least two e-courts (paperless courts) are functioning in the Delhi High Court and one e-trial court has become functional for the first time in India. The Delhi Government fully backed the High Court in computerisation process. The technology involved, if put to optimum use, will virtually revolutionise the case management. It all boils down to change of the mindset and adaption to rapidly advancing technology.

The Delhi High Court, in one of its initiatives undertook the task of examining the issue of arrears. The Committee of Hon’ble Judges analysing the data scientifically, came out with certain concrete suggestions with regard to the distribution of business amongst various benches, suggested clear targets and change in the rule of procedure. The changes introduced in wake of the report have given encouraging results within a year.

Judicial appointments :

BCAJ Do you feel that the system and procedures for appointments of higher judiciary is sound ?

APS India is perhaps the only country in the world where the judiciary makes the appointments to itself. In the Second Judges’ case, a larger Bench of the Supreme Court reversed the view in SP Gupta’s case and declared that the word ‘consultation’ appearing in Article 142 of the Constitution should be read to mean ‘concurrence’, thereby vesting the CJI with the final say in the mater of appointments. The power so vested in the judiciary would be exercised through the collegiums consisting of the CJI and two most senior colleagues. In the Third Judges’ case, the Court slightly altered the process by directing that the CJI shall make a recommendation to appoint a Judge of the Supreme Court in consultation with four senior-most puisne judges of the Supreme Court and insofar as the appointments to the High Courts are concerned, recommendation must be in consultation with the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court.

There is a considerable controversy about whether the Court has not amended the language of the Article by purporting to interpret it. This new dispensation of appointment and transfer of judges laid down by the Supreme Court has not been well received in India. The Bar and other sections of the society have been critical of this. For example, Mr. T. R. Andhyarujina has said : “A collegium which decides the matter in secrecy lacks transparency and is likely to be considered a cabal. Prejudice and favour of one or other member of the collegium for an incumbent cannot be ruled out.” Justice Krishna Iyer has described the pro-tem collegiums — “an egregious fabrication, a functioning anarchy”.

Vesting the power of appointment only in the executive or the self-selection by the judges are both fraught with difficulties. Hence, the trend now in modern constitutions, is to entrust the power of recommendation for judicial appointments to an independent council or commission. Such a council or commission is composed of representatives of institutions closely connected with administration of justice. The civic society also gets adequate representation. Such councils are now functioning in England, Wales and South Africa. The 1998 European Charter on the Statute of Judges also recommends selection by independent commission where at least 50% of the members should be sitting judges. In the USA, a candidate nominated by the President for appointment to the Supreme Court has to face public hearings conducted by the Senate.

BCAJ Unfortunately, of late, corruption seems to have crept into the judicial process as well. What are the probable causes of this ? Are the judges underpaid so that they are lured ? What needs to be done to arrest this trend ?

APS There is no point in saying that there is no corruption in the judiciary. Corruption has definitely crept in the lower judiciary and in some States it has reached disturbing levels. The higher judiciary also cannot be said to be completely free from corruption, though, in my opinion, it is marginal. Former CJI S. P. Bharucha has publicly stated that nearly 10% of the judges of the superior judiciary are corrupt. At present, two High Court judges are facing impeachment proceedings. I may also refer to the infamous incident of ‘cash at door’ in another High Court. Surprisingly, no further action was taken in spite of the report of an in-house committee indicting a sitting judge. I am not prepared to accept that this phenomenon has anything to do with the salary structure of the judges. Salaries of the judges have vastly improved after the VI Central Pay Commission. The problem, according to me, lies with the flawed selection process. Further, the process of impeachment is extremely tedious and has not proved to be effective against erring judges. Perhaps, time has come to devise a new procedure for disciplining judges without in any manner compromising the judicial independence.

Tribunalisation :

BCAJ Do you think that the creation of various tribunals being resorted to by the Government will undermine the quality of the judicial process ? Have the tribunals generally done good work ? Have they reduced the burden on the courts or have they, in fact, become one additional forum for litigation ?

APS In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. R. Gandhi, the validity of the constitution of National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has been upheld. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was whether the ‘wholesale’ transfer of powers as contemplated by the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 would have offended the Constitutional scheme of separation of powers and independence of judiciary and to what extent the powers of judiciary and High Court (excepting judicial review under Articles 226-227) can be transferred to tribunals. Though the Apex Court upheld the constitution of the NCLT and NCLAT, further directions were given to the effect that only judges and advocates can be considered for appointment as judicial members. Certain other directions were given protecting the tenure, salaries and perks of the members of the tribunal. As per the direction of the Apex Court, the selection of the members has to be made by a committee presided over by the CJI or his nominee.

The argument generally advanced to support the tribunalisation is that the court functions under archaic and elaborate procedural laws and highly technical evidence law and all litigation in courts can get inevitably delayed which leads to frustration and dissatisfaction amongst litigants. On the other hand, tribunals are free from shackles of the procedural laws and evidence law. They can provide easy access to speedy justice in a ‘cost-affordable and user-friendly’ manner. But, in India unfortunately tribunals have not achieved full independence. The secretary of the concerned sponsoring department sits in the selection committee for appointment. When the tribunals are formed they are mostly dependent on their sponsoring department for funding, infrastructure and even place for functioning. In L. Chandra Kumar, the Supreme Court observed that the tribunals have been functioning unsatisfactorily because there is no authority charged with supervising and fulfilling their administrative requirements. The tribunals constituted under different enactments are administered by different administrative departments of the Central and State Governments.

In R. Gandhi’s case, the Supreme Court has extensively referred to the Leggett Committee Report, which was submitted to the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain in March, 2001. Some of the important recommendations in the report are that the members of the tribunal would be independent persons, not civil servants. They should resemble courts and not bureaucratic boards. There is a need to rationalise and modernise the tribunals by creating more coherent framework for their functioning. All tribunals should be supported by a tribunal service i.e., a common administrative service which would raise their status, while preserving their distinctiveness from the courts. The Supreme Court has urged the Central Government to consider and implement the key recommendations of the Leggett Committee. In the absence of these reforms, the objective of forming these tribunals would not be achieved and, as stated by you, they would be merely one additional forum for litigation.

Arbitration and mediation :

BCAJ In our practice, we see that when a matter is referred to arbitration panel comprising of retired judges, it gets prolonged like a trial in the court itself. Will arbitration in commercial matters by panel comprising of persons who have expertise in the commercial matters be more effective and speedy than the panel of retired judges ?

APS The use of arbitration has taken on staggering proportions in international arena. The full potential of arbitration has not been realised in India. The basic problem lies in the system of ad hoc arbitration. According to critics, many arbitrators are not familiar with the practice of arbitration or how to effectively conduct arbitration process. Lawyers are often not trained in the law and practice of arbitration. There is a tendency among them to prolong arbitrations, seek unnecessary adjournments. One of the critics commented that often retired judges are appointed as arbitrators who, by virtue of long tenure on the Bench, have got accustomed to tedious rules pertaining to procedure and evidence. As a result, arbitrations become battle of pleadings and procedure, with each party trying to stall, if it works to their favour. The Parliamentary Standing Committee’s Report of 2003 highlights that there is absence of accountability of arbitrators, huge pendency of cases, no rules as to who can be appointed as arbitrators or regarding their views, time limit for making an award or consequences of not making an award within the time limit.

The need of the hour is institutionalisation of arbitration in India, along the lines suggested by the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report. The Ministry of Law and Justice has published a consultation paper suggesting extensive amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. One of the proposed amendments is to S. 11 whereby the Chief Justice, instead of choosing an arbitrator may choose an institution and such institution shall refer the matter to one or more arbitrators from their panel. As a result of the decision of 7-Judges Bench judgment in SBP Company v. Patel Engineering Limited, the provisions contained in Ss.(4), Ss.(5), Ss.(7), Ss.(8) and Ss.(9) of S. 11 with regard to appointment of arbitrators by any person or institution designated by the Chief Justice rendered totally ineffective. I hope that with the amendment institutionalised arbitration will develop in India.

The Delhi High Court has started an arbitration centre in its own precincts. The endeavour is to create a system that would ensure expeditious disposal of the matters referred to arbitration. The Centre has state-of-the-art infrastructure and elaborate rules have been laid down to govern the mattes referred to it. The panel of arbitrators of the Centre includes not only retired judges but also eminent chartered accountants, engineers, architects, etc. Incidentally, I may also mention that some of the other amendments proposed by the Law Ministry would be able to clear the confusion created by the recent Supreme Court judgments and make the implementation of the Act smooth and effective. Lok Sabha has passed the Commercial Division of High Court Bill, 2005 which provides for constitution of arbitration division in the High Courts to deal exclusively with arbitration cases.

BCAJ Courts,  tribunals  (e.g.,  CLB)  often  informally ask parties to settle the matter by negotiations. Will statutory recognition to this help in reducing the backlog? What can be done to promote and make effective the alternate dispute resolution mechanism ?

APS I fully agree that there is an urgent need to introduce provisions on the lines of S. 89 of the CPC for tribunals like CLB, DRT, etc. S. 89 itself requires an amendment to bring clarity in the process of mediation and conciliation. Mediation and court-supervised mediation in particular, has become more common place in the US and in many countries. The procedure has become increasingly a standard practice. Court-ordered mediation has proved to be a very good way to involve and commit lawyers and participants to the mediation process, because in essence they have no other choice. In the UK penalties in terms of cost can be imposed on parties that refuse to mediate on unreasonable and unsatisfactory grounds. With the active support of the Bench and the assistance of trained mediators, many of the matters can be resolved in CLB or even in DRT.

Right to Information :

BCAJ The RTI Act has been servicing the citizens fairly well. No doubt it has some deficiencies. Huge controversy is on between the Government (DoPT, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions) and citizens, between Sonia Gandhi and PM and so on. What are your views on this issue ?

APS The right to access the information has been described as a right to citizenship or a right to humanity. All major human right conventions such as UDHR, ICCPR, incorporate specific provisions on the right to information. By a series of decisions of the Supreme Court, (State of UP v. Raj Narain and S. P. Gupta v. Union of India), the right to information is held to be implicit in the guarantee of free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. In a recent decision in Secretary General Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, the Delhi High Court has held that the right to information is embedded in Article 14 (equality), Article 19(1)(a) (free speech and expression) and Article 21 (life and liberty). The right to know and freedom of information are inalienable components of freedom of expression and participation in public affairs.

Corruption is now recognised as violation of human rights and one of the objectives of right to information is eradication of ineffective and corrupt governance. UNDP has reported decline in ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) in more than thirty countries, which affects ordinary man. Therefore, it is really necessary that the ordinary man is enabled to participate in the process that affects his daily life and is empowered with the information to play an effective role in policy making and legislative decision making. With access to information, poor people can begin to organise themselves to form groups to be able to influence the decisions that affect them.

Some of the most serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are justified by governments as necessary to protect the national security. It is therefore imperative to enable people to monitor the conduct of the Government to participate fully in democratic society by giving them access to Government-held information and to limit the scope of restrictions of freedom of expression that may be imposed in the interest of national security. Without free access, the common man is likely to feel ‘powerless’, ‘alienated’ and ‘left out’.

Any attempt to dilute the RTI Act must be discouraged. The Government machinery must now learn to live with the information regime.

BCAJ The CJI has been advocating for exemption of judiciary from the application of RTI Act. As per the press reports the CJI has pointed out that the ‘independence of the higher judiciary needs to be safeguarded in the implementation of the RTI Act’. What are your views on this ?

APS Independence of judiciary cannot be separated from judicial accountability. The guarantee of judicial independence is for the benefit of the people and not the judges. It is neither a right, nor a privilege of the judges. An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble and independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous. The usual recommendations for increasing accountability in general are not very different for the judiciary than they are for any other public institution. The total transparency in the judicial system can be achieved

    (a) by a transparent system of selection of judges, publicised criteria and discussion on their applications, and (b) transparency of internal operations and their subjugation to pre-established rules, use of resources, salaries, judicial standards of behavior and evolution etc. and (c) functional system for registering complaints for institutional operations or behavior of individual trust. As observed by the Delhi High Court, well defined and publicly known standards and procedures complement, rather than diminish, the notion of judicial independence. The former CJI in subsequent interviews clarified that he is not in particular against the application of the RTI Act to the judiciary, but his reservation is only to the disclosure of information relating to the appointments. As stated earlier, the present system of appointments is opaque and shrouded in secrecy, there is need to bring total transparency even in the procedure for appointments to the superior courts.

BCAJ Under the RTI Act, ‘Information’ includes information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.

Considering this, can one access documents of public companies, especially public utility companies as ‘information’ ?

APS The term ‘information’ is widely worded and includes information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any law for the time being in force. Right to information is defined to mean information accessible under the Act, which is held by or under the control of any public authority. In Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, the Delhi High Court gave a broad meaning to the word ‘held’ to mean the information which has been created, sought, used or consciously retained by a public authority. Both the provisions will have to be read together and the applicant will not have any right to access the information of any corporations or public utility companies unless it is held by the public authority within the meaning of S. 2(j) of the RTI Act.

BCAJ What changes could be made in RTI Act for furthering its objectives?

APS From the screened system of governance protected by the Official Secrets Act, we have taken more than 70 years to enact the Right to Information Act. We cannot really say it is a voluntary movement towards openness, this is more a reaction to the unstoppable global trend towards the recognition of the right to information. Ideally the Act should also apply to the corporations and MNCs which are engaged in public utility services. NGOs, educational institutions, charitable trusts, and trade unions should be just as accountable and as transparent as the Government in a developing democracy. The involvement of MNCs in human rights violations and generating hazards is well documented. The Bhopal gas tragedy is a glaring example of violation of human rights at the hands of MNCs. Corporations produce wealth; they also produce risk, both to humans and to the eco system. Further the Act provides for sweeping exemptions, there is no mechanism to deter the delay or refusal in granting information, there is no scope for intervention in spreading awareness. . . . . suo moto or proactive duty on the part of the authorities to furnish information, information is given only on demand. Notwithstanding all these, it is a great move towards the access.

Criminal justice system :

BCAJ In criminal matters the conviction rate is said to be rather low. Is it that investigations are shoddy or do we need to review the way courts consider the evidence ?

APS First, let me give some statistics. On an average about 60 lac crimes are registered in each year in the States and Union Territories. 1/3 of these are IPC crimes and the rest are offences under Special and Local laws. Under the CrPC, as it exists today, the investigation of a criminal offence is by the police, whose duties are the maintenance of law and order. The strength of the police force over the years (from 1995 onwards) has remained between 12 and 13 lac, and they are expected to handle virtually unimaginable workload.

In India, not even 45% of the people charged with IPC offences, including mob violence, are ultimately convicted. In other countries like the UK, France, the USA and Japan, the conviction rate for similar offences is over 90%.

Huge number of criminal cases are pending for years together. When they are placed before Magistrates or Sessions Courts at the stage of evidence, due to excessive lapse of time, the witnesses are either dead or have left to some other place or their whereabouts are not known to the prosecution. There are many causes for failure of prosecution and delay is certainly the main cause.

The Malimath Committee’s report has suggested many reforms and although one may not agree with all the recommendations, at least some of them were excellent, but not implemented by the Central Government. For example, the Committee recommended that there should be a separate investigation wing with experienced police officers trained in forensic methods of investigation to be in charge of the investigation, leaving the law and order to be dealt with by a separate and distinct enforcement wing.

Plea bargaining was an important recommendation by the Malilmath Committee, which has been partially accepted but its implementation is far from satisfactory. The Malimath Committee also recommended stringent action against perjury. It has recommended to States for providing more infrastructures to the investigating machinery, especially in regard to accommodation, mobility, connectivity, use of technology, training facilities, etc. It has emphasised that forensic science and modern technology must be used in the investigation, right from the commencement of the investigation. There are some excellent suggestions like representation to victims or if he is dead, to his legal representatives and creating a victim compensation fund. Even after passage of more than ten years, there is not much progress on these recommendations. It is a pity that the much-needed police reforms are not taking place in spite of specific directions of the Supreme Court.

LISTED COMPANIES REQUIRED TO INCREASE AND MAINTAIN 25% PUBLIC SHAREHOLDING

fiogf49gjkf0d

Securities Laws

A recent amendment dated 4th June 2010 to the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957 (‘the Rules’) requires that existing
companies whose public shareholding is less than 25%, shall increase such
holding to that level in a phased manner. For companies seeking listing for the
first time, the initial level of public holding would need to be at least 25%
with one exception discussed later herein.

This amendment is not a major policy change except that it is
one more effort — in the background of consistent earlier failures — to increase
the public holding to 25%. However, one change — and effectively it is a major
change at least in terms of impact on capital markets — is that now even the
government companies would be required to attain and maintain 25% public
holding.

It will have to be seen whether this fresh attempt is
successful in achieving the objective. If it is, a substantial quantity of
equity shares would flow into the market raising funds, as per some reports, of
nearly Rs.2 lakh crores over a period of the next few years. However, as we will
see later on, the provision relating to public shareholding is mentioned at
multiple places and unfortunately this is an amendment of just one provision of
law, leaving others untouched resulting in overlap, contradiction and confusion.

While a detailed historical analysis of this issue may not be
of interest here, generally, it can be stated that the level of public holding
has been the subject of continuous change. At an early stage the level of public
holding required was 60%, then it was 25% and an exception was made for a group
of industries, particularly emerging ones such as software, etc., to allow 10%
public holding. There were also some conditions and exceptions to these
holdings.

Note also that there was a distinction in the provisions for
minimum public holding at the time of public issue and minimum public
shareholding thereafter. The problem gets complicated not only because these
requirements at these two stages were different, but also that the regulators
was different. The initial listing requirement is prescribed by
the Central Government through ‘Rules’, while the continuing listing
requirements are prescribed by SEBI through the listing agreement and other
regulations.

The situation in law and facts today is thus as follows. The
old Rules prescribed initial listing requirements and while it generally
required a minimum initial public issue of 25%, under certain situations, such
issue could be of just 10%. Logically, the provisions of law, though prescribed
by SEBI, should state that after the public issue, the company should maintain
these respective percentages. However, partly on account of changing policies
and partly on account of poor drafting, the requirements of law as contained
particularly in the listing agreement are ambiguous. Essentially, the intention
was that not only the 25/10% public shareholding should be maintained, but that
even those companies who had a lower public shareholding for any reason should
also raise their holding to such percentages. In practice, owing to poor
drafting, poor enforcement, practical problems, keeping exceptions, etc., this
was not achieved.

Thus, to reiterate, the objective of the law-makers was to
ensure that the public holding should be of a reasonable minimum level so as to
serve the purposes of listing. The amended law now provides that this minimum
level is 25% uniformly for all companies. The intention also is that the
ambiguities in the provisions be eliminated partly by better drafting and partly
by simplifying by not allowing any exceptions to this Rule.

In the light of general discussion as above, let us now
consider the amendments made.


(a) The term ‘public shareholding’ is defined and it
would mean the holding of persons other than (i) Promoters and the Promoter
Group (both defined as per the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, 2009 (ii)
subsidiaries and associates of the company.

(i) The ‘public shareholding’ is intended to be of
equity shares. However, this is not well brought out. The requirements of
initial public issue cover both the issue of equity shares as well as the
convertible debentures, but the requirements of continuing public
shareholding thereafter refer only to equity shares.

(b) At least 25% of all public issues of equity shares
and convertible debentures under an offer document shall be to the public
shareholders.

(i) An exception to the above is that if the post-offer
market capitalisation calculated with reference to the offer price is at
least Rs.4000 crores, then a 10% issue is sufficient. However, even such
companies would be required to increase the public shareholding to at
least 25% in a phased manner, with at least 5% every year till this 25% is
reached.

(c) All existing listed companies are required to
maintain 25% public shareholding. Those companies that do not have such
minimum 25% public shareholding are required to increase the public
shareholding by at least 5% every year till such 25% public shareholding is
reached. Thus, the intention is that within a maximum period of 5 years, all
companies should have at least 25% public shareholding.

(d) The provision enabling exceptions to be made for
government companies has been omitted. This is a significant amendment. As
per some press reports, to achieve 25% public holding, almost 85% of the
fresh issue of shares would be by the ‘government companies’.


A clear time frame to achieve 25% public shareholding has
been prescribed. However, what happens if the company does not comply with such
requirement for any reason ?

(i) There is no specific provision in the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, dealing with violation of this new Rule 19A.
It appears that the following could be the consequences :


  • A
    penalty of up to Rs.1 crore.



  • Imprisonment up to 10 years or a fine up to Rs.25 crores or both.



  • Suspension of listing/delisting may also be possible.



(ii) Of course, the usual provisions governing
penalty/prosecution would apply. For example, the facility of compounding of
the violation would be available.

Now let us see some of the concerns with regard to the
amendment.

A major puzzle is that the provisions of Clause 40A of the listing agreement have not been repealed/ modified. It can be seen that this is the provision, howsoever defective, that specifically deals with requirement of increasing the public holding to the specified levels. As can also be seen, this Clause is plainly contradictory with the new requirements. For example, the new requirement requires all companies to maintain/increase their public holding to a common 25%, while Clause 40A has many exceptions. In fact, the scheme of the law till now was simple that is the Rules dealt with ‘initial listing’ while ‘continuing listing’ was dealt with by the listing agreement. However, now there is overlap that does not serve any purpose. While one could technically take a view that a later provision of law overrides an earlier one, this can hardly be a happy approach to take either for the company or even for SEBI.

Unlike the existing Clause 40A, there is no provision for an exception or extension. No exception is given to any type of company. No power is also given to SEBI or the stock exchanges to make any exception or granting any extension to the time schedule for raising public holding.

A major concern is how can the public shareholding be increased?? What are the permissible methods — or, to put it the other way, are any methods prohibited?? SEBI has been authorised to specify the manner in which the public shareholding shall be increased. The common methods may be a fresh public issue, offer for sale by the Promoters, offloading of shares by Promoters in the open market or through off-market deals, etc. One will have to wait for SEBI to prescribe these methods.

The scheme of having a minimum public shareholding has to be built in not only in the Rules and the listing agreement but also in other provisions of law such as the ‘Takeover Regulations’. These will also need amendment to achieve 25% public shareholding.

For the record, it may be recollected that the definition of ‘public’ itself was criticised. It was stated that the inclusion of FIIs, etc. in public effectively resulted in the net holding of the remaining ‘actual public’ to be quite small. Thus, removing such entities from this category was seriously considered. However, no such exclusion has been made and thus holding of FIIs, NRIs, FIs, etc. would be included in ‘public’ shareholding.

It is seen from various published reports that basically companies that would be affected would be the large government companies. In fact, these reports estimate that almost all of the issues in terms of amount would come from such companies. However, it is also true that such companies have not always been found to be wholly compliant with listing requirements. For example, many of government companies have not yet complied with the requirements of ‘corporate governance’. SEBI

has actually passed orders recording this and while it has not awarded any punishment, the orders have highlighted the plight of companies which are effectively at mercy of the government.

Companies that made a public issue of 10% in recent years can rightly air a grievance that had they known that they would be required to make a 25% public issue, they would not have made a public issue in the first place. I think this is a serious and a fair concern and an exception would have to be made for such companies. Having made a public issue of, say, 10%, they can now neither stay, nor exit easily without causing problems to many. To put it simply, they cannot delist and they cannot dilute?!

In conclusion, it appears that unless the new provision is strictly implemented and enforced, it would be merely another half-hearted paper attempt. Newspapers are already reporting that the Finance Ministry is considering tweaking with the new rules. If this happens, it will be another instance of lack of co-ordination between the Government and the Regulator, and perhaps yet another attempt and opportunity going waste.

Delisting of Shares — The newly notified regulations

fiogf49gjkf0d
Securities Laws

1) SEBI has, on 10.6.2009, notified new Regulations
relating to delisting of equity shares of listed companies. Essentially, they
provide for a detailed procedure for delisting and certain safeguards for public
shareholders. The new Regulations replace the earlier SEBI Guidelines of 2003.

2) The Regulations provide for different ways in which
delisting can take place. The most common one would be where it is voluntary and
initiated by the company and the promoters. Then there is a fast track but,
again, voluntary, delisting of defined ‘small’ companies. Under certain
circumstances, there can also be compulsory delisting. Finally, there are
residuary cases such as of BIFR companies, companies in winding up, etc.

3) Delisting means removal of listing of equity shares from
recognised stock exchanges. Thus, shareholders do not have any more a ready
market for their shares. Almost all shareholders — at least all the public
shareholders — buy shares on the assurance that there is continued listing.
Indeed, at the time of a public issue, the law requires that if listing does not
take place soon thereafter, the monies raised have to be refunded.

4) Listing provides significant advantages. There is a ready
market for the shares and this itself adds to the intrinsic value of a share.
Ready market provided by listing results in a better price since there are more
persons competing to buy the shares. Such wide and ready market also adds
further value to the shares on account of sheer liquidity whereby share-holders
can get virtually instant cash by selling their shares.

5) Listing is obviously advantageous to the company too as
funds can be raised easily and at a relatively lesser cost. However, the flip-
side is that there can be considerable costs and inconvenience requiring
compliance with SEBI requirements and corporate governance regulations. Hence,
companies look at delisting as an option. There are also many other reasons for
the company to consider delisting.

6) Considering space constraints, we would consider here
mainly, and even that too briefly, the Regulations where Promoters initiate
delisting
.

7) Under the new Regulations, the procedure for voluntary
delisting is even more complicated and costly than earlier. It can be summarised
as follows :

a) The first step is taking approval of the Board and then
of the shareholders. There are 3 special features to be noted for the
shareholder approval. Firstly, the approval is required through postal ballot,
thus ensuring wide participation of share-holders. Secondly, the approval
needs a special resolution. Thus, at least 75% of those who vote have to vote
in favour of delisting. Finally, of the votes cast by public shareholders, at
least 2/3rds have to vote in favour. This is a new and interesting requirement
as it ensures potentially unfair and unpopular delisting proposals get nipped
in the bud.

b) The next step is taking in principle approval of stock
exchanges. This step will ensure that the broad feasibility of the proposal of
delisting would be tested relatively early. In fact, it could have been the
first step to ensure a basic test. The application has to be disposed of
within 30 days of receiving an application complete in all respects.

c) Then, the Promoters have to initiate the exit offer to
public shareholders within one year of the special resolution. This means that
the Promoters have to offer to buy shares of the public shareholders. ‘Public
shareholders’ means essentially share-holders other than the Promoters. This
is a sensible requirement as it allows the public shareholders to get their
monies rather than get stuck with illiquid shares.

The ‘offer price’ has to be at least the ‘base price’ that
is derived by a formula that takes into account quoted prices of the recent
past. However, this price is fortunately not binding. With this price as the
base, a procedure of book building is initiated where the public shareholders
quote the price at which they are willing to sell. If the prices and
quantities offered are such that the Promoters are willing and able to buy
either 50% of the total public holding or increase their holding to at least
90%, and they agree to do so, then the delisting is successful. If not, the
process fails.

d) However, it does not mean that the remaining
shareholders find their shares irrevocably illiquid. The Regulations require
that the Promoters should, over a further period of at least one year, buy the
remaining shares, if offered, at the same price.


• Using the
market price as benchmark for the offer price is defective and unfair to the
shareholders. Listing gives a signifcant premium to the shares. Conversely,
news of delisting results in the quoted price reaching nearer to the value
of an unlisted share. Since the formula for the base price relies on quoted
prices, the shareholders are thus deprived of a fair price.


e) In ‘book building’, there is obvious scope for
manipulation by both sides. The Promoters may line up some friendly public
shareholders to reach any one of the magic cut-off limit as above. On the
other side, shareholders may be tempted to ask for unduly high price and even
rigging and cartelisation has been alleged frequently in the past. There is no
downside for them obviously since even if they fail and if there are enough
shareholders offering a lower price, they can always get this price over the
next one year as the Regulations require the Promoter to keep the offer open
for another one year. Of course if too many shareholders do this, the
Promoters may simply exercise their option to withdraw.

f) SEBI has attempted to make the process fair and free of
manipulation. In particular, there are specific provisions providing that
there is no manipulation, fraud, deceit, etc. in the process by the Promoter
or any person.


8) Fast-track delisting of ‘small’ companies :


a) Special provisions are made for ‘small’ companies satisfying certain conditions and a relatively faster process is provided for delisting of shares of ‘small’ companies.

b) The basic benefit given is that the elaborate procedure for giving an exit offer would not apply and while such an exit offer still needs to be given, a faster and simpler procedure is provided for.

c) Small companies for this purpose would mean two types of companies :
    

  • In the first type, there would be a company with a paid-up capital up to Rs. 1 crore and whose equity shares were not traded at all in any recognised stock exchange in the preceding one year.

  •     In the second type, there are 300 or lesser number of public shareholders and the paid-up value of shares held by such public shareholders does not exceed Rs. 1 crore.

d) Instead of the elaborate procedure for exit offer, a shorter process is provided for. An exit offer price is determined in consultation with a merchant banker. The offer is conveyed to the public share-holders. 90% of the public shareholders (Regulations are not clear but presumably 90% refers to value and not the number of public shareholders) need to agree either to sell their shares at the offer price or to continue to remain shareholders post-delisting. The offer document would also state that their agreement also includes an agreement to waive the book-building process for price-discovery.

9) Compulsory  delisting :

a) Certain grounds for compulsory delisting may be prescribed by rules made pursuant to Section 21A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Needless to add, there would need to exist strong grounds to do this and where the continuance of listing may be found to be more harmful than delisting and consequent loss of market for the shares.

b) Apart from existence of such serious grounds, the decision for compulsory delisting is to be taken by a panel of the stock exchange, consisting of 5 members including a representative of small investors.

c) Compulsory delisting does not mean that the Promoters escape the requirement of buying out the public shareholders. A fair price of the shares is worked out and the Promoter is required to pay such price to the public shareholders to acquire their shares. The Regulations do not provide for a time limit for carrying out such purchase. That apart, the Company, its Promoters and all companies promoted by them, and whole-time directors would be debarred from accessing the capital market or seek listing of their shares for ten years after delisting. One wonders, though, whether this requirement can be enforced in practice since typically the Promoters of companies facing such serious charges may default even on these further requirements.

Poser: Whole-time director could be an employee holding stock options or having a small holding, who could change his job. How will this requirement impact him and  the company  he joins?

10. Miscellaneous  provisions  and points:

a) Two stock exchanges – BSE and NSE for now – are specified as nationwide stock exchanges. If delisting is sought from other than these and where listing continues on one or both of such exchanges, the process is simpler and, importantly, the require-ment of making an exit offer is waived.

b)  If  delisting   is  pursuant to  a  scheme sanctioned by BIFRand if such scheme lays down the procedure for delisting or provides for an exit option to the public shareholders, then the Regulations shall not apply.

c) A minimum period of 3 years should have passed after listing before an application can be made for delisting.

d) A peculiar feature of the Regulations is that the exit offer is required to be given by the Promoters. No funds of the Company shall be used directly or indirectly. Buyback of shares as a means of delisting is specifically prohibited. This is strange and even absurd. Delisting is the reverse of listing. In case of listing, usually, it is the Company that issues shares to the public and receives monies for such issue. In case of delisting, the process ought to be the opposite – the Company should repay the monies back to the shareholders. If, during listing, the Promoters do not get any money, how can they be expected to raise money to buyout the public shareholders? Also, delisting does not recognise a professionally managed company where. there are no Promoters. Does that mean that shares of such companies cannot be voluntarily delisted ?

e) Under the exit offer, the Promoter is required to place 100% of the minimum offer consideration in escrow in cash by way of bank guarantee. Even after buying out the shareholders who offer their shares in the first round, the Promoter will need to maintain the escrow to provide for the remaining shareholders who have option to offer for a period of one year. This is sensible new requirement but, for the Promoters, this results in blocking of funds or maintenance of bank guarantee for one year.

Conclusion:

a) Reading the Regulations, one wonders whether SEBI thinks complexity is equivalent to comprehensiveness. While many provisions are made in enormous detail, some principle and vital issues are ignored. The pricing formula continues to be unfair as Promoters can literally offer the shareholders the option of the proverbial devil and deep sea – either accept the offer price or get your shares delisted (even the middle ground of rejection of delisting suffers from the company’s shares being under the stigma of potential delisting and thus quite possibly under-quoted). On the other side, forcing the Promoters to raise funds from outside the Company for delisting is inappropriate and is a breeding ground of corruption. The Regulations also effectively punish compliant companies making them undergo the elabora te procedure and payment for the exit offer while ‘vanishing’ companies escape both the procedure as well as the payment. Thus, while one recognises the thoughtful small touches at many places, the Regulations, that have come after more than a decade of consideration, disappoint as a whole.

Public Issue of Securitised Instruments — the new SEBI Regulations

fiogf49gjkf0d

Securities Laws

This series of articles introducing securities laws for
listed companies to the lay reader continues . . .


(1) Background :


(a) SEBI has finally notified the regulatory scheme for
public issue and listing of securitised instruments. While we will review these
Regulations later herein, it is worth considering, very briefly, the background
of ‘securitised instruments’.

(b) The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (often referred to as SARFESI Act
or, simply, the Securitisation Act) is known more for the powers that
particularly institutional lenders are given under this Act to recover their
dues. The other half of this Act is securitisation of assets.

(c) While I am sure that readers are familiar with this term,
a quick description of securitisation may be worthwhile. To take a typical
example, a lender may have debts of various kinds arising out of loans granted
by it. The debts may be payable over a long period of time.. For rotation of
these funds or for other reasons, the lender may want to assign these debts to a
buyer who then simply collects the debts. Such buyer, in turn, may be a person
with his own money or, more often, raises monies from investors who may be
interested in relatively safer returns. This process can be loosely
referred to as securitisation. Effectively, securities are issued to the
investors towards their interests in the debt so bought.

(d) The buyer may invest his own money or raise monies from
private investors. However, a bigger source of money may be the public for
various reasons. Firstly, the public may be interested in safe returns from
securities. The returns may be relatively higher than other instruments.
Properly securitised and issued in small amounts, such instruments may become
attractive to the public. However, issue to the public requires necessary legal
provisions of investor protection and it is at this stage SEBI steps in. SEBI
has to ensure that the process of issue to the public of such instruments is
transparent, with full and fair disclosures and after the issue, the interests
of the investors are safeguarded. Also, the monies received are managed by
registered intermediaries.

(e) Thus, SEBI has recently, on 26th May 2008, notified the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Public Offer and Listing of Securitised
Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 (‘the Regulations’) which contain very
detailed provisions relating to issue and listing of such instruments. It is
worth reviewing these new though quite specialised Regulations.

(2) Scheme of the Regulations :


(a) The Regulations seek to make comprehensive provisions
relating to the formation, constitution and structuring, etc. of an entity
issuing securitised instruments, called ‘Special Purpose Distinct Entity’ (‘SPDI’)
in the Regulations. The Regulations provide for : How and in what form would
such a SPDI be formed and structured, what type of Securitised Debt Instruments
(‘SDI’) they can issue, what would be the disclosures, and how it would be
managed, etc.

(b) The structure of SPDI can be loosely compared with the
structure for mutual funds though SPDI seems to have lesser flexibility. SPDIs
and instruments issued by them are comparable with mutual funds in the sense
that the investments are made effectively on behalf of the unit holders and
managed by persons on behalf of such investors. The essential difference is that
these Regulations focus on a very specialised type of securitisation and hence
make very specific requirements for them.

(c) It would be also worth describing the process involved in
the securitisation of debt and thereafter making a public issue of SDI and
related matters. There would be a Sponsor who would establish an SPDI. The SPDI
has to be in the form of a Trust. There would be Trustees who would manage the
SPDI and carry out other related functions. There would be an Originator who
assigns certain debts to the SPDI. The SPDI would then issue the SDI to the
public under a Scheme and then list such SDI on the stock exchange. The SPDI
would then collect dues in respect of the debts so acquired and distribute such
monies, after deducting costs, to the investors. The investors, in turn, may
hold the SDI and enjoy the steady returns or they may at any time sell the SDI
on the stock exchange at which they are listed at the prevailing market price.
The Scheme would come to an end normally when all the debts are recovered and
the investors are fully paid off.

(d) With this very broad overview of the Regulations, let us
look at some interesting aspects of the Regulations.

(3) Trustees :


(a) The Trustees have perhaps the greatest of responsibility
under the Regulations. They have to take great care while acquiring the
specified debts and particularly ensure that these debts are recoverable,
enforceable and also assignable to SPDI. They have to make the requisite
disclosures in the offer document. They have to manage the debts and recover
them and distribute the proceeds to the investors. They have personal and direct
responsibility in case of contraventions. Having said that, though the
responsibilities cannot be understated, it also appears that each of these
obligations is not absolute, but the intention is more of preventing negligence
and fraud. If, for example, there are bad debts beyond the control and
reasonable foresight
of the Trustees, they would not be held
responsible.

(b)    Interestingly, the Trustees need not necessarily be Trustees registered as such intermediaries with SEBI.However, they would require to be registered with SEBI under these Regulations if they are not so registered otherwise as Trustees. Certain other entities would also not require such registration under the Regulations. Thus, a person can get himself registered as a Trustee under these Regulations and qualify to manage the SPDI.The Trustee can also be a corporate entity.

(c)    The requirements of registration under these Regulations are elaborate and are similar to registration of other intermediaries.

(4)    Debts or receivables  that can be acquired:

(a)    These would be the core assets of the SPDI just as shares and other specified securities are the core assets of mutual funds. However, the definition of these debts that can be acquired by SPDI is quite narrow and would include items such as mortgage debt, financial assets as defined in the Securitisation Act, etc.

(5) SPDI:

(a)    This is the entity, a Trust, that would acquire debts and issue securities to investors. The SPDI has to be quite specialised – in fact, it practically cannot do any other activity except of securitisation. The reason is obvious. The objective is to acquire a chunk of debts and then issue instruments to investors representing an appropriate interest in these debts. The SPDI would then only manage and recover these debts. If it does any other activity, and if there is any loss, the investors would suffer since the loss would go to reduce the debts. However, certain passive investment of surplus monies is, for example, allowed.

(b)    There is an entity termed ‘Servicer’ who can do/be given the job of collecting the debts and distributing the proceeds to the investors. Strangely,it is not required that such ‘Servicer’ should be a registered intermediary. In my opinion a person who could be given the control of all the assets of the SPDI for collection and even the further distribution to the investors should be registered with SEBI for proper control.

(6)    Scheme:

(a)    As in the case of mutual funds, the SPDI can frame schemes pursuant to which it can issue SDI to the investors. Thus, there can be multiple schemes. This also means that recovery of one lot of debts and repayment in full to the investors would not mean the end of the SPDI itself.The SPDI can issue securities under another scheme. In fact, it can issue securities under multiple schemes. Again, quite obviously, each of the schemes would have to be kept segregated in all respects.

(b)    Each scheme would have its own disclosures ~ and features which would have to be complied with regard to that particular scheme.

(7) Accounts and Audit:

(a)    The SPDI would be a Trust and thus would not be subject to the normal requirements of accounts and audit as, for example, companies are subject to. Thus, the Regulations make specific though quite general and broad requirements relating to accounting and audit. The Regulations also require compliance of Guidance Notes issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

(8) Dematerialisation:

(a)    The SDI issued should be capable of dematerialisation. However, at the option of the investor, securities in physical form can also be issued.

(9)    Credit rating:

(a)    Where the core assets are debts, credit rating is required as this helps in the assessment of the risk being assumed by the investor.

(b)    The SPDI would have to obtain at least two credit ratings. Interestingly, it will have to disclose all the credit ratings obtained by it and not just the ones it found acceptable. Thus, the SPDI can go shopping for credit ratings, but SPDI will have to disclose all the ratings received.

(c)    Having said that, no minimum credit rating has been prescribed for the issue of SDI as for example is the case in case of deposits issued by NBFCs. Apparently, the objective may be that it would be up to the investor to balance the credit rating received with the return expected and take his decision accordingly. Hence, in line with the logic of the above, no maximum rate of return is prescribed as so provided for NBFCs.

(d)    The credit rating would have to be reviewed periodically, but not later than a period of one year from the previous rating.

(10) Miscellaneous provisions:

(a)    There are elaborate provisions for inspection of the accounts, records, etc. In case violations are found, there are specific provisions in the Regulations themselves. Further the general provisions in the SEBI Act and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act to penalise the violations would also be applicable.

(b)    There are provisions relating to minimum sub-scription, underwriting, etc. which are conceptually similar to the public issue of securities.

(c)    The SDI would have to be listed and where they are not listed, the amounts raised would have to be refunded. However, it appears that no time limit is specifically provided for the time within which the SDI should be listed.

(11) Conclusion:

(a) One could argue that SEBI has been proactive in issuing regulations even when the instrument is not popular – for example – the regulations relating to buyback were issued in 1998and they were barely used for some years. Presently, the global economy is suffering from the sub-prime crisis and securitised assets are said to be the major culprit. Hence, perhaps investors may be frightened of such assets. Having said that, securitised instruments offer an otherwise well-developed alternative to investors for investments. I am sure that sooner or later these instruments will gain popularity in India.

(b) The Regulations also show a level of maturity in the sense that many of the problems faced by SEBIover the past few years have been addressed. Of course, this is perhaps another reason that the Regulations are unduly complex! The coming years will show the fate of the innovative and sophisticated instruments. In India it will be a learning experience for both the investors and their advisors and of course for the auditors.

Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered Long term investors in Government dated Securities

fiogf49gjkf0d
Presently, SEBI registered Foreign Institutional Investors (FII), Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) and long term investors can purchase, on repatriation basis, Government securities up to US $ 25 billion and non-convertible debentures (NCD)/onds issued by an Indian company up to US $ 51 billion.
This circular has increased the limit for investment in Government securities by US $ 5 billion from US $ 25 billion to US $ 30 billion. This additional limit of US $ 5 billion is available to long term investors registered with SEBI viz. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Multilateral Agencies, Pension/ Insurance/ Endowment Funds, Foreign Central Banks.
levitra

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 110 dated June 12, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Foreign Direct Investment – Reporting of issue/ transfer of Shares to/by a FVCI

Presently, transfer of equity shares/fully and mandatorily convertible debentures/fully and mandatorily convertible preference shares (hereinafter referred to as ‘shares’) of an Indian company, from a nonresident to a person resident in India (resident) or vice versa, has to be reported to RBI, through the bank, within 60 days of the transaction. Also, receipt of consideration for issue of shares of an Indian company, to a non-resident has to be reported to RBI, through a bank, within 30 days from the date of receipt.

This circular has amended Form FC-GPR & Form FC-TRS by inserting the following remarks in para 3(4) and 5(a)(4) of form FC-GPR and para 4(4) and para 5(4) of form FC-TRS: –

‘The investment/s made by SEBI registered FVCI is /are under FDI Scheme, in terms of Schedule 1 to Notification No. FEMA 20 dated 3rd May, 2000.’ This circular also clarifies that whenever a SEBI registered FVCI acquires shares of an Indian company under FDI Scheme in terms of Schedule 1 of Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000 such investments have to be reported in form FC-GPR/ FC-TRS only. When investment is made in terms of Schedule 6 of the Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 no FC-GPR/FC-TRS needs to be filed. Such transactions have to be reported by the custodian bank in the monthly reporting format as prescribed by RBI from time to time.

Annexed to this circular are the revised forms FCGPR and FC-TRS.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 111 dated June 12, 2013

levitra

Amount paid towards domain name registration, server charges for web hosting are not payment towards technical services

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 2

12 M/s. Millenium Infocom Technologies Ltd.
v.
ACIT

21 SOT 152 (Del.)

S. 40(a)(i), S. 9(1)(vi)/S. 9(1)(vii), 195;

India-USA Treaty Article 26(3)

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 31-1-2008

Issues :



l
Amount paid towards domain name registration, server charges for web hosting
are not payments towards technical services. There is no withholding
obligation u/s.9(1)(vii) or u/s.9(1)(vi) as it subsisted for A.Y. 01-02.


l
Even if there is default of TDS, there can be no disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) for
non-deduction of tax at source in view of provisions of non-discrimination
Article of the Treaty.


l
The assessee who has remitted funds without tax deduction by obtaining
requisite certificate of a CA and by following CBDT-laid down procedure cannot
be faulted with for not obtaining prior NOC of the AO u/s.195(2).



Facts :

The issue in appeal was disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) for alleged
failure of the assessee of not deducting tax at source in respect of amounts
remitted for registration of domain name and for server charges. The assessee
had remitted the amounts after obtaining requisite certificate of a Chartered
Accountant.

The AO was of the view that the services obtained by the
assessee in the form of domain registration and in the nature of access to
server space were technical services chargeable to tax in India u/s. 9(1)(vii)
of the Act.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that the amount
paid towards server space was in the nature of lease rental and was not for
obtaining any services. The assessee himself had contended that the amount would
be equipment royalty if regard be had to amendment made to the definition of
royalty effective from A.Y. 2002-03.

The assessee also relied on provisions of non-discrimination
Article of the Treaty to contest disallowance u/s.40(a)(i). In the view of the
assessee, Article 26(3) of India-USA Treaty did not permit disallowance of
expenses in respect of payment made to US resident merely because of failure of
the payer (assessee) to deduct tax at source, since parallel payment made to
resident without deduction of tax at source would not have triggered
disallowance for the payer.

The assessee also claimed that since remittance was supported
by suitable NIL TDS certificate of CA obtained in terms of procedure laid down
in CBDT Circulars, it was not imperative for it to have obtained prior NOC
u/s.195(2).

Held :

The Tribunal accepted the contentions of the assessee and
held as under :

Relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in
Skycell Communications Ltd. v. DCIT,
(2001) (251 ITR 53) (Mad.), it was held
that payment made for hosting of website and access of server was not fees for
technical services.

Referring to Model commentaries, it was concluded that the
server on which the website is stored and through which it is accessible is a
piece of industrial equipment. Having noted that, the Tribunal referred to
amended definition of royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) (as applicable from A.Y. 2002-03) and
concluded that rent paid for hosting of website on servers was for use of
commercial and scientific equipment and was therefore royalty. The Tribunal
noted that the amended definition was applicable from the subsequent year and
hence the amount was not chargeable as royalty income for the year under
reference.

The Tribunal noted in detail self-certification procedure
laid down by various CBDT Circulars which replaced the need of obtaining
authorisation of the AO for making remittance to a non-resident. Having noted
the contents of various CBDT Circulars and after referring to the decision of
Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. v CIT,
(1999) (239 ITR 587) (SC), the Tribunal concluded as under :

“Even in the cases where lower tax has been deducted or no
tax deducted, the assessee by filing an undertaking before the RBI (addressed
to the assessing officer) has made himself liable not only for payment of tax
on such remittances, but also for penalty and prosecution for the defaults
committed by him for non-deduction or lower deduction of tax at source. The
contention of the Ld DR by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh
Limited (supra) that the assessee was under an obligation to make
application to the Assessing Officer u/s.195(2) of the Act for the
determination of income and tax to be deducted, in our view, holds no water,
as it runs contrary to the Circulars issued by the CBDT.”

 


Relying on the decision of Herbalife International India
(P) Ltd. v. ACIT,
(2006) (101 ITD 450), the Tribunal also accepted the
assessee’s contention that no disallowance can be made having regard to
non-discrimination provisions of Article 26(3) of the treaty, irrespective of
whether or not the assessee theoretically had obligation of deducting tax at
source.

levitra

Exemption u/s. 10A: A. Ys. 2002-03 and 2003-04: Current losses as well as brought forward losses of the non-EPZ unit cannot be deducted or reduced from the profits of the EPZ unit for computing the deduction u/s. 10A:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Tei Technologies (P) Ltd.; 259 CTR 186 (Del):

In the relevant years, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10A, 1961 by computing the exempt amount without setting off the loss of non eligible units. The Assessing Officer computed the amount after setting off the loss from the non -eligible units against the profit of the eligible units. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Even after the amendment by the Finance Act, 2000, section 10A has been retained in Chapter III of the Act, notwithstanding the change in the language of s/s. (1) thereof. Secondly, though s/s. (1) provides for a deduction of the eligible profits, it further states that the deduction “shall be allowed from the total income of the assesee”.

ii) Determination of total income is the last point before the tax is charged, and once the total income is determined or quantified, there is absolutely no scope for making any further deduction. If this is the true legal position, it is not possible to understand s/s. (1) of section 10A as providing for a “deduction” of the profits of the eligible unit “from the total income of the assessee”. The definition of the expression “total income” given in section 2(45) cannot be imported into the interpretation of s/s. (1) having regard to the context in which it is used and the scheme of the Act relating to the charge of tax.

iii) The form of the return of income prescribed by the Rules gives a further indication that section 10A provides for an exemption and not merely a deduction. Steps given in the return form ITR-6 are also an indication that the relief u/s. 10A has to be given before the adjustment of the losses of the current year and the brought forward losses from the past years.

iv) Incomes which are enumerated in Chapter III have traditionally been considered as incomes which are exempt from tax rather than as deduction in the computation of total income. The fact that a particular class of income is only partially exempt from taxation does not necessarily mean that it is only a deduction. Admittedly, there is ambiguity and lack of clarity or precision in the language employed in section 10A(1) which says that deduction shall be made from the total income, when the Act contains no provision to allow any deduction from the total income.

v) Thus, it is not impermissible to rely on the heading or title of Chapter III and interpret the section as providing for an exemption rather than a deduction even after the amendment by Finance Act, 2000 w.e.f. 01-04-2001.

vi) S/s. (4) of section 80A cannot defeat such construction. Sole object of s/s. (4), is to ensure that double benefit does not enure to an assessee in respect of the same income, once u/s. 10A or 10B or under any of the provisions of Chapter VI-A and again under any other provisions of the Act. This s/s. does not militate against the view that section 10A or section 10B is an exemption provision.

vii) Contents of Circular No. 5 of 2010 dated 03-06- 2010, accord with the aforesaid view. Therefore, the current losses as well as brought forward losses of the non-EPZ unit cannot be deducted or reduced from the profits of EPZ unit for computing the deduction u/s. 10A.”

levitra

Charitable trust: Certificate u/s. 80G(5): Amendment by Finance Act (No.2) of 2009 and Circular Nos. 5 and 7 of 2010 issued by CBDT: Certificate once granted operates in perpetuity: Withdrawal, if any, should be as per the procedure:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Bhhola Bhandari Charitable Trust: 259 CTR 279 (P&H):

The assessee, a charitable trust was granted certificate u/s. 80G(5), which was valid upto the F.Y. 2010-11 ending 31-03-2011. The assessee filed an application for renewal on 25-04-2011 which was withdrawn on 30-05-2011 in view of the amendment by Finance Act (No. 2) of 2009 and Circular Nos. 5 of 2010 and 7 of 2010 wherein it was stated that the Certificate granted u/s. 80G(5) which is existing on 01-10-2010 would continue till perpetuity unless it is withdrawn as per law. However, CIT passed order dated 05-12-2011 withdrawing the certificate. The Tribunal set aside the said order.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We find that the order of the Tribunal setting aside the order of CIT is based on sound reasoning. The assessee had valid exemption on 01-10-201, when the provisions of section 80G of the Act were amended so as to dispense with the periodic renewal of the exemptions. Such statutory provisions were clarified by Circular No. 5 of 2010 and Circular No. 7 of 2010 issued by the CBDT. Once the statute has given perpetuity to the exemptions granted u/s. 80G(5) of the Act, the same could not be withdrawn without issuing show cause notice in terms of the statutory provisions in the manner prescribed by law.

ii) In view of the said fact, we do not find that any substantial question of law arises for consideration.”

levitra

Charitable trust: S/s. 11(1)(d) and 80G(5): A. Y. 2005-06 to 2007-08: Certificate u/s. 80G(5); Refusal to continue on the ground that the conditions u/s. 11(1)(d) not satisfied: Refusal not proper: Department directed to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to the trust:

fiogf49gjkf0d
DIT (Exemption) vs. Sri Ramakrishna Seva Ashram: 258 CTR 201 (Kar):

The assessee, a charitable trust, was registered u/s. 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in May 1991 and was allowed exemption u/s. 11 of the Act since then. A certificate u/s. 80G(5) of the Act was also issued to the assessee trust. The assessee’s application dated 02-02-2009 for continuation of certificate u/s. 80G was rejected on the ground that the donations to the rural project fund are not corpus donations, as such, the same are not credited to corpus account. No details of the donors is furnished in spite of the specific directions. Such donations have not been considered for computation of 85% application u/s. 11(1) of the Act for the A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and directed the DIT(Exemption) to grant continuation of the 80G certificate.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised before the Karnataka High Court:

“If the assessee receives contributions for charitable purposes and does not show them in the statement of account as the ‘corpus fund’, but, shows the said amount under a different specific head, does it cease to be a corpus fund to be eligible for the benefit u/s. 11(1)(d) of the Act.?”

