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PROFIT SPLIT METHOD – EXAMINING THE SPLIT

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1. Background

The fast growth in the technology, communication and transportation has led to a number of multinational national enterprises (MNEs) having the flexibility to conduct their operations through enterprises set up anywhere in the world. This has given rise to significant global trade such as international transfer of goods and services, capital, intangibles within the entities in the MNE. The MNE group’s transaction structure is determined by a combination of market forces, group policies which could differ from open market conditions operating in independent entities. In such a scenario it becomes important to establish appropriate ‘transfer price’ for the transactions within the MNE group.

2. Introduction

Internationally “arm’s length principle” or the “arm’s length price” has been accepted as a benchmark for establishing transfer price for intercompany transactions. The arm’s length principle is based on ‘separate entity approach” wherein each entity is regarded as a separate entity in the group. Arm’s length principle applies to transactions between related parties i.e. the associated enterprises (AE). Each country has prescribed various criteria’s to determine the AE relationship. Different transfer pricing methods have been prescribed for implementation of the arm’s length principle and the same can be applied by both the taxpayers and the tax authorities to determine the appropriate arm’s length price. While the OECD guidelines1, UN Manual2 and the approaches followed across various jurisdictions provide guidance on the various methods adopted, however, the evolving business practices and the indigenous methods adopted by the companies make it imperative to bring about harmonisation of the methods applied in line with the changing business and commercial environment.

The Indian transfer pricing regulations have recognized six methods which can be applied by the tax payers to demonstrate the arm’s length price of the international transactions. Earlier under the OECD guidelines, the Transactional profit methods were to be resorted to only when the traditional transaction methods could not be reliably applied alone or exceptionally could not be applied at all. Now the transactional profit methods (namely TNMM and PSM) have been accorded status of an acceptable method of transfer pricing. The Indian TP regulations follows the “most appropriate method” principle to demonstrate the arm’s length principle, whereby the tax payer has to test all the methods in order to select the most appropriate method that justifies the arm’s length measure for the international transactions. PSM is also one of the methods that have been prescribed in the Indian TP Regulations.

In the ensuing paragraphs discussion is focused on PSM:

3. Transaction Profit Split Method

3.1 History

The PSM, wherein the arm’s length price is determined through division of consolidated profits between the members of the group, has had a long history in terms of actual use by both the taxpayers and tax authorities. In the 1979 OECD Guidelines, PSM was excluded as an acceptable arm’s length pricing method, although reference to profit allocations based on proportionate contribution to final profit in the said guidelines can be implied as allowance of this approach. However in the 1995 version of the OECD Guidelines, PSM was included as second best option to the traditional transaction based methods. Across the OECD delegates there was been reluctance to accept PSM as an apt method to determine arm’s length price as there was lack in well articulated economic theory or practical experience justifying the application of the method in specific transactions or application of global formulary apportionment3. Nevertheless, PSM when correctly applied offers an important alternative to the traditional one sided transactional or profit based valuation approaches and it addresses the exceptional bilateral aspects of certain transactions while being in compliance with the arm’s length principle.

3.2 Concept

The OECD guidelines define PSM as “A transactional profit method that identifies the combined profit to be split for the associated enterprises from a controlled transaction …. And then splits those profits between the associated enterprises based upon an economically valid basis that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement made at arm’s length.”

The PSM seeks to eliminate the effect on profits of special conditions made or imposed in controlled transaction (or in controlled transactions that it is appropriate to aggregate) by determining the division of profits that independent enterprises would have expected to realise from engaging in the transaction or transactions.

The PSM first identifies the profits (i.e. combined profits) to be split between the associated enterprises from the controlled transactions in which the associated enterprises are engaged. The said combined profits are then split on an economically valid basis that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement made at arm’s length.

The PSM is generally applied when there is significant contribution of intangible property by the parties of the controlled transactions.

3.3 PSM under the Indian TP Regulations

The Indian Transfer pricing Regulations are covered in Chapter X of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’). Section 92C of the Act has provided PSM as one of the methods to determine the arm’s length price of the international transaction. Further, Rule 10B(1)(d) of the Income tax Rules, 1962 (‘the Rules’) provides guidance on the identification and application of PSM.
The Indian TP Regulations provide that PSM is mainly applicable to the following transactions:

(a) International transaction involving transfer of unique intangibles or in circumstances where two or more enterprises perform functions which involves unique or valuable contributions.
(b) In multiple international transactions which are so interrelated that they cannot be evaluated separately for the purpose of determining the arm’s length price of any one transaction.

It is clear that PSM cannot be a most appropriate method where the transactions employ only routine functions and comparables can be found. PSM is the most appropriate method only when the operations involve high integration.

For the purpose of determining the arm’s length price under the PSM, the following steps are required:
(a) Determination of the combined net profit of the AEs arising from the international transaction in which they are engaged.
(b) E valuation of the relative contribution made by each of the AE to the earning of such combined net profit on the basis of the following:

a. functions performed, assets employed or to be employed and risks assumed by each enterprise; and,
b. reliable external market data which indicate how such contribution would be evaluated by unrelated enterprises performing comparable functions in similar circumstances.
(c) The combined net profit is then split amongst the enterprises in proportion to their relative contributions, as evaluated in (b) above;
(d) The profit thus apportioned to the taxpayer is taken into account to arrive at an arm’s length price in relation to the international transaction.

The   indian   TP   regulations   also   provide   that   the combined net profit referred to in sub-Clause (a) may, in the first instance, be partially allocated to each AE so as to provide it with a basic return appropriate for the type of international transaction in which it is engaged, with reference to market returns achieved for similar types of transactions by independent enterprises and thereafter, the residual net profit remaining after such allocation may be split amongst the aes in proportion to their relative contribution in the manner specified under sub-Clauses (b) and (c). In such a case the aggregate of the net profit allocated to the AE in the first instance together with the residual net profit apportioned to that AE on the basis of its relative contribution shall be taken to be net profit arising to that enterprise from the international transaction.

3.4    Approaches for splitting profits

For the purpose of splitting the profits to determine the arm’s length price under PSM, generally following two approaches namely contribution analysis and residual analysis  are  considered.  The  said  approaches  are  not necessarily exhaustive or mutually exhaustive.

(a)    Contribution analysis – under the contribution analysis, the combined profits from the controlled transactions are allocated between the  aes  on  the basis of the relative values of the functions performed, assets employed and  risk  assumed  by each of the ae engaged in the controlled transaction. External market  data  that  reflects how the independent enterprises allocate the profits in similar circumstances should supplement the analysis to the extent possible. The profit so apportioned is used to arrive at the arm’s length price in relation to the international transaction.  The said profit of the AE when added to the costs incurred in relation to the international transaction would result in arm’s length price.

Contribution analysis may apply to various circumstances and various techniques apply to a contribution analysis. these techniques endeavor to evaluate quantitatively the contribution of each party to the transaction. Some of the techniques applied globally are discussed below:

i.    Capital  investment  approach  –  The  said  approach consists of assessing the relative contribution of the parties to the transaction based on the capital invested in  the  intangibles  by  both  parties.  For  determining the basis for profit split, reliance is placed on the economic relationship between the capitals invested by the parties to the transaction. Investment includes investment in intangible capital and operating profits. For applying this technique, it would be relevant that the intangibles as well as the economic owners of such capital are well defined. Also, it is necessary to have an indepth understanding of the circumstances relating to the transaction. This technique can be applied to cases where the expenditures building up the capital can provide a realistic picture of the contribution made by the parties to the transaction.

ii.    Compensation approach – Under this technique the labour cost data (including salary, fringe benefits, bonuses, etc.) of each party is taken into consideration to determine the contribution towards the transaction. Once the labour costs of one party are collated they are captialised in order to capture the amount of time required to build the corresponding intangible asset. The assumption for taking into consideration the labour cost data is that it is a representative of the economic value to the company created by an employee. The principle underlying this technique is in line with the “significant people function” concept discussed in the OECD report on the “Attribution of profits to permanent establishment Part i (december 2006). This technique can be adopted only in a scenario where labour resources are critical value drivers for the transaction. This technique requires specific attention as it is based on an indepth understanding of the market/ industry, group’s value chain and key drivers, the nature of the functions/roles and responsibilities of the persons, related costs which are the basis for the assessment of the contribution.

iii.    Bargaining theory approach – Under this technique, the bargaining positions of each of the parties to the transactions are analysed to assess the contribution made. Bargaining theory if used effectively could be a powerful tool to determine the contribution of each party as it evaluates the roles of each party and thereby the corresponding function towards adding value to the transaction.

iv.    Survey  approach  – This  technique  is  adopted  when identification of the internal and external data to be considered for determining the contribution is not possible. under this approach, opinions on the assumptions for splitting the profits are obtained from  both inside and outside the  company. the key challenge of this approach is the identification of the internal and external experts whose opinions have to be considered and also the compilation of the set of questions that would be relevant. Statistical tools can be employed to analyse the opinions sought from the internal and external experts to arrive at a numerical valuation.  This  approach  to  be  effective  requires robust documentation of the opinions, survey design and the survey answers.

In applying the contribution analysis, the above techniques can be effective tools in quantifying the contribution of the group entities in the transaction. In most cases, a conjunction of these techniques could allow determining the appropriate arm’s length pricing for the transaction.

(b)    Residual analysis – under the residual analysis, the combined profits from controlled transactions are allocated between AEs based on two step approach:
a.    Step 1: depending on the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed, the basic return appropriate to the respective ae is determined. The combined profit is allocated on this basis which results in partial allocation of the combined net profits to each AE.
b.    Step 2: The residual profits is allocated on the basis of an analysis of the facts and circumstances (reference can be made to contribution analysis).

The said profit of the AE when added to the costs incurred in relation to the international transaction would result in arm’s length price.

In practice, generally residual analysis is adopted more as compared to contribution analysis. This is so as the residual analysis is a two step process wherein the first step determines a basic return for routine functions based on comparables and the second step analyses returns to unique intangible assets based not on comparables but on relative value. Further, the possible dispute before the tax administration is reduced as the profits to be attributed based on relative value post the first step is reduced.

Comparable Profit Split Method (CPSM)
In some countries, a different version namely CPSM of PSM is applied. Here, the profit is split by comparing the allocation of operating profits between the AES to the allocation of operating profits between independent enterprises  participating  in  similar  circumstance.  The Indian Regulations also hint at comparable profit split method.  however,  the  tribunal  in  one  of  the  recent ruling in the case of Global one india Private Limited (discussed later) has held that mandatory direction in the rules  to  mandatorily  use  the  comparable  PSM  to  split profits would make the PSM redundant in most case as obtaining relevant market data on third party for splitting profits would be difficult.

Contribution analysis and CPSM are different as CPSM depends on availability of external market data to directly measure the relative value of contribution, while the contribution analysis can be applied even if such a direct measurement is not available. However, both contribution analysis and CPSM are difficult to apply in practice as the reliable external market data required to split the combined profits are often not available.

3.5    Identification of key value drivers – robust functional analysis

Functional analysis is of prime importance in the arm’s length principle. Functional analysis identifies the significant functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed by the parties to the controlled arrangement.   it assists in assessing the values of the contributions of the parties in the controlled arrangement. The functions that need to be identified and compared includes design, manufacturing, assembling, research and development, servicing, purchasing, distribution, marketing, advertising, transportation, financing and management. The types of assets used to be considered includes plant and machinery, use of valuable intangibles, financial assets, etc. and also the nature of the assets used needs to be considered such as the age, market value, location, property right protections available etc. further, the functional analysis has to consider the material risks assumed by the parties as the assumption and allocation of risk would influence the conditions of the transactions between the ae. The risks to be considered could include market risks, such as input cost and output price fluctuations; risks of loss associated with the investment in and use of property, plant and equipment, risks of the success or failure of investment in research and development, financial risks such as caused by currency exchange rate and interest rate variability, credit risks, etc.

Robust functional analysis assists in identifying the key value drivers of each party to the transactions thereby highlighting where the value is created.

3.6    Methodology to split profits – relevant factors

It is imperative that the arm’s length allocation of the combined or residual profits is resultant of robust functional analysis and knowledge  of  the  entire trade of the parties to the transaction and the profits made by  the  said  parties.  The  OECD  guidelines  recommend approximating as closely as possible the split of profits that would have been realised had the parties been independent enterprises.

Some of the methods and the factors impacting the profit split are discussed below:

Methods:

3.6.1    Reliance on data from comparable uncontrolled transactions

Here, the splitting of profits is based on the division of profits actually arising from comparable uncontrolled transactions. Instances of sources of information on uncontrolled transactions that could assist determination of mechanism to split profits based on facts and circumstances includes joint venture arrangements between independent parties, development projects in the oil and gas industry, arrangements between independent music record labels, uncontrolled arrangements in financial services sector, etc.

3.6.2    Allocation keys

Splitting of profits can be achieved using appropriate allocation keys. Based on the facts and circumstances  of the case, the allocation keys can be fixed or variable. In a scenario where there are more than one allocation key used, then it is necessary to weight the allocation keys used in order to determine the relative contribution that each allocation key represents to the earning of the combined profits. The key requirement being that the allocation keys used to split the profits should be based on objective data and supported by comparables data or internal data or both.

Generally used allocation keys are based on assets/ capital (operating assets, fixed assets, intangible assets, capital employed) or costs (relative spending on key areas such  as  marketing,  r&d,  etc.).  Other  allocation  keys based on incremental sales, headcounts, time spent by and salary costs of certain set of people for the creation of the combined profits, etc.

Asset/capital based allocation keys can be used where there is strong correlation between tangible or intangible assets or capital employed and creation of value in the context of controlled transaction.

Cost based allocation key i.e. allocation based on expenses can be used where it is possible to identify a strong correlation between relative expenses incurred and relative value added. Cost based allocation is simplistic. however, cost based allocations are sensitive to the accounting classification of the costs. Hence, it becomes pertinent to select the costs that will be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the allocation key consistently among the parties to the controlled transaction.

3.6.3    Assignment of weights

Here, the profits are split between the relevant entities by assigning of weights to the relative contributions of the parties involved against the value drivers created from the transactions. However, assignment of weights to the value drivers  would  be  subjective.  the  process  of  assigning weights can be backed up by conducting interviews with the employees of both the parties, analysis of the industry, etc in order to determine the weights to be assigned to the value drivers. regression analysis can also be adopted to estimate the relative contribution of the value drivers in enhancing the profits.

3.6.4    Bargaining capacity

Under this approach, the outcome of the bargaining between independent enterprises in the open market can be the criteria to allocate the residual profits. This is a two step approach. In the first step, post the determination  of the combined profits, the lowest price available in the open market should be given to the entities involved in the  transaction.  thereafter,  the  highest  price  available that the buyer is willing to pay should be estimated. The difference between such highest and the lowest price should be considered as the residual profit. In the second step, the residual profit should be allocated amongst the entities involved in the transaction on the basis of how the independent enterprises would have split the said differential profits.

however, this approach has not seen much practical application in india.

Factors impacting profit split

3.6.5    Timing Issues

Timing is an important aspect that needs to be factored while determining the relevant period from which the elements of determination of the allocation keys is based. Difficulty could be on account of the time gap between the incurring of the expenses and time when the value  is created. Also, in certain instances, it could be difficult to identify which period’s expenses are to be considered. This  determination  is  of  prime  importance  in  order  to appropriately allocate the  profits  between  the  parties to the controlled transactions based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

3.6.6    Estimation of projected profits

In a scenario where PSm is applied by the ae to determine the transfer price in controlled transactions, then each AE would have to achieve the profits that independent enterprise would have expected to realize in similar circumstances. Generally, such transfer prices would be based upon projected profits rather than actual profits as it would not be possible for the taxpayers to know what the profits of the business activity would be at the time of establishing the transfer price. When the tax authority analyses the application of PSM to assess if the method has reliably established the arm’s length transfer price then it is critical to acknowledge that the tax payer at the point of establishing the transfer price would not have known the actual profit of the business activity. In such a scenario the application of PSm would be contrary to the arm’s length principle because the independent parties in similar circumstances would have only relied on projections.

3.7    Example of PSM under the residual profit split approach

Facts of the case

a.    FCO  is  engaged  in  manufacturing  and  selling  of semiconductor products. It developed an original semiconductor and holds the patent for the manufacturing technology.
b.    FCO  has  an  overseas  subsidiary  ICO which  is engaged in developing and manufacturing digital equipment using the new semiconductors as well as additional technology developed by itself.
c.    Company ICO is the only manufacturer licensed by FCO to manufacture the new semiconductor.
d.    FCO   purchases   all   of   the   digital   equipment manufactured by ICO and sells them to third parties.

Key aspect of the transaction

Both FCO and ICO contribute to the success of the digital equipment through their design of the semiconductor and  the  equipment.  The  key  driver  of  the  transaction is  the  technology.  The  products  are  very  advanced  in technology and unique in design and concept.

Independent comparables with similar profile or intangible assets could not be obtained due to the uniqueness of the  transaction.  Therefore,  none  of  the  methods  being CUP, CPM or TNMM could be considered as the ‘most appropriate method’ in this case. Accordingly, PSM was considered as the most appropriate method.

Upon screening of various external data sources, the group is able to obtain reliable data on digital equipment contract manufacturers and its wholesalers. However, upon analysis it was noted that these  manufacturers and wholesalers did not own any unique intangibles. Comparable external data revealed that the manufacturers ordinarily earn a mark-up of 10% while the wholesalers derive a 25% margin on sales.

Application of PSM

Step 1 – Determining the basic return

Particulars

ICo

FCo

Sales

125

150

Cost
of Goods Sold

85

125

Gross margin

40

25

Less
: Operating expenses

5

15

operating margin

35

10


The simplified accounts of FCO and ICO are as under:

The total operating profit for the group is $ 45 (35+10)

Calculation of returns for contract manufacturer function

ICO (Contract Manufacturer)

Cost of goods sold

$ 85

Margins
earned by contract manufactures in ICO country

10%

Cost mark-up of ICO

(10% x 85) 8.5

Transfer
price based on independent compa- rables (without intangibles)

$ 93.50

FCO (intangible owner)

Sales to third party customers

$ 150

Resale
margin of wholesalers comparables (without intangibles)

25%

Resale margin (or gross margin)

$ 37.50

Computation of basic return based on comparables (without intangibles)

Particulars

ICo (in $)

FCo (in $)

Sales

93.5

 

Cost
of Goods Sold

85

 

Gross margin

8.5

37.5

Operating
expenses

5

15

Routine operating margin

3.5

22.5

The total Routine operating margin of the group is $ 26.

Step 2: Dividing the residual profit

The residual profit of the group is Operating Profit – routine operating margins given to both entities = $45 –
$26 = $19

Identifying intangibles (i.e. key value drivers): detailed analysis of the two companies demonstrated that two particular expense items namely r&d expenses and marketing expenses are key intangibles critical to the success of the digital equipment.

the r&d expenses and marketing expenses incurred by each company are (assumed):
FCO $12 (80%)
ICO $ 3 (20%)

Assuming  that  the  r&d  and  marketing  expenses  are equally significant in contributing to the residual profits, based on the proportionate expenses incurred:
FCO’s share of residual profit (80% x 19) $15.20 ICO’s share of residual profit (20% x 19) $ 3.80

Apportionment of adjusted profit Therefore, the adjusted operating profit of FCO is = $22.50 + $15.20 = $37.70
ICO is = $3.50 + $3.80 = $7.30

The adjusted tax accounts are as follows:

Particulars

ICo

FCo (in $)

Sales

97.3

150

Cost
of Goods Sold

85

97.3

Gross margin

12.3

52.7

Sales,
General & Admin

5

15

operating margin

7.3

37.7


hence, the transfer price for iCo sales to fCo determined using the residual analysis approach should be $97.30.
 
Key factors to be considered for PSM
(a)    robust   far   analysis   is   basis   on   which   the contribution of the parties to the key value drivers of the transaction would be determined
(b)    in depth knowledge of industry is necessary in deciding on the key value drivers
(c)    detailed discussion with the personnel of the parties to the international transaction would be crucial in concluding on the key value drivers and the weights that could be assigned based on the contribution of each party to the transaction.

3.8    Practical difficulties when applying PSM

Application of PSM could pose certain difficulties which could restrict the determination of the combined profits for the purpose of allocation amongst the enterprises involved in the transactions.

Some of the practical difficulties are mentioned below:

(a)    ascertaining the basis to split that is economically valid could be a difficulty that the AE could face.
(b)    disaggregating the controlled transaction in a case of highly integrated transactions could be difficult considering the levels of integration within the group entities.
(c)    availability of external comparables  for  valuation  of intangibles and other unique contributions could pose challenges.
.
3.9    Strengths and weaknesses

3.9.1    PSM includes the following strengths:

?    offers solution for highly integrated operations for which one-sided method would not be appropriate. also appropriate to transactions where both parties make unique and valuable contributions to the transaction.
?    Best suited for transactions where the traditional methods prove inappropriate due to lack of comparable transactions.
?    Offers flexibility by taking into account specific, possibly unique, facts and circumstances of the associated enterprises that are not present in independent enterprises while still constituting an arm’s length approach to the extent that it reflects what independent enterprises would have done under same circumstances.
?    application of this method does not result in either party to the controlled transaction being left with an extreme and improbable profit result as both the parties to the transaction are evaluated.
? able to deal with returns to synergies between intangible assets or profits arising from economies of scale.

3.9.2    PSM includes the following weaknesses:

?    Splitting of residual profits under the residual analysis on the basis of relative value is weak considering the assumption that synergy value is divided pro rata to the relative value of the inputs.
?    Dependency on access to data from foreign affiliates to determine the combined profits. Difficulty to  the aes and tax administrators to obtain information from foreign affiliates.
?    Difficulty in ascertaining the combined revenues and costs for all the associated enterprises taking part in the controlled transactions due to difference in accounting practices. also allocation of the costs to the controlled transaction vis-à-vis other activities of the aes would be difficult.

3.10    Indian tax authorities views on certain transactions

3.10.1    Captive research and development centers

India’s pool of scientific and engineering talent has attracted several global corporations to set up research and development (r&d) centers in india. these set ups generally operate as a limited risk captive center being compensated on a cost plus mark-up basis by their overseas parent companies. The influx of such centers has generated employment opportunities, large scale capital investment in state of art facilities and made path for cutting edge technologies. However, the indian tax authorities have challenged the business models and pricing mechanisms adopted by such centers and have resorted to attributing higher compensation for the r&d activities performed by indian entity. The higher margins applied by the tax authorities has stirred dispute and uncertainty amongst the key players in this sector.

The  rangachary  committee  was  set  up  by  the  indian Government to make recommendation on the transfer pricingissues faced by r&d centers. The said committee’s report prompted the Central Board of direct taxes (CBDT) to issue following circulars with an aim to provide certainty on such issues:

(a)    Circular No. 2 of 2013 – made the application of PSM almost mandatory for determining the profits attributable  to  the  r&d  centers  especially  those which perform r&d activity involving generation and transfer of unique tangibles or engaged in multiple and highly integrated international transactions.
(b)    Circular No. 3 of 2013 – prescribed certain conditions on fulfillment of which the R&D centers could be treated as entities bearing insignificant risks and would not be required to apply PSM.

The  said  circulars  was  not  accepted  by  the  taxpayers and based on various representations made by the stakeholders the CBDT rescinded Circular no.  2  to  state there were hierarchy of methods and that PSm  was preferred method to determine arm’s length price of intangibles or multiple inter-related transactions. Further Circular no. 6 was introduced in place of erstwhile Circular No. 3. The circular also classified R&D centres into following 3 categories:

?    Centres which are entrepreneurial in nature
?    Centres based on cost sharing arrangements
?    Centres which undertake minimal insignificant risks in the r&d activities in india.

The  amended  circulars  3  and  6  states  that  PSm  is  not the  most  appropriate  method  for  the  r&d  centers  with insignificant risks bearing and that TNMM can be applied for determining the arm’s length .

3.10.2    Location savings

Location savings refers to the cost savings in a low cost jurisdictions like india are instrumental in increasing the profits of the parent companies. The Indian tax authorities are of the view that such savings should be factored while determining the arm’s length price for the indian entity. Accordingly, the tax authorities have proposed high mark- ups for captive iteS/ it sectors.

The tax authorities are of the opinion that in addition to the operational advantages leading to location savings, India offers location specific advantages (LSA) such as highly specialised and skilled manpower and knowledge, access and proximity to growing markets, large consumer base, etc. The incremental profit from LSA is known as location  rents.  The  tax  authorities  have  acknowledged that an arm’s length compensation should factor an appropriate split of cost savings between the parties. Hence, the tax authorities recommend profit split method as most appropriate method to determine the arm’s length compensation for cost savings and location rents between the parties.

3.10.3    Investment banking

By nature the investment banking transactions are complex, integrated and require contributions from different locations within the group to co-ordinate and interact with each other to complete a transaction and deliver efficient solutions to the client. The services cannot be easily segregated and accordingly assignment of fees towards each of the service is a difficult proposition.

Over the years, india’s role has evolved from being a support service provider providing routine services like back-office and administration to performing high end functions like origination, underwriting and execution. Accordingly, the indian investment banking companies have to adopt global pricing policies followed at group level. the Global policy generally provides for an allocation of income/revenue of the group to various group entities. It reflects the factor approach discussed in the Guidelines on Global trading discussed in the oeCd report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments.

Considering that the investment  banking  operations  are highly integrated and also involve contributions by various group entities, PSM could be considered as the most appropriate method. However, since the policies of investment banking call for split of gross revenues or split of revenues on a deal by deal basis, as such they do not strictly fall under the PSM according to the indian transfer pricing regulations. However, the other method (i.e. sixth method notified) could be evaluated for this purpose.

3.11    Indian judicial precedence

Global One India Private Limited vs. ACIT [TS-115- ITAT-2014(Del)

The PSm prescribed in the indian TP regulations is quite unique as compared to the OECD guidelines and UN TP manual. While the OECD Guidelines and the un TP Manual allow flexibility to the taxpayer to adopt any of the sub methods namely – contribution PSM, residual PSM or  comparable  PSM,  the  indian  TP  regulations  require the residual/contribution PSM to be substantiated by comparable PSM.

The    tribunal    observed    that    allocation    based    on benchmarking with external uncontrolled transactions would result in impossibility of application as it is not possible to obtain comparables for allocating residual profits. Further, the Tribunal observed that the prescription in  the  rules  to  mandatorily  use  the  comparable  PSM to split profits would make the PSM redundant in most case as obtaining relevant market data on third party for splitting profits would be difficult. Such data would be available in cases of joint venture arrangements.

The  tribunal  in  this  landmark  ruling  held  that  residual PSM was the most appropriate method. By placing reliance on the OECD Guidelines, UN TP manual and US TP regulations, the Tribunal held that the residual profits should be allocated based on relative value of each enterprises contribution.

The  tribunal  also  accepted  that  if  the  PSM  applied  by the taxpayer did not fit within the definition of PSM then the same could be considered as the ‘other method’ as provided in rule 10AB of the rules. The tribunal observed that the ‘other method’ applicable retrospectively, was introduced with the intention of enabling the determination of the arm’s length price for cases where prescribed methods posed practical difficulty in application.

ITO vs. Net Freight (India) Pvt. Ltd.[TS-363-ITAT- 2013(DEL)-TP]

The application of the PSm under the indian tP regulations is  detailed  in  rules  10B  and  10C.  the  tribunal  in  this ruling explained the application of PSm based on the guidance  provided  in  rule  10B(1)(d)  and  observed  the following:

•    A plain reading of the Rule 10(b)(1)(d) demonstrates that PSm is applicable mainly in international transactions – (a) involving transfer of unique intangibles; (b) in multiple international transactions which are so interrelated that they cannot be evaluated separately.
•    Under the transfer pricing rules described the assessee can adopt either contribution PSM, where the entire system profits are split among the various aes swho are parties to the transaction in question or residual PSM, where each of the aes who are parties to the transaction in question are first assigned routine basic returns for the routine functions performed by the, and there after the residual profits are split among the AES.

Aztek Software (TS-4-ITAT-2007(Bang)-TP)

In special bench ruling the application of PSm was explained in detail. The Tribunal observed that the profits needs to be split among the associated enterprises on the basis of reliable external market data, which indicates how the unrelated parties have split the profits in similar circumstances. Further, the tribunal held that for practical application, benchmarking with reliable external market data is to be done in case of residual PSM, at the first stage, where the combined net profits are partially allocated to each enterprise so as to provide it with an appropriate base return keeping in view the nature of the transaction. The residual profits may be split as per the relative contribution of the associated enterprise. also, for splitting the residuary profits a scientific basis for allocation may be applied.

3.12    Conclusion

The  PSM  has  recently  become  more  acceptable  as  an appropriate method and the revenue authorities are applying the method more frequently to determine the arm’s length price of controlled transactions. Correctly structured application of PSm is fully consistent with arm’s length economies and the separate enterprise standard. however, application of multiple methods as a corroborative to evaluate the arm’s length result of the most appropriate method has found place in practice. PSM can be used along with one or more transfer pricing methods to arrive at an arm’s length result. it is of importance to note that PSm as a method brings out principles on how to split profits among the AEs involved in the transaction, however it is a question whether under the domestic laws the adjusted profits (post allocation) should be taxed or not. Given the current complexity of the transactions and evolving business atmosphere, flexibility in application of methods is of utmost importance in order to determine the arm’s length pricing and arrive at firm and robust solution to the group.

State of Uttarakhand and Others vs. Nestle India Ltd., (2012) 55 VST 145 (Uttarakhand)

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VAT- Rate of Tax-Entry in Schedule-Tomato Sauce-Is Processed Vegetables-Taxable at Four Percent, Entry 6 of Sch. II (B) of The Uttarakhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005

Facts
The respondent company had paid tax @ 4% under the Uttarakhand Vat Act on sale of tomato sauce being all kinds of processed vegetables and covered by entry 6 of the Schedule II(B) of the Act. The assessing authority levied tax of 12.5% based on circular issued by commissioner clarifying rate of tax on sale of tomato sauce as 12.5%. The company filed writ petition before the Uttarakhand High Court against the assessment order and the single judge allowed the writ petition filed by the company and quashed the circular and directed that the rate of 12.5% should not be recovered from the company on sale of tomato sauce. The revenue filed appeal before the division bench of High Court against the judgment of single judge.

Held
Under entry 6 of Schedule II(B), tax is payable at 4% on sale of all processed and preserved vegetables, vegetable mushrooms and fruits including fruit jams, jellies, fruit squash, paste, fruit drinks and fruit juices and achar (whether in sealed container or otherwise). Botanically, the tomato is a fruit but for the purpose of trade it is classified as a vegetable. It is common that tomatoes are widely used as canned vegetable in the form of juice, sauces, pastes and ketchup. Tomato sauce refers to tomato concentrate with salt, pepper, onion/garlic, sugar, spices and preservatives. It is a processed item, normally marketed in bottles and Cannes before being served as a dish. The tomato sauce being a processed and preserved vegetable is covered under entry 6 of schedule II(B) of the act liable to tax @ 4%. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue and confirmed the order of single judge.

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M/S. ABB Ltd vs. Commissioner, Delhi VAT, (2012) 55 VST 1 (Delhi)

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Inter-State Sale – Works Contract-Manufacture of Goods outside the State- Used In Works Contract-Transaction of Inter-State Sale.

Sale In Course of Import- Works Contract- Import of Goods- As Approved by Employer- Used In Contract- Sale in Course of Import- Not Taxable, sections 3 and 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

Facts
The appellant a Public Ltd. Company was awarded indivisible works contract for supply, installation, testing and commissioning of traction, electrification, power supply, power distribution and SCADA systems for Delhi Metro by Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC). The company manufactured certain goods required for the projects outside the State of Delhi and used in execution of works contract. Likewise, the company imported certain goods required for the projects and used in execution of works contract. The company took approval of the DMRC for purchase of goods as stipulated in the contract. The company while filing vat returns under the Delhi Vat Act claimed the exemption form payment of the tax on sale of goods purchased from outside the State of Delhi being inter-State sale not liable to tax under the Delhi Vat Act. Likewise it claimed exemption form payment of tax u/s. 5(2) of the CST Act in respect of sale of goods imported under the contract being sale in the course of import. The vat department rejected the claim of company both as inter-State sale as well as sale in the course of import and levied tax under the Delhi Vat Act. The company filed appeal before the Delhi High Court against the judgment of the Tribunal confirming the assessment order.

Held
On the facts of the case the High Court held that in the present case, there was a live and conceivable link between the sale and movement of goods. The goods were custom made. The DMRC was aware that the goods were to be sourced from the appellant’s factories which were outside Delhi. The reference to specific locations, in the list issued by DMRC, in respect of particular equipment which were integral to the contract. Accordingly, the High Court held the transaction as inter-State sale and not liable to tax under the Delhi Vat Act.

In respect of import of goods the High Court considering various conditions in the contract held that the transaction was a sale in the course of import exempt u/s. 5(2) of the CST Act. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Company.

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2014] 48 taxmann.com 11 (New Delhi – CESTAT) (LB) Great Lakes Institute of Management Ltd. vs. CST

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Larger Bench explains interpretation of “commercial training or coaching” u/ss 65(26), 65(27) in the light of reasons recorded in the decision of Magnus Society’s case. Effect of explanation appended to section 65(105)(zzc) with effect from 01-07-2003 also commented upon.

Facts:
This reference application was made to consider the issue pertaining to interpretation of “commercial training or coaching” and taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zzc) since the division bench expressed doubts on vitality of reasons recorded in the decision of Magnus Society vs. CC&CE [2009] 18 STT 193 (Bang- CESTAT) which tried to make a distinction between activities of an institution imparting a particular skill such as in computers, computer operations, spoken English or accountancy on one hand and a proper format of education imparted by institutions imparting “higher learning” such as MBA, management, computer science and such other disciplines; and concluded that institutions imparting higher learning like MBA, etc., cannot be characterised as commercial training or coaching centres; that institutions preparing students for entrance examination to various universities could be called commercial training or coaching centre; but not so in respect of institutions recognised by law.

Held:
The reference answered is summarised below:
• On analysing relevant statutory provisions it can be inferred that any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching where training or coaching is provided for consideration and irrespective of its constitutive or organisational basis or architecture; i.e., whether or not such centre or institute is registered as a trust, a society or other similar organisation under any law for the time being in force; and carrying on its activity with or without a profit motive, engaged in imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field (excluding sports), irrespective of whether on culmination of the training or coaching regimen, a certificate is issued; and including coaching or tutorial classes, is a commercial training or coaching centre. Pre-school training and coaching centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or any other educational qualification recognised by law for the time being in force, are only excluded from the sphere of the defined entity.

• What “commercial training or coaching” means must be ascertained exclusively from the relevant provisions of the Act and applying the appropriate interpretative principles in case of grammatical, syntactic or contextual ambiguity. From the legislated definition, training or coaching therefore means imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field. Parliament has not restricted the scope of “training or coaching” as is defined by super adding any conditions such as in terms of pedagogic methodology, course or training content, syllabus, duration, periodicity, tenure/ duration or like conditions. There is thus no scope for restrictive interpretation. A good faith interpretation of section 65(27) requires that wherever skills/ knowledge/lessons are imparted on any subject or field, the activity must be considered to be “training or coaching”. When Parliament enacts a generic and unambiguous definition mandating, that imparting skills/knowledge/lessons on any subject or field shall amount to “training or coaching”, the generic definition is required to be given effect to, legislatively ordained, without demur. Accordingly, dissecting the expression “training or coaching”, as defined in section 65(27) of the Act to identify distinctions on the basis of contemporaneous or potential advancements in educational methodologies, hierarchies or pedagogy would result in subversion of the legislative purposes underlying enactment of the definition of the provision of section 65(27). Where legislature has signaled a generic description, the judicial branch may not resort to mini-classification.

• Therefore subject to the excluded entities, expressly in section 65(27), any other institute or establishment which imparts skill/knowledge/lessons on any subject or field (excluding sports), would be a commercial training or coaching centre providing commercial training or coaching; a taxable service u/s. 65(105) (zzg), irrespective of the nature of training regime; the course content; and irrespective of whether the training or coaching is in respect of one or more disciplines of learning, skills or knowledge or a broader raft of academic disciplines. The Bench refused to consider the meaning of the term ‘commercial’ in the light of authorities cited by the counsel on the ground that, Parliament has introduced the retrospective ‘Explanation’ in section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act and this Explanation clarifies assumed ambiguities in ascertainment of the expression ‘commercial’. The Tribunal also did not analyse the several administrative constructions of statutory provisions in various circulars/notifications.

Note: Reader may refer to the decision of New Delhi CESTAT in the case of N.I.B.S. & Corporate Management [2013] 36 taxmann.com 117 (New Delhi – CESTAT) wherein Tribunal has taken a prima facie view that the word ‘commercial’ in definitions at sections 65(26) and 65(27) and 65(105)(zzzc) cannot be considered to be superfluous and the Explanation added by Finance Act, 2010 may not be a sufficient reason to take a view that the impugned training to be a “commercial training”.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 73 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. CST, Noida

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Facts:
The appellant, a body corporate established under U. P. Industrial Development Act, 1976 (UPIDA) discharges statutory duties and functions which includes allotment of land on lease basis and providing municipal services in the Greater Noida, being notified as an industrial township by the Government of U.P In terms of UPIDA. The Appellant may sell, lease or otherwise transfer, whether by auction, allotment or otherwise, any land or building belonging to the Authority in the industrial development area on terms and conditions it may think fit. The appellant accordingly allocated vacant land to various persons for residential/group housing, institutional, commercial or industrial purposes on 90 years lease term. In respect of such allotment of vacant land, the appellant, in addition to an amount called premium also collected lease rent. Besides this, the appellant have also rented a constructed building for commercial purposes in respect of which they paid service tax on the rent since 01-06- 2007. Based on the above facts, the following issues were framed.

Issue 1:
• Whether providing vacant land on lease for construction of building or structure at a later stage for furtherance of business or commerce, service tax is chargeable only with effect from 01- 07-2010?

Held:
Yes. Relying upon the decision of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority’ [2014] 44 Taxmann.com 287 (New Delhi-CESTAT), the Tribunal held that, giving of vacant land on license, rent or lease for construction of structure at a later stage for furtherance of business or commerce became taxable only with effect from 01-07- 2010 under Clause (v) of Explanation I to section 65(105) (zzzz) and this activity was not taxable during the period prior to 01-07-2010.

• Whether rent received during the period from 01-07-2010 in respect of leases of vacant land for construction of buildings or temporary structures for commercial use granted during the period prior to 01-07-2010 are also liable to service tax?

Issue 2:

Held:
Yes. Unlike manufacture of goods and clearance of manufactured goods which are one-time events, the provision of service in pursuance of an agreement for the same, may after starting the provision of service, continue for some time for several days, months or years, depending on the terms of the agreement and in between, a service which at the time of initiating the provision of service was non-taxable may become taxable. Since the taxing event for service tax is provision of service, not the event of entering into an agreement for provision of service, the service provided from the date on which the same became taxable, would attract service tax, irrespective of the fact that at the time of entering into an agreement for provision of service, the same was not taxable. Issue 3: • Whether service tax is chargeable only on the lease rent?

