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[2015] 62 taxmann.com 319 (Rajkot – Trib.) ITO vs. MUR Shipping DMC Co., UAE A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 23-10-2015

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Articles 4, 8, 24, India-UAE DTAA – if a UAE company was managed and controlled wholly in UAE DTAA benefits could not be denied by invoking LOB clause even though entire share capital was owned by Swiss companies.

Facts
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, UAE. It was engaged in operation of ships in international traffic. Its entire share capital was held by two companies incorporated in Switzerland. The taxpayer had obtained a ship under a long-term time charter arrangement from a company incorporated in Marshall Islands. While the manager director of the taxpayer was residing in UAE, its two other directors also had permanent residential visa of UAE. The Board meetings and important decision were being taken at Dubai. The taxpayer had obtained tax residency certificate from UAE tax authority. The taxpayer claimed that having regard to the provisions of Article 8 of India-UAE DTAA, its profit from shipping activity was not taxable in India.

The AO concluded that the effective control and management of the taxpayer was not situated in UAE. Hence, it was not resident in UAE. Therefore, he invoked LOB provision in Article 29 on the ground that: (i) the ship was owned by an entity from a country with which India did not have DTAA ; and (ii) the taxpayer was owned by Swiss shareholders who would not have been entitled to DTAA benefit if they had directly carried on business. The AO held that the agent/freight beneficiary was not entitled to claim benefit under DTAA.

In appeal, the CIT held that the taxpayer was entitled to India-UAE DTAA benefit.

Held
In ADIT vs. Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA [(2013) 56 SOT 278 (Mum.)], it is held that effectively, the income from operations of ships in international traffic is not taxable in India, irrespective of whether it is earned by a Swiss tax resident or a UAE tax resident because Article 22(1) of India-Switzerland DTAA , and Article 8 of India- UAE DTAA respectively exempt the income from taxation in India.

As regards residential status under article 4(1), what is required is that it should be a “company which is incorporated in the UAE and which is managed and controlled wholly in UAE”. This was not disputed. The directors were resident in UAE. It is irrelevant that they were not UAE nationals.

The AO was not justified in invoking LOB clause in Article 29 and denying benefits under India-UAE DTAA because there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the affairs of the company were conducted from UAE, and further no material was brought on the record to establish that the company was not wholly controlled and managed in UAE.

India’s Double taxation Avoidance Ag reements [DTAAs] & Ag reements for Exchange of information [AEIs] – Recent Developments

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In the last 3 years since our last Article on the subject published in
the December, 2012 issue of BCAJ, India has signed DTAAs with 8
countries and has entered into revised DTAAs with 4 countries. India has
also amended few DTAAs by signing Protocols amending the existing
DTAAs. In this Article, our intention is to highlight the salient
features of such DTAAs or Protocols amending the DTAAs. The purpose is
not to deal with such DTAAs or Protocols extensively or exhaustively. It
will be seen that the recent treaties/protocols follow more or less a
similar pattern.

Further, the DTAAs with certain countries have
been modified primarily to include ‘Limitation of Benefits (LOB)
Clause’. Further, Articles on ‘Exchange of Information’ and ‘Assistance
in Collection of Taxes’ have been included or the scope of such existing
Articles has been extended.

The reader is advised to refer the text of the relevant DTAA or the Protocol while dealing with facts of a particular case.

Aadhar Card Scheme – Right to Privacy – Judicial Discipline – View expressed by smaller benches without explaining reasons for not following pronouncements of larger Benches – Matter referred to larger Bench – Constitution of India Article 141.

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Justice K. S. Puttaswamy & Anr. vs. UOI & Ors. AIR 2015 SC 3081

The collection by the Govt. of biometric data of residents under Aadhar Card Scheme challenged to be violative of the right to privacy.

The Court directed that the Union of India shall give wide publicity in the electronic and print media including radio and television networks that it is not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhar card. The production of an Aadhar card will not be a condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen. The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhar card will not be used by the Govt. for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of food grains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution Scheme. The information about an individual obtained by the Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above or as may be directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation.

The Hon’ble Court was of the opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution. What is at stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights including that precious and inalienable right under Article 21. If the observations made in M. P. Sharma (AIR 1954 SC 300) and Kharak Singh (AIR 1963 SC 1295) are to be read literally and accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more particularly right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality. The Hon’ble Court was also of the opinion that the institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that pronouncement made by larger Benches of the Court cannot be ignored by the smaller Benches without appropriately explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements made by such larger Benches. The Hon’ble Court was of the opinion that there appeared to be certain amount of apparent unresolved contradiction in the law declared by the Court.

BEPS and the Likely Impact on Indian Tax Laws

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Introduction

The recent tax investigations by the British Parliamentary Committees, U. S. Senate and the Australian Senate Economics References Committee on the tax-avoidancedriven structures of multi-national corporations, such as Starbucks, Apple, Google and Microsoft among others, have shifted the focus from prevention of tax evasion to prevention of tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning. Today, countries, whilst trying to maintain a certain form of tax competitiveness, have realised the effect that the tax loss on account of the aggressive tax planning structures is having on the recovering economies, and are trying hard to crack down on aggressive tax planning structures, which result in the erosion of their sovereign tax base. Closer home, this shift is also reflected in the big-bang amendments to the Finance Bill, 2012 in the aftermath of the Vodafone judgement.

However, there was a growing consensus among the member countries of the G20 that there would need to be a common set of guidelines to be enacted by all the countries so as to effectively tackle such aggressive structures. Hence, the OECD on request by the leaders of the member countries of the G20, in 2013, formulated a 15 – point Action Plan under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’) Project. On 5th October 2015, the OECD issued the final reports on the BEPS Project. During the 2 years, the OECD released discussion drafts for public comments under each of the Action Plans. The final reports were issued after taking into consideration the public comments received on the discussion drafts as well as on the basis of discussion with various other organisations such as the United Nations, African Tax Administration, Centre de recontre des administrations fiscales and the Centro Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

This article attempts to briefly summarise all the Action Plans of the BEPS Project and the possible impact in India, due to likely amendments in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’) in light of the BEPS Project. In this regard, it may be pointed out that it would be worthwhile for a practitioner in the field of international tax to understand all the Action Plans, irrespective of their effect in an Indian context, as international tax involves the interaction of the domestic tax laws of various countries. It may be possible that while not implemented in India, some of the Action Plans may have been implemented in various other countries, involved in future transactions with India, and would therefore impact such transactions.

Action 1: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy

While recognising that in today’s world of the digital economy, the international tax laws, many of which are nearly a century old, would need to be amended, the report on Action 1 states that it is difficult to ring fence the digital economy from the non–digital economy and therefore, in respect of direct taxes, the recommendations have been incorporated in the other Action Plans of the BEPS Project.

Action 2: Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements

A hybrid financial instrument is generally treated as a debt instrument in the country of the payer, thus leading to a deduction of the interest, but as equity in the country of the recipient, thus leading to be considered eligible for a participation exemption. A hybrid entity on the other hand is one which varies in respect of it’s opacity from a tax perspective in different jurisdictions. One country treats such entity as transparent under its tax laws, whereas another country treats the same entity as opaque under its tax law.

The OECD recognises that hybrid mismatch arrangements can be used to achieve double non – taxation or long – term deferral by exploiting the differences in the tax treatment of instruments or entities under the laws of two or more tax jurisdictions. The Action Plan clearly defines the scope as covering only those mismatch arrangements which involve a hybrid element. Therefore, payments made to exempt entities have not been considered in this Action Plan. Hybrid mismatch arrangements generally involve the use of hybrid financial instruments or hybrid entities. The Action Plan states that the use of hybrid mismatch arrangements leads to lower tax by way of three outcomes, namely

(a) Deduction and Non – Inclusion of Income (D/NI Income): This generally refers to a deduction being claimed in one country for a particular payment with no corresponding income being considered in the country of the recipient.

(b) D ouble Deduction (DD): This generally refers to a single payment being claimed twice as a deduction in two different countries.

(c) Generation of multiple foreign tax credits for one amount of foreign tax paid.

One example of such a possible hybrid mismatch arrangement is provided in order to understand the term better. A partnership firm in India, ABC is treated as an entity, liable to tax in India (as it is a person defined in section 2(31) of the Act), whereas such a firm is treated as transparent in the UK, i.e. the partners are liable to tax on the income of the partnership in the UK. In case, ABC, which has its partners in the UK, makes a payment to a third party, the payment would be considered as a deduction in India while computing the income of ABC. Similarly, at the same time, the UK would disregard the existence of ABC and therefore, would grant the deduction of such payment to its partners, leading to a case of double deduction for the same payment in two different jurisdictions through the use of a hybrid entity, in this case, an Indian partnership.

The OECD has provided the following recommendations in respect of hybrid mismatch arrangements:

(a) I n the case of use of hybrid instruments or hybrid entities giving rise to a D/NI outcome, it is recommended that the payer jurisdiction deny the deduction in the hands of the payer. However, in case the payer jurisdiction does not deny the deduction in the hands of the payer, a secondary rule is recommended whereby the recipient jurisdiction is required to consider the payment as income in the hands of the recipient.

(b) I n the case of payment made to a reverse hybrid (an entity which is transparent under the tax laws of the country in which it is incorporated but opaque under the tax laws of other countries) giving rise to a D/NI outcome, it is recommended that the payer country deny the deduction.

(c) I n the case of payment made by a hybrid entity giving rise to a DD outcome, it is recommended that the jurisdiction of the parent deny the deduction. In case the jurisdiction of the parent is unable to deny the deduction, it is recommended that the jurisdiction of the payer deny the deduction.

(d) In the case of a payment made by a dual resident giving rise to a DD outcome, it is recommended that the jurisdiction of the residence deny the deduction.

 In this regard, it may be pointed out that the recommendations provided require amendments in the domestic tax laws of various countries.

Therefore, there is a possibility of the Act being amended to incorporate these recommendations, especially the primary rule of denying the deduction which gives rise to a D/NI outcome. Moreover, the use of primary and defensive or secondary rule may result in an additional compliance burden on the taxpayer as well as the tax administration, as information would be required as regards the taxation of the payments in the corresponding countries, in order to determine if there is a hybrid mismatch arrangement on a case-by-case basis. It is also believed that even in case there is no specific amendment in order to incorporate the recommendations in respect of the hybrid mismatch arrangements, the GAAR in the Act, which is currently proposed to be effective from AY 2018-19, can be used to tackle such structures.

Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules

Action 3 of the BEPS Project provides recommendations regarding the design of CFC rules. It does so by breaking down the CFC rules into building blocks:

a. Definition of CFC

b. Threshold requirements

c. Definition of CFC income

d. Rules for computing income

e. Threshold for attribution of income

f. Rules to prevent or eliminate double taxation

The report states that the main objective of CFC rules is to prevent the income from being shifted either from the parent jurisdiction or the parent as well as other jurisdictions. This would need to be kept in mind while formulating a policy. In respect of the definition of a CFC, it is recommended to broadly define the entities covered under the CFC regime, in order to include even the permanent establishments and transparent entities. With regards to the definition of control for the purpose of determining as to whether an entity is a CFC or not, the report recommends that the CFC rules should provide a combination of both legal and economic control, and supplement that with a de facto test (decision making) or a test based on consolidation for accounting purposes. Further, the report also provides that control should be defined to include both direct as well as indirect control. The report also recommends inclusion of a modified hybrid mismatch rule, which requires an intragroup payment to a CFC to be taken into account for calculation of the income under the CFC rules. Under this modified hybrid mismatch rule, an intragroup payment may be taken into account if the payment is not included in the CFC income and if the payment would have been included in the CFC income if there was no hybrid mismatch. With regards to threshold limits, the report recommends that the CFC rules only apply in case of those foreign companies who are effectively taxed at a rate meaningfully lower than that applied in the parent jurisdiction.

With regards to the CFC income, the report recommends that the rules cover at least the following types of income:

a. Dividends;

b. Interest and other financing income;

c. Insurance income;

d. Sales and services income;

e. Royalties and other IP income.

In respect of computation of income, the report recommends that the rules of the jurisdiction of the parent company apply. It also recommends that the losses of a CFC should be offset against the profits of the same CFC or against the profit of another CFC from the same jurisdiction. Finally, in respect of the attribution of the CFC income to the appropriate shareholders of the CFC, the report recommends that the attribution should be tied to the minimum control threshold and the amount of income to be attributed to each shareholder should be determined in reference to their proportionate shareholding or influence. It may be worthwhile to point out that the proposed Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 included CFC rules. The Finance Minister, while presenting the Finance Bill, 2015, stated that the work on DTC would be abandoned as most of the proposed amendments have already been enacted in the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, the legislation in relation to CFC has not yet been enacted in the domestic tax law, and therefore, it is only a matter of time before the same is introduced in the Act.

Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments

Action 4 relating to limitation of interest deductions attempts to address three main risks:

(a) High level of debts being shifted to high tax countries thus leading to an overall lower tax burden for the group;

(b) Intragroup loans being used to generate interest deductions in excess of the group’s actual third party interest expense;

(c) Third party debt or intragroup financing being used to fund the generation of tax exempt income.

In order to address these risks, the report recommends a fixed ratio rule whereby the interest deduction available is linked as a percentage (recommended range of 10% to 30%) of the profits of the entity before taking into account the interest deduction, tax expenditure, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). Additionally, the report also recommends that in case the interest expense of an entity exceeds the fixed ratio rule, a country may still allow the deduction up to a limit of the ratio of the overall group’s net interest/EBITDA. In this regard, it may be pointed out that this limit on deduction of interest will apply to all interest expenditure and not just that involving related entities. The Act currently allows deduction of the interest only to the extent it qualifies for a business purpose. There are no rules in the Act specifically limiting the deduction of interest to a specified percentage of profits or earnings. Such a limitation, if introduced, would have a significant tax impact on many Indian companies, which are highly leveraged. Such an amendment may also make it difficult to monitor the overall group’s interest deductions and ratio, and therefore, may lead to an increase in the administrative as well as compliance burden of the taxpayer, as well as that of the tax authorities.

Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account Transparency and Substance

The report on Action 5 deals with preferential tax regimes, such as the IP Box regime, and the amendments required in such regimes, in order to ensure that there is a fair tax competition between the countries. One of the approaches recommended is the nexus approach, which provides that a taxpayer can avail the benefit of the preferential regimes (mainly IP regimes) only to the extent it incurred qualifying R&D expenditure, which gave rise to IP income. The report also recommends the exchange of information in relation to rulings where BEPS may be an issue between countries. Finally the report reviews the preferential regimes of a few countries to determine if they are amounting to harmful tax competition. In this regard, the report provides that the special tax regimes available to certain taxpayers in India such as those in the SEZ, for shipping companies, offshore banking units and life insurance business are not harmful. Therefore, no amendment is expected in respect of this recommendation.

Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances

The Action Plan released in July 2013 by OECD on Action 6 read, “Develop model treaty provisions and recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. Work will also be done to clarify that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non – taxation and to identify the tax policy considerations that, in general, countries should consider before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country. The work will be co – ordinated with the work on hybrids.” In order to combat treaty shopping, the report follows a three-pronged approach:

a. A mendment in Preamble to treaties;

b. LOB clause; and

c. PPT rule

The report recommends the introduction of the LOB clause in the tax treaties. There are two versions of the clause provided in the report – a simplified version and a detailed version, with the choice given to the Contracting States.

The detailed version, as the nomenclature suggests, provides specific conditions to be satisfied, instead of the more generic ones provided in the simplified version. The LOB clause is a refined residence concept, as it goes beyond the concept of residence for the purposes of claiming the benefit of the treaty. The LOB clause provides that only a qualified person would be entitled to the benefits of the treaty. A qualified person is a person who has satisfied certain ownership and business requirements to provide sufficient link between the person and the Contracting State, the benefit of whose treaty network is being utilised. In addition to the LOB clause, the draft also includes a PPT clause as provided below, “Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit under this Convention shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining the benefit was one of the principle purposes of any arrangement or transactions that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of this Convention”.

Thus, the PPT clause makes it clear that no benefit shall be provided for an income if one of the purposes (and not necessarily the sole purpose) was to obtain the benefits of the treaty. Further, the report also attempts to tackle the abuse of the lower rate of tax in the country of source, in the case of dividends paid to parent companies exceeding a certain threshold of ownership under Article 10(2)(a) of the OECD Model Convention. The report provides that the required percentage of holding for obtaining the benefit of the lower rate of tax should also include a minimum period, for which such shareholding should be maintained, before the dividend is paid. Currently, Article 13(4) of the OECD Model Convention provides that gains derived by a company from the sale of shares, of which an immovable property constituted more than 50% of the value, is taxable in the country of source. The report recommends that this clause should be extended to include comparable interests in other forms of entities such as partnership. Additionally, the report also recommends that there should be a provision for considering a period for which the percentage of value of the immovable property must be considered, in order to tackle situations wherein assets are transferred from other entities in order to dilute the percentage of value of the immovable property to that of the shares or comparable interest being alienated. In the case of dual resident companies, Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Convention provides that for the purposes of the Convention, a dual resident company shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State in which the place of effective management is situated. However, in order to combat tax avoidance through this area, the report recommends that the residence of a dual resident company for the purposes of a tax treaty be determined by competent authorities, and not where the place of effective management is situated. In respect of abuse of the domestic tax laws, the report recommends the enactment of the GAARs along with specific anti – abuse rules, such as thin capitalisation rules, in the domestic tax laws. Finally, the report recommends the change in the Preamble to the treaty to include non – creation of opportunities for non – taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or tax avoidance. This would enable the reader to understand the object of the treaty in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. From an Indian context, the Act has already provided for GAARs which would come into effect from Assessment Year 2018-19. Currently, India’s treaty with the US (the LOB clause was first introduced in the US Model Convention) has an LOB clause which prevents tax avoidance to a certain extent.

Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status

Currently, business carried on by a resident of a Contracting State through a commissionaire structure in the other Contracting State is not taxable in the latter State on account of the absence of a permanent establishment. Under Article 5 of the OECD Model Convention, an agent can said to constitute a PE for the principal if he habitually concludes contracts which are binding on the principal. This lead to many abusive transactions wherein the agent (commissionaire) negotiated the major terms of the contract but would be officially concluded only by the principal. In order to counter such abusive transactions, the report has recommended an amendment in Article 5(5) of the Model Convention to extend the definition of permanent establishment to these commissionaire structures as well, by providing that in case a person plays an important role in the conclusion of the contract which is concluded by the principal without any material modifications, such person or agent shall be deemed to be considered as the permanent establishment of the principal. Further, it has been recommended that the meaning of the term “independent agent” under Article 5(6) of the OECD Model be amended to exclude an agent, which satisfies certain ownership criteria in respect of the holding of the principal in the agent. Currently, Article 5(4) of the OECD Model provides a list of activities which do not constitute a fixed – place permanent establishment in a Contracting State. These activities included use of facilities and maintenance of stock of goods for storage, delivery or display of goods, maintenance of a fixed place of business for processing by another enterprise or for collecting information. These activities were considered to be excluded from the definition of the permanent establishment, irrespective of whether the activities were considered to be of a preparatory or auxiliary nature in respect of the business of a taxpayer. The report now has recommended that the aforementioned activities be excluded from being considered as a permanent establishment only if they are of a preparatory or auxiliary nature to the business of the taxpayer. In order to ensure that there is no abuse of the exclusion of the activities from the definition of a permanent establishment by splitting up the activities of the group, the report recommends that a new paragraph of anti – fragmentation be added to Article 5(4), which provides that in case the activities of the enterprise along with its related enterprise together do not constitute activities of a preparatory or auxiliary nature, the enterprise would not be eligible to claim the benefit of Article 5(4). As these recommendations refer to the OECD Model and the tax treaties, no amendment is expected in this regard in the Act.

Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation

The reports on Actions 8, 9 and 10 attempt to revise the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (‘TPG’) in order to ensure that the transfer pricing outcomes are linked to value creation.

Some of the major amendments recommended in the TPG are as follows:

a. Contractual arrangements would need to be matched with actual conduct of the parties to the contract/ transaction. In case the contract and the conduct does not match, the contractual arrangements would need to be ignored for determining the arm’s length price;

b. An entity would not be entitled to higher returns if it undertakes risks which it does not control, or it does not have the financial capacity to control the risks.

 In other words, it is not just the undertaking of the risk, but also the control over the risk and ability to control the risk, that would entitle an entity to higher returns in the case of determination of the arm’s length price;

c. In the case of the synergistic benefits available for being a member of a group, the benefit of the synergies should be allocated only to those parties, which have contributed to such benefit being available;

d. In the case of funding without any additional economic activities, the entity funding would be only entitled to a risk – free return and no additional return is to be provided while determining the arm’s length price, specifically under the profit split method.

The report recommends the following steps for analysing the transactions involving intangibles:

a. Identifying the legal owner of the intangibles;

b. Identifying the parties performing the functions, using the assets and assuming risks relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles (‘DEMPE functions’);

c. Confirming the actual conduct of the parties in accordance with legal arrangements;

d. Identifying the controlled transactions related to the above activities;

e. Determining the arm’s length price in accordance with each party’s contributions to the functions, assets and risks.

The report further provides that the legal owner of the intangibles is entitled to all the anticipated returns from the exploitation of the intangible if it performs functions, provides assets and controls as well as bears the risks in relation to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. As the recommendations discussed above involve an amendment to the TPG, which is merely guidance in respect of determining the arm’s length price, no major amendment in the Act is expected in this regard. However, one may see an impact of this change in the future assessments in transfer pricing cases.

Action 11: Measuring and Monitoring BEPS

Understanding the effect that base erosion and profit shifting has on the economic activity of a country, Action 11 provides guidance and recommendations on how to measure and monitor BEPS.

The report provides the following indicators of BEPS behaviours and activity in a country:

 a. The profit rates of an MNE group is higher in a lowtax country as compared to the average worldwide profit rate;

b. T he effective tax rate of an MNE entity is substantially lower than similar enterprises having only domestic operations;

c. T he FDI is heavily concentrated;

d. The taxable profits of an entity are not higher where the intangible assets are situated in a commercial or economic sense;

e. T here is a high intragroup and third – party debt specifically in the high – tax countries

As this would require high co-ordination between the countries, the report recommends that the OECD work closely with the participating countries and provide corporate tax statistics. As this report merely refers to how BEPS can be monitored, major amendment is expected in this regard in the Act.

Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules

The report on Action 12 provides a framework for formulation of mandatory disclosure rules of international tax schemes in order to enhance transparency, provide timely information and act as a deterrence. As the reports only provides the framework for such rules, they have not been analysed in this article.

Action 13: Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting

In order to provide the necessary tools to the tax authorities in order to ensure that the profit attributed is linked to value creation, the report on Action 13 recommends certain changes in the transfer pricing documentation.

The three – tiered approach recommended in respect of the transfer pricing documentation is as follows:

a. A “master file” containing information of the global operations of the MNE group and the transfer pricing policies shall be made available to all the tax authorities in which the group does business;

b. A “local file” containing detailed information about the transactions and related parties in respect of each entity shall be made available to the tax authorities in which the entity is situated.

This local file is similar to the transfer pricing documentation that is available today; c. A “Country – by – Country Report (CBCR)” shall be made available to the tax authorities of the jurisdiction in which the parent company of the group is situated. The CBCR will contain information concerning business activity, profits before tax, income tax paid, number of employees, capital structure, retained earnings and tangible assets of each entity in the group irrespective of the jurisdiction in which it is situated. A number of countries have begun implementation of the CBCR. It is expected that India may also amend the transfer pricing regulations in order to ask for this information from the taxpayer. One of the major concerns in the introduction of the CBCR is that it enables the tax authorities to ascertain the transfer prices beyond the principle of the arm’s length price. However, the report clearly states that this information should not be used by tax authorities to conduct complementary audits.

Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective

The report on Action 14 recommends minimum standards for countries to adhere to in order to ensure that the Mutual Agreement Procedure provided in the tax treaties through Article 25 has been effectively implemented. The minimum standards recommended are:

a. Treaty obligations in respect of Mutual Agreement Procedures have been fully effected in a timely manner and with good faith;

b. Administrative issues in relation to treaty disputes should be resolved in a timely and effective manner;

c. Taxpayers should face minimum administrative and procedural burden to request for a MAP.

In order to ensure that corresponding adjustments in respect of transfer pricing adjustments do not face any hurdles, the report recommends that Article 9(2) of the OECD Model should be incorporated in all tax treaties. A group of countries (which notably does not include India) have agreed to incorporate a mandatory arbitration clause in the MAP Article in their tax treaties. No major amendment to the Act is expected in respect of this recommendation.

Action 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties

The report on Action 15 recommends incorporating the recommendations discussed above in the existing tax treaties through a multilateral instrument. This will ensure that the lengthy procedure of negotiating each bilateral tax treaty is not required. India is one of the expected signatories to the multilateral instrument, which is expected to be open for signatures from December 2016. However, the major challenge in this multilateral instrument is that bilateral treaties in most countries, including India, come into effect after they have been approved by the Parliament. Therefore, the concern in signing a multilateral treaty to override the existing bilateral tax treaties without approval from the Parliament is genuine. In this regard, it is believed that the Income -tax Act, 1961 will be amended to allow the multilateral treaty to override the bilateral tax treaties signed by India without any approval of the Parliament. Moreover, in the case of a multilateral instrument, the wordings of the instrument would need to be carefully written in order to ensure that all the treaties, which may not necessarily have the same wordings, are appropriately modified. Similarly, it would be important to ensure that all the countries, which would be a signatory to the instrument, come to a consensus in respect of the wordings of the instrument as well as the recommendations itself. Additionally, all the countries in the world are not signatories to the multilateral instrument. Therefore, it would be interesting to see how the countries which are not signatories would react in respect of treaties with the countries which are signatory to the instrument.

Conclusion

To conclude, there is a question mark over the success of the BEPS Project, especially in respect of the implementation of the recommendations. However, that has not stopped countries from viewing tax avoidance very seriously. It is only a matter of time before countries start amending their tax laws to implement some, if not all, of the recommendations. India, being an active member in the BEPS Project, is almost certain to do so, and we may see quite a few amendments in the Finance Act, 2016 in respect of some of the recommendations. This will significantly alter the way multinational enterprises and we, as tax advisors will have to function. It will give rise to a new line of thought in the evolving world of tax planning wherein one would need to balance value creation and substance along with transparency with tax efficiency. _

VAT – Works Contract – Goods Involved in Execution of Works Contract – Rate of Tax Applicable to The Goods Deemed to be Sold, section 4(1)(c)of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003

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10. M/S Durga Projects Inc vs. State of Karnataka and Another, [2013] 62 VSTs 482 (Karn)

VAT – Works Contract – Goods Involved in Execution of Works Contract – Rate of Tax Applicable to The Goods Deemed to be Sold, section 4(1)(c)of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Facts
The appellant, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of civil works contract, purchased necessary building materials, hardware, etc., the goods falling under Schedule III, certain items of ‘declared goods’ falling u/s. 15 of the CST Act and other non-scheduled goods from within and outside the State as well as from unregistered dealers. The appellant made an application u/s. 60 of the KVAT Act before the Authority for Clarifications and Advance Rulings (ACAR for short) seeking for clarification in respect of: a) A pplicability of the rate of tax on execution of civil works contract under the Act; and b) Whether input tax credit can be availed out of output tax paid by the contractor. The ACAR, after examining the matter in detail, by its order dated 2-8-2006 came to the conclusion that there is no specific entry providing rate of tax on works contract under the KVAT Act, up to 31-3-2006 and therefore, tax should be levied as per the rate applicable on the value of each class of goods involved in the execution of works contract i.e. if the goods involved are taxable at the rate of 4%, then works contract rate would be at 4% and if the rate is 12.5%, the works contract rate would also be at 12.5%. With regard to the clarification of input tax credit is concerned, no finding was given. The appellant subsequently sought for rectification of the order dated 2-8-2006 before the ACAR. The ACAR further clarified on 7-12-2006 stating that iron and steel is one of the commodities specified u/s. 14 of the CST Act 1956, as goods of special importance and therefore, the iron and steel are to be subjected to works contract tax at 4%, when it was used in the same form and if they are used in manufacture or fabrication of product, it would no longer qualify as iron and steel and would have to be subjected to works contract tax at 12.5%.The Commissioner for Commercial Taxes after noticing the clarification order passed by the ACAR found that the order passed by the ACAR is erroneous and prejudice to the interest of the revenue and issued notice u/s. 64(2) of the Act on 25- 8-2010. The Commissioner for Commercial Taxes, after considering the objections filed by the appellant, by its order dated 12-10-2010 set aside the order passed by the ACAR in exercise of its suo-motu revisionary power and held that the goods used in the works contract cannot be treated on par with the normal sale of goods for the purpose of arriving at the rate for the period prior to 1-4- 2006. Further, the iron and steel or any other declared goods used for executing the works contract would be liable to be taxed as per the State Law. The appellant, being aggrieved by the order dated 12-10-2010 passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, filed appeal before the Karnataka High Court.

Held

Section 4(1)(c) was inserted by Act No.4 of 2006 w.e.f. 1-4-2006 thereby levying tax on the works contract by specifying the rate of tax under the Sixth Schedule. Prior to the amendment, the tax was being collected on the rate applicable to sale of each class of goods under Section 3(1) of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act provides for levy of tax on sale of goods. Section 4 prescribes the rate of tax. Neither section 3 nor section 4 of the Act seeks or intend to levy or prescribe different rate of tax for the goods involved in the normal sale and for the goods involved in the deemed sale. Both normal sale as well as the deemed sale should be treated as one and the same with respect to levy of tax on sale of goods. Admittedly, prior to 1-4- 2006 insertion of clause (c) to section 4, the rate of tax was not prescribed in respect of transfer of the property in goods, (whether as goods or in any other form) involved in the execution of works contract. Hence, the tax has to be levied as per section 3(1) of the Act. The sale under the works contract is a deemed sale of transfer of the goods alone and it is not different from the normal sale. Hence, the tax has to be levied on the price of the goods and material used in the works contract as if there was a sale of goods and materials. The property in the goods used in the work contract will be deemed to have been passed over to the buyer as soon as the goods or material used are incorporated to the moveable property by principle of accretion to the moveable property. For the period prior to 1-4-2006, tax has to be levied as per section 3(1) of the Act and for the period subsequent to 1-4-2006, tax has to be levied as per section 4(1)(c) of the Act. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the firm. The order passed by the Commissioner was set aside and the order passed by the ACAR was restored.

Value Added Tax – Providing Passive Infrastructure Service and Related Operations and Maintenance Services – To Telecommunication Operators – on a Share Basis – Not a Transfer of Right to Use Goods – Not Taxable, Section 2(1)(2c) (vi) of The Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

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9. M/S. Indus Tower Ltd vs. Union of India, [2013] by VST 422 (Delhi)

Value Added Tax – Providing Passive Infrastructure Service and Related Operations and Maintenance Services – To Telecommunication Operators – on a Share Basis – Not a Transfer of Right to Use Goods – Not Taxable, Section 2(1)(2c) (vi) of The Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

Facts

Indus, the petitioner company, registered with the Department of Telecommunication for providing passive infrastructure services and related operations and maintenance services to various telecommunications operators in India on a sharing basis. It is the policy of the Government of India to encourage extensive infrastructure sharing and in pursuance with the policy, the telecom operators were required to create a high quality, rapid and wide coverage of mobile telecommunications network in India. The passive infrastructure facilities or services could be shared by several telecom operators so that it becomes cost effective.

Accordingly, it put up passive infrastructure facilities at several places. The arrangement worked this way. Indus would put up the towers and a shelter which is a construction in which the telecom operators are permitted to keep and maintain their base terminal stations (BTS), associated antenna, back-haul connectivity to the network of the sharing telecom operator and associated civil and electrical works required to provide telecom services. The telecom tower and shelter, both put up by the petitioner, is called “the passive infrastructure”. In addition to the tower and shelter, Indus also provided diesel generator sets, air-conditioners, electrical and civil works, DC power system, battery bank, etc. All these were known as passive infrastructure. The “active infrastructure” consists of the BTS, associated antenna, back-haul connectivity and other requisite equipment and associated civil and electrical works required to provide the telecommunication services by the telecom operator at a telecom and telecommunication site other than the passive infrastructure. The active infrastructure was owned and operated by the sharing telecom operator, passive infrastructure was owned by Indus. There could be several operators who may use the tower and shelter which are parts of the passive infrastructure by keeping their BTS, etc., therein and sharing the entire passive infrastructure on an agreed basis. The antennae belonging to the sharing telecom provider may be put up or installed at different heights in the tower as per the requirements of the sharing telecom operators. The working of the telecom network basically involves the process of receiving and transmitting the telecom signals. The active infrastructure which is owned and put up by the sharing telecom operators needs certain conditions for proper functioning and uninterrupted telecom network/ signals. These conditions are maintenance of a particular temperature, humidity level, safety, etc. These conditions are ensured by the passive infrastructure made available by the petitioner to the sharing telecom operators. The Indus Company filed application before the Commissioner of Vat u/s. 84 of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (DVAT ) and posed following question to be determined by him;- “Whether, in the facts and circumstances, the provision of passive infrastructure services by the applicant to sharing operators would tantamount to ‘Transfer of right to use goods’ as per section 2(1)(zc)(vi) of the DVAT Act, 2004 and therefore become liable to tax under the DVAT Act? If yes, then how should the sale price as per section 9(1) (zd) of the DVAT Act be determined for the purpose of discharging the liability under the DVAT Act ?” The Commissioner, on an examination of the agreement entered into between the petitioner and M/s. Sistema Shyam Tele Services Ltd., which was taken as representative of the agreements entered into by the petitioner with various telecom operators, held that the entire amount of consideration received from the sharing telecom operators for providing access to the passive infrastructure would amount to consideration for the “transfer of the right to use goods” as defined in section 2(1)(zc)(vi) of the DVAT Act and was exigible to tax under the said Act. He however held that since a separate bill was being raised for consumption of energy by each sharing operator as per actual consumption as detailed in the contract, the charges collected by the petitioner on this account shall be exempt from the levy of value added tax. The Company filed writ petition before the Delhi High Court against the impugned order of the Commissioner.

Held

The ‘right to use goods’ – in this case the right to use the passive infrastructure can be said to have been transferred by Indus to the sharing telecom operators only if the possession of the said infrastructure had been transferred to them. They would have the right to use the passive infrastructure if they were in lawful possession of it. There has to be, in that case, an act demonstrating the intention to part with the possession of the passive infrastructure. There is none in the present case. The passive infrastructure is an indispensable requirement for the proper functioning of the active infrastructure which is owned and operated by the sharing telecom operators. The passive infrastructure is shared by several telecom operators and that is why they are referred to as sharing telecom operators in the MSA. The MSA merely permits access to the sharing telecom operators to the passive infrastructure to the extent it is necessary for the proper functioning of the active infrastructure. It was the responsibility of Indus to ensure that the passive infrastructure functions to its full efficiency and potential, which in turn means that it had to be in possession of the passive infrastructure and cannot part with the same in favour of the sharing telecom operators. With several such restrictions and curtailment of the access made available to the sharing telecom operators to the passive infrastructure and with severe penalties prescribed for failure on the part of the Indus to ensure uninterrupted and high quality service provided by the passive infrastructure, it is difficult to imagine how Indus could have intended to part with the possession of part of the infrastructure. That would have been a major impediment in the discharge of its responsibilities assumed under the MSA. The limited access made available to the sharing telecom operators is inconsistent with the notion of a “right to use” the passive infrastructure in the fullest sense of the expression. At best it can only be termed as a permissive use of the passive infrastructure for very limited purposes with very limited and strictly regulated access. It is therefore difficult to see how the arrangement could be understood as a transfer of the right to use the passive infrastructure. When Indus has not transferred the possession of the passive infrastructure to the sharing telecom operators in the manner understood in law, the limited access provided to them can only be regarded as a permissive use or a limited license to use the same. The possession of the passive infrastructure always remained with Indus. The sharing telecom operators did not therefore, have any right to use the passive infrastructure. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the Indus and quashed the order passed by the Commissioner holding the Indus liable to pay vat.

Sales Tax – Pulp based Drink – Known as “Slice” – Predominantly Contained Water – Not a Food Article Within the Meaning of Entry 47 of Schedule I, Section – 4(1)(a)(d) and Entry 47 of Schedule I of The Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975

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8. M/S. Varun Beverages Ltd vs. Commissioner of Vat, [2003] 62 VST 388 (Delhi)

Sales Tax – Pulp based Drink – Known as “Slice” – Predominantly Contained Water – Not a Food Article Within the Meaning of Entry 47 of Schedule I, Section – 4(1)(a)(d) and Entry 47 of Schedule I of The Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975

FACTS

The appellant trades in aerated drinks, mineral water and fruit pulp based drink known as “slice”. It sought to deposit sales tax at 8% under residual entry on the basis that “slice” is not a preserved food article thus not covered by entry 47 of Schedule I of the Act. The department on the other hand treated it as food article and levied tax @12% under entry 47 of Schedule I of the Act. The appellant filed appeal up to Tribunal without any success. The appellant thereafter filed appeal before The Delhi High Court against the decision of the Tribunal rejecting the appeal filed by it.

HELD

There is no reference under the Delhi Sales Tax Act imposing definition contained in The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and reliance by the Tribunal on it was misplaced. The predominant content of the Mango Pulp Drink is water i.e. 70 % and the Mango Pulp content is 17%. This product does not claimed to be a fruit juice and therefore the revenue cannot urge that it has even a minimum modicum of nutritive properties. Arguably, if the product was entirely milk based, the consideration might have been different. However, the mango pulp based drink, at best an instant energy giver and in all cases a thirst quencher; by no stretch of imagination can it be called a “food article” at least not within the contemplation of the statute, by an application of the common parlance test. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the company and held that the impugned product is not covered by entry 47 of Schedule I of the Act as “preserved food article” and taxable at 8% under residual entry.

VAT – Levy of VAT on MRP – Not Permissible, Section 4(5) of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

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7. M/S. ITC Limited vs. State of Karnataka and Others, [ 2013] 62 VST 320 (Karn)

VAT – Levy of VAT on MRP – Not Permissible, Section 4(5) of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

FACTS

The Petitioner filed a Writ Petition before the Karnataka High Court challenging the constitutional validity of section 4(5) of the Act, inserted by Karnataka Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, 2004 for levy of tax on sale of Cigars, Gutkha and other manufactured tobacco, on the maximum retail price (MRP) indicated on the label of the container or packing thereof.

HELD

The Supreme Court, in Rajasthan Chemist Association [2006] 147 STC 542, while considering the validity of a provision similar to the one impugned herein had upheld view of the Rajasthan High Court that it is not permissible for the legislature of a State to levy tax on sale of goods by adopting a notional price as a measure of tax; such a legislative measure has to be outside the ambit of entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The same reasoning applies to the provision impugned herein as both are similar. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the company and sub-section (5) of section 4 of the Act providing levy of tax on sale of cigars, tobacco etc. on the MRP as unconstitutional on the ground that such a taxing provision is beyond the legislative competence of the State under entry 54 of List II of the seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

Contribution to expenses cannot by any stretch be deemed to be a consideration for any identified service rendered to members by access to the facilities or advantage by a club or association. However, if the payments are specifically attributable to such facility, advantage or service, the subscription will be taxable.

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45. [2015] 62 taxmann.com 2 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Cricket Club of India Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax

Contribution to expenses cannot by any stretch be deemed to be a consideration for any identified service rendered to members by access to the facilities or advantage by a club or association. However, if the payments are specifically attributable to such facility, advantage or service, the subscription will be taxable.

Facts

The Assessee is a members’ club providing various facilities to its members. Service tax was paid on the entrance fees under protest under Club or Association service. A refund was sought of the amount paid on account of principle of mutuality and on the ground that entrance fees is not a consideration for any service. The department denied refund and the same was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals), accordingly the present appeal is filed.

Held

The Tribunal noted that Clubs or Associations need funds to exist. Wages of employees, energy charges, maintenance and repairs etc. are necessary expenses for sustenance. Implicit in membership of clubs and associations is the obligation to share in such expenses for maintaining the assets of the club and the contributing members are not the direct beneficiaries of such services. Contribution to expenses cannot, by any stretch, be deemed to be consideration for any identified service rendered to individual members by access to the facilities or advantage that is within the wherewithal of the “club or association”. However, to the extent that it is possible to identify the facilities, advantage or services without further payments specifically attributable to such facility, advantage or service, the subscription will be taxable. It was also observed that without an identified recipient who compensates the identified provider with appropriate consideration for an identified service, a service cannot be held to have been provided. Further, relying on the decision of the Sports Club of Gujarat [2013] 40 STT 486/35 taxmann.com 557 (Guj.), the principle of mutuality was upheld and the appeal was allowed.

Reassessment beyond Reasons

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Issue for Consideration
Quite often, one comes across orders of reassessment wherein additions are made in respect of items that are not listed in the reasons recorded for reopening at the time of issue of notice u/s. 147, for reopening an assessment.

In many a case, no additions are made for the issues that formed part of the reasons for reopening, while passing an order of reassessment, and instead, additions are made on altogether new issues that are not part of the reasons recorded.

There has been an ongoing conflict concerning the scope of reassessment. Should the scope extend to cover issues not recorded in the reasons and, if yes, should such extension be denied, at least in cases where the reasons for which the reopening was made, have been found to be invalid on final reassessment. An additional issue that arises is whether a fresh notice u/s. 148 is required to be issued for covering the new issue in reassessment.

The issue about including new issues where additions are also made in respect of the recorded reasons is settled in favour of sustenance of addition on account of a new or additional issues. What appears however, to be open is the issue where addition is made on account of an issue that has not been found in the reasons recorded and where no addition is made for the reasons recorded. Conflicting decisions are delivered on the subject by High Courts with some upholding the right of the Assessing Officer, and some dismissing it.

N. Govindaraju’s case
The issue recently came up for consideration of the Karnataka High court in the case of N. Govindaraju vs. ITO, 60 taxmann.com 333 (Karnataka).In that case, the assessee, an individual, had income from house property, transport business, capital gains and other sources, and had filed the return of income, which was processed u/s. 143(1) and accepted. A notice u/s. 148 was issued for reopening the assessment for the purpose of assessing the income from the sale of property u/s. 45(2) and also for denying the benefit of indexation. The reassessment was completed on total income of Rs.29.91 lakh. No addition was made u/s. 45(2), nor was indexation denied to him in reassessment. Additions were however made for reasons other than the one recorded in the notice.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the reassessment and the Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was justified in law.

On appeal to the High Court, the assessee raised the following questions for consideration of the court; “Whether the Tribunal was correct in upholding reassessment proceedings, when the reason recorded for re-opening of assessment u/s.147 of Act itself does not survive. Whether the Tribunal was correct in upholding levy of tax on a different issue, which was not a subject matter for re-opening the assessment and moreover the reason recorded for the re-opening of the assessment itself does not survive.”

On behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that the order u/s. 147 of the Act had to be in consonance with the reasons given for which notice u/s. 148 had been issued, and once it was found that no tax could be levied for the reasons given in the notice for reopening the assessment, independent assessment or reassessment on other issues would not be permissible, even if subsequently, in the course of such proceedings some other income chargeable to tax was found to have escaped assessment; the reason for which notice was given had to survive, and it was only thereafter that ‘any other income’ which was found to have escaped assessment could be assessed or reassessed in such proceedings; the reopening of assessment should first be valid (which could be only when reason for reopening survived) and once the reopening was valid, then u/s. 147 of the Act, the entire case could be reassessed on all grounds or issues; if reopening was valid and reassessment could be made for such reason, then only the AO could proceed further and not doing so, without even the reason for reopening surviving, it could lead to fishing and roving enquiry and would give unfettered powers to the AO.

The Revenue submitted that under the old section 147 (as it stood prior to 1989), grounds or items for which no reasons had been recorded could not be opened, and because of conflicting decisions of the High Courts, the provisions of the said section had now been clarified to include or cover any other income chargeable to tax which might have escaped assessment and for which reasons might not have been recorded before giving the notice; that the said section 147 was in two parts, which had to be read independently, and the phrase “such income”, in the first part, was with regard to which reasons had been recorded and the phrase “any other income” in the second part was with regard to where no reasons were recorded in the notice and had come to notice of the AO during the course of the proceedings. Both being independent, once the satisfaction in the notice was found sufficient, addition could be made on all grounds, i.e., for which reason had been recorded and also for which no reason had been recorded. All that was necessary was that during the course of the proceedings u/s. 147, income chargeable to tax must be found to have escaped assessment. Strong reliance was placed by the Revenue on the insertion of Explanation 3 in support of its contentions.

The court, on hearing the contentions of the parties, held that once the notice for reopening of a previously closed assessment was held to be valid, the assessment proceedings as well as the assessment order already passed would be deemed to have been set aside and the AO would then have the power to pass fresh assessment order with regard to the entire income which escaped assessment and to levy tax thereon. and doing so was his duty .

The court observed that the issue was whether the latter part of the section relating to ‘any other income’ was to be read in conjunction with the first part (relating to ‘such income’) or not; if it was to be read in conjunction, then without there being any addition made with regard to ‘such income’ (for which reason had been given in the notice for reopening the assessment), the second part could not be invoked; however, if it was not to be so read in conjunction, the second part could be invoked independently even without the reason for the first part surviving.

In the opinion of the court, from a plain reading of section 147, it was clear that its latter part provided that ‘any other income’ chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and which had come to the notice of the AO subsequently in the course of the proceedings, could also be taxed. It further noted that the sole purpose of Chapter XIV of the Act was to bring to tax the entire taxable income of the assessee and, in doing so, where the AO had reason to believe that some income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, he might assess or reassess such income. In doing so, it would be open to him to also independently assess or reassess any other income which did not form the subject matter of notice.

The court took note of the conflicting decisions of the high courts on the subject, noting that some had held that the second part of section 147 was to be read in conjunction with the first part, and some had held that the second part was to be read independently.

It held that the insertion of Explanation 3 could not be but for the benefit of the revenue, and not the assessee. In that view of the matter, on reading section 147, it was clear that the phrase ‘and also’ joined the first and second parts of the section; the phrase ‘and’ was conjunctive which was to join the first part with the second part, but ‘also’ was for the second part and was disjunctive; it segregated the first part from the second. Upon reading the full section, the phrase ‘and also’ could not be said to be conjunctive. It was thus clear to the court that once satisfaction of reasons for the notice was found sufficient, i.e., if the notice u/s. 148(2) was found to be valid, then addition could be made on all grounds or issues (with regard to ‘any other income’ also) which might come to the notice of the AO subsequently during the course of proceedings u/s. 147, even though reason for notice for ‘such income’ which might have escaped assessment, did not survive.

Importantly, the court held that Explanation 3 was inserted to address the ambiguity in the main provision of the enactment that had arisen because of the different interpretation of different High Courts about the issue whether the second part of the section was independent of the first part, or not. To clarify the same, Explanation 3 was inserted, by which it had been clarified that the AO could assess the income in respect of any issue which had escaped assessment and also ‘any other income’ (of the second part of section 147) which came to his notice subsequently during the course of the proceedings under the section. After the insertion of Explanation 3 to section 147, it was clear that the use of the phrase ‘and also’ between the first and the second parts of the section was not conjunctive and assessment of ‘any other income’ (of the second part) can be made independent of the first part (relating to ‘such income’ for which reasons were given in notice u/s. 148), notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue (‘any other income’) had not been given in the reasons recorded u/s. 148(2).

Considering the provision of section 147 as well as its Explanation 3, and also keeping in view that section 147 was for the benefit of the revenue and not the assessee, and was aimed at garnering the escaped income of the assessee, and also keeping in view that it was the constitutional obligation of every assessee to disclose his total income on which it was to pay tax, it was held by the court that the two parts of section 147 (one relating to ‘such income’and the other to ‘any other income’) were to be read independently. In doing so, it observed that the phrase ‘such income’ used in the first part of section 147 was with regard to which reasons had been recorded u/s. 148(2), and the phrase ‘any other income’ used in the second part of the section was with regard to a case where no reasons had been recorded before issuing notice and a reason had come to the notice of the AO subsequently during the course of the proceedings, which could be assessed independent of the first part, even when no addition could be made with regard to ‘such income’, once the notice on the basis of which proceedings had commenced, was found to be valid.

The Karnataka High Court took note of the decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd. 331 ITR 236( Bom.) Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT, 336 ITR 136(Dl.) and CIT vs. Adhunik Niryat Ispat Ltd.(Del.) and CIT vs. Mohmed Juned Dadani, 355 ITR 172 (Del.). and noted that, with due respect to the view taken in the aforesaid cases, it was unable to persuade itself to follow the same.

The court concurred with the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Majinder Singh Kang vs. CIT, 344 ITR 358 which was delivered after noticing that the earlier judgments in the cases of CIT vs. Atlas Cycle Industries 180 ITR 319 and CIT vs. Shri Ram Singh 306 ITR 343 were rendered prior to the insertion of Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act, wherein it was held that “a plain reading of Explanation 3 to section147 clearly depicts that the Assessing Officer has power to make additions even on the ground that reassessment notice might not have been issued in the case during the reassessment proceedings, if he arrives at a conclusion that some other income has escaped assessment which comes to his notice during the course of proceedings for reassessment u/s.148 of the Act. The provision nowhere postulates or contemplates that it is only when there is some addition on the ground on which reassessment had been initiated, that the Assessing Officer can make additions on any other grounds on which the income has escaped assessment”.

The court further noted that the same view was reiterated by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT vs. Mehak Finvest (P.) Ltd,.367 ITR 769 wherein it was also noticed that the Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment in the case of Majinder Singh (supra ) had been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Mohmed Juned Dadani’s case
The issue had arisen in the case of CIT-II vs. Mohmed Juned Dadani, 30 taxmann.com 1 (Gujarat). In this case, the assessment was completed allowing assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80HHC. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer initiated reassessment proceedings taking a view that if two export incentives, i.e., DEPB licence income and excise duty refund were excluded from the income of the assessee, there would be a loss from export business and, consequently, assessee would not be entitled to deduction u/s. 80HHC. In the reassessment, the AO made additions of cash credit u/s. 68 and on account of some unverifiable purchases. However, the AO did not disturb the deduction u/s. 80HHC, previously claimed by the assessee.

The assessee carried such order in appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) where he contended that the AO had no jurisdiction to travel beyond the reasons for reopening the assessment, which appeal however, was rejected by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal, finding that in the reassessment proceedings, no disallowance had been made towards assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80HHC, which was the reason on the basis of which notice for reopening of the assessment was issued, held that the order of reassessment was without jurisdiction and bad in law.

On revenue’s appeal to the Gujarat High Court, the court addressed the following substantial question of law. “Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that when on the ground on which the reopening of assessment is based, no additions are made by the Assessing Officer in the order of assessment, he cannot make additions on some other grounds which did not form part of the reasons recorded by him.” .

On behalf of the revenue, it was submitted that the Tribunal committed a grave error in interpreting the provisions contained in section 147 of the Act ; the section as amended w.e.f. 01.04.1989, gave ample authority to an AO to assess or reassess any income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment, as long as the requirements of a valid reopening of the assessment were satisfied; once an assessment was reopened, by virtue of valid exercise of powers u/s. 147 of the Act, thereafter, there would be no further limitation on the AO framing assessment on all or any of the grounds mentioned in the reasons recorded or even on the grounds not so mentioned; that the position was clear even before Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act was added with retrospective effect from 01.04.1989; in any case, by virtue of such Explanation being introduced in section 147, the issue had been put beyond any pale of controversy. The decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Majinder Singh Kang vs. CIT 344 ITR 358 was relied upon by the revenue.