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) The word ‘corpus’ is used in the context of IT Act. This can be understood in the context of a capital opposed to expenditure. It is a capital of an assessee; a capital of an estate, capital of a trust; a capital of an institution. Therefore, if any voluntary contribution is made with a specific direction, then it shall be treated as the capital of the trust for carrying on its charitable or religious activities. Then such an income falls u/s. 11(1)(d) and is not liable to tax. Therefore, it is not necessary that a voluntary contribution should be made with a specific direction to treat it as corpus.

ii) If the intention of the donor is to give that money to a trust which they will keep in trust account in deposit and the income from the same is utilized for carrying on a particular activity, it satisfies the definition part of the corpus. The assessee would be entitled to the benefit of exemption from payment of tax levied. From whatever angle it may be seen, the deposited amount cannot be said to be income in the hands of the recipient trust.

iii) Similarly, the assessee after receiving the amount keeps the amount in deposit and only utilises the income from the deposit to carry out the charitable activities, then also the said amount would be a contribution to the corpus of the trust and the nomenclature in which the amount is kept in deposit is of no relevance as long as the contribution received are kept in deposit as capital and only the income from the said capital which is to be utilised for carrying on charitable and religious activities of the institute/corpus of the trust, for which section 11(1)(d) is attracted and the said income is not liable to tax under the Act. In so far as the argument that the person who made these contributions do not specifically direct that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust is concerned, it has no substance. In view of the language employed in section 11(1)(d), the requirement is that the voluntary contributions have to be made with a specific direction. The law does not require that the said direction should be in writing. In the absence of the direction in writing, the only way that one can find out whether there was a specific direction and to find out how the money so paid is utilised. If the money so received by way of voluntary conrtributions, if it is meant to be used for the leprosy patients and is credited to a particular account and from the income from the said capital, the said activity is carried on, the requirement of section 11(1)(d) is complied with.

iv) In the instant case from records it is seen that those people who have paid by way of donation that includes the cheque with a letter with a specific direction, which is in compliance with section 11(1)(d). But, in case the contributions are made without cheque, i.e., by cash, and oral direction has been issued to the trust to utilise the said fund for the purpose of treating the leprosy patients and if such amounts are credited to the account meant for it, even then the requirement of section 11(1)(d) is complied with.

v) The attitude of the IT authorities is surprising who are over-technical in denying the benefit to the deserving institutions which are rendering laudable services to the rural masses. By not granting tax exemption, which they deserve, the authorities have hampered the said social activities of the trust and they are made to waste their precious time, energy and money in fighting this litigation. Unfortunately, the persons who took a decision to file an appeal before this court are wasting the precious time of the trust which could have been used in the social service. Public money and the time of this court is also wasted. This attitude on the part of the Department cannot be countenanced. Therefore, it is appropriate to impose cost incurred by the assessee for fighting litigation so that the Department would be more careful in taking decision to file appeal in such frivolous cases by ignoring the policy of the Government, viz., National Litigation Policy, 2011.

vi) Hence, the appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-, to be deposited by the Department within one month from today in favour of the rural project fund of the assessee trust.”

levitra

Business income or house property income: S/s. 22 and 28: A. Y. 2003-04: Assessee owner of property: Hotel run in property by company of which assessee was director: No lease of property: Share of profits received by assessee: Assessable as business income:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Francis Wacziarg; 353 ITR 187 (Del):

Assessee was the owner of the property. Hotels were run in the property by a company in which assessee was director. There was no lease agreement. The assessee was entitled to a certain share in the gross operating profit calculated in terms of the agreement. The asessee disclosed the income as business income and claimed deduction of expenditure and depreciation. The Assessing Officer assessed the income as income from house property and disallowed the claim for deduction of expenditure and depreciation. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Commissioner (Appeals) had given a detailed factual finding why income earned by the assessee from the three properties was taxable under the head “Income from business or profession” and not under the head “Income from house property”. This finding had been upheld by the Tribunal. The findings were not perverse and were based on documents and material placed on record. This income was assessable as business income.

ii) Once it was held that the income from the three properties was taxable under the head “Income from business or profession” depreciation had to be allowed under the provisions of section 32. Similarly, disallowance of 80% from the expenses deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals)/Tribunal had been explained and supported by cogent reasoning. The depreciation and the expenditure were deductible.”

levitra

Business expenditure: S/s. 2(24)(x), 36(1)(va) and 43B: A. Y. 2001-02: Employees’ contribution towards ESI: Deposited before due date for filing return though after due date prescribed under ESI Act, 1948: Deduction to be allowed: No distinction to be made between employer’s contribution and employees’ contribution: Amendment of section 43B by Finance Act, 2003 deleting second proviso is retrospective:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd; 258 CTR 216 (HP):

For the A. Y. 2001-02, the assessee’s claim for deduction of employees’ contribution to ESI was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the same was deposited after the due date prescribed under the ESI Act though it was deposited before the due date for filing the return of income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that amounts received by the assessee from employees for crediting to their accounts in provident fund and ESI but not so credited on or before the due dates specified under the respective statutes, were allowable deductions u/s. 36(1) (va) of the IT Act?”

The Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) By the Finance Act, 1987 section 2(24)(x) was inserted and the sums collected by the assessee from his employees as contribution to provident funds and ESI were to be treated as income. By the same Act, section 36(1)(va) was introduced. Resultantly, the contribution of the employees collected by the employer was treated as his income. At the same time, the same was allowed as deductible expense if deposited within a particular time. Section 43B was also amended in the year 1987 itself and the two provisos were inserted. As per the amendment, there was no differentiation between the employer’s or employees’ contributions. Both had to be deposited by the due date as defined in the Explanation below cl. (va) of s/s. (1) of section 36. By the Finance Act of 2003, which came into effect from 1st April, 2004, the second proviso to section 43B which specifically made reference to section 36(1)(va) was deleted. The amendment was curative in nature and hence would apply with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1988.

ii) The second proviso to section 43B(b) specifically referred to the due date u/s. 36(1)(va) and as such, it cannot be urged that the provisions of section 43B and section 36(1)(va) should not be read together. It is clear that the law was enacted to ensure that the payment of the contributions towards the provident funds, the ESI funds or other such welfare schemes must be made before furnishing the return of income u/s. 139(1).

iii) Though the amount was not deposited by the due date under the Welfare Acts, it was definitely deposited before furnishing the returns. That is no reason to deny him the benefit of section 43B, which starts with a non obstante clause and which clearly lays down that the assessee can take benefit of deduction of such contributions, if the same are paid before furnishing the return. There is no reason to make any distinction between the employees’ contribution or the employer’s contribution.”

levitra

Bad debts: Section 36(1)(vii): A. Y. 2007-08: Assessee taking all assets and liabilities of two web portals from its holding company as going concerns: Debt due to holding company: Assessee is entitled to write off: Bad debt allowable:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Times Business Solutions Ltd. 354 ITR 25 (del):

Consequent
upon a scheme of demerger, the assessee company had acquired all the
assets and liabilities of two web based portals that were hitherto being
operated by the assessee’s holding company. The portals were acquired
as going concerns. In the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer rejected
the claim for deduction of bad debt of Rs. 3,63,31,432/- on the ground
that these debts related to the years 2003 to 2006 when the web portals
were run and operated by the holding company and that the assessee could
not have written off the bad debts as such contravened section
36(1)(vii). The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
When the original owner would have been entitled to write off the bad
debts, the successor who acquires the assets and liabilities from the
previous owner would also be entitled to treat the bad debts in the same
manner in which the original owner was entitled under law.

ii)
The assesee had acquired all the assets and liabilities of two web based
portals from its holding company. The assessee, for the A. Y. 2007-08,
had written off the bad debts acquired from the holding company.
Therefore, the asessee was entitled to write off the irrecoverable bad
debts related to the years 2003 to 2006 when the web portals were run by
the holding company.

iii) The appeal is dismissed.”

levitra

THE FINANCE ACT, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d

1 Introduction

1.1 Shri P. Chidambaram, the Union Finance Minister, presented the last effective Budget of the present term of the UPA II Government for the year 2013-14 on 28th February, 2013. The Finance Bill, 2013, introduced by him with his budget, contained 125 clauses, out of which only 53 clauses relate to ‘Direct Taxes’ and 72 clauses relate to ‘Indirect Taxes’. This year, there was no serious debate in the Parliament on the Finance Bill. The Finance Minister introduced 11 new clauses, which were more or less of clarificatory nature on 30th April, 2013, and the Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on the same day without any debate. Similarly, the Rajya Sabha passed the Finance Bill without any debate on 2nd May, 2013. The Bill has received the assent of the President on 10th May, 2013.

1.2 While concluding his Budget Speech, the Finance Minister has, in Para 188, made some predictions as under:

“Any economist will tell us what India can become. We are the tenth-largest economy in the World. We can become the eighth, or perhaps the seventh largest by 2017. By 2015, we could become a $5 trillion economy, and among the [top] five in the world. What we will become depends on us and on the choices that we make. Swami Vivekananda, whose 150th birth anniversary we celebrate this year, told the people: “All the strength and succour you want is within yourself. Therefore, make your own future.”

1.3 In Para 185 of the Budget Speech, it is stated that the effect of changes in Direct Tax Laws this year will bring additional revenue of Rs. 13,300 crore. So far as Indirect Taxes are concerned, the additional revenue will be Rs 4,700 crore.

1.4 In this Article, the amendments made in the Income-tax Act, the Wealth Tax Act and Securities Transaction Tax (STT) are discussed. A new tax viz. “Commodities Transaction Tax” (CTT) is now levied u/s. 105 to 124 of the Finance Act, 2013. This is on the same lines as the STT. The important features of this new tax are also discussed in this Article.

2 Rates of income tax, surcharge and education cess:
2.1 Surcharge on Super-Rich:

There are no changes in the tax slabs, rates of income tax, or rates of Education Cess. In Para 126 of the Budget Speech, the Finance Minister has stated that “Fiscal consolidation cannot be effected only by cutting expenditure. Wherever possible, revenues must also be augmented. When I need to raise resources, who can I go to except those who are relatively well placed in society? There are 42,800 persons — let me repeat, only 42,800 persons — who admitted to a taxable income exceeding Rs. 1 crore per year. I propose to impose a surcharge of 10 percent on persons whose taxable income exceeds Rs. 1 crore per year. This will apply to individuals, HUFs, firms and entities with similar tax status.” In Para 127, he has stated that in the cases of domestic companies, the existing surcharge is 5% if the taxable income exceeds Rs. 1 crore. This will now be 10% if the taxable income exceeds Rs. 10 crore. Similarly, in the case of a foreign company the existing surcharge of 2% will increase to 5% — if the income exceeds Rs. 10 crore. In Para 128, the Finance Minister has stated that the existing surcharge of 5% will increase to 10% in case of tax on dividend distribution. Further, in Para 129 of his speech, he has stated that this additional surcharge will be in force only for one year i.e. financial year 2013-14 (A.Y. 2014-15).

2.2 Rebate from Tax:

In order to give a small relief to Resident Individual Tax Payers, a new Section 87A is inserted in the Income-tax Act (IT Act) w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. Under this section, a resident individual whose total income does not exceed Rs. 5 lakh, will be entitled to receive a rebate of Rs. 2,000/- or the income tax payable (whichever is less) from the income tax payable by him. It may be noted that this rebate cannot be claimed by an HUF.

2.3 Rates of Income-tax and Surcharge:

(i) For Resident Individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI and Artificial Juridical Person, as stated above, there are no changes in the tax slabs, rates of Income tax or rates of Education Cess. The only change is about levy of 10% surcharge on tax if the income exceeds Rs. 1 crore. The rates of tax for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 (Accounting years ending on 31-03-2013 and 31-03-2014) are the same as stated below):

Notes:

•    In A.Y. 2014-15 Surcharge @ 10% of the tax will be payable if income of the assessee exceeds Rs. 1 crore.
•    An Individual having gross total income below Rs 5 lakh will get rebate upto Rs. 2,000/- from tax in A.Y. 2014-15 u/s. 87A.
•    Education Cess of 3% (2%+1%) of the tax is payable for both the years.

(ii)    The following table gives figures of tax payable by Resident Individual, HUF, AOP, BOI etc. in A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15.

(a)    Tax payable in A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting year ending on 31-03-2013)


Note: The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for Education Cess.

(b)    Tax payable in A.Y. 2014-15(Accounting year ending on 31-03-2014)
Notes:

•    In the first two items (Rs. 3 lakh and Rs. 5 lakh) in the case of an Individual having income below Rs. 5 lakh, the tax payable will be reduced by Rebate of Rs. 2,000/- u/s. 87A.
•    The last item (Rs. 125 lakh) includes surcharge of 10%.
•    The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for Education Cess.

(iii)    Other Assessees (excluding companies)

The rates of taxes (including rate of Education Cess) for the other assesses (excluding companies) for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 are the same. No surcharge on tax was payable by Co-operative Societies, Firms, LLP or Local Authority in A.Y. 2013-14. However, in A.Y. 2014-15, if the income of the above entities exceed Rs. 1 crore, Surcharge @ 10% of tax will be payable.

(iv)    For Companies:

The rates of Income tax for Companies for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 are the same. For domestic companies, surcharge of 5% of tax is payable in A.Y. 2013-14 if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore. In A.Y. 2014-15, the rate of surcharge will be 5% if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore but does not exceed Rs. 10 crore. If the total income exceeds Rs. 10 crore, the rate of surcharge will be 10% of the tax payable on the entire income.

In the case of a foreign company there is no change in the rates of income tax in A.Y. 2013- 14 and A.Y. 2014-15. As regards surcharge, the rate is 2% of the tax if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore in A.Y. 2013-14. In A.Y. 2014-15, the rate of surcharge will be 2% if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore but does not exceed Rs. 10 crore. If the total income exceed Rs 10 crore the rate of surcharge will be 5% of the tax payable on the entire income.

In both the above cases, Education Cess @ 3% of tax is payable in A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15.

(v)    Rate of Tax u/s. 115JB (MAT)

The rate of tax (i.e. 18.5%) will be payable on the book profits of a company computed u/s. 115JB (MAT) in A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15. The surcharge will be payable on this tax as stated in (iv) above. Education Cess @ 3% of the tax plus applicable surcharge will be payable as at present.

(vi)    Rate of Tax u/s. 115JC (AMT)

The rate of tax (i.e. 18.5%) will be payable on the adjusted total income of non-corporate assesses u/s. 115JC (AMT) in A.Y. 2013 -14 and A.Y. 2014-15. The surcharge and Education Cess will be payable on this tax as stated in (iii) above.

(vii)    Dividend Distribution Tax
:

Dividend Distribution Tax or Income Distribution Tax payable u/s. 115O, 115QA, 115R or 115TA shall be pay-able as provided in these section. The surcharge at 10% of tax will be payable in respect of the above tax for A.Y. 2014-15. The Education Cess @ 3% of the tax shall also be payable on the above tax. It may be noted that surcharge @ 10% of tax will be payable irrespective of the amount distributed under these sections.

(viii)    Rate of Tax on Dividends from Specified Foreign Companies:

The concessional rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess which was applicable for A.Y. 2013-14 u/s. 115BBD has been extended for one more year i.e. for A.Y. 2014-15.

2.4 Education Cess:

As in the earlier years, Education Cess of 3% (including 1% Higher Education Cess) of the income tax and applicable surcharge is payable by all resident assessees and non-resident assessees. No Education Cess or surcharge is applicable on TDS and TCS from payments to all resident corporate and non-corporate assesses. However, if tax is deducted from

(a)    payments to foreign companies, (b) payments to non-residents or (c) salary to residents or non-residents, Education Cess at 3% of the tax and applicable surcharge is to be deducted.

3.    Tax deduction and collection at source (TDS and TCS)

3.1 In the case of a resident assessee or a domestic company, where tax is required to be deducted or collected at source, no surcharge or Education Cess of the applicable rate of tax is to be considered. However, in the case of a non -resident or a foreign company while deducting or collecting tax at source, under the provisions of the Income-tax Act during the period commencing from 01-04-2013, the applicable rate of tax is to be increased by the applicable rate of surcharge and Education Cess. As stated earlier, in the case of non-residents (other than foreign companies), if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore, the rate of surcharge is 10% of the tax. In the case of a foreign company, if the total income is more than Rs. 1 crore but less than Rs. 10 crore, the rate of surcharge is 2% of the tax. If the income is more than Rs. 10 crore, this rate is 5% of the tax on total income. In all cases, the rate of Education Cess is 3% of the tax (including applicable surcharge).

3.2 TDS on transfer of immovable property:

(i)    Section 194-1A – This new section is inserted in the Income-tax Act w.e.f. 01-06-2013. It provides that any person (transferee) who purchases any immovable property (whether residential or commercial) for a consideration, shall now deduct tax at source at the rate of 1% of the amount paid to a resident seller (transferor) if the said consideration exceeds Rs. 50 lakh. For this purpose, the term “Immovable Property”, is defined to mean any land (other than Agricultural Land) or any building or part of a building. It may be noted that the section will apply in both cases i.e. when the purchaser is purchasing the property as a capital asset or as stock-in-trade.

(ii)    This section will apply to all assessees, whether resident or non-resident, who purchase any immovable property in India from a resident. In other words, the obligation for deduction of tax is on every purchaser of immovable property, whether he is required to get his books of accounts audited u/s. 44AB or not. It will not be necessary for the purchaser to obtain Tax Deduction Account Number (TAN) u/s. 203A.

However, the purchaser will have to file TDS Return and deposit TDS amount with the Government as provided in Section 200. The seller of the property must provide his PAN to the purchaser. If this is not done, tax on the sale consideration will have to be deducted at 20% as provided in section 206AA. It may be noted that the option of obtaining certificate from the A.O. u/s. 197 prescribing NIL rate or lower rate of TDS is not available in the above case.

(iii)    If the purchase of the immovable property is from a non-resident, the tax will be deductible by the purchaser at the applicable rate u/s. 195 as at present. This new section will not apply to such a purchase. Similarly, this new section will not apply to payment of compensation on acquisition of immovable property to which the provisions of TDS u/s. 194LA are applicable.

(iv)    It may be noted that a similar provision for TDS was proposed to be introduced by the insertion of section 194LAA in the Income-tax Act by the Finance Bill, 2012. Under this provision, it was proposed that the purchaser of an immovable property for a consideration exceeding Rs. 50 lakh in the specified area and Rs. 20 lakh in other areas shall deduct tax at source @ 1% of the consideration. For this purpose, the consideration was to be considered as specified in the Sale Deed or stamp duty valuation u/s. 50C whichever was higher. The registering authority was directed not to register the document unless the evidence for payment of TDS amount was produced before him. There was a lot of protest against the introduction of such a provision last year. Therefore, this provision was dropped before passing the Finance Act, 2012. A similar provision is again introduced this year and in the absence of any serious debate the same has been now brought into force from 01-06-2013.

(v)    This new provision is likely to raise some issues as under:

(a) The definition of immovable property only covers land (other than agricultural land) or building or part of the building. This will mean that any right in a building such as tenancy right, leasehold right etc. will not be subject to this TDS provision. [Refer: Atul G Puranik vs. ITO 132 ITD 499 (Mum)]

(b)    If a person has booked a flat in a building under construction, either the flat is booked before 01-06-
2013 or after that date, and makes payment for the same, a question will arise whether he is required to deduct tax at source under this section. It is possible to take the view that by the agreement with the builder the purchaser gets a right to get the flat when constructed. Therefore, when the instalment payments are made to the builder there is no transfer of immovable property. [Refer: ITO vs. Yasin Moosa Godil 147 TTJ 94 (Ahd)] The transfer of flat will take place only when possession is given.

Therefore, the obligation to deduct tax will arise under this section only when the last instalment is paid against possession of the flat. However, TDS @ 1% will have to be deducted on the entire consideration for the flat at that time.

(c)    Since there is no specific mention in this section that if the amount of stamp duty valuation u/s. 50C is more than the actual consideration, the stamp duty valuation will be considered as consideration for TDS purposes, it can be concluded that tax is to be deducted from the actual consideration payable as per the sale deed. As stated earlier, in the Finance Bill, 2012 the proposed section 194LAA specifically provided for considering stamp duty valuation if that was more than the consideration stated in the Sale Deed. There is no such provision in this new section 194-1A.

(d)    Section 199 of the Income-tax Act provides that credit for TDS amount will be given against the income in respect of which such tax is deducted. In a transaction of sale of immovable property, the seller will be showing income from such sale under the head “Capital Gains” or “Income from Business or Profession”. It may so happen that an individual selling his immovable property may claim exemption u/s. 54 or 54F due to reinvestment in another property or u/s. 54EC by reinvestment in Bonds. In all such cases, credit for TDS under this new section will be available even if the income computed under the head “Capital Gains” is NIL.

(e)    If the property is purchased by two or more persons as co-owners, the tax will be deductible by each co-owner in respect of his/her share of the consideration paid if the total consideration for the property exceeds Rs. 50 lakh. This section also applies in respect of purchase of property from a relative.

(f)    It may be noted that there is no provision for disallowance of purchase price of the property u/s. 40(a)(ia) in the case of a purchaser who has purchased the property as stock-in-trade.

3.3    tds from interest income of FII or qfi:

Section 194LD: This is a new Section inserted in the Income-tax Act w.e.f. 01-06-2013. This Section provides that any person paying interest to a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or a Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI) in respect of the following investment shall deduct tax at source at the rate of 5% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess.

(a)    Interest on a Government Security

(b)    Interest on a rupee denominated bond of an Indian Company, provided that the rate of interest does not exceed the rate notified by the Central Government.

It may be noted that consequential amendments have been made in Sections 115A, 115AD, 195 and 196D. However, no consequential amendment is made in Section 206AA and, therefore, in the case of any FII or QFI, if PAN is not furnished tax will be deductible @ 20% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess.

3.4 Section 206AA: This section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. By this amendment, it is now clarified that in respect of interest paid to a non-resident or a foreign company on long term infrastructure bonds issued by an Indian Company in foreign currency as provided in section 194LC, the provisions of section 206AA will not apply from 01-06 -2013. Therefore, if such foreigner lender does not furnish PAN, the tax will be deducted at 5% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess u/s. 194LC and not at the rate of 20% as provided in section 206AA.

It is surprising that similar concession is not given u/s. 206AA to tax deductible u/s. 194LD as discussed in Para 3.3 above.

3.5    Section 206C – Tax collection at source (TCS)

This section was amended last year w.e.f. 01-07-2012 by inserting s/s. (1D) in section 206C providing for TCS @ 1% of the sale consideration for bullion purchased by a buyer if the consideration exceeded Rs. 2 lakh and was paid in cash by the buyer. It was provided that for this purpose, the term “Bullion” shall not include any coin or any other article weighing 10 grams or less. This provision is now amended by the Finance Act, 2013, and it is provided that w.e.f. 01-06-2013, the exemption given from TCS provision to a coin or other article of bullion weighing 10 grams or less shall not be available. Therefore, tax will have to be collected @ 1% if the buyer of bullion (including any coin or other article) pays amount exceeding Rs. 2 lakh in cash.

4.    Exemptions and Deductions:

4.1    Agricultural Land Section 2(1A) and 2(14):

These two sections of the Income tax Act have been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15.

(i)    Section 2(14) defines the term “Capital Asset”.
As per the provisions of the section before the amendment, agricultural land situated within the jurisdiction of a Municipality, Cantonment Board etc. having population of more than 10,000 was considered as a Capital Asset. Similarly, agricultural land situated within the distance (not exceeding 8 kms) from the local limits of a Municipality, Cantonment Board etc. as notified was also considered as Capital Asset.

(ii)    Section 2(14) has now been amended to provide that the agricultural land situated in any area within the following distance, measured aerially, from the local limits of any Municipality, Cantonment etc. shall be considered as a Capital Asset.

(a)    Within 2 kms having population of more than 10,000 but less than 1 lakh;
(b)    Within 6 kms having population of more than 1 lac but less than 10 lakh;
(c)    Within 8 kms having population of more than 10    lakh.

In other words, agricultural land situated outside the above territory will not be considered as Capital Asset u/s. 2(14).

(iii)    The population for the above purpose is defined to mean population according to the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published before the first day of the Financial Year. The distance for the above purpose is to be measured “aerially”. This provision appears to have been made to settle the controversy about the method of measurement. In the case of CIT vs. Satinder Pal Singh 188 Taxman 54 (P&H) it was held that the distance should be measured by approach road and not by a straight line distance on a horizontal plane.

(iv)    Section 2(1A) has similarly been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15.

Income derived from any building and situated in the immediate vicinity of the agricultural land is presently exempt as agricultural income, subject to certain conditions u/s. 2(1A). By amendment of this section, it is now provided that income from such building falling within the area specified in (ii) above will not qualify for exemption as agricultural income.

4.2    Keyman Insurance Policy – Section 10(10D)

(i)    Section 10(10D) grants exemption to any sum received under a life insurance policy, subject to certain conditions. Amount received on maturity of Keyman Insurance Policy is not exempt u/s. 10(10D). There was a controversy whether the Keyman Insurance Policy assigned to the beneficiary continues to be a Keyman Insurance Policy. Delhi High Court held in the case of CIT vs. Rajan Nanda 349 ITR 8 that the Keyman Insurance Policy becomes an ordinary policy on the life of the beneficiary on assignment and therefore the amount received under this policy will be exempt if other conditions of section 10(10D) are complied with. To overcome this decision, Explanation 1 to the section is now amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 to provide that the Keyman Insurance Policy which has been assigned to the beneficiary during its term, with or without consideration, will be considered to be a Keyman Insurance Policy u/s. 10(10D) and exemption under that section will not be available in respect of the amount received on maturity. It may be noted that for A.Y. 2013-14 and earlier years the exemption can be claimed on the basis of Delhi High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Rajan Nanda 349 ITR 8.

(ii)    One of the conditions for granting exemption provided in section 10(10D)(d) is that the annual premium payable in respect to a life insurance policy should not exceed 10% of capital sum insured. This percentage of the premium is increased to 15% in the case of insurance policy issued on or after 01-04-2013 on the life of (a) a person with disability stated in section 80U or (b) a person who is suffering from a disease or ailment specified u/s. 80DDB. Consequential amendment is made in section 80C also.


4.3    Securitisation Trusts: New Sections 10(23DA), 10(35A), 115TA to 115TC

(i)    New Scheme for taxation of Income of Securitisation Trust (Trust) has been introduced from A.Y. 2014-15. For this purpose, new sections 10(23D), 10(35A), 115TA, 115TB and 115TC have been added. The terms “Securitisation Trust”, “Securities”, “Securitised Debt Instrument”, “Instruments” “Investor” and “Special Purpose Vehicle” are defined in section 115TC. These terms have the same meaning as given to them in SEBI (Public Offer and

Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 or the Guidelines on the securitisation of standard assets issued by RBI.

(ii)    Under the new scheme the provisions can be summarised as under:

(a)    Any income of the Trust from the activity of securitisation will be exempt from tax u/s. 10(23DA);

(b)    Income received by the Investor holding any securitised debt instrument or securities issued by the Trust will be exempt in the hands of the Investor u/s. 10(35A);

(c)    Trust will be liable to pay at the following rates on the income distributed to the investor u/s. 115TA.

•    In the case of Individual or HUF – 25% Income tax plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess;

•    In the case of others – 30% Income tax plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess;

•    In the case of a person who is not liable to pay tax on such income – No tax is payable by the Trust.

The provisions for payment of the above tax on income distributed to Investors are contained in section 115TA to 115TC. These provisions are similar to tax payable on distribution of dividend by a company and tax payable on distribution of income by a Mutual Fund.

(iii)    Section 115TA also provides for filing of Statement of income distributed and tax paid thereon, charging of interest for the delayed payment of tax and treating a person responsible for compliance with these provisions as an assessee in default for the non-compliance with provisions of sections 115TA to 115TC.

(iv)    If one compares the existing provisions with the above new scheme, it will noticed that under the above scheme the total tax liability of the trust and Investors, put together, will be more.

4.4    Investor Protection Fund:    New Section 10(23ED)

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. This section grants exemption to any income, by way of contribution received from a Depository by an Investor Protection Fund (Fund) set up in accordance with the regulations notified by the Central Government. It may be noted that Depositories (NSDL or CDSL) are required to set up Investor Protection Fund as provided in SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996. The above exemption is now provided to the Fund in respect of contribution by the Depository. It is also provides that if the Fund shares any amount with the Depository in any year, out of such exempt income, the amount so shared will be taxable in its hands. This section is on the same lines as section 10(23EA) which grants exemption to amount contributed by a recognised Stock Exchange to its approved Investor Protection Fund.

4.5    Venture Capital Fund: Section 10(23FB):

This section provides for exemption to any income of Venture Capital Company (VCC) and Venture Capital Fund (VCF) from investment in Venture Capital Undertaking (VCU). Essentially, this section treats VCC and VCF as pass-through entities. U/s. 10(23FB), the income of VCC and VCF is exempt but is taxable directly in the hands of investors in these entities u/s. 115U. The SEBI (VCF) Regulations, 1996, have been replaced by the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 w.e.f. 12-05-2012. By amendment of Section 10(23FB), w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14, the existing explanation has been substituted to provide as under:

(i)    The pass-through status can be enjoyed by VCC and VCF that has been granted registration as category I Alternative Investment Fund;

(ii)    VCC and VCF registered and governed by old VCF Regulations will continue to enjoy the pass through status;

(iii)    VCC/VCF will have to comply with the conditions stated in the Explanation. Shares of the VCC and Units of the VCF should not be listed on any recognised stock exchange. 2/3rd of the investible funds should be invested in unlisted equity shares or equity linked instruments of a VCU. Further, the VCC should not invest any funds in a VCU in which its directors and substantial shareholders (10% or more holding) hold more than 15% of paid-up equity share capital of the VCU. Similar conditions are provided for VCF also.

4.6    Section 10(48):

Under this section, any income received in India in Indian currency by a foreign company on account of sale of crude oil to any person in India is exempt from tax, subject to certain conditions. The scope of this exemption is now expanded w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 and it is now provided that this exemption can be claimed by a foreign company in respect of income from sale to any person in India of crude oil, any other goods or rendering of services as may be notified by the Central Government.

4.7    New Section 10(49):

This new Section is inserted in the Income -tax Act to provide for exemption from tax to any income of the National Financial Holding Company Ltd., a company set up by the Central Government on 07-06-2012. This exemption is granted for A.Y. 2013-14 and for subsequent years.

4.8    Recognised Provident Fund:

One of the conditions in Schedule IV – Proviso to Rule 3 of Part A is that a Provident Fund will be considered as recognised under the Income tax Act only if the establishment for which the Provident Fund is set up is also exempted u/s. 17 of the P.F. Act. The date for obtaining such exemption under the P.F. Act which expired on 31-03-2013 under Rule 3 has now been extended by amendment of Rule 3 to 31-03-2014.

4.9    Rajiv    Gandhi    Equity    Savings    Scheme (RGESS):    Section 80CCG:

At present, a resident individual, who is a first time retail investor, investing in listed equity shares under RGESS Scheme, is allowed a one time deduction of 50% of the eligible investment upto Rs. 50,000/- in the A.Y. 2013-14. Thus, the maximum deduction allowable under this section is Rs. 25,000/- if the gross total income of such individual does not exceed Rs. 10 lakh.

Now this section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 to provide as under:

(i)    Limit of gross total income of the individual is increased from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs 12 lakh.

(ii)    The scope of investment in eligible investment is extended to include listed units of an equity fund specified in RGESS. This includes investment in eligible shares, ETFs and Mutual Fund Units which has such eligible shares as the underlying assets.

(iii)    The deduction upto Rs. 25,000/- (50% of investment upto Rs. 50,000/-) will now be available for each of the 3 consecutive assessment years beginning with the year in which such investment was first made.

(iv)    There is a lock-in period of 3 years for such investment.

(v)    If the prescribed conditions of RGESS are violated, the deduction originally granted will be deemed to be the income of the year in which such violation takes place.

4.10 Contribution to Health Scheme: Section 80D:

At present deduction u/s. 80D can be claimed in respect of premium on Mediclaim Policy upto Rs. 15,000/- (Rs. 20,000/- for Senior Citizens) by an individual or an HUF. Such deduction is also allowable for any contribution made to the Central Government Health Scheme or for preventive health check-up subject to the above limit. By amendment of this section the above benefit is now extended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014 -15 to contribution to such other Health Schemes as may be notified by the Central Government.

4.11  Additional Deduction for Interest on Housing Loans: Section 80EE:

This is a new section inserted in the Income tax Act w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. Under this section, one time deduction upto Rs. 1,00,000/- will be allowed to an individual for interest paid on Housing Loan taken for acquiring a residential house. This deduction will be over and above the deduction allowed for interest paid for the housing loan u/s. 24(b) of the Income-tax Act. This deduction can be claimed subject to following conditions.

(i)    Housing Loan should be taken from a Bank, Financial Institution or a Housing Finance Company as defined in Section 80EE (5);

(ii)    Housing Loan should have been sanctioned between 01-04-2013 to 31-03-2014;

(iii)    Housing Loan sanctioned should not exceed Rs. 25 lakh;

(iv)    The value of the residential house should not exceed Rs. 40 lakh;

(v)    The individual claiming this deduction should not own any residential house on the date of sanction of the housing loan;

(vi)    If the interest payable on the above loan, in A.Y. 2014-15, is less than Rs. 1,00,000/-, the assessee can claim deduction for the balance amount paid in A.Y. 2015-16. In other words, deduction allowable for interest on the housing loan in the A.Y. 2014-15 and 2015-16 cannot exceed Rs. 1,00,000/-.

It may be noted that this deduction cannot be claimed by an HUF. Further, there is no condition that the residential house should be self occupied. The assessee can let out the residential house. It also appears that if a residential house is purchased by two or more co-owners, each co-owner can claim the deduction for interest under this section against his share of income from the joint property.

4.12 Donation u/s. 80G:

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. At present, donation to National Children’s Fund is eligible for deduction u/s. 80G at the rate of 50% of the amount of the donation. This section is now amended to provide that 100% of the donation to National Children’s Fund made on or after 01-04-2013 will be eligible for deduction u/s. 80G.

4.13 Donation to Political Parties: Sections 80GGB and 80GGC.

These two sections provide for deduction from gross total income of 100% of the amount donated by any company, individual, HUF, firm, LLP or other specified persons to recognised Political Parties or Electoral Trusts. Now, it is provided, by amendment of these sections, that no such deduction will be allowed if such donation is made in cash on or after 01-04-2013. It may be noted that in sections 80G and 80GGA donation to approved trusts can be made in cash upto Rs. 10,000/-. So far as Political Donations are concerned, it is now provided that no cash donations will be eligible for deduction under the above sections.

4.14 Power Sector undertakings: Deduction u/s. 80IA.

This section provides for deduction of income of certain undertakings. This includes undertaking which commences its business of generation and/or distribution, transmission or distribution of power, or substantial renovation and modernisation of the existing transmission or distribution lines on or before 31-03-2013. By amendment of this section, the above time limit for commencement of business by such an undertaking is extended upto 31-03-2014.

4.15 Additional deduction for wages paid to New Workmen: Section 80JJAA:

Under the existing section, deduction is allowed to an Indian Company of an additional amount equal to 30% of the wages paid to new regular workmen employed by the Company in an industrial undertaking engaged in the manufacture or production of an article or thing, subject to certain conditions specified in this section.

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 to provide as under:

(i)    Now the above deduction can be claimed by an Indian company only if it is deriving income from the manufacture of goods in a factory. For this purpose, the word “Factory” shall have the same meaning as in section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948;

(ii)    The new regular workmen should be employed by the company in such factory;

(iii)    This deduction can be claimed by the company in the year in which appointment is made and for two subsequent assessment years;

(iv)    Such deduction is not allowable to the company in case the factory is hived off, transferred from another existing entity or acquired as a result of an amalgamation.

5.    Income from Business or Profession:

5.1 Investment Allowance: New Section 32AC: This is a new section inserted in the Income tax Act w.e.f. A.Y. 2014- 15. The section provides for a one time deduction (Investment Allowance) to a company. This deduction can be claimed if the following conditions are complied with:

(i)    This deduction can be claimed by a company engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing.

(ii)    Such a company should acquire and install specified new asset between 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2015 for an aggregate cost exceeding Rs. 100 crore. If the specified new asset is acquired before 1-4-2013, this deduction cannot be claimed.

(iii)    The above deduction is allowable at the rate of 15% of the actual cost of the specified new asset acquired and installed during the accounting year 2013-14 (A.Y. 2014-15) if the actual cost of such asset exceeds Rs. 100 crore. If such actual cost is less than Rs. 100 crore no deduction will be allowed in A.Y. 2014-15.

(iv)The company can claim deduction of 15% of the actual cost of such new asset acquired and installed during accounting year 2014-15 (A.Y. 2015-16) if the aggregate cost of the new asset during the period 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2015 exceeds Rs. 100 crore.

  In other words, deduction of 15% can be claimed as under:

v)   The deduction allowed under this section will be over and above the normal depreciation and additional depreciation (20%) allowable u/s. 32(1)(ii) and (iia) on the above specified new assets.

(vi)   This being a special incentive for encouraging industrial companies which invest more than Rs. 100 crore in specified new assets, the amount of deduction allowed is not to be deducted from W.D.V. of the block of assets.

(vii)   Further, this deduction is not for depreciation and, therefore, for the purpose of carry forward of losses, it will form part of business loss and not “unabsorbed depreciation”.

(viii)   Since no provision for this deduction of 15% (investment allowance) is required to be made in the books of the company, deduction for this amount cannot be claimed for computation of Book Profits u/s. 115 JB.

(ix)   For the purpose of this section, specified new asset means new plant and machinery. This will not include (a) ship or aircraft, (b) second hand plant and machinery (whether imported or not), (c) plant and machinery installed in office premises or residential premises (including guest house), (d) office appliances, (including computers or computer software), (e) vehicles, and (f) plant and machinery in respect of which 100% deduction by way of depreciation or otherwise is allowed in any previous year.  It may be noted that intangible assets are not excluded from the definition of specified new asset.  Therefore, any intangible asset attached to a plant and machinery can be considered as a specified new asset.

(x)    It may be noted that this deduction will not be allowable to companies engaged in the business of hotel, hospital, road, bridge and other construction businesses.

(xi)  There is a lock-in period of 5 years for the above specified new assets.  If such asset is sold or transferred within 5 years of the date of installation, then the amount allowed as deduction in the earlier years will be taxable as profit or gain from business in the year of such sale or transfer.  This will be in addition to the taxability of capital gains (if any) arising on such sale or transfer of such assets.

(xii)  The above provision of lock-in period as stated in (xi) above, will not apply if the transfer of such asset is as a result of an amalgamation or a demerger.  However, the Amalgamated Company or the Resulting Company will have to ensure that such new asset is not sold or transferred by it within 5 years from the date of installation by the Amalgamating Company or the Demerged Company.

5.2 Deduction of Bad/Doubtful Debts to Indian Banks: Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) – (i) Under the existing provisions of section 36(1)(viia), banks and financial institutions, depending upon their categories, are entitled to claim deduction for provision for bad and doubtful debts made for Urban and Rural Branches at specified rates. Similarly, a bank/financial institution is also entitled to claim deduction for bad debts actually written off u/s. 36(1)(vii) to the extent it is in excess of the credit balance in Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts A/c made u/s. 36(1)(viia).  Some doubts had arisen about the interpretation of the provisions of these two sections.  In the case of Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd v/s CIT 343 ITR 270 the Supreme Court held that banks are entitled to full benefit of write off  bad debts, written off u/s. 36(1)(vii) in addition to the deduction for the provision for bad and doubtful debts made u/s. 36(1)(viia). It is also held that, in the case of rural advances, there will be no double deduction for provision made u/s. 36(1)(viia). The proviso to section 36(1)(vii) limits its application to the bank which has made such provision u/s.6(1)(viia). The provision of section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) and 36(2)(V) should be construed together.  Thus, they form a complete scheme for deduction and prescribe the extent to which deduction is available to banks.

(II)    For removal of doubts, section 36(1)(vii) has been amended from A.Y. 2014-15 by adding an Explanation that for the purpose of proviso to this section, the account referred to therein shall be only one account in respect of provision for doubtful debts u/s. 36(1)(viia). In other words, no distinction will be made for provision for urban and rural advances made u/s. 36(1)(viia). Therefore, in such cases, the amount of deduction in respect of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) shall be limited to the amount by which the same exceeds the credit balance of the provision made u/s. 36(1)(viia).

5.3 Commodities Transaction Tax (CTT):
Section 36(1) has been amended from A.Y. 2014-15 and it is now provided in section 36(1)(xvi) that the amount equal to CTT paid by the assessee in respect of the taxable commodities transactions entered by it in the course of its business will be allowed as its business expenditure.

5.4 Disallowance of certain payments by State Government Undertakings: Section 40(a)(iib) -This new clause has been added in section 40(a) from A.Y. 2014-15. Disputes had arisen in income tax assessments of some State Government Undertakings (SGU) as to whether any amount paid by SGU to the State Government by way of Royalty, Licence Fees, Service Fee, Privilege Fee, Service charges or any similar Fee/charge is deductible as business expenditure. It is now provided by this amendment that any such fee or charge which is levied exclusively on the SGU or is directly or indirectly appropriated from the SGU by the State Government will not be allowed as business expenditure to SGU. For this purpose, Explanation to the section defines SGU. (It includes a company in which the State Government has more than 50% of equity).

5.5  Commodity Derivative Transactions:
Section 43(5) – This section defines a “Speculative Transaction”. At present, it excludes from this definition certain transactions, including eligible transactions in respect of derivative transactions carried out in a recognised Stock Exchange. In view of introduction of MCX as a recognised association for commodities transactions, this section is now amended from A.Y. 2014-15 to provide that eligible transactions in Commodity Derivatives entered into through a recognised association will not be considered as speculative transactions.

5.6 Full value of consideration of Immovable Property held as Stock-in-Trade: New section 43CA

–    (i) This new section is inserted from A.Y. 2014-15. Therefore, it will apply to real estate transactions entered into on or after 1st April, 2013. U/s. 50C, in the case of transfer of an immovable property (land, building or both) which is held by the seller as a capital asset, if the consideration is less than the market value adopted (assessed or assessable) for the purpose of payment of stamp duty, such stamp duty valuation is considered as the full value of the consideration u/s. 50C. Thus, the capital gain in the hands of the seller is computed on that basis as provided u/s. 50C. This provision was not applicable to immovable property held by the seller as stock-in-trade.

(ii)    By introduction of this new section 43CA, it is now provided that the above concept of section 50C of adopting stamp duty valuation as full value of consideration will apply for computation of business income in the hands of seller who holds such property as stock-in-trade. The provisions of section 50C are made applicable w.e.f. 01-04-2013, to the extent applicable, to such transactions. This new provision will apply to Builders, Developers and Dealers engaged in real estate transactions. The provision will apply according to the method of accounting followed by the assessee. It may be noted that this new provision will not apply when the assessee makes a slump sale of the business as a going concern.

(iii)    It is also provided in this Section that if there is a time gap between the date of the agreement of sale and the date of registration. The full value of the consideration will be determined with reference to the stamp duty valuation assessable on the date of the agreement of sale provided that full or part of the consideration stated in the agreement was paid, otherwise than in cash.

(iv)    It may be noted that the definition of immovable property for the purpose of this section or section 50C does not include any right in the immovable property such as leasehold or tenancy right etc. If the assessee has booked a flat in a property under construction, the right to get possession of the flat is not covered under the section. However, when the property is constructed and the possession of the flat is taken, the section will apply with reference to the Agreement for sale when executed.

(v)    It may be noted that section 56(2)(vii)(b) has been amended as discussed in Para 6 below. Effect of this amendment is that w.e.f. 01-04-2013, in the case of a purchaser of an immovable property, if the difference between the stamp duty valuation and the actual consideration paid as per the agreement of sale is more than Rs. 50,000/-, such difference will be considered as “income from other sources” in the hands of such purchaser. However, this provision will not apply if the purchase is from a relative as defined in Explanation to section 56(2)(vii). From this provision, it will be noticed the difference between the stamp duty valuation and actual consideration will be taxable in the hands of the seller as well as the purchaser if such difference exceeds Rs. 50,000/-.

6.    Income from other sources
: Section 56(2)(vii)(b) – (i) This section is amended from A.Y. 2014-15. This section provides for levy of tax on certain gifts received from non-relatives. This amendment comes into force in respect of transactions relating to purchase of immovable property i.e. land, building or both made on or after 01-04-2013. Prior to 31-03-2013, if an immovable property was received by an Individual or HUF from a non-relative, without consideration, the market value (based on the stamp duty valuation) on the date of the gift, if it exceeds Rs. 50,000/-, was treated as income from other sources in the hands of the assessee. There is no change in this provision. However, it is now provided, w.e.f. 01-04-2013, that if the purchase of an immovable property by an Individual or HUF is made for consideration which is less than the stamp duty valuation assessed or assessable by the stamp duty authorities, the difference will be taxable as income in the hands of the purchaser. This provision will apply only if such difference is more than Rs. 50,000/-.

(ii)    It is now also provided by this amendment that if there is a time gap between the date of the agreement for purchase of the property and date of registration of the agreement, the stamp duty valuation assessable on the date of the agreement will be considered for this purpose. This concession will apply only if the full or part of the consideration stated in the agreement is paid by the purchaser by any mode other than cash before the date of registration.

(iii)    For this purpose, the term “Immovable Property” is defined to mean “Land, Building or Both”. This will mean that any right in the immovable property will not be covered by this provision. Therefore, any tenancy right, leasehold right or similar right will not be considered as Immovable Property. If a flat in a building under construction is booked by the individual or HUF, the right to get possession of the flat will not be considered as purchase of immovable property under this section. Therefore, the consideration paid for this right as per the agreement will not be covered by this section.

(iv)    If the stamp duty valuation is disputed, the provisions of section 50C for reference to Valuation
Officer will apply.

(v)    It may be noted that if the difference between the stamp duty valuation and actual consideration exceeds Rs. 50,000/- tax will be payable on such notional amount by the seller as well as the purchaser under the following sections:

(a)    In the case of the seller who is holding the immovable property as stock-in-trade as business income under new section 43CA – w.e.f. 01-04-2013.

(b)    In the case of the seller who is holding the property as a capital asset, as capital gain u/s. 50C.

(c)    In the case of Individual or HUF purchaser, under amended section 56(2)(vii)(b) – w.e.f. 01-04-2013 as income from other sources.

(vi)    It may be noted that in the hands of the individual or HUF, if such property is held as “Capital Asset”, then such an assessee will be entitled to claim that the stamp duty valuation of the property adopted for taxation u/s. 56(2)(vii)(b) should be deemed to be the cost of acquisition of such property. To this extent there will be some deferred benefit to such individual or HUF. This benefit is provided u/s. 49(4). This benefit will not be available to a person who purchases an immovable property and treats it as stock-in-trade of his business.

(vii)    It may be noted that amendment similar to what has been made, as stated above, in section 56(2)(vii)(b) was made in section 50(2)(vii)(b) by the Finance (no.2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 01-10-2009. When it was pointed out to the Government that such a provision is unjust as both the seller and the purchaser of the immovable property will have to pay tax on this same notional addition, it was realised by the Government and in the Finance Act, 2010, this provision for levying tax on the purchaser was deleted with retrospective effect from 01-10-2009. This year the same amendment is made to tax the purchaser w.e.f. 01-04-2013, which has the effect of levying tax on the seller as well as the purchaser on the same notional addition. No reasons are given in the Explanatory Statement issued with the Finance Bill, 2013, for reintroducing this provision.

7.    Buy-back of shares and Dividend Distribution Tax: Sections 10 (34A), 115-O, 115 QA to 115QC and 115R:

7.1 (i) At present, when a company buys back its shares from shareholders u/s. 77A of the Companies Act the shareholder is liable to pay tax u/s. 46A on the difference between the amount received from the company and the cost of acquisition of shares as provided u/s. 48 under the head “Capital Gains”. This provision will continue to apply in the case of shares which are listed if such buy back is not through a Recognised Stock Exchange.

(ii)    A new section 115QA is inserted w.e.f. 01-06-2013 which provides as under.

(a)    This section applies to buy back of shares which are not listed by a domestic company (whether public or private) u/s. 77A of the Companies Act on or after 01-06-2013.

(b)    The consideration paid by the company to its shareholders for such buy-back of shares will now be liable to additional tax in the hands of the company at the rate of 20% plus 10% surcharge on tax (i.e. 2%) and 3% Education Cess on the tax (i.e. 0.66%) (Aggregate 22.66%). This tax is to be paid on the amount of such consideration after deduction of the amount received on the issue of such shares.

(c)    The shareholder receiving this consideration on buy back of shares will not be liable to pay capital gains tax u/s. 46A as provided in the new section 10(34A) introduced w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15.

(d)    The above tax is to be deposited with the Government within 14 days of the payment of the consideration by the company to the shareholders.

(e)    No credit for such tax can be claimed by the shareholder or the company against any tax liability.

(f)    The above provision is on the same lines as Dividend Distribution Tax payable u/s. 115-0.

