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11 Section 92B of the Act – Providing corporate guarantee in respect of loans taken by AE does not constitute international transaction; amendment to section 92B relating to international transaction of issuance of corporate guarantee applies prospectively from FY 2012-13. Transfer of funds with intention to make investment cannot be treated as international transaction especially where shares are allotted against such advances.

[2017] 86 taxmann.com 254 (Hyderabad Trib.)

Bartronics
India Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Y: 2012-13                                                                      

Date of Order:
27th September, 2017

Section 92B of
the Act – Providing corporate guarantee in respect of loans taken by AE does
not constitute international transaction; amendment to section 92B relating to
international transaction of issuance of corporate guarantee applies
prospectively from FY 2012-13. Transfer of funds with intention to make
investment cannot be treated as international transaction especially where
shares are allotted against such advances.


FACTS

The Taxpayer,
an Indian company provided a corporate guarantee in respect of the borrowings
of one of its overseas associated enterprises (AEs) without charging any
guarantee fee. Further, the Taxpayer had provided certain interest free
advances to its AE. Such advances were recorded in the books of the Taxpayer as
loans.

The Taxpayer
contended that the furnishing of corporate guarantee is not an international
transaction for the reason that the amendment by Finance Act 2012 which
included corporate guarantee within the definition of “international
transaction” is prospective in nature and does not apply to the year under
consideration.

Further, the
advances were provided out of business expediency as an investment and/or as a
parental support to the AE from taxpayer’s surplus/owned funds; without
incurring any costs. Hence, they should not be treated as international
transaction. In any case, since AE had allotted shares against advances
provided by the Taxpayer in the subsequent assessment year, they could not be
treated as international transaction.

During the
course of assessment proceedings, Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO), imputed
corporate guarantee fee and interest on advances in the hands of the Taxpayer.
Aggrieved by the order of TPO, Taxpayer appealed before the DRP. DRP confirmed
the action of the TPO.

Aggrieved by
the order of DRP, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

HELD

  Although
the definition of “international transaction” was amended by FA 2012, to
include corporate guarantee within its ambit with retrospective effect, such
amendment has to be treated as effective from FY 2012-13.

   Although
different views have been taken by different Tribunals on the prospective
applicability of the FA 2012 amendment, Taxpayer can adopt a view which is
favourable to him until a contrary view is taken by a higher court. Reliance in
this regard was placed on the decision of Dr. Reddy Laboratories [2017] 81
taxmann.com 398 (Hyd. Trib). Thus, corporate guarantee granted by the Taxpayer
prior to FY 2012-13 did not qualify as an “international transaction”.

   Though the
advances were classified in the books of the Taxpayer as “advances”, what is
relevant is to evaluate the intention of providing the advances. Mere
classification of transaction as loans and advances in the balance sheet did
not qualify them as loan.

   Taxpayer
had transferred the funds with the intention of investing in its AE. In fact,
shares were allotted by the AE against such advances. Thus, granting of such
advances could not be treated as international transaction. Reliance was placed
on KAR Therapeutics & Estates (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 86 (Hyd.) of 2016].
Thus, ALP adjusted in this regard was also not warranted.

COMPILERS NOTE

This month’s
Twitter Treats would obviously be dominated by the event that has shaken up the
whole of India – Demonetization of the currency notes. Since 8th November
evening, thousands of tweets on this subject have been sent out. Here are some
of the interesting ones:

@patelameet 

Earthquake
measuring 10 on the Rich – chor scale hits the black money hoarders in India
#indiafightscorruption

@joshikhushboo7

Country’s
detoxification on! #DeMonitization

@rishibagree              

Journalist
snubbed his driver when he asked Rs 500 advance After #DeMonetisation
same journo called the driver & gave him 12 months advance

@b50

I saw one
shop accept an old Rs 500 note for a Rs80 item and give back change,
smilingly. The customer told her God Bless You. Respect.

@DrGarekar

#IncomeTax
must be taught from Nursery so that paying taxes become ingrained in DNA of
every child as he grows to adulthood & start earning

@PawanDurani

UPA which
said Rs 30 is sufficient for daily expense of a common man in India for
a day is complaining about Rs 2000 withdrawal limit #Irony

@navinkhaitan

Congratulations
those who got the Rs 2000 note U hv successfully cleared Level1 Level2:
Find someone to accept the note n give u change

@anilkumble1074

Massive
googly bowled by our Hon. PM @narendramodi today. Well done Sir! Proud of you!!

@patelameet 

More notes
will be counted tonight in India than votes in USA #indiafightscorruption

@kapsology

ATMs giving
only Rs 2000 note if you withdraw Rs 2000. Iss note ka achaar
daale kya? No one is going to give change for it in the market.

@FortunateYogi

I want to
have a meal of Rs. 80 and all I have is a 2000 note, for which no
one gives me change. #MyExperience #ConfusedModiSarkar

@coolfunnytshirt

One out of
many positive side effects of #Demonitization – It has unmasked many
‘neutral’, ‘unbiased’ and ‘apolitical’ people on our TL.

@gauravcsawant

My first Rs
2000
note. Almost didn’t want it to go. Then the vegetable vendor said: the
more it changes hands better for all of us :))

@rameshsrivats 

Maybe we can
call this ATM calibration issue a Why-2K problem?

@rameshsrivats 

Good that we
are diverting cash from shady purposes to shaadi purposes.

@rameshsrivats 

ATM:
Welcome. Please enter PIN.

Rahul: Here,
take.

ATM: Ouch!
Not that pin.

And here are
some more tweets worth reading!

@graphic_foodie

I never love
my husband more than when he does my tax return #truelove

ObamaMalik                 

How do
illegal people pay income tax if they have no social security for their
tax form? I am legal. I have social security. I pay tax

@ashwinmushran

Pay Service
Tax!
Then told there is now a Service Tax half yearly return! Then
pay accountant to file that you’ve paid service Tax! Repeat

@aquasaurabh

After Income
Declaration Scheme
to tackle black money the Govt has Patriotism Declaration Scheme
fr just 5 cr #ADHMReleaseDrama @karanjohar

@mkvenu1

“Sin
tax” under GST regime is being lowered drastically to enable the “sinners”
to generate more cash. They help fund elections, after all.

@JamuntinI

God may even
forgive your Sins, taxation dept., wouldn’t. Sin tax @ 40% for your
Smoke…probably. #GST Update.

@rameshsrivats  

Now that a
real estate tycoon is winning the US elections, Congress must be seriously
looking at Robert Vadra.

@rameshsrivats  

Watching
NDTV. The Congress spokesperson is putting full nonsense. He should be treated
like a 1,000 rupee note, & discontinued immediately.

And here is
the list of a few bollywood actors’ twitter
handles that you may want to follow:

Madhuri
Dixit Nene – @madhuridixit

Shah Rukh
Khan – @iamsrk

Alia Bhat –
@aliaa08

Dilip Kumar
– @TheDilipKumar

Deepika
Padukone – @deepikapaduokne

Priyanka
Chopra – @priyankachopra

Karan Johar
– @karanjohar

Aamir Khan –
@aamir_khan

Anil Kapoor
– @AnilKapoor

Anupam Kher
– @AnupamPKher

Rishi
Kapoor – @chintskap
_

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO INVESTOR ADVISERS’ REGULATIONS – WIDE RANGING IMPLICATIONS INCLUDING TO CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

SEBI has issued on 7th October 2016 a consultation paper
proposing some amendments to regulations relating to investment advisors and
investment advice generally. Some of the proposed changes affect Chartered
Accountants, Company Secretaries, lawyers and other professionals directly. The
changes generally would make the regulations relating to investment advisors
much stricter. They will also make the categorisations between various types of
advisers sharper, so much so that they may end up being mutually exclusive.

Curiously, this paper has
invited widespread criticism on the grounds that SEBI perhaps did not expect.
Clearly, there were certain valid concerns SEBI has had to address through the
proposals. However, partly due to over-reach and partly due to
ill-drafted/ill-conceived proposals, there has been a strong opposition.
However, considering that amendments are inevitable, it is necessary to
consider the background and also the proposals as they presently stand.

Background of the provisions

SEBI had in 2013 notified regulations
relating to investment advisers (the SEBI (Investment Advisers) Regulations
2013 or “the Regulations”). These Regulations created a fresh category of
persons who assist investors in making investments. The others include
portfolio managers, mutual fund distributors, stock brokers, etc. This
category was created for a specific objective and to resolve certain conflicts
of interest that arose when the adviser was also the seller/distributor of
products.

An investor who approaches an
intermediary faces a concern about the objectivity of the intermediary. On one
hand, the investor expects that the intermediary will give him impartial advice
on which product he should invest in, taking into account his needs and
circumstances. On the other hand, the intermediary usually is paid by the
organisation (i.e., mutual fund, etc.) whose product he distributes. In
any case, he has his further own self interest to serve which may motivate him
to push those products that give him the highest of commissions/remuneration.
The result can not only be costly for the investor in terms of his effectively
paying high cost for making investments, but he may also end up holding
investments that are not suited to him. Mis-selling of units is such a serious
issue that it has actually been made a category of fraudulent practice under
the PFUTP Regulations. Generally, code of conduct relating to intermediaries
too lay stress on their taking into account interests of their clients above self-interest.

However, obviously, this is not
enough. So long as there is conflict of interest, temptations will remain and
no regulations can resolve it merely by mandating against it or banning it. The
Investment Advisers Regulations created a neat solution. It created a category
of intermediaries – Investment Advisers – who would focus on giving advice and
not distributing products. Thus, they will render skilled advice to clients
taking into account their needs and circumstances and thus suggest a portfolio
or investment products that serve their needs. More importantly, their fees
will be directly paid by such clients. The Investment Advisers thus have
motivation as well as interest in focussing only the interests of clients. They
are generally not permitted to accept remuneration/commission from entities
whose products they may recommend.

The Regulations go further and
mandate a higher level of professionalism in such Investment Advisers. They are
required to carry out proper client analysis and document it. Acting as
Investment Advisers would require prior registration. A certain level of
qualifications and also certification is also mandated for such persons.

However, while Investment
Advisers generally were required to obtain registration, exemption from
registration was given to certain persons. For example, persons who give
investment advice as part as incidental to their other activities are not
required to register. A good example is of Chartered Accountants who may give
such advice as part of their practice of rendering tax and related advice to
their clients. Similarly, distributors of products may also give such advice. Such persons are not required to be registered.

This may now undergo a
significant change as per the proposals made in the Consultation Paper.

No exemption to Chartered
Accountants and others who render investment advice incidentally

Chartered Accountants, Company
Secretaries, lawyers, stock brokers, etc. who give investment advice
incidental to their primary activity of professional practice will now require
registration as Investment Advisers. The result will be that such persons will
now have to focus on their core activity and cannot, even if asked, render
investment advice to their clients.

It is not as if such persons
are not qualified or otherwise unregulated. Further, it is also not as if they
have conflict of interest. Yet, this requirement is proposed.

It is possible that some such
persons may obtain the required registration to enable them to continue giving
such advice to their clients. However, it is more likely that the
categorisation of persons will become more distinct and separate with each group
focussing on their own activities.

Mutual Fund distributors to be
debarred from giving investment advice

As explained earlier,
intermediaries such as mutual fund distributors face the very conflict of
interest that is the focus of the Investment Advisers Regulations. They are
paid by the mutual fund/AMC whose products they sell though the investor may
expect that they are given impartial advice suited to their circumstances. Such
distributors under the Regulations were not required to be registered as Investment
Advisers, if they gave advice that is incidental to the selling of such
products. The Consultation Paper now proposes to wholly prohibit them from
giving such advice even incidental to selling.

Categorisation between Research
Analysts and Investment Advisers

Research Analysts and
Investment Advisers provide similar functions in relation to giving of
investment advice. However, the nature of their functions and approach is
significantly different and thus requirements relating to their registration
and functioning are covered under separate Regulations. A proposal now makes
this categorisation even sharper.

The Consultation Paper observes
that investment advice is often given in electronic and broadcasting media. A
certain level of exemption is presently provided under the Investment Advisers
Regulations to such advice that is widely available to public. It is now
proposed to divide such advice being given. Simply stated, generic advice in
such media to public at large can be given by research analysts while client
specific advice can be given by Investment Advisers.

Another recommendation further
clarifies this divide. Research Analysts would be required to send their
recommendations to all classes of its clients at the same time. The reason is that
their recommendations are generic and product related and not client specific.
Thereafter or independently, the role of the Investment Adviser would arise
where the investor would take the help of such Adviser to decide whether such
recommendation is suitable for his needs and circumstances.

Investment tips via social
media and the like

This proposal has seen very
strong criticism. While the criticism is justified, the evil that is sought to
be addressed also needs to be considered.

It is too often found – as
evidenced by several orders of SEBI – that there are persons who use the
internet and social media for giving tips in dubious scrips whose price and
trading are manipulated to trap unsuspecting investors. Tips are given by SMS,
whatsapp, social media, etc. Often, these scrips are what are known as
“penny stocks” who rarely have any intrinsic value but are quoted at low
prices. The price of the shares are manipulated and huge volume is also seen in
stock exchange which tempts investors into investing. The investing public may
be influenced by the low price and hence, there is expectation that loss too
can be low. The shares, after some time, see their price and volumes both
crashing with investors then left holding the valueless shares. In some cases,
SEBI has identified persons who carry out such manipulative/fraudulent
activities and debar/punish them. At other times, it may be difficult even to
identify who they are.

The Consultation Paper now
seeks to wholly debar giving of such tips unless such persons who give tips are
themselves registered as Investment Advisers and thus subjected to the
regulatory requirements. Moreover, giving of such tips in violation of such
requirements will be treated as a fraudulent act inviting stringent punishment.

This proposal has invited very
strong criticism. The objection obviously is not against action against such
dubious/fraudulent tippers. It is the blanket and overreaching ban against all
type of tips on internet and social media irrespective of who is giving such
types, of what type and in what manner. To give a most basic example, a person
may recommend in passing to his friend a particular share in a conversation
over WhatsApp. This may not be well researched and even accurate. Yet, such a thing is so common. Such a tip may attract severe punishment.

It is common to find
whatsapp/facebook groups where investment advice is freely taken/given amongst
like minded persons. There are countless blogs that discuss investments and it
is likely that some sort of recommendation may be given on such blogs. Critics
have given example of comments of persons like Warren Buffet and the like who
discuss their investments publicly.

It is felt that SEBI has not
thought through this issue well and their recommendation may restrain free
discussion of stocks and investments generally. It is even stated that such
restriction amounts to severe and unjustified restraint on freedom of speech.

One will have to see how SEBI
deals with this criticism and what modified form of regulation it comes out
with.

Ban on schemes, competition,
games, etc. relating to stock market

SEBI has observed that many
persons organise competition, games, etc. relating to stock market which
may involve predicting the price of shares on stock markets. The paper makes it
clear that SEBI does not approve or endorse such schemes and thus the public
may engage in such schemes at their own risk. However, SEBI goes a step beyond
such hands-off/caveat emptor approach and notes that the public may end up
suffering losses. Hence, the paper recommends a total ban on such schemes, etc.

Client Agreement by Investment
Advisers

Client agreements have always
been a concern in respect of intermediaries in securities markets. There may be
non-uniformity or even sheer non-existence of such agreements. Or the terms may
be one-sided or opaque. Certain minimum level of protection of clients may not
be provided. Hence, SEBI often provides for certain standard form of such
agreements with certain minimum requirements that cannot be deviated from. For
Investment Advisers, the paper recommends a “Rights and Obligation” document.
The paper recommends a certain minimum provisions in such document including
various disclosures by the Investment Adviser. The result would be that, while
avoiding over-formalisation, a certain level of protection as well as
disclosure would be available to the client.

Other recommendations

The Paper generally seeks to
make several other amendments. The Regulations particularly relating to Investment
Advisers will thus see substantial amendments.

Conclusion

Intermediaries are considered
to be the gatekeepers to securities markets who deal with investors directly.
It is then inevitable that such intermediaries will face considerable
regulation and supervision. It is also expected that SEBI would ensure that,
through registration, it creates a requirement whereby only qualified persons
who comply with certain basic requirements as well as ethics are only permitted
to operate. Further, conflicts of interests are also avoided. This has resulted
in not only multiple categories of such intermediaries but increasingly complex
regulatory requirements. Whatever shape the final requirements may come in
following the consultation paper, they will only increase such requirements
which eventually will also increase costs of compliance. The multiple
categories will ensure that there is sharp specialisation and many
intermediaries and even professionals like Chartered Accountants will have to
give up certain activities they may otherwise be engaging in. The investors
will have advantage of such specialisation but will then have to go to multiple
intermediaries to fulfill their simple desires of investing in capital market
products. _

INDIA ON THE CUSP OF CHANGE!

On 8th
November 2016, the Prime Minister may have possibly altered the course India
was taking. He announced demonetisation of Rs. 1000 and Rs. 500 notes which
constituted 86% of the currency in circulation. For its sheer magnitude, his
courageous decision deserves kudos. I would like to compare this decision to
that of his predecessor (as the then Finance Minister) in 1991, which broke the
shackles of the Indian economy. His announcement will have possibly the same
impact if not greater.