On the other hand, the assessee drew attention to the statutory provisions contained in section 147 of the Act, as amended w.e.f. 01.04.1989, and the explanatory memorandum clarifying the background in which Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act was enacted. It was submitted that section 147 of the Act, prior to introduction of Explanation 3, permitted the AO to assess or reassess any income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and also any other income which had escaped assessment and which came to the notice of the AO subsequently in the course of the proceedings for reassessment; that the words “and also any other income” must be understood as to be referring to such income which had escaped assessment but the ground for which had not been mentioned in the reasons recorded, in addition to income which had escaped assessment and for which mention had been made in the reasons recorded; that Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act did not change the basic proposition, nor it was meant to do so, as would be clear from the explanatory memorandum explaining the reasons for introduction of the said explanation; that power to reopen the assessment which had been previously closed was peculiar in nature and was available to the AO under the Income-tax Act which was not normally available to an officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers; such powers, therefore, must be strictly construed, authorising an AO to assess income under any head even if the same was not part of the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment, would give wide powers which were possible of arbitrary exercise; that for an AO to assess income on any ground not mentioned in the reasons recorded, it was essential that there was a valid reopening of assessment; if the grounds, on which the reopening of the assessment failed, there would thereafter be no longer a valid reopening of an assessment in which the AO could make any additions on some other grounds.

The Gujarat High Court held that the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that when on the ground on which the reopening of assessment was based, no additions were made by the AO in the order of assessment, he could not make additions on some other grounds which did not form part of reasons recorded by him. It was not in dispute that once an assessment was reopened by a valid exercise of jurisdiction u/s. 147, it was open for the AO to assess or reassess any income which had escaped assessment which came to his light during the course of his assessment proceedings which was not mentioned in the reason for issuing notice u/s. 148, provided the ground on which the notice was issued for reopening survived.

Significantly, the court supplied an interesting dimension by noting that in a notice for reassessment which had been issued beyond a period of four years from the end of relevant assessment year, the condition that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts for the purpose of assessment must also be established. If in such a situation, the stand of the revenue was accepted, a very incongruent situation would come about, if ultimately the AO were to drop the ground on which notice for reopening had been issued, but to chase some other grounds not so mentioned for issuance of the notice. In such a situation, even if a case where notice for reopening had been issued beyond a period of four years, the assessment would continue even though on all the grounds on which the additions were being made, there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose true and full material facts. In such a situation, an important requirement of failure on part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts would be totally circumvented. Thus, it was apparent that Explanation 3 to section 147 does not change the situation insofar as the present controversy was concerned.

In deciding the case, the High court approved the decision relied upon by the assessee in the case of CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd. 331 ITR 236 in which the Bombay High Court considering an identical situation, interpreting the provisions contained in section 147 of the Act, held that the situation would not be different by virtue of introduction of Explanation 3 to the said section. The High Court, placing heavy reliance on the explanatory memorandum, held that if upon issuance of a notice u/s. 148 of the Act, the AO did not assess the income which he had reason to believe had escaped assessment and which formed the basis of a notice u/s.148, it was not open to him to assess independently any other income which did not form the subject matter of the notice.

In addition, the Gujarat High Court approved the decisions in the case of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT , 336 ITR 136 (Delhi) wherein the court besides approving the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Jet Airways, held that sub-section (2) of section 148 mandated reasons for issuance of notice by the AO and s/s. (1) thereof mandated service of notice to the assessee before the AO proceeded to assess, reassess or recompute the escaped income and those conditions were required to be fulfilled to assess or reassess the escaped income chargeable to tax. The Gujarat High court also approved the observations of the Delhi High Court to the effect that the Legislature could not be presumed to have intended to give blanket powers to the AO such that on assuming jurisdiction u/s. 147 regarding assessment or reassessment of the escaped income, he could keep on making roving inquiry, and thereby including different items of income not connected or related with the reasons to believe, on the basis of which he assumed jurisdiction, and also the finding of the Delhi High Court, that for every new issue coming before the AO during the course of proceedings of assessment or reassessment of escaped income, and which he intended to take into account, he would be required to issue a fresh notice u/s. 148. The ratio of the decision in the case of Asstt. CIT vs. Major Deepak Mehta, 344 ITR 641 (Chhattisgarh) was also approved by the court.

The Gujarat High Court, relying on the Memorandum explaining the provisions of Explanation 3, held that it was meant to be clarificatory in nature and to put the issue beyond any legal controversy; when the Legislature found that in face of the provisions contained in section 147 of the Act post 01.04.1989, some of the courts had taken a view that the AO was restricted to the reassessment proceedings only on issues in respect of which the reasons were recorded for reopening the assessment, such explanation was introduced in the statute; thus, the explanation was meant to be merely clarificatory in nature and was introduced with the purpose of putting at rest the legal controversy regarding the true interpretation of section 147 of the Act which had arisen on account of certain judicial pronouncements especially in the cases of CIT vs. Atlas Cycle Industries, 180 ITR 319 (P&H), Travancore Cements Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT 305 ITR 170 (Kerala).

The Gujarat High Court did not agree with the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Majinder Singh Kang (supra) by noting that all other courts had uniformly taken a view that Explanation 3 to section 147 of the Act did not change the situation insofar as the present controversy was concerned, and for the reason that the explanatory memorandum to Explanation 3 to section of the Act was not brought to the notice of the High Court in the said case.

Observations

On a bare reading of the main provision, it is gathered that section 147, as is substituted by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1989, enables inclusion of any other income that has escaped assessment and which comes to the notice subsequently in the course of proceedings. Accordingly, it should be possible for an AO to also include any new item while making reassessment, though such item was not included in recorded reasons. This main provision was found to be deficient, in the past by the courts, on the following two counts;

The substituted provision while permitting the AO to rope in a new issue in the scope of reassessment, did not override the specific provisions of section148(2), which required an AO to record reasons before issue of a notice u/s. 148 for doing so.

The substituted provision permitted the AO to rope in a new issue in the scope of reassessment only where the original issue on which the reassessment was reopened has been found to be valid.

One of the above referred deficiencies has been expressly cured by insertion of Explanation 3 w.e.f 01.04.1989 by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, whereunder the requirement of the new issue being recorded in reasons for reopening as per section 148(2), before a notice is issued, has been dispensed with. As regards the other deficiency concerning the need for survival of the recorded issue, some courts recently have found that the AO is empowered to expand the scope of reassessment either by virtue of Explanation 3 or independent of it, while a few other courts have found that the deficiency continued in spite of Explanation 3.

The issue that has attracted conflicting views therefore is narrowed down to whether the word ‘and also’ used in the main proviso are conjunctive and cumulative or they are disjunctive and detach the latter part of the provision from the earlier part. In the alternative, whether, with insertion of Explanation 3, the AO is authorised to rope in a new issue, even where no addition is made in respect of the issue recorded in reasons for reopening.

The question is that when the reason recorded for reopening the assessment u/s. 147 itself does not survive, can tax be levied for a totally different reason or issue, which was not the subject matter of reopening the assessment. In other words, if reasons for reopening are (a) and (b) and during reassessment proceedings , income is found to have escaped from assessment for some other reason say, (c) and (d), then, if reasons (a) and (b) do not survive, and no addition can be made for such reasons, can additions be made on the basis of reasons or grounds (c) and (d) that did not find place in the reasons recorded. The related questions are whether the main provision permits such an assessment and whether the insertion of the Explanation 3 has made such an assessment possible.

Section 147 of the Act, even without the aid of Explanation 3, enabled the AO while framing an assessment section 147 of the Act, to assess or reassess such income for which he had recorded his reasons to believe had escaped assessment and also any other income which escaped assessment which came to his notice subsequently in the course of the assessment proceedings.

Insertion of Explanation in a section of an Act is for a different purpose than insertion of a ‘Proviso’. Explanation gives a reason or justification and explains the contents of the main section, whereas ‘Proviso’ puts a condition on the contents of the main section or qualifies the same. ‘Proviso’ is generally intended to restrain the enacting clause, whereas Explanation explains or clarifies the main section. ‘Proviso’ limits the scope of the enactment as it puts a condition, whereas Explanation clarifies the enactment as it explains and is useful for settling a matter or controversy. In the instant case, insertion of Explanation 3 to section 147 does not in any manner override the main section and has been added with no other purpose than to explain or clarify the main section so as to also bring in ‘any other income’ (of the second part of section 147) within the ambit of tax, which may have escaped assessment, and comes to the notice of the AO subsequently during the course of the proceedings.

Circular 5 of 2010 issued by the CBDT also makes this position clear. There is no conflict between the main section 147 and its Explanation 3. This Explanation has been inserted only to clarify the main section and not to curtail its scope, even though it is for the benefit of the revenue and not the assessee.

Explanation 3 thus does not, in any manner, even purport to expand the powers of the AO u/s. 147 of the Act. In any case, an explanation cannot expand the scope and sweep of the main body of the statutory provision. In case of S. Sundaram Pillai vs. V. R. Pattabiraman AIR 1985 (SC) 582 the Supreme Court observed that, an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision, but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows, it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision.

An explanation cannot override the scope of the main provision nor can it extend the scope. An explanation can only explain the scope of the main provision by eliminating the ambiguity.

The Rajasthan High Court in Shri Ram Singh 306 ITR 343 and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in CIT vs. Atlas Cycle Industries, 180 ITR 319 had interpreted the words ‘and also’, used in the main section itself, in a cumulative and conjunctive sense and held that to read these words as being in the alternative, would be to rewrite the language used by the Parliament. The said decision was delivered before insertion of Explanation 3.

Parliament must be regarded as being aware of the interpretation that was placed on the words “and also”. Parliament however has not taken away the basis of that decision while it was open to the Parliament, having regard to the plenitude of its legislative powers, to do so. It could have clearly provided in Explanation 3 that power to deal with a new issue would be irrespective of survival of the old issues for which reasons were recorded. It was not so done, and in view of that, the provisions of section 147 as they stood after the amendment of 1st April, 1989, continue to hold the field.

The fluid state of law on the issue prevailing up to 31.03.1988, was sought to be addressed by insertion of substituted provision w.e.f. 01.04.1989. This insertion was found inadequate by the courts for addressing the issue under consideration and to meet the concerns of the courts, Explanation 3 is claimed to have been inserted witnesses cannot be procured for various other reasons, like death of both attesting witness, out of jurisdiction, physical incapacity, insanity etc. Section 69 should apply and can be extended to such cases. Hence, the word “not found” occurring in section 69 of Evidence Act should receive a wider purposive interpretation than its literal meaning and should take in situation where the presence of the attesting witness cannot be procured. This view gets its support from Venkataramayya vs. Kamisetti Gattayya (AIR 1927 Madras 662) and Ponnuswami Goundan vs. Kalyanasundara Ayyar (AIR 1930 Madras 770).

It is settled that mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed by section 63 of Indian Succession Act. Section 69 imposes a twin fold duty on the propounder. It provides that if no such attesting witness can be found, it must be proved that attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting and also that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Hence, to rely on a Will propounded in a case covered by section 69 the propounder should prove i) that the attestation is in the handwriting of the attesting witness and ii) that the document was signed by the executant. Both the limbs will have to be cumulatively proved by the propounder. Evidently, the section demands proof of execution in addition to attestation and does not permit execution to be inferred from proof of attestation. However, section 69 presumes that once the handwriting of attesting witness is proved he has witnessed the execution of the document. The twin requirement of proving the signature and handwriting has to be in accordance with section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Transfer of immovable property – TDS under section 194-IA: Analysis and Issues

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Introduction
Section 194-IA has been introduced by the Finance Act, 2013 (FA, 2013) with effect from 1st June, 2013. Section 194-IA provides for deduction of tax at source in respect of payment, by any person, being a transferee, to a resident transferor, of any sum by way of consideration for transfer of any immovable property. The Explanation to the section defines the terms `agricultural land’ and `immovable property’.

Object of introducing section 194-IA
In case the language of the provision is capable of two interpretations then the one which advances the object of introducing the provision will have to adopted. The Memorandum explaining the salient features of the Finance Bill, 2013 classified this provision under the caption `Widening of Tax Base and Anti Tax Avoidance Measures’. The Heydon’s Mischief Rule of Interpretation states that while interpreting a provision that interpretation has to be adopted which removes the mischief which was prevalent before the introduction of the provision. The Object of introducing the provision and the Mischief which the Legislature sought to remove can be better understood from the following extracts from the Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Bill:

“E. WIDENING OF TAX BASE AND ANTI TAX AVOI DANCE MEASURES
Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) on transfer of certain immovable properties (other than agricultural land)

…………. However, the information furnished to the department in Annual Information Returns by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar indicate that a majority of the purchasers or sellers of immovable properties, valued at Rs. 30 lakh or more, during the financial year 2011-12 did not quote or quoted invalid PAN in the documents relating to transfer of the property.

……… In order to have a reporting mechanism of transactions in the real estate sector and also to collect tax at the earliest point of time, it is proposed to insert a new section 194-IA to provide that every transferee, at the time of making payment or ………”

A perusal of the above, clearly indicates that the difficulty faced was that the Annual Information Return, furnished to the Department, by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar, in a majority of the cases, did not have a PAN or had an invalid PAN in the documents relating to transfer of property. This is what is sought to be curbed by introducing the provisions of section 194-IA.

The two objects of introducing the provisions of section 194-IA are:-

(i) to have a reporting mechanism of transactions in the real estate sector; and
(ii) to collect tax at the earliest point of time.

These objectives will have to be kept in mind while interpreting some of the provisions, the language whereof is capable of two interpretations.

Text of Section 194-IA:
For the sake of convenience, the provisions of section194- IA are reproduced hereunder:

“194-IA. (1) Any person, being a transferee, responsible for paying (other than the person referred to in section 194LA) to a resident transferor any sum by way of consideration for transfer of any immovable property (other than agricultural land), shall, at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the transferor or at the time of payment of such sum in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct an amount equal to one per cent of such sum as income-tax thereon.

(2) No deduction under sub-section (1) shall be made where the consideration for the transfer of an immovable property is less than fifty lakh rupees.

(3) The provisions of section 203A shall not apply to a person required to deduct tax in accordance with the provisions of this section.

Explanation.–– For the purposes of this section,––

(a) “agricultural land” means agricultural land in India, not being a land situated in any area referred to in items (a) and (b) of sub-clause (iii) of clause (14) of section 2;

(b) “immovable property” means any land (other than agricultural land) or any building or part of a building.”

Analysis of Section 194-IA:
Conditions for applicability of the section:
(i) there is a transferee;
(ii) there is a transferor;
(iii) the transferor is a resident;
(iv) there is a transfer of an immovable property, as defined, from the transferor to the transferee;
(v) the transferee is responsible for paying any sum;
(vi) such sum is by way of consideration for transfer of any immovable property;
(vii) the amount of consideration is Rs. 50 lakh or more;
(viii) the transferee is not a person referred to in section 194LA;
(ix) the transferee either :
(a) credits such sum referred to in (vi), or
(b) makes a payment of such sum;
(x) the payment referred to in (ix)(b) is made either by

(a) cash, or
(b) by issue of cheque, or
(c) by issue of draft, or
(d) by any other mode.

Consequences if the above conditions apply:
(i) The transferee becomes liable to deduct tax at source;
(ii) such deduction shall be of an amount;
(iii) the amount of deduction shall be equal to 1% of the sum referred to in (vi) above;
(iv) such a liability arises upon credit of such sum or at the time of making the payment, whichever is earlier;
(v) provisions of section 203A shall not apply to the transferee.

Exceptions: This section would not apply if –
(i) The transferee is a person covered by section 194LA; or
(ii) the transferor is a non-resident; or
(iii) consideration for transfer of immovable property is less than Rs. 50 lakh; or
(iv) the immovable property transferred is an agricultural land as explained subsequently.

Analysis of certain terms used in section 194-IA:
Immovable Property has been defined in Explanation (a) to section 194-IA to mean:
• any land [including land described in section 2(14) (iiia) and 2(14)(iiib) i.e. land which is commonly known as urban agricultural land];
• any building; and
• any part of a building;
• but does not include `agricultural land’.

Agricultural land has been defined in Explanation (b) to section 194-IA – Agricultural land situated in India not being land referred to in section 2(14)(iiia) and 2(14)(iiib). Transferee: The obligation to deduct tax is on the transferee of any immovable property, as defined. The transferee may be any person. He may be an individual, Hindu undivided family, firm, LLP, company, AOP, BOI, cooperative society. He could even be a builder / developer. However, where Government is the purchaser, the section may not apply since Government is not a person (CIT vs. Dredging Corporation of India) (174 ITR 682) (AP). Residential status of the transferee is immaterial. The section applies even to a non-resident buyer or even to a buyer who is an agriculturist. Other conditions being satisfied, the section will apply even when the purchaser / transferee is a family member / relative of the seller / transferor. However, the purchaser / transferee should not be a person referred to in section 194LA. If the purchaser / transferee is a person referred to in section 194LA, such a person is not required to deduct tax under this section. Joint transferee: In case of joint transferee each coowner will be liable for compliance with this section. Transferor: The transferor / seller may be any person. The transferor should be a resident. He may even be Resident but Not Ordinarily Resident. If the transferor / seller happens to be a non-resident the provisions of section 195 may apply but certainly not the provisions of this section.

Any sum: The section states that the purchaser / transferee should be responsible for paying to the seller / transferor any sum by way of consideration for transfer of immovable property. The term `sum’ has not been defined in the Act.

The expression “any sum paid” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of H.H. Sri Rama Verma vs. CIT (187 ITR 308) (SC) to mean only amount of money given as donations and not to donations in kind.

In the context of section 194-IA an issue would arise as to whether the section applies when the consideration is in kind e.g. in cases of exchange. This issue has been dealt with, in detail, subsequently under the caption `Issues’.

Consideration: The term `consideration’ has not been defined in the Act. The term is also not defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The Patna High Court in Rai Bahadur H.P. Banerjee vs. CIT ([1941] 9 ITR 137)(Pat) held that the word ‘consideration’ is not defined in the Transfer of Property Act and must be given a meaning similar to the meaning which it has in the Indian Contract Act. Similar view has been taken by the Kerala High Court in the case of CGT vs. Smt. C K Nirmala (215 ITR 156)(Ker) and by the Bombay High Court in the case of Keshub Mahindra vs. CGT (70 ITR 1)(Bom). Section 2(b), of the Indian Contract Act defines `consideration’ as under:

“When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.”

An issue which arises for consideration is whether the amount of service tax, VAT payable by the transferee to the transferor constitutes part of consideration and therefore tax is required to be deducted even on these amounts. By virtue of Circular No. 1/2014 dated 13.1.2014, tax is not required to be deducted at source on the amount of service tax. The question of deduction of tax at source, therefore, survives only in respect of VAT . Looked at it from a common man’s perspective the amount of service tax and VAT agreed to be paid by the transferee to the transferor would certainly form part of consideration for transfer of immovable property. The liability to pay these amounts under the respective statutes is of the transferor. Accordingly, it appears that VAT amount constitutes consideration and tax will have to be deducted even on the amount of VAT . In addition, these amounts may also attract stamp duty under the stamp law of a State. However, in cases where the transferee is faced with a show cause notice for failure to deduct tax at source on the amount of VAT , the transferee may contend that the analagoy of excluding service tax would apply equally to VAT as well.

Immovable Property: This term is defined exhaustively to mean land (other than agricultural land) or any building or a part of a building. Agricultural land is not immovable property. Agricultural land is defined for this purpose. Urban agricultural land is immovable property. Immovable property could be land, agricultural land outside India, urban agricultural land, office, flat, shop, godown, theatre, hotel, hospital, etc. Immovable property could be stock-intrade of the developer. Immovable property could be held as either stock-in-trade or as capital asset.

Meaning of ‘transfer’: The section applies to consideration for transfer. The question which arises is whether the term `transfer’ would mean only transfer by way of conveyance under general law through a registered instrument or it would even cover the transactions / agreements referred to in section 2(47)(v) and (vi) i.e. in cases where possession is given in part performance of the contract u/s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act or a transaction of becoming a member of a co-operative society, company, etc. Also, would the provisions be applicable to part payments made but not in the year of transfer (conditions of 2(47)(v) not being satisfied)?

Immovable Property located outside India: The section does not mention that the immovable property should be situated in India. Therefore, a literal interpretation would be that the immovable property could be situated any where may be in India or may be outside India. Further, the term `agricultural land’ has been defined to mean agricultural land situated in India. The fact that agricultural land in India is excluded from immovable property could be understood in two ways – one that from the immovable property in India exclusion is to be made of agricultural land in India and the other could be that from the immovable property wherever situated only the agricultural land in India is excluded. Thus, two interpretations are possible. However, if a view is taken that the section applies even in respect of immovable property situated outside India then the position will be that a buyer who is outside India and who is neither a citizen of India nor a resident of India who is buying immovable property located outside India from a resident of India, will be required to deduct income-tax under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, it would mean that it is expected of every person dealing with a resident of India to be aware of the provisions of the Indian laws. Assuming that such a buyer is aware of these provisions and decides to comply with the provisions of this section, he will have to obtain a PAN so as to be able to make payment of the amount of TDS. A question would arise as to whether the Government of India can cast an obligation on a non-resident to deduct tax from payments made by him for purchase of a property which is situated outside India. The only nexus which such a transferor has with India being that he is buying immovable property from a person who is a resident of India. In case of default in complying with the provisions of this section, the buyer would be regarded as an assessee-in-default and would be liable to pay interest and penalty as well. Such an interpretation may not be upheld by Courts. Therefore, it appears that the section would apply to only immovable property situated in India.

Threshold for non-deduction: Sub-section (1) of section 194-IA casts an obligation on the transferee to deduct tax at source. S/s. (1) does not have a threshold limit. S/s. (2) provides that no deduction under subsection (1) shall be made where the consideration for the transfer of an immovable property is less than fifty lakh rupees. The issue for consideration is whether the limit of fifty lakh rupees is qua the immovable property or is it qua the transferee. This issue is dealt with, in detail, subsequently under the caption `Issues’.

Quantum of tax to be deducted: Deduction is to be of an amount equal to one per cent of such sum as incometax. Surcharge and cess on this amount are not to be deducted. If the transferor / seller does not provide PAN, technically, the rate of tax could be 20% by virtue of provisions of section 206AA. However, the challan for payment of tax deducted u/s. 194-IA requires PAN as a compulsory field and it does not proceed without PAN having been filled in. Challan No. 281 which is applicable for payment of TDS other than TDS u/s. 194-IA, does not have a field to make payment of TDS u/s. 194-IA, though the same may have been deducted at the rate mentioned in section 206AA. It seems that the procedure has been so designed so as to further the objective stated in the Memorandum explaining the salient features of the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2013 viz. to overcome the difficulty which was being faced viz. the PAN Nos. not being quoted or invalid PAN Nos. being quoted in the AIR.

At this stage, it would be relevant to note the Karnataka High Court in the case of A. Kowsalya Bai vs. UOI (346 ITR 156)(Kar) has read down the provisions of section 206AA and has held it to be inapplicable to persons whose income is less than the taxable limit.

The deduction is with reference to consideration and not with reference to valuation as done by stamp valuation authorities though in the case of transferor / seller section 50C / section 43CA may be attracted.

No deduction / Deduction at lower rate: There is no provision of either the transferor giving a declaration to the transferee asking him not to deduct tax at source or to deduct tax at lower rate. Transferor cannot even obtain an order from the Assessing Officer authorizing the transferee / buyer not to deduct tax or to deduct it at a lower rate. Thus, tax is deductible at source even in cases where the transferor is entitled to exemption u/s. 54, 54EC, 54F. Similar is the position where the transferor is to suffer a loss as a result of transfer or has brought forward losses which are available for set off against gain on transfer of immovable property.

Consequences of non-deduction: Failure to deduct tax under this section may result in the person i.e. the transferee being deemed to be an assessee in default. Failure to deduct tax will attract interest and penalty. Also, provisions of section 40(a)(ia) will be attracted with effect from assessment year 2015-16.

No requirement to obtain TAN / file quarterly returns: The transferee is not required to obtain TAN if he does not have one. Also, he is not required to file quarterly returns / statements.

Obligation to pay tax so deducted and issue certificate: The tax deducted by the transferee has to be paid to the credit of the Central Government within 7 days from the end of the month in which the deduction is made. TDS payment shall be accompanied by a challancum- statement in Form 26QB. Payment is to be made by remitting it electronically to RBI or SBI or any authorised bank or by paying it physically in any authorised bank. Payer / Transferee is required to issue TDS certificate in Form 16B, to be generated online from the web portal. The TDS certificate is to be issued within 15 days from the due date for furnishing challan-cum-statement in Form 26QB.

Issues: Various issues arise in day to day practice on the applicability of the provisions of section 194-IA of the Act. The author does not necessarily have an answer to all the issues which may arise. Some of the important and more common issues are as under: –

(a) Amounts paid before the provision coming into effect – Provisions of section 194-IA have been introduced in the Income-tax Act, 1961 with effect from 1.6.2013. The obligation to deduct tax under this section arises at the time of payment or at the time of credit of the amount to the account of the transferor, which ever is earlier. Therefore, in a case where either the payment or the credit has been made before 1.6.2013, the question of deduction of tax at source under this section should not arise. While this position may appear to be quite obvious interpretation of the provision, if an authority is required for this proposition a reference can be made to the order dated 3rd June, 2015 of the Karnataka High Court while deciding the Writ Petition in the case of Shubhankar Estates Private Limited vs. The Senior Sub-Registrar, The Union Bank of India and the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (Writ Petition No. 57385/2013). The Karnataka High Court in this case directed the Registrar to complete the registration without insisting on the deduction of tax at source and to release the document to the petitioner. The Court has, in para 5 of the order, held as under –

“5. In that light, if the provision contained in Section 194-IA as extracted above is noticed, the obligation on the transferee to deduct 1% of the sale consideration towards TDS had come into effect only on 1.6.2013. If that be the position, as on 2.3.2012 when the petitioner in the instant case as the transferee had paid the amount to the transferor, there was no obligation in law on the petitioner to deduct the said amount. If this aspect of the matter is kept in view, even though the provision had come into force as on the date of presentation of the sale certificate for registration, the petitioner having parted with the sale consideration much earlier, was not expected to deduct the amount and produce proof in that regard to the Sub-Registrar. It is no doubt true that in respect of the said amount the third respondent would have the right to recover the taxes due. But, in the instant case, the communication as addressed from the third respondent to the first respondent could not have been held against the petitioner in the circumstances stated above. In the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, where the petitioner being an auction purchaser had paid the entire sale consideration much earlier to the provision coming into force, the endorsement dated 4.12.2013 requiring the petitioner to deduct the income-tax and indicating that the registration would be made thereafter cannot be sustained.”

(b) Applicability of section 206AA – Section 194-IA requires deduction of tax at source at the rate of one per cent. In a case where the transferor does not provide the payer with his PAN, technically, the provisions of section 206AA would be attracted and the deduction would have to be made at the rate of 20%. However, such a situation seems to be quite unlikely since the challan by which the tax is required to be paid by the deductor, transferee, requires the PAN of the transferor as a compulsory field. Hence, in the event that the deduction has to be made, it will have to be made at the rate mentioned in section 194- IA i.e. one per cent.

(c) Applicability to composite transactions where both land and building are subject matter of transfer – Under provisions of section 194-IA tax is required to be deducted, subject to satisfaction of other conditions mentioned in the section, on the amount of consideration for transfer of immovable property. The term `immovable property’ is defined in Explanation (a) to the section as meaning any land or any building or part of a building. Provisions of sections 43CA, 50C and 56(2)(vii) use the term land or building or both. The word `both’ is absent in section 194-IA. Therefore, in cases where tax has not been deducted (not deliberately as a planning measure) on amount of consideration for transfer of a composite transfer comprising of land and building both, one may contend that the Legislature has consciously used a different language in section 194-IA and has left out composite transactions of both land and building e.g. purchase of a bungalow comprising of building and also the land beneath it.

(d) Payment of consideration by a Bank / Housing Finance Institution to a transferor on behalf of the transferee – In a case where the transferee has taken a loan for discharge of consideration to the transferor, the bank / housing finance institution disburses the loan by issuing a cheque / pay order to the transferor towards consideration due to him from the transferee. In such a case, a question arises as to how does a transferee comply with his obligation to deduct tax at source under this section. The banks / financial institutions in such a case issue a cheque / pay order in favour of the transferor of the net amount and the amount equivalent to tax deductible at source under this section is given to the transferee upon his producing a challan evidencing the amount deposited by him towards tax deducted at source. The alternative to this could be that the transferee requests and authorises the bank / financial institution, in writing, to disburse the net amount to the transferor and to deposit the amount required to be deducted at source under this section to the credit of the Central Government on behalf of the transferee i.e. in such a case, the bank / financial institution will deposit tax at source as an agent of the transferee and the challan will contain the PAN and other particulars of the transferee. In actual practice, it is understood that, the first option is what the banks / financial institutions have been following.

(e) Limit of Rs. 50 lakh – whether it is qua an immovable property or qua the transferee / transferor – Threshold for non-deduction: Sub-section (1) of section 194-IA casts an obligation on the transferee to deduct tax at source. S/s. (1) does not have a threshold limit. S/s. (2) provides that no deduction under subsection (1) shall be made where the consideration for the transfer of an immovable property is less than fifty lakh rupees. The issue for consideration is whether the limit of fifty lakh rupees is qua the immovable property or is it qua the transferee. The following paragraphs attempt to address this issue :-

(i) The Memorandum explaining the salient provisions of Finance Bill, 2013 says the Annual Information Returns filed by sub-registrars often indicate that in majority of the cases purchaser or sellers of immovable property did not quote or quoted an invalid PAN in the documents relating to transfer of immovable property. The Sub-Registrar in terms of Rule 114E read with section 285BA is required to report each transaction involving purchase or sale of an immovable property valued at Rs. 30 lakh or more in the Annual Information Return.

(ii) Thus it is clear that the purpose of the newlyinserted section 194-IA is to augment what is already being reported by the Sub-Registrar.

(iii) It may be noted that the Sub-Registrar has got to report a transaction even if the share of each buyer, in case of joint ownership, is below Rs. 30 lakh.

(iv) Following the purpose for which the section 194-IA was inserted, one may conclude that the threshold limit of Rs. 50 lakh for applicability of Section 194-IA is to be determined property-wise and not transferee-wise. This is so because the buyers of immovable properties can’t be allowed to do what the sub-registrar couldn’t do i.e. split up the sale consideration buyer-wise and claim immunity from deduction of TDS since consideration attributable to each buyer is below Rs. 50 lakh.

(v) Thus, the provisions of section 194-IA will apply to a property transaction involving more than one buyer though the share of each buyer in the property is less than Rs. 50 lakh, but the consideration for transfer of the immovable property, in aggregate, is more than Rs. 50 lakh. In such case, tax will be deducted and deposited by each buyer in respect of their respective share in the immovable property.

(vi) Similarly, in case of a transaction involving more than one seller, tax will be deducted in respect of amount paid to each seller and their respective PAN will be quoted in Form 26QB while making payment.

(vii) Judicial pronouncements under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Chapter XX-C) propose a similar philosophy that immovable property which is the subject matter of the transfer has to be seen in real light and provisions of Chapter XX-C shall apply when by a single agreement of transfer, co-owners of a property agreed to sell the property to the respondent which was above the limit prescribed for application of 269C.

(viii) Chapter XX-C dealt with purchase by Central Government of immovable properties in certain cases of transfer and provided for pre-emptive right of purchase of immovable property by the Government in a case where the apparent consideration for transfer of such property exceeded the specified limit mentioned under Section 269UC.

(ix) Section – 269-UC (1) read as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or in any other law for the time being in force, no transfer of any immovable property in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees, as may be prescribed, shall be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property (hereinafter referred to as the transferor) and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred (hereinafter referred to as the transferee) in accordance with the provisions of s/s. (2) at least four months before the intended date of transfer.”

(x) The Bombay High Court in the case of Jodharam Daulat Ram Arora vs. M. B Kodnanai (120 CTR 166)(Bom) wherein there was one vendor and three purchasers, held as under:

‘The agreement in question before it was a composite agreement in respect of the flat and there was nothing in the agreement which indicate that the purchasers had agreed to buy individually an undivided 1/3rd share of the flat from the vendor. All the concerned parties had filed Form No.37-I and therefore it was not open to them to contend that section 269UD had no application and the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction.’

(xi) However, the Madras High Court took a contrary view in the case of K. V. Kishore vs. Appropriate Authority (189 ITR 264)(Mad). The Court held that –

‘What is sold, is the individual undivided share in the property and the value of each such share in the said immovable property was less than Rs. 25 lakh. The transferors were co-owners and each coowner was getting an apparent consideration that was less than the limit prescribed i.e less than Rs. 25 lakh. The provisions of Chapter XX-C was not attracted even though the amount that all the coowners received exceeded Rs. 25 lakh.’

(xii) Other High Courts in various judgments also upheld the above stated view of the Madras High Court.

(xiii) However, in Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Varshaben Bharatbhai Shah (248 ITR 342)(SC), where two co-owners entered into an agreement to transfer immovable property, situated in Ahmedabad, to a seller for a sum of Rs. 47 lakh which was above the limit prescribed for application to appropriate authority u/s. 269UC of the Act, the Supreme Court reversing the decision of Gujarat High Court in Varshaben Bharatbhai Shah vs. Appropriate Authority (221 ITR 819)(Guj) and various judgments of other High Courts held that :

‘What, in our opinion, has to be seen for the purposes of attracting Chapter XX-C is: what is the property which is the subject-matter for such transfer and what is the apparent consideration for such transfer. This has to be seen in a real light with due regard to the object of the Chapter and not in an artificial or technical manner. Looked at realistically, it was the immovable property which was the subject matter of transfer. If the apparent consideration for the transfer is more than the limit prescribed for the relevant area under Rule 48K, what has then to be seen is whether the apparent consideration for the property is less than the market value thereof by 15 % or more. If so, the notice for pre-emptive purchase can be issued and it is then for the parties to the transaction to satisfy the appropriate authority that the apparent consideration is the real consideration for the transfer.’

‘In the present case the said agreement is for the sale of the immovable property and that the equal shares of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein were to be transferred to Respondent No. 1 is a necessary incident of such sale. The parties had also in Form 37-I correctly stated that what was being sold was the property and not the onehalf shares of the transferors and that the total apparent consideration for the transfer was Rs. 47 lakh. It was of no consequence that Respondents owned the property as tenants-in-common or that that was how they had shown their ownership in their income-tax returns. The provisions of Chapter XX-C applied.’

(xiv) The Supreme Court further added that: ‘Even if the agreement had been so drawn so as to show the transfer of the equal shares of the second and third respondents in the said immovable property, our conclusion would have been the same for, looked at realistically, it was the said immovable property which was the subject of transfer.’

‘We are of the opinion that the judgments of the Madras, Karnataka, Delhi and Calcutta High Courts referred to above are based on a wrong approach and are erroneous. We approve of the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Jodharam Daulatram Arora’s Case [1996]’

(xv) From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is the law of the land that even if the property is owned by more than one persons and the apparent consideration in relation to the interest of each co-owner in the property is less than the ‘specified limit’, the provisions of Chapter XXC would be applicable if such property is transferred under a single agreement and the apparent consideration for the property as a whole exceeds the ‘specified limit’.

(xvi) Therefore, u/s. 194-IA also, if the consideration for the purchase of an immovable property shoots beyond 49,99,999/-, one has to withhold tax @ 1 per cent. The number of buyers signing up the agreement for transfer will not make a difference nor would the number of sellers make any difference either.

(f) Applicability of the section to a transaction of transfer by way of an exchange / where the consideration is in kind – The section requires deduction of tax at source by the transferee to a resident transferor out of any sum paid by way of consideration for the transfer of any immovable property (other than agricultural land). Questions do arise as to whether the provisions of this section are to be complied with, in cases, where the consideration is in kind eg., transactions of exchange or cases where the agreement is for joint development of the land belonging to the transferor by the transferee and the transferor is entitled to receive from the transferee a portion of the developed area i.e. a certain percentage of flats. There is no monetary consideration involved in such transactions. Assuming that the other conditions of the section are satisfied, the question being examined in this paragraph is whether the section contemplates the deduction only in cases where the consideration is in monetary terms or even in cases where the consideration is in kind. This controversy arises because of the words `any other mode’ used in sub-section (1) of section 194-IA.

The following arguments can be considered to support the proposition that the provisions of section 194-IA would apply only when the consideration is fixed in monetary terms:-

As has been stated earlier, the expression “any sum paid” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of H. H. Sri Rama Verma vs. CIT (187 ITR 308) (SC) to mean only amount of money given as donations and not to donations in kind.

The provision contemplates `deduction’ – in cases where consideration is paid in kind ‘deduction’ is not possible.

Section 194B which deals with deduction from payment of any income by way of winnings from any lottery or cross word puzzle or card game or other game of any sort. This section has a specific proviso which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1997, w.e.f. 01.06.1997 which specifically deals with winnings wholly in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind, but the part in cash not being sufficient to meet liability of tax. Prior to the insertion of the proviso the CBDT had in Circular No. 428 dated 8.8.1985 stated that the section does not apply where the prize is given only in kind. The relevant portion of the circular is reproduced hereunder –

Circular : No. 428 [F. No. 275/30/85-IT(B)], dated 8-8-1985.

“3. The substance of the main provisions in the law insofar as they relate to deduction of income-tax at source from winnings from lotteries and crossword puzzles, is given hereunder :

(1) No tax will be deducted at source where the income by way of winnings from lottery or crossword puzzle is Rs. 1,000 or less.

(2) Where a prize is given partly in cash and partly in kind, income-tax will be deductible from each prize with reference to the aggregate amount of the cash prize and the value of the prize in kind. Where, however, the prize is given only in kind, no income-tax will be required to be deducted. ………..” U/s. 194B deduction is out of specified income.

U/s. 194-IA deduction is out of consideration for transfer of immovable property. Like consideration, income could be in cash or in kind. Following the above mentioned circular it can be safely argued that tax is not deductible when consideration is in kind. Recently, the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chief Accounts Officer, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagar Palike (BBMP) (ITA NO. 94 of 2015 and ITA No. 466 of 2015; order dated 29th September, 2015), was dealing with a case where BBMP had taken over certain lands which were reserved and in lieu thereof it had allotted CDR (Certificate of Development Rights) to the persons who were the owners of the land so taken over. The owners of land were allotted CDR rights in the form of additional floor area, which shall be equal to one and a half times of area of land surrendered. The AO treated the BBMP as an assessee in default for not having deducted TDS u/s. 194LA. The language of section 194LA is materially similar to the language of section 194-IA. The Court has in para 9 held that where there is neither any quantification of the sum payable in terms of money nor any actual payment is made in monetary terms, it would not be fair to burden a person with the obligation of deducting tax at source and exposing him to the consequences of such default.

Thus, for the reasons stated above, it appears that the tax will be required to be deducted at source only in those cases where consideration is fixed in monetary terms. The consideration having been fixed by the parties in monetary terms the same may be discharged in kind. In cases, where the consideration is fixed in monetary terms but is discharged in kind, it is possible to argue that the provisions of the section may apply. In cases where consideration is fixed in kind (e.g. exchange transactions or cases of development agreement where the land owner is entitled to a share in the developed area and no monetary consideration), the better view appears to be that tax will not be required to be deducted at source. (f) Applicability of the section to rights in land or buildings or to reversionary rights -The section applies to consideration for transfer of immovable property (other than agricultural land). Immovable property has been defined to mean land or building or part of a building. Questions do arise as to whether tax is required to be deducted at source when the subject matter of transfer is not land or building or part of a building but rights in land or rights in building e.g. transfer of tenancy rights, grant of lease, etc. In the context of section 50C which applies to cases of transfer of land or building or both, the Tribunals have in the following cases taken a view that the provisions of section 50C do not apply to cases of transfer of rights in land or building but applies only when there is a transfer of land or building:
Kishori Sharad Gaitonde (ITA No. 1561/M/2009) (Mum SMC)(URO)
DCIT vs. Tejinder Singh [2012] 50 SOT 391 (Kol.)(Trib.)
Atul G. Puranik vs. ITO [2011] 58 DTR 208 (Mum.)(Trib.)
ITO vs. Yasin Moosa Godil [2012] 18 ITR 253 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

Following the ratio of the above decisions, it is possible to take a view that the provisions of section 194-IA do not apply to transfer of rights in land or building.

However, when reversionary rights are transferred by the landlord, the consideration paid for acquiring reversionary rights would be subject to deduction of tax at source in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(g) Applicability of the section to introduction of an immovable property by a partner of a firm into a firm – When a partner of a firm introduces land or building into a partnership firm where he is a partner, question arises whether tax is required to be deducted at source. If yes, who will deduct tax at source and on what amount? In a case where a partner of a firm introduces immovable property into a firm as his capital contribution, there is undoubtedly a transfer. Supreme Court has in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai vs. CIT (1985) (156 ITR 509) (SC) held that what was the exclusive interest of a partner in his personal asset is, upon its introduction into the partnership firm as his share to the partnership capital, transformed into a shared interest with the other partners in that asset. Qua that asset, there is a shared interest. For the purposes of computing capital gains, the amount credited to the capital account of the partner is deemed to be full value of consideration by virtue of the deeming fiction created by section 45. The deeming fiction had to be introduced to overcome the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai (supra) where the SC held that the interest of a partner in the partnership firm is an interest which cannot be evaluated immediately. It is an interest which is subject to the operation of future transactions of the partnership, and it may diminish in value depending on accumulating liabilities and losses with a fall in the prosperity of the partnership firm. The evaluation of a partner’s interest takes place only when there is a dissolution of the firm or upon his retirement from it. While it may be an arguable proposition, to contend that the deeming fiction is only for the purposes of computation of capital gain and cannot be extended to provisions of section 194-IA of the Act, it would certainly be safer for the partnership firm to deduct tax at source u/s. 194-IA by considering the amount credited to the partner’s capital account as the amount of consideration.

Conclusion:
The above are some of the issues which arise in connection with the applicability of the provisions of section 194-IA. There are several other issues which are not covered here e.g. Applicability to cases of slump sale, amalgamation, amount paid by builder to a co-operative housing society/member thereof on redevelopment of property, applicability to acquisition of shares with occupancy rights attached to them, assignment of booking rights, etc. It would now be worthwhile to remind the reader of the golden rule applicable while interpreting the provisions of TDS i.e. when in doubt – Deduct. The arguments stated above can be resorted to in the event of any inadvertent slip in complying with the provisions.

Expectations from our new leaders

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When this issue reaches you, the voting for the Regional Councils and the Central Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), will have been completed. The fate of the candidates, either seeking reelection or desiring to enter the council for the first time would have been sealed in the ballot boxes. The counting will take place and the election results will be known before the end of the year.

What is then that the ordinary members of the ICAI expect of our new leaders? First and foremost, our leaders should set an example for the members of the profession to follow. It is said that we get the leaders we deserve. However, it is equally true that when leaders show the path, followers follow. Members of the Council, whether it be Central or Regional, should set an example of ethical, disciplined, proactive and transparent behaviour. In the recent past, our profession has been continuously facing flak for declining ethical standards. If our leaders set high standards of morality and ethics, the general membership will look up to them. Further, they will then have the courage to represent to the government and other authorities when erroneous decisions, unfair to the members are being taken. I am deeply conscious that it is not easy to meet this expectation, but my suggestion to our new leaders is that they should make a beginning in that direction.

I have, in earlier editorials, expressed the view that the deliberations of our leaders both in councils and in various committees should be communicated to the general membership. This will achieve two objectives; the first is that, if discussions are regarding certain proposed amendments to legislation or regulations, both the concerned authorities and the members will be aware that the Council of a regulatory body is seized of the issues. The second is that the stakeholders would be able to communicate to the council their views, so that a decision after considering their thoughts can be taken. Transparency in governance is the buzzword today, and it is appropriate that a premier institution like the ICAI should set an example.

Another expectation is in regard to communication. Many times the government and the regulators take decisions which affect the interests of the members, their clients or both. While it is true that in regard to decisions affecting trade and industry it is the responsibility of the respective associations to take up the matter, it is equally true that the profession should be catalysts in that process. Therefore, if our leaders, through various committees or individually, have made various representations or have not made them for certain specific reasons, both should be placed in the public domain. The government may not necessarily accept the representation, but the fact that the leadership is taking action will boost the confidence of professional colleagues. Secondly, if an additional responsibility has been cast on the profession, and in discharging that responsibility the profession expects some specific action from the service recipient, that expectation should be communicated. If there are inherent limitations/difficulties in carrying out the new tasks, those also should be intimated. This will ensure that the service providers and service recipients work together rather than criticising each other. It is not as if today our leaders do not communicate. The need is that our leaders should not only speak, they should also listen, and the fact that they are listening should be made known to all.

At times professional colleagues may have expectations from our Institution, which may be totally unreasonable. In such a situation, the newly elected council members should be firm and explain patiently to the profession as to why the expectations are unwarranted. We elect leaders not for taking popular decisions but taking right decisions even if some of us find them difficult to digest. The true test of leadership is not in doing what the public wants but in doing what is right and in convincing people that what is being done is in their interest.

Lastly, significant attention needs to be given to students. These are members of the future. One often finds that, during the period of articleship, and even after passing the final examination and becoming Chartered Accountants students do not have any sense of belonging towards their alma mater. There is, in fact, a sense of alienation. This does not augur well for an institution which is into its seventh decade of existence and is really destined to play an important role in the life of a fast-growing nation. There is a feeling among new entrants that the ICAI does not do enough for them. It is a grudge that they harbour from their student days. Their grievances may not necessarily be correct, but this feeling needs to be addressed. It is only if younger members take interest in the affairs of an institution can it become vibrant. It is true that this is not a problem unique only to ICAI but is affecting other institutions as well. I hope our new leaders will take note.

I have tried to put together a few thoughts for the members of the new councils, Central and Regional. On behalf of all readers and the BCAS, I wish them well and hope all their dreams come true. When I communicate with you again the New Year would have already begun. I take this opportunity to wish all readers and their families a very happy and prosperous New Year!

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Namaskar

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‘Because I love life, I know I shall love death as well’
Gurudev Tagore

1.
We mortals live in the fear of death. We do not realise that `death’ is
a reliever of pain and `death’ also is a leveller, for it is said :
sceptre and crown in dust be equal made. The greatest wonder is that
whilst we see others die we don’t believe that we are also going to die.
We little realise that death is a certainty. There is a saying in Guru
Granth Saheb that implies death is a certainty. ‘Jo UPJIO so bins hai karo aaj ke kaaj’. Translated it means : Everything that is born must die – don’t greave, do today’s work.

2. The question is : what is death? Philosophers say : birth and death are two sides of the same coin – and are the threads which weave life. Death also gives birth when bible propounds the concept that ‘unless a seed dies it can produce no grain. A seed has to cease to be itself in order to be a source of life to others’.
I believe that ‘death’ is a friend who is born with me, walks with me,
laughs with me and weeps with me – the only thing I don’t know when he
is going to ask me to walk with him. This uncertainty brings in the fear
of the unknown. To face this uncertainty we have to accept death as
reality and be ready for it and do what Leonardo da Vinci said ‘while I
thought that I was learning how to live, I have been learning how to
die’. Let us learn how to die. Death is not to be feared.

3. The next question is : what does death do!
Death converts a person into a thought – memory. It makes us realise
that the physical body of ours comes with an expiry date and death is a
painful truth – nay – just truth. It at times impels us to think ‘life
is an illusion’. It also teaches us to reflect on our actions – in other
words – check our actions on the touchstone of morality.

4. Have we noticed that persons belonging to a particular sect apply Bhasma on their forehead! They probably believe that bhasma reminds them and prepares them to meet ‘death’ as ultimately body turns into Bhasma – ash. What a wonderful way to live with death.

5.
There is another way of viewing death. For those of us who believe in
the concept of re-incarnation – there is no death – because death is
only a comma and not a full stop. Hal Borland has put this concept
beautifully in words when he says ‘your end is neither an end nor a beginning but a going on, with all the wisdom that experience can instil in us’.
Every birth is an experience gatherer. Our philosophy of karma also
propounds the concept that we take birth again and again to live the
result of our good and bad actions.

6. Have we ever observed our
reactions at someone’s death. Death at 25 is shocking, at 50 it causes
anguish and at or after 70 death is accepted as a norm. We say either he
lived well or he is relieved of his pain and suffering.

7.
Swami Sukhabodhananda says: ‘Death is the most critical defining feature
of life. When you die, you are making the ultimate desirable assertion
that you have been alive. In fact, death is a precondition to life’.

8.
We have to realise that there should be no fear of an event that is
certain – death. We need to live life – live it and enjoy it because
life is worth living as it is a gift from God. Whilst enjoying life, the
one death we should seek is the death of ego.

9. I would conclude by quoting Osho :

‘It is not whether life exists after death. The real question is :Whether you are alive before death?

NB:
The author attempts every morning to ask himself the question : How
will I live this day if it was my last day – so should we all. The
answer, friends, would reflect the answer to the question asked by OSHO.

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Sahitya storm – Writers must stand up for intel – lectual freedom, returning awards may not be the best way

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A rising tide of writers are returning their Sahitya a kademi awards in protest against growing intolerance and restricted space for freedom of choice in the country, since nda governments came to power at the Centre in 2014 and subsequently in many states. Culture is an early warning sign, and BJP-led governments must take note of growing signs of disquiet. e ven as people are lynched on suspicion of consuming beef, three rationalists have been murdered in succession in m aharashtra and Karnataka – extremely un- i ndian acts that are being laid at the door of h indu extremists. they are usually followed by a stream of statements from high-ranking BJP leaders, which appear to condone heinous crimes and create a culture of impunity around them by trotting out the time-worn cliché of ‘hurt sentiments’.

If writers and intellectuals were to secede, it would seriously diminish i ndian soft power. But more importantly, they broach broader concerns. Poor people in the countryside are dependent on the cattle trade. Curtailing this due to the hysteria over beef will see a drop in their living standards at a time when the agricultural sector is already in crisis. moreover, youth have grown aspirational and will not take kindly to an atmosphere of restricted political and social freedoms. a ll this will hurt B j P in elections and make Prime minister Narendra Modi’s modernising agenda seem hollow.

At the same time, writers also need to reflect on the perhaps unintended irony of returning their Sahitya a kademi awards as a protest against the government. t his implicitly concedes that Sahitya a kademi is a government body, and thereby raises the question why they were content with government patronage and did not fight for an autonomous body that truly represents writers.

A related concern is whether writers have been as vocal about muslim fundamentalism, or of left-wing crackdowns on dissent, as they have been on hindu fundamentalism. Few writers protested, for example, when the Left stifled intellectual life in Bengal or when Taslima nasrin was drummed out of that state. a solution would be to have a robust, autonomous body of writers that is willing to speak out on assaults on freedom of expression, no matter what quarter the attack is coming from. the government, on its part, must note that leftwing intolerance does not justify right-wing intolerance; both will lead to the same sorry results. India can flourish only in a liberal atmosphere, which gives citizens the right to choose.

A new international tax regime – Govt must con – sult industry and implement BEPS project

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The recent unveiling of the final reports on 15 action plans by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD , under its Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) project will undoubtedly mean new and formidable challenges for many companies operating in india and abroad. No less formidable will be the challenge the BEPS project will pose for the Indian tax authorities, as they have to conform to a new regime of cross-border taxation even as they undertake fresh tax policy reforms at home. The BEPS measures, according to one estimate, will affect just under 200 large indian companies. to begin with, these companies will have to adhere to the country-by-country reporting standards for their operations in different tax jurisdictions. Globally, an estimated 9,000 companies will be impacted by the new measures, and each of them will have to reckon with the tax policies in vogue in different countries where they have business operations. t he numbers may not look too large at present. But there is no doubt that the manner in which the indian authorities ensure tax compliance by companies operating in india under the BEPS regime will determine to a great extent india’s reputation in providing the ease of doing business, and hence its attractiveness as a destination for new investments.