(iii)    New section 115QB is also inserted to provide that interest at the rate of 1% p.m. for each month or part of the month shall be payable for the delay in payment of tax as required u/s. 115QA. Further, under new section 115QC provision is made for considering the company as assessee in default if it does not comply with the provisions of section 115QA. These provisions are similar to existing sections 115P and 115Q.

(iv)    In section 115QA, it is stated that from the consideration paid by the company for buy-back of shares, the amount received on issue of shares should be deducted and the tax @ 20% is to be paid on this net amount. The question for consideration is as to how the amount received on issue of shares will be worked out in the following cases:

(a)    When shares are issued at a Premium.

(b)    When shares are issued as Bonus shares.

(c)    When shares are issued on conversion of debentures.

(d)    When shares are issued to employees at concessional rate under ESOP scheme.

(e)    When shares are issued at a discount or there is reduction in face value of shares to write off losses under a High Court Order.

(f)    When shares are issued on amalgamation or on demerger.

In all the above cases, it will not be possible to determine the exact amount received on the issue of a particular share which the shareholder has offered for buy-back. This practical difficulty will have to be resolved by the tax authorities by a issuing a clarification.

(v)    In the above scheme of taxation of the net consideration paid on buy-back of shares, it will be noticed that the tax is payable by the company. However, at present, the shareholder holding shares as a Capital Asset, is pays tax on such buy-back on the surplus, after the following deductions, under the head capital gains, at applicable rate.

(a)    Actual cost of shares or Indexed cost (if long term asset) is deductible from the consideration.

(b)    Set off of other capital loss or brought forward loss can be claimed against such capital gain.

(c)    Benefit of deduction u/s. 54EC or 54F is available if the consideration is invested in Bonds or purchase of a residential house.

Taking into consideration the above, it will be noticed that incidence of tax under the new section 115QA will be higher as compared to the present provisions. In the case of a person holding such shares as stock-in-trade he will not get benefit of deduction of actual cost or set off of business losses or set off of carried forward losses.

7.2 Section 115-0:
This section deals with Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) payable by a Domestic company on dividend distributed by it. Section 115-0 (1A) has now been amended w.e.f. 01- 06-2013 to provide that no DDT will be payable on the amount relatable to dividend received from a foreign subsidiary company on which tax is paid by the domestic company at 15% u/s 115 BBD.

7.3 Section 115R:
(i) This section deals with the payment of additional tax by a Mutual Fund (other than an equity oriented mutual fund) on the income distributed to the unit holders. This section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. Hitherto such additional tax payable in respect of income distribution to Individual or HUF unit holders (excluding Money Market Fund or liquid fund) was 12.5%. Now from 1-6-2013 such tax will be payable by Mutual Fund at the rate of 25%. This will mean that the amount to be distributed to such unit holders will be reduced.

(ii)    There is also an amendment in the section from 1-6-2013 to the effect that the rate of tax payable in the case of income distribution by an Infrastructure Debt Fund Scheme to a Non-Resident (including foreign company) unit holder shall be 5% only.

(iii)    Surcharge at the rate of 10% of tax and Education Cess at the rate of 3% of tax will also be payable on the above tax.

8.    Tax Residency Certificate for Non-Residents(TRC):  Sections 90 and 90A

(i)These two sections empower the Central Government to enter into Agreements with any foreign country, Specified Territory or certain specified/Notified Associations in Specified Territories for avoidance of double taxation (DTAA). The Finance Act, 2012, had amended section 90 by insertion of sub- section (2A) w.e.f. 01-04-2013 to provide that the provisions of new sections 95 to 102 dealing with General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR) will be applicable even if the provisions of DTAA are more favourable to the assessee. In other words, where GAAR is invoked the assessee cannot seek protection of beneficial provision of DTAA. Similar amendment was also made in section 90A.

(ii)    These two sections have now been amended to provide that section 90(2A) as well as 90A(2A) will now apply w.e.f. A.Y. 2016-17 because applicability of the provisions of sections 95 to 102 dealing with GAAR has now been postponed to A.Y. 2016-17.

(iii)    (a) In section 90(4) as well as 90A(4), last year an amendment was made to provide that a Non Resident cannot claim benefit of DTAA unless Tax Residency Certificate in the form prescribed is obtained from the foreign country/specified territory with which India has entered into DTAA. In this certificate, such Foreign Country/Territory was required to certify the place of residence and such other particulars which the Indian Tax Department may require to decide where the benefit claimed under a particular DTAA is available to the Non Resident assessee.

(b)    Some doubts were expressed about the effect of the amendment on the evidential value of TRC. Subsequently, the CBDT issued a press release clarifying the issue as under. “The Tax Residency Certificate produced by resident of contracting state will be accepted as evidence that he is a resident of that contracting state and the Income tax Authorities in India will not go behind the TRC and question his residential status.”

(c)    To give effect to the above assurance section 90(4) as well as 90A(4) have been amended and the requirements about the Tax Residency Certificate containing the prescribed particulars about the assessee being resident of the contracting foreign country/specified territory has now been removed with retrospective effect i.e. A.Y. 2013-14. After removal of the above requirements s/s. (5) has been added in section 90 as well as 90A to provide that the Non-Resident which has obtained TRC from the foreign country/specified territory shall provide such other documents and information as may be prescribed. This amendment is made w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14.

9.    Taxation of Non-Residents: Sections 115A and 115AD

9.1 Section 115A: This section deals with tax on Dividends, Royalty and Technical Service Fees in the case of a Non-Resident. This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 as under :

(i)    It is now provided that the tax on interest referred to in section 194LD from Rupee Denominated Bonds of Indian Company as discussed in para 3.3 above will be payable @ 5% plus applicable surcharge and the Education Cess.

(ii)    Under the existing section 115A(i)(b), the rate of tax on Royalty and Fees for Technical services is 10%. With effect from 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2014-15) that rate is increased to 25% plus applicable surcharge and the Education Cess.

9.2 Section 115AD : This section deals with taxation of Foreign Institutional Investors. By an amendment of this section, w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15, it is now provided that the tax on interest referred to in section 194LD from Rupee Denominated Bonds of an Indian company, as discussed in para 3.3 above, will be payable @ 5% plus applicable surcharge and the Education Cess.

10.    General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR)

10.1 This was a new concept introduced in the Income tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. Very wide powers were given to the tax authorities by these provisions. In new Chapter X–A, sections 95 to 102 were inserted. In para 154 of the Budget Speech, while introducing the Finance Bill, 2012, the Finance Minister had stated that “I propose to introduce a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) in order to counter aggressive tax avoidance schemes, while ensuring that it is used only in appropriate cases, enabling review by a GAAR panel.”

10.2 The reasons for introducing GAAR provisions in the Income tax Act were explained in the Explanatory Notes attached to the Finance Bill, 2012 as under:

“The question of substance over form has consistently arisen in the implementation of taxation laws. In the Indian context, judicial decisions have varied. While some courts in certain circumstances had held that legal form of transactions can be dispensed with and the real substance of the transaction can be considered while applying the taxation laws, others have held that the form is to be given sanctity. The existence of anti-avoidance principles are based on various judicial pronouncements. There are some specific anti-avoidance provisions but general anti-avoidance has been dealt only through judicial decisions in specific cases.

In an environment of moderate rate of tax, it is necessary that the correct tax base be subject to tax in the face of aggressive tax planning and use of opaque law tax jurisdictions for residence as well as for sourcing capital. Most countries have codified the “substance over form” doctrine in the form of General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR).

In the above background and keeping in view of the aggressive tax planning with the use of sophisticated structures, there is a need for statutory provisions so as to codify the doctrine of “substance over form” where the real intention of the parties and effect of transaction and purpose of an arrangement is taken into account for determining the tax consequences, irrespective of the legal structure that has been superimposed to camouflage the real intent and purpose. Internationally several countries have introduced, and are administering statutory General Anti Avoidance Provisions. It is, therefore, important that Indian taxation law also incorporates a statutory General Anti Avoidance Provisions to deal with aggressive tax planning. The basic criticism of statutory GAAR which is raised worldwide is that it provides a wide discretion and authority to the tax administration which at times is prone to be misused. This vital aspect, therefore, needs to be kept in mind while formulating any GAAR regime.”

10.3 There was large scale opposition to the introduction of this provision in the form suggested in the Finance Bill, 2012, and the DTC Bill, 2010, pending consideration of the Parliament. This opposition was voiced by various Trade and Industry bodies in India and abroad. The Finance Minister responded to the various suggestions made by members of the Parliament and various Trade and Industry bodies while replying to the debate in the Parliament on 7th May 2012, in the following words.

“Certain provisions relating to a General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) have also been proposed in the Finance Bill, 2012. After examining the recommendations of the Standing Committee on GAAR provisions in the DTC Bill, 2010, I propose to amend the GAAR provisions as follows:

(i)    Remove the onus of proof entirely from the tax payer to the Revenue Department before any action can be initiated under GAAR.

(ii)    Introduce an independent member in the GAAR approving panel to ensure objectivity and transparency. One member of the panel now would be an officer of the level of Joint Secretary or above from the Ministry of Law.

(iii)    Provide that any tax payer (resident or non-resident) can approach the Authority for Advances Ruling (AAR) for a ruling as to whether an arrangement to be undertaken by the assessee is permissible or not under the GAAR provisions.

To provide greater clarity and certainty in the matters relating to GAAR, a Committee has been constituted under the Chairmanship of the Director General of Income Tax (International Taxation) to give recommendations for formulating the rules and guidelines for implementation of the GAAR provisions and to suggest safeguards so that these provisions are not applied indiscriminately. The Committee has already held several rounds of discussion with various stakeholders including the Foreign Institutional Investors. The Committee will submit its recommendations by 31st May, 2012.

To provide more time to both tax payers and the tax administration to address all related issues. I propose to defer the applicability of the GAAR provisions by one year. The GAAR provisions will now apply to Income of Financial Year 2013-14 and subsequent years.”

10.4 For the reasons stated above, special provisions relating to GAAR were made in sections 95 to 102 in the Income tax Act from A.Y. 2014-15 (Accounting Year ending 31-3- 2014) and onwards. These provisions applied to all assesses (Residents or Non-Residents) in respect of their transactions in India as well as abroad. Wide powers were given to the tax authorities to disregard any agreement, arrangement or any claim for expenditure, deduction or relief.

10.5 The GAAR provisions contained in sections 95 to 102 (chapter X-A) and in section 144-BA which were introduced by the Finance Act, 2012, w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 have now been withdrawn and replaced by another set of provisions in new chapter X-A (sections 95 to 102) and new section 144-BA by the Finance Act, 2013, w.e.f. A.Y. 2016-17 (Accounting year 01-04-2015 to 31-03-2016).

10.6 In para 150 of the Budget Speech while introducing the Finance Bill, 2013, the Finance Minister has stated as under:

“150. Hon’ble Members are aware that the Finance Act, 2012 introduced the General Anti Avoidance Rules, for short, GAAR. A number of representations were received against the new provisions. An expert committee was constituted to consult stakeholders and finalise the GAAR guidelines. After careful consideration of the report, Government announced certain decisions on 14-01-2013 which were widely welcomed. I propose to incorporate those decisions in the Income tax Act. The modified provisions preserve the basic thrust and purpose of GAAR. Impermissible tax avoidance arrangements will be subjected to tax after a determination is made through a well laid out procedure involving an assessing officer and an Approving Panel headed by the Judge. I propose to bring the modified provisions into effect from 01-04-2016.”

10.7 In the Explanatory Statement presented with the Finance Bill, 2013, the reasons for introducing the new provisions are explained as under:

“The General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was introduced in the Income tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. The substantive provisions relating to GAAR are contained in Chapter X-A (consisting of section 95 to 102) of the Income tax Act. The procedural provisions relating to mechanism for invocation of GAAR and passing of the assessment order in consequence thereof are contained to section 144 BA. The provisions of Chapter X-A as well as section 144 BA would have come into force with effect from 1st April, 2014.

A number of representations were received against the provisions relating to GAAR. An Expert Committee was constituted by the Government with broad terms of reference including consultation with stakeholders and finalizing the GAAR guidelines and a road map for implementation. The Expert Committee’s recommendations included suggestions for legislative amendments, formulation of rules and prescribing guidelines for implementations of GAAR. The major recommendations of the Expert Committee have been accepted by the Government, with some modifications. Some of the recommendations accepted by the Government require amendment in the provisions of Chapter X-A and section 144 BA.”

GaarProvisions

10.8 In view of the above discussion, the existing sections 95 to 102 and 144BA have been now deleted. New set of Sections 95 to 102 and 144BA have been inserted in the Income tax Act w.e.f. F.Y.: 2015-16 (A.Y. 2016-17). These new provisions are discussed below broadly.

10.9 Section 95 :
This section provides that an arrangement entered into by an assessee may be declared to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The tax arising from such declaration by the tax authorities, will be determined subject to provisions of sections 96 to 102. It is also stated in this section that the provisions of sections 96 to 102 may be applied to any step or a part of the arrangement as they are applicable to the entire arrangement.

10.10 Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (Section 96) :

(i)    Section 96 explains the meaning of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement to mean an arrangement, the main purpose of which is to obtain a tax benefit and it –

(a)    Creates rights or obligations which would not ordinarily be created between persons dealing at arm’s length.

(b)    Results, directly or indirectly, in misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

(c)    Lacks commercial substance, or is deemed to lack commercial substance u/s. 97, in whole or in part, or

(d)    is entered into or carried out, by means, or in a manner, which are not ordinarily employed for bonafide purposes.

(ii)    An arrangement whereby there is any tax benefit to the assessee shall be presumed to have been entered into or carried out for the main purpose of obtaining tax benefits, unless the assessee proved otherwise. It will be noticed that this was a very heavy burden cast on the assessee. The Finance Minister has, however, declared on 07-05-2012 that the onus of proof will be on the department who has to establish that the arrangement is to avoid tax before initiating the proceedings under these provisions.

10.11 Lack of Commercial Substance (Section 97) :

(i)    Section 97 explains the concept of Lack of Commercial Substance in an arrangement entered into by the assessee. It states that an arrangement shall be deemed to lack commercial substance if:

(a)    The substance or effect of the arrangement, as a whole, is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the form of its individual steps or a part of such steps; or

(b)    It involves or includes:

–    Round Trip Financing
–    An accommodating party.
–    Elements that have the effect of offsetting Or cancelling each other; or
–    A transaction which is conducted through one or more persons and disguises the value, location, source, ownership or control of funds which is the subject matter of such transaction.

(ii)    It involves the location of an asset or a transaction or the place of residence of any party which is without any substantial commercial purpose. In other words, the particular location is disclosed only to obtain tax benefit for a party, or

(iii)    It does not have a significant effect upon the business risks or net cash flows of any party to the arrangement apart from any effect attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained.

(iv)    For the above purpose, it is provided that round trip financing includes any arrangement in which through a series of transactions –

(a)    Funds are transferred among the parties to the arrangement, and,

(b)    Such transactions do not have any substantial commercial purpose other than obtaining tax benefit.

(iii)    It is further stated that the above view will be taken by the tax authorities without having regard to the following:

(a)    Whether or not the funds involved in the round trip financing can be traced to any funds transferred to, or received by, any party in connection with the arrangement.

(b)    The time or sequence in which the funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received, or

(c)    The means by, manner in, or mode through which funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received.

(iv)    The party to such an arrangement shall be treated as “Accommodating Party” whether or not such party is connected with the other parties to the arrangement, if the main purpose of, direct or indirect tax benefit under the Income tax Act.

(v)    It is clarified in the section that the following factors may be relevant but shall not be sufficient for determining whether the arrangement lacks commercial substance.

(a)    The period or the time for which the arrangement exists

(b)The fact of payment of taxes, directly or indirectly, under the arrangement.

(c)    The fact that an exit route, including transfer of any activity, business or operations, is provided by the arrangement.

10.12 Consequence of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (Section 98) :

Under the newly inserted section 144BA, the Commissioner has been empowered to declare any arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement. Section 98 states that if an arrangement is declared as impermissible, then the consequences, in relation to tax or the arrangement shall be determined in such manner as is deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case. This will include denial of tax benefit or any benefit under applicable DTAA. The following is the illustrative list of consequences and it is provided that the same will not be limited to the list.

(i)    Disregarding, combining or re-characterising any step in, or part or whole of the impermissible avoidance arrangement;

(ii)    Treating, the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been entered into or carried out;

(iii)    Disregarding any accommodating party or treating any accommodating party and any other party as one and the same person;

(iv)    Deeming persons who are connected persons in relation to each other to be one and the same person;

(v)    Re-allocating between the parties to the arrangement, (a) any accrual or receipt of a capital or revenue nature or (b) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate;

(vi)    Treating (a) the place of residence of any party to the arrangement or (b) situs of an asset or of a transaction at a place other than the place or location of the transaction stated under the arrangement.

(vii)    Considering or looking through any arrangement by disregarding any corporate structure.

(viii)    It is also clarified that for the above purpose that tax authorities may re-characterise (a) any equity into debt or any debt into equity, (b) any accrual or receipt of Capital nature may be treated as of revenue nature or vice versa or (c) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate may be recharacterised.

10.13 Section 99 : This section provides for treatment of connected persons and accommodating party.

The section provides that for the purposes of sections 95 to 102, for determining whether a tax benefit exists –

(i)    The parties who are connected persons, in relation to each other, may be treated as one and same person.

(ii)    Any accommodating party may be disregarded.

(iii)    Such accommodating party and any other party may be treated as one and same person.

(iv)    The arrangement may be considered or looked through by disregarding any corporate structure.

10.14 It is further provided in section 100 that the provisions of sections 95 to 102 shall apply in addition to, or in lieu of, any other basis for determination of tax liability. Section 101 gives power to CBDT to prescribe the guidelines and lay down conditions for application of sections 95 to 102 relating to General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR). Let us hope that these guidelines will specify the type of arrangements and transactions in relation to which alone the tax authorities have to invoke the provision of GAAR. Further, it is necessary to specify that if the tax benefit sought to be obtained by any arrangement is, say Rs. 5 crore or more in a year, then only the tax authorities will invoke these powers.

10.15 Section 102 : This section defines words or expressions used in sections 95 to 102 as stated above. Some of these definitions are as under:

(i)    “Arrangement” means any step in, a part or whole of any transaction, operations, scheme, agreement or understanding, whether enforceable or not, and includes the alienation of any property in such transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding.

(ii)    “Connected Person”, in relation to a person who is an Individual, Company, HUF, Firm, LLP, AOP or BOI is defined in more or less the same manner as the term “Related Person” is defined in section 40A(2). It may be noted that, for this purpose, the definition of the word “Relative” is wider in as much as the definition of “Relative” given in Explanation to section 56(2)(vi) is adopted, whereas in section 40A(2) the narrower definition of “Relative” given in section 2(41) is adopted.

(iii)    “Fund” includes (a) any cash, (b) cash equivalents and (c) any right or obligation to receive or pay in cash or cash equivalent.

(iv)    “Party” means any person, including Permanent Establishment which participates or takes part in an arrangement.

(v)    “Relative” has the same meaning as given in section 56(2)(vi) – Explanation. It may be noted that this definition is very wide as compared to the definition given in section 2 (41) which is adopted for the purpose of explaining related person in section 40 A (2).

(vi)    The definition of a person having substantial interest in the company and other non-corporate bodies is the same as given in section 40A (2).

(vii)    “Tax Benefit” includes (a) a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under the Income tax Act, (b) an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under the Act, (c) a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount that would be payable under the Act, as a result of tax treaty, (d) an increase in a refund of tax or other amounts under the Act as a result of tax treaty, (e) a reduction in total income or (f) increase in loss in the relevant accounting year or any other accounting year.

(viii)    “Tax Treaty” means Agreements entered into by the Government with any foreign country, territory or Association u/s. 90 or 90A.

10.16 Section 144 BA : Procedure for declaring an arrangement as impressible u/s. 95 to 102 is given in this section. This section will come into force from A.Y. 2016-17.

(i)    The Assessing Officer can, at any stage of assessment or reassessment, make a reference to the Commissioner for invoking GAAR. On receipt of reference the Commissioner has to hear the tax payer. If he is not satisfied by the submissions of the taxpayer and is of the opinion that GAAR provisions are to be invoked, he has to refer the matter to an “Approving Panel”. In case the assessee does not object or reply, the Commissioner can issue such directions as he deems fit in respect of declaration as to whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement or not.

(ii)    The Approving Panel has to dispose of the reference within a period of six months from the end of the month in which the reference was received from the Commissioner.

(iii)    The Approving Panel can either declare an arrangement to be impermissible or declare it not to be so after examining material and getting further inquiry to be made. It can issue such directions as it thinks fit. It can also decide the year or years for which such an arrangement will considered as impermissible. It has to give hearing to the assessee before taking any decision in the matter.

(iv)    The Assessing Officer (AO) can determine consequences of such a positive declaration of arrangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement.

(v)    The final order, in case any consequences of GAAR are determined, shall be passed by the AO only after approval by Commissioner and, thereafter, first appeal against such order shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal.

(vi)    The period taken by the proceedings before Commissioner and the Approving Panel shall be excluded from time limitation for completion of assessment.

(vii)    The Central Government has to constitute one or more Approving Panels. Each Panel shall consist of 3 members, including a chairperson. The constitution of the Panel shall be as under.

(a)    Chairperson – He shall be a sitting or retired judge of a High Court.

(b)    Members – One member shall be IRS of the rank of CCIT or above.

–    One member shall be an academic or scholar having special knowledge of matters such as direct taxes, business accounts and international trade practices.

The term of the Panel shall ordinarily be for one year and may be extended from time to time upto 3 years. The Panel shall have power similar to those vested in AAR u/s. 245U. CBDT has to provide office infrastructure, manpower and other facilities to the Approving Panel’s members. The remuneration payable to Panel members shall be decided by the Central Government.

(viii)    In addition to the above, it is provided that the CBDT has to prescribe a scheme for efficient functioning of the Approving Panel and expeditious disposal of the references made to it.

(ix)    Appeal against order of assessment passed under the GAAR provisions, after approval by the appropriate authority, is to be filed directly with the ITA Tribunal and not before CIT(A). Section 144C relating to reference before DRT does not apply to such assessment order and, therefore, no reference can be made to DRT when GAAR provisions are invoked.

10.17 The above GAAR provisions will have far reaching consequences for assessees engaged in the business with Indian or Foreign parties. GAAR is not restricted to only business transactions. Therefore, all assessees who are engaged in business or profession or who have no income from business or profession will be affected by these provisions. It appears that any assessee having any arrangement, agreement, or transaction with a connected person will have to take care that the same is at Arm’s Length Consideration. In particular, an assessee will have to consider the implications of GAAR while (a) executing a WILL or Trust, (b) entering into a partnership or forming an LLP, (c) taking controlling interest in a company, (f) entering into amalgamation of two or more companies, (c) effecting demerger of a company, (f) entering into a consortium or joint venture, (g) entering into foreign collaboration, or (h) acquiring an Indian or Foreign company. It may be noted that this is only an illustrative list and there may be other transactions which may attract GAAR provisions.

10.18 From the wording of the above provisions of sections 95 to 102 and 144BA it appears that the provisions of GAAR can be invoked even in respect of an arrangement made prior to 01-04-2015. The CIT or the Approving Panel can hold any such arrangement entered into prior to 01-04-2015 as impermissible and direct the AO to make adjustments in the computation of income or tax in the assessment year 2016-17 or any year thereafter. As stated in para 15.15 of the report of the Standing Committee on Finance on the DTC Bill, 2010 it would be fair to apply GAAR provisions prospectively so that it is not made applicable to existing arrangements/transactions. Even in the Press Note issued by the Central Government on 14-01-2013 it was stated that transactions entered into prior to 30-08-2010 will not made subject to GAAR provisions. This has not been provided in the above sections and, therefore, the above GAAR provisions will have a retrospective effect.

10.19 In section 101, it is stated that CBDT will issue guidelines to provide for the circumstances under which GAAR should be invoked. Let us hope that these guidelines will specify that GAAR provisions will apply to all arrangements or transactions entered into after 01-04-2015 and also the type of arrangements or transactions to which GAAR will apply. It is also necessary to specify that GAAR provisions will be invoked only if the tax sought to be avoided is more than Rs. 5 crore, in any one year. This is also suggested by the Standing Committee on Finance in their report on the DTC Bill, 2010. Even in the Press Note dated 14-01-2013, the Government had stated that there will be monetary threshold of Rs. 3 crore of tax benefit in a year for invocation of GAAR.

10.20 It may be noted that the above revised set of provisions for invoking of GAAR which will come into force on 01-04-2015 do not contain provisions relating to following decisions of the Government announced in the Government Press Note dated 14-1-2013.

(i)    GAAR will not apply to an FII which does not avail treaty benefit.

(ii)    GAAR will not apply to Non-Resident Investors in FII.

(iii)    Where GAAR and SAAR are both in force, only one of them will apply subject to prescribed guidelines.

(iv)    GAAR will be restricted to only “PART” of the arrangement which is impermissible and not to the whole arrangement.

Let us hope that these issues will be considered when CBDT issues the Guidelines for invocation of GAAR.

11.    Assessments, Reassessments and Appeals:

11.1 Section 132B : This section, which deals with application of seized or requisioned assets, is amended w.e.f. 01 -06-2013. This section provides that the “existing liability” under the Income tax Act, Wealth tax Act, etc. and the amount of liability determined on completion of assessment under 153A and the assessment of the year relevant to the previous year in which search is initiated or requisition is made, or the amount of liability determined on completion of assessment for the block period (including any penalty levied or interest payable in connection with such assessment) may be recovered out of assets seized u/s. 132 or requisitioned u/s. 132A if such person is in default or is deemed to be in default. It was debatable as to whether the assets seized or requisitioned could be adjusted against advance tax payable. With effect from 01-06-2013, an Explanation 2 is inserted to this section to provide that the “existing liability” does not include advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

11.2 Section 139(9) :
This section explains when the return of income filed by the assessee u/s. 139 will be considered as defective. If these defects are not removed within the prescribed time, the A.O. will consider that the assessee has not filed the return. This section is now amended w.e.f. 01- 06- 2013. As per section 140A of the Act tax payable on the basis of return of income i.e. self assessment tax, along with interest payable, if any, is required to be paid by the assessee before furnishing the return of income. With effect from 1st June, 2013, non-payment of self assessment tax together with interest, if any, payable in accordance with the provisions of section 140A, before furnishing the return of income, shall make the return of income a defective return. This defect will have to be rectified on receipt of defect notice u/s. 139(9) within the prescribed time.

11.3 Section 142(2A) :
This section empowers the CIT to order a Special Tax Audit of Accounts of the assessee in specified circumstances. At present, order for such audit can be passed having regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts of the assessee and taking into consideration the interest of the revenue. The scope of this section is now expanded w.e.f. 01-06-2013. By amendment of this section such order for Special Audit can be passed by the CIT having regard to –

(i)    Volume of the accounts,

(ii)    Doubts about the correctness of the accounts,

(iii)    Multiplicity of transactions in the accounts and

(iv)    Specialised nature of business activity of the assessee.

This new provision will cover a large number of assessees and although the accounts of large companies are audited by Statutory Auditors as well as Tax Auditors, they can be subjected to this Special Audit.

It may be noted that the CIT has to fix fees of the Chartered Accountant for such special audit on the basis of guidelines contained in Rule 14B and the same is payable by the Central Government.

11.4 Section 153 : This section deals with the time limit for the completion of Assessments and Reassessments. Some issues were arising in computation of this time limit. To resolve these issues the following amendments are made in this section with effect from different dates as stated below.

(i)    If income of the assessee was first assessable in A.Y. 2009-10 or any subsequent year, and the matter is referred to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) u/s. 92 CA, the time limit for completion of assessment will be 3 years from the end of the assessment year instead of 2 years. This amendment is effective from 01-07-2012.

(ii)    In the case of reassessment where notice u/s. 148 is issued on or after 1-4-2010 and the case is referred to TPO u/s. 92CA, the time limit for completion of reassessment will be two years instead of 1 year. This is effective from 01-07-2012.

(iii)    Where order of ITA Tribunal is received by CIT or where CIT has passed order u/s. 263 or 264 on or after 01-04-2010, and while passing the fresh assessment order, a reference is made to TPO u/s. 92CA, the time limit for completion of the fresh assessment will be two years instead of 1 year. This is effective from 01-07-2012.

(iv)    Explanation 1(iii) to this section is amended from 01-06-2013. At present, in computing time limit for completion of assessment in a case in which AO has issued direction for special Audit u/s. 142(2A), the period from the date on which such direction is issued to the date on which the assessee is required to furnish report of the special Audit is to be excluded. It is now provided that, if the above direction is challenged in any court, the period upto the date on which such order is set aside by the court will also be excluded.

(v)    Explanation 1(viii) to this section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. It is now provided that while computing the time limit for completion of assessment the time taken for obtaining information from a foreign country/territory of foreign specified Association u/s. 90 or 90A will be excluded. This will be subject to a maximum of one year.

(vi)    A new clause (ix) is added to Explanation 1 to the above section, effective from 01-04-2016. This relates to GAAR provisions as discussed in para 10 above. It is provided in this clause that the period from the date on which reference for declaration of an arrangement to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement is received by CIT u/s. 144BA and the date when direction from the CIT or the Approving Panel is received by the A.O. will be excluded for computing the period for completion of the assessment.

11.5 Section 153B : This section provides for time limit for completion of assessment in cases of Search and Seizure u/s. 153A. The section is amended from 01-07-2012, 01-04-2013 and from 01-04-2016 as stated in para 11.4 above. These amendments for computation of time limit for completion of the assessment or the reassessment are on the same lines as amendments in section 153 discussed in para 11.4 above.

11.6 Section 153D : This section provides for prior approval for assessment in cases of search or Requisition. This section is amended w.e.f. 01-04-2016. It is now provided that in cases of assessments or reassessments in respect of any of the years mentioned in section 153(1)(b) or the assessment year referred to in section 153B(1)(b), where the Assessing Officer has made a reference to the Commissioner to declare an arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement and to determine the consequence of such an arrangement within the meaning of Chapter X- A, dealing with GAAR, the Assessing Officer shall pass the order of assessment or reassessment with the prior approval of the Commissioner. In such cases, the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner shall not be required.

11.7 Sections 167C and 179 : These sections deal with recovery of taxes due from partners of an LLP in liquidation and directors of a private limited company in liquidation respectively. These sections are amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. Section 167C allows recovery from the partners of any tax due from an LLP in certain cases. Similarly, section 179 allows recovery from the directors of any tax due from a private company in certain cases. In certain decisions [e.g. Dinesh T. Tailor vs. TRO 326 ITR 85 (Bom.)] it has been held that the “Tax due” will not comprehend within its ambit a penalty or interest. Now, an Explanation is added to both these sections to provide that the expression “Tax due” shall include penalty, interest or any other sum payable under the Act. It would, therefore, be possible for tax authorities to recover not only the tax but also the penalty and the interest dues of an LLP or private company from its partners or directors respectively.

11.8 Sections 245N and 245R :(i) Section 245N(a) defines “Advance Ruling”. In view of the amendments relating to GAAR as discussed in para 10 above, section 245N(a)(iv) has been amended w.e.f. 01-04-2015 (A.Y.: 2016-17). It provides that a Non-Resident can obtain Advance Ruling under XIX-B in respect of determination or decision by Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) whether an arrangement, which is proposed to be undertaken by a Resident or Non-Resident, is an impermissible avoidance arrangement as referred to in GAAR provisions. Consequential amendment is made in section 245N(b) also.

(ii)    Section 245R is also amended effective 01-04-2015 to provide that AAR will not allow an application where it finds that the transaction is designed prime facie as arrangement which is impermissible avoidance arrangement.

11.9 Section 246A:
This section provides for appeal to CIT(A). Clauses (1)(a)(b)(ba) and (c) of section 246A have been amended w.e.f. 01-04-2016 to provide that an assessment or reassessment order passed u/s. 143(3), 147 or 153A with the approval of CIT u/s. 144BA(12) or any order passed u/s. 154 or 155 in relation to such an order shall not be appealable before CIT(A). In all such cases, direct appeal before ITA Tribunal can be filed.

11.10 Section 252: This section deals with the constitution and appointment of the ITA Tribunal Members. This section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. After this amendment, it is provided that the Central Government shall appoint a President of ITA Tribunal out of the following persons.

(i)    A sitting or retired High Court Judge who has completed 7 years or more of service as such High
Court Judge.

(ii)    Senior Vice President or one of the Vice Presidents of ITA Tribunal.

11.11 Section 253:
This section provides for the list of orders against which appeal can be filed before the ITA Tribunal. Effective from A.Y. 2016 -17, it is now provided that such appeal can be filed directly before the ITA Tribunal against an assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) in regular case, in reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 or in search proceedings u/s. 153A with the approval of CIT u/s. 144BA. Even orders passed u/s. 154 or 155 to rectify mistakes in such proceedings u/s. 144BA will be subject to such appeals before ITA Tribunal u/s. 253.

11.12 Section 271FA: This section provides for levy of penalty for failure to furnish “Annual Information Return” (AIR). This section is amended effective from 01-04-2013 (A.Y. 2014-15). As per the existing provisions, in case of failure in furnishing AIR a penalty of Rs. 100 is leviable for each of day of default after the prescribed date. i.e. 31st August. If the Income tax authority issues notice requiring any person, who has failed to furnish an AIR to submit such return and such person does not furnish such return within the time provided in the notice then the enhanced penalty of Rs. 500 per day is now leviable for the period of such default after the expiry of time provided to furnish the return in the notice issued by AO.

12.    Wealth tax act :

12.1 Section 2(ea): Explanation 1(b) defines “Urban land”. The existing definition is modified w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 in such a manner that Urban Land within the area as stated in the amended section 2(1A) of the Income tax Act (as discussed in para 4.1 above) will be included in the definition of Urban Land.

The Finance Minister has stated in his speech while replying to Budget discussion that no wealth tax will be levied on Agricultural Land as at present.

12.2 Sections 14A, 14B and 46 : These sections are amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. So far provision for electronic filing of returns are applicable to returns filed under the Income tax Act.p Now, sections 14A, 14B & 46 of WT Act are inserted to facilitate electronic filing of annexure – less return of net wealth. Under these provisions, rules will be made for the following:

(i)    The class of person who shall be required to furnish the return electronically.

(ii)    The form and manner in which returns can be filed electronically.

(iii)    The computer resource or the electronic record to which the return may be transmitted electronically.

(iv)    The exemption from furnishing the documents, statements, reports, etc. along with the return filed in an electronic form.

13.    Commodities transaction tax (ctt)

(i)    The Finance Act, 2013 has introduced a new tax called Commodities Transaction Tax (CTT) to be levied on Taxable Commodities Transactions entered into in a recognised association. A transaction of sale of commodity derivatives in respect of commodities, other than agricultural commodities, traded in recognised associations is considered as Taxable Commodities Transaction.

(ii)    CTT is leviable on sale of Commodities Derivatives at the rate of 0.01 per cent and the same is payable by the seller.

(iii)    Section 36 of the Income-tax Act is amended to provide that CTT paid in the course of business shall be allowable as deduction if the income arising from such taxable commodities transactions is included in the income computed under the head “Profits and gains of business of profession”.

(iv)    This tax is to be levied from the date on which Chapter VII of the Finance Act, 2013 relating to CTT comes in to force by way of notification by the Central Government.

(v)    Sections 105 to 124 (Chapter VII) of the Finance Act, 2013, make detailed provisions for the levy of CTT, collection, filing of returns, assessments, appeals, rectifications, penalties etc. on the same lines as chapter VII of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 relating to STT.

14.    Securities Transactions Tax (stt)

With effect from 1st June, 2013, the rates of STT have been revised as under:

15.    General Observations:

15.1 This year’s budget being the last effective budget of the present Government can be considered as a soft budget. The provisions relating to GAAR which were to come into force from the current year have been postponed by two years. The provisions relating to the constitution of the Approving Panel and resolution of GAAR disputes have been strengthened. However, unless the mindset of the persons administering these provisions is changed, the tax payers will have to face hardships and they will face unending litigation. For implementing such complex provisions, the tax authorities have to implement these provisions by taking into consideration the ground realities of business and industry in our country. In implementing such provisions the tax authorities should not only consider the letter of the law but should consider the spirit behind this legislation. For this purpose, the CBDT will have to consider the business realities while framing the tax payer friendly guidelines for implementing these provisions.

15.2 As stated above, the Finance Minister has addressed the issue relating to GAAR to some extent. However, the provisions relating to taxation of Non-Residents introduced last year with retrospective effect have not been addressed. These provisions have affected our relationship with many foreign countries. This will affect our global trade in the long term. Disputes have arisen in some cases of large Multinationals and the Government is trying to resolve these disputes by enactment of separate legislation. When the Government has recognised that these disputes have arisen due to these retrospective amendments, it should have amended these provisions and given them only prospective effect.

15.3 One disturbing feature relates to the amendments made this year relating to TDS from consideration paid or payable on purchase of an Immovable Property under new section 194-IA. This will put tax payers and those who are not liable to pay tax into many practical difficulties of collecting 1% tax at source, depositing the same with the Government and filing return of TDS. There will be some issues relating to the date on which such tax is to be deducted when a flat is booked prior to 01-06-2013 or after that date in a building under construction and payments are made in instalments.

15.4 Amendment made in section 56(2)(vii)(b) levying tax on the notional amount of difference between stamp duty valuation of an immovable property sold and the actual consideration paid by an Individual or HUF (Purchaser). This will mean levying tax on the same notional amount in the hands of the seller as well as purchaser. It may be noted that such tax is not payable if the purchaser is a firm, LLP, company or persons other than individual or HUF. Similar tax was levied in 2009 but was withdrawn in 2010 with retrospective effect. It is unfortunate that the Government has again levied this type of tax which is payable by individual/HUF purchaser and seller of the property on the same notional amount. This is a very harsh and unjust provision in the Income-tax Act.

15.5 Provision made last year, effective from 01-04-2012 relating to “Specified Domestic Transactions” has increased the compliance cost of assessees. Transfer Pricing provisions have been made applicable to some domestic transactions. Although one year has passed since these provisions have come into force, there is no clarity about the type of transactions to which these provision will apply. No adequate data about comparable prices is available. In particular, there is no clarity as to how the assessing officers will compare the managerial remuneration paid to connected persons while making disallowance u/s. 40A(2). CBDT has not framed any separate Rule prescribing the information or documents required to be maintained by the assessee to whom this provision is applicable. No separate Form of Audit Report to be obtained u/s. 92E by the assessee to whom these provisions apply has been prescribed. We are informed that the provisions of Rule 10D and 10E and Form 3CEB of Audit Report prescribed for International Transactions can be used. If we refer to these Rules and the Form it will be noticed that there is no mention about Specified Domestic Transactions in these Rules or Form. It is not clear as to how specific requirements of these Domestic Transactions are to be reported in the Audit Report.

15.6 It may be noted that the present Finance Minister mooted the idea of replacing the present Income-tax Act and the Wealth Tax Act by Direct Taxes Code (DTC) in 2006-07. The DTC Bill, 2009 was circulated on 12.08.2009 for public debate. After considering the suggestions from various quarters, the DTC Bill, 2010, was introduced in the Lok Sabha and was to come into force w.e.f. 01.04.2012. The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee of the Finance. Since its report was delayed, DTC could not be passed in 2011 and hence its implementation was delayed. In Para 154 of the Budget Speech the Finance Minister has stated that DTC is work-in-progress. He has also stated that the report of the Standing Committee is received. The same is being examined and the revised Bill will be introduced in the budget session of the Parliament. This has not happened and it appears that this important legislation may not be passed during the present term of the UPA II Government.

15.7 Another legislation viz. Goods and Service Tax (GST) in the field of Indirect Taxes, was announced by the Finance Minister in 2007-08. He has referred to this in Para 186 of the Budget Speech this year. Due to differences in the views of various States, the required legislation has not been introduced in the Parliament. The Prime Minister has admitted that GST, which is to replace Excise Duty, Customs Duty, Service Tax and VAT laws in our Country may be enacted in 2014 after the elections by the new Government which may come to power.

15.8 Another major reform measure in the field of Corporate legislation relates to replacement of the Companies Act, 1956 by the Companies Bill, 2011. This Bill has been passed by the Lok Sabha in December, 2012. It is pending in the Rajya Sabha. The impression given to us was that this Bill will be passed in this year’s Budget Session and will come into force soon. This Bill is pending before the Rajya Sabha and this important legislation is also delayed.

15.9 The above three legislations are being discussed for the last more than five years but our Parliament is not able to legislate the same. We are assured that these new legislations will simplify our tax and Corporate Legislation and make the life of all stakeholders hassle free. Let us hope the Parliament in its wisdom legislates these provisions before the end of the current Financial Year.

(Acknowledgement: S.M. Jhaveri, Chartered Accountant and Dalpat H Shah, Chartered Accountant have assisted the Author in the preparation of this Article)

MEDIA AND ACCOUNTABILITY

fiogf49gjkf0d
The phone hacking scandal in the UK two years ago focused the world’s attention on media misconduct like rarely before. What was particularly shocking was that tabloid reporters hacked into and deleted the voice mail messages left by a missing 13-year-old girl, who was later found dead.

It triggered public outrage — understandably so — and led to the shutting down of Britain’s biggest Sunday paper, the arrests of the Prime Minister’s spokesman and several journalists and senior newspaper executives, the resignation of the country’s highest-ranking police officer, and the setting up of a public inquiry under Lord Justice Leveson.

A debate has raged since about whether the media should be subjected to greater regulation – not just in the UK, but in democracies around the world. Sections of the political class have, not surprisingly, supported the idea of stricter oversight and punishment.

There is often a thin line between regulation and control. In India, there have been periodic efforts at muzzling the media, most infamously during the Emergency. It is as much the public’s responsibility as it is the media’s to ensure that every such attempt is vigorously resisted. The media is meant to act as a watchdog; it has a duty to tell people things their governments don’t want them to know (barring genuinely sensitive information). This perforce casts it in an adversarial role.

The idea of democracy is predicated on freedom of the press (‘media’ and ‘press’ are used interchangeably here, and include print, broadcast and online). As the First Amendment of the US Constitution said, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble…” And while our own Constitution does not specifically refer to freedom of the press, it is implied in Article 19, which lists freedom of speech and expression as one of our fundamental rights. Various courts have over the years emphasised the centrality of freedom of the press to the democratic process.

Does that mean the media should not be held accountable for what it writes or broadcasts? Absolutely not.

Every industry and profession has a responsibility to its customers and clients. Just as an automobile manufacturer needs to answer for faulty brakes or a pharmaceutical company for substandard drugs or a CA firm for the quality of its audits, a newspaper or a TV channel must answer for inaccurate and irresponsible reporting.

Unlike say, a builder or a doctor, a journalist cannot directly cause a person’s death. But his incompetence or dishonesty can cause damage that some, especially the more righteous, might consider a fate worse than death – loss of reputation.

Yes, there are laws against defamation, slander and libel. While article 19(1)(a) guarantees free speech and expression, 19(2) specifies the grounds for “reasonable restrictions” on free speech (defamation, public order, incitement to an offence, etc).

But in practice, the media is protected, more by default than design, by the glacial speed at which things move through our judiciary. Most journalists know it takes years for a defamation case (like most other cases) to reach legal closure — unless the aggrieved party has the resources to hasten the process. By then the damage has been done. Punitive action, either in the form of compensation or an apology, a decade later is cold consolation for a person whose standing in society has been dented (although increasingly, it would appear that people don’t care).

There is also the Press Council of India, set up as a statutory body under a 1978 Act, to ensure freedom of the press and to hear complaints against newspapers. While Wikipedia describes it as an “extremely powerful body”, truth is, very few newspapers quake at the thought of being censured by the council.

A parliamentary standing committee recently submitted a report recommending either a single regulatory body for print and electronic media or a diarchy in which the Press Council has enhanced powers and there is a similar statutory body for the electronic media.

Such proposals have obviously not found great favour with the media, whose contention has always been: We don’t need outsiders to regulate us, we can do it ourselves.

There is reason to oppose external controls. What is the guarantee that the hidden hand of government will not seek to strangle a newspaper or channel that it considers inimical to its interests? Governments have been known to exert influence over institutions that are supposed to be completely independent. As it is, governments across the country routinely try to browbeat newspapers that run unfavourable stories by cutting off advertising — which amounts to abuse of power because it is taxpayers money they are using as leverage to block the people’s right to information. Many small and financially fragile papers, which depend on such advertising for survival, are often forced to fall in line.

Much of the credit for exposing corruption in high places must go to the media. It has acted, at least in some small way, as a check on governments, public officials and corporations from subverting the system.

But while the media is often quick to demand accountability from the executive and the legislature, who does it answer to? The obvious answer is: To the public in general and to its readers/viewers in particular.

As we all know, practice doesn’t always measure up to principle. Ministers and legislators can also seek refuge behind a similar defence by claiming, “We are elected by the people, and we answer to them. If they don’t like us, if they think we have lost the right to hold office, they can always vote us out.” But take a look at the scandals around us: Does it look like our politicians shiver with fear at the thought of their less-than-ethical practices inviting electoral backlash?

TV channels and newspapers like to claim that their viewers/readers have the freedom to switch out/unsubscribe, which would be bad for subscription and advertising revenue. So, if for nothing else, they’ll stay honest because it makes business sense.

There is some merit in this line of argument, but only up to a point. Corruption, whether at an individual or an institutional level, does not follow the laws of ethical business as they are taught in B-schools. When a journalist writes with mala fide intent, he is obviously not concerned about damaging reputations — of others, or his own.

One would like to believe that such dishonesty exists only on the fringes of established mainstream media, and that an overwhelming majority of us cannot be influenced to write in lieu of monetary or other favours. (We are leaving aside intellectual dishonesty, which is a separate subject by itself. Also, sponsored features or ‘advertorials’ do not fall under this category.)

So why do newspapers and TV channels still make so many mistakes, including some that can hurt people and their reputations? Much of it has to do with subject ignorance, lack of application (which is a polite way of saying ‘laziness’), inadequate fact-checking, and the rush to be first at any cost. A few unintentional, genuine mistakes are perhaps inevitable, even pardonable, given the tight deadlines newspapers and channels have to race against day in and night out — so long as those mistakes don’t end up hurting innocent people. And so long as we in media are prompt in acknowledging our mistakes.

The media’s challenge is to strike a delicate balance between being aggressive, sceptical and independent on one hand, and sensitive, decent and knowledgeable on the other. Combining so many attributes might seem like a tall order, but we need to hold ourselves to a higher standard. The paper I work for has taken a decision to play down news of school students committing suicide during exams and results. We are aware that other papers might choose to splash such ‘stories’ on front page, and we might look like we have missed them, but so be it. We believe it’s the right thing to do.

At the end of the day, we in the media need to do the right thing. This might sound simplistic, to the point of naivete. How can anyone expect a growing, fragmented, competitive industry that lies at the intersection of politics, business and a society in churn to develop the collective conscience to do the ‘right thing’? Surely, we’re expecting too much? Perhaps. But if an overwhelming majority of the media can learn to be fair and responsible, the law as it exists today is good enough to deal with a few rogue elements. Every industry has its seamy underbelly, but that cannot be a reason for any government to bring an AK-47 to a wrestling match.

If however the public comes to believe the media is incapable of managing its own house, we could be opening ourselves up to calls for tougher legislation and regulation. Recent developments in cricket should serve as a cautionary tale for all of us.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction Every profession has an objective and purpose for its origin and sustenance. Accounting profession is no exception. While the role and significance of the accounting profession keeps evolving to match with the changing expectations of the stakeholders, laws and regulations, the underlying philosophy remains constant. The commitment of the profession to the society is enshrined in the motto adopted by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) from the Kathopanishad – “Ya esa suptesu jagarti” – “That person who is awake in those that sleep”. The accounting profession is the conscience keeper of the finance world as its members perform the accounting and auditing and assurance services. The profession is recognised as a partner in nation building as its members provide value added services to business enterprises in terms of planning, budgeting, funding, restructuring, strategising growth and expansion, cost optimisation so on and so forth.

Evolution 
Even before India became a Republic in 1950, the Gov-ernment of India enacted “The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949” and conferred the statutory and special recognition on the profession by chartering it and conferring autonomy on ICAI. This demonstrates the importance attributed to our profession by the Parliament and the need to regulate it with sound principles and standards. Since then, the profession has grown from strength to strength evolving its journey into a glorious history. The various milestones accomplished by its members reflect the astute wisdom acquired out of a sound learning process and robust practical training besides the recognition of our role given by the society. At the same time, we must acknowledge that autonomy comes with accountability and recognition is tagged on with responsibility. Assuming there are two professionals- one a member of our profession and another a non-member, with similar skills sets and knowledge, a client would prefer a member of our profession as there is a regulatory mechanism governing the profession and accountability in the case of a Chartered Accountant is better ensured than such a non-member. Accountability, therefore, is not a dis-advantage but an inherent strength of the profession.

In terms of membership strength, there has been phenomenal growth in the last one decade and consider-able number of members has been taking up employment in preference to public practice on account of enlarging opportunities in the industry. The following data demonstrates the shift in strength from public practice (COP) to employment (No COP) which also drives home the point that the profession is gaining more recognition in the in-house decision making and administration positions within the business segment. Instead of merely providing inputs for decision making, many of our members have attained positions whereby they are the decision makers for the business enterprise at the helm of affairs. There are many members who are CEOs and CFOs rendering yeomen service to the Industry segment of the Economy. The data also indicates that about 50% of them have entered the profession in the last one decade and therefore they all must be below the age of 35 years.

Scaling up with Quality

Out of the 1.2 billion population in India, only 2.17 lakh are qualified members of the profession. About a million students are pursuing the curriculum of our profession in various stages. Considering the fact that 47.5% of the 1.2 billion are youth below the age of 25 years, India has the demographic advantage of possessing substantial size of young population. Our profession can embrace good number of this segment in order to enable them to emerge as Chartered Accountants. This proposition may be fraught with two apprehensions namely, increase in number might lead to degeneration in standards and emergence of more professionals might lead to unemployment. Both these concerns do merit attention but can be effectively addressed by taking appropriate measures. We must ensure that quantity does not result in compromising of quality. The content of the curriculum, the examination and evalu-ation methodology and above all practical training and orientation should be constantly reviewed, monitored and implemented to match with the best expectations of the market. Further, the blending of technological skills with professional skills should be seamlessly and progressively done to equip the members to plunge into newer areas of services.

India has immense potential to emerge as a strong economic power being the third fastest growing economy next only to China and Indonesia. Although the present scenario is worrisome with GDP touching 4.8% growth in the fourth quarter of the last fiscal, our economy will bounce back soon to catch up with the desired 8% growth by 2015-16. Consequently, we should not have any inhibition to scale up with quality as otherwise persons with less competence and no accountability will strive to occupy the positions that would get generated with the growth of the economy. Further, our profession can contribute in a modest manner to the endeavour of reaping the demographic dividend by producing capable young finance professionals. India has the potential of emerging as the human resource hub for the rest of the world. There are already over 30,000 CAs settled abroad serving different economies. We must continue to produce professionals who are nurtured in India, but groomed for the world.