The decision
of demonetisation has been taken for three reasons-to tackle the menace of
counterfeit notes, consequentially to turn off the terror funding tap, and last
but not the least to bring holders of unaccounted money to book. To what extent
the decision will succeed in achieving the objectives only time can tell. The
announcement took virtually everyone by surprise and has been applauded by the
majority. The world is looking at India with expectation. Economists differ on
the possible outcomes, as they do in most cases. Political parties, while
supporting the intent have raised questions about tardy implementation, a major
part of them being justified.

The ordinary
citizen has borne the brunt of the difficulties of the currency crunch, and the
problem is far more serious in the villages than in the cities where plastic
money and various forms of electronic transactions have already taken root.
Indians however are patiently bearing the” inconvenience”, to put it mildly, in
the hope that the decision will be of great benefit to the country, reduce
corruption and result in punishing the persons engaged in illegal activities
and evasion of taxes. One hopes that, as far as the drive against the
unaccounted wealth is concerned, this is only the beginning of a series of
actions which the Prime Minister has promised to take.

Much has
already been said about the economic downturn on account of cash crunch. If
long term benefits are to be realised, a limited fall in economic growth should
be acceptable. In any case, this decision will garner much more for the
government coffers, than the two amnesty schemes for foreign/domestic
unaccounted wealth and income could get. If Rs.15 lakh crore is the money in
high denomination notes and 30% of it is not returned / deposited or exchanged,
that itself would amount to Rs. 4.5 lakh crore.

While the
intent of the Prime Minister in this initiative cannot be doubted, there are
certain concerns which need to be addressed. The first is in regard to the
notices that various persons have been receiving on their depositing cash in
their bank accounts and the surveys that are being carried out. While the
Income tax Department certainly has the power to enquire into the source of
money, such actions should not lead to inspector raj which could, in turn, lead
to abuse of power. Even prior to demonetisation, there were complaints of tax
terrorism. There must be a balance between seeking information and
inconvenience to the public.The use of authority must be judicious.

The second
aspect which the government must brace itself for is a possible rise in crime.
If reports are to be believed, a large part of the underworld, particularly the
foot soldiers are unemployed, as hawala, gambling, extortion have halted or
reduced due to non-availability of cash. For a few days, they would survive on
what they have earned in the past, but if society does not create alternative
sources of employment, retrain them or assimilate them into the mainstream
economy,there would be many unemployed youth on the streets who could cause
problems for other sections of society.

While these
problems are certainly a cause for concern, the move to demonetise currency
notes has several benefits, some intended, others unintended. There seems to be
a fall in terrorist activities, both internal and external, with their sources
of funds having totally been choked. This lull in activity is probably an
opportunity to launch a social/ political offensive, so that the menace can be
contained, if not eradicated.

Demonetisation
has also given a fillip to the drive for financial and digital inclusion.
Banks, both in public sector and private sector, are making a serious attempt
to reach the rural areas. This is a drive which the government must
wholeheartedly support with the funds now at its command. Secondly, a much
larger number of people – consumers, manufacturers, traders and service
providers have started making and accepting payment in the cashless mode. This
will ensure that transactions are recorded and costs in making them are cut.

As I write
this editorial, the Finance Minister presented a bill in the Lok Sabha
proposing additional tax liability in respect of the undisclosed income,
voluntarily declared, assessed or income unearthed after a search. In addition,
the said bill contains a scheme whereby the declarant can pay only 50%, 25%
would have to be deposited in a scheme known as Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan
Yojana 2016 (PMGKY), and the declarant would be entitled to retain the balance
25%. After the demonetisation announcement, a detailed article had been worked
on by two of our illustrious past presidents Pradip Kapasi and Gautam Nayak.
However, as they were in the process of finalising it, the Taxation Laws
(Second Amendment) Bill, 2016 was moved. It has now been passed in the Lok
Sabha and awaits presidential assent. Reading the clauses in the bill, the
article would have required complete rewriting. After considering the
limitation of time given the deadline for printing of this issue, it was
impossible to make the changes and provide a detailed analysis of the
amendments, which would be expected by readers. The two authors would however
endeavour to carry out the necessary changes in their article and a sincere
attempt will be made to place that article on the BCAS website. This is of
course presuming that more changes are not made! As an information to readers,
I have attempted to summarise the provisions of the bill in regard to the
enhanced tax liability, surcharge and penalty under the Income-tax Act in
respect of such undisclosed money, etc., which makes the PMGKY seem a
worthwhile alternative. Readers may kindly note that this is only a prima facie
view as I do not possess the ability of the eminent past presidents.

Category of Income

Rate of Tax

Surcharge

Penalty

Total liability

If unexplained income is declared in return of income

60%

15%

nil

75%

If unexplained income is determined by
assessing officer

60%

15%

7.5%

82.5%

Education cess would also be payable at 3% of the above
tax and surcharge.

A separate
penalty is also provided if income is found after a search which is carried out
after the bill receives presidential assent, and undisclosed income is
unearthed as a consequence thereof.

The
cumulative effect of the demonetisation, and the amendments in tax provisions
will have to be seen as time progresses.

To conclude, the last quarter of 2016 has seen
the Indian Premier taking a pathbreaking decision. If all goes well, the year
2017 should see the rise of a brighter sun on the Indian horizon.

19. Appellate Tribunal – Power to consider new ground etc. – Sections 142(2A) and (2C) – A. Y. 2005-06 – Tribunal has power to consider the question of validity of extension of time u/s. 142(2C) of the Act – Amendment by Finance Act, 2008 is prospective and not retrospective

Principal CIT vs. Nilkanth Concast P.
Ltd.; 387 ITR 568 (Del):

The relevant year is the A. Y. 2005-06. In
the appeal filed by the Revenue before the Delhi High Court, the following
questions were raised:

“i)  Whether the ITAT is
competent to adjudicate the order of the AO under proviso to section
142(2C), which is not provided u/s. 146A 
or 153?

ii)  Whether the ITAT is
competent to admit an issue for the first time where there is no material in
the assessment order or in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) on the basis of quite the issue of validity of the order of the
Assessing Officer under the proviso to section 142(2C) could be raised
and considered?”

iii)  Whether the AO is
competent to extend the period of filing the audit report on the express
request of the nominated auditor under proviso to section 142(2C) r.w.s.
142(2A) ?”

The High Court held as under:

“i)  The powers of the Tribunal
are wide enough to consider a point which may not have been urged before the
Commissioner(Appeals) as long as the question requires to be examined in the
interest
of justice.

ii)  The Tribunal had not
exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the question whether the Assessing
Officer was justified in extending the time for the auditor nominated u/s.
142(2C), to submit the audit report.

iii)  Under proviso to
section 142(2C) of the Act, there was no power with the Assessing Officer to suo
moto
extend the time for filing audit report prior to April 1, 2008. The
power was subsequently provided by amending the proviso by the Finance
Act, 2008 and the amendment was prospective in nature.

iv) The Assessing Officer was
not competent to extend the period for filing the audit report on the request
of the nominated auditor. It could be done only on the request made on behalf
of the assessee.”

APARIGRAHA (NON-POSSESSION)

An Ashramite of Gandhi
Ashram was required to adopt “Ekadash Vrats” – Eleven vows. Vows are not
just rules but has a much more deeper meaning. A vow requires unflinching
determination; determination which does not bend before discomfort and
difficulties. According to Gandhiji, “Taking vows is not a sign of weakness,
but of strength to do at any cost something that one ought to do constitutes a
vow”. Further, according to him, “to do something ‘as far as possible’ provides
a fatal loop hole. To do something ‘as far as possible’ is to succumb to the
very first temptation. Vows are necessary for the purpose of self-purification
and self-realisation.

What are these eleven
vows? They are (1) Truth, (2) Ahimsa. (3) Brahmacharya, (4) Control of the
palate, (5) Non-stealing, (6) Non-possession, (7) Fearlessness, (8) Removal of
untouchability, (9) Bread labour – work, (10) Tolerance – Equality of Religions
and (11) Humility.

Of the above eleven vows,
the one of non-possession also called ‘Aparigraha’ is to my mind a very
important one. Non-possession is allied to non-stealing according to Gandhiji.
If we posses something, if we hold on to something which is not required by us,
it amounts indirectly to stealing. We are depriving others of what we hold on
to, which they need and we do not. A bird, an animal does not think of what it
will need tomorrow and worry about it.

It is true of course, that
a human being cannot possibly live like a bird, without a house, without
clothes and without providing for his needs for food. However, one can keep
one’s needs to a minimum and do with little. As we reduce our dependence on
material things, our happiness and inner satisfaction and peace increase. We
have to learn to simplify our lives.

But what do we see around
us, and what do we actually put in practice? The homes of the rich are stuffed
full of material things. Hundreds of saris, dresses, scores of costly purses
and shoes and dozens of shirts, etc. This is not uncommon…. And yet the
urge to collect more and more is never satisfied. On the other hand, millions
do not get even two square meals a day; so many go hungry to bed every night,
many do not have even a spare set of clothes.We have to learn to “Share and
Care”. We cannot, like Marie Antoinette, the French Queen, say that “If they do
not have bread, let them eat cake.”

According to Gandhiji, the
principle of Non-possession (Aparigraha) is applicable not only to
things but also to thoughts. We should not clutter up our brains with too much
of needless information and useless knowledge. Wrongful thoughts keep us away
from the rightful path and come in the way of our search for God.

What would happen if all
of us start observing “Aparigraha” – non-accumulation – and accept it as
a governing value of our lives? Then there would be no more poverty, and no
needy persons. As Gandhiji has said, “there is enough in this world for
everyone’s need but not for everyone’s greed.” There would neither be rich
persons nor poor persons. The divide between the haves and have-nots would
disappear. It may not be possible to totally observe ‘Aparigraha’ in our
day to day life. But we can certainly reduce senseless accumulation of
possessions and wealth which even our great grandchildren will not need.

Is it even possible to
follow ‘Aparigraha’? I know of some professionals who do follow it. In
their case, whatever they earn in excess of their needs goes straight for
charity. Recently, I came across one person who since the last 42 years is
keeping only 20% of his income for himself and gives away 80%! And believe me,
his income is not all that great.

So let us begin. Begin
now, today itself. Begin small but begin. Let us go through our possessions. Is
it necessary to keep 30 shirts? Or 300 sarees? 12 pairs of shoes? 20 ties?

Friends, without waiting
any longer, we should have a fresh look at our wealth and our incomes and start
the process of ‘Aparigraha’ – of non-accumulation. It would certainly
simplify our lives and make us a lot more happier.

20. Assessment – Transfer pricing – DRP is superior to AO- AO is bound by decision of DRP – ESPN Star Sports Mauritius

S. N.
C. ET Compagnie vs. UOI; 388 ITR 383 (Delhi):

In this
case, the DRP declared that the Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction to deal
with an issue. However, the Assessing Officer passed a final assessment order
ignoring the order of the DRP.  

The Delhi
High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)  The
language used by the Assessing Officer while disagreeing with the binding order
of the DRP was wholly unacceptable.

ii)  The
draft assessment order dated 28/03/2014 and the final assessment order dated
28/01/2015, passed by the Assessing Officer were void ab initio and
liable to be quashed on that basis.”

Section 10A – Claim for deduction u/s. 10A cannot be denied merely beause the assessee has inadvertently omitted to furnish the relevant details relating to deduction u/s. 10A in the appropriate columns of the return of income filed electronically

10.  ACIT vs. Albert A. Kallati
ITAT  Mumbai `A’ Bench
Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)
ITA No.: 2888/Mum/2013
A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of Order: 3rd August, 2016.
Counsel for revenue / assessee: Reepal Tralshawala / Sachchidanand Dubey

FACTS
The assessee, a manufacturer of diamond studded gold jewellery having manufacturing unit located in SEZ, filed his return of income for the year under consideration on 30.9.2009.  Subsequently, he revised his return of income twice.  In all the three returns of income, the assessee did not show any claim for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, even though the total income was shown at Rs. Nil in the original return. Hence, the Assessing Officer (AO) did not allow deduction u/s. 10A of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who called for a remand report wherein the AO submitted that the assessee had been allowed deduction u/s.10A of the Act in AY 2006-07 to 2008-09.  Before the CIT(A) the assessee submitted the relevant details relating to deduction u/s. 10A which were inadvertently omitted to be furnished int eh appropriate columns of the return of income filed electronically. The CIT(A) was convinced that there was a genuine mistake and accordingly, he directed the AO to allow the deduction.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that there was no dispute with regard to the fact that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act for the year under consideration.  The AO did not allow the claim, since it was not claimed in the return of income.  However, the conduct of the assessee shows that he assessee had intended to claim the same, but the relevant details were omitted to be entered in the return of income.  The Tribunal held that the inadvertent omission so made should not come in the way of the assessee to claim the deduction, which he is legally entitled to.  The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

Sections 40(a)(ia), 194I – U/s. 194I tax is not required to be deducted on reimbursements and therefore, the amount so reimbursed cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia)

9.  Aditya Birla Minacs Worldwide Ltd. vs. ACIT
ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench
Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)
ITA No.: 4549/Mum/2014
A.Y.: 2007-08. Date of Order: 2nd August, 2016
Counsel for assessee / revenue: Ronak G. Doshi / A. Ramachandran

FACTS
The assessee reimbursed rent and parking charges amounting to Rs. 71.49 lakh to its holding company, PSI Data System Ltd.  The holding company had entered into a rent agreement with M/s Golf Links. The assessee entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with its holding company on 1.4.2006 pursuant to which the assessee company would occupy a portion of premises taken on lease by the holding company and the holding company shall apportion the rent payment with the assessee company in the ratio of space actually utilised by the assessee.  The MOU also provided that all statutory liabilities in relation to rental facilities such as TDS, service tax, are the responsibilities of the holding company.  

During the year under consideration, the assessee reimbursed a sum of Rs. 71,49,545 to its holding company as its share of rental expenditure incurred by the holding company. The assessee did not deduct tax at source from the said payment on the reasoning that the liability to deduct tax at source from the rent payment paid to the landlord was taken up by the holding company.  The landlord, M/s Golf Links, had obtained a certificate u/s. 197(1) for non-deduction of tax at source, therefore, the holding company did not deduct tax at source from the rent paid by it to the landlord.  The holding company had obtained no deduction certificate for payments covered by sections 194A, 194C and 194J.  It was also submitted to the AO that the holding company was of a bonafide belief that reimbursement of rent from the assessee would not form part of its income in its hands and hence it did not obtain  specific certificate for payments covered by section 194I.  

The AO held that the assessee should have deducted tax from rent payments made by the assessee to its holding company. He disallowed Rs. 71,49,545 by invoking provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the rental agreement has been entered into between the holding company and the land lord and hence the inference drawn by the tax authorities is against the facts available on record. The Tribunal observed that an identical issue was considered by the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Prime Broking Co. (I) Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 6627/Mum/2010 dated 19.10.2012) and the Tribunal held that the provisions of section 194I shall not apply to reimbursement of rent.  The decision rendered by the Tribunal has since been upheld by the Bombay High Court vide its order dated 9th June, 2015 reported in 2015-TIOL-1472-HC-Bom-IT.

The Tribunal further observed that the return of income of the holding company for the year under consideration has been accepted. Since the payment received from the assessee towards rent has been offered in the return of income filed by the holding company, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be applied to the case of the assessee as per the second proviso thereto, which is held to be retrospective by the Delhi High Court in the case of Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd. (377 ITR 635)(Del).  

Considering the ratio of the judgments of the Bombay High Court and the Delhi High Court, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition made u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act relating to reimbursement of rent.

Section 41(1) – Amounts shown in Balance Sheet cannot be deemed to be cases of “cessation of liability” only because they are outstanding for several years. The AO has to establish with evidence that there has been a cessation of liability with regard to the outstanding creditors.

8.  ITO vs. Vikram A. Pradhan

ITAT  Mumbai `F’ Bench
Before Jason P. Boaz (AM) and Sandeep Gosain (AM)
ITA No.: 2212/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09.  Date of Order: 24th August, 2016
Counsel for revenue / assessee: M. V. Rajguru / None

FACTS

In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee’s balance sheet reflected creditors of Rs. 33,44,827.  Upon enquiry, the assessee submitted that these are old creditors pertaining to the period when he carried out business in Indore and that these have been carried forward for past 7 to 8 years and are unpaid due to disputes with the creditors.