Held:
Yes. Relying upon the decision of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority’ case (supra), the Tribunal held that all the leases of immovable property viz. short-term, long-term or perpetual as per section 65(105)(zzzz) would be covered for service tax.

Issue 4:
• Whether service tax is chargeable also on one time premium amount charged in respect of long-term leases?

Held:
No. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Panbari Tea Co. Ltd. [1965] 57 ITR 422, the Tribunal held that the premium is the price paid for obtaining the lease of an immovable property. While rent, on the other hand, is the payment made for use and occupation of the immovable property leased. Since taxing event u/s. 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65(90a) is renting of immovable property, service tax is leviable only on the element of rent, i.e., the payments made for continuous enjoyment under lease which are in the nature of the rent irrespective of whether the rent is collected periodically or in advance in lumpsum. Service tax u/s. 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65 (90a) cannot be charged on the ‘premium’ or ‘salami’ paid by the lessee for transfer of interest in the property from the lessor to the lessee as this amount is not for continued enjoyment of the property leased.

Issue 5:
• Whether service tax is payable on the processing charges for approval of building plans for transfer charges, miscellaneous income such as map revision fee, map validation fee, forfeiture charges, penalty, restoration charges, documentation charges, etc., and also on the rent received from the staff for residential premises?

Held:
As per the amended provisions effective from 01-06-2007, section 65(105)(zzzz) covers not only the service of renting of immovable property to any other person for use in the course of furtherance of business or commerce but also any other service in relation to such renting. Therefore, the services in connection with renting of immovable property for business/commerce would also be taxable. Therefore, processing charges for application for land allotment would be taxable. However, the services like processing and approval of building plan, map revision, malba charges connected with building of structures on the land allotted on lease basis have no nexus with the renting of immovable property for business or commerce, and as such, the charges of map approval, validation, map revision, malba charges, etc., would not attract service tax. Further, restoration charges or penalty being in the nature of penalty for violating conditions of the lease, the same cannot be treated as consideration for lease and hence not taxable. Similarly, rent from the staff towards residential premises is also not for furtherance of commerce or business would not attract service tax.

Issue 6:
• Whether the allotment of vacant land to builders for construction of residential complexes would attract service tax u/s. 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65(90a)?

Held:
No. The Tribunal observed that Explanation 1 to section 65(90a) defines the term ‘for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce’ as including the use of immovable property as the factories, office buildings, warehouses, theatres, exhibition halls and multiple use buildings. However, when a building is constructed on a vacant land leased is purely a residential one, the same cannot be said to be a building to be used for furtherance of business or commerce. Therefore, such allotment of land to the builder or a group housing society for construction of residential complex would not be covered by section 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65(90a).

Issue 7: •
Whether extended period under proviso to section 73(1) is applicable in the present case and consequently whether Penalties under sections 76,77 and 78 of the Act are leviable?

Held:
No. Tribunal found merit in the plea of bonafide belief as to non-taxability of long term lease. Therefore invoking section 80, all penalties were waived. Note: Readers may refer to New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. CCE [2014] 44 taxmann.com 287 digest provided at case No.50 335 (2014) 46-A BCAJ.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 33 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Kisan Cooperative Sugar Factory Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut

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Welding electrodes used for repair and maintenance of plant and machinery are inputs and covered by the expression in or in relation to manufacture – Held, CENVAT Credit allowed.

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer of sugar and molasses took credit of welding electrodes used for repair and maintenance of plant and machinery. The department denied the said credit relying upon the judgment of Tribunal in case of 2008 taxmann.com 532 (Kol-CESTAT) SAIL vs. CCE on the ground that SLP filed against Tribunal’  decision was dismissed by the Apex Court vide judgment reported in 2002 (139) ELT A-294 (SC). Assessee contended that regular repair and maintenance of plant and machinery was necessary for smooth manufacturing operation and therefore the impugned order disallowing credit was not justified.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the definition of input during the period of dispute, as given in Rule 2(k) of the CCR, covered all the goods which are used in or in relation to manufacture of final products whether directly or indirectly and whether contained in the final product or not. It held that, the expression “used in or in relation to manufacture of final products whether directly or indirectly” is obviously wider in scope than the expression “used in the manufacture of”, as the former expression expands scope of the latter expression. The Tribunal relied upon the decision in the case of 1997 (91) ELT 34 (SC) J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer to hold that goods used in an activity, without which manufacturing operations, though theoretically possible, are not commercially feasible, have to be treated as, used in the manufacture of the final products. Tribunal observed that it is nobody’s case that manufacturing activity is commercially feasible with malfunctioning machinery, and leaking pipes, tubes and tanks and accordingly held that repair and maintenance of plant and machinery, though by itself not a manufacturing activity, has to be treated as an activity in relation to manufacture and inputs used in repair & maintenance would have to be treated as goods used in relation to manufacture.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 226 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Palmtech Institutions India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Jaipur

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CENVAT Credit on input services of outdoor catering and mandap keeper used for organising a function to felicitate students prior to 01-04-2011 is allowable.

Facts: The appellant provided commercial training and coaching services and as a part thereof, they organised a function to felicitate students for which the appellant did not recover any charges from the students and availed CENVAT Credit on input services of outdoor catering and mandap keeper services. The Department alleged that such services are not input services as per section 2(l) of the CCR.

Held: The Tribunal noted that neither any evidence of recovery of any expenses against the appellant was available nor any allegation by revenue was made for this. It also took a view that decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of [2012] 20 taxmann.com 699 Toyota Kirloskar Motors (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE is squarely applicable to this case and accordingly allowed the credit.

Note: In Toyota Kirloskar case, while interpreting Rule 2(l) the Court followed the test as to whether there is a nexus with the manufacture of final products as well as the business of manufacture of final product. It was further held that, to find out whether there is a nexus with the manufacturer of final products, it is necessary to keep in mind the exhaustive definition contained in input service and then the word used therein, i.e., the activities relating to business and then decide whether any particular service would constitute input service. The Court took a view that such expenses are incurred in connection with activities relating to business and hence allowable as CENVAT Credit. Therefore, this decision may not apply in respect of period after 01-04-2011 when scope of inclusive part of the definition was restricted by deleting the expression “activities relating to business such as”.

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[2014] 36 STR 569 (Tri. – Ahmd) Shreeji Shipping vs. CCE&ST, Rajkot

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Stevedoring service and lighterage service provided at minor ports in Gujarat prior 01-07- 2010 is not exigible to service tax under “Port Service”.

Facts:
The appellant provided stevedoring services (loading/ unloading of export cargo) and lighterage services (sea transportation from the location where the mother vessel is anchored till the jetty an vice versa) at minor ports in Gujarat and not paid service tax under port services for the period prior to 1st July, 2010. The revenue demanded service tax u/s. 65(105)(zzl) considering the appellant’s service as taxable port services and the appellant challenged the demand on the ground that the definition required that the service provider is to be authorised by the port and this being absent in its case, no service tax is leviable. The appellant also contended that only w. e.f. 1st July, 2010 when the definition of port service was amended, any service provided within the port can be considered as “port services” and this cannot be the ground to levy service tax for the period prior to 1st July, 2010. The Commissioner (appeals) confirmed the service tax demanded in the SCNs.

Held:
The Tribunal relying on the Apex Court’s decision on Aphali Pharmaceuticals vs. State of Maharashtra reported at 1989 (44) ELT 613 held that the expression “authorised by the port” can have no other meaning than what has been given to it under the laws governing ports in India and such an interpretation is consistent with the scheme of the Finance Act, which has borrowed the scope and ambit of several services with respect to the cognate legislation governing such service. The appellant provided documentary evidence that other party was authorised under the Gujarat Maritime Act, 1981 and no such authorisation is given to the appellant and in absence of authorisation the appellant is not authorised by the port. The Revenue had relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Onkarlal Nandlal vs. State of Rajasthan – AIR 1986 SC 214 and submitted that only the definition of ‘port’ is to be referred in Major Port Trusts Act and no other provision is to be applied. The Tribunal held that the said judgment is not applicable as facts of the said case are different as in the said case an exception to the section was sought to be read and therefore was negated by the Supreme Court. Further in response to the respondent’s reliance on the case of Western Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. CCE reported in 2011 (25) STR 305, the Tribunal relying on Sir Silk Ltd. vs. Textile Committee & Ors – AIR 1987 SC 317 held that the principle of pari material statute can be applied and therefore levy of service tax on port services is with reference to services provided by a major port/minor port or any person authorised by them and the persons covered under the Finance Act, 1994 are pari material. The Tribunal also held that no cognisance was taken of the amendment made to the definition of port service wherein any service provided within the port is treated as “port services” which means that the person providing the services within the port may not be an authorised person by the port. The Tribunal in relation to the invocation of extended period relied on the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Jayprakash Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2002 (146) ELT 381 (SC) and held that the dispute being of interpretation and different views taken at different times and further as substantial portion of the demand is time barred by limitation, extended period cannot be invoked and in view of the above judicial pronouncements the impugned order was set aside.

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[2014] 36 STR 593 (Tri. -Mumbai) Seed Infotech Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune – III

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Longer period of limitation cannot be invoked and penalties not imposable in absence of suppression with intent to evade tax payment. Recruitment services cannot be taxed before 16-06-2005.

Facts:
The appellant provided computer training to corporate clients as well as students. It also provided recruitment agency services, it allowed its clients to use software owned by itself and provided space for conduct of examination/conference for its clients in relation to recruitment. The demand was confirmed under the above four categories by invoking the extended period of limitation and also confirmed penalty. The appellant contended that computer training services was exempt under the notification 9/2003-S.T. dated 20-06-2003 and therefore not liable to service tax. The said exemption for computer training was withdrawn by 24/2004-S.T. dated 10-09-2004 and later reinstated vide notification 19/2005-ST dated 07-06-2005. The computer training services were not exempt during the period 10- 09-2004 till 07-06-2005 but the Tribunal in the case of Sunwin Techno Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2008 (10) STR 329 held that the computer training services were exempt for the period 10-09-2004 till 07- 06-2005. However, the Supreme Court has reversed the Tribunal’s decision. The appellant in the meantime had paid service tax in relation to computer training provided to corporate clients under the Extra Ordinary Taxpayers Friendly Scheme and its declaration was accepted. Further, they sought clarification from the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner whether computer training to students was exempt. However, they did not receive any reply. The appellant’s contention in relation to recruitment services was that the definition u/s. 65(68) and 65(105) (k) of the Act was amended only w. e. f. 16-06-2005 and therefore demand prior to the said period is not sustainable. In relation to usage of software the appellant submitted that it is franchise services and not intellectual property services and therefore not liable to service tax during the impugned period. Similarly, the appellant contended it did not provide any business support services and therefore the question of payment of service tax does not arise.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the facts and the action of the appellant seeking clarification indicates clearly that there was no suppression with an intention to evade tax and therefore the demand beyond the normal period and penalty was set aside. Demand under manpower supply services for recruitment is not sustainable for the period before 16-06-2005 and therefore the penalties imposed to be reduced accordingly. The Tribunal upheld the demand and penalty imposed under the intellectual property services as well as business auxiliary services.

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2014] 36 STR 704 (Tri. -Mumbai) Mercedes Benz India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune – I

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Trading was not an exempt service prior to 01- 04-2011 but CENVAT Credit on common services is required to be reversed on the basis of turnover

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer of motor vehicles also imported motor vehicles and sold them in domestic markets and therefore was a manufacturer as well as a trader. The appellant availed CENVAT Credit on common input services such as “advertising services”, “event management services”, “business auxiliary services” and “business support service”. The CENVAT Credit on the said input services was denied on the ground that ‘trading’ is an exempt service as per the explanation introduced under Rule 6(3) of CCR, 2004 and extended period was invoked as the appellant provided exempt services was not disclosed in the ST-3 returns and the Commissioner (Appeals) disallowed the entire CENVAT Credit on common services for the period March 2005 till March 2011 and also appropriated CENVAT Credit in relation to input services used exclusively for trading and further demanded 6% of the amount of trading turnover for the period post March 2011. The appellant submitted that the explanation was introduced w. e. f. April 2011 and therefore ‘trading’ can be considered as exempt service only from April 2011.

Held:
The Tribunal held that ‘trading’ was not a service till 31st March 2011 and therefore cannot be an exempt service. Amendment to rules cannot be applied retrospectively as Government has no powers to amend delegated legislation vide a notification. Rules can be amended retrospectively only by an Act. The Tribunal discussed the case of Metro Shoes Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2008 (10) STR 382 (Tribunal), Loreal India Private Ltd. 2012 (281) ELT 264 and Orion Appliances Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2010 (19) STR 205 and held that the CENVAT Credit on common services is to be disallowed on the basis of trading turnover to total turnover (trading as well as manufacture turnover) and therefore directed the lower authorities to re-compute the liability. The Tribunal also held that ‘business’ used in the definition of “input service” under Rule 2(l) of CCR, 2004 relates to business of manufacture of final products and not to trading activity and therefore any input service in relation to “trading activity” is not to be treated as input service. The extended period of limitation is properly invoked as CENVAT Credit availed in relation to trading activity was not disclosed and therefore the penalty was also upheld.

Note: The Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal disallowing CENVAT Credit on services relating to trading activity prior to 01-04-2011 reported at 2014-TIOL-2186- HC-Mad-CX.

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[2014] 36 STR 549 (Tri. -Del) Kunal Fabricators & Engineering Works vs. CST, Mumbai – II

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Repairs and maintenance services provided in absence of any agreement is not liable to service tax. Fabrication, erection and installation of steel storage tanks, dozers and settlers, etc. are not liable to service tax under “Business Auxiliary Services”.

Facts:
The assessee registered under Business Auxiliary Services and Goods Transport Agency Services also provided repairs and maintenance services on which no service tax was paid. Further, they also fabricated, erected and installed water tanks, etc., in the client’s factory and service tax was confirmed under “Business Auxiliary Services”. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that repairs and maintenance services provided by the respondent in terms of an agreement/contract are only liable to service tax and as the department was unable to produce such agreement, the said repair and maintenance service is not liable to service tax. Services of fabrication, erection and installation of storage tanks, etc., are not covered under “Business Auxiliary Services” and therefore not exigible to service tax. The department therefore filed this appeal.

Held:
In the absence of any evidence provided by the department that the services of repairs and maintenance were provided under agreement, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was upheld in this regard. Fabrication, erection and installation services were sought to be taxed under Business Auxiliary Services and the said services are not covered under “Business Auxiliary Services” as defined u/s. 65(19) and therefore the said services are also not exigible to service tax. The department’s appeal was dismissed.

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[2014] (36) STR 481 (Del.) Commissioner of Service Tax vs. ITC LTD.

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Show cause notice could be issued without mentioning specific sub clause of the definition of business auxiliary service if other contents are indicative of appropriate charge.

Facts:
Revenue was of the view that the assessee short paid/ not paid service tax and accordingly, issued show cause notice under business auxiliary services without specifying the sub-clause under which the service was covered. The respondent contested the demand on various grounds including that the activities were not in the nature of business auxiliary services. The orderin- original confirmed the demand and also specified the applicable sub-clause of business auxiliary service. Referring to various decisions on the subject matter, the Tribunal quashed the show cause notice on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice since the show cause notice did not specify the sub-clause of section 65(19). The Tribunal observed that though the services were prima facie assumed to be in the nature of Business Auxiliary services, the reason for such assumption was not mentioned in the show cause notice. Being aggrieved, the department filed the appeal to the Hon’ble High Court after the due date and sought the condonation of delay in filing appeal.

Held:
After condoning the delay in filing appeal and noting the contents of the show cause notice, it was observed that the respondent knew the relevant facts and provisions were mentioned in the show cause notice. The object of the show cause notice is to inform assessee so that relevant facts and submissions can be brought on the record and the assessee is not prejudiced by manifestly vague notice which leaves him confused. The assessee must be given reasonable opportunity and made aware as to what he has to meet. The show cause notice cannot be read as a legislative enactment which is to the point, precise and required to show exceptional lucidity. The assessee is to be conveyed the allegations properly. After the show cause notice is served, the conduct of the parties, opportunity of personal hearing etc., are relevant factors to ascertain whether the decision was unjust or not and it was granted to the respondent. Though specific sub-clause of the definition of business auxiliary services was not mentioned in the show cause notice, the show cause notice was drafted in a way that the person reading the show cause notice can make out that the demand was raised under which sub-clause and therefore the appeal is disposed off in the said terms.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 8 (Allahabad) Commissioner of Central Excise, Noida vs. Samsung India Electronic Ltd

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CENVAT Credit on capital goods used for manufacturing exempted intermediate products and the said intermediate goods are used captively for dutiable final product – Held, CENVAT Credit is allowed.

Facts:
Samsung Electronics India Information and Telecommunication Ltd. (SEIITL) is manufacturing CTV chassis for the appellant on job work basis. SEIITL was amalgamated with the appellant with effect from 01- 04-2003. Prior to amalgamation, SEIITL took CENVAT Credit of duty paid on certain capital goods received from assessee and used exclusively for the purpose of manufacture of CTV chassis (exempted goods) supplied to the appellant. The said CTV chassis are used by the appellant for manufacturing of dutiable final product, i.e., Colour TV. The department denied CENVAT Credit of capital goods by invoking Rule 6(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) as the capital goods were used exclusively in manufacturing exempted product. The Tribunal decided the matter in favour of appellant, aggrieved by which, the department preferred this appeal.

Held:
The High Court observed that Rule 3 of CCR allows the credit on capital goods received in the factory and used in the manufacture of intermediate products by a job worker. Further Rule 6(4) denies the CENVAT Credit only if capital goods are exclusively used in the manufacture of final products exempted from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon. In the appellant’s case, chassis manufactured by the job worker was an intermediary product which in turn would be used by the assesse in manufacturing TV, a dutiable product. The High Court referred to CBEC Circular No. 665/56/2002-CX dated 25-09-2002 which allows credit of capital goods to manufacturer in such cases. The Hon’ble High Court held that object of the CENVAT Credit is to avoid cascading effect of duty. Based on the circular and also relying upon various judicial pronouncements on the subject matter including the Apex Court’s decision in the case of 2004 taxmann.com 1332 (SC) Escorts Ltd. vs. CCE, the department’s appeal was dismissed.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 450 (Madras) Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem vs. K.M.B. Granites (P.) Ltd

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Scope of GTA service – Held, “commercial concern” includes individual truck operator.

Facts: The appellant (manufacturer) availed GTA services for transporting its inward as well as outward transportation of goods. Revenue demanded tax under ‘GTA ’ service under reverse charge mechanism as per Rule 2(1)(d) (v) of Service Tax Rules, 1994. Appellant contended that services were availed from individual transport operators and not from GTA . Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the appellant following the judgments of the Bangalore Tribunal in cases of Lakshminarayana Mining Co. vs. CST [2010] 24 STT 61 and CCE & C vs. Kanaka Durga Agro Oil Products (P.) Ltd. [2009] 22 STT 435. Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision, revenue filed an appeal before the High Court.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court relying upon its own decision in the case of CCE vs. Salem Co-Operative Sugar Mills Ltd. 2014 (35) STR (450) (Mad) held that individual operator would also be covered within the meaning of expression ‘commercial concern’ as appeared u/s. 65(50b) of Finance Act.

Note: While deciding this case, the High Court appears to be under the impression that the Lakshminarayana Mining Co.’s (supra) and Kanaka Durga Agro’s case (supra) relied upon by the Tribunal dealt with the issue as to whether individual can be regarded as commercial concern or not? In Kanaka Durga’s case, the issue before the Tribunal was not whether individual is covered within the meaning of “commercial concern” but whether GTA includes individual truck operators/owners or on the agents thereof. It was submitted before the Tribunal that the aspect of agency being absent when a truck owner or operator gives a truck without an agent being go-between, there can be no tax. From the definition of the GTA and also the clarification given by the Finance Minister in the budget speech, Tribunal held that individual truck owners and operators are not covered within scope of section 65(50b). Kanaka Durga’s decision was followed in Lakshminarayana Mining Co.’s case which was also affirmed by the Karnataka HC in i.

In Salem Co-Operative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) case, Tribunal relied upon Kanaka Durga Agro Oil Products Pvt. Ltd.’ s case and remanded the matter back to adjudicating authority to verify whether services are received from individual owners. When Salem’s case came up before the Madras High Court in 2014 (35) STR 450 (Mad), the High Court neither overruled nor distinguished Kanaka Durga Agro & Lakshminarayana Mining (supra). Hence, to that extent it appears that reliance on Salem’s case for the purpose of present matter is misplaced.

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[2014] 36 STR 492 (Bom.) Dimensions Logistics Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST. Mumbai – II

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Recovery of destination charges for services provided by foreign-service provider for clearance of goods is liable to service tax under clearing & forwarding agent’s service. Freight margin earned from freight forwarding activity may not be exigible to service tax under clearing and forwarding services. Early hearing granted.

Facts:
The appellant registered under clearing & forwarding agent’s services was audited. The department found difference in the amounts captured in the ST-3 returns and the financials. The appellant did not provide reconciliation of the difference before the adjudicating authority but before the Tribunal reconciled it and submitted that the said difference was on account of (a) margin of freight on account of freight forwarding activity and (b) recovery of destination charges from its clients for service provided by foreign-service providers. The Tribunal considering the submissions of the appellant directed pre-deposit of Rs.40,57,603/- against which the appeal was made to the High Court. The appellant’s counsel submitted that freight margin was not exigible to service tax under the clearing & forwarding agent’s service and relied on the case of CCE, Panchkula vs. Kulcip Medicines Pvt. Ltd. 2009 (14) STR 608 (P & H). Recovery of destination charges is also not liable for service tax as service was provided outside India and therefore covered under Rule 3(ii) of the Import of Service Rules.

Held:
The Tribunal had found substance in the arguments of the appellant’s counsel and therefore scaled down the tax liability and further in respect of destination charges even though the Tribunal rendered a prima facie finding against the Appellant. The Hon. Court found this aspect arguable and therefore directed a pre-deposit of Rs. 20 lakh in cash and directed the Tribunal to hear the appeal in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any earlier observations.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 365 (Kerala) Union of India vs. Kerala Bar Hotels Association, Cochin

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Constitutional Validity – “restaurant service” and “short term accommodation service” – Held, section 65(105)(zzzzv) & (zzzzw), respectively are ultra vires the Constitution.

Facts:
The department filed appeal against judgment of the single judge in case of [2013] 35 taxmann.com 568 (Ker) Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association vs. UOI in which (i) levy of service tax on restaurants; and (ii) levy of service tax on renting of hotels was held as unconstitutional as it was challenged that the Union is incompetent to levy service tax on “Restaurant Service” [65(105)(zzzzv)] and “short-term accommodation service” [65(105)(zzzzw)].

Held:
The High Court observed in regard to the restaurant service that prior to 46th Constitutional amendment in relation to supply of food and beverages in a restaurant, the law was that the whole transaction is a service and therefore, the same would not come within the scope of “sale of goods”, for the purpose of imposition and levy of tax by the States. However, as a result of amendment in Article 366 (29A) (f), supply of goods, by way of service or otherwise, being food and other articles of human consumption, were deemed to be sale of those goods by the person making the transfer or supply to whom such transfer or supply is made. Relying upon decision in the case of K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2000] 117 STC 1, the High Court held that by virtue of the Constitution (Forty Sixth Amendment) Act, supply of food and beverages in a restaurant was also deemed to be a sale, conferring authority on the States to tax on the whole consideration received by the person making the supply of food and beverages. In other words, in view of the aforesaid constitutional amendment, it cannot be said that there is any service involved in the supply of food and other articles of human consumption in a restaurant. The High Court therefore affirmed the decision of the single bench. The High Court distinguished the decision of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India [2006] 4 STT 308 (SC), on the ground that, it dealt with the variety of services extended by such mandap keepers to their customers and does not deal with the supply of food in a restaurant. The supply of food and other consumables in a restaurant cannot be equated with the services rendered by a mandap keeper in relation to the use of mandaps and also the services, if any, rendered by him as a caterer. The High Court did not agree with the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Indian Hotels & Restaurant Association vs. Union of India [2014] 44 taxmann.com 455 (Bom.).

As regards service tax on short-term accommodation service, the High Court after analysing the provisions of Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act and following the decision of the Supreme Court in case of [2005] 2 SCC 515 Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. vs. State of U.P. held that the matter covered by section 65 (105)(zzzzw) is a matter enumerated in Entry 62 of List II of Seventh Schedule and the States alone have the legislative competence to enact any law imposing tax on the said matter and therefore cannot be liable to service tax.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated 21st November, 2014

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Release of Foreign Exchange for Haj/Umrah pilgrimage

This circular permits persons going on Haj/Umrah pilgrimage to carry the entire BTQ entitlement in cash/up to the cash limit specified by the Haj Committee of India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated 21st November, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Parking of ECB proceeds

Presently, persons who have availed ECB have to immediately bring into India, for credit to their Rupee accounts with banks in India, ECB proceeds meant for Rupee expenditure in India for permitted end uses.

This circular permits a person who has availed ECB to park ECB proceeds (both under the automatic and approval routes) in term deposits with a bank in India for a maximum period of six months, subject to the under mentioned terms and conditions, pending utilisation for permitted end uses.

i. The applicable guidelines with respect to eligible borrower, recognised lender, average maturity period, all-incost, permitted end uses, etc. have been complied with.
ii. No charge in any form can be created on such term deposits i.e. to say that the term deposits should be kept unencumbered during their currency.

iii. Such term deposits must be exclusively in the name of the borrower.

iv. Such term deposits must be available for liquidation as and when required.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 38 dated 20th November, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.321/2014-RB dated 26th September, 2014 Acquisition/Transfer of Immovable property – Payment of taxes

This circular clarifies that all transactions involving acquisition of immovable property in India by NRI/PIO/Non- Residents are subject to the applicable tax laws in India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 37 dated 20th November, 2014

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Export of Goods/Software/Services – Period of Realisation and Repatriation of Export Proceeds – For exporters including Units in SEZs, Status Holder Exporters, EOUs, Units in EHTPs, STPs and BTPs

This circular states that all exporters, including Units in SEZ, Status Holder Exporters, EOU, Units in EHTP, STP & BTP, must uniformly realize and repatriate export proceeds with respect to export of goods/services/software within a period of 9 months from the date of export. However, in the case of exports made to warehouses established outside India, the period for realisation and repatriaton of export proceeds will continue to be 15 months from the date of export.

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SEBI Regulations 2014 on Share Based Benefits – important changes over the ESOPs Guidelines

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Background
SEBI has notified the SEBI
(Share Based Employee Benefits) Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”) on
28th October 2014. They replace the SEBI (Employee Stock Option Scheme
and Employee Stock Purchase Scheme) Guidelines, 1999 (“the Guidelines”).
The Regulations come into force from that date. However, a transition
period has been given for certain specific matters as also generally to
bring all existing Schemes in conformity with the new Regulations.

The
new Regulations, though they have many amendments, are in many ways
similar in structure with the earlier Guidelines. However, the
Regulations now have far wider reach in three major aspects. Firstly,
they now specifically also cover share-based benefits such as Stock
Appreciation Rights. This is also made clear by the title of the
Regulations that now refers to generically sharebased employee benefits
other than stock options in place of Stock Options and Stock Purchase
schemes. Secondly, instead of providing specifically for how stock
options and share purchase schemes should be accounted for, the
Regulations essentially provide that the accounting shall be carried out
as per the Guidance Note/Accounting Standards of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India.

Thirdly, now, the Regulations
specifically provide for dealing in shares by schemes for employees
other than Schemes for stock options/share purchase. The earlier
Guidelines were more or less silent on this. As will be seen later, it
was found that many such schemes dealt in shares of the Company. The
concern was whether these were misused for various purposes. Now the
Regulations specifically recognise and permit, subject to conditions and
restrictions, purchase and otherwise dealing in shares of the Company.

Finally, the change in the legal status of the law from Guidelines to Regulations also has important implications.

These are discussed in detail hereafter.

Eligible employees
The
definition of employees has been modified. Employees of associate
companies (as defined in section 2(6) of the Companies Act, 2013) are
also eligible to such Schemes. Independent Directors are now
specifically ineligible. The conditions under which nominee directors of
institutions may be eligible have been made more elaborate.

Regulations specifically cover SARs
The
Guidelines did cover a form of Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) but
this was indirect, and of a particular form only. They focused more on
stock option and share purchase schemes. Now, the Regulations provide
specifically for Schemes of SARs.

SARs provide for rights for
being paid for appreciation in the price of the shares. An employee
would thus be given a right to be paid for the increase in the value of
the shares from the date when the right was granted to the date when he
choses to exercise the SAR. The Regulations provide that he can choose
to be paid for the appreciation either in the form of cash or shares.

The
erstwhile Guidelines too did provide for cashless exercise of stock
options. This involved allotment of shares which would be handed over to
a stockbroker. The stock broker would then sell the shares. Of the sale
proceeds, the exercise price would be retained by the Company and the
appreciation paid to the employee.

The Regulations provide for
payment of appreciation directly by the Company without allotting any
shares. However, such appreciation can also be paid in the form of
shares.

The other features of SARs are similar to stock option/
share purchase schemes. There has to be a waiting period of one year
before exercise of the SARs.

General Employee Benefits Scheme (GEBS) and Retirement Benefit Schemes (RBS)
Two
new categories of Schemes have been now specifically covered. However,
such schemes are covered only if they deal or are intended to deal in
the shares of the company that they are required to comply with the
Regulations.

Such Schemes shall not hold more than 10% of their
assets as per the last audited balance sheet in the form of shares of
the Company. For this purpose, the book value or market value or fair
value of the assets is considered, whichever is the lowest.

To which Schemes are the Regulations applicable?
The
Guidelines applied to schemes set up by companies for issue of stock
options and share purchase. It was not clear whether other schemes that
also dealt in shares were also covered. It was seen that there were
Schemes that were for the benefit of the Company but were not apparently
controlled by the Company or its Promoters but also dealt in the shares
of the Company. Under what circumstances would such Schemes be
regulated? The Regulations now have specific provisions to deal with
this.

Firstly, they apply to Schemes of stock options, share
purchase, SARs, general employee benefits schemes and retirement benefit
schemes. Such Schemes should involve dealing in the shares of the
Company, directly or indirectly. Further, the Scheme should have a link
with the Company in any of the following ways:-

(i) the Scheme is set up by the Company or any other company in its group (the term group is widely defined); or
(ii) the Scheme is funded or guaranteed by the Company or any other company in its group; or
(iii) the Scheme is controlled or managed by the Company or any other company in its group.

The
Company of course needs to be a listed company. Thus, companies would
be free to set up Schemes for benefit of employees and the employees
themselves are free to set up such Schemes without being regulated by
SEBI. However, if they deal in the shares of the Company and are
connected with the company in any of the specified manner, then they
will need to comply with the provisions.

Dealing in shares by share based benefits Schemes
As
stated earlier, it was observed by SEBI that several Schemes were set
up apparently for the benefit of employees but dealt in the shares of
the company. They apparently were not connected with the company. They
held shares of the Company that were often acquired from the secondary
market. There were legitimate concerns that the object of such Schemes
was more to carry out illegitimate objects such as surreptitious holding
shares on behalf of the Promoters, carry out insider trading or price
manipulation, give market support to price at time of fall, etc. This
was of even more concern when funds of the Company were directly or
indirectly used.

SEBI did issue certain directions to require
control this aspect. However, it seems that it was also realised that
there may be legitimate reasons why certain Schemes may be required to
hold shares of the Company. The Regulations now provide for more
transparency and clarity. Such Schemes are now allowed to deal in shares
subject to certain restrictions and disclosures.Existing Schemes
holding shares are also required to comply after completion of a
transition period.

In case it is desired that share acquisition
be carried out through secondary acquisition or gift of shares, then
such Schemes should be administered through a Trust. There are certain
restrictions over appointment of Trustees to such Trusts. Further, in
such cases, specific and separate approval of the shareholders by way of
a special resolution is required to set up such Schemes.

SEBI lays down limits upto which the trusts administering such Schemes may hold shares. Stock options, share purchase and Sars may not hold shares more than 5% of the share capital of the Company in the year prior to which approval of the shareholders is obtained (as expanded by bonus/rights issues made later). For general benefits and retirement benefits Schemes, the maximum holding is 2%. however, all such Schemes put together cannot hold more than 5% shares. Such limits will not apply in case of gift of shares by the Promoters or other shareholders or where these are acquired by way of a fresh issue of shares.

The   yearly   cap   on   acquisition   of   shares   through secondary market by the trust is set at 2% of the paid up share capital as at the end of the preceding financial year.

In any case, the number of shares acquired through secondary market purchases cannot exceed the grant  of benefits in the form of stock options/share purchase/ Sars. If there are such excess holdings, they will need   to be appropriated within a reasonable period but not beyond the end of the following financial year. There is also generally a lock in period of six months, except for certain specified manner of disposal.

The trustees  of  such trusts  are  prohibited  from  voting on such shares. This will ensure that such shares are not acquired for supplementing the voting power of the Promoters/management.

Further,  the  holding  by  such trusts  will  not  be  counted as part of public holding. Companies would thus be required to maintain the minimum public holding as required by law.

Approval   of   Shareholders Broadly, the requirement of approval of shareholders for such Schemes remain the same as under the Guidelines, i.e., approval should be by way of a special resolution. However, separate approval shall be obtained in certain cases such as permitting acquisition of shares from the secondary market, grant of options etc. to employees of subsidiary/holding/associate companies, etc.

Accounting for stock options, etc.
Accounting for discount on issue of stock options, etc. has always  been  a  controversial  issue. the  Guidelines  had provided in fair detail how such discount should be computed and accounted. Companies were required to follow such accounting as a pre-condition for issue of stock options, etc. at a price they chose to determine. However,   it was seen that the accounting provisions were not very detailed particularly to cover the wide variety of such schemes in practice. Further, the accounting method created areas of potential difference between what was recommended by accounting bodies. The Regulations have now simplified the provisions. The accounting for such schemes shall be as per the Guidance note of ICAI or accounting Standards as may be prescribed by from time to time by the ICAI.

The  Guidance  note  of  the  ICAI  on accounting  for  employee Share Based payments covers such accounting requirements.

Transition Period
Companies that have existing Schemes are required to comply with the regulations within one year. Trusts holding shares in excess of the limits specified in the Regulations are required to bring down the holding in five years.

Regulations vs. Guidelines
The erstwhile Guidelines had, at best, dubious sanctity as an enforceable law. Several earlier important provisions relating to securities markets were in the form of Guidelines. It was uncertain to a large extent whether they could be enforced, whether acts/omissions in violation of law could make the transactions void and above all, whether SEBI could initiate adverse measures in the form of adverse directions, penalties and prosecutions against the parties.

As will be discussed later, it appeared that certain Schemes involved dealing in shares and it was felt that these dealing in shares were for purposes other than purely for benefit of employees. It may have been difficult to enforce the Guidelines or punish any violations in such cases.

Issue of the regulations cures these defects. Thus, this is an important change of the provisions relating to share-based benefits.

This  trend  of  changing  Guidelines  into  regulations  is seen in other areas as well and it is expected soon for the provisions in regard to corporate governance.

Conclusion
The  regulations,  while  not  overhauling  the  provisions relating to share-based benefits substantially, do make important changes, remove certain possibilities for abuse align the provisions with the new Companies act, 2013.

Part D: Ethics & Governance & Accountability

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Good Governance Day:
The government has announced that it will celebrate former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s birthday on 25th December as ‘Sushasan Diwas’ or ‘Good Governance Day’.

HRD Ministry is keen to celebrate 25th December as good governance day to mark the birthdays of A. B. Vajpayee and Madan Mohan Malaviya.

• Promise of Better Governance:
The fact that BJP regime is in power because of the promises they have made to provide better governance is a good sign for it puts pressure on the system to make a visible difference. The Modi government has embarked on an ambitious project – the attempt is to move from a mental model of governance being about dispensing resources to one that actively seeks outcomes, but this needs an ability to convert programmes into measurable and repeatable actions on the ground. This will need a dramatic overhaul of the administrative infrastructures, and its understanding of the nature of power. It might be relatively easier to ring in the big changes, but the real challenge might lie in the everyday experience of governance. Boring, predictable governance is the need of the hour but to deliver that what we need are sweeping administrative reforms. Other more glamorous reforms will be rendered meaningless without fixing the nuts and bolts of governance.

[Santosh Desai in the Times of India dated December 15]

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Release vs. Gift

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Synopsis
Is there a difference between an instrument of release and a gift? Do the legal implications, tax and stamp duty consequences change depending on the phraseology used to describe the instrument? This Article examines some such issues in relation to immovable property transactions.

Introduction
“A Rose by any Other Name Smells as Sweet!” Could the above Shakespearean proverb be applied also to a transfer of property by a release or a gift? The answer is yes and no! A release and a gift are both species of transfers of property. However, there is a difference in law between the two. While the ultimate implication of both is that property is transferred (normally without consideration) but the law treats treats the two on a different footing. Let us look at the key differences and some similarities between the two.

Gift
A Gift is a specie of transfer of property with which almost all individuals, especially in India, are familiar. It is, from time immemorial, one of the most famous (and often infamous) modes of transferring movable as well as immovable property. The revenue and the legislation often frown upon the concept of gifts. The amendments in section 56(2) of the Income tax Act are testimony to this.

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which deals, mainly, with immovable property and also contains some provisions dealing with movable property, defines the term “Gift”. The Act also lays down some substantive and procedural provisions for constituting a valid gift. This Act defines a gift as a transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the Donor to another, called the Donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the Donee. The important characteristics of a Gift are:

(a) Gift is one of the modes of transfer of property.
(b) A gift can be of immovable or movable property.
(c) T he gift must be voluntary, i.e., without any coercion, fraud, undue influence.
(d) I t must be without any consideration from the Donee to the Donor.
(e) A person cannot make a Gift to himself, there must be a Donor and a Donee.
(f) T he Gift must be accepted by the Donee during the Donee’s lifetime.
(g) I t could be conditional.

Gift of an immovable property must be by way of a Gift Deed in writing which is executed by the Donor and the Deed must be registered under the Registration Act. Further, it must be attested by two or more witnesses. Thus, any gift of immovable property which is not registered would be invalid. Gifts requiring registration are subjected to stamp duty which is levied on the value of the property gifted.

Release
While we are all too familiar with the concept of gift, let us understand what is meant by a release. A release is much larger than a gift and could take various forms. For instance, if a release is made for consideration it would be tantamount to a conveyance while if it was made without consideration it would amount to a gift. What then is a release? Simply put, a release means renunciation of right in property by one co-owner in favour of another co-owner. Thus, the essential ingredient of a release is that both the transferor and transferee must be existing co-owners in the property. In a release the transferee would never be a stranger but would always be one who has an existing right in the property. Hence, a release can never be for the entire property but would always be for a portion thereof. To illustrate, A and B are equal co-owners in a in a flat. A relinquishes his share to B. This can be achieved by a release deed. If in this case, A charges any consideration from B then it could also be termed as a conveyance while if it is without consideration that it can also be termed as a gift.