Knowledge Management and Innovation

The profession today stands on the threshold of dynamism and change. We need to be diligent in knowledge management and innovation. Any laxity on our part could be fatal. The government, the regulators, the society and the clients do expect the profession to take proactive measures for knowledge updating and skill upgradation. Both in the core areas of our practice such as assurance function as well as in the non-core areas such as consultancy/advisory functions, we need to be empowered consistently. Any inaction can create a void which will be filled by those outside our profession. John F Kennedy said that there are risks and costs to action but they are far less than the long range risks of comfortable inaction. We just cannot afford to be indifferent or ignorant of the developments around us. Practising the accountancy profession is like riding a bicycle and one does not fall off unless one stops pedalling. Learning is akin to pedalling. No other factor can inspire more confidence and faith of the stakeholders in our profession than the demonstrative quest for knowledge and competence gained out of it. The profession owes to the stakeholders an assur-ance that its members are the most competent and empowered lot to deliver services with quality. The profession can ill afford to be negligent on this aspect of the accountability.

Quality in service leads to excellence, which is a definite attribute that paves way for growth and development of the profession. However, there are limits to the excellence we can achieve on a narrow base. The profession needs to innovate and re-engineer itself to a new trajectory of divergence and efficiency. The profession needs to evolve new products, new services, new systems procedures and methodologies to maximise utility but minimise the cost. Excellence is like the summit of a pyramid, larger the base higher the summit. We should not spare any endeavour to broaden the base of the quality of our services with skills, standards and values and build the pyramid of excellence, the summit of which is unmatched by that of any other profession.

Capacity Building of Firms

It is common knowledge that Indian entrepreneurs are consolidating their businesses to grow big and face global competition. Multinationals are establishing subsidiaries of large size in India. Takeovers, mergers, amalgamations and collaborations are the order of the day. Professionals should also become conscious of this factor and gear up to restructure their firms, reorient their skills and expand their firm size. When an enterprise or a business group grows and the professional firm rendering service to it does not, the chances of replacement by a bigger firm cannot be ruled out.

On a closer look at the following data relating to the composition of the firms in our profession, it is not difficult to realise that most of them are small and medium practitioners (SMPs). Although there is commendable improvement in the growth and expansion of the firms over the last one decade, still we have a long way to go. To the growing Indian business enterprises, our profession is accountable to assure that our firms would measure up to the size that is required to ably cater to the array of services expected by them.

Independence and sanctity of signature

Unlike a few other professions where the accountability is primarily to the client, in our profession the account-ability extends to various stakeholders. For instance, when a member of the profession is exercising the assurance function in the nature of statutory audit and appends his signature, he is not only accountable to the shareholders who are the owners of the company but also to the investors, depositors, lenders – banks and institutions, regulators, customers and all those who make decisions relying on the authenticity of the financial statements so attested. Expression of independent and qualitative opinion is imperative for securing and fulfilling the accountability aspect of the profession. Attest function is the exclusive domain of our profession. We have been given this recognition on the faith that we will discharge it with utmost care and competence. Considering the fact that audit is not a privilege but a responsibility, it requires to be shouldered carefully by skilled and credible hands. Besides, audit is a time-bound exercise and, therefore, adequate trained manpower, infrastructure and audit tools and manuals are inevitable for a firm to acquit it creditably in discharging such function. Assurance function demands excellence, integrity and independence and when properly discharged commands unshakable faith, respect and image.

If warranted, based on facts and figures, we should have the mettle to express an adverse opinion on the financial statements of the client who ends up paying for such an opinion. Any dereliction in this regard might dilute our significance and exclusivity. When we consciously discharge our duties to meet with the genuine expectations of the stakeholders, our stature and rights get automatically preserved and cherished. Rights which flow from duties not done properly are not worth having.

Adherence to various standards governing the profession; ensuring proper documentation of work done and resorting to expression of opinion without fear or favour leaves no room for a gap in performance. Succumbing to pressure of a branch manager of a bank to complete an audit in undue haste or to classify certain NPAs as good debts may at best please him but undoubtedly erodes the image of the professional even in his mind. Losing sight of the significance of quality in work may result in short term gains to that professional but brings disrepute to the entire profession. If the nation’s interest is upheld and protected while serving a client, it brings greater glory to the profession and the brand image is enhanced by reinforcing stronger faith and instilling greater confidence.

The signature of any professional is an expression of credibility. So is the case with the signature of a member of our profession which is truly trusted and highly respected. The status of the signature of a person becomes elevated and turns out to be a precious one on acquiring professional qualification as a Chartered Accountant. Even if a miniscule section of the society perceives that the signature of a member of our profession is available for the asking or solely for a consideration that would be a dreadful scenario and could lead to erosion of goodwill which our forefathers have so strenuously built over six decades.

Ethical values

Some members of the profession strive and survive on account of the goodwill created by our forefathers. Many members contribute to and enhance such good-will by their exemplary conduct, impeccable integrity and qualitative delivery of services. Unfortunately, the conduct of a few has diminishing effect on the goodwill of the profession. We need to introspect as to which category we should belong to and the answer is obvious. Fee based approach in everything we do would be fatal in the long run whereas value based approach would enhance our reputation. Mahatma Gandhi said that there is enough for every one’s need but not for the greed. The Father of the nation also indicated that ‘ends’ do not justify the ‘means’. It might pay to be unethical in the short run, but in return one loses self-esteem and peace of mind, which is too precious a price one should dread to pay and suffer.

Lord T.B. McCauley said, “the measure of man’s real character is what he would do if he knew he would never be found out”. Everyone aspires to grow and reach greater heights. It will be nice to always bear in mind that ability may take us to the top but it requires character to stay there. Quality in service without compromising on ethical values begets not only prosperity in the long run but undoubtedly helps us to build image and command respect. In matters of innovation and empowerment, one should swim with the current, but in matters of values and principles, one should stand like a rock.

Challenging Environment

With the passage of time, business practices are getting corrupted. Government departments are difficult to deal with when straightforward approach is adhered to. The business philosophy and practices are degenerating in values due to which many frauds and scams are surfacing. There is lack of transparency and accountability in the usage of resources by the governments as well as entrepreneurs. Manipulations and fudging in matters of finance and accounts are resorted to for various reasons and more particularly for evading tax outflows. In such an environment it is a challenge for the accounting profession to discharge the duties upholding standards and values. A profession like ours owes it to the society to possess the courage of conviction and perform our role in the best interest of the economy in order to establish unblemished track record for the posterity to inherit.

The audit reports of C&AG on allocation of spectrum in the telecom sector as well as natural resources such as coal has brought in accolades from the public and created enormous awareness among the masses on the need for good governance and has served as a warning for those involved in the decision making process to be accountable. Many of our members have been instrumental in bringing out frauds and manipulations. The future is going to be tougher in this regard and all the same we need to gear up to face the challenge and ensure that there is no performance gap. No other profession can boast of having as proximate a role and nexus as ours with the economic development of our country. Let us reinvent the significance of our role in partnering, participating and partaking in building a credible economy in the incredible India.

Professional Social Responsibility (PSR)

A member of our profession is considered to belong to the elite segment of the Indian society. About 27% of the Indian population is perceived to be below the poverty line. We owe it to the society to contribute in uplifting the lives of the downtrodden and under privileged masses. The standing and respectability of the profession can touch lofty heights only if the profession is able to positively contribute to the socio-economic development of the society. Several measures can be resorted to as part of PSR initiatives and some of them can be readily spelt out. Firstly, ICAI and professional forums like BCAS can enhance the level of contribution in the policy formulations by various ministries of the Central Government and of the State Governments on socio economic reforms and their effective implementation. Secondly, senior members of the profession and other members with requisite exposure, aptitude and inclination, can plunge into public life in large numbers; accept positions such as trustees of public charitable trusts and institutions, become governing board members of educational, health care institutions and not for profit organisations, assume leadership in chambers of commerce, management and trade associations. Thirdly, every medium and large firm can establish a charitable institution and carry out activities to meet societal needs in a small way.

It is well known that ICAI has a Benevolent Fund for the members of the profession, which goes to the rescue of the distressed, in times of need. Another similar measure was conceptualised as ‘Fund for Education and Welfare of Students’ during 2006-07 but seemed to have been lost sight of down the line.(Please refer page 1186 of February 2007 Journal, The Chartered Accountant). If properly taken up, this fund would assist meritorious but poor students to be financially supported and counselled to pursue and qualify as members of our profession. CA. Prema earned wide acclaim by achieving All India First rank in the November 2012 examination in spite of hailing from a humble background with her father being an auto rickshaw driver in Mumbai. Many such students could be ably supported and made members of our profession. We should reach out to those bright students who might not otherwise take up higher studies and thereby change the profile of their families by the power of our professional qualification. This can be yet another measure worth pondering over to be acted upon as part of the PSR initiative.

Conclusion

As we continue our glorious journey, it’s time that we take stock of the socio-economic changes unfolding around us and adjust the course of our journey accordingly for larger benefit of the society and the nation. We may not have the ability to change the course of the wind but we can set the sail appropriately to proceed in the noble path we choose to progress. French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre said that we have no destinies other than those we forge ourselves. Let us make the society feel proud of our profession and thereby justify our existence.

Lawyers’ Duties and Accountability

fiogf49gjkf0d
A story going the rounds is that the Chairman of a company after referring to the next speaker as a lawyer added “he is nevertheless a nice person.” But is the jibe deserved? Before passing judgement it would be appropriate to consider the duties a lawyer owes to his client, to his profession and to the Court, his accountability therefor and the conflicts which arise in discharging the separate and distinct duties. Recently, the emphasis has shifted to the lawyer’s duty to Society. Though one cannot ignore this duty it is a duty subordinate to his primary duties of accountability to his client, profession and to the Court. The meticulous performance of these duties with care and precision is itself the performance of his duty to Society. Though not normally referred to, there is a fifth and equally – if not more – important duty – his duty to himself.

Very often the lay person raises a question as to how a lawyer could defend a particular person or a particular action of his client which in the lay mind was indefensible. The Bar Council of India has framed a code of conduct to be followed by all advocates. One of the duties of an advocate is to accept a brief in the Courts or Tribunals in or before which he normally practices. If, however, his brief requires him to argue contrary to his beliefs and there is a conflict of duty to his client and to himself then, his duty to himself may justify his returning the brief. It is not for him to choose which is a good case and which is not. The central function of a lawyer is to represent his client and to say in legal parlance what the client would have said if he was to argue his own case and had the required legal acumen. James Boswell in his Life of Samuel Johnson records having asked the great man “What do you think of supporting a cause which is known to be bad?” Dr. Johnson’s reply was to the effect: “Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad till the judge determines it. You are to state facts clearly, so that your thinking or what you call knowing a cause to be bad must be from reasoning, must be from supposing your arguments to be weak and inconclusive …”

Lord Macmillan in “Law and Other Things” has said that the advocate by the rules of his profession has, theoretically at least no choice in the selection of the cases he takes up. He quotes Erskine as saying that if an advocate is permitted to say that he will not stand between the Crown and the subject arraigned in the Court on the basis of his opinion above the correctness of his client’s stand “from that moment the liberties of England are at an end.”

It is the duty of an advocate to uphold the interest of his client by all fair and honourable means without regard to any unpleasant consequences to himself or to any other. An issue which sometimes arises is whether in discharging this duty there would be a conflict with the advocate’s duty to the Court. Whilst he must uphold in all ways the interest of his client at the same time he must not put forward as a fact when he knows (as distinct from what he suspects) to be untrue. For example, if the client has told him that he has done something the advocate cannot urge that he has not done it though he would be justified in taking the stand that it is for the other side to prove that his client had indeed done the act as alleged by the other side. Many people take the view that this is a facetious distinction which lawyers draw. However, the rule of law requires that it is for the plaintiff or the prosecutor to establish his case with acceptable evidence and if the lawyer does not take this stand he would be cutting at the root of the rule of law. It is also urged that a lawyer’s duty to society requires that he should not defend someone who he believes to be guilty of what is alleged against him. Those who would so urge should ponder over whether if a man sentenced to death for murder falls sick whilst in jail should a doctor attend to him or decline to do so in the belief that Society would be well served by his early demise. A lawyer’s duty is to his client and to the Court and if one may say so to the law. In my opinion these override any amorphous duty to Society which is spoken of so glibly. An advocate’s loyalty is to the law and the law requires that no man should be punished without adequate evidence. The cynic may counter that it is fortunate that people are born whose moral standards are sufficiently flexible to enable them to practise the calling of law!

Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that except with the client’s consent a lawyer cannot disclose any communication made to him by the client or to reveal the contents of any document to which he has become privy in the course of his professional employment or disclose the advice tendered by him to his client. Contrary to this specific provision of law the activist, who champions the lawyers so called duty to Society, would urge that the lawyer must not keep secret his knowledge about an illegality committed by his client. In my view there is no such duty and the importance of complete and free communication between a lawyer and his client is itself for the welfare of Society at large.

An interesting issue arises when a client wants to know the consequences of his acting in a manner which is contrary to the law. It would appear that it is the lawyer’s duty to explain what would be the decision in law if the misdeed is discovered but he should in no way be a party to facilitate on such misdeed. A fine issue arises – is it the duty of the lawyer to tell the client that what he proposes to do is contrary to the law and he ought not to embark on the act. It would appear (though there may certainly be two views on the issue) that it is not for the lawyer to be a moralist but leave it to the client to decide whether knowing the consequences ethical and otherwise, of what he proposes to do, he should still go through with his earlier scheme. Here also the protagonist of “duty to Society” may take a contrary view.

An arguing Counsel owes a duty to his client and to the Court for attending the hearing of an appeal from the beginning to the end. It is not enough that the lawyer attends Court only at the time his turn comes to argue the case for his client and thereafter on completing the argument leaves the Court with some excuse or the other proffered to the judge. The lawyer’s defence is that he owes a duty to other clients for whom also he is to appear on the very day. I feel that unless the lawyer is present throughout the hearing of the appeal and has heard the arguments of the opposing Counsel he would not be able to give off his best to the client or to render full assistance to the Court. He should choose which case he will attend to and return the other briefs in good time or have the other hearing adjourned. In a witness action the position may be different.

Sometimes a possible conflict arises when a judge seeks Counsel’s opinion on a particular matter which is in issue between the contesting parties. If the lawyer was to express his opinion or what he believes to be the right position in law he may be acting adversely to his client’s interest. He would therefore be justified in politely declining the judge’s request to give his opinion. Some purist may contend that in taking this stand the lawyer is not discharging his duty to the Court. Though the lawyer’s duty to the client is certainly not more important than his duty to the Court, nevertheless the “inquisitive” judge should have realised that the duty of the lawyer is to argue his case and not to express his opinion on the issue involved. Undoubtedly, tact of a high degree is required in meeting such a situation. People must realise that what a lawyer believes and what he argues are not the same.

A related issue is to what extent the duty of a lawyer to the Court compels him to cite all possible decisions which he is aware of even though some of them may be contrary to what he is briefed to argue. Whilst the lawyer must bring to the notice of the Judge any judgement which is binding on the judge like that of the Supreme Court of India or of the Federal Court or the Privy Council (when the opinion of the Privy Council is as of a point of time when the same was binding on the Indian Courts). He will also have to disclose to the Court any judgement of the High Court of the state where he is arguing the matter as the same may be binding or if the judge wants to take a contrary view he may have to refer the matter to a larger Bench. It is not the duty of the lawyer to cite decisions rendered by other Courts which are not binding. It is for the opposing lawyer, if he so thinks fit, to bring such decisions to the notice of the Court. This shows that the lawyer can honour his duty both to the Court and to the client in respect of a particular matter without infringing either.

Sometimes a very piquant situation arises. A judge recuses himself from a case on the ground that one of the parties has “approached” him. Should the lawyer of the alleged defaulter also opt out of the case? In my opinion, he should first of all satisfy himself that indeed a representative on behalf of his client had approached the judge, with the client’s authority to do so. Unfortunately, there are today people who without being instructed by the client to do so approach a judge in a pending matter of which they are aware and then approach the client with the offer of procuring a favourable judgement. Once he is satisfied that the judge was indeed approached under his client’s instructions he should return the brief though it is possible that this may prejudice the client adversely if the brief is returned in the midst of a hearing. It would also show his client in poor light. This sort of situation really calls for a fine balance being drawn between the lawyer’s duty to the client and to the Court.

When discharging his duties to his client the lawyer often is faced with matching the same to his duty to the profession and to his co-professional. Though it may be in the interest of his client for the lawyer to interrupt the other side’s Counsel so as to distract him from his trend of thought or interfere with the flow of his arguments, it would be a breach of his duty to a co-professional and he must not indulge in it. I must say that I have found that in the southern states of India the respect for the right of the opposing professional to have full uninterrupted opportunity to express his views is far more evident than in the northern and, may I add, western states?

It is undoubtedly the duty of the lawyer to the Court always to be courteous and deferential to the judge but that does not mean he has to be obsequious. If for any reason it appears that the judge is acting un-reasonably and making comments which are wholly uncalled for either against the litigant or the lawyer or the legal profession it is his duty to stand up to the judge and, as politely as possible, to correct him. It is not the lawyer’s duty to the Court to submit to insults to himself or his profession or to fawn for petty favours. I remember an occasion when a judge was unreasonably giving a junior lawyer a tough time. As the Court rose for lunch a senior lawyer, who was wait-ing for his case to be called out got up and suggested that perhaps the junior lawyer deserved a more patient hearing. The judge – full marks to him – saw reason and his attitude changed post lunch. It is remarkable that the senior lawyer really did not know the junior at all but the incident shows the importance of stand-ing up to a judge even when it does not affect the lawyer personally.

It sometimes happens that a “succeeding” lawyer in the course of his argument takes a stand different from what his predecessor, who was then representing the client, had taken. If it is in the client’s interest for him to take a contrary stand he should do so but without in any way decrying or condemning the stand previously taken by the predecessor lawyer. In this manner he fulfills his duty both to the client and to the profession.

Sometimes a lawyer may feel that it would be advis-able for a client to consult another lawyer or even to brief another lawyer rather than himself. He should frankly advise the client to do what is in client’s interest though it may conflict with his own pecuniary interest. A lawyer is sometimes asked to recommend the name of a junior to assist him. The lawyer should either leave it to the client to choose the junior lawyer or suggest 3 or 4 names preferably not only from his chamber and leave it to the client to decide who should be briefed. This would fulfill the duty of the lawyer to his co-professional by not depriving a junior outside his chamber from being briefed.

In the practice of the profession sometimes peculiar situations arise which have a bearing on conflict of duties. It may happen that after a case is heard and decided the advocate reliably learns that the judgement was improperly procured. This would mean that even though the client may not himself be guilty of any improper conduct there was a miscarriage of justice. Is it the duty of the advocate in these circumstances to bring these facts to the notice of the Court for considering whether to order a retrial? The purist would undoubtedly say that it is advocate’s duty to do so but there may be practical difficulties.

An interesting instance of conflict of duties may arise when a lawyer accepts a directorship. It may happen in this way: the company of which he is a director may be confronted with a particular problem and looking to the facts of the case the company may have to adopt a particular stand in law and the director would have voted in favour of taking such a stand. In the light of this peculiar position his view of what is the correct position may get warped and he may not be able to render independent advice to another company facing a similar problem. For a similar reason, a lawyer who is a director of a company must not appear in Court for the company as he may not be able to maintain the sense of independence and detachment required of him. In similar vein a firm of solicitors, a partner of which is a director on the Board of a company, is not allowed to represent the company in Court. This is sometimes overcome by the solicitors firm interposing a dummy lawyer. But that is really a case of failure of duty to one’s conscience!

A common source of conflict is where each of two partners of a firm represents persons arraigned against each other. They build some sort of a Chinese wall to urge that they both function independently. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that there is bound to be at some stage a conflict of duties and the firm may tilt in favour of the client who is more important to it; namely, from whom it hopes to earn a larger fee in the long run.

It goes without saying that an advocate cannot be a party to procuring evidence by inducement. By procur-ing evidence the advocate may further the cause of justice but may he be guilty of breach of his duty to the Court or the profession and perhaps even to society. For example, a suit is filed by A claiming damages from B who had assaulted him. X was the only witness to the incident. When the matter is to be heard in Court X suggests to A’s lawyer that he may not come to give evidence and if he is summoned he may plead that he did not remember what exactly happened. He may slyly add that he could be induced to state the truth. If the lawyer spurns X’s suggestion it may mean that his client who was entitled in law to succeed may not be able to prove his case. On a strict view of the matter it would appear that the advocate is in breach of his duty to the Court and the profession if he suc-cumbs to the suggestion made by the witness. If he does not succumb to X’s demand is he in breach of his duty to the client because the client may fail in a cause where he deserved to succeed? The puritan will undoubtedly opine that upholding the process of law and justice is more important than an individual client’s obtaining of damages for the wrong done to him. On the other hand, one may think that it is reasonable to do a little wrong to achieve a higher good in the form of a person justly succeeding in the litigation launched by him. It appears that whichever way he acts the lawyer may later have pangs of conscience. A self saving action on the part of the lawyer may be to tell his client to contact X if he so deemed fit. Of course this would mean that the lawyer would have to live with the disconcerting fact that he, at least passively, was a party to “procuring” evidence.

An advocate undoubtedly owes a duty to his fellow professional: not to run him down or attempt to take over his brief. Does it mean that he should not appear in a matter in which his fellow professional is sued? The answer obviously is that his duty to his client, who claims relief against a professional brother, is higher than his duty to a fellow professional or to the profession. If a lawyer declines to appear against a brother lawyer it would mean that the affected party may not be able to find a lawyer to represent him.

Sometimes a client realises that he is bound to fail in his plea before the Court but he would like to postpone the evil day. It would appear that the advocate’s duty to the client permits him to obtain an adjournment on whatever grounds are available but without putting forward a false excuse. The fact that thereby there is a delay which is adverse to the interest of the other side does not mean that the advocate is in breach of his duty to the profession or to the Court.

The lawyer’s duty to the client does not extend to car-rying out all his instructions. For example it is not his duty to oppose the grant of an adjournment sought by the other side because his client says so or to urge an argument the client insists on even though the lawyer feels it would be counter productive or not ethical to do so, then, the advocate’s duty to himself, to the Court and to the profession must prevail. However, he should communicate his decision to the client in good time and he should give the client the option to brief another Counsel. In similar light is the case where the opposing side’s Counsel has slipped up. Should the advocate take advantage of that position? The classical view would be he should not. I do not know how far that is practical because surely it is not Counsel’s duty to say that his co-professional has made a slip in not pressing a particular point or not pressing it forcefully enough and the judge should consider the same.

I have referred above to a lawyer’s duty to Society. It would be apt to mention Society’s duty to “law.” Nowadays the media pronounces upon a case and lawyers comment on a case in progress. This may prejudice the interest of one of the litigants in the case. Society and all of us owe a duty to law and its fair administration and to desist from action which can conflict with a litigant’s right to a fair and free trial. I am conscious that if it were not for the interest taken by the media several matters of grave concern which involve prominent politicians and other personalities may have gone unattended to. Even so one should try to reconcile duties of the media to law and to Society.

Finally, does the advocate-writer of an article owe a duty to his reader not to bore him even though his personal vanity tempts him to continue? I should think so and so in deference thereto and to fulfill a higher duty I shall wind up this piece!

Export of Goods and Services – Realisation and Repatriation period for units in Special Economic Zones (SEZ)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Presently, there is no time limit for realisation and repatriation of export proceeds in respect of exports made by units in SEZ.

This circular provides that exporters in a SEZ must now realize and repatriate within a period of twelve months from the date of export the full value of goods/software/services exported by them. In case they require any extension of time beyond the above stipulated period they have to obtain specific permission of RBI.

levitra

2013 (30) STR 347 (Del) Delhi Chit Fund Association vs. Union of India

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether services provided in relation to conducting a chit business is a taxable service u/s. 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 inserted with effect from 1st July, 2012 ?

Facts:

The appellant, an association of chit fund companies based in Delhi operating under the Chit Funds Act, 1982. Notification No.26/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 issued by the Government exempted services provided in relation to chit to the extent of 70% subject to the conditions as specified.

The appellant pleaded to quash the said notification in so far as it sought to subject the activities of business of chit fund companies to the levy of service tax to the extent of 30% of the consideration received for the services when the law itself provides that such services were not taxable at all in the first place and they contented that vide Explanation 2 to section 65B(44), the consideration charged for services of foreman in chit business, are also excluded from the charge of service tax. Further, the explanation provided in the Education Guide issued by the CBEC at para 2.8.2. also was not correct having regards to the proper interpretation of the statutory provisions.

Held:

Allowing the appeal, it was held that the function of an Explanation was to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. It’s the intention of the legislature which was paramount and a mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such a function. Any ambiguity or doubt in the interpretation of the exclusionary part of the definition of the “service” gets cleared up on a careful examination of the implications of Explanation 2. This Explanation was enacted only “for the purposes of this clause” and since it was placed below clause (c), strictly speaking it was relevant only for the purpose of the aforesaid clause. Further, the answer given at para 2.8.2. of the Education guide was also not correct having regards to the proper interpretation of the statutory provision. Hence, no service tax was chargeable on the service rendered by the foreman in a business of chit fund.

levitra

Board Instruction No.137/132/2010-ST dated 11-05- 2011 quashed

fiogf49gjkf0d
Board Instruction No.137/132/2010-ST dated 11-05- 2011 quashed

Facts
The
appellant was an Aircraft maintenance engineering training school
approved by Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) for providing
Aircraft maintenance engineering (AME) training and conducting
examination wherein the course was approved by the DGCA under relevant
statutory provisions of Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR). Based on the
Board’s Instruction No. 137/132/2010- ST dated 11-05-2011, the
department raised demand. The appellant contended that they issued a
certificate approved by DGCA which fully controlled such training
institutes by prescribing syllabus, regulating number of seats per
session, manner of conduct of exam etc. and that the instruction (supra)
was in contravention of section 65(105) (zzc) read with section 65(27)
of the Act and Notification dated 25-04-2011. The respondents contended
that the appellant did not issue any certificate, degree or diploma
recognised by law but only issued a certificate of course completion
that the AME course was not approved by DGCA but they only issued a
Certificate of Approval to impart training but not to issue any degree,
diploma or certificate recognised by law. In view thereof, the exclusion
provided in the definition of Commercial Training & Coaching was
not applicable to the appellant as their role was limited to train
candidates to appear for the examination conducted by the DGCA and that
DGCA itself did not qualify as an institute recognised by law. Revenue
also contended that the instructions were not binding on quasi-judicial
authorities and thus the writ remedy was not available to the appellant.

The DGCA in its counter affidavit stated that being a
subordinate office of Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India it
is a regulatory body in the field of civil aviation primarily dealing
with safety issues with respect to air transport services, enforcement
of civil air regulations, air safety and air worthiness standards. They
further stated that in accordance of the CAR, AME institutes were
required to issue course completion certificates to the students who had
successfully passed, the format of which was approved by DGCA and that
DGCA was not empowered to grant/recognise degree or diploma course
offered by any institute/organisation.

Held

After
perusal of the Act and Rules along with CAR, it was held that not every
institute could offer such course and impart training without the
approval as per the Act, Rules and CAR. The DGCA regulated the course
content offered by such institute and gave relaxation to the successful
candidates by way of grant of authority/license to render services of
aircraft repair and maintenance and to certify the aircraft’s
airworthiness. The Hon. High Court interpreted the expression
“recognised by law” to have a wide meaning and thus held that even if
the certificate/degree/diploma/qualification was not the product of a
statute but had approval of some kind in ‘law’, it would be considered
as exempt. The reasoning in the impugned instruction mixes up and
confuses ‘qualification’ with “a license to practice on the basis of the
qualification”. An educational qualification recognised by law would
not cease to be recognised by law merely because for practicing in the
field, a further examination held by a body is required to be taken. In
view thereof, the instruction, being contrary to section 65(27) and
notification dated 25/04/2011, was quashed.

[Note: Earlier, on
the above issue, an advance ruling was decided against the assessee in
CAE Flight Training (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commission of Service Tax,
Bangalore 2010 (18) STR 785 (AAR). Similarly, the CESTAT Mumbai also
decided against the assessee in Bombay Flying Club vs. CST, Mumbai-II
2013 (29) STR 156 (Tri.-Mumbai). These decisions appear to have been
overruled by the above.]

levitra

2013 (30) STR 337 (SC) M/s. Tata Sky Ltd. vs. State of M.P And Others

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether entertainment duty can be levied on the services of Direct to Home (DTH) Broadcasting on the basis of a notification? Held, No.

Facts:

The appellant provided services of DTH broadcasting under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Indian Telegraphy Act, 1933 and discharged service tax thereon. In exercise of their powers, the State Government issued a notification dated 05-05-2008 fixing 20 percent entertainment duty in respect of every payment made for admission to an entertainment other than cinemas, videos cassette recorders and cable service and thus proceeded to demand entertainment duty from the appellant. The appellant filed a writ petition before the Hon. Madhya Pradesh High Court which dismissed the petition and upheld the said levy and demand thereof. The appellant therefore filed a petition before the Hon. Supreme Court against the said levy.

Held:

The Hon. Supreme Court held in favour of the appellant in view of the following observations:

The provisions of the Act were applicable only to place-related entertainment. In other words, the Act covered an entertainment which takes place in a specified physical location to which persons are admitted on payment of some charge. The legislative history and the amendments introduced by the state in the said Act further substantiated the above fact.

The activity of DTH Broadcasting was not covered by the provisions of section 3 read with section 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d) read with section 4 of the said Act and thus, the provisions of the Act cannot be extended to cover DTH operations carried out by the appellant. Further, it was elementary that a notification issued in exercise of powers under the Act should not amend the Act. Moreover, the notification merely prescribed the rate of entertainment duty at 20 percent in respect of every payment for admission to an entertainment other than cinema, video cassette recorder and cable service. The notification could not enlarge either the charging section or amend the provision of collection under section 4 of the Act read with the Rules. It was, therefore, clear that the notification in no way improved the case of the State. Lastly, if no duty could be levied on DTH operation under the Act prior to the issuance of the notification, then duty cannot also be levied under the said Act after the issuance of the notification.

levitra

Retrospective Amendment in MVAT Act – Validity

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction

There are a number of cases wherein the issue about validity of retrospective amendment in Fiscal Statues has been dealt with. One such situation arose under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act).

The background is that the State of Maharashtra has notified incentive schemes, popularly known as Package Scheme of Incentives (PSI). The schemes were notified from time to time in about 5 years interval.

A similar scheme was announced in the year 1993. Normally, the original unit coming up in the notified backward area is eligible for the benefits of such scheme/s. However, the Government also granted such benefits for expansion of units subject to compliance of certain requirements about minimum capital investment/increase in productions etc.

These units were issued Eligibility Certificate by the Implementing Agency like District Industries Centre and for sales tax purpose the Entitlement Certificate was issued by the Sales Tax Department. Based on such Entitlement Certificate, the eligible units were entitled to enjoy sales tax benefits by way of exemption from payment of tax or were given an option to have deferment facility, whereby they could collect the tax and pay the same to the Government after certain number of years as per the Scheme. The units had the option to choose the method, i.e. either exemption or deferment, for enjoying the benefits.

Pro-rata Method for Expansion

The issue arose where the unit was already holding Entitlement Certificate as an Original Unit (Existing Unit) and it was also granted further Entitlement Certificate for Expansion. The understanding of the Expansion Unit was that they were entitled to avail the benefit of Scheme for all the production of the unit, i.e. production relating to the Existing Unit as well as the Expansion.

However, the approach of the Sales Tax Department was that the Expansion unit can enjoy the benefit to the extent of ratio of Expansion. In other words, it was contemplated by theDepartment that out of the full production, only pro-rata production relating to the Expansion could enjoy PSI benefit. They clarified pro -rata method to work out such turnover by way of a circular. As per the said circular, unit can take benefit in proportion of capital increase to the total capital or production increase to the total production.

The issue was contested by the dealers since 2001 and in case of Pee Vee Textiles (App. No. 48 and others of 2000 dated 17.3.2001) MST Tribunal held that even in case of Expansion, the unit is entitled to enjoy benefit for the full production and the monetary limits should be adjusted accordingly. The issue was further contested before the Hon. Bombay High Court. The Hon. Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Pee Vee Textile (26 VST 281)(Bom) confirmed the decision of the Tribunal. The said judgment of the Hon. Bombay High Court was further confirmed by the Hon. Supreme Court in July 2009.

Retrospective Amendment

On this background, certain amendments were brought in the MVAT Act, in August 2009, by way of an Ordinance. Section 93 of the MVAT Act, 2002 was amended and other amendments were made providing the ratio method for pro-rata working in case of Expansion. Impliedly, the said amendment was effective from 01-04-2005. The period under BST Act was not touched and it remained governed by the above judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court. However, under VAT period effect was given from 01-04-2005.

Since the operation of the amendment was retrospective, it was challenged before the Hon. High Court on the ground of Constitutional Validity. Amongst others, following were the main contentions of the petitioners:

– There was no amendment in the original PSI and the changes are only in the Act which is not permissible.
– The retrospective amendment can be justified only when it is meant for removing the defect shown by the judiciary.
– The retrospective amendment will affect units harshly, since they have already enjoyed the benefits and now have no opportunity to pass on the burden to the buyers and the ultimate customers.
– There was conscious decision by the government from time to time not to implement the pro-rata method. The non-implimentation of section 41BB under BST Act and section 93 in the MVAT Act by not prescribing Rules for pro-rata method was stressed upon. It was shown that even the Rule for pro-rata method proposed in the draft Rules was withdrawn while publishing the Final Rules in 2005.

On behalf of government the submissions were as under:

– That there was intention to provide benefits on pro-rata method.
– There is no vested right to enjoy windfall benefits.
– In Pee Vee Textiles, the Hon. High Court confirmed the judgment of the Tribunal on the ground that inspite of having powers u/s. 41BB to provide pro -rata method, the same is not implemented by prescribing Rules. The legislature has now corrected the said position by the above retrospective amendment. Thus it is for curing the lacuna.

Judgment of the High Court in the case of Jindal Poly Films and Others (W.P.No.313 of 2010 and others dt. 10-10-2013).

After considering the arguments of both the sides, the Hon. High Court referred to a number of judgments about retrospective amendment in the Act. And the Hon. High Court observed that there is ample power for retrospective provision except that it should be reasonable. Like, if the levy is a surprise then it can be considered as invalid.

In particular facts of the above case, Hon. High Court felt that the amendment is not a surprise amendment, but it is to cure the basis of the judgment in the case of Pee Vee Textile. In a nutshell, the Hon. High Court has observed as under:

“32. Essentially, the issue before the Court is as to whether the validating legislation has cured the vice that was noted in the judgment of this Court. Alternately, whether the same judgment could have been rendered despite the amended provisions of the law. The judgment of the Division Bench in Pee Vee Textiles noted that the legislative intent embodied in Section 41BB of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 could not be effectuated in the absence of rules framed by the State Government prescribing the ratio for the grant of proportionate incentives. This anomaly has been corrected by the state legislature by the enactment of the Maharashtra Act 22 of 2009. The fact that a draft rule which had been formulated at an anterior point in time had not been converted into an operative piece of subordinate legislation cannot possibly override the power of the state legislature to enact legislation which falls within its legislative competence. There can be no estoppel against the legislature. It is legitimately open to the legislature to enact validating legislation with retrospective effect to cure a deficiency which was noted in the judgment of the Court as a result of which the legislative intent of granting incentives pro-rata could not be effectuated. The legislature has stepped in to cure the deficiency. The validating legislation and the amendment lay down the manner in which proportionate incentives would be computed. Such a course of action is legitimately open and cannot be regarded as being arbitrary or as violative of Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The principle of allowing pro-rata incentives subserves the object of the legislation. If the legislature has, as in the present case, determined that the purpose of the Package Schemes of Incentives should or would be achieved by allowing incentives to be computed on a proportional basis, that legislative assessment cannot be regarded as unconstitutional.”

The Hon. High Court accordingly upheld the retrospective validity and also justified levy of interest. However, the levy of penalty was held to be invalid for the period prior to the amendment. Accordingly, the Hon. High Court disposed of the petitions.

Penalties, Prosecution, Power to Arrest – Recent Amendments

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction:

Significant amendments have been made by the Finance Act, 2013 through introduction of provisions for imposing penalties on directors/ managers/etc. of a company and making certain offences cognisable thereby empowering tax authorities to arrest a person without warrant. These amendments which have far reaching implications, are discussed hereafter.

Penalty for failure to register:

Presently, u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), penalty for failure to register within the due date, is the higher of the following:

? Rs. 10,000/- or

? Rs. 200/- per day during which the default continues.

Section 77 of the Act is amended with effect from 10-05-2013, to restrict the maximum amount of penalty for failure to register to Rs. 10,000/-. Though the penalty is still on the higher side, the amendment is a welcome one.

Penalty on directors, managers, secretary or other officers for certain contraventions by a company:

The Finance Act, 2011, with effect from 08-04-2011, made section 9AA of the Central Excise Act 1944 (‘CEA’) applicable to service tax. This section provides that if an offence is committed by a company (which includes a firm), the persons liable to be proceeded against and punished are:

• the company;

• every person, who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business except where he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence; and

• any director (who in relation to a firm means a partner), manager, secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent or connivance or because of neglect attributable to whom the offence has been committed.

In addition to the above, a new section 78A is introduced with effect from 10-05-2013, for imposing a financial penalty upto Rs. 1,00,000/- on directors, managers, secretary or other officers in charge of the company for specified contraventions committed by a company namely :

• evasion of service tax; or

• issuance of invoice, bill or challan without provision of taxable services contravening the provisions of the Rules prescribed under the Act;

• availment and utilisation of credit of taxes/ duty without actual receipt of taxable service or excisable goods either fully or partially in violation of the Credit Rules;

• failure to pay to the Government any amount collected as service tax beyond a period of six months from the date on which such payment became due.

The aforesaid persons would be liable to penalty only if:

• at the time of such contravention they were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business; and

• they were knowingly concerned with such contravention.

The terminology “in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company” has been a subject of interpretation by the Supreme Court as well as High Courts from time to time. Some judicial considerations are given hereafter:

In Girdhari Lal Gupta vs. D N Menta, Collector of Customs (1971) 3 SCR 748, it was held that, the words “in charge of” must mean in overall control of the day to day business of the company or the firm;

In State of Karnataka vs. Pratap Chand 1981 (1) FAC 374, it was observed that, a partner who was not in overall control of the day to day business of the firm could not be proceeded against merely because he had a right to participate in the business of the partnership firm under the terms of the partnership deed.

In light of the foregoing, it would appear that, whether or not a director/manager/etc. of a company was “in charge/responsible”, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Hence, it would be very difficult to lay down specific parameters as to the precise situations under which penalty would be imposable.

In this regard, it may be noted that for the contraventions mentioned in case of evasion, issuance of bogus invoices and non-payment amount collected as service tax, such persons may also be liable to be prosecuted in terms of section 89 of the Act read with section 9AA of CEA in addition to suffering a financial penalty u/s. 78A of the Act.

Further, in the absence of a corresponding amendment in section 80 of the Act, the defense of “reasonable cause” available under the said section would not be available against imposition of penalty u/s. 78A of the Act.

Failure to pay tax collected beyond 6 months – maximum imprisonment increased from 3 years to 7 years:

Presently, failure to pay to the Government any amount collected as service tax beyond a period of six months from the date on which such payment became due is a punishable offence. The quantum of punishment for this offence is increased with effect from 10-05-2013. Section 89 of the Act, as amended, prescribes the quantum of punishment separately in respect of first offence and second offence and also in cases where amount exceeds Rs. 50 lakh and other cases. The quantum of punishment for various offences as applicable from 10-05-2013 is summarised in the Table at the end:

Cognizance of offences and power to arrest:


 Amendments in brief:

Significant amendments are made with effect from 10-05-2013 by introducing provisions relating to arrest of persons for offences under the Act. These provisions are summarised hereafter :

Offences are divided into two categories viz:

• Cognisable offences i.e. where the person can be arrested without ‘warrant’; and

• Non-cognisable offences [i.e. offences other than the above].

Failure to pay tax collected beyond 6 months from the due date where the ‘amount’ exceeds Rs. 50 lakh is the only cognisable offence. All other punishable offences (viz. knowingly evading service tax, availing bogus credits, supplying false information, etc.) are non-cognisable offences.

If the Commissioner of Central Excise (‘CCE’) has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence u/s. 89 of the Act where the ‘amount’ exceeds Rs. 50 lakh he may by general or special order authorise any officer of Central Excise not below the rank of Superintendent of Central Excise to arrest such person.

Where a person is arrested for any cognisable offence, every officer authorised to arrest a person shall inform such person of the grounds of arrest and produce him before a magistrate within 24 hours.

• In the case of a non-cognisable and bailable offence, the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner, shall for the purpose of releasing an arrested person on bail or otherwise have the same powers and be subject to the same provisions as an officer in charge of a police station has, and is subject to u/s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC”).

• All arrests shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC.

Some considerations under Central Excise:

Provisions relating to power to arrest have been existing under Central Excise/Customs laws. Some considerations under the said laws are set out hereafter. The same could serve as a useful guide for the purpose of the service tax.

Powers to arrest:

U/s. 13 of CEA, an Excise Officer (EO) not below the rank of Inspector, is empowered to arrest a person whom they have “reason to believe” to be liable to be punished under provisions of CEA. Such arrest can be only with prior approval of the Commissioner.

EO can arrest and inform the concerned person as to the ground of arrest. The person arrested has to be forwarded to the Magistrate and must be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours. The Magistrate may grant the bail on bond or refuse the bail and remand him to custody. Bail is at the total discretion of Court.

As per Section 50 of CrPC, a person arrested should be informed full particulars of the offence and his rights about the bail.

In Sunil Gupta vs. UOI (2000) 118 ELT8 (P&H), it was held that, even if offences under Central Excise are not cognisable, EO duly empowered u/s. 13 of CEA can arrest a person without a warrant.

In Rajni vs. UOI (2003) 156 ELT 28 (All), it was observed that, powers and duties of EO are not parallel to power of Station House Officer of the police station. As per section 155 of CrPC, investigation can be made only with order of Magistrate. EO has to follow provisions of CrPC as well as regards the arrest, or filing of complaint.
 
As per section 155 of CrPC, a police officer cannot investigate a non – cognisable case without the order of a Magistrate, A police officer cannot arrest a person who has committed a non-cognisable offence, without a warrant, as per section 2(1) of CrPC.

However, these restrictions are only to police officers. Section 13 of CEA confers substantive powers of arrest. These powers can be exercised by a duly authorised EO without a warrant of arrest. [Refer Sunil Gupta vs. UOI (2000) 118 ELT 8 (P&H)].

Arrest can be made only as per the provisions of section 46 of CrPC. Under this section, the person making arrest shall actually touch or confine the body of person to be arrested, unless the persons submit to the custody. If he resists the arrest, all necessary means may be applied to effect the arrest. However, this does not give right to cause death of a person, unless the accused of the offence is punishable to death or with imprisonment for life.

Arresting authority should make all efforts to keep a lady constable present. But in circumstances if a lady constable is not available or delay in ar-rest would impede the course of investigation, arresting officer, for reasons to be recorded in writing, can arrest a lady for lawful reasons at any time of day or night, even in absence of a lady constable [State of Maharashtra vs. Christian Community Welfare Council 2003 AIR SCW 5524.]

EO can make enquiry even after the arrest. In Badaku Joti Savani vs. State of Mysore – AIR 1966 SC 1746, it has been held by the Supreme Court that, though EO has the powers of a police officer, he is not a “police officer” unless he has powers to lodge a report u/s. 173 of CrPC. Statements made before EO even after arrest are not hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and these statements can be used as evidence against the accused.

Procedure after arrest:

The person arrested has to be forwarded to the EO who is empowered to send the arrested per-son to a Magistrate. If such empowered EO is not available within reasonable distance, the person may be sent to officer-in-charge of the nearest police station. Superintendent of CE has been empowered for this purpose. [Section 19 of CEA].

EO of the rank of Superintendent or above will make enquiry into the charges against the person arrested. While making enquiry, he has the same powers as an officer–in–charge of a police station [Section 21(1)(b) of CEA]. If he is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused person, he can forward the person to Magistrate for bail or custody, [Proviso (a) to Section 21(2) of CEA].

EO making arrest has powers to release a person on executing a bond with or without sureties, and make a report to his superior officer. He can do so if it appears to him that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of sus-picion against the accused person [Proviso (b) to section 21(2) of CEA]. Superintendent of CE and officers above him have been empowered for this purpose vide Notification No. 9/99-CE(NT) dated 10-02- 1999. However, if he is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, he shall either admit him to bail to appear before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or forward him in the custody of such Magistrate [Proviso (a) to section 21(2) of CEA].

Section 20 of CEA prescribes that the police officer shall either admit him to bail to appear before a Magistrate having jurisdiction, or in default of bail, forward him in the custody of such Magistrate. The arrested person must be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest.

Granting ‘Bail’:

‘Bail’ means a “security for prisoner’s appearance, on giving which he is released pending trial”. If offence is ‘bailable’, grant of bail is automatic and can be given by a police officer in charge of a police station or by a Court, on bond or with-out bond. Court has no discretion in the matter. In case of non–bailable offence, accused can be released on bail, unless the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, Court has discretion whether to release on bail or not in respect of non–bailable offences.

The considerations which normally weigh with the Court in granting bail in non–bailable offences are basically – (a) nature and seriousness of offence (b) character of the evidence (c) circumstances which are peculiar to the accused (d) a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured in the trial (e) reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with (f) larger interest of public or State and (g) other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal vs. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2005 SC 716 (SC 3 Member Bench)].

The basic rule is in favour of granting a bail ex-cept where the course of justice being affected, gravity or heinous nature of the crime, risk of non appearance at the trial, influencing or intimidation of witnesses and similar other possibilities exist [State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand AIR 1977 SC 2447].

In Chaman Lal vs. State of UP 2004 AIR SCW 4705, it was considered that Court dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive exploration of the merits of case is not necessary. It is necessary for the Court dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors before granting bail – (a) Nature of accusation and severity of punishment in case of conviction and nature of supporting evidence (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.

Since the words used in section 20 of CEA are “shall admit the arrested person to bail”, it was argued that the Magistrate must release the person on bail. He has no power to keep the person in judicial custody, if he gives necessary bail bond. There were divergent opinions about whether Magistrate can detain him or he must release the arrested person on bail. Finally, in Director of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan (1994) 70 ELT 12 (SC) Supreme Court has held that the Magistrate has jurisdiction u/s. 167(2) of CrPC to authorise detention of a person arrested under Customs Act etc. as provisions are identical. Thus the Magistrate may grant the bail on bond or refuse the bail and remand him to custody. Bail is at the total discretion of the Court.

In Sankarlal Saraf vs. State of West Bengal (1993) 67 ELT 477 (Cal), a division bench has held that power to grant bail, by necessary implication, includes power to refuse bail, Thus, Magistrate can refuse bail and order custody, police, jail or otherwise.

As per section 167 (2) of CrPC, a person can be kept in judicial custody for 60 days. If investigations are not completed within 60 days, the person arrested should be released on bail. The period is 90 days when offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment of 10 years or more.

Section 438 of CrPC makes provision for “anticipatory bail”. Court should grant or refuse bail after exercising its judicial discretion wisely [Director of Enforcement vs. PV Prabhakar Rao (1997) AIR 1997 SC 3868 (3 Member Bench) – quoting Gurbaksh Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) AIR 1980 SC 1632 (SC Constitution Bench).]

Conclusion

The amendments relating to penalties, prosecution & powers of arrest discussed above have been a subject of widespread expression of concerns by the trade & industry and the tax paying fraternity inasmuch as the provisions could be misused to cause undue harassment by the tax authorities.

In para 3 of TRU Circular No DOF No. 334/3/2013 TRU dated 28 -02-2013, it is clarified that policy wing of CBEC will issue detailed instructions in due course of time. It is felt that CBEC should issue a draft circular and seek views of trade & industry and all affected persons before finalising such instructions.
 

Table —Summary of Punishment for various offences

   

Dilip Sambhaji Shirodkar vs. ITO ITAT “D” Bench, Mumbai Before P.M.Jagtap (A.M.) and Dr S.T.M. Pavalan (J. M.) ITA No.8899/Mum/2010 Assessment Year: 2006-07. Decided on 12.06.2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Jitnedra Jain & Sachin Romani / Rajarshi Dwivedy

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 69 – Acquisition of a flat in lieu of the surrender of a tenancy right – Existence of difference in value between consideration for tenancy right acquired and the value of the new flat received in lieu thereof not sufficient ground for making addition.

Facts:
The assessee was an individual engaged in the occupation of goldsmith. In his return of income he had declared a total income at Rs. 0.80 lakh. The AO, in assessment made u/s.143(3) found that during the year under consideration the assessee had purchased a property worth Rs. 50.35 lakh. The AO treated this impugned investment as unexplained and made an addition of Rs.50.35 lakh u/s.69. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the assessee submitted that he had acquired tenancy right as per Agreement dated 09-04-2001 for a sum of Rs. 4 lakh. Thereafter, pursuant to the agreement dated 07-10-2005, the assessee was allotted a flat in another building in lieu of surrender of his tenancy right. The value of the flat allotted in lieu of surrender of tenancy right was Rs. 50.35 lakh as per the valuation done by the Stamp Duty Authorities, while registering the agreement. He further submitted that the consideration on the surrender of the tenancy rights, equal to the value of the new flat, stood fully invested in a residential flat, the Long Term Capital Gain arising on the said transaction was not chargeable to tax u/s.54F. The contention of the revenue was that the assessee had not been able to prove that he had received the flat by virtue of the surrender of tenancy rights.