The AO considered the entire creditors balance outstanding aggregating to Rs. 33,44,827 as income of the assessee by invoking section 41(1) as cessation of liability for the reason that these are old amounts and pertain to assessee’s old place of business and still remain unpaid.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who after considering the material on record and also referring to the judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Sugauli Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. 236 ITR 518 (SC) and UOI vs. J. K. Synthetics Ltd. (199 ITR 14)(SC) held that in the case on hand there was no write back of liability payable to creditors which is disclosed in the assessee’s balance sheet.  He also observed that no independent inquiries were carried out by the AO to establish that these creditors have written off the debts appearing in their respective account.  He held that the AO was not justified in unilaterally deciding that the amounts reflected as liabilities in the balance sheet of the assessee have ceased to exist within the meaning of section 41(1) of the Act.  He allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the AO has failed to cause enquiries to be made with or notices issued to creditors to ascertain from them whether they have remitted the dues from the assessees in their books of account.  The fact that the creditors outstanding balances were not written back in the assessee’s books of account, but rather stood reflected in the asseessee’s balance sheet clearly establishes that there is no cessation of liability.  On the contrary, it is an acknowledgement by the assessee of existing debts it owes to its creditors.  It further observed that no material has been brought on record by the AO to show that there was remission or cessation of liability.  When the AO was of the view that there was cessation of liability in the case on hand, it was incumbent upon him to cause necessary enquiries to be made in order to bring on record material evidence to establish the requirement for invoking the provisions of section 41(1) of the Act.  The very fact that the assessee reflects these amounts as creditors in his Balance Sheet is an acknowledgement of his liability to these creditors and this also extends the period of limitation u/s.18 of the Limitation Act.  Once the assessee acknowledges that the debts to creditors are outstanding in his Balance Sheet, that he is liable to pay his creditors, Revenue cannot suo moto conclude that the creditors have remitted their liability or that the liability has otherwise ceased to exist, without bringing on record any material evidence to the contrary.  Since the AO had not brought on record any material evidence to establish that there was cessation of liability in respect of the outstanding creditors reflected in the Balance Sheet, the Tribunal concurred with the finding of the CIT(A) that the addition of Rs. 33,44,827 u/s. 41(1) of the Act is unsustainable.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Sections 271(1)(c), 271AAA – Penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c) to a case covered by section 271AAA is void

7.  Nukala Ramakrishna Eluru vs. DCIT
ITAT  Vishakapatnam Bench
Before V. Durga Rao (JM) and G. Manjunatha (AM)
ITA Nos.: 189 to 192/Vizag/2014
A.Ys.: 2005-06 to 2008-09.   Date of Order: 16th September, 2016.
Counsel for assessee / revenue: C. Subramanyam / T.S.N. Murthy

FACTS

On 16.11.2007,  a search u/s. 132 of the Act was conducted in the residential as well as business premises of the assessee, engaged in the business of rearing and trading of fish and other ancillary business activities.   During the course of search, department unearthed details of investments made in the purchase of immovable properties standing in the name of the assessee and his family members  including business concerns.  The assessee filed his return of income for AY 2008-09 on 30.09.2008 declaring total income of Rs. 75,39,560.  This return of income was revised on 14.9.2009 and a total income of Rs. 1,82,84,170 was declared in the revised return of income.  Subsequently, this return of income was again revised and in the final revised return of income the income disclosed was Rs. 4,10,32,920.

The AO assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 4,10,32,990. He initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and after asking the assessee to explain why penalty should not be levied for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, he levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who directed the AO to levy penalty on the difference between Rs. 1,82,84170 (being total income in first revised return) and Rs. 75,39,560 (being total income in the original return of income).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended on his behalf that the levy of penalty for AY 2008-09 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act was void ab initio.

HELD

In the present case on hand, on perusal of the facts available on record we find that the search had taken place on 16.11.2007 which falls under the assessment year 2008-09 which is the year before us.  The year before us was therefore, covered by the Explanation of specified previous year as per Explanation (b) to section 271AAA of the Act.  It is not in dispute that the income in question has been assessed as income of the assessment year 2008-09 i.e. specified previous year.  The AO himself has treated the undisclosed income of the assessee as such.  Once we come to the conclusion that the year before us is a specified previous year and the undisclosed income belongs to this year, an inevitable finding in view of the discussions above is that the provisions of section 271AAA will come into play to deal with penalty for concealment of particulars of income.  It is clear from the above fact that the AO has not invoked the correct provisions of law for levying penalty for concealment of income.  Therefore, we are of the view that the AO erred in levying penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, when a specific provision is provided by way of section 271AAA to deal with penalty provisions, in cases where search took place on or after 1.6.2007.

The Tribunal considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also the ratio of the decision of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Subhash M. Patel in ITA No. 256/AHD/2012 dated 20.7.2012, held that the penalty order passed by the AO under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, is void ab initio and liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal quashed the penalty order passed by the AO u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for AY 2008-09.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Sections 51 and 56 – Clause (ix) of section 56(2) (inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2015) which lays down that amount of advance received for sale of property shall be treated as income if the same is forfeited and negotiations do not result in transfer of such capital asset and corresponding proviso to section 51 (inserted with effect from 01-04-2015) which states that if the amount of advance received was treated as income in pursuance of section 56(2)(ix), then no deduction of the said amount shall be done in computing the cost of acquisition when the said property is ultimately sold, do not have a retrospective effect.

[2016] 160 ITD 426 (Mumbai Trib.) ITO vs. Fiesta Properties (P.) Ltd.
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 11th August, 2016

Section 41(1) read with Sections 28(i) and 51- Prior to 01.04.2015, if an assessee builder had received advance towards sale property held by it as a capital asset and the same was standing as liability in balance sheet of the assessee and if the actual sale transfer didn’t materialise, then the said amount would not be taxable u/s. 41(1) on writing off of corresponding amount by transferee but would be deducted u/s. 51 from cost of acquisition in computing capital gain when the property is ultimately sold.

FACTS

The assessee company was engaged, interalia, in the business of construction of properties. During the year under consideration, the assessee company had shown income mainly from rent under the head ‘Income from house property’ and also ‘Income from business’.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noted that there was a liability of Rs.3.74 crore as shown in the balance sheet of the assessee, in the name of M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust. The said liability was created in the year 1995, when the assessee had received the said amount from the said trust as an advance for sale of assessee’s property. The AO conducted enquiries from M/s. Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust, who vide their letter dated 29.11.2012 replied that the liability had been written off in the year under consideration.

AO was of the view that the assessee being in the business of construction had trading liability and hence, the cessation of said liability should be treated as income of the assessee u/s. 41(1) of the Act. Accordingly, he added the said amount of Rs.3.74 crore to the total income of the assessee. The AO also observed that though both the assessee as well as M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust, contended that the transaction was in respect of transfer of property, but both the parties failed to furnish any proof that the transaction was for an immovable property. Without any documentation, a property transaction of the magnitude of Rs. 3.74 crore in the year 1995 was beyond comprehension. Since there was no supporting evidence, the AO held that the advance received by the assessee from M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust was an interest-free unsecured deposit in the course of the business of the assessee company. Thus, on the ground of cessation of the liability, the AO added the amount of Rs. 3.74 crore u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before CIT(A). It was submitted that the impugned amount was received by the assessee with regard to sale of property located at Chennai. The assessee also furnished copies of the correspondences between itself and M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust indicating that all through, the intention of the advance received was for transfer of the assessee’s property at Madras and when the deal did not materialise, the said M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah started demanding its money back. Copies of all these correspondences were also furnished before the AO. After considering the entire submissions it was held by CIT(A) that impugned amount was not taxable in the hands of the assessee either u/s. 41(1) or u/s. 28(iv) or under any other provisions of the Act and that whenever the impugned property is sold by the assessee, the cost of acquisition of the property shall be reduced by the amount of Rs.3.74 crore for the purpose of computation of capital gains in view of provisions of section 51 of the Act.

On revenue’s appeal before the Tribunal:

HELD

The admitted facts on record are that assessee has been showing its rental income from its properties, including the impugned property located at Madras and the same has also been assessed by the AO under the head ‘Income from house property’. These properties have been undoubtedly shown as capital assets in the balance-sheet and never have been declared as stock-in-trade. This position has all along been accepted by the revenue.

Further, as far as the assessee is concerned, the liability of Rs.3.74 crore is still outstanding in the name of aforesaid party. The CIT(A) has recorded a clear and categorical finding that correspondence between the assessee company and said party revealed that the transaction was in respect of assessee’s property located at Madras. But, the transaction could not be completed. This factual finding could not be rebutted by the Ld DR. Thus, as per facts and records brought before us, aforesaid property is undoubtedly capital asset of the assessee company. Under these circumstances, it has been rightly held by the CIT(A) that the impugned amount of advance received towards sale of immovable property being capital asset of the assessee company, cannot be taxed under the provisions of section 41(1) or section 28(iv) of the Act, especially due to the fact that the legislature has provided the specific provision in this regard, i.e. section 51 of the Act.

Clause (ix) of section 56(2), inserted w.e.f. 01-04-2015, clearly lays down that amount of advance received for sale of property shall be treated as income if the same is forfeited and negotiations do not result in transfer of such capital asset. Also proviso, introduced with effect from 01-04-2015 to section 51, states that if the amount of advance received was treated as income in pursuance of section 56(2)(ix), then no deduction of the said amount shall be done in computing the cost of acquisition when the said property is ultimately sold.

These provisions are not clarificatory in nature. These provisions lay down a substantive law creating additional tax liability upon an assessee and, therefore, this cannot have retrospective effect. Further, with the insertion of these provisions, it becomes clear that earlier the law was not like this. Thus, for the year before us, i.e. A.Y. 2010-11, the then existing provisions of section 51 shall be applicable which clearly provides that the amount of advance received should be reduced from the cost of acquisition of asset.

Thus, the action of CIT(A) in directing the AO to delete the addition of Rs.3.74 crore which was made by the AO u/s. 41(1) of the Act, is hereby upheld.

9. Genuineness of trust – a breach/contravention of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950-would not result in the trust being disqualified from being approved u/s. 80G.

D.I.T. (Exemptions) Mumbai vs. Shri Sai
Baba Charitable Trust. [ Income tax Appeal no. 902 of 2014 dt : 15/10/2016
(Bombay High Court)].

[D.I.T. (Exemptions) Mumbai vs. Shri Sai
Baba Charitable Trust., [dated 13/11/2013 ; A Y: 2011-12. Mum. ITAT ]

The assessee is a Charitable Trust duly
registered u/s. 12AA Act. On 2nd December, 2011, the assessee Trust
applied to the Director of Income Tax (Exemption) for renewal of Certificate /
approval u/s. 80G. The application was rejected by the Director of Income Tax
(Exemption). This rejection was on the ground that the Trust had obtained
unsecured loan of Rs. 50 lakh from third parties without obtaining prior
approval of the Charity Commissioner as required u/s. 36A(3) of the Bombay
Public Trust Act, 1950. Thus, concluding that the assessee is not a genuine
trust.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an
appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned order held that there is
no dispute that the assessee fully satisfied the conditions specified in
section 80G(5) of the Act for approval there under. It further observed that
there is no requirement under the Act that a breach / contravention of the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 would result in the trust being disqualified from
being approved u/s. 80G of the Act. It held that the very fact that the Revenue
had not initiated any action u/s. 12AA of the Act to revoke its registration
would imply that the activities of the Trust are genuine.

Moreover, the Tribunal also records the fact
that the Charity Commissioner has not taken any action against the assessee for
violation of the provisions of section 36A of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950
in having borrowed funds without its prior permission. In the aforesaid circumstances,
the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Revenue appealed before the High Court
and urged that the Trust is not a genuine trust in as much as it has been
borrowing funds on regular basis from third persons and has been repaying it by
borrowing further funds from other parties on regular basis.

The Hon. High Court find that the impugned
order of the Tribunal has on the basis of the clear provision of section 80G
recorded that the assessee completely satisfies/fulfils all the conditions
specified in section 80G(5) for the purposes of availing benefit u/s. 80G. This
coupled with the fact that the Revenue itself has also not taken any
proceedings to have the registration cancelled, would itself imply that the
Revenue does consider the Trust to be a genuine trust.

It is an undisputed position that the assessee
satisfies all conditions for approval of the trust u/s. 80G. Therefore, it is
not open to the Authorities to refuse approval by imposing conditions which are
not mentioned in Section 80G. In the above circumstances, the impugned order of
the Tribunal was upheld. Therefore,
the appeal was dismissed.

8. Interpretation – SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CEDIT OPUS – Once the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.

Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS vs.
M/s.Oberoi Constructions Pvt.Ltd. [Income tax Appeal no 573 of 2014 dt :
01/10/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS vs.
M/s.Oberoi Constructions Pvt.Ltd., [dated 06/10/2013 ; A Y: 2006-07. Mum. ITAT
]

The assessee is in construction business.
During the AY: 2006 – 07, the assessee had paid share application money to one
M/s. Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. The Assessing Officer added the amount
of Rs.10.35 crore as deemed dividend on a substantive basis in the hands of
Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and on a protective basis in the hands of its
director Mr. Vikas Oberoi in their assessment orders. Being aggrieved, both
M/s.Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Vikas Oberoi challenged their
orders of assessment holding that they are in receipt of deemed dividend. Their
appeals were allowed by the CIT(A) holding that they could not be charged to
tax on the amount of Rs.10.35 crores as recipients of deemed dividend u/s.
2(22)(e).

Being aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the
Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal which was dismissed. Thereafter, the
Revenue filed an appeal to High court, being in the case of M/s.Siddhivinayak
Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Vikas Oberoi. The High Court by orders dated 4th
July 2014 and 8th June 2016, respectively, dismissed both the
Revenue’s appeals from the orders of the Tribunal holding that M/s.
Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Vikas Oberoi cannot be charged to tax as
recipients of deemed dividend.

In the meantime, pending the aforesaid
proceedings, the ACIT (TDS) passed an order dated 11th February 2011
u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act holding the assessee to be an assessee in
default for not having deducted tax on the deemed dividend of Rs.10.35 crore
paid to M/s. Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. The assessee, being aggrieved,
filed an appeal to the CIT (A). The appeal of the assessee was allowed by the
CIT (A) holding that as in the appellate proceedings in respect of M/s.
Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. ikas Oberoi, the addition of income
to the extent of Rs.10.35 crore u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act on substantive and
protective basis had been deleted, there was no taxable income which had to
suffer tax deduction at source. Consequently, no failure to deduct tax could
arise.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue carried the
issue in further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order of the
CIT (Appeals) holding that once the addition made on account of deemed dividend
is deleted in the hands of the recipient of the amount of Rs.10.35 crore, there
could be no failure to deduct tax at source thereon. Thus, the consequent
demand u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A) upon the assessee was not justified.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal
before High Court. The High Court held that both the CIT (A) as well as the
Tribunal in these (TDS) proceedings have held that as the very basis for
holding the assessee liable for failure to deduct tax did not subsist, the TDS
proceedings must also fail. This was in view of the orders passed in the case
of recipients i.e. M/s.Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr.Vikas Oberoi in
appeal by the authorities under the Act including this Court that they were not
liable to any tax as they had not received any deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e).
Once the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls (sublato fundamento
Cedit opus
). The grievance of the Revenue is that in TDS proceedings, one
must ignore the orders passed in the hands of the recipients i.e.
M/s.Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr.Vikas Oberoi.

The Court observed that the officers of the
Revenue while administering the TDS provisions are not outside the scope of the
Act and orders passed under the Act in respect of the character of the payment
made under the Act are binding upon them. The fact that at the time the order
of the ACIT (TDS) was passed, there was basis to do so does not mean that
orders passed on income in the hands of the recipients will have no bearing in
deciding its validity. One must not ignore the fact that this order of the TDS
officer is tentative in nature and its existence would depend upon the nature
of receipt in the hands of the recipient and subject to the orders passed in
respect thereof by appropriate court. In the above view, the appeal was
dismissed.

Section 54F – The assessee cannot be denied deduction u/s. 54F, if the assessee makes investment in residential house within the time limit prescribed u/s. 54F but is unable to get the title of the flat registered in his name or unable to get the possession of the flat due to fault of the builder.

10.   [2016] 159 ITD 964 (Mumbai Trib.) (SMC)

Rajeev B. Shah vs. ITO
A.Y.: 2010-11      Date of Order: 8th July, 2016

FACTS

During the year under consideration, the assessee had sold one plot of land and had claimed deduction u/s. 54F for investment of sale proceeds in an under-construction flat.

The Developer had allotted, flat No. 602 of 6th floor, to the assessee.

The AO rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act on the ground that the property was incomplete and document related to purchase of property was not registered even after three years of the said investment.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A), who also confirmed the action of the AO by stating that merely because a so-called letter of allotment was issued in a building which was never given permission for construction beyond two floors, it cannot be said that for the purpose of section 54F, the appellant’s obligation ended as soon as he issued the cheque.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

We find that the facts in question are not disputed and the only issue is that whether assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 54F, when the assessee has made investment in purchase of residential house within the time limit prescribed u/s. 54F but is unable to get the title of the flat registered in his name or is unable to get the possession of the flat due to fault of the builder.

The intention of the assessee is very clear that he has invested almost the entire sale consideration of land in purchase of this residential flat. It is another issue that the flat could not be completed and the suit, directing the builder to complete the construction, filed by the assessee, is pending before the Hon’ble BombayHigh Court.

It is impossible for the assessee to complete formalities such as taking over possession for getting the flat registered in his name and this cannot be the reason for denying the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 54F of the Act.

Hence, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

7. Reopening of assessment – the reasons for reopening must be based on some material – the material used by the AO for forming his opinion must have some bearing or nexus with escapement of income – If not, the reopening notice would be clearly without jurisdiction: Section 148.