The BEPS project, led by the OECD and the Group of 20 (G20) countries, is a response to the 2008 global financial crisis, and is meant to lay the foundations of sustainable and long-term economic growth by avoiding policies that promote growth at the expense of other countries. it has been estimated that multinational businesses have often used a complex transaction structure to artificially reduce their outgo on corporate taxes by shifting to jurisdictions with lower taxation. according to OECD estimates, such tax avoidance has led to a global revenue loss of $100- 240 billion every year – as significantly large as four to 10 per cent of global corporate income-tax revenues. the 15 action plans approved under the BEPS project will help improve transparency for both businesses and governments by introducing commonly agreed minimum standards for tax administration across countries. they are focused on a large number of diverse and important issues including those pertaining to alignment of taxation with the location of economic activity and value creation, application of transfer pricing guidelines and taxation of digital enterprises like those engaged in e-commerce. of particular importance is the BEPS regime’s focus on reinforcing the limitation of benefits to companies to prevent what is commonly referred to as treaty-shopping, where a company uses a location of business with the sole purpose of taking advantage of a tax benefit available under a bilateral tax agreement.

The challenges for both Indian tax policy makers and the companies are, therefore, huge. Indian companies expected to come under the purview of BEPS will have to increase their awareness of the new regime and start preparing to comply with the new regulations that are likely to be in place from 2017. Without losing much time, they have to bring their accounting systems up to date, improve their compliance mechanisms, particularly with regard to country-by-country reporting standards and transfer pricing rules, and upgrade the manner in which they report data. of some concern will be the way the BEPS regime will bring digital economy enterprises like start-ups and e-commerce ventures under the tax net. For the Indian tax authorities, the tasks are even more onerous. they have to start a process of consulting industry players on the BEPS regime and how they intend to bring their taxation system in line with the mandated international standards. this cannot be allowed to be a new source of irritation for industry or a cause for rising cost of compliance. there has to be a healthy balance between ensuring compliance without adversely affecting India Inc’s competitiveness.

New SEBI Listing Regulations – revised requirements of corporate governance, disclosures, etc.

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Background

SEBI has recently notified the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“the Listing Regulations”). They will primarily replace the Listing Agreement and certain related provisions. On the face of it, it may appear that the notification is old wine in a new bottle. A superficial review may even create an impression that the Listing Regulations make merely cosmetic/ aesthetic changes in that they organise into categories/ chapters the myriad of clauses that were messily placed in the Listing Agreement, being the result of random additions/deletions and endless amendments. However, a closer analysis reveals that there are several structural changes and new requirements/modifications. Primarily, the status of the provisions has been substantially elevated from a set of provisions that had a dubious legal status to a proper law with, as we will discuss later, severe consequences. The rights and obligations of various parties that were unclear and uncertain under the Listing Agreement are now clearer, well-defined and attributed directly and specifically. More important is the fact that the obligations of various persons such as the company, its directors, the Chief Financial Officer, Company Secretary, etc. and even the auditors and the Audit Committee have increased. The life of the already overburdened and underpaid independent directors will worsen further.

The new regulations are fairly lengthy, though this is also on account of the fact that they seek to cover the listing obligations of not just equity shares but also other types of securities. Still, the 111 page long regulations would need a deep study to understand their implications. In this article, some highlights are briefly discussed.

Nature of the Regulations

The Regulations largely compile, rewrite and re-organise at several places, the familiar Listing Agreement and certain related provisions, in the form of Regulations. The Listing Agreement primarily provide for certain obligations of companies whose securities have been listed on recognised stock exchanges. The requirements include disclosures of important developments in such companies, of periodic accounts, etc. The Listing Agreement is also the place where Clause 49 that covers the requirements relating to corporate governance are placed. There are several other requirements contained in other provisions. These are now gathered at one place in an organised manner in the new Listing Regulations. Thus, while the SEBI ICDR   Regulations pave the road to listing of securities of a company, the Listing Regulations
now provide for requirements of their continued listing.

A formal and very short Listing Agreement of course continues (which listed companies are required to execute) but the substantive provisions are now in the Listing Regulations. Further, the Listing Regulations provide for separate chapters for requirements in case of different type of listed securities.

Date when the regulations shall come into effect

The bulk of the regulations shall come into effect from 1st December 2015 (except, however, as will be seen later, for two sets of provisions that have come into effect immediately, i.e. from 2nd September 2015). This has given time for companies and others concerned to absorb the contents, changes and implications of the new
provisions.

More severe punishment for violations

The primary structural change is that, instead of the provisions being in the form of a listing agreement, which, at least conceptually, had a dubious legal status and hence implications, the Listing Regulations have a well recognised and well defined status and implications.

The Listing Agreement was of course not a mere private agreement where only the signing parties could act against each other. For example, section 23E of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, provided for a stiff penalty for violation of listing conditions. The stock exchanges too ensured discipline and enforcement to considerable extent. Further, SEBI had direct control over the provisions. Nevertheless, the element of uncertainty remained. Moreover, the final recourse of contraventions of the Listing Agreement could, in theory, only be of terminating the Listing Agreement. This would mean delisting the shares in the present case which would obviously be counter productive as this would harm the shareholders for no fault of theirs. SEBI has of course been using its generic and wide powers to take action and pass fairly stringent orders. It has debarred directors, executives, etc. and generally taken penal action in various forms. However, this is not a happy situation. For one, such action is taken only in extreme cases. Further, the role and liability of various parties remains unclear.

Now that the provisions are in the form of regulations, there are clear penalties and other actions under the SEBI Act and the Listing Regulations. Parties such as directors, compliance officers, Auditors, Independent Directors, etc. are clearer on what their role is now.

Penalties are now specific and well defined. Penalties would be levied on specified parties, of defined amounts and as per specified transparent due legal process. It is clearer what the roles of the company (which is primary and generally comprehensive), the compliance officer (there are some provisions made for them directly), and the audit committee are.

Generally, as seen later, corporate governance provisions too have been elevated to status of law and the roles of individual parties or groups are now directly  defined.

Regulation 98 also provides specifically for various actions by the stock exchanges in case of contraventions of the Listing Regulations. These actions include levy  of fine, suspension of trading, etc. These actions are in addition to the penal and other actions under the SEBI Act. In many cases, there may be further action under the Companies Act, 2013 too.

Corporate governance now a law

Clause 49, as a legal term, is now history. Earlier, as a clause bearing that number, it was part of the Listing Agreement and thus had implications only as much as of the Listing Agreement. Now it is a specific component of the Listing Regulations.

While the requirements remain largely unchanged, considering that each requirement lays down what each person, committee, board, etc., has to do, the liability of parties is now specific and defined. These parties would now know what are the requirements statutorily expected of them and what are the consequences of non-compliance.

Chartered accountants and other professionals including auditors who are associated with listed companies in various ways will particularly need to pay heed to and understand the new provisions well.

Related party transactions

The requirements for approval, disclosure, etc. of related party transactions are largely carried over from Clause 49. The requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Audit Committee for all related party transactions continues. The relaxation for giving prior omnibus approval for certain types of recurring transactions as also for transactions up to a specified value under certain conditions also continues.

As earlier, material (as defined) related party transactions require approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution where related parties shall not vote. Two changes were expected. One was that the resolution required would be ordinary and not special. This change has been made and with immediate effect. Thus, now, only an ordinary resolution is required for  approval of material related party transactions. The other was that only the bar on voting on such resolutions should be on only those parties that are related for the purposes of the proposed transactions. This change has not materialised. All related parties are barred from voting at such resolution. The definition of related party transactions remains broader. To these and certain other extent, the requirements under the Regulations are different from the corresponding requirements under the Companies Act, 2013.

Disclosures of material developments

The new Regulations provide for substantially revised provisions for disclosures by companies. Investors and markets generally expect suo motu and prompt disclosure of developments by the company. However, there was uncertainty on what to report, when to report, who to report and how to report. Balance is required between sending a deluge of information where a few important things get hidden in a pile of information, and reporting arbitrarily selective aspects only at the last possible date. Balance is also required in reporting things too early and too late when rumours and leaks have already caused havoc to the markets.

The Regulations now provide for completely re-written requirements for disclosures of  material developments. They are divided broadly into two categories – disclosures of developments that are material as per certain specified guidelines and developments that are deemed to be material and hence to be reported. The stage at which the developments are to be disclosed has also been defined, and once that stage is reached, the requirement also is for prompt disclosure.

Of particular note are the deemed material items. For example, certain types of frauds are  deemed to be material developments irrespective of the amounts involved.

Obligations of the Board

The regulations now specify and define, even if largely general terms, the obligations and duties of the Board of Directors of a listed company. This is of course largely carried over from clause 49. However, again, considering that the requirements are now in the form of  regulations, they will have greater implications. They will need closer attention.

Accounts and financial Disclosures

The requirements of making periodic disclosure of results continue largely as earlier. This aspect would require greater study and analysis particularly by CFOs and Auditors.

Cessation of a person/group from the Promoter Group

Though relatively an infrequent happening, persons seeking to be excluded from the Promoter Group present not just a sensitive issue, but also remains uncertain in terms of legal provisions. For example, an individual or even a family/group may desire to be excluded from the Promoter Group. This may be because they no more hold partly or wholly any control or they wish to relinquish control. Being in control, even if it is joint, results in certain obligations which they wish to relinquish too, along with the control. At the same time, allowing such exclusion may result in persons having control or even a material connection being excluded from obligations. The Listing Regulations now contain fairly comprehensive and transparent requirements for permitting such exclusion. These requirements have come into effect from 2nd September 2015.

Conclusion

The lengthy Regulations provide for many things with far ranging implications that cannot be even highlighted in a short article. However, it is clear that the job of the board, director,  committees, compliance officer, etc. has increased substantially. While in the short term, the transition from the Listing Agreement to the isting Regulations may be smooth, in the longer term perhaps, as companies and others are regularly hauled up and penalised in various forms, the implications of the changes will be realised. It is becoming more and more difficult to exist as a listed company and to be associated with a listed company. In the longer term the question that will confront us is, whether and to whom it is financially and otherwise rewarding to be so?

Jaitley’s Gambit – Piecemeal tax reforms only act as a palliative, it’s time to revive direct tax code

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Finance minister Arun Jaitley has constituted a committee of experts to suggest changes to income tax law with the aim of simplifying it, providing a stable environment and reducing the incidence of litigation through removal of ambiguities. The aims are unexceptionable but the approach is puzzling. during his budget speech, Jaitley said he saw no merit in pursuing a new direct tax law. But controversies since then over the law’s interpretation forced him to engage in firefighting, which has now culminated in the expert committee. i ndia needs a new direct tax code underpinned by an integrated approach to reform, rather than piecemeal change.

The last six years have seen three finance ministers struggle to reform the direct tax code. The first draft in 2009 was the most comprehensive attempt to change the code, but it wasn’t fully implemented. i n the interim, problems multiplied as the law was not in sync with structural changes in the economy. Litigation has grown. a t the end of 2013-14, Rs.2.59 trillion of direct taxes claimed was under dispute. Problems aren’t going away as the recent controversy over MAT on foreign portfolio investors showed.

Jaitley should restart the exercise of a comprehensive new direct tax code. experience suggests that piecemeal reform merely works as apalliative. Not long after an effort at piecemeal reform, a controversy erupts and the fallout spills over to other areas of the economy. t he only way for Jaitley to avoid frequent bouts of crisis management is to completely overhaul the existing law. Blueprints of earlier attempts make it easier to get started and exclusive central control of direct tax means that the legislative process for a new law will be easier.

MAT on FPIs – Fickle Tax Laws hurt Foreign In – vestors

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It is absurd that foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) are facing fresh income-tax queries after the government granted them a retrospective exemption from the minimum alternate tax ( mat ), based on the recommendations of the justice A . P. Shah panel. however, FPIs will now reportedly have to convince tax authorities that they do not have a permanent establishment
 (PE) here to escape the tax.

Foreign institutional investors, now FPIs, have been in relentless fear that tax authorities could construe their domestic custodian as a PE in India, making them liable to pay tax. The government must come out with a clear communiqué on what constitutes a P E , and not leave it to interpretation. Waffling on the promise to scrap MAT on FPIs could create mayhem on the markets, needlessly. do servers, for example, create a permanent presence?
In the OECD’s view, a server i fixed, automated equipment that can perform important and essential business functions – may be sufficient to create a PE at the equipment location without the presence of human beings. Conflicting rulings by the authority of advance rulings have only added to uncertainty in this area of taxation. t he government should clear the air to mitigate investor concerns.

In this case, FPIs have approached the Dispute r esolution m echanism ( DR. P). t he need is to ensure its robust functioning – the DR. P has a pool of dedicated tax officers. India has slipped in the World Bank’s latest ease of doing business index in terms of paying taxes, and mounting disputes could be a major reason. t he country’s tax regime must be reformed to minimise disputes. o ur tax officers should be better trained to deal with complex transactions as India globalises. Predictability of tax conduct is on par with simplicity of the law.

Moody’s is right to warn that belligerent com – munal rhetoric could ruin India’s economic pros – pects

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi has gone all out to pitch i ndia as a global business destination. But the research arm of international ratings agency Moody’s has injected a timely note of warning on domestic actions that might scupper this bid. in a report titled ‘ India outlook: Searching for Potential’, moody’s a nalytics has said unequivocally that unless m odi reins in BJP members making controversial statements, i ndia runs the risk of losing domestic and global credibility.

President Pranab Mukherjee, addressing the Delhi high court on its golden jubilee, pitched yet again for pluralism and tolerance. and RBI governor Raghuram Rajan devoted a good part of his IIT Delhi convocation speech to explicating why tolerance is essential for i ndia’s economic progress. While tolerance allows the best ideas to come forward and compete, in an intolerant regime the worst ideas can’t be questioned. in place of the false opposition between tolerance and nationalism that hyper-nationalists within BJP presume tolerance, as r ajan proposes, should be deemed a patriotic service.

As the Moody’s report points out, there are two interrelated ways that religious majoritarianism and the spreading culture of bans and intolerance can hold up economic progress. First, rising ethnic tensions will discourage investors who have a host of international destinations to choose from. Second, the political debate in the country will turn away from development to more divisive issues, creating stiffer opposition to the government in Parliament and holding up the passage of reform measures key to turning around a sagging economy – such as GST, relaxed labour laws and land acquisition norms. Modi needs to lay down the ‘ sabka saath sabka vikas ’ line more firmly within his own party and government by telling his hardline colleagues they can’t have the cake and eat it too: it’s either economic progress or the religious agenda.

Ease of doing business in India – From 130 to 50 – Long road to genuinely improving business en – vironment

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The World Bank’s Doing Business 2016 report, which evaluates the ease of doing business across the world, has said that i ndia is the 130th toughest nation in the world in which to do business. t his is four ranks higher than it was in 2015, in which its rank has been recalculated to be 134 instead of 142. t he n arendra m odi-led government’s stated aim, to drag i ndia into the top 50 before its term is over, at present, looks distant. e ven this improvement underlines, in fact, how deep and wide-ranging reform will have to be just to improve on paper, let alone in fact and in the eyes of entrepreneurs and investors. t he improvement in the national ranking comes from, essentially, a few procedural changes in how d elhi’s power distribution company BS e S gets new connections to customers in south, east and west d elhi. t he number of inspectors has been reduced from two to one and the number of steps to the process reduced. a nd, the reason why i ndia has jumped many steps in the new method of evaluating ranks is because “reliability” of power supply is now a criterion, which it wasn’t in the old method used till 2015. o f course, power supply in d elhi and m umbai, the only locations the World Bank considers, is reliable – but, in the rest of the country, that is not always the case. Far deeper and broader reform will be needed, and it would be risky to be content with such improvements. Coincidentally, the government has also announced a committee, led by a retired judge, to look into how to redraft the income-tax law. t his is a valuable effort; by making the language clearer and less ambiguous, the number of disputes between the taxman and companies or individuals could theoretically be reduced. t he number of tax cases has gone up in the past decade, and several thousands of complex legal cases block up i ndia’s courts. o f course a well-drafted law might conceivably help settle cases quicker. But without a better-administered income- tax department, one that is not incentivised to chase down targets, a well-drafted law will make only a limited impact in tackling the current problems. n or will a better-drafted law help settle outstanding or frivolous cases quicker in the absence of judicial capacity at every level.

Finally, the quality of drafting of the tax law is not its only constraint on the ease of doing business – India ranked 157th in the world in terms of the ease of paying taxes. according to the report, 243 hours a year are devoted by business to paying taxes, which they have to do as many as 33 times, at an effective tax rate of close to 60 per cent of profits. In other words, the tax system needs to be overhauled not just in terms of legal but also economic effectiveness. And this is not a difficult task either. The finance ministry has in its possession a series of reports on taxation reforms, which have outlined a detailed action plan on how to make India’s tax system less adversarial, more friendly to the tax-payer and less prone to litigation. i t is time the ministry took a closer look at those recommendations for overhauling the tax system. a shallow effort will not work.

[Comment: Without a change in the mindset of the Bureaucracy, Revenue officials & the Regulators, it would be an impossible aspiration !]

Keeping abreast – Judiciary needs to keep up with economic knowledge

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Do senior judges and regulators who have to increasingly deliver pronouncements and findings on complex technical and economic issues have a chance to keep abreast with the rapid changes taking place to knowledge? r ecently the Bombay h igh Court delivered a verdict on taxation issues relating to Vodafone, a telecom service provider, and the Competition Commission of i ndia pronounced on the conduct of sugar mills. i n such instances the judicial or quasi-judicial authority needs to have a knowledge of not just the law but also have some grounding in the imperatives governing market-driven economies and ground realities in particular industries. t he latter keep changing rapidly with technological developments altering the rules of the game even as the number of regulators with specific economic jurisdictions keeps going up.

There is already some institutional support in this endeavour. t he National Judicial a cademy, a training institute for judicial officers, has established the “national judicial education strategy” which holds programmes for high court judges and district judges. But the training usually pertains to matters like correct legal procedure and evaluating evidence. t his does not sufficiently help a judge when dealing with scientific evidence in judging, say, an intellectual property dispute in pharmaceuticals or information technology software. Consider the differences with senior i ndian civil servants who can, for instance under the Colombo Plan, attend courses in internationally reputable institutions to acquaint themselves with the latest developments in economic thinking and public administration.

Given the increasing calls being made upon the judiciary to freely and fairly determine contentious issues which are grounded in the latest technology and economic principles, senior judges and regulators would benefit from refreshing their knowledge beyond the domain of law. t here is a need, therefore to formalise a system whereby senior judges and regulators can expand their knowledge base in keeping with the changing needs of society. the cost of even the best such training has been substantially reduced by the rapidly expanding fields of e-learning and e-tutoring. modules can be prepared keeping the needs of judges in mind and they can pursue them interactively, with guidance from remotely placed experts. the process can be topped up with a course or residential seminar at a reputed institution. a ll professionals – not just civil servants or doctors – need to keep abreast with the new knowledge of the day and there is an urgent need to set in place a system to deliver this to judges.

Arbitration Law Amendments – Cuts Both Ways!

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Introduction

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) was enacted in 1996 to repeal and replace the Arbitration Act, 1940 and other ancillary Acts. It was considered a pathbreaking Act since, to a great extent, it institutionalised the forum of Arbitration in India and introduced various sweeping changes based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Arbitration was considered to be the saviour to a judiciary creaking from an alarming number of cases. It was considered to be a fast-track route to dispute resolution. However, the reality has been quite contrary.

Almost 20 years later, the Government felt that the Act requires urgent changes and since Parliament was not in session, it promulgated an Ordinance titled, The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015. This Ordinance was promulgated by the President on 23rd October, 2015 and is in force from that date. The Ordinance has  introduced several changes to the Act, which are intended to speed up the process and improve the quality of arbitration. Under the Constitution of India, an Ordinance must be laid before both the Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate as an Ordinance after six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament. Thus, the Government must come out with an Amendment Act within this time or another Ordinance.

As is the case with several enactments, there is often a slip between the cup and the lip and the best of intent is set to naught! The Ordinance contains a few good amendments and a few not so good ones. Let us examine some crucial changes introduced by this Ordinance and how some of these could actually derail the process of arbitration!

Arbitrators’ Fees Capped

An extremely innovative concept introduced by the Ordinance is that of fixing the fees of the arbitrators. The High Court is empowered to frame Rules for the fees of the arbitrators after considering the rates specified in the Schedule to the Ordinance. The Schedule lays down model fees on an ad valorem basis with a cap on the maximum fees which can be charged. The sliding scale provides for a minimum fee of Rs.45,000 for a dispute in which the sum involved is up to Rs.5 lakh. The maximum slab is in case of a dispute in which the sum  involved is above Rs.20 crore, in which case the fees are Rs.19.87 lakh + 0.5% of the claim above Rs.20 crore. However, the maximum fees cannot exceed Rs.30 lakh. This is probably one of the few instances of a Central Enactment laying down fees. While the lawyers and other consultants appearing before the arbitrators can charge any amount of fees, the arbitrators are constrained by the Ordinance! Moreover, what happens if the arbitrators actually spend more time and effort in hearings, gathering evidences, etc., than the fees prescribed by the Ordinance? Would this in fact not reduce the supply of good arbitrators? Fees are a matter of demand and supply and commercial negotiation between the parties to the dispute and the arbitrators. One wonders where is the need for legislative intervention in this? Would this not disincentivise good arbitrators?

The Ordinance provides an escape route by stating that the limit on fees would not apply to international commercial arbitrations and those arbitrations which are as per the rules of an  arbitral institution. Thus, for instance, if parties to the dispute agree to hold the arbitration as per the Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration, then the fee schedule prescribed by the Council would not apply.

No more Recusing oneself afterwards

The Ordinance seeks to lay down under what scenarios an arbitrator would be considered as having a conflict of interest scenario with the parties to the dispute. Thus, instead of allegations of conflict cropping up later on and the arbitrator recusing himself, the law upfront states what is a conflict.

Where there is existence of a direct or indirect past or present relationship of the arbitrator either with any of the parties to the dispute or in relation to the subject matter of the dispute, then he must disclose such interest, in writing, before accepting appointment. The interest could be financial, business, professional or any other kind which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality.

While a good part of this was already contained in the Act, the Ordinance seeks to provide the grounds which shall guide in determining whether or not circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. A long list of 34 such circumstances has been given, classified under the following grounds:

  • Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties to the dispute or their counsel
  • Arbitrator’s relationship to the dispute
  • Arbitrator’s direct or indirect interest in the dispute
  • Previous services for one of the parties or other involvement in the case
  • Relationship between an arbitrator and another arbitrator
  • Relationship between an arbitrator and counsel
  • Relationship between an arbitrator and parties to the dispute or their affiliates
  • Other circumstances.

This specific list of circumstances would remove any ambiguity as to whether or not there is any conflict of interest in a given case. If the arbitrator is of the view that there exist  circumstances of the type specified in the Ordinance, then the format in which the disclosure is to be made has also been laid down.

Magical Time limit for completion

Just as in the fairy tale, Cinderella had a time limit of getting home by 12 midnight, an  arbitration award must now be made within a period of 12 months from the date of reference to the arbitral Tribunal! The date of reference is the date on which all the arbitrators have received written notice of their appointment. Thus, there is a maximum period of 12 months to dispose of the arbitration. If the parties consent, the 12 months period can be extended by a maximum further period of 6 months. Any extension beyond 6 months cannot be granted by the parties.

After this extended period of 18 months, only the Court would have powers to extend the period or else the mandate of the arbitrators would terminate. While the intent is to speed up the process, this may actually retard the process. Lobbing the ball back to the Court would be a step backwards.

While granting the extension, the Court may substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if such a substitution does take place, then the substituted arbitrators would be deemed to have been  appointed from inception and the proceedings would continue from the stage where they  ended before the earlier panel of arbitrators. Further, the new arbitrators would have deemed to have received the evidence and material already on record. Is this not an extremely strange position? What if all the arbitrators are replaced and all evidence / witnesses / submissions  were already heard by the earlier panel? The new panel would be expected to pronounce its award without examining the witnesses, without hearing the submissions once again, etc. They would have to rely solely on the papers before them. All the best to the new arbitrators for jumping on to a running train.

Carrot and Stick approach for Arbitrators

Another novel concept introduced is the success fee and penalty clause for arbitrators. If the arbitrators complete an arbitration within 6 months from the date of reference (instead of the available 12 months), then they shall be entitled to such additional fees as the parties decide. Thus, there is an incentive for completing the job earlier. The law also presents a stick to the arbitrators. If the Court extends the arbitration beyond 18 months but while doing so finds that the delay is attributable to the arbitrator’s fault, then it may reduce the arbitrator’s fees by a maximum of 5% for each month of delay. Thus, if the Court is of the view that  the entire delay over 12 months was due to the fault of the arbitrator, then it may deduct 5% * 6 = 30% of the fees! Who wants to be an arbitrator is going to be the name of the new game!

Fast Track Procedure

One good concept is that of a fast track arbitration. If the parties agree then they can opt for this instead of the regular procedure. In this case, there may be a sole arbitrator who shall only admit written submissions. There would not be any oral hearings unless all the parties so  request or unless the arbitrator considers it necessary for certain clarifications. Technical formalities may also be disposed of by the arbitrator. However, the award must be made  within a period of 6 months from the date of reference. The model fees and maximum fees would not apply in the case of a fast track procedure.

Award against Public Policy

One of the grounds for setting aside an arbitration award by a Court is, if it finds that the  award is in conflict with the public policy of India. The Act provided that this was a general phrase which could have several grounds. It only stated that an award made by fraud or induced by corruption would be one of them. This gave an open field to the parties to challenge the award, thereby delaying the dispute resolution process.

The Ordinance has come out with an exhaustive and restrictive meaning of the term ‘conflict with the public policy of India’ as a ground for challenging an award. Only where making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law or is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice, the award shall be treated as against the Public Policy of India.

Conclusion

Internationally, an arbitration is usually completed within a year (even though it may not be a legal binding to do so). In India, arbitrations are nefarious for lingering on. In this scenario, when the time limit is set by law, is it helpful? While the idea behind the Ordinance is a noble one, that of speeding up and improving the quality of arbitration so as to lessen the load of the judiciary, one wonders whether the pill may in fact be worse than the ill!

Is this a knee-jerk reaction to improving India’s ease of doing business ranking or is it a well-thought out longterm strategy is something which time will tell. Has the Government unwittingly unleashed a double-edged sword, one which would speed up the arbitration process but may also reduce the number of arbitrators? It would be worthwhile to remember that those who live by the sword, often perish by it!!

Aadhaar – Govt should now bring forth an effec – tive privacy law

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The Supreme Court’s modification of its order on Aadhaar, expanding the use of the unique identification system to four additional welfare schemes – provident funds and pensions, the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and Jan Dhan Yojana – is a welcome step. t he court’s earlier decision this summer limiting Aadhaar to the public food distribution system and fuel subsidies had thrown authorities like the Ministry of Rural
Development and the Election Commission into confusion. t hey were reported to be pulling back from using the biometric system as it was feared they would be seen to be in contempt of court. t he earlier order ruled that Aadhaar could be used for food and fuel subsidies but not for other purposes, limiting the use of this potent tool to contain subsidies leakage. Aadhaar is best understood as a technology foundation upon which i ndia can build a better, more-targeted and less-leaky subsidies system – food and fuel subsidies have been grossly misdirected over the past several decades. It can also help achieve radically higher rates of financial inclusion. In Bengaluru, efforts by a non-governmental organisation has seen construction labourers, among others, open bank accounts late at night at small grocery stores and remit money to their families in rural India. By being able to do so without paying onerous commissions of as much as Rs. 100 for a remittance of Rs.1,000 has made them eager adopters of a financial inclusion effort that uses Aadhaar as a backbone. Aadhaar thus enjoys support at both ends of the policy spectrum: the poor without bank accounts, who are delighted to have access to services that are often elusive, and policymakers, who see larger goals such as reducing the fiscal deficit and wasteful expenditure. n ot surprisingly, the judgment last week was welcomed by both the central bank governor and the finance minister. Chief Justice H L Dattu put forward an elemental question: if Aadhaar was to be used for the public distribution system and cooking gas supplies, “why not extend it to other activities?

The thorny question of whether Aadhaar is a threat to privacy and indeed whether privacy is a fundamental right has again been referred to a larger bench to adjudicate. m any observers have criticised the government for muddling the issue of using Aadhaar by arguing that there was no fundamental right to privacy. indeed, the government might not have had to embark on this long and tortuous road of protracted legal challenges to a adhaar if it had legislated adequate laws to protect privacy. Aadhaar has been something of a case study in enrolment – some 920 million indians have an Aadhaar identity – but its safeguards and benefits are poorly understood by many in the middle class. t he use of it for a “know your customer”, for instance, stays within the banking system. When an authentication is done, the system does not know the purpose for which it was done. n o system this large is immune from, say, a hacker, but what it replaces was riddled with abuse. But that is no excuse for not putting in place a privacy law to prevent anybody from misusing individual data. t he court’s decision allowing a wider use of Aadhaar should ensure improved governance that is both more humane and pragmatic in dispensing welfare benefits. The government should now urgently get down to the task of framing an effective privacy law to address all doubts and concerns over data security.

Whose India is it? – Today’s intolerant hordes would do well to read the Constitution, plus Vi – vekananda

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Clouds are gathering over the idea of India, threatening to shut out the sun of liberal democracy. t he light of liberalism opens minds. It shines on debate and diversity. It radiates tolerance. t hat is how the founding fathers of the nation saw it. So, they wanted India to be liberal and tolerant. t hey wrote a Constitution proclaiming ‘liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship’ as a founding principle of this republic. today, there’s a growing anxiety in the air, an anxiety about the life of that principle. People in India, as well as in other parts of the world, have begun to wonder: i s India tolerant? i s it safe to live or travel in those swathes of the country where the beast of intolerance prowls? is it safe to dine in public if you eat meat and fish? i s it a safe home for a Christian or a Muslim or a Buddhist or an atheist or even a Hindu of any shade different from the one declared as exclusively authentic by the marauding mobs of Hindutva? Will it turn into a Pakistan, where if you don’t surrender to an exclusive brand of Islam as defined by the radicals, being a Muslim by faith is no longer enough to ensure safety? ask a Shia or an Ahmadiyya or a liberal. Jinnah himself won’t qualify to be Islamic in today’s Pakistan.

Just as Gandhi and Tagore and, yes, even Vivekananda would blink in disbelief at the kind of India demanded by today’s intolerant hordes. i t won’t be possible to enter into a detailed discussion in this space but here are two thoughts for consideration: one, India is not a Hindu nation, not even a ‘ Hindu-Majority’ country in constitutional terms. two, Hinduism can be seen as a way of life or a portmanteau term to describe a civilisation. it’s not a single-faith dogma.

On Point one, the framers of the secular Constitution were careful to avoid any reference to Hinduism as a requirement for citizenship. article 25 assures citizens ‘freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion’, which means any religion. Sub-clause 2(b) mentions hindu religious institutions only in the context of the state’s ability to provide ‘for social welfare and reform’ and explains ‘ Hindus’ here to mean also Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists.

Clearly, the founding fathers were determined to ensure that india would not be a Pakistan, which had been created solely as a home for Muslims. India would be a democratic, secular entity in which people of any faith or no faith would be able to pursue their preferred way of life or religion. Unless there is any highly unlikely move to throw out the Constitution and rewrite its basic tenets, it would remain totally unconstitutional to call India a Hindu nation.

Although the census might say that India contains a majority of persons who describe themselves as hindu, it remains a constitutionally secular republic which does not officially recognise any religious identity as a defining characteristic of an Indian. in fact, among those who say they are hindu by faith or custom there exists such a range of belief and practice that, in a sense, every single religious sect, caste and ethnic group can be considered a ‘minority’ in a secular India which does not recognise any section of its diverse population as dominant. the Jains and the Sikhs saw this as a door to get minority status. others, like dalits, can as well.

Point two. Indians have just two secular faiths in which all communities, castes and ethnic groups believe: Bollywood and cricket. the religious picture, especially of Hinduism, reflects myriad realities. Even Diwali, assumed to be the quintessentially hindu festival, is an occasion when Bengalis and eastern i ndians worship a blood- drunk Kali, not sweet Lakshmi. Navratri in Gujarat has little connection with Dussehra in north India even as they happen at the same time.

And, vegetarianism is not, repeat not, a required h indu practice. Going by available surveys, a minority of i ndians are vegetarian, including a minority of h indus. not even Hindu Brahmins are all Vegetarian. Kashmiri and eastern Indian brahmins eat meat and fish. And ancient Hindus merrily ate beef after sacrificing bulls way back then.

If you don’t believe me, read the literature. For spiritual endorsement, read Vivekananda.

On Religious Tolerance – Dr. Rajan has displayed candour and courage rare in India’s public servants.

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In the current public discourse on religious tolerance, reserve Bank of India Governor
Raghuram Rajan’s convocation address to the students of the Indian Institute of Technology
( iit ) delhi on Saturday, delivered an unmistakable if nuanced critique of the ideological underpinnings of this government and their outward manifestation. d rawing on the work of nobel Laureates robert Solow and richard Feynman and using the example of india’s global it achievements to make his point, D R. Rajan linked the importance of ideas to a nation’s progress and highlighted the need to “foster competition in the marketplace for ideas” as a prerequisite for delivering economic growth. a chieving this, he argued, required “the right to question and challenge, the right to behave differently so long as it does not hurt others seriously”. When someone of d r. r ajan’s stature and authority adds his voice to the growing avalanche of criticism from a broad range of civil society, the importance of the message cannot be underestimated. It is especially impactful because he addressed precisely the age cohort that the current regime targets with its message of religious nationalism with all its deceptive certainties.

In leveraging the functional independence of his job as central bank governor to comment on issues that are, strictly, outside his official remit, Dr. Rajan has displayed candour and courage rare in i ndia’s public servants. h owever, there may be unintended repercussions to the institution he heads. To be sure, this is not the first time he has publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s non-monetary policy actions and it is unlikely to be the last. i n this, he is perhaps following the precedents set by central bankers like Ben Bernanke and janet yellen of the u S Federal reserve and m ark Carney of the Bank of england. But they work within developed democracies where standards of debate are reasonably mature. d r. r ajan raised this point in his speech. ” t olerance means not being so insecure about one’s ideas that one cannot subject them to challenge – it implies a degree of detachment that is absolutely necessary for mature debate.” unfortunately, this is manifestly not the case in india, so it is unlikely that his remarks will be received in the spirit in which they were made.

Indeed, the manner in which senior ruling party functionaries are fiercely dismissing all criticism as politically motivated is a case in point – though President Pranab

Mukherjee’s repeated reference to intolerance in quick succession admittedly makes that point hard to refute. d r. r ajan’s criticism should also be set against the growing pressure – as much by the last regime as this one – to curtail the RBI governor’s room for independent action and the proclivity to establish unequivocal control over institutions. i t could encourage the government to take that short step towards appointing governors who may lack the expertise and understanding that consistently marked past appointees – and who is thus amenable to doing the government’s bidding. it is a dangerous prospect.

Will – Execution Proof – Both attesting witnesses not alive – Evidence Act should receive a wider purposive interpretation: Evidence Act Section 68, 69.

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C. G. Raveendran & Ors. vs. C. G. Gopi & Ors. AIR 2015 Kerala 250

The plaintiffs and defendants were the children of late Govindan and Bhanumathi. Govindan died on 28/8/1994 and Bhanumathi on 18/5/2004. The plaint schedule properties belonged to Govindan. He had constructed a building therein and was residing there with his family till his death.

According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Govindan, the right to the properties have devolved on the plaintiffs and the defendants equally and they were entitled to inherit. However, the plaintiffs came to know about a registered Will allegedly executed by Govindan.

It was contended that the Will was a fabricated one and Govindan had no occasion to execute such a Will. During the period of execution of the Will, Govindan was mentally ill and was undergoing treatment for partial paralysis. He had not executed the Will and was allegedly executed under suspicious circumstances. Hence the suit was filed seeking a declaration that the Will was null and void and for a consequential partition of the properties.

The Court below on an evaluation of the oral testimony on the side of the plaintiffs and the oral evidence on the side of the defendants held that Will was validly executed by Govindan.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the above evidence had to be evaluated to decide the genuineness of Will. It is pertinent to note that Will is registered. In the absence of any serious challenge regarding registration, it must be presumed that the Will was registered after complying with all the statutory formalities. Registration of a Will is a piece of evidence confirming its genuineness and can confer it a higher degree of sanctity. There seems to be a consensus in the judicial pronouncements that, though there is no requirement that Will should be registered, but if registered, it adds to its authenticity.

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, provides that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. In the present case, the attesting witnesses are Parameswaran and Padmanabhan Nair. Parameswaran himself was the scribe. There is no legal bar in scribe himself being an attesting witness, provided he has actually seen the executant signing or affixing his mark or has received a personal acknowledgment from the executant and has consciously affixed his signature as an attesting witness, as a token of having witnessed the executant signing or affixing his mark. Evidence should prove that the scribe, apart from being so, had signed for the purpose of testifying to the signature of the executant and had the animo attestandi.

It is on record that both the attesting witnesses are no more alive. Hence, section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot apply. The provision that governs the field can only be the section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act. It deals with a situation wherein no attesting witnesses can be found. Though the Statute prescribes that section 69 applies when the witness is not found, in the absence of any other provision dealing with cases wherein the presence of witnesses cannot be procured for various other reasons, like death of both attesting witness, out of jurisdiction, physical incapacity, insanity etc. Section 69 should apply and can be extended to such cases. Hence, the word “not found” occurring in section 69 of Evidence Act should receive a wider purposive interpretation than its literal meaning and should take in situation where the presence of the attesting witness cannot be procured. This view gets its support from Venkataramayya vs. Kamisetti Gattayya (AIR 1927 Madras 662) and Ponnuswami Goundan vs. Kalyanasundara Ayyar (AIR 1930 Madras 770).

It is settled that mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed by section 63 of Indian Succession Act. Section 69 imposes a twin fold duty on the propounder. It provides that if no such attesting witness can be found, it must be proved that attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting and also that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Hence, to rely on a Will propounded in a case covered by section 69 the propounder should prove i) that the attestation is in the handwriting of the attesting witness and ii) that the document was signed by the executant. Both the limbs will have to be cumulatively proved by the propounder. Evidently, the section demands proof of execution in addition to attestation and does not permit execution to be inferred from proof of attestation. However, section 69 presumes that once the handwriting of attesting witness is proved he has witnessed the execution of the document. The twin requirement of proving the signature and handwriting has to be in accordance with section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Architect Services, Consulting Engineers Services, Management Consultancy Services etc. used for construction are eligible input services against the output service of Renting of Immovable Property.

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44. [2015-TIOL-2418-CESTAT-MUM] Maharashtra Cricket Association vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III.

Architect Services, Consulting Engineers Services, Management Consultancy Services etc. used for construction are eligible input services against the output service of Renting of Immovable Property.

Facts

The assessee, an association, constructed a stadium and availed the services of Architect, Consulting Engineering and Management Consultancy and availed CENVAT credit of the service tax paid thereon. The department contended that vide Circular No. 98/01/2008-ST, the credit of service tax paid on commercial or industrial construction or works contract service used for construction of immovable property is not eligible to a person providing renting of immovable property service and accordingly the input services availed being in relation to construction are inadmissible for credit.

Held

The Tribunal observed that the definition of input service provided under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT credit Rules, 2004 specifically includes services “in relation to setting up, premises of provider of output service or an office relating to such premises”. Accordingly, the services used for setting up the stadium are eligible input services. The Tribunal also noted that the circular being contrary to the definition of input service is not tenable. Further, relying on the decision of Navratna S.G. Highway Prop. Pvt. Ltd vs. Commr. of ST, Ahmedabad-2011-TIOL-1703- CESTAT-AHM, the appeal was allowed.

51 taxmann.com 1 (Mumbai) Johnson & Johnson Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT SA No. 288 /Mum/2014 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Date of Order: 31.10.2014

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If the Tribunal has granted stay, even if there is consent of the assessee, the Officer should not collect the amount stayed.

Facts:
By
this stay application the assessee sought stay of collection of
outstanding demand of Rs. 43,24,08,871. The AO after reference to
determine transfer pricing adjustments u/s. 92C of the Act passed an
order determining the income of the assessee at Rs. 353.30 crore and
raised an additional demand of Rs. 116.27 crore. The Tribunal while
dealing with stay application dated 19.2.2014 noticed that most of the
issues stated before the Tribunal have been decided in favor of the
assessee in the orders passed by the Tribunal in assessee’s own cases
for earlier years and therefore it granted stay and directed the AO not
to make any adjustment except for the amount of Rs. 7.50 crore.

The
AO, despite the specific direction by the Bench, obtained consent
letter from the assessee and collected Rs. 16.64 crore during the
subsistence of the stay order. The amount outstanding had been reduced
to Rs. 43.24 crore.

Since the DR sought adjournment from time to time, the assessee filed a fresh stay application for extension of stay.

Held:
In
the proceedings for hearing the second stay application the Tribunal
noticed that the AO followed an innovative method of collection of taxes
despite specific directions of the Bench. The Tribunal clarified that
neither the assessee nor the Revenue has the right to flout the decision
of the Tribunal and being an officer functioning under the Government
of India it is his obligation to follow the directions of the superior
authority and even if there is consent he should not have collected the
amount.

The Tribunal having noticed that in few other cases also
similar consent letters were obtained and tax collected despite the
stay order being passed by the Tribunal, the Bench deplored this
practice and directed the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax to issue a
letter to all concerned officers not to adopt this kind of approach of
obtaining consent letters and to respect the order passed by the
Tribunal as otherwise the Tribunal would be constrained to view the
conduct of the Department adversely.

The Tribunal extended the
stay for a further period of six months and also directed the AO to
refund the amount collected, contrary to the order passed by ITAT in
S.A. No. 50/Mum/2014, along with interest within 15 days and to furnish
the proof of having refunded the amount before the Bench.

The stay application filed by the assessee was allowed.

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49 taxmann.com 578 (Cochin) Three Star Granites (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 11/Cochin/2011 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 25.4.2014

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Section 40(a)(ia) – No disallowance can be made u/s 40(a)(ia) in cases of short deduction of tax at source.

Facts :
In respect of certain payments made by the assessee to resident contractors the Tribunal vide its order dated 29th March, 2012 decided that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source u/s. 194I and not u/s. 194C as was the contention of the assessee. Aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal, the assessee carried the matter, by way of an appeal u/s. 260A, to the High Court. The High Court vide its order dated 26th November, 2013 held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source u/s. 194I and not u/s. 194C. For the limited purposes of applicability of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act in respect of short deduction of tax, i.e., deduction of tax at 2.06 % instead of 10 % u/s. 194-I of the Act, the High Court restored the matter to the file of the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the issue of disallowance in respect of short deduction of of tax at source has been considered by the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2013] 60 SOT 1 (Cochin). Having considered the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) and also the provisions of section 201(1A), the Tribunal held that section 40(a)(ia) does not envisage a situation where there was short deduction/lesser deduction as in case of section 201(1A) of the Act. There is an obvious omission to include short deduction/lesser deduction in section 40(a) (ia) of the Act. Therefore, the entire expenditure whose genuineness was not doubted by the Assessing Officer, cannot be disallowed. The Tribunal set aside the orders of lower authorities and deleted the entire disallowance.

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Gift – Validity – Delivery of possession is not an essential prerequisite for making of valid gift in case of immovable property: Transfer of property Act. Section 123.

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Renikuntha Rajamma (D) by LRS vs. AIR 2014 SC 2906

A reference was made to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement as to the true and correct interpretation of sections 122 and 123 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Plaintiff-Respondent in this appeal filed for a declaration to the effect that revocation deed dated 5th March, 1986 executed by the Defendant-Appellant purporting to revoke a gift deed earlier executed by her was null and void.

The Plaintiff’s case as set out in the plaint was that the gift deed executed by the Defendant- Appellant was valid in the eyes of law and had been accepted by the Plaintiff when the donee-Defendant had reserved to herself during for life, the right to enjoy the benefits arising from the suit property. The purported revocation of the gift in favour of the Plaintiff-Respondent in terms of the revocation deed was, on that basis, assailed and a declaration about its being invalid and void ab initio prayed for.

The suit was contested by the Defendant-Appellant herein on several grounds including the ground that the gift deed executed in favour of the Plaintiff was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. The parties led evidence and went through the trial with the Trial Court eventually holding that the deed purporting to revoke the gift in favour of the Plaintiff was null and void. The Trial Court found that the Defendant had failed to prove that the gift deed set up by the Plaintiff was vitiated by fraud or undue influence or that it was a sham or nominal document. The gift, according to Trial Court, had been validly made and accepted by the Plaintiff, hence, irrevocable in nature. It was also held that since the donor had taken no steps to assail the gift made by her for more than 12 years, the same was voluntary in nature and free from any undue influence, misrepresentation or suspicion. The fact that the donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her life time did not affect the validity of the deed, opined the Trial Court.

The First Appellate Court also held that the gift deed was not a sham document, as alleged by the Defendant and that its purported cancellation/revocation was totally ineffective.

The first Appellate Court also affirmed the finding of the Trial Court that the donee had accepted the gift made in his favour. The appeal filed by the Defendant (Appellant herein) was dismissed.

The High Court declined to interfere with the judgments and orders impugned before it and dismissed the second appeal of the Appellant, holding that the case set up by the Defendant that the gift was vitiated by undue influence or fraud had been thoroughly disproved at the trial.

The Court observed that Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with gifts generally and, inter alia, provides for the mode of making gifts. Section 122 of the Act defines ‘gift’ as a transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration by one person called the donor to another called the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. In order to constitute a valid gift, acceptance must, according to this provision, be made during the life time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving the gift. It stipulates that a gift is void if the donee dies before acceptance.

Section 123 regulates mode of making a gift and, inter alia, provides that a gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. In the case of movable property, transfer either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery is valid u/s. 123.

When read with section 122 of the Act, a gift made by a registered instrument duly signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses is valid, if the same is accepted by or on behalf of the donee. That such acceptance must be given during the life time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving is evident from a plain reading of section 122 of the Act. A conjoint reading of sections 122 and 123 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Judicial pronouncements as to the true and correct interpretation of section 123 of the T.P. Act have for a fairly long period held that section 123 of the Act supersedes the rule of Hindu Law if it contained any stipulation in making delivery of possession an essential condition for the completion of a valid gift.

Section 123 of the T.P. Act is in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, section 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the words “transfer must be effected” used by the Parliament insofar as immovable property is concerned. In contradistinction to that requirement the second part of section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery.” The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that insofar as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned, the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. In the case of immovable property no doubt requires a registered instrument, but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective.

There is indeed no provision in law that ownership in property cannot be gifted without transfer of possession of such property. As noticed earlier, section 123 does not make the delivery of possession of the gifted property essential for validity of a gift.

The recitals in the gift deed also prove transfer of absolute title in the gifted property from the donor to the donee. What is retained is only the right to use the property during the lifetime of the donor which does not in any way affect the transfer of ownership in favour of the donee by the donor.

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Labour Reforms – Hold the Celebrations

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There has been some minor celebration over the fact that the president has given assent to changes in three central laws relating to industrial labour, proposed by the Rajasthan government and, therefore, applicable to that state. It would seem that we are prepared to celebrate even the smallest change in labour legislation in one corner of the country, when what the country needs is wholesale change across all states. The most significant of the changes in Rajasthan is one that does away with the need for government permission to retrench staff or shut down a unit, so long as the unit employs fewer than 300 workers (against 100 earlier). This is to be welcomed, but do remember that a more ambitious change along the same lines was proposed on a national scale by Yashwant Sinha, in a Budget speech, more than a decade ago. So this is reform by inches over decades. In any case, the real changes needed in labour laws are not those that facilitate units shutting down, rather those that help units to function more easily – though it is also true that you are more likely to hire workers if you know that you can retrench them should they become surplus.

What one would like to hear more of are the changes to labour laws on an all-India scale that the Cabinet was widely reported to have cleared more than three months ago. These were more wide-ranging, though perhaps not comprehensive, and with all-India application. As reported at the time, the changes related to limits on hours of overtime (important for seasonal businesses that have peaking cycles at specific times of the year), women working night shifts (many industries have traditionally had more women employees), reducing the scope for harassing factory owners because of minor infractions, and simplifying form-filling for the owners of small factories. Some of these changes were clearly designed to reduce the scope for blackmail by labour inspectors – harking back once again to Yashwant Sinha’s unfulfilled promise to get rid of the “inspector raj”.

The accompanying message to the country has to be that the government wants to create real jobs that create real value, and pay much better wages than the rural employment guarantee programme does. China, which has been factory to the world, is now less than competitive in quite a few labour-intensive industries because of its much higher level of per capita income and a stronger currency. So far the slack has been taken up by countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines. There is no reason why some of those industries should not find a welcoming home in India. If the government can bring about a more congenial environment for employers, the jobs should materialise – and that would be more important than all the other Modi initiatives so far.

(Source: Article in Weekend Ruminations by T. N. Ninan in Business Standard dated 15.11.2014)

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Gold imports: Reform Taxes, don’t create new smugglers

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Gold imports have skyrocketed despite the global price of the yellow metal weakening. That signals that gold has not lost its sheen as an investment choice. The government is worried that the surge in gold imports could undermine the country’s balance of payments position. The worry is not misplaced. India’s current account deficit is within limits of prudence, due to the sharp drop in global crude prices, but splurging foreign exchange on imported gold will negate these gains. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people are using their unaccounted money to buy jewellery and bullion, shunning financial instruments that create audit trails. So, the need is to establish audit trails of these transactions. One way would be for the Centre to impose a nominal 1% excise duty on jewellery, to create audit trails and curb the use of black money to fund gold purchases.

Jewellery purchases in cash of over Rs. 5 lakh is captured under the annual information returns (AIR) that identify potential taxpayers by examining their expenditure patterns. AIR creates an audit trail too, but there are no trails for cash purchases below Rs. 5 lakh. The import surge is being attributed to a relaxation of the 80:20 scheme — at least onefifth of every lot of imported gold is exclusively made available for exports, and the balance for domestic use — for star and premier trading houses. However, the government should desist from any attempt to restrict the demand for gold through quantitative restrictions or impose higher import duties, as it would only encourage smuggling.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 17-11-2014)

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Voluntary Disclosure Scheme for politicians

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I am a senior citizen. My greatest regret is that I was totally inactive beyond my personal and professional life. I was happy with my family, books, T.V., residence, court-work and holidays here and abroad. Doing something concrete for the nation was no part of my life or living. Not surprising, of late, I have been experiencing substantial remorse on this count. By such indifference I, like many others, permitted some unscrupulous and corrupt politicians to loot the people of this country. It is because of this loot that crores of people of this country are below the poverty line and many children are dying at infancy or in the womb, all because of the absence of proper nourishment. I blame particularly the educated, me included, for being self-centered and being totally indifferent to this on-going loot; a loot of far greater magnitude than what our foreign rules are accepted of.

I have come across, of course, a few politicians, who are sorry for their sins and would like to wash off those sins, given an opportunity. There are others, who also must be given a similar opportunity so that they are not blamed for what follows in case the opportunity is not availed of. These people have enjoyed the monies, which really belong to the nation and which would have alleviated the poverty of teeming millions of this country; these politicians have enjoyed the ill-gotten monies for a fairly long time. The earlier they pay back the same to the nation, the better. In this direction, let me share a few ideas.

By way of a first opportunity, there must be Voluntary Disclosure and Repayment Scheme (‘Scheme’ hereafter) promulgated by the Government, giving an opportunity to such profligate politicians to voluntarily declare the amount of ill-gotten monies that they have got by corruption or by any other illegal means and to payback the same to the Government forthwith or by installments, as may be laid down in the scheme. The Scheme will apply even to a member of Village Panchayat. In future, a similar Scheme can be promulgated for Government servants.

The politicians making such a declaration would have immunity from prosecution and penalty under all laws of the land in respect of the ill-gotten monies declared under the Scheme.

If after the expiry of the scheme, any politician, who has not availed of the scheme, is found to have the monies received in corruption, his entire wealth will immediately vest in the Government and the custody thereof will also be immediately taken by the Government. A special committee headed by the retired Supreme Court judge will decide whether the politician has been having the ill-gotten monies with him and yet has not availed of the Scheme.