A release of a share in an immovable property in excess of Rs. 100 requires that the instrument is registered.

Practical experience shows that sometimes a release deed is executed (and accepted by the Registrar) even in cases where the transferee has no interest in the property. In such cases, a gift deed or a conveyance is a better alternative. However, in law, a release deed can transfer title to one who before the transfer had no interest in the property – Kuppuswamy Chettiar vs. A.S. P. A. Arumugam Chettiar 1967 AIR 1395 (SC), although in such cases, the duty would be as on a conveyance or a gift deed.

Stamp Duty
Since Gifts/Release Deeds of immovable property require registration, they would also require to be duly stamped.

The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, applicable in the State of Maharashtra defines an “instrument of gift” to include, in a case where the gift is not in writing, any instrument recording whether by way of declaration or otherwise the making or acceptance of such oral gift. The gift could be of movable or immovable property. The term gift has not been defined and hence, one has to refer to the definition given u/s. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act”.

An instrument of gift not being a Settlement or a Will or a transfer attracts duty under Artice 34 of Schedule-I. A gift deed attracts duty at the same rate as applicable to a Conveyance (under Article 25) on the market value of the property which is the subject matter of the gift. Thus, in case of immovable property, the rates vary depending upon the type of immovable property, (i.e., whether it is a land, building, a flat in co-operative society), and the location (relevant in case of land and building). The maximum rate for immovable property is 5% of the Reckoner Value. Further, any gift of property to a family member (i.e., a spouse, sibling, lineal ascendant/descendant ) of the donor, shall attract duty @ 2% or as specified above, whichever is less.

On the other hand, under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, a release deed attracts duty on an Instrument of Release whereby a person renounces a claim upon other person or property as follows: If the release is of an ancestral property in favour of certain specified relatives ~Rs. 200

Every other Case ~ Same duty as on a conveyance as on the market value of the share, interest or part renounced.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Asha Krishnalal Bajaj, 2001(2) Bom CR (PB) 629 held that a Release Deed is not a conveyance and only attracts stamp duty as on a release deed. In the case of Shailesh Harilal Poonatar, 2004 (4) All MR 479, the Bombay High Court held that a release deed without consideration under which one co-owner released his share in favour of another in respect of a property received under a will, was not a conveyance. Accordingly, it was liable to be stamped not as a conveyance but as a release deed.

To plug this loophole, in 2005, the duty in the State of Maharashtra was increased on such instruments to Rs. 5 for every Rs. 500 of market value of the property. The 2006 Amendment Act has once again made an amendment in Maharashtra to provide that if the release is in respect of ancestral property and is executed by or in favour of the renouncer’s spouse, siblings, parents, children, grandchildren of predeceased son, or the legal heirs of these relatives, then the stamp duty would only be Rs. 200. In case of any other Release Deed, the duty is equal to a conveyance. Thus, for immovable properties, it would be @ 5% on the market value of the property. What is an ancestral property becomes an important issue.

The   Punjab   &   haryana   high   Court   in   the   case   of Harendar Singh vs. State, (2008) 3 PLR 183 (P&H) has held that property received by a mother from her sons is not ancestral in nature. in another decision of the Punjab and haryana high Court, it has been held that property inherited by a hindu male from his father, grandfather or great grandfather is ancestral for him–Hardial Singh vs. Nahar Singh AIR 2010 (NOC) 1087 (P&H).

In Laxmikant vs. Collector and Assistant Superintendent of Stamps, Ahmedabad AIR (1976) Guj 158, it was held that a release postulates that the claim is renounced in favour of a person, who has got some right in the property. Release also connotes that the person releasing his right does not retain any ownership right over it. Where the property was thrown in the common hotch-pot with the result that while before the said property was thrown, the person throwing the property was the sole owner, after it is so thrown, he remains a joint owner. Therefore, retention of joint ownership, and the fact that the other members of the family had, previous to the throwing of the property in the joint stock of the family, no right in the property, conclusively showed that the transaction did not amount to a release.

Stamp Duty as on a Gift or a release – which to pay?
Having looked at the provisions pertaining to gift deed and release deed, the essential question is which to consider for paying stamp duty? if the property may be called “an- cestral” and is in favour of defined relatives, the obvious answer is release deed since in that case, the duty is only Rs. 200! The definition of conveyance under the Maharashtra Stamp act states that any instrument whereby a co-owner transfers his interest to another co-owner would be a conveyance. hence, in such cases the instrument would not be a release deed but would be a conveyance. however, if no consideration is charged then it would not be a conveyance and the moot point would be should it be considered as a gift? if one sees the wordings used in the Stamp Act, it defines a release deed only as one “where a person renounces a claim upon another or against any specified property”. Would instruments which are in the nature of a gift deed or a conveyance deed also fall under this definition of a release deed is the question? The cur- rent practice suggests that the answer is “yes”.

In Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Rustom Nussewanji Patel, AIR 1968 Mad. 159 (FB), the Court observed that in order to determine whether a document is a release deed or conveyance, the nomenclature or the language used is not decisive. What is decisive is the actual character of the transaction and the precise nature of the rights created by means of the instrument. In rustoms case, the essential ingredients of release were present, there was already a legal right in the property vested in the releasee and the release operated to enlarge that right into an absolute title for the entire property, insofor as the parties were concerned.

A recent decision of the delhi high Court in the case of Srichand Badlani vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2014 539 (Del), the contention is that in order to qualify as a relinquishment deed, the document must purport to relinquish share of the relinquishor in favour of all the other co-owners of the property and, if the relinquishment is   in favour of only one of the two co-owners, it has to be treated as a Gift deed, the property having been inherited from a common ancestor. It further held that one of the co-owners can relinquish his share in a co-owned property in favour of one or more of the co-owners. The document executed by him in this regard would continue to be a relinquishment deed irrespective of whether the relinquishment is in favour of one or all the remaining co- owners of the property. there is no basis in law for the proposition that if the relinquishment deed is executed in favour of one of the co-owners, it would be treated as a Gift deed. the law of stamp duty treats relinquishment deed and Gift deed as separate documents, chargeable with different stamp duties. it is not necessary that in order  to  qualify  as  a  relinquishment  deed  the  document must purport to relinquish the share of the relinquisher in favour of all the remaining co- owners of the property. Even if the relinquishment is in favour of one of the co- owners it would qualify as a relinquishment deed. more- over, it is immaterial as to what the relationship between the co- owners of the property. So long as relinquishment is in favour of one of the co-owners, the relationship between the relinquisher and the relinquishee is wholly immaterial and of no consequence at all. The law permits one of the co-owners even if they are not related to each other to relinquish his share in favour of other co-owner.

In Manjulaben Amrutlal vs. CCRA, 1994 GLR 1779 (FB) two sons executed a release in favour of their par- ents for their joint family property. it was held that it was difficult to hold that the parents of the applicants did not have any right, title and interest or share in the property for which deed was executed. The document clearly recit- ed that it was no claim release deed. it also recited in the deed that house was purchased by the mother as their guardian. executants and parents were residing jointly and that they were maintained by their parents. It is also stated that by the said deed whatever right and share they had in the house was released in favour of their mother and father. hence, by the impugned deed the executants had renounced their claim against the house which was purchased by their mother in their names. the property was originally purchased in the name of minors. It was treated by the parents at the most as joint hindu family property, as stated by them. Once it was a joint hindu family property, all the members of the h.u.f. would have share in the said property. In the deed itself it was mentioned that the executants (sons) were maintained by the parents. There was no reason to hold that the property was not belonging to the h.u.f. of executants and their parents. Once it is held that the property belonged to an HUF , then there was no difficulty in holding that the deed executed by the applicants was a release deed and not a gift deed.

Taxation
Section 56(2)(vii) of the income-tax act taxes certain gifts received by an individual or an huf from unrelated sources. hence, such gifts are taxed as income from other Sources in the hands of the donee. A receipt under a release deed without consideration would also be cov- ered by the same provision. thus,  whether under a gift or a release deed, specified receipts without consideration would be taxable u/s. 56(2)(vii).

An acquisition for consideration of a share in a house property from one co-owner by another co-owner under a release deed tantamounts to a purchase for the purposes of exemption u/s. 54 of the income-tax act. This was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. TN Aravinda Reddy, 120 ITR 46 (SC). It held that a release was a transfer of the releasor’s share for a consideration to the releasee who purchased the share of the releaser and was thus, entitled to relief u/s. 54.

Conclusion
The structuring of an instrument is an important element. Drafting should pay heed to the Law and Language both. While a document drafted in a particular manner and form may yield the desired results it may not always have the desired consequences!

Stamp valuation – Market value – Property purchased in Company Court auction – Sale deed executed in their favour by official liquidator – Registration authorities cannot question the sale deed on ground of undervaluation. Stamp Act, 1899, section 47-A.

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The Inspector General of Registration, Chennai and Ors vs. K.P. Kadar Hussain. AIR 2014 Madras 230.

The Respondents purchased the property in an auction, which was held by this Court, after paper publication on 08-03-2012. The said sale was confirmed by this Court and the Court directed the Official Liquidator to execute a sale deed in favour of the Respondents after receiving entire sale consideration.

The Respondents contended that it was not open to the appellants to take a stand that since the guideline value of the properties were increased only in the month of April 2012 and therefore, the Respondents are liable to pay the amount on that basis.

The Respondents vehemently submitted that the law is a well settled in regard to the purchase of property in a Court Auction and the authorities cannot refer the document demanding higher stamp duty unless a fraudulent attempt on the part of parties to document to evade payment of stamp duty is manifest.

When the Respondents had purchased the properties in question by way of sale deeds executed by the official liquidator for the sale value mentioned in the sale deeds, the said value cannot be questioned by appellants at a later point of time merely on the premise that the sale value mentioned in the sale deeds purchased by the respondents cannot be termed as `market value’.

The court observed that section 47A has no application whatsoever, in sofar as the respondents, purchasers of properties in company court auction because of the prime reason that there is no room for entertaining any doubt that there was any under valuation in regard to the sale deeds executed by the official liquidator.

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Right to fly National Flag – Fundamental Right of Citizen – Mandamus would not lie against authority to act in contravention of provisions of statute: Constitution of India.

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H. R. Vishwanath vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 2014 Karnataka 163

The writ petition was filed asking for a mandamus against the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, not to allow Sri Ravivarma Kumar, Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka, 2nd respondent herein, to hoist the Indian National Flag at the Office of Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka i.e., parallel to the Advocates’ Association, Bangalore and to ensure enough solidarity, unity and integrity of the Advocates’ Association and for a mandamus to the 2nd respondent, to participate in the Flag hoisting ceremony of the Advocates’ Association, on the eve of Independence Day.

According to the petitioner, respondent violated the established norm of celebration of Independency Day and Republic Day, by the Advocates’ Association. He submitted that a parallel function was being organised by the 2nd respondent, since, a Circular has been issued to all the Law Officers of the Government, to participate in the function, wherein, he would hoist the National Flag. Petitioner submitted that the 2nd respondent by hoisting the National Flag, by organising a separate function, rather than participating in the Flag hoisting ceremony of the Advocates’ Association, has destroyed the unity and integrity of the Association.

The question that arose for consideration is, whether a mandamus can lie against the 1st respondent, not to allow the hoisting of Indian National Flag.

The Court held that the Right to fly the National Flag freely with respect and dignity is a fundamental right of a citizen within the meaning of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

The Court observed that order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities.

Thus, it is clear, that for issue of a writ of mandamus, there must be a legal right with the petitioner, to compel the performance of statutory duty cast upon the 1st respondent. The petitioner was not able to show that there was any statute or rule having the force of law which cast a duty on respondent No.1, not to allow respondent No. 2, hoist the National Flag near the Office of the Advocate General and to ensure his participation in the Flag hoisting ceremony organised by the 3rd respondent, as the President of the Advocates’ Association.

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Precedent – Binding nature of order of Tribunal – Strictures against Commissioner (Appeals): Section 35G of Central Excise Act 1944.

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CCE, Chennai – IV vs. Fenner India Ltd. 2014 (307) ELT 516 (Mad.)

The facts were that the first respondent/assessee is engaged in the manufacturing of Oil Seals. On account of fire accident on 05-05-2006 in the ‘post cutting area’ of the factory, the work in progress stocks were burnt and rendered unfit for usage, which was informed to the department in writing on the same day. It was further stated that the assessee had availed Cenvat credit on the raw materials, which were to be used for production of Oil Seals. A show cause notice dated 28-12-2006 was issued calling upon the assessee to explain as to why the Cenvat credit availed on raw materials, which were destroyed in fire should not be reversed. The assessee by referring to Rule 2(k)(i) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 submitted its reply. The Assessee relied on the Tribunal decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai III vs. Indchem Electronics reported 2003 (151) ELT 393 (Trib. Chennai). The Original Authority, rejected the assessee’s plea and directed the assessee to reverse the Cenvat credit availed.

The assessee preferred appeal before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). The First Appellate Authority held that the assessee is liable to reverse the credit on inputs contained in the work-in-progress, which were destroyed in fire, by placing reliance on the decision of the Tribunal, in the case of M/s. Tambraparani Coatings vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry: 2006 (193) E.L.T. 80 (Tri.-Chen.)]. As regards the order of the Tribunal in the case of Indchem Electronics, the First Appellate Authority held that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Department as against the said order was dismissed by a non-speaking order and therefore that would not be binding. On the above ground, the appeal came to be rejected.

Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred a further appeal to the CESTAT . The Tribunal after considering the case of the assessee and taking note of the facts held that there is no dispute with regard to the destruction of the goods, when manufacturing work is in progress, and therefore the assessee need not reverse the Cenvat credit availed. The Tribunal by placing reliance on the decision of Indchem Electronics (cited supra) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal, the Court held that stand taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) is wholly unsustainable and quite contrary to the settled legal position. It is to be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dismissing the assessee appeal has assigned reasons. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Appellate Tribunal in its impugned order had held that Modvat/Cenvat credit cannot be denied on inputs destroyed in the fire accident when the fact that the inputs were actually issued and thereafter destroyed in fire accident, which fact is not disputed by the Department. Therefore, it cannot be stated that it is a non-speaking order. In any event the Commissioner orders are subject to scrutiny by the Tribunal and he is bound by the order passed by the Tribunal and it is wholly untenable on the part of the Commissioner to contend that the decision of the Tribunal would not bind the Commissioner. Therefore, the finding of the Commissioner to that extent is absolutely perverse.

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Gift – Muslim Law – Immovable property – Conditions curtailing its use or disposal are to be treated as void. Transfer of property Act section 123

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V. Seeramachandra Avadhani (D) by L.Rs vs. Shaik Abdul Rahim and Anr. AIR 2014 SC 3464

Sheikh Hussein was married to Banu Bibi. During the subsistence of his matrimonial ties, Sheikh Hussein executed a gift deed on 26-04-1952, whereby a “tiled house” with open space was gifted in favour of his wife Banu Bibi. Banu Bibi enjoyed the immovable property gifted to her, during the lifetime of her husband Sheikh Hussein. Sheikh Hussein died in 1966. Even after the demise of Sheikh Hussein, Banu Bibi continued to exclusively enjoy the said immovable property. On 02- 05-197802- 05-1978, Banu Bibi sold the gifted immovable property, to V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani. The vendee V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani is the Appellant before the Court (through his legal representatives).

Banu Bibi died on 17-02-1989. On her demise, the Respondents before this Court-Shaik Abdul Rahim and Shaik Abdul Gaffoor issued a legal notice to the vendee. Through the legal notice, they staked a claim on the abovementioned gifted immovable property. In the notice, the Respondents asserted, firstly, that Banu Bibi had only a life interest in the gifted immovable property; and secondly, the Respondents being the legal representatives of Sheikh Hussein (who had gifted the immovable property to Banu Bibi) came to be vested with the right and title over the gifted immovable property, after the demise of Banu Bibi.

In the suit, the Respondents sought a declaration of title, over the “tiled house” with open space, gifted by Sheikh Hussein to his wife Banu Bibi.

The Court observed that the parameters for gifts (under Mohammedan Law) are clear and well defined. Gifts pertaining to the corpus of the property are absolute. Where a gift of corpus seeks to impose a limit, in point of time (as a life interest), the condition is void. Likewise, all other conditions, in a gift of the corpus are impermissible. In other words, the gift of the corpus has to be unconditional. Conditions are however permissible, if the gift is merely of a usufruct. Therefore, the gift of a usufruct can validly impose a limit, in point of time (as an interest, restricted to the life of the donee).

Having concluded that the donor Sheikh Hussein through the gift deed dated 26-04-1952, had transferred the corpus of the immovable property to his wife Banu Bibi, it is natural to conclude that the gift deed executed in favour of Banu Bibi, was valid.

The conditions depicted in the gift deed, that the donee would not have any right to gift or sell the gifted property, or that the donee would be precluded from alienating the gifted immovable property during her life time, are void.

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Family – Definition – Is exhaustive and not illustrative : Stamp Act 1899 Sch. I, Art. 58(a) Explanation

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T. Muthu Balu vs. The Inspector General of Registration Chennai & Anr. AIR 2014 Madras 240

The
petitioner executed a Settlement Deed, in respect of certain items of
properties mentioned in the schedule to a document, in favour of his
great-grand daughter S. Sugirtha, dated 11-11-2011, the same was on the
file of the Sub-Registrar, Madurai, the 2nd respondent herein. The
petitioner claimed exemption from payment of normal Stamp Duty stating
that the settlement is between persons coming under the term “Family”
mentioned in Article 58(a) of Schedule-I to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
However, the 2nd respondent did not release the document and insisted on
payment of normal stamp duty on the ground that the registration fee in
the instant case would not be covered under Article 58(a), in view of
Explanation to Article 58(a) of Schedule-I of the Indian Stamp Act.

The
Hon’ble Court observed that the word “family” as defined in the
Explanation to Article 58(a) of Schedule I, appended to the Stamp Act,
would mean only such of those persons mentioned in the Explanation. The
definition to the word “family” is exhaustive and not illustrative and
it is applicable only to such of those persons indicated therein and it
will not extend to other persons who do not form part of the definition
“family”. The interpretation of the word “means” in the Explanation will
be specific to the members of the family mentioned therein.

The
definition cannot give an extended or expanded meaning to the word
“grand child” to include “great grand child” also. It is for the state
government to include great grandchild and other remote lineal
descendants, as members of the family, it they chose to, for the purpose
of extending the benefit of the concessional stamp duty applicable to
settlement within the members of the family.

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Audit materiality – a precision cast in stone or a subjective variable measure?

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Material information means information that
matters, whether it is important or is essential. In accounting
parlance, it relates to information that should be recognised, measured
or disclosed in accordance with the requirements of a financial
reporting framework. In measuring or disclosing accounting information,
emphasis is on the needs of known or perceived users of the financial
statements.

In auditing, materiality refers to the largest
threshold of uncorrected errors, misstatements, or erroneous disclosures
or omissions that could exist in the financial statements and yet are
not misleading. Misstatements including omissions, are material if they,
individually or in aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence
the economic decisions of users of the financial statements. The users
are considered as a group of users of the financial statements rather
than as individual users.

SA 320 – ‘Materiality in Planning and
Performing an Audit’ provides guiding principles to auditors on
consideration of materiality in audit of financial statements.

The
determination of materiality is a matter of professional judgment. In
determining the materiality of an item, the auditor considers not only
the item’s nature and amount relative to the financial statements, but
also the needs of the users of such financial statements. Materiality
has a pervasive effect in a financial statement audit. Materiality also
has significant implications for audit efficiency. In current times,
given the scale and volume of operations of enterprises, complexities in
business and supporting IT systems, plethora of regulatory compliances
etc., it is imperative for an auditor to be meticulous in determining
materiality for addressing the risk of material misstatements in an
effective and efficient manner.

Materiality is one of the most
important considerations in planning the audit approach-identifying
significant accounts/disclosures and determining the extent, nature and
timing of audit procedures. While determining materiality at the
planning stage, it may not be possible for the auditor to anticipate all
of the factors that will ultimately influence the materiality judgment
in the evaluation of audit results at the completion of the audit. These
factors must be considered as and when they arise, and therefore
materiality needs to be evaluated throughout the course of the audit and
revised if deemed appropriate.

In planning an audit, the
auditor would ordinarily assess materiality at the overall financial
statement level, because the auditor’s opinion extends to the financial
statements taken as a whole. However, in certain circumstances, for an
entity, it is possible that misstatement of a particular significant
account balance or disclosure could impact or influence the decisions of
the users of the financial statements for that entity. In such cases,
the auditor would need to determine materiality for that account or
disclosure at an amount which is less than the materiality for the
financial statements as a whole. For instance, in enterprises where
financial statements include large provisions with a high degree of
estimation uncertainty, the existence of such provisions may influence
user’s assessment of materiality for such provisions, for example
provisions for insurance claims in an insurance company, oil rig
decommissioning costs in the case of an oil company etc.

In
computing materiality for the financial statements as a whole, the
auditor needs to evaluate an appropriate benchmark to be used. The
benchmark could be profit (loss) before tax from continuing operations,
total assets, or total revenues. Materiality is determined based on the
amount of the benchmark selected. Some of the factors which need to be
considered while determining the amount/percentage of the benchmark are:

Debt arrangements – whether limited debt or publicly traded debt, existence of loan covenants sensitive to operating results.

Business
environment – whether entity operates in a stable or volatile business
environment, business operates in a regulated or non-regulated industry,
business sustainability, complexity of business operations/processes,
product portfolio, few or many external users of the entity’s financial
statements etc

As one can envisage, evaluation of the factors
stated above requires judgment and there can be no scientific formula to
arrive at the percentage to be applied to the benchmark to determine
materiality. SA 320 does not specify a range of percentages that could
be applied to the benchmark as this is left to the auditor’s judgment,
ideally the one selected by the auditor should be the benchmark that
most represents the needs of the users of the financial statements. The
commonly applied ranges are given below:

It
is pertinent to note that materiality is not a mere quantitative
measure. A misstatement that is quantitatively immaterial may be
qualitatively material. Qualitative factors often require subjective
judgment and evaluation in light of other information that may not be
readily available to the auditor.

While selecting account
balances for testing, one cannot assume on a generic basis that account
balances which fall below the materiality determined for the financial
statements as a whole should be scoped out from audit. The auditor
should be wary of the risk that accounts with seemingly immaterial
balances may contain understatements that when aggregated would exceed
the overall materiality, i.e., aggregation risk. To address the
aggregation risk, auditors usually discount (hair-cut) the overall
materiality by 25% or more. Such an adjustment is not a mere calculation
but is driven by factors such as:

Weak or strong Internal control environment at the entity.
Entity with a history of material weaknesses and/or a number of control deficiencies.
High turnover of senior management.
Entity with a history of large or numerous misstatements in previous audits.
Entity with more complex accounting issues and significant estimates.
Entity that operates in a number of locations etc.

Let
us consider some case studies to understand practical application of
the concept of audit materiality from a quantitative measurement
viewpoint.

Case study I – Size and nature

Background
XYZ
Ltd. is a company engaged in the business of dairy products with its
head office in Mumbai. The Company caters to customers in Pune, Mumbai,
Ahmedabad and Surat through its factories in Mumbai and Ahmedabad.

The
turnover and net profit after tax of the company for FY 20X0-X1 (April
20X0-March 20X1) was Rs. 1,456 million and Rs. 305 million respectively.
The net assets of the Company as at 31st March 20X1 aggregated Rs.
13,570 million.

During the financial year 20X0-X1,
1. ZED Ltd., a distributor for Surat region who owed the Company Rs. 0.6 million was declared bankrupt.

2.
HUD Products Ltd., a supplier to whom the Company had paid Rs. 45
million as an advance for future supplies as per the terms of
arrangement had been facing cash crunch and has discontinued its
operations from June 20X0. The Company has not received any supplies
since April 20X1.

3. T he company has decided to curtail its
operations in Ahmedabad which has traditionally been a major source of
revenue for the Company in the past however on account of increase in
competition the Company is unable to sustain its market share. The
Company already commenced the process of dismantling one of the plants
in the month of March 20X1.

As an auditor which of the above events will be material for the Company?

Analysis

As per SA 320, judgments about materiality are made in the light of surrounding circumstances, and are affected by the size or nature of a misstatement, or a combination of both.

In the above scenarios, the default of Rs. 0.6 million by ZED Ltd. is immaterial for a Company with a huge turnover of Rs. 1,456 million. Thus, based on the size of the Company. the auditor would consider the said transaction as not material to be reported.

On the contrary, amount of advance given to HUD Products Ltd. of Rs. 45 million, which is considered doubtful of recoverability would be material to the financial statements as omission of the same could influence the decisions of the users of financial statements. Also, delay in supplies would affect the production schedule of the Company which would also impact sales adversely. Therefore this event would be considered as material.

Similarly, the Company’s decision of curtailing its Ahmedabad’s operations should be disclosed in the financial statements as it is by its nature material to understanding the entity’s scope of operations in the future.

Case study II – Selection of benchmark

Background

TED Private Limited (TED) is in the business of providing courier services. TED is located in Mumbai. It has a subsidiary LED Private Limited (LED), located in Delhi. TED was established in 2001 and its subsidiary was established in 2012. TED is a well established company in the market and is profit making since the year 2005. However, LED being recently established has lower profits and in fact profit has been volatile in nature during the past three years. The financial position for TED and LED given below:

XET & Associates (‘XET’) were appointed as auditors for the year 2014 for TED and its subsidiary LED. Ram Bhave, Audit Manager at XET selected profit before tax as the benchmark for the purpose of calculating the materiality of TED. Since LED had earned higher profit in 2014 as compared to the previous year, Ram selected profit before tax as an appropriate benchmark for the subsidiary as well. In the light of SA 320, evaluate:

a) Whether Ram did the right selection of the benchmark for the purpose of determining audit materiality for both the entities?

b) Also evaluate whether the materiality for LED will be the same if LED was financed solely by debt rather than equity?

c) Would the situation be different in case LED received revenue from TED on a markup of 10% on its expenses?

Analysis (a)

According to SA 320, determining materiality involves the exercise of professional judgment. Factors that may affect the identification of an appropriate benchmark include the following:

  •     Whether there are items on which would be subject to specific focus by the users of the financial statements of the entity in question?

  •     The nature of the entity, the stage at which the entity is in its life cycle, and the industry and economic environment in which the entity operates.

  •     The entity’s ownership structure and the way it is financed.

  •     The relative volatility of the benchmark.

Profit before tax from continuing operations is often used for profit-oriented entity. However when profit before tax from continuing operations is volatile, other benchmarks may be more appropriate, such as total revenue or gross profit.

In the above case, based on financial position for past three years, it is evident that TED is a profit-oriented company and accordingly the profit before tax is an appropriate benchmark taken by the auditor for the purpose of calculating the materiality.

Analysis (b)

Ram selected profit before tax as benchmark for calculating materiality for LED however the company has yet to fully establish its operations and accordingly the profit before tax is volatile in nature. In such a case, based on the relative volatility, Ram must select gross measures like total revenue as the benchmark for calculating the materiality.

Analysis (c)

In case if LED is financed solely by debt, users may lay more emphasis on assets and claims (such as charges/ mortgages/encumbrances or like) on them rather than on the entity’s earnings. In this situation, Ram could consider either net assets or total assets as the benchmark for calculating the materiality.

Analysis (d)

If LED were to earn revenue from TED at a constant markup of 10% on its aggregate expenditure, it would not be appropriate to take profit before tax or revenue as the benchmark as revenue and profits would fluctuate every year in proportion to the expense and may not be considered as the right measure to reflect the financial performance of the entity. In such a scenario, Ram may choose to use total expenses or net assets or total assets as benchmark for purpose of determining materiality.

The above case studies elucidate the quantitative aspects of materiality. In the next article, we shall discuss case studies revolving around other aspects of SA 320 such as qualitative factors, normalisation, materiality at account balance and revision of materiality.

Closing remarks

Materiality is one of the factors that affects the auditor’s judgment about the sufficiency of audit evidence. One may generalise that lower the materiality level, the greater would be the quantum of evidence needed. At the same time, auditing standards do not establish an absolute level or a percentage or a mathematical formula which is universally applicable. The elements an auditor uses to determine the benchmark are based on his experience and on numerous other factors some of which were elucidated in this article. As a judgmental concept, however, materiality is susceptible to subjectivity.

Ind -AS Carve Out – Recognition of bargain purchase gain and common control transactions

Recognition of bargain purchase gain
IFRS
3 requires bargain purchase gain arising on business combination to be
recognised in profit or loss. However, a careful analysis is required to
determine whether a gain truly exists. Ind-AS 103 (draft) requires the
same to be recognised in other comprehensive income (OCI) and
accumulated in equity as capital reserve. However, if there is no clear
evidence for the underlying reason for classification of the business
combination as a bargain purchase, then the gain should be recognised
directly in the equity as capital reserve. Ind-AS’s are still in draft
stage and a final version may be available even before this article is
published.

Technical perspective
Arguments against this carve out are as follows:

(a)
An economic gain is inherent in a bargain purchase. At the acquisition
date, the acquirer is better off by the amount by which the fair value
of the acquired business exceeds the fair value of the consideration
paid. In concept, the acquirer should recognise this gain in its profit
or loss.

(b) We appreciate that appearance of a bargain
purchase, particularly, without any evidence of the underlying reasons,
will raise concerns about the existence of measurement errors. IFRS 3
have addressed these concerns by requiring the acquirer to review
procedures used to measure the amounts to be recognised at the
acquisition date. Moreover, concerns regarding measurement
errors/potential abuse may not be sufficient reason to reject
technically correct accounting treatment.

(c) The application of
Ind-AS carve-out implies that whilst an entity recognises bargain
purchase gain directly in OCI, it will recognise depreciation,
amortisation or impairment of assets acquired in profit or loss for the
subsequent periods based on the fair valuation of the assets taken over.
This creates a mismatch between items recognised in profit or loss and
those recognized in OCI. Also, it may adversely impact divided paying
capacity of companies.

To avoid such mismatches and to protect
their future profit or loss/distributable reserves, certain entities may
attempt to notionally reduce the fair value of the assets acquired and
avoid bargain purchase gain scenario. The ICAI has made this carve-out
to avoid potential abuse; however, it may actually end up doing the
reverse.

(d) Concerns about abuse resulting from gain
recognition may be exaggerated. Our experience and interactions with
financial analysts and other users suggest that they give little weight,
if any, to one-time or unusual gains, such as those resulting from a
bargain purchase transaction. In addition, we believe that entities
would have a disincentive to overstate assets acquired or understate
liabilities assumed in a business combination because that generally
results in higher post-combination expenses, i.e., when the assets are
used or become impaired or liabilities are re-measured or settled.

We
believe that Ind-AS 103 should require bargain purchase gain arising on
business combination to be recognised in profit or loss both for
acquisition of subsidiaries and associates. In any case, we do not
believe that this is a major issue, and making a carve-out for this
matter seems unwarranted.

Accounting for common control transactions
IFRS
3 excludes from its scope business combinations of entities under
common control and provides no further guidance on how common control
transactions are accounted for. Based on prevailing practices, an entity
may account for such combination by applying either the acquisition
method (in accordance with IFRS 3) or the pooling of interests method.
The selected accounting policy is applied consistently. However, where
an entity selects the acquisition method of accounting, the transaction
must have substance from the perspective of the reporting entity.

Ind-AS
103 requires business combinations under common control to be
mandatorily accounted using the pooling method. The application of this
method requires the following:

(i) The assets and liabilities of the combining entities are reflected at their carrying amounts.
(ii)
No adjustments are made to reflect fair values, or recognise any new
assets or liabilities. The only adjustments that are made are to
harmonize the accounting policies.
(iii) The financial information
in the financial statements in respect of prior periods have to be
restated as if the combination had occurred from the beginning of the
earliest period presented in the financial statements, irrespective of
the actual date of the combination.
(iv) Ind-AS 103 originally
hosted on the MCA website required that excess of the amount recorded as
share capital issued plus any additional consideration in form of cash
or other assets given by the transferee entity over the amount of share
capital of the transferor company is recognised as goodwill.

However,
an exposure draft of amendment to Ind-AS 103 proposes that any
difference between the consideration paid and share capital of the
transferor should be transferred to separate component of equity, viz.,
“Common Control Transaction Capital Reserve.” Ind-AS’s are still in
draft stage and a final version may be available even before this
article is published.

Though there is no IFRS standard that
deals with common control transactions, global practice is to account
them using the pooling method; and in case where the common control
transaction has substance acquisition accounting is permitted.

Technical perspective
IFRS
does not deal with the pooling method. However, it was dealt with in
the erstwhile IAS 22 Business Combinations. Both US and UK GAAP also
provide guidance on the pooling method. Interestingly, neither of these
standards nor AS 14 Accounting for Amalgamations under Indian GAAP allow
any new goodwill to be recognized in the pooling method. Any excess
consideration paid to the erstwhile shareholders of the transferee is a
transaction between the shareholders and reflected directly in the
equity. Thus, goodwill accounting required by original Ind- AS 103 was
contrary to the basic principle of the pooling method. Hence, we agree
that the change proposed in the ED reflects better application of the
pooling method. Despite the proposed correction, we have the following
concerns on accounting for common control business combination
prescribed in Ind-AS 103.

(a) I n our view, it is not
appropriate to mandate the pooling method for all common control
business combinations. In practice, many groups enter into these
transactions as part of their IPO plans. Post IPO, there will be
significant non-controlling interest in the combined entity. In such
cases, companies typically prefer applying the acquisition method to the
common control business combination. However, it may not be possible
under Ind-AS 103.

(b) T he pooling method as discussed in Ind-AS
103 is applicable only to accounting for common control business
combinations. It is not applicable to accounting for transfer between
common control entities of assets/ liabilities not constituting
business.

(c) Whilst Ind-AS 103 requires common control business
combinations to be accounted for using the pooling method, it is not
clear whether the same principles also apply to acquisition of an
associate/ joint venture from an entity under common control.

Our preferred view is that at this juncture, the ICAI should not address common control business combination accounting     in     Ind-AS    103.    Rather,     there     is     sufficient    global precedence to rely upon. however, this approach is not suitable for the long term.  it may be noted that the IASB is developing a separate  IFRS for common control transactions. the ICAI should work with the IASB on the     proposed     IFRS     to     address     India     specific     concerns.      Alternatively, the  ICAI should develop a temporary  
standard, but ensure that the same is in line with current global practice.

Growing concerns with financial statement

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The past few decades have seen frauds related to financial statements increase dramatically, both in terms of numbers and the size of the losses. This has resulted in turmoil in the capital markets, loss in shareholder value, and in some cases, companies filing for bankruptcy. Fraudulent financial statements affect shareholders, lenders, creditors, and employees. Although the regulators (under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 and new Companies Act, 2013) have done significantly to improve corporate governance standards in an effort to deter fraud; financial statement fraud continues to remain a serious concern for investors and other capital markets stakeholders.

According to the ACFE’s “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, 2014”, it is estimated that only 9 % of cases involved financial statement fraud, but those cases had the highest financial impact, representing a median loss of $ 1 million.

What is financial statement fraud?
Financial statement fraud is deliberate misrepresentation, misstatement or omission of financial statement data for the purpose of misleading the reviewer and creating a false impression of an organisation’s financial strength.

The key causes of this increasing problem could be executive incentives such as stock option benefits, bonuses or justification for increased salaries; stock market expectations which provided rewards for shortterm behaviour; greed by investment banks, commercial banks and investors etc.

Such frauds can take different forms, but there are several methods commonly used by perpetrators. These include creating fictitious revenues, timing differences, concealed liabilities or expenses, improper disclosure, related party transactions, and improper asset valuations. From an accounting perspective, revenues, profits, or assets are typically overstated, while losses, expenses, or liabilities are understated in the books of accounts.

Some common approaches to project a false but improved appearance of financials include:

Overstatement or falsification of revenues is the most common fraud, wherein the perpetrator creates fictitious revenue or customers, records future sales in the current period, reports increased revenue without equally rising cash flow or records sales that never occurred.

Understatement of expenses or liabilities by shrinking the company’s debt on paper. This makes the company appear more profitable, while the fraudster records expenses as assets or even fails to record them at all. Additional ways to manipulate financial statements include leaving special purpose entities or subsidiaries off a parent company’s books or failing to report certain obligations as liabilities.

Improper asset valuation exaggerates company assets to deceive investors or to siphon funds for personal gains. It can involve improperly valuing inventory, investments, fixed assets or accounts receivable. It may also involve creating fictitious receivables, not writing down obsolete inventory on the company’s balance sheet, manipulating the estimates of an asset’s useful life and overstating the residual value.

Related party transactions; fraudulent transactions with the parent company and its subsidiaries and the ability to influence the policies of the other parties.

Warning bells
Red flags around financial statements are indicators of a possible fraud scenario and these warning signs should be addressed immediately. While they may not ascertain the actual occurrence of a fraud, they show that the company may be prone to fraudulent activities. Red flags are never sure signs but indicate that the organisation should ask for reasonable answers.

Warning signs related to financial statement fraud can be categorised into four broad categories:

(i) Tone at the top: aggressive style of management and over ambitious targets by the top management may lead to fraudulent activities at various levels. Concentration of powers in the hands of one or two individuals or an autocratic style of leadership also may lead to fraudulent activities.
(ii) Processes drawback: Lack of supervision and monitoring, lack of segregation of duties and excessive use of journal entries may motivate fraudsters as it opens up multiple avenues to manipulate the books of accounts.
(iii) Systems limitations: lack of system controls, manual (legacy) and disintegrated systems are easy to penetrate and could be manipulated by fraudsters.
(iv) Attitude of employees: Employees with mediocre calibre, ignorant mind-set, little responsibility and no willingness to question the management can create problems in preparing the financial statements.

There are certain indicators that organisations can analyse to proactively identify fraud risks.

Revenue
• A spike in the revenue during the month/ quarter/ year closing without any collections.
 • Sales made to fake agents or customers or to small proprietary or partnership firms.
• Increase in debts being substantially higher than revenue growth.

Expenses
• Preference given to a single vendor after receiving quotations from other vendors or contract given to vendors that are relatively unknown in the industry or are fictitious. In case of machinery, purchasing it from agents rather than other OEMs.
• Significant variation in the volume/ value of provision for expenses.
• Large unexplained JV or partnership.
• Consistent advances paid to certain parties whereas some creditors payments are delayed.

Cash and bank balances
• High cash withdrawals or deposits without necessary approvals.
• Large payments issued to certain contractors or vendors.
• Absence of physical bank statements.
• Transfer of large round amounts within different bank accounts.

Accounting records
• Large number of journal entries passed in books of accounts.
• Low end accounting software without audit trail mechanism.
• Large number of backdated entries.