Director of Income Tax (IT) vs. Doosan
Heavy Industries & Construction Co.  
[ Income tax Appeal no. 670 of 2014, dt : 04/10/2016 (Bombay High
Court)].

[Director of Income Tax (IT) vs. Doosan
Heavy Industries & Construction Co,. [ITA No. 3930/MUM/2006, 3897/MUM/2006,
746/MUM/2007; Bench : L ; dated 19/07/2013; AYs: 2000-2001, 2003-2004. Mum.
ITAT ]

The Assessee is a Project Contractor. It
awarded a contract by Kondapalli Power Corporation Ltd.(KPCL), Andhra Pradesh
to set up a power plant on a turnkey basis. Further, KPCL had awarded an
onshore contract to the Assessee for supply of goods and services along with
the commissioning of the plant. KPCL also awarded an offshore supply contract
to Hanjung DCM Co. Ltd. (Hanjung) for supply of equipment valued at US$ 103
million. The equipment valued at US$ 103 million was supplied by Hanjung and
taken delivery of outside India by the Assessee for and on behalf of KPCL. The
aforesaid equipment was lost during its transit after the Assessee took
delivery from Hanjung. As the insurance claim was not honoured, the Assessee
filed a suit against the Insurance Company for recovery of US$ 103 million. The
regular assessment proceeding was completed for the subject  A.Y. u/s. 143(3).

A reopening notice was issued by the
Assessing Officer for the subject A.Y. and the reasons to believe that income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment u/s. 147 of the Act. During the course
of assessment proceedings, it was noticed that there was another contract
titled “Offshore Equipment Supply Contract” also dated 1st February,
1998 entered into between M/s. Lanco Kondapalli Power Private Limited and M/s.
Hanjung DCM Co. Ltd. (Hanjung). The AO had reason to believe that income of US$
51.5 million chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Issue notice u/s. 148.

The assessee during the assessment
proceedings consequent to reopening notice dated 26th March 2004
submitted that the same is without jurisdiction and, therefore, must be
quashed. Nevertheless, the AO proceeded on the basis that in the suit filed by
the Assessee in the Secunderabad Court against the Insurance Company it had
claimed to have supplied equipment valued at US$ 103 million which was lost.

The Assessing Officer placed reliance on
para 5 of the plaint, which reads as under :

“ 5. MAIN SUPPLY CONTRACT “

Under the terms
of contract dated 15th February 1998 (“Supply Contract”) between
Plaintiff and LKPL, Plaintiff agreed to supply equipment, materials and design
for the construction of LKPL’s combined cycle power plant at Kondapalli IDA,
Andhra Pradesh in India (the “Kondapalli Project”). The value of this Supply
Contract was about US$ 103 million.” It was on the aforesaid basis that the AO
sought to justify his reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has
escaped assessment and, therefore, proceeded to hold even on merits against the
Assessee.

On appeal, the CIT(A) examined all the
facts. These facts included not only the suit as filed but also the terms of
the contract and scope of work, in particular the responsibility of the parties
there under. Based on this examination, the CIT(A) concluded that in terms of
its obligation to insure the goods/equipment during transit, the appellant had
taken out an Insurance policy as a contractor with KPCL as the principal. Based
on this policy coupled with the plaint as filed, the CIT(A) observed that the
plaint has to be read as a whole. So read, the nature of the relationship
between the parties as described in paragraph 4 thereof, which, as extracted in
the order, reads as under :

“4. A brief reference to the parties
involved in relation to the subject matter of this suit is as follows :

a. Lanco Kondapalli Power Pvt. Limited (formerly a public limited
company) (‘LKPL’) is the owner of the Kondapalli Power Project.

b. Plaintiff is the EPC
contractor for the Kondapalli Power Project, and an assured under the policy
issued by Defendant.

 i. Encon Services Limited (‘Encon’) is the subcontractor of Plaintiff
for transportation of the GT & GTG from Kakinada to Machilipatnam.

j.   Seaways Shipping Limited
(‘SSL’) was appointed by Encon for inland transportation of GT & GTG from
Kakinada to Machilipatnam, and was the character of ‘Jala Hamsa’ and ‘AmethiI’.

n. Aistom are the suppliers of the GT & GTC, from whom Plaintiff
arranged to procure the replacement equipment for ensuring completion of the
project.”

The CIT(A) came to the conclusion that on
the basis of the words used in para 5 of the plaint, it cannot be established
that the assessee had supplied (as owner) the equipment, material and design,
and that the word “supply” only refers to the responsibilities of the assessee
for setting up of the power project as per the onshore contract. The reasons as
recorded do not therefore suggest any link between the material found by him and
his conclusion that there was reason to believe that the income chargeable has
escaped assessment. He, therefore, concluded that there was no reason to form a
belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal, by
the impugned order, confirmed the finding of the CIT(A).

The Hon. High Court observed that at the
stage of a notice of reopening, the AO does not have to “establish” that any
income has escaped assessment. However the AO must simply be shown to have
formed an opinion, which, in turn, is supported by reasons. The reasons
themselves must be based on some material. A minimum requirement one would
expect in the face of this scheme of things is that the material used by the AO
for forming his opinion must have some bearing or nexus with escapement of
income. If not, the reopening notice would be clearly without jurisdiction. In
the present case, the material used by the AO for purportedly forming this
opinion is the description of the assessee of itself as “a supplier” of the
equipment in an EPC contract, which inter alia required it to take offshore
delivery of the equipment from a foreign vendor and supply and install the same
onshore. Mere description as a “supplier” in a suit by the assessee against the
insurance company claiming an insurance claim for loss of equipment, when the
assessee insured the equipment jointly with the purchaser, can possibly have no
connection with the escapement of any income arising out of sale of the
equipment. Since that was the only material used by the AO for issuance of the
reopening notice, the notice is without any legal basis or justification. In
these circumstances, the order of the coordinate bench for Assessment Years
1999-2000 and 2002-2003 also supports the Respondent’s contention that they
were not suppliers of the equipment and no income assessable to tax has escaped
assessment. It’s obligation was to insure the goods/equipment during transit
done by it either on its own or through a subcontractor.

The Hon. High Court also found that, the
contract provided that the contractor, i.e. Assessee will provide/arrange at
its own cost in the joint name of the owner and contractor a comprehensive
insurance cover to the project, including any damage to the goods during transit.
It was in that context that the Assessee had made a claim for insurance. Taking
into account the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the CIT(A) and by
the Tribunal, and that nothing has been shown to indicate that the finding is
perverse the appeal was dismissed.

6. Penalty – CIT(A) could not have imposed penalty on a new ground which was not the basis for initiation of penalty – penalty could be only on the ground on which it was initiated – Not liable for penalty : u/s. 271(1)(c)

CIT vs. Acme Associates. [ Income tax
Appeal no 640 of 2014 dated : 17/10/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Acme Associates vs. ACIT. [ITA No.
649/MUM/2011; Bench : I; dated 13/09/2013 ; A Y: 2005- 2006.( MUM.)  ITAT ]

The assessee is in the business of Real
Estate Development. For the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee has filed its ROI ,
declaring a income of Rs. 2.04 crore claiming 100% deduction u/s. 80IB(10).
During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that two
buyers, viz. Ms. Sulbha M. Waghle and Mr. Mangesh G. Waghle had entered into
joint agreement for purchase of flats which in the aggregate exceeded 1,000
sq.ft. Consequently, AO disallowed the deduction claimed u/s. 801B(10) and
initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) on the aforesaid ground for furnishing
inaccurate information/concealing income.

The assessee carried the issue in appeal to
the CIT(A). During pendency of the appeal, a search action u/s. 132 was carried
out on the assessee group. Consequent to which, notices u/s.153A were issued to
the assessee including one for the subject A Y 2005-06. In the above
circumstances, the assessee withdrew its appeal for A.Y. 2005-06 pending before
CIT(A). Thereafter, by order dated 30th March, 2010, the AO imposed
penalty upon assessee u/s. 271(1)(c). This was on the very ground on which the
AO had initiated penalty proceedings viz. selling of flats to two members of
the family which in the aggregate was in excess of 1000 sq.ft. of built up
area. Therefore concluding that the Assessee has furnished incorrect
particulars of income/concealed particulars of income. Consequently, a penalty
was imposed.

Being aggrieved, the assessee carried the
order of the AO imposing penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) to CIT(A). The CIT (A)
confirmed the penalty imposed by the AO. However, the confirmation was on a
completely new and different ground viz. that during search proceedings, the
assessee had made disclosure that the project in respect of which deduction
u/s. 801B(10) was being claimed was not completed before the due date i.e. 31st
March 2008. Thus confirming the order dated 30th March, 2010.
It is to be noted that CIT(A) in its order did not deal with the issue on which
the AO had initiated and confirmed the penalty upon the assessee.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed a
further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the initiation and
confirmation of penalty by the AO u/s. 271(1)(c) was not on the ground that the
project was not completed by the due date, on which the CIT (A) confirmed the
penalty. Thus, the Tribunal held that this could not be done by the CIT(A) as
the penalty proceedings were initiated on account of selling flats of an area
in excess of 1000 sq.ft. i.e. a ground different from the ground on which
the   CIT(A) confirmed the penalty. The
order also noted the fact that at the time when the return of income was filed
on 31st October 2005, it was not possible to predict whether the
project would be completed on or before the specified date 31st
March 2008. Further, the Tribunal also examined the issue on which the
Assessing Officer had imposed penalty, namely, selling of two flats to the
members of same family, the area of which in the aggregate exceeded 1000 sq.ft.
built up and held that no material was brought on record that assessee had
constructed a flat of more than 1000 sq.ft. built up area or that the assessee
had sold any unit of more than 1000 sq.ft. It renders a finding of fact that
after units had been sold the buyers had joined two flats resulting in a flat
in excess of 1000 sq.ft. In the aforesaid view, the Tribunal held that there is
no furnishing of inaccurate particulars and/ or concealing of income warranting
the imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

The Hon. High Court in the revenue appeal
held that, it was the original ground on basis of which penalty was initiated,
that the assessee was required to offer explanation during penalty proceedings
to establish that the claim as made in the return of income was not on account
of furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or concealment of income vis-a-vis
of selling flat having area 1000 sq.ft. The AO under the Act also considered
the assessee’s explanation in the context in which the penalty proceedings were
initiated and did not rightly place any reliance upon the subsequent events. In
an appeal from the order of the Assessing Officer, the CIT(A) could not have
imposed penalty on a new ground which was not the basis for initiation of
penalty. The appeal before the CIT(A) was with regard to issue of penalty u/s.
271(1)(c) only on the ground on which the penalty proceedings were initiated in
the assessment order. Although the powers of CIT(A) are coterminous with that
of the AO, the imposition of penalty could be only the ground on which it was
initiated. This is not the case, where the CIT(A) had independently initiated
penalty proceedings on a new ground in an order in quantum proceedings in
appeal from the Assessment Order. This alone could lead to the imposition of
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on the new ground. The ground on which the penalty was
initiated and penalty imposed by the AO, namely, that the flat had been sold in
the project which was in excess of 1000 sq.ft., the Tribunal has recorded a
finding of fact that the flats were sold individually by two separate
agreements individually to the purchasers in joint names. However, two flats
were subsequently joined by the purchasers aggregating the size of two flats to
1000 sq.ft. built up purchased from the assessee. This is finding of fact which
has not been shown to be perverse or arbitrary. In the above view, revenue
appeal was dismissed.

28. TDS – Interest u/s. 28 of Land Acquisition Act- capital gain or income from other sources – Sections 45, 56 and 194A – Interest assessable as capital gain – Tax not deductible at source on such interest

Movaliya Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO; 388
ITR 343 (Guj):

Pursuant to acquisition of land of the
assessee, by a Court order dated 23/03/2011, additional compensation was
awarded with interest. The executive engineer proposed to deduct tax at source
of Rs. 2,07,416/- u/s. 194A. The assessee made an application to the Assessing
Officer u/s. 197 to issue certificate
for Nil deduction of tax. The Assessing Officer rejected the application.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)  In the case of CIT vs.
Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1 (SC
), the Supreme Court held that it is clear
that whereas interest u/s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not treated
as a part of income subject to tax, interest earned u/s. 28, which is on
enhanced compensation or consideration making it exigible to tax u/s.
45(5).  The substitution of section 145A
by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 was not in connection with the decision of the
Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1 (SC), but brought to
mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on account of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Rama Bai vs. CIT 181 ITR 400 (SC), whereby it was held
that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced compensation shall be
taxable on accrual basis.

ii)  Therefore, the words
“interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation” in section 145A of
the Act have to be construed in the manner interpreted by the Supreme Court in CIT
vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1 (SC)
. As a necessary corollary, therefore,
the payment made u/s. 28 of the 1894 Act is interest as envisaged u/s.
145A  and cannot be treated as income
from other sources.

iii) The Assessing Officer was not
justified in requiring the deduction of tax at source u/s. 194A in respect of
such interest. The assessee was, therefore, entitled to refund of the amount
wrongly deducted u/s. 194A .”

27. Revision – Limitation – Section 263 – A. Y. 2007-08 – Reassessment in respect of items other than item sought to be revised by Commissioner – Period of limitation begins from original assessment – Not from date of reassessment in which item was not in question

I. G. Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Principal CIT; 388 ITR 135 (All):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessment u/s.
143(3) was completed on 31/10/2011. Sales tax incentive received from UP
Government was treated as revenue receipt, but the sales tax subsidy received
from the Maharashtra Government was not treated as revenue receipt and
accordingly was accepted as capital receipt. Subsequently, a reassessment order
u/s. 147 was passed on 15/03/2015 making disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i), on account
of non-deduction of tax at source. Thereafter, on 08/06/2016, the Principal
Commissioner issued notice u/s. 263, on the ground that the sales tax subsidy
accruing to the assessee under the scheme of the Government of Maharashtra was
not brought to tax as revenue receipt.

The Allowed High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee challenging the notice u/s. 263 and held
as under:

“i)  Limitation prescribed u/s.
263(2) for exercise of power u/s. sub-section (1) thereof is two years from the
end of financial year in which the order sought to be revised was passed.

ii)  The reassessment order was
not for review or reassessment of the entire case but only in respect of a
particular item. In all other respects, the original assessment order was
maintained, and addition made by assessment order dated 26/03/2015 was added in
the income assessed in the original assessment order. Though the notice u/s.
263(1) referred to the reassessment order, in fact, it referred to a
discrepancy in the regular assessment order dated 31/10/2011, wherein the
incentive of value added tax from Maharashtra Government received by the
assessee was allowed to be deducted. This incentive had no concern with the
reassessment proceedings in the order dated 26/03/2015.

iii)  Since the notice issued
by the Principal Commissioner was in reference to a discrepancy in the original
assessment order dated 31/10/2011 and not the reassessment order dated
26/03/2015, the limitation would run from the dated of the regular order of
assessment and therefore, the notice was barred by limitation prescribed u/s.
263(2). Impugned notice dated 08/06/2016 is quashed.”

26. TDS – Payment of salary to priests and nuns of catholic institutions – Ultimate beneficiaries congregation or dioceses with benefit of exemption from tax – No liability to deduct tax at source

Holy Cross Primary School vs. CBDT; 388
ITR 162 (Mad):

The assessee filed writ petition for
quashing of the letter dated 07/10/2015 of the Income-tax Department and the
Circular of the Director of Treasuries dated 26/10/2015 insisting in deduction
of tax at source from the salaries of the religious nuns and priests in the
service of the assessee school contending that, the concerned religious priests
and nuns did not take the salaries, but were ultimately depositing it with the
concerned diocese or congregation or institution only which are exempt from tax.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

“Tax need not be deducted at source in so
far as the payments of salaries of the religious priests and nuns of the
catholic institutions who were attached to the respective congregation or
dioceses who were already exempted from the purview of the income tax liability
as on the date of the order.”

25. Capital gains – Section 50C: A. Y. 2006-07 – Stamp duty value higher than sale price- Reference to DVO – Valuation by DVO binding on AO

Principal CIT vs. Ravjibhai Nagjibhai
Thesia; 388 ITR 358 (Guj):

In the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee sold his
land for a consideration of Rs. 16 lakh. The Stamp Valuation Authority valued
the property at Rs. 2,33,70,600/-. The case was therefore referred to the DVO
at the request of the assessee u/s. 50C(2). The DVO valued the property at Rs.
24,15,000/-. However, the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order before
the report of the DVO was received treating the difference of Rs. 2,17,70,600/-
as undisclosed income. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal deleted the
addition and held that the capital gain has to be computed u/s. 50C on the
basis of the valuation by the DVO.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  Once a reference was made
by the Assessing Officer u/s. 50C of the Act, to the DVO, for valuation of the
capital asset, the Assessing Officer was obliged to complete the assessment in
conformity with the estimation made by the DVO.

ii)  Under sub-section (2) of
section 50C, it was such lower valuation which was required to be taken into consideration
for the purposes of assessment. There was no legal infirmity in the orders of
the appellate authorities warranting interference.”

LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL

Introduction

A company is a separate legal entity with a perpetual succession and an identity distinct from its members. Members may come and go but a company continues to exist independent of its members. This is a principle of law which has been laid down since the time the very first statute dealing with companies came into existence. However, there are times when the Courts decide to look behind the company, i.e., lift or pierce the corporate veil and ascertain who are the real beneficiaries behind the entity. Such scenarios are very few and far between but they do exist and are resorted to by the Courts in the rarest or rare cases.

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Estate Officer UT Chandigarh vs. M/s. Esys Information Technologies P Ltd, CA No 3765/2016 (“Esys’s case”) had an occasion to deal with the circumstances when the corporate veil may be lifted.

Corporate Identity

Section 9 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that from the date of incorporation of a company, all its members shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is formed and the company shall be capable of owning property and shall have a perpetual succession. Thus, this section lays down the corporate identity of a company which is distinct and separate from its members.

Factual Matrix of Esys’s Case

Esys,a subsidiary of a Singapore company, was allotted a site at an Information Technology Park at Chandigarh under the Allotment of Small Campus Site in Chandigarh Information Services Park Rules, 2002. Esys was supposed to carry out construction of a campus site but before doing so, 98% of its shareholding was transferred by its Singapore-based holding company to a Dubai-based group company. The Dubai-based group company, in turn, transferred its controlling stake to another company, known as Teledata Informatics Ltd. In neither case was permission obtained for the transfer of shares. The Estate Officer concluded that since the shareholding changed hands after land allotment and that too without the prior permission of the Estate Officer, there was a violation of the terms of the allotment letter. The particular clause of the allotment letter being referred to by the Officer stated that the transfer of the site would not be allowed for 10 years from the date of allotment without the prior permission. It may be allowed in the event of merger or split of the allottee and that too after obtaining prior permission. Further, all cases of transfer were subject to payment of prescribed transfer charges.

As a result of the transfers, not only did the Dubai-based company became the owner of the land but it was further transferred to Teledata. This fact of transfer to Teledata was suppressed on oath by the Director of Esys but was discovered by the Estate Officer from an affidavit filed by the Director before the High Court of Singapore in another matter. In that affidavit the Director had very clearly conceded that Teledata was the new owner of Esys. The Estate Officer concluded that the manner in which the transfer was made was not permissible as per the Rules and terms of the allotment letter. The holding company and its subsidiaries were two distinct legal entities and hence, the corporate veil should be lifted so as to unearth the mala fide, dishonest and fraudulent design of the allottee. Accordingly, the Officer contended that this amounted to an illegal transfer of the land and also ordered that the allotted site be resumed. The Appellate Authority upheld this Order of the Estate Officer.

High Court’s verdict

The Punjab and Haryana High Court overruled the verdict of the Appellate Authority. It refused to lift the corporate veil in the case under discussion. It stated that there was neither a transfer of the allotted site nor a merger of the allottee. The allottee was a juristic entity and continued to remain as such. It relied upon an old decision of Saloman vs. Saloman, 1897 AC 22(1) which held that a company is separate and distinct legal entity. It also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar vs. CIT, 27 ITR 1(SC) where the Court held that that a shareholderhas got no right in the property of the company. His only rights are the right to vote and right to dividend, if declared, but that does not, either individuallyor collectively, amount to more than a right to participate in the profits of the company. The company was a juristic person and was distinct from the shareholders. It was the company which owned the property and not the shareholders. It also discussed the judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. ITO, AIR 1964 SC 1486 which held that a shareholder does not own the property of the corporation or carries on the business with which the corporation is concerned. The High Court further held that the argument that the principle of lifting of the corporate veil should be applied, did not arise in the impugned case since the shareholders were distinct from the company and there was no change in the name of the allottee. The allotment continued in the name of the company. Change in shareholding could not be construed to be violative of the allotment letter as the company was a distinct and separate entity and composition of share holding did not change the nature of the company. It accordingly set aside the Officer’s site resumption order.

Based on this the Estate Officer appealed to the Supreme Court where a pointed question was raised by the Supreme Court to the director as to whether the shares of Esys have been transferred to Teledata? The director stated on oath that they have not been which was in fact, contrary to the truth.

When can the Veil be Lifted?

The Supreme Court held that in Juggilal Kamlapat vs. CIT 73 ITR 702 (SC), it has been laid down that it is true that from juristic point of view a company is a legal personality entirely distinct from its members and it is capable of enjoying rights and being subjected to rights and duties which are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by its members but in certain exceptional cases the Court is entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity and to pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade. For example, the Court has power to disregard the corporate entity if it is used for tax evasion or to circumvent tax obligation or to perpetrate fraud. It further discussed the decisions of Jai Narain Parasrampuria vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf, 2006 (7) SCC 756;State of U.P vs. Renusagar Power Co., AIR 1988 SC 1737 wherein the Supreme Court held that it was well settled that the corporate veil could in certain situations can be pierced or lifted. In the expanding horizon of modern jurisprudence, lifting of corporate veil was permissible. Its frontiers were unlimited. It must, however, depend primarily on the realities of the situation. The aim of legislation was to do justice to all the parties. The principle behind the doctrine was a changing concept and it was expanding its horizon Whenever a corporate entity was abused for an unjust and inequitable purpose, the court would not hesitate to lift the veil and look into the realities so as to identify the persons who are guilty and liable therefor. The Apex Court observed that the corporate veil even though not lifted was becoming more and more transparent in modern company jurisprudence. It held that the case of Saloman vs. Saloman, 1897 AC 22(1) was still popular but the veil has been pierced in many cases. The lifting of the veil has been held to be permissible in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 1370 which held that it may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be prevented or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricably connected as to be in reality, part of one concern.

Though not considered in this decision but the Supreme Court in Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. UOI, 341 ITR 1 (SC) had also dealt with this issue by stating that lifting of the corporate veil is readily applied in the cases coming within the Company Law, Law of Contract, and Law of Taxation. Once the transaction is shown to be fraudulent, sham, circuitous or a device designed to defeat the interests of the shareholders, investors, parties to the contract and also for tax evasion, the Court can always lift the corporate veil and examine the substance of the transaction. The Court is entitled to lift the veil of the corporate entity and pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade meaning that the court has the power to disregard the corporate entity if it is used for tax evasion. This principle is also applied in cases of a holding company – subsidiary relationship- where in spite of being separate legal personalities, if the facts reveal that they have indulged in dubious methods for tax evasion. This decision examined the concept of whether a transaction should be “looked at” or “looked through”. The amendments made by the Finance Act, 2012 to section 9 and section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which introduced the concept of taxation of Indirect Transfers, are nothing but an extension of the doctrine of lifting of the corporate veil.

Apex Court’s Decision

After considering various factors, the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the High Court in Esys’s case. It also held that prima facie from the affidavit of the director filed in Singapore, there was a transfer in favour of Teledata. Inspite of a direction to disclose the facts, there was a concealment of material facts. Esys was guilty of concealing the truth and thus, it held that the provisions of the allotment letter have been clearly violated and the Estate Officer was within his rights to resume possession of the land.

Fallout of this Decision

This decision raises several unanswered questions. Was this view taken by the Supreme Court merely because the director lied on on oath or would the doctrine of lifting the veil be applied in all cases where shares of a company are transferred? It appears that the Court was driven towards this view because of the concealment by the director. However, if there was no concealment, would the decision of the Supreme Court been different? It is relevant to note that the allotment letter contained no restriction on the transfer of shares of the allottee! All that it prohibited was a transfer of the site.

This question is relevant in several other situations. In case of transfer of shares of a company owning a valuable piece of land at Mumbai would stamp duty be levied @ 0.25% as on a transfer of shares or 5% as on conveyance of property? The Mumbai ITAT in the case of Irfan Abdul Kader Fazlani, ITA No. 8831/Mum/11 has held that section 50C cannot be applied to the sale of shares of a property owning company. The veil cannot be pierced in such a case to contend that what is being sold is actually land and building.

Similar questions also arise in flats where collector’s charges are to be paid. These charges are currently being avoided because what is being sold are shares of the company and not the property per se.

Further, if shares of such a company are long-term capital assets but the land held by the company is short-term capital asset, then would the gain on sale of shares be treated as short-term capital gain? A similar question was placed before the Karnataka High Court in Bhoruka Engineering Industries Ltd vs. DCIT, 356 ITR 25 (Kar). In that case, shares of a listed company were sold through the exchange and capital gains exemption was claimed u/s. 10(38). The only asset of the company was land. The AO contended that the veil should be lifted since what had been sold was virtually land and hence, the exemption should be denied.

The High Court denied this plea of the Department and held that the transaction was real, valuable consideration was paid, all legal formalities were complied with and what was transferred was the shares and not the immovable property. The finding of the assessing authority that it was a transfer of immovable property was contrary to the law and contrary to the material on record. It held that they committed a serious error in proceeding on the assumption that the effect of transfer of share was transfer of immovable property and therefore, if the veil of the company was lifted what appeared to them was transfer of immovable property. According to the High Court, such a finding was impermissible in law.

Conclusion

One can only hope that the lifting of the veil is resorted to in select cases, such as, those where there are instances of fraud or deceit. A wrong use of this decision could open up a Pandora’s box and it could be like Vodafone’s case being revisited all over again – one only hopes this purdah is not lifted easily!! _

24. Income – Accrual – Mercantile system of accounting- Section 145(1) – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2009-10 – Nonconvertible unsecured debentures issued by group company – Group company in financial difficulties – Resolution passed by board of directors of assessee to waive interest on debentures for six years – The Tribunal holding that even though assessee following mercantile system of accounting interest did not accrue – Neither perverse nor arbitrary – Notional interest cannot be brought to tax

CIT vs. Neon Solutions Pvt. Ltd; 387 ITR
667 (Bom):

The assessee
subscribed 2 % non-convertible unsecured debentures issued by one of its group
companies in 2003. As the company which issued the debentures was in financial
difficulties, waiver of interest on the debentures till March 31, 2010 was
approved at a meeting of the debenture holders in 2004. A resolution was passed
by the board of directors of the assessee to this effect.

The Assessing
Officer brought to tax the notional interest at the rate of 2 %  on the debentures for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and
2009-10 on the ground that the waiver of interest was unbelievable. The
Tribunal deleted the addition and held that even in the mercantile system of
accounting, income could be regarded as accrued only if there was certainty of
receiving it and not when it was waived.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The
order of the Tribunal was based on the facts and its findings were not found to
be perverse or arbitrary. It found that the various resolutions passed by the
company and the communications exchanged between the parties established the
fact that the interest on the debentures was waived for six years and that
there was no reason to disbelieve the resolution waiving the interest.

ii)  Amalgamation of the
issuing company with the also establishes the fact that it was in financial
difficulties. Moreover, for the A. Ys. prior to 2007-08 no additions were made
by the Department on account of notional interest.

iii)  No question of law
arose.”

23. Business expenditure – Gratuity – Sections 36(1)(v), 40A(9) – A. Ys. 2007-08 to 2009-10 – Application by assessee for approval of scheme neither approved nor rejected by Competent Authority – Finding that assessee complied with conditions stipulated for approval – Assessee entitled to allowance

CIT vs. Jaipur Thar Gramin Bank; 388 ITR
228 (Raj):

The assessee is a co-operative society doing
banking business. For the A. Ys. 2007-08 to 2009-10, it claimed deduction u/s.
36(1)(v), of the sum paid on account of employer’s contribution to the gratuity
scheme created by it exclusively for the benefit of its employees under an
irrevocable trust. It claimed that it had filed an application to the competent
authority for approving the gratuity scheme. The  Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure
on the ground that formal order had been passed by the competent authority. The
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the claim for deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The assessee could not be
made to suffer for the inaction of the authorities and the Assessing Officer
ought not to have disallowed the claims of contribution to gratuity scheme
merely because the Commissioner had not granted approval to the gratuity
scheme.

ii)  The assessee was sponsored
by the UCO bank, a Government of India undertaking and held duly complied with
the conditions laid down for approval u/s. 36(1)(a) of the Act.

iii)  Both the appellate
authorities had found the expenses allowable based on material and evidence on
record. The assessee had fulfilled the condition laid down for approval having
created a trust with the Life Insurance Corporation of India and had deposited
the amount.

iv) The Tribunal was justified
in holding that the claims were proper and allowable. No question of law
arose.”

6. Reassessment – Full and true disclosure – Giving value of land in a certificate of registered architect and engineer supplied in response to a query would not amount full and true disclosure of the actual asset of plot – Reopening was valid

M/s. Girilal and Co. vs. ITO and Ors.(2016) 387 ITR 122
(SC)

The appellant, a partnership firm, was engaged in the
business of construction of building and development of real estate. In the
year 2000, the appellant/firm was engaged in developing two housing projects on
a plot bearing CTS No. 329 B(Part) of village Kondiwita in Andheri (East)
Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as “the said plot”). The said plot was acquired
by the appellant originally as a capital asset but portion thereof was
converted at different point of time into stock-in-trade. The appellant on
October 29, 2001 filed its return of income for the assessment year 2001-02. On
May 1, 2003, an assessment order was passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act determining
the total income at Rs. 12,36,393 after allowing deduction u/s. 80-1B (10) of
the Act. After scrutiny of the said return of income, a notice dated March 15,
2007, was served on the appellant u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act” ) inter alia alleging that the
appellant’s income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 2001-02 has
escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act. Vide
communication dated April 11, 2007, the appellant sought the reason recorded
for reopening the assessment which were made available to the appellant on
April 12, 2007. It was found that the appellant had not correctly disclosed the
actual *assets of the said plot and hence, the appellant was not entitled for
deduction u/s. 80(1B)(10) of the Act. It was noted that the information
regarding the actual size of the plot used for the construction was only
available in the valuation report and hence, the case was covered under
Explanation 2(c)(iv) of section 147 of the Act. The appellant objected to the
assumption of jurisdiction u/s. 148 for the reason that the appellant had
disclosed all the facts fully and truly and respondent No. 1 was fully aware of
the floor space index. Respondent No.2 rejected the objections. Being
aggrieved, the appellant preferred a writ petition before the High Court
challenging the notice dated March 15, 2007 issued u/s. 147 of the Act. The
High Court vide impugned judgment dated December 12, 2007 dismissed the
writ petition. The High Court was of the opinion that as there was no true
disclosure of the exact size of the plot when the new construction commenced it
prima facie could not be said that there were no reasons to believe. The
information was in the annexures and consequently Explanation 2(c)(iv) of
section 147 of the was applicable. 
Accordingly, to the High Court, the question was whether the petitioners
considering the size of the plot and part of it having already been developed
could claim the benefit u/s. 80-1B (10) of the Income-tax Act. The issue as to
whether the size of the plot of land to be considered at the time the new
construction is being put up or whether the building already constructed
including various deduction like R. G. Area, set back had to be considered in
computing the size of the plot was an issue which it did not wish to answer at
the stage in the exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction.

Before the Supreme Court, the Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant/firm submitted that there was no reason to
reopen the assessment when in the return filed by the appellant full disclosure
of all the relevant facts was made. On this basis, it was further argued that
it was merely a case of change of opinion which was not a valid ground for
reopening of the assessment. He drew the attention of the Supreme Court to the
communication dated February 10, 2003 addressed by the appellant to the
Assessing Officer. In para 11 thereof, there was a mention about the land in
question. The Supreme Court rejected the aforesaid submissions of the learned
senior counsel for the appellant as according to the Supreme Court, in para 11,
only the value of the land was stated and in support, a certificate from the
registered architect and engineer was filed. The Supreme Court held that it was
clear from the above that this information was supplied as there was some query
about the value of the land. Obviously, while going to this document the
Assessing Officer would examine the value of the land. However, the reason for
issuing notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act was that the appellant had not
correctly disclosed the actual *assets of the plot and hence, it was not
entitled for deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Act. The income-tax authority
itself had mentioned in the notice u/s.148 of the Act that such information was
available only in the valuation report. Giving the information in this manner
was of no help to the appellant as the Assessing Officer was not expected to go
through the said information available in the valuation report for the purpose
of ascertaining the actual *construction of the plot.

On the facts of this case, therefore, the Supreme Court found
that the Revenue was right in reopening the assessment and the High Court had
rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant challenging the validity
of the notice u/s. 148 of the Act.

*
Note: This should be the size of the plot.
_

22. Business expenditure – A. Y. 1999-00 – Same business or different business – tests – Expenditure incurred in setting up new line of same business is deductible

CIT vs. Max India Ltd. (No.1); 388 ITR 74
(P&H):

For the A. Y. 1999-00, the Assessing Officer
made disallowance of Rs. 6,70,78,483/- on account of expenses for setting up
new business. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the
deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and
Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  While determining whether
two or more lines of businesses of the assessee are the same “business” or
“different businesses” regard must be had to the common management of the main
business and other lines of businesses, unity of trading organization, common
employees, common administration, a common fund and a common place of business.
For evaluating the “same business”, the test of unity of control and the nature
of business is to be applied.

ii)  The Commissioner (Appeals)
after appreciating the evidence produced on record had observed that various
businesses carried on by the assessee including health care constituted the
same business of the assessee. The Appellate Tribunal was right in law in
allowing the expenses in setting up new business of Rs. 6,70,78,483 treating it
as revenue in nature.”