The concerned laws must be amended to provide that in cases of corruption beyond a particular figure the incumbent must be punished with life imprisonment and others with rigorous imprisonment of minimum 14 years; the corruption cases of these VIPs must be taken up on a priority basis by the Courts; if necessary Special Courts must be established so that the litigation, which is bound to ensue at the instance of these VIPs and VVIPs comes to an end immediately and the message goes to all concerned that now the corruption is not profitable, or for that matter dangerous and risky. The attempt in this article is to give an idea to get back the people’s money from the corrupt. To those who will feel like criticising the idea, my earnest request is to come out with a better and more effective idea; I will be very happy.

It is a sad commentary on the CBI, that inspite of long-standing corruption, its record on this count, to say the least, is not very impressive. Is it that they did not know what every man in the street knew? The rampant corruption requires a CBI with bigger manpower and greater competence. Today, CBI does not seem to be fully equipped to take on the powerful and influential head on.

More criminal lawyers and chartered accountants trained in investigation of corruption cases must be put at the disposal of the CBI at the stage of investigation; in fact, the CBI must have some of them in house, so that they are at their beck and call any time it wants them.

Looking at the fact that the corrupt are also very powerful and influential persons, it is very necessary that the C.B.I. must be made an independent body, like the Election Commission. It will be unfair to expect much on this count from the present CBI. We must acknowledge that with all its handicaps, the performance of the CBI of late is becoming better. The present C.B.I. can go up as much as its Chief is keen to take it. Recall what Seshan did to the Election Commission. An independent C.B.I. will be a great check on the corrupt and will have huge credibility amongst the people of this country and even abroad.

I will exhort to those amongst us to whom the nation is dear, particularly the youngsters, to see that these corrupt politicians cannot enjoy status and power resulting from their ill-gotten riches. I will suggest that Gandhian methods must be adopted when the corrupt are out to show, rather exhibit, their ill-gotten wealth on various social or other occasions. A great mass of Gandhians, scattered all across the country in a disjointed manner, can be of great help in this direction. In this direction if they unite for this work, miracles can happen. Recall the Anna Hazare movement.

Let me illustrate as to where we were when we got independence and where we are now. When Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister, he was invited to a wedding function, by one of his ministers. Instead of straightaway attending the marriage function, he sent his personal secretary to check whether the function was on a modest scale or was it on an ostentatious and gaudy scale. After the personal secretary reported that it was on a modest scale, he attended.

I think it is high time that the Prime Minister and the State’s Chief Ministers must ask their Cabinet Colleagues to live within their legitimate means; or for that matter set all examples in simple living. The citizens of this country will highly appreciate it.

The citizens, particularly the industrialists and the big traders, must at least decide that they will not be seeking favours from the Ministers and the Government servants by bribe, and the FICCI can declare a particular year say 2015 as the ‘No bribe year’. Those people who help the CBI to catch the corrupt red-handed must be rewarded by the Government in appreciation of their service to the nation. The T.V. channels can do a great job by publishing and glorifying such events. Let me state one heartening incident, which I read sometime back. A particular unit of WIPRO required a dedicated electric sub-station and for installation thereof some permission was required. That unit made an application. The Manager of that unit, who was newly appointed, was approached by the public utility employee informing him that in ordinary course, the permission would take about a year but if his demands are met he can get the permission within a week’s time. The newly appointed Manager thought that this is a great opportunity to impress the boss about his competence and went to Mr. Azim Premji. Mr. Premji heard him patiently and then told him, “You are new to this company. Let me tell you that bribing is not our culture. Therefore, hereafter do not think of doing any such thing as long as you are in this organisation.” We require many more Premjis. I am sure there are a few others like Mr. Premji; but for sure, we require many many more like him. In the challenging task of making India corruption free India, the industry and trade leaders can contribute a lot.

Let me tell the people that as against the corrupt ones there are honest politicians also. It is because of such people that the country has not collapsed.

I request the Government and our Economists to tell the nation as to what is the corruption-cost component in the cost of living index.

Lastly, the Election must be funded by the State. The earlier this is done, the better, because anybody can have an alibi when caught red-handed that he was accepting monies for the party. The ensuing election in the States is a great opportunity to the voters. Consider only that candidate to be eligible for vote who declares on oath his (and his family members’) wealth as on last 31st March at least one month before election and undertakes to declare it as on 31st March of every year thereafter till the next election.

I am absolutely shocked by the ‘I don’t care’ attitude of the Central and State Governments to the progressively aggravating problem of overpopulation and the absence of any discussion of the problem as if it does not exist at all! In my humble opinion, all the talk of progress will be a hogwash if the overpopulation problem is not urgently attended to. It looks like that after the back lash in late Sanjay Gandhi’s times, the politicians of all hue decided to turn a Nelson’s eye to the problem.

In the end, it is impossible to conclude this article without mentioning that our judiciary, particularly the higher echelons thereof like the Supreme Court and High Court have done remarkable work and has made us all very proud. I wonder if the framers of the Constitution would have imagined that the judicial wing in future will be a life belt to a sinking nation caught in the malicious whirlpool of rampant, nepotism, dishonesty and corruption. Permit me to say that much more is expected from the judiciary.

One man from Gujarat was instrumental in getting us independence. I hope and trust that another man from Gujarat also fulfils the hopes and inspiration of the nation, which has entrusted its destiny into his hands.

Let me conclude with Pearl Buck; “Oh India, dare to be worthy of your Gandhi.” Jai Hind.

Press Note No. 9 – DIPP File No. 9(8)/2014-IL(IP) dated 20th October, 2014

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Press Note No. 9 – DIPP File No. 9(8)/2014-IL(IP) dated 20th October, 2014

Streamlining the procedures for grant of Industrial Licences

This Press Note contains 3 clauses which modify the existing preocedures as under: –

1. Increasing the validity of the Industrial Licence
This Press Note, in supersession of Press Note No. 5 (2014 Series) dated 2nd July, 2014, provides for 2 extensions of 2 years each in the initial validity of 3 years of the Industrial Licence.

2. Removal of stipulation of annual capacity in the Industrial Licence

Annual capacity for defense items for Industrial Licence has been de-regulated. The Licencee now has to submit half-yearly production returns to the DIPP & Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence in the proscribed format.

3. Sale of Defence items to Government entities without approval of Ministry of Defence

Licensee’s are allowed to sell Defence items to Government entities under the control of Ministry of Home Affairs, State Governments, Public Sector Undertakings and other valid Defence Licenced Companies without prior approval of the Department of Defence Production. Sales to others will require prior approval of the Department of Defence Production.

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Are sebi’s answers to Faqs binding on sebi and/or third parties?

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Synopsis
This article touches upon the issue of legal sanctity, enforceability & binding nature of the answers to ‘frequently asked questions’ (FAQs), that are provided by the SEBI. It raises some fundamental questions – whether SEBI has the authority to issue such FAQs, whether these FAQs are binding on SEBI and/or third parties, and can these FAQs override regulations issued by the SEBI?

These challenging questions have been debated in the light of a recent SEBI order where the SEBI-issued FAQS were relied upon & also considered valid in deciding the questions of law. The article, after comprehensive analysis, demonstrates a view that is inconsistent with the view held in the recent SEBI order.

Basic issue
How far are answers by SEBI to Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’) on SEBI Regulations, etc. binding? Can they even be relied on by SEBI? More so, when substantive legal issues are to be decided which may result in grant/rejection of relief to parties or even levy of penalty for violation of Regulations. SEBI has recently passed an Order (dated 30th October, 2014 in matter of Mr. A. B. Gupta) where it relies on the FAQs. Further, SEBI asserts that FAQs are valid and can be relied on by SEBI for answering questions of law.

What are FAQ s?
As is known, SEBI (like many other regulators) issues Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’) from time-to-time (the correct term should be AFAQ – Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, but that is perhaps a semantic issue).

Thus, they are generally answers to specific questions that SEBI anticipates or has received from timeto- time. The answers are usually not reasoned in detail though in some cases, where the Regulation itself answers the question, due reference is given. Often they are answers about how the Regulations would be viewed in practice and also about matters of procedure. Such details may not always be possible to be inserted in Regulations.

However, several questions arise. If the Regulations say one thing and the FAQs something different, or even the opposite, will the FAQs override the Regulations? If the Regulations do not cover certain matters, can the FAQs fill in the gaps and provide for such matters, even if by this it would mean extending or amending the Regulations? In particular, can the FAQs be binding in regard to the Regulations, when these FAQs give clarifications on substantial matters and/or matters which can result in penalty/prosecution or other adverse directions? Indeed, in the other extreme, can SEBI even rely on such FAQs in any manner? ?

How are FAQ s issued?
There does not seem to be any prescribed procedure by which the FAQs are issued. Indeed, as we will see later, there is no legal power or basis to issue FAQs either which gives them any legal sanctity. Generally, they seem to be issued by way of display on its website. It is not clear under whose authority, if any, these are issued – i.e., whether it is issued by the authority of the Board with contents duly confirmed by it, or by the Chairman of SEBI or by a senior official. Further, the FAQs can keep changing from time-to-time and while it appears that at least in a couple of cases, they have highlighted the change and when it was made, it is possible that the FAQs could be changed without any notification. The FAQs can be added to, deleted from, and amended generally from time to time without any notice or even a mention.

SEBI’s order
In this background, let us consider what the recent SEBI Order said.

SEBI, as stated earlier, recently passed an order in which it relied on its own FAQs for arriving at answers to substantive issues of law under the Regulations. While doing so, it made some observations. The case concerns an allegedly hostile takeover and is on some objections made by certain persons against open offer made. The core issues in that case are interesting. However, this post focuses only on one matter and that is on the manner in which SEBI has relied on FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) on the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers), Regulations 2011 (the Regulations), released by it.

SEBI relied on the FAQs to arrive at the conclusion on two issues raised. The issues were significant. Depending on which way SEBI had decided it, certain parties could have gained or lost substantial rights. Hence, the Order interpreted the Regulations. Whether the interpretation was correct or not could be a matter of debate. What is worth reviewing here are observations SEBI made while relying on the FAQs.

At first, SEBI relied on the FAQs while answering the issues raised. The complainant objected to SEBI’s reliance on FAQs saying they do not have the force of Regulations. SEBI rejected this argument and said:-

“9. The complainant’s Advocates acknowledged the existence of SEBI’s FAQs as reproduced on pages 15-16 of this Order but argued that FAQs does not have the force of regulations and therefore should not be considered at all. The question before me is whether SEBI can interpret its own regulations, which it has done in the form of FAQs. I am of the opinion that it can and it should, otherwise doubts raised about the effect of regulations would bring the entire business to a halt. I am of the opinion that such interpretations are valid so long as these are transparent and applied consistently without discrimination. No case has been made out that SEBI interpreted regulations 3(1), 3(2) and 4 otherwise in any other matter, or that SEBI’s interpretation was not known publicly.”

Several questions arise.
– Do FAQs have the force of Regulations?
– Is SEBI’s interpretation expressed through FAQs binding on third parties?
– Does SEBI’s interpretation bind SEBI itself?

Assuming such interpretations are valid, what are pre-requisites for reliance on such FAQs – whether it is enough that they are (i) transparent/published and known publicly (ii) applied consistently without discrimination?

SEBI seems to have taken a view that the FAQs are binding if they are transparent and applied consistently. On one of the issues raised, it even gave a few examples of similar practices adopted in the past where it had applied in practice the same interpretation that it was applying in the present case. However, does practice make or amend law in such circumstances?

Nature of FAQ s as per the FAQ s
Firstly, let us examine the FAQs themselves. This is what the introductory paragraphs to the FAQs to the SEBI (SAST) Regulations 2011, which are the subject matter of this decision, say:-

“These FAQs offer only a simplistic explanation/ clarification of terms/concepts related to the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 [“SAST Regulations, 2011”]. Any such explanation/clarification that is provided herein should not be regarded as an interpretation of law nor be treated as a binding opinion/ guidance from the Securities and Exchange Board of India [“SEBI”]. For full particulars of laws governing the substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers, please refer to actual text of the Acts/ Regulations/Circulars appearing under the Legal Framework Section on the SEBI website.” (emphasis supplied).

Thus, the FAQs themselves clearly say that are not to be regarded as interpretation of law. Further, they are not binding on SEBI or third parties nor do they have the status of any guidance from SEBI. For knowing the law, it is the actual text of the Regulations, etc. that has to be read.

Nature of Regulations and manner of their issue

The SEBI Act, 1992 empowers SEBI to issue Regulations for certain specified purposes. The Regulations are required to be made – and amended – in the prescribed manner u/s. 31 of the SEBI Act, 1992. They have to be released and notified as prescribed under the Act. They have to be then laid before the House of Parliament for prescribed period. Any changes agreed by the Houses have to be duly incorporated.

Further, violations of the Regulations have significant consequences under the Act and the Regulations them- selves. These include penalties, prosecution, directions, etc. Thus, there is a clear basis of Regulations as a law, clear prescribed procedure of how they are to be made and notified. Finally, it is this clear basis which gives them a force of law such that violations of Regulations have adverse consequences in law.

Whether There is any Power To issue FAQs?
SEBI does not have power under the Act to issue such “clarifications” to the Regulations where such clarifications would have binding force of Regulations, particularly when they contradict the Regulations or result in extended application of the Regulations. Indeed, there is no concept of FAQs under the Act.

There have been several decisions of the Courts and even the Securities Appellate Tribunal that uphold Regulations over circulars. And that in case of any contradictions between the Regulations and circulars, it will be the Regulations that would apply.

Undoubtedly, the FAQs would help a party, particularly a lay person, in throwing some light at what the Regulations are trying to say. They may even be a sort of guidance of how SEBI views certain issues, though it seems from the introduction to the FAQs themselves that they may not be binding even on SEBI.

In case the Regulations are clear, therefore, it is submitted then FAQs have no relevance. Indeed, it cannot be even said that in case of ambiguity, the FAQs could be looked into and the views in the FAQs could apply.

It appears that SEBI has erred in stating that the FAQs have any binding legal status. SEBI, it is submitted, cannot take any adverse action in terms of penalties/prosecution/directions by relying on FAQs that contradict the Regulations. The Regulations are self-contained in this sense; the FAQs cannot add or modify the Regulations.

In conclusion, it is reiterated that the issue here is not whether the interpretation given in the FAQs is correct or not, it is on how much, if at all, can they be considered binding on SEBI and/or parties. The better view seems to be that FAQs cannot be relied on at all while deciding on substantive legal issues. They are neither binding on SEBI nor they are binding on any third party.

REITs: Providing Liquidity to Illiquid Assets!

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Synopsis
When a cheque issued to a creditor is dishonoured, where does the creditor file a suit against the debtor – in the Court which has jurisdiction over the creditor or in a Court which has jurisdiction over the debtor? This one issue has been oscillating back and forth with several Supreme Court decisions giving their view one way or the other. There now seems to be some finality on the matter …. … … … or is it?

Introduction
According to a 2008 Report of the Law Commission of India, over 38 lakh cheque bouncing cases were pending at the Magistrate Level as of October 2008. Over six years have passed since that Report and this figure is expected to have leapfrogged! The Magistrate is the first Court in the hierarchy of criminal justice in India and if this entry level forum itself is clogged, one can very well understand why justice in India often takes so long.

Section138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the Act”) is one of the few provisions which is equally well known both by lawmen and laymen. The section imposes a criminal liability in case of a dishonoured or bounced cheque. One of the most litigious issues in relation to a bounced cheque has been which Court has jurisdiction over a case? Say a debtor which has its registered office in Ranchi, Jharkhand issued a cheque drawn on a Ranchi bank to a creditor based in Mumbai and the cheque bounces, should the suit be filed in Mumbai or in Ranchi? This answer could make a big difference since the ease of filing a case in one’s own city or State is manifold as compared to a remote location. This issue has recently seen several Supreme Court and High Court decisions leading to a see-saw, one way and the other. A slew of decisions have come out strongly in favour of the accused unlike the earlier decisions which were procomplainant. Let us look at the history and the current position on this very important aspect which has made several creditors and banks jittery.

The Law: Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
Before we plunge into the issue on hand, let us pause for a moment and examine the impugned section. Section138 of the Act provides that if any cheque is drawn by a person to another person, and if the cheque is dishonoured because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s bank accounts, then such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years and/or with a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque. In order to invoke the provisions of section138, the following three steps are necessary:

(a) the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) once the payee is informed by the bank about the dishonour of the cheque, then he must, within 30 days of such information, make a demand for the payment of the said account of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

A fourth step is specified u/s.142 of the Act which provides that a complaint must be made to the Court within 30 days from the date from which the cause of action arises (i.e., the notice period).

Where to file the case – Bhaskaran sets the stage!
A two-member bench of the Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510 laid down five important components for filing a compliant u/s. 138 of the Act:

(1) D rawing of the cheque,
(2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank,
(3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank,
(4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, and
(5) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

The Apex Court finally concluded that since an offence could pertain to any of the above five acts there could be five offences which could be committed at five different locations and hence, the suit could be filed in any Court having jurisdiction over these locations. Thus, the complainant can select any of the five Courts for filing his complaint within whose jurisdiction the five acts were done.

To continue our example above, the creditor could file his case against the Ranchi Company before the Magistrate Court in Mumbai (or Ranchi) and save himself a lot of trouble and effort, not to mention money! Suppose further, that the creditor has operations in all major cities and also bank accounts in all these cities. He deposits the cheque in his Ahmedabad branch which bounces. He issues the Notice from his Hyderabad office. As per Bhaskaran’s decision, not only can he file the suit in Mumbai or Ranchi but even from Ahmedabad and Hyderabad. Thus, the payee has full freedom to decide where to sue the drawer from. At times, this can also be used as a tool for harassment and as a pressure tactic.

Subsequent Cases Queer the Pitch
There have been several subsequent decisions but two noteworthy cases stand out. In Harman Electronics P. Ltd. vs. National Panasonic India (2009) 1 SCC 720, another two-member Bench held that the correct Court would be the one where the Notice for the bounced cheque was received and not where the Notice was sent. It also observed that section138 is being rampantly misused for territorial jurisdiction.

A subsequent three-member Bench in Shri Ishar Alloy Steels vs. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609 clarified that to be able to file a case u/s. 138 the cheque must be presented within six months on the bank of the drawer and not to the bank of the payer. The place where the complainant presented the cheque would not be relevant. Thus, the decisions of Harman and Ishar Alloy suggest that the Court of the accused should be the place where the suit should be filed. To continue our example above, the creditor could file his case against the Ranchi Company before the Jharkhand Courts.

Interestingly in Nishant Aggarwal vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma (2013) 10 SCC 72 the Supreme Court held that the ratio laid down by these two decisions in the case of Harman and Ishar Alloy did not dilute the principle stated in Bhaskaran’s case. This view was followed by the Supreme

Court in FIL Industries Ltd. vs. Imtiyaz Ahmad Bhat (2014) 2 SCC 266 and in Escorts Ltd. vs. Rama Mukherjee (2014) 2 SCC 255 all of which followed Bhaskaran.

Dashrath Rathod’s case – Cat amongst the Pigeons?
A recent decision of the three-member Supreme Court decision in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra, Cr. A. No. 2287 /2009 Order dated 1st August, 2014 has led to debtors across the Country celebrating and creditors panicking. The decision of the Apex Court was as follows:

(a) T he offence contemplated u/s. 138 stands committed on the dishonour of the cheque, and accordingly the Magistrate at the place where this occurs is ordinarily where the Complaint must be filed, entertained and tried. The place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank, is located. The law should not be warped for commercial exigencies.

(b) T he place of the issuance or delivery of the statutory notice or where the Complainant chooses to present the cheque for encashment by his bank are not relevant for purposes of territorial jurisdiction of the complaints.

(c)    It is also now manifest that traders and businessmen have become reckless and incautious in extending credit where they would heretofore have been ex- tremely hesitant, solely because of the availability of redress by way of criminal proceedings.

(d)    Every magistrate is inundated with prosecutions u/s. 138 NI act, so much so that the burden is becoming unbearable and detrimental to the disposal of other equally pressing litigation.

(e)    Courts are not required to twist the law to give relief to incautious or impetuous persons and hence, the territorial jurisdiction is restricted to the Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which in the present context is where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn.

(f)    Bhaskaran’s case permitting prosecution at any one of the five places has resulted in hardship and inconvenience to the accused. Thus, it overruled Bhaskaran’s case and all subsequent decisions which followed it. Consequently, it endorsed the views expressed in the cases of harman and Ishar alloy.

(g)    Courts must avoid an interpretation which can be used as an instrument of oppression by the complainant.

The Supreme Court also observed as follows in respect to the problem this order would create for Creditors:

(a)    It is always open to the creditor to insist that the cheques in question be made payable at a place of the creditor’s convenience.

(b)    the relief introduced by section 138 of the act is in ad- dition to the contemplations in the Indian Penal Code. It is still open to such a payee recipient of a dishon- oured cheque to lodge a First Information report (FLR) with the Police or file a Complaint directly before the concerned magistrate. If the payee succeeds in establishing that the inducement for accepting a cheque which subsequently bounced had occurred where he resides or ordinarily transacts business, he will not have to suffer the travails of journeying to the place where the cheque has been dishonoured.

Coming back to our example, the case must now deffnitely be filed before the Courts in Ranchi. Thus, it is the creditor who now would have to travel to ranchi every time  there  is  a  hearing  and  appoint  local  lawyers. this substantially pushes up the cost of litigation.

Decision Retrospective or Prospective?

Is  this  decision  retrospective  or  prospective?  the  Supreme Court in Dashrath’s case held that this decision applied retrospectively and not just to complaints filed after the date of the Order!

The Court however held that this decision would not apply in those pending cases where the accused has been summoned to give evidence u/s. 145(2) of the act. Section 145(2) requires that the complainant has given evidence under an Affidavit and he has been summoned and examined.

All other cases where evidence recording has not commenced would be bound by this order and shall be returned to the proper jurisdictional Court in accordance with the Order laid down by the Court. If they are refiled within 30 days of their return then they shall be deemed to have been filed in time else they would be treated as being filed late. This decision would cause a series of transfer of cases in Courts across India.

Section 145(2) – a gaTeway? Considering the gateway given u/s.145(2), a series of cases have come up before the Courts as to whether they are exempt from the decision of Dashrath’s case. Some of the important principles laid down by the Bombay high Court in this respect are as follows:

(a)    Peter David Pinto vs. Dinesh Ranawat, Cr. WP No. 4421 /2013 dated 9th September 2014 – Mere filing of an affidavit cannot take the case out of the princi- ples laid down by the Supreme Court. Section 145(2) would apply only when the complainant has been ex- amined/cross-examined.

(b)    Suresh K. K. vs. Mansingaram, Cr. WP No. 923/2013 dated 9th September, 2014 and Sanjay Ramchandra Shrikande, Cr. WP No. 3619/2013 dated 19th Septem- ber, 2014 – even in a case which has travelled beyond section 145(2), the gateway provided by Dashrath’s case would not be available where the challenge of territorial jurisdiction has been given before the Supreme Court Order. Thus, the Supreme Court’s gateway is only applicable to cases where an objection to jurisdiction has been raised on the basis of the judgment. the Bombay high Court held that the Supreme Court order was retrospective in nature. Thus, Courts are loath to allow the gateway very easily.

Back to square one?
Can the decision in Dashrath’s case be distinguished in those cases where the cheque has been issued at par? thus, can it be said that for all cheques which are pay- able at par, the place where the cheques are deposited would  have  jurisdiction?  this  was  the  issue  before  the Bombay high Court in the case of Ramanbhai Mathurbhai Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, Cr. WP No. 2362/2014 dated 25th August, 2014. the Bombay high Court was faced with a case where “at par cheques” drawn on an ahmedabad      Branch      were      dishonoured.      They were    deposited    at    a    branch    in    mumbai.       The Court  held   that   by   issuing   cheques   payable   at all  branches,  the  drawer  of  the   cheques   had   given an option to the banker of payee to get the cheques cleared from the nearest available branch of bank of the drawer. It, therefore, held that the cheques were dishonoured within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court were they  bounced.  the  Bombay  high  Court  took  this  view based on its interpretation of Dashrath’s case.

It may be noted that the delhi high Court in similar facts in GVPR Engineers Ltd. vs. A. K. Tiwari, Cr. MC 3689/2009 dated 31st January, 2011 has held that the mere fact that a cheque is payable does not confer territorial jurisdiction on the place where the cheque is dishonoured. this decision was not considered by the Bombay high Court.

Stay
The Supreme Court vide its order dated 16th September, 2014 in SLP (Crl.) No. 7251/2014 has granted an interim stay to the Bombay High Court’s Order in Raman-bhai Mathurbhai Patel vs. State of Maharashtra. A final decision of the Supreme Court on this issue of cheques payable at par is expected soon.

Conclusion
One hopes that a judicial see-saw of this type where the complainants are in the dark over where to file suits is resolved soon. A reading of Dashrath’s decision shows that the question of cheques “payable at par” was not an issue before the apex Court. Since a majority of cheques are payable at par, based on this Bombay high Court decision, the suit could be filed at the place where they were deposited. the view endorsed by the Bombay high Court merits consideration considering centralised processing and clearing systems/electronic fund transfers. In today’s day and age the cheque does not physically travel to the drawer’s branch. In fact, even within a bank after centralised processing, it is the centralised unit which clears all cheques without physically receiving a cheque. One would have to wait and watch how the Supreme Court deals with these interesting arguments while finally deciding the issue!

Family Settlement – Registration – Document not compulsorily registrable –Registration Act, section 17:

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Vikaram Singh & Anr. vs. Ajit Indersingh; AIR 2014 Del 173

The learned Single Judge held that Memorandum of Family Settlement not being a registered document was inadmissible in evidence and also held that family arrangements are governed by special equities and principles applicable to dealings between strangers do not apply to dealings within the family.

On appeal, the division Bench held that the tenth recital records that a family settlement was being reduced into writing because it had already been acted upon by the parties. Thus, it is clear that the Deed of Family Settlement is a Memorandum i.e., a written record of what the parties had orally agreed upon at an earlier point of time and had acted thereupon. The second thing which emerges is that parties have acknowledged antecedent title. Thus, the court agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in view of the law declared in the decisions. AIR 1958 SC 706 Nanibai & Ors. vs. Geeta Bai Kom Rama Gunge, AIR 1976 SC 807 Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., and AIR 2007 SC 18 Hansa Industries vs. Kidar Sons Industries Ltd. The Deed of Family Settlement does not require any registration u/s. 17 and is a document admissible in evidence.

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Coparcenary property – Right of daughters – Section 6 as amended by Amendment Act (2005) is available to all daughters living on date of coming into force of 2005 Amendment Act : Hindu Succession Act, 1956:

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Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari & Ors vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari AIR 2014 Bombay 151 (FB).

The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the provisions of amended section 6 are retroactive in operation, and daughters living on 9th September, 2005 get rights in coparcenary property with effect from 9th September, 2005.

The Amendment Act applies to daughters born any time provided the daughters born prior to 9th September, 2005 are alive on the date of the coming into force of the Amendment Act i.e., on 9th September,2005. There is no dispute between the parties that the Amendment Act applies to daughters born on or after 9th September, 2005.

A bare perusal of sub-section (1) of section 6 would, thus, clearly show that the legislative intent in enacting clause (a) is prospective i.e. daughter born on or after 9th September, 2005 will become a coparcenary by birth, but the legislative intent in enacting clauses (b) and (c) is retroactive, because rights in the coparcenary property are conferred by clause (b) on the daughter who was already born before the amendment, and who is alive on the date of Amendment coming into force. Hence, if a daughter of a coparcener had died before 9th September, 2005, since she would not have acquired any rights in the coparcenary property, her heirs would have no right in the coparcenary property. Since section 6(1) expressly confers right on daughter only on and with effect from the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act, it is not possible to take that view of the heirs of a deceased daughter would get such a right.

On examination of amendment section 6 of the principal act and bearing in mind the words ‘on and from commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 2005 found in section 6’, it must follow that the rights under the amended section 6 can be exercised by a daughter of a coparcener only after the commencement of the Amendment Act, 2005. Therefore, it is imperative that the daughter who seeks to exercise such a right must herself be alive at the time when the Amendment Act, 2005 was brought into force. It would not matter whether the daughter concerned is born before 1956 or after 1956. This is for the simple reason that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, when it came into force applied to all Hindus in the country irrespective of their date of birth. The date of birth was not a criterion for application of the Principal Act. The only requirement is that when the Act is being sought to be applied, the person concerned must be a existence/ living. The Parliament has specifically used the word “on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession(Amendment) Act, 2005″ so as to ensure that rights which are already settled are not disturbed by virtue of a person claiming as heir to a daughter who had passed away before the Amendment Act came into force.

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Citizenship by Registration – Eligibility Criteria not fulfilled:Citizenship Act, 1955 section 5(1)(a):

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Shah Mohammed Anwar Ali & Ors vs. The State of Assam & Ors. AIR 2014 Gauhati 156

The appellant Nos. 1 and 2 filed a writ petition, praying for a direction to the respondents to consider their applications filed u/s. 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and to pass appropriate orders thereon, in accordance with law, contending inter alia that both the petitioners were born in Gauhati and the petitioner no. 1’s father was also initially a citizen of India born in undivided India. It has further been contended that after partition, the father of the petitioner no. 1 permanently settled in Shylet district of the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and due to his old age ailments, the petitioners along with their first child Shah Mohammad Aminul Islam, who is the appellant no. 3 went to Bangladesh in the month of September, 1991 and stayed in Bangladesh up to the month of March, 1992, during which period the second child, namely, Jakia (appellant no. 4) was born in Bangladesh on 30-12-1991. The further contention of the writ petitioners was that they again went to Bangladesh in the month of November, 1996 to attend to the ailing father of the appellant no. 1 with the intention to return to India as early as possible, but unfortunately as the father of the petitioner no. 1 fell seriously ill, for which they had to stay back in Bangladesh.Thereafter though they wanted to return to India, they could not do so and under compelling circumstances they had to obtain the passports from the Government of Bangladesh and entered India on 10-05-1997 as Bangladeshi nationals. It has also been pleaded that after the expiry of the initial period of visa, they filed an application for extension from time to time and accordingly the visa was extended and though their application for further extension of visa dated 21-03-1998 was under active consideration of the Government, they were arrested along with their minor children on the ground that they overstayed in India beyond the period for which visa was granted.

The court observed that sub-section (2) of section 9 of 1955 Act, empowers the Central Govt. to determine the question as to whether, when or how any citizen of India has acquired the citizenship of another country, if such question arises for consideration. It is, therefore, the Central Government and no other authority, who can determine such question. The writ court would also, ordinarily, not enter into such determination unless of course the determination made by the Central Government is put to challenge by the aggrieved party.

In the instant case, the applicants never at any point of time, prior to filing of the writ petition, claimed that they had under compulsion and not voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Bangladesh. On the other hand, they had filed the application u/s. 5(1)(a) of 1955 Act seeking registration of their names as Indian citizen, upon accepting that they had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Bangladesh.

Since the question as to whether, when or how the applicants acquired citizenship of Bangladesh, did not arise at all, there was no question of determination of such question by the Central Government, before passing an order of deportation.

The appellants having approached the writ Court for a direction to the respondent authorities to consider their applications filed u/s. 5(1)(a) of the 1955 Act, they must demonstrate that they have fulfilled the requirement of the said provisions of law for getting their names registered, which they had failed to do. The writ Court rightly refused to issue directions, which if issued, would be a futile writ, when the appellants on their own admission have accepted that they have not fulfilled the requirement of section 5(1)(a) of the said Act.

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Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 – Delay in filing application before Chief Controlling Revenue Authority – Specific exclusion of Limitation Act – Executive cannot condone delay taking recourse of limitation Act: Limitation Act section 5, 29:

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Jayminbhai Navinbhai Doshi & Ors vs. State of Gujarat & Ors AIR 2014 Gujarat 220

The petitioners challenged the orders passed by the authority u/s. 53 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, by which, the said authority, viz., the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority refused to condone the delay in filing the proceedings on the ground that those were not filed within 90 days from the date of order passed by the competent authority because of lack of power with such authority to condone the delay.

The Bombay Stamp Act is a self contained code dealing with all relevant matters exhaustively therein and its provisions show an intention to depart from the common rule, qui facit per lalium facit per se. In the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, there is no provision incorporated by which the provision of the Limitation Act is extended to the proceedings under the said statute. The provision of the Limitation Act applies only to courts and courts alone, and it does not even apply to any Tribunal or any other authority unless by virtue of the statute creating such Tribunal or the Authority, the provisions of the Limitation Act have been specifically made applicable.

Thus, in the instant case, the authority u/s. 53 of the Act not being a Court could not take the assistance of the provisions contained in section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 54 of the Bombay Stamp Act however, unlike section 53, specifically gives power to the Chief controlling Revenue Authority to condone delay in preferring an application beyond the period of limitation fixed therein, namely, 60 days, but that power of condonation by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority is also limited to only to a further period not exceeding 30 days.

Thus, if the Chief Controlling Authority has no power of condonation, it necessarily follows that the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority cannot condone the delay.

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Ind-AS Carve Outs – Straightlining of leases

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The issue of straight-lining of leases is very important for many enterprises; particularly entities that obtain assets on long-term operating leases; for example, retail entities, multiplexes, telecom towers, etc. Thus, if a telecom tower was leased for nine years on a non-cancellable basis, paying rent of Rs.1,00,000 in the first year, with a 10% escalation each year, the charge in the P&L each year would be Rs.1,50,883 and not the contractual amount to be paid which is the rent for previous year plus 10% escalation. In determining the lease period for straight-lining the possibility of lease extension is also considered, and hence the impact could be much higher than one would normally anticipate.

In a recent discussion organised by an industry association on IFRS adoption, the author was surprised, when the presenter opined that operating leases should not be straight-lined under IFRS and hence a carve-out was required. The reason provided for the carve-out was that IFRS should be pain free. Interestingly, straight-lining is required under Indian GAAP (and is also clarified by an Expert Advisory Committee opinion). Thus, it was absolutely fine to give pain under the Indian GAAP but not under IFRS!

Financial statements should reflect a true and fair view, based on robust accounting standards. Whether the accounting gives pain or is pain free is not relevant. However, what is an appropriate technical approach can sometimes be very debatable. Straight-lining of leases is one such instance where there are strong arguments in favour of and against straight-lining of leases, which one should consider. Let us discuss what those arguments are.

Arguments for and against straight-lining of leases
The primary reason for straight-lining of leases is contained in paragraph 23 of AS-19 which states that “Lease payments under an operating lease should be recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss on a straight-line basis over the lease term unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit.” In other words, in the above example of telecom towers, the benefit received from the telecom tower over the nine years is absolutely uniform and hence the charge in each of the nine years should be equal. The lessee is expected to derive the same benefit, in physical terms, from the leased asset over the lease term and, accordingly, the scheduled rent increases in the lease rental do not meet the criterion for recognising expense/ income on a basis other than straight-line basis over the lease term.

One view is that the increases in rent in the agreement may only be considered as an adjustment for inflation and hence leases should not be straight-lined. The counter argument is that inflation factor in the agreement may not be representative of the inflation index in the country. Thus, it may so happen that a 10% escalation is built in the rent agreement each year in anticipation of inflation, was not supported by the inflation index, which was expected to be 5%. In reality, it may so happen that in subsequent years rents may fall down drastically, instead of going up. In other words, the cost of operating would be cheaper in future years and hence the assumption that escalations represent future inflation may not be tenable. In India, it may be fair to state that one of the reasons for lease rentals to increase is the inflation factor. Now if the scale up on the rentals in the agreement was based on an inflation index rather than a fixed amount, the scale up would be treated as contingent rentals under AS-19 and accounted for as and when the contingent rentals become due (not on straight-line). However, if the rent increases does not represent an inflation index then straight-lining would be required. This appears to be a fair argument for straightlining leases.

It is understandable that in India people focus on contractual terms and therefore recognising any expense or income that does not represent those contractual terms makes them very uncomfortable. An interesting point would be to look at the standard on depreciation, which permits the straight-line, written down value method and other methods such as unit of production method. A lessee would depreciate an asset obtained on finance lease and capitalised by it using any of the above methods. In other words, the P&L charge would not be based on the contractual terms/payments. Thus, focusing on contractual terms/payments in the case of operating lease would also not be appropriate and would unnecessarily result in structuring possibilities.

Some argue that straight-lining results in recognising future costs. The standard ignores the fact that as time passes, costs go up (or may go down) and so does revenue. The cost of operating in 2007 would always be different from the cost of operating in 2008. The same can be said for the revenue rates; they may go up or down. To try and straight-line the cost (in the case of lessee’s) selectively for leases is a violation of sound accounting principles.

Paragraph 24 of AS-19 states that, “for operating leases, lease payments (excluding costs for services such as insurance and maintenance) are recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss on a straight-line basis unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit, even if the payments are not on that basis.” This means that if services are provided by lessor to the lessee, for example, maintenance services with a 10% increase each year, those are not required to be straight-lined. Also when a purchaser makes an upfront commitment to purchase goods each year from a seller with a 10% increase over the previous year’s rate, one does not straight-line the cost of purchase over those years. Therefore the point is if straight-lining is not required as a principle in the framework or by other standards, then is it appropriate to apply it selectively in the case of leases?

A point to be noted is that the straight-lining under the standard is an anti-abuse measure arising out of rent-free periods. Thus, if a building is taken on operating lease for three years, with zero rent in the first two years and rent of Rs. 3 lakh for the third year, the standard would require Rs. 1 lakh to be charged each year. This is fair, because in substance there is no such thing as rent-free period. Therefore, some argue that to require straight-lining when there is no indication of deliberate ballooning is unfairly stretching the argument for straight-lining.

The straight-lining of lease rentals would result in a deferred equalisation which may be a liability or an asset. For example, if the operating lease is for two years with rental in year one, of Rs. 100 and rental in year two of Rs. 110; equalisation would result in a deferred liability of Rs. 5 in the first year (which will reverse in the following year). Now the problem with deferred equalisation is that it does not fulfill the definition of an asset or liability under “The Framework For The Preparation And Presentation Of Financial Statements” issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Under the framework, asset and liability is defined as follows:

(a) An asset is a resource controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.

(b) A liability is a present obligation of the enterprise arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the enterprise of resources embodying economic benefits.

It begs the question therefore that if deferred equalisation is not an asset or liability as defined under the Framework, then what is it doing in the balance sheet?

Overall, there appears to be good arguments for and against straight-lining of leases. Ultimately, one has to take a decision.

Overall Conclusion
The adoption of Ind-AS will bring India at par with the world (more than 120 countries) at large that has adopted IFRS. To achieve full benefit, it is imperative that Ind-AS’s are notified without any major difference from IASb IFRS. If India were to implement IFRS with too many differences,  it  would  be  akin to moving from one Indian gAAP to another Indian gAAP. This would entail 100% efforts with zero benefits. Moving from Indian GAAP to IASB IFRS would entail 100% efforts but will provide 100% benefits. By adopting IASB IFRS it would become possible  for  Indian companies to state that they are compliant with IASB IFRS, and hence those financial statements can be used globally.

It is well appreciated that accounting is an art, and not   a precise science. Primarily, financial statements should reflect and capture the underlying substance of transactions. The accounting standards are drafted to ensure that underlying transactions are properly accounted for and also aggregated and reflected transparently in the financial statements. But as already pointed out, this is not a precise science, and people may have different views as is evident from the above debate on leases. Sometimes there are no right or wrong answers, and a decision needs to be taken and people need to move ahead.

IASB IFRS is not necessarily the best cut in all cases, and there may be a few instances where the standards could have been better, from another person’s perspective. Nonetheless, the author believes that the standard setters and regulators will have to consider the benefit of these carve outs with the benefits lost as a result of departing from IASB IFRS. ultimately, it is not about one-upmanship but aligning with the world. In my view, full adoption of IASb IFRS is a goal worth pursuing. At the same time the standards setters and regulators should engage with the IASB in resolving the Indian specific issues amicably. As an alternative approach, the author suggests that companies should be allowed an option to adopt IASb IFRS, instead of Ind-AS, if they wish to.

In the long-run, the Indian standard setters and regulators should work closely with the IASB so that any differences that arise are resolved more promptly. A mutually respectable relationship can be built with the IASB, where the IASB and the world can gain from India’s participation in the standard setting process and simultaneously India can also benefit from the process in improving its financial reporting framework.

IASB certainly has a global objective of having one set  of uniform IFRS standards across the world. Therefore, if IFRS are adopted in India without any carve-outs it would be a positive development for IASB. But adopting full IFRS or providing an option to do so, would be a far bigger positive development for India.

Role of an auditor in assessing fraud risks

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Introduction
Worldwide, companies are striving to survive in adverse economic and competitive market conditions. This survival struggle often results in some of them engaging in unethical business practices such as fraud, espionage and corruption. To help organisations mitigate these risks, regulatory bodies, both international and national, have reformed and implemented several stringent laws and regulations. These include Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the US, UK Bribery Act in UK and the new Companies Act, 2013 in India.

The Companies Act 2013 – A new era of corporate governance
According to the 13th Global Fraud Survey, 2013 by EY, 34% of India respondents said that they resorted to unethical actions in a business situation, which is the second highest amongst the surveyed nations. The Companies Act, 2013 is set to be a game changer for corporate India, paving the way for an enhanced control environment, greater transparency and higher standards of governance. Section 447, under the Act for the first time provides a definition of fraud and also makes extensive provisions for penalising fraudulent activities.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has specifically outlined the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement to adopt leading global practices on corporate governance and to make the corporate governance framework more effective. The enforcement of these norms demands organisations to provide assurance to the board, audit committee on adequacy of internal controls, effective risk management process, anti-fraud controls and effective legal compliance framework. With these changes in place, the role of an auditor has undergone a significant transformation.

Reporting on internal financial controls

Management is still dependent on auditors to provide them assurance on anti-fraud controls which are in place across businesses, together with the ability to detect and deter a potential fraud. Auditors are expected to evaluate accounting systems for weakness, reviewing and monitoring internal controls, determining the degree of fraud risks and interpreting financial data for picking up unusual trends and following up on red flags.

The Companies Act, 2013 has made it mandatory for the auditors to comment on whether the company has adequate internal financial controls system in place and operating effectiveness for such controls. Here, the term, ‘internal financial controls,’ means the policies and procedures adopted by the company for ensuring orderly and efficient conduct of its business, including the prevention and detection of frauds or errors, the accuracy and completeness of the accounting records, and the timely preparation of reliable financial information.

Evaluating fraud risks
An auditor should have the ability to understand how a fraud is committed and how it can be identified. He/ she should also understand the underlying factors that motivate individuals to commit fraud. As per the Companies Act, 2013, the term ‘fraud’ includes any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of the position committed by any person, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss.
• Under the Act, liability and punishment for fraud is extended to every individual who has been a party to it intentionally, including the auditors of the organisations.
• Auditors need to be involved in monitoring the whistleblowing mechanism, which is made mandatory for directors and all employees to report genuine cases of frauds.

Therefore, an auditor is expected to be in a position to identify potentially fraudulent situations during the course of the audit and play a vital role in preventing fraud and other unethical acts. It is essential they remain unbiased and must conduct the audit with a clear mind-set to catch possible material misstatements resulting from a fraud. This should be regardless of their relationship with the organisation or their belief about the management’s honesty or integrity. Objectively, the auditor is always in a better position to detect symptoms that accompany fraud, and usually has continual presence in the organisation. This provides them with a better understanding of the organisation and its internal financial controls.

With the new legislations, the auditor will now need to take responsibility over the adequacy of fraud prevention measures in various business processes. He/she is required to exercise professional scepticism, which requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained suggests that a material misstatement or fraud has occurred. Sometimes, he/ she may even have to undertake extended audit procedures in areas where potential red flags were noticed. Another key consideration is the inclusion of fraud detection procedure as part of every audit and keeping an eye open for red flags.

Proactive auditing to look for fraud risks
In this new era of auditing, ushered in by the Companies Act 2013, Auditors will have to proactively look for fraud vulnerabilities and fraud risks, by extending the audit procedure to:

Examine and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of internal financial controls

• Unusual transactions
• Adjustments in the period-end financial reporting process
• Related party transactions

Make use of data analytics to find unfamiliar items and perform detailed analyses of high risk transactions
Identify relevant fraud risks: Understand the business environment. Review the documentation of previous and suspected frauds, monitoring the reporting through whistle-blowing mechanisms and formulating the ethics programme
Outline existing controls to potential fraud schemes and carry out a gap assessment.

In the standard audit reports that accompany corporate financial statements, the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud is not discussed. Indeed, the word fraud isn’t mentioned at all. The auditing profession calls the discrepancy between what investors expect and what auditors do an “expectations gap.”

In recent years, audit firms have attempted to close the gap by educating the public on their role. Even though fraud is not one of the main objectives of auditors, it has been observed in past few years they have been instrumental in detecting or raising a warning sign to the management. It has been an increasing trend that the auditors have come across a fraud or a potential fraud and highlighted the same to the management or investigating agencies. It is with their help that investigators are able to crack the toughest cases by using various forensic tools and techniques such as data analytics, disk imaging, extensive public domain searches etc. Understanding fraud risk and developing the necessary skills for fraud detection is now a necessity for auditors; as stakeholders expect them to be red flag bearers of good corporate governance within the company.

The road ahead
Going forward, the role of the auditor is expected to become much more onerous as the board, management and Independent Directors seek increased comfort on newer areas to comply with the complex regulatory environment and legal duties and responsibilities. Their role is set to evolve into a more extensive, outward, forward looking and continuous activity to help deliver a more sustainable, efficient and effective audit function.

Please note: Views expressed in this article are personal to the author.

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AMD Research & Development Center India Private Limited vs. DCIT (Unreported) ITA No 692 to 695/Hyd/14 A.Ys.:2007-08 to 2010-11, Dated: 22.10.2014

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Article 12, India-Canada DTAA – On facts, ‘reimbursement’ by Indian subsidiary to parent company held FIS since Indian company was not the exclusive beneficiary of the services procured by parent company from third party.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company, which was a subsidiary of a Canadian company (“Canada Co”). The taxpayer was set-up as an R & D Design Centre for providing captive services to its parent. The services provided mainly included design, development and support for software and hardware solutions. During the relevant tax years, the taxpayer had made certain payments to the parent company towards software and engineering services without withholding any tax. According to the taxpayer, an Indian third party had provided engineering services to the taxpayer and the payment for the same was made by the parent company. Thus, the payment made by the taxpayer to the parent company was merely reimbursement of that payment and since there was no element of profit, no tax was required to be withheld.

After further examination and noting his findings, the AO concluded that payments to the parent company were “income from other sources” under the Act and under Article 21(3) of India-Canada DTAA and the taxpayer was required to withhold tax from the payments.

Held:
No agreement was entered into either between the taxpayer and the Indian third party or between the taxpayer and the parent company. The taxpayer was to render chip designing and software development services. Since the taxpayer did not have requisite skill set, the parent company was to provide the required portion of the services by procuring from third parties. Master Transfer Pricing Agreement entered into between the taxpayer and parent company clearly provided that services contracted by one party from a third party were also meant for the benefit of other member of the group. Findings of Commissioner of Service Tax showed that benefit of services rendered by Indian third party was availed by the taxpayer. These findings were not disputed by the tax authority. Since the services procured by the parent company from the Indian third party were for the benefit of the taxpayer, the amount paid by the taxpayer to the parent company was not extra profit/cash.

However, as the benefit of services contracted from third parties was to be available to all group companies and not only the taxpayer, it cannot be said that it was a case of pure reimbursement. Thus, the parent company had also substantially benefited from the services. Further, under Contractor Services Agreement, the Indian third party had agreed that all innovations and contract work product resulting from its services will be sole and exclusive property of the parent company and had assigned all rights in favour of the parent company.

Accordingly, the payment made by the taxpayer to the parent company was neither a gratuitous payment nor reimbursement of actual expenses without any element of profit. Therefore, the payment was in nature of FIS in terms of India-Canada DTAA. Consequently, the taxpayer had defaulted by not withholding tax.

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ITO vs. Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. (Unreported) ITA No 57/Mum/2009 & ITA No 7315/Mum/2008 A.Y. 2007-08, Dated: 12.11.2014

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Article 12, 14, India-Switzerland DTAA; Section 9(1)(vii), the Act – Installation and commissioning of plant and machinery being “assembly”, consideration therefor is excluded under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. While the payment for classroom training would be FTS under Article 12, that for shop floor training would not be covered by Article 12.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company engaged in the business of printing and publishing of newspapers. The taxpayer entered into two contracts with a Swiss company (“Swiss Co”) – one contract was for supply of plant and machinery and second contract was for installation and commissioning of the plant and machinery and operational training of the staff. The taxpayer did not withhold tax from the payments made to Swiss Co under both the contracts.

According to the AO, the payments made under the second contract were in the nature of FTS and therefore, the taxpayer was required to withhold tax on the same. In appeal, CIT(A) concluded that 75% of the payments under the second contract were towards installation and commissioning, which was in the nature of “assembly” and therefore, was excluded in terms of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and the balance 25% being towards training of employees, was FTS.

Held:
Installation and commissioning of plant

The plant and machinery comprised of various components/ units, which had to be put together and aligned in a manner that they would function optimally. Such activity would qualify as “assembly”. Accordingly, the consideration paid to Swiss Co towards installation and commissioning will not be FTS in terms of the definition in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. ? As regards India-Switzerland DTAA, though the consideration would be FTS in terms of Article 12(4), Article 12(5)(b), inter alia, excludes services covered by Article 14 which deals with “Independent Personal Service”. Since the engineers deputed by Swiss Co had stayed in India for less than 183 days, in terms of Article 14, the consideration was taxable only in Switzerland.

As regards the issue whether Article 14 applies also to a non-individual, it may be noted that in Christiani & Nielsen Copenhagan vs. ITO [1991] 39 ITD 355 (Bom), the Tribunal had held that Article dealing with “Independent Personal services” applied only in case of individuals was in the context of India-Denmark DTAA, which specifically mentioned “individual” whereas India- Switzerland DTAA mentions “resident”, which term also includes non-individuals. However, in MSEB vs. DCIT [2004] 90 ITD 793 (Mum), in the context of India- UK DTAA, the Tribunal has held that “Independent Personal services” Article applies to all the residents. Accordingly, Swiss Co was qualified for benefit under Article 14.

Training of staff
Training services include both class room training and shop floor training (i.e., training on the machine). While the payment for classroom training would be FTS under Article 12 that for shop floor training would not be covered under Article 12.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 256 (Delhi – Trib.) DCIT vs. Exxon Mobil Gas (India) (P.) Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05, Dated: 13.11.2014

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To compute net operating profit under TNMM for determining PLI of comparable company, non-operating incomes and non-operating expenses should be excluded.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a tax resident of India and a membercompany of Exxon Mobil Group engaged in oil and gas industry globally. The taxpayer was engaged in the activity of conducting market survey and performing related advisory services to its AEs. In respect of the relevant tax year, the taxpayer had reported four international transactions out of which one of the transactions pertaining to ‘conducting market survey activities and related advisory services’ was disputed by the TPO. To demonstrate the ALP of this transaction, the taxpayer had adopted TNMM as the most appropriate method and Operating Profit to Total Cost (OP/TC) as the Profit Level Indicator (PLI) and had selected twelve companies as comparable. By adopting multiple year data of these companies, the taxpayer computed average OP margin at 4.46% and showed its international transaction was at ALP.
The TPO rejected use of multiple year data and used only current year data. Since current year data for four companies was not available, TPO used only eight companies and computed OP/TC margin at 17.96%.

In respect of one of the companies, the profit margin was 37.14% whereas, according to the taxpayer, the correct OP/TC margin was 6.98% after excluding “other income”.