If enough warning signs are in place, the next step will be to perform procedures that will help assess the actual occurrence of fraud. Exposing a fraudulent financial statement can be challenging–irrespective of the company size. Maryam Hussain, an investigator at EY, in her book titled “Corporate Fraud: the Human Factor”, states that every instance of fraud and corruption leaves a trail which is visible but often unseen until it is too late. Perpetrators typically take special care to conceal their wrongdoings in an elaborate fashion.

Sometimes the fraud is buried in a series of complex transactions; other times it can be found in a single transaction recorded in the accounting records. Detection can be accomplished with appropriate forensic procedures that include analysis of financial records, public documents, background checks, interviews with suspects and laboratory analysis of physical and electronic evidence.

Although listed above are common schemes used to commit financial statement fraud, it is imperative to be aware that it is not an exhaustive list. There are many ways to commit fraudulent or unethical activities. No matter what method is used, the fraudster typically tends to either overstate revenues, profits, or assets or understate losses, expenses, or liabilities.

Financial statement fraud is expensive, seemingly common in and typically involves one or more senior executives in the company. To conclude, the impact of such a fraud can be devastating to the organisation’s reputation among stakeholders and business ecosystem as a whole.

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TS-719-ITAT-2014(Chennai) ITO vs. M/s F.L Smidth Ltd. A.Y: 2004-05, Dated: 01-09-2014

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Section 9(1)(vi) – Payment for shrink wrap software license reimbursed under a cost sharing arrangement is “royalty” under the Income Tax Act (Act); on facts, India-Denmark Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) is not applicable as the Denmark Company was not beneficial owner but merely an agent of the software license provider.

Facts:
Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the business of consulting engineers and architects. A group concern of the Taxpayer based in Denmark (DCo) executed cost sharing agreements (CSA) with all its group concerns, including the Taxpayer, for sharing the cost of various software licenses such as the standardised Microsoft office software application. This was procured from M/s Microsoft Corporation USA (Microsoft) by way of a global indent.

In terms of the cost sharing formula in CSA, DCo raised an invoice on the Taxpayer for the proportionate cost of the software. During the relevant tax year, the Taxpayer made payment to DCo against the said invoice, without deducting tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act on the premise that the said payment represented merely reimbursement/ recharge of cost without any income component. Further, since payment was towards standardised copyrighted article, there was royalty element involved.

The Tax Authority was of the view that the impugned payment was for acquisition of a software license and hence, was in the nature of royalty taxable u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act. Rejecting the contention that there was no income element in the reimbursements the Tax Authority opined that DCo was acting as a distributor/agent of Microsoft and hence tax was required to be withheld on such taxable payment.

On appeal by the Taxpayer, the First Appellate Authority held that the payment under consideration was for a readymade off-the-shelf software for in-house use without authority to commercially exploit the same and hence, the payment was not in the nature of royalty. Rather, being a copyrighted programme, it was in the nature of sale of ‘goods’.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

Under the Act
Granting of a license is included as a right in the definition of royalty under Explanation 2(i) and 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. This would also include license to use ‘shrink wrap software’, irrespective of the medium or mode of acquiring the licenced right. Hence, the fact that the licensed software was ‘shrink wrap software’ would not impact royalty taxation.

The ratio laid down by the Karnataka High Court in case of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.1 and Synopsis International Old Ltd.2 squarely applied to the case under consideration.

The decisions relied on by the Taxpayer stand distinguished since they were in the context of transaction undertaken on ‘principal to principal’ basis. In the present fact pattern, DCo acted as an agent of Microsoft US.

Delhi HC ruling in case of Ericsson AB and the Mumbai Tribunal ruling in case of ACIT vs. Sonata Information Tech. Ltd. did not pertain solely to ‘license’ transactions and hence are not applicable in the present issue. Further, the Supreme Court (SC) ruling in case of Tata Consultancy Services was not in the context of the Act and hence cannot be applied.

Invoice raised specifically quoted only licence and right of usage embedded therein. Therefore, the payment under consideration for acquiring a shrink wrap software licence from Microsoft answers the definition of royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act, and is therefore liable to withholding tax in India.

CSA is immaterial in determining the character of transaction. Cost sharing formula or any other method is only an internal arrangement. Such arrangement does not impact the characterisation of an underlying transaction which is to be determined based on facts of the case and statutory provisions.

The exclusionary provision u/s. 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Act, dealing with payment for business or source of income outside India, is not applicable since the royalty payment made to DCo is for the purpose of business of the Taxpayer in India.

Under India-Denmark DTAA
DCo was only placing indent for all its group concerns for appropriate internal arrangement and convenience. Hence, DCo merely acted as an agent of Microsoft which is the beneficial owner of the payment under consideration. Since the beneficial owner is not a resident of Denmark, the benefit of treaty is not available under para 5 of Article 13.

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TS-660-ITAT-2014(DEL) Consulting Engineering Corporation vs. JDIT A.Y: 2003-05, Dated: 31-10-2014

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Articles 5 and 7 of India-USA DTAA – Branch engaged in preparation of drawings, designs and structural calculations by engaging highly technical and skilled professionals, which constitutes the core business of head office (HO), triggers PE of the HO in India.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a US Company, has a branch in India (branch). The Indian branch provided engineering design and consultancy services to its HO, i.e, the Taxpayer. As part of these services, the branch prepared drawings and designs and also structural calculations by engaging highly technical and skilled professionals. For these services the branch was reimbursed at cost plus margin. The Tax Authority contended that the presence of Taxpayer in the form of fixed assets, number of employees etc., in India indicates that the activities carried out by the branch constituted main business of the Taxpayer and the cost reimbursed by the Taxpayer to the branch was not at arm’s length. Thus, the Taxpayer has a PE in India as per India-USA DTAA and the income attributable to the operation carried out by the PE shall be taxable in terms of Article 7 of the India US DTAA .

The Taxpayer contended that the activities of the branch were in the nature of preparatory and auxiliary services and hence the branch does not constitute a PE of the Taxpayer in India. Consequently, no income can be assessed in terms of Article 7 of the India-US DTAA .

Held:
The Branch was engaged in preparation of drawings, designs and doing structural calculations which require high technical and managerial skills. The branch was also doing research and development work for the Taxpayer which was the core business of the Taxpayer and the same cannot be considered to be of preparatory or auxiliary character. Accordingly, in terms of Article 5 of India-USA DTAA , the branch constituted PE of the Taxpayer in India.

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Lectures Meeting

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Topic : I nternational & Domestic Transfer
Pricing Recent Developments
Speaker : T. P. Ostwal, Chartered Accountant
Date : 5th November 2014
Venue : Walchand Hirachand Hall, Indian
Merchants Chamber

Mr. T. P. Ostwal gave a brief introduction about the evolution of transfer pricing regulations. TP provisions, as introduced in India in the year 2001, have their origin in OECD Guidelines issued in 2001. Though the 1922 Act had certain transfer pricing provisions, it has gained importance only after introduction of section 92 by the Finance Act, 2001.

Highlighting the recent trends, he mentioned that the Income Tax department made transfer pricing adjustments of Rs. 70,000 crore in 2012-13, which reduced to Rs. 65,000 crore in 2012-13. The speaker expressed a hope that with the new government coming in, the scenario would change for the better.

The speaker welcomed the recent Vodafone transfer pricing decision by the Bombay High Court. In his view, the $ 490 Million tax dispute was based on a stand which was illegal from the beginning i.e. application of transfer pricing provisions relating to computation of income to issue of equity share capital, which is a capital transaction. This was a case of issue of equity shares by an Indian subsidiary to its holding company at a premium as per DCF valuation methodology prescribed under FEMA.

However, as per the TPO and DRP, the equity shares ought to have been valued at a much higher value. As per the tax authorities, the consequence of issue of shares by Vodafone India to its holding company at a lower premium resulted in subsidising the price payable by the holding company, which difference was sought to be taxed. Besides, this deficit was treated as a loan extended by Vodafone India to its holding company and periodical interest thereon was sought to be charged to tax as interest income as a secondary adjustment.

The speaker reiterated the fact that transfer pricing provisions cannot apply to issue of equity shares. Bombay High Court rightly held that Chapter X is a machinery provision to arrive at ALP of a transaction and not a computation provision. Since the issue of shares at a premium by Vodafone India to its nonresident holding company did not give rise to any income from an International Transaction, there could be no occasion to apply the transfer pricing provisions to adjust the income. Many other such cases, including Shell India, are pending. He hoped that the Government would accept the Bombay High Court order.

The speaker also referred to another case of Tops Security, wherein a similar stand has been taken by the tax authorities in a reverse situation, in respect of shares subscribed to by an Indian company in an overseas subsidiary, where the shortfall in valuation of shares of the subsidiary subscribed to has been sought to be taxed as income, besides being treated as a loan, and interest thereon sought to be taxed.

Mr. Ostwal was of the view that the secondary adjustments made by the Transfer Pricing Officers are not permissible, as there is no provision for such secondary adjustments under the law.

Thereafter, the learned speaker invited the attention to the amendments to section 92B(2), has deeming certain domestic transactions as international transactions. A transaction entered into by an enterprise with a person other than an AE will be deemed to be an international transaction if there exists a prior agreement in relation to the relevant transaction between such other person and the AE or the terms of the relevant transaction are determined in substance between them. For an international transaction, section 92B(1) provides that at least one of the parties has to be a non-resident. The amendment provides that section 92B(2) would irrespective of whether such other person, with whom the transaction takes place, is a non-resident or not. This amendment has overridden the decisions of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Kodak India Pvt. Ltd. andthe Hyderabad Tribunal in the case of Swarnadhara IJMII Integrated Township Development Co. Pvt Ltd.

The speaker referred to the Finance Minister’s speech proposing to permit use of multiple year data and interquartile range. The law had not yet been amended in this regard. This had the potential to reduce more than half of the transfer pricing litigation. He explained the logic in considering multiple year data while benchmarking and the issues faced at the time of assessments. The Tax department has been of the view that an average of multiple year data cannot be taken, and the determination of ALP should be based on single year data. Further, he explained the practice followed by other countries wherein inter quartile range is accepted by the respective countries.

He mentioned that even Advanced Pricing Agreement (‘APA’) has not been a success on account of various imperfections. There are 2 types of APAs – (1) Unilateral (2) Bilateral. Till now, only 4 to 5 APAs have been cleared by the department and all of them have been Unilateral APAs. Bilateral APAs would be more beneficial to the taxpayer as that would be approved by competent authorities of both the countries, with full tax credit in relation to the income in the other country. The new amendment in regard to rollback mechanisms in APA looks interesting and beneficial to the tax payer; however there is no clarity as to how it would practically work. What would be its effect on the existing litigation matters pending before the Tribunal or the DRP or the AO or on completed assessments?

The speaker commented that Safe Harbour Rules have been ineffective as the profit margins notified by the department in this regard are too high.

The learned speaker highlighted an important issue as to whether corporate guarantee qualify as an international transaction for transfer pricing purposes. Whether guarantees include letter of credit? In this regard, he pointed out to an important ruling of Delhi Tribunal in the case of Bharti Airtel, wherein it was held that corporate guarantee would have no bearing on profits, incomes, losses or assets and is hence not an international transaction. Provision of corporate guarantee is a shareholders function, and would therefore be on capital account.

The speaker touched upon certain amendments hoped for in the field of Domestic Transfer Pricing. He informed that safe harbour rules are expected for DTP. Besides, payments made by one company to another wherein both the companies are paying taxes at the same rates might be exempted from the regulations. This would certainly relax the rigours of domestic transfer pricing provisions.

In conclusion, the speaker pointed out that transfer pricing provisions have also now crept into the Companies Act 2013 (section 188) and Clause 49 of the Listing Regulations, in respect of related party transactions, which are required to be on an arms length basis.

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Oil at $60 isn’t all positive

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The global implications of falling oil prices are largely positive – but that doesn’t mean that there aren’t some risks, too

Everyone
is busy celebrating collapsing oil prices, and the huge positives this
will bring to the global economy. From mid-June, prices are down by more
than 40 per cent, with Brent now falling to below $65 a barrel. There
are many highly credible commentators calling for a continued price
spiral, with price forecasts of $50-55 a barrel by mid-2015 not
uncommon. Where prices ultimately settle and for how long is obviously
anyone’s guess, but this is a huge move with global implications both
politically and economically. Is such a large move in so short a time
unambiguously positive for the global economy, as almost everyone seems
to believe? Is it a massive tax cut and more or less a free lunch as
most want to believe?

The decline in oil prices is simply a
transfer of purchasing power from the producer of oil to its consumer.
From the global economy perspective, there is no additional wealth
created

The obvious positive is that this transfer of wealth
from the oil producers to the consumers/importers should lead to a boost
in consumption. A $40-a-barrel decline in prices will lead to a
transfer of $1.3 trillion a year. It is widely accepted that this will
lead to a boost in global gross domestic product (GDP), as the
propensity of the oil importer to consume is greater than the propensity
of the oil producer to spend.

Markets also cheer as the
importers are the European Union, Japan, China, India and even the
United States, all far more relevant for global financial markets than
Russia, Venezuela, Iran or Nigeria (the worst hit by the decline in
prices). While this is a short-term positive for global growth, as
consumers spend and consumption accelerates it will imply a decline in
global savings, which may have longer-term consequences on financial
markets and interest rates. Ultimately, the oil producers were not just
sitting on their oil revenues, they were invested in some financial
asset, somewhere in the world. This investment will stop as consumption
picks up. There are other implications on global financial markets, not
all of which are positive. As the folks at Gavekal point out, nobody
seems to be thinking of the inventory and liquidity effects of such a
steep decline in oil prices. Assume the world consumes about 92 million
barrels of oil daily and carries about 100 days of inventory. When oil
was trading at $100, $920 billion was stuck in inventories, held by
someone in the system and financed by someone else. If the price of oil
settles at $60, the financing needs will drop to $552 billion. Almost
$400 billion of liquidity will get released into the global system. This
is a positive and will only add to the excess liquidity sloshing around
global financial markets. Such a capital release can fundamentally
alter the economics of many players in the value chain.

However,
somebody will also have to take the near $400-billion loss on existing
inventories as prices for all end products adjust immediately. Some of
the inventories will be held in sovereign strategic reserves, and these
losses will be absorbed or camouflaged in national accounts. However,
there will be collateral damage to the whole petroleum value chain, and
somebody will be on the hook for these inventory losses. It is not clear
where the losses will surface, and the absorptive capacity of the
losers. One cannot rule out some nasty surprises. During the last big
decline in oil prices, starting in 1985, large parts of the Texas
banking system went under, and it was also arguably a catalyst for the
eventual demise of the Soviet Union. Losses of $400 billion can stress
any financial system or counterparty.

Over the past few years,
we have seen a massive buildout of non-Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries oil production capacity, largely in shale and tar
sands in North America. Many of these assets are unviable below $60-65 a
barrel, and the question then becomes: how was this rapid production
build-out financed? Clearly, the producers were not generating
sufficient cash flow to self- finance the production/drilling surge. It
was debt – either high-yield bonds or bank lending – that has financed
the majority of the infrastructure needed to sustain the production
surge we have seen in North America over the past five years. But at $60
oil, much of this debt can no longer be serviced.

This has
already thrown the high-yield market into a bit of a tizzy, as energy
was the highest share of the market and spreads for energy issuers have
surged. Most players in the sector have no ability to access new
high-yield issuance. If losses are significant, it may impact access to
high-yield debt for all sectors of the economy. At a minimum high-yield
spreads will rise. Either way, either access or cost of debt will be
negatively impacted for many sectors of the global economy that need
capital the most.

If banks are left holding the can, the
problems may be even bigger. The losses incurred by the banks on this
lending could erode their capital base and earnings power, further
weakening their ability and willingness to lend. If banks do not want to
lend, that has obvious implications for the pace and sustainability of
any economic upturn.

The other obvious negative of declining oil
prices is the impact it has on the relative attractiveness of
alternative energy and renewables. It will make the world economy more
carbon-intensive and less energy-efficient. Just when solar was nearly
at grid parity, the bar has moved downwards.

In a world fighting
deflation, lower oil prices do not really help the central banks. By
putting downward pressure on headline inflation, already low inflation
expectations may get further entrenched or blindside the central banks
to any pick-up in underlying inflationary pressures.

The simple
point is that there is no free lunch, and one should not ignore the
negative repercussions of such a sharp and quick move in a critical
global commodity. There will be both losers and gainers, and it is
important to think this through and not be caught with the losers.

(Source: Business Standard dated 12-12-2014)

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Sanskrit, taught well, can be as rewarding as economics

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Discovering one’s past helps to nourish those roots, instilling a quiet self-confidence as one travels through life. Losing that memory risks losing a sense of the self.

With this conviction I decided to read Sanskrit a few years ago I wanted to read the Mahabharata. Mine was not a religious or political project but a literary one. I wanted to approach the text with full consciousness of the present, making it relevant to my life. I searched for a pundit or a shastri but none shared my desire to ‘interrogate’ the text so that it would speak to me. Thus, I ended up at the University of Chicago.

I had to go abroad to study Sanskrit because it is too often a soul-killing experience in India. Although we have dozens of Sanskrit university departments, our better students do not become Sanskrit teachers. Partly it is middle-class insecurities over jobs, but Sanskrit is not taught with an open, enquiring, analytical mind. According to the renowned Sanskritist, Sheldon Pollock, India had at Independence a wealth of world-class scholars such as Hiriyanna, Kane, Radhakrishnan, Sukthankar, and more. Today we have none.

The current controversy about teaching Sanskrit in our schools is not the debate we should be having. The primary purpose of education is not to teach a language or pump facts into us but to foster our ability to think — to question, interpret and develop our cognitive capabilities. A second reason is to inspire and instill passion. Only a passionate person achieves anything in life and realizes the full human potential. And this needs passionate teachers, which is at the heart of the problem.

Too many believe that education is only about ‘making a living’ when, in fact, it is also about ‘making a life.’ Yes, later education should prepare one for a career, but early education should instill the self-confidence to think for ourselves, to imagine and dream about something we absolutely must do in life. A proper teaching of Sanskrit can help in fostering a sense of self-assuredness and humanity, much in the way that reading Latin and Greek did for generations of Europeans when they searched for their roots in classical Rome and Greece.

This is the answer to the bright young person who asks, ‘Why should I invest in learning a difficult language like Sanskrit when I could enhance my life chances by studying economics or commerce?’ Sanskrit can, in fact, boost one’s life chances. A rigorous training in Panini’s grammar rules can reward us with the ability to formulate and express ideas that are uncommon in our languages of everyday life. Its literature opens up ‘another human consciousness and another way to be human’, according to Pollock.

Teaching Sanskrit under the ‘three-language formula’ has failed because of poor teachers and curriculum. But the debate is also about choice. Those who would make teaching Sanskrit compulsory in school are wrong. We should foster excellence in Sanskrit teaching rather than shove it down children’s throats.

The lack of civility in the present debate is only matched by ignorance and zealotry on both sides. The Hindu right makes grandiose claims about airplanes and stem cell research in ancient India and this undermines the real achievements of Sanskrit. The anti-brahmin, Marxist, post-colonial attack reduces the genuine achievements of Orientalist scholars to ‘false consciousness’. Those who defend Sanskrit lack the open-mindedness that led, ironically, to the great burst of creative works by their ancestors. In the end, the present controversy might be a good thing if it helps to foster excellence in teaching Sanskrit in India.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Shri Gurucharan Das in Times of India, dated 14-12-2014)

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Technological Unemployment – Job prospects are grim today, as humans and organisations aren’t keeping up with the pace of technology

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At an informal meeting of some wise men of Mumbai’s financial world, the conversation focused on the rapid automation of more and more work once done by humans and whether it will lead to “technological unemployment” – a phrase coined by John Maynard Keynes, who in 1930 had talked about a “new disease”, which is the inability of the economy to create new jobs faster than jobs are lost to automation.

One of the participants in the informal meeting gave some food for thought for the new government – after jobless growth and jobless mini-recession, will it be a case of jobless recovery? Going by the drift of the conversation, it was apparent no one knew the answer to that question. Technological change over the last generation has wiped out many low- and middle-skill jobs. Just think about the big army of secretaries, typists, telephone and computer operators and payroll clerks who occupied vast office space in earlier years? There are examples galore.

If this was the past, consider the future, and here the news isn’t too good for even some of the most skilled jobs. Though spoken in a different context, McKinsey Inc CEO Dominic Barton told The Economic Times last week, “If you are a heart surgeon in the US today, you better be worried about driverless cars because most of the heart transplants come from car accidents and car accidents are going to drop dramatically with driverless cars”.

If heart surgeons have reasons to feel worried about driverless cars, imagine the plight of truck and taxi drivers when computers start driving more safely than humans. And it’s not a remote possibility. In April 2014, the Google team working on the project announced that their driverless vehicles have now logged nearly 1.1 million km.

If you find all this talk about machines taking away jobs a little outdated, you could do what one of the participants in the informal meeting suggested – read a 75-page e-book, Race Against the Machine, by Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee. The authors have brought together a range of statistics and examples to show how technological progress has deep consequences for skills, wages and jobs. Faster, cheaper computers and increasingly clever software are giving machines capabilities that were once thought to be distinctively human – like understanding speech, translating from one language to another and recognising patterns. So automation is rapidly moving beyond factories to areas that provide most jobs in the economy. The e-book makes the case that employment prospects are grim for many today, as humans and our organisations aren’t keeping up with the pace of technology. Is it time to re-imagine the Skill India mission?

(Source: Article by Shyamal Majumdar in Business Standard dated 5th December, 2014)

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Throwaway culture

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Unlike earlier days when things were made to last, today everything is disposable

We’ve
had to get rid of our TV set, which was eight years old, and was acting
up. Can’t you repair it? i asked the technician. He looked at me as
though i’d morphed into a Martian. You don’t repair eight-year-old TVs;
you throw them away, he said.

So we got rid of it at a literally
throwaway price, a small fraction of what we’d paid for it. Now, as i
sit and look at the new TV we’ve bought to replace the old one, i can’t
help but think of its impending demise a few short years from now.

It’s
not just TV sets that belong to what could be called the throwaway
culture. Cars, computers, mobile phones, anything you care to name seems
to be made so as to ensure that it will self-destruct, or be rendered
useless, within a relatively short span of time. And that short span of
time seems to be getting shorter and shorter.

No sooner have you
got the very latest smartphone/ music system/ iPad/ electric nostril
hair clipper when a NEW! IMPROVED! UPDATED version of the darn thing is
launched and you find yourself saddled with the old model which your
raddiwala might have to be cajoled into carting away.

It’s
called ‘built-in obsolescence’, designing devices in such a way as to
make them disposable almost as soon as you’ve bought them. What are
known as ‘consumer durables’ should more appropriately be called
‘consumer disposables’ in today’s transient technology where yesterday’s
new is today’s old.

In earlier times, people didn’t merely buy
durable goods like cars, or refrigerators; they developed a relationship
with them. They weren’t just mechanical devices; they were part of the
family, and like other family members they often developed all manner of
idiosyncratic behaviour – rattles, wheezing, sudden stops and starts –
as they grew older, endearing traits that humanised them.

Instead
of being ashamed of their age, people were proud of how old their car
was, or their fridge, or their music system. It showed how well they’d
been looked after, like aging relatives whom one cherished.

Those
days are dim memories in today’s disposable culture of inbuilt
obsolescence. To which India boasts one notable exception: the
never-say-die neta who successfully defers all attempts to be put out to
pasture and comes with a genuinely lifetime guarantee.

(Source: Times of India, dated 03-12-2014)

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Black holes in the economy: Noida engineer’s case shows why India must get to the roots of black money generation

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India is one of the world’s largest generators of black money, and this is aided and supported by a weak institutional mechanism and incentives framework, which actually encourages it. The generation of black money in India is both a planned by-design activity and an unplanned ‘we-are-like-this-only’ socio cultural aspect of how we conduct our day-to-day lives, especially in everyday transactions.

Given complex social and economic dimensions to black money, it is not susceptible to easy solutions. Which parts of the Indian ecosystem are conducive for the generation of black money and what immediate steps can the government take to curb it?

First, almost every public works department of most governments in India manufactures illegal money – while awarding contracts for roads, buildings’ construction and other such projects.

This is because the system is very forgiving till ‘quid pro quo’ can be proved as per Sections 8, 9 and 10 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Unless the bribe is taken in full view of a camera where voice samples and video images can be independently authenticated as being genuine and not doctored, it is almost impossible to prove this, thereby encouraging mass retail corruption in government.

India’s forensic abilities are limited and extraordinary investigative abilities are needed to link the money trail to questionable transactions (and not noting in files) and further link them to ‘quid pro quo’ as defined under the Act where it involves public servants.

Second, almost every Indian businessman’s favourite national pastime is over-invoicing and under-invoicing. Most Indian buyers and sellers try to reduce or hide their profits to pay less taxes than due (under-invoicing), or else they over-invoice imports.

Third, India’s real estate sector is the ‘mecca’ of black money generation and habitation. It is estimated that of India’s $2 trillion economy about 10-15% comprises real estate transactions of which about 40% is estimated to be in cash transactions!

It is impossible for an average Indian to sell property while accepting money purely by cheque, even if they are willing to sell their assets at a discount. This generates large sums of black money, which the promised real estate regulator is required urgently to curb.

In addition to addressing the above issues, what else can the government do to curb black money? The usual response of many governments is to announce a ‘one time’ amnesty scheme. These are short-term responses, for no one believes that anything is ‘one time’ in India. Further, while it may generate revenue for the government, it militates against the honest taxpayer.

Opaque instruments such as P-notes, introduced for and by vested interests with deep roots in subverting the system, should be forced to disclose the names of those whose wealth they contain. Likewise shell accounts or donations to trusts, anything that encourages ‘round tripping’ must be investigated.

An amendment to the existing Prevention of Money Laundering Act, to have every Indian citizen disclose all bank accounts and immoveable assets in India and abroad, would be a first step to build an inventory which can provide baseline data upon which changes can be tracked using an electronic tracking system.

Lastly, a request for disclosing names of purported offenders to the public is expected to be placed before Supreme Court by the SIT today. This great clamour and pressure to make all the names public is unwarranted because it will be in clear violation of the confidentiality norm in various bilateral investment and tax treaties, which can lead to a huge reputational risk for India, globally, if that happens.

Clear thinking suggests that one should make a distinction between crime proceeds and black money. The two are fundamentally different and here one is referring to the latter, not the former. Black money is money on which there is legitimate tax due in India but remaining unpaid. Instead of embarrassing a handful, the focus should be on getting to the roots of black money generation and preventing or reducing that significantly.

India should emerge as a torchbearer on the global stage through its concrete actions at home and abroad to curb black money, which will make it a global role model to emulate and not a pariah to shun.

(Source: Extracts from an article in Times of India, dated 03-12-2014)

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Rajan sings a different tune, pitches for ‘Make for India

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As the Narendra Modi government goes on an overdrive in its ‘Make in India’ campaign, there is a word of advice from Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan.

Amid the slowing of the world economy, Rajan on Friday cautioned the government against too much focus on merchandise export-led growth through this campaign and advised to supplement it with ‘Make for India’.

However, since domestic demand tends to get overstimulated, the government will have to frame suitable fiscal policies and RBI itself will have to ensure inflation remains low, Rajan said in his Bharat Ram Memorial Lecture here.

He said the path of disinflation may not be as steep in India as in industrialised nations and disclosed that RBI will talk to the government on the timeline beyond 2016 to keep inflation at four per cent, plus-minus two per cent.

To finance domestic demand responsibly, he advised that it be financed primarily through internal sources and suggested some more budgetary benefits for savings in this regard.

“The world is unlikely to be able to accommodate another export-led China,” Rajan said in his address, organised by industry body Ficci, in New Delhi on Friday.

Clarifying he was not suggesting pessimism for exports, he said, “I am counselling against an export-led strategy that involves subsidising exporters with cheap inputs, as well as an undervalued exchange rate, simply because it is unlikely to be very effective at this juncture.”

Rajan, formerl chief economic advisor in the finance ministry, said India would have to compete with China, which still has some surplus agricultural labour to draw on, when it decided to push manufacturing exports. “Export-led growth will not be as easy as it was for the Asian economies that took that path before us.”

Besides, industrial countries had themselves been improving capital-intensive flexible manufacturing, so much so that some manufacturing activity was being “reshored”, he said. “Any emerging market wanting to export manufacturing goods will have to contend with this new phenomenon.”

If external demand growth is likely to be muted, India has to produce for the internal market. “This means we have to work on creating the strongest sustainable unified market we can which requires a reduction in transaction costs of buying and selling across the country,” the governor said. Improvements in the physical transportation network would help but so would fewer, but more efficient and competitive intermediaries in the supply chain from the producer to consumer, he said.

At a time when the Centre is struggling to evolve a consensus with states on the issue of a national goods & services tax (GST), Rajan said: “A well designed GST Bill, by reducing state border taxes, will have the important consequence of creating a truly national market for goods and services, which will be critical for our growth in years to come.”

He also said the government would have to frame suitable fiscal policies and RBI itself would have to ensure inflation remained low, since domestic demand tends to get overstimulated.

He further pointed out that the path of disinflation might not be as steep in India as in developed nations and the glide path as advocated by the Urjit Patel committee suited the country.

“Our banking system is undergoing some stress. Our banks have to learn from past mistakes in project evaluation and structuring, as they finance the immense needs of the economy,” he advised. They (banks) would also have to improve their efficiency as they compete with new players like the recently licensed universal banks, as well as the soon-to-be licensed payment and small finance banks.

“At the same time, we should not make their task harder by creating impediments in the process of turning around, or recovering, stressed assets. RBI, the government, as well as courts have considerable work to do here,” Rajan said, pitching for financial inclusion and some Budget sops to boost savings.

“The income tax benefits for an individual to save were largely fixed in nominal terms until the recent Budget; this means the real value of the benefits has eroded. Some budgetary incentives for household savings could help ensure the country’s investment is largely financed from domestic savings,” he said.

Rajan said it was worth debating whether India needed more institutions to ensure deficits stayed within control and the quality of Budgets remained high.

“A number of countries have independent Budget offices and committees that opine on Budgets. These offices are especially important in scoring budgetary estimates, including unfunded long-term liabilities that industrial countries have shown are so easy to contract in times of growth, and hard to actually deliver.”

In addition to inflation, he said, a central bank had to pay attention to financial stability. This was a secondary objective but might become central if the economy entered a low-inflation credit and asset-price boom. “Financial stability sometimes means regulators, including the central bank, have to go against popular sentiment.”

The role of regulators was not to boost the Sensex but to ensure the underlying fundamentals of the economy and its financial system were sound enough for sustainable growth, he said. “Any positive consequences to the Sensex are welcome but are only a collateral benefit, not the objective.”

While emphasising on policies to attract foreign direct investment to fund the country’s current account deficit, Rajan said policies should not compromise India’s interests.

In this regard, Rajan said, the requirements to patent a medicine in India were perfectly reasonable, no matter what international drug companies said. He also said policies should not focus only on FDI but promote young entrepreneurs, arguing “if we make it easier for young Indian companies to do business, we will also make it easier for foreign companies to invest, for both are outsiders to the system”.

This meant a transparent and quick legal process to deal with contractual disputes, and a proper system of bankruptcy to deal with distress — both issues the government had taken on, he said.

Noting that India did not belong to any power bloc, Rajan advised it, besides other emerging countries, to not only ensure quota reforms in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank but inject new agenda, new ideas and new thinking into the global arena. “No longer will it suffice for India to simply object to industrial countries’ proposals; it will have to put some of its own on the table.”

(Source: The Economic Times dated 13-12-2014)

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51 dated 17th December, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2000 – Exemption thereof
This circular provides that all multilateral organisations of which India is a member nation, and their subsidiary/ affiliate bodies in India, and their officials in India are entitled to the exemption in terms of Regulation 4(5) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2000, notified vide Notification No. FEMA 5/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50 dated 16 December, 2014

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Rupee Drawing Arrangement – Delegation of work to Regional Offices – Submission of Statements/Returns

This circular reminds banks to make all their correspondence with RBI including submission of prescribed statements to the Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of the Reserve Bank, under whose jurisdiction their registered offices function.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49 dated 16th December, 2014

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Money Transfer Service Scheme – Delegation of work to Regional Offices – Submission of Statements/Returns

This circular reminds Indian Agents under MTSS to make all their correspondence with RBI including submission of prescribed statements to the Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of the Reserve Bank, under whose jurisdiction their registered offices function.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48 dated December 09, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.320/2014-RB dated 5th September, 2014 Overseas Investments by Alternative Investment Funds (AIF )

This circular now permits an Indian Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) as defined under the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 to invest in foreign securities subject to guidelines issued by RBI & SEBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 47 dated 8th December, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.320/2014-RB dated 5th September, 2014 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Review of FDI policy – Sector Specific Conditions – Railway Infrastructure

This Notification & circular have made the following two changes in to Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000 pertaining to FDI in Railway Infrastructure so as to bring it line with the Press Note issued by DIPP.

The amendments are as under: –
1. T he existing Annexure A has been substituted as under: –

“Annexure A”

Sectors Prohibited for FDI
FDI is prohibited in:
(a) Lottery Business including Government/ private lottery,
online lotteries, etc.
(b) Gambling and Betting including casinos etc.
(c) Chit funds
(d) Nidhi company
(e) Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs)
(f) Real Estate Business or Construction of Farm Houses
(g) Manufacturing of Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes,
of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes
(h) Activities/sectors not open to private sector investment
e.g.
(I) Atomic energy and
(II) Railway operations (other than permitted activities
mentioned in entry 18 of Annex B).

Note: Foreign technology collaboration in any form including licensing for franchise, trademark, brand name, management contract is also prohibited for Lottery Business and Gambling and Betting activities.”

2. Annexure B has been amended as under: –
a. I n the existing entry 12.1, for the clauses (ii) and (iii), the following shall be substituted, namely:
“(ii) Infrastructure” refers to facilities required for functioning of units located in the Industrial Park and includes roads (including approach roads), railway line/sidings including electrified railway lines and connectivities to the main railway line, water supply and sewerage, common effluent treatment facility, telecom network, generation and distribution of power, air conditioning.

(iii) “Common Facilities” refer to the facilities available for all the units located in the industrial park, and include facilities of power, roads (including approach roads), railway line/sidings including electrified railway lines and connectivities to the main railway line, water supply and sewerage, common effluent treatment, common testing, telecom services, air conditioning, common facility buildings, industrial canteens, convention/ conference halls, parking, travel desks, security service, first aid center, ambulance and other safety services, training facilities and such other facilities meant for common use of the units located in the Industrial Park.”

b. T he following new Clause 18 has been added and certain other clauses have been re-numbered: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 46 dated 8th December, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 312/2014-RB dated 2nd July, 2014 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Review of FDI policy – Sector Specific conditions – Defence

This Notification & circular have made the following two changes in to Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000 pertaining to FDI in Defence Sector so as to bring it line with the Press Notes issued by DIPP.

The amendments are as under: –
1. I n Regulation 14(3)(iv)(D) the words “Defence Sector” have been deleted.
2. Paragraph 6 of Annexure B pertaining to “Defence Sector” has been substituted as under: –



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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 45 dated 8th December, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 312/2014-RB dated 2nd July, 2014 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Review of FDI policy – Sector Specific conditions

This circular has amended Annexure B of Schedule 1 to Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000 with regard to sectoral classification/conditionalities for FDI/Foreign Investment so as to align it with the Circular on Consolidated FDI Policy issued by the DIPP on 17th April, 2014. The amended clauses are annexed to this Circular.

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Press Note No. 10 (2014 Series) dated December 03, 2014

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Review of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy on the Construction Development Sector – amendment to ‘Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2014’ 

This Press Note has with immediate effect revised paragraph 6.2.11 of ‘Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2014’ as under: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43 dated 2nd December, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 324/2014-RB dated 31st October, 2014 Remittance of Assets – Submission of Auditor’s certificate

This circular reiterates that RBI will not issue any instructions under the FEMA, 1999 with respect to submition of certificates on tax payments. Banks will have to comply with the instructions issued by CBDT with respect to requirements under the tax laws, as applicable.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42 dated 28th November8, 2014

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Import of Gold (under 20: 80 Scheme) by Nominated Banks/Agencies/Entities

This circular states that the 80 : 20 scheme for import of gold and all instuctions/restrictions pertaining thereto stand withdrawn with immediate effect.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 41 dated 25th November, 2014

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Routing of funds raised abroad to India

This
circular states that when funds raised overseas by overseas
holding/associate/subsidiary/group companies of Indian Companies are
routed back to the Indian companies: –

1. Indian
companies/their banks must not issue any direct or indirect guarantee or
create any contingent liability or offer any security in any form for
such borrowings by their overseas holding/associate/subsidiary/ group
companies except for the purposes explicitly permitted in the relevant
Regulations.

2. Funds raised abroad by overseas
holding/associate /subsidiary/group companies of Indian companies with
support of the Indian companies/their banks, as mentioned above, cannot
be used in India unless it conforms to the general or specific
permission granted under the relevant Regulations.

3. Indian
companies/their banks using or establishing structures which contravene
the above will be liable for penal action as prescribed under FEMA,
1999.

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Period of Holding on Conversion of Leasehold Property into Ownership

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Issue for Consideration
When an
immovable property held as a capital asset is transferred, for
computation of the capital gains, it is essential to first identify the
period of holding of the asset transferred for determining as to whether
the property was a long-term capital asset or a short term capital
asset by applying the definitions of long-term capital asset and short
term capital asset contained in sections 2(29A) and 2(42A) respectively,
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. If the immovable property was held for
more than 36 months, it is a long-term capital asset, or else it is a
short term capital asset. Such classification is important, because the
manner of computation of the gains is more beneficial in the case of
long-term capital gains. Such gains are also taxable at a lower rate,
besides qualifying for certain exemptions.

The complication
arises when the immovable property that is being transferred was to
begin with taken on lease by the assessee, and the leasehold rights
therein were thereafter converted into ownership rights within a period
of 36 months prior to the date of transfer of the immovable property,
with the combined total period of lease and ownership put together
exceeding 36 months. In such cases, the question that has arisen for
consideration is whether the property that is under transfer can be said
to have been held for more than 36 months or not, and accordingly
whether it will be regarded as a long-term capital asset or whether it
would be treated as a short term capital asset.

While the
Karnataka and the Bombay High Courts have taken the view that the gains
arising on sale of the property under such circumstances would be a
short term capital gains, the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary
view and held that the gains would be classified as longterm capital
gains .

Dr. V. V. Mody’s case
The issue first came up before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Dr. V. V. Mody 218 ITR 1.

In
this case, the assessee was allotted a site by the development
authority in 1972 on lease with a stipulation that the asset in question
would be sold after a period of 10 years to the assesse. A
lease-cum-sale agreement was executed at that point of time, providing
for payment of certain amount by the assessee, and that on payment of
the entire sale consideration, conveyance was agreed to be executed in
favour of the assessee at the end of the 10th year. Subsequently, in
pursuance of the said agreement, a sale deed was executed in favour of
the assessee in March 1982, which was registered in May 1982. The
assessee sold the site in November 1982, and claimed that the capital
gains arising on sale was a long term capital gain, since he held the
site since 1972.