RATE OF TAX APPLICABLE TO CAPITAL GAINS ON LOSS OF EXEMPTION BY A CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS TRUST

Issue for Consideration

A charitable or religious trust is entitled to exemption
under sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provided that it is
registered u/s. 12AA and fulfils other requirements of sections 11 to 13. Under
sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d), if a benefit is provided to a specified person
or the specified investment pattern is not adhered to, the benefit of the
exemption is lost and the income of the trust so losing the exemption is
taxable at the maximum marginal rate by virtue of the provisions of section
164(2).

Normally, for all assessees, long term capital gains is
chargeable to tax under the provisions of section 112 at the rate of 20%, while
certain types of short term capital gains arising on sale of equity shares on a
recognised stock exchange is chargeable to tax at the concessional rate of 15%
under the provisions of section 111A.

The issue has arisen before the tribunal as to what should be
the rate of taxation in respect of income in the nature of a long term capital
gains, in the case of a charitable or religious trust, losing exemption on
account of violation of section13. While the Mumbai bench of the tribunal has
taken the view that such gain is taxable at the rate of 20% u/s. 112, the
Chennai bench of the tribunal has taken a contrary view, holding that such gain
is taxable at the maximum marginal rate as per section 164(2) of the Act.

Jamsetji Tata Trust’s case

The issue first came up for consideration before the Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jamsetji Tata Trust vs. Jt.DIT(E), 148
ITD 388 (Mum).

In this case, the assessee trust sold certain shares of Tata
Consultancy Services Ltd, and acquired preference shares of Tata Sons Ltd. It
earned long-term capital gains on sale of the shares of TCS, which was exempt
u/s. 10(38), dividends, which were exempt u/s. 10(34), and other interest and short
term capital gains. It claimed exemption u/s. 11 in respect of the interest and
short term capital gains, besides the exemptions under sections 10(34) and
10(38) in respect of the dividends and the long term capital gains.

The assessing officer denied the benefit of the exemption
u/s. 11, by invoking the provisions of section 13(1)(d), on the ground, that by
holding equity shares of TCS and Tata Sons, the assessee had violated the
investment pattern specified in section 11(5). The assessing officer taxed the
entire income of the trust, including the dividends, the long-term capital
gains, the short term capital gains as well as the interest income at the
maximum marginal rate, by applying the provisions of section 164(2).
The Commissioner(Appeals) upheld the order of the assessing officer.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued
that the denial of exemption u/s. 11 was not justified, that the assessee was
entitled to the exemptions u/s. 10, and that only the income from the investments
attracting the provisions of section 13(1)(d) was taxable at the maximum
marginal rate. It was further argued that the rate of tax on the short term
capital gains arising from sale of shares should have been the rate prescribed
u/s. 111A, and not the maximum marginal rate.

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that the denial of
exemption u/s. 11 was justified. As regards the rate of tax, it was argued that
since the provisions of section 164(2) were applicable, the maximum marginal
rate was to be applied to the entire taxable income of the assessee, and not
separate rates on income of separate nature.

The Tribunal, after considering the arguments of the assessee
and the revenue and after analysing the provisions of the Income-tax Act, held
that only the income arising from the prohibited investments was ineligible for
the benefit of the exemption u/s. 11, and attracted tax at the maximum marginal
rate, and not the entire income. The Tribunal further held that the income
which was exempt u/s. 10 (dividends and long term capital gains) could not be
brought to tax under sections 11 and 13, since those sections did not have
overriding effect over section 10. Once the conditions of section 10 were
satisfied, no other condition could be fastened for denying the claim u/s. 10.

Addressing the issue of whether the rate u/s. 111A of 15% or
the maximum marginal rate u/s. 164(2) was to be applied to the short term
capital gains, the Tribunal noted that section 164(2) did not prescribe the
rate of tax, but mandated the maximum marginal rate as prescribed under the
provisions of the Act. It observed that section 111A was a special provision
legislated for providing for rate of tax chargeable on short term capital gains
on sale of equity shares or units of an equity oriented fund, which was
subjected to securities transaction tax (STT) and as such  the maximum marginal rate for income from
specified short term gains should be the rate prescribed therein.

According to the Tribunal, when the short term capital gains
arising from the sale of shares subjected to STT was chargeable to tax at 15%,
then the maximum marginal rate, referred to in section 164(2), on such income
could not exceed the maximum rate of tax provided u/s. 111A of the Act. It
accordingly held that the short term capital gains on sale of shares already
subjected to STT was chargeable to tax at the maximum marginal rate, which
could not exceed the rate provided u/s. 111A of the Income-tax Act.

India Cements Educational Society’s case

The issue again came up before the Chennai bench of the
tribunal in the case of DDIT vs. India Cements Educational Society 157 ITD
1008
.

In this case, the assessee was a Society registered u/s.
12AA. It sold a plot of land and advanced the sale proceeds of the land to a
company in which the president of the Society and his wife were directors. It
claimed exemption in respect of capital gains arising on such sale on the
ground that the sale proceeds were reinvested in a specified capital asset.

The assessing officer denied exemption u/s. 11 to the Society
on the ground that the amount advanced to the company was not an approved
investment u/s. 11(5). He therefore taxed the income of the Society and the
maximum marginal rate under the provisions of section 164(2).

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal,
holding that the assessing officer had not proved what benefit accrued to the
specified person from the advancement of the amount to the company, and that
mere making of an advance to third parties could not be treated as utilisation
for investment in capital asset within the meaning of section 11(5). He
therefore held that while the benefit of exemption u/s. 11 was available, the
making of the advance out of the sale proceeds was not an investment in a new
capital asset. In the context of the issue under consideration, the
Commissioner(Appeals) held that the capital gains to be assessed as per section
48, was to be taxed at the rate prescribed u/s. 112 of the Act, and not at the
‘maximum marginal rate’ adopted by the assessing officer.

Before the tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued
that the entire income of the Society, other than the capital gains, continued
to be exempt u/s. 11 of the Act and that the capital gains alone was to be
taxed in terms of section 164(2) on account of the alleged violation of the
conditions of section 13 of the Act by applying the maximum marginal rate
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of DIT(E)
vs. Sheth Mafatlal Gagalbhai Foundation Trust 249 ITR 533, and the decision of
the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Fr Mullers Charitable
Institutions 363 ITR 230,
for the proposition that whenever there was a
violation u/s. 11(5), then only income from such investment or deposit which
was made in violation of section 11(5) was liable to be taxed, and violation
u/s. 13(1)(d) did not result in denial of exemption u/s.11 for the entire total
income of the assessee. Reliance was also placed on the CBDT circular number
387 dated 6.4.1984 152 ITR 1 (St.), where it was stated in paragraph 28.6 that
where a trust contravened the provisions of section 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d), the
maximum marginal rate of income tax would apply only to that part of the income
which had forfeited exemption under those provisions.

In the context of the issue under consideration, It was
further argued by the assessee that, in view of the decision of the Karnataka
High Court in the case of Fr Muller’s Charitable Institutions (supra),
the rate of tax applicable for taxing the capital gains was the rate prescribed
u/s. 112. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Mumbai bench of the
tribunal in the case of Jamsetji Tata Trust (supra), which had held, in
the case of short term capital gains on sale of shares subject to STT, that the
maximum marginal rate on capital gains could not exceed the rate provided u/s.
111A. This decision had been followed by the Mumbai bench in the case of Mahindra
and Mahindra Employees Stock Option Trust vs. DCIT 155 ITD 1046,
where the
tribunal had held that capital gain was to be assessed by applying the
provisions of section 112, even if the income was assessed as per section 164.

The tribunal examined the provisions of sections 11 and 13.
It noted that in the case before it, there was a violation of section 13(1)(c),
as the Society had invested funds in a limited company, where the trustee was
the managing director and his wife was a director. Following the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Rattan Trust 227 ITR 356 and the
decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nagarathu Vaisiyargal
Sangam 246 ITR 164
, the tribunal held that the assessing officer was
justified in applying the provisions of section 13(1)(c), and denying exemption
u/s. 11 to the Society.

Analysing the provisions of section 164(2), the Tribunal,
observed that the income of a charitable or religious trust, which was not
exempt u/s. 11 or 12 was charged to tax as if such exempt income was the income
of an AOP. The proviso to that section provided that where the non-exempt
portion of the relevant income arose as a consequence of the contravention of
the provisions of section 13(1)(c) or (d), such income would be subjected to
tax at the maximum marginal rate.

Considering both the decisions of the Mumbai bench of the
Tribunal, cited before it, the Chennai bench of the tribunal, in the context of
the issue under consideration, found that the Mumbai bench had not considered
the meaning of the term ‘maximum marginal rate’ as defined in section 2(29C),
whereunder the term was defined to mean the rate of income tax (including
surcharge on income tax, if any) applicable in relation to the highest slab of
income in the case of an individual, association of persons or, as the case may
be, body of individuals as specified in the Finance Act of the relevant year.
The Chennai bench of the tribunal observed that on account of section 2(29C),
the two decisions of the Mumbai bench could not be said to have laid down the
correct proposition of law.

The Chennai bench of the Tribunal therefore held that the
benefit of section 112 to assess the gain from the transfer of the capital
asset could not be given to the Society, and that the long-term capital gains
was chargeable at the maximum marginal rate u/s. 164(2) r.w.s. 2(29C) of the Act.

Observations

A similar question has arisen in the case of private trusts,
where the individual share of beneficiaries is unknown, known as discretionary
trusts. Under the provisions of section 164(1), the income of such trusts is
also taxable at the maximum marginal rate. The issue has been decided by Delhi
and Gujarat High Courts, in the cases of CIT vs. SAE Head Office Monthly
Paid Employees Welfare Trust (2004) 271 ITR 159 (Del)
and Niti Trust vs.
CIT (1996) 221 ITR 435 (Guj)
, that the long term capital gains earned by a
discretionary trust is not taxable at the maximum marginal rate u/s. 164(1),
but at the concessional rate of tax u/s. 112. These decisions have not been
considered by the Chennai bench of the Tribunal. The language of both sections
164(1) and 164(2) being similar, the ratio of these decisions would apply
squarely to section 164(2) as well.

Section 2(29C) while defining the term ‘maximum marginal
rate’ provides for adoption of the highest slab rate prescribed for an
individual, etc.  This rate, in
certain cases, varies w.r.t . the nature of income and head of income and in
such cases the rate specially provided for becomes the maximum marginal rate
for taxing such income. In cases where the rate is specifically provided for in
a particular provision of the Act, it is that rate that should then be taken to
represent the maximum marginal rate. The decisions above referred to support
such a view.

Alternatively, it can be contested that both the provisions
are independent and operate accordingly. he language of neither section
111A/112 nor section 164(2) indicates that one has a specific overriding effect
over the other. None of these provisions could be said to be general. The
principle generalia specialibus non derogant providing that a specific
provision prevailing over a general provision also cannot be readily applied.
While section 111A/112 is a provision applicable to specific types of income of
all assessees, section 164(2) applies to all incomes of specific types of
assessees. In any case, if a view is to be taken then the better view is to
treat section 112 as a special provision.

It needs to be kept in mind that section 112 provides for a
rate of tax for long term capital gains, irrespective of the type of assessee
who earns the capital gains. This rate applies not only to individuals and
HUFs, but also to partnership firms, associations of persons, domestic
companies, as well as foreign companies. While an individual is liable to tax
at slab rates of tax, partnership firms and domestic companies are liable to a
flat rate of tax of 30%, and foreign companies are liable to tax at a flat rate
of 40%. Yet, for all these different types of entities liable to different
rates of tax, the rate of tax u/s. 111A or section 112 is the same, i.e. 15%
and 20% respectively. This indicates that the rate applicable to such types of
capital gains should not differ, irrespective of the rate of tax applicable to
the other income of the entity.

On the other hand, the provisions of section 164(2) are
intended to ensure that the trust losing exemption on account of the violation
of the provisions of sections 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d) does not benefit by paying a
lower rate of tax by taxing such incomes at the maximum marginal rate. However,
till assessment year 2014-15, a trust would claim exemption under the
provisions of section 10 in respect of income such as dividends, long term
capital gains on sale of equity shares on which STT was paid, etc.,
irrespective of whether the remainder of its income was exempt u/s. 11 or not.
The question of payment of tax at the maximum marginal rate did not arise in
the case of such income which was exempt. That being the case, where certain
incomes, such as long term capital gains or short term capital gains is liable
to tax at lower rates of tax than normal income, the question of taxation at
the maximum marginal rate should equally not apply. The maximum marginal rate
should therefore apply to income which is otherwise not taxable at a
concessional rate of tax.

If one also examines the format of the income tax returns for
charitable and religious trusts in Form No 7, as well as the forms applicable
to discretionary trusts in Form No 5, there is a specific reference in schedule
SI – Income Chargeable to tax at special rates, to specific rates of 15% under
section 111A for specified types of short term capital gains and of 20% u/s.
112 for long term capital gains. This clearly indicates that such gains are not
intended to be taxed at the maximum marginal rates.

The view that is beneficial to the assessee should be adopted
in a case where two views are possible. Besides, whenever there is a difference
of opinion between two benches of the Tribunal, such a difference is required
to be referred to a Special Bench of the Tribunal for consideration. The
Chennai bench of the tribunal chose to not to follow the decisions of the Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal, though cited before it, on the ground that the Mumbai
bench had overlooked a certain provision of the Act, rather than referring the
issue to a Special Bench.

The better view therefore is that of the Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal, that even if a charitable or religious trust loses
exemption u/s. 11 by virtue of the provisions of sections 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d),
the short term capital gains covered by section 111A or long term capital gains
covered by section 112, is chargeable to tax at the rates specified in those
sections, and not at the maximum marginal rate specified in section 164(2). _

ANALYSIS OF “EQUALISATION LEVY” AND SOME ISSUES

1.    Background

The Finance Act,
2016  (FA) in the  chapter VIII (comprising clauses 163 to 180)
has introduced a new tax i.e “equalisation levy” on consideration received or
receivable for any specified services.

The article deals with
some of the important provisions of the chapter and the issues arising there
from.

The Government of India
constituted a committee on taxation of E- commerce. The said committee made
proposal for equalisation levy on specified transactions. The Committee took
cognisance of the Report on Action 1 of Base Erosion & Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Project, wherein very significant work has been undertaken for identifying
the tax challenges arising from digital economy, the possible options to
address them and constraints likely to be faced. The Committee also noted that
this report has been accepted by G-20 countries, including India and OECD,
thereby providing a broad consensus view on these issues. The committee
submitted its report in February, 2016 and accepting the proposal contained in
the report, the Government has introduced this chapter.

The committee stated in
its report that “The significant difference, between an ‘Equalisation Levy’
that is proposed to be imposed on gross amount of payments, and the withholding
tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 would be that under the latter, withholding
tax is only a mechanism of collecting tax, whereas an ‘Equalisation Levy’ on
gross payments would be a final tax.”

As far as
constitutionality of the provision is concerned, the committee expressed the
view that “Equalisation levy on gross amounts of transactions or payments made
for digital services appears to be in accordance with the entries at Serial
Number 92C70 and 9771 of the First List in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India. The existing precedent in the form of the Service Tax
appears to remove any ambiguities and doubts in this regard. Thus this
committee is of the view that Equalisation Levy as a tax on gross amounts of
transactions, imposed by the
Union through a statute made by the
Parliament, would satisfy the test of constitutional validity.”

It is noteworthy to look
at the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance bill so as to
understand the rationale for imposition of the levy.

“……..The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recommended, in Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project under Action Plan 1, to impose a
final withholding tax on certain payments for digital goods or services
provided by a foreign e-commerce provider or imposition of a equalisation
levy on consideration for certain digital transactions received by a
non-resident from a resident or from a non-resident having permanent
establishment in other contracting state.

Considering the
potential of new digital economy and the rapidly evolving nature of business
operations it is found essential to address the challenges in terms of taxation
of such digital transactions as mentioned above. In order to address these
challenges, it is proposed to insert a new Chapter titled “Equalisation
Levy” in the Finance Bill, to provide for an equalisation levy of 6 % of
the amount of consideration for specified services received or receivable by a
non-resident not having permanent establishment (‘PE’) in India, from a
resident in India who carries out business or profession, or from a
non-resident having permanent establishment in India
.”

The objective of the
Government is to impose tax on the consideration received by the non-resident.
The rationale is, on the one hand the consideration paid is tax deductible
while computing the income of the payer, the same escapes the source country
taxation, because payee does not have a permanent establishment in India or
otherwise. The equalisation levy is quantified with reference to the
consideration received by the non resident. The equalisation levy is charged at
the rate of 6% on the amount of consideration received or receivable by the non
resident.

2.    Scope
of the levy

2.1.  Section163
provides that the provisions of the chapter extends to the whole of India,
except Jammu and Kashmir and the same will come into force from the date of its
applicability notified by the Central Government i.e appointed date. The
Government has appointed 1st day of June,2016 as the date on which
Chapter VIII would come into force.