Held:
Major component of other income of the comparable company was interest income. TNMM contemplates using OP to a suitable base and to determine OP items of non-operating income should be excluded.
If non-operating income is to be excluded, non-operating expenses should also be excluded. Hence, the tribunal remanded the matter to AO/TPO for correct determination of OP/TC of the comparable company after excluding non-operating income as well as nonoperating expenses.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 379 (Delhi – Trib.) Mitsubishi Corporation India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08, Dated: 21.10.2014

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Article 24, India-Japan DTAA; sections 40(a)
(i), (ia), the Act – the exclusion in section 40(a) (ia), and its
retrospective effect, should be read into section 40(a)(i) to achieve
deduction neutrality envisaged in Article 24(3) of India- Japan DTAA.

Facts:
The
taxpayer was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese company engaged in
general import and export trading of diverse range of products (known
as ‘sogo shosha’ in Japanese). During the relevant tax year the taxpayer
made payments to certain Associated Enterprises (‘AEs’) which included
Japanese entities, towards import of goods. The taxpayer did not
withhold tax from such payments. However in case where the recipient
entity had PE in India, the recipient had furnished its return of income
including the payments received from taxpayer and had also paid taxes
on such income.

As the taxpayer had not withheld tax from the
payments made to the non-resident entities, the tax authority disallowed
the payments.

The taxpayer contended that Article 24 of
India-Japan DTAA provides protection against discrimination vis-à-vis
resident taxpayers. The taxpayer contended that since the provisions of
section 40(a)(ia) of the Act read with section 201(1) of the Act,
exclude payments made to a resident payee without withholding tax if
certain conditions are fulfilled, the payments made to non-residents too
cannot be disallowed in view of non-discrimination provision in
India-Japan DTAA.

However, the tax authority contended that the
taxpayer being an Indian resident was not entitled to access
nondiscrimination provision under India-Japan DTAA.

Before proceeding with its ruling, the Tribunal segregated the payments into three broad categories.

Category
(a): where the tax authority’s claim of recipients having a PE in India
was negated by the judicial authorities (i.e., the recipients were
found to have no PE in India).
Category (b): where there was no
material on record with the tax authority that recipients had a PE and
the same was also not in dispute before any judicial authority.
Category (c): where the recipient entity had a PE in India.

Held:
Analysis of payments

Category
(a): in absence of PE there was no income chargeable to tax in India
and accordingly, there was no liability to withhold taxes1 .
Consequently, no disallowance can be made.

Category (b): the
onus is on the tax authority to establish that the non-resident entity
had PE in India and such onus was not discharged. Accordingly, there was
no failure by the taxpayer in not withholding tax from payments made to
such entity. Consequently, disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) cannot be made.

Category
(c): the taxpayer had made payment to a Japanese entity which had a PE
in India. That entity had accepted tax liability in respect of the
payments received from the taxpayer. In this case the taxpayer had
invoked the non-discrimination provision in India- Japan DTAA and had
contended that disallowance could not be made.

Indian resident accessing deduction non-discrimination Article under DTAA
In
Daimler Chrysler India Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT (29 SOT 202) (Pune), it was
held that being resident of a treaty country is not a pre-condition to
seek non-discrimination protection under DTAA and payment to a
nonresident who is a resident of a treaty country would be adequate to
invoke non-discrimination provision.

Since the payment was made
by the taxpayer to a Japanese tax resident, the non-discrimination claim
under India-Japan DTAA was tenable2.

Scope of non-discrimination Article under India-Japan DTAA

Deduction
neutrality provision in the non-discrimination article is designed to
primarily seek parity in eligibility for deduction between payments made
to residents and those made to non-residents.
UN Model convention
commentary on Article 24(4), which is similar to Article 24(3) of
India-Japan DTAA, mentions that the relevant paragraph is designed to
end deduction discrimination where unrestricted deductions are allowed
in respect of payments made by residents to other residents but such
payments to nonresidents are restricted or prohibited.
Thus, there
cannot be discrimination regarding deductibility of expenses in respect
of payments made to Japanese residents and on which no tax has been
withheld if there is no corresponding pre-condition visà- vis payments
made to Indian residents.

Differentiation simplicitor also results in discrimination
In
Automated Securities Clearance Inc. 118 TTJ 619, the Pune Tribunal had
held that, in order to establish discrimination, the taxpayer has to
demonstrate that it has been subjected to different treatment vis-à-vis
other taxpayers, which is unreasonable, arbitrary or irrelevant.
However, since the above decision was in the context of the India-US
DTAA, it cannot be automatically applied to any other DTAA.
In
Rajeev Sureshbhai Gajwani vs. ACIT [8 ITR (Trib) 616], Special Bench of
the Tribunal has held that differentiation simplicitor in deductibility
of payment is enough to invoke non-discrimination provision.

Impact on disallowance if tax paid by recipient nonresident
Though
the exclusion in second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is in effect from
1st April 2013, several Tribunal decisions3 have held that the amendment
is retrospectively effective from 1st April 2005 when the disallowance
provision was introduced for payments made to residents. In Bharati
Shipyard4, Special Bench of Mumbai Tribunal had observed that an
amendment of a substantive provision aimed at removing unintended
consequences to make the provision workable has to be treated as
retrospective in application.
Since section 40(a)(i) does not have
exclusion clause similar to the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia),
payments made to non-residents in similar circumstances will be
disallowable. Thus, in terms of Article 24(3) of India-Japan DTAA, it
will be discrimination. Accordingly, the exclusion in section 40(a)(ia),
and its retrospective effect, should be read into section 40(a) (i) to
achieve deduction neutrality envisaged in Article 24(3) of India-Japan
DTAA.
Therefore, payments made by Indian tax residents to Japanese
tax residents without deduction of tax cannot be disallowed u/s.
40(a)(i) if the Japanese tax residents have furnished their return of
income, accounted such payments for computing income and have paid tax
due on their declared income.

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M/S.Tata Consultancy Service vs. Commercial Tax Officer Thiruvanmiyur Assessment Circle, Chennai and Another, [2012] 54 VST 477 (Mad)

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Sales Tax- Recovery of Tax- Sale of Land On Which Unit of the Seller was Situated- Bona Fide Transaction-Notice to The Purchaser- For Recovery of Arrears Of Sales Tax Dues- Of Selling Dealer- Not Permissible-Transaction Not Void, Section 24A of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts
The petitioner company had purchased land from M/S. Gum (India) Ltd. after making due enquiry and had obtained encumbrance certificate which did not disclose any encumbrance over the property in question. The sale deed was executed on 30th March, 2001. The sales tax department issued notice to the petitioner company on 26th May, 2004 to pay amount of sales tax payable by the seller namely M/S. Gum (India) Ltd. under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, for the period 1992-93 to 1998-99 on the ground that the land was purchased by the petitioner company knowing the fact that the selling dealer was in arrears of sales tax. The petitioner company filed writ petition before the Madras High Court to quash the notice issued by the sales tax department for payment of arrears of sales tax payable by the selling dealer.

Held
The High Court on facts of the case held that the petitioner had purchased the land from the selling dealer without notice of charge said to have been created on the property in question in respect of alleged arrears of sales tax payable by the vendor company. As long as the transaction, between the original assessee and petitioner-company, is not shown to be fraudulent in nature, it cannot be said that such transaction is void as per section 24A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. As the respondent had failed to establish their claim that the petitioner company had purchased the property in question, with the knowledge of liability of employees provident fund, and in respect of the arrears of sales tax said to be payable to the sales tax department, the purchase of said property by the petitioner company cannot be held as invalid in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the company and set aside the impugned notice of demand issued by the sales tax department.

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Additional Commissioner of VAT-I, Mumbai vs. Gupta Metallics & Power Ltd. [2012] 54 VST 292 ( Bom)

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Value Added Tax- Set-off- Raw Material- Coal Used as Raw Material by Manufacturer of Sponge Iron- Not Used as Fuel- Full Set-Off to Be Granted, Provision To Disallow Set-Off on Purchase of Motor Spirit Except In Certain Cases Mentioned in Rule- Dealer Not Entitled to Claim Set-Off-On Purchase of High Speed Diesel- Used As Fuel, Rs. 52(1)(a), 53, 54(b) of The Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005.

Facts
The respondent company is a manufacturer of sponge iron and used iron ore, coal and dolomite as raw materials. The respondent company claimed full set-off of tax paid on purchase of coal used as raw material and also claimed set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel. The assessing authority treated use of coal partially as raw material and partially as fuel and accordingly disallowed 50% set-off of tax paid on of purchase of coal treated used as fuel. Further, it disallowed set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel. The first appellate authority confirmed the action of the assessing authority. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and granted full set-off of tax paid on purchase of coal by treating it used as raw material and granted partial set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel. The department filed appeal before the Bombay High Court against the judgment of Tribunal.

Held
The High Court considering chemical report held that chemical qualities of non-coking coal to generate heat were used to manufacture sponge iron. Merely because heat is generated in the process it cannot be a ground to hold that non-coking coal was used as fuel. On facts the High Court held that the coal was used as raw material and not used as fuel. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the department and confirmed the judgment of Tribunal to grant full set-off of tax paid on purchase of coal by treating it used as raw material.

As regards another issue for disallowance of set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel, the High Court held that rule 54(b) creates an embargo as regards claiming set-off except cases mentioned in it, which prohibits grant of set-off on purchase of motor spirit. On account of this specific provision, the provision of rules 52 and 53 cannot be applied in favour of the respondent company. Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeal filed by the department and disallowed set-off tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel.

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National Organic Chemicals Industries Ltd vs. State of Maharashtra, [2012] 54 VST 271 (Bom)

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Central Sales Tax- Works Contract- -Supply and Laying of Pipe Line- Prior to 11-05-2002-Whether Divisible or Indivisible- Issue of Invoice Showing Value of Material- For Payment of Excise Duty- Not Relevant- On Facts- Held As Indivisible Works Contract- Not Liable to Tax- Section 2(g) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts
The applicant company entered in to contract for supply and laying of pipe lines for transportation of natural gas with Assam Gas. The company claimed exemption from payment of tax as no tax under the CST Act was applicable prior to amendment to section 2(g) of the CST Acti.e.11-5-2002, defining the term sale, to include transfer of property in goods involved in execution of works contract. The company claimed the transaction as indivisible works contract effected in the course of inter- State trade and in absence of definition of sale to include deemed sale no tax was paid under the CST Act. The assessing authority considering excise invoice issued by the company, in the name of Assam Gas, showing value of material for payment of excise duty and other terms of the contract held the contract as divisible works contract one for supply of pipes and other for installation and levied tax under the CST Act. The appellate authority as well as Tribunal up held the levy of tax under the CST Act by the assessing authority. The Tribunal at the instance of Company referred question of law before the Bombay High Court.

Held
The authorities below erred in placing reliance on the invoices which were raised by the applicant company to only comply with the excise duty provisions.The High Court considering various clauses of agreement held that the transaction between the company and Assam Gas was indivisible inter-State works contract. The liability to pay tax under the CST Act would arise only after 11-05-2002 from which the section 2(g) was amended. Since the transaction pertains to period prior to 11-05- 202 no tax under the CST Act is payable. The High Court accordingly answered the question of law in favour of the applicant company.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 435 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad vs. Amitdeep Motors

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Classification of Service – Commission received for procuring orders and peripheral activities – dominant nature of service – Not a C&F Agent Services.

Facts:
The respondent assessee was an authorized dealer of M/s. Maruti Udyog Ltd (‘MUL’). Apart from procuring orders from the Government department like BSF, CRPF & State Police etc., it conducted pre-delivery inspection, giving coupons for free after-sales services, etc. and also arranged waybill or entry permit required for the dispatch of the vehicle and received commission from MUL for such services rendered. Revenue sought to tax the activities under Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services stating that definition of C&F agent service was wide enough to cover these activities. Commissioner (Appeals) decided in favor of the assessee.

 Held:
The Hon’ble Delhi Tribunal held that it is an accepted fact that one of the crucial elements of C&F agent service is that it works on the direction of the principal. In the present case the respondent was actually taking orders from the Government departments and therefore it was basically facilitating the supply of cars to them and earning commission from MUL. Therefore, this crucial element was absent. This fact was also clear from the observations made by the Commissioner (Appeals). It was also noted that before the Commissioner (Appeals), assessee vehemently contended that they have never physically received and stored the goods in their premises but the goods were physically delivered by MUL to the customers. In this factual background and relying upon the decision of the Delhi Tribunal (LB) in the case of Larsen & Toubro vs. CCE 2006 (3) S.T.R. 321 (Tri. – LB), it was concluded that procuring the order from the Government departments was the main element of the impugned service and any peripheral aspects thereof would not bring it within the scope of C&F Agent Service. Note: It appears that Tribunal has taken a view that activity concerning supply of cars was in fact a service to Government departments from which assessee did not receive any consideration. The commission received from MUL was only for procuring the orders. In Larsen & Toubro’s case (supra) it was held that, clearing and forwarding activities do not flow directly or indirectly from mere procurement of orders. The activity of procuring orders is treated separately by Parliament under Business Auxiliary Service and independent of clearing and forwarding operations. This case has also been affirmed by the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in 2008 (10) STR 229. Reader may also refer to the Tribunal decision in Transasia Sales Syndicate case which is affirmed by Hon’ble SC in [2014] 50 taxmann.com 438 (SC).

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 434 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) Aims Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise Daman

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Repairs and maintenance of gas cylinders – no service tax paid on sale of valve which is separately indicated on invoice – CENVAT on such input requires reversal being ‘inputs’ cleared as such – matter remanded.

Facts:
Assessee was supplying valves in course of repair and maintenance of gas cylinders and
did not pay service tax thereon. CENVAT Credit was taken of duty paid on the said valves. Revenue included value of valves in the value of services. It was argued that, VAT was paid on supply of valves and therefore, same was not includible in value of services. Revenue contended that since credit was taken on valves, exemption under Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 could not be allowed.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal observed that from the invoices it is not clear whether VAT is paid on the sale of valves as claimed and therefore remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority for such verification. It was also held that even if it is accepted that while providing the services there is sale of valves the same will amount to clearing of inputs as such on which CENVAT Credit is required to be reversed at the time of clearance as per CENVAT Credit Rules 2004.

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Accept the Vodafone decision with grace, make a new beginning!

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When one scans the morning papers one often reads about government officials acting high-handedly, irrationally and with blatant disregard for public interest. It was therefore heartening to note that the Attorney General of India had advised the government not to appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court in Vodafone’s case. It is learnt that the CBDT chairman is of the view that the decision should be accepted. This is exactly the manner in which government officials holding high positions are expected to act. They must advise the government based on their expert knowledge of the subject and not tender that advice, which those who seek it want to hear.

When Mr. Modi assumed power at the end of May, his promise to the people was fair and equitable laws. In fact he has stated on a number of occasions that while new laws in the interest of the citizen needed to be enacted, several others which had clearly outlived their utility, and were causing unnecessary bottlenecks in the development process, needed to be annulled.

More than the complex and cumbersome laws, it is the irrational interpretation and implementation by overzealous tax officials that causes harassment to law abiding and diligent citizens. Indiscriminate additions in transfer pricing assessments is one such area. While undoubtedly, legislation in this regard was required as a large number of multinationals were shifting profits outside the country of source that is India. The object of transfer pricing legislation is to ensure that India got its fair share of tax. Unfortunately, the provisions are being treated as a revenue gathering measure with extreme interpretations and high-pitched assessments. This has created a great deal of uncertainty in the minds of the foreign investors. In fact, many transfer pricing assessments have virtually turned into tax terrorism. If the government does heed to the advice of its Attorney General, and accepts the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Vodafone case, then it will be a welcome step indeed.

While one must ensure that the unscrupulous do not get away, there needs to be a change in the mindset of officials that often tends to treat a taxpayer as a criminal. What is the need of the hour is fair laws, total transparency in legislating them, and administration of the enacted laws with a human face. A citizen would not mind paying a little higher tax if he were to be treated fairly. Those who interpret the law equitably must be encouraged. Whenever possible uncertainty must be removed. Safe harbour rules are a step in the right direction. Those, however. need to be realistic.

In the area of direct taxes, there are some provisions which treat a taxpayer unfairly. One set of them is relating to tax deduction at source. A majority of deductors discharge the obligation cast on them to deduct taxes diligently. In fact, the collection of taxes is the responsibility of the sovereign, which has been passed on to tax payers. Deduction of tax is therefore a service for which a person receives no payment. In such a situation, justice demands that as long a person acts bona fide, and discharges his obligation based on an honest interpretation of law, he must not be penalised. Similarly, in regard to the procedures for filing of statements, they must be streamlined and the processes be made more user-friendly. If the efficient discharge of this obligation can be appreciated in some mode that would be even better. So much for the deductor. As regards the recipient of income, once he establishes the fact that such tax has been withheld, then there must be a mechanism where after a due process of verification he is given credit for the same without him having to depend on the deductors filing a statement and completing all the processes. This is more so when the deductor is the government or a government undertaking. There are several instances where government departments have deducted tax but have not filed the statements. No action is taken in such cases.

Another area of grievance is adherence to timelines and efficient dispensation of justice in the tax field. While a taxpayer is required to comply with all the deadlines, in many cases there is not much of an obligation to act expeditiously on the tax administrator. While the tax payer is penalised for not acting within the time prescribed, there is no such penalty for the administrator. Whatever limitations and timelines are prescribed in the statute are for the lower end of the tax administration hierarchy. For instance, there is absolutely no time limit in which the first appellate authority needs to dispose of an appeal. There is also no timeline for disposal of the second appeal. There is no time line for disposing application u/s. 264. There may be administrative problems for which the citizen is not responsible. In this situation the hapless taxpayer is put to great hardship. Even when grievances are redressed the redress must be in substance and not in form. We often find orders passed in a cavalier manner so that the rounds of litigation increase. Each authority blames the lower one. Significant change in laws and procedures is necessary to achieve speedy dispensation of justice.

There are great expectations from the new government. At the time the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014 was introduced, the new Finance Minister had hardly any time to fulfil what was promised. The budget to be presented in February 2015 provides a great opportunity to this government to establish that it means business. It is time that the broom which has been thrown away by one political party in the capital is caught hold of by the Prime Minister and his men and all the cobwebs in the tax administration are cleaned. What citizens want is lesser laws but more justice.

The year 2014 is coming to an end. It has been the year in which change has occurred, and expectations are rising. One hopes that the year 2015 will see some of the dreams fulfilled.

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The Difficult Path

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“Two paths diverged in the woods. I took the one less travelled and that has made all the difference.”
–Robert Frost.

In life there are two paths. One is a well beaten path travelled upon by most of the people. It is an easy path. The journey on the same is comfortable. But at the end of the journey one, is at the same level as the one with which one started.

The other path is the one which is less travelled upon. It is difficult. It is uphill and one has to struggle to progress on this path. The end of the journey sees one at a far greater height. One may be breathless, but one would be very happy and satisfied.

The first one is called the “Preya” path in Upanishads; the second “Shreya”.

When one looks around, one finds that the present generation is better fed, better educated, lives longer, and is relatively healthier than the earlier ones. However, this is true only of the upper crust of the society. For most of the others, things have not improved. Most of them are poor and have no food, water, or shelter and no education. Closing our eyes to the problems and miseries of these people is selecting the first path. Deciding to work for them, committing our time, money and resources is the second path, the path less travelled upon. I, as at a very late age in my life decided to take the second path, and regret not having taken it earlier.

When I see the sufferings of my fellow beings, my heart bleeds. I do see around me several people who are well to do, but who are not doing anything to help the poor and needy. A question arises that though we are all good people, why do we not help? Why do we hesitate to take the second path? Those who hesitate can be divided in three different categories.

(1) The first set is of people are completely in oblivion of the plight of others. They are like Prince Siddharth before he became Gautam Buddha! They need to be awakened and made aware of the sufferings of the others.

(2) There are others who are vaguely aware of the situation but are not moved to help. Sufficient empathy has not arisen in their hearts for the suffering lot.

(3) The last class of people who are aware of the problem, who want to do something, but just do not know what to do? How to do? Where to start? They are helpless. They feel helpless.

For the first type of persons who are just unaware of the sufferings we have to make them see the sufferings of the poor. It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. But a visit to any of these places where our poor and needy stay is worth a thousand pictures. If we can expose these people, particularly of the younger generation, to the sufferings of the poor, some of them are bound to be touched by what they see.

This applies equally to the second category of persons who lack empathy. Maybe a stronger dose of the same medicine will put them on the right path.

The third category of people is of persons who want to do, but do not know how. They have to be shown the work done with dedication without seeking rewards by our silent workers, our unsung heroes. This will give them direction and motivate them to start treading the path less travelled.

Friends, we are at a time in history when our country needs us. Quoting President Kennedy, “We have not to ask what our country would do for us, but ask ourselves what we can do for our country”. It is for us, the educated, the well to do, to make a difference in the lives of our poor and needy brethren. Let us leave our foot prints on the sands of time. Moreover, each one of us seeks happiness – nay – eternal happiness. This comes from serving the poor. Friends, let us take this path, though difficult, to live in happiness. To serve the poor is the highest form of spirituality – something which illuminates the human mind. But it is difficult. I would conclude by quoting from Kathopanishad:

“Like the sharp edge of a razor is that path, difficult to cross and hard to tread”

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[2014] 35 S.T.R. 351 (Tri. – Ahmd.) S.V. Jiwani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & S.T.

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Provisions of Rule 2(A) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 applicable only when value cannot be determined u/s. 67(1)(2)(3) of the Finance Act and Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007 is optional.

Facts:
Appellant were awarded a contract for setting up plant and service tax was discharged on the entire value of the contract under works contract service and CENVAT Credit was availed on inputs and input services. Department contended that under works contact services there is no option to pay tax at the full rate and thus the availment and utilisation of CENVAT Credit was incorrect.

Held:
The expression “subject to the provisions of section 67” under Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules means that if value of services involved in execution of works contract service cannot be determined u/s. 67 then only Rule 2A would apply. Rule 3(1) of the Composition Rules is merely an option provided to discharge the service tax liability and hence CENVAT Credit on inputs and input services is available since tax has been discharged @ full rate on the entire value of the contract u/s. 67 being a statutory provision of the Act.

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[2014] 36 S.T.R. 545 (Tri.-Del) Gurmehar Construction vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur

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Following Bhayana Builders free supply of material by the service recipient is not includible in the gross value of taxable service. Interest is not chargeable when CENVAT Credit is reversed before utilisation.

Facts:
The Appellant received free supply of diesel from the service recipient for rendering taxable service. The department included the value of free supplies in the assessable value u/s. 67 of the Finance Act. Further interest was demanded on wrong availment of CENVAT Credit which was reversed without utilisation.

Held:
Tribunal relying on the decision of the larger bench in the case of Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Service Tax, held value of free supplies is not includible in the gross amount charged. Relying on the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd 2012 (26) S.T.R. 204 (Kar), where the Court taking due note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. 2012(25) S.T.R. 184 (S.C.) concluded “that Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable” the Tribunal held that interest is not chargeable when CENVAT Credit was reversed without utilisation.

Note: It was noted by the Tribunal, the decision of the CESTAT, Mumbai in the case of Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd 2014 (301) E.L.T. 573 (Tri.) distinguishing the decision of the Karnataka High Court that when a judgment is sought to be distinguished, the difference in the facts should be such so as to have a material effect on the findings contained in the judgment. The Bench further stated that they are legally bound by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in absence of any judgment to the contrary of any other Court equivalent or superior to it.

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[2014] 36 STR 83 (Tri.-Mum.) Samarth Sevabhavi Trust vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Aurangabad

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Activity of harvesting and transporting sugarcane does not amount to provision of supply of manpower services. Demand cannot be confirmed on the basis of wrong understanding of the Appellants or any other person i.e. merely because the Appellants had agreed that the activity to be classified as supply of manpower services in the statement recorded, the same cannot be taken as a base to confirm service tax demand.

Facts:
The farmers had contracted with the sugar factory for the sale of sugarcane. The Appellant entered into an agreement for cutting/harvesting sugarcane and transporting the same from field to factory. There was an arrangement with truck owners and their labourers to harvest sugarcane and transport it to the factory who agreed to pay charges on the basis of tonnage of sugarcane supplied. It paid commission to contractors as a percentage of harvesting and transportation charges. All the payments were first received by the Appellant and distributed to the contractors who in turn were paid supervision charges to undertake the transactions. Department classified the services as supply of manpower services. It was claimed that only payment was routed through them and there was no element of provision of supply of manpower services. Even if the services of labourers were to be taxed, the same may be classified as business auxiliary services. In absence of issuance of Show Cause Notice and issuance of order under business auxiliary services, the Show Cause Notice and Order are bad in Law.

The revenue, on the other hand, contended that the employees representing the Appellant agreed that the activities amounted to supply of manpower vide the statements recorded by the Adjudicating Authority.

Held:
After analysing the agreements, it was observed that the agreement was for cutting and transporting sugarcane and there was no provision of supply of manpower services. Relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in case of Amrit Sanjivni Sugarcane Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. vide Order No. A/532/2013/CSTB/C-1 dated 02-04- 201302-04- 2013, it was held that the services were in the nature of business auxiliary services. Merely because in the statements, the classification of services was agreed as supply of manpower services, the same cannot be taken as a valid ground for demand of service tax. Demand should be made in accordance with the law, taking into account the nature of contract. In no case, demand should be confirmed on the basis of wrong understanding of the Appellant or any other person. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the department was directed to refund the amount of pre-deposit.

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[2014] 36 STR 102 (Tri.-Mum.) Calderys India Refractories Ltd. vs. C. C. E., Aurangabad

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Promptness in payment of service tax, reflection of transactions in Balance Sheets and revenue neutrality were evidences of a bonafide case for non-levy of penalty u/ss. 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellants on detection paid service tax with interest immediately and filed a letter with the department stating that since service tax with interest was paid and since the non-payment was unintentional, no penalties should be levied on them.

Further with effect from 10-05-2008 when section 78 is invoked, no penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 is payable. It was contested that since the liability pertained to January, 2009, penalty cannot be levied under section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the dropping of penalty u/s. 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was pleaded on factual grounds. It was argued that they did not suppress any information with an intention to evade service tax and this was a bonafide case.

The department contended that the issue was noticed only when the audit party examined the records and therefore, there was suppression of facts.

Held:
In view of amendment to section 78 during the relevant period, penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was not sustainable in Law. The payment of service tax was made immediately on discovery and was intimated to the department much before the issuance of Show Cause Notice, the transaction was already reflected in respective Balance Sheets. Accordingly, it was evident that there was no intention to suppress facts. Further, since it was a case of reverse charge mechanism, the situation was revenue neutral in view of CENVAT Credit available to the Appellants. Relying on the decision of Ahmedabad Tribunal in case of Essar Steel Ltd. 2009 (13) STR 579 (Tri.-Ahmd.), it was held that penalty was not imposable u/ss. 77 and 78 vide section 73(3) read with section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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[2014] 36 STR 199 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Toyota Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. of C. Ex., Daman

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Slow-down in realty sector held to be a reasonable cause for invocation of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellants filed service tax returns, however, there was a delay in payment of service tax. The department demanded interest and penalty on the same. An appeal was filed with the contention that since there was a slow-down in realty sector, they were unable to pay service tax in time.

Held:
Having regard to facts of the case, the Tribunal invoked provision of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 as there was a reasonable cause for failure in payment of service tax in time and penalty u/s. 76 was waived off.

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[2014] 36 STR 96 (Tri.-Mum.) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai vs. Diotech India Ltd.

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Non-refundable registration fees for e-commerce forms part of value of taxable services leviable to service tax.

Facts:
The Respondents were in the business of providing website and e-learning in electronic form and were also engaged in trading of consumer goods and branded goods and were registered under the category of online information and database access or retrieval services. The department alleged that the registration fees charged should form part of value of taxable services since the same was non-refundable. The fees were adjusted in the first purchase made by the online buyer and even in case of no purchases by the online user, these fees were not refundable. Since the charges were never declared or shown in returns, extended period of limitation was invoked.

Held:
Since the registration fee was not refundable, it would be added to the gross value of taxable services, leviable to service tax. Since only on scrutiny of records by the department, the issue was noticed, it was a case of suppression of facts with intent to evade service tax and therefore, extended period of limitation was justified.

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30. [2014] 36 STR 78 (Tri.-Bang) Aacess Equipments vs. Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex., Hyderabad – IV

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Promptness in making payment could be considered to be reasonable cause to waive penalty u/s. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellant contended that he was under a bonafide belief that service tax was supposed to be paid by the service provider in case of GTA services. Further, on being pointed out by the department, Service tax liability under reverse charge mechanism was paid immediately. The revenue argued that since the liability was not contested, extended period of limitation was rightly invoked and the pertinent reason for failure to pay service tax was ignorance, which was not a reasonable cause to waive off penalties.

Held:
The Appellant was a proprietorship concern and not supported by any professional person. Layman would generally believe that service tax has to be paid by service provider. Further, service tax was paid immediately with interest on detection. Accordingly, having regard to the promptness and peculiar circumstances of the case, penalty u/s. 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was set aside by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 389 (Karnataka) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Large Taxpayers Unit vs. Fosroc Chemicals (India) (P.) Ltd.

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Supply of final product to SEZ ‘developer’ – Period Prior to 31-12-2008 – No reversal of CENVAT credit under Rule 6 – Notification No. 50/2008-C.E.(N.T.) dated 31-12-2008 held retrospective.

Facts:
Assessee – manufacturer made clearance of their final products to SEZ developers without payment of duty against letters of undertaking (LUT) during the period January, 2006 to December, 2006. CENVAT Credit of the duty paid on inputs attributable to supplies made to SEZ developer was not reversed. The revenue sought reversal of appropriate CENVAT Credit under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The Assessee filed an appeal before the CESTAT, Bangalore and argued that in view of amendment carried out in Rule 6(6)(i) vide Notification No.50/2008-CE(NT) dated 31-12-2008, no reversal was required in case of clearances to SEZ Developers and the said notification is clarificatory and therefore has retrospective applicability. Tribunal allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the revenue appealed before the High Court.

Held:
The High Court observed that section 51 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 overrides the provision of all other laws for the time being in force. This section therefore overreaches and eclipses the provisions of any other law containing provisions contrary to the SEZ Act, 2005. Though the definition of the word ‘export’ in the SEZ Act, in section 2(m) included supply of goods to a ‘Unit’ or ‘Developer’, in Rule 6(6)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 the word ‘Developer’ was conspicuously missing and only ‘Unit’ was included before the 2008 amendment. It is in that context the aforesaid amendment by Notification No.50/2008 CE (N.T) dated 31-12-2008 was brought in, to clarify the doubt. Further, by reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor has any penal consequence been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby. Therefore, it was held that the said amendment is clarificatory in nature. This was also clarified from Clause 4 of CBEC circular bearing No.29/2006-Cus. dated 27-12-2006.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 225 (Punjab & Haryana) Neel Metal Products Ltd vs. CCE

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Section 11A of the Central Excise Act – payment of differential duty at the time of issue of supplementary invoices – SCN issued after one year for demanding ‘interest’ on such differential duties paid by the assessee – Held, such notices are barred by limitation.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of auto components, sheet metal components and tools entered into long term contracts with automobile companies for sale of finished excisable goods. On price revision, differential excise duty was paid at the time of issue of supplementary invoices. The question is whether the liability to pay interest on differential excise duty already paid at the time of issue of supplementary invoices would continue and can be demanded beyond the normal period of limitation of one year from the date of supplementary invoice u/s. 11A read with section 11AB of the Act?

Held
The High Court observed that the matter was squarely covered by its decision in the case of Jai Bharat Maruti Ltd.’s case [2014] 50 taxmann.com 224. It also observed that the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kwality Ice Cream Company vs. UOI 2012 (281) ELT 507 (Del) and decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner vs. TVS Whirlpool Ltd. 2000 (119) ELT A 177 (SC) are the leading authorities which answer the question in favour of the assessee. The Supreme Court has held that, the period of limitation that applies to a claim for the principal amount should also apply to the claim for interest thereon. Based on this principle laid down by the Apex Court, the appeal was allowed and notices demanding interest were held without jurisdiction.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 31 (Allahabad) Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise vs. J.P. Transformers

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Repairs & Maintenance of Transformers – no service tax paid on material on which Excise/ Sales Tax is paid and separately indicated on invoice – Notification No. 12/2003, dated 20-06-2003.

Facts:
Assessee was engaged in the manufacture as well as repairs and maintenance of electrical transformers. By virtue of Notification No. 12/2003 dated 20-06-2003, service tax was paid only on labour charges recovered from the customer. It was contended that the contract being a composite contract of service of repairing transformers, it was required to pay the service tax on the total contracted value, including consumables and items used in the repair of the transformers. Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the Assessee. Aggrieved by the same, revenue filed appeal before the High Court.

Held:
The High Court observed that Tribunal has given its decision based on undisputed finding of fact that the value of the goods and materials utilised for repair of the transformers is separately disclosed in the agreement and in the invoices and excise duty/value added tax has been paid on goods used in the repairing process. Therefore, since there is no substantial question of law the appeal is dismissed. It was also noted that, reliance placed by the Tribunal on its own decision in the case of Balaji Tirupati Enterprises vs. CCE [2014] 43 taxmann.com 42 (New Delhi-CESTAT), which is subsequently upheld by the High Court has also not been disputed in the Appeal Memo.

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[2014] 36 STR 288 (Cal.) Mohta Technocrafts Pvt. Ltd. vs. CESTAT, Kolkata

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Stay application disposed by Tribunal on the reasons of non-coooperation with the adjudicating authority and new grounds taken before it for the first time, was held to be inappropriate.

Facts:
The Appellant filed writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal rejecting the application for waiver of predeposit on the reasons of alleged non-cooperation at the time of adjudication and since new pleas were raised for the first time before it.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court, held that the alleged noncooperation was absent and that the Tribunal’s finding was contrary to the records available and also reason for new plea was perverse. It was held that it is a settled position of law that Tribunal while dealing with application for seeking waiver of pre-deposit shall record the prima facie case and unjust financial hardship and thus the matter was remanded for consideration afresh.

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[2014] 36 STR 271 (Cal) Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI

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The High Court may entertain a writ petition in spite of alternate remedy being available, if it is filed for enforcement of fundamental right or actions/proceedings initiated, are in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction.

Facts:
The Appellant preferred writ petition against the issuance of Show Cause Notice demanding service tax under “Business Auxiliary Service” (BAS) without mentioning the sub-clause of BAS under which service tax was alleged to be leviable and extended period of limitation was invoked on account of suppression of facts and contravention of provisions with intention to evade tax. Department took preliminary objection to the maintainability of petition since Appellant had an equally efficacious alternative remedy of adjudication before adjudicating authority.

Held:
It was held that normally High Court does not entertain a writ petition where an alternate remedy is available. However, if a writ petition is filed for enforcement of fundamental right or if it proves that actions/proceedings initiated are in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction, High Court can intervene and pass appropriate orders. From the records, it was observed that facts of the case were known to the department from beginning and a mere failure to declare does not amount to willful suppression. The initial onus of providing materials to invoke section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, is with the department. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the assessee. In the present case, department failed to discharge their initial onus. The Show Cause Notice even did not mention the relevant sub-Clause of BAS. Accordingly, the Show Cause Notice was held to be issued without jurisdiction and was set aside.

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[2014] 36 STR 269 (All.) CC Customs & Ex. Kanpur vs. J P Transformers

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The Tribunal does not have power to extend the Stay beyond the statutory period of 365 days.

Facts:
Revenue preferred the present appeal challenging the order of Tribunal extending period of Stay beyond 365 days ignoring the third proviso to section 35C (2A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Further, no reason was given for not disposing appeal within 365 days.

Held:

The third proviso undoubtedly bars and prohibits Tribunal from extending the interim Stay Order beyond 365 days. It stipulates deemed vacation and imposes no fault consequences in strict terms. In the instant case, Tribunal had recorded finding that it could not dispose appeal for no fault of the assessee. The Supreme Court in case of Kumar Cotton Mills P. Ltd. 2005 (180) ELT 434 (SC) held that the amendment in third proviso to section 35C(2A) of the Central Excise Act, cannot be interpreted to give powers to the Tribunal to extend the Stay Orders indefinitely. The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the Appeal expeditiously.

(Note: On an identical issue, the Karnataka High Court in CIT, Bangalore vs. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading P. Ltd 2014 (35) STR 320 and the Delhi High Court in Comm. of Income Tax-II vs. Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 284 had held that the Tribunal cannot extend the Stay beyond statutory period of 365 days.)

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[2014] 36 STR 241 (Bom.) Tech Mahindra Ltd. vs. CCEx. Pune-III

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No refund of CENVAT Credit on the onsite services not provided from India, since it does not fulfill the conditions of export of services.

Facts:
The Appellant, an Indian entity entered into a contract to develop software for a US based customer. The offsite activities were performed in India and onsite activities were carried out by the Appellant’s US based subsidiary. There was no privity of contract between the US based subsidiary and the customer. The subsidiary billed the Appellant for the work done by it. The services provided to the customer were claimed to be export of services. For the payments made to its subsidiary, service tax was discharged considering it to be import of services and was claimed as CENVAT Credit and being unable to utilise, applied for refund.

Department after allowing refund claim in totality for initial years, rejected the claim proportionately to the extent of onsite services for subsequent years stating that onsite activities were not provided from India and therefore, there was violation of condition of Rule 3(2)(a) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005.

It was argued that if the onsite services were held to be not provided from India then the same would not take colour of import of services and therefore, service tax pad thereon should be eligible for refund u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Held:
High Court observed that onsite services were admittedly rendered by the US subsidiary to the customer and there was no privity of contract between them and hence could not be regarded as export of services since the condition that the services should be provided from India, was not fulfilled and thus no refund proportionate to onsite services was granted. Further, the alternative argument in respect of refund was not entertained by the Court since an application for refund under the same was not made.

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[2014] 36 STR 3 (Guj.) Sadguru Construction Co. vs. Union of India

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Payment between 01-03-2013 and 10-05-2013, i.e., till enactment of Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES), could be covered within the definition of “tax dues” under VCES in view of express statutory provisions.

Payments made under duress are in the nature of deposits till crystallisation of tax liability by way of passing an adjudication order, Circulars, contrary to statutory provisions, are bad in law.

Facts:
Petitioners faced an inquiry on 08-03-2013 and deposited some amount under duress between 09-03-2013 to 15-04-2013 in respect of service tax liability upto 31- 03-2013. To get immunity from interest, penalty and other proceedings, it was claimed that payments made between 09-03-2013 to 15-03-2013 were covered within the definition of “tax dues” and should be considered as made under VCES, since it remains unpaid as on 01- 03-2013. The department, following CBEC circular No. 170/5/2013-S dated 08-08-2013, contended that the amount deposited before enactment of VCES i.e. 10- 05-2013 cannot be included in the declaration under VCES. It was argued that the department cannot rely on a circular which overrides statutory provisions of the law i.e. definition of ‘tax dues’ under VCES.

Held:
Having regard to the definition of “tax dues” and provisions pertaining to the person eligible to make declaration, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the position of a declarant vis-à-vis his service tax dues would have to be ascertained as on 01-03-2013. If any proceedings were pending on 01-03-2013, then declaration cannot be accepted. Further, the arrears of tax dues between 01-10- 2007 to 31-12-2012, unpaid till 01-03-2013 could only be declared. Since there was no inquiry pending and the tax dues were unpaid as on 01-03-2013, the benefit of VCES could not be denied. The amount was under duress and was in the nature of deposit in absence of crystallisation of tax liability by passing an adjudication order. Further, clarification cannot override statutory provisions of the statute and if they are contrary to provisions, the clarifications would be invalid.

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Sale in course of export, whether within the purview of the Local Act?

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Introduction
The sales or purchases taking place in the course of import/export are immune from sales tax as per Article 286 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, such transactions are exempt from sales tax (VAT). The transactions of export sales and sale in the course of export are defined in section 5(1) & 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 (CST) as under;

Section 5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export. –

(1) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India, only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s.(1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.

Controversy
A controversy that had arisen and still remains, is as to whether the export sale is to be first considered as effected within the State in which the goods for export are ascertained and then categorised as ‘export sale’? If the sales are first considered as sales within the State from which export is made then they will form part of the turnover in the said State and then deduction will be given towards export sale. This will have a number of implications as per provisions of the Local Act. On the other hand, if it is considered that they are outside the purview of the Local Act then they will not form part of the turnover in that State and will remain outside the turnover. This may also have its own repercussions as per provisions of the Local Act.

Issue before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court
A controversy arose before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in respect of interpretation of Rule 42H of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules (BST). The Hon’ble Bombay High Court has reproduced the rule, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below:

“R. 42H. Drawback, setoff etc. of tax paid on goods purchased by a dealer liable for levy of value added of sales tax on goods specified in Schedule C.

(1) While assessing the amount of tax payable by a Registered dealer (hereinafter, in this rule, referred to as “the claimant dealer”) in respect of any period starting on or after the 1st October 1995 on his sales of goods (being goods in respect of which the deduction from turnover of sales has not been allowed under sub-section (1) of section 8 because of the provision contained in s/s. (3) or, as the case may be, in sub-section (3A) of section 12A, the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of sub Rule (2), grant him drawback, setoff or, as the case may be, a refund of aggregate of the sums determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 44D in respect of purchase of such goods including the goods used for packing of such goods.

Provided that, drawback, set off or, as the case may be, refund under this rule shall not exceed the tax payable on the sale of such goods, not being sales against any declaration or certificate prescribed under the Act, Rules or as the case may be, any entry of Schedule to the notification issued u/s. 41:

Provided further that, if the dealer effects any sales by way of a delivery of goods as hire purchase of any system of payment by instalments, then the amount of drawback, setoff, or as the case may be, refund under this rule shall be in proportion to the purchase price of that instalment.”

The appellant dealer has sold goods against form 14B, so as to claim exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act,1956 r/w Rule 21A of the BST Rules.

The department interpreted that since the sales covered by section 5(3) cannot be said to be disallowed because of section 12A of the BST Act,1959, the set off is not admissible on the purchases relating to such sales under rule 42H. On the other hand, the dealer was canvassing that first it is a local sale covered by BST Act, 1959 and since resale is not admissible, he has sold the goods against form 14B and hence, set off is admissible.

After noting the controversy, as above, the Hon’ble High Court observed as under in relation to nature of sales effected u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act:

“13) A bare perusal of this Rule would indicate that a dealer may make a claim that he is not liable to pay tax under the BST in respect of his sale of goods on the ground that the sale of such goods is a sale in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the CST. He can therefore produce a certificate in the Form referred by us above along with evidence of export of such goods and claim exemption in respect of the liability to pay the Sales Tax. Pertinently, this form has to be filled in and signed by the exporter to whom the goods are sold. Section 5 of the CST contains s/s. (3). Section 5 has been inserted in the CST so as to determine as to when a sale or purchase of goods can be said to be taking place in the course of import or export. Sub-Section (3) was inserted therein with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1976, which reads as under:

“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s. (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.” 14) A bare perusal thereof would indicate that the same has been inserted so as to take out of the purview of the provision namely, section 5, the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India. That is also deemed to be in the course of such export, provided such last sale or purchase took place after and was for the purpose of complying with an agreement or order for or in relation to such export. Ordinarily this would not have been within the purview of sub-section (1) of section 5. Therefore, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 5, such sale or purchase is also deemed to be in the course of the export. This aspect becomes clear if one peruses section 75 of the BST, which specifically excludes, from the purview of the BST, certain sales and purchases. This section reads as under:

Section 75 Certain sales and purchases not to be liable to tax.
Nothing in this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be deemed to impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on any sale or purchase of any goods, where such sale or purchase takes place (a) (i) outside the State; or (ii) in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India, or the export of the goods out of such territory; or (b) in the course of interstate trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act and the said rules shall be read and construed accordingly.

Explanation. For the purpose of this section whether a sale or purchase takes place
(i) outside the State, or
(ii) in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India or export of the goods out of such territory, or
(iii) in the course of interstate trade or commerce, shall be determined in accordance with the principles specified in section 3, 4 and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.”

15)    Therefore, the sales and purchases which are not liable to tax under the BST by virtue of section 75 have been rightly excluded or taken out of the purview of Rule 42H and that is the only interpretation which can be placed on the said Rule. If one peruses section 5 and particularly s/s. (1) and s/s. (3) of the CST together with section 75 of the BST, Rule 21A of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, Form N14B harmoniously and together, it would be apparent that what is not within the purview of the BST can never be brought in for the purposes of claiming a deduction or setoff under Rule 42H. If that is the intent of legislature and it has been given effect to by the Tribunal in the impugned order, then we do not find that its conclusion  is vitiated.”

Conclusion

From the above  observations,  an  inference  arises  that the sales covered u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act cannot  be considered as within the purview of Local Act. The implication is that it cannot be clubbed into turnover under Local Act at all. However, there are earlier judgments like M/s. Onkarlal Nandlal vs.State of Rajasthan (60 STC 314)(SC) and also N. D. Georgopoulos vs. State of Maharashtra (37 STC 187)(bom), wherein it was held that the situs of export sale is in the State, from where the sale is effected i.e., from where the export is made. In other words, it is first considered to be within purview of the Local Act and then the deduction.

The above judgment of the Bombay High Court creates a different scenario. This will certainly be a pointer for debate and a further judgment may have to be awaited to get the clarity.

TIME LIMIT FOR AVAILING CENVAT CREDIT

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Preliminary
For the first time, since the introduction of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR, 2004) with effect from 10-09-2004, time limit has been introduced (with effect from 01-09- 2014) for availing CENVAT Credit on inputs and input services. Similar time limit was introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules in the year 1995. However, the same was withdrawn in the year 2000 when CENVAT Rules were introduced in supersession of MODVAT Rules.

An analysis of implications arising from the newly introduced time limit under CCR 2004 and related larger issues are discussed hereafter.

CENVAT (earlier MODVA T) is a substantive right

Some important observations by the Supreme Court, in the context of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme, are very much relevant for CCR 2004 as well, are as under:

Observations of Supreme Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. UOI (1999) 106 ELT 3 (SC)

In the context of specific provisions that were introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules for lapsing of unutilised credit in specific cases, the following observations were made by the Supreme Court

Para 5
…………

In 1995-96 Budget Modvat Scheme was liberalised/ simplified and the credit earned on any input was allowed to be utilised for payment of duty on any final product manufactured within the same factory irrespective of whether such inputs were used in its manufacture or not.…….. The stand of the assessee is that they have utilised the facility of paying excise duty on the inputs and carried the credit towards excise duty payable on the finished products. For the purpose of utilisation of the credit all vestitive facts or necessary incidents thereto have taken place prior to 16-03-1995 or utilisation of the finished products prior to 16-03-1995. Thus, the assessee became entitled to take the credit of the input instantaneously once the input is received in the factory on the basis of the existing scheme….. the right to the credit has become absolute at any rate when the input is used in the manufacture of the final product. The basic postulate, that the scheme is merely being altered and, therefore, does not have any retrospective or retro-active effect, submitted on behalf of the State, does not appeal to us. As pointed out by us that when on the strength of the rules available certain acts have been done by the parties concerned, incidents following thereto must take place in accordance with the scheme under which the duty had been paid on the manufactured products and if such a situation is sought to be altered, necessarily it follows that right, which had accrued to a party such as availability of a scheme, is affected and, in particular, it loses sight of the fact that provision for facility of credit is as good as tax paid till tax is adjusted on future goods on the basis of the several commitments which would have been made by the assessees concerned. Therefore, the scheme sought to be introduced cannot be made applicable to the goods which had already come into existence in respect of which the earlier scheme was applied under which the assessees had availed of the credit facility for payment of taxes. It is on the basis of the earlier scheme necessarily the taxes have to be adjusted and payment made complete. Any manner or mode of application of the said rule would result in affecting the rights of the assessees.

Para 6

We may look at the matter from another angle. If on the inputs the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are finished subsequently. Thus, a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the raw materials or the inputs and that right would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed.

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC)

Para 17
………..
It is clear from these Rules, as we read them, that a manufacturer obtains credit for the excise duty paid on raw material to be used by him in the production of an excisable product immediately it makes the requisite declaration and obtain an acknowledgement thereof. It is entitled to use the credit at any time thereafter when making payment of excise duty on the excisable product. There is no provision in the Rules which provides for a reversal of the credit by the excise authorities except where it has been illegally or irregularly taken, in which event it stands cancelled or, if utilised, has to be paid for. We are here really concerned with credit that has been validly taken, and its benefit is available to the manufacturer without any limitation in time or otherwise unless the manufacturer itself chooses not to use the raw material in its excisable product. The credit is, therefore, indefeasible. It should also be noted that there is no co–relation of the raw material and the final product; that is to say, it is not as if credit can be taken only on a final product that is manufactured out of the particular raw material to which the credit is related. The credit may be taken against the excise duty on a final product manufactured on the very day that it becomes available.

Para 18

It is therefore, that in the case of Eicher Motors vs. Union of India (1999) 106 ELT 3 this Court said that a credit under the MODVAT Scheme was “as good as tax paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of judicial forums under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme when no time limit was prescribed

In CCE vs. Mysore Lac & Paint Works Ltd. (1991) 52 ELT 590 (CEGAT), it was held that six months is a reasonable time for taking CENVAT Credit.

In one case, it was held that in the absence of any time limit, CENVAT Credit can be taken any time – even after three or four years. – SAIL vs. CCE (2000) 41 RLT 706 (CEGAT) – followed in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. CCE (2001) 129 ELT 459 (CEGAT).

In Coromandal Fertilizer Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 239 ELT 99 (Tri – Bang), it has been held that, when the law is settled on the issue, there is no justification to deny the credit on the ground that it is availed after three to seven years from the date of receipt of inputs. Further, since the CENVAT Credit Rules do not prescribe any outer limit, the Revenue’s contention that credit should be availed within reasonable period is not acceptable.

Useful reference can also be made to judicial rulings in J. V. Strips Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 218 ELT 252 (Tri – Del) where credits taken after a considerable delay was denied to the assessee and Essar Steel vs. CCE (2008) 222 ELT 154 (Tri – Ahd).

It is evident from the above that in the absence of specific provisions in regard to time limit for availing credit, judicial authorities did consider time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise (viz., six months at the relevant time) as a reasonable time for taking credits. However, it needs to be noted that, the time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise/Service tax has since been increased from six months to one year.

Observations when time limit was prescribed under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme

Supreme Court Ruling in Osram Surya (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (2012) 142 ELT 5 (SC)

Prior to the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G i.e., prior to 29-06-1995, a manufacturer was en- titled to withdraw the said credit at any time without there being a limitation on such withdrawal. On 29-06- 1995, second proviso to Rule 57G was introduced by substituting the then existing proviso and the newly introduced proviso read thus : “Provided further that the manufacturer shall not take credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in first proviso to this sub-rule:”

In the said case, the appellants who had received their inputs for the manufacture of their respective products, had taken credit under the Modvat Scheme, admittedly, six months after the date of issue of the documents specified in the said proviso to Rule 57G. Therefore, the said credit was disallowed by the authorities. This action of the authorities was questioned by the appellants before the Tribunal, contending that the benefit of the credit which had accrued to them prior to the introduction of the second proviso to the said Rule, cannot be taken away by introduction of a limitation because it was a vested right accrued to them prior to the coming into force of the said proviso to the Rule. They also contended that, the said proviso is not retrospective in its operation and is only applicable to the inputs received by a manufacturer after the introduction of the said proviso. Further, since the said proviso did not specifically state that it is taking away the vested right of a manufacturer, the proviso should be read to mean that the same is not applicable in regard to the credit accrued to a manufacturer prior to the introduction of the said Rule.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the language of the newly introduced proviso is very clear and admits no ambiguity, therefore, the question of interpretation of the Rule contrary to the said language does not arise at all and on a plain reading of the Rule, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that after the in- troduction of the said proviso to the Rule, no manufacturer could avail of credit subsequent to a period of six months, as stipulated in the said proviso.