The assessing officer treated the gains as a
short term capital gain, holding that the assessee acquired the site
only in March 1982, when the conveyance was executed in his favour and
the asset that was transferred was a short term capital asset in the
hands of the assessee. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s
appeal, agreeing with the view of the assessee that the site had been
held by him since 1972. On appeal by the revenue, the tribunal held that
the rights acquired under the lease-cum-sale agreement were also
capital assets. It held that on transfer of the site, the assessee had
in fact transferred a bundle of rights, a part of which (half) were held
as a long term capital asset. It accordingly directed that 50% of the
sale consideration should be regarded as received pertaining to the
transfer of the short term capital asset , with 50% of the consideration
being regarded as pertaining to the transfer of the long term capital
asset, with 50% of the cost of the asset being attributed to each of the
components.

Before the Karnataka High Court, on behalf of the
assessee, it was argued that the lease rights held by the assessee was a
capital asset, since the expression “property of any kind” in the
definition of capital asset in section 2(14) was wide enough to include
rights enjoyed by an assessee in respect of immovable property, even
though such rights were inferior to the rights of ownership of the
property. It was argued that transfer of such lights would legitimately
give rise to capital gains, and since these rights were held for more
than 36 months, the gains was to be treated as a long-term capital gain.

The Karnataka High Court noted that there were two questions
which arose for consideration before it – what was the capital asset
that had been transferred by the assessee giving rise to the capital
gains, and since when was that capital asset held by the assessee.
According to the High Court, the answers to these questions were
straight and simple. The asset transferred was title to the site, which
the assessee held on the basis of the conveyance in his favour since
March 1982. The gain was therefore a short term capital gain.

The
High Court noted that the approach adopted by the tribunal implied that
the transfer made by the assessee pertained to both the lease rights as
well as title to the property, which in turn meant that as on the date
of the transfer in favour of the purchaser, the assessee combined in
himself the dual capacity of being not only the owner of the property,
but also the lessee thereof. According to the High Court, this approach
was not legally sound and ignored the legal effect of the transfer of
absolute title in favour of the assessee, who was holding the site in
question till March 1982, only on the basis of the leasecum- sale
agreement.

The significance of the transfer was that it brought
about a merger of the lesser interest held by the assessee in the bigger
estate acquired by him under the sale deed in his favour. Merger
implied the vesting of lesser rights held by an individual in the larger
estate that he may acquire qua the property in question. It postulated
the extinction of the lesser estate, whenever the person holding any
such estate acquired a greater estate in respect of the same property.
In the event of the lesser and the greater estate is coinciding in the
same individual, the lesser got annihilated, ground or sunk in the
larger. The doctrine owed its origin to the English common law, but with
equity intervening, the position in England was that merger would be
deemed to take place only in case the party acquiring the larger estate
intended so. The High Court noted that this position was accepted, even
in India except to the extent that the statutory provisions like the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 mandated otherwise. The High Court noted
the observations made by the Supreme Court in Jyotish Thakur vs.
Tarakant Jha AIR 1963 SC 605 in this regard.

The Karnataka High
Court noted that the assessee held the site in question under an
agreement of lease cum sale, and that it was not in dispute that in so
far as an agreement to sell was concerned, it did not create any right
in the property agreed to be sold. The assessee had valuable interest in
the site in his capacity as a lessee, which leasehold rights was a
capital asset. These rights, being a lesser estate in comparison to the
larger one representing the title or the property, merged with the
larger estate upon the assessee acquiring the title to the property
under the sale deed.

The  Karnataka  high  Court  noted  that  there  were  two questions which arose for consideration before it – what was the capital asset that had been transferred by the assessee giving rise to the capital gains, and since when was that capital asset held by the assessee. According to the high Court, the answers to these questions were straight  and  simple.  The  asset  transferred  was  title  to the site, which the assessee held on the basis of the conveyance in his favour since march 1982. the gain was therefore a short term capital gain.

The high Court noted that the approach adopted by the tribunal implied that the transfer made by the assessee pertained to both the lease rights as well as title to the property, which in turn meant that as on the date of the transfer in favour of the purchaser, the assessee combined in himself the dual capacity of being not only the owner of the property, but also the lessee thereof. According to the high Court, this approach was not legally sound and ignored the legal effect of the transfer of absolute title    in favour of the assessee, who was holding the site in question till march 1982, only on the basis of the lease- cum-sale agreement.

The significance of the transfer was that it brought about a merger of the lesser interest held by the assessee in the bigger estate acquired by him under the sale deed in his favour. Merger implied the vesting of lesser rights held by an individual in the larger estate that he may acquire qua the property in question. It postulated the extinction of the lesser estate, whenever the person holding any such estate acquired a greater estate in respect of the same property. in the event of the lesser and the greater estate is coinciding in the same individual, the lesser got annihilated,  ground  or  sunk  in  the  larger.  The  doctrine owed its origin to the english common law, but with equity intervening, the position in england was that merger would be deemed to take place only in case the party acquiring the larger estate intended so. the high Court noted that this position was accepted, even in india except to the extent that the statutory provisions like the transfer of Property act, 1882 mandated otherwise. The high Court noted the observations made by the Supreme Court in jyotish  Thakur  vs. Tarakant  Jha AIR  1963  SC 605 in this regard.

The Karnataka high Court noted that the assessee held the site in question under an agreement of lease cum sale, and that it was not in dispute that in so far as an agreement to sell was concerned, it did not create any right in the property agreed to be sold. The assessee had valuable interest in the site in his capacity as a lessee, which leasehold rights was a capital asset. these rights, being a lesser estate in comparison to the larger one representing the title or the property, merged with the larger estate upon the assessee acquiring the title to the property under the sale deed.

The Karnataka high Court noted the provisions of section 111(d) of the transfer of Property act, which provided that a lease of immovable property determined in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property became vested at the same time in one person in the same right. According to the high Court, this provision recognised what was true even on first principles, i.e., a person cannot be a tenant and landlord qua the same property at the same time. In the opinion of the high Court, the question of the assessee intending to keep the two capacities or estates, namely one of leasehold rights and the other of ownership, separately from each other or any such separation of the interests held by him being beneficial to the assessee, did not arise. The question of intention of the assessee or his interest would arise only if the situation was not covered by the provisions of section 111 (d).

The  Karnataka  high  Court  noted  that  from  the  date of sale in favour of the assessee, the assessee  had  only one capacity to describe himself qua the land in question, and that was the capacity of being the absolute owner of the same. it was in that capacity alone that the assessee transferred his title over the site in favour of the purchaser. the sale did not describe the transfer made in favour of the purchaser to be one of the rights which the assessee held in respect of the site prior to the sale deed. All such rights had sunk or drowned in the larger estate and therefore stood extinguished. The legal effect of the transfer made in favour of the assessee was that he had become the absolute owner of the property and therefore all that he could convey and did actually convey to the transferee was the absolute title in the property without any reference to any inferior rights that the assessee had held prior to his becoming owner.

Viewed from that angle, according to the Karnataka high Court, it was apparent that what the assessee transferred had been held by him only from the date of the sale deed in his favour and not earlier to that. Therefore, in the view of the high Court, the question of splitting up the sale price or the cost of acquisition of the asset separately for the purposes of short-term and long-term capital gains did not arise.

The  high  Court  rejected  the  argument  of  the  assessee regarding the transfer of leasehold rights by the assessee, which were long-term capital assets.  according  to  it, the issue was not whether such leasehold rights were    a property or a capital asset, but  whether  any  such right existed and could be transferred by the assessee after it had merged in the larger estate acquired by the assessee.  This  was  so  because  what  was  transferred by the assessee was not the lesser  interest  held  by him prior to becoming the absolute owner, but the total interest acquired by him in the form of absolute title to the property. Unless it was possible for the assessee to hold the two estates simultaneous and independent of each other, the transfer of the title in the property could not be deemed to be a transfer of both the larger and the lesser estates, so as to make them amenable to the process of splitting into long term and short term capital gains.

The   Karnataka   high   Court   therefore   held   that   as from march 1982, the assessee had only one estate representing the title to the property, and the capital gain arising from the transfer of this estate gave rise to a short term gain.

A similar view was taken by the Bombay high Court in the case of CIT vs. Dr. D. A. Irani 234 ITR 850, where it dealt with a case of an assessee having tenancy right over a flat, who acquired the ownership rights to the flat and sold the flat within 5 months of acquisition. In that case as well, the Bombay high Court applied the provisions of section 111(d) of the transfer of Property act, to hold that the gain on sale of the flat was a short term capital gain.

Rama rani kalia’s case

the issue again came up recently before the allahabad high Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Rama Rani Kalia 358 ITR 499. in this case, the assessee acquired a property on leasehold basis in 1984. She applied for freehold rights, which were granted by the collector in march 2004. Within 3 days thereafter, the property was sold. the assessee claimed the capital gains on sale of the property to be long term capital gains.

The assessing officer took the view that since the property was sold within 3 days of conversion of the leasehold rights into freehold rights, the capital gains was a short term  capital  gains.  The  Commissioner(appeals)  held that the conversion of leasehold property into freehold property was an improvement of title over the property, since the assessee was the owner of the property even prior to conversion. He therefore held that the gain was a long term capital gains. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner(appeals).

The  allahabad  high  Court  noted  that  the  difference between a short term capital asset and a long-term capital asset was the period for which the property had been held by the assessee, and not the  nature of title  or the property. according to the high Court, the lessee  of the property had rights as owner of the property for all  purposes,  subject  to  covenants  of  the  lease.  The lessee may transfer the leasehold rights of the property with the consent of the lessor, subject to covenants of the lease deed. The conversion of the rights of the lessee in the property from leasehold right into freehold was only by way of improvement of rights over the property, which she enjoyed.

According to the allahabad high Court, the conversion would not have any effect on the taxability of gains from such property, which was related to the period over which the property was held. Since the property was held by the assessee as a lessee since 1984, and was transferred  in march 2004, after the leasehold rights were converted into freehold rights of the same property, which was in her possession, the conversion was by way of improvement of title, which, according to the high Court, would not have any effect on the taxability of profits .

The allahabad high Court therefore held that the gains arising on sale of property was long term capital gains.

The  allahabad  high  Court,  in  yet  another  decision, delivered in ita no. 134 of 2007 dated 22-11-2007, in the case of Dhiraj Shyamji Chauhan has confirmed that the period of holding in such cases should commence from the date of acquiring leasehold rights.

Observations
The Supreme Court, in the case of A.R. Krishnamurthy vs. CIT 176 ITR 417, held that a land is a bundle of rights. the issue is whether these rights are separable, whether they can be separately transferred, and if transferred together, whether it is possible to bifurcate the rights between those held for more than 36 months and those held for a shorter period. in the case of A R Krishnamurthy, the Supreme Court considered a situation of grant of mining rights, which was one of the bundle of rights acquired on acquisition of the land. in that case, the Supreme Court directed bifurcation of the cost of acquisition to compute the capital gains. In that case, of course, it was the assessee himself who separated the rights, and transferred one of the rights. The court found that each of the rights comprised in the bundle was capable of being separately transferred for a valuable consideration. Conversely, the different rights in an asset can be acquired at different point of time, acquisition     of each of which has the effect of improving the title of the acquirer over the property.   The doctrine of merger, embodied in the transfer of Property act, provides that on acquisition, by the lessee, of the freehold rights in a property, the lesser estate of the lessee i.e., his leasehold rights merge into a larger estate of the lessee i.e., his freehold rights. . .

Section 111 (d) of the transfer of Property act provides as under:

111. A lease of immovable property determines – (a)…..
(b)…..
(c)    ….
(d)    in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right.

From the statutory provision, it is clear that a lease comes to an end when the same person is both the owner as well as the lessee of the property, and therefore the subject matter of transfer is the ownership rights in the property, which remain on merger, to the buyer of the property. To that extent, the views of the Karnataka high Court and the Bombay High Court at first seem to be justified when the courts dealt with the nature of rights or the title that the buyer acquired. What perhaps, was overlooked, with respect, and had remained unaddressed, was the issue whether the asset in question was held for a longer period that began with the date of acquiring the leasehold rights in the property. This issue was specifically dealt with by the allahabad high court in the later decision which after considering the ratio of the decision of the Karnataka high court chose to take a contrary view.

The issue in question, as identified by the Allahabad High Court, is about the period of holding of a capital asset which is determined with reference to the period for which an asset is ‘held by an assessee’. the property all along remained the same i.e., an immovable property. What was changed was the rights over the property – from leasehold  to  ownership.  the  assessee  remained  the same. Holding a property under a leasehold right as a lessee, is also a recognised mode of holding the property. It is only when the property in question is changed, that the period of holding is shortened, for e.g., warrants to shares. When the property remains the same, the change in the title to the property is not a relevant factor for the purposes of the income-tax act.

It is a settled position that lease is one of the modes of acquisition of an immovable property and that leasehold rights are a capital asset capable of being transferred. Applying the law of section 2(47) to the case of a purchase or acquisition, it is possible to hold that an asset is acquired on execution of a lease deed. It is also clear that an immovable property comprises of a bundle of rights and grant of lease is one such right.

In the case of R. K. Palshikar HUF vs. CIT 172 ITR 311, the Supreme Court held that grant of a lease of a property for 99 years amounts to transfer of the property, giving rise to capital gains. if that is the position, and under tax laws, the owner is regarded as having transferred the property, the logical consequence should be that the lessee is then regarded as the deemed owner, a position that is acknowledged by section 27 of the act. Even A.
R. Krishnamurthy’s case (supra) was a case of grant of a mining lease for 10 years, where the Supreme Court followed r. K. Palshikar huf’s decision (supra), taking a view that transfer of capital asset in section 45 includes grant of mining lease for any period.

In fact, section 27 of the income-tax act provides that a person who acquires any rights (excluding any rights by way of a lease from month to month or for a period not exceeding one year) in or with respect to any building or part thereof, by virtue of any such transaction referred to in section 269UA(F), is deemed to be the owner of that building or part thereof. Section 269UA(F), which dealt with acquisition proceedings, refers to, inter alia, a lease for a period exceeding 12 years. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the income-tax act regards the property as having been transferred to the lessee if the lease is for a period exceeding 12 years.

Under such circumstances, is it appropriate to say that the lessee was really not the owner, for the period that he was a lessee, when it comes to payment of capital gains taxes, even if he was a lessee for more than 12 years?

The cost of acquisition is a significant factor in computation of the capital gains. The cost in certain specified cases remains the historical cost, and, in those cases, the courts have taken a consistent view that the period of holding should also be so taken, by relating it back, in the interest of the harmonious construction of the provisions of the act, [h.f.Craig harvey  244 itr 578 (mad.), and manjula j. Shah, 355 itr 474(Bom)].

Alternatively, the cost would have to be taken as the market value as on the date of conversion where a view is taken that the period of holding should be determined with reference to the date of acquisition of the new asset. The law on this aspect is very clear that the cost should be the market value.

In case of an asset held under a deed of conveyance executed in pursuance of an agreement for sale, the period of holding should commence from the date of agreement and not of the deed, though on execution of the deed, the rights under the agreement are extinguished and absolute rights are acquired in the asset.

It may not be possible to separate the gains in two parts nor may it be possible to divide the consideration, but the period of holding can surely be said to have begun from the date of the lease, particularly in a case where the lessee has acquired a dominion over the property with   a right to transfer the same in lieu of consideration paid by him. In fact, in dr. V. V. mody’s case, the lease was coupled with the right to acquire ownership after a period of ten years, which right itself was a capital asset. The definition of the term ‘capital asset’ u/s. 2(14) includes a ‘property of any kind’ and is wide enough to cover the case of a leasehold right. Having acquired a capital asset, it does not vanish in thin air, unless it is lawfully transferred or is improved upon.

The issue therefore is not whether there were two estates or one but is all about the period of holding of the property. It may be that the latest rights that are transferred may not be old, but the property that is transferred is certainly old. Even the pedigree of the new rights is ancestral.

Various explanations contained in ssection  2(42a)  of the Act, precisely confirm the theory of harmonious construction by extending the period of holding in cases of various financial assets referred to therein. This principle also is approved by section 55 of the act. in all cases, where the historical cost is frozen in time, the period of holding of the new asset is extended to cover the period of holding of the old asset as well. this is, otherwise, also true on first principles of taxation.

One strong view is that the issue cannot be determined with reference to the provisions of section 111 of the transfer  of  Property  act.  These  provisions  have  the limited impact of explaining the title of a person over a property.  they  simply  explain  that  the  inferior  rights  of a  person  are  transformed  into  the  superior  rights.  this does not affect the period of holding of the property at all. It only improves the legal title to the property. Tax laws clearly recognise the concept of holding of an asset other than by way of legal title – leasehold rights in a property is one such form of ownership.

In fact, the delhi high Court, in a recent decision in the case of CIT vs. Frick India Ltd. 369 ITR 328, has analysed the meaning of the term “held by the assessee” u/s. 2(42A) as under:

“We would like to elucidate and explain the expression, “held by the assessee” in some detail. General words should normally receive plain and ordinary construction but this principle is subject to the context in which the words are used as the words  reflect  the  intention  of the Legislature. The words have to be construed and interpreted to effectuate the object and purpose of the provision, when they are capable of multiple meanings or are ambiguous. Isolated reading of words can on occasions negate the very purpose. Lord Diplock had referred to the term, “business” as an ‘etymological chameleon’, which suits its meaning to the context in which it is found. The background, therefore, has to be given due regard and not to be ignored, to avoid absurdities. This principle is applicable when we interpret the word, “held” in section 2(42A) of the Act, for the said word is capable of divergent and different connotations and understanding.

The word, ‘held’ as used in section 2(42A) of the Act is with reference to a capital asset and the term, ‘capital asset’ is not confined and restricted to ownership of a property or an asset. Capital assets can consist of rights other than ownership right in an asset, like leasehold rights, allotment rights, etc. The sequitur, therefore, is that the word ‘held’ or ‘hold’ is not synonymous with right over the asset as an owner and has to be given a broader and wider meaning. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, the word ‘hold’ has been given a variety of meanings under nine different headings. Four of them, i.e, 1, 4, 8 and 9 read as under:

‘1. To possess in virtue of a lawful title; as in the expression, common in grants, “to have and to hold,” or in that applied to notes, “the owner and holder.”
** ** **
4. To maintain or sustain; to be under the necessity or duty of sustaining or proving; as when it is said that a party “holds the affirmative” or negative of an issue in a cause.
** ** **
8.    To possess; to occupy; to be in possession and administration of; as to hold office.

The word ‘held’ was interpreted to mean “lawfully held, to possess by legal title”. The term ‘legal title’ here not only includes ownership, but also title or right of a tenant, which will mean actual possession of the land and a  right to hold the same and claim possession thereof as a tenant (we are not examining rights of a rank trespasser in the  present  decision  and  we  express  no  opinion  in that regard).”

From  this,  it  is  clear  that  the  term  “held”  need  not necessarily refer to only the period of holding as an owner.

Under the law contained in the income-tax act, 1961, in the context, there are only two possibilities:

a.    a transfer arises on conversion of leasehold rights into ownership rights in which case;
i.    liability to capital gains is attracted on such conversion, and
ii.    the fair market value becomes the cost of acquisition of the new asset,
 
9.    To keep; to retain; to maintain possession of or authority over.’

or

b.    there is no transfer on such conversion and the period of holding is extended to include the period during which the asset was held on lease.

The latter view seems to be the more equitable view of the matter, but given the views of the Karnataka and Bombay high Courts, the debate will ultimately be settled only by a decision of the Supreme Court.

Auditing profession at the crossroads

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I intended to sign off the year 2014 on a much happier note, putting before the readers the thoughts of a resurgent India, expectations of economic reform and the prospects of a prosperous year to come. However, two events compelled me write on a much more serious issue. The first was an article on “Accounting scandals” which appeared in the Economist on 13th December, and the second was the report of the CAG on third-party reporting tabled before the Parliament on 19th December.

The Economist article describes an erroneous decision made by the investment guru Warren Buffett, attributed to a grave accounting error which was not noticed by the auditors. The article describes a large number of business failures, resulting in huge losses to investors which could have been avoided if there had been proper reporting by auditors. The article, a balanced one, states that the auditors, at the very least, failed to raise an alarm.

Back home, the CAG report on tax audit reports is far more scathing. According to the report, the errors by the tax auditors, resulted in a short levy of taxes to the extent of Rs. 2,813 crore.The CAG audit report lists specific areas where tax auditors have failed to perform their duties. The report recommends action against errant auditors. While it is likely that some of the views expressed by the auditor may be on account of a genuine difference in interpretation, or some may be bona fide errors, it is improbable that this is the case in respect of all shortcomings that have been reported.This may occur on account of the tax auditor not having the requisite skill set. While I do not wish to engage self-flagellation, it is true that some of our professional colleagues have not realised that if one is to deliver quality service, knowledge needs to be continuously updated. One cannot afford to rest content with what one has learnt in the past. There is one issue that also needs attention. The tax audit report at the stage that it was introduced was expected to assist the assessing authorities in framing assessments. From an assurance on correctness of data form 3CD now requires expression of opinion on a number of issues some of them complex. Is this what is expected of the auditor? Possibly the regulator that is the ICAI and the concerned authorities need to revisit some aspects in regard to the scope of the report.

As regards audit which gives an assurance in regard to financial statements, over the last few years there has been a continuous erosion of the confidence which investors, regulators and the general public reposed in the ability and integrity of auditors. One talks of the “expectation gap” on a number of occasions, but it has widened rather than narrowed.

The real scope of audit, and the limitations in which an auditor functions have not been appreciated by the users of financial statements, and the profession has failed to educate them. Nearly a century ago, a British judge had said that an auditor is a “watchdog and not a bloodhound”. The auditing profession has used that assertion as a shield, while not realising that a domesticated watchdog may gradually forget his true role. What is expected by the public is a guarantee that the accounting statements are true and correct, while what the auditors express is an opinion on the accounts with significant caveats which are not understood by the reader at all. While one fully understands that it is virtually impossible to give a guarantee of accuracy of accounts, given the gamut of complex accounting rules and standards it is extremely difficult for the user to understand the true import of the “opinion” expressed. This expectation gap must be bridged urgently if the auditing profession intends to retain the respect and confidence of the users of financial statements.

The second aspect which is a cause for concern is the conflict of interest. The users or beneficiaries of the services of the auditor do not pay for the same. In practice, investors have very little say in the appointment of an auditor or in determining his compensation. The purchasers of his services, do so only because they are required to. To put it bluntly, an auditor is appointed not because the management believes that he will add value but because there is a statutory mandate. Therefore, in theory, an auditor protects the interests of shareholders and regulators, but in practice, his concern is that if he barks too loudly he will be driven out. The Companies Act, 2013 seeks to address this problem by providing for rotation of audits. To what extent this will be successful remains to be seen.

Another problem is that the users of auditing service have a serious lack of choice. The Economist article points out that more than 90% of the top companies are audited by the big four. Managements tend to choose from among these auditors believing that if any other service provider is used, it may not be acceptable to investors. With large companies having business interests across the globe, the tendency is to deal with a firm who has presence in all countries. While one can have no quarrel with the prosperity of our professional brothers, companies need to realise that there is local talent with the same quality, if not better, in the auditing profession in many countries. If there is serious competition, auditing firms may be on their toes to ensure a value add, rather than ensuring compliance with the letter of the regulation.

In this scenario where the profession is being blamed, what is the solution? One obvious answer is the deterrent legal action against the apparent wrong doers. The Economist article states that given the judicial system and the complex accounting rules auditors have been able to ward off compensation claims with minimal payouts. Other penal actions have also not been very successful.

The only lasting solution is regulation. While there are no immediate answers, it is necessary to ensure greater healthy competition among service providers. The profession is already looking at consolidation in mid-size firms and that process needs to accelerate. The “audit committees” of companies need to be given more teeth and need to be manned by independent professionals. Another suggested remedy is scrapping of the statutory requirement for audit altogether. The supporters of this theory say that this will ensure that service providers pay more attention to what value addition they can provide and what users of service really want.

The Economist article contains a novel solution by Joshua Ronen, a professor at a New York university. He propounds a concept of”financial statements insurance”. Insurance firms will provide coverage to protect shareholders from accounting errors and will hire auditors to assess the odds of a misstatement.

This being the last editorial for the year, let me not end on a gloomy note. Our profession, hitherto dominated by the male species has seen an increasing number of young lady entrants. Let us then welcome the young ladies to the profession. May their tribe increase!

Wishing all readers a very happy and prosperous 2015,

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LEARNING FROM A SAINT

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“All the Darkness in the world does not have the power
to snuff out a single candle”

Life has a strange way of giving lessons. Unexpected events happen and they give one’s life a new direction. One such incident helped to direct me to “the path less travelled”. It must be twenty years ago, that professional work took me to Halol in Gujarat. My colleague and I had one evening free. Somebody suggested that we should visit Muni Seva Ashram situated a short distance away, run by a saintly lady Smt. Anuben Thakkar. We accepted the suggestion. I am glad we did.

We reached the Ashram in the early evening to be greeted by Anuben herself. She was dressed in saffron clothes. It was twenty years ago, that Anuben decided to commit her life to work for the poorest of the poor. Her Guru indicated to her four places on the map. She told me, “I selected Waghodia, which was the worst place. If I had to light a lamp, should I not do so at the darkest place!” The place selected by her was infested with robbers. The Collector and Police authorities tried to persuade her to move to another place in the interest of her safety. But she did not budge. She built her hut with the material borrowed from the villagers and started work by looking after the children of the women, when their mothers went to work in the fields.

This was the first lesson. It taught me that if I had a choice. I should select work which helps the poorest of the poor that is most difficult. The first lesson was:

“If you want to light a candle, light it at the
darkest places”

When we were taken around the Ashram, we saw what Anuben was able to achieve in just 20 years. There were 20 day care centres. There were two residential schools with 250 children each. There was an Orphanage, where there were 80 kids. Anuben’s direction to donors was that, they should not give broken toys and torn clothes for the children. They should give only such things as they would give to their own children! Apart from these, she also had an old age home for 40 people and a 60-bed hospital……..and a nurse’s training centre! The last one which we were shown was a separate unit for 100 girls with intellectual disabilities, which was a recent addition. Parents of one such daughter cried their heart out. To look after 100 such girls and with so much love and affection was something only Anuben could do. Her dream was to set up a full-scale cancer hospital. This hospital had already been setup and was doing fantastic work. The project was started by her, but sadly she did not survive to see the full fledged hospital working.

All along people like us have not done anything on the pretext that the problem is so vast and we alone cannot do much. Here was a lady whom I considered to be less educated, less impressive in personality, with lesser resources and lesser connections. If she could do so much in such a short time, I had no business not to put in my best efforts and do whatever little I can. May be I could achieve only a small fraction of what Anuben achieved. But I had no excuse for running away from the problems of our people. The second lesson was this:

“Do not ask what ‘I’ alone can do”

Anuben was explaining how the centre for those mentally retarded girls came up. “The government gave the land so I started.” I could not help asking as to where the money came from and how could she start without entering that the required money would be available. Her reply was simple, “It is God’s work………He was bound to send money and He did!” This was an eye opener and also the third lesson. This is the experience of several social workers. Whenever they took up such work with faith, where the help came from one does not know. This was the third lesson.

“If one takes up god’s work with sincerity, he never
lets one down”

So friends, let us select a place which is the darkest and light our candles. Do not ask what we alone can do, and have faith that God will not let us down. Let us begin and let us begin now.

“Let me light my lamp
Says the star
 And never debate
If it will help to remove the darkness”

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Sales vis-à-vis Free supply of goods

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Introduction
Sales tax is leviable, when there is sale of goods. The term ‘sale’ is defined in the sales tax laws. The Hon. Supreme Court has also analysed the said term in number of judgments. The landmark judgment is in case of Gannon Dunkerly and Co. (9 STC 353)(SC), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under in relation to ‘sale transaction’:

“Thus, according to the law both of England and of India, in order to constitute a sale it is necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods, which of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it must be supported by money consideration, and that as a result of the transaction property must actually pass in the goods ……”

From above passage it is clear that to be a ‘sale’ following criteria need to be fulfilled.

(i) There should be two parties to contract i.e. seller and purchaser,
(ii) The subject matter of sale is moveable goods,
(iii) T here must be money consideration and
(iv) Transfer of property i.e. transfer of ownership from seller to purchaser.

Therefore before levying sales tax, fulfillment of above criteria is necessary.

Amongst others, it is also clear from the above that the consideration is one of the requirements for constituting ‘sale’ and in fact that is the measure of tax, normally referred to as “sale price”. Determination of sale price is debatable issue.

Free supply by customer
Sometimes, the buyer supplies certain items like moulds, tools and dies etc. to the supplier. The said supply is for manufacturing goods which are eventually to be sold to the said buyer who has supplied such items. Since such items belong to the buyer, the buyer may be writing off such items in their books of account by way of amortisation (also can be equated with depreciation). For purpose of excise payment such amortisation may be added to the cost of such items supplied by the supplier. However, question arises whether such amount is required to be added in the sale price of the supplier and whether supplier is liable to pay tax on such higher value.

Consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
The Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with such situation in case of Ts Tech Sun (India) Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (15 VST 559)(SC). The facts as narrated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 are as under:

“Department, in this case, has sought to load amortized cost of the moulds supplied by its customer to the sale price of auto components in the hands of the appellant herein. According to the department, under section 4(1) (a) of the 1944 Act, value has to be the normal price, which has to be the sole consideration and if the price fixed is without consideration for the moulds then, according to the department, it cannot be said that price was sole consideration. In other words, according to the department, if the consideration for moulds is not taken into account then under the excise law, price, which is the measure of value, cannot be said to be the sole consideration. According to the department, in this case, price of auto components sold by the appellant was fixed or to be fixed by inter se negotiations. That, without the price of the moulds being taken into account, the price of the finished product would not reflect the real assessable value. According to the department, without the supply of moulds from its customer, final product could not be made. By use of the moulds, the appellant was able to manufacture the auto components. Therefore, according to the department, some money value was required to be attributed on account of usage of moulds as such moulds contributed to the value of the final product, namely, auto components. Therefore, by not taking into account the money value of moulds supplied by the customer, the price stood depressed. In the circumstances, according to the department, amortised cost had to be loaded to the price charged or chargeable by the appellant for the finished products.

On the above case of the department, the question which arises for determination in this civil appeal is whether section 4 of the 1944 Act read with rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 (“Excise Valuation Rules, 2000”) can be read into section 3 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948?”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court thereafter analysed the legal position with reference to Excise law and Sales tax. The relevant observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court are in para 16 as under:

“Before analysing section 3 of the 1948 Act, it is important to keep in mind that in income-tax cases, tax is exigible on “real income” which means the actual income received by or which accrues to the assessee. In case of sales tax, tax is exigible on real price received or receivable by the dealer in respect of a sale. A dealer is entitled to frame his price-structure in a manner conducive to the type of his business or with a view to withstand the competition. In a given case, cost may be more than the price. The dealer may base his price-structure to give an incentive to his clients, agents, distributors, etc., particularly if he is a manufacturer. In such cases, his price-structure has to be scrutinised by the department under the sales tax law to find out the real sale price receivable by him. There may be cases where he is required to give a discount on account of defect in quality or delay. The important thing to be noted is that “price” is the amount of consideration which a seller charges the buyer for parting with the title to the goods. It comprises of the amount which the dealer himself has to pay for the purchase of the goods, the expenditure, which he is to incur for transporting the goods from the place of purchase to the place of sale, the duties, if any, levied on the particular goods bought by him, the octroi duty, which he may have had to pay and his own margin of profit after meeting handling charges including interest on the capital invested. The cost price of the goods actually paid by him under various heads of accounts would no doubt constitute the consideration for which he would part with his title to the goods. The entire amount of consideration, including the sales tax component, which the purchaser pays, would constitute the price of goods. To this extent, there is no difficulty. The difficulty comes in when by law or by legal fiction the department seeks to introduce a notional concept as an element of the “real price”. This is particularly important when there is no rule to that effect in the sales tax law. Even under the definition of “turnover” in section 2(i) one has to take into account only the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold. It is this aggregate amount which is taxable under section 3 read with section 2(i) of the 1948 Act.”

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has drawn the conclusion in para 19 as under:

“U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 is a self-contained code for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods in Uttar Pradesh. Clause (bb) of section 2 defines the expression “trade tax” to mean a tax payable under the Act. Clause (h) of section 2 defines the expression “sale” to include transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose for cash or deferred payment or other valuable with section 3F of the 1948 Act. Section 3, inter alia, provides that every dealer shall for each assessment year pay a tax at the rates provided under section 3A, section 3D or section 3H on his turnover of sales or purchases or both, as the case may be, which shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 3F provides for tax on transfer of right to use any goods or goods involved in execution of works contract. The definition of “sale” in section 2(h) is in two parts. The first part covers the normal sale and the second part covers deemed sales. In the present case, we are concerned with sale of auto components to the buyer. It is a normal sale. The aggregate amount for which these auto parts/components are sold constitutes the turnover relating to such sales within the meaning of turnover in section 2(i). Therefore, it is on such turnover that liability of tax under section 3 of the 1948 Act has to be determined. Therefore, sales tax or trade tax under the 1948 Act is leviable on sale, whether actual or deemed, and for every sale there has to be a consideration. On the other hand, excise duty is a levy on a taxable event of “manufacture” and it is calculated on the “value” of manufactured goods. Excise duty is not concerned with ownership or sale. The liability under the excise law is event-based and irrespective of whether the goods are sold or captively consumed. Under the excise law, the liability is there even when the manufacturer is not the owner of raw material or finished goods (as in the case of job workers). Excise duty, therefore, is independent of ownership (see: Ujagar Prints vs. Union of India [1989] 3 SCC 488(1)). Therefore, for sales tax purposes, what has to be taken into account is the consideration for transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer. For this purpose, tax is to be levied on the agreed consideration for transfer of property in the goods and in such a case cost of manufacture is irrelevant. As compared to the sales tax law, the scheme of levy of excise duty is totally different. For excise duty purposes, transfer of property in goods or ownership is irrelevant. As stated, excise duty is a duty on manufacture. The provisions relating   to measure (section 4 of 1944 Act read with the Excise Valuation Rules, 2000) aim at taking into consideration all items of costs of manufacture and all expenses which lead to value addition to be taken into account and for that purpose rule 6 makes a deeming provision by providing for notional additions.

Such deeming fictions and notional additions in excise law are totally irrelevant for sales tax purposes. Therefore, in any event, these notional additions cannot be read into clause 5.1 and clause 5.2 of the general agreement for purchase of parts dated July 31, 1997.”

Conclusion
Thus,  the  legal  position  that  gets  settled  is  that  for sales tax purpose the parameters about ‘sale price’ are different. it is the actual amount, received from the buyer, that is relevant and not the notional value, if any. There may be number of such similar situations like supply of parts to be incorporated in the goods to be ultimately supplied to the buyers. In such cases also the value of such parts may be considered for levy of excise duty, but it cannot form part of sale price for sales tax purpose, as there is no receipt of such notional value from buyer. The above judgment will, therefore, serve as a good indicator for deciding the ‘sale price’.

Controversy: whether renting of vehicle & hiring of vehicle different for service tax?

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The question posed in the caption was answered as
‘yes’ recently by the Uttarakhand High Court in August 2014 whereas
Gujarat High Court in 2013 had ruled that they are not different
concepts. The service of “rent-a-cab” was introduced initially in 1997.
The service providers are more often than not individuals or small time
firms and often found to be from semi organised sector. Rounds of
litigation is not achieving finality for a service that carries 60%
abatement on its value. Prior to the above two decisions, there have
been two to three judgments of different High Courts involving
taxability of transportation service under rent-a-cab scheme and/or tour
operators which also included widely followed decisions in First
Secretary Federation of Bus Operators vs. UOI 2001 (134) ELT 618 (Mad)
and CCE, Chandigarh vs. Kuldeep Singh Gill 2010 (18) STR 708 (P&H).

Decision of The Uttarakhand High Court:
Recently,
the Division Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court, dismissed revenue’s
appeal in 2014-TIOL- 2039-HC-UKAND-ST, Commissioner of Customs &
Central Excise vs. Sachin Malhotra & Others, taking a view that
unless control over vehicle is passed to the hirer under the rent-a-cab
scheme, there cannot be a taxable transaction u/s. 65(105)(o) read with
section 65(91) of the Finance Act,1994 – (The Act).

It is also
observed, “Though both rent and hire may in different context, have the
same connotation, in the context of rent-a-cab scheme and hiring, we are
of the view that they signify two different transactions. What the
lawgiver has chosen fit to tax by way of imposition of service tax is
only transaction relating to business of renting of cabs”. While
deciding as above, the Hon. High Court expressly stated “we are unable
to subscribe to the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
(supra) which is relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. We
would think that the said Court has not considered the aspects, which we
would think were absolutely relevant in arriving at a conclusion”. The
aspect the Court referred to while concluding as above is section 75 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which contains provisions relating to
empowering Central Government to notify a scheme for renting of motor
cabs. The Rent-A-Cab Scheme,1989 has been formed under these provisions
and which contemplates licensing of the operator under such scheme and
other incidental matters. The counsel for the revenue discussing all
relevant issues and rulings on the subject matter also pleaded to the
Court to ignore the provisions of section 75 of the Motor Vehicles Act
yet, probably did not bring to the attention of the Court that when the
service of rent-a-cab scheme operator was introduced for the first time
in the net of service tax with effect from 16/07/1997 the definition of
rent a cab scheme operator read as:

“Rent-a-cab scheme operator
means a person who is the holder of a license under the Rent-a-Cab
Scheme, 1989 formed by the Central Government under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988”.

The said definition was substituted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1998 to read as follows:

Section 65(19) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act):
“Rent-a-cab scheme operator means any person engaged in the business of renting of cabs”.

In
turn, taxable service as per section 65(105)(o) of the Act is defined
as “any service provided or to be provided to any person by a rent-a-cab
scheme operator in relation to renting of cab.”

While
considering revenue’s appeal the Hon. High Court in addition to the
P&H High Court’s decision of Kuldeep Singh Gill (supra) also
discussed at length the other two important decisions viz. Secretary
Federation of Bus Operator Association of TN (supra) and L. V.
Sankeshwar Proprietix Vijayanand Travels vs. Superintendent of Central
Excise 2006-TIOL-340-HC-KAR ST in addition to discussing CIT vs. Madan
& Co. (2002) 174 CTR (Madras)-172.

However, according to the
High Court, each one was distinguished or differed with as the facts of
each of them did not help revenue’s case.

In view of this, it is desirable to briefly summarise at least two of these decisions.