Held:

The tribunal agreed with the assessee that the agreement dated 07-10-2005 clearly indicated that the new flat was acquired by the assessee in lieu of surrender of his tenancy right in the old building. The perusal of the agreement dated 09-04-2001, also indicated that the old tenants transferred the tenancy rights in respect of the said property to the assessee for a consideration of Rs. 4 lakh. Secondly, as regards the reasoning of the CIT(A) that the acquisition value of Rs. 4 lakh had not been paid by the assessee, the tribunal found merit in the contention of the assessee that the same had been by way of constructive payment made by the builder on behalf of the assessee, which according to it was not a new practice of the developer in business of construction industry. Thirdly, regarding the finding of the lower authorities as to the difference in values between the consideration for relinquishment of rights by the old tenant (Rs.4 lakh) and the market value of the new flat (more than Rs.50 lakh), the tribunal opined that it was beyond the purview of the lower authorities to suspect a transaction solely on the ground of adequacy/inadequacy of consideration in the absence of any other corroborating evidence and thereby making any adverse inferences. Further, the value as adopted by AO was based on the valuation determined by the stamp duty authorities while registering the agreement dated 07-10-2005. Therefore, it held that mere suspicion without evidence on record could not be the basis for making an addition to income u/s. 69 and hence, the addition made was deleted.

levitra

MITC Rolling Mills P. Ltd. vs ACIT ITAT “B” Banch, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan, (V.P.) and Rajendra, (A. M.) ITA No.2789/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 13.05.2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: T. M. Gosher / Mohit Jain

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 32(1)(iia) – Additional depreciation on Plant and Machinery – Where the plant and machineries were put into use for less than 180 days in the year of installation and hence, disentitled the assessee to the 50% of the additional amount of depreciation, the assessee was entitled to the balance 50% of the additional depreciation in the subsequent year.
Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of iron and steel. Assessee installed certain new plant and machinery after September, 2007. For the previous year relevant to A. Y. 2008-09 the plant and machinery having been put to operation for less than 180 days the assessee claimed only 50% of the additional depreciation and the balance 50% was claimed in the previous year relevant to A. Y. 2009-10, which is the year under appeal. The AO as well as the CIT(A) were of the opinion that the assessee was not entitled to claim balance 50% deprecation in the subsequent year u/s. 32(1)(iia) of the Act. The case of the assessee was that it is a onetime incentive allowed to the assessee under the Act where the object was to encourage establishment of industries and hence, balance 50% was allowable in the year under consideration.

Held:
The tribunal placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Delhi tribunal:

i. DCIT vs. Cosmo Films Ltd. 139 ITD 628

ii. ACIT vs. Sil Investment Ltd. 54 SOT 54

The tribunal noted that as per the Delhi tribunal, there was no restriction on allowing balance of one time incentive in the subsequent year if the provisions are constructed reasonably, liberally and in a purposive manner. According to it, the additional benefit was intended to give impetus to industrialisation and in that direction the assessee was entitled to get the benefit in full when there was no restriction in the statute to deny the benefit of balance 50% when the new plant and machinery was acquired and put to use for less than 180 days in the immediately preceding year. Accordingly, it was held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation in the subsequent year if the entire depreciation was not allowed in the first year of installation.

levitra

Apollo Tyres vs. DCIT ITAT Cochin Bench Before N. R. S. Ganesan (JM) and B. R. Baskaran (AM) ITA No. 31/Coch/2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 29th May, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Percy J. Pardiwala, T. P. Ostwal and Indra Anand, Madhur Agarwal/M. Anil Kumar

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 40(a)(ia) – Section 40(a)(ia) does not envisage a situation where there was short deduction/lesser deduction as in case of section 201(1A) and therefore in case of short/lesser deduction of tax, the entire expenditure whose genuineness was not doubted by the AO cannot be disallowed.

Facts:

The assessee made payments on which tax deductible at source was deducted at a rate lower than the rate at which tax ought to have been deducted. The short deduction was due to surcharge not being considered in some cases and in some cases rate applicable to sub-contractors was applied instead of applying the rate for payment to contractors. The AO disallowed a sum of Rs. 68,68,556 u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal after having considered the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) and section 201(1A) of the Act held as follows :

In section 201(1A) the legislature intended to levy interest even in case of short deduction of tax. In other words, if any part of the tax which was required to be deducted was found to be not deducted then interest u/s. 201(1A) can be levied in respect of that part of the amount which was not deducted whereas the language of section 40(a)(ia) does not say that even for short deduction disallowance has to be made proportionately. Therefore, the legislature has clearly envisaged in section 201(1A) for levy of interest on the amount on which tax was not deducted whereas the legislature has omitted to do so in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. In other words, provisions of section 40(a)(ia) do not enable the AO to disallow any proportionate amount for short deduction or lesser deduction.

The Mumbai Bench found that short deduction of TDS, if any, could have been considered as liability under the Income-tax Act as due from the assessee. Therefore, the disallowance of the entire expenditure, whose genuineness was not doubted by the AO is not justified. A similar view was also taken by the Kolkatta Bench of the Tribunal in the case of CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal. In this case, on appeal by the revenue, the Calcutta High Court confirmed the order of the Kolkatta Bench of the Tribunal (ITA No. 183 of 2012, GA No. 2069 of 2012 judgment dated 3.12.2012).

Section 40(a)(ia) does not envisage a situation where there was short deduction/lesser deduction as in case of section 201(1A) of the Act. Therefore, in case of short/lesser deduction of tax, the entire expenditure whose genuineness was not doubted by the AO cannot be disallowed.

This ground of appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

levitra

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 109 dated June 11, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Processing and Settlement of Export related receipts facilitated by Online Payment Gateways – Enhancement of the value of transaction

Presently, banks can offer facility to repatriate export related remittances by entering into standing arrangements with Online Payment Gateway Service Providers (OPGSP) for export of goods and services for value not exceeding US $ 3,000 per transaction.

This circular has increased this limit from US $ 3,000 to US $ 10,000 per transaction. Hence, banks can now offer facility to repatriate export related remittances by entering into standing arrangements with Online Payment Gateway Service Providers (OPGSP) for export of goods and services for value not exceeding US $ 10,000 per transaction.

levitra

Gift Tax – Deemed Gift – Whether there is deemed gift of bonus shares (retained by the Donee) by the Donor in the year of revocation of gift of shares with proviso that gift shall not include bonus shares? – Matter remanded.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Satya Nand Munjal vs. CGT (2013) 350 ITR 640(SC)

On 20th February, 1982, the assessee, being the absolute owner of 6000 fully paid up equity shares of the face value of Rs. 25 each of M/s. Hero Cycles (P) Ltd., executed a deed of revocable transfer in favour of M/s. Yogesh Chandran and Brothers Associates (the transferee). Under the deed the assessee could, on completion of 74 months from the date of transfer but before the expiry of 82 months from the said date, exercise the power of revoking the gift. In other words, the assessee left a window of eight months within which the gift could be revoked.

The deed of revocable transfer specifically stated that the gift shall not include any bonus shares or right shares received and/or accruing or coming to the transferee from M/s. Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. (the company) by virtue of ownership or by virtue of the shares gifted by the assessee and standing in the name of the transferee. Effectively therefore, only a gift of 6,000 equity shares was made by the assessee to the transferee.

On 29th September, 1982, the company issued bonus shares and since the transferee was a holder of the gifted equity shares, 4,000 bonus shares of the said company were allotted to the transferee by the company. Similarly, on 31st May, 1986, another 10,000 bonus shares were allotted to the transferee by the company. 

Thereafter, during the window of eight months, the assessee revoked the gift on 15th June, 1988, with the result that the 6,000 shares gifted to the transferee came back to the assessee. However, the 14,000 bonus shares allotted to the transfree while it was the holder of the equity shares of the company continued with the transferee.

Assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1982-83

For the assessment year 1982-83, the Gift-tax Officer passed an assessment order on 17th February 1987, in respect of the assessee. He held that the revocable transaction entered into by the assessee was only for the purpose of reducing the tax liability. As such, it could not be accepted as a valid gift. For arriving at this conclusion, the Assessing Officer relied upon McDowell and Co. Ltd. vs. CTO [1985] 154 ITR 148 (SC). Accordingly, the Assessing Officer, while holding the gift to be void, made the assessment on a protective basis.

Feeling aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Gift Tax (Appeals), but found no success. The Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals) however, held that since the gift was void, a protective assessment could not be made.

The assessee then preferred a further appeal to the Tribunal and by its order dated 23rd August 1991, allowing the appeal; the Tribunal held that the revocable gift to be valid. It was noted the concept of a revocable transfer by way of gift was recognised by section 6(2) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (“the Act”). The value of the gift in such a case was to to calculated in terms of rule 11 of the Gift-tax Rules 1958.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the Revenue took up the matter in appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By its judgement and order in CGT vs. Satya Nand Munjal [2002] 256 ITR 516 (P&H) the High Court dismissed the appeal and held:

“It is a legitimate attempt on the part of the assessee to save money by following a legal method. If on account of a lacuna in the law or otherwise the assessee is able to avoid payment of tax within the letter of law, it cannot be said that the action is void because it is intended to save payment of tax. So long as the law exists in its present form, the taxpayer is entitled to take its advantage. We find no ground to accept the contention that merely because the gift was made with the purpose of saving on payment of wealth tax, it needs to be ignored.”

Assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1989-90

On 30th January, 1996, the Gift-tax Officer issued a notice to the assessee u/s. 16(1) of the Act to the effect that for the assessment year 1989-90 the gift made by the assessee was chargeable to gift-tax and that it had escaped assessment year. The assessee responded to the notice by simply stating that there is no gift that had escaped assessment.

On 24th March, 1998, the Assessing Officer passed a reassessment order for the assessment year 1989-90. While doing so, he framed two issues for consideration: firstly, whether the transferee becomes the owner of the bonus shares particularly because the shares have been received by it as a result of a revocable transfer; secondly, whether the bonus shares received by the transferee could be described as a benefit by the transferee from the transferred shares.

The Assessing Officer held that the transferee does not become the owner of the gifted shares until the transfer is an irrevocable transfer. Proceedings on this basis, it was held that the 14,000 bonus shares allotted to the transferee were a part and parcel of the gifted shares and the assessee only took back 6,000 shares from the transferee pursuant to the revocable gift. Consequently, it was held that the assessee had surrendered his right to get back 14,000 bonus shares which were treated as a gift by the assessee to the transferee in view of the provisions of section 4(1)(c) of the Act. The assessee was taxed accordingly.

Feeling aggrieved by the reassessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals). By his order dated 8th September, 1998, the Commissioner held that since there was no regular transfer of the bonus shares, the transferee could not claim any ownership of the shares. The Commissioner also referred to McDowell and Co. Ltd. and held that the assessee had carefully planned his affairs in such a manner as to deprive the Revenue of a substantial amount of gift-tax. The reassessment order was accordingly upheld.

The assessee then took up the matter with the Tribunal which held in its order dated 23rd May, 2000, that in view of the assessment to gift-tax made in respect of the assessee for the assessment year 1982-83, the notice issued u/s. 16(1) of the Act was merely a change of opinion and, as such the reassessment proceedings could not have been taken up. On the merits of the case, it was noted that neither the dividend income on the bonus shares nor their value had been taxed in the hands of the assessee. Consequently, the assessee was liable to succeed on the merits of the case also. The gift-tax reassessment was accordingly quashed by the Tribunal. The Revenue then came up in appeal before the High Court with the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in quashing the gift tax assessment in the assessee’s case?”

In the impugned order, the High Court held that the assessee was liable to gift-tax on the value of the bonus shares which were a gift made by the assessee to the transferee. It was held that the bonus shares were income from the original shares by relying upon Escorts Farms (Ramgarh) Ltd. vs. CIT [1996] 222 ITR 509 (SC). Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the reassessment order upheld.

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, the Supreme Court observed that the fundamental question before the High Court was whether there was in fact a gift of 14,000 bonus shares made by the assessee to the transferee. According to the Supreme Court the answer to this question lay in the interpretation of section 4(1)(c) of the Act, but a perusal of the impugned judgment and order facially indicated that there had been no consideration of the provisions of section 4(1) (c) of the Act.

The submission of the learned counsel for the assessee is that on an interpretation of section 4(1)(c) of the Act, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination, that the assessee had made a gift of 14,000 bonus shares to the transferee in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1989-90.

The Supreme Court however, was not inclined to decide this issue finally since it did not have the view of the High Court on the interpretation of section 4(1)(c) of the Act. Nor did it have the view of the High Court on the applicability or otherwise of the principle laid down in McDowell and Co. Ltd.

As far as the applicability of Escorts Farms is concerned, the Supreme Court observed that the question that arose for consideration in that case was the determination of the cost of acquisition of the original shares when bonus shares are subsequently issued. That is the second part of section 4(1)(c) of the Act and that question would arise (if at all) only after finding is given by the High Court on the first part of section 4(1)(c) of the Act.

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for de novo consideration by the High Court keeping in mind the provisions of section 4(1)(c) of the Act as well as the orders passed in the case of the assessee for the assessment year 1982-83.

Depreciation – Assessee is entitled to depreciation in respect of vehicles financed by it but registered in the name of third parties and is eligible to claim it at a higher rate where such vehicles are used in the business of running on hire.

fiogf49gjkf0d
I.C.D.S. Ltd. vs. CIT & Anr. (2013) 350 ITR 527 (SC)

The assessee a public limited company, classified by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as a non-banking finance company was engaged in the business of hire purchase, leasing and real estate, etc. The vehicles, on which depreciation was claimed, were stated to have been purchased by the assessee against direct payment to the manufactures. The assessee as a part of its business, leased out their vehicles to its customers and therefore, had no physical affiliation with the vehicles. In fact, lesse were registered as the owners of the vehicles, in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”).

In its return of income for the relevant assessment years, the assessee claimed, among other heads, depreciation in relation to certain assets, (additions made to the trucks) which, as explained above, had been financed by the assessee but registered in the name of third parties. The assessee also claimed depreciation at the higher rate on the ground that the vehicles were used in the business of running on hire.

The Assessing Officer disallowed claims, both of depreciation and higher rate, on the ground that the assessee’s use of these vehicles was only by way of leasing out to other and not as actual user of the vehicles in the business of running them on hire. It had merely financed the purchase of these assets and was neither the owner nor used of these assets. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeals to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). In so far as the question of depreciation at normal rate was concerned, the Commissioner (Appeals) agreed with the assessee. However, the assessee’s claim for depreciation at higher rate did not find favour with the Commissioner.

Being aggrieved, both the assessee and the Revenue carried the matter further in appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). The Tribunal agreed with the assessee on both the counts.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Bombay High Court u/s. 260A of the Act. The High Court framed the following substantial questions of law for its adjudication :

“Whether the appellant (assessee) is the owner of the vehicles which are leased out by it to its customers and whether the appellant (assessee) is entitled to the higher rate of depreciation on the said vehicles, on the ground that they were hired out to the appellant’s customers.”

Answering both the questions in favour of the Revenue, the High Court held that in view of the fact that the vehicles were not registered in the name of the assessee, and that the assessee had only financed the transaction, it could not be held to be the owner of the vehicles, and thus, was not entitled do claim depreciation in respect of these vehicles.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, it was held that the provision on depreciation in the Act reads that the asset must be “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business”. Therefore, it imposes a twin requirement of “ownership” and “usage for business” for a successful claim u/s. 32 of the Act.

Before the Supreme Court, the Revenue attacked both legs of this portion of the section by contending: (i) that the assessee is not the owner of the vehicles in question, and (ii) that the assessee did not use these trucks in the course of its business. It was argued that depreciation can be claimed by an assessee only in a case where the assessee is both the owner and user of the asset.

The Supreme Court dealt with the second contention before considering the first. The Revenue argued before the Supreme Court that since the lessees were actually using the vehicles, they were the ones entitled to claim depreciation and not the assessee. The Supreme Court was not persuaded to agree with the argument. According to the Supreme Court, the section requires that the assessee must use the asset for the “purposes of business”. It does not mandate usage of the asset by the assessee itself. As long as the asset is utilised for the purpose of business of the assessee, the requirement of section 32 will stand satisfied notwithstanding non-usage of the asset itself by the assessee. The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the assessee was a leasing company which leased out trucks that it purchased. Therefore, on a combined reading of section 2(13) and section 2(24) of the Act, the income derived from leasing of the trucks would be business income or income derived in the course of business, and has been so assessed. Hence, it fulfilled the aforesaid second requirement of section 32 of the Act, viz., that the asset must be used in the course of business. The assessee did use the vehicles in the courses of its leasing business. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the fact that the trucks themselves were not used the assessee was irrelevant for the purpose of the section.

Dealing with the first requirement, i.e., the issue of ownership, the Supreme Court held that no depreciation allowance is granted in respect of any capital expenditure which the assessee may be obliged to incur on the property of other. Therefore, the entire case hangs on the question of ownership. If the assessee is the owner of the vehicles, then he will be entitled to the claim on depreciation, otherwise, not.

The Supreme Court noted that definitions of ‘owner’, ‘ownership’ and ‘own’ given in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) and observed that these definitions essentially made ownership a function of legal right or title against the rest of the world. However, as seen therein, it is “nomen generalissimum, and its meaning is to be gathered from the connection in which it is used, and from the subject-matter to which it is applied.”

According to the Supreme Court scrutiny of the material facts at hand raised a presumption of ownership in favour of the assessee. The vehicle, along with its keys, was delivered to the assessee upon which, the lease agreement was entered into by the assessee with the customer.

The Supreme Court noted that the Revenue’s objection to the claim of the assessee was founded on the lease agreement. It argued that at the end of the lease period, the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the lessee at a nominal value not exceeding 1 per cent of the original cost of the vehicle, making the assessee in effect a financier. However, the Supreme Court was not persuaded to agree with the Revenue. According to the Supreme Court as long as the assessee had a right to retain the legal title of the vehicle against the rest of the world, it would be the owner of the vehicle in the eyes of law. A scrutiny of the sale agreement could not be the basis of raising question against the ownership of the vehicle. The clues qua ownership lie in the lease agreement itself, which clearly pointed in favour of the assessee.

The Supreme Court observed that the only hindrance to the claim of the assessee, which was also the lynchpin of the case of the Revenue, was section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which defines ownership as follows:

‘Owner’ means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject or hire-purchase agreement, or a agreement of lease or an agreement of a hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.”

The Supreme Court noted that the general open-ing words of the aforesaid section 2(30) say that the owner of a motor vehicle is the one in whose name it is registered, which, in the present case, is the lessee. The subsequent specific statement on leasing agreements states that in respect of a vehicle given on lease, the lessee who is in possession shall be the owner. The Revenue before the Supreme Court thus, argued that in case of ownership of vehicles, the test of ownership is the registration and certification. Since the certificates were in the name of the lessee, they would be the legal owners of the vehicles and the ones entitled to claim deprecation. Therefore, the general and specific statements on ownership construe ownership in favour of the lessee, and, hence, were in favour of the Revenue.

According to the Supreme Court, there was no merit in the Revenue’s arguments for more than one reason:

(i)    Section 2(30) is a deeming provision that creates a legal fiction of ownership in favour of lessee only for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act. It defines ownership for the subsequent provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, not for the purpose of law in general. It serves more as a guide to what terms in the Motor Vehicles Act mean. Therefore, if the Motor Vehicles Act at any point uses the term owner in any section, it means the one in whose name the vehicle is registered and in the case of a lease agreement, the lessee. That is all. It is not a statement of law on ownership in general. Perhaps, the repository of a general statement law on ownership may be the Sale of Goods Act;

ii)    Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act must be read in consonance with s/s. (4) and (5) of section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Motor Vehicles Act in terms of s/s. (4) and (5) of section 51 mandates that during the period of lease, the vehicle be registered, in the certificate of registration, in the name of the lessee and, on conclusion of the lease period, the vehicle be registered in the name of the lessor as owner. The section leaves no choice to the lessor but to allow the vehicle to be registered in the name of the lessee. Thus, no inference can be drawn from the registration certificate as to ownership of the legal title of the vehicle; and

(iii)    If the lessee was in fact the owner, he would have claimed depreciation on the vehicles, which, as specifically recorded in the order of the Appellate Tribunal, was not done. It would be a strange situation to have no claim of depreciation in case of particular depreciable asset due to a vacuum of ownership. The entire lease rent received by the assessee is assessed as business income in its hands and the entire lease rent paid by the lessee has been treated as deductible revenue expenditure in the hands of the leassee. This reaffirms the posision that the assessee is in fact that owner of the vehicle, in so far as section 32 of the Act is concerned.

Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the Supreme Court held that the lessor, i.e., the assessee was the owner of the vehicles. As the owner, it used the assets in the course of its business, satisfying both requirements of section 32 of the Act, and, hence, was entitled to claim depreciation in respect of additions made to the trucks, which were leased out.

With regard to the claim of the assessee for a higher rate of depreciation, the Supreme Court held that the import of the same term “purposes of business”, used in the second proviso to section 32(1) of the Act gained significance. According to the Supreme Court the interpretation of these words would not be any different from that which it ascribed to them earlier, u/s. 32(1) of the Act. Therefore, the assessee fulfilled even the requirements for a claim of a higher rate of depreciation, and hence, was entitled to the same.

In this regard, the Supreme Court inter alia endorsed the following observations of the Tribunal, which clinched the issue in favour of the assessee.

“15. The Central Board of Direct Taxes, vide Circular No.652, dated 14th June, 1993, has clarified that the higher rate of 40 per cent in case of lorries, etc., plying on hire shall not apply if the vehicle is used in a non-hiring business of the assessee. This circular cannot be read out of its context to deny higher appreciation in case of leased vehicles when the actual use in hiring business.

Perhaps, the author meant that when the actual use of the vehicle is in hire business, it is entitled for depreciation at a higher rate.”

Search and seizure – Block Assessment – Undisclosed Income – If the search is conducted after the expiry of the due date of filing return, payment of advance tax or deduction of tax at source is irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income – The ‘disclosure of income’ is disclosure of total income in a valid return u/s. 139.

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. A. R. Enterprises, (2013) 350 ITR 489 (SC)

The assessee firm came into existence on 25th June 1992. On 23rd February, 1996, a search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out at the premises of another concern, viz., M/s. A.R. Mercantile P. Ltd. During the course of the search, certain books and documents pertaining to the assessee, i.e., M/s. A.R. Enterprises, were seized. On scrutiny, the Assessing Officer found that though the assessee had taxable income for the assessment year 1995-96, no return of income had been filed (due to be filed on or before 31st October, 1995) till the date of the search. Based on the material seized by virtue of the aforesaid search, the Assessing Officer was satisfied that the assessee had not disclosed its income pertaining to the assessment year 1995-96. Accordingly (without recording any reasons for his satisfaction), he initiated action u/s. 158BD of the Act requiring the assessee to file its return of income. The assessee, after filing return for the block period (ten years preceding the previous years), which covered the assessment years 1993-94 to 1995- 96, pointed out that it had already filed returns for the assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95. It objected to action initiated under Chapter XTV-B of the Act on the ground that in relation to the assessment year 1995-96, advance tax had already been paid in three installments and, therefore, income for that period could not be deemed to be undisclosed.

Rejecting the plea of the assessee, the Assessing Officer formed the opinion that the assessee had failed to file the return as on the date of search, and the seized documents did show income, which had not been or would not have been declared. Accordingly, he proceeded to compute the total undisclosed income for the block period 1993-94 to 1995-96 (up to the date of search), treating the income returned by the assessee for the period 1995-96 as nil, as stipulated in section 158BB(1)(c) of the Act.

Against the said order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. Accepting the stand of the assessee, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, and held that having paid the advance tax, the assessee had disclosed his income for the relevant assessment year.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madras u/s. 260A of the Act, questioning the validity of the order of the Tribunal.

Before the High Court, the stand of the Revenue was that since the return for the assessment year 1995-96 had not filed by the due date, by filing the return after the search, the assessee could not escape the consequences as stipulated in Chapter XIV-B of the Act. It was contended that payment of advance tax by itself did not establish the intention to disclose the income.

The Revenue’s plea did not find favour with the High Court. It observed that payment of advance tax itself necessarily implies disclosure of the income on which the advance is paid.

The short question for consideration before the Supreme Court was therefore whether payment of advance tax by an assessee would by itself tantamount to disclosure of income for the relevant assessment year and whether such income can be treated as undisclosed income for the purpose of application of Chapter XIV-B of the Act?

The Supreme Court held that “undisclosed income” is defined by section 158B as that income “which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act”. The Legislature has chosen to define “undisclosed income” in terms of income not disclosed, without providing any definition of “disclosure” of income in the first place. The Supreme Court was of the view that the only way of disclosing income, on the part of an assessee, is through filing of a return, as stipulated in the Act, and, therefore, an “undisclosed income” signifies income not stated in the return filed. According to the Supreme Court, it seemed that the Legislature had clearly carved out two scenarios for income to be deemed as undisclosed : (i) where the income has clearly not been disclosed, and (ii) where the income would not have been disclosed. If a situation is covered by any one of the two, income would be undisclosed in the eyes of the Act and, hence, subject to the machinery provisions of Chapter XIV-B. The second category viz, where income would not have been disclosed, contemplates the likelihood of disclosure, it is a presumption of the intention of the assessee since in concluding that as assessee would or would not have disclosed income, one is ipso facto making a statement with respect to whether or not the assessee possessed the intention to do the same. To gauge this, however, reliance must be placed on the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.

One such fact, as claimed by the the assessee, is the payment of advance tax. However, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the degree of its material significance depended on the time at which the search is conducted in relation to the due date for filing return. Depending on which side of the due date the search was conducted, material significance of payment of advance taxes vacillated in construing the intention of the assessee. If the search was conducted after the expiry of the due date for filing return, payment of advance tax was irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income. Such a situation would find place which the first category carved out by section 158B of the Act, i.e. where income has clearly not been disclosed. The existence of an intention to disclose did not arise since, as held earlier, the opportunity of disclosure had lapsed, i.e., through filing or return of income by the due date. If, on the other hand, search was conducted prior to the due date for filing return, the opportunity to disclose income or, in other words, to file return and disclose income still existed. In which case, payment of advance tax may be a material fact for deciding whether an assessee intended to disclose. An assessee is entitled to make the legitimate claim that even though the search or the documents recovered, show an income earned by him, he has paid advance tax for the relevant assessment year and has an opportunity to declare the total income, in the return of income, which he would file by the due date. Hence, the fulcrum of such a decision is the due date for filing of return of income visà- vis date of search. Payment of advance tax may be a relevant factor in construing the intention to disclose income or filing return as long as the assessee continues to have an opportunity to file return and disclose his income and not past the due date of filing return. Therefore, there can be no generic rule as to the significance of payment of advance tax in construing the intention of disclosure of income. The same depends on the facts of the case, and hinges on the positioning of the search operations qua the due date for filing returns.

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the question that whether payment of advance by an assessee per se is tantamount to disclosure of total income, for the relevant assessment year, at the very outset had to be answered in the negative. On further scrutiny, according to the Supreme Court there was yet another reason to opine so. Payment of advance tax and filing of return are functions of completely different notions of income i.e. estimated income and total income respectively. The payment of advance tax is based on an estimation of the total income that is chargeable to tax and not on the total income itself. According to section 209(1)(a), the assessee shall first estimate his “current income” and thereafter pay income tax calculated on this estimated income on the rates in force in the relevant financial year. This income is an estimation that is made by the assessee and may not be the exact income, which may ultimately be declared u/s. 139 and assessed u/s. 143. The payment of advance tax does not absolve an assessee from obligation to file return disclosing total income u/s. 139. Hence, the ‘disclosure of income’ is the disclosure of the total income in a valid return u/ s. 139, subject to assessment and chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that in the instant case, after the search was conducted on 23rd February 1996, it was found that for the assessment year 1995-96, the assessee had not filed its return of income by the due date. It was only when the block proceedings were initiated by the Assessing Officer, that the assessee filed its return for the said assessment year on 11th July, 1996 u/s. 158BC showing its total income at Rs. 7,02,768. The Supreme Court held that since the assessee had not filed its return of income by the due date, the Assessing Officer was correct in assuming that the assessee would not have disclosed its total income.

Note 1: During the course of hearing, the counsel for the assessee relying upon the decision in Asst. CIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon (2010) 321 ITR 362 (SC) for the first time contended that the Revenue did not have jurisdiction to invoke Chapter XIV-B against the assessee as the Assessing Officer had not recorded his satisfaction that any undisclosed income belonged to the assessee or that the assessee did not have the intention to disclose their income before initiating proceeding u/s. 158BD. The Supreme Court however was unable to appreciate the submission since the same was never urged before the High Court and the Tribunal and refrained from making any observations on it.

Note 2: In CIT vs. Nachammai [C.A. No.2580 of 2010], a companion appeal, the issue was whether tax deduction at source amounts to disclosure of income. The Supreme Court held that since the tax to be deducted at source is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee for the relevant financial year, such deduction cannot result in the disclosure of total income.

Deemed Registration and Time Limit for Disposal of Application for Registration of Charitable Trusts u/s.12AA

fiogf49gjkf0d
Issue for Consideration
Every charitable or religious trust, seeking exemption of its income under the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is required to be registered with the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s. 12AA. The procedure for such registration is laid down in section 12AA. S/s. (2) of section 12AA provides that every order, granting or refusing registration by the Commissioner, shall be passed before the expiry of 6 months from the end of the month in which the application u/s. 12A, made by the trust, was received by him.

Since the section does not specifically mention the consequences of non-disposal of the application by the Commissioner within the specified time limit, a controversy has arisen as to what would be the consequences in such a situation. One view is that the trust shall not be made to suffer for the inaction of the Commissioner and the registration shall be deemed to have been granted. The other view is that the trust shall not be granted the exemption from tax, since the same is not registered. One more view is that the time limit prescribed in section 12AA is not mandatory and the Commissioner can and should proceed with the application and take appropriate decision even after the expiry of the time limit and such decision shall have retrospective effect. While the Allahabad High Court has taken the view that in the event of such failure to pass an order, within the specified time by the Commissioner, registration shall be deemed to have been granted u/s. 12AA, as the time limit provided in the section is mandatory and no decision on the application can be taken on expiry of the time limit thereafter, a contrary view has been taken by the Madras and Orissa High Courts to the effect that such a time limit is not mandatory, and that non-disposal of the application shall not result in the deemed registration of the trust and till such time as registration is granted, the trust shall be treated as not registered and non-registration of the trust shall result in denial of the exemption from tax so however the Commissioner shall pass the appropriate orders on the application of the assessee at the earliest though after the expiry of the prescribed time. In short, according to the latest view, the registration cannot be deemed to have been granted and the Commissioner is empowered to deal with and should deal with the application even after the expiry of the time specified in section 12AA.

Society for the Promotion of Education Adventure Sport’s case:

The issue came up before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment vs. CIT 216 CTR (All) 167.

The assessee was a society running a school, whose income was entitled to exemption u/s. 10(22). On omission of section 10(22), it applied for registration u/s. 12A. No decision however was taken by the Commissioner on its application within the time limit of 6 months fixed by section 12AA (2), and in fact, no decision was taken, even after a lapse of almost 5 years. On account of such delay, large tax demands were raised on the assessee. The assessee filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the tax demands.

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the registration
should be deemed to have been granted after the expiry of the period
prescribed u/s. 12AA(2), if no decision had been taken on the
application for registration. Reliance was placed on various decisions
of the Allahabad High Court, which had held that where an application
for extension of time was moved, but was not decided, it would be deemed
to have been allowed; that given the fact that the CIT was required to
give an opportunity to the applicant before refusing registration and
that reasons for refusal were required to be given by the CIT in his
order, the absence of any such opportunity and the order of the CIT
should be taken to mean that he had not found any reason for refusing
registration;, that the legislative intent wasevident by the fact that the order of the CIT granting registration, was not appealable by the Income Tax Department and that the laches and lapses on the part of the Income tax Department could not be to its own advantage by treating the application for registration as rejected.

On behalf of the Department, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chet Ram Vashisht vs. Municipal Corporation AIR 1981 SC 653, where the Court examined the effect of the failure on the part of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to decide an application for sanction to a layout plan within the period specified in section 313(3) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The Allahabad High Court observed that what had to be examined was the consequence of such a long delay on the part of the Income tax authorities in not deciding the assesssee’s application for registration. It noted that admittedly after the statutory limitation, the CIT would become functus officio, and he could not, on expiry of the time limit, thereafter pass any order either allowing or rejecting the registration. Obviously, the application could not be allowed to be treated as perpetually undecided. Therefore, the key question, in the opinion of the court, was whether upon lapse of the six-month period without any decision, the application for registration should be treated as rejected or it should be treated as allowed.

The Allahabad High Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision cited on behalf of the revenue, in Chet Ram Vashist’s case (supra), by pointing out that the said decision dealt with a different statute and that one of the important aspects considered by the Supreme Court for taking view in that case that the sanction of the layout was mandatory and could not be deemed to have been granted on expiry of the time limit, was the purpose and objective behind of the provision requiring sanction of the layout plans. The High Court noted that under the relevant provision of the said statute, there was involved an element of public interest, namely, to prevent unplanned and haphazard development or construction to the detriment of the public and any sanction or deemed sanction of a layout plan entailing constructions being carried out, would create an irreversible situation. The Allahabad High Court noted that in the case before it, there was no such element of public interest in the case before it under the provisions of section 12A; that taking a view that non-consideration of the registration application within the time limit would result in deemed registration might, at the worst, cause loss of some revenue or income tax, payable by that individual trust.

The Allahabad High Court compared the act of non-disposal of an application with a situation where the assessing authority failed to make assessment or reassessment within the prescribed limitation, which also led occasionally to loss of revenue from that individual assessee. It observed that taking the contrary view and holding that not taking of a decision within the time limit was of no consequence would leave the assessee totally at the mercy of the tax authorities, as the assessee had not been provided any remedy under the Act against non-decision by the Commissioner on an application by the assessee.

The Allahabad High Court observed that taking the view of deemed registration did not create any irreversible situation, because the CIT had the power to cancel registration u/s. 12AA(3) if he was satisfied that the objects of such trust were not genuine or the activities were not being carried out in accordance with its objects and the only drawback might be that such cancellation would operate only prospectively. The deemed registration, in the court’s view, furthered the object and purpose of the statutory provision.

Considering the pros and cons of the two views, the Allahabad High Court held that the non-consideration of the application for registration within the time fixed by section 12AA(2) led to the deemed grant of registration as there was no good reason to make the assessee suffer merely because the Income Tax Department was not able to keep its officers under check and control and take timely decisions in such simple matters such as consideration of applications for registration, even within the long six-month period provided by section 12AA(2).

The Allahabad High Court therefore directed the Commissioner to treat the assessee as an institution approved and registered u/s. 12AA, to recompute its income by applying the provisions of section 11, and to issue a formal certificate of approval forthwith.

Sheela Christian Charitable Trust’s case:
The issue later also came up before the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust 354 ITR 478 (Mad).

In this case, the trust created in August 2003, made a delayed application for registration u/s. 12AA in August 2005 without a specific request for condonation of delay being filed. It had not filed the accounts since its inception along with the application. Since details of activities and copy of accounts were not filed with the Commissioner, he merely lodged the application and did not process the same. A second application was made in April 2007, seeking retrospective registration from April 2005. This application was rejected by the Commissioner. On appeal, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner to decide the matter afresh, after giving opportunity to the assessee.

The Commissioner, as directed by the tribunal, gave an opportunity to the assessee and considered the matter afresh. This time the Commissioner granted the registration to the trust but with prospective effect. He rejected the assessee’s request to grant registration with effect from April 2005, holding that there was no just and reasonable cause for delay in filing the application.

On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that so far as condonation of delay was concerned, a pragmatic approach should be adopted and substantial cause of justice should not be denied merely on pedantic reasons. The Tribunal noted that the order granting or refusing registration should have been passed before the expiry of 6 months from the end of the month in which the application was received, and since the Commissioner kept the application pending beyond the permitted time, and it was neither accepted nor rejected within the period of 6 months, the registration should be assumed to have been granted. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Society for Promo-tion of Education Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment (supra). It therefore held that the original application of August 2005 was to be treated as accepted, and registration u/s. 12AA should be deemed to have been granted to the trust.

On behalf of the Department, on appeal against the said order of the tribunal, it was argued before the Madras High Court that the Tribunal ought to have held that the trust could not agitate the inaction of the Commissioner on its earlier application in a subsequent application filed by it for registration u/s. 12AA. It was further contended that the tribunal erred in holding that there was a deemed registration by relying on the decisions of the Orissa High Court in the case of Srikhetra, A. C. Bhakti-Vedanta Swami Charitable Trust vs. Asst. CIT (2006) 2 OLR 75 and of the Madras High Court in the case of Anjuman-E-Khyrkhah-E-Aam 354 ITR 474, for the proposition that there was no concept of deemed registration u/s. 12AA(2).

The Madras High Court analysed the provisions of section 12AA(2) and the decision of the Orissa High Court referred to above. It agreed with the Orissa High Court that the time frame laid down u/s. 12AA(2) was only directory and not mandatory and that the Commissioner could pass an order even after the expiry of the statutory time limit. It observed that section 12AA(1)(b)(i) and (ii) made it clear that there was a statutory mandate imposed on the Commissioner to pass an order in writing either registering the trust or refusing to register the trust. It noted that the Madras high court in Anjuman’s case (supra), where the Commissioner had passed an order on the last day of the time limit neither accepting nor rejecting the application but lodging the complaint instead, had rejected the concept of deemed registration and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner to afford an opportunity of hearing to the trust and to decide the matter afresh.

In view of the above, and noting that the counsel for the trust also fairly submitted to the Court that there was no question of “deemed registration” and that the matter be remitted back to the Commissioner for consideration of the matter afresh, the Madras High Court held that non-consideration of the registration application, within the prescribed time, did not amount to “deemed registration” of the trust. The Madras High Court therefore set aside the matter and remitted it back to the Commissioner for consideration of the application afresh, to pass orders after affording sufficient opportunity to the trust.

This decision of the Madras High Court was also followed by it in a subsequent decision in the case of CIT vs. Karimangalam Onriya Pengal Semipu Amaipu Ltd 354 ITR 483, where also a similar concession was given by the counsel for the trust and there also, the Madras High Court remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for consideration afresh.

Observations

The decisions of the Madras High Court seem to have been significantly influenced by the decision of the Orissa High Court in Bhakti-Vedanta Swami Charitable Trust’s case. In that case, the delayed application was made in August 2004, but was claimed to have been misplaced by the tax authorities and was made significantly without a request for condonation of delay. The Orissa High Court observed in that case, as under:

“In our view, the period of 6 months as provided in s/s. (2) of section 12AA is not mandatory. Though the word “shall” has been used, but it is well known that to ascertain whether a provision is mandatory or not, the expression “shall” is not always decisive. It is also well known that whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory has to be ascertained not only from the wording of the statute, but also from the nature and design of the statute and the purpose which it seeks to achieve. Herein the time-frame under s/s. (2) of section 12AA of the Act has been so provided to exclude any delay or lethargic approach in the matter of dealing with such appli-cation. Since the consequence for non-compliance with the said timeframe has not been spelt out in the statute, this Court cannot hold that the said time limit is mandatory in nature, nor the period of six months has been couched in negative words. Most of the time, negative words indicate a mandatory intent. This Court is also of the opinion that when public duty is to be performed by the public authorities, the time limit which is granted by the statute is normally not mandatory but is directory in the absence of any clear statutory intent to the contrary. See Montréal Street Railway Company vs. Normandin AIR 1917 PC 142. Here, there is no such express statutory intent, nor does it follow from necessary implication.”

In this case, the Orissa High Court directed the authorities to complete the statutory exercise of deciding on the application within a period of six months from the date of the court order, and that if the registration was granted, it would relate back to the date of application. The court also levied costs on the officer for his careless attitude taken and the misleading stand taken before the court by the Department.

The Orissa High Court proceeded on the basis that the task being performed by the Commissioner was a public duty, and therefore took the view that it did that no time limit could be laid down in such a situation. On the other hand, the Allahabad High Court rightly distinguished the process of registration for a trust and noted that in such process, there was merely a tax liability of an individual trust involved, and no public element or public interest involved.

If one would take the decision of the Orissa High Court to its logical conclusion, it would mean that in every case where the time limit was exceeded, the trust would have to approach the High Courts for extending the time limits, since the Commissioner would take the stand that he cannot pass an order once the time limit has expired under the law. This would create untold difficulty for such trusts, for no fault of theirs.

The Orissa High Court decision also ignores the fact that the statute has expressly laid down a time limit for disposal of the application for registration — whereas the High Court’s view seems to be that such a time limit cannot be laid down, but is merely a guidance. As against this, the Allahabad High Court has rightly tried to sub- serve the purpose of laying down the time limit by the legislature, which is to avoid undue delays in processing of applications, which was the norm earlier.

A note may also be taken of the following observations in the decision of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 111 ITD 175, while upholding the concept of deemed registration on failure to pass an order within the specified period:

“If the application for registration is to abate because the CIT did not pass an order thereon and the assessee is asked to file another application again that would be putting, the assessee to the grind all over again for no fault of his. That consequence should be avoided. If the application is to be treated as pending, then again the CIT would be getting an extended period of limitation which the section does not allow. Further, it would be uncertain as to how long the period can be extended. The assessee cannot be kept waiting to the end of time. If it is held that the application must be deemed to have been refused, obviously the assessee must be in a position to file an appeal against the refusal to the Tribunal but it will not be able to do so in the absence of a written order containing the reasons for refusal; the appeal remedy would be rendered illusory. That consequence cannot be countenanced. Therefore by a process of exclusion, the conclusion is that the CIT must be deemed to have allowed the registration if he has not passed any order within the time prescribed. That way, the rights of the Department are also protected in the sense that it would be open to the CIT to cancel the deemed registration by invoking s/s. (3) to section 12AA, if it is otherwise permitted and the procedure prescribed therefor is followed. The assessee, if aggrieved by the cancellation of registration, has a right to appeal to the Tribunal u/s. 253(1)(c)…..

It would be incongruous to hold that while the condition that the trust or charitable institution must be registered with the CIT is mandatory or absolute, the provision that the CIT shall pass an order thereon within six months from the end of

the month in which the application was filed is merely directory, leaving it to the convenience of the CIT to pass the order at any time he likes disregarding the time-limit prescribed. That would introduce an element of uncertainty and con-fusion in the administration of the Act and may even compel trusts or institutions claiming exemption u/s. 11 to invoke Art. 226 of the Constitution. Such consequences have to be avoided. The assessments of the trust or charitable institution may in the meantime be completed rejecting the claim for exemption on the ground that it is not registered, even though the trust/charitable institution is found by the AO to satisfy the other conditions such as application of income, investment of the funds and so on. In other words, by not passing the order within the time-limit, the claim of the trust/charitable institution can be frustrated, albeit unintentionally. There is no good ground shown, nor does any appear to exist in the scheme of the Act, to hold that the time-limit within which the CIT has to pass an order on the application for registration of the trust or institution is merely directory. It is not merely a question of prejudice being caused to the assessee, but it is something which goes to the very root of good administration and obedience to the law. It could not have been the intention of the law that the CIT could pass the order granting or refusing registration at any time. Any provision has to be so interpreted as to advance the cause and suppress the mischief.”

The one thing that is clear is that an assessee cannot be altogether denied the benefit of tax exemption on account of the laches of the Commissioner in dealing with the assessee’s application in time; he also cannot refuse to pass an order on the application on the ground that the law prevents him in doing so after the statutorily prescribed time. In short he cannot take benefit of his lapses by inflicting punishment on the assessee. Even under the view of the Orissa and Madras High Courts, not so favourable to the assessees, the need for the Commissioner to dispose the application remaining undisposed, is not dispensed with. The courts have clearly hauled up the authorities for their inaction by awarding the costs and have directed the authorities to dispose the application within the extended time after affording opportunity to the assessee. Importantly, the courts have held that the decision of the authorities when taken shall have retrospective effect, thereby ensuring that no undue harm is caused to the assessee for no fault of his. What perhaps remains to be ensured is that the tax demand, if any, in the intervening period is not pursued and enforced and the assessee is saved the trouble of moving the courts to make the Commissioner act on his application.

The purposive interpretation adopted by the Allahabad High Court, that registration should be deemed to have been granted, however, seems to be the far better and practical view of the matter, fulfilling both the requirements of the provision and its intention. The view is strengthened by the presence of the Proviso to section 12AA(1) which provides for giving an opportunity of hearing to the assesseee, by the Commissioner, before rejecting his application for registration which in turn clearly conveys that the denial of registration on account of non disposal of application is altogether ruled out. This view has the effect of satisfying the law abiding assessee who has made the application in time and is otherwise equitous in as much as the law provides for no condonation of delay in application of the assessee.

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Third Member – Formulation point of differences and thereafter to decide: [Customs Act. 1962 Section 129 C(5)]

fiogf49gjkf0d
Amod Stampings P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs 2013 (289) ELT 421 (Guj.)

The questions of law that arose in this tax appeal was, can any order be passed by a majority, which includes the third member, when the third member admittedly holds that:

“I find that no specific point of difference has been placed before me. It appears from ‘DIFFERENCE OF OPINION’ framed by the Regular Bench that I have to concur with one of the member”

The facts are not disputed that there was difference of opinion between two learned members of the Division Bench. In view of section 129C(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 in case of difference of opinion between two members of the tribunal, the point of difference of opinion was required to be stated by the members and thereafter the matter was to be decided by a third member. The opinion of the third member would form part of the majority decision. In the facts of the present case, when the learned third member of the tribunal before whom the matter went, the differing member had not framed the point of difference of opinion. When the matter was being heard by learned third member, in his judgment, he recorded that no specific point of difference has been placed before him.

Once the learned third member found that point of difference of opinion has not been formulated by the two members of the Bench then the learned third member was required to send the matter back to the Division Bench for formulating the point of difference of opinion and only after the point of difference of opinion was formulated, decide that question. The learned third member could not say that though difference of opinion has not been framed, he has to agree or disagree with the member and accordingly he has agreed with the judicial member. The approach of the learned third member was not correct in law and he was required to send the matter back to the Bench of the two members who had differed, for formulation of the point of difference of opinion afresh so that question can be considered and decided by the learned third member.

A Division Bench of this Court in Colourtex vs. Union of India [2006 (198) ELT 169 (Guj.)] has held that exact difference has to be formulated by members of the Division Bench of the Tribunal and it is not open to them to formulate a question as to whether the appeal is to be rejected or remanded for a fresh decision for determination of duty, confiscation and penalty etc. In the present case, the question formulated by the Division Bench does not specify the requirement of s/s. (5) of section 129C of the Act. Therefore, the order passed by learned third member as well as the difference of opinion expressed, generally, by differing members without precise formulation of the point of difference cannot be entertained. The appeal was allowed. The matter was remanded to the differing members of the Tribunal to formulate point of difference in a manner required under the law and thereafter refer the matter to learned third member for decision.

levitra

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Pronouncement of the order – Gist of decision should be pronounced: Appeal to High Court – NTT – The High Court has no power to entertain an appeal, even though notification not yet issued by Govt. to set up NTT. (Customs Act 1962 S.130)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Commissioner Of Customs (SEA), Chennai vs. C.P. Aqua Culture (India) P. Ltd. (2013) (290) ELT 202 (Mad.)

The appeal of the first respondent, a private company was posted for hearing before the Appellate Tribunal on 04-06-2009 and after hearing the detailed arguments from both sides, the Appellate Tribunal pronounced the order in the open Court allowing the appeal and the gist of the said pronouncement was recorded and signed by the Members on 04-06-2009 but the matter was entrusted to the Member (Technical) for drafting a detailed order giving the reasons. Subsequently, vide internal note dated 22-06-2009, the matter was posted for re-hearing on 30-06-2009. As against the same, the first respondent Company filed the Writ Petition seeking a direction to the Appellate Tribunal to pass the detailed order in line with the pronouncement made in the open Court and gist of decision recorded and signed on 04-06-2009.

The learned single Judge, on consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the materials placed on record, allowed the Writ Petition directing the Appellate Tribunal to pass a detailed order in the appeal filed by the first respondent in consonance with the gist of the decision pronounced, recorded, signed and dated in open Court on 04-06-2009 within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. Feeling aggrieved, the Department preferred a Writ Appeal.

The main contention of the learned counsel representing the Department was that the Tribunal immediately after hearing the appeal on 04-06- 2009 observed that “appeal allowed” without recording the gist of the order, and according to him, it is only the formal expression of the Tribunal to allow the appeal in the open Court without dictating any reasoned order and such an oral order announced in open Court, but not followed by a detailed written order giving reasons, is not a valid order in the eyes of the law. He further submitted that the note dated 22-06-2009 given by the Technical Member for re-hearing of the appeal was accepted by the Vice President (Judicial Member) and, therefore, prayed for interference of this Court and also sought for directions to the Tribunal to rehear the appeal as the gist of the order was not passed by it on 04-06-2009.

The Hon’ble Court observed that though the order was pronounced in the open Court on 04-06-2009 as “Appeal allowed” and last hearing date was recorded as 04-06-2009, an endorsement has been made by the Vice-President to the Member (Technical) to the effect “for orders please” from which it is clear that the matter was entrusted to the Member (Technical) for drafting a detailed order. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute that 04-06-2009 is the last date of hearing.

The Tribunal simply held “appeal allowed” without recording even the gist of the decision and, therefore, the same cannot be termed as a decision or order or judgment of the Tribunal.

The Hon’ble Court further observed that the circumstances leading to the filing of the appeal were not as per the provisions of the Act or Rules. The other issue before the Court was whether the High Court had the power to entertain an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal.

The unamended section 130 of the Customs Act speaks about appeal to High Court. It enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal to the High Court against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of July, 2003. But it is pertinent to note that by virtue of enactment of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 (49 of 2005), several provisions of the Act were omitted including section 130. This section was omitted by section 30 and schedule, part VI with effect from 28-12-2005. Therefore, from the date of omission of Section 130, the jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded.

Though the learned counsel for the first respondent tried to convince the Bench that notification is yet to be issued, the Act is very clear that the jurisdiction of the High Court was excluded from 28-12-2005.

There is no dispute that the High Courts in India have inherent and plenary powers, and as a court of record the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers. However, the said principle has to be decided with the specific provisions in the enactment and in the light of the scheme of the Act, particularly in this case, in view of enactment of Act 49 of 2005 by virtue of which the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s. 130 of the Act has been ousted, it would not be possible to hold that in spite of the abovementioned statutory provisions, the High Court is free to entertain appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal.

The Hon’ble Court held that the High Court had no power to entertain an appeal filed against the order of the Tribunal and if the parties were aggrieved, they should have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of appeal u/s. 130-E of the Customs Act instead of resorting to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the jurisdiction of this Court has been ousted by Act 49 of 2005 from 28-12-2005.

The Division Bench thus held that the learned single Judge ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition.

The Writ Appeal was allowed.

levitra

Y. P. Trivedi vs. JCIT ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before Vijay Pal Rao (JM) and Rajendra (AM) ITA No. 5994/Mum/2010 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 11th July, 2012. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Usha Dalal/A K Nayak

fiogf49gjkf0d
Delay in filing appeal due to CA’s fault is bonafide and must be condoned. Courts should take a lenient view on the matter of condonation of delay provided the explanation and the reason for delay is bonafide and not merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way.