The observations and findings of the Supreme Court are as under:

Para 6

At the outset, we must note that none of the appellants have challenged the validity of the said proviso, therefore, we will have to proceed on the basis that the proviso in question is a valid one. In that background, the sole question that we will have to consider will be: whether the proviso to the Rule in question is applicable to the cases of manufacturers who had received their inputs prior to the introduction of the said proviso and are seeking to take credit in regard to the said inputs beyond the period of six months.

Para 7

……….by introducing the limitation in the said proviso to the Rule, the statute has not taken away any of the vested rights which had accrued to the manufacturers under the Scheme of Modvat. That vested right continues to be in existence and what is restricted is the time within which the manufacturer has to enforce that right. The appellants, however, contended that imposition of a limitation is as good as taking away the vested right. In support of their argument, they have placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India [1999] 106 ELT 3 (SC)] wherein this Court had held that a right accrued to an assessee on the date when it paid the tax on the raw-materials or the inputs would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed ……. In the facts of Eicher case (supra) that was a case where- in by introduction of the Rule a credit which was in the account of the manufacturer was held not to be available on the coming into force of that Rule, by that the right to credit itself was taken away, whereas in the instant case by the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G, the credit in the account of a manufacturer was not taken away but only the manner and the time within which the said credit was to be taken or utilized alone was stipulated. It is to be noted at this juncture that the substantive right has not been taken away by the introduction of the proviso to the Rule in question but a procedural restriction was introduced which, in our opinion, is permissible in law. Therefore, in our opinion, the law laid down by this Court in Eicher’s case (supra) does not apply to the facts of these cases. This is also the position with regard to the judgment of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Pune & Ors. vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. & Ors. [1997 (7) SCC 448].

Para 8

It is vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that in effect by introduction of this Rule, a manufac- turer in whose account certain credit existed, would be denied of the right to take such credit consequently, as in the case of Eicher (supra), a manufacturer’s vested right is taken away, therefore, the Rule in question should be interpreted in such a manner that it did not apply to cases where credit in question had accrued prior to the date of introduction of this proviso. In our opinion, this argument is not available to the appellants because none has questioned the legality or the validity of the Rule in question, therefore, any argument which in effect questions the validity of the Rule, cannot be permitted to be raised. The argument of the appellants that there was no time whatsoever given to some of the manufacturers to avail the credit after the introduction of the Rule also is based on arbitrariness of the Rule, and the same also will have to be rejected on the ground that there is no challenge to the validity of the Rule……………

Para 9

……..in our opinion the language of the proviso con- cerned is unambiguous. It specifically states that a manufacturer cannot take credit after six months from the date of issue of any of the documents specified in the first proviso to the said sub-rule. A plain reading of this sub-rule clearly shows that it applies to those cases where a manufacturer is seeking to take the credit after the introduction of the Rule and to cases where the manu- facturer is seeking to do so after a period of six months from the date when the manufacturer received the inputs. This subrule does not operate retrospectively in the sense it does not cancel the credits nor does it in any manner affect the rights of those persons who have already taken the credit before coming into force of the Rule in question. It operates prospectively in regard to those manufacturers who seek to take credit after the coming into force of this Rule………..

(emphasis supplied)

Gujarat high Court Ruling in Baroda Rayon Corporation Ltd. vs. UOI (2014) 306 ELT 551 (GUJ)

The main challenge in the petition was to the Notification No. 16/94-CE (NT), dated 30-03-1994. By virtue of the said notification, gate pass issued under Rule 52A of the MODVAT Rules as it stood prior to 01-04-1994, has been prescribed as a document for the purpose of Rule 57G of the Rules. However, the notification also provided that the documents should have been issued before 01- 04-1994 and the credit under the said Rule should have been taken on or before 30-06-1994. It is this part of the notification was challenged in the petition.

The Court observed and held as under:

Para 8
………. the right to avail of credit is conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. Rule 57G only provides the procedure to be observed by the manufacturer. Thus, while exercis- ing powers under Rule 57G of the Rules, the Central Government is not empowered to curtail any right conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. In the circumstances, the impugned notification issued in exercise of powers under Rule 57G of the Rules insofar as the same prescribes a time-limit for taking of credit, being in excess of the powers conferred under the said rule is ultra vires the same and as such cannot be sustained to that extent.

Para 9

Another aspect of the matter is that by curtailing the time- limit within which the credit taken is to be availed, in effect and substance the said notification provides for lapsing of the credit that has already accrued in favour of the pe- titioner. In this regard it may be noted that the petition pertains to credit taken in the year 1994.    Hence,
the present case would be squarely covered by the deci- sions of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Pune vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd, (supra) and in the case of Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India, (supra) Court.

Para 11

In view of the above discussion, the petition suc- ceeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned No- tification No. 16/94-C.E. (N.T), dated 30th March, 1994 to the extent it provides that the credit under Rule 57G of the rules has to be taken on or before 30th June, 1994 being in excess of the powers conferred under Rule 57g of the Rules is hereby quashed and set aside.

Illustrative cases where credit was allowed after six months from the date of issue of specified documents

•    Alembic Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 293 ELT 119 (Tri – Ahd)

•    CCE vs. Ford India Ltd. (2012) 284 ELT 202 (Tri – Chennai)

•    Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 246 ELT 364 (Tri Ahd)

Illustrative cases where credit was denied when taken after 6 months from the date of issue of the specified documents

•    BHEL vs. CC & CE(A) (2007) 219 ELT 609 (Tri Bang)

•    NVK Mohammed Sultan Rawther & Sons Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 237 ELT 741 (Tri – Chennai)

Validity of time limit introduced under CCR 04 with effect from 01/09/2014.

Vide Notification No. 21/2014 CE (NT) dated 11-07-2014, two new provisos have been inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 respectively effective 01-09-2014, providing that a manufacturer/service provider shall not take CEN- VAT credit on inputs/input services after six months from the date of any of the documents specified in Rule 9(1) of CCR 2004. As such, no reasons have been provided by the Government for the sudden introduction of time limit, 10 years subsequent to the introduction of CCR 2004.

It would appear that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi discussed above, would be relevant in the context of CCR 2004 as well inasmuch as CENVAT Credit is a substantive right  of a manufacturer/service provider. The applicability of the aforesaid principles is strengthened in the scenario of substantial expansion of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme. The prevalent CCR 2004 covers the manufacturing sector substantially and more importantly services sector post introduction of Negative List based taxation of services with effect from 01-07-2012.

Hence, on the basis of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi, provisos inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 with effect from 01/09/2014 providing for time limit for taking CENVAT credit on inputs / input services can be challenged before a Court of law inasmuch as it curtails the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya’s case support availability of this option to a manufacturer/ service provider.

Without prejudice to the above, it would also appear that the time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 could be regarded as retrospective to an extent it imposes re- strictions on CENVAT Credit entitlement in regard to duty/tax paid documents issued prior to 01-09-2014. Hence, it does curtail the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Despite, the observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya Case, it would appear that, a strong case on this ground also can be made to advance an alternative proposition that time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 should apply only to duty / tax paid documents issued on or after 01-09-2014.

Applicability of time limit to Re – Credits
Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 allows CENVAT redit in respect of input service on or after the day on which the invoice is received by a manufacturer/service provider. However, third proviso to the said Rule 4 (7) reads as under:

“Provided also that in case the payment of the value of input service and the service tax paid or payable as indicated in the invoice, bill or as the case may be, challan referred to in Rule 9, except in respect of input service where the whole of the service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service , is not made within three months of the date of the invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan, the manufacturer or the service provider who has taken credit on such input service, shall pay an amount equal to the CENVAT Credit availed on such input service and in case the said payment is made, the manufacturer or output service provider, as the case may be, shall be entitled to take the credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier subject to the other provisions of these rules:”

(emphasis supplied)

With effect from 01-09-2014, the sixth proviso has been inserted in Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 which provides as under:

“….the manufacturer or the provider of output ser- vice shall not take CENVAT Credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 9.”

Hence, a very important practical issue arises for consid- eration is as to whether the time limit of six months would apply to cases where initial credit has been properly taken within six months but re-credit in terms of third proviso  to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is taken after a period of six months from the date of issue of the tax paid document.

According to one view, in cases where re–credit taken  by the manufacturer/service provider is after the expiry of six months from the date of invoice upon payment, in light of the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09- 2014 prescribing a six month time limit for availment of credit, the manufacturer/output service provider would not be entitled to take re-credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier. This view is supported by the terminology “subject to the other provisions of these rules” appearing in the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004. Hence, the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09-2014, would apply in full force in such cases.

However, according to a second view, “re-credit” allowed as per the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not taking CENVAT Credit, but it is re-credit of an “amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier” and hence, the sixth proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not appli- cable to such cases. The time limit of six months applies to taking of CENVAT Credit for the first time and not to subsequent re-credit upon payment. Thus, once credit is validly taken within the permitted time limit of six months, subsequent re–credit upon payment pertains to reversal of amount equivalent to CENVAT Credit reversed and not taking of credit.

This view is supported by judicial rulings referred above in cases of Alembic Ltd. (supra)., Ford India Ltd. (supra) and Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. (supra) earlier. Though in a different context, useful reference could also be made to ruling in CCE vs. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (2010) 259 ELT 13 (GUJ)

Rightly considering the above uncertainty, the Govern- ment has issued Circular No. 990/14/2014-CX-8 dated 19th November, 2014 whereby it is clarified at para 3 that if credit is taken for the first time within six months of the issue of the document under Rule 9(1) of CCR,2004, the condition of taking credit within six months is fulfilled. The limitation period of six months therefore would not apply for taking re-credit of amount reversed. The said clarification is also provided in respect of two more situations viz.
a)    when the value of input or capital goods on which CENVAT Credit taken is written off or such provision is made in the books of account, the manufac- turer or service provider has to reverse the credit taken (Rule 3(5B) of CCR, 2004)
b)    When inputs sent to job worker are not received back within 180 days, the manufacturer or service provider, in the first instance has to reverse the credit taken.

Thus in all the three situations, while taking re-credit, the limitation of six months would not apply if credit in the first instance is taken within the prescribed time limit of six months of the receipt of eligible document.

Conclusion

According to the Budget Estimates for the year 2014-15, collection from service tax (Rs. 2.16 lakh crore) is likely to exceed Central Excise (Rs. 2.05 lakh crore) for the first time. Further, as per the stated taxation policy of the Government, we are moving towards a GST Regime in due course of time. Hence, in that perspective, it is imperative that we have seamless flow of credits and a robust input tax credit regime in line with GST/VAT Systems prevalent worldwide. To advance this cause, the following is recommended:

a)    The time limit for availment of CENVAT credits should be done away with.

b)    Alternatively, if the time limit is to be continued, it should be increased to one year (so as to be consistent with time limit for claiming refund) and the same should be made applicable to duty/tax paid documents issued after 01-09-2014.

c)    Linkage of CENVAT Credit availment with payment to suppliers was relevant prior to the introduction of POT Rules when service tax was required to be paid to the Government after realisation from the customers. The said linkage is not required subsequent to the introduction of POT Rules. Hence, the same should be done away with.

Naresh T. Wadhwani vs. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Pune Bench “A”, Pune Before G. S. Pannu (A. M.) and R. S. Padvekar (J. M.) ITA Nos.18, 19, 20, 60 & 61/PN/2013 Assessment Years : 2007-08, 2008-09 & 2009-10. Decided on 28.10.2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: V. L. Jain/M. S. Verma

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Section 80 IB (10)(c) and (14)(a) – Open terrace cannot be a part of the ‘built-up area’

Facts:
The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) was rejected by the lower authorities on the ground that the condition prescribed in clause (c) of section 80IB(10) was not complied with. As per sub-Clause (c) of section 80IB(10) the residential units in the housing project cannot have built-up area of more than 1,500 sq.ft. The housing project of the assessee in Pune city was approved by the local authority on 29.07.2005. The AO applied the definition of ‘built-up area’ contained in section 80IB(14) (a). According to him, as per the said definition, the area comprising of the projected terrace was also to be considered as part of the ‘built-up area’. Based thereon the AO computed the area and found that six of the residential units of the housing project were having built-up area in excess of 1500 sq.ft. Therefore, he denied the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Rs.1.4 crore. On appeal the CIT(A) upheld the stand of the AO that the built-up area of the aforesaid six units was violative of the condition prescribed in Clause (c) of section 80IB(10). He, however, allowed pro-rata deduction in respect of profits from the residential units of the project which complied with the requirements of section 80IB(10)(c) of the Act. Not being satisfied with the order of the CIT(A), assessee as well as the Revenue are in appeal before the tribunal.

Before the Tribunal, the revenue submitted that open terrace was a private terrace which was available for use of the owner of the unit to the exclusion of others. It also relied on the decisions of the Hyderabad Tribunal in the case of Modi Builders & Realtors (P.) Ltd., (2011) 12 taxmann. com 129 and of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Siddhivinayak Homes, Mumbai vs. Department of Income Tax, vide ITA No. 8726 / Mum / 2010 order dated 26.09.2012, for the proposition that all projections and elevations at the floor level are liable to be included in the definition of ‘built-up area’ for the purposes of examining the condition prescribed in Clause (c) of section 80IB(10) of the Act. According to it, the built-up area for the purpose has to be understood in the light of what has been sold by the assessee builder to the respective customers.

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Ceebros Hotels Private Limited vs. DCIT (Tax Case (Appeal) No. 581 of 2008 order dated 19.10.2012) the Tribunal held that the area of open terrace cannot be a part of the ‘built-up area’ in a case where such terrace is a projection attached to the residential unit and there being no room under such terrace, even if the same is available exclusively for use of the respective unit holders. The Tribunal also observed that as per the said decision, terrace area would not form part of the built-up area even if the assessee sold it to the purchaser as a private terrace.

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Recovery of tax – Section 226(3)(vi) – Garnishee objecting to liability and payment and filing affidavit in this regard – No further proceedings for recovery can be made against garnishee – TRO cannot discover on his own that statement on oath by garnishee was false – Provision applies only to an admitted liability and not to disputed liability:

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Uttar Pradesh Carbon and Chemicals Ltd. vs. TRO; 368 ITR 384 (All):

The petitioner company was engaged in the business of financial services. One assessee RCFSL, which had become defaulter of income-tax dues for Rs. 3.2 crore claimed that an amount of Rs. 1.55 crore was due to it from the petitioner. On the basis of the claim of the assessee, the TRO issued garnishee notice u/s. 226(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requiring the petitioner to pay the said amount to the TRO towards the tax dues of the assessee. Since there was no response, the TRO attached 4,24,910 shares of the petitioner in Jhunjhunwala Vanaspati Ltd., and also the bank balance of Rs. 28,988.78 in ICICI bank and also got the shares and the amount transferred to the TRO. Being aware of the said action of the TRO the petitioner appeared before the TRO and raised objections and also claimed that the garnishee notice was not served on the petitioner and accordingly the garnishee proceedings are invalid. The petitioner also produced the books of account as required by the TRO and explained that there is no outstanding payable to the assessee. The petitioner also filed an affidavit denying the liability as required u/s. 226(3)(vi) of the Act. However, the TRO did not accept the petitioner’s claim.

On a writ petition challenging the garnishee action taken by the TRO, the Allahabad High Court held as under:

“i) Under Clause (vi) of section 226(3) of the Act, a limited enquiry can be conducted by the TRO to find about the genuineness of the affidavit. He is required to give notice to the person giving the affidavit that he is going to hold an enquiry for the purpose of determining whether the statement made on oath on behalf of the garnishee is correct or false. The ITO cannot discover on his own that the statement on oath made on behalf of the garnishee was false in any material particular and cannot subjectively reach a conclusion that in his opinion the affidavit filed by the garnishee was false in any material particular.

ii) Further, this provision is intended to apply only to an admitted liability where a person admits by word or by conduct that any money is due to the assessee or is held by him for or on account of assessee. The authorities under the garb of the inquiry cannot adjudicate upon a bona fide dispute between the garnishee and the assessee.

iii) Section 226(3) is not a charging section nor does it give any power to the TRO to adjudicate a dispute. Bona fide disputes, if any, between the garnishee and the assessee cannot be adjudicated by the authorities u/s. 226(3). The Legislature could not have meant to entrust the authority with the jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the quantum of such liability between the garnishee and the assessee, which matter is within the purview of the civil courts.

iv) The assessee asserted that it had advanced certain sums of money to the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner was its debtor but the petitioner had denied this assertion. No steps had been taken by the assessee for recovery of that amount before any forum or any appropriate court of law.

vi) Pursuant to the affidavit filed by the petitioner before the TRO denying its liability to pay any amount and further denying that any sum is or was payable to the assessee, no steps had been taken by the TRO to cross check with the assessee or inquire into the genuineness of the affidavit filed by the petitioner. Since the petitioner had appeared and participated in the proceedings, the order of the TRO treating the petitioner as an assessee in default could not continue any longer.

vii) In view of the categorical denial by the petitioner to pay any amount, the attachment made by the TRO could not continue any further, especially as till date no inquiry had been made by the Revenue into the genuineness of the affidavits filed by the petitioner.

viii) Income Tax Department was restrained from alienating the shares, which were transferred to the demat account of the TRO. The order of the TRO treating the petitioner as a assessee in default could not be sustained and was quashed. Within two weeks the TRO to transfer the shares to the petitioner and also the amount of Rs. 28,988.78/- with interest”

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Penalty – Section 269SS and 271D – A. Y. 2007- 08 – Scope of section 269SS – Provision does not apply to liabilities recorded by book entries – Penalty not justified u/s. 271D:

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CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd.; 367 ITR 433 (Del):

In
the relevant year i.e., A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee had purchased land
worth Rs. 14.22 crore and the same was reflected in the books of
account. The purchase price was paid by one PACL to the land owners by
demand drafts on behalf of the assessee and accordingly PACL was shown
as creditor to that extent in the books of account of the assessee. The
Assessing Officer held that the assessee has taken loan from PACL in
violation of section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and therefore
imposed penalty u/s. 271D of the Act. CIT(A) cancelled the penalty. The
Tribunal held that the order of penalty was barred by limitation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court held as under:
“i)
A plain reading of section 269SS indicates that the import of the
provision is limited. It applies to a transaction where a deposit or a
loan is accepted by an assessee otherwise than by an account payee
cheque or an account payee draft. The ambit of the section is clearly
restricted to a transaction involving acceptance of money and not
intended to affect cases where a debt or a liability arises on account
of book entries. The object of the section is to prevent transactions in
currency. This is also clearly explicit from clause (iii) of the
Explanation to section 269SS of the Act which defines loan or deposit to
mean “loan or deposit of money”. The liability recorded in the books of
account by way of journal entries, i.e. crediting the account of a
party to whom moneys are payable or debiting the account of a party from
whom moneys are receivable in the books of account, is clearly outside
the ambit of the provisions section 269SS of the Act because passing
such entries does not involve acceptance of any loan or deposit of
money.

ii) No money was transacted other than through banking
channels. PACL made certain payments through banking channels to the
land owners. This payment made on behalf of the assessee was recorded by
the assessee in the books by crediting the account of PACL.

iii)
In view of this admitted position, no infringement of section 269SS of
the Act was made out. The levy of penalty was invalid.”

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Income: Accrual and time – Sections 2(24) (vd) and 28(v) – A. Y. 1995-96 – Acquisition of shares at concessional rate – Prohibition on sale of shares for lock-in period of three years – No benefit in the form of differential price accruing to assessee – No income accrues:

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CIT vs. K. N. B. Investments (P) Ltd.; 367 ITR 616 (T&AP):

The assessee was allotted nine lakh shares and 8,13,900 shares in the financial year 1994-95 at a concessional rate of Rs. 90 per share. In the A. Y. 1995-96 the Assessing Officer took the view that the market value of the shares was Rs. 455 per share and that the difference of Rs. 365 was to be treated as “benefit” as defined u/s. 2(24) (vd) r.w.s. 28(iv). Accordingly, he levied tax thereon. The Tribunal held that as long as the bar to sell the shares operated, the question of any benefit in the form of differential price, accruing to the assessee did not arise. The Tribunal accordingly deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There exists a distinction between “accrual of income”, on the one hand, and “arising of income”, on the other. While accrual is almost notional in nature, the other is factual.

ii) There was a clear bar for a period of three years prohibiting the sale of shares. The benefit can be said to have arisen to an individual, if only, any person in his place, would have got the differential price, by selling the shares. Irrespective of the willingness or otherwise of the person holding such a share, if the bar operates, it could not be said that the sale of the share would take place or that it would yield the differential price.

iii) A close scrutiny of the concept of “arising of income” discloses that, it, in fact, must flow into the assets of the assessee, during previous year, and thereby, it became taxable in the financial year.

iv) The Income-tax Officer had not demonstrated that the income in the form of “benefit” had arisen to the assessee at all. The sole basis for levying tax on the amount was on the assumption that in case the shares were sold, they would have yielded the differential price and that, in turn, could be treated as income. Even if the exercise contemplated by the Income Tax Officer was taken as permissible in law, at the most, it amounted to “accrual” and not “arising” of income.

v) The Tribunal had explained the subtle distinction between the two, in a perfect manner and arrived at the correct conclusion.”

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Export profits – Deduction u/s. 80HHC – A. Y. 2003-04 – Gain derived from change in foreign exchange rate is export profit – Gain realised in subsequent year – Entitled to deduction u/s. 80HHC:

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CIT vs. Priyanka Gems: 367 ITR 575 (Guj):

The assessee was engaged in the business of export. For the A. Y. 2003-04 the assesseee received net of Rs. 71,23,361/- by way of exchange rate difference on exports made in the earlier year. The assessee claimed deduction of the said amount u/s. 80HHC of the Incometax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the sum was income from other sources and 90% thereof would be excluded for the purpose of deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction of the said amount u/s. 80HHC of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The source of the income of the assessee was export. On the basis of accrual, income was already reflected in the assessee’s account on the date of the export at the prevailing rate of exchange. Further, the income was earned merely on account of foreign exchange fluctuation. Such income, therefore, was directly related to the assessee’s export business and could not be said to have been removed beyond the first degree.

ii) The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80HHC.”

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Depreciation – WDV – Section 43(1), (6) – A. Ys. 1976-77 to 1978-79 – Depreciation “actually allowed” – No concept of allowance on notional basis: Amalgamation – WDV of fixed assets of amalgamating company to be calculated on basis of actual cost less depreciation actually allowed to amalgamating company:

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Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. vs. CIT; 368 ITR 513 (Bom):

The
non-resident holding company of the assessee had an industrial
undertaking in India. Under a scheme of amalgamation, the industrial
undertaking was hived off to the assessee and the assets and liabilities
of the undertaking were taken over by the assessee. For the A. Ys.
1976-77 to 1978-79 the assessee claimed that for the purpose of granting
depreciation, the cost of the assets should be taken at the original
cost, viz., Rs. 2,54,67,325/- or alternatively at Rs. 1,72,78,297/-
being the cost, less depreciation actually allowed. The Assessing
Officer took the WDV of Rs. 93,14,942/- which was arrived at after
taking into account depreciation that would have been granted to the
parent company under the provisions of the Act.This was upheld by the
Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
There was no concept of depreciation being allowed on a notional basis
or that depreciation can be granted implicitly as held by the Tribunal.
The depreciation has to be actually allowed as can be discerned from a
conjoint reading of the provisions in the Act. The WDV of the fixed
assets of the parent company had to be calculated on the basis of the
actual cost less depreciation “actually allowed” to the parent company.
The WDV could not have been arrived at on the basis that depreciation
had been granted on a notional basis, or implicitly as held by the
Tribunal.

ii) The scheme of amalgamation approved by the
assessee itself had valued the fixed assets at Rs. 1,72,78,297/-, which
valuation had been arrived at after taking into account depreciation.
This being the case, and the assessee having accepted the WDV of the
fixed assets at Rs. 1,72,78,297/-, it could not be heard to say that the
WDV had to be calculated by taking into account the figure of Rs.
2,54,67,325/- being the original cost of the fixed assets to the parent
company.”

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Capital gain – Short-term or long-term – Sections 2(29B), 2(42B) and 45 – A. Y. 1990-91 – In case of allotment of flat, holding period commences from the date of allotment – Allotment of flat on 7th/30th June, 1986 – Payment of first instalment on 04-07-1986 – Sale of flat on 05-07- 1989 – Gain is long term capital gain:

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Mrs. Madhu Kaul vs. CIT; 271 CTR 107 (P&H):

A flat was alloted to the assessee on 07-06-1986, vide letter conveyed to the assessee on 30-06-1986. The assessee paid the first instalment on 04-07-1986. The assessee sold the flat on 05-07-1989. The assessee claimed that the capital gain is long term capital gain. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer:

On appeal by the assessee, the Punjab and Haryana High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Admittedly, the flat was alloted to the assessee on 07- 06-1986, vide letter conveyed to the assessee on 30-06- 1986. The assessee paid the first instalment on 04-07- 1986, thereby confering a right upon the assessee to hold a flat, which was later identified and possession delivered on a later date. The mere fact that the possession was delivered later, does not detract from the fact that the allottee was conferred a right to hold property on issuance of an allotment letter. The payment of the balance instalments, identification of a particular flat and delivery of possession are consequential acts, that relate back to and arise from the rights conferred by the allotment letter.

ii) The Tribunal has erred in holding that the transaction does not envisage a long term capital gain.”

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Appellate Tribunal – Power to admit additional ground – Notice u/s. 158BD – The Tribunal cancelled the block assessment order u/s. 158BD holding that the notice u/s. 158BD was not valid – The High Court held that the notice was valid and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for deciding on merits – The assessee raised an additional ground relying on the decision of the Supreme Court – The Tribunal was not justified in refusing to admit the additional ground:

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Lekshmi Traders vs. CIT; 367 ITR 551 (Ker):

Pursuant
to the search action in the premises of one of the partners of the
assessee firm a block assessment order u/s. 158BD was passed in the case
of assessee firm. The order was cancelled by the Tribunal holding that
the notice u/s. 158BD was not valid. On appeal by the Revenue the High
Court held that the notice was valid and remanded the matter back to the
Tribunal for deciding on merits. In the remand proceedings the assessee
raised an additional ground relying upon the decision of the Supreme
Court. The Tribunal refused to admit the additional ground holding that
the powers of the Tribunal were confined to the order of the remand
passed by the Court wherein, a direction was given by the Court to
consider the appeal on merits.

The Kerala High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)
The powers of the Tribunal are not curtailed by the judgment of the
Division Bench, merely because the judgment, in the operative portion “
directed the matter to be considered on the merits after hearing the
parties.”

ii) It was also not correct to say that the decision
of the Division Bench concurring the validity of the notice would
prevent the Tribunal from considering any other ground which the
assessee had raised for consideration. It could not, therefore, be said
that when the Court sent back the matter for fresh consideration, no
other points than those raised in the grounds of appeal could be
considered and no additional ground could be allowed to be raised for
consideration.

iii) Therefore, the Tribunal was to consider the additional ground raised by the assessee and take appropriate decision.”

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Appeal before CIT(A) – Power to grant stay of recovery – Section 220(6) – A. Y. 2011-12: During pendency of appeal before him the CIT(A) has inherent jurisdiction to grant stay of recovery:

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Gera Realty Estates vs. CIT(A): 368 ITR 366 (Bom):

During the pendency of appeal before the CIT(A) for the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee made application before the CIT(A) for stay of recovery proceedings against an order passed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 220(6). The CIT(A) dismissed the application holding that though he had inherent power to consider the stay application, it would not be considered for administrative reasons which according to him, madated avoidance of multiple stay application before different authorities.

The Bombay High Court allowed the assessee’s writ petition and held as under:

“i) The jurisdiction of the CIT(A) to deal with applications for stay of the order in appeal before him is inherent as an appellate authority. This jurisdiction is to be exercised on examining the order in appeal. As against this, the jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer of staying the demand u/s. 220(6), and that of the Commissioner to stay the demand, are on different considerations, i.e., including other factors over and above the order.

ii) The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner do not stay the order in appeal but only stay the demand issued consequent to the order which is in appeal. This is only to ensure that the assessee is not deemed to be an assessee in default.

iii) The jurisdiction of the CIT (A) as an appellate authority ought not to be confused with that of either the Assessing Officer u/s. 220(6) of the Act or of the Commissioner in his administrative capacity.

iv) The CIT(A) was directed to dispose of the stay application as expeditiously as possible. In the mean time, the Revenue was not to adopt coercive proceedings against the assesee till the disposal of the stay application by the CIT(A).”

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Deduction u/s. 80HHA/80-IA – A. Y. 1991-92: Interest earned on fixed deposits placed out of business compulsion is “derived” from the undertaking – Interest is eligible for deduction:

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Empire Pumps Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (Guj); ITA No. 187 of 2003 dated 14-10-2014:

The assessee, eligible for section 80HHA/80-IA, was compelled to park a part of its funds in fixed deposits under the insistence of the financial institutions. The interest income has to be treated as business income and cannot be termed as income from other sources. Interest income is the income derived from the undertaking and is eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHA/80-IA.

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Business expenditure/loss – Sections 28 and 37(1) – Even if the business is illegal, loss which is incidental to the business has to be allowed u/s. 28 and the Explanation to section 37(1) is not relevant: Disallowance of claim for deduction of loss on account of gold seized by Custom Authorities is not justified:

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Bipinchandra K. Bhatia vs. Dy. CIT (Guj): ITA No. 107 of 2004 dated 16-10-2014:

The assessee, an individual, was dealing in bullion and gold jewellery. Pursuant to search on 12-01-1999, block assessment was made u/s. 158BC. One of the additions was by way of disallowance of the claim for deduction of Rs. 40,34,898/- on account of gold seized by the Custom Authorities. The Tribunal upheld the addition relying on Explanation to section 37(1) of the Act. In the appeal to the High Court, the following question was raised:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has substantially erred in disregarding the fact that business is being carried on by the appellant and hence, the loss incidental to business is allowable u/s. 28 and the provision of section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot override the provisions of section 28?”

The Gujarat High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under:

“i) Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. T. A. Quereshi vs. CIT; 287 ITR 547 (SC), the loss which was incurred during the course of business even if the same is illegal is required to be compensated and for the loss suffered by the appellant, the Court is required to answer this Tax Appeal in favour of the assessee.

ii) Having heard learned Advocates appearing for the parties, this Appeal is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.”

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Recovery of tax – Garnishee notice – Stock exchange membership card is a privilege and not a property capable of attachment and the proceeds of the a card which has been auctioned cannot be paid over to Income-tax – Membership security which is handed over to the Exchange continues to be the assets of the members which can be liquidated on default – Stock Exchange has a lien over membership security and being a secured creditor, would have priority over Government Dues

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The Stock Exchange, Bombay vs. V.S. Kandalgaonkar & Ors. (2014) 368 ITR 296 (SC)

By a notice dated 29th June 1994, the Stock Exchange, Bombay declared one Shri Suresh Damji Shah as a defaulter with immediate effect as he had failed to meet his obligations and discharge his liabilities. By a notice dated 5th October 1995 issued u/s. 226 (3) of the Incometax Act, the Income-tax Department wrote to the Stock Exchange and told them that Shri Shah’s membership card being liable to be auctioned, the amount realised at such auction should be paid towards Income-tax dues of Assessment Year 1989-90 and 1990-91 amounting to Rs.25.43 lakh. The Stock Exchange, Bombay by its letter dated 11th October, 1995 replied to the said notice and stated that under Rules 5 and 6 of the Stock Exchange the membership right is a personal privilege and is inalienable. Further, under Rule 9 on death or default of a member his right of nomination shall cease and vest in the Exchange and accordingly the membership right of Shri Shah has vested with the Exchange on his being declared a defaulter. This being the case, since the Exchange is now and has always been the owner of the membership card, no amount of tax arrears of Shri Shah are payable by it. By a prohibitory order dated 10th May, 1996, the Incometax Department prohibited and restrained the Stock Exchange from making any payment relating to Shri Shah to any person whomsoever otherwise than to the Incometax Department. The amount claimed in the prohibitory order was stated to be Rs. 37.48 lakh plus interest. On 18th July, 1996, the Solicitors of the Stock Exchange, Bombay wrote to the Income-tax Department calling upon them to withdraw the prohibitory order dated 10th May, 1996 in view of the fact that the membership right of the Exchange is a personal privilege and is inalienable. By a letter dated 27th December, 1996, the Tax Department wrote back to the Bombay Stock Exchange refusing to recall its prohibitory order. Meanwhile, Shri Shah applied to be re-admitted to the Stock Exchange which application was rejected by the Stock Exchange on 13th February, 1997.

The Stock Exchange then filed a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 220 of 1997 dated 24th December, 1997.

By a judgment dated 27th March 2003, most of the contentions of the Stock Exchange were rejected and the Writ Petition was dismissed.

The judgment set out two main issues which according to it arose for determination. They were:

[A] Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the TRO was right in attaching the sale proceeds of the nomination rights of the Defaulter-Member. If not, whether the TRO was entitled to attach under Rule 26(1) of Schedule–II to the Income-tax Act, the Balance Surplus amount lying with BSE out of the sale proceeds of the nomination rights of the Defaulter-Member under rule 16(1)(iii) framed by BSE r/w the Resolution of the General Body of BSE dated 13-10-1999?

[B] Whether deposits made by the Defaulting Member under various Heads such as Security Deposit, Margin Money, Securities deposited by Members and Others are attachable u/s. 226(3)(i)(x) read with Rule 26(1)(a)(c) of Schedule-II to the Income-tax Act?

Issue A was answered by saying that though a defaulting member had no interest in a membership card and that the Income-tax Department was not right in attaching the sale proceeds of such card, still money which is likely to come in the hands of the garnishee, that is the Bombay Stock Exchange, for and on behalf of the assessee is attachable because the requisite condition is the subsistence of an ascertained debt in the hands of the garnishee which is due to the assessee, or the existence of a contractual relationship between the assessee and the Stock Exchange consequent upon which money is likely to come in the hands of the garnishee for and on behalf of the assessee.

Issue B was answered by saying that even on vesting of all the assets of the assessee in the defaulter’s committee, all such assets continued to belong to the assessee. Section 73(3) Civil Procedure Code mandates that Government debts have a priority and that being so they will have precedence over other dues. It was further held that the lien that the Stock Exchange may possess under Rule 43 does not make it a secured creditor so that debts due to the Income-tax Department would have precedence.

The judgment then went on to say:

“11. To sum up, we hereby declare:

(a) That, the Other Assets (as described in Issue B hereinabove) are attachable and recoverable under provisions of section 226(3)(i)(x) read with Rule 26(1) (a)(c) of Schedule-II to the Income Tax Act.

(b) That, the Government and Other Creditors such as BSE, the Clearing House and Other Creditor-Members under Rules and Bye-laws of the Stock Exchange are creditors of equal degree and u/s. 73(3), Civil Procedure Code, the Government dues shall have priority over other such creditors.

(c) That, in the matter of application of Defaulters’ Asset under bye-law 400, the Defaulters’ Committee shall give priority to the debt due to the Government and the balance, if any, shall be distributed in terms of the Bye-laws 324 alongwith Byelaw 400 of the BSE.

(d) That, a sum of Rs. 34,06,680 representing Balance Surplus lying with the Exchange out of sale proceeds of the nomination rights of the Defaulter-Member is attachable under the above provisions of the Income -tax Act read with Rule 16 of the BSE Rules and consequently, the said amount is directed to be paid over to the TRO under the impugned Prohibitory Order.

(e) We hereby direct the BSE also to hand the securities lying in Members Security Deposit Accounts to the TRO, who would be entitled to sell and appropriate the sale proceeds towards the claim of the Income-tax Department against the Defaulting Broker-Member. If the TRO so direct, those securities could also be sold by BSE and the realised value, on the date of the sale, could be handed over to the TRO. It is for the TRO to decide this point. We further direct credit balance its the Clearing House of Rs. 1,53,538/- to be paid over to the TRO and that the TRO would be entitled to appropriate the said amount towards the dues of the Department. In short, we are directing BSE to pay a sum of Rs. 35,60,218/- to the TRO and in addition thereto, the TRO would be entitled to the realised value of the Securities as on the date of sale. In this case, the Prohibitory Order is before the date of insolvency of the Broker concerned.

(f) In future, the principles laid down by this judgment should be followed by BSE and the TRO would to attach such Other Assets and appropriate the amounts towards its claim under the Income Tax Act.”

A Special Leave Petition was filed against the said judgment being SLP(Civil) No. 8245 of 2003 in which, by an order dated 7th May 2003, the operation of the judgment was not stayed to the extent that it specifically directed the petitioner to make certain payments and handover securities to the Income-tax Department. However, in so far as the judgment declared law, the operation of such declaration of law was stayed.

The Counsel appearing on behalf of the Stock Exchange made essentially three submissions:

(i)    By virtue of the judgment in Stock Exchange, Ahmedabad vs. Asstt. Commisioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad, [(2001) 248 ITR 209 (SC)], the sale proceeds of a membership card and the membership card itself being only a personal privilege granted to a member cannot be attached by the Income-tax Department at any stage. The moment a member is declared a defaulter all rights qua the membership card of the member cease and even his right of nomination vests in the Stock Exchange. The High Court was therefore not correct in saying that though a membership card is only a personal privilege and ordinarily the Income-tax Department cannot attach the sale proceeds, yet since these amounts came into the hands of the Stock Exchange for and on behalf of the assessee they were attachable.

(ii)    On conjoint reading of Rule 38 and 44 it was argued that all securities in the form of shares that are given by a member shall be transferred and held either in the name of the trustees of the Stock Exchange or in the name of a Bank which is approved by the Governing Board. By operation of Rule 44, on termination of the membership of a broker, whatever remains by way of security after clearing all debts has to be “transferred” either to him or as he shall direct or in the absence  of such direction to his legal representatives. The argument therefore is that what is contemplated is a transfer of these shares by virtue of which the member ceases to be owner of these shares for the period that they are “transferred” and this being so, the Income- tax Department cannot lay their hands on these shares or the sale proceeds thereof as the member ceases to have ownership rights of these shares.

(iii)    It was also argued that by virtue of Rule 43, the Stock Exchange has a first and paramount lien for any sum due to it, and that this made it a secured creditor so that in any case income tax dues would not to be given preference over dues to secured creditors.

The Supreme Court dealt with each one of the contentions and held as under:

Re.: (1)
A reading of Rules 5 and 9 lead to the conclusion that    a membership card is only a personal permission from the Stock Exchange to exercise the rights and privileges that may be given subject to Rules, Bye-Laws and Regulations of the Exchange. Further, the moment a member is declared a defaulter, his right of nomination shall cease and vest in the Exchange because even the personal privilege given is at that point taken away from the defaulting member.

Further, the rules and the bye-laws also make  this  clear. Under Rule 16(iii), whenever the  Governing  Board exercises the right of nomination in respect of a membership which vests in the Exchange, the ultimate surplus that  may  remain  after  the  membership  card  is sold by the Exchange comes only to the Exchange – it does not go to the member. This is in contrast with bye-law 400 (ix) which, deals with the application of the defaulting member’s other assets  and  securities,  and in this case ultimately the surplus is paid only to the defaulting member, making it clear that these amounts really belonged to the defaulting member.

The conclusion of the High Court that the proceeds of    a card which has been auctioned can be paid over to  the Income-tax Department for the dues of the member by virtue of Rule 16 (iii) is incorrect as such member     at no point owns any property capable of attachment,   as has been held in the Ahmedabad Stock Exchange case(supra).

Re: (2)
Rules 36 to 46 belong to a Chapter in the Rules entitled “Membership Security”. Rule 36 specifies that a new member shall on admission provide security and shall maintain such  security  with  the  Stock  Exchange  for  a determined sum at all the times that he carries on business. Rule 37 deals with the form of such security and states that it may be in the form of a deposit of cash or deposit receipt of a Bank or in the form of security approved by the Governing Board. Rule 38 deals with how these securities are held. Rule 41 enables the member to withdraw any security provided by him if he provides another security in lieu thereof of sufficient value to the satisfaction of the Governing Board. Rule 43 states that the security provided shall be a first and paramount lien for any sum due to the Stock Exchange and Rule  44 deals with the return of such security under certain circumstances. On a conjoint reading of these Rules what emerges is as follows:

(i)    The entire Chapter deals only with security to be provided by a member as the Chapter heading states;

(ii)    The security to be furnished can be in various forms. What is important is that cash is in the form of a deposit and securities are also “deposited” with the Stock Exchange under Rule 37;

(iii)    Rule 38 which is crucial provides how securities are to be “held” which is clear from the marginal note appended to it. What falls for construction is the expression “securities shall be transferred to and held”. Blacks Dictionary defines “transfer” as follows:

“Transfer means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of  or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.”

It is clear therefore that the expression “transfer” can depending upon its context mean transfer of ownership or transfer of possession. It is clear that what is transferred is only possession as the member  only  “deposits”  these securities. Further, as has been held in Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat vs. Pranlal Jayanand Thakur &  Ors., 1975 (2) SCR 534 at 541, a share transfer can    be accomplished by physically transferring or delivering a share certificate together with a blank transfer form signed by the transferor. The transfer of shares in favour of the Stock Exchange is only for the purposes of easy liquidity in the event of default.

(iv)    The expression “transferred” must take colour from the expression “lodged” in Rule 38 when it comes to deposits of cash. Understood in this sense, transfer only means delivery for the purposes of holding such shares as securities;

(v)    This is also clear from the language of Rule 38 when it says “such deposit shall be entirely at the risk of the member providing the security ………..” Obviously, first and foremost the cash lodged and the shares transferred are only deposits. Secondly, they are entirely at the risk of the member who provides the security making it clear that such member continues to be the owner of the said shares by way of security for otherwise they cannot possibly be at the member’s risk;

(vi)    Under Rule 41 a member may withdraw any security provided by him if he satisfies the conditions of the Rules. This again shows that what is sought to be withdrawn is a security which the member owns;

(vii)    By Rule 43 a lien on securities is provided to the Stock Exchange. Such lien is only compatible with the member being owner of the security, for otherwise no question arises of an owner (the Stock Exchange, if the Counsel is right) having a lien on its own moveable property;

(viii)    Therefore, when Rule 44 speaks of repayment and transfer it has to be understood in the above sense as the security is being given back to the member under the circumstances mentioned in the Rule;

(ix)    Bye-law 326 and 330 also refer to securities that are “deposited” by the defaulter and recovery of securities and “other assets” due. Obviously, therefore, securities which are handed over to the exchange continue to be assets of the member which can be liquidated on default.

(x)    The Counsel’s argument would also create a dichotomy between “cash lodged” and Bank Deposit Receipts and securities  “transferred.”  The  form  a  particular security takes cannot possibly lead to a conclusion that cash lodged, being only a deposit, continues to belong to the member, whereas Bank Deposit Receipts and securities, being “transferred” would belong to the Stock Exchange.

Though the judgment in Bombay Stock Exchange vs. Jaya I. Shah [(2004) 1 SCC 160] had no direct application to the facts it did held that after the assets of the defaulting member are pooled together and amounts are realized, the payments that would be made from such pool would be from the assets of the defaulting member. To that extent, therefore, the aforesaid judgment reinforces what has been stated above.

Re: (3)
The first thing to be noticed is that the Income Tax Act does not provide for any paramountcy of dues by way of income tax. This is why the Court in Dena Bank’s case [(2001) 247 ITR 165 (SC)] held that Government dues only have priority over unsecured debts and in so holding the Court referred to a judgment in Giles vs. Grover (1832)(131) English Reports 563 in which it has been held that the Crown has no precedence over a pledgee of goods.

In the present case, the common law of England qua Crown debts became applicable by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution which states that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before  the commencement of the Constitution shall continue in force until altered or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority. In fact, in Collector of Aurangabad and Anr. vs. Central Bank of India and Anr. [(1968 21 STC 10 (SC)] after referring to various authorities held that the claim of the Government to priority for arrears of income tax dues stems from the English common law doctrine of priority of Crown debts and has been given judicial recognition in British India prior to 1950 and was therefore “law in force” in the territory of India before the Constitution and was continued by Article 372 of the Constitution (at page 861, 862).

In the present case, the lien possessed by the Stock Exchange makes it a secured creditor. That being the case, it is clear that whether the lien under Rule 43 is a statutory lien or is a lien arising out of agreement does not make much of a difference as the Stock Exchange, being a secured creditor, would have priority over Government dues.

The Supreme Court answered the three issues as above. The Supreme Court allowed the Stock Exchange’s appeal and the set aside the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.

Taxability of a Subvention Receipt

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Issue for Consideration
It is not uncommon for a company in the red to
receive financial assistance from its holding company, to enable to it
to turn the corner by recouping its losses, incurred or likely to be
incurred. In such cases, the question that arises under the Income-tax
Act, is about the nature of such receipt. The courts have been asked to
determine whether such receipts, known as subvention receipts, are
taxable or not in the hands of the subsidiary.

The Supreme court in the
case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., 228 ITR 253, laid down
extensive tests for determination of nature of income in cases wherein
an asseseee receives financial assistance under a scheme formulated by
the Government. It held that the point of time, as also its source and
the form of the assistance, are factors that are irrelevant for
determining the taxability of the receipt. The purpose for which the
payment is received is of the paramount importance for ascertaining the
taxability or otherwise of a receipt.

The issue, in the context of
assistance from the holding company, has been recently examined by the
Delhi High Court and the Karnataka High Court. While the first court
held that the receipt is of capital nature not liable to tax, the latter
held the same to be taxable.

Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance’s case

The Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Deutsche Post Bank Home
Finance Ltd., 24 taxmann.com 341, was required to consider the following
question of law at the behest of the Income tax Department: “Whether
the amount of Rs. 11,22,38,874/-, infused by BHW Holding AG, Germany to
the assessee by way of subvention assistance, is taxable as a revenue
receipt and therefore falls within the definition of ‘income’ under
Section 2(24) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

In that case, the assessee,
an Indian company, was engaged in the activity of housing finance. It
was a 100% subsidiary of one German company BHW Holding AG. On an
evaluation by the holding company, the assessee was likely to, on
account of its business activity, incur losses by which its capital
would be substantially if not entirely eroded. By two letters dated
24-09-2004 and 04-02-2005, the holding company granted subvention
assistance to the assessee of Euro 2,000,000, equivalent to Rs.
11,22,38,874. The assessee treated the receipt to be a capital receipt,
not liable to tax.

The Assessing Officer held that the disbursement of
incentive (i.e., subvention receipt ) was by way of casual receipt in
order to assist the assessee to continue its business operation and held
the same to be taxable. On appeal to the CIT(A), the assessee’s
contention that the money received could not be taxed, was accepted by
him. The ITAT rejected the Revenue’s appeal, inter alia, holding that
the holding company had paid the money as subvention payment towards
restoration of the net worth of the company expected to be partly eroded
by the losses suffered/projected by the assessee company for the
financial year 2004-05. The certificate of inward remittance issued by
UTI Bank Ltd confirmed the said fact. This was further supported by the
copy of confirmation received through email wherein the holding company
had certified that they had not claimed the subvention payment as
expenditure in their return of income, no tax benefit had been received
by it in respect of subvention payment and it had capitalised the amount
in its books of account. The ITAT relied on the decision in the case of
CIT vs. Handicrafts & Handloom Export Corporation of India, 140 ITR
532(Delhi).

On behalf of Revenue, before the High Court, it was argued
that the ITAT fell into error in deciding that the subvention receipt
received from the Holding Company was not income, as defined in section
2(24) of the Act.

The Revenue urged that the decision in the
case of the
Handicrafts & Handloom Export Corporation of India vs. CIT, 140 ITR
532(Delhi) relied upon by the Tribunal was not applicable, since the
facts of the case were different. In that case the funds were public in
nature and the cash assistance given by the holding company to STC, was
not subjected to taxation. Reliance was placed upon the decisions in the
cases of Ratna Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, 33 ITR 644 (All.) and
V.S.S.V. Meenakshi Achi vs. CIT, 50 ITR 206 (Mad.) wherein it was held
that where public funds were used as an incentive or in order to assist,
or give subsidy to recoup a unit’s losses or to provide against a
financial liability, such an assistance would not qualify as income. It
was further stressed that the true and correct test to be applied was to
be the purposive test, spelt out in the decision of CIT vs. Ponni
Sugars & Chemicals Ltd., 306 ITR 392 (SC). It was submitted that
only if the real purpose of the assistance was to protect investment or
to ensure that the liabilities adversely impacting the accounts of the
company were met, then and then only the assistance would fall outside
the ambit of taxation.

The assessee, on the other hand,
submitted that the view taken by the CIT(A) and confirmed by the ITAT
was predominantly based upon the decision in the case of the Handicrafts
& Handloom Export Corporation of India (supra) and that there was
in fact no substantial question of law which required to be answered,
since the issue had been settled by the previous decision in the case of
the Handicrafts & Handloom Export Corporation of India (supra ).

On
hearing the parties, the court narrowed the question to whether
assistance given by the assessee’s holding company was a capital receipt
or a revenue receipt in the hands of the assessee. The court examined
the Revenue’s contention that the decision in Handicrafts & Handloom
Export Corporation of India (supra) was not applicable to the case,
because the nature of funds were public in character and in that view of
the matter the appropriate criteria was the purposive test which
determined the character of funds in a given case as was done in the
case of Ponni Sugar & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) by quoting from the
said decision.

On examination, the court held that there was no
shift in the nature of the determinative test, to decide whether a
receipt was revenue or capital. It observed that no doubt there were
observations in that judgment stating that the character of public funds
was an important factor which persuaded the court to hold that such
assistance did not fall within the definition of income. However, this
did not persuade the court to take a different view in the case before
it, in as much as it was not in dispute that the assessee did incur
losses and the assistance was given at a point of time when the losses
were anticipated.

So far as the decision in Ponni Sugar & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) was concerned, the court held that “no doubt the Court clarified how a subsidy should be treated, i.e., by purposive test. The Court presciently held if the object of the subsidy scheme was to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably then the receipt is to the revenue account. On the other hand, under the subsidy scheme, if the object is to enable the assessee to set up a new unit or expand it then the receipt of the subsidy is to the capital account. Therefore, it is the assessee’s action which determines whether subsidy is to avoid losses and liabilities or boost its profits. On a proper application of the above test we see no difference between the facts of the present case and those in Handicrafts & Handloom Export Corporation of India (supra). The assessee was inevitably on the road to incurring losses; its holding company decided to intervene and render assistance. The ITAT has also recorded that, keeping aside the depreciation which the assessee would have been entitled to, actual losses amounted to Rs. 8.7 crore.”

Having regard to all the circumstances, the Delhi High Court was of the opinion that the subvention money received by the assessee company was not liable to tax.

Siemens Public communication Networks’ case

The issue again came up for consideration of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Siemens Public Communication  Networks  Ltd.  41  taxmann. com 139. The assessee, a company in this case, was incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and was engaged in the business of manufacturing Digital Electronic switching systems, computer software and software services. It had filed return of income for the Assessment years 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 declaring loss of substantial amounts. It had received amounts of Rs. 21,28,40,000, Rs. 1,33,45,000, and Rs. 2,95,84,556, respectively for these assessment years from Siemens AG, a German company who was its principal shareholder. The assessee explained the said sum as “subvention payment” from the principal shareholder of the assessee-company, which was paid to the assessee company for two reasons, namely, the company was a potentially sick company, and that its capacity to borrow had reduced substantially, leading to shortage of working capital.

The letter dated 24-09-1998 issued by Siemens  AG, and the assessee’s letter dated 19-02-2002, explained that Siemens AG, being a parent company, had agreed to infuse further capital by reimbursing the accumulated loss. The case of the assessee was that the payment made by Siemens AG was to make good the loss incurred by it, and the receipt of the subvention monies was a capital receipt in nature, and hence, could not be treated as income or revenue receipt.