In
case of Kuldeep Singh Gill (supra), the assesse provided transport
service to a corporate on contract basis and contended that since they
did not hold any kind of permit including the tourist permit issued
under the Motor Vehicles Act they were not liable for service tax as
rent-a-cab service provider. In addition to this, no other valid ground
was put forth for non-taxability. The court therefore observed that
section 65 of the Finance Act,1994 does not talk of tourist permit
issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, but only talks about user of the
tourist vehicle by tour operator. Merely, because the Motor Vehicles Act
provides for granting tourist permit, it would not automatically mean
that section 65 also contemplates only a tourist permit and not
otherwise. The court observed and followed the judgment in Secretary,
Federation of Bus Operators (supra) “mutatis-mutandis” which clearly
concluded that ‘tourist permit’ is not required to attract provisions of
section 65(52) of the Finance Act”. Therefore, transport service
provided by the Respondent in this case is a taxable service. In turn,
in case of Secretary, Federation of Bus Operators (supra), the Hon.
Madras High Court examined the issue of service tax applicable to tour
operators u/s. 65(52) and rent-a-cab scheme operator u/s. 65(38) of the
Act & dealt with each category separately. As regards, rent-a-cab
service, the court categorically, interalia held as follows:

“We
have already pointed out that the scope of amended provision, which is
as per Section 65(38), has been widened by deleting the requirement of
holding a licence under Rent-a-cab Scheme,1989. Under the amended
provision any person engaged in business of renting of cabs becomes a
rent-a-cab scheme operator.

(53) we have, therefore, no
hesitation in holding that if the petitioners are plying the motor cabs
or maxi cabs and the services are provided by them to any person in
relation to the renting of the cabs, such service becomes a “taxable
service” and therefore, comes within the ambit of Section 66(3) of the
Finance Act.

Decision of the Gujarat High Court:

As opposed to the above, another recently reported de- cision of the Gujarat high Court (although decided on 10/05/2013 as against the above order of 6th august, 2014, of the uttarakhand high Court) in CST vs. Vijay Travels 2014 (36) STR 513 (Guj) again in appeal by the revenue, the hon. Court has held that there is no difference between renting and hiring of vehicle for levy of service tax. In this case, it was contended in assessee’s case that while the assessee provided passenger vehicles like ambassador, Swaraj mazda, 56 Seater luxury buses etc. to a State Government Board on hire and charged for the same on kilometer basis. It was argued that vehicles were not on rent and the activity did not amount to hand- ing over possession of vehicle to a person who wished to rent it and to drive it himself or through his own driver or to keep it at its disposal and regardless the rent would be payable. as against this, in case of hiring, the passengers are carried for a fare and possession of the vehicle remains with the driver and the entire responsibility would be of the car owner. The counsel for assessee also discussed provisions of section 75 of the motor Vehicles act and contended that only licensed persons under the said section are targeted under the tax net whereas transportation service providers were not intended to be taxed by the above provisions. further, distinction was sought to be made by the assessee’s counsel with the madras high Court’s decision in federation of Bus operators (supra) by stressing that the said judgment dealt with the question of tour operators which is a wholly different service from rent-a-cab service and the judgment did not deal with the issue as to what constitutes renting of a motor cab. He further urged that the judgment of the P&h high Court (supra) also did not deal with the said issue and therefore it was not a binding precedent. Summarily, the case of the assessee was that they operated trips to various places where the management continued with themselves and payment was made on kilometer basis and they did not give vehicles to the Board for operating under Board’s management. the ahmedabad tribunal on the basis of these details had held that no service tax was leviable on this. in fact, this very tribunal at a later date also in Shri Gayatri Tourist Bus Service vs. CCE, Vadodara 2013 (29) STR 499 (Tri.-Ahmd) by a majority decision (the matter was  referred  to  the third  member  on  account  of  difference of opinion) has decided in a similar situation that when vehicles are used for transportation of personnel and delegates of client and the assessee is paid on the basis of log book maintained for the purpose, the vehicles are held as not rented to the client.   This is because in case of renting, the driver of property is depossessed and possession passes on to person who has taken it for usage. When the payment is not on a monthly fixed rent but based on usage means that vehicle is not let out on rent and hence service is not taxable as rent-a-cab service. Coming back to the case before the Gujarat high Court, the above factual matrix was examined vis-à-vis the statutory provisions of service tax law including the definition of cab in section 65(20) of the Act which reads as:

“‘Cab’ means –
(i)    motor cab, or
(ii)    a maxi cab, or
(iii)    any motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than twelve passengers excluding the driver for hire or reward”.

Motor cab, maxi cab in turn have been given the mean- ings under the service tax law, as given under the mo- tor Vehicles Act. For the definition of motor vehicle also, the meaning given in the motor Vehicles act was referred to. The issue consequently was therefore to examine who can be said to have been engaged in the business of renting of a cab and whether renting and hiring of vehicle as contended by the assessee is con- templated by the statute to exclude latter category from tax net?

The Court noted that the requirement of having minimum 50 vehicles and a license as required under the rent Cab Scheme 1989 was done away with the substitution of  the definition of rent-a-cab in 1998 and therefore it would amount to artificial requirement of statute if only those persons are taxed who give away their vehicles without retaining  any  control  personally  or  through  driver.  The Court observed that the concept of lease and license was brought about by contending that lease would have insurable interest which is absent in license.

For this  purpose, the Court examined various dictionary meanings of ‘rent’, one of which provides as “A tax or similar charge levied or paid to a person”. Simultaneously, the Court found that the word ‘hire’ means “payment under contract for the use of something” or “a bailment by which the use of thing or the services are contracted for, at a certain price or reward.” On examination, it was observed that both in renting and licensing de facto pos- session of the thing is enjoyed and came to the conclusion “conceptually and essentially if the nature of service provided is the same, natural corollary is that such service is taxed under the taxing statute.” It was also observed that concept of providing transportation service where de jure control remains with the owner of the vehicle and the driver and yet it functions in accordance with the wish and desire of the person hiring it. In the absence of any specific exclusion in the statute of such service from taxing net, a large portion of such services cannot be held to be non-inclusive by any artificial interpretation and therefore escape the liability on the ground that hiring is differ- ent from renting and such distinction does not find favour with the court. This is because there is nothing to read into the taxing statute that only those persons owning the vehicles and providing on rent with exclusive control of the customer only would be charged was held by the hon. high Court while deciding this case, the hon. high Court relied on the P&h high Court decision (supra) as well as heavily relied on the madras high Court decision in Secretary, federation of Bus operators assn. t.n. (supra).

Conclusion:

It is quite evident at this point that the controversy may or may not end soon on the above issue at least for the period prior to the negative list based service taxation. However, yet another significant concept required to b examined is whether or not a contract of renting and/or hiring a motor vehicle for the use of hirer irrespective of duration of usage of the vehicle amount to “transferring of goods by way of hiring, leasing or licensing wherein transfer of right to use such goods occurs and therefore a transaction would be considered one of ‘deemed sale’ under the Vat laws as decided in landmark decision of the andhra Pradesh high Court in M/s. G.S. Lamba & Sons & others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT, [analysed in november 2012 issue of BCAJ]. In this case, the issue before the court was whether hiring of transit mixers was contract of transportation service or transfer of the right to use goods.under the contracts, the transit mixers were never transferred to hirer/user Grasim as the effective control over running & using, disciplinary control over drivers, obtaining route permits, to maintain & upkeep vehicles in good condition responsibility for damage during transportation etc. as well as registration of vehicles remained vested in petitioner, the claimant of transport service provider. After a very detailed examination and analysis of terms of contract vis-à-vis all relevant statutory provisions  of  Vat/Sales  tax,  Sale  of  Goods act,  along  with article 366 (29a)(d) of the Constitution of india etc. and considering law laid down by various relevant judicial pronouncements including landmark decision of BSNL vs. UOI 2006-TIOL-15-SC-CT-LB, it was held that tax is not levied on delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use property in goods. This is for the fact that all the tests laid down in BSnL decision (supra) are satisfied cumulatively viz. goods are available for delivery, there is consensus ad idem as to the identity of goods, the transferee has a legal right to goods including the use of licenses, permissions etc. available, for the period during the use, the transferee has the legal right to the exclusion of the transferor and lastly the owner/transferor does not have the right to transfer the same right to others during the period the transferee having legal rights to use the goods. Further, this is irrespective of the length of the duration. Thus, it was held to be the case of ‘deemed sale’ involving transfer of right to use goods and not one of transportation service. It may sound like the opening of Pandora’s box but do the facts of hiring/renting a cab not appear analogical to the contract of hiring of transit mixers (along with drivers)? at this point, however it is to be noted that education Guide published by the Government at paras 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 while clarifying scope and coverage of the declared service of transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing etc. without transferring the right to use goods, after discussing the test laid down by BSNL (supra) has clarified at illustrations 1 and 4 that when a vehicle is given on hire along with driver where the charge is recovered on mileage basis or when all responsibility is of the owner to abide by the laws, the right to use is not transferred as the car owner retains permissions and licenses relating to cab and therefore effective control and possession is not transferred and thus it is a declared service. Readers may ponder over the same depending however on the relevant facts of each case.

Constitution Amendment Bill for introducing Goods and Services Tax

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1 The Government of India introduced the
Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty Second Amendment) Bill, 2014 in the
Lok Sabha on 19th December, 2014. The Bill has proposed various
amendments to the Constitution of India to enable the Centre and States
to introduce the comprehensive Goods and Services Tax (GST).

2.
Before the key proposals of the Bill are examined, it would be
worthwhile to recap the framework of the proposed GST. The broad
contours of GST were outlined in the First Discussion Paper on Goods and
Services Tax in India, released by the Empowered Committee of State
Finance Ministers in November, 2009. The broad framework of GST
envisaged in the First Discussion Paper was as follows.

(a) Levy of Dual GST on all transactions – Central GST (CGST) and State GST (SGST);

(b) T he following indirect taxes should be subsumed into GST –


Central levies : Central Excise Duty, Additional Excise Duties, Excise
on Medicinal and Toilet Preparations, Service Tax, CVD and SAD of
Customs, Surcharges and Cesses;

– State levies : VAT /Sales Tax,
Entertainment Tax (unless levied by local bodies), Luxury Tax, Taxes on
lotteries, betting and gambling, State Surcharges and Cesses, Entry Tax
not in lieu of Octroi;

(c) A ll goods and services should be
covered under GST except Alcoholic beverages and Petroleum products,
i.e. crude, motor spirit (including ATF ) and HSD. While Tobacco was to
be included in GST, decision on coverage of Natural Gas was kept open;

(d)
I nter-State transactions would be subjected to Intermediate GST (IGST =
CGST + SGST) by the Centre. IGST would also be levied on consignment or
stock transfers;

(e) Exports would be zero – rated with similar benefits to SEZs. GST would be levied on import of goods and services;

(f) Credit of IGST, CGST and SGST would be available to the receiver of the goods and services;

(g)
U tilisation of input tax credit would be against corresponding
liability i.e. CGST against CGST and SGST against SGST. The rules for
taking input tax credit and utilisation of suchcredit would be aligned.
Cross utilisation would not be permitted;

(h) Concurrent jurisdiction for administering GST to the Centre and the States;

(i) U niform threshold of Rs.10 lakh and Rs.1.5 crore for registration and liability for payment of tax for SGST and CGST.

3.
T he First Discussion Paper was followed by the report of the Task
Force set up by the Thirteenth Finance Commission in 2009 and comments
on the First Discussion Paper released by the Department of Revenue in
2010. However, for the purposes of the intended framework, the First
Discussion Paper may be taken as the starting point.

4. T he
amendments proposed in the Constitution Amendment Bill may be analysed
with reference to the intended framework outlined above.

5. New definitions
– The Bill proposes 3 new definitions in Article 366 of the
Constitution 366(12A) : ‘Goods and Services tax’ to mean any tax on
supply of goods or services or both except tax on the supply of
alcoholic liquor for human consumption. 366(26A) : ‘Services’ which
means anything other than goods. 366(29B) : State’ for the purposes of
articles 246A, 268, 269, 269A and 279A to include a Union Territory with
Legislature.

5.4 Concept of ‘Supply’: Presently, tax is
being levied on manufacture (Excise), on Sale or Purchases of goods or
on provisions of services. The proposed amendments introduce the concept
of ‘supply’. ‘Supply’, however, is not defined and one will have to
interpret this in terms of the common parlance meaning or its dictionary
meaning.

5.4.1 Presently, amongst the laws likely to be
subsumed, the Centre is empowered to levy tax on import and manufacture.
The powers of the States are in respect of taxation of sales and
purchases of goods. ‘Sales’ has been interpreted to mean ‘sale’ as
defined under the Sale of Goods which, amongst others, pre-supposes a
transaction between 2 parties. The powers of the States, in respect of
deemed sales under Article 366(29A), also presupposes existence of two
parties for the purposes of the transactions enumerated therein.

5.4.2
‘Supply’ on the other hand, conveys something more than sale. ‘Supply’
means to make something available to someone; to provide.

5.4.3 T
he question which arises is whether ‘supply’ could be read as a
transaction for the purposes of levy of tax even in the absence of two
parties. In the context of the Indian tax laws and the Constitution
entries interpreted so far, ‘supply’ may still be read as one between
two parties. The intention on the other hand, obviously is to enable
levy of GST on consignment and stock transfers, where transfers between
branches, depots, factories, offices, etc. do not necessarily involve
two distinct parties.

5.4.4 ‘Supply’ in the proposed amendments
will now cover not only consignments and stock transfers but also
despatches, deliveries, supplies, etc. without the intention of passing
of property, entering into or effecting a transaction. The following
will also constitute ‘supply’ and could be subjected to tax, if so
provided by the Central or State GST laws.

(i) dispatches to job workers for job work, processing and return;
(ii) deliveries for the purposes of repairs, testing, etc;
(iii) delivery of free samples;
(iv) movement of goods for exhibition or demonstration and return;
(v) dispatches on sale or return basis;
(vi) free issues or supplies to manufacturers, contractors, etc;
(vii) gifts and free supplies.

5.5 ‘Consideration’:
Another important aspect is the omission of reference to
‘consideration’ as an important element to constitute a taxable
transaction. So far, powers of the States were saddled with the
requirement of ‘consideration’ in order to levy tax, in so far as tax on
sales or purchases of goods was concerned. Even ‘deemed sales’ under
Article 366(29A) required consideration for the purposes of levy of tax.

5.5.1 T he omission of the requirement of ‘consideration’ will
not only allow taxation of consignment and stock transfers, but also
various transactions enumerated above. It would now be open for
Governments to provide for levy tax on any or all supplies with a view
to garner revenue. This may include –

(i) gratis or free supplies, such as a desert provided free at a restaurant for deficient service;
(ii) partly developed software handed over to a service provider for further development;
(iii) free parking at a theatre or a mall;
(iv) donations and charity;
(v) free products or services in lieu of loyalty points;
(vi) consumption by employees of goods or services; etc.

5.5.2
T he immediate fallout of an attempt to tax a transaction in the
absence of consideration would be the valuation of the goods or services
for the purpose of levy of tax. Substantial valuation disputes have
been witnessed under the Excise law and the Customs Law or at a State
level, on the levy of Entry Tax or Octroi.

‘Services’: The
definition ‘anything other than goods’ appears to be too broad to have
been intended. Immovable property, money, actionable claims, etc. would
be services. ‘Goods’ are defined under Article 366(12) to include all
materials, commodities and articles. Courts have interpreted this to
include tangible as well as intangible properties. Accordingly,
intangible properties such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.
would continue to be goods.

5.6.1    The  ongoing  disputes  in  relation  to  transactions involving supply of software, packaged  as  well as customised, franchisee agreements, rights to record or broadcast events, etc. would therefore continue. This will particularly be so in the context of the levy of additional tax, discussed in para 7.

5.7    The proposed amendments do not provide clarity to the treatment of composite transactions or deemed   sales.   the   question   arises   whether composite transactions will be subjected to tax. At present, composite transactions have been defined under article 366(29a). While this clause (29A) has not been omitted, the phrase ‘tax on one sale or purchase of goods’ which it defines finds no mention in the amendments relating to GSt. the only indication would be use of the word ‘both’ in the definition of ‘goods and services tax’. Will the use of this word ‘both’ be adequate to cover within its scope composite transactions otherwise defined under article 366(29a)? Would separate principles be required to classify composite transactions as goods or services? even otherwise, transactions involving repairs, annual maintenance contracts, photocopying, printing, etc. Which are composite contracts would suffer the perils of interpretation as to the taxing powers with reference to the rates of taxes as well as the place of supply for determining the appropriate State to levy the tax. Similar would be the predicament in the context of works contracts or catering contracts. Should these be transactions of supply of goods or of services? another area  of debate would be in respect of other deemed sales such as leasing of tangibles or intangibles, hire purchase transactions as also treatment of licences relating to tangible or intangible property. Question will also arise regarding treatment of additional charges for anything done to the goods before or at the time of delivery such as packing, freight, transit insurance, installation charges, etc. which may be separately charged on the bill or invoice. Should these charges be treated as components of the supply of goods or as distinct services?

5.8    It will therefore, be imperative to define ‘supply’ as well as introduce the requirement of ‘consideration’ for taxing transaction. Exceptions may be carved out for specific instances such as inter-State stock transfers and consignment transfers. As will be seen  from  the  stated  framework  discussed  in Para 2 and the taxing powers discussed in para  8, inter-State consignments and stock transfers are the only instances where tax is expected to be levied even in the absence of two parties, transfer of ownership or consideration. Under these circumstances, the requirement of ‘consideration’ should be a pre-requisite while defining the taxing powers of the States and may be omitted only so far as the Centre is concerned.

5.9    European   union:   the   Sixth   directive,   which prescribes the guidelines for the member States to levy VAT on goods and services, clearly defines ‘supply’ and also incorporates the requirement of ‘consideration’. Article 2 of the directive provides for taxation of supply of goods, intra-community acquisition of goods, and supply of services, all for a consideration only. It also provides for levy of Vat on importation of goods.

5.9.1    Under article 14, ‘supply of goods’ means transfer of the right to dispose tangible property as owner. It is under article 17 that transfer of goods to another member State is treated as a supply of goods for consideration. Special provision has been made under article 16 for self-supply or use of goods by staff is treated as supply of goods for consideration.

5.9.2    Similarly, provisions have been made under article 24 for ‘supply of services’ which means any transaction which does not constitute supply of goods and, for self-supply and use of services by staff under article 26.

5.10    Australia: under the new tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act, 1999 ‘taxable supply’ is defined as a supply which is made for consideration (Section 9-5). ‘Supply’, on the other hand, is defined to mean supply in any form including supply of goods, services, etc. (Section 9-10).

6.    Amendments to Sixth and Seventh Schedule : the following amendments have been proposed to the Sixth and Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

6.1    Sixth Schedule – Paragraph 8 – under the provisions  for  the  administration  of  tribal  areas in   assam,   meghalaya,   tripura   and   mizoram, the power to levy of taxes on entertainment and amusements is proposed to be granted to the district Councils.

6.2    Seventh Schedule List 1 – Entry 84 – this entry has been amended to restrict the powers of the Centre to levy excise duty only on manufacture or production of petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas, aviation turbine fuel and tobacco and tobacco products.

6.2.1    While tobacco and tobacco products would also be subjected to GST, petroleum products and natural gas would be brought within the coverage of GST at a subsequent date (further discussion in para 8).

6.3    Seventh Schedule, List 1, Entries 92 and 92C – these entries are proposed to be omitted. these  relate  to  taxes  on  sale  or  purchases  of newspapers and on advertisements therein and tax  on  services.  these  levies  will  therefore  be subsumed under GSt.

6.4    Seventh Schedule, List ii – Entry 52 – this entry relating to tax on entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein is proposed to be omitted. accordingly, entry tax, octroi and LBT would be subsumed under GST.

6.5    Seventh Schedule, List ii – Entry 54 – this entry is proposed to be substituted to enable States to levy tax on sales or purchases of petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas, aviation turbine fuel and alcoholic liquor for human consumption, other than sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of international trade or commerce.

6.6    Seventh Schedule, List ii – Entry 55 – this entry in relation to taxes on advertisements other than advertisements published in newspapers and advertisements broadcast by radio and television is proposed to be deleted. These levies will now be subsumed under GST.

6.7    Seventh  Schedule,  List  ii  –  Entry  62  –  the existing entry relating to taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling is proposed to be substituted. The new entry is proposed to enable levy of taxes on entertainment and amusements to the extent levied and collected by a Panchayat or a municipality or a regional Council or a district Council. the power to levy tax on betting and gambling has been omitted.

6.7.1    The exception carved out for tax on entertainment and amusements by local bodies and authorities may be undesirable. While the total revenues of these bodies and authorities from these sources of taxation is not immediately known, such as exception distorts the GSt regime. for example, if such services are provided from other States to the areas under the jurisdiction of local bodies and authorities, iGSt will be levied. how will claim of input tax credit of such IGST be available? on the other hand, should such services be provided from these areas, will there be no levy by these bodies and authorities, as inter-State transactions can only be taxed by the Centre (see para 8).

6.8    From the above, the following may be noted:

(a)    alcoholic Liquor for human consumption would be out of the purview of GST and will be the subject matter of taxation by the States. This includes tax on manufacture as well as sale of alcoholic liquor;

(b)    Excise on tobacco and tobacco products would continue  to  be  levied  by  the  Centre.  therefore, these  will  be  subjected  to  GST  in  addition  to excise duty;

(c)    Luxury tax would be subsumed into GST;

(d)    The  powers  to  levy  tax  on  betting  and  gambling has been omitted. While services in relation to betting and gambling, such as services by bookies, etc. may be taxed under GST, there is no provision to  enable  taxation  of  winnings  from  betting and gambling.

(e)    Entertainment tax and tax on amusements can also be levied by Panchayat, municipality, regional Council or district Council. There is no bar on these levies being introduced in future by these bodies.

7.    Levy of ‘Additional Tax’ – the Bill, vide section 18, proposes to levy ‘additional tax’ on the supply of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce at a rate not exceeding one percent for 2 years or such other period as the GSt Council may  recommend.   This  tax  would  be  levied  and collected by the Centre and would be assigned to the States from where the supply originates and the proceeds would not form part of the Consolidated fund.   The   Parliament,   would   formulate   the principles for determining the place of origin.

7.1    The most striking aspect of this proposed section is that this does not amend or introduce any article in the Constitution for the purposes of levy of additional tax. Therefore, this may be read to be a statement of intent and not an enabling provision in the Constitution.

7.2    Another aspect of this proposed levy is the lack of specific provision for assignment of this levy to the States. article 268 and 269 provide for assignment of stamp duties, tax on medicinal and toilet preparations, central sales tax and tax on consignment of goods to the States and such levies do not form part of the Consolidated fund. However, no specific provision has been made in respect of this additional tax in the Constitution. The  question  is,  will  a  separate  provision  be required for assignment of ‘additional tax’  to the States?

7.3    It may be noted that this levy will only be on supply of goods and not on services. further, this will also apply to stock transfers and consignment transfers and  will  not  be  creditable.  Therefore,  this  levy will be a cost. this will therefore increase the tax burden on inter-State transactions and will require businesses to restrict stock movements since every movement of stocks will attract this non creditable  levy.  This  will  also  be  levied  on  other movements discussed in para 5.4.4. movements of goods for job work, repairs/testing, exhibition, etc. would attract this levy on each movement. the levy is against the stated objectives of GSt and is unlikely to be well received by business.

7.4    Also, this levy will be for a period of two years or  such  other  period  as  the  GST  Council  may recommend. There is no time limit prescribed for the levy and the levy can continue perpetually.

8.    New Article 246A – this new article is proposed to   be   inserted   to   provide   for   levy   of   GSt simultaneously by the Centre as well as by the States. It further provides that the Parliament shall  have  the  exclusive  powers  to  levy  GSt  on supply of goods and services taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Under an explanation, the provisions of this article in respect of petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas and aviation turbine fuel shall take effect only from the date recommended by the  GSt  Council.  this  explanation  will  enable introduction   of   GST   at   a   subsequent   date. However, the taxing powers of the Centre and States in relation to these products under the Seventh Schedule (discussed in paras 6.2 and 6.5) has not been made subject to this article. Therefore, it will be possible for the Centre and the States to continue with the levy of excise and Vat on these products even after introduction of GSt on these products.

9.    Article 268 : This article provides for assignment of stamp duties and duties of excise on medicinal and  toilet  preparations  to  the  States.  Reference to excise on medicinal and toilet preparations is proposed to be deleted so as to bring these products under GST. Stamp duty on the instruments covered in List I of the Seventh Schedule would continue to be assigned to and therefore levied by the States.

10.    Article 269 :
this article provides for assignment of taxes on inter-State sales and purchases of goods and on inter-State consignment of goods to the States this has been made subject to levy of tax under new article 269a.

11.    New Article 269A – this new article provides for levy  of  GSt  on  inter-State  supply  of  goods  and services by the Centre. this tax shall be apportioned in the manner provided by the Parliament on the recommendation of the GSt Council.

11.1    Under this article, supply of goods and services in the course of import into the territory of india shall be deemed to be inter-State supplies. Parliament may formulate the principles for determining when a supply takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.

11.2    This article  will  enable  levy  of  GST on  import  of goods and services. appropriate provisions will have to be made for determining the levy of iGSt on such imports particularly where the rates of taxes may not be uniform across all States. for e.g., if goods are imported at JNPT by an importer based in Bhopal, how should the IGST (CGST + SGST) be calculated?  Should this be at the SGST rate of maharashtra or of madhya Pradesh. Similarly, for services, how should the IGST rate be calculated for multi-locational business? Should this be the SGST rate prevalent in the State when the office is situated and which receives the invoice from the foreign service provider ?

12.    Article 270 : This article provides for distribution of taxes collected by the Centre and forming part of the Consolidated fund. this article is proposed to  be  amended  to  include  any  GST collected  by the Centres on inter-States supplies and which has not been apportioned to the States under the new article 269A.

13.    Article  286:  this article  imposes  restrictions  on the powers of the States to levy tax on transactions taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, import or export. amendments have been proposed to substitute reference to ‘sales and purchases’ and ‘goods’ with supply of goods or services.

13.1 Sub-article (3), which imposed restrictions on taxation of goods of special importance (declared goods) is proposed to be deleted to enable levy of GSt at a higher rate.

14.    New Article 279A : GST Council: New Article is proposed to be inserted for enabling constitution of  the  Goods  and  Services  tax  Council  (GST Council).  The  GST Council  shall  be  constituted by the President within 60 days from the date of commencement of the amendment act. It will comprise  of  the  union  finance  minister  as  the Chairperson. The union minister of State in charge of revenue or finance and the State finance and taxation ministers will be the members.

14.1    The  GST Council  would  make  recommendations to the Centre and the States on the taxes to be subsumed into GST, the goods and services which should  be  taxed  and  exempted,  the  model  GST law,  principles  of  levy,  apportionment  of  IGST, place of supply principles, threshold limits, rates including floor rates with bands, special rates for raising additional resources during any natural calamity or disaster and special provisions for arunachal Pradesh, assam, jammu and Kashmir, meghalaya, manipur, mizoram, nagaland, Sikkim, tripura, himachal Pradesh and uttarakhand.

14.2    The GST Council would also recommend the date from  which  GST  should  be  levied  on  petroleum crudes, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas and aviation turbine fuel.

14.3    The article prescribes the modalities of functioning of  the  GSt  Council.  the  decisions  of  the  GSt Council would be by a majority determined on the basis of prescribed weightages.  the GSt Council would also decide about the modalities to resolve disputes arising out of its recommendations.

14.4    The GST Council would thus play a recommendatory role and its recommendations would not be binding. it will not be resolving disputes on GST but would only lay down the modalities for resolving disputes.

15.    Compensation to States: Section 19 of the Bill provides for compensation to the States for loss of revenue on account of implementation of GST for a period upto 5 years.  The Parliament will provide for the compensation on the recommendation of the GST Council.

15.1 Section 19 of the Bill does not amend or introduce an article for providing the compensation. therefore, this may be read only as a statement of intent and will have no binding effect to grant any compensation unless a law to that effect is made.

16.    Transitional provisions:
Section 20 of the Bill states that any provision of any law relating to tax on goods or services or on both in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the act, which is inconsistent with the amendments carried out the Constitution, shall continue to be  in force until amended or repealed by the State Legislature or other competent authority or until expiration of one year from the commencement of the act, whichever is earlier.

16.1    Transitional   provisions   are   common   in   every amending enactment. however, this section provides the savings in relation to State enactments. moreover, it states that the provisions of the State enactment, which are not consistent with the amendments to the Constitution, shall continue to be in force until repealed or for one year after the commencement of the amendment act. Therefore, it appears that all existing enactments which are inconsistent with the amendments will become ultra vires at the end of one year even if GST is not introduced.

16.2    A question has arisen regarding the proceedings arising out of the existing laws, namely assessments, appeals, recoveries as well as refunds. a view has been expressed that such proceedings cannot be taken up or pursued after the repeal or the expiry of one year in the absence of the taxing powers under the Constitution.

17.    Transactions taking place from,  to  and  within the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of india – no provision has been made to provide for levy and collection of GST on transactions taking place from, to and within these areas. india does not have sovereignty over these areas though it has the right to extend any Central enactment to these areas (the income tax, Customs, excise and the Service tax laws have been  extended  to  these  areas).  transactions  of supply of goods and services to these area will not be inter-State transactions. how will GSt be levied on these transactions? moreover, in respect of transactions taking place in these areas (production of crude, construction, repairs and maintenance by contractors, catering at the rigs and platforms, etc.),  how  will  GST  be  payable  and  who  will  be the taxing authority? how will tax be payable on supplies from these areas to the landmass of india (movement of crude to refineries, movement of capital equipment from the rigs and platforms or movement of old and obsolete assets, scrap, etc.)?

The  Constitution  amendment  Bill  was  much  awaited to  pave  the  way  for  introduction  of  GST.  While  this  Bill signals the intent to introduce GST from 1st april, 2016, there are various aspects which need detailed review, deliberations and guidance from Constitution experts. Businesses and professionals would critically evaluate these proposals seeking clarity in the taxing powers of the Centre and the States which should translate into clear, concise and unambiguous GST laws.

Nitco Logistics Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT ITAT (Asr) Before A.D. Jain (J. M.) and B.P. Jain (A. M.) I.T.A. No. 437(Asr)/2012 Assessment Year:2009-10.Decided on 05-09-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: P.N. Arora/Saad Kidwai

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Section 2(24) – Collection of Dharmarth along with the assessee company’s freight income and used for charity is not part of the income of the assessee.

Facts:
The AO made an addition of Rs. 15.99 lakh on account of Dharmarth collected by the assessee along with freight receipt which was not reflected by it in its profit and loss account. According to the AO, the receipts were directly related to the business of the assessee; that the receipts were received not by a trust created for the purposes of charity, but by a company doing business and trading and that no evidence had been filed by the assessee that the receipts had been actually spent on charity. The CIT(A) upheld the addition inter alia on the ground that the assessee was unable to establish that the object of the assessee company, as per its memorandum and articles of association, was also to carry out charity.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the stand of the assessee was entirely in line with its stand taken earlier in A.Y. 2001-02 to A.Y. 2008-09 which was never disputed by the revenue. According to the Tribunal, once the receipts are routed as such to a charitable trust by the assessee company and the nature of that trust has not been questioned, the receipts are Dharmarth receipts and nothing else. Further, it was noted that the memorandum and articles of association of the assessee company clearly showed that one of the objectives of the assessee company is charity. Further, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Bijli Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd. (1979) 116 ITR 60 the tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Facts:
The assessee being a company is an association of various industrialists formed in the year 1925 for development of trade, industries and commerce.

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Asst. CIT (TDS) vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai Before Sanjay Arora (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM) I.T.A. No. 5808/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on 03-12-2014 Counsel for Revenue/Assessee: Premanand J./ Naresh Jain & Mahesh Saboo

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Section 194-I – Payments towards lease premium and additional Floor Space Index (FSI) charges not subjected to TDS.

Facts:
The issue before the Tribunal was about the exigibility to Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) u/s.194-I of the sum, described as lease premium and additional Floor Space Index (FSI) charges paid by the assessee to Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) during the relevant year.

The Revenue’s case was that u/s.194-I the ‘rent’ is very comprehensively defined to include any payment made under the lease, sub-lease, tenancy or any such agreement or arrangement for use (either separately or together) of any land, building, plant, machinery, etc. By legal fiction, therefore, the scope of the term ‘rent’ stands thus extended beyond its common meaning. The same would include not only the payments on revenue account, but on capital account as well, as long as the sum paid is toward the use of any of the assets specified under the provision. For the purpose, the reliance was placed on the decisions in the case of CIT vs. Reebok India Co. [2007] 291 ITR 455 (Del); United Airlines vs. CIT [2006] 287 ITR 281 (Del); Krishna Oberoi vs. Union of India [2002] 257 ITR 105 (AP); and CIT vs. H.M.T. Ltd. [1993] 203 ITR 820 (Kar).

The CIT(A) on appeal, had held that the lease premium in the instant case was only toward acquisition of lease hold rights and additional FSI in the leased plots and thus, the payment made was not in the nature of rent hence, not covered u/s. 194(I).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the amount charged by MMRDA as lease premium was equal to the rate prevailing as per the stamp duty ready reckoner for the acquisition of commercial premises. Further, it was also noted that there was no provision in the lease agreement for termination of the lease at the instance of the lessee and hence, for the refund of lease premium under normal circumstances. It noted that even the charges levied for additional FSI was as per the ready reckoner rate. Thus, according to the Tribunal, the whole transaction was for grant of leasehold rights or transfer of property; the lease premium paid by the assessee was the consideration for acquiring leasehold rights, which comprise a bundle of rights, including the right of possession, exploitation and its long term enjoyment. It further observed that the charges for FSI also partake the character of capital assets in the form of Transferable Development Rights (TDRs), such that the owner (of land) transfers the rights of development and exploitation of land, which rights are again capital in nature.

On the basis as discussed above and relying on the decisions in the cases of ITO vs. Naman BKC CHS Ltd. (in ITA Nos. 708 & 709/Mum/2012 dated 12-09-2013) and TRO vs. Shelton Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (in ITA No. 5678/ Mum/2012 dated 19-05-2014), the Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. Referring to the decisions of the Tribunal in ITO vs. Dhirendra Ramji Vora (in ITA No.3179/Mum/2012 dated 09-04-2014) and Naman BKC CHS Ltd. (supra), it further observed that the decisions relied on by the A.O. were distinguishable and cannot be applied to the case of the assessee.

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[2014] 150 ITD 502 (Mum) Urban Infrastructure Venture Capital Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y. 2008-09. Date of Order – 21st May, 2014.

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Section 37(1) – When the assessee incurs expenditure, on the premises taken on rent by it, which does not create any new capital asset and the said expenditure merely helps the assessee for efficiently carrying on its business and the items on which expenditure so incurred cannot be reused on vacation of said premises, then such expenditure has to be treated as revenue in nature.

Explanation-1 after the fifth proviso to section 32(1)(ii) – It can be invoked only if the expenditure itself is capital in nature

FACTS
During the year under consideration, the assessee, an investment manager/advisor, had taken new premises on rent and had carried civil work, tiling work, marble work, fittings, fixtures, interior work in respect of said premises. The assessee had treated the said expenses as revenue expenditure.

However the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that these were major renovation expenses in the nature of capital and since the property was taken on lease, the assessee was entitled to depreciation only.

The Commissioner (Appeals) sustained the disallowance on the basis of Explanation (1) after the fifth proviso to section 32(1)(ii) which reads as – where the business or profession of the assessee is carried on in a building not owned by him but in respect of which the assessee holds a lease or other right of occupancy and any capital expenditure is incurred by the assessee for the purposes of the business or profession on the construction of any structure or doing of any work in or in relation to, and by way of renovation or extension of, or improvement to, the building, then, the provisions of this clause shall apply as if the said structure or work is a building owned by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The nature of business of the assessee needed a posh office as the visitors/clients were normally corporate executives and high net-worth individuals. It was submitted that during the course of its business, the assessee had to cater high-profile clients both Indian as well as foreign and hence the office premises were required to be kept to a good standard. The expenditure incurred by the assessee was in order to meet these business requirements.

The civil work, tiling work, marble work, fittings, fixtures, interior work carried out in respect of said rented premises brought changes only in the internal part of the structure. No new asset had been created and the said expenditure merely helped the assessee for efficiently carrying on its business and the items on which expenditure had been incurred could not be reused on vacation of said premises. Hence, the expenses incurred were revenue in nature.

Also the pre-condition to invoke the provision of Explanation- 1 after the fifth proviso to section 32(1)(ii) is that expenditure itself should be capital in nature. If the expenditure by its nature itself is not capital in nature and its nature is revenue then provisions of Explanation-1 after fifth proviso to section 32(1)(ii) will not be applicable at all.

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2014] 150 ITD 440 (Jd) Jeewanram Choudhary vs. CIT A.Y. 2006-07 Date of Order – 22nd February, 2013

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Section 145, read with section 263 – Where Assessing Officer rejects books of account of the assessee due to its defects and applies a particular gross profit rate to derive assessee’s income, after applying his mind and after examining records and details, his order cannot be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of revenue and consequently it is not permissible for Commissioner to invoke revisionary powers to complete assessment in manner he likes by simply applying different gross profit rate.

FACTS
During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noted that the assessee firm had not maintained stock register and details of material consumed on a dayto- day basis. In the absence thereof, the consumption of material was not fully verifiable. Thus, on noticing various defects in the books of account of the assessee, Assessing Officer rejected the same as per section 145(3).

The Assessing Officer rather than making item-wise additions deemed it appropriate to estimate the gross profit rate considering the past history of the assessee. He accordingly worked out the addition, by applying gross profit rate of 9.5%, which was derived by comparing current year’s turnover with past year’s turnover.

Subsequently, the Commissioner pointing out defects, similar to the defects pointed out by the Assessing Officer, rejected the books of accounts of the assessee and exercising his revisionary power u/s. 263, calculated income of assessee taking gross profit rate of 10% by treating the order passed by the Assessing Officer as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. On assessee’s appeal.

HELD
In the year under consideration, the pross profit rate declared by the assessee was 8.5% while in the preceding assessment year gross profit rate of 10% was applied by the Assessing Officer after rejecting the books of account. However, the turnover of the assessee increased in the assessment year under consideration in comparison to the immediately assessment preceding year. The Assessing Officer, therefore, keeping the past history in mind considered it fair and reasonable to apply gross profit rate of 9.5%. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer did not apply his mind while framing the assessment.

The Commissioner did not doubt the turnover shown by the assessee but was of the view that Assessing Officer ought to have applied gross profit rate of 10% instead of 9.5%. However the various defects in the books of account of the assessee on which jurisdiction was assumed by Commissioner u/s. 263, were already considered by the Assessing Officer while rejecting the books of account and determining the income by applying the gross profit rate.

It is well-settled that once the books of account are rejected, the only alternative to determine the income is application of net profit rate. Also, the Assessing Officer framed the assessment after examining the records and the details which were called for by him and also after applying his mind came to the conclusion of applying Gross Profit rate of 9.5%. Therefore, the assessment order passed by him cannot be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Also, when the Assessing Officer as well as Commissioner were of the same view that in the assessee’s case, gross profit rate was to be applied for determining the taxable income, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Assessing Officer by applying a particular gross profit rate, was erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Therefore, the order passed by the Commissioner by simply applying a different gross profit is held to be not sustainable.