Facts:
The appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal was delayed by 496 days. The assessee filed an application for condonation of delay as well as affidavit of the assessee and his CA explaining the reasons for delay in filing the appeal. It was explained that the CA of the assessee on receiving the order of CIT(A) gave it to the person maintain records of appeal matters for taking photocopy and sending to assessee’s office for filing appeal. The said order got mixed up with other papers and the appeal could not be filed in time. Upon the same being noticed the appeal was filed after tracing the order. It was submitted that the delay is neither deliberate nor willful but due to misplacement of the order in the office of the CA and therefore, it was a bonafide mistake. Relying on the decision of the SC in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Kajiji (167 ITR 471)(SC) it was contended that Justice oriented approach has to be taken by the Court while deciding the matter of condonation and the case should be decided on merits and not on technicalities.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the facts of the case do not suggest that the assessee had acted in a malafide manner or the reasons explained is only a device to cover an ulterior purpose. It is settled proposition of law that the Court should take a lenient view on the matter of condonation of delay. However, the explanation and the reason for delay must be bonafide and not merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The Court should be liberal in construing the sufficient cause and should lean in favour of such party. Whenever substantial Justice and technical considerations are opposed to each other, cause of substantial Justice has to be preferred.

Since the appeal could not be filed due to bonafide mistake and inadvertence, the Tribunal, in the interest of Justice, condoned the delay in filing the appeal.

levitra

(2013) 87 DTR 346 (Bang) Tata Teleservices Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2006-07 to 2008-09 Dated: 27th November 2012

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 194H – Service fees against credit cards is not commission and hence provisions of section 194H not applicable

Facts:

The assessee, a company engaged in the business of telecom services has arrangement with several banks whereby the customers of the assessee holding credit card can make payment for services utilised by them through credit card. When a customer makes payment by credit card, bank processes payment after retaining fees for processing payment. The Assessing Officer treated such processing charges as commission and raised demands u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A). The CIT(A) rejected the Assessing Officers stand and upheld the claim of the assessee. The Department went into appeal.

Held:

The Honourable Tribunal held that commission paid to the credit card companies cannot be considered as falling within the purview of section 194H. Even though the definition of the term “commission or brokerage” used in the said section is an inclusive definition, it is clear that the liability to make TDS under the said section arises only when a person acts on behalf of another person. In the case of commission retained by the credit card companies however, it cannot be said that the bank acts on behalf of the merchant establishment or that even the merchant establishment conducts the transactions for the bank. The sale made on the basis of a credit card is clearly a transaction of the merchant establishment only and the credit card company only facilitates the electronic payment, for a certain charge. The commission retained by the credit card company is therefore in the nature of normal bank charges and not in the nature of commission or brokerage for acting on behalf of the merchant establishment.

Thus there is no requirement for making TDS on the commission retained by the credit card companies since payments to bank on account of utilisation of credit card facilities would be in the nature of bank charges and not commission within meaning of section 194H.

levitra

[2012] 134 ITD 463 (Mum.) Siam Commercial Bank PCL vs. DCIT (International taxation)-2(1), Mumbai A.Y. 2000-2001 Date of Order – 25th February 2011

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 5 – Accrual of income – Discounting charges of next year shall not accrue as income in current year. Section 36(1)(vii) – Section 36(1)(viia) – Claim of bad debts is to be restricted by amount of opening balance in ‘provision for bad and doubtful debts’ account instead of closing balance and then deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia) is to be allowed

Facts I:

The assessee, a foreign bank, following mercantile system of accounting did not offer discount received on bills discounted which were relating to period after 31-03-2000, for A.Y. 2000-01. The same was brought under tax by A.O. in A.Y. 2000-01.

Held I:

The period of bill is relevant as it requires the divesting of funds by the lender for such period entailing the incurring of interest expenditure for such period. The quantum of discounting charges has direct nexus with the due date of the bill, which, in turn, determines the period for which the bank is deprived of its funds in discounting the bill. As the interest cost, of funds invested, for the subsequent year shall not become deductible in the current year, naturally the corresponding income in the form of discounting charges for the next year shall also not accrue as income in the current year.

Facts II:

For A.Y. 2000-01, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 1,57,46,917/- for bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii), being the amount of bad debts written off in current year at Rs. 1,88,87,553/- less provision allowed u/s. 36(1)(viia) of A.Y. 1999-2000 at Rs. 31,40,636/-. It also claimed separate deduction in respect of provision for bad and doubtful debts of Rs. 35,02,564/- made during the current year. The AO held that the bad debts deduction should be allowed only in excess of the balance at the end of the year and not at the beginning of the year.

Held II:

In each year ordinarily there are two types of deductions, viz., firstly on account of provision made at the end of the current year by limiting it to the adjusted total income for the year and secondly the amount of bad debts actually written off. The Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in directing the AO to restrict the claim of bad debts by the amount of opening balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account as at the beginning of the instead of closing balance and then allowing deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia).
levitra

(2012) 134 ITD 269 (Visakha) Transstory (India) Ltd. vs. ITO Assessment Year: 2006-07 Date of order: 14th July, 2011

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 80 IA – Assessee was acting through joint venture and consortium for executing eligible contracts, whether eligible to claim deduction u/s 80 IA. Joint venture was only a de jure contractor but the assessee was a de facto contractor – Joint venture or the consortium was only a paper entity and has not executed any contract itself – Assessee is entitled for the deductions u/s. 80-IA(4) on the profit earned from the execution of the work awarded to JV and consortium.

Facts:

The assessee is a company and it formed joint venture named “Navayuga Transtoy (JV)” which bid for the contract. The Irrigation Department of Andhra Pradesh awarded the contract to JV, which became entitled to execute works worth Rs. 664.50 crore. As per the terms of the JV, the assessee was to execute 40 per cent of the work in the JV, the other constituent partner was to execute 60 per cent of the works awarded. Both the constituent partners of the JV raised bills on the JV for quantity of work as certified by technical consultant appointed by the State Government. The JV in turn raised a consolidated bill on the Irrigation Department of Andhra Pradesh Government without making any additions. The Irrigation Department makes the payments to the JV, which shares the payment in accordance with the bills raised by each. The JV files its IT returns separately but does not claim any deduction u/s. 80-IA(4).

The assessee had also formed a consortium along with one M/s Corporation Transtroy, OJSC, Moscow, with the understanding that the assessee would execute 100 per cent of the works which were awarded to the consortium by the Government of Karnataka. During the year assessee executed works valued worth Rs. 31.09 crore. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80- IA(4) on the profits derived out of the aforesaid works. But it was disallowed by the AO on the ground that the work was not awarded to the assessee.

Held:

The joint venture and consortium was formed to obtain contract from Government Bodies. As per the joint venture, the project awarded to the joint venture was to be executed by the joint venturers or the constituents. Once the project was awarded to the joint venture or consortium it was to be executed by venturers or constituents in the ratio agreed upon by them. It was the assessee who executed the work contract or project given to the joint venture. Whatever bills were raised by the assessee for the work executed on JV and consortium, the joint venture and consortium in turn raised the further bill of the same amount to the Government. Whatever payment was received by the joint venture, it was accordingly transferred to their constituents. The joint venture is an independent identity and has filed the return of income and was also assessed to tax but neither offered any profit/ income earned nor claimed any exemption/deduction u/s. 80 IA. The joint venture was contractor only as per law, in factual terms the assessee was the contractor. All other conditions u/s. 80IA have been fulfilled. The dispute arose only with the fact of the contract being awarded only to the joint venture and not the assessee and therefore the assessee was not allowed the deduction. U/s. 80-IA the legislature has also used the word consortium of such companies meaning thereby the legislature was aware about the object of formation of consortium and joint venture. Therefore, the mere formation of the consortium or joint venture for obtaining a contract cannot debar the venture from claiming exemption.

levitra

Software Technology Park: Exemption u/s. 10A: A. Y. 2003-04: Approval by Director of Software Parks of India is valid: Approval by Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee not necessary:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Technovate E Solutions P. Ltd.; 354 ITR 110 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10A and furnished a registration issued by a director of the Software Technology Parks of India in support of the claim. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the approval of the director of the Software Technology Parks of India was not a valid approval from a specified authority. He held that only the Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee was competent to grant approval to units functioning within the Software Technology Park for the purposes of exemption u/s. 10A. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

i) The CBDT in Instruction No. 1 of 2006, dated 31-03- 2006, clarified that the claim of deduction u/s. 10A should not be denied to the software technology park units only on the ground that the approval/ registration to such units had been granted by the Director of Software Technology Parks of India. In the Instruction, the Board also made a reference to the Inter-Ministerial communication dated 23-03-2006, issued by the Secretary, Minister of  Communications and Technologies to the effect that the approvals issued by the director of the Software Technology Parks of India had the authority of the Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee and that all approvals granted by director of the Software Technology Parks of India were, therefore, deemed to be valid.

ii) The position was also clear from a letter dated 6th May, 2009, issued by the Board to the Joint Secretary, Minister of Commerce and Industry wherein a distinction had been drawn between the provisions of sections 10A and 10B and in which it had been clarified that a unit approved by a director under the Software Technology Park Scheme would be allowed exemption only u/s. 10A as a software technology park unit and not u/s. 10B as 100% export oriented unit.

iii) Therefore, approval granted by the director of the Software Technology Parks of India would be deemed to be valid in as much as the directors were functioning under the delegated authority of the Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee.

iv) Thus the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the approval granted by the director of the Software Technology Parks of India was sufficient approval so as to satisfy the conditions relating to approvals u/s. 10A.”

levitra

Reassessment: Reason to believe: Change of opinion: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2007-08: Information regarding bogus companies engaged in providing accommodation entries to which assessee was allegedly a beneficiary was in possession of AO while making assessment u/s. 143(3): In response to query raised by AO the assessee furnished all information including alleged accommodation entry providers with their confirmations: Subsequent notice u/s. 148 and the consequent reassessment are not valid:

Pardesi Developers & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. vs. CIT: 258 CTR 411 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessment was originally completed by an order u/s. 143(3) dated 30-12-2009. Subsequently, a notice u/s. 148 dated 30-08-2011 was issued for reopening the assessment. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition challenging the notice and held as under:

“i) It is an admitted position that the information regarding the alleged accommodation entry providers had been circulated to all the AOs on 30-04-2009 which included the AO of the assessee. In other words, the AO of the assessee had received the said information with regard to the alleged accommodation- entry providing companies. Thereafter, on 09-11-2009, the assessee furnished a reply to the questioner which had been issued on 18-02-2009. In that reply, the assessee gave details of share capital raised by the assessee. These details included the sums received from the alleged accommodationentry providers. Along with the said reply dated 09-11-2009, confirmations from the said parties were also furnished. A similar reply was again furnished on 27-11-2009. Despite the furnishing of these details, the AO, in order to further verify and confirm the said facts, issued notices u/s. 133(6) to the said companies directly, on 27-30th November 2009. All the concerned parties responded to those notices and affirmed their respective confirmations, which they had earlier provided to the AO. It is only subsequent thereto that the assessment was framed.

ii) In the backdrop of these facts, it is difficult to believe the plea taken in the purported reasons that the said information was “neither available with the Department nor did the assessee disclose the same at the time of assessment proceedings”. From the aforesaid facts it is clear that the information was available with the Department and it had been circulated to all the AOs. There is nothing to show that the AO did not receive the said information. And, there is nothing to show that the AO had not applied his mind to the information received by him. On the contrary, it is apparent because he was mindful of the said information that he issued notices u/s. 133(6) directly to the parties to confirm the factum of application of shares and the source of funds of such shares.

iii) Therefore, the very foundation of the notice u/s. 148 is not established even ex facie. Consequently, it cannot be said that the AO had the requisite belief u/s.147 and, as a consequence, the impugned notice dated 30-08-2011 and the order on objections dated 03-08-2012 are liable to be quashed.”

Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2000-01: Notice u/s. 148 at the instance of the audit party: Not valid:

fiogf49gjkf0d
Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd. vs. ACIT; 353 ITR 398 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2000-01, the assessment was originally completed u/s. 143(3). Subsequently, a notice u/s. 148 was issued at the instance of the audit party.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of the notice and held as under:

“i) Though an audit objection may serve as information, on the basis of which the Income-tax Officer can act, ultimate action must depend directly and solely on the formation of belief by the Income-tax Officer on his own.

ii) It was contended on behalf of the assessee that the Assessing Officer held no independent belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. He submitted that the Assessing Officer was under compulsion by the audit party to issue for reopening of assessment though she herself held a firm belief that no income had escaped assessment. The assessing Officer in her affidavit did not deny this.

iii) In the affidavit what was vaguely stated was that the Department was apprehensive about the source of information on the basis of which such averments were made. Inter-departmental correspondence was strictly confidential. On a direction from the Court the Revenue made a candid statement that the file containing exchanges between the Assessing Officer and the audit party was not traceable.

iv) The Revenue not having either denied the clear averments of the asessee made in the petition on oath nor having produced the original files to demonstrate the independent formation of the opinion by the Assessing Officer though sufficient time was made available, the issue stood firmly concluded in favour of the assessee. The reassessment notice was not valid.”

levitra

Income: Lottery: Sections 2(24)(ix) and 115BB : Assessee was allotted a Contessa car as the first prize under the National Savings Scheme: Not a lottery: Not income liable to tax:

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Dr. S. P. Suguna Seelan; 353 ITR 391 (Mad):

The assessee was allotted a Contessa car as the first prize under the National Savings Scheme. The Assessing Officer treated the prize as winnings from lotteries within the meaning of section 2(24) (ix), 1961, and subjected to the special rate u/s. 115BB. The Tribunal held that the prize won by the assessee was not covered by section 2(24)(ix) and allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The car won by the assessee on draw of lots under the incentive scheme of the National Savings Scheme was not a lottery and was not liable to tax.”

levitra

Nature of Inter-State Lease Transaction vis-À-vis normal inter-state sale

fiogf49gjkf0d

VAT

An important issue arose before the Maharashtra Sales Tax
Tribunal in respect of nature of interstate lease transaction in the case of
Thermax Babcock & Wilcox Ltd. (S.A. 1285 of 2003, dated 14-12-2009). The facts
are that M/s. RIL entered into a lease transaction for lease of boiler with M/s.
RUPL. Both parties are located in Gujarat. M/s. RUPL placed order on M/s. T of
Pune for supply of boiler component. The unloading place was RIL in Gujarat. The
period involved was 1997-98. M/s. T collected ‘C’ Form from RUPL. In the
assessment of T, tax at 4% was levied on the above supply value under the CST
Act, 1956. The appellant, M/s. T was agitating the levy of tax on the ground
that his supplies to RUPL are in the course of inter-state lease and the period
being prior to 11-5-2002, tax is not attracted. It was submitted that the lease
transactions are brought in the CST Act from 11-5-2002 and hence the levy of tax
in case of the appellant was argued to be illegal and unlawful.

Thus the issue before the Tribunal was whether the
transaction of M/s. T to supply boiler parts to M/s. RUPL, who has leased boiler
to M/s. RIL, amounts to inter-state lease transaction. The gist of arguments of
the appellant may be noted as under :

    (a) There was a tripartite agreement between the T, RUPL and RIL.

    (b) There was a lease agreement between RUPL and RIL by which the lessor, RUPL, agreed to purchase the goods (auxiliary boiler) from the appellant (M/s. T) and lease it out to RIL (lessee). The lease agreement between RUPL and RIL has identified M/s. T as a manufacturer and supplier of required goods as per the specification and design agreed upon.

    (c) RUPL has placed the purchase order pursuant to lease agreement between RUPL and RIL and accordingly the goods manufactured by the appellant (M/s. T) have been moved from Pune to Jamnagar (Gujarat). These goods were dispatched to RIL, Jamnagar A/c RUPL who was described as consignee.

    (d) When the manufacturer dispatched the goods to the consignee ‘RIL A/c RUPL’ and handed over the goods to the common carrier, according to M/s. T, the right to use the goods got transferred to the consignee, RIL.

    (e) Since these transactions involved inter-state movement from Maharashtra to Gujarat, it was an inter-state lease transaction, not liable to tax, being effected prior to the amendment in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 to this effect.

    (f) According to M/s. T, the facts and the ratio laid down in the case of M/s. ITC Classic Finance & Services v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Andhra Pradesh, (97 STC 337) are similar to those present in the case of the appellant, and therefore, prayer was made to delete the tax levied on inter-state lease transactions @ 4% against declarations in Form ‘C’, which were issued as a matter of abundant caution.

The M.S.T. Tribunal examined the above arguments in light of
legal position about inter-state sales transactions, as well as nature of the
lease transaction. Citing the judgments in the case of M/s. Magnese Ore India
Ltd. (37 STC 489) & M/s. Mohmad Sirajuddin (36 STC 136) (SC), the Tribunal
observed as under in relation to the inter-state lease transaction :

“That the following conditions must be fulfilled before the
sale can be said to take place in the course of inter-state trade;


1. There is a contract of sale, which contains a
stipulation express or implied, regarding the movement of the goods from one
state to another.

2. In pursuance of that agreement, the goods in fact move
from one state to another.

3. Ultimately a concluded sale takes place in the state
where the goods are sent, which must be different from the state from which
the goods moved.


If these conditions are complied with, then by virtue of S. 9
of the Central Act, it is the state from which the goods moved which will be
competent to levy the tax under the provision of the Central Act.”

The M.S.T. Tribunal also referred to the judgments cited by
the appellant viz. M/s. ITC Classic Finance & Services (97 STC 330) and M/s.
Srei International Finance Ltd. (16 VST 193). In this respect, the M.S.T.
Tribunal observed that in these judgments the issue was about lease charges
charged by respective parties. The Tribunal observed that in the present case,
the amount charged by the appellant is for supply of goods and not for leasing
of goods. Therefore, the M.S.T. Tribunal held that these judgments are not
applicable to the present case.

The Tribunal noted the factual position as under :

  • The appellant is a
    manufacturer and supplier of boilers and its parts.


  • It is an admitted fact
    that RUPL entered into an agreement to lease out the goods required by RIL,
    and this lease agreement was signed on 6-6-1997.


  • This lease agreement was
    between RUPL and RIL and not with the appellant M/s. T.


  • As per this lease
    agreement, the lessor (RUPL) agreed to give and the lessee (RIL) agreed to
    take on lease diverse equipment, details and aggregated amount whereof was
    specified in Schedule-I attached to that agreement on the terms and conditions
    mentioned therein.


  • As per this lease
    agreement the lessor (RUPL) agreed to transfer the right to use by way of
    lease and RIL (lessee) agreed to take on lease the equipment to be operated
    under the supervision and the technical assistance of RUPL.


  • The lease agreement has
    identified M/s. T as a vendor who was to manufacture and supply auxiliary
    boilers at particular value.

  •     The Schedule-I also referred to purchase order No. 22960-EE-MBB001-MA, dated 2nd August, 1997, which appears at Sr. No. 45 along with other vendors who were also identified as manufactures and suppliers of various parts and components for installing power plant at Jamnagar for RIL.
  •     The total value of entire lease agreement was at a much higher amount than the sale value of goods by the appellant.
  •     The Schedule 2 indicated that after the installation of power plant, RUPL was entitled to receive monthly lease at particular amount from RIL, with whom lease agreement was made.

Based on the above facts, the Tribunal held that RUPL becomes owner of goods after supply by M/s. T. RUPL has leased the goods as his goods. Therefore, the transaction by M/s. T was pure and simple normal sale for supply of goods and not a lease transaction. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the arguments of the appellant holding as under :

    1. The agreement between the appellant and RUPL was not a lease agreement which stipulated handing over the possession of goods for absolute use.

    2. There was an agreement which is reflected in the purchase order placed by RUPL, which proves that the agreement was for transfer of property in the goods and not transfer of right to use the goods as contemplated under the Lease Act.

    3. RUPL has to first acquire the property in goods by way of purchase from the appellant to become absolute owner of property and then only RUPL becomes legally competent to lease out this property and not otherwise. When RUPL acquired the property in goods, inter-state sale got concluded, which was effected by the appellant (M/s. T). The Tribunal observed that M/s. T has failed to establish inextricable link.

Accordingly, the M.S.T. Tribunal held that the leasing is between RUPL and RIL which is a separate transaction. The sale by M/s. T to RUPL is normal sale liable to tax and as such the Tribunal confirmed the levy of tax under the CST Act, 1956.

InterState Sale — Judicial Interpretation vis-à-vis delivery of goods

InterState Sale — Judicial Interpretation vis-à-vis delivery of goods :

    InterState sale transactions are covered by the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act). The nature of interState sale has been defined in Section 3 of the CST Act. In fact there are two sub-sections namely 3(a) and 3(b). Section 3(a) covers direct interState sale involving movement of goods from one State to another State. Section 3(b) covers interState sale transaction effected by transfer of documents of title to goods during the movement of goods from one State to another State. The discussion here is in respect of nature of sale covered by Section 3(a).

    Section 3(a) is reproduced below for ready reference.

    “S.3. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of interState trade of commerce — A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or …”

    Thus a sale occasioning movement of goods from one State to another State is covered by above sub-Section. However whether there is movement of goods from one State to another State, so as to be covered by Section 3(a), is required to be ascertained from facts of the case. Where the vendor dispatches the goods to the buyer in other State there is not much difficulty. However when there is no direct dispatch proof the difficulty arises. For example, a buyer from another State has taken delivery from the vendor at his premises. Whether such transactions will be interState or intra State raises an issue. Such issue has to be decided based on relevant other documents/circumstances. There are certain decisions by various forums to ascertain the correct position. Reference can be made to following few judgments for looking further into the subject.

Nivea Time (108 STC 6) (Bom.) :

    The observations of the Bombay High Court on nature of interState sale are as under :

    “8. Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 lays down when a sale or purchase of goods is said to take place in the course of interState trade or commerce. It says :

    “A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of interState trade or commerce if the sale or purchase —

    (a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or

    (b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.”

    In this case, we are concerned with sale or purchase falling under clause (a).

    9. It is well-settled by now by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that a sale can be said to have taken place in the course of interState trade under clause (a) of Section 3, if it can be shown that the sale has occasioned the movement of goods from one State to another. A sale in the course of interState trade has three essentials : (i) there must be a sale; (ii) the goods must actually be moved from one State to another; and (iii) the sale and movement of the goods must be part of the same transaction. The word ‘occasions’ is used as a verb and means to cause to be the immediate cause thereof. There has to be a direct nexus between the sale and the movement of the goods from one State to another. In other words, the movement should be an incident of and necessitated by the contract of sale and be interlinked with the sale of goods.”

    In this case there was no direct dispatch proof. However the buyer was from other State and goods purchased were meant for factory in other State. The Hon’ble High Court held transaction as interState sale.

English Electric Company of India Ltd. vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [1976] (38 STC 475) (SC)

    In this case, the Supreme Court observed as under :

    ‘…. – If there is a conceivable link between the movement of the goods and the buyer’s contract, and if in the course of interState movement the goods move only to reach the buyer, in satisfaction of his contract of purchase and such a nexus is otherwise inexplicable, then the sale or purchase of the specific or ascertained goods ought to be deemed to have taken place in the course of interState trade or commerce as such a sale or purchase occasioned the movement of the goods from one State to another ….”

    From the above judgments it becomes clear that unless a link between dispatch and pre-existing sale is established, no interState sale can take place. The movement is to be cause and effect of such sale. In light of the above judgments for practical purposes following aspects of a transaction are looked into;

    (a) There must be pre existing sale from a buyer from other State.

    (b) The goods should be ascertained qua such pre existing sale to fulfil the requirement of such sale.

    (c) The said goods should be moved to other State. It is necessary that same goods in the same quality and the same quantity are moved to other State.

    (d) The same goods should be delivered to buyer so as to complete the interState sale.

    (e) Once the above criteria are fulfilled, then even if delivery is local, the transaction will be interState sale.

    Who moves the goods ? It is not very much important. Link between sale and movement is relevant. Therefore, even if local delivery is given but if goods are to be taken to other State by buyer it will be interState sale. However to comply with the conditions of Section 3(a), following proof should be preserved :

    a) Purchase order from the buyer stating that the goods are meant for his place in other State and he will move the goods to such place.

    b) Confirmation from the buyer that the goods are taken to such place.

If the above evidence is available it will be interState sale. However, if such evidence is lacking, then the transaction will be a local sale transaction.

Saraswathi Agencies    (21 VST 200) Mad.

In this case the link between the sale and movement was missing, though buyer was from other State. The transaction was held to be local sale. The gist of the said judgment is as under.

“In order to come under the category of interState sale, the sale should be to a purchaser outside the State and there should be movement of goods from one State to another. In case the movement of goods from one State to another was occasioned on account of the agreement entered into between the seller and the purchaser, the sale is a sale in the course of interState trade attracting the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. But when the actual movement of goods was at the instance of the purchaser and the part played by the dealer was: only delivery of the articles at the place of business of the dealer, it cannot be said that there was an interState sale warranting payment of Central sales tax. The dealer should have undertaken the task of supplying the articles in the business place of the purchaser in different States for the purpose of the, Central Sales Tax Act. Therefore the paramount consideration in the matter of interState sale is the contract as well as the movement of goods.

The petitioner, a dealer in electrical goods, wet grinders, pumpsets, etc., for the assessment year 1994 – 95 reported nil total and taxable turnover under the CST Act. The Assessing Officer fourtd that the sale in favour of purchasers from Kerala; Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh were not shown in the accounts. Accordingly, the assessing authority considered those sales as interState sales. The petitioner appealed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who confirmed the assessment. THe Appellate Tribunal was also of the opinion that the bills having been raised in the name of tli.”e consumers from other States, the transactions were interState sales liable for payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. On writ petition, the Madras High Court held;

If purchasers from neighbouring States came to Chennai and made purchases from the dealer in Chennai and took articles to their home State on their own, it could not be said that there was an element of interState sale in the transaction. There was no evidence to show that the petitioner itself had dispatched the goods through lorry service to the Sta tes of Karna taka, Kerala and And hra Pradesh. No evidence was found in the assessment order to show such dispatch by the dealer. It was the consistent case of the dealer that the goods were delivered at Chennai only, though the purchasers were from the neighbouring States. There was no obligation on the part of the petitioner to transport those articles to the actual place of the purchasers. Unless and until it was proved that the products were actually delivered by the dealer in the respective States as shown in the bills, it could not be said that the transaction was an interState trade.

In the absence of any such positive material evidencing interState sale, the sales as found in the assessment order could not be termed to be sales in the course of interState trade warranting payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act.

Burden  of Proof:

Commissioner of Sales Tax, V.P., Lucknow  vs. Suresh  Chand Jain (70 STC 45)(SC) :

In this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the facts given below, also dealt with issue of burden of proof. The Honble Supreme Court observed as under:

“The respondent, a dealer carrying on business in tendu leaves in U.P., had claimed from the very beginning that he had effected only local sales of the tendu leaves, that he had not effected any sales of tendu leaves in the course of inter-State trade, that he had never applied to the Forest Department for issue of form T.P. IV and no such forms were issued to him, and that the tendu leaves were never booked by him through railway or trucks for places outside U.P. The Appellate Tribunal found nothing to discredit the version of the dealer. The Tribunal had also taken notice of T.P. form IV which did not relate to sale but was a permit or certificate regarding the validity of nikasi of tendu leaves from the forest. The Tribunal accepted the claim of the dealer and held that the sales in question were not inter-State sales. On revision, the High Court found no material to interfere. On a petition for special leave filed by the Department:

The Supreme Court  dismissing the petition held that the Tribunal applied the correct principle of law, viz., that the condition precedent for imposing sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956,was that the goods must move out of the State in pursuance of some contract entered into between the seller and the purchaser.

A sale can be said to be in the course of inter-State trade only if two conditions concur, uiz., (i) a sale of goods and (ii) a transport of those goods from one State to another. Unless both these conditions were satisfied, there could be no sale in the course of inter-State trade. There must be evidence that the transportation was occasioned by the contract and as a result goods moved out of the bargain between the parties, from one State to another.

The onus lies on the Revenue to disprove the contention of the dealer that a sale is a local sale and to show that it is an inter-State sale.”

Thus burden to prove a particular fact lies on the party who alleges otherwise. In fact there are number of rulings in relation to this issue. The above are indicative to look a little more into the subject.

Determination of value of goods and value of services — Domain of contracting parties

Trademark/Brand registered in India and nurtured and used in business in India represents property situated in India — Capital gain arising on its transfer taxable in India.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 2

11 Fosters Australia Ltd., In re


170 Taxman 341 (AAR)

S. 9(1)(i) of the Act

India-Australia Treaty

A.Y. : 2007-08. Dated : 9-5-2008

 

Issues :



l
Trademark/Brand registered in India and nurtured and used in business in India
represents property situated in India. Capital gain arising on transfer of
such property is taxable in India in the hands of non-resident transferor,
irrespective of the situs of the execution of contract and irrespective of
situs of delivery of such IPR.


l
Gain arising on transfer of technology and intellectual property in the form
of technology manuals, brewing IP, process, etc. vesting in NR transferor
abroad and delivered outside India is not taxable in India.


l
The assessee can rely on independent valuation report for determination of
that part of the composite consideration which is taxable in India.


 


Facts :

The applicant Australian Company (herein called FAL or Ausco)
was engaged in the business of brewing, processing, marketing and promoting and
selling beer products in Australia and abroad. Ausco owned various brands
including Foster’s brand and related logo which were in use in the marketing of
products. The technology and know-how, including recipe and brewing
specifications, were also owned by Ausco.

Ausco had registered its brand ‘Foster’ in India in the year
1993. Later on, some further brands were also registered in India.

Somewhere in 1997, Ausco entered into Brand Licence Agreement
with Foster India (ICO), a Group Company in India. Entire share capital of ICO
was held by companies in Mauritius which in turn were held by another group
company in Mauritius called Dismin. ICO was given an exclusive right to use
various brands of Ausco and was also given access to brewing technology and
know-how. For such licence, ICO was paying royalty after deducting suitable tax
at source.

On 4-8-2006, Ausco and Dismin entered into Sale & Purchase
(S&P) Agreement with SAB Miller Ltd., a UK Company, (herein SAB). The S&P was a
composite agreement for sale of Mauritius companies which held shares of ICO by
Dismin and sale by Ausco of trademarks, brand and assignment of contract for
grant of exclusive and perpetual licence in respect of brewing technology for
the territory of India. For all these (including for shares of ICO) items, SAB
was required to pay a sum of US $ 120 M.

In terms of the S&P Agreement, SAB UK nominated SKOL India,
subsidiary of SAB Group as the entity which purchased all the assets which were
subject matter of the S&P Agreement. The S&P Agreement was actually implemented
by execution of certain definitive agreements which included transfer of shares
by Dismin of its holding in the other Mauritius companies which held shares of
ICO. Ausco executed assignment agreement in September 2006 for transfer of
brands and trademark for use by SKOL in the territory of India. It also gave
perpetual licence for use of brewing intellectual property by delivery of
brewing manual and other related literature also for use within territory of
India. The assignment agreement was executed in Australia. It was claimed that
all deliverables in terms of the agreement were given to SKOL at Australia. A
nominal consideration of US $ 100 was stated to be the consideration of
assignment.

The applicant Ausco filed application before the AAR, seeking
advance ruling on the question whether receipt arising to it from the transfer
of its right, title and interest in and to the trademarks, brand IP and for
grant of exclusive perpetual licence of brewing technology was taxable in India.
The other related question raised before the AAR was that if the amount was held
taxable, whether the applicant was required to pay tax on the gain computed,
based on consideration as per independent valuation obtained by the applicant.

At the outset, the applicant’s counsel made it clear that
taxability of income arising from transfer of shares effected by Dismin (Mauco)
was not an issue before AAR.

 

On the aspect of non-taxability of gain arising from transfer
of brand and technology IPR, the applicant contended that these intangibles were
located at the domicile of the owner (i.e., at Australia). The applicant
relied on the terms of original brand licence agreement of 1997 signed by it
with ICO to contend that soon upon contemplated change of ICO’s ownership, the
licence agreement stood terminated. As a consequence, the assets reverted back
and were not situated in India as on the date on which
the same were transferred to SKOL. The applicant also contended that since
assets situated outside India stood transferred outside India, no part of
capital gains was chargeable to tax in India. By relying on decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Finlay Mills Ltd., (AIR 1951 SC 464),
it was the claim of the applicant that registration of trademark was merely for
protection of IPR and did not impact the situs or location of IPR. The assessee
also relied on AAR ruling in the case of Pfizer Corporation, in. Re
(2004) (271 ITR 101). In this case, Pfizer Corporation had granted access and
licence of technology use and trademark to another group company in India. The
licence agreement was terminated by paying compensation to ICO. After such
termination, Pfizer Corporation had transferred technology dossier to a Danish
company. The AAR had in that case accepted Pfizer’s contention that this
represented transfer of asset located outside India.



Applicability of Regulation 17(6) in processing the work items.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Vide Circular No 10/2013 dated 8th May 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has amended the Regulation 17(6) Of Companies Regulations, 1956 which read as “the Registrar shall not keep any document pending for approval and registration or for taking on record or for rejection or otherwise for more than 120 days from date of filing excluding the cases in which an approval from the Central Government or Regional Director or Company Law Board or any other competent authority is required.”

to

“with the approval of Competent Authority, henceforth under the provisions of Regulation 17(6) of the Companies Act, 1956, ad hoc work items may be created to extend the validity of the work beyond the time limits prescribed under the Regulation by the ROC concerned.

The ROC concerned shall record the specific reasons for creating the ad-hoc item. Details of the adhoc work items, reasons for creation shall be intimated to the RD every fortnight.”

For full version of the circularhttp://www.mca.gov. in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_10_2013.pdf

levitra

Proposed Accounting for Leases – Will it Impact Business Operating Models?

fiogf49gjkf0d
On 16th May 2013, the IASB issued an exposure draft (ED) on Leases. This is the second exposure draft issued after much internal and external deliberation by the IASB.

The leases project is one of the joint projects between the FASB and IASB which has been a focus area for the boards. The ED proposes fundamental changes to the existing lease accounting and is aimed to bring most leases on balance sheet for lessees. The first exposure draft was issued in September 2010 and since then, there have been various IASB meetings and public consultations. The second exposure draft is open for comments until September 2013. It introduces a dual-model approach for lease accounting, which would have a significant impact on the classification of leases, as well as the pattern and presentation of lease expense and income.

In this article, we will discuss some of the fundamental changes that are proposed in the Leases exposure draft.

Identification of leases

The ED defines a lease as “a contract that conveys the right to use an asset (the underlying asset) for a period of time in exchange for consideration”. An entity would determine whether a contract contains or is a lease by assessing whether:

(a) fulfillment of the contract depends on the use of an identified asset; and
(b) the contract conveys the right to control the use of the identified asset for a period of time in exchange for consideration.

A contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset if the customer has both the ability to direct the use and receive the benefits from use of the identified asset throughout the term of This definition encompasses the embedded leases concept currently under IFRIC 4. Hence arrangements which are not structured as leases but include an identified asset where the customer can direct the use and receive benefits will be considered leases. However, the ED puts a greater focus on the customer’s ability to direct the use of the underlying asset which means that contracts in which the customer uses substantially all of the output of an asset, but does not control its operations may not fall under the lease definition.

Lease term

The determination of the lease term is based on the non-cancellable period of the lease, together with any optional renewal periods which the lessee has a significant economic incentive to exercise and periods covered by a termination option, if the lessee has a significant economic incentive not to terminate. The proposals include many factors for an entity to consider which are contract-based, asset-based, entitybased and market-based such as the amount of lease payments in the secondary period, location of the asset, financial consequences of termination, market rentals, etc for determination of the lease term. Again, there are no bright lines for the term ‘significant economic incentive’.

These proposals are a significant change as the lease term is a crucial estimate in determining the classification and accounting for the lease.

Classification – Type A and Type B leases

The ED identifies two types of leases – Type A and Type B. These are in some ways akin to current finance lease and operating lease models under IAS 17 Leases. The classification criteria would be based on the nature of the underlying asset and the extent to which the asset is consumed by the lessee over the lease term.

If the underlying asset is not property (i.e. not land and/or a building), it is classified as a Type A lease, unless the lease term is for an insignificant part of the total economic life of the underlying asset or the present value of the lease payments is insignificant relative to the fair value of the underlying asset. An underlying asset that is property (i.e. land and/or a building), is classified as a Type B lease, unless the lease term is for the major part of the remaining economic life of the underlying asset or the present value of the lease payments accounts for substantially all of the fair value of the underlying asset.

However, in all cases, if the lessee has a significant economic incentive to exercise an option within the lease to purchase the underlying asset, then the lease is classified as a Type A lease.

The terms ‘insignificant’, ‘major part’ and ‘significant economic incentive’ are not defined in the ED and there are no explicit bright lines or threshold percentages to make this assessment.

In effect, most leases other than property would be Type A leases and most leases of property would be Type B leases unless the above presumptions are rebutted.

Example

Company A enters into a 2-year lease contract for an item of equipment which has a total economic life of 10 years. The lease does not contain any renewal, purchase, or termination options. The lease payments of Rs. 1000 per year are made at the end of the period, their present value is calculated at Rs. 1,735 using a discount rate of 10%. The fair value of the equipment is Rs. 5,500 at the date of inception of the lease.

This lease would be classified as a Type A lease since it is not property and the lease term is considered more than an insignificant part of the total economic life (20%) and the present value of lease payments is more than insignificant relative to the fair value of the equipment (31.5%).

This lease would have been classified as an operating lease under the existing principles of IAS 17. However, the Type A classification will lead to much different accounting under the ED proposals.

Accounting by lessee

In a Type A lease, the lessee would recognise a lease liability, initially measured at the present value of future lease payments, and also a right-of-use (ROU) asset measured at the amount of initial measurement of lease liability plus any initial direct costs and payments made at or before the commencement date less any lease incentives received. Subsequently, the lessee would measure the lease liability at amortised cost using the effective interest rate method and the ROU asset at cost less accumulated amortisation – generally on a straightline basis. The lessee would present amortisation of the ROU asset and interest expense on the lease liability as separate expenses on the statement of profit or loss. The ROU asset will be presented under property, plant and equipment as a separate category (bifurcated further between Type A and Type B leases residual assets).

Continuing the example above, the lessee would have recognised a lease liability and a ROU asset of Rs. 1,735. In year 1, the amortisation expense would be Rs. 867 (1735/2) and interest expense of Rs. 174 (1735*10%). In year 2, the amortisation expense would be Rs. 867 and interest expense of Rs. 91 ((1735+174- 1000)*10%). The cash outflow of Rs. 1000 will be reduced from the lease liability. Thus, under the Type A model, the lessee would see a front loading of the lease expense.

In a Type B lease, the lessee would follow the approach for Type A leases for initial measurement. Subsequently, the lessee would calculate amortisation of the ROU asset as a balancing figure, such that the total lease cost would be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term and would be presented as total lease cost (amortisation plus interest expense) as a single line item in the income statement. Hence, considering the example above, under the Type B model, in year 1, the lessee would record a total expense of 1000 split between interest expense of Rs. 174 and ROU amortisation of Rs. 826. This will effectively result in a straight-line recognition of the lease expense over the lease period.

Accounting by lessor

In a type A lease, on commencement, the lessor would derecognise the underlying asset and recognise a lease receivable, representing its right to receive lease payments as well as a residual asset, representing its interest in the underlying asset at the end of the lease term. The total profit i.e. difference between the fair value of the asset and the carrying amount of the asset (if any) will be divided between upfront profit and unearned profit. Upfront profit will be recognised at the lease commencement and is calculated as total profit multiplied to the proportion that the present value of the lease payments divided by the fair value of the underlying asset.

The lease receivable would initially be measured at the present value of future lease payments. The lessor would measure the lease receivable at amortised cost using the effective interest rate method. In addition, the lease receivable will be tested for impairment under IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The lessor would also be required to re measure the lease receivable to reflect any changes to the lease payments or to the discount rate. Such re measurement may be triggered due to a change in lease term, lessee having or no longer having a significant economic incentive to exercise purchase option, etc .

The residual asset would be measured at the present value of the amount that the lessor expects to derive from the underlying asset at the end of the lease term, discounted at the rate that the lessor charges the lessee adjusted for the present value of expected variable lease payments. In the balance sheet, the residual asset is presented as net residual asset after reducing the unearned profit. Subsequently the residual asset will be accreted with interest over the lease period. Also, this residual asset is subject to impairment provisions under IAS 36.

This accounting under Type A leases for the lessor is much more complex than the existing finance lease accounting model.

Continuing the example above, consider the following additional facts: the carrying amount of the equipment in lessor’s books is Rs. 5,000 on the inception of the lease. The lessor estimates that the future value of the equipment at the end of the lease term would be Rs 4,555 (the present value using 10% discount rate would be Rs. 3,765). The following entry would be recorded in the lessor’s books at commencement:

Lease receivable Dr. 1,735
Gross residual asset Dr. 3,765*
Equipment Cr. 5,000
Unearned profit Cr. 342
(500-158)
Gain on lease of equipment Cr. 158
((5500-5000)*(1735/5500))

*Rs. 3423 (3765-342) is the net residual asset to be presented in the balance sheet.

In Year 1, lessor would receive a cash flow of Rs. 1000 of which Rs. 174 (1735*10%) would be recorded as interest income and Rs. 826 would be reduced from the lease receivable. Also, the lessor will book interest income on accretion of the residual asset Rs. 375 (3765 x10%).

For Type B leases, the lessor would follow an accounting model similar to that of an operating lease per existing IAS 17 and would continue to recognise the underlying asset in its balance sheet and recognise the lease income on a straight line basis over the lease term. However, there are proposed additional disclosures requirements for lessors’ of Type B leases compared to current GAAP.

Exemption for Short-term leases

The ED gives the option to entities to elect not to apply the new accounting model to short-term leases. A short-term lease is a lease that has a maximum possible term under the contract including any renewal options of less than 12 months and does not contain any purchase options for the lessee to buy the underlying asset. Under this option, lessees and lessors would only recognise lease expense/income on a straight line basis.

Impact

The new proposals will have a significant impact on the future of lease accounting. Entities will need to reexamine lease identification and classification as per new proposals. Moreover, recognising new assets and liabilities will impact key financial performance metrics. Management will need to make new estimates and judgments. Some of these estimates and judgments need to be reassessed at each balance sheet date giving rise to volatility in the balance sheet. The new proposals may also impact the way lease contracts are structured. This ED does not propose an effective date but it is unlikely to be effective before 1st January 2017.

Integrated Reporting

fiogf49gjkf0d
If we think that it’s only financial reporting that has seen substantial changes in the last 5 years, initiatives around better, more effective communication about an organisation’s sustainability and value creation through corporate reporting weren’t left far behind. As accountants, our professional responsibility primarily revolves around preparation, review and analysis of financial information. The management of an entity has even greater responsibility when it comes to communicating with shareholders and other stakeholders about how they are managing the business, how they are using the resources available to them and, above all, how they are creating value not just for its shareholders but for the environment at large in which it operates.

In this direction, a major milestone was achieved in April this year. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) issued a consultation draft of the International Integrated Reporting Framework (the ‘Framework’). The IIRC is a global coalition of companies, investors, regulators, standard setters and other key stakeholders. The main aim of the IIRC is to create a globally accepted integrated reporting framework and to make integrated reporting a globally accepted corporate reporting norm.

The Integrated Reporting (or IR) Framework sets out the purpose, provides guidance and outlines how businesses can better explain how they create, sustain and increase their value in the short, medium and long term. The aim is also to enhance accountability and stewardship and support integrated thinking and decision making in the wake of increasing challenges to traditional business models.

What is IR?

IR is defined as a process that results in communication by an organisation, most visibly a periodic integrated report, about value creation over time. It aims to communicate the ‘integrated thinking’ through which management applies a collective understanding of the full complexity of value creation to investors and other stakeholders. An integrated report is a concise communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term. The length of these time frames will be decided by each the organisation differently with reference to its business strategy, investment cycles, and its stakeholders’ needs and expectations. Accordingly, there is no set answer for establishing the length for each term.

IR is intended to be a continuous process and to be most effective should connect with other elements of an organisation’s external communication, e.g. financial statements or sustainability report.

IIRC identifies those charged with governance as having the ultimate responsibility of the IR. On the other side, key audience is the providers of financial capital. At the same time, it is accepted that IR benefits all external parties interested in an organisation’s ability to create value over time, including employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, local communities, legislators, regulators, and policy-makers. It is important to note that the purpose of an integrated report is not to measure the value of an organisation or of all the capitals, but rather to provide information that enables the intended report users to assess the ability of the organisation to create value over time.

To lend further credibility to the IR process, organisations may seek independent, external assurance to enhance the credibility of their reports. The Framework provides reporting criteria against which organisations and assurance providers assess a report’s adherence; it does not yet provide the protocols for performing assurance engagements.

IR Framework

The purpose of the Framework is to assist organisations with the process of IR. In particular, the Framework establishes Guiding Principles and Content Elements that govern the overall content of an integrated report, helping organisations determine how best to express their unique value creation story in a meaningful and transparent way.

The Framework sets out six guiding principles to help preparers determine the structure of the integrated report.

These are:

• Strategic focus and future orientation
• Connectivity of information
• Stakeholder responsiveness
• Materiality and conciseness
• Reliability and completeness
• Consistency and comparability

An integrated report is structured by answering the following questions for each of its seven content elements:

• Organizational overview and external environment: What does the organisation do and what are the circumstances under which it operates?

• Governance: How does the organisation’s governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term?

• Opportunities and risks: What are the specific opportunities and risks that affect the organization’s ability to create value over the short, medium and long term and how is the organization dealing with them?

• Strategy and resource allocation: Where does the organisation want to go and how does it intend to get there?

• Business model: What is the organisation’s business model and to what extent is it resilient?

• Performance: To what extent has the organisation achieved its strategic objectives and what are its outcomes in terms of effects on the capital?

• Future outlook: What challenges and uncertainties is the organisation likely to encounter in pursuing its strategy, and what are the potential implications for its business model and its future performance?

Pilot Programme

IR is a new concept and is in its formative stage. The IIRC acknowledges this fact. Accordingly, in order to construct and test its thoughts around the Framework, the IIRC began a Pilot Programme in October 2011. This programme was soon joined in by over 90 businesses and 30 investor organisations from around the globe. Some of the business network participants are Tata Steel, Kirloskar Brothers Limited, Unilever, The Coca- Cola Company, HSBC, Microsoft Corporation, and Prudential Financial among others. [Source: www.theiirc.org]. Version 1.0 of the Framework is expected to be published in December 2013, much before the end of the Programme in September 2014, thereby allowing participants time to test the Framework during their following reporting cycle. This will also enable the IIRC to assess IR outcomes and complete its work.

IR is still a voluntary initiative so why bother now?

Well, the key results of the Pilot Programme speak for themselves. 95% of participants find that integrated reporting provides a clearer view of the business model and increases board focus on the right KPIs; 93% feel it leads to the better data quality collection, greater focus on sustainability issues, development of improved cross-functional working processes and breaking down silos between teams; and 88% agreed that IR leads to improvements in business decision making.

Currently, the industry participation is led by financial services, while more than 50% of the geographical spread is accounted for by Europe as these were the worst affected during the financial crisis. Sustainability concerns may have sowed the seeds of the IR on a global scale, but the trends emerging from the Pilot Programme provide enough evidence of much wider benefits to the organisations and their stakeholders – now and in the future.

Let’s prepare for a world of valued corporate reporting!

levitra

GAP in GAAP – Accounting for Associates

fiogf49gjkf0d
Background: An entity is an investor in an associate in accordance with AS 23 Accounting for Investments in Associates in Consolidated Financial Statements. The investor accounts for its interest in the associate using the equity method in AS 23. The investor enters into a lease agreement with the associate, classified as a finance lease under AS 19 Leases. The gain on the lease transaction exceeds the carrying amount of the investor’s investment in the associate.

The author notes two views for the accounting for the gain elimination:

View A:
The gain from the transaction is eliminated only to the extent that it does not exceed the carrying amount of the investor’s interest in the associate. This view is by analogy to AS 23.18 where an entity’s share of losses of an associate ceases to be recognised when the investment carrying amount is reduced to zero. Paragraph 18 of AS 23 states “If, under the equity method, an investor’s share of losses of an associate equals or exceeds the carrying amount of the investment, the investor ordinarily discontinues recognising the share of further losses and the investment is reported at nil value.”

View B: All the investor’s share of the gain is eliminated. This view is supported by AS 23.13, which states that gains/losses from transactions are recognised only to the extent of the unrelated investors’ interests in the associate. Paragraph 13 states “In using equity method for accounting for investment in an associate, unrealised profits and losses resulting from transactions between the investor and the associate should be eliminated to the extent of the investor’s interest in the associate.”

Author supports View B. The second question therefore is – how should the gains to be eliminated, in excess of the carrying amount of the interest in the associate? Two methods are identified:

Method 1:
As deferred income

Method 2: As a deduction from the related asset recognised by the investor.

Author supports Method 1, because ‘deferred income’ shows the nature of the eliminated gains and it would enable users to readily obtain information about the amount of eliminated gains in excess of the investors interest in the associate.

Author’s Recommendation:
Author considers that AS 23 lacks guidance on the accounting for the elimination of any gain in excess of the carrying amount of the investment. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India may consider amending AS 23 via a narrow-scope amendment to add specific guidance on how to account for the corresponding entry for the eliminated gain in excess of the carrying amount of the investor’s interest in the associate.

levitra

TS-187-ITAT-2013(Del) Convergys Customer Management Group Inc. vs. ADIT A.Ys: 2006-07 & 2008-09, Dated: 10.05.2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
India-US DTAA – Frequent visits of employees of FCo to premises of Indian subsidiary (IndCo), their having a “fixed place” at their disposal and their occupying key positions in IndCo constituted PE of FCo in India, which was practically the projection of FCo’s business in India. On facts, profit to be attributed to Indian PE was to be calculated based on formulary apportionment.

Facts:
Convergys Customer Management Group Inc (FCo) provides information technology (IT) enabled customer management services by utilising its advanced information system capabilities, human resource management skills and industry experience. FCo has a subsidiary in India, IndCo, which provides IT-enabled call centre/back office support services to FCo on a principal-to-principal basis.
FCo claimed that it procured from ICo services on a principal-to-principal basis and FCo’s business was not carried out in India. Furthermore, substantial risks of business such as market, price, R&D, service liability risks etc., vested with FCo outside India. Additionally, there was no tax liability as procurement of services was akin to purchasing goods/merchandise and, accordingly, the benefit of the PE exclusion for purchase/preparatory or auxiliary function should also be available.
The Tax Authority alleged that FCo, in its activities in India through its employees and subsidiary, satisfied the requirement of a fixed place, services and also a Dependant Agent PE (DAPE) in India. For the purposes of attributing profits, the Tax Authority recomputed the taxable income by allocating global revenue in proportion to the number of employees. On appeal, CIT(A) agreed with the Tax Authority that a fixed place PE was constituted. On attribution of profits, the CIT(A) however held that no further profits can be attributed to FCo’s PE as the transfer pricing (TP) study of IndCo supported that ICo was remunerated at ALP.
Both FCo and the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
On existence of a PE

Considering the entirety of facts, the view of CIT(A) on fixed place PE was upheld for the following reasons:
FCo’s employees frequently visited the premises of IndCo to provide supervision, direction and control over the business operations of IndCo. Accordingly, such employees had a “fixed place” at their disposal. IndCo was practically the projection of FCo’s business in India and IndCo carried out its business under the control and guidance of FCo, without assuming any significant risk in relation to such functions. FCo has also provided certain assets/software on “free of cost” basis to IndCo.