2.2.  The
provisions will apply to the consideration received or receivable for specified
services provided on or after the appointed date. By implication, any
consideration received after the appointed date for the services provided
before the appointed date shall be outside the provisions of this chapter. The
provisions of the chapter will not apply to the consideration received or
receivable for the services provided outside the territorial jurisdiction. This
obviously would require determining the place of provision of the services. For
determining the place of provision of services, one may have to look at the
provisions of the service tax act and the rules framed thereunder. Generally,
place of provision of service is the location of the service receiver.

3.    Important
Definitions

Section 164 defines
various terms used in the chapter. It also provides that any words and
expressions which is used in the chapter but not defined in the chapter will
have the same meanings as it has under the Income tax act (ITA) or the rules
there under if the same have been defined there under. Some of the important
terms defined in the chapter are:

i)   “equalisation
levy” means the tax leviable on consideration received or receivable for any
specified service under the provisions of this Chapter;  It may be noted that though the word levy is
used in the nomenclature, it is clearly a tax.

ii)  “specified
service” means online advertisement, any provision for digital advertising
space or any other facility or service for the purpose of online advertisement
and includes any other service as may be notified by the Central Government in
this behalf. The committee on E-commerce has recommended more services to be
subject to equalisation levy and the Government has accordingly retained the
power to notify more services as specified services.

iii)  “online”
means a facility or service or right or benefit or access that is obtained
through the internet or any other form of digital or telecommunication network;

iv) “permanent
establishment” includes a fixed place of business through which the business of
the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. The definition is an inclusive
definition and is on the same line as is in section 92F(iiia) of the ITA.

4.    Charge
of levy

4.1.  Section
165 deals with the charge of the equalization levy. It provides that the
equalisation levy @6% be charged on the amount of consideration received or
receivable for providing specified services. The other conditions are:

a)  The
service provider has to be non-resident and

b)  It
should receive consideration for the services from

            i)   a 
person resident in India who is carrying on business or profession or

            ii)  a non resident having a permanent
establishment (PE) in India (hereinafter referred to as ‘specified persons’ or
‘assessee’).

4.2.  It
also provides for the cases when the equalisation levy will not be charged.
They are:

i)   when
the non resident who is providing the specified services has a permanent
establishment in India and such services are effectively connected to the said
permanent establishment i.e when the non-resident offers the income from the
specified services as a part of its PE profit.

ii)  when
the aggregate amount of consideration received or receivable for the specified
services from each of the specified persons in a previous year is INR one lakh
or less.

iii)  when
the specified persons makes the payment towards specified services not for the
purposes of carrying on its business or profession. In such a case even if the
payment exceeds INR one lakh, the same will not be subject to equalisation levy
since the same is not claimed as deduction for the purposes of computing the
taxable income of the specified persons.

It is pertinent to note
that as per the Article 7 of any double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA),
non residents are taxable in their country of residence as far as the taxation
of the business profits is concerned. They can be taxed in the source country
only if they carry on business in the source country through a permanent
establishment  and in such case also only
to the extent of the income attributable to the permanent establishment. Equalisation
levy is sought to be imposed on the business income of the non resident when
the non resident has no PE in India. Hence, to that extent the tax is not
consistent with the provisions of the DTAA. However, it may be noted that the
scope of the DTAA is confined only to the taxes covered under Article 2. Since
this is a new tax, none of the existing DTAA would have covered the same.
However, a question may arise that whether equalisation levy be regarded as an
identical or similar tax to the existing taxes covered by the Article 2? Most DTAA
provides to include similar taxes imposed subsequently to be included within
the scope of Article 2 subject to certain conditions. Hence, if the answer to
the question is yes, then imposition of equalisation levy on the business
profits of the non resident when it has no PE in India may not be regarded as
compatible with Article 7 of the DTAA. The current imposition presupposes that
it is not.. The stand of the Government appears to be that it is not a tax on
the income (and hence, it it has been kept outside the ITA and imposed by the
Finance Act) and therefore there is no inconsistency between the treaty
provisions and the imposition of equalisation levy.

5.    Collection
and Recovery

5.1.  Section
166 provides for the collection and recovery of the equalisation levy. It
designates the specified persons as assessee and cast an obligation on them to
deduct the amount of equalisation levy from the amount of consideration paid or
payable to the non resident towards the provision of the specified services.

5.2.  There
is no obligation to deduct the levy from the consideration if the aggregate
amount payable to a non resident in a previous year is INR one lakh or less.
The wording seems to suggest that the limit of one lakh rupees is qua
each non resident. The assessee has to pay levy so deducted during a month to
the credit of the Central Government by the 7th of the next calendar
month. Delay in the payment would be visited with the simple interest @ 1% per
month or part thereof. In addition to the interest, the assessee would be
liable to a penalty of INR 1000 per day of delay. However, it is provided that
such penalty should not exceed the amount of the levy.

5.3.  The
liability to pay the levy would be there irrespective of the fact whether the
assessee has deducted the same from the payment made to the non resident. When
the assessee fails to deduct the levy, in addition to the interest, penalty
equivalent to the amount of levy is imposable on the assessee. In such a case a
question would arise as to whether the levy so paid will increase the cost of
the services availed or it will appear as a separate item in the books of
accounts. In both the cases, in my view the amount should be deductible while
computing the income of the assessee.

5.4.  The
possible three scenarios which can arise in view of the above provision is
illustrated by the respective accounting entries:

a.  Assessee
makes payment of Rs. 100 towards specified services to X and deduct tax there
from:



Specified Services A/c.          Dr.     100

      To X                                                                                                                 100

 

X A/c                           Dr.
    100

To Bank                                          94        

To Equalisation Levy                                   06

 

Equalisation Levy 
      Dr.     6

To  Bank                                            6

b. Assessee has as a
part of agreement agreed to bear the equalisation levy

Specified Services A/c.              Dr.      106.38

         To X                                                106.38

X A/c                           Dr.
106.38

         To
Bank                                               100      

         To
Equalisation Levy                           06.38

Equalisation Levy       
Dr.  6.38

         
To  Bank                             6.38

(In both the above cases, the payment of
Equalisation levy by the assessee would be regarded as deducted from the
payment made to X)

c.  Assessee
fails to deduct but makes the payment of the levy as envisaged u/s. 166(3)

Specified Services A/c.              Dr.      100

      To X                                                  100

X A/c                          Dr.
  100

      To
Bank                                             100 

Equalisation Levy       
Dr.  6

     
To  Bank                              6

Would the 3rd scenario survive? The act has
envisaged the same. In this case the assessee may save the tax of 0.38 but he
will be exposed to the penalty equivalent to the amount of equalisation levy
u/s. 171. However, it may be noted that penalty is discretionary and may not be
levied in appropriate cases.

5.5.  As
noted above, the levy is not chargeable when the non resident providing the
service has a PE in India and the specified service is effectively connected to
such PE. The assessee is either a person resident in India or a PE of a non
resident in India. The assessee before deducting the levy will have to ensure
that the non resident providing the service has no PE in India and even if it
has a PE in India, the said service is not effectively connected to the said
PE. They may have to possibly depend on the declaration from the non -resident
in this respect.

5.6.  Whether
a non-resident has a PE in the source country or not is generally a contentious
issue and it is very rare that the taxpayer and the tax authorities would agree
at the initial stage. If it is ultimately found or held that the levy was not
chargeable, can the refund be granted to the assessee? There are provisions in
the chapter for grant of the refund to the assesse on processing the statement
furnished by the assessee. Such a case may not be covered by the said refund
provision and also because there are limitations of the time to grant refund
under such cases. Can the refund be claimed on the ground that the levy is
without any authority of law and hence the limitation should not apply? 

6.    Procedure
and Penalties

6.1.  Section
167 imposes an obligation on every assessee to furnish a statement in the
prescribed format in respect of all specified services during the financial
year. The government has notified Equalisation Levy Rules, 2016 and prescribed
Form No. 1 as the prescribed form of the statement. The rules provide that the
said form should be furnished annually on or before 30th June in
respect of the preceding financial year. The form should give information in
respect of all the specified services chargeable to equalisation levy during
the financial year.

6.2.  The
assessee would be entitled to revise the statement if he notices any errors or
omissions at any time within two years from the end of the financial year in
which the specified service was provided. He may also furnish the statement in
the aforesaid period if he has not furnished the statement within the
prescribed time.

6.3.  The
Assessing officer may serve a notice on any assessee to furnish the statement
if he has not furnished the same within thirty days from the date of service of
the notice. However, the section does not provide any time limit within which
the AO may serve the said notice. On a harmonious reading of the provisions,
one may take a view that the said notice has to be served within the aforesaid
period of two years. What is the basis on which the AO can issue such notice
has not been provided. What are the rights available to the assesse when he
receives the notice, can he challenge the issue of the notice by the AO?  Section 172 provides that an assessee who
fails to furnish the statement within the time prescribed under the rules or
the time prescribed by the AO in his notice, would be liable to pay a penalty
of INR 100 for each day of failure.

6.4.  The AO, before imposing any penalty under the
chapter has to give the assessee an opportunity to advance his case as to why
the penalty should not be imposed. If the assessee proves that that there was a
reasonable cause for the failure and the AO is satisfied about the same, AO
should not impose any penalty. The order imposing the penalty has been made
appealable to CIT(A) and the order of CIT(A) 
has been made appealable to the Tribunal.  Provision of section 249 to 251 and section
253 to 255 of the ITA has been made applicable to such appeals. Section 178 of
the FA, 2016 list down various other sections of the ITA which would apply in
relation to equalisation levy as they apply in relation to income tax.

6.5.  Section
168 provides for the processing of the statement and issue of intimation to the
assessee after carrying out adjustment in respect of arithmetical accuracy and
computation of interest. The intimation is required to be sent within one year
from the end of the financial year in which the prescribed statement under
clause 167 is furnished.

6.6.  Section
169 empowers the AO to rectify the intimation for any mistake apparent from
record and provides that the intimation be amended within one year from the end
of the financial year in which the same was issued. The AO may rectify the
mistake on his own or on the same being brought to his notice by the assessee.
Any rectification which has the effect of increasing the liability of the
assessee or reducing the refund entitlement to the assessee, be made only by
making an order and after giving the assessee a show cause to that effect and a
reasonable opportunity of being heard. If in consequence of any order, any
amount is payable by the assessee, the rules provides the AO to serve a notice
of demand in form no.2 specifying the amount payable by the assessee. The
chapter is silent about the appellability of this order. Under the rules, it is
provided that the intimation u/s. 168 is deemed to be notice of demand. If the
intimation is deemed as notice of demand under the ITA and the same is in
consequence of an order, then the appeal provisions under the ITA should also
follow.

7.    Consideration
to be exempt from tax in the hands of non resident

7.1.  A new
clause (50) has been introduced in section 10 of the Income-tax act, whereby
any income arising from specified services which is chargeable to equalisation
levy under chapter VIII of the FA 2016 is exempt from the charge to the income
tax. The said clause is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

‘(50) any
income arising from any specified service provided on or after the date on
which the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016 comes into force
and chargeable to equalisation levy under that Chapter.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,
“specified service” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (i) of
section 164 of Chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016.’

7.2.  In
other words income of the non resident from provision of the specified services
to the assessee under chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016 is exempt from
income tax in the hands of the non resident if the same is chargeable to
equalisation levy. However, it does not mean that the income of the non
resident from the specified services would be charged to income tax if the same
is not chargeable to equalisation levy for any reason. The charge to income tax
has to be independently established under the ITA.

8.    Disallowance
of payment in the hands of payer

8.1.  A new
clause (ib) has been introduced in section 40 of the Income-tax act with effect
from 1st June,2016. Section 40 provides for the cases when the
amount is not permitted to be deducted from computing the income under the head
“profits and gains of business or profession” or permitted to be deducted
subject to certain conditions. The said clause is reproduced hereunder for
ready reference:

 (ib)
any consideration paid or payable to a non-resident for a specified service on
which equalisation levy is deductible under the provisions of Chapter VIII of
the Finance Act, 2016, and such levy has not been deducted or after deduction,
has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of
section 139:

        Provided
that where in respect of any such consideration, the equalisation levy has been
deducted in any subsequent year or has been deducted during the previous year
but paid after the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139, such
sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous
year in which such levy has been paid;”.

8.2.  In
this respect, the following may be noted:

a) Chapter
VIII of the FA 2016 provides for due dates of payment of the equalisation levy
and consequence of the delayed payment. For the purpose of section 40(ib) of
the ITA, the same is irrelevant. The relevant date for the same will be the due
date of furnishing the return of income u/s. 139 of the ITA.

b) Section
166(3) of the Finance Act envisages a situation when the assessee fails to
deduct the levy from the amount paid or payable to a non resident. As per the
said section, the assesse e is liable to pay the levy even if he has not
deducted the same from the payment. Section 40(ib) of the ITA envisages
situation of deduction of the levy and payment thereof thereafter. Can a view
be taken that cases u/s. 166(3) of the FA are not covered by section 40(ib) of
the ITA? Whether in such a case, provision of section 43B of the ITA would be
applicable and the compliance thereof would be necessary?.

c) What will
be the impact of non discrimination article of the relevant double tax
avoidance agreement (DTAA) on section 40(ib) of the ITA? Relevant extract of
article 24(4) of the OECD and UN model convention (both are identical) is
reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

24(4) Except where the provisions of paragraph 1
of Article 9, paragraph 6 of Article 11 or paragraph 4 of Article 12, apply,
interest, royalties and other disbursements paid by an enterprise of a
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the
purpose of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible
under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the
first-mentioned State….
.

Section 40(ib) disallowance is applicable in
respect of consideration paid or payable to non-resident for specified services
and not to the resident. Hence, prima facie, the assessee can invoke the
said article of the relevant DTAA. Article 24(6) provides that the provisions
of non discrimination article will not be restricted to the taxes covered under
article 2 and the same extends its applicability to taxes of every kind and
description. In view of this, equalisation levy would be covered by the
non-discrimination article notwithstanding what is the scope of article 2. The
question that may still survive is whether payment towards specified services
would be covered within the words “other disbursements” appearing in article 24(4)?

It may be noted that any consideration received
or receivable by a resident from the provision of the specified services to the
assessee is not subject to equalisation levy and hence, there is no question of
any deduction from the payment and consequential disallowance. In fact, to this
extent there is discrimination. However, the existing provision of Article 24
does not specifically recognise such discrimination. Can revenue argue that the
payment to resident is not subject any equalisation levy at all and hence,
there is no discrimination within the meaning of Article 24(4)?

9.    Challenges

9.1.  A
question that arises is whether it is a tax on the income of the non resident?
According to the Government, it is not a tax on the income of the non resident.
In fact the income of the non resident which is subject to the levy is
specifically made exempt from income tax. By exempting the income under the ITA
which is subject to equalisation levy, whether the Government has weaken its
case that it is not a tax on income or a tax akin to tax on income?

9.2.  Who is
the person chargeable to tax? Under the FA, the assessee is the person making
payment towards the specified services and claiming the said payment as
expenditure while computing its taxable income. Whether he is charged to tax or
it is the non resident?

9.3.  In tax
jurisprudence, it is well settled that following four factors are essential
ingredients to a taxing statute:-

a.  subject
of tax;

b.  person
liable to pay the tax;

c.  rate at
which tax is to be paid, and

d.  measure
or value on which the rate is to be applied.