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Valuation of property – Reference to DVO – Section 142A – A. Y. 1991-92 – AO not rejecting books of account – Reference to DVO and addition on account of differential amount as unexplained investment is not sustainable –

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CIT vs. Lakshmi Constructions; 369 ITR 271 (T&AP):

For the A. Y. 1991-92, the assessee firm had disclosed a sum of Rs. 23,75,000/- towards the cost of construction of a building. The Assessing Officer, without rejecting the assessee’s books of account, referred the matter to the DVO and as per the report of the DVO treated the difference as unexplained investment. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition holding that reference to the DVO could not have been made, unless the Assessing Officer rejected or doubted the veracity of the books of account of the assessee. On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court held as under:

“i) It is only when the Assessing Officer did not take the contents of the books of account, on their face value, that he could have resorted to an independent valuation. The Tribunal maintained the distinction and held that even before ordering the valuation of any property by independent valuer in respect of an assessee, who has maintained the books of account, the Assessing Officer must, as a first step, express his lack of confidence in the books of account. That not having been done, the very reference to the Valuation Officer could not be sustained in law.

ii) Though section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was amended in the year 2004 with retrospective effect from 1972, the exercise undertaken by the Assessing Officer could not be sustained on the touchstone of that provision.”

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TDS – Sections 194A, 201(1) and (1A) – Fixed deposit in name of Registrar General of High Court under directions of Court – S. 194A not to apply to credit by Bank in name of Registrar General – Bank has no obligation to deduct tax at source thereon-

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UCO Bank vs. UOI and Dy. CIT; 369 ITR 335 (Del):

The Petitioner bank had accepted fixed deposits in the name of the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court in compliance with a direction by the Court in relation to certain proceedings before the Court. On the question of applicability of section 194A, 201(1) and (1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the High Court held as under:

“i) In the absence of an assessee, the machinery of provisions for deduction of tax to his credit are ineffective. The expression “payee” u/s. 194A would mean the recipient of the income whose account is maintained by the person paying interest. The Registrar General of the Court was clearly not the recipient of the income represented by interest that accrued on the deposits made in his/her name. Therefore, the Registrar General could not be considered as a “payee” for the purposes of section 194A. The Registrar General was also not an assessee in respect of the deposits made with the bank pursuant to the orders of the Court. The credit by the bank in the name of the Registrar General would, thus, not attract the provisions of section 194A. Although section 190(1) clarifies that deduction of tax can be made prior to the assessment year of regular assessment, none the less the section would not imply that deduction of tax is mandatory even where it is known that the payee is not the assessee and there is no other assessee. The deposits kept with the bank under the orders of this Court were, essentially, funds which were in custodia legis, that is, funds in the custody of the Court. The interest on that account – although credited in the name of the Registrar General – was also part of funds under the custody of the Court. The credit of interest to such account was, thus, not a credit to an account of a person who was liable to be assessed to tax. Thus, the bank would have no obligation to deduct tax because at the time of credit there was no person assessable in respect of that income which may be represented by the interest accrued/paid in respect of the deposits. The words “credit of such income to the account of the payee” occurring in section 194A have to be ascribed a meaning in conformity with the scheme of the Act and that would necessarily imply that deduction of tax bears nexus with the income of an assessee.

ii) Circular No. 8 of 2011, dated 04-10-2011, proceeds on an assumption that the litigant depositing the money is the account holder with the bank or is the recipient of the income represented by the interest accruing thereon. This assumption is fundamentally erroneous as the litigant who is asked to deposit the money in Court ceases to have any control or proprietary right over those funds. The amount deposited vests with the Court and the depositor ceases to exercise any dominion over those funds. It is also not necessary that the litigant who deposits the money would be the ultimate recipient of the funds. The person who is ultimately granted the funds would be determined by orders that may be passed subsequently. And at that stage, undisputedly, tax would be required to be deducted at source to the credit of the recipient. However, the litigant who deposits the funds cannot be stated to be the recipient of income.

iii) Deducting tax in the name of the litigant who deposits the funds with the Court would also create another anomaly because the amount deducted would necessarily lie to his credit with the Income Tax Authorities. In other words, the tax deducted at source would reflect as a tax paid by that litigant/depositor. He, thus, would be entitled to claim the credit in his return of income. The implications of this are that whereas the Court had removed the funds from the custody of a litigant/depositor by judicial orders, a part of the accretion thereon is received by him by way of tax deducted at source. This is clearly impermissible because it would run contrary to the intent of judicial orders.

iv) Therefore, the notices issued by the Assistant Commissioner directing the bank to submit the details of deposits made with the bank by all litigants in the name of the Registrar General of the Court during the financial years 2005-06 to 2010-11, Circular No. 8 of 2011 and the order holding the bank to be an assesee in default within the meaning of section 201(1) for a sum of Rs. 7,78,34,950 determined u/s. 201(1)/201(1A) were liable to be set aside.”

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TDS: Income – Charge – Sections 4, 6 and 194A – Compensation awarded under Motor Vehicles Act is in lieu of death of a person or bodily injury suffered in a vehicular accident and it cannot be said to be taxable income; Tax is not deductible on interest on term deposits made by the Registry in terms of the orders passed by the Court in Motor Accident Claims cases – Circular No. 8/2011, dated 14-10-2011 quashed-

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Court on its own motion vs. H. P. State Cooperative Bank Ltd.; [2014] 52 taxmann.com 151 (HP):

The Registrar of the Himachal Pradesh High Court had put up a note that Bank Authorities were making tax deductions on interest accrued on the term deposits, i.e., fixed deposits made by the Registry in terms of the orders passed by the Court in Motor Accident Claims cases. The matter was referred to the Finance/Purchase Committee for examination. The Committee was of the view that since the dispute involved was intricate and public interest was involved, it was recommended that the matter required consideration on judicial side. The recommendation of the Committee was treated as Public interest Litigation and suo motu proceedings were drawn. The department filed the reply and pleaded that in terms of Circular No. 8/2011, dated 14-10-2011, issued by the Income-tax authorities, income-tax was to be deducted on the interest periodically accruing on the deposits made on the court orders to protect the interest of the litigants.

The High Court Held as under:

“i) The circular, dated 14-10-2011, issued by the incometax authorities, is not in tune with the mandate of sections 2(42) and 2(31), read with section 6. The said circular also is not in accordance with the mandate of section 194A.

ii) Section 194A clearly provides that any person, not being an individual or a Hindu undivided family, responsible for paying to a “resident” any income by way of interest, other than income by way of interest on securities shall deduct income tax on such income at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or by any other mode.

iii) While going through the said provisions of law, one comes to the inescapable conclusion that the mandate of the said provisions does not apply to the accident claim cases and the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act is awarded in lieu of death of a person or bodily injury suffered in a vehicular accident, which is damage and not income.

iv) Chapter X and XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for grant of compensation to the victims of a vehicular accident. The Motor Vehicles Act has undergone a sea change and the purpose of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims so that they may be saved from social evils and starvation, and that the victims get some sort of help as early as possible. It is just to save them from sufferings, agony and to rehabilitate them. One wonder how and under what provisions of law the income tax authorities have treated the amount awarded or interest accrued on term deposits made in Motor Accident Claims cases as income. Therefore, the said Circular is against the concept and provisions referred to hereinabove and runs contrary to the mandate of granting compensation.

v) The Apex Court has gone to the extent of saying that the Claims Tribunals, in Motor Accident Claims cases, should award compensation without succumbing to the niceties of law and procedural wrangles and tangles.

vi) The Circular dated 14-10-2011, issued by the Income- Tax Authorities, whereby deduction of income-tax has been ordered on the award amount and interest accrued on the deposits made under the orders of the Court in Motor Accident Claims cases, was quashed, and in case any such deduction has been made by department, they are directed to refund the same, with interest at the rate of 12% from the date of deduction till payment.”

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Recovery of tax – Provisional attachment – Section 281B – A. Ys. 2010-11 to 2013-14 – For valid provisional attachment notice to pay arrears is mandatory-

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T. Senthil Kumar vs. CIT: 369 ITR 101 (Mad):

Allowing
the assessee’s writ petition challenging the orders of provisional
attachment u/s. 281B of the Incometax Act, 1961, the Madras High Court
held as under:

“i) A combined reading of the provisions of law
would show that even to make a provisional attachment of the property of
the assessee, there should be a notice to pay the arrears as per rule
51 of the Second Schedule, Part III of the Income-tax Act. Without any
notice to the assessee, the provisional attachment cannot be made u/s.
281B of the Act. In the instant case this court finds that without
notice of demand to pay arrears, the respondent has passed an order for
provisional attachment in arbitrary manner.

iii) This court is
of the considered view that in the absence of any notice of demand or
notice u/s. 156 of the Act, the petitioner cannot be termed as “assessee
in default” or “assessee deemed to be in default”. Similarly, in the
absence of any notice to pay the arrears of tax as per rule 51 of Second
Schedule, Part III, of the Act, there cannot be any provisional
attachment u/s. 281B of the Act. Hence the impugned orders are liable to
the quashed.”

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Penalty – Concealment of income – Section 271(1)(c) – A. Y. 1997-98 – High Court admitting quantum appeal by assessee – Debatable issue – Penalty not leviable-

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CIT vs. Nayan Builders: 368 ITR 722 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 1997-98, in respect of addition made by the Assessing Officer, the High Court had admitted the appeal filed by the assessee and substantial questions of law were framed. Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 imposed by the Assessing Officer was cancelled by the Tribunal on the ground that the quantum appeal has been admitted by the High Court.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The imposition of penalty was found not to be justified and the appeal was allowed. As a proof that the penalty was debatable and arguable issue, the Tribunal referred to the order on the assessee’s appeal in quantum proceedings and the substantial questions of law which had been framed therein.

ii) Thus, there was no case made out for imposition of penalty and the penalty was rightly set aside.”

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Loss: Carry forward and set-off – Sections 80, 143(3) and 154 – A. Y. 1997-98 – Return with positive income filed in time – AO computed loss in order u/s. 143(3) – Loss can be carried forward and set off – Rectification u/s. 154 to withdraw carry forward of loss not justified-

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CIT Srinivasa Builders; 369 ITR 69 (Karn):

For the A. Y. 1997-98, the assessee filed return of income on 06/01/1998 declaring income of Rs. 5,29,270/-. The Assessing Officer concluded the assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and assessed the business loss of Rs. 74,84,234/- and also allowed the same to be carried forward. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 154, to rectify the order, withdrawing the benefit of carry forward of business loss stating that the return filed by the assessee was belated. Accordingly, he rectified the assessment order. The Tribunal set aside the order of rectification.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The assessee had not violated any of the conditions u/s. 80 of the Act. The assessee had shown positive income in the return but in the assessment, the business loss was determined by the Assessing Officer. This being the factual position the assessee was entitled to the benefit of carry forward of business loss.

ii) Whether the loss ultimately determined by the Assessing Officer was liable to be carried forward or not was a debatable issue. The order of rectification was not valid.”

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Foreign projects – Deduction u/s. 80HHB – A. Y. 1984-85 – Assessee having more than fifty construction sites in India and abroad – Assessee is entitled to deduction in respect of each project instead of netting up of profits from all overseas projects –

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CIT vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.; 368 ITR 733 (Bom):

The assessee was engaged in construction activity having more than 50 construction sites in India and abroad. For the A. Y. 1984-85, the assessee computed the claim for deduction u/s. 80HHB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of each of the foreign projects. The Assessing Officer computed the deductible amount by netting off the profit from all the overseas projects. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer was not justified in computing the income from construction activities undertaken abroad and by process of clubbing or netting. The only issue before the Tribunal was whether the computation of deduction u/s. 80HHB could be made in respect of each unit and that was not prohibited by section 80HHB(1). It was only for the purpose of computation of the deduction and whether the section prohibited computation unit-wise that the Tribunal referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court. Beyond that, it had not considered any wider question or controversy.

ii) The Tribunal had decided the matter essentially in the light of the facts and material placed before it. In such circumstances and considering the provisions of section 80HHB and the order of the Tribunal, the Tribunal was not in error in holding that the assessee was entitled to the deduction u/s. 80HHB in respect of each project instead of netting up of profits from all the overseas projects.

iii) Thus, the Tribunal was in no error in directing the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction as claimed by the assessee without setting off all the losses suffered in other foreign projects.”

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Company – Book Profits – Computation – Assessee is entitled to reduce from its book profits, the profit derived from captive power plants in determining tax payable for the purposes of section 115JA

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CIT vs. DCM Sriram Consolidation Ltd. [2014] 368 ITR 720 (SC)

The assessee had four divisions, namely, Shriram Fertilizers and Chemicals, Shriram Cement Works, Shriram Alkalies and Chemicals and the textile division. In addition, the assessee also had four industrial undertakings which were engaged in captive power generation (hereinafter referred to as “CPP(s)”). Three out of the four CPPs were situated at Kota, which generated power equivalent 10 MW, 30 MW and 35 MW, respectively. The fourth CPP, at Bharuch, which was situated in the State of Gujarat, generated 18 MW power. For the purposes of setting up CPPs the assessee had taken requisite permission from the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred as “ RSEB”), as well as the Gujarat State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “GSEB”).

On 29th November, 1997, the assessee filed a return declaring a loss of Rs. 43,31,74,077. In a note attached to the return, the assessee had disclosed the profit and loss derived from each of the CPPs, and also indicated the formula adopted for computation of the profit derived from the respective CPPs. Briefly, the method for computation of profit and loss indicated in the note appended to the return was the rate per unit as charged by the respective State Electricity Board for transfer of power, reduced by 7% on account of absence of transmission and distribution losses (wheeling charges). From the figure obtained by applying the reconfigured rate per unit, deduction was made towards specific expenses, as well as common expenses attributable to each CPP so as to arrive at the figure of profit/loss of each CPP. In the note appended to the return of the assessee, the break up of total profit in the sum of Rs. 41,88,50,862 was detailed out in the following manner.

The assessee, however, for the purposes of the provisions of section 115JA of the Act based on its books of account, disclosed income of the sum of Rs.86,33,382. By an intimation dated 7th July, 1998, the Revenue processed the return filed by the assessee under the provisions of section 143(1)(a) of the Act. On 30th March, 1999, the assessee filed the revised return declaring a loss of Rs. 39,36,71,056. For the purposes of section 115JA of the Act, the assessee continued to show its income as Rs. 86,33,382. The case of the assessee was taken up by the Assessing Officer for scrutiny. A notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act was issued. During the course of scrutiny, the Assessing Officer raised a query with regard to the deduction of a sum of Rs. 41,88,50,862 from book profit by the assessee while computing tax u/s. 115JA of the Act. In response to the querry of the Assessing Officer, the assessee informed that the said amount has been reduced from the book profit as this amount was profit derived from CPPs set up by the assessee with the permission of the RSEB and the GSEB.

The Assessing Officer after a detailed discussion, vide order dated 24th March, 2000, rejected the claim of the assessee and added back the deduction claimed by the assessee from book profit, broadly on the following grounds:

(i) the memorandum and articles of association did not permit the assessee to engage in the business of generation of power;

(ii) the permission granted by the State Electricity Boards prohibited sale of energy so generated or supply of energy free of cost to others;

(iii) the sanction give by RSEB was only for setting up of turbo generator and not for parallel generation; and

(iv) the assessee was in the business of manufacturing fertiliser, for which purpose, it had received a subsidy as the urea manufactured was a controlled and consequently, a licensed item being subject to the retention price scheme of the Government of India which, mandated that since sale price and the distribution of urea was fully controlled, the manufacturer would be allowed a subsidy in a manner which permitted him to earn a return of 12 % on his net worth after taking into account the cost of raw material and capital employed, which included both the fixed and variable cost. From this, it was concluded that as the assessee had received a subsidy from the Government of India for manufacture of urea and as was apparent from the balance sheet and profit and loss account filed by the assessee, the CPPs were a part of the fertiliser, cement and caustic soda plants. The CPPs were included in the aforesaid plants and thus it could not be said that the income derived from the said plants, keeping in view the subsidy received by the assessee under the retention price scheme, was in any way, income derived from generation of power; and

(v) lastly, the assessee was not in the business of generation of power and that the assessee is not deriving any income from business of generation of power. A distinction was drawn between an industrial undertaking generating power and one which was in the business of generating power. The assessee’s case was likened to an undertaking which is generating power but is not in the business of generating power and, hence, not deriving income from generation of power.

The assessee being aggrieved, preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). By an order dated 21st January, 2001, the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee with respect of the said issue.

Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals), the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal sustained the finding returned by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in totality.

On further appeal by the Revenue, the High Court was of the view that the issue which required their determination was whether on a plain reading of the provisions of Explanation (iv) to section 115JA of the Act, the assessee would be entitled to reduce the book profits to the extent of profit derived fromits CPPs, while computing the MAT u/s. 115JA of the Act. According to the High Court, the entire objection of the Revenue to this claim on the assessee was pivoted on the submission that the assessee cannot derive profit from transfer of power from its CPPs to its other units for the following reasons:

(i) Firstly, there was no sale, inasmuch as, the transfer of power was not to a third party and consequently, no profits could have been earned by the assessee;

(ii) Secondly, in any event, the generation of power by CPPs would not constitute business within the meaning of Explanation (iv) to section 115JA of the Act as the main line of activity of the assessee was not the business of generation of power, an expression which finds mention in Explanation (iv) to section 115JA of the Act and;

(iii) Lastly, there was no mechanism for computing the sale price, and consequently, the profit which would be derived on transfer of energy from the assessee’s CPPs to its other units.

According to the High Court, the fallacy in the argument was self-evident, inasmuch as, counsel for the Revenue had proceeded on the basis that the words and expressions used in Explanation (iv) to section 115JA were to be confined to a situation which involved a commercial transaction with an outsider. According to the High Court , if the words and expression used in the said Explanation (iv) were to be given their plain meaning then the claim of the assessee had to be accepted.

The high Court thereafter went on to deal with each of the contentions of Revenue. To answer the first contention as to whether there could be sale of power and the resultant derivation of profits in a situation as the present one, the high Court held that one has to look no further than to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar [1963] 48 itr (SC) 123. Based on the ratio of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, it was clear that in arriving at an amount that was to be deducted from book profits – which was really to the benefit of the assessee as it reduced the amount of tax which it was liable to pay under the provisions of section 115JA of the Act, the principle or apportionment of profits resting on disintegration of ultimate profits realised by the assessee by sale of the final product by the assessee had to be applied. In applying that principle it was not necessary  to depart from the principle that no  one  could  trade with himself.

When looked at from this angle, it was quite clear that the profit derived by the assessee on transfer of energy from its CPPs to its other units was “embedded” in the ultimate profit earned on sale of its final products. The assessee by taking resort to explanation (iv) to section 115JA had sought to apportion and, consequently, reduce that part of the profit which was derived from transfer of energy from its CPPs in arriving at book profits amenable to tax u/s. 115JA of the act.

As to the second contention as to whether the assessee was in the business of generation of power, based on the findings returned both by the Commissioner of Income- tax  (appeals)  as  well  as  the  tribunal,  the  high  Court held that it could not be said that the assessee is not engaged in the business. as rightly held by the tribunal, the assessee had been authorised by the State electricity Boards to generate electricity. The generation of electricity had been undertaken by the assessee by setting up a fully independent and identifiable industrial undertaking. these   undertakings   had   separate   and   independent infrastructures, which were managed independently and whose accounts were prepared and maintained separately and subjected to audit.   The term “business” which prefixes generation of power in clause (iv) of the explanation to section 115JA was not limited to one which is carried on only by engaging with an outside third party. The meaning of the word “business” as defined in section 2(13) of the act includes any trade commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. The definition of “business”, which is inclusive, clearly brings within its ambit the activity undertaken by the assessee, which was, captive  generation  of  power  for  its  own  purposes.  The high Court held that the approach of the Commissioner of income-tax (appeals) and, consequently, the tribunal, both in law and on facts could not be faulted with. The High Court was of the opinion that the Assessing Officer had clearly erred in holding that, since the main business of the assessee was of manufacture and sale of urea,    it could not be said to be in the business of generation  of power in terms of explanation (iv) to section 115JA of the act.

In view of the discussion above, the high Court held   that the assessee was entitled to reduce from its book profits, the profits derived from its CPPs, in determining tax payable for the purposes of section 115JA of the act. It also concurred with the line of reasoning  adopted  both by the Commissioner of income-tax (appeals) as well as the tribunal as regards the computation of sale price  and  consequent  profits  in  terms  of  Explanation
(iv)    of section 115JA of the act. the high Court further held that it was unfair to remand the matter for the purposes of computation of profits in terms of Explanation
(iv)    u/s. 115JA of the act since the Commissioner of income-tax (appeals) had categorically recorded the facts with regard to computation and, particularly of its judgement that despite being given an opportunity by the Commissioner of income-tax (appeals) nothing had been brought on record by the Assessing Officer, which could persuade them to disagree with the computation filed   by the assessee, which had been authenticated by the assessee’s auditors.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue holding that the principle of law propounded in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar (supra) had rightly been applied by the high Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.

DTAA between India and Singapore – Fees for technical services – A. Y. 2005-06 – Technical knowledge not made available with services – Amount not fees for technical services – Not taxable in India-

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DIT vs. Sun Microsystems India P. Ltd.; 369 ITR 63 (Karn):

The assessee entered into an agreement for availing of logistic services of S of Singapore. Under the agreement, the services included spare management services, provision of buffer stock, defective repair services, managing local repair centres, business planning to address service levels, etc. S did not have any place of business or permanent establishment in India. The entire services were rendered by S from outside India. The Assessing Officer held that the payments made by the assessee to S were taxable in India. The Tribunal held that as S did not have any permanent establishment and had not made available the technical knowledge, experience or skill, the payments made by the assessee to S were not required to be taxed under the head “Business” and were not taxable in view of article 7 of DTAA between India and Singapore.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) If along with the technical services rendered, the service provider also makes available the technology which it used in rendering the services, the case falls within the definition of “fees for technical services” as contained in DTAA . However, if technology is not made available along with technical services what rendered is only technical services and the technical knowledge is withheld, such a technical service would not fall within the definition of “technical services” in DTAA and the payment thereof is not liable to tax.

ii) From the facts of this case, it was clear that S had not made available to the assessee the technology or the technological services which was required to provide the distribution, management and logistic services. That was a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on appreciation of the entire material on record. The Payments made by the assessee were not liable to be taxed under the head “ fees for technical services”.”

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Capital gain: Long-term or short-term – Sections 2(42A) and 45 – Written lease for three years – Assessee continuing to pay rent and occupying premises for 10 more years – Amount received on surrender of tenancy is long-term capital gain

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CIT vs. Frick India Ltd.; 369 ITR 328 (Del):

Under a written tenancy agreement for three years the assessee occupied premises on 15-03-1973. Thereafter the assessee continued to use and occupy the premises as a tenant. Rent was paid by assessee and was accepted by the landlord. On 18-02-1987 the tenancy rights were surrendered and consideration of Rs. 6.78 crore was received from a third party. The Assessing Officer held that the amount should be treated as short-term capital gains and not as long term capital gains. The logic behind the finding of the Assessing Officer was that the tenancy after the initial period of three years by way of a written instrument, was month to month. Thus the tenancy rights were extinguished on the last day of each month and a fresh or new tenancy was created. The Tribunal held that the amount was assessable as long-term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The tenancy rights had been held for nearly fourteen years and consideration received on surrender had been rightly treated as long-term capital gain.”

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Capital gain or income from other sources – Sections 10(3) and 56(1) – A. Y 1992-93 – Relinquishment of sub-tenancy rights – Receipt is capital gain and not income under the head “Income from other sources”-

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ACIT vs. G. C. Shah; 369 ITR 323 (Guj)

In the A. Y. 1992-93, the Assessing Officer found that the assessee had received Rs. 5 lakh as miscellaneous income from relinquishment of sub-tenancy rights of a property. He made an addition of Rs. 5 lakh as income under the head “Income from other sources”. The Tribunal held that the amount is taxable as “capital gain” and not as “income from other sources”.

On appeal by the Revenue the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Revenue could have taxed the amount of Rs. 5 lakh, which was received towards surrendering the tenancy rights from the lessor, under the head “Capital gains” and not under any other head. Therefore, the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error in passing the order.”

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Capital gain vs. Business income – Sections 28 and 45 – A. Y. 2005-06 – Assessee share broker maintaining separate portfolios for investment and stock-in-trade – Profit from sale of shares of three companies held as investment – Profit assessable as short-term capital gain-

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CIT vs. CNB FINWIZ Ltd.; 369 ITR 228 (Del):

The assessee was a share broker registered with the National Stock Exchange and the Bombay Stock Exchange and was engaged in the business of purchase and sale of shares. In the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee declared short-term capital gains of Rs. 82,32,316/- from sale of shares held by it as investment. The Assessing Officer held that the profit was assessable as business income. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that it is short-term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was clear from the finding of the Tribunal that the assessee, though a member of the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange, maintained two portfolios, one relating to investment and the other relating to stock-in-trade. Profits and losses from investments were shown as “capital gains” either long term or short term and profits and losses from “stock-intrade were shown as “business income”. This position was also accepted in earlier assessment years, i.e., A. Y. 2002-03 onwards.

ii) The assessee had turnover of more than Rs. 4697.23 crore, whereas investment in shares in comparison was small amount of Rs. 2.95 crore. The assessee had declared “business income” of Rs. 63.77 crore in respect of transactions as a member of the stock exchanges and as a result of carrying out trade in shares.

ii) The shares held as investment were kept in a separate portfolio. The shares related to only three companies were not treated as stock-in-trade. These shares were sold after a gap of four months or more. Hence the profits were assessable as short-term capital gains.”

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Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Section 36(1)(iii) – A. Y. 1983-84 – Assessee as guarantor repaying instalments of loans taken by its subsidiary company for its business – Interest on such payments is deductible-

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J. K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. CIT; 369 ITR 310 (All):

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture and sale of synthetic yarn and cement. It had a subsidiary company. The subsidiary company incurred heavy losses and as a result, it became a defaulter in paying its debts. The assessee was also a guarantor to the loans taken by the subsidiary company for the purpose of protecting its own business interest. Since the subsidiary company could not adhere to the repayment of its liabilities, the assessee repaid instalments of the loans. It claimed deduction of the interest on the amounts advanced for such payments. The claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer and this was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Three conditions must be established by an assessee for getting the benefit u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. They are (i) interest should have been payable, (ii) there should be a borrowing, and (iii) capital must have been borrowed or taken for business purposes.

ii) In Madhav Prasad Jatia vs. CIT [1979] 118 ITR 200 (SC), the Supreme Court held that the expression “for the purpose of business” occurring u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act is wider in scope than the expression “for the purpose of earning income, profits or gains”. Where a holding company has a deep interest in its subsidiary company and advances money to the subsidiary company and the money is used by the subsidiary company for its business purposes, the assessee would be entitled to deduction of interest on its borrowed loans.

iii) The assessee had deep business interest in the existence of its subsidiary company and discharged its legal obligation by repaying the instalments of loan to the financial institutions. Such loans were given for the purpose of business. The assessee was entitled to deduction of interest.”

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 78 dated December 3, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) by Holding Companies/Core Investment Companies for the project use in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)

This circular permit Holding Companies/Core Investment Companies (CIC) to raise ECB under the automatic route/approval route, as the case may be, for project use in SPV subject to the following terms and conditions:

i. The business activity of the SPV should be in the infrastructure sector as defined in the extant ECB guidelines.

ii. The infrastructure project must be implemented by the SPV established exclusively for implementing the project.

iii. ECB proceeds must be utilized either for fresh capital expenditure or for refinancing of existing Rupee loans (under the approval route) availed of from the domestic banking system for capital expenditure.

iv. ECB for SPV can be raised for up to 3 years after the Commercial Operations Date of the SPV.

v. The SPV has to give an undertaking that no other method of funding, such as, trade credit (if for import of capital goods), etc. will be used for the portion of fresh capital expenditure that is financed through ECB.

vi. ECB proceeds must be kept in a separate escrow account pending utilization for permissible end-uses and use of such proceeds must be strictly monitored by the bank for permissible uses.

vii. Holding Companies that come under the Core Investment Company (CIC) regulatory framework have to comply with the following additional terms and conditions: –

a) ECB availed is within the ceiling of leverage stipulated for CIC, i.e., their outside liabilities including ECB must not be more than 2.5 times of their adjusted net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet; and

b) In case of CIC with asset size below Rs. 100 crore, ECB availed of must be on fully hedged basis.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 77 dated November 22, 2013

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Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings by Authorised Dealer Banks

Presently, banks can borrow funds from international/ multilateral financial institutions up to a limit of 100% of their unimpaired Tier I capital as at the close of the previous quarter or $ 10 million (or its equivalent), whichever is higher (excluding borrowings for financing of export credit in foreign currency and capital instruments) for the purpose of general banking business (but not for capital augmentation) and also swap the same at a concessional rate with RBI. This facility is available up to 30th November, 2013.

This circular provides that where any bank is being sanctioned any loan from any international/ multilateral financial institutions and is receiving a firm commitment in this regard on or before 30th November, 2013, it will be allowed to enter into a forward-forward swap under the first leg of which the bank can sell forward the contracted amount of foreign currency corresponding to the loan amount for delivery up to 31st December, 2013. However, if the bank is not able to deliver the contracted amount of foreign currency on the contracted date, it will have to pay the difference between concessional swap rate contracted and the market swap rate plus one hundred basis points.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 7 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Jetking Infotrain Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether mere omission to declare activity before department would amount to suppression of fact and attract penalty u/s. 78 when there no suppression is alleged in the SCN.? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant running computer coaching centres imparted computer education at different locations in India. They entered into agreements with persons to provide computer training on franchisee basis and from the fees received, they transferred the amount to the related franchise’s account after retaining 15%. The department treated this as a “franchise service” and confirmed service tax and imposed an equivalent amount of penalty apart from penalties u/s. 76 and 77 of the Act. The appellant did not contest the demand as the issue was decided against the appellant in another decision of Tribunal in similar case. For the penalty the appellant pleaded bonafide belief that the services as to non-taxability as franchise service.

Held
The penalty u/s. 78 was dropped on the ground that there is no specific allegation in the showcause notice for suppression of facts with intent to evade Service Tax and that mere omission to declare the activity would not amount to suppression of fact.

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2013 (32) STR 423 (Tri-Ahmd) Matrix Telecom P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Vadodara –II

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Whether penalty is imposable when service tax was paid before issuance of SCN and was a revenue neutral exercise.

Facts:
Appellant engaged in manufacturing of excisable goods paid the duty. Appellant received services of marketing & management consultancy from certain foreign service providers located out of India. During the course of audit, audit party pointed out the applicability of service tax on the receipt of the services from out of India. Appellant obtained the service tax registration and paid service tax with interest. Show Cause Notice was issued levying service tax, interest & penalty and were confirmed in the Order. Appellant challenged the imposition of penalty.

Held:
Since imposition of tax on import of services was under dispute at various fora and got final after the Bombay High Court gave decision in Indian National Ship Owners Association [2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom)], the Appellant deposited service tax after being pointed out by the Revenue.

Also the payment of service tax was revenue neutral exercise since it was available for credit against excise duty and therefore penalty was set aside.

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Whether reimbursement of electricity could be included in the taxable value for the purpose of renting of immovable property service?

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Facts:
Appellant provided renting of immovable property service to the tenants. Appellant charged service tax on the amount received from tenants except for reimbursement of electricity. Respondent confirmed the demand on the reimbursement of electricity.

Held:
Tribunal observed that electricity is regarded as goods as per Excise Tariff Heading 27 of CETA and as per Schedule A-20 of the Maharashtra VAT Act. Also Notification No. 12/2003 provides exemption for supply of goods and hence, service tax was held not applicable on reimbursement of electricity.

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2013 (32) STR 430 (Tri-Chennai) Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd vs. CCE ST-LTD Chennai.

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Whether passing of credit entry in the accounts tantamount to refund of money?

Facts:
Appellant an insurance service provider adjusted the service tax refunded to the intermediaries on the cancelled insurance policies against the service tax liability on the insurance premium for subsequent period. Revenue objected to the adjustment after noticing that in case of intermediaries, Appellant did not refund the actual amount of cancelled premium and service tax by way of cheque but had passed credit entries in the balances appearing in its books of accounts. Respondent considered this to be unsatisfactory, confirmed the demand.

Held:
Tribunal observed that, prima facie a credit in the account of intermediaries amounted to refund of money, however for the purpose of verification of the claim, the matter was remanded for de-novo adjudication.

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2013 TIOL 1727 CESTAT Mum, Atlas Documentary Facilitators Co Pvt. Ltd vs. CST, Mumbai

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CENVAT credit cannot be denied if claimed on the basis of debit notes capturing the details in annexure to the said debit note. Further denial of CENVAT credit on the basis of all the premises from where taxable services were provided, make the provisions of centralised registration redundant.

Facts:
The Appellant provided “Business Auxiliary Services” (BAS) and had centralised registration. It provided BAS services to banks and therefore was allotted part of the bank premises and the bank charged rent plus service tax to them. The bank issued debit notes on the Appellant and all the details as stipulated under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 2004 and Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were provided in the annexure to the debit notes issued by the bank. The Appellant availed the credit based on the said debit notes. CENVAT credit was denied on the grounds that all the details were not mentioned on the debit note but in the annexure and the annexure cannot be treated as CENVAT document. Further that the Appellant had not registered bank premises from where the taxable service was provided.

Held:
The details as required under the provisions of law for claiming the CENVAT credit were provided and also the provisions do not lay down any particular format for the CENVAT claiming documents thus the CENVAT cannot be denied if all the details are provided as required under the law. The Appellant had obtained centralised registration and thus seeking registration of all the premises from which it provides taxable service will make the Rule 4B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 granting centralized registration redundant and therefore the CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the grounds as implied by the department.

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2013 TIOL 1734 CESTAT – Kol, UCO Bank vs. CST, Kolkata

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CENVAT credit cannot be disallowed on adhoc basis without verification. Payments made vide wrong accounting code cannot be demanded again as tax is already paid and moreover when the department regularised the subsequent payment under the wrong code.

Facts:
The Appellant is a bank registered under centralized registration under service tax and discharged all its liabilities from its head office i.e. centralised registered premises. The Appellant took the CENVAT credit based on invoices pertaining to the head office kept at the head office and that pertaining to branch office was kept at the respective branches. During the CERA audit, invoices on which CENVAT credit was availed were demanded and the Appellant offered the invoices available at the head office but on account of huge volume, no checking was done and the CENVAT credit was denied. Secondly, the Appellant paid the service tax liability under the wrong accounting code and therefore they was asked to pay the said service tax again. Relying on the case of Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Goa 2013 TIOL 1044 CESTAT Mum, the Appellant pleaded bonafides regarding use of erroneous code. However, they informed that the department itself regularised such a subsequent irregular payment and on intimation by the department and produced the relevant documents as evidence.

Held:
CENVAT credit cannot be denied without verification only because the volume is huge. Joint effort be made to conduct verification and case is remanded for verification. The payment made under wrong accounting code cannot be demanded and remanded the case for verification of the Appellant’s case that the subsequent payment was regularised by the department.

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2013 (32) STR 474 (Tri-Mumbai) Golden Tobacco Ltd vs. CCEx, Mumbai – V

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Whether Mobile/Telephone service installed at the residence of the Directors eligible for credit?

Facts:
Appellant preferred the appeal against order of Revenue denying the service tax credit on mobile/ telephone installed at the residence of the Directors of the Appellant on the reasoning that the same did not qualify as input service definition.

Held:
Tribunal referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ultratech Cement Ltd.-2010 (260) ELT 369 (Bom.) which held that services used by the manufacturer of excisable goods in the course of its business activity would be entitled for credit, allowed the appeal of the Appellant.

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2013 (32) STR 525 (Tri-Chennai) Central Bank of India vs. Comm. of Ex & ST, Chennai.

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Whether is there any time limit for availing the CENVAT credit?

Facts:
Appellant had taken CENVAT credit in the year 2009 for the period pertaining to year 2004 to 2009. Respondent issued SCN and denied the credit and imposed the interest and penalties.

Held:
Tribunal observed that neither the Central Excise Act nor CENVAT Credit Rules prescribed any time limit within which credit should be taken, although it was prescribed that CENVAT credit would be available immediately. The appeal was allowed with consequential reliefs.

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2013 (32) STR 451 (Tri-Mumbai) Anand Construction Co. vs. CCEx, Kolhapur

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Whether service tax on construction of a hostel building can be confirmed on the ground of non-production of evidence for the use of the said building without any factual allegation of its commercial use?

Facts:
Appellant constructed a hostel for an educational institution which was to be used for stay by the students of the said institution. Respondent issued SCN and demanded service tax on the activity of construction of the said hostel building. Appellant contended that since the building was constructed for the purpose other than commercial purpose, service tax was not applicable and Respondent did not dispute the facts. Revenue considered it taxable as no evidence of the claim of noncommercial use was produced.

Held:
Tribunal held that since the said building was constructed for the purpose of residence of students and there was absence of allegation that building was being used for any other purpose, set aside the demand and granted the relief.

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2013 (32) STR 418 (Tri-Delhi) Indusind Media & Communication Ltd vs. CCE, Delhi

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Whether carriage fees charged for providing desired frequency for broadcasting channels signals would be classifiable under BAS or BSS?

Facts:
Appellant provided broadcasting & cable TV services and were registered as such. SCN was issued raising the demand of service tax on carriage fees received for providing desired frequency for broadcasting channels signals under business auxiliary service. Also demand was raised under Lease Circuit service for amount received for providing voice & data circuit service. Demand was confirmed with interest and penalties.

Held:
Carriage fees charged from different channels for providing desired frequency for broadcasting their channel’s signals which facilitates better quality view of channel. Better quality of channels enhanced the viewer-ship of channel and thus amounted to promotion of broadcasting channel and therefore classifiable under business auxiliary service.

Original authority classified voice & data circuit service under Lease Circuit service for a certain period and under telecommunication service for subsequent period. Appellate authority in its Order classified the said service under telecommunication service. Both the departmental authorities have not given any findings on the applicability of the said classification and therefore this issue was remanded to original authority.

Since no finding was recorded on the issue of invocation of extended period and penalties, the Appellant’s claim that proper disclosures were made in the service tax returns in respect of carriage fees, voice & data circuit fees received, the matter was remanded to the original authority.

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2013 (32) STR 407 (Tri-Bang) Ace Credit vs. CCEx, Mangalore

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Whether services of Direct Sales Associate/Agent of bank is classifiable as “provision of service on behalf of client” or “promotion/marketing of services provided by client”.

Facts:
Appellant challenged service tax under one of the sub-clause of the definition of Business Auxiliary Service (BAS) and applicability of extended period of limitation and levy of penalty.