On attribution of profits

An overall attribution of profits to the PE is a TP issue and no further profits can be attributed once an arm’s length price has been determined for IndCo, as TP analysis subsumes the risk profile of the alleged PE. Thus, there can however be further attribution if it is found that PE has risk profile which is not captured in IndCo TP analysis.

The correct approach thereafter to arrive at the profits attributable to the PE is to compute global operating income percentage of a particular line of business as per annual report of FCo and applying such percentage to the end customer revenue with regard to contracts/projects, where services are procured from IndCo. The amount arrived at is the operating income from Indian operations and such operating income is to be reduced by the profit before tax of IndCo. This residual profit which represents income of FCo is to be apportioned to the US and India. Profit attributable to the PE should be estimated on residual profits.

levitra

“Other Income” – Article 21- Whether Items of Income Not Taxable Under Other Articles (6 to 20) of a Tax Treaty would be Assessable Under “Other Income” Article?

fiogf49gjkf0d
1. Background

1.1 Quite often, an item of income may not be taxed under Articles 6 to 20 of a Tax Treaty due to application of distributive rules agreed between the two Contracting States. For example, an item of income may not be taxable as “Business Profits” under Article 7 or as “Shipping or Aircraft Profits” under Article 8 or as “Fees for Technical Services” (FTS) under Article 12 of a Tax treaty either because the income does not satisfy the definition of FTS as contained in that Treaty or it does not satisfy other conditionalities stipulated in Article 12 e.g., it may not meet the test of “make available concept” embedded in a particular treaty. The item of income may also not be taxable due to various exclusions/exemptions contained in the respective Articles. Similarly, an item of Business Income may not be taxable in the Source Country (say, India) under Article 7 of the applicable Tax treaty, as the Non-Resident (NR) Assessee does not have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India as defined in Article 5 of the Tax Treaty. In such cases, a question arises whether such an item of income would be assessable to tax as “Other Income” under Article 21 (or the corresponding Article of the applicable Tax Treaty.)

1.2 In such cases, the Tax Department argues that even if the income of a NR is not taxable in India under Article 7 as business profits or under Article 12 as fees for technical services, such income is still taxable in India as ‘Other Income’ under Article 21.

1.3 The Department’s interpretation of the scope of Article 21 is that when taxability fails under all articles of the applicable tax treaty, the taxability automatically arises under this article. In other words, for example, when a business profit is not taxable under Article 7, it is taxable under Article 21 which in turn gives right to the Source State to tax it as per its domestic tax laws.

In this article, we shall examine the limited aspect of the scope of Article 21 and the judicial interpretation thereof. We shall focus on the applicability of article 21 on “Other Income” vis-à-vis income dealt with by other articles of a tax treaty.

2. Text of “Other Income” – Article 21 of OECD MC

“21(1): Items of Income of a Resident of a Contracting State, wherever arising, not dealt with in the foregoing articles of this Convention shall be taxable only in that State.”

Paragraph 2 is not reproduced, as it is not relevant for the purpose of our discussion. Paragraph 1 of Article 21 of UN Model Convention is identical to that Article 21(1) of OECD MC.

The dispute centers around the correct interpretation of the words “not dealt with” contained in Para 1 of Article 21, as reproduced above.

3. Essar Oil Ltd. vs DCIT 2005-TII-24-ITAT-MUMINTL

The controversy was analyzed and discussed at length in this case in the context of Article 8 of India-Singapore DTAA.

3.1 Facts of the Case: The assessee, a resident company had taken a tanker on voyage charter basis from a non-resident company (HMPL) based in Singapore for transportation of petroleum products from the port of Chennai to the port of Hazira, both in India. The AO held that the assessee had defaulted in not deducting TDS while making payment since it did not operate in international waters and had a PE in India and so protection under Article 8 would not be available. Also, section 44B would be applicable in case of the non-resident company. The same was upheld by the CIT(A).

3.2 Decision: After elaborate discussion, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee, by observing as follows:

“38. We do not also agree with the argument of the revenue that income of HMPL is straight away covered by article 23 of Singapore DTAA. Article 23 of Singapore DTAA deals with income not expressly mentioned elsewhere in the DTAA. It deals with items of income which are not expressly mentioned in the foregoing articles of the said agreement may be taxed in accordance with the taxation laws of the Contracting States.

39. Prof. Klaus Vogel, the authority on the subject, has again held that the application of the residuary provision in article 23 is very narrow and it is generally applied to such residual receipts or income such as social insurance, annuity arising out of previous contributions, maintenance payments to relatives, accident benefit payments, income from so-called derivatives, lottery winnings and income from gambling, etc. Article 23 does not cover income arising out of business. In the present case, the income earned by M/s. HMPL is income earned out of business. Income earned by an assessee out of shipping operations is invariably business income which is recognised by the provisions of Indian Income-tax Act itself. Even according to the assessing authority, if the assessee falls under article 23 of the Singapore DTAA, the assessee is governed by provisions of section 44B of the Incometax Act, 1961. The heading given to section 44B is – “Special provision for computing profits and gains of shipping business in the case of non-residents”. The Act itself provides that income earned out of shipping business by a non-resident is to be considered as profits and gains and it is for that reason the taxability of such profit has been brought u/s. 44B which is brought under Part D of Chapter IV of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Part D deals with computation of income under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ in sections 28 to 44DA. The income attributable to operations carried out by M/s. HMPL is nothing but germane to the regular business of shipping carried on by it. Therefore, by the basic concept of Indian income taxation itself is that such income is ‘income from business’. (Emphasis supplied)

4 0. ….

41. Even if, for the sake of arguments one holds that the case is not covered by article 8 of Singapore DTAA, still it does not preclude the assessee to claim the immunity under article 7. The income attributable to the Singapore shipping company is business profit and de hors article 8, the case is still coming under article 7 of the DTAA which deals with the taxability of business profit. Article 8 is a specific provision over and above the general provision of business profits provided in article 7. If the case of the assessee does not fall under the specific provision of article 8, still, the assessee could not be deprived of the benefit already available to it under the general provisions of article 7. Only for the reason that the assessee does not come under article 8, the assessee could not be placed under a lesser advantage than article 7. ………..Article 8 provides for a specific benefit carved out of the general benefit given in article 7. Therefore, if the special benefit of article 8 is not available, let the matter be closed there. One cannot go further and cannot say that the assessee is not even entitled for the benefit of article 7.

42. Therefore, we hold that the profit attributable to M/s. HMPL was in the nature of business income and business income is covered by article 7 of DTAA even if the assessee is driven out of article 8.”

4. DCIT vs. Andaman Sea Food Pvt. Ltd. 2012-TII- 67-ITAT-KOL-INTL

The controversy was again analyzed and discussed at length in this case in the context of Article 23 of India-Singapore DTAA.

4.1 Facts of the Case: In this case, the assessee did not deduct tax at source from Consultancy Charges to the Singapore based NR. The CIT(A) held that the consultancy fees paid by the assessee to the NR was not covered by the scope of the expression ‘fees for technical services’ under Article 12 of the DTAA; that since the NR did not have any PE in India, the income of the assessee was also not taxable as ‘business profits’ in India. The Tax Department argued that even if the income was not taxable in India under Article 7 as business profits or under Article 12 as fees for technical services, still the amounts were taxable as other income under Article 23 of India-Singapore DTAA.

4.2 Decision: After elaborate discussion, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee, as follows:

a)    With regard to the Department’s Contention that the amount paid to the Non-resident fell within the category of the “other sum”, the Tribunal noted that “the CIT(A) had stated that “Section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act provides that in computing income of an assessee under the head ‘profits and gains of business’, deduction will not be allowed for any expenditure being royalty, fees for technical services and other sum chargeable under the Act, if it is payable outside India, or in India to a non resident, and on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII B and such tax has not been deducted”, and it was in this context that the CIT(A) noted that though the fee paid was not covered by fees for technical services, it could fall under the head ‘other sum’ but since the said other sum was not chargeable to tax in India, the assessee did not have any tax withholding obligation. This classification of income was not in the context of treaty classification but in the context of, what he believed to be, two categories of income referred to under section 40(a)(i), i.e. ‘royalties and fees for technical services’ and ‘other sums chargeable to tax’……………… What is material is that the expression ‘other income’ was used in the context of mandate of Section 40(a)(i) and not in the context of treaty classification of income.” (Emphasis Supplied).

b)    With regard to the Department’s argument that “consultancy charges, brokerage, com-mission, and incomes of like nature which are covered by the expression “other sums” as stated in Section 40(a)(i) and chargeable to tax in India as per the Income Tax Act, and also are squarely covered by Article 23 of the India Singapore tax treaty, the Tribunal observed that “This argument proceeds on the fallacious assumption that ‘other sums’ u/s. 40(a)(i) constitutes an income which is not chargeable under the specific provisions of different articles of India Singapore tax treaty, whereas not only this expression ‘other income’ is to be read in conjunction with the words immediately following the expression ‘chargeable under the provisions of this (i.e. the Income-tax Act 1961) Act’, it is important to bear in mind that this expression, i.e. ‘other sums, also covers all types of incomes other than (a) interest, and (ii) royalties and fees for technical services. Even business profits are covered by the expression ‘other sums chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ so far as the provisions of section 40(a)(i) and section 195 are concerned and, therefore, going by this logic, even a business income, when not taxable under article 7, can always be taxed under article 23. That is clearly an absurd result.”

c)    The Tribunal further observed that “A tax treaty assigns taxing rights of various types of income to the source state upon fulfill-ment of conditions laid down in respective clauses of the treaty. When these conditions are satisfied, the source state gets the right to tax the same, but when those conditions are not satisfied, the source state does not have the taxing right in respect of the said income. When a tax treaty does not assign taxation rights of a particular kind of income to the source state under the treaty provision dealing with that particular kind of income, such taxability cannot also be invoked under the residuary provisions of Article 23 either. The interpretation canvassed by the learned Departmental Representative, if accepted, will render allocation of taxing rights under a treaty redundant. In any case, to suggest that consultancy charges, brokerage and commission can be taxed under article 23, as has been suggested by the learned Departmental Representative, overlooks the fact that these incomes can indeed be taxed under article 7, article 12 or article 14 when conditions laid down in the respective articles are satisfied.” (Emphasis Supplied)

d)    The Tribunal held that “It is also important to bear in mind the fact that article 23 begins with the words ‘items of income not expressly covered’ by provisions of Articles 6-22. There-fore, it is not the fact of taxability under articles 6-22 which leads to taxability under article 23, but the fact of income of that nature not being covered by articles 6-22 which can lead to taxability under article 23. There could be many such items of income which are not covered by these specific treaty provisions, such as alimony, lottery income, gambling income, rent paid by resident of a contracting state for the use of an immovable property in a third state, and damages (other than for loss of income covered by articles 6-22) etc. In our humble understanding, therefore, article 23 does not apply to items of income which can be classified under sections 6-22 whether or not taxable under these articles, and the income from consultancy charges is covered by Article 7, Article 12 or Article 14 when conditions laid down therein are satisfied. Learned Departmental Representative’s argument, emphatic and enthusiastic as it was, lacks legally sustainable merits and is contrary to the scheme of the tax treaty.” (Emphasis Supplied).

e)    The Tribunal referred to and relied upon certain observations of the AAR in the case of Gearbulk AG – 318 ITR 66 (AAR) (2009-TII-09-ARA-INTL), discussed below.

5.    ADIT vs. Mediterranean Shipping Co., S.A. [2012] 27 taxmann.com 77:

5.1  Facts of the case:

•    Assessee was a Swiss company engaged in the business of operations of ships in the international waters through chartered ships. During the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee had total collection of freight to the tune of Rs. 295.63 crore on which a sum of Rs. 9.33 crore was paid towards the tax liability. In its return of income, however, the assessee declared ‘nil’ income on the ground that there was no article in the Indo-Swiss treaty dealing specifically with taxability of shipping profit; that article 7 of the treaty, dealing with the business profits, specifically excluded profits from the operation of ships in international traffic; that article 22 of the treaty, dealing with other income, subjected shipping profits to tax only in the State of residence, i.e., the Switzerland. Accordingly, the stand of the assessee was that the international shipping profits was not taxable in India and the entire tax of Rs. 9.33 crore paid was liable to be refunded.

•    The Assessing Officer, however, rejected the stand of the assessee relying upon the CBDT Circular No. 333, dated 02-04-1982 whereby it was clarified that where there is no specific provision in the agreement, it is the basic law, i.e., the Indian Income-tax Act which will govern the taxation of the income. Accordingly, the shipping profits of the assessee were held taxable under section 44B of the Income-tax Act at the rate of 7.5 per cent of the total freight collection of Rs. 295.63 crore.

•    On appeal by the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the claim of the assessee that article 22 applied to the profits earned from shipping business in question. The Commissioner (Appeals), however, proceeded to determine as to whether the case of the assessee was covered under article 22(2), which provides for an exception to the applicability of article 22. Under sub- article (2) of article 22 it is provided, inter alia, that provisions of article 22(1) shall not apply to income if the recipient of such income, being a resident of contracting state, carries on business in the other contracting State through a PE therein and the right or property in respect of which income is paid is effectively connected with such PE. After referring to the relevant clauses of the agreement of assessee with MSC, the Commissioner (Appeals) held MSC to be assessee’s PE in India.

•    After holding MSC to be assessee’s PE in India, the Commissioner (Appeals) proceeded to examine as to whether the shipping prof-its derived from operation of ships were effectively connected with said PE; and held that they were not. Accordingly, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that article 22(1) was applicable in the case of the assessee and, therefore, the profits from shipping business was taxable in Switzerland and not in India.

5.2 Decision:

The Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee. The Tribunal observed and held as under:

“A reading of article 22 especially paragraph 1 thereof makes it clear that the items of income of a resident of a contracting State, i.e., Switzerland which are not dealt with in the foregoing articles of the Indo-Swiss treaty shall be taxable only that State. In the instant case, the assessee company being a resident of Switzerland, the income, wherever arising, would fall within the scope of the residuary article 22 if the same is not dealt with in any other articles of the treaty.

The question, therefore, is whether the shipping profits are dealt with in any other articles of the Indo-Swiss treaty or not. The contention raised by the revenue is that by agreeing to exclude the shipping profits from article 8 as well as article 7 of the Indo-Swiss treaty, India and Switzerland had agreed to leave the shipping profits to be taxed by each State according to its domestic law and this undisputed position prevailing up to 2001 did not change as a result of introduction of article 22 of the treaty with effect from 01-04-2001. The contention cannot be agreed with. It is held that as a result of introduction of article 22, the items of income not dealt with in the other articles of the Indo-Swiss treaty are covered in the residuary article 22 and their taxability is governed by the said article with effect from 01-04-2001. Articles 7 and 8 of the treaty, therefore, cannot be relied upon to say that by agreeing to exclude the shipping profits from said articles, the shipping profits are left to be taxed by each contracting State according to its domestic law. It is no doubt true that this was the position prior to introduction of article 22 in the Indo-Swiss treaty in the year 2001 but the same was altered as a result of introduction of the said article inasmuch as it become necessary to find out as to whether shipping profits have been dealt with in any other article of the treaty. Mere exclusion of shipping profits from the scope of treaty could have resulted in leaving the same to be taxed by the concerned contracting State according to its domestic law prior to introduction of article 22. However, such exclusion alone will not take it out of the scope of article 22 unless it is established that the shipping profits have been dealt within any other article of the treaty. The language of article 22(1) in this regard is plain and simple and the requirement for application of the said article is explicitly clear. [Para 33]

In order to say that a particular item of income has been dealt with, it is necessary that the relevant article must state whether Switzerland or India or both have a right to tax such item of income. Vesting of such jurisdiction must positively and explicitly stated and it cannot be inferred by implication as sought to be contended by the revenue relying upon articles 7 and 8 of the treaty. The mere exclusion of international shipping profit from article 7 can-not be regarded as an item of income dealt with by the said article as envisaged in article 22(1). The expression ‘dealt with’ contemplates a positive action and such positive action in the instant context would be when there is an article categorically stating the source of country or the country of residence or both have a right to tax that item of income. The fact that the expression used in article 22(1) of the Indo-Swiss treaty is ‘dealt with’ vis-a-vis the expression ‘mentioned’ used in some other treaties clearly demonstrates that the expression ‘dealt with’ is some thing more than a mere mention of such income in the article. The international shipping profits can at the most be said to have mentioned in article 7 but the same cannot be said to have been dealt with in the said article. [Para 35]

Up to assessment year 2001-02, international ship-ping profits no doubt were being taxed under the domestic laws as per the provisions of section 44B. However, it was not because of the exclusion contained in Article 7 that India was vested with the authority to tax such international shipping profit but it was because there was no other article in the Indo-Swiss treaty dealing with international shipping profits which could override the provisions of section 44B in terms of section 90(2) being more beneficial to the assessee. This position, however, has changed as a result of introduction of article 22 in the Indo-Swiss treaty which now governs the international shipping profits not being dealt with specifically by any other article of the treaty and if the provisions of article 22 are beneficial to the assessee, the same are bound to prevail over the provisions of section 44B. [Para 41]

It is held that the item of income in question, i.e., international shipping profit cannot be said to be dealt with in any other articles of the Indo- Swiss treaty and the taxability of the said income, thus, is governed by residuary article 22 introduced in the treaty with effect from 01-04-2002. [Para 48]”

We may mention that Article 8 of the Indo-Swiss DTAA has been amended vide Notification dated 27-12-2011 to include Shipping Profits within its scope and accordingly, the controversy no longer survives.

6.    AAR Ruling in the case of Gearbulk AG – 318 ITR 66 (AAR) (2009-TII-09-ARA-INTL)

6.1 Similar issue arose in the case of Gearbulk AG, a Shipping Company, in the context of India-Switzerland DTAA. In this case, the Applicant, a Swiss Company, had income from Shipping Business. At the relevant point in time, Article 8 of India-Switzerland DTAA dealt with only profits from the operation of Aircraft and did not deal with profits from Operation of Ships. The issue before the AAR was whether tax-ability of such Shipping Profits was governed by Article 7 of India – Swiss DTAA or whether the same was taxable in India in terms of “Other Income” – Article 22 of the Treaty.

6.2 After discussing the meaning of the expression ‘deal with’ as given in various dictionaries, the AAR held in favor of the revenue. The AAR held that the Freight Income received by the Applicant is liable to be taxed in India under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and that such income is not covered by he provisions of Indo-Swiss DTAA.

7.    ACIT vs. Viceroy Hotels Ltd. Hyderabad 2011-TII-97-ITAT-HYD-INTL

7.1 In this case, the assessee, engaged in the business of running a Five Star Hotel by the name of “VICEROY”, was being converted into Marriott Chain Hotel under the franchisee granted by the International Licensing Company SARL (Marriott USA). To meet the standard for Marriott Group, the assessee embarked upon an expansion programme by way of adding new blocks in the hotel and also upgradation by way of bringing about interior and exterior changes, landscaping etc. For this purpose the assessee entered into four separate and independent agreements with one Anthony Corbett & As-sociates of UK; Marriott International Design &    Constructions of USA; Bensly Design Group International Construction Company Ltd., Thailand and Lim Hong Lian of Singapore.

7.2 With regard to payment of landscape architectural consultancy services to a Thai Company, the issue arose whether in the absence of an Article relating to fee for technical services in the India-Thailand DTAA, services of landscape architectural consultancy can be taxed under the residuary Article 22 of the DTAA.

7.3 With regard to non deduction of tax at source on the amount paid to M/s. Bensly Design, Thailand which is engaged in the business of landscape architectural consultancy, the lower authorities were of the opinion that though the DTAA does not clearly spell out the taxation of fees for technical services, the amount paid by the assessee to M/s Bensly group would fall within the purview of article 22 of the Agreement which is residuary clause dealing with other income not expressly dealt in other articles of DTAA.

7.4 According to lower authorities, the services rendered by Bensly group do not constitute professional or independent personal services under article 14 of the DTAA between India and Kingdom of Thailand. Without prejudice to this, the A.O. observed that even if the payments made to the NR is treated as fees for professional services or independent activities within the meaning of article 14 of the DTAA, then also such fees can be taxed under the IT Act. It is because, the exemption provided under article 14 is available only to such payments that are not borne by an enterprise or a PE situated in India. In the present case, the payment has been made by an enterprise situated in India and accordingly, the non-resident company is not entitled to claim any exemption on the strength of Article 14 of the DTAA.

7.5 The A.O. also stated that the instruction con-tained in CBDT circular No. 333 (F.506/42/81-FTD) dated 02-04-1982 is in effect complementary to Article 22 of the DTAA which provide that where there is no specific provision under the DTAA, it is the basic law which will govern the taxation of the income of the non-resident. Following the aforesaid stand, the A.O. invoked provision of section 9(1) r.w.s. 115A(1)(b)(B) of the IT Act and treated the entire fees as income chargeable to tax in India since all the expenses of the NR were reimbursed by the assessee deductor. The A.O. further stated that the agreement under which the technical services are rendered is neither approved by the central govt. nor does it relate to a matter included in the industrial policy and hence the deductor should have deducted tax at source at the rate of 40% plus surcharge as prescribed in the relevant Finance Act for any other income arising to a non resident company in India and since the deductor had failed to discharge its statutory obligation, the assessee was treated as an assessee in default.

7.6 According to the assessee, as there is no PE for M/s Bensly Design, Thailand in India, and no foreign employee stayed in India for more than 90 days, the CIT (A) should have exempted the business profit of the company from taxation in India. Under Article 7 of the DTAA income earned by a NR in India under the head business, can be taxed in India only if the NR has a PE in India. If the business is carried on through employees and if those employees stay in India for less than 183 days in the case of Thailand, there will be no PE in India and the corresponding business profit of the NR becomes non taxable. According to the assessee, as per Indo-Thai DTAA, there is no article in the relevant DTAA dealing with fees for technical services, there is only an article dealing with royalties, and of course, there is an article dealing with business profits. The A.O. wrongly applied the residuary Article 22 and taxed the income arising in India for the Thai company at the rate of 40%.

7.7 The Tribunal negatived the contentions of the Tax Department and held, “The fees paid to M/s Bensly Design, Thailand for rendering services of landscape architectural consultancy is not covered as per the DTAA since there is no article in the relevant DTAA dealing with this nature of payments. There is only one article dealing with Royalties and another dealing with business profit. Under Article 7 of the DTAA, income earned by a non resident in India under the head ‘business’ can be taxed in India only if the non-resident has a permanent establishment in India. In this case, the business was carried on through employees and there is no record that these employees stayed in India for more than 183 days. Accordingly there is no PE in India and corresponding business profit of non-resident cannot be taxed in India and provision of section 195 is not applicable.”

8.    Credit Suisse (Singapore) Ltd. vs. ADIT – 2012-TII-214-ITAT-MUM-INTL

8.1 In this case, the assessee company incorporated in Singapore and a tax resident there was registered with SEBI as a sub-account of Credit Suisse. The assessee had inter alia, conducted portfolio investments in Indian securities. The assessee had shown net short-term capital loss from sale of shares and sale of shares underlying FCCBs besides gains from exchange traded derivative contracts. The net resultant gains were claimed as exempt under Article 13(4) of the tax treaty. The dividend income was also claimed as exempt u/s. 10(34).

8.2 The assessee also claimed that gains made by it from cancellation of forward contracts were not chargeable to tax. The assessee claimed that the foreign exchange forward contracts were entered to hedge its exposures in respect of its Indian Investments being shares/exchange traded derivative contracts; that being an FII sub-account, in view of the provisions of Section 115AD, wherein the transactions in underlying assets against which the foreign exchange forward cover contracts were entered into, were taxed as ‘capital gains’, the foreign exchange forward cover contracts also took on the color of their underlying assets, being capital assets. Consequently, the gains realised from cancellation of such forward cover contracts had to be regarded as capital gains, which were not liable to tax in India as per Article 13(4) of the tax treaty. It was claimed that although these gains could be taxed as business profits since the assessee did not have a PE in India, the same could not be taxed in India.

The AO rejected the assessee’s explanation and held that the transaction in forward purchase of foreign exchange and settlement could not be said to be resulting in capital gains as the same was never held by the assessee as capital asset but was meant to be settled by price difference. Also, as the assessee was not eligible to carry on business in India as per SEBI regulations, the income arising from settlement of forward contracts could not be treated as business income. Thus, the AO held that the assessee’s income from cancellation of foreign exchange forward contracts was neither capital gains income nor business income but ‘income from other sources’ under Article 23 of the tax treaty. However, the Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the case of Citicorp Investment Bank (Singapore) Ltd. vs. Dy. Director of Income Tax (International Taxation)(2012-TII-86-ITAT-MUM-INTL) and Citicorp Banking Corporation, Bahrain vs. Addl. Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) (2011-TII-40- ITAT-MUM-INTL), held that gains arising from early settlement of forward foreign exchange contract has to be treated as capital gain and that the A.O. and the DRP were not justified in treating the said gain as ‘income from other sources’.

8.3 We may mention that the Tribunal, while deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, did not discuss the controversy of application of Article 23 vis-à-vis application of Article 7 or Article 13 of India – Singapore DTAA.

9.    Lanka Hydraulic Institute Ltd (2011-TII-09-ARA-INTL)

9.1 In this case, the applicant, a Tax Resident of Sri Lanka, had sought an advance ruling from the Authority on the taxability of the payment received under its contract with WAPCOS and in the absence of a specific article for the taxation of fees for technical services, in the India-Sri Lanka DTAA, whether this payment would be governed by Article 7 of the tax treaty which dealt with taxation of business profits.

9.2 The AAR held, without much discussion and reasoning, as follows:

“It is true that the treaty does not contain a specific article for the taxation of fees for technical services. In that event reference is to be made to Article 22 of the Tax Treaty which reads as follows:

‘Item of income of a resident of a Contract-ing State which are not expressly mentioned in the foregoing Article of this Agreement in respect of which he is subject to tax in that state shall be taxable only in that state.’

Accordingly, the fees for technical services shall be governed by Article 22 of the Tax Treaty and not as per Article 7 of the Tax Treaty which deals with taxation of business profits.”

We may mention that, effectively the Ruling was in favor of the Sri Lankan Applicant since Indo-Sri Lankan DTAA provides that income falling under the scope of Article 22 shall be taxable only in the state of the Resident i.e. in Sri Lanka. However, since the income in question was essentially in the nature of Business Profits, in our humble opinion, in the absence of FTS Article in Indo-Sri Lankan DTAA, such income should be taxable in accordance with provisions of Article 7 and not in accordance with provisions of Article 22 of the DTAA. Thus, in principle, we are not in agreement with the aforesaid AAR Ruling.

9.3 Following its Ruling in the case of Lanka Hydraulic Institute Ltd (2011-TII-09-ARA-INTL), similar view was taken by the AAR in case of XYZ (AAR Nos. 886 to 911, 913 to 924, 927, 929 and 930 of 2010)(2012) 20 taxmann.com 88 (AAR); and held that in absence of FTS Article, services would get covered by “Other Income” Article. In this case the income was in the nature of inspection, verification, testing and certification services (IVTC).

In our humble opinion, both the AAR Rulings mentioned herein above are not in accordance with Principles of Interpretation of Tax Treaties and require reconsideration.

10.    Conclusion

In some Indian DTAAs, under Article 21 exclusive right of taxation is given to source state like Brazil, United Mexican States, Namibia and South Africa. In few Indian DTAAs, Right of taxation is in accordance with laws of the respective Contracting States/both the contracting states like in case of Singapore and Italy. India’s DTAAs with Greece, Netherlands and Libya does not contain ‘Other Income’ Article. In many other Indian DTAAs, Primary right of taxation to ‘State of Residence’ and Correlative right to the ‘State of Source’. In such cases, issue regarding applicability of Article 7 instead of Article 21, is of great relevance.

The issue is yet to be tested before the higher judiciary. However, in our humble view, the analysis and reasoning advanced by the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Andaman Sea Food Pvt. Ltd appears to be very sound and in accordance with well accepted principles of Interpretation of Tax Treaties and is worth following.

Order No.A/700-703/13/ (STB/C-I dated 15/03/2013) Commissioner of Service tax, Mumbai vs. TCS.E-Serve Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether service tax is payable under reverse charge on the amount paid for using international private leased circuit provided from abroad?

Facts:

Appellant provided call centre services, computerised data processing services etc. to customers in India and abroad and accordingly was registered under Business Auxiliary Services and Business Support Services. Appellant used international private leased circuit service provided by a Singapore company and as such paid charges to the foreign company. The dispute related to whether service tax was payable u/s. 66A for availing the said lease circuit/telecommunication service from abroad. The Appellant contested the levy on the ground that the service provider was not a “telegraph authority” as per definition of the term contained in section 65(111) and thus did not provide taxable service for the provisions relating to telecommunication service. Further, CBEC vide its circular 137/21/2011 dated 15-07-2011 clarified to the effect that foreign vendors being not licensed under Indian Telegraph Act were not covered by section 65(109a). Appellant placed reliance on Karvy Consultants Ltd. 2006 (1) STR 7 (AP) which dealt with a similar situation in the context of banking and other financial service. It was contended that under GST Act of Singapore, telecommunication service including international leased circuit line or network, if provided from a place in Singapore to a place outside Singapore, was treated as a taxable supply but qualified for zero rating. Hence, the same could not be subjected to tax in India. The revenue strongly contended that the service in question was specified in section 65(105) and the provider of service was licensed to provide such service under the Singapore Telecommunication Act. Further, section 66A created a deeming fiction and thus, the foreign service provider not being a telegraph authority should not come in the way of enforcing the said section. The circular/letter referred above being internal correspondence between the Board and the field formation would not have any binding force and reliance was placed by the revenue on Unitech Ltd. 2008 (12) STR 752 wherein on architect’s service received from a commercial concern abroad, reverse charge applicability was upheld.

Held:

Service tax was leviable u/s. 66 of the Act on taxable services referred to in section 65(105). Consequently, service tax was leviable u/s. 66A only in case of taxable services as covered by section 65(105). Thus, if a service was not covered by section 65(105), it could neither be liable u/s. 66 nor u/s. 66A. Thus for a leased circuit service to be taxable as per section 65(105) read with 65(111), the foreign service provider who was not a telegraph authority as defined under the law was not liable u/s. 66 or u/s. 66A. This legal position was evident from the Board’s clarification vide its above cited letter of 15-07-2011. The Bench also relied on the ratio of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Karvy Consultants Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that in order that NBFC would be covered under net of service tax as banking and financial service provider, mere registration as NBFC was not enough but its principal business should be of receiving deposits/ lending. Further, the facts obtained in the case of Unitech Ltd. (supra), were also distinguished and the appeal was allowed on merits.
levitra

2013 (30) STR 369 (Tri. – Bang) Balarami Reddy & Co. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the order-in-original sent by speed post considered proper service?

Facts:

An order dated 26-09-2008 was issued to the appellant vide speed post. The appellant, on nonreceipt of the said order, collected the same from the Superintendent of Central Excise on 06-01-2010 and filed an appeal with the Commissioner (Appeals) on 05-02-2010. The appellate authority took the view that the order must have been served on the assessee as early as September 2008 and consequently the appeal was dismissed considering it heavily time-barred.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal held that, the copy of the order-in-original was sent to the assessee by speed post whereas the legal requirement was to send it by registered post with acknowledgement due. Dispatch of order-in-original by speed post was not in accordance with section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and thus, the impugned order was set aside.
levitra

2013 (30) STR 385 (Tri-Del.) Sarvashaktiman Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur

fiogf49gjkf0d
What will be the date of receipt for the purpose of payment of service tax? – cheque was received on 04-01-2007, deposited in bank on 05-02-2007 and service tax paid on 05-03-2007.

Facts:

The appellant provided business auxiliary services. For the services provided till December, 2006, the bills were raised in December, 2006 but the payment was received in January and the cheque deposited in the bank on 05-02-2007; as such the service tax was paid on 05-03-2007. The original adjudicating authority imposed penalties u/s. 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. On appeal against the above order, Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the penalty imposed u/s. 78 and 77 but upheld penalty u/s. 76.

Held:

The Tribunal held that, section 76 provided for imposition of penalty where the person liable to pay service tax in accordance of section 68 failed to pay such tax. In the present case, although the cheque was received on 04-01-2007, the same was actually deposited in the bank on 05-02-2007 and thus, it was to be considered as if the consideration was received in the month of February itself, requiring them to deposit the tax in March, 2007. There being no delay in depositing the service tax, penalty u/s. 76 was set aside with consequential relief.
levitra

2013 (30) STR 402( Tri.-Kolkata) Reliance Telecom Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether service tax is applicable on MRP of RCV (Recharge Coupons Vouchers) or on amount actually received from distributors after reduction of their commission?

Facts:

The appellant provided telecommunication service and charged their customers for the services to be provided by them as per the value of the recharge vouchers (RCV) purchased. While arriving at the taxable value, the appellant deducted the discount offered to their distributors from the value of the voucher and contended that it had service tax liability only to the extent of the amount received by them. As per section 67 of the Act, the value of any taxable service ought to be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him and thus, service tax was payable on the amount charged or consideration received by them from the distributors. The appellant further submitted that there was a clear principal to principal relationship between them and the distributors. Hence, service tax was payable on the discounted price and not on the MRP printed on the RCV’s. According to the revenue, since the RCV’s were sold on MRP, they were treated as OTC (over the counter) goods in the market and issuance of receipt for OTC goods being rarely practiced, production of the document in support of the allegation that RCV’s were sold on MRP was not feasible.

Held:

As per the provisions of section 67, if the provision of service is for a consideration in money, then the taxable value was the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him and thus, the service was provided to the consumer and not to the distributor. The Tribunal further held that, where it was established that the charges collected from the consumers in lieu of the RCV’s was a service charge and not a sale, it was automatically established that the amount deducted by the dealer was nothing but commission to be included in the taxable income of the Appellant and thus, directed the appellant to pre-deposit 25% of the demand.
levitra

2013 (30) STR 371 (Tri-Del.) Pooja Forge Lab vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Faridabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on GTA services is available where the appellant has entered into Free on Road (FOR) contract with the customers?

Facts:

The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of nuts and bolts, wire equipment etc. and entered into an FOR contract with their customers. As such, the transportation of the said goods being the responsibility of the appellant, they paid service tax under GTA and claimed CENVAT on the same. The Revenue contended that with the amendment in the definition of input services with effect from 01-04-2008 the appellant was not entitled to avail the credit.

The appellant contended that their sales were on FOR basis and, as such, place of removal gets extended to the buyer’s premises. They produced on record the purchase order as also the invoices along with a Chartered Accountant’s certificate in support of their claim and relied upon Ambuja Cements Ltd. vs. Union of India reported at [2009 (236) ELT 431 (P & H)] where the Board’s Circular of 2007 was examined and it was held that they were entitled to the benefit of CENVAT credit of service tax paid on the GTA services.

Held:

There was no justifiable reason to uphold the finding of the lower authorities where the Chartered Accountant’s certificate stated to the effect that sale was on FOR basis and all the expenses incurred up to the buyer’s premises formed part of the cost of final product. Further, the appellant were the owners of the goods up to the place of delivery i.e. the buyers’ premises and as such the GTA services so availed by them, were to be treated as input service and, thus, they were entitled to the credit.

levitra

2013 (30) STR 357 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Oracle Granito Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether CENVAT credit is allowed on service tax paid in respect of renting of immovable property used for displaying finished goods?

Facts:
The appellants were manufacturers of vitrified tiles and availed CENVAT credit of duty paid on inputs, capital goods and input services in accordance with the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The appellants also availed CENVAT of service tax paid of Rs. 1,11,240/- on the rent charged at the premises used for facilitating display of the appellants’ goods. The department disallowed the credit and levied interest and penalties. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order. The appellants contended that, the property taken on rent for the purpose of displaying its vitrified tiles were in line of its business and relied on Bharat Fritz Werner Ltd. 2011 (22) STR 429 (Tri.- Bang) and Micro Labs Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 383 (Kar.) = 2011 (270) ELT 156 (Kar.).

The ld. Respondent contended that, in the present case, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the amount of service tax paid by them was included in the final value of the products manufactured and cleared by them which has to be satisfied by the Appellant.

Held:

It was undisputed that the properties were taken on rent by the appellants for display of vitrified tiles and that the service provider had discharged the service tax under the category of renting of immovable property services. Further, the appellants also produced the chartered accountant’s certificate and thus, the services were utilised by the appellants for the purpose of enhancement of their business. Also, since the services were directly or indirectly used for the purpose of their business, credit could not be denied.

levitra

2013 (30) STR. 435 (Tri.-Delhi) Bhavik vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur- I

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether service tax under reverse charge is applicable on the services of erection & commissioning of an imported machinery by foreign party’s technicians where no separate consideration was mentioned in the agreement towards installation?

Facts:
The appellant imported textile machinery form Japan, Italy etc. under a contract with the foreign exporter and discharged duty thereon. The agreement also included installation and erection to be done by the foreign supplier who would send his technical persons to do the job.

Revenue initiated the proceedings on the installation and erections done by foreign technical personnel and confirmed the demand of Rs. 37,35,730/- for the period post 18-04-2006 on the basis of the valuation done with recourse to Notification No. 19/2003-ST dated 21-08-2003 and Notification No. 1/2006-ST dated 01-03-2006 along with imposition of penalties u/s. 76 and 78. The appellant contended that the foreign exporter had office in India in which case service tax liability would not fall upon the recipient of services. Also, they had discharged customs duty on the entire value of the textile machinery and that the notifications referred to by the Commissioner were optional granting abatement to the persons who are otherwise liable to pay the service tax. The revenue stated that payment of customs duty on the value of the goods has got nothing to do with the payment of service tax. The said duties were separate duties and the appellant was liable to pay service tax on that part of the value of contract which related to the services provided by the foreign persons. They further contended that the adjudicating authority was correct in arriving at the value of services in terms of said notifications.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal, granting stay unconditionally, held that, there being only one contract between the appellant and the foreign supplier, such supply of textile machinery included the work of installation, erection and commissioning. Further, customs duty was paid on the entire value in the agreement and as such, it was not proper to artificially segregate it into two parts i.e. value of the machinery and value of services. Further, the adoption of notification for arriving at the artificial deemed value of the services was also not proper inasmuch as the said notification provided option to the assessee to seek abatement of 67% in the value of services for payment of service tax and the same have no applicability to the facts of the present case.

levitra

2013-TIOL-789-CESTAT-MUM Ane Industries Pvt. Ltd./Shri Gagandeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether interest amount would accrue on credit taken but not utilised?
Facts:
The appellant rendered services of mining and availed ineligible CENVAT credit to the extent of Rs. 47,79,078/- but did not utilise the same. Interest and penalties were confirmed. The appellant relied on the case of Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 204 (Cal) where it was held that interest liability would not accrue if there was no liability to pay duty.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. 2011 (265) ELT 3 (SC) held that that there was no difference between the expression “credit taken” and “credit utilised” for the purpose of recovery of wrongly availed credit in terms of Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and accordingly ordered deposit of Rs. 15 lakh.

levitra

2013-TIOL-734-CESTAT-MUM M/s. GMMCO Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur

fiogf49gjkf0d
When VAT is payable on a transaction, whether service tax is payable? Held, No. Pre-deposit stayed.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in renting of earthmoving equipment such as caterpillar, excavators, etc. to various customers and discharged VAT liability on the same. The department contended that the effective possession and control was with the appellant as emerging from the agreement with one of their customer and thus, the transaction was one of “Supply of Tangible Goods” service liable to service tax. The appellant contended that the activity undertaken by them was one of leasing on which VAT liability was to be discharged as per the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002. They also relied on Circular MF (DR) 224/1/2008-TRU dated 29/02/2008 and on the case of G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT in support of their claim.

Held:
On perusal of the agreement entered into by the appellant and applying the ratio in the decision of G. S. Lamba & Sons (supra), it was held that the transaction prima facie was for “transfer of right to use” which was deemed to be ‘sale’ and not “supply of tangible goods for use service” and as such, full waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

levitra

2013-TIOL-441-HC-DEL-ST Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax v. Simplex Infrastructure and Foundary Works.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the term ‘firm’ also included a private limited company for the purpose of the definition of Consulting Engineer? Held, No.

Facts

The Appellant contended that the respondents; a private limited company was included in the definition of Consulting Engineers having recourse to section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which defined the term ‘person’ to include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not.

Held:

The Hon. High Court dismissing the appeal held that the definition prior to 01-05-2006 included the term firm only and only post 01-05-2006, the term body corporate was introduced. Further, reliance was also not placed on the definition of person in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act was incorrect, as nowhere the term ‘person’ was used in the definition of “Consulting Engineer”.

[Note: This decision did not consider and is opposed to the decision in case of M. N. Dastur & Co. Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (4) ST R 3 (Cal)]

levitra

When Can an Open Offer be Avoided? – Supreme Court Decides

fiogf49gjkf0d
The Supreme Court recently had an occasion to
render an interesting decision (Nirma Industries Limited vs. SEBI
((2013) 33 Taxmann.com 333(SC), dated 9th May 2013) on the Takeover
Regulations. It examined the very rationale of the Regulations. In
particular, the question was when could a person taking over a listed
company avoid an open offer? More specifically, having already paid the
promoters for acquiring the controlling interest in a company, can the
acquirer avoid paying the public for their shares? Can the acquirer be
allowed to withdraw if he later finds that the value of the shares was
substantially lower than he was supposedly aware of?

This
decision has drawn a lot of controversy and criticism. It has been said
that the acquirer, having already suffered by getting over valued
promoters shares, should not be made to suffer again by being required
to acquire shares of the public. Partly this owes to certain peculiar
facts and legal interpretation on certain issues which the Court upheld.
Partly also because it is said that the law creates certain hurdles and
then punishes the acquirer for not being able to cross them. But mainly
on certain substantive grounds. I respectfully differ with contrary
views on certain aspects and submit that the Supreme Court has rightly
required the acquirer to comply with its obligations to the public. The
few areas of legal ambiguity have also been rightly interpreted by the
Court.

The facts are indeed peculiar and on a first glance raise
certain sympathy too. To summarise, certain lenders (collectively
referred herein as “Nirma”) granted certain loans to the promoters of a
listed company (“the Company”) against security of shares of the
Company. When there was default in repayment, Nirma exercised the pledge
and acquired the shares. This resulted in trigger of requirement of
open offer which Nirma initiated. However, on later investigation, Nirma
found that there were allegedly serious misappropriations, etc. in the
Company. Nirma applied to SEBI for grant of exemption from making an
open offer or other alternate reliefs. SEBI refused. The Securities
Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) upheld this decision. On appeal, the Supreme
Court too upheld the decision. Now, let us consider the background of
the law, then the more detailed facts, the decision of the Supreme Court
and the areas of contention.

What do the Takeover Regulations provide?

The
Takeover Regulations, since their inception, are based on a particular
concept. Whoever acquires a listed company (control or substantial
shares in it) ought to also acquire further shares from the public. The
principle behind this is that members of the public invest in the shares
of such company based on the existing promoter group. If another group
replaces the existing group, the public should have a chance to exit
with them. The other objective is to provide the public shareholders an
opportunity to sell their shares at least at the same price as the
exiting promoters. Curiously, despite several rounds of amendments, the
public shareholders are given step-fatherly treatment in one important
aspect. While the Promoters can sell 100% of their shares at a
particular price, the public shareholders cannot. Only 26% (earlier 20%)
of the share capital needs to be acquired from the public.

What happened in this case?

Nirma
lent a certain sum of money to promoters (“the Promoters”) of the
Company against pledge of shares of the Company. The promoters
defaulted. Nirma exercised the pledge and acquired the pledged shares
that triggered the open offer requirements. Nirma made an open offer at
the prescribed price to the public. However, because of findings of
multiple audits, Nirma realised that there were allegedly huge
misappropriations, understatement of liabilities, etc. Consequently, the
value of the shares was far lower than the open offer price.

Nirma
requested SEBI that it should not be required to make the open offer to
the public. Alternatively, the open offer could be at a lower than the
prescribed price nearer to the actual valuation if the alleged
misappropriations, etc. were factored in the valuation.

SEBI
rejected this request. Nirma appealed to SAT which too rejected it.
Nirma appealed to the Supreme Court, which also dismissed the appeal on
grounds discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Grounds why Supreme Court rejected the plea for exemption

Nirma
raised several contentions. One set of them was on legal issues. It
contended that SEBI did have general powers to grant exemption that SEBI
said it did not have. The other set of contentions was that if SEBI had
powers, the facts of the case had enough merits that SEBI ought to have
granted the exemption. The Supreme Court rejected both the contentions.

The first contention was that SEBI did have generic powers to
grant exemption. The specific grounds listed in the Regulations were, it
was contended, not exhaustive and, further, SEBI did not have power to
grant exemption on grounds similar to the specified ones but had broader
powers. The Regulations provided for three grounds for withdrawal of
open offer. First was that statutory approvals for making of the open
offer were refused. Second was that the sole acquirer, being a natural
person, had died. The third clause was “such circumstances as in the
opinion of the Board merits withdrawal”.

The contention of Nirma
was that (since the first two grounds did not apply here) SEBI had wide
and unrestricted powers under the residuary powers under the third
ground. SEBI, however, contended that its powers were ejusdem generis
the earlier powers. The present circumstances were not such that could
place pari materia with the earlier grounds and hence exemption could
not be considered.

The Supreme Court noted that Regulation 27 first provides that “No public offer, once made, shall be withdrawn”.
The exceptions to this thus shall be strictly construed. It also held
that the residuary power to grant exemption had to be considered ejusdem
generis the earlier powers. Since such powers conceived of a practical
impossibility of the open offer going further, the residuary power of
SEBI has also to be restricted to those other situations where the there
was similar practical impossibility. It held that the present
circumstances did not have any such practical impossibility. Nirma had
contended that an earlier specific ground that was deleted ought to have
been considered. This deleted ground provided that the open offer could
be withdrawn in case there was a competing bid. However, the Court
rejected this contention too.

The Supreme Court observed as follows:-

“Applying the aforesaid tests, we have no hesitation in accepting the conclusions reached by SAT that clause (b) and (c) referred to circumstances which pertain to a class, category or genus, that the common thread which runs through them is the impossibility in carrying out the public offer. Therefore, the term “such circumstances” in clause (d) would also be restricted to situation which would make it impossible for the acquirer to perform the public offer. The discretion has been left to the Board by the legislature realising that it is impossible to anticipate all the circumstances that may arise making it impossible to complete a public offer. Therefore, certain amount of discretion has been left with the Board to determine as to whether the circumstances fall within the realm of impossibility as visualised under sub- clause (b) and (c). In the present case, we are not satisfied that circumstances are such which would make it impossible for the acquirer to perform the public offer. The possibility that the acquirer would end-up making loses instead of generating a huge profit would not bring the situation within the realm of impossibility.”

Even on the issue whether the facts warranted exemption on generic grounds, if SEBI indeed had such powers, the Supreme Court answered in the negative. The Court held that Nirma’s real reason for seeking withdrawal was for avoiding economic losses. However, such a ground could not be permitted at the cost of the public shareholders. The Court noted that there were several red flags in the Company such as litigations against the Company, etc. and Nirma took the decision to acquire the shares fully conscious of these. Hence, such ground was also rejected.

The other major ground on general legal principles that a fraud vitiated any contract or obligation was also rejected.

The Court also refused to grant downward revision of price nearer to the value had the alleged siphoning off/understatement of liabilities, etc. were taken into account.

Criticism and support of the decision

The decision has been criticised on certain grounds. It was suggested the Court ought to have interpreted the powers of SEBI broadly and not applied the principle of ejusdem generis. Even if this principle was applied, it ought to have taken a broader view and taken into account the deleted ground also. All in all, it should have held that SEBI did have powers to grant withdrawal.

On merits too, criticism was made that the offeror was already subjected to loss on account of having acquired the shares from the promoters through pledge. Forcing the acquirer to suffer further loss was unfair and also resulted in unintended benefit to the public shareholders. The acquirer was victim of fraud and should not have been victimised further.

It is also stated that the law does not permit extensive due diligence by acquirers because of restrictions in Regulations relating to insider trading. In such a situation where an acquirer is handicapped, he should not be forced to carry out an acquisition when later investigation does throw up a fraud that could have been found through earlier due diligence.

It is submitted that while the circumstances were peculiar, the acquirer cannot escape the liability of making an open offer. This was a case where the acquirer acquired control and not merely 3substantial quantity of shares. The directors representing the erstwhile promoters resigned and Independent Directors were appointed. Further, though the acquisition was really in the form of exercise of pledge, it was a conscious act. Though not specified, it appears to me that these shares could have been immediately sold in the market at the then prevailing higher market price. However, the acquirer proceeded to carry out further investigations that revealed the hidden losses.

Further, effectively, the acquirer acquired shares of the erstwhile promoters but did not want to carry out the inevitable next step of acquiring shares of the public. In effect, the promoters did get money through original lending and exercise of pledge. Having acquired the controlling interest, the acquirer could not avoid the open offer that came as a package deal with it.

It is submitted that permitting exemption from making an open offer would have been a bad precedent and opened litigation in future cases where acquirers would come before SEBI on several pretexts seeking exemption and even benefitting from the sheer delay. It would be extremely unfair to allow acquisition of a controlling interest without making the public offer.

One may also recollect that the public shareholders even otherwise suffer from an inequity in takeover of companies. The promoters get to sell all their shares while only 26% (earlier 20%) of the public shareholding is to be acquired under an open offer.

Perhaps what is needed is change in law relating to pledge of shares. It is true that pledges are subject to misuse since an acquisition may be disguised as a pledge. Usually, however, financial lenders are not interested in acquiring control of a company. Thus, there is a case for amending the law to give some relief. For example, an exemption could be granted in cases where pledge is exercised but the shares so acquired are sold by way of auction within a time frame. The acquirer of shares through such sale would be required to make an open offer. If the lender does not sell within the time frame, the lender should be required to make an open offer.

Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“the Act”) provides for instances when the Government can compulsorily acquire private land for public purposes and for companies. It also provides for the manner of compensation and other incidental matters in this connection. The provisions of the Act have been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act does not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected persons and their families. The definition of the crucial term “public purposes” is very wide and is often the subject-matter of great dispute. There have been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 not only by the Central Government but also by the State Governments. Further, there has been heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement was necessary.

Accordingly, to have a unified legislation dealing with acquisition of land, to provide for just and fair compensation and make adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the affected persons and their families, the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 (“the Bill”) was introduced in Parliament. The Bill thus provides for repealing and replacing the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with broad provisions for adequate rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the project affected persons and their families. An important milestone was crossed by the Bill when the Government managed a broad all-party consensus on this crucial legislation. Hence, let us look at some of the salient provisions of this very important Law relating to land acquisition.