The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee. The first Appellate Authority, however, in appeal, reversed the order of the Assessing Officer treating the said monies received from Siemens AG as capital receipt. The Appellate Tribunal, in the  appeal filed by the revenue, confirmed the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority in the following words; “6. The rival contentions in regard to the above have been very carefully considered. The assessee company (Siemens Public Communications)(sic) apparently paid the assessee or compensated the assessee in view of the continued losses, and this in fact was to augment the capital base and to improve the net worth which had eroded due to losses suffered by the company. With a view to compensate the erosion in the reserves    in (sic) surplus, the parent company pumps into its subsidiary company, funds to stabilise its capital account. It was considering all these reasons that the Commissioner of Income Tax (A) came to the conclusion that it was on capital account. If the amount so paid by the company is treated as revenue income, it would amount to taxing the parent company itself. The other reason is that the parent company paying its subsidiary company, is within the same group and not for  any  purpose  which is in the nature of income, so as to be treated as taxable income.”

The revenue, before the court, submitted that the monies paid by Siemens AG to the assessee were on revenue account and were paid not only to make good the loss but to make the assessee company run, which had no monies to spend over day to day expenditure to keep it running at the relevant time; that on the basis of the said monies/aid extended by Siemens AG, the assessee not only made its loss good, but started running its business in profit; that who paid the amount was absolutely an irrelevant fact and what was important was the object for which such assistance was extended; from the facts of the case, it was clear that in the first assessment year, the assessee company had suffered loss, whereas in the subsequent assessment years, it started making profit, which fact clearly showed that the amount paid by Siemens AG was used for running the business and therefore, it would   fall under the category of revenue receipt and not  capital receipt.

In support of the submissions, reliance was  placed  upon the decisions  of the Supreme Court in the cases  of CIT vs. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 306 ITR 392 and Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. vs. CIT 228 ITR 253 (SC).

On the other hand, the assessee submitted that the appeal deserved to be rejected outright, since no substantial question of law was involved. It was further submitted that having regard to the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, the question of law as raised, did not fall for consideration as a substantial question of law and that the findings of the Tribunal even on the question of law were justified and the Tribunal had rightly treated the amount paid by Siemens AG as “Subvention payment” and had rightly treated it against the capital account. It was further submitted that the judgments relied upon on behalf of the revenue were not applicable to the facts of the present case.

The Karnataka High Court examined the facts and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases relied upon by the Revenue namely, CIT vs. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) and Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. vs. CIT (supra). It observed that applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, and keeping in view the objective behind the payment made by Siemens AG, the court was satisfied that it was received by the assessee on revenue account. From the facts, it was clear to the court that huge amounts were paid by Siemens AG not only to make good the loss, but also to see that the assessee would run more profitably and the payment was by way of assistance in carrying on the business. The court noted that it was not the case of the assessee that the monies paid by Siemens AG were  utilised  either for repayment of the loan undertaken by the assessee for setting up its unit or for expansion of existing unit/business.

The court took note of the observation of the Supreme Court to the effect that the point of time at which the subsidy was paid was not relevant and the source and the form of subsidy was immaterial. In the opinion of the High Court, the main eligibility condition for receipt was that the amount ought to have been utilised by the assessee to meet recurring expenses and/or to run its business more profitably and so also to get out of the loss that it was suffering at the relevant time. In any case, the court noted that the receipt was not for acquiring capital assets or to bring into existence any new asset. As a matter of fact, after getting the financial aid from Siemens AG, the assessee company turned its business from loss to profit, which was evident from the facts reflected in the return of income filed for all the three assessment years. In this backdrop, if the purpose test is applied, it was clear to the court that the payment was made by Siemens AG for meeting recurring expenses/working capital.

The Karnataka High Court questioned the basis of the findings of the tribunal where the tribunal had observed that Siemens AG paid the assessee or  compensated the assessee in view of the continued losses, and such financial aid was extended to augment the capital base and to improve the net worth which had eroded the losses suffered by the company. According to the court, the facts on record spoke otherwise and on the other hand, supported the case of the revenue that the financial aid was extended by Siemens AG not only to make good the loss but to see that the company ran more profitably.

The court, while deciding the issue in favour of the Revenue by allowing its appeal, held as follows; “It is the object which is relevant for the financial assistance which determines the nature of such assistance. In other words, the character of the receipts in the hands of the assessee has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which payment was made. If the financial assistance is extended for repayment of the loan undertaken by the assessee for setting up new unit or for expansion of existing business then the receipt of such aid could be termed as capital  in nature. On the other hand, if the financial assistance  is extended to run business more profitably or to meet recurring expenses, such payment will have to be treated as revenue receipt. It is not the case of the assessee,   in  the  present  case,  that  the  financial  assistance was extended by Siemens AG either  for  setting  up  any unit or expansion of existing business or for acquiring any assets.”

Observations
A receipt of subvention money apparently is in the nature of gift and in the absence of any express provision for taxing such a receipt, the same cannot be brought to income tax. It is only when such a receipt is  in the ordinary course of business and has the effect of augmenting the profits of an assessee or recouping the assessee’s revenue expenditure that a question arises for consideration whether a receipt is taxable or not. A receipt from the holding company to meet the expansion needs of the subsidiary company or for the repayment  of loans are not in dispute and there appears to be kind of an unanimity that such receipts are capital in nature. Also not in dispute is the receipt to arrest the erosion     of capital. It seems that even the Karnataka High Court has expressed no disagreement on this understanding  of the law.

There appears to be no doubt that the purposive test is to be applied, for determination of the issue on hand, as has been laid down by the apex court in the cases of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. and Ponni Sugars  & Chemicals Ltd. (supra). Under the purposive test, as per the court, a receipt will not be taxable in a case where the same is received for the purpose of repayment of the liabilities or for expansion of the undertaking, including for acquisition of the assets.

As against that, a receipt will be taxable where it is for the purposes of meeting the expenditure or for increasing the profit of the business. A receipt to meet the erosion of the net worth will also be on capital account.

It is interesting to note that both the courts have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case      of CIT vs. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) to deliver contrasting decisions. This has happened mainly for the reason that the assesseee in the case before   the Karnataka High Court had not been able to clearly establish to the satisfaction of the court that the receipt in question was for arresting the erosion of net worth     in spite of the finding of the tribunal on this aspect. The Tribunal had given a finding of fact that the receipt was for improving the net worth of the subsidiary company but the court gave a finding to the contrary by holding that the tribunal was not right, on facts, to have given such finding.

It is also relevant that the assessee in the case before the Karnataka High Court did not cite the favourable decision in the case of Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance (supra) which was a current decision directly on the subject of the subvention receipt. It also did not cite or rely upon the decision in the case of Handicrafts & Handloom Corporation Of India (supra), a decision that was relied upon by the Delhi High Court while deciding the issue in favour of Deutsche Home Bank Finance.

In the case of Handicrafts & Handloom Corporation Of India (supra ), the assessee, a wholly subsidiary company of State Trading Corporation (STC), incurred a loss in  its business of export of handloom, etc. for assessment year 1970-71. STC gave cash assistance at 6 per cent of the foreign earnings of the assessee to recoup the losses. Cash assistance of Rs. 11.70 lakh was given by STC. The question was whether such cash assistance amounted to income. The Court noticed previous rulings of the Allahabad and Madras High Court, respectively,  in cases of Ratna Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) and V.S.
S.V. Meenakshi Achi (supra), the ratio of which decision was confirmed by the common judgment by the Supreme Court in the case of V. S. S. V. Meenakshi Achi (supra).

The Court held that the amounts given by the STC to  the assessee, i.e., Handicrafts & Handloom Export Corporation of India in order to recoup its losses, which were incurred year after year, were akin to assistance  by a father to ensure the business survival of his child. The Court held that the amount given by the father would only be in the nature of gifts/or voluntary payment and not stemming from any business consideration. The position is similar here, where the shareholder is ensuring the survival of the subsidiary.

In Lurgi India Co. Ltd. 302 ITR 67(Delhi), the assessee received a sum of Rs. 13 crore from its parent company Lurgi Company AG, which was credited to profit and loss account by way of capital grant. However, in computation of total income it was stated that the amount was received from Lurgi AG for recouping its losses. The amount so received was held to be capital grant not chargeable to tax under the Act following the ratio of the decision of  the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Handicrafts  & Handloom Export Corporation of India vs. CIT (supra). Kindly see the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of Indian Textile Engineers, 141 ITR 69 and of the Calcutta high court in the case of Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd. 165 ITR 416 which confirm the above treatment of receipt.

The Delhi High Court in the case of Handicrafts & Handloom Corporation Of India (supra ), held that there was a basic difference between the grants made by a Government or from public funds generally to assessee in a particular line of business or trade, with a view to help them in the trade or to supplement their general revenues or trading receipts and not ear-marked for any specific or particular purpose and a case of a private party agreeing to make good the losses incurred by an assessee on account of a mutual relationship that subsisted between them. The former were treated as a trading receipt because they reach the trader in his capacity as such, and were made in order to assist him in carrying on of the trade. The latter were in the nature of gifts or voluntary payments motivated by personal relationship and not stemming from any business considerations. The amount received from parent company was not grants received from an outsider or the Government on such general grounds. The amounts were paid by STC to the assessee in order to enable it to recoup those losses and to enable it to meet its liabilities. The amounts received by the assessee from STC could not be treated as part of the trading receipt.

It seems that subvention money received from the holding company, not as trader, but to recoup the losses likely to be suffered by the subsidiary, should be capital in nature, more so where the holding company otherwise has no trading  relation  with  the  subsidiary  company. A receipt not to meet the recurring expenditure but to help in purchasing capital assets or for expansion of the business is more likely to be capital in nature. So is the case where the receipt is not for the purpose of assisting the assessee to run the business more profitably. A voluntary payment arising out of personal  relationship  of parent and subsidiary company, not stemming from any business considerations, is not a revenue receipt. The case is further strengthened where the holding company does not treat the payment as an expenditure. In our view, the decision of the Karnataka High Court was delivered on the basis of the facts and cannot be taken as laying down any precedent for taxing a subvention receipt in general.

Transactional Net Margin Method – Overview and Analysis

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1 Background

Under transfer pricing, the transaction (controlled transaction) between the taxpayer and its associated enterprise or related party, as the case may be, has to be at Arm’s Length Price (‘ALP) i.e. the price at which the independent parties would have entered into the same or similar transaction under similar circumstances. The Chapter II of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (‘OECD guidelines’) prescribe the following methods in order to determine the arm’s length price of the controlled transaction:

The old OECD hierarchy of methods suggested that the CUP method was the most preferred, next came the other “traditional transactional” methods (resale price and cost plus) followed, in “exceptional” cases where the first three methods cannot reliably be applied, by the profit based methods (the transactional net margin method and profit split). Profit based methods were described as ‘methods of last resort’. This distinction is now removed. The basis for choosing one method over the others is now expressed as “finding the most appropriate method for a particular case”. Nevertheless, it is clear that some sort of comparison is required and that the basis for that comparison includes the availability and reliability of the comparable data that can be used when applying any particular method.

In line with the OECD guidelines, the Indian Transfer Pricing Regulations (‘TPR’) provides that the arm’s length price of an international transactions and specified domestic transactions is to be determined by adopting any one of the above methods, being most appropriate (i.e. the method which provides the most reliable measure of the arm’s length price considering the facts and circumstances in each case). However, in addition to above, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (‘CBDT’) under the Indian TPR has prescribed such other method which tests the arm’s length price of the controlled transaction with reference to the price which has been charged or paid for the same or similar uncontrolled transaction under similar circumstances.

2. Conceptual framework

Mechanism to apply TNMM has been mentioned Rule 10B(1)(e) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 as under:

“(i) the net profit margin realised by the enterprise from an international transaction entered into with an associated enterprise is computed in relation to costs incurred or sales effected or assets employed or to be employed by the enterprise or having regard to any other relevant base;

(ii) the net profit margin realised by the enterprise or by an unrelated enterprise from a comparable uncontrolled transaction or a number of such transactions is computed having regard to the same base;

(iii) the net profit margin referred to in sub-clause (ii) arising in comparable uncontrolled transactions is adjusted to take into account the differences, if any, between the international transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market;

(iv) the net profit margin realised by the enterprise and referred to in sub-clause (i) is established to be the same as the net profit margin referred to in sub-clause (iii); (v) the net profit margin thus established is then taken into account to arrive at an arm’s length price in relation to the international transaction.”

TNMM is applied with an objective to examine the ratio of net profit in relation to an appropriate base (e.g., costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realises from a controlled transaction. In the event where such uncontrolled transaction of the taxpayer are not available, net profit relative to identical base realised by unrelated enterprises from comparable uncontrolled transaction is determined. The net profit of taxpayers under controlled transaction is compared either with net profit margins of taxpayer under uncontrolled transaction or with the net profit margins of unrelated enterprises from comparable uncontrolled transactions after making appropriate adjustments, if any. The net profit margin earned under uncontrolled transactions after necessary adjustments, if any is considered as arm’s length margin in respect of the international transaction or specified domestic transaction.

TNMM does not require strict product and functional comparability as is required in case of traditional methods such as CUP, RPM and CPM. The TNMM primarily focuses on comparison of net profit margin realised by the associated enterprises in their controlled transactions with that of uncontrolled transactions. Typical transactions where TNMM can be applied are provision of services, distribution of finished products where RPM cannot be applied, transfer of semi-finished goods where CPM cannot be applied, transactions involving intangibles where PSM cannot be used, etc.

TNMM is generally the preferred method amongst the taxpayers and the tax authorities. However, the manner of applying TNMM is often seen as cause of dispute in most of the practical cases. More often there exists difference of opinion between taxpayers and the revenue authorities in respect of considering the TNMM as the most appropriate method against the traditional methods. For example, practically in most of the cases of a distributor having import transactions from related parties for onward distribution in the Indian market, while the taxpayers select RPM for benchmarking such international transactions, the tax authorities select TNMM as the most appropriate method. Further, application of CUP method/CPM over TNMM or vice versa is often seen as a matter of disputes during transfer pricing audits in India.

3. Application of TNMM, pertinent issues and few judicial rulings

The steps involved in application of TNMM are as under:

Each of the above steps on application of TNMM, practical difficulties/challenges during the transfer pricing audits in India and few of the judicial rulings are briefly described as under:

Step 1: Selection of the tested party
When applying TNMM, it is necessary to choose the party to the transaction for which a financial indicator (mark-up on costs, gross margin, or net profit indicator) is tested. As a general rule, the tested party is the one to which a transfer pricing method can be applied in the most reliable manner and for which the most reliable comparables can be found, i.e., it will most often be the one that has the less complex functional analysis. However this has been an area of litigation during transfer pricing audits in India. The revenue authorities and the tax payers have divergent views on selection of tested party i.e., whether tested party should be Indian tax payers or foreign Associated Enterprise (AE). Selection of foreign comparables is also one of the area where litigation subsists during transfer pricing audits in India.

Judicial Rulings:

However diverse are the judicial pronouncements supporting selection of foreign AE as a tested party, including Development Consultants P. Ltd. vs. DCIT [2008] 115 TTJ 577 (Kol), Mastek Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012]
53 SOT 111 (Ahd.), AIA Engineering Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 50 SOT 134 (Ahd.), Global Vantedge Private Limited vs. DCIT  (2010-TIOL-  24-ITAT-DEL),  General  Motors India P. Ltd. vs. DCIT [ITA nos. 3096/Ahd 2010  and  3308/ Ahd 2011.], the outcome of said Tribunal rulings are in accordance with the international best practices with regards to selection of tested party. It has been settled  in these rulings that tested party should be the least complex entity for which reliable data in respect of itself and in respect of comparables is available. In such cases it was held that the tested party could be the local entity or a foreign AE. Such rulings gave credence to the fact that the foreign AE can also be selected as a tested party depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

Step 2: Selection of data for comparison
The Indian TPR requires that the arm’s length analysis be based on data for the relevant financial year only.

While applying TNMM, one of the conflicts prevails where the taxpayers are required to maintain contemporaneous documentation i.e. documentation should exist before the Form 3CEB is filed. As per the Income-tax rules, the data to be used for arm’s length analysis has to be for the relevant financial year under consideration. However, as has been experienced till date, the data for comparable companies (in case where external TNMM using search process from databases is preferred) for the arm’s  length analysis in respect of the relevant financial year  is generally not available before the Form 3CEB is filed due to search database limitations. This leads to need for usage of multiple year data in order to undertake arm’s length analysis. Internationally also, multiple year data analysis is considered as it takes into account relevant economic factors like business cycles etc., which may impact the determination of arm’s length price.

Judicial Rulings:
Practically it has been noticed that the India tax authorities do not consider multiple year data analysis and proceed to perform the TNMM analysis using single year data i.e. the data related to financial year under consideration. There are host of rulings against the taxpayers disregarding the usage of multiple year data including Aztec Software and Technology vs. ACIT (294 ITR 32, Bang ITAT), Symantec Software Solutions Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT No. 7894/ MUM/2010, etc.

However, contrary to the above rulings, the jurisdictional Bangalore Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Phillips Software Centre Private Limited (ITA No. 218/ Bang/2008) has held that the TPO cannot use data during assessment that was not available to the assessee at the time of preparation of documentation. Further, the Hon’ble Delhi Tribunal in case of Panasonic India Private Limited vs. Income Tax Officer (ITA No.1417/Del/2008) held that proviso to Rule 10B(4) would allow the taxpayer to adopt the previous two year’s average PLI along with the current year’s PLI of the tested party and on a similar footing allow the taxpayer to adopt the three year’s average PLI of comparable companies.

The above practical difficulty should be now resolved   by the recent amendment in the Finance Act, 2014. It was proposed in the Budget Speech of 2014 by the Hon’ble Central Finance Minister that use of multiple year data (instead of single year data) would be allowed for comparability analysis. However, the detailed rules in this regard would be notified subsequently.

Step 3: Aggregation of transactions
While computing profits under TNMM, the international transactions in relation to a particular activity which are subject to transfer pricing are aggregated and the net profit for the activity is arrived for benchmarking with   the uncontrolled transaction. While, the Indian TPR is silent on the aggregation of transactions, the principles on aggregation of transactions are contained in the OECD guidelines. For example, consider as case where there are multiple sales transaction entered by an India taxpayer, being a manufacturer to its various group companies located in different parts of the world. Due to inherent practicalities of determining net profits earned by the taxpayer in respect of each of such sales transactions, it is more often seen that all the sales transactions are ‘aggregated’ and the net profit of the taxpayer arising  out of its manufacturing activities is benchmarked as a separate ‘class of transaction’.

Further, practically it is seen that while applying TNMM, all the international transactions are aggregated and entity wide net profit is determined for benchmarking purpose. For example consider a scenario  where  a  taxpayer  has entered into multiple  international  transactions such as sales from manufacturing activities, sales from distribution activities, payment of royalty, payment of corporate charges, interest payments, etc. It is seen that in many cases, all the transactions are aggregated and net profit of the taxpayer is determined and compared  for benchmarking analysis. However, as per the various judicial pronouncements it is well settled that each and every transaction needs to be benchmarked separately taking into consideration the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed (typically called as FAR analysis) under each of such transactions.

Aggregation  and  segmentation  is  often   challenged by the income tax authorities. Appropriate level of segmentation of the taxpayer’s financial data is needed while determining the  net  profits  of  the  taxpayers  from controlled transaction. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply TNMM on a company-wide basis if the company engages in a variety of different controlled transactions that cannot be appropriately compared on an aggregate basis with those of an independent enterprise. Similarly, when analysing the transactions between the independent enterprises to the extent they are needed, profits attributable to transactions that are not similar to the controlled transactions under examination based on the FAR  analysis should be excluded for the purpose   of comparison.

Practically, there are numerous cases wherein while making the transfer pricing adjustments, the tax authorities have applied TNMM on overall entitywide basis instead of restricting the adjustments to international transactions only. The TNMM analysis should be restricted only to the international transaction.

Judicial Rulings:
The issue related to the principle of aggregation of transaction  vis-a-vis  segmentation  of  transactions  and restriction of transfer pricing adjustment to the international transactions only is covered under various ITAT rulings such as Aztec Software and Technology vs
.ACIT, (294 ITR 32 – Bang ITAT); Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd vs. ACIT (299 ITR 175 – Del ITAT), M/s Panasonic India Pvt Ltd vs. Income Tax Officer (2010) TII-47-ITAT- DEL-TP; UCB India Private Ltd. vs. ACIT (reference: ITA No. 428 & 429 of 2007); DCIT vs. M/s Starlite (reference: ITA No. 2279/Mum/06), Birlasoft (India) Limited vs. DCIT [TS-227-ITAT-2014(DEL)-TP]; Tecnimont ICB Pvt. Ltd. [TS-251-ITAT-2013(Mum)-TP],etc.

Application of TNMM on aggregated basis in case where unique intangibles are involved:

In certain cases, comparability analysis could be difficult where the transactions include unique intangibles. Following extracts from the OECD  guidelines  deals  with a typical case where the transaction involves sale  of branded products and difficulty that could arise in determining ALP of the transaction.

“6.25 For example, it may be the case that a branded athletic shoe transferred in a controlled transaction is comparable to an athletic shoe transferred under a different brand name in an uncontrolled transaction both in terms of the quality and specification of the shoe itself and also in terms of the consumer acceptability and other characteristics of the brand name in that market. Where such a comparison is not possible, some help also may be found, if adequate evidence is available, by comparing the volume of sales and the prices chargeable and profits realised for trademarked goods with those for similar goods that do not carry the trademark. It therefore may be possible to use sales of unbranded products as comparable transactions to sales of branded products that are otherwise comparables, but only to the extent that adjustments can be made to account for any value added by the trademark. For example, branded athletic shoe “A” may be comparable to an unbranded shoe in all respects (after adjustments) except for the brand name itself. In such a case, the premium attributable to the brand might be determined by comparing an unbranded shoe with different features, transferred in an uncontrolled transaction, to its branded equivalent, also transferred in an uncontrolled transaction. Then it may be possible to use this information as an aid in determining the price of branded shoe “A”, although adjustments may be necessary for the effect of the difference in features on the value of the brand. However, adjustments may be particularly difficult where a trademarked product has a dominant market position such that the generic product is in essence trading in a different market, particularly where sophisticated products are involved.”

Application of TNMM is such cases could be more useful as the net margins are less affected and are more tolerant to product differences and other conditions prevailing in case of controlled transactions vis-a-vis uncontrolled comparable transactions.

Further, practically let us consider an example in case  of a Manufacturing concern, say A Ltd. There are sales by A Ltd. to its various group companies and also there are royalty payments to a group company towards use  of brand, technical know-how, etc. The ideal approach would be to benchmark the sales transactions and royalty payment transaction separately. However, quite often due to practical difficulties related to availability of comparability of data etc., separate benchmarking of such transactions becomes difficult. To counter such scenario, TNMM is generally applied on an aggregate entitywide basis, wherein net profit from a “class of transactions” i.e. Manufacturing sales is benchmarked using comparable data either internally or using external database with appropriate adjustments, if any.

Step 4: Identification of comparables

Comparable analysis is the essence of Transfer pricing and that too while applying TNMM. Under TNMM, the comparable analysis is required at broad functional level based on the FAR analysis. For example, comparables can be chosen depending upon broad category of business i.e., trading function, manufacturing function, service function etc. The comparables (uncontrolled transaction) typically can be internal comparable or external comparables.

TNMM should ideally be established by  reference  to the net profit indicator  that  the  same  taxpayer  earns in comparable uncontrolled transactions, i.e., by reference to “internal comparables” Where the internal comparables are not available, the net margin that would have been earned in comparable transactions by an independent enterprise (“external comparables”) may serve as a guide. A functional analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions is required to determine whether the transactions are comparable and what adjustments may be necessary to obtain reliable results.

External comparables are found out using publicly available databases. Prowess (a database developed by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Private Limited) and CapitalinePlus (a database developed by Capital Market Publishers India Private Limited) are  widely  used amongst the taxpayers and transfer pricing authorities in India.

The OECD guidelines specifies the use internal TNMM over external TNMM. However, the controversy in respect of the same subsists between the taxpayer and the revenue authorities. Internal TNMM has been considered to be preferable by the Indian appellate tax authorities. While the internal TNMM is more preferred choice, it is not applied due to lack of comparable data. Further while applying external TNMM over database, there are host of differences on the manner of selection of comparable companies – commonly called as “search process”. There are continual disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities on selection of appropriate search filters. For example the prominent disagreements over quantitative filters could be application of minimum/maximum sales turnover (for example considering software giants like Infosys, Wipro etc., having huge turnover while comparing with pygmies software players), filter for service revenue over total revenue, export sales filter, employee cost to total sales filter, filter on related party transactions, etc.

Further, as we understand that in practical world no company can have its exactly comparable company with same functionalities; application of TNMM sometimes becomes a challenging task for taxpayers as well as tax authorities. Therefore qualitative analysis under TNMM more often fails to reach consensus between tax payers and tax authorities on identification of ‘ideal’ comparables.

Judicial Rulings:

The various judicial rulings placed emphasise on selection of comparable companies considering the Functions, Assets and Risk (FAR) analysis of the controlled transactions vis-a-vis uncontrolled transactions. The few important rulings include Mentor Graphics (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (112 TTJ 408, 2007 18 SOT 76, 109 ITD 101 – Delhi
ITAT), UCB India Private Limited vs. ACIT [2009-TIOL- 184-ITAT-MUM, (2009) 30 SOT 95)], DCIT vs. Quark Systems (P) Ltd. (2010-TIOL-31-ITAT-CHDSB), etc.

Step 5: Selection of suitable PLI

The application of TNMM requires the selection of an appropriate PLI. The PLI measures the relationship between (i) profits and (ii) either costs incurred, revenues earned, or assets employed.

In applying the TNMM, an appropriate PLI needs to be selected considering a number of factors, including the nature of the activities of the tested party, the reliability  of the available data with respect to the comparable companies, and the extent to which the PLI is likely to produce an appropriate measure of an arm’s length result.

A variety of PLIs can be used. TNMM aims at arriving   at the arm’s length operating profit (i.e., profit before financial and non-operating expenses).  The  examples of PLI commonly used while applying TNMM are net operating profit/total operating cost (OP/TC), net operating profit/total sales (OP/Sales), net operating profit on total assets employed (return on assets), net operating profit on capital employed (return on capital employed), berry ratio (i.e. ratio of gross profit over operating value added expenses), etc.

Determination of the appropriate base while choosing PLI: The denominator of a PLI should be focused on the relevant indicator(s) of the value of the functions performed by the tested party in the transaction under review, taking account of its assets used and risks assumed. For instance, capital- intensive activities such as certain manufacturing activities may involve significant investment risk, even in those cases where the operational risks (such as market risks or inventory risks) might be limited. Where a transactional net margin method is applied to such cases, the investment- related risks are reflected in the net profit indicator if the latter is a return on investment (e.g. return on assets or return on capital employed).

The denominator should be reasonably independent from controlled transactions; otherwise there would be no objective starting point. For instance, when analysing a transaction consisting in the purchase of goods by a distributor from an associated enterprise for resale to independent customers, one could not weight the net profit indicator against the cost of goods sold because these costs are the controlled costs for which consistency with the arm’s length principle is being tested. Similarly, for a controlled transaction consisting in the provision    of services to an associated enterprise, one could not weight the net profit indicator against the revenue from the sale of services because these are the controlled sales for which consistency with the arm’s length principle is being tested.

During the transfer pricing audits, the selection of appropriate PLI is one of the disputed issues. For example, in case where the taxpayers has imports as well as export transactions with its AEs. In such an event, selection of PLI i.e. OP/cost, OP/sales or berry ratio could be a debatable issue. The transfer pricing authorities typically do not accept usage of PLI such as return on assets or return on capital employed disregarding the functional profiles, nature of industry and other critical business or economic reasons. Usage of Berry ratio in case of typical limited risk distributors or service provider is quite often not considered appropriate by the transfer pricing authorities in India.

Judicial Rulings:
Various judicial rulings in dealt with the aspect of PLI selection, few of important ones being Schefenacker Motherson Ltd vs. DCIT [123 TTJ 509 (Del)], Kyungshin Industrial Motherson Limited vs. DCIT, New Delhi [2010-TII-61-ITAT-DEL-TP], etc.

Step 6: Economic adjustments, if any
The Indian TPR provides that the net profit margin should be adjusted to take into account the differences, if any, between the international transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market. Typical comparability adjustments while applying TNMM are working capital adjustments, market risk adjustment, capacity utilisation adjustments, etc. However, in absence of concrete guidance on manner of carrying out such adjustment workings under the Indian TPR, practically   it becomes difficult for the taxpayers to convince the tax authorities on veracity of such adjustments. However, in case of working capital adjustments, guidance is more often taken from OECD guidelines on mechanisms to carry our such adjustments and this is too some extent accepted by the Transfer Pricing authorities in India.

Judicial Rulings:
There are multiple judicial rulings on economic adjustments while applying TNMM. The rulings dealt with allowance of working capital adjustments, capacity utilisation adjustments, adjustments due to accounting policies (depreciation charge), etc. The important ones being Mentor Graphics (P) Ltd. vs.  DCIT  [112  TTJ  408, 2007 18 SOT 76, 109 ITD 101 (Del ITAT)], E-gain
Communication (P) ltd. vs. ITO [118 TTJ 354, 23 SOT 385 (Pune ITAT)], Philips Software Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2008-TIOL-471-ITAT-BANG], TO vs. CRM Services India
(P) Ltd., CRM Services India (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [ITA No. 4796(Del)/2010,ITA No. 4796(Del)/2010], etc.

Step 7: Assessment of profit for comparisons
As a matter of principle, only those items that (a) directly or indirectly relate to the controlled transaction at hand and (b) are of an operating nature are taken into account in the determination of the net profit indicator for the application of the TNMM. However, in a practical scenario, there are many controversies in the treatment of revenue items into operating or non-operating. For example, treatment of foreign exchange fluctuations, bad debts, provision for bad debt, amortisation of goodwill, etc. as operating/non-operating items. The assessment of profit depends upon appropriate selection of cost base and    in absence of appropriate guidance and host of diverse judicial pronouncements, practical difficulty in applying TNMM still prevails.

Judicial Rulings:
In absence of any guidelines as to what should form  part of “operating costs”/”operating revenue” while determining “operating net profit” for TNMM application is debatable under the Indian transfer pricing regime. The various judicial pronouncements in India dealt with the issue related to computation of net profits of the tested party and comparable companies in  order  to  assess the arm’s length price. The prominent rulings being Schefenacker Motherson Ltd. vs. DCIT [123 TTJ 509 – Delhi ITAT], Chrys Capital Investment Advisors India Pvt. Ltd. [2010-TII-11-ITAT-Delhi-TP], Sap Labs India Private Limited vs. ACIT Bangalore [2010-TII-44-ITAT-BANG-TP], DHL Express India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-353-ITAT-2011(Mum)], Trilogy E business Software India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-455-ITAT- 2011(Bang)],etc.

Step 8: Determination of the arm’s length price
In order to apply the arm’s length principle, sometimes it is possible to test the same with a single uncontrolled price/ margin. However, transfer pricing is not an exact science and therefore, in most of the cases, application of the most appropriate method results in a range of prices/margin which are comparable to the controlled transaction. In such cases, as provided under the Indian TPR, the arm’s length price must be determined considering the average mean of such range of prices/margin.

The Indian TPR also provides that the average mean as mentioned above can be adjusted by +/- 1% in case of wholesale traders and 3% in case of others to fit in the arm’s length principle.

Judicial Rulings:
There are judicial rulings such as Mentor Graphics (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [112 TTJ 408, 2007 18 SOT 76, 109 ITD 101 – Del ITAT], ACIT vs. MSS India Pvt. Ltd. [123 TTJ
657 2009-TIOL-416-ITAT-PUNE], etc. on the principles on determination of arm’s length price.

Summary of few judicial rulings on each of the above aspect related to application of TNMM is enclosed as Annexure 1.

4.    advantages and limitations of applying the TNMM

5.    revised chapters i-iii of the OECD guidelines

The erstwhile OECD guidelines included five comparability factors – characteristics of property or services, functional analysis, contractual terms, economic circumstances and business strategy. Under the revised OECD guidelines, while the said comparability factors are still applicable, revised Chapter III of the OECD guidelines sets out a ten-step process for performing a comparability analysis. Application of the steps is stated as being “good practice” and is not compulsory “as reliability of the outcome is more important than the process”. The ten steps, which are not necessarily sequential, are:-

?    Broad based analysis of the taxpayer’s circumstances;
?    Determination of years to be covered;
?    Functional analysis;
?    Review of existing internal comparables;
?    Determination of available sources of information on external comparables;
?    Selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method;
?    Identification of the potential comparables;
?    Determination of and making appropriate comparability adjustments where appropriate;
?    Interpretation and use of data collected; and
?    Implementation of the support processes.

In terms of comparability adjustments, the revised OECD guidelines suggests the basis of undertaking or not undertaking adjustments to the comparables and tested party and concludes that, if possible, adjustments must be made where differences exist, which could materially affect the comparison. The revised OECD guidelines also state that where internal comparables exist, it may not be necessary to search for external comparables. However, it also recognises that internal comparables are not always necessarily a more reliable basis for evaluating arm’s length nature of transaction between taxpayer and related party.

The revised OECD  guidelines  reinforces  that  TNMM  is unlikely to be reliable if both parties to a transaction contribute unique intangibles. Where TNMM is applicable, the OECD guidelines provides guidance on the comparability standard to be applied, reinforcing the importance of determining an appropriate profit level indicator as the basis of the analysis and discussing the importance of undertaking adjustments so that interest and foreign exchange income and expenses are treated in a comparable manner in the profit level indicator of both the tested party and the comparables. Annexure I to Chapter II of the revised OECD guidelines has laid down certain numerical illustrations on sensitivity of gross and net profit indicators.

Illustrations on sensitivity of gross and Net Profit Margins Due To Functional Differences

llustration 1 – Difference in functional and risk profile of distributors:

Enterprises  performing  different  functions  may  have  a wide range of gross profit margins while still earning broadly similar levels of net profits. For instance, TNMM would be less sensitive to differences in volume, extent and complexity of functions and operating expenses.

Let us consider an example of a distributor, say X Ltd. importing certain goods from its group companies for further distribution in India. X Ltd. performs significant marketing function and bears product obsolescence risk. Also let us assume that there is another distributor, say Y Ltd. importing similar goods from its group companies for further distribution in India. The import price for X Ltd. and Y Ltd. for the goods would be different in view of difference in the functions and risk borne by each of them. The import price in case of X Ltd. should typically be lower than that of import price in case of Y Ltd. The gross profits of X Ltd. and Y Ltd. would be influenced by such functional differences. However, TNMM is more tolerant to such functional differences. This can be explained by way of numeric illustration as under:

(*) Assume that in this case the difference of INR 100    in transaction price corresponds to the difference in the extent and complexity of the marketing function performed by the distributor and the difference in the allocation of the obsolescence risk between the manufacturer and the distributor.

From the above table, it can be observed that the risk   of error at gross margin level would amount to INR 100 (10% x 1,000), while it would amount to INR 20 (2% x 1,000) if a TNMM was applied.

This illustrates the fact that, depending on the circumstances of the case and in particular of the effect of the functional differences on the cost structure and on the revenue of the “comparables”, net profit margins can be less sensitive than gross margins to differences in the extent and complexity of functions.

Illustration    2    –    Effect    of    a    difference    in manufacturers’ capacity utilisation:
 
In certain scenario TNMM may be more sensitive than the cost plus or resale price methods to differences in capacity utilisation, because differences in the levels of absorption of indirect fixed costs (e.g. fixed manufacturing costs or fixed distribution costs) would affect the net profit but may not affect the gross margin or gross mark-up on costs if not reflected in price differences. Let us consider an example where P Ltd. a manufacturer of certain goods operates in full capacity (say 1000 units per year) vis-a- vis. Q Ltd., a manufacturer of similar goods which operates at a lesser capacity of what it could manufacture in full year (say 800 units per year in case where full capacity is 1000 units).

case and in particular on the proportion of fixed and variable costs and on whether it is the taxpayer or the “comparable” which is in an over-capacity situation.

In addition to above, the OECD guidelines have under Annexure to Chapter III has provided an example of a working capital adjustment typically undertaken while applying TNMM.

6.    Conclusion

TNMM does not require stringent comparability norms (product comparability, exact functional comparability, etc.) unlike in case of other prescribed transfer pricing methods like  CUP, RPM,  CPM  and  PSM.  Therefore  it can be noticed that TNMM is generally the preferred method amongst the taxpayers and transfer pricing authorities in India. (*) This assumes that the arm’s length price of
 
However, the TNMM has its own practical difficulties and nuances explained above. As discussed, over a decade old Indian transfer pricing regime has witnessed significant number of judicial rulings  relating  to  various  aspects on application of TNMM. This include aspects such as preference of other transfer pricing methods over TNMM, selection of tested party, selection of comparable period, choosing appropriate PLIs, segmentation vs. aggregation of transactions, selection of comparable companies, application of appropriate search filters, validation of transfer pricing adjustments, determination of appropriate cost base while applying TNMM,  etc.  Such  difference of opinion between the taxpayers and transfer pricing authorities on application of TNMM has led to disputes and controversies during transfer pricing audits in India. Reference on ten step process of comparability analysis under the revised OECD guidelines and numerical examples on sensitivity of gross and net profit indictors
 
The manufactured products is not affected by the manufacturer’s capacity utilisation.

From the above table it can be observed that the risk of error when applying at gross margin level could amount to 16 (2% x 800) instead of 50 (5% x 1000) if TNMM is applied.

This illustrates the fact that net profit indicators can be more sensitive than gross mark-ups or gross margins to differences in the capacity utilisation, depending on the facts and circumstances of the

Under typical circumstances could serve as guiding factor for applying TNMM under the Indian Transfer Pricing context.

Thus, in view of above, the need for hour in the Indian transfer pricing regime is to reinforce certain regulatory framework and lay out concrete guidelines on application of TNMM and mitigate the practical challenges on application of TNMM as the most appropriate method. This will certainly help in resolving perpetual uncertainty, hardship and never ending litigation for the taxpayers and transfer pricing authorities in India.

Annexure 1 – Few Judicial rulings on various aspects related To application of TNMM:
1.    selection of tested party:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Development Consultants P. Ltd. vs. DCIT [2008] 115
TTJ 577 (Kol)

Principles
laid down for selection of tested party – 1) least complex entity 2)
non-owning of valuable intangible property or unique assets

Mastek Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 53

SOT 111 (Ahd.)

Selected
party should be least complex and should not be unique, so that prima facie can- not be distinguished
from poten- tial uncontrolled comparables.

AIA Engineering Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 50 SOT 134 (Ahd.)

Upheld
selection of Foreign AE as tested party.

Ranbaxy Laboratories vs. ACIT [2008] 110 ITD 428 (Delhi)

The assessee’ s stand of consid-
ering foreign AE as tested party was rejected due to factors like geographic
locations, economic background and FAR analysis.

Global Vantedge Private Limited vs. DCIT (2010-TIOL-
24-ITAT- DEL),

Held
that least complex entity (Foreign AE in given case) re- quires fewer adjustments and thus should be accepted.

General Motors India P. Ltd., vs. DCIT [ITA nos. 3096/Ahd 2010

and 3308/Ahd 2011.

Upheld
selection of Foreign AE as tested party.

2.    selection of data for comparison:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Phillips Software Centre Private Limited (ITA No. 218/Bang/2008)

The TPO cannot use data
during assessment that was not avail- able to the assessee at the time of
preparation of documentation.

Panasonic India Private Lim- ited vs. Income Tax
Officer (ITA No.1417/Del/2008)

proviso to Rule 10B(4) would allow the
taxpayer to adopt the previous two year’s average PLI along with the current
year’s PLI of the tested party and on a

similar footing allow the taxpayer to adopt the three year’s average
PLI of comparable companies.

3. aggregation of transactions vs. segmentation:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Aztec Software and Technology vs. ACIT,

( 294 ITR 32, Bang ITAT)

Use of
multiple year data is justified only if its influence on determination of ALP
can be demonstrated.

Chrys Capital Investment Advisors India Pvt. Ltd.
(2010-TII-11-ITAT-

Delhi-TP)

Use of multiple year data rejected

Symantec Software Solutions Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT (ITA
No.7894/ MUM/2010)

TPO is entitled to consider
the material in public domain, which was not available to the assessee at the
time of the TP study.

M/s.Smart Trust Infosolutions P. Ltd.

[ITA No. 4172/Del/2009, ITA No. 4172/Del/2009 –
TS-355-ITAT-

2013(DEL)-TP]

Multiple
year data cannot be used and only current year data is to be used.

4. Identification of comparables:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Mentor Graphics (P) Ltd.
vs. DCIT

Selection of comparables to
be made considering the specific characteristics of the controlled
transaction (FAR) rather than a broad comparison of activities.

UCB India Private Limited vs. ACIT

[2009-TIOL-184-ITAT-MUM, (2009) 30 SOT 95)]

Emphasis
on FAR analysis while selecting comparables. internal comparables are
preferable to external comparables. This view is also supported in case of Bir- lasoft (India) Ltd. vs. DCIT [I.T.A.
No. 4776/D/2011 (Para 4).

DCIT vs. Quark Systems (P) Ltd.
(2010-TIOL-31-ITAT-CHDSB)

Proper FAR analysis
to be done while accepting the comparable company in its star-up phase.

Haworth (India) Pvt. Ltd., vs. DCIT (ITA
No.5341/Del/2010)

A company which is majorly
deal- ing in non-comparable segments cannot be accepted as function- ally
comparable.

Cummins Turbo Technologies Ltd., UK
[TS-304-ITAT-2014- (Pune)-TP]

ITAT rejected comparables with wide profit
fluctuations.

5.    selection of PLI:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Schefenacker Motherson Ltd. vs. DCIT [123 TTJ 509
(Del)]

Taxpayer can use Cash Profit/

Sales or Cost as PLI

Kyungshin Industrial Motherson Limited vs. DCIT, New
Delhi [2010-TII-61-ITAT-DEL-TP]

Operating profit to capital
employed was accepted as PLI as against operating profit to sales adopted by
CIT(A) (Case remanded).

6. economic adjustments:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Mentor Graphics (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [112 TTJ 408, 2007
18 SOT 76,

109 ITD 101 (Del ITAT)]

Adjustment
permitted for differ- ences in

a)  working capital

b)  risk and growth

c)  R and D
expenses However, if differences are so

material
that adjustment cannot be made then the company should be rejected. TNMM is
more tolerant to minor functional and risk level differences. Certain
significant risks like market

risks,
contract risks, credit and collection risks, infringement of intellectual
property right etc. are material
and can lead to major difference in the value of transaction.

E-gain Communication (P) Ltd. vs. ITO

In
conformity with ‘Mentor Graphics’ Adjustment permitted for diff. in

a)  working capital

b)  risk and growth

c)  R and D expenses

d) Accounting policies

Philips Software Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

[2008-TIOL-471-ITAT-BANG]

Adjustment permitted for diff. in

a)  working capital;

b)  risk; and

c)  Accounting policies.

Skoda Auto India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

[2009-TIOL-214-ITAT-PUNE]

File remitted to TPO for consider- ing following
adjustment:

a)  difference
due to higher import duty due to
higher % of import of raw materials by the tested party vis-a-vis the comparables.

b)  Capacity under-utilisation
at the initial phase of operations

7. Assessment of profits for comparison:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Schefenacker Motherson Ltd vs. DCIT

[123 TTJ 509 – Delhi ITAT]

a)  There is
no standard test to compute operating margins and each item needs to be
decided on case to case basis.

b)  Tax depreciation and not book depreciation should be consid-
ered for the purpose of margin calculation. However, deprecia- tion which has
varied basis and rates are not to be allowed in all

cases.

Chrys Capital Investment Advisors India Pvt. Ltd. [2010-TII-11-ITAT-

Delhi-TP]

Non-operating
expenditures – a) Interest, b) dividend, c) income from investment
operations,

d) trading
in bonds and capital market operations, etc.

Sap Labs India Private Limited vs. ACIT Bangalore
[2010-TII-44- ITAT-BANG-TP]

a) Forex
gain and b) Donation paid are operating items and

a) income
tax refunds and b) compensation payment towards termination of agreement are

non-operating
items.

Haworth (India) Pvt. Ltd., vs. DCIT [ITA
No.5341/Del/2010]

Prior period expense has to
be considered as operating if it has nexus with the revenue.

DHL Express India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-353-ITAT-2011(Mum)]

“….interest income, rent
receipts, dividend receipts, penalty collect- ed, rent deposits returned
back, foreign exchange fluctuations and profit on sale of assets do not form
part of the operational income because these items have nothing to do with
the main operations of the assessee.”

Trilogy E Business Software India Pvt. Ltd.

[TS-455-ITAT-2011(Bang)]

Held that foreign exchange
gain to be considered while computing operating profit margin.

M/s.Panasonic Sales &
Services

(I) Company Limited vs. ACIT [I.T.A. No.
1957/Mds/2012]

Outward freight on sales
and cash discount not to be reduced from sales while computing gross profit
margin under RPM.

8.    Determination of arm’s length price:

Judicial Ruling

Principle

Mentor Graphics (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [112 TTJ 408, 2007
18 SOT 76,

109 ITD 101 – Del ITAT]

ALP does not mean maximum
price or maximum profit in the range. It is not necessary for the tax payer
to satisfy all points (margins) in the range. Even if one point (margin) is
satisfied, the taxpayer can be taken to have established its case

ACIT vs. MSS India Pvt. Ltd. [ 123 TTJ 657
2009-TIOL- 416-ITAT-PUNE]

Where the arm’s length
nature of pricing arrangement has been demonstrated, the taxpayers final
profit or loss position is not relevant.

Fulford (India) Ltd. [2011 12 tax- mann.com 219 – Mumbai ITAT]

TPO should
apply his mind afresh every year and should not rely on orders of TPO for
preced- ing years while computing ALP.

ACIT vs. The Upper India Chamber of Commerce ITAT Lucknow `B’ Bench Before Sunil Kumar Yadav (JM) and A. K. Garodia (AM) ITA No. 601 /Lkw/2011 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on: 5th November, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Y. P. Srivastava/ Abhinav Mehrotra

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Ss. 11, 12A, 50C – Provisions of section 50C cannot be invoked in the case of a society or a charitable trust registered u/s. 12A of the Act. In such a case income is to be computed as per section 11(1A) of the Act which is a complete code by itself.

Facts:
The assessee, a society registered u/s. 12A of the Act, transferred its capital asset whose stamp duty value was more than the consideration accruing or arising on the transfer of the asset. The net consideration arising on transfer of capital asset was invested by the assessee in other capital asset. The Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 43,78,588 on account of capital gain arising out of sale of property by applying the provisions of section 50C of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

Held:
The question of applicability of provisions of section 50C of the Act on transfer of capital asset in the case of a charitable society was examined by the Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Shri Dwarikadhish Temple Trust, Kanpur (ITA No. 256 & 257/Lkw/2011), in which the Tribunal has held that where the entire sale consideration was invested in other capital asset, provisions of section 50C of the Act should not be invoked. The Tribunal noted the following observations from the said order –

“6.1 From the order of the CIT(A),we find that the assessee is a charitable and religious trust registered u/s. 12A of the Act. It is also noted by the Assessing Officer that the assessee has sold immovable property for total sale consideration of Rs. 2.25 lakh and the entire sale consideration was invested in other capital asset i.e. fixed asset with bank. The Assessing Officer invoked the provisions of section 50C of the Act and computed the capital income at Rs. 66.38 lakh based on the value adopted by stamp duty authorities for stamp duty purposes. We find that the CIT(A) has decided this issue in favour of the assessee by following the Tribunal decision in the case of Gyanchand Batra vs. Income Tax Officer 115 DTR 45 (Jp – Trib).

6.2 We also find that it is specifically mentioned in section 50C(1) of the Act that the stamp duty value is to be considered as full value of consideration received or accruing as a result of transfer for the purpose of section 48 of the Act. It is true that the assessee is a charitable trust and the income of the assessee has to be computed u/s .11 of the Act. As per sub-section (1A) of section 11 of the Act, if the net consideration for transfer of capital asset of a charitable trust is utilised for acquiring new capital asset, then the whole of capital gain is exempt. Considering all these facts, we do not find any reason to interfere in the order of CIT(A) on this issue.

6.3 Regarding the reliance placed by the Learned D.R. of the Revenue on the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court rendered in the case of Lissie Medical Institutions vs. CIT(supra), we find that in that case, it was held by the Hon’ble Kerala High Court that claim of depreciation is not allowable on the assets which were considered as application of income at the time of acquisition of assets. In our considered opinion, this judgment is not relevant in the present case.

6.4 As per the above decision, we find that no interference is called for in the order of CIT(A).”

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) has adjudicated the issue based on legal provisions and various judicial pronouncements while holding that section 11(1A) of the Act which lays down a complete system of taxability of capital gains in respect of an institution approved by the CIT u/s. 12A of the Act is a complete code. The Tribunal held the order of the CIT(A) to be in accordance with law. It confirmed the order of CIT(A).

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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Deduction u/s.80IB of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1999-00: Condition of employing ten or more workers: ‘Worker’ means person employed by assessee directly or by or through any agency including a contractor.

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[CIT v. M/s. Jyoti Plastic Works Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.), ITA No. 5045 of 2010, dated 15-11-2011]

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture of goods by using job workers. Its total number of permanent employees was less than ten. If the job workers are taken into account, the number was more than ten. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80IB was rejected on the ground that the total number of workers (permanent) was less than ten and the condition in section 80IB(2)(iv) was not satisfied. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The following question was raised in the appeal filed by the Revenue:

“Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the workers supplied by the contractor are also to be treated as workers employed by the assessee for the purposes of section 80IB(2)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Section 80IB(2)(iv)(iii) provides that an industrial undertaking must ‘employ’ ten or more workers in a manufacturing process carried on with the aid of power. The expression ‘worker’ which is not defined in the Act means any person employed by the assessee directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor).

(ii) What is relevant is the employment of ten or more workers and not the mode and the manner of employment. The fact that the employer-employee relationship between the workers employed by the assessee differs cannot be a ground to deny deduction u/s.80IB.”

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Deduction u/s.80HHE in case of MAT assessment is to be worked out on the basis of adjusted book profit u/s.115JA and not on the basis of profit computed under regular provisions of the law applicable to the computation of profits and gains of business or profession.

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[CIT, Chennai v. Bhari Incomation Tech. Sys P. Ltd., {SLP (Civil) No.33750/2009 dated 20-10-2011}]

The assessee filed its return of income for A.Y. 2000- 01. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHE to the extent of Rs.1,56,33,719 against net profit as per profit and loss account amounting to Rs.3,07,84,105 to arrive at the book profit of Rs.1,51,50,386 u/s.115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This claim for deduction made by the assessee was rejected by the AO.

According to the AO, since in the present case in normal computation no net profit was left after brought-forward losses of the earlier years got adjusted against the current year’s profit, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.80HHE to the extent of Rs.1,56,33,719 for computing book profit u/s.115JA. In Appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. The assessee went in appeal, against the order of the CIT(A), before the Tribunal which, following the judgment of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Range 8(3) v. Syncome Formulations (1) Limited, [(2007) 106 ITD 193], took the view that the MAT scheme which includes section 115JA did not take away the benefits given u/s.80HHE. The said judgment of the Special Bench was with regard to computation of deduction u/s.80HHC which, like section 80HHE, fell under Chapter VI-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court upheld the judgment of the Tribunal. On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that in the said judgment of Special Bench, which Kishor Karia Chartered Accountant Atul Jasani Advocate Glimpses of supreme court rulings squarely applied to the facts of the present case, the Tribunal had held that the deduction u/s.80HHC (section 80HHE also fell in Chapter VI-A) had to be worked out not on the basis of regular income tax profits, but it had to be worked out on the basis of the adjusted book profits in a case where section 115JA was applicable. In the said judgment the dichotomy between the regular income tax profits and adjusted book profits u/s.115JA was clearly brought out. The Tribunal in the said judgment had rightly held that in section 115JA relief had to be computed u/s.80HHC(3)/3(A).

According to the Tribunal, once law itself declared that the adjusted book profit was amendable for further deductions on specified grounds, in a case where section 80HHC (80HHE in the present case) was operational, it became clear that computation for the deduction under those sections needed to be worked out on the basis of the adjusted book profit. The Supreme Court noted that in the present case it was concerned with section 80HHE which was referred to in the Explanation to section 115JA, Clause (ix).