9.4.  From
the analysis of the provisions of the chapter, it is clear that the subject of
tax is the specified services. From the harmonious reading of the section 165
and 166, it appears that the person liable to pay tax is non resident, but the
collection and the recovery is made from the persons paying the considerations
towards the specified services by way of deduction and they are being regarded
as assessee. It is interesting to note that the non resident receiving the
consideration has no obligation whatsoever under the chapter. What is the
difference between a person charged to tax and a person liable to pay tax? Can
a person who is charged to tax be not liable to tax? Can not the person who is
liable to tax and who is also regarded as assessee, should be considered as the
person charged to tax? Is it that in the scheme of equalisation levy, these questions
does not matter? These questions pose a significant challenge to the new tax.
_

(Ethical dilemma)

Arjun (A) — Oh, I am surrounded by the ocean around!  But not a single drop of water to drink! Hey Shree Ram!
Shrikrishna (S) — What reminds you of that great poetry?  And why you called Shree Ram when I am always around you?
A —    Shrikrishna, sorry. You are not only around me, but always in my heart too. I am just thinking of the present situation. I wanted both Shree Ram and Shrikrishna to help me.
S —    What situation? Which ocean you are thinking of?
A —    Ocean of old notes! High Denomination Notes. HDN! These are in plenty everywhere. But of no use at all !
S —    And you don’t have small value notes to spend. Right?
A —    Absolutely! I did not have money to pay for the cab. Nowadays, you have stopped driving my chariot! So I came here on foot.
S —    Good for health.
A —    Cannot buy provisions and vegetables – and day-to-day things. Literally starving.
S —    That is also good for health. Of late, you all had taken to over-eating!
A —    Jokes apart; but this cancellation of HDNs has spoilt our sleep.
S —    Why? You had so much of it?
A —    No. If I had that kind of money, I would not have continued this ‘magajmari’ in the practice.
S —    Then why are you bothered so much if you don’t have HDNs?
A —    Wherever I go, people keep on asking me about ‘conversion’ round the clock !
S —    Why can’t you tell that Government’s pronouncements are very clear. You can exchange notes at many places.
A —    Oh Lord! Why are you pretending to be ignorant though you are omniscient?
S —    Ha! Ha! Ha! People seek your advice on converting huge black money into white. Is that correct?
A —    Yes. They ask questions about what will happen in income tax? Will they charge tax as well as penalty?
S —    So you give answers. What is there? That’s your usual work.
A —    No Lord! It is not that simple. It is more complicated than even your Bhagwad Geeta!
S —    Really? But what is your dilemma?
A —    See, basically, there are too many questions and no definite answers. There is guess-work and speculation.
S —    Then say, you don’t know the answer. Why are you afraid?
A —    Actually, they ask me whether I can convert their notes into ‘white’ money.
S —    That’s money-laundering.
A —    But many of our CA friends have taken it as an opportunity to earn money! My dilemma is, what should I do? Whether to jump into that game or remain away.
S —    Similar dilemma you were faced with in Mahabharata.
A —    And you had advised me to jump in; and not run away from it. What is your advice now?
S —    Arjun, my advice is the same. ‘jump in’ in the same way.
A —    Oh! So you are advising me to enter into the field of conversion? Simply fall in line with my friends doing this change of colour of money? Bhagwan, you too?
S —    No my dear! I had advised you to jump in the war that time.  Same way, here also jump in the war with the weapons of honesty and straight forwardness. Say ‘No’ to such temptations.
A —    So you mean, honesty is the best policy.  They say, it is true that by honest business practices, one can become a millionaire; but for that, one first needs to be a billionaire!! Ha! Ha!
S —    See, Arjun, whether this withdrawal of HDN was good or bad in economic sense, time alone will decide.  But it was an honest decision; taken with good intentions.
A —    No doubt about it.  It requires lot of courage.  Failure in execution on the part of Administration does not mean the decision was bad.  I agree.  These hoarders of black money had literally spoilt our country.
S —    You said it! No value for truth.  All-pervasive corruption.  All unscrupulous elements.  Bribery, on money, no value for merit.  This had threatened even the national security.
A —    It was necessary to teach a lesson to such economic offenders and enemies of the nation.
S —    If that is your view, and still if you indulge in abetting the money-laundering, it will be the greatest treachery.
A —    But as a part of my profession, I must help my clients.  I should steer them out of the difficulties in financial and tax matters. That is our sacred duty!  Should I give it up? That is my dilemma.
S —    When two such values seem to be conflicting, always remember, there cannot be compromise with honesty. That is one of the noblest virtues.  Moreover, national interests, interests of the society are supreme! They are above all other considerations.  If you help the wrong-doers today, there will be further deterioration, downfall – of the society.  Your posterity is going to live in that kind of the world.  Is it acceptable to you?
A —    You are right.  But our next generation has already migrated!
S —    Why they were required to leave the country?  It was because of the inaction, indifference of the intellectual class.  You used your brilliant brains in protecting and helping; if not encouraging the wrong elements.
A —    Bhagwan, you have opened my eyes.  I must tell this to my CA friends.
S —    Moreover, there could be criminal liability on you people – prosecution under tax laws, prevention of Anti-money laundering Act, FEMA, Benami Transactions Act, and what not! This is abetment.
A —    Yes.  My Lord!  I will caution all my friends.  They should avoid all the jugglery – not just out of fear; but with a positive thought that we should be supporting only good things. Bless me Lord !
S —    Tathaastu.
Om Shanti.
Note:
This dialogue is based on the present situation arising out of cancellation of the HDNs. CAs are expected to give preference to the ‘values’ in life and  national duty. _

FRAUD INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES AND OTHER ASPECTS – PART II

Use of the juxtaposition test in audit to detect fraud

Conventional audit tests look for reasonable evidence to
support the financial statements being audited. Vouching, tracing, casting and
scrutiny of accounts, whether in manual or soft data form, usually include
examination of records or documents, but they are seldom penetrative enough to
detect  duplication, falsification,
manipulation and forgery. In this regard, the additional use of a juxtaposition
test may be very useful in many audit situations to directly ferret out fraud.
What exactly is this juxtaposition test? It is a simple common sense test of
comparison, by placing side by side, two or more pieces of evidence. In simple
words, to juxtapose means to put adjacent to, or to place side by side to
facilitate comparison. It can be used either to detect similarities where none
are expected or differences where there should be none.

Usually in the course of day-to-day business, senior
management executives have to review, sign, or approve various documents,
invoices, even agreements and contracts with external parties such as vendors,
customers, etc. Even within an organisation, there are documents
constantly floating around for approval, such as vouchers, letters, minutes of
meetings. In almost every such situation, the relevant document (say for example
a vendor’s bill), will be seen or examined only one at a time. Two or
more documents (or any other evidence such as CCTV, Audio recordings, pictures
etc) from a particular party will seldom be examined together for comparison.
Usually only very important details, computations, amounts, or specific clauses
are examined and scrutinised more carefully. Consequently a fraud like a
duplicated letterhead bill from a vendor can easily escape detection because
one may not remember what exactly the original letterhead looked like. This
kind of fraud and many other frauds in evidence relied upon can perhaps be
detected by applying this simple juxtaposition test.

This juxtaposition test can be used in myriad number of ways,
in different situations, on different objects. Let us consider the various
places where such a juxtaposition test can be used:

1.  Comparison of external letters / documents for
inexplicable similarities indicating that the source is the same. Eg, multiple
quotations may not be from different parties but actually the same. Similarly
reference letters from two different employers may have some unique
similarities where there should be none. For example the following instances of
two such reference letters from totally different organisations indicate
exactly the same grammatical mistakes, spelling mistakes and english sentences.
These can be easily spotted only by juxtaposition and are outlined below.

 (Above names,
addresses, are purely for academic and demonstrative purposes. Any resemblance
to any entity is purely co-incidental. Nowhere is any fraud suggested or
implied)

2.  Approval signatures. Just as a bank manager
compares a signed cheque or an RTGS form with the specimen signature, it is
imperative for an auditor to see hard copy documents such as vouchers,
agreements, bills, minutes etc., with the specimen signature of those
who have signed. In one case, an auditor specifically asked for a list of
specimen signatures of the approving authorities on agreements, important
documents, records and vouchers. The company initially resisted but relented
and provided him such signatures. There were some sarcastic remarks about him
conducting an investigation instead of an audit. However the auditor was
unruffled and took this step as a routine control testing procedure and his
effort paid rich dividends. He meticulously conducted a sample check comparison
of approval signatures on payment vouchers with specimen signatures provided by
the company to him. He found some signatures which did not match with any
signature on the list given to him. He then went to the CFO of the company to
inquire about these unidentified signatures. The CFO was also surprised because
he too could not identify any of those signatures. After making detailed
inquiries with all departments, it was eventually established that they belonged
to no one and were mere scribbles
. There were no such authorised
signatories and approvals for such vouchers were fictitious and invalid
authorisations. No one bothered to inquire who had authorized them and the
cashier presumed that these were genuine authorisations. In a year almost Rs 80
lacs were so paid through multiple small value vouchers. All that was required
was someone to see whether such signatures were known and valid before permitting
such expenditure. It is important to note that one need not be a signature
verification technical expert. A simple comparison with given signatures is
enough to detect fraud.

Example of an unidentifiable signature

3.  Juxtaposition check can be even within a
document. In the above case, the cashier did not have readily all the specimen
signatures. The juxtaposition test is sometimes missed out even when it is
possible on one single document. A huge purchase order of over Rs. 60 lakh was
executed without anyone realising that all the three signatures of the buyer,
checker and approver were the same. The human mind becomes so cluttered with
other information on any given document that focus is given only on critical
information such as value, rate, date, vendor, description of the material and
the existence of approval signatures. The human mind gets switched off beyond
that to examine deeply by applying any test for deception or wrongdoing. In
this case since the three signature were side by side (juxtaposed) on the
voucher. Just by looking at the three signatures, one could easily see that
they were by the same person.

(above is just an imaginary voucher with assumed names,
product and signatures for demonstration purposes; any resemblance is
co-incidental and unintentional and nowhere is any such person or entity
connected with fraud).

In the same manner, the juxtaposition test can be used to
compare:

(a) Vendors’ bills. Usually printing and stationery
bills, transport bills, courier charges, and similar regular expenditure
related bills are the ones most likely to be duplicated or replicated. By
juxtaposing these expenses, we will be in a position to identify anomalies and
perhaps spot a fictitious bill.

(b) Agreements and contracts lying between two or
more departments such as legal department, commercial department, purchase
department etc. It is expected that these are identical copies, but
wrongdoers even make alterations in copies of different departments for ulterior
motives of facilitating fraud.

(c) Documents with different ages. A two year old
document when compared with a recent document will have a difference in the
physical condition. Over a period of time, paper yellows out, creases, smudges
with handling and even tears a little. 
However, new documents have a crisp, whiter look and usually do not have
many smudges. In one case an auditor compared bills from a  suspected supplier for a two year period and
applied a juxtaposition test. Though he did not find anything anomalous in the
content matter,  he noticed that one of
the oldest bills was absolutely white and crisp. This stood out in complete
contrast with all the bills of that year. On a detailed investigation, it was
revealed that the bill was inserted recently because the original one had been
removed for a wrongful purpose of alteration. 

There are many such examples of the juxtaposition test on
documents; but  one may well ask whether
this test is going to be useful in the paperless environment with soft data,
spreadsheets, data on audio recordings, videos, CCTVs etc. The answer is
yes, very much. In some of the future articles in BCAS journal,  further examples and illustrations of usage
of juxtaposition test will be given. _

SECTION B: REVISED AS 10 ‘PROPERTY, PLANT & EQUIPMENT’ APPLICABLE FROM ACCOUNTING YEARS COMMENCING FROM 1ST APRIL 2016 ONWARDS FOLLOWED IN FY 2015-16

NHPC Ltd. (31-3-2016)

From Notes to Financial Statements

Note 29, para 15:

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has notified revised AS-10,
“Property, Plant & Equipment” on 30.03.2016, to be applicable for
accounting periods commencing on or after that date. Para 9 of revised AS-10 permits
Unit of Measure Approach which allows capitalisation of expenditure of capital
nature incurred for creation of facilities, over which the company does not
have control but the creation of which is essential principally for
construction of the project.  Further,
the transitional provision in revised AS-10 allows retrospective capitalisation
of costs charged earlier to the statement of profit and loss but eligible to be
included as a part of the cost of a project for construction of property, plant
and equipment in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 9. The Unit of
Measure Approach also exists in Para 9 of Ind AS-16, “Property, Plant &
Equipment.” It strengthens the accounting policy no.2.3.4 on capital work in
progress. Had this policy not been adopted but implemented from 01.04.2016, the
para 88 of Revised AS-10 on transitional provision would automatically take
care of capitalisation of such expenditure. 
As such, significant accounting policy no.2.3.4 and consequential
accounting treatment of enabling assets as followed in FY 2014-15 has been
continued. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.176.21 crore (Previous year Rs.173.61
crore) has been included in Fixed Assets as Tangible Assets/CWIP.

From Auditors’ Report

Emphasis of Matters

We draw attention to the following matters in the Notes to
the financial statements:

a)    
to e) … not reproduced

f)

Auditor’s Comment tor’s
Comment

Management’s reply

 

Accounting policy no.2.3.4 On capital work in progress read with
note no. 29 Para 15 to the financial statements about the capital expenditure
incurred for creation of facilities over which the company does not have
control but the creation of which is essential principally for construction
of the project is charged to “expenditure attributable to construction (eac)”
as the same is in line with revised as-10 notified on 30.03.2016 As para 88
of the revised accounting standard which stated about transitional provision
that shall result into the same treatment.

Disclosure through note is a statement of fact.

 

DEEMED COST EXEMPTION ON FIXED ASSETS AND INTANGIBLES

Introduction

The application of the deemed cost
exemption to fixed assets and intangible assets has led to peculiar issues and
challenges. Let us first consider the wording of the exemption followed by the
clarifications provided by the Ind AS Transition Facilitation Group (ITFG).

Paragraph D7AA of Ind AS 101

D7AA – Where there is no change in
its functional currency on the date of transition to Ind ASs, a first-time
adopter to Ind ASs may elect to continue with the carrying value for all of its
property, plant and equipment as recognised in the financial statements as at
the date of transition to Ind ASs, measured as per the previous GAAP and use
that as its deemed cost as at the date of transition after making necessary
adjustments for decommissioning liabilities. If an entity avails the option, no
further adjustments to the deemed cost of the property, plant and equipment so
determined in the opening balance sheet shall be made for transition
adjustments that might arise from the application of other Ind ASs. This option
can also be availed for intangible assets covered by Ind AS 38, Intangible
Assets
and investment property covered by Ind AS 40 Investment Property.

Salient features of the exemption

1.  The
entity can continue with the carrying amount under previous GAAP for all of its
fixed assets, investment property and intangible assets after making necessary
adjustment for decommissioning liabilities. The ITFG opined that if a first
time adopter chooses the D7AA option, then the option of applying this on
selective basis to some of the items of property, plant and equipment and using
fair value for others is not available.

2.  The exemption is
available to an entity only where there is no change in the functional currency
on the date of transition to Ind AS.

3.  No further adjustments to
the deemed cost so determined in the opening balance sheet shall be made for
transition adjustments that might arise from the application of other Ind ASs

4.  The exemption is an
additional option under Ind AS. An entity may choose not to use this option,
and instead use other first time adoption options. For example, in the case of
fixed assets, an entity may choose to:

a.  state retrospectively all
the fixed assets in accordance with Ind AS principles

b.  selectively choose to
fair value some fixed assets and use Ind AS principles for other fixed assets.

ITFG Clarification Bulletin 3 – Issue 9

The Company has chosen to continue
with the carrying value for all of its property, plant and equipment as recognised
in the financial statements as at the date of transition to Ind AS, measured as
per the previous GAAP. The Company has recorded capital spares in its previous
GAAP financial statements as a part of inventory, which under Ind AS would
qualify to be classified as fixed assets. Would such a reclassification be
required under Ind AS? Would such a reclassification taint the deemed
cost exemption?

As per paragraph D7AA, once the
company chooses previous GAAP as deemed cost as provided in paragraph D7AA of Ind
AS 101, it is not allowed to adjust the carrying value of property, plant and
equipment for any adjustments other than decommissioning costs. In this case, a
question arises whether the company may capitalise spares as a part of
property, plant and equipment on the date of transition to Ind AS. It may be
noted deemed cost exemption as the previous GAAP is in respect of carrying
value of property, plant and equipment capitalised under previous GAAP on the
date of transition to Ind AS. The ITFG opined that this condition does not
prevent a company to recognise an asset whose recognition is required by Ind AS
on the date of transition. The ITFG opined that the Company should recognise
‘capital spares’ if they meet definition of PPE as on the date of transition,
in addition to continuing carrying value of PPE as per paragraph D7AA of Ind AS
101.

ITFG Clarification Bulletin 5 – Issue 4

The Company has chosen to continue
with the carrying value for all of its property, plant and equipment as
recognised in the financial statements as at the date of transition to Ind AS,
measured as per the previous GAAP. The company has previously taken a loan for
construction of fixed assets and paid processing fee thereon. The entire
processing fees on the loan were upfront capitalised as part of the relevant
fixed assets as per the previous GAAP. The loan needs to be accounted for as
per amortised cost method in accordance with Ind AS 109, Financial
Instruments
. Whether the Company is required to adjust the carrying amount
of fixed assets as per the previous GAAP to reflect accounting treatment of
processing fees as per Ind AS 109?

When the option of deemed cost
exemption is availed for property, plant and equipment under paragraph D7AA of
Ind AS 101, no further adjustments to the deemed cost of the property, plant
and equipment shall be made for transition adjustments that might arise from
the application of other Ind AS. Thus, once the entity avails the exemption
provided in paragraph D7AA, it will be carrying forward the previous GAAP
carrying amount.

Paragraph 10 of Ind AS 101, inter
alia
, provides that Ind AS will be applied in measuring all recognised
assets and liabilities except for mandatory exceptions and voluntary exemptions
other Ind AS. Processing fees is required to be deducted from loan amount to
arrive at the amortised cost as per the requirements of Ind AS 109. In view of
this, with respect to property, plant and equipment, the company shall continue
the carrying amount of PPE as per previous GAAP on the date of transition to
Ind AS since it has availed the deemed cost option provided in paragraph D7AA
of Ind AS 101 for PPE. In the given case, the Company need to apply the
requirements of Ind AS 109 retrospectively for loans outstanding on the date of
transition to Ind AS at amortised cost. The ITFG opined that the adjustments
related to the outstanding loans to bring these in conformity with Ind AS 109
shall be recognised in the retained earnings on the date of transition. Consequently,
the carrying value of PPE as per previous GAAP cannot be adjusted to reflect
accounting treatment of processing fees.

ITFG Clarification Bulletin 5