Applicability of the Bill

The provisions relating to land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement, shall apply, when the Government acquires land,—

(a) for its own use, hold and control; or

(b) with the purpose to transfer it for the use of private companies for public purpose (including Public Private Partnership projects but not including national or state highway projects); or

(c) on the request of private companies for immediate and declared use by such companies of land for public purposes.

The provisions relating to rehabilitation and resettlement shall also apply in cases where,—

(a) a private company purchases or acquires land, equal to or more than 100 acres in rural areas or equal to or more than 50 acres in urban areas, through private negotiations with the owner of the land;

(b) a private company requests the Government for acquisition of a part of an area so identified for a public purpose:

The Bill does not apply to certain land acquisition Acts, such as:

(a) The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958
(b) The Atomic Energy Act, 1962
(c) The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978
(d) The National Highways Act, 1956
(e) The Special Economic Zones Act, 2005
(f) The Electricity Act, 2003
(g) The Railways Act, 1989

Determination of Social Impact and Public Purpose

Whenever the Government intends to acquire land for a public purpose, it shall carry out a Social Impact Assessment study in consultation with the Gram Sabha in rural areas or an equivalent body in urban areas, in the affected area in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed.

Public Purpose has been defined to include the provision of land for:

(a) strategic defence purposes/national security /safety of the people;

(b) railways, highways, ports, power and irrigation purposes for use by Government and public sector companies or corporations;

(c) project affected people;

(d) planned development of villages or any site in the urban area or provision of land for residential purposes for the weaker sections or the provision of land for Government administered educational, agricultural, health and research schemes or institutions;

(e) residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced by reason of the implementation of any Government scheme

(f) the provision of land in the public interest for any other use or in case of PPPs (Public Private Partnership) projects with the prior consent of at least 80% of the project affected people

(g) the provision of land in the public interest for private companies for the production of goods for public or provision of public services with the prior consent of at least 80% of the project affected people. However, if public sector companies want the land for similar uses then the 80% consent condition does not apply.

To ensure food security, multi-crop irrigated land shall be acquired only as a last resort. An equivalent area of culturable wasteland shall be developed, if multi-crop land is acquired. In districts where net sown area is less than 50% of the total geographical area, no more than 10% of the net sown area of the district will be acquired. The Social Impact Assessment study shall include all the following:

(a) assessment of nature of public interest involved;

(b) estimation of affected families and the number of families among them likely to be displaced;

(c) study of socio-economic impact upon the families residing in the adjoining area of the land acquired;

(d) extent of lands, public and private, houses, settlements and other common properties likely to be affected by the proposed acquisition;

(e) whether the extent of land proposed for acquisition is the absolute bare-minimum extent needed for the project;

(f) whether land acquisition at an alternate place has been considered and found not feasible;

(g) study of social impact from the project

It remains to be seen whether such a Study delays the land acquisition process. The Study should be evaluated by an independent multi-disciplinary expert group constituted by the Government.

If the land sought to be acquired is 100 acres or more, then the Government must constitute a Committee to examine the land acquisition proposals. It would be headed by the Chief Secretary of State/ Union Territory. The role of the Committee would be to ensure the following:

(a) there is a legitimate and bona fide public purpose for the proposed acquisition which necessitates the acquisition of the land identified;

(b) the public purpose referred shall on a balance of convenience and in the long term, be in the larger public interest so as to justify the social impact as determined by the Social Impact Assessment that has been carried out;

(c) only the minimum area of land required for the project is proposed to be acquired;

(d) the Collector of the district, where the acquisition of land is proposed, has explored the possibilities of—

(i) acquisition of waste, degraded or barren lands and found that acquiring such waste, degraded or barren lands is not feasible;

(ii) acquisition of agricultural land, especially land under assured irrigation, is only as a demonstrable last resort.

Acquisition Process

Whenever it appears to the Government that land in any area is required or likely to be required for any public purpose, a preliminary notification to that effect along with details of the land to be acquired in rural and urban areas shall be published.

The notification shall also contain a statement on the nature of the public purpose involved, reasons necessitating the displacement of affected persons, summary of the Social Impact Assessment Report and particulars of the Administrator appointed for the purposes of rehabilitation and resettlement.

No person shall make any transaction or cause any transaction of land specified in the preliminary notification or create any encumbrances on such land from the date of publication of such notification till such time as the proceedings under this Chapter are completed.

Where a preliminary notification u/s. 11 is not issued within 12 months from the date of appraisal of the Social Impact Assessment report submitted by the Expert Committee, then, such report shall be deemed to have lapsed and a fresh Social Impact Assessment shall be required to be undertaken prior to the acquisition proceeding.

Where no declaration is made u/s. 19 within twelve months from the date of preliminary notification, then such preliminary notification shall be deemed to have been rescinded.

Any person interested in any land which has been notified, may object within 60 days from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification.

The decision of the Government on the objections made shall be final.

Upon the publication of the preliminary notification by the Collector, the Administrator for Rehabilitation and Resettlement shall conduct a survey and undertake a census of the affected families.

The Administrator shall, based on the survey and census, prepare a draft Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme as prescribed, which shall include particulars of the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements of each land owner and landless whose livelihoods are primarily dependent on the lands being acquired. The same shall be open to suggestions /objections in a public hearing. The Administrator shall, on completion of public hearing submit the draft Scheme for Rehabilitation and Resettlement along with a specific report on the claims and objections raised in the public hearing to the Collector.

The Collector shall review the draft Scheme submitted by the Administrator with the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Committee at the Project level. He shall submit the draft Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme with his suggestions to the Commissioner Rehabilitation and Resettlement for approval of the Scheme.

When the Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect, along with a declaration of an area identified as the ‘resettlement area’ for the purposes of rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected families. The declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is required for a public purpose and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in such manner as specified under this Act.

The Collector shall thereupon cause the land to be marked out and measured, and if no plan has been made thereof, a plan to be made of the same. The Collector shall also make an award of—

(a)    the true area of the land;

b) the compensation as determined along with Rehabilitation and Resettlement award as determined; and

(c)    the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons believed to be interested in the land.

The Collector shall make an award within 2 years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.

Market value of land

The Collector shall adopt the following criteria in assessing and determining the market value of the land, namely:

(a)    the minimum land value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or

(b)    the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area. The average sale price shall be determined taking into account the sale deeds or the agreements to sell registered for similar type of area in the near village or near vicinity area during immediately preceding 3 years of the year in which such acquisition of land is proposed to be made. For this purpose, 50% of the sale deeds in which the highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into account.

whichever is higher:

The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied by a specified factor. For instance, it is 2 in rural land, 1 in urban area land, etc. Thus, only value in rural areas is doubled.

The Collector having determined the market value of the land to be acquired shall calculate the total amount of compensation to be paid to the land owner (whose land has been acquired) by including all assets attached to the land. For determining the market value of the building and other immovable property attached to the land, the Collector may use the services of an Engineer/Other Specialists. Similarly, for assessing the value of crops, trees, plants, attached to the land, the Collector can use the services of an experienced person in the field of agriculture, etc.

The Collector having determined the total compensation to be paid, shall, to arrive at the final award, impose a ‘Solatium ’ amount equivalent to 100% of the compensation amount. The solatium amount shall be in addition to the compensation payable to any person whose land has been acquired. Thus, it is like an additional compensation.

The provisions of the Income- tax Act are also relevant in this respect. Section 45(4) of the Act provides that where capital gains arises from the compulsory acquisition of a capital asset under any law, then the compensation awarded in the first instance shall be taxable in the year of award. If the same is enhanced subsequently, then the enhancement amount would be taxable in the year of receipt by the assessee.

R&R Provisions

The Bill contains provisions for Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Project Affected People (PAP) in case of an acquisition.

The Government may appoint an Administrator for carrying out the R&R provisions. The Government may also appoint a Commissioner for R&R. He may be appointed for supervising the formulation of R&R Schemes and for their proper implementation.

In case the land is purchased privately and is more than or equal to 100 acres within rural areas or is more than or equal to 50 acres in urban areas, then the permission of the Commissioner is required. Thus, the obligation to rehabilitate for private acquisition is only if the area acquired is 50 acres or more.

A Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority would be established for settling any disputes relating to acquisition, compensation and R&R. This would be headed by a sitting/retired High Court Judge.

Temporary Acquisition

Whenever it appears to the Government that the temporary occupation and use of any waste or arable land are needed for any public purpose, or for a company, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same for such terms as it shall think fit, not exceeding 3 years from the commencement of such occupation.

The compensation may be either in a gross sum of money, or by monthly or other periodical payments, as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively.

In case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or apportionment thereof, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority

Other Important Provisions

Any award for land acquisition is exempt from stamp duty.

If any land or part thereof acquired remains unutilised for a period of 10 years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall return to the Land Bank of the Government by reversion. Whenever the ownership of any land acquired under this Act is transferred to any person for a consideration, without any development having taken place on such land, 20% of the appreciated land value shall be shared amongst the persons from whom the lands were acquired or their heirs, in proportion to the value at which the lands.

Comparison with the Act

A broad comparison of the Act vis-à-vis the Bill reveals the key differences as shown in the table:

Conclusion

The Bill is one of the most important recent laws in the real estate sector. It would have far reaching implications and consequences. Hence, it becomes essential to carefully study and understand this Law.

Service of Notice – Presumption Rebuttable – Endorsement as “Refused” – The respondent as the plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendant was a monthly tenant. [Section 114 (e) Evidence Act]

fiogf49gjkf0d
Kanak Pramanik vs. Indrajit Bandopadhya AIR 2013 Calcutta 60

Defendant defaulted in payment of rent and accordingly plaintiff sent a notice u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act under registered post with A/D asking the defendant to quit and vacate the suit premises on expiry of the month of Agrahayan 1395 B. S. The defendant refused to accept such notice and did not also vacate the suit premises. Accordingly, the suit for ejectment and recovery of khas possession with consequential reliefs was filed.

The Appellant/defendant contested the said suit by filing a written statement denying the material allegations of the plaint and contending inter alia that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff’s father Haripada Banerjee and that on the death of Haripada Banerjee, all his heirs became joint landlords and that the plaintiff was not the sole landlord and had no authority to file said ejectment suit as the sole landlord. It was further alleged that defendant did not receive any notice and that plaintiff managed to obtain a postal endorsement “refused” in collusion with postal peon.

The Trial Court framed several issues including an issue as to whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and whether the notice u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was legal, valid and sufficient and was duly served upon the defendant. After hearing the Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment observing that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff and that the notice u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was legal, valid and sufficient and that on account of refusal on the part of the defendant to accept the same it amounted to good service.

The Hon’ble Court observed that now it is settled law that once a notice is sent under registered post with A/D with proper stamp and proper address and is returned with an endorsement of the postal peon “refused” then there is a presumption of tender and refusal amounting to a good service of notice. However, said presumption is rebuttable. If the addressee denies said tender and alleged refusal on his part in his pleadings as well as in his evidence and the same is found believable to the Courts then the presumption of service will be deemed to be sufficiently rebutted. In that case, the onus will shift back to the addressor for proving such alleged tender and refusal by calling the postal peon to the witness box.

In the case in hand, admittedly the appellant tenant took specific plea not only in his written statement but also in his evidence that there was no tender of said notice to him by the postal peon and as such there was no question of refusal on his part to accept the same. The Courts below, however, refused to accept his version on the ground that he did not file any document to show that he was present in his office on that day. The respondent landlord has also admitted that the appellant tenant was an employee of the Government mint at Alipur. It also came out from evidence that the defendant remained absent from the suit shop room during the working period of the working days and that a barber shop was run therein through his employee Gour Chandra Pramanik. A Government employee is expected to be in his office during the office hours in a working day, in absence of any evidence to the contrary. Neither of the parties produced any evidence to show that on the relevant date of alleged tender or alleged refusal the appellant tenant was present in the said suit shop by not going to his office.

During hearing the learned counsel for the appellant tenant drew the attention of the Court to the cross-examination of the appellant landlord wherein he categorically stated that the postal peon told him that he went to the defendant’s shop room but he did not meet with him. According to the counsel, said admission of the plaintiff coupled with denial on the part of the appellant tenant belied the story of alleged tender by the postal peon to the defendant or refusal on the part of the defendant.

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that notice to quit has to be sent either by post to the party or be tendered or delivered personally to such party or to one of his family members or servants at his residence/place of business or if such tender or delivery is not practicable, it be affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. In the case in hand, only one notice to quit was sent to the appellant tenant under registered post with A/D. It returned with the endorsement of the postal peon “refused”. The appellant tenant took specific plea not only in his written statement but also in his evidence that the postal peon did not tender any notice to him and accordingly there was no question of refusal on his part to accept the same. It also came out from evidence that the suit premises is a barber shop being run by appellant tenant through an employee Gour Chandra Pramanik. As such even in the absence of the appellant tenant if the postal peon tendered the notice to his employee Gour Chandra Pramanik to be refused to be accepted by Gour still it might amount to refusal on the part of the tenant treating it to be good service of notice. But there is no evidence to that effect also from the side of the respondent landlord. Rather the appellant tenant also examined said employee Gour Chandra Pramanik who categorically stated that on the relevant date i.e. 17-10-1988 postal peon did not visit said barber shop for service of the notice nor to speak of tendering the same to him. Said evidence remained unshaken in spite of cross-examination. In view of the aforesaid evidence on record it is palpable that the appellant tenant was able to rebut the presumption of due service in view of postal endorsement “refused” on the envelope of notice and that it was a duty of the respondent landlord to produce the postal peon on the dock to discharge the burden of proving the service of the notice.

Proper service of notice to quit is the very backbone of a suit of ejectment filed under the Transfer of Property Act. In this case, the deemed service of notice in view of postal endorsement “refused” is found to be not acceptable. As such, the Ejectment Decrees passed by learned Courts below banking on said deemed service of notice were not sustainable in law. As a result, the appeal was allowed.

levitra

Partnership firm – Legal entity – Income-tax Return (Income Tax Act, 1961 Section 184)

fiogf49gjkf0d
PBR Select Infra Projects, Rep by Partner vs. Commissioner of Tenders and Anr. AIR 2013 NOC 126 AP

The Hon’ble Court observed that for the limited purpose of the Act, a firm is conferred legal recognition as an entity and the Act made its assessment compulsory. But, I do not find any conceivable reason why the Income-tax returns of such a firm shall not be made use of by its partners for the purpose of satisfying the prequalification criteria of a tender document. Even if individual partners are liable for getting their individual incomes separately assessed u/s. 10 of the Act, in the absence of any legal bar under the provisions of the Act, there can be no reason for preventing a partner of a partnership firm from filing the Income-tax returns of the firm for the purpose of showing his turnover, financial capacity and other requirements as prescribed by the tender conditions.

The Court observed that the fiction introduced in section 184 of the Act, whereby a legal status is conferred on a partnership firm, cannot be extended to destroy the legal relationship between the partners and the firm. Such a water-tight compartment can be presumed only when the question of compliance with the requirement of section 184 of the Act arises. For instance, where a firm was not assessed under the Act and its partners who got their individual incomes assessed separately plead that the assessments in their individual capacity shall be deemed to be the assessment of the firm, section 184 can be pressed into service to negate such stand of the partners. But once the firm is assessed under the Act, such assessment would, enure to the benefit of its partners for the purposes such as the present one, where proof of assessment of the tenderer is required.

With regard to the second submission, respondent No. 3 filed the VAT clearance for the immediately preceding year in which the tender was called. However, along with the VAT clearance certificate dated 21-01-2011, respondent No. 3 has filed the VAT Returns Report dated 27-01-2012 of the Commercial Tax Department for the period from December 2010 to December 2011. This Report needs to be read along with the VAT clearance certificate dated 21-01-2011. None of the respondents have disputed the authenticity of the VAT Returns Report, which were up to December 2011, i.e., a couple of months prior to the issuance of the tender notification. In this view of the matter, the tender conditions is duly satisfied and hence the technical bid of respondent No. 3 is not liable for rejection on a hyper-technical ground that the formal latest VAT clearance certificate was not filed by him.

levitra

Foreign Judgement – Insolvency proceedings – Initiation of in India directly without any testing or filtration provided in CPC for execution of foreign decree in India – Not permissible: [Code of Civil Procedure 1908 section. 13, 14, 44A].

fiogf49gjkf0d
Abraaj Investment Management Ltd vs. Neville Tuli & Ors. AIR 2013 (NOC) 91 (Bom.)

The CPC provides specific provisions for execution of the decree passed by the court in reciprocating territory. The reciprocating territory means the territory as is defined u/s. 44-A of the CPC. It is clear even from the specific provision that any foreign judgment or decree cannot be put for execution unless there is reciprocating agreement or treaty as contemplated. The national or international treaties and or conventions and or agreements have their own value for the purposes of inter-border transactions and various such jurisdictional aspects. Everything is under control of the respective provisions of the respective States and the countries. Nothing is free and or no one can take any steps in any country without the sanction/ permission and or the filtrations so contemplated under the respective acts of the country. Section 13 of CPC contemplates when a foreign judgment shall be conclusive so that appropriate suits and or proceedings can be initiated by the concerned court/ parties in India. It provides the procedure to be followed before accepting the foreign judgment’s conclusiveness. It also means the merits of such judgments. Section 14 of CPC contemplates presumption so far as the foreign judgments are concerned. Section 114 of the Evidence Act deals with the presumptive value, even of the foreign judgment. The concept of presumption itself means that it is always rebuttable if a case is made out. Therefore, merely because it is a foreign judgment and or decree, that itself is not conclusive judgment for the purpose of final execution in India. Both required pre-testing or pre-filtrations as provided under the CPC and other relevant laws and rules. There are no provisions whereby any party/person can directly invoke the insolvency Act, based upon such foreign ex-parte judgment/decree. Even the foreign award cannot be executed in such fashion in India. It is also subject to the procedural filtration and the challenge.

The concept of execution of any decree and or order is different than initiation of the insolvency action based upon the decree or order. If these two concepts are totally different then it is difficult to accept the submission that for the initiation of the insolvency proceedings, no steps or permission and or the filtrations is necessary, as there are no specific boundaries or rules to restrict the same.

Once the insolvency notice is issued and if not complied with, the consequences are quite disastrous. The Insolvency Act provides various consequences in case the party in spite of service of insolvency notice failed to comply with the same. The act of insolvency in the commercial world has its own effect to destroy and or hamper the name, fame and the market and the business. Once the act of insolvency is committed, the declaration will be “for all the debtors” though action was initiated by the party for recovery of their respective monetary claims. The concept of “action in rem” and its effect just cannot be overlooked even at this stage, while considering the scheme of the insolvency Act.

In view of the Insolvency Act, the officer/official assignee based upon the averments made by the decree holder and believing the certified copies and or copies of the foreign judgment and or decree thought it to be correct and binding even on merit and issued the insolvency notice. The debtor after receipt of the same if failed to comply with the same, asked to face the consequences. For execution of a foreign decree, the filtration is provided and it is difficult for the party to execute the foreign judgment and or decree in India without following the procedure of law how the official assignee can initiate insolvency notice straightway on the basis of such foreign judgment by treating the same to be a final decree or order passed by the foreign court. Admittedly, there is nothing under the Insolvency Act and or CPC which permit and or entitles any one to put such foreign decree or judgment as the basis for initiating the insolvency proceedings in such fashion. If there are no provisions there is no permission. The Indian Court under the Insolvency Act is not empowered and or authorised to initiate insolvency proceedings in such fashion directly on the basis of the foreign judgment and or order.

The Court observed that such initiation of insolvency proceedings based upon a foreign judgment and or decree directly without any testing and or filtration as available for execution of the foreign decree in India will create more complications because of its various multifaceted problems and the situations. The initiation of such proceedings itself is not sufficient.

levitra

Accountability

fiogf49gjkf0d
The ancient Romans had a tradition: whenever one of their engineers constructed an arch, as the capstone was hoisted into place, the engineer assumed accountability for his work in the most profound way possible: he stood under the arch. (Quoting Michael Armstrong)

We talk of accountability of government and government agencies, public companies and NGOs. Then there is accountability of individuals – those working in a group or team as well as in their individual capacity. Accountability of an individual is not restricted only to his work but extends to his family and the social circle within which he moves.

At times accountability is fixed by law, rules and regulations. This can be considered as the statutory accountability. In every civilised society there are regulators appointed under various statutes which seek accountability from organisations and individuals. There regulators oversee that organisations and individuals remain accountable.

When it comes to governments and organisations (commercial or otherwise), transparency in their affairs often brings about better accountability. That has been the genesis of ‘Right to Information’. Generally, when governments and organisations have to disclose more, their policies, decisions and actions are such that they become more accountable. After all, sunlight is the best disinfectant!

It is also a fact that the scope of statutory accountability in various fields has been increasing. This is true of various professions, professionals as well as organisations. May be this is due to the fact that there is an attempt from those accountable to limit their accountability.

An auditor may feel that he is accountable only to the shareholders to whom he reports. But today, he is accountable, responsible and liable not only to the shareholders, but also to many other stakeholders like potential investors, lenders, employees of the company and many more.

When CAG questions decisions and actions of the Government, his powers and jurisdiction are questioned and thus avoiding accountability.

Political parties talk of being accountable to people, serving the people. But when it comes to being transparent about their affairs, these parties take shelter behind technicalities. All major political parties are united in opposing the recent order of the Central Information Commission holding political parties as ‘Public Authorities’ and ordering them to disclose information. There is even the talk of promulgating an Ordinance to amend the Right to Information Act to keep the political parties outside the purview of the RTI.

Often, there is a conflict (either perceived or real) while doing one’s duty when one is accountable in more than one way or to those whose interests may be conflicting. Such a conflict is not unique to one profession but it may arise in various situations. For example, a bureaucrat or a police officer is accountable to his political master, his colleagues and also to the public (not necessarily in that order). Given our system, one can imagine the plight of an honest government servant. This may happen to a lawyer, a chartered accountant, an independent director, or for that matter any person. These are tricky situations where one needs to reason, reconcile, muster courage and above all, listen to one’s conscience. Certainly, this is not easy.

Accountability of media – whether it is the print media or the electronic media – is another area which raises a lot of debate. No doubt, the media has played a yeoman role in drawing public attention to scams, corruption, and the plight of people who have suffered injustice. Media depends on news and at times on creating news, sensationalising events and conducting trial by media under the garb of debates. The controversy raised by Radia tapes which disclosed the role played by some senior journalists in government affairs or promoting certain industrial houses is still fresh in mind. Freedom of speech and expression is of utmost importance and media plays and has an important role in safeguarding that. It can do that only if the media itself is accountable and takes that accountability seriously.

Rules and regulations may impose accountability. But the true accountability is “the quality or state of being accountable; especially: an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s actions”. (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accountability) It is a state of mind, a sense of doing one’s duty with clear conscience.

In this Special Issue, we bring you articles from respected persons from various fields – Mr. S. E. Dastur, Senior Advocate, Padmashree Mr. T. N. Manoharan, past President of our Institute and Mr. Jaideep Bose, Editorial Director, the Times of India dealing with the issue of accountability and duty. My special thanks to each of them for sharing their thoughts. This month, the features – Namaskar, Accounting World and RTI also deal, directly or indirectly, with the issue of accountability.

With this issue of the Journal, I pass the baton to Mr. Anil Sathe who will take over as the Editor of this Journal.

levitra

Laxman Rekha – Accountability

fiogf49gjkf0d
At his best, man is the noblest of all animals, separated from law and justice he is the worst’. —Aristotle.
The issues for us are:
• what do we mean by ‘Laxman Rekha’. Is it an imaginary line or does it prescribe the limits of human behaviour ?
• why is it prescribed only for humans ? and
• what are the consequences of crossing the ‘laxman rekha’ ?

I don’t have the answers but will still make an attempt to share my thoughts on these perennial issues. In my view, ‘laxman rekha’ is meant for us humans because we have the capacity to think and act. Other creations act according to their nature as they don’t have the faculty of thinking.

‘Laxman Rekha’ I believe is a code of conduct for us — human beings – laid down by us as members of society.

Whenever a person crosses the ‘laxman rekha’, he/she faces the consequences – our epics and history depicts this. For example :

• When Bali – a very learned and powerful ruler crossed it by co-habiting with his brother’s wife – and usurping his kingdom, he met his end at the hands of Ram.

• Aahilya for wrongly and not wilfully crossing the ‘laxman rekha’, became a stone and had to wait for Ram to revive her.

• Sita had to go through ‘ágni pariksha’ and suffer separation from Ram for crossing the ‘laxman rekha’.

• Draupadi crossed the ‘laxman rekha’ of a ‘good host’ when she called Duryodhan ‘andhi ka beta andha’ and she sowed the seeds of war – Mahabharat.

• Clinton crossed the ‘laxman rekha’ for his immoral behaviour and was impeached. He apologised and survived but the damage he did to the office of the President survives. The blemish hasn’t gone away despite his services to society.

• Cancer survivor and cancer care evangelist Lance Armstrong – super cyclist and super hero – the man whom fame and fortune favoured, confesses to the use of drugs and paid a big price – loss of respect.

• Walmart, the largest retailer in the world has been charged for violation of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for indulging in bribery and corruption in Mexico. This has resulted in Walmart initiating investigations in India and China. Newspapers report that some officers, vendors and consultants have been suspended in India and expansion of Bharti Walmart is on hold — the result – loss of reputation and business, and possibility of prosecution in the USA.

• Ramalinga Raju – the founder of Satyam suffered in prison for over two years and is facing a host of civil and criminal cases.

• Recently, our Law minister had to resign for interfering with investigation reports.

The list is metaphorically unending.

It is a fact that the pain of leaders and icons crossing the ‘laxman rekha’ for the followers becomes personal – which makes the followers revolt both mentally and physically.

Consequences of crossing the ‘laxman rekha’ are visible in society today – the cancer of corruption is having disastrous consequences on governance and economic and social environment and behaviour. The way our parliamentarians (leaders) behave in parliament – exhibits a kind of violence which is abhorring. The tragedy that it is that these very leaders ask us not to indulge in violence and remain within ‘laxman rekha’. They forget it is not words but actions which are emulated by people. Parliament is a forum created to discuss, debate and decide and not for storming into the well and tearing bills being tabled. It is a forum created to create laws and not break laws. Our leaders have probably forgotten the maxim: ‘lead by example’.

All this violence of crossing the ‘laxman rekha’ is for us to feel – Society is on tenterhooks and explosive. At the drop of a hat we have strikes, dharnas and violence – which I reiterate are nothing but consequences of crossing the ‘laxman rekha’. We are experiencing violence of all kinds — we have become intolerant and are sacrificing our right to express the banning of books, art, people and movies that is not only adversely impacting us, but will also affect future generations. Salman Rushdie christens the present environment as ‘cultural emergency’. Shobhaa De says ‘we are living in the republic of hate and nightmares’. We as a nation cross the ‘laxman rekha’ when we stifle ‘freedom of speech’, a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. We are giving up the concept of – ‘live and let live’. Any time whether at home or at office or as citizen the moment, I indulge in ‘you have no right’, I am crossing the ‘laxman rekha’ of tolerance and this crossing leads to strife. Believe me, the ‘right to express’ includes the ‘right to dissent’ Mr. Manish Tewari, our Minister for Information and Broadcasting affirms that :

‘Freedom of expression must include right to offend’.

‘Laxman rekha’ is not only for sinners or saints or for those in power but is also for us – the normal – the householder, the office goer and the entrepreneur – who despite corruption value ‘values’.

It is a sad fact that we are unconsciously imbibing the culture of conflict, crime and corruption and I dare say all of us are directly or indirectly have contributed to it and are affected and impacted by this. We are impatient and intolerant. We need to remember that today’s leaders have risen from amongst us. We in India and probably people across the world have crossed the ‘Laxman rekha’ – the result is unrest. Let us not forget that all crimes – social or economic – represent crossing the ‘laxman rekha’. For example:

• The Chief Minister of a State – a beloved leader – wants her driver to be whipped for being 15 minutes late – the Times of India of 08-02-2013.
• Khaps in Haryana and Punjab have mandated and ensured that a couple though married be separated because marriage between the two castes to which they belong is not permitted by custom.
• Minister of a State is said to be involved in the murder of a police officer.
• Members of a state assembly are charged with assaulting a police officer. The questions we have to ask ourselves are :
• Is this the secular India we gave ourselves and was dreamt by the leaders who drafted our Constitution
• Is this non – tolerant environment that we want to live in and leave for our children.

The issue is: if this is what we don’t want, then what should we do to contain this and bring back the culture of love, compassion and confidence in law to live within the ‘laxman rekha’ and be happy.

I believe ‘laxman rekha’ is the litmus test of accountability not only for the society but for each one individually. Hence , it is for us as members of society to lay down, modify or reject the norms. We are the ones who cross or maintain the ‘laxman rekha’. Being an optimist, I believe that there is a ray of hope because there is a silent revolt against the present environment of corruption and intolerance. Ministers are resigning apparently because of intolerant behaviour of a chief minister. The recent protests against corruption and misbehaviour (rape) are instances of this resurgence. People and press are talking about ‘ethical values’. We also now have the Right to Information Act – which is bringing transparency in governance and probably instilling some ‘fear of retribution’ in those who govern – the powerful. It was Kahlil Gibran who said:

‘Life without freedom is like a body without a soul and freedom without thought is like a confused spirit’.

To bring ‘laxman rekha’ back in society, let us join this silent movement by contributing to it both ‘time and money’. Gandhi had resilience. It was his faith in our desire and need for freedom that gave us freedom. Let us develop ‘resilience’ and return to ‘values’ even despite having been bent and battered. Let us revive the spirit to live by ‘values’ by living ‘values’. This will be our legacy to the young and coming generations.

Let us do and we can. Let us not cross ‘laxman rekha’. Let us bring back ‘accountability’.

Clarification on Multi Brand Retail Trading Dated June 6, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Paragraph 6.2.16.5 of ‘Circular 1 of 2013-Consolidated FDI Policy’

The
Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) has issued a
clarification in the form of FAQ on queries of prospective
investors/stakeholders on FDI policy for multi-brand retail trading.
These clarifications are in respect of Paragraph 6.2.16.5 of ‘Circular 1
of 2013-Consolidated FDI Policy’.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 108 dated June 11, 2013

levitra

Press note 2 (2013 Series) – D/o IPP F. No. 5/3/2005-FC.I Dated June 03, 2013

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 107 dated June 4, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Import of Gold by Nominated Banks / Agencies

Presently, banks can import gold on consignment basis only to meet the genuine needs of exporters of gold jewellery.

This circular provides that, with immediate effect: –

1. Along with banks, all nominated agencies/premier /star trading houses can import gold on consignment basis only to meet the genuine needs of exporters of gold jewellery.

2. Except in the case of import of gold to meet the needs of exporters of gold jewellery, all Letters of Credit (LC) opened by banks/nominated agencies for import of gold under all categories will only be on 100 % cash margin basis and all imports of gold have to be compulsorily on Documents against Payment (DP) basis.

levitra

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 106 dated May 23, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Liberalised Remittance Scheme for Resident Individuals – Reporting

Presently, banks are required to submit LRS data in hard copy as well as through the Online Returns Filing System (ORFS) of RBI.

This circular provides that henceforth, i.e. LRS data for 30th June, 2013 and subsequent months have to be uploaded in ORFS on or before the 5th of the following month. Where there is no data to be furnished, banks must to upload ‘nil’ figures in the ORFS system.

levitra

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 105 dated May 20, 2013

fiogf49gjkf0d
Export of Goods and Software – Realisation and Repatriation of export proceeds – Liberalisation

Presently, exporters were permitted to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported up to 31st March, 2013 within twelve months from the date of export.

This circular provides that exporters are required to realise and repatriate the full value of goods or software exported up to 30th September, 2013 within nine months from the date of export. However, there are no changes in the provisions with respect to period of realisation and repatriation of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to warehouses established outside India.

levitra

S. 69C—If there is a dispute of the source of the expenditure, then addition can be made u/s.69C — Merely because labour charges are shown as outstanding cannot be a ground to make addition u/s.69C.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

(Full text of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)



14 Muscovite Construction v. ACIT
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. S. Padvekar (JM) and Rajendra Singh (AM)
ITA No. 2856/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 21-5-2010
Counsel for assessee/revenue : C. N. Vaze/Rajnesh Dev Buvman.

S. 69C—If there is a dispute of the source of the
expenditure, then addition can be made u/s.69C — Merely because labour charges
are shown as outstanding cannot be a ground to make addition u/s.69C.

Per R. S. Padvekar :

Facts :

The assessee was carrying on business of civil construction
contract work and labour contract. It filed its return of income declaring an
income of Rs.14,29,579. In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing
Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had debited labour charges of Rs.1.10
crores in the P & L Account and in the balance sheet out of the said expenditure
a sum of Rs.54,56,235 was shown as outstanding. The outstanding labour charges
were for the months of Jan, Feb and March 2005. In response to the show cause
notice issued by the AO asking the assessee to explain why outstanding labour
charges/ wages should not be treated as unexplained, the assessee submitted that
it was facing a financial crunch in the business and the break-up of monthly
wages in respect of each type of labour like carpenter, mason, etc. was
furnished. The AO, not being satisfied with the explanation furnished, added the
amount of Rs.54,56,235 as unexplained expenditure u/s.69C.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that nothing has been brought on record by
the AO to show that the assessee has used the money which was not reflected in
the books of account. It also noted that in the immediate next year the assessee
has paid the outstanding wages/labour charges and also that in the assessment
order for A.Y. 2006-07 the AO has discussed the issue. The Tribunal held that as
per the language used by the Legislature in S. 69C, if there is a dispute of the
source of the expenditure, then the addition can be made. Since the payment of
outstanding wages has been accepted by the AO in the next year, hence no
addition can be made u/s.69C of the Act. It also noted that it was not that the
expenditure was bogus or non-genuine and the AO has also not examined any of the
labourers to support his case. It held that merely because labour charges are
shown as outstanding that cannot be a ground to make the addition u/s.69C.

The Tribunal deleted the addition and decided the ground in
favour of the assessee.

levitra

S. 73—Any speculation loss computed for A.Y. 2006-07 and later assessment years alone would be hit by the amendment made w.e.f. 1-4-2006 by the Finance Act, 2005 to S. 73(4)— Limit of carry forward of subsequent assessment years applies only to such loss.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

(Full text of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)



13 Virendra Kumar Jain v. ACIT
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. V. Easwar (Sr. VP) and
A. L. Gehlot (AM)
ITA No. 1009/Mum./2010

A.Y. : 2006-07. Decided on : 31-5-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Vijay Mehta/ K. K. Das

 

S. 73—Any speculation loss computed for A.Y. 2006-07 and
later assessment years alone would be hit by the amendment made w.e.f. 1-4-2006
by the Finance Act, 2005 to S. 73(4)— Limit of carry forward of subsequent
assessment years applies only to such loss.

Per R. V. Easwar :

Facts :

In A.Y. 2001-02 the assessee suffered a speculation loss of
Rs.4,55,30,494 which loss was allowed to be carried forward to subsequent years
u/s.73(2) of the Act. In the return filed for A.Y. 2006-07 the assessee claimed
that speculation loss brought forward from A.Y. 2001-02 should be set off
against speculation profits for the A.Y. 2006-07. The Assessing Officer (AO)
denied the claim of the assessee on the ground that u/s.73(4) no loss shall be
carried forward for more than four assessment years immediately succeeding the
assessment year for which it was first computed. He held that speculation loss
for A.Y. 2001-02 cannot be carried forward beyond A.Y. 2005-06.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who
upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

It is a settled rule of interpretation that a vested right
can be taken away only by express language or by necessary implication. This is
settled by the decision of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth & General Mills
Company Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1927 (PC) 242 and the same has been cited with approval
by the Supreme Court in the case of Jose Dacosta v. Bascora Sadashiv Sinai
Narcomin, AIR (1975) SC 1843. The assessee had a vested right to carry forward
the speculation loss for a period of eight assessment years as per S. 73(4) as
it stood before the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2005. That such a right
is a vested right cannot be doubted after the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of CIT v. Shah Sadiq & Sons, 166 ITR 102 (SC). In S. 73(4) or in any
other provision there is no express language or any implication to the effect
that the right of the assessee to carry forward the speculation loss for a
period of eight subsequent assessment years has been taken away.

Any speculation loss computed for the A.Y. 2006-07 and later
assessment years alone would be hit by the amendment and such loss can be
carried forward only for four subsequent assessment years. The vested right of
the assessee has not been taken away.

The amendment made by The Finance Act, 2005 w.e.f. 1-4-2006
is merely to substitute the words ‘four assessment years’ for the words ‘eight
assessment years’ in Ss.(4) of S. 73. Ss.(4) of S. 73 refers only to the loss to
be carried forward to the subsequent years. It does not say anything about the
set-off of the speculation loss brought forward from the earlier years. There is
a distinction between a loss brought forward from the earlier years and a loss
to be carried forward to the subsequent years. The sub-section deals only with
the speculation loss to be carried forward to the subsequent years and in the
very nature of the things, it cannot apply to speculation loss quantified in any
assessment year before the A.Y. 2006-07.

The Tribunal made a reference to the Income-tax Rules
prescribing form of return of income and noted that the form in ITR 4 makes a
distinction between loss brought forward and loss to be carried forward. It held
that since in the present case it was concerned with the assessee’s right to set
off the brought forward speculation losses against speculation profits for A.Y.
2006-07, Ss.(4) of S. 73 has no application.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

levitra

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28(iv) and S. 41(1) — Whether reduction in the liability availed by the assessee on the basis of One Time Settlement Scheme in respect of its outstanding term loans is to be treated as taxable u/s.28(iv) or u/s.41(1) — Held, No.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the
Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the Society mails
a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and
postage.)



17. Accelerated Freez & Drying Co. Ltd. v. Dy.
CIT



ITAT Cochin

Before Dr. O. K. Narayanan (AM) and

N. Vijayakumaran (JM)

ITA No. 971/Coch./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 5-5-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : R. Sreenivasan/

C. Karthikeyan Nair

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28(iv) and S. 41(1) — Whether
reduction in the liability availed by the assessee on the basis of One Time
Settlement Scheme in respect of its outstanding term loans is to be treated as
taxable u/s.28(iv) or u/s.41(1) — Held, No.

 

Per Dr. O. K. Narayanan :

Facts :

The assessee company, engaged in the business of sea food
exports, had availed term loans from three banks, viz. ICICI Bank Ltd.,
Standard Chartered Bank Ltd., and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation,
Hongkong. These term loans were availed by the assessee for the purpose of
acquiring capital assets to be deployed in the manufacturing system of the
assessee company. Due to bad financial position the assessee defaulted on
payment of installments and interest. The total amount of loans that remained
payable to the banks amounted to Rs.3486.03 lakhs.

 

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year
under appeal, the assessee reached an agreement with the three bankers for One
Time Settlement (OTS) of its loan liability whereby the loan liability of
Rs.3486.03 lakhs was settled on payment of Rs.2450 lakhs resulting in a waiver
of loan amount of Rs.1036.03 lakhs. This principal amount of loan waived by
the banks was credited by the assessee to General Reserve Account and was not
offered for tax.

 

The AO held that waiver resulted in earning gain for the
assessee company in the course of carrying on of its business. He further held
that u/s.2(24)(i) both ‘profits’ and also ‘gains’ are income; it is a mandate
of S. 28 to levy income-tax not only on the profits of the business but even
on the gains of a business. He, therefore, held that In the light of the
definitions attributed to the expressions ‘income’ and ‘gains’, the waiver
benefit enjoyed by the assessee company should be treated as income of the
assessee from business. The AO relied on a decision of the Supreme Court (SC)
in the case of T. V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons. He, accordingly, included the
amount of Rs.1036.03 lakhs in computation of assessable income under the head
‘Income from Business’.

 

The CIT(A) held that waiver amount was rightly charged
u/s.28(iv) of the Act. She also observed that the decision of the SC in the
case of T. V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons is analogous in facts and the ratio of
the said decision was applicable to the assessee’s case. She dismissed the
appeal.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal stated that the facts of the assessee’s case
are quite different from the facts considered by the SC in the case of T. V.
Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. and therefore the said decision does not become
applicable to the present case of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal noted that the Bombay High Court while
delivering its judgment in the case of Solid Containers Ltd. has not dissented
in any way from the earlier decision in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.
It observed that in the case of Solid Containers Ltd. the Court has reiterated
the ratio laid down in the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in the case of
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., that the loan availed for acquiring capital
assets, when waived, cannot be treated as assessable income. Therefore, it
held that it is not possible to hold that as far as the loan waiver of capital
account is concerned, the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Solid Containers Ltd. clashes with the judgment of the same court in the case
of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.

 

The Tribunal held that since the loan waiver amount
credited by the assessee in its general reserve account is covered by the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.,
the said waiver amount cannot be held as taxable.

 

The Tribunal noted that the SC has in the case of Polyflex
(India) Pvt. Ltd. examined the constitution of S. 41(1) and categorically
ruled that the words ‘remission or cessation thereof’ apply only to a trading
liability. Since the term loans availed by the assessee from the three banks
were not in the nature of trading liability but were in the nature of capital
liability, it held that the waiver thereof would not become income u/s.41(1)
on the ground of remission or cessation thereof. It also noted that the
assessee never had the benefit of deduction of the term loan availed by it
from the banks on capital account. Also, the term loans availed were not in
the nature of any loss or expenditure. Therefore, it held that S. 41(1) had no
application to the present case.

 

The Tribunal found the issue raised to be squarely covered
by the judgment of SC in the case of Polyflex (India) Pvt. Ltd., the decision
of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., decision
of the Delhi High Court in the case of Phool Chand Jiwan Ram and the decision
of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Cochin Co. Ltd.

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia) and S. 194H — Whether trade discount allowed to a customer constitutes commission liable for deduction of tax u/s.194H — Held, No

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the
Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the Society mails
a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and
postage.)



16. S. D. Pharmacy Pvt. Ltd.

v.
Dy. CIT



ITAT Cochin

Before Dr. O. K. Narayanan (AM) and

N. Vijayakumaran (JM)

ITA No. 948/Coch./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 5-5-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : R. Sreenivasan/

V. M. Thyagarajan

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia) and S. 194H — Whether
trade discount allowed to a customer constitutes commission liable for
deduction of tax u/s.194H — Held, No.

 

Per Dr. O. K. Narayanan :

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of
manufacture and sale of ayurvedic products. In the course of assessment
proceedings the AO noticed that the total sales of the assessee were
Rs.4,82,12,960 and corresponding trade discount amounted to Rs.1,42,43,565.
This trade discount was given to four concerns of which one was a sister
concern of the assessee. The amount of trade discount to the sister concern
was Rs.1,34,24,839 since the major sales of the assessee were to its sister
concern.

 

The AO disallowed the amount of trade discount of
Rs.1,42,43,565 u/s.40(a)(ia) since he held that the discount fell within the
ambit of S. 194H of the Act and since the assessee had not deducted tax at
source the same was not allowable.

 

The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

 

On an appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal it was pointed
out to the Tribunal that the products sold were billed at gross amount and
trade discount was given at the rate of 50% or 30% or 17.20%, as the case may
be. Trade discount allowed was reduced from the gross invoice value and net
amount was shown as net price payable by the parties. Sales tax was collected
on the net amount so payable by the parties. In the accounts, the customer’s
account was debited with the net amount and the amount of trade discount was
debited to Trade Discount A/c which was transferred to the debit of Trading
Account. Sales turnover was a gross amount. The property in the goods passed
to the customer on delivery of the goods. It is only the net amount which was
receivable from the customer for the goods sold. Reliance, on behalf of the
assessee, was placed on the decision of Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Mother Dairy India Ltd.

 

Held :

The Tribunal found this to be a case of outright sale on a
principal to principal basis at the net amount. The trade discount was held to
be margin that the dealers could enjoy in retail trade. The Tribunal noted
that there was nothing on record to show that dealers and buyers were not
acting on their own behalf and since the sales were made on principal to
principal basis there was no question of assessee paying any commission or
brokerage or similar amounts to parties for the services rendered by them. The
Tribunal also took note of the fact that the assessee was not crediting the
discount to the account of the customer/dealer but was directly debiting it to
Trade Discount A/c.

 

The Tribunal following the ratio of the decision of the
Kerala High Court in the case of M. S. Hameed and Ors. held that since the
assessee was not making any payment of commission or brokerage to the parties
nor was it crediting the accounts of the parties for similar amounts there was
no occasion to deduct the tax as contemplated u/s.194H.

 

The Tribunal also noted that the Kerala High Court has in
the case of Kerala Stamp Vendors Association held that discount given on price
by the seller to the purchaser cannot be termed as ‘commission’ or ‘brokerage’
for services rendered in the course of buying and selling of goods as the act
of buying does not constitute rendering of any service.

 

Considering the facts and following the ratio of the two
decisions of Kerala High Court the Tribunal held that trade discount debited
by the assessee in its accounts is not covered by the provisions of S. 194H of
the Act. Since there was no liability on the part of the assessee to deduct
any tax on the amount of trade discount given to its dealers the disallowance
of Rs.1,42,43,565 was deleted.

 

Cases referred :



(1) Mother Dairy India Ltd. v. ITO, ITA No.
2975/Del./2008 dated 12-12-2008

(2) M. S. Hameed and Ors. v. Director of State
Lotteries and Ors.,
249 ITR 186 (Ker.)

(3) Kerala Stamp Vendors Association v. Office of the
Accountant-General and Ors.,
(282 ITR 7) (Ker.)

 

levitra

S. 2(22)(e) : Balance in share premium account cannot be considered as part of accumulated profit.

fiogf49gjkf0d

New Page 1

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)




17 DCIT v. MAIPO India Limited


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, New Delhi

Before R. V. Easwar (VP) and

K. D. Ranjan (AM)

ITA No. 2266/Del./2005.

A.Y. : 1996-97. Decided on : 7-3-2008

Counsels for revenue/assessee : A. K. Singh/

Rano Jain

S. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deemed dividend —
Whether balance in share premium account can be considered as part of
accumulated profit — Held, No.

 

Per R. V. Easwar :

Facts :

The assessee had received an advance of Rs.25.43 lacs from
another company ‘G’, wherein it held 40% of the shares. Before the year end, the
assessee had repaid the sum of Rs.14.31 lacs. The AO assessed the balanced sum
of Rs.11.12 lacs u/s.2(22)(e) of the Act. In the books of G, the aggregate sum
of reserves and surplus of Rs.1.95 crore included the sum of Rs. 1.9 crore of
share premium. The issue was whether the balance in share premium account could
be considered as accumulated profit.

 

According to the Revenue, Explanation 2 to S. 2(22)(e) did
not provide for exclusion of capital profit expressly, and secondly, unlike
other clauses of S. 2(22) which contained the expression ‘whether capitalised or
not’, clause (e) did not contain the said expression. Therefore, it was
contended by it that the balance in share premium account was part of
accumulated profit.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that as per the provision in the Companies
Act, 1956, application of the proceeds of the share premium account, for
purposes other than those given in S. 78 of the Companies Act, was treated as a
reduction of the company’s share capital. The said purposes were :



  • To pay up fully paid-up bonus shares;



  • To write off preliminary expenses;



  •  To write off share issue expenses;



  • To pay premium on redemption of redeemable shares/debentures;



  • To purchase its own shares/securities.


 


The above position was also confirmed by the Apex Court in
the case of Allahabad Bank Ltd. Thus, according to the Tribunal, not only was
there a prohibition on the distribution of the share premium account as dividend
under the Companies Act, but the same was treated as part of the share capital
of the company. Further, relying on another decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Urmila Ramesh, it observed that the expression ‘whether capitalised or
not’ (as referred to by the Revenue in its submission), could have an
application only where the profits are capable of being capitalised. The same
were not applicable where the receipts in question formed part of the share
capital.

 

Based on the above and also relying on the ratio of the
decision of the Apex Court in the case of P. K. Badiani, the Tribunal upheld the
decision of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

Cases referred to :



(1) CIT v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., AIR 1969 SC 1058
(SC)

(2) CIT v. Urmila Ramesh, (1998) 230 ITR 422 (SC)

(3) P. K. Badiani v. CIT, (1976) 105 ITR 642 (SC)


levitra

After the stimulus phase-out – Govt errs in focusing only on financing current account deficit.

fiogf49gjkf0d
The US Federal Reserve has dropped clear hints that its long phase of quantitative easing, in which it bought bonds in an “open-ended” manner, will come to an end. It will not cease abruptly – which is why it is now being called a “tapering”. However, even the prospect that the end of the Fed’s massive stimulus, which flushed global markets with liquidity, is on the horizon has been enough to cause jitters among investors. The question that many should now ask is: what will be the medium-term fallout of the shift in the Fed’s stance? In particular, how will it affect emerging markets – especially India? So far, under the influence of easy money, the stock market index in India has run up 4,000 points to around 19,000; bond markets, too, were long buoyed by one-way inputs. The Sensex has taken a few losses. But it’s the debt market that has seen the real action, with well over $3 billion of foreign money flowing out of Indian government bonds in the last two weeks. The rupee, in its recent rapid depreciation to close to 59 against the dollar, has suffered a fate similar to the currencies of other growthchallenged emerging market countries – both Brazil and South Africa have seen their currencies hit a four-year low against the dollar. India, however, has a particularly large current account deficit, around five per cent of GDP, making it particularly dependent on foreign investors being willing to take on emerging market risk so that their inflows finance India’s imports.

Finance Minister P Chidambaram spoke obliquely about this situation when he called for a “longterm view” on the part of investors, and promised more reform that would address the problem. There weren’t too many details on offer, but even the broad hints that Mr Chidambaram dropped suggest the government is looking at the problem primarily from a limited perspective of financing the current account gap, without addressing the fundamental cause of the deficit. He referenced, in particular, the reviewing of caps on foreign direct investment (FDI) in various sectors. Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Board of India raised investment limits for long-term foreign investors in government debt by another $5 billion to $30 billion. These two measures are, broadly, more of the same approach that the government has tried so far. They are not in and of themselves a problem, and should even be welcomed. But measures to promote FDI and FII holding of debt merely paper over the current account deficit problem – they do not solve it. As long as there is an imbalance on India’s books with the rest of the world, these steps will never be enough.

The focus on financing the current account deficit is, thus, the wrong focus. What is needed instead is to boost exports, and to improve India’s macroeconomic fundamentals. The latter is complicated by the fact that the effects of the end of quantitative easing elsewhere may well upset India’s monetary schedule, making the Reserve Bank of India less likely to reduce interest rates. The space to do so has to be provided from somewhere, however, and thus fiscal correction must accelerate – allowing borrowing rates to come down and investment to rise. Without that, investment-led growth – as well as consumption in rate-sensitive sectors like automobiles, real estate and so on – will not recover. Meanwhile, the lopsided balance of trade shows the need for fundamental reform. A good proportion of the current account deficit, for example, is due to imports of pulses and cooking oil. Pushing foodgrain-specific food security will make this problem worse, not better. And promoting exports will need basic labour law reform. This is where the government should be looking.

(Source: The Business Standard dated 14.06.2013)
levitra