According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Syncome Formulations (supra) squarely applied to the present case. Following the view taken by the Special Bench in Syncome Formulations (supra), the Tribunal in the present case had come to the conclusion that deduction claimed by the assessee u/s.80 HHE had to be worked out on the basis of adjusted book profit u/s.115JA and not on the basis of the profits computed under regular provisions of law applicable to computation of profits and gains of business. According to the Supreme Court there was no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Syncome Formulations (supra). The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave filed by the Department. Note: In the above context, reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd., which has been analysed by us in the column ‘Closements’ in November, 2010 issue of the Journal.

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Taxability of Income from ‘sale of computer software’ as ‘royalty’

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Issue for consideration

Section 4 and section 5 r.w.s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act provide for taxability of income from royalty in India. Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act by a deeming fiction provides for the taxation of income from royalty in India. Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act defines the word ‘royalty’, which is wide enough to cover both industrial royalties as well as copyright royalties, both being forms of intellectual property. Computer software is regarded as an ‘industrial royalty’ and/or a ‘copyright royalty’. Industrial properties include patents, inventions, process, trademarks, industrial designs, geographic indicators of source, etc. and are generally granted for an article or for the process of making such article. Whereas on the other hand, copyright property include literary and artistic works, plays, films, musical works, knowledge, experience, skill, etc. and are generally granted for ideas, principles, skills, etc.

Just as tangible goods are sold, leased or rented in order to earn monetary gain, on similar lines, the Intellectual Property laws enable authors of the intellectual properties to exploit their work for monetary gain. The modes of exploitation of intellectual property for monetary gains are different for each type of Intellectual Property, which has been covered in various sub-clauses of the definition of ‘royalty’ under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) and subjected to tax as per the scheme of the Act.

On similar lines, monetary gains arising from exploitation of computer program, an intellectual property, which subsists in computer software is sought to be taxed as royalty under the Act. Explanation 3 to section 9(1)(vi) defines computer software as computer program recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device and includes any such program or any customised electronic data. The Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of AP, 271 ITR 401 held that shelf software were ‘goods’ for the purpose of Sales tax and that there was no distinction between the branded and unbranded software. Without prejudice to the applicability of the aforesaid conclusions as drawn by the Apex Court in context of indirect tax laws, to the provisions of the Act, at least one may refer to the aforesaid decision for a proper understanding as to what software is and what is the nature and character of software, which is also advised by the Apex Court in the decision. The controversy, sought to be discussed here, revolves around the issue whether the income from a sale of the computer software is a ‘royalty’, or is a ‘sale’.

The Revenue holds such sales to be royalty on the ground that during the course of sale of computer software, computer program embedded in it is also licensed and/ or parted with the enduser of the software, and as against the claim of the taxpayers who treat the transaction as one of sale of computer software and not of the computer program embedded in it. The Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’) recently in its ruling in the case of Millennium IT Software Ltd., in re, 62 DTR 1 had an occasion to deal with the aforesaid issue under consideration, wherein the AAR while deciding against the taxpayer’s contention, held that the income from the transaction be regarded as a royalty, liable to tax in India. In deciding the issue in this case the AAR gave findings that were contrary to its own findings on the subject given in the earlier decisions in the cases of Dassault Systems K. K., in re, 322 ITR 125 and FactSet Research Systems Inc, in re, 317 ITR 169.

Millennium IT Software’s case

Millennium IT Software Ltd. (‘Millennium’), a Sri Lankan company, had entered into a software licence and maintenance agreement (‘SLMA’) with Indian Commodity and Exchange Ltd. (‘ICEL’), an Indian company, on 27 March 2009. Under the agreement, Millennium had allowed ICEL to use the software product ‘licensed program’, owned by it. As per the SLMA, an ‘implementation fee’ of Rs.4 crores was agreed to be paid by ICEL to Millennium for licence to use the ‘licensed program’ for 4 years and its installation, with a clause to extend the licence period at the discretion of ICEL. The other relevant terms of SLMA are provided as under:

— Millennium had granted ICEL a ‘right to use’ the licensed program for its business operation;

— Rights granted under the SLMA were nonexclusive, non-transferable, non-assignable, indivisible;

— Millennium had granted rights to make copies of the licensed program to be installed on equipments only at designated sites of ICEL and each copy of licensed program was to carry copyright, trademark and other notice relating to proprietary rights of Millennium;

 — ICEL had no right to sell, distribute or disclose the licensed program or associated documents to any third party;

 — No intellectual property right or licence was granted to ICEL.

Use of source code and reverse engineering of the licensed program was strictly prohibited; Based on the aforesaid clauses in SLMA, Millennium submitted before the AAR that the implementation fee was not chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act or under the DTAA with Sri Lanka relying on some of the earlier favourable legal decisions on the subject. The Income-tax Department objected to the said contention of Millennium and submitted before the AAR, that consideration towards implementation fee should be termed as industrial intellectual property that was covered under the vires of the definition of ‘royalty’ under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi).

The AAR however, to begin with, chose to classify computer software as a copyright intellectual royalty as against the Revenue’s contention that it was an industrial intellectual property. The AAR observed that ICEL under SLMA was granted a ‘licence to use’ the computer program which was owned and developed by Millennium and that the consideration paid as ‘implementation fee’ was to enable ICEL to have a ‘right to use’ the licensed program. Further, the AAR held that as per SLMA, Millennium had not only conveyed the ‘right to use’ the software to ICEL but along with the said right had also enabled ICEL to ‘use’ copyright embedded in the program though limited in nature. The AAR in addition to above, held that the second proviso to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act was substantive in nature and if the conditions of second proviso to section 9(1)(vi) were not satisfied, then the intention of the Legislature was to tax even the income from sale of a computer software as a royalty under the Act.

Distinguishing its earlier decision on the facts in the case of Dassault Systems K. K. (supra), the AAR concluded that the consideration received for ‘right to use’ the software is embedded with right or interest in computer program and therefore, would be termed as royalty under the provisions of the Act as well as Article 12.3 of the DTAA with Sri Lanka and made the following observations as regard to DTAA with Sri Lanka:

“The DTAA involved herein is the one between India and Sri Lanka. The definition of royalty contained in this treaty in Article 12.3 shows that it is a payment of any kind received as consideration for the ‘use of or the right to any copyright’. This is seen to differ from some of the later treaties like the one with USA wherein royalty is payment of any kind received as consideration for the ‘use of, or the right to use, any copyright’. The definition in the India-Sri Lanka DTAA is wider than the one found in the IT Act. For, it takes in even the consideration received for permitting another to use a copyright. Even a right to use need not be conferred.

…. It is not necessary even to grant the right to use the copyright if one were to look at it literally, though the grant of a right to use could be said to be included in the grant of a right in the copyright.”

The AAR concluded that the consideration received by Millennium from ICEL be termed as a royalty under the DTAA and u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act.

Dassault Systems’ case

Dassault Systems K. K., (‘Dassault’), a Japanese Company, is engaged in the business of providing ‘Product Lifecycle Management’ software solutions, applications and services. Dassault marketed the aforesaid licensed products mostly through a distribution channel comprising of Value Added Resellers (‘VAR’). VARs are independent third-party resellers who are in the business of selling software products to end-users. As per the business model, Dassault entered into General Value Added Resellers Agreement (‘GVA’) with VARs and sold the software product to VARs for a consideration based on the standard list less discount. The VARs in turn sold the products to end-users at a price independently determined by VARs. The end-users then entered into End User Licence Agreement (‘EULA’) with Dassault and VARs for the product supplied.

Based on the abovementioned facts, Dassault had sought for a ruling from the AAR as to whether the consideration received by Dassault from VARs, from sale of software products would be termed as a business income or a royalty under the Act and/or DTAA between India and Japan. Further, the AAR was explained the modus operandi of the transactions undertaken between Dassault, VARs and the end-users. Dassault submitted before AAR that the end-users including VARs in the sale of software products were only transferred copyrighted software containing computer program but not the copyright therein. It was further contended that consideration was paid for ‘use of copyrighted product and not for use of copyright in computer program’. The end-users/VARs did not avail any of the rights referred to in section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’). The Income-tax Department objected to the contention of Dassault and submitted that consideration received by Dassault from VARs was on account of rights conferred u/s.14(b) of the 1957 Act and therefore, would be termed as a royalty under the Act.

The AAR to begin with, considered the ordinary meaning of ‘copyright’, reference was made to various definition provisions, modes of transfer of copy-right under the 1957 Act and to the earlier decision of the AAR in the case of FactSet Research Systems Inc., 317 ITR 169. It referred to various clauses of GVA and EULA agreements and the provision of section 14 of the 1957 Act and observed that passing of a ‘right to use’ and facilitating the use of a product for which the owner had a copyright was not the same thing as transferring or assigning rights in relation to the copyright. Further, it observed that “use of a copyrighted product does not entail enjoyment of rights referred in section 14 of the 1957 Act” for computer program and therefore no copyright was transferred and/or parted in the course of said transaction. Merely authorising or enabling a customer to have the benefit of data or instructions therein without any further right to deal with them independently did not entail transfer of rights in relation to copyright or conferment of the right of using the copyright. After negating the objections of the Revenue and in light of the aforesaid observations and references to some of earlier favourable legal decisions on the subject, the AAR held that considering the facts of the case no rights in relation to copyright had been transferred, nor any right of using the copyright as such had been conferred on VARs/end-users in the course of transactions.

In deciding the application, the AAR referred to the provisions of Article 12.3 of the DTAA with Japan which read as under:

“The term ‘royalties’ as used in this article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films and films or tapes for radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.”

On due consideration of the said Article 12 of the DTAA and the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, the AAR concluded that the income from the transaction under consideration was not a royalty.

Observations

The Income-tax Act, 1961 defines royalty in relation to computer program under Explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) as ‘transfer of all or any rights (including granting of license) in respect of any copyright ………..A question which requires consideration is therefore, whether the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights’ under the said Explanation can be read to implicitly cover ‘use’ or ‘right to use’.

Observations here are restricted to the provisions of the Act and no references are sought to the text of respective DTAAs, for following reasons:

  •     The definition of royalty and the text of the provisions on royalty under the respective DTAAs are different;

  •     Once the nature of income being discussed here fails to be termed as a ‘royalty’ under the provisions of the Act, then one may not be required even to refer to the provisions of the respective DTAAs, considering the fact that recourse to DTAA is envisaged only for any reliefs and benefits, not conferred by the Act.

The issue under consideration is otherwise a multi- faceted issue and has several dimensions which are sought to be addressed through a few questions and answers thereon.

Does the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights’ under Explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) include ‘use or right to use’?

A construction of definition of royalty under the Act explains that different actions qua the type of intellectual properties are covered and subjected to tax according to the scheme of the Act, which is tabulated below:
 

The Legislature in its wisdom has distinguished between the royalty for industry intellectual properties and copyright intellectual properties. It appears that the distinction is in sync with the available means through which each type of intellectual property is exploited for earning a monetary gain. To take an illustration, a technical design which belongs to industrial intellectual property type can be exploited for earning monetary gain in any of the ways as mentioned in Explanation 2(i), (ii) and (iii) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, but the same test may fail for films, artistic work, etc., a part of copyright intellectual property type, and vice versa.

When different provisions are made depending upon the type of intellectual property, then the part relevant thereto only should be applied while determining whether or not that part shall fall under the definition of royalty. Such a construction is in accordance with the Latin legal maxim ‘Expresso unius est exclusive alterius’. The general meaning of the maxim is that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. As a fallout of the said construction, it is possible to hold that rights as prescribed in Explanation 2(i) to (iva) of section 9(1)(vi), as in the nature of right to share information and the use or right to use thereof cannot be covered by the expression ‘transfer of all or any right (including granting of licence)’ under Explanation 2(v) of the Act. In other words, the Legislature did not seek to consider ‘use or right to use’ of computer program embedded in computer software as royalty under the Act.


What is meant by the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights (including granting of licence’ and which rights are sought to be covered?

Though the Act defines the word ‘royalty’, but the expressions viz., ‘all or any’, ‘or’ are uncertain as regard to their scope. Similarly, the terms patents, copyrights, process, invention, skill, etc., remain undefined. In such circumstances, one is required to scrutinise the legislative history to ascertain the principal intention of the Legislature. The above-referred terms are defined in their respective governing special Acts on the subject viz., Copyrights Act, 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’); Patents Act, 1970; Trade Marks Act, 1999, etc.

Section 14 of the 1957 Act defines a copyright in the computer program as a list of rights granted to the author of computer program. The Act also provides for the modes for transfer of the said list of rights in computer program viz. assignment and licence of rights. References to other types of intellectual properties provide for similar provisions under the respective Acts. The intention of the Legislature can therefore be considered as referring to the rights as listed in section 14 of the 1957 Act. The aforesaid construction is also supported by the decision of the Special Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Motorola Inc v. DCIT, 95 ITD 269.
 

Whether the rights referred in section 14 of the Copyrights Act, 1957 are transferred in sale of computer software to end-users?

To answer this pertinent question, one requires to appreciate the nature of the transaction which generally takes place in a sale of computer software to end-users. A sale of computer software to end-users either takes place directly from the author of the computer program to end-users or through the channel of distributors. In either case, the computer program embedded in the computer software may or may not be parted and/or licensed with the computer software. Generally, in such sale transactions, what is sought to be parted with the end-users is the copy of copyrighted program embedded in the computer software and not the copyrighted computer program.

Therefore, it requires to be seen whether in a standard End-user License Agreement (‘EULA’) of computer software between the author and end-users, any of the rights mentioned in section 14 r.w.s. 52 of the 1957 Act are made available to the end-users. A table summarising the rights u/s.14 for computer program, as available to each party, generally, to exercise after the transaction of sale of computer software is reproduced below:

Whereas the author of the computer program, as observed in the Table, has all the rights, the end-user does not have any rights under Section 14. Further, the distributors have rights to sell or give on commercial rental a copy of computer program or give limited right to reproduce and store the said computer programs. In other words, the end-users cannot exercise any rights in respect of copyrights in computer program and therefore, any consider-ation paid to the authors/ distributors by the end-user towards sale of computer software may not qualify for being termed as a ‘royalty’ under the Act. In contrast, under the agreement between the author and distributor, since the right to sell or give on commercial rental is conferred on the distributors, any consideration received by the author from a distributor in such a scenario may qualify to be termed as a ‘royalty’ under the Act.

Whether ‘computer program’ is copyright and/or industrial intellectual property?

Though it may sound ironical, but all the contrary judgments on the subject confirm to the proposition that ‘computer program’ is a literary work and qualifies to be termed as a copyright intellectual property. However, the difference of opinion stems in considering the computer program as industrial intellectual property, not being limited to patents but also as process, invention and secret formula. Since, ‘invention’, and ‘patents’ are not defined under the Act it shall be necessary to rely on the respective special Acts governing the law on the subject. Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970 (‘the 1970 Act’) which defines ‘invention’ specifically excludes computer program from being regarded as invention. Section 2(m) of the 1970 Act defines ‘patent’ as an invention, thereby indirectly excluding computer program from its purview. Further, since the end-users do not have any access to the computer program embedded in computer software, they cannot be said to have rights in relation to a process. Lastly, to classify computer program as a secret formula shall be too far-fetched, considering the fact that a secret formula is placed as genus of ‘technical know-how’ under the provisions of the Act.

As a result, computer program embedded in computer software may only be termed as a copyright intellectual property under Explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi).

Without prejudice to aforesaid discussions, recently the Delhi High Court in a judgement delivered in the case of CIT v. Dynamic Vertical Software India (P)    Ltd., 332 ITR 222, has based on the facts and circumstances of the case where the assessee, a dealer of Microsoft, had been purchasing the on the subject software from Microsoft and selling it further in Indian market held that the payment made by the assessee to Microsoft could not be termed as a ‘royalty’. Therefore, it can be said that computer software is not a copyright intellectual property.

Lastly, if the rights to use intellectual property are capable of and are allowed to be transferred in sale of computer software to end-users, then every second person would have been capable of developing softwares like Microsoft, Oracle, etc. The general understanding of the word ‘royalty’ in the context of copyright refer to a consideration received by the author from the publisher, who published his work and not as a consideration received by the publisher from the end-user on sale of copy of work.

Based on the aforesaid discussions and observations made in the decision in the case of Dassault Systems (supra), it appears that the ratio of the recent decision of the AAR in the case of Millennium IT Systems (supra) may require reconsideration.

Adding to the bandwagon of major judgments, the AAR has recently in the case of Upaid Systems Limited, In re, 885 of 2010, dated 12th October 2011, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, held that the consideration paid by Satyam to Upaid for perpetual licence of right to use computer software shall be taxable as ‘royalty’ under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

1    Facts in the case of Dassault Systems K. K. (supra) were different then generally prevailing in the industry or found in the case of Gracemac Corporation v. ADIT, (supra)
2    For limited purpose as provided in section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957
3    Facts in the case of Dassault Systems K. K. (supra) were different then generally prevailing in the industry or found in the case of Gracemac Corporation v. ADIT, (supra)
4    Motorola Inc v. DCIT, (95 ITD 269) (Del.) (SB)
5    Gracemac Corporation vs ADIT (47 DTR 65) (Del)
6    Sonata Information Technology Ltd vs ACIT (103 ITD 324) (Bang.)
7    Frontline Soft Ltd vs DCIT (12 DTR 131) (Hyd)

Digest of recent important foreign decisions on cross-border taxation

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Part II

In the first part of the Article published in November, 2011, we dealt with some of the recent important foreign decisions on cross-border taxation. The remaining decisions are covered in this part.

8. New Zealand — Supreme Court decision on tax avoidance
On 24 August 2011, in a significant unanimous decision by five judges, the Supreme Court in Penny and Hooper v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, SC 62/2010 (2011) NZSC 95 held that the transfer of the taxpayers’ medical practices to companies owned by family trusts was lawful, being a business structure choice that the taxpayers were entitled to make. There was nothing artificial or unusual for companies under the taxpayers’ control to pay salaries to the taxpayers. However, fixing the salaries at an artificially low level to avoid paying tax at the highest personal tax rate did constitute tax avoidance. The commencement of paying lower salaries coincided with the increase in the top personal income tax rate to 39%, while the corporate rate was 30%. In addition, the taxpayers maintained control of all of the companies’ income and were able to, and did, transfer funds from the companies for their own, and their families’ use.
The Court acknowledged that there circumstances where the setting of a salary at a low level may be justified, e.g., where a company has a commercial need to retain funds for capital expenditure, or where a company faces, or is about to experience, financial difficulties. In these situations, tax avoidance does not arise when low salaries are paid. However, where the setting of the annual salary is influenced in more than an incidental way by the impact of taxation, the whole arrangement is considered to be tax avoidance. In this case, the tax advantage was at least one of the principal purposes and effects of the taxpayers’ arrangements, rendering them void u/s. BG 1 of the Income-tax Act, 2007.

The Court stated the basic principle as follows:

— “. . . . the policy underlying the general antiavoidance provision is to negate any structuring of a taxpayer’s affairs whether or not done as a matter of ‘ordinary business or family dealings’ . . . unless any tax advantage is just an incidental feature. That must include using a company structure to fix the taxpayer’s salary in an artificial manner”; and
— “Parliament must have contemplated and been content that people may structure their transactions for commercial reasons or for family reasons in which any tax advantage is merely incidental, but that they will not be permitted to do so when tax avoidance is more than a merely incidental purpose or effect of the steps they have taken.”
The Supreme Court decision followed Peate v. Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia, (1962-1964) 111 CLR 443, affirmed (1967) 1 AC 308 (PC), where a doctor similarly used a company, which paid him a low salary, to avoid taxation that would have been paid if the doctor had derived the income himself and then applied it for the benefit of his family. The doctor nevertheless retained control of all of the income.

On a separate matter, the Court also criticised the practice (which was evident in this case) of expert witnesses going beyond their role as authorities in their field of expertise and expressing their views on legal issues in the case at hand. The Court considered the practice undesirable and a wasteful duplication of time and effort, and rather pointedly directed that the practice stop and, if it did not, lower courts should require amended briefs to be filed.

There is now a call from tax practitioners seeking Inland Revenue certainty about what constitutes artificially low salaries. It is difficult to see Inland Revenue drawing a definitive line given that there are circumstances where, on a case-by-case basis, low salaries can be justified, as noted by the Supreme Court. Reference :

 TNS:2010-06-07:NZ-1; ITS:NZ; ITA:NZ; IGTT:NZ.

9. Estonia — Application of CFC and GAAR — Substance over Form Principle — Supreme Court rules Re attribution of foreign company’s profits to Estonian company
On 26 September 2011, the Supreme Court of Estonia gave its decision in the case of Technomar v. Tax Authorities, (Case No. 3-3-1-42-11) where it, among other issues, decided for the first time on the attribution of a foreign company’s income to an Estonian company.

(a) Facts

The Estonian resident individual held shares in a taxpayer, Estonian resident company, Technomar. A Manx company (Ltd.) and a US company (L.L.C.) derived their income from (i) purchasing goods from third parties and selling them for a higher price to Technomar, or from (ii) purchasing goods from Technomar and selling them for a higher price to third parties. Both of these companies were incorporated and controlled by the above-mentioned individual shareholder of Technomar.
L.L.C. transferred EEK 118 million from its Estonian bank account to its Austrian account.
The tax authorities considered that Technomar used Ltd. and L.L.C. as conduit companies to evade taxes. Therefore, the tax authorities applied the look-through approach and concluded that all the transactions, profits and assets of Ltd. and L.L.C. were Technomar’s and, correspondingly, all transfers from the bank account of L.L.C. must be treated as made directly by Technomar.
Further, as, due to the bank secrecy rules, the tax authorities did not manage to receive information from the Austrian authorities on the L.L.C.’s bank account in Austria, the EEK 118 million transferred by L.L.C. to Austria was treated as undocumented expense of Technomar. As a result, the tax authorities assessed Technomar in respect of these transfers.
Technomar appealed against the assessment to the administrative Court, which upheld the tax authorities’ position. Subsequently, the Court of appeal also decided in favour of the tax authorities. Technomar appealed to the Supreme Court.

(b) Legal background

U/s.22 of the Income-tax Law (ITL), resident individuals are taxable on the income of a controlled company established in a low-tax territory, whether or not such company has distributed any profits. As retained earnings of resident companies are tax exempt, the ITL does not contain such a provision for companies.
Section 84 of the Law on Taxation sets out the general anti-avoidance rule which provides that where, from the content of a transaction it is evident that such a transaction is performed for the purposes of tax evasion, the conditions corresponding to the actual economic substance shall apply for tax purposes (substance-over-form principle).

(c) Issue

The issue before the Court was, in essence, whether or not the transactions and bank transfers of Ltd. and L.L.C. could be attributed to the Estonian company under the general anti-avoidance rule, and whether bank transfers to accounts, of which the tax authorities have no means to receive information about, can be qualified as taxable hidden profit distributions under the ITL.

(d)    Decision

The Court agreed with the tax authorities that the substance-over-form principle allows the authorities to attribute the income of a foreign company to an Estonian company if the circumstances of the transactions demonstrate that the transactions of the foreign company have not been directly concluded for the interests of the individual who manages and controls the company, but to conceal the transactions related to the economic activities of the Estonian company.

Technomar’s argument that Ltd. and L.L.C. were separate legal persons with separate tax liabilities and, therefore, the tax authorities should have, instead of applying the general substance-over-form principle, applied specific provisions such as section 22 ITL or section 50(4) ITL (transfer pricing), was not upheld. The Court stated that in order to apply the latter provisions, the companies should have been engaged in independent economic activities. In the case at hand, the Court agreed with the tax authorities that Ltd. and L.L.C. did not engage in such activities and the transactions concluded by them were fictitious.

Also, the Court did not recognise the position of Technomar that transfers of funds from one account of the company to its other account, whether Estonian or foreign, cannot be considered as a non-business expense. The Court held that in certain circumstances it is allowed to tax as a non-business expense payments from one account of the company to another or withdrawals of cash. The pre-condition for the non-taxation of retained corporate profits is the use of these profits in business. However, such use must be proven. Any transfer or cash payment which makes it impossible to exercise control over the use of funds must be taxed as a non-business expense. If the movement of attributed funds on the bank accounts is not reflected in the company’s books and the tax authorities have no means to receive information on the use of funds on some accounts, then the transfer to such account constitutes a payment for which there is no source document certifying the transaction. In this regard, there is no difference in which country the bank account is situated or for which reason the tax authorities are not able to obtain information about the account.

The Court upheld the position of the tax authorities and the lower Courts, and dismissed the appeal of Technomar.

Reference: CTA:EE:10.

10.    Brazil — CFC — Superior Court of Justice rules on impossibility of setting off tax losses of foreign-controlled and affiliated companies against taxable profit in Brazil

The Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça — STJ) in the session held on 27 September 2011, within the case records of Special Appeal n. 1161003 filed by Marcopolo S/A against the Federal Treasury, ruled on the question of the impossibility of offsetting tax losses of foreign-controlled and affiliated companies against taxable profits of the parent company in Brazil.

(a)    Background

Law 9,249/1995 determines that profits accrued by foreign-controlled and affiliated companies of Brazilian companies are taxable in Brazil. When imposing this obligation, Law 9,249/1995 expressly provides that potential tax losses resulting from activities carried out by these foreign entities could not be offset against the taxable profits of the parent company in Brazil.

Subsequently, Provisional Measure 2,158/2001 (PM 2,158) anticipated the timing for recognition and taxation of foreign profits earned by foreign-controlled or affiliated companies to the end of the same calendar year in which they are accrued in the balance sheet of the foreign companies, regardless of their actual distribution to the Brazilian parent company.

PM 2,158 was silent vis-à-vis the impossibility of offsetting tax losses incurred by foreign-controlled and affiliated companies against the taxable profits of the parent company in Brazil. Therefore, Marcopolo S/A has argued that PM 2,158 has actually revoked the prohibition set forth by Law 9,249/1995 and, from that moment on, the offsetting would be allowed.

(b)    Decision

The Justices of the Superior Court of Justice, in a unanimous decision, ruled that tax losses of foreign-controlled and affiliated companies cannot be offset against the taxable profits of their parent company in Brazil. This reasoning was based on the argument that this would provide a double advantage to the Brazilian company, given that these tax losses could be used to offset the profits to be generated by the same foreign-controlled and affiliated companies in the following tax years.

Furthermore, the Justices understood that PM 2,158 has not revoked the prohibition set forth by Law 9,249/1995 in that regard and, therefore, the provisions brought by the latter are still applicable.

It is expected that Marcopolo S/A would file an appeal against this decision before the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal — STF).

Reference: CTS:BR:1.5.1., 6.1.1.; CTA:BR:1.8.1., 7.2.2.

11.    Netherlands; European Union; France; Ger-many; Portugal — Thin capitalisation rules Netherlands Supreme Court — AG opines on application of thin capitalisation provision under tax treaties with France, Germany and Portugal

On 9 September 2011, Advocate-General (AG) Wattel delivered his opinion in case No. 10/05268 on the application of the Dutch thin capitalisation rules under the France-Netherlands tax treaty on income and capital of 16 March 1973 as amended, the Germany-Netherlands tax treaty on income and capital of 16 June 1959 as amended and the Netherlands-Portugal tax treaty on income and capital of 20 September 1999 (‘the treaties’).

(a)    Facts:

The taxpayer is a company resident in the Netherlands, which in 2004 was owned for 95% by a French company. In 2004, The taxpayer had debts to companies, established in France, Germany and Portugal, belonging to the same group as the taxpayer. The taxpayer deducted the negative balance of the group interest. The tax inspector rejected the deduction based on the Dutch thin capitalisation provision of Article 10d of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CIT).

(b)    Issues and opinion:
The issues before the Supreme Court are as follows:

Issue (1)

The AG considered that the thin capitalisation provision is compatible with EU law with reference to the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 25 February 2010 in the case C-337/08, X-holding, in which it was held that the Netherlands rules disallowing cross-border group taxation are compatible with freedom of establishment and a decision of the Supreme Court of 24 June 2011, nr. 09/05115, in which it was decided that the loss relief restriction applicable to holding companies is not incompatible with EU freedom of establishment (see TNS:2011-06-27:NL-3). In addition, the AG considered that EU law does not oblige to allow a cross-border consolidation and also not to separate from a package deal group regime, parts which in domestic situations result only from the full consolidation.

Issue (2)

The AG refers to the decision of the ECJ of 21 July 2011 in the Case C-397/09, Scheuten Solar Technology. The AG observed that the aim of the Directive is not a broadening of the tax base of the related company paying the interest, but the prevention of legal double taxation at the level of the receiving company. Therefore, the AG takes the view that the thin capitalisation provision is compatible with Article 1 of the Interest and Royalty Directive.

Issue (3)

The AG rejected the appeal based on Article 25(5) (non-discrimination) under the treaty with France because the taxpayer is not treated differently from another company which is not part of a group and is not comparable with a group company. In addition, the AG held that the non-discrimination provision does not oblige to allow a cross-border fiscal unity.

Furthermore, the AG rejected the appeal based on Article 6 of the treaty with Germany and Article 9 of the treaty with France, because the application of a thin capitalisation provision is not incompatible with those arm’s-length provisions. Based on the wording ‘may’, the AG opined that those provisions do not preclude the application of thin capitalisation provisions without the possibility of proof to the contrary.

In addition, the AG pointed out that these treaty provisions textually do not concern capital structures or the determination of the tax base, but transactions.

The AG did not take the 1992 Commentary to the OECD Model Convention into account, because the tax treaties with France and Germany were signed before, but noted that the 1992 Commentary supports the view of the taxpayer.

In addition, the AG referred to the group test, included in the thin capitalisation provision. Under this test, companies may opt that the excessive debt is determined by multiplying the difference between the average annual debts and the average annual equity using a multiplier based on the commercial debt/equity ratio of the group. The AG held that this option may be regarded as a possibility of proof to the contrary.

The AG accepted the taxpayer’s appeal based on Artilce 9 of the treaty with Portugal and Article X of the protocol to that treaty and held that this arm’s-length provision obliges the treaty states to allow the taxpayer with the possibility of providing proof to the contrary.

Consequently, the AG opined to overturn the decision of the Lower Court Haarlem and held that the case should be referred to another Court for further fact finding.

Reference:  tnS:2010-11-19:nl-2;  tnS:2011-06-27:nl-3;
CtS:nl:7.3.; Cta:nl:10.3.; hold:nl; tt:Fr-nl:02:enG:1973:tt;
tt:de-nl:02:enG:1959:tt;  tt:nl-Pt:02:enG:1999:tt;
tt:e2:82:enG:2003:tt; eCJd:C-337/08; eCJd:C-397/09.

Acknowledgment/Source:
We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period September to October, 2011.

Section 148 — Reassessment proceedings — Assessee’s appeal allowed by the CIT(A) on merits — In the appellate proceedings whether the assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings — Held, Yes.

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Dy. CIT v. Duratex Export
ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)
ITA Nos. 3088 & 3089/Mum./2010 (C.O. Nos. 19 & 20/Mum./2011) A.Ys.: 2001-02 & 2002-03 Decided on: 15-6-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: R. K. Gupta/ K. Shivaram

Section 148 — Reassessment proceedings — Assessee’s appeal allowed by the CIT(A) on merits — In the appellate proceedings whether the assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings — Held, Yes.


Facts:

The assessee firm was engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading in fabrics. Pursuant to the scrutiny assessment proceedings, the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was finalised on 19-12-2003. In its return the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80HHC amounting to Rs.3.18 crores which was computed after considering the sum of Rs.24.03 lac received on account of sale of DEPB licence. The assessment for A.Y. 2002-03 was made u/s.143(1). By the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, the receipt on account of the sale of DEPB licence was excluded from the definition of the term ‘total turnover’. The amendment made was retrospective from April 1, 1998. In view thereof, the AO reopened the assessment u/s.147 and issued the notice dated 28-3-2008 u/s.148. The assessee challenged validity of the action of the AO.

On appeal, the CIT(A) treated the grievance against reopening of assessment as not pressed but gave relief to the assess on merits in respect of additions made on account of the sale of DEPB licence by following the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports [318 ITR (AT) 87]. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalpataru Colours & Chemicals (328 ITR 451) whereunder the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports was reversed. As regards the validity of reopening of assessment, it was contended that since the assessee did not object to reopening of assessment before the CIT(A), it was not open to do so now.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the mere fact that the assessee was not allowed to, or did not, press the grievance against the reopening of assessment before the CIT(A), particularly in a situation in which the resultant addition on merits could not have been sustained because of binding judicial precedent then holding at the relevant point of time, the assessee cannot be deprived of his rights to adjudicate the reopening of assessment at a later stage. Accordingly, it proceeded to decide the validity of the reassessment proceedings. Relying on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of Dharmik Exim Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, (ITA No. 232/ Mum./2009), the Tribunal observed that it was a settled legal position that when the assessment is reopened beyond four years from the end of the relevant previous year and unless it cannot be established that the assessee had failed to disclose all the material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment, such reassessment proceedings cannot be upheld under the law. In the case of the assessee, the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was made u/s.143(3) on 19-12-2003 while the notice u/s.148 was issued after 4 years on 28-3-2008. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the grievance raised by the assessee in its cross-objection and allowed the same.

According to it, the fact that the assessment for A.Y. 2002-03 was framed u/s.143(1) would not have any impact on the validity of reassessment proceedings. As per the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pirojsha Godrej Foundation v. ADIT, [133 TTJ (Mumbai) 194] where it was held that irrespective of whether the assessment was finalised u/s.143(1) or section 143(3), the requirements of section 147 have to be fulfilled, the Tribunal allowed the cross-objection of the assessee challenging the reassessment proceedings and the appeals filed by the Revenue was dismissed as infructuous.

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Section 271B r.w.s 44AB — Penalty for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee following project completion method of accounting — Whether advances received from the customers could be considered as part of turnover — Held, No.

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Siroya Developers v. DCIT
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai
Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)
ITA No. 600/Mum./2010
A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 12-1-2011 Counsels for assessee/revenue: B. V. Jhaveri/ S. K. Singh

Section 271B r.w.s 44AB — Penalty for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee following project completion method of accounting — Whether advances received from the customers could be considered as part of turnover — Held, No.


Facts:

The assessee, a property developer, was following project completion method. During the year the opening work in progress was Rs.4.35 crore and the closing work in progress was Rs.10.07 crore. Besides the assessee had also received advances against sale of flats of Rs.4.03 crore. According to the AO, the assessee was required to obtain and file report u/s.44AB by 31-10-2005. For failure to do so, he levied a penalty u/s.271B. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, when the assessee was following the project completion method of accounting, the advances received against booking of flats cannot be treated as sale proceeds or a turnover or as part of gross receipt because the same was not received by the assessee unconditionally. For the purpose it relied on views expressed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and on the Pune Tribunal decision in the case of ACIT v. B. K. Jhala & Associates, (69 ITD 141). Accordingly, the penalty levied was deleted and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 14A — Rule 8D can be invoked only after AO records his satisfaction on how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Onus is on the AO to show that expenditure has been incurred for earning taxfree income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumptions.

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DCIT v. Jindal Photo Limited ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi
Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (VP) and A. D. Jain (JM)
ITA Nos. 814/Del./2011
A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 23-9-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: R. S. Negi/ Rupesh Saini

Section 14A — Rule 8D can be invoked only after AO records his satisfaction on how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Onus is on the AO to show that expenditure has been incurred for earning tax-free income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumptions.


Facts:

The AO disallowed a sum of Rs.31.01,542 u/s.14A of the Act by invoking Rule 8D. However, he did not record satisfaction as to how the assessee’s calculation was not correct. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the applicability of Rule 8D but he reduced the amount of disallowance to Rs.19,43,022 by reducing the amount of disallowance on account of interest but as regards disallowance of administrative expenses he upheld the action of the AO. He also upheld the applicability of Rule 8D. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objections.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee has suo motu made a disallowance u/s.14A. The Tribunal also noted that the AO has invoked Rule 8D without recording satisfaction as to how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Upon considering the ratio of various decisions of the Tribunal and the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Hero Cycles, (323 ITR 518), the Tribunal held that for invoking Rule 8D the AO must record satisfaction as to how the claim of the assessee is incorrect. If that is not done, provisions of Rule 8D cannot be invoked. An ad hoc disallowance cannot be made under Rule 8D. The onus is on the AO to establish that expenditure has been incurred for earning exempt income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumption that the assessee must have incurred expenditure to earn tax-free income.

Since the AO had not recorded satisfaction regarding the assessee’s calculation being incorrect and since such satisfaction is a pre-requisite for invoking Rule 8D, the CIT(A) erred in partially approving the action of the AO. The Tribunal dismissed this ground of the appeal filed by the Department. Cases referred:

1. CIT v. Hero Cycles, (323 ITR 518) (P&H)

2. ACIT v. Eicher Ltd., (101 TTJ 369) (Del.)

3. Maruti Udyog v. DCIT, (92 ITD 119) (Del.)

4. Wimco Seedlings Ltd. v. DCIT, (107 ITD 267) (Del.) (TM)

5. Punjab National Bank v. DCIT, (103 TTJ 908) (Del.)

6. Vidyut Investment Ltd. (10 SOT 284) (Del.) 7. D. J. Mehta v. ITO, (290 ITR 238) (Mum.) (AT)

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Capital gains v. Business Income: Section 28(va) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2006- 07: Consideration received on transfer of rights of trade mark, brands and copy rights: Business given up distinct from business continued: Consideration not arising out of business: Not business income, but is longterm capital gain.

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[CIT v. Mediworld Publications Pvt. Ltd., 337 ITR 178 (Del.), 244 CTR 387 (Del.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of healthcare, print media and electronic media communications. The assessee entered into a specified assets transfer agreement with one CMP for sale of all its rights, title and interest in specified assets of its healthcare journals and communications business. In consideration of the transfer the assessee had received Rs.3.80 crores. In the return of income the receipt was shown as the long-term capital gain. The Assessing Officer taxed it as business income u/s.28(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that it is long-term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) By the agreement, the assessee had transferred the rights of trade marks, brands, copyrights, etc., in the journals and publications. The clinical trials business which the assessee continued to carry on was distinct and separate from the business of healthcare journals and communications. As far as the healthcare journals and communication business is concerned, it had been given up in entirety in favour of the transferee.

(ii) Thus section 28(va) was not applicable to any sum received on account of transfer of right to carry on any business which was chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’. In the specified asset transfer agreement, ‘business’ was to mean the business of publishing, distributing and selling the periodicals and products as carried on by the seller (assessee).

(iii) There was a transfer of exclusive assets and on the transfer it was the transferee which had become the sole and undisputed owner of these assets which were the business assets of the assessee.

(iv) We find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.”

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Business expenditure: Interest on borrowed capital: Section 36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Assessee invested borrowed funds in the shares of subsidiary company to have control over that company: Interest on borrowed funds allowable as deduction u/s.36(1)(iii).

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[CIT v. Phil Corporation Ltd., 244 CTR 226 (Bom.)]

The assessee had invested the borrowed funds in the shares of the subsidiary company. The assessee’s claim for deduction of interest u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) The Tribunal found that the assessee had invested the amount in question in subsidiary company for the acquisition of its shares i.e., to have a control over majority shares but not to earn dividend or interest. Before the Tribunal, it was not disputed that such an investment is an integral part of the business.

(ii) We find that the reasoning of the Tribunal that the overdraft was not operated only for investing in shares of subsidiary company to have control over that company and, therefore, the element of interest paid on the overdraft was not susceptible of bifurcation and, therefore, the respondent no. 1 is entitled to the deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act is correct and deserves to be accepted.

(iii) In the result we hold that Tribunal was right
in deleting the addition.”

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Business expenditure: Deduction u/s.35AB of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96: Agreement for supply of technical knowhow: Assessee obliged to pay income-tax under the agreement: Assessee entitled to deduction of income tax paid u/s.35AB.

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[Tata Yodogawa v. CIT, 243 CTR 263 (Jharkhand)]

The assessee entered into a collaboration agreement with ESW for acquiring know-how for use in the business. Under the agreement, the assessee was required to pay a fixed sum and also the tax payable on such sum. Jharkhand High Court considered the following question of law: “Whether deduction u/s.35AB was permissible only in respect of the remittances made by the assessee to ESW or it was permissible in respect of the income-tax paid by the assessee on the said remittances in terms of the collaboration agreement? To be more specific the question is whether the phrase ‘lump sum consideration’ used in section 35AB(1) would include the taxes paid by the assessee under the agreement for acquisition of know-how?” The High Court held as under:

“(i) Deduction u/s.35AB is permissible in respect of any lump sum consideration for acquiring any know-how for use for the purpose of assessee’s business. The word ‘consideration’ include the entire obligation of the assessee, without which the assessee would not be able to acquire the know-how.

(ii) On the facts of the case the obligation of the assessee under the agreement with ESW extended not merely to remitting the amount of two million DM to ESW, but also extended to payment of taxes which would include the income-tax as well as the R&D cess. It seems quite obvious that if the assessee had not paid the tax or the R&D cess, and had merely made payment of two million DM to ESW, the latter would not be obliged to part with the knowhow in view of the terms of the collaboration agreement. Therefore, payment of these taxes are as integral a part of the ‘consideration’ as the payment of two million DM.

(iii) There is no logical reason for not treating the income-tax paid by the assessee in terms of the collaboration agreement as part of the ‘consideration’ for acquisition of the knowhow. The word ‘lump sum’ as used before the word ‘consideration’ in section 35AB only excludes periodical or turnover based payments like royalty, etc., and any one-time payment for the know-how would fall within the expression ‘lump sum’ if it is fixed and specified in the agreement, although it may be payable in installments.”

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Appellate Tribunal: Power to examine validity of search: Sections 132(1), 253(1)(b) and 254(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961: B. P. 1985-86 to 5-12-1995: The Tribunal has power to examine the validity of the search in an appeal against the assessment order passed pursuant to search.

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[C. Ramaiah Reddy v. ACIT, 244 CTR 126 (Kar.)]

On the scope of the power of the Appellate Tribunal to examine the validity of search u/s.132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Karnataka High Court held as under:

“(i) A search u/s.132 as contemplated by Chapter XIV-B has to be a valid search. An illegal search is no search and in such a case Chapter XIV-B would have no application.

(ii) If the conditions for the exercise of power are not satisfied, the proceeding is liable to be quashed and consequently the block assessment cannot be sustained. Thus, when the assessee challenges the order of assessment and contends that the search is illegal and void, the said question goes to the root of the matter. If the said search and seizure results in determination of liability and levy of tax, then the assessee can be said to be an aggrieved person. Though he cannot prefer an appeal against the authorisation of search and seizure, once such unauthorised or illegal search and seizure culminates in an assessment order, he gets a right to challenge the assessment on several grounds including the validity of authorisation and initiation of search and seizure.

(iii) If he has not challenged the validity of initiation of the proceedings by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, he would not lose his right to challenge the same in the appeal. Specific words used in clause (b) of s.s (1) of section 253 i.e., “an order passed by the AO under clause (c) of section 158BC in respect of search initiated u/s.132” tend to show that this appeal provision specifically applies to an assessment order consequent to search initiated u/s.132. Thus, the subjectmatter of the appeal under the provision is not only the assessment order made by the AO, but also ‘a search initiated’ u/s.132.

(iv) Therefore, if the assessee contends that the search initiated u/s.132 is not in accordance with law, the said contention has to be considered and adjudicated upon by the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the assessee against the assessment order. It is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal first to go into the jurisdictional aspect and satisfy itself that the search was valid and legal. It is only then it can go into the correctness of the order of block assessment.

(v) Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision under the Act for appeal against illegal search, the Tribunal is not estopped from going into such question in the appeal filed against the assessment order.”

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Reassessment: Sections 143(3), 147 and 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1999-00: Assessment u/s.143(3): Subsequent reopening of assessment (beyond 4 years): The recorded reasons must indicate as to how there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the facts fully and truly: Lapse on the part of the AO cannot be a ground for reopening when the primary facts are disclosed.

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[M/s. Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (Del.), ITA No. 87 of 2010 dated 11-11-2011]

For the A.Y. 1999-00, the case was taken up for scrutiny and the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act. Subsequently, (beyond the period of 4 years) the assessment was reopened and an addition of Rs.79,23,834 was made u/s.2(22)(e) of the Act, in the reassessment. The reopening and the addition were confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the following question was framed : “Whether the Assessing Officer was justified and correct in law in initiating the reassessment proceedings for reasons recorded in Annexure A2?” The Delhi High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee and held as under: “

(i) In the regular assessment the Assessing Officer had inquired into the details of the advances received, but did not make any addition u/s.2(22)(e). If the Assessing Officer fails to apply legal provisions, no fault can be attributed to the assessee. The assessee is merely required to make a full and true disclosure of material facts, but is not required to disclose, state or explain the law.

(ii) A lapse or error on the part of the Assessing Officer cannot be regarded as a failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts.

(iii) Though the recorded reasons state that the assessee had failed to fully and truly disclose the facts, they do not indicate why and how there was this failure. Mere repetition or quoting the language of the proviso is not sufficient. The basis of the averment should either be stated or be apparent from the record.

(iv) Explanation (1) to section 147 which states that mere production of books is not sufficient does not apply to a case where the Assessing Officer failed to apply the law to admitted facts on record.

(v) The allegation that the assessee did not disclose the true and correct nature of the payment received from the sister concerns, nor disclosed the extent of holding of the sister concern so as to enable the Assessing officer to apply his mind regarding section 2(22)(e) is not acceptable. The assessee had filed statement of accounts of each creditor and indicated them to be sister concerns. The primary facts were furnished. The law does not impose any further obligation of disclosure on the assessee.

(vi) Appeal is accordingly allowed and the reassessment proceedings are set aside.”

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Section 40(a)(ia) — If tax has been deducted at source and paid to the Government, then no disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) can be made on the ground that the deduction was at a wrong rate or under an incorrect section.

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DCIT v. S. K. Tekriwal
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Kolkata
Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and
C. D. Rao (AM)
ITA Nos. 1135/Kol./2010
A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 21-10-2011
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Niraj Kumar/Sanjay Bajoria
       

Section 40(a)(ia) — If tax has been deducted at source and paid to the Government, then no disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) can be made on the ground that the deduction was at a wrong rate or under an incorrect section.


Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of bridges, roads, dams and canals and heavy earth-moving activities in contract with government and semi-government bodies such as BRO, PWD, NTPC, etc. The assessee filed return of income showing total income at Rs.45,49,360. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noted that the assessee had debited Rs.3,37,37,464 in the P & L Account under the head ‘machine hire charges’ and on this tax was deducted at source @ 1%. The AO held that these payments attracted TDS u/s.194I @ 10%. He rejected the submissions of the assessee that the payments were made to sub-contractors for completion of specific work and therefore, tax was deducted @ 1% u/s.194C(2) of the Act and also that the payments were not made for hiring of machines, but the same were wrongly grouped under the head ‘Machine hire charges’. He made a proportionate disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act with respect to machinery hire charges. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who examined the agreements entered into by the assessee and found that the quantity of work was fixed and the rate was fixed with reference to the quantity of work. He found merit in the argument that hire charges depend on the time period for which the machines are used. But in the present case, time consumed by the subcontractors or the period for which machines were used was not at all a factor in deciding the payments to be made to sub-contractors. It was only on the basis of quantity of work that the payments were made. He held that the payments were covered by S. 194C(2) and therefore provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) are not attracted. He deleted the addition made by the AO. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the ITAT.

Held:

The Tribunal after examining the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) observed that in the present case tax has been deducted at source, although u/s.194C(2) of the Act, it is not a case of non-deduction of tax or no deduction of tax as is the import of the section. It observed that even if it is considered that the sum under consideration falls u/s.194I, it may be considered that tax has been deducted at lower rate and it cannot be considered to be a case of non-deduction or no deduction. It noted that the C Bench of Mumbai ITAT in the case of Chandabhoy & Jassobhoy (ITA No. 20/Mum./2010, order dated 8-7-2011) the Tribunal was dealing with a case where the assessee deducted tax u/s.192 of the Act, whereas the Revenue contended that the tax should have been deducted u/s.194J of the Act, the Tribunal in that case held that the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) of the Act can be invoked only in the event of nondeduction of tax but not for lesser deduction of tax. S. 40(a)(ia) has two limbs, one is where inter alia the assessee has to deduct tax and the second where after deducting tax, inter alia, the assessee has to pay the same into Government account. There is nothing in the said section to treat, inter alia, the assessee as a defaulter where there is a shortfall in deduction. S. 40(a)(ia) refers only to the duty to deduct tax and pay to Government account. If there is any shortfall due to any difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payments falling under various TDS provisions, the assessee can be declared to be an assessee in default u/s.201 of the Act and no disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) allowing the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Section 41(1) — Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability — On settlement of dispute the cost of machinery had reduced by two crore — Depreciation allowed in earlier years on two crore cannot be taxed u/s.41(1) or 41(2).

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130 ITD 46 (Hyd.) Binjrajka Steel Tubes Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-9-2010

Section 41(1) — Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability — On settlement of dispute the cost of machinery had reduced by two crore — Depreciation allowed in earlier years on two crore cannot be taxed u/s.41(1) or 41(2).


Facts:

The assessee company was carrying on the business of manufacturing of steel tubes. In its assessment, the Assessing Officer observed that as per disclosure in the Notes of Accounts, the auditors had stated that by virtue of settlement of dispute with Tata SSL Ltd., the cost of machinery was reduced by Rs.2crore and the excess depreciation that was claimed on these Rs.2 crore in the earlier years had been adjusted in current year’s depreciation.

The Assessing Officer issued a show-cause notice demanding an explanation as to why the depreciation allowed in the earlier years should not be added back u/s.41(1).

 In response to the above notice the assessee furnished an explanation stating that section 41(1) was applicable in respect of trading liabilities. Not satisfied with assessee’s reply, the Assessing Officer treated Rs.2 crore as income u/s.41(1).

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the decision of the Assessing Officer. On second appeal, the Tribunal held as follows.

Held:

 It is clear from the reading of section 41(1) that where any allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred and subsequently the assessee, during any previous year, has obtained/ recovered such loss, expenditure or trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount obtained by him, shall be deemed to be the income of that previous year. However the purpose of having section 41(2) in addition to section 41(1) implies that depreciation is neither loss nor expenditure nor a trading liability as referred to in section 41(1). It is only remission of liability incurred on capital goods. Hence the benefit of depreciation obtained by the assessee cannot be termed as an allowance or expenditure claimed by him and therefore will not be taxed u/s.41(1). The alternate contention of Revenue was that amount in question could be brought to tax u/s.41(2) and the same was also not upheld. (However the depreciation claimed by the assessee on Rs.2 crore was taxed u/s.28(iv) as value of benefit arising from business.)

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Section 154, read with section 68 — Rectification of mistakes and unsatisfactory explanation given by the assessee about the nature and source of income.

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129 ITD 469 (Mum.) DCIT v. Waman Hari Pethe Sons A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 25-3-2010

Section 154, read with section 68 — Rectification of mistakes and unsatisfactory explanation given by the assessee about the nature and source of income.


Facts:

The assessment of the assessee was completed u/s.143(3). Subsequently, the Assessing Officer initiated proceedings u/s.154 in respect of gold deposits received from customers. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee had failed to establish the identity of customers who had given gold deposits. The Assessing Officer rejected the objection of the assessee and enhanced the assessment by making the addition u/s.68.

Held:

It was held that the power of the Assessing Officer is limited to rectify the mistakes that are apparent on the face of the record. The Assessing Officer does not have the power to go into the debatable issues and determine taxability. According to section 68, where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source of the same or the explanation offered by him is not satisfactory in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year. On the other hand, section 154 deals with rectification of mistakes apparent from record. In the course of rectification proceedings u/s.154, the Assessing Officer cannot go into debatable issues to determine taxability of unexplained cash credits.

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