Appellant was appointed as Direct Sales Associate/ Agent of ICICI and HDFC banks for promoting various products of these banks at relevant times. Appellant obtained service tax registration by disclosing the nature of services rendered by it under BAS category under sub-clause “provision of service on behalf of client” which was made taxable from 10-09-2004 started paying taxRespondent issued demand on the basis that the services provided by Appellant were covered not under the clause of “provision of services on behalf of client” but under sub-clause “promotion/ marketing of services provided by client” which was taxable from 01-07-2003.

Held:
Tribunal after referring the agreement entered between Appellant & Banks held that Appellant by using its expertise, staff, infrastructure was marketing the products of Banks and these were nothing but the services provided by Bank. Hence services of the Appellant were classifiable under sub-clause “Promotion/marketing of services provided by the client” which was taxable w.e.f. 01-07- 2003. Further, non-disclosure of services rendered at the time of obtaining service tax registration in the year 2004 amounted to suppression of material facts for the period prior to year 2004 and hence invocation of extended period was justified. However, since Appellant filed an application under “Extra-ordinary Taxpayer-Friendly Scheme” in the year 2004, the case was considered covered u/s. 80 for setting aside the penalties.

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2012 (32) STR 392 (Guj) C C Patel & Associates Pvt Ltd vs. UOI

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Whether refund claim for services tax paid twice can be rejected on the ground of limitation?

Facts:
Appellant preferred refund claim for service tax paid twice (second time at the instance of department) against the Order of CESTAT rejecting the appeal filed by Appellate.

Appellant deposited service tax on billing basis instead of receipt basis that too before the due date. Respondent passed the orders raising the demand of service tax on the receipts realised in subsequent period, without adjusting the service tax paid at the time of billing. Appellant deposited the service tax demanded with interest and preferred a refund claim. Respondent rejected the refund claim on the ground of limitation and also due to possibility of unjust enrichment.

Held:
High Court after referring to provisions of section 68(2) & 68(3) of the Finance Act as existed at the relevant time, held that, Appellant had already deposited the entire tax on billing basis thus had complied the requirement of section 68. The logic advanced in the Order of Respondent while demanding the tax was fundamentally incorrect. Question of limitation in case of retention of service tax which was paid twice would not arise and such retention was without authority of law. Appellant has deposited the tax separately and second time under insistence of Revenue which was the subject matter of refund, hence principal of unjust enrichment was not applicable. Appeal was allowed with direction to refund the tax paid.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 69 (Madras HC) – CCE vs. Salem Starch & Manufacturers’ Service Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd.

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Whether, co-operative society providing platform for the sellers and buyers to meet in a common place, providing a storage facility to the manufacturer, and organising of the sale of the products etc is liable for service tax under “clearing and forwarding” service? Held, No.

Facts:
The respondent a registered co-operative society formed with the object of improvement of tapioca cultivation and tapioca sago and starch industry and of the economic condition of tapioca cultivators and sago and starch manufacturers in some area. Their activities involved in the case were as under:

Members of the society sent their products to the society’s premises by making their own arrangements for loading, transport and unloading of the goods. The said goods were weighed and sent to the godown maintained by the society. Samples were drawn for quality testing as well  as for display in the tender hall. On receipt of the tenders from the registered merchants, who also happened to be members of the society, the higher rate offered for each lot was displayed. On confirmation of the price by the principal, the buyer was intimated suitably to make his arrangements to lift the stock. Thereupon the society prepared the statement of bill to the members, wherein, deductions were made towards advance paid, interest payable, godown services charges, godown rent, unloading charges, marking charges, bank service charges and courier charges etc. According to the society, it acted as agent between the members and buyers; provided warehousing facility and gave advance money to the members before sale if so requested by the members

As contended by the Revenue, the society received the goods from principal, effected sales only after obtaining the concurrence of the principal; they maintained the records for receipts, despatches and the stock available with them in the warehouse and therefore tax was sought to be levied under “clearing and forwarding service” and it was confirmed in the first appeal.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that the consignments of sale were brought by the principal to the premises of the society for auction and that the society did not clear the consignments from its premises. After the sale, the goods were delivered to the buyer at the sales premises by the owner/principal. As such there was no forwarding took place. Referring to the decision in Mahavir Generics vs. CCE [2007] 6 STT 523 (New Delhi-CESTAT) the Tribunal held that the assessee was not doing forwarding services and consequently, there was no liability to pay the service tax. Before Hon. High Court, the Revenue placed reliance on the CBEC Circular in F.No. B/43/7/97 TRU dated 11-07-1997 which the society contested and placed reliance on section 65A(2) (b) of the Finance Act that even assuming that there is a combination of different services, the Revenue must find out the essential character of the service to bring the society within the framework of the activity of clearing and forwarding.

High Court held as under:

• There is no evidence to show that the assessee had a responsibility of arranging despatch of goods purchased by the buyer in the auction nor had responsibility to collect the goods from the principal’s premises. It is only the principal who brought their products on the society’s premises to make use of the common market platform of the Society for its members and on the request of the principal, the society offered the storage facility.

• On reading of the nature of activity rendered by the society, it is clear that except for receiving the goods which were brought to its doorsteps by its principal and displaying the goods received for sale, practically, nothing else was done by the society in the matter of taking the goods from the principal and for further despatching of the goods to the buyer by engaging transporter or on its own. The conduct of the society, handling the goods on receipt raising invoices on sale or maintaining records as to the stock availability, rate at best, indicates it only as an agency offering storage facility. This act, per se, does not convert the assessee’s transaction as that of a clearing and forwarding agency. The essential character of the activity of providing a platform for the sellers and buyers to meet in a common place, providing a storage facility to the manufacturer, the financial help etc. do not, take the society anywhere near the activities discharged by a clearing and forwarding agent. The incidental services offered in the transaction in arranging the transporting of the goods to the buyer would not, decide the nature of the transaction as one of clearing and forwarding agency.

(Note: It may be noted that, decision of Mahaveer Generics relied upon by the Tribunal has been approved by P&H High Court in the case of CCE vs. Kulchip Medicines 2009 (14) STR 608, however it has been subsequently reversed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Commissioner of C.Ex (Bangalore) vs. Mahaveer Generics 2010 (17) STR 225 (Kar) distinguishing the said decision of P&H High Court (supra).

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2013 (32) STR 388 (Kar.) Prakash Retail Private Limited vs. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Tax (Audit), Udupi

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Whether charges for transportation and installation included in the “Sale Price” of goods is subjected to VAT?

Facts:
Appellant was engaged in the trading of household articles, electrical and electronic goods and sold these goods to its customers by placing orders with various manufacturers. The terms of sale were on ex-factory basis and the sale price was charged as per price list issued by the manufactures. Thereafter Appellant arranged for the transportation from the place of manufacturer to the customers by collecting transport charges. Further Appellant charged for the installation of these items at the place of the customers. The invoices raised by it had three components – sale price, transport charges and installation charges. Appellant deposited VAT on the sale price and paid service tax on the transport charges and installation charges. Authority demanded VAT on transport and installation charges for which the present writ is filed.

Held:
The High Court after referring to section 2(36) of KVAT Act held that, the said section specifies the term ‘turnover’ which means the aggregate amount for which goods are sold shall include any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of goods sold at the time of or before the delivery thereof. If the transfer of title to goods is to be at the place of seller then the subsequent charges for transporting goods & installation do not form part of the amount for which goods are sold. From the price lists and sale invoices of the Appellant, it becomes clear that the sale prices are on ex-factory basis and do not include the installation. Therefore the sale price of the goods at the ex-showroom price attracts sales tax/VAT. Subsequent to the transfer of title in goods at the place of seller, Appellant acts as agent of customers for transportation of goods and installation. Therefore the transportation and installation charges do not become part of the sale price of goods. In this case, Appellant has collected transport & installation charges and deposited service tax thus Appellant has discharged its legal obligation of paying service tax. The State Government cannot be enriched by wrongly bringing the transport and installation charges as part of sale price of the goods. Thus the writ was allowed and the order was quashed.

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Branch Transfer, Inter State Sale vis-àvis Dispatch of Semi-finished Goods

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Introduction
Under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act), the transaction of ‘sale’ (inter- state sale) is liable to tax. A transaction of sale becomes inter-state sale, if because of such sale, there is movement of goods from one State to another State. In other words, if there is link between inter-state movement of goods and the pre-agreed sale between the transferor (seller) and the buyer then there will be inter-state sale.

However, there can be inter-state movement of goods (otherwise than an agreement to sale), like; when goods are sent from one branch in one State to another branch in other State of the same entity or to the agent or principal as the case may be (commonly known as ‘consignment transfer/branch transfer’).

There is a lot of litigation about claim of branch transfer vis-à-vis inter-state sale. The transferor branch may be transferring goods to another branch for compliance of requirement of a local customer of the transferee branch. Whether there is conceivable link between dispatch to branch and ultimate sale to the local customer will decide the nature of transaction. If there is conceivable link then the branch transfer will amount to inter-state sale. If there is no such conceivable link, then it will not amount to inter state sale and claim of branch transfer will remain allowable.

Whether there is conceivable link between branch transfer and ultimate sale will depend upon facts of each case. Therefore, there can not be any general ratio for deciding the nature of transaction.

Dispatch of Semi-finished goods
An interesting issue arose before Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal (MSTT) in case of Multi Flex Lami Prints Ltd. (Appeal No. 61 of 2008 dated 29.7.2013).

Facts were that the appellant/dealer was engaged in the activity of supply of packaging pouches. The packing pouches were to be supplied to one particular customer and they were printed accordingly as per his specifications. Appellant had manufacturing unit at Mahad in Maharashtra. There, on the raw materials, processes like colour separation, cylinder making, printing and lamination were carried on. After above processes, the processed goods were sent to Silvassa the unit. In the Silvassa unit, processes like slitting and pouching were done. Thereafter the pouches were supplied to the customers.

In the assessment, the branch transfer claim was allowed. However, in revision proceedings, the said claim was disallowed holding that the transfer is interstate sale. The fact of manufacturing the goods as per specification of customer in Mahad and dispatch to Silvassa was considered as the determinative factor for holding the transfer as inter state sale.

Judgment of Hon’ble Tribunal
Before the Hon’ble Tribunal, several arguments about legality of the revision order were taken. However, Hon’ble Tribunal considered the revision action as valid. On merits, Hon’ble Tribunal held that the revision is not correct. The observations of Hon’ble Tribunal are reproduced below:

“It was explained in the said letter that the processes, namely colour separation, cylinder making, printing and lamination had been carried out at the factory in Mahad and thereafter, the laminated films were dispatched to Silvassa Unit of the appellant for further processing such as slitting and pouching. It was then explained by the appellant to the revising Officer that the goods sent to Silvassa Unit were Semi finished goods and thereafter they were slit according to the specification of width given by the customer. The slit films were then stretch-wrapped and packed, which is known as primary packing. The said film rolls were thereafter put in corrugated boxes which are known as secondary packing. It was also explained by the appellant to the revising Officer that in case the customer requires the material in pouch form, the laminated/slitted films is converted into pouches of types/sizes as per specification of the customers and after quality check and packing they are dispatched to the customer. It also appears that it was explained by the appellant to the revising officer that, although the goods become identifiable to a particular customer at the time of leaving Mahad Unit but in a Semi finished condition. It was explained by the appellant that the semi finished goods received by the Silvassa Unit were subjected to further processing of slitting and pouching at Silvassa unit and were thereafter dispatched to the customers at various places outside Silvassa in finished form. It would appear that it was the case of the appellant before the revising officer that the goods sent to the branch were not delivered/ sold as such by the Silvassa branch, but they were different goods from the goods sent to the Silvassa branch. A perusal of revision order shows that the revising officer had not controverted this factual submission of the appellant and thus accepted the contention of the appellant that the goods sent by the appellant to the Silvassa unit were the goods manufactured up to lamination stage and further process such as slitting and pouching were done at Silvassa unit and the goods ultimately delivered to the buyers outside Silvassa were after slitting and pouching made at Silvassa. In support of the claim that slitting and pouching of laminated and printed packaging film amounts to manufacturing activity, the appellant has relied upon the judgment dated 24th September 2012 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.741 of 2010. The revenue has however relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Faridabad Iron and Steel Traders Association v/s. Union of India in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 7595 of 2001 and 94 of 2002 decided on 21-11-2003 to support it’s case that slitting of laminated films does not amount to manufacture. The concept of manufacture envisages that the processes to which the goods are subjected to should not only bring about change in the goods but the change should be such that the goods after subjecting to processes emerge as a different commercial commodity. In Faridabad Iron and Steel Traders Association, it was held by the Delhi High Court that mere cutting or slitting of Steel Sheet does not amount to manufacture because the identity of the product remains unchanged. We are of the view that in the context of the facts of the present case it would be most appropriate to decide the issue relying upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.741 of 2010. We agree with the appellant that the nature of goods actually delivered to the buyers by Silvassa unit are different from the goods sent by the appellant’s factory at Mahad to it’s Silvassa Unit. This fact is borne out from the description in the stock transfer invoices raised by the appellant on its Silvassa branch and the sales invoices issued by the Silvassa branch to the buyers.”

It is further observed as under;

“In the present appeal before us, the goods manufactured and ultimately delivered to the customer by the Silvassa branch of the appellant are made as per the specifications of the customer. Manufacturing involves the processes namely, colour separation, Cylinder making, printing, lamination, slitting and pouching. Processes upto lamination stage are done at Mahad factory in Maharashtra. The goods manufactured upto lamination stages are sent to Silvassa branch. But they are not delivered to the customer in the form  in which they are received by Silvassa branch because the goods in the form in which they are received by Silvassa branch are not ready to be delivered/sold to the customers as per their requirement/orders. The goods received by Silvassa branch are subjected to further processing of slitting and pouching so as to make them appropriate for delivery to the customer as per his specification. Slitting and pouching is done at Silvassa. Thus, it is clear that the goods delivered by Silvassa branch of the appellant to the customer is a different commercial commodity from the goods sent by Mahad factory of the appellant to Silvassa branch and therefore it is difficult to hold that there is an inter-State sale of the same goods which were manufactured by the Mahad factory of the appellant and dispatched to Silvassa branch. In the case of Bharat Electronics Ltd., (46 VST179), The petitioner had manufactured night vision devices at its Machilipatnam Unit which were transferred to other units of the petitioner outside the State to be incorporated in the equipment to be manufactured at the other units which were eventually sold there from to end customers. It was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that it is only if the goods which move from one State to another are sold as they are would the question of such transfer of goods attracting levy of tax under the C.S.T Act as an inter-state sale arise.”

Conclusion
The above judgment will be useful for deciding the nature of transaction, when there is branch transfer of Semi-finished goods. However, the nature of processes carried out at relevant places is also required to be seen before arriving to conclusion. It is expected that above judgment will provide guidelines.

IFB Agro Industries Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ‘B’ Bench Kolkata Before P. K. Bansal (A. M.) and George Mathan (J. M.) ITA No. 1721/Kol/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 12th March, 2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: S. K. Tulsiyan / Ajoy Kr. Singh

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Section 2(22)(e) – Deemed dividend – Intercorporate deposit is neither loan nor advance hence not covered u/s. 2(22)(e).

Facts
The assessee had received Inter-corporate deposits of Rs. 11.20 crore. from IFB Automotive Pvt. Ltd., a company wherein the assessee held 18.82% of the shares. The said deposit was treated by the AO as a loan and invoking the provisions of section 2(22) (e), he taxed the said receipt as income of the assessee. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and further relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Star Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. reported in 203 ITR 11, wherein it has been held that a loan to a shareholder to the extent to its accumulated profits was liable to be treated as deemed dividend.

Held
The tribunal noted that the dispute primarily revolves around the issue as to whether the Inter corporate deposits received by the assessee from M/s. IFB is a ‘loan’ or ‘advance’ or is a ‘deposit’. It further noted that the provisions of section 2(22)(e) refers to only ‘loans’ and ‘advances’ it does not talk of a ‘deposit’. According to the tribunal, the fact that the term ‘deposit’ cannot mean a ‘loan’ and that the two terms ‘loan’ and the term ‘deposit’ are two different and distinct terms, is evident from the explanation to section 269T as also section 269SS of the Act where both the terms are used. Further, it was noted that the second proviso to section 269SS of the Act recognises the term ‘loan’ taken or ‘deposit’ accepted. The tribunal then observed that once it is accepted that the terms ‘loan’ and ‘deposit’ are two distinct terms which has distinct meaning then, if term ‘loan’ is used in a particular section, the deposit received by an assessee cannot be treated as a ‘loan’ for that section.

Further, on perusal of the decision of the Special Bench of the Ahmedabad bench Tribunal in the case of Gujarat Gas & Financial Services Ltd. reported in 115 ITD 218 which had taken into consideration the decision of the Special Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Housing & Urban Development Corporation Ltd. reported in 102 TTJ (SB) 936 and of the Bombay tribunal in the case of Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. reported in 28 SOT 383, the tribunal opined that the Inter corporate deposits cannot be treated as a loan falling within the purview of section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Accordingly, the addition representing inter-corporate deposits treated as loan by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deleted by the tribunal.

As regards the decisions relied on by the CIT(A) as also by his counsel before the tribunal, it observed that the same were on ‘loans’ and none of the decisions referred to by them discussed anywhere that deposits were to be treated as loans.

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[2013] 144 ITD 57 (Mumbai-Trib.) IGFT Ltd. vs. ITO-2(2)(1), Mumbai A.Y. 2001-02 Date of Order: 13th May 2013

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Section 4 – Sum received for transfer of intangible assets on discontinuance of business resulting in loss of enduring trading assets considered as capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

Section 4 – Non-compete fees received on transfer of sole and main business for not carrying on the same for a limited period was considered as capital receipts not chargeable to tax during the A.Y. 2001-02.

Facts
Assessee-company was engaged in the business of merchant banking. It had transferred its business of merchant banking in the form of employees, customer and client relationship, a list of 10 largest clients and certain know-how for a sum of Rs. 25 lakh. Further, it also received a sum of Rs. 1 crore as non-compete fees for a consideration towards not carrying on the same business for a period of 3 years after its transfer.

Assessee claimed that a sum of Rs. 1.25 crore was capital receipts not chargeable to tax.

The Ld. CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO and taxed the receipts of Rs. 1.25 crore under the head business income due to the following reasons:

I. Business was hampered only for the period of 3 years and not forever. Amount was received as compensation during the course of business and there was no loss of capital assets or capital structure of the assessee’s business. Business has been continued as evident from the annual accounts of subsequent years.
II. Amount received Rs. 1.25 crore was negligible as compared to the earnings from the business of Rs. 7.5 crore and it defies business prudence of the assessee.
III. There was no basis for computing the amount of consideration of Rs.1.25 crore.

Held:
The Hon’ble ITAT held that impugned receipt of Rs. 25 lakh was a capital receipt due to the following reasons:

The assessee received the consideration for the transfer of its merchant banking business and the same was discontinued by it. Hence, compensation received cannot be considered as receipts during the course of business.

Also the Revenue failed to show as to how the agreement was not bona fide. It has been accepted that the agreement was with unrelated and unknown party which at relevant point of time was reputed international firm of chartered accountants. It was intended to be acted upon by both.

Further, it has been held that it is for the transferor to fix the consideration for the transfer. It is not at the instance of the revenue to raise any issue on its adequacy. After discontinuing the merchant banking business, assessee did not have any active source of income and its income consist of mainly dividend from shares and mutual funds, profit on sale of shares, interest income and nominal consultancy charges. Hence there was substantial fall in profit earning of the assessee. It has also been held that the transfer of business has resulted in loss of enduring trading.

Following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.C. Shrinivasa Setty 128 ITR 294, it has been held that, as said intangible assets were self generated having no cost of acquisition the sum received from transfer of the same was not liable to tax under the head capital gains also.

The Hon’ble ITAT also held that impugned receipt of Rs. 1 crore was a capital receipt due to the following reasons:
It has been held that decisions relied by Ld. CIT(A) are not applicable to the facts of this case, as in this case sole and main business had been transferred and not one of the businesses.

Secondly, agreement was made only for a period of 3 years is not relevant as generally all the noncompete agreements are limited in point of time which prescribes period of non-competition.

Thirdly, non-competition fee is taxable capital receipt and not revenue receipt by specific legislative mandate vide section 28 (va) of Income Tax Act, 1961 and that too w.e.f. 1-04-2003. Hence, it is not applicable for relevant assessment year. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in case of Gufic Chem (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2011] 332 ITR 602 fees received under non-competition agreement is capital receipt as amendment does not cover the relevant assessment year.

Editor’s Note: The decision may not apply after the insertion of Section 28 (va)with effect from A.Y.2003-04

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2013-TIOL-1038-ITAT-MUM DCIT vs. Weizmann Ltd. ITA No. 770/Mum/2011 Assessment Years: 2008-09. Date of Order: 31.10.2013

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Section 32 – Dealership network is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii).

Facts
During the previous year the assessee claimed deprecation of Rs. 1,84,65,131 credit for TDS of Rs. 58,22,932

The assessee, a company which is engaged in the business of dealing in foreign exchange, filed its return of income for the year under consideration declaring total income of Rs. 9,48,61,257/-. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had claimed depreciation of Rs. 1,84,65,131/- @ 25% on the dealership network purchased by it in the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2007-08 from AFL.

The assessee submitted that the AFL had vast representative/dealer network in India and the same was acquired by the assessee for expanding its base and business. It was contended that the said network was in the nature of license and franchisee and therefore was eligible for depreciation @ 25% u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act.

The AO was of the view that the assessee could not prove that any right of the nature as provided in section 32(1)(ii) of the Act was acquired by it and that the right or advantage so acquired was depreciable over a period of time. He, therefore, disallowed the claim of the assessee for depreciation on the dealership network.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the disallowance made by the A.O. by following the order of his predecessor in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007-08 wherein a similar claim of the assessee for depreciation @25% on dealership network was allowed by his predecessor treating the dealership network as intangible asset eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
It is observed that a similar issue was involved in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007-08 wherein the claim of the assessee for depreciation on dealership network is allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 30-03-2012 passed in ITA No. 3571/Mum/2011 holding that the consideration paid by the assessee to AFL was for the purpose of enhancing its network in the field of money transaction business by acquiring rights or infrastructure or other advantages attached to the marketing network and since the same was in the nature of intangible asset as contemplated u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act, the assessee was entitled to depreciation thereon @ 25%. The Tribunal following the decision of the co-ordinate Bench, in the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007- 08, upheld the order of the ld. CIT(A) allowing the claim of the assessee for depreciation on dealership network u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act and dismiss ground No. 1 of Revenue’s appeal.

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2013-TIOL-1045-ITAT-HYD NCC Maytas JV vs. ACIT ITA No. 812/Hyd/2013 Assessment Years: 2006-07. Date of Order: 13.09.2013

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Section 199, Rule 37BA – A part of TDS cannot be denied on the ground that the corresponding turnover has not been shown in the assessment year in which credit is being claimed if income relating to such TDS has already been offered for taxation in an earlier assessment year.

Facts
During the previous year the assessee claimed credit for TDS of Rs. 58,22,932 based on the certificate filed. The certificate mentioned gross receipts of Rs. 25,23,31,091. Upon being asked to explain whether these receipts are credited to the current year’s P & L Account, the assessee submitted that Rs. 23,99,32,700 were credited to P & L Account and the balance had already been offered for taxation in the preceding assessment years. The assessee submitted that the credit of TDS was not claimed in the preceding assessment years.

The Assessing Officer held that u/s. 199 credit for TDS has to be restricted to the receipts shown by the assessee. He disallowed proportionate amount of TDS and allowed credit of only Rs. 55,36,798.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO by observing that Rule 37BA of Income-tax Rules, 1962 provided for such apportionment of TDS to different assessment years in which the income is assessable on proportionate basis.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the revenue authorities have not disputed the claim of the assessee that the balance portion of the turnover was offered to tax in the earlier assessment year. Further, there was no material brought on record to show that the assessee had claimed corresponding TDS relating to the balance portion of the turnover in the concerned assessment years. The entire TDS relating to Rs.25,23,31,091/- was claimed for the impugned assessment year as the TDS certificate relates to the assessment year under dispute. The assessee having not claimed any portion of TDS in the preceding assessment years wherein a part of the turnover was offered to tax, the assessee’s claim of TDS in the impugned assessment year cannot be rejected on the ground that it relates to the turnover which has not been shown by the assessee for the impugned assessment year.

Income relating to such TDS having already been offered to tax in the earlier assessment years and since the assessee has not claimed corresponding TDS in those assessment years, no disallowance of the TDS claimed can be done. As regards reliance by CIT (A) rule 37BA the Tribunal observed that in the first place the said rule is not applicable to the assessment year under dispute as it has been inserted into the statute by IT (Sixth Amendment) Rules 2009 with effect from 1-4-2009. Even if we go by the aforesaid rule, the Assessing Officer was required to give credit to the TDS in the corresponding assessment years wherein the income was so offered which also would have resulted in refund to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim credit for the entire TDS amount of Rs.55,22,932/- in the impugned assessment year. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-1054-ITAT-DEL DCIT vs. Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd ITA No. 910 to 912/Del/2010 Assessment Years: 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2003-04. Date of Order: 25.10.2013

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S/s. 139(1), 148, 282 – Notice issued under section 148 if not served by post has to be served in a manner provided in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purposes of service of summons. Accordingly, when the copy of the notice retained by the process server did not contain the time of service nor the manner of service nor the name and address of the person identifying the service and witnessing the delivery of the notice, the same cannot be considered as a valid service of notice issued u/s. 148 though the copy retained had the signature of the receiver, date and the phone number.

Facts
For assessment year 2003-04 the Assessing Officer (AO) issued on 22-03-2005 notice u/s. 148 of the Act which according to the AO was duly served. Vide letter dated 18-10-2005 the assessee informed the AO that the said notice was not received by it and in any case the return filed u/s. 139(1) may be treated as a return in response to notice u/s. 148. Upon receiving this letter the AO wrote a letter dated 28-10-2005 informing the assessee that the notice u/s. 48 had been duly served on 24-03-2005 by the process server on the address of the company and that the same was duly acknowledged. The address where the notice was served was the declared address of the assessee company. It was only vide letter dated 13-07-2005 that the assessee had informed the AO about the change in address. A copy of the said notice was attached with the letter. The assessee filed objections in respect of reassessment proceedings u/s. 148 vide letter dated 02-12-2005, filed on 08-12-2005. The AO replied to the objections.

The assessee again contended that the notice u/s. 148 was not served and therefore the proceedings were void ab initio. The AO rejected this argument and completed the assessment.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who considering the provisions of section 282 of the Act and also the provisions of CPC held that  the mandate of section 148 is that the notice should be served on the assessee. Since the notice was served through the notice server of the Department and not by post, the procedure contemplated by the CPC under Order V for service has to be followed. Having examined the procedure laid down by CPC he held that there was no material on record to even establish the person to whom notice was allegedly served was authorised to receive the notice, rather that person was not identifiable. Despite repeated requests from the assessee and even after instructions from CIT(A) the AO was not able to name the person on whom the notice was served. If notice in some way or other reached the assessee then it cannot be treated as proper service of notice since statute prescribes specific mode of service to be followed. Acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction. He held that there was no valid service of notice u/s. 148 and consequently reassessment proceedings are void ab initio. He quashed the proceedings.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Service of notice is the sine qua non for a proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act to get underway. Section 148 (1) of the Act provides that the Assessing Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee, as required therein. As to the procedure for service of such notice, section 282 of the Act is the governing section and it provides that such a notice may be served either by post, or as if it was a summons issued by a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the present case, evidently, the service was as a summons and not by post.

Therefore, the service is governed by the relevant provisions of the CPC, i.e., Order V thereof. As per Rule 12 of Order V, CPC, service of a summons, wherever practicable, shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he has an agent empowered to accept such service. As per Rule 16, the process server shall require the signature of the person to whom the copy of the summons is delivered. According to Rule 18, the process server shall endorse or annex, on or to the original summons, a return stating the time when and the manner in which the summons was served, and the name and address of the person identifying the person served and witnessing the delivery of the summons.

The Tribunal observed that in the present case, first of all, though there is a signature on the copy of the notice retained by the process server (APB 56) and it contains a date, i.e., 24-03-2005 and a number, i.e., 26145991, neither the time of service, nor the manner of service, nor the name and address of the person identifying the service and witnessing the delivery of the notice, are present. Thus, the requirement of Order V Rule 18 of the CPC has evidently not been met with.

Thus, the servicee of the notice has nowhere been identified in spite of repeated requests made by the assessee to the Assessing Officer to do so. In fact, in para 6.7 of the impugned order, the Ld. CIT (A) has noted that even after instructions from him [the CIT (A)], the Assessing Officer was not able to name the person on whom the notice was served. In the absence of identification of the servicee, it is, obviously, well nigh impossible to contend, much less prove, that the servicee was an agent of the assessee company. And, as such, it cannot be said that the servicee had been appointed as an agent of the assessee to accept service of notices on behalf of the assessee. This, as correctly noted by the Ld. CIT (A) stands long back settled, inter alia, in the following case laws:-

i) ‘CIT vs. Baxiram Rodmall’, 2 ITR 438 (Nagpur);
ii) ‘CIT vs. Dey Brothers’, 3 ITR 213’ (Rang); and
iii) ‘C.N. Nataraj vs. Fifth ITO’, 56 ITR 250 (Mys).

The provisions of the CPC, in keeping with those of Section 282 of the IT Act, as relevant herein, are not a mere formality. Fulfillment of the requirements therein is the sine qua non for a proper and valid service of notice. Herein, not only has the alleged servicee not been identified, the person identifying such servicee has also not been even named, thereby violating the provisions of Order V, Rule 18, CPC, as has duly correctly been taken into consideration by the Ld. CIT (A).

The Tribunal upheld the action of CIT (A) in holding that the invalid service of notice u/s. 148 of the IT Act, cannot be said to be merely a procedural defect and it cannot be cured by the participation of the assessee in the re-assessment proceedings. It confirmed the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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2013-TIOL-1063-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Smt. Bina Gupta ITA No. 4074/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2009-10. Date of Order: 18.10.2013

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S/s. 45, 54, 54F – Deduction u/s. 54F cannot be denied in a case where the assessee has made payment and as per agreement was scheduled to receive possession of the property but did not receive possession of the property.

Facts:
During the previous year the assessee sold a residential house on 13-06-2008 and a plot of land on 10-11-2008. Both these assets were held by the assessee as long term capital assets. The long term capital gain arising on transfer of house was Rs. 31,00,369 and long term capital gain arising on transfer of plot was Rs. 19,89,914. Thus the aggregate long term capital gain was Rs. 50,90,283. The assessee claimed exemption u/ss. 54 and 54F. The assessee entered into an agreement with Golden Gate Properties Ltd. on 18-12-2008 for purchase of a house. She paid the builder Rs. 42,50,000 on different dates between 31-05-2008 to 31-12-2008 and deposited Rs. 14,50,000 in capital gain account scheme. As per agreement, the assessee was scheduled to receive possession of the house by 30- 09-2009 i.e. within the time limit mentioned in these sections for purchase of house.

Before the AO, the assessee relied upon the ratio of the decisions in the case of CIT vs. R. L. Sood (2000) 245 ITR 727 (Del); CIT vs. Sardarmal Kothari & Another 302 ITR 286; the judgment of Karnataka High Court dated 15-02-2012 in the case of CIT vs. Sri Sambandam Udaykumar in IT Appeal No. 175/2012 (2012-TIOL-217- HC-Kar-IT); Mrs. Seetha Subramanian vs. ACIT 56 TTJ 417 (Mad) and Satish Chandra Gupta vs. AO (54 ITD 508 (Del) and argued that the delay was not due to the fault of the assessee.

The AO rejected the arguments of the assessee that there was no relationship between the assessee and the builder and hence there can be no occasion to consider connivance. He also rejected the contention that the builders had since entered into a financial arrangement with M/.s J M Financial Asset Reconstruction Co. P. Ltd. who had committed funds to the builders and the builder had communicated that construction of the flat allotted was under progress and date of possession communicated by them was December 2012 and the builders had further demanded funds of Rs. 14,17,352 vide email dated 10-03-2012 and the assessee was in the process of arranging the same.

Since the assessee had not received possession of the house, the AO denied the exemption on the ground that these sections require purchase of house within a period of two years from date of transfer and even while the assessment was going on the assessee had not received possession of the house.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the payments were made by the assessee on the specific dates pursuant to an agreement entered with the builder on 18-12-2008 i.e. within the specified time and the delivery was scheduled to take place before 30-09-2009 i.e. very much within the stipulated time and also that since there was no relationship between the assessee and the builder no connivance or collusion can be read into the agreement. Considering these facts and also the settled legal position laid down interalia by the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. R. L. Sood 245 ITR 727 (Del) the Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A). The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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[2013] 144 ITD 668 (Delhi – Trib.) ITO vs. Indian Newspaper Society A.Y. 2007-08 & 2009-10 Date of Order – 20.06.2013

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Section 194-I – Where payment of lease premium was not made on periodical basis but it was a one time payment to acquire land with right to construct a commercial complex thereon, section 194-I had no application on deposit of such lease premium.

Facts:
The assessee was a non-profit-making company. The assessee was offered certain land on lease for a period of 80 years by the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA). The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on lease premium u/s. 194-I and accordingly treated the assessee as assessee-indefault u/s. 201.The CIT (A) partly allowed assessee’s claim. The CIT(A) held that as the lease premium was paid once and was paid prior to date of lease agreement, such payment being in nature of capital expenditure, does not attract section 194-I.

Held:
It is well-settled that premium and rent have distinct and separate connotations in law.

The essence of premium lies in the fact that it is paid prior to the creation of the landlord and tenant relationship that is, before the commencement of the tenancy and constitutes the very superstructure of the existence of that relationship. Its another vital characteristic is that it is a one-time non-recurring payment for transferring and purchasing the right to enjoy the benefits granted by the lessor resulting in conveyance of some of the rights, title and interest in the property out of such a bundle of rights.

In the present case the payment was done before the initiation of the tenancy relationship between the appellant and the MMRDA and consequently, a cardinal ingredient of premium is satisfied.

Hence, undoubtedly premium in relation to leased land is a payment on capital account not liable to be classified as revenue outgoing.

Readers may also refer to judgement of High Court of Delhi in the case of Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [(2013) 350 ITR 24 / (2012) 23 taxmann. com 265]

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Settlement Commission: S/s. 245C and 245D: Where order passed by Commission u/s. 245D(2C) was not focussed on issues and contentions raised by petitioners and by revenue, same was cryptic and was set aside:

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MARC Bathing Luxuries Ltd. vs. ITSC; [2013] 38 taxmann. com 308 (Delhi):

The petitioners had filed two applications u/s. 245C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and disclosed the entire amount of unaccounted turnover which became subject-matter of orders passed by the Settlement Commission under the Excise Act. Applications were allowed to be proceeded with and a report u/s. 245D(2B) was sought from the concerned Commissioner. The Settlement Commission, however, held that applicants was indulged in suppression of income even before Commission and rejected the application filed by the petitioners. Petitioners filed writ petitions and submitted that the two petitioners were subjected to search under the Central Excise Act, 1944 and thereafter by the Income Tax Department and the Settlement Commission was swayed by factors which even the Commissioner did not consider were relevant. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

 “i) Facts and the dispute inter se parties have not been reflected upon and adverted to in the impugned order. It is recorded that the order under challenge is cryptic and is not focused on the issues and contentions, which were raised by the petitioners and by the Commissioner.

 ii) The Settlement Commissioner earlier had directed and decided to proceed with the applications on 14-01-2013 in the two cases. They had set out points, which had to be adjudicated and decided. These included turnover of the two applicants for the assessment years covered, determination of the issues arising out of the stock, including valuation by the Department, allowability of excise duty for the Assessment year 2009-10 and determination of year-wise additional income. All these factors and facts have been shunned and ignored. The Settlement Commission has rejected the applications for all assessment years, without referring to facts and issues relating to each year.

 iii) Once an application is filed, then the said application must be dealt with in accordance with law, i.e., refer to the contentions of the petitioners, the contention of the revenue and then an objective, considered and a reasoned decision has to be taken. This is only when the stand of the two sides are fully noticed and considered before an order u/s. 245D(2C) is passed. The impugned orders do not meet the said legal requirements.

 iv) The petitioners must come clean and be honest and admit their faults and cannot but declare their true and full undisclosed income. However, their plea and explanation that their declarations are genuine and truthful, cannot be rejected without a legitimate and fair consideration. The two searches were conducted in earlier years and not in the period relevant to the assessment year 2012-13. The Settlement Commission’s order has not referred to any specific issues and documents or made references to the contentions of the Commissioner. Facts stated are incorrect or that Commissioner had not objected to the stock reduction is not adverted to. Maybe, the applications deserve dismissal for the said reasons but full factual position should be noted, before opinion is formed whether there has been full and true disclosure. There has been error and failure in the decision making process and the failure vitiates the order passed.

v) In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 01-03-2013 in the case of the two petitioners is set aside and pass an order of remand.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2006-07: Additions based on reasons recorded prior to notice deleted in appeal: Reassessment on other grounds recorded after issue of notice not valid:

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CIT vs. Living Media India Ltd.; 359 ITR 106 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. On 19-01-2010, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 on the ground that the deduction of doubtful debts of Rs. 1,87,41,755/- was wrongly allowed and accordingly there is escapement of income from tax to that extent. Subsequently, after nine months, additional reasons as regards depreciation and section 14A disallowance were supplied by the Assessing Officer. In reassessment additions were made on all the three counts. The Commissioner (Appeals) held the notice u/s. 148 was valid. He also confirmed the addition concerning the depreciation. He deleted the additions concerning bad debts and s. 14A disallowance. Before the Tribunal, the assessee challenged the validity of notice u/s. 148 and the addition concerning depreciation. The Department preferred appeal against the deletion concerning the bad debts. The Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal and allowed the assesee’s appeal.

 On appeal by the Revenue against the finding of the Tribunal that the proceedings u/s. 147/148 were invalid and the addition concerning depreciation, the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and held as under:

“i) The appeal was not concerned with the issue of bad debts and, therefore, the deletion of the addition made on account of bad debts had become final. Until and unless there was an addition on the basis of the original reasons, no other additions could be made in view of the expression “and also” used in Explanation 3 to section 147. Therefore, in the absence of any addition on the issue of bad debts no additions could have been made by the Assessing Officer.

ii) The initiation of the proceedings u/s. 147 was also bad as held by the Tribunal because of the record of the assessment completed originally nowhere showed that the assessee had claimed any deduction on account of provision for bad debt and the assessing Officer assumed jurisdiction without any material. In fact, the entire issue of the provision for bad debts was discussed by the Assessing Officer at the time of original assessment and, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the attempt to reassess was based on a mere change of opinion.

iii) On the basis of the very same notice issued u/s. 148, the Assessing Officer had recorded additional reasons subsequent to the issuance of the notice and this was impermissible in law.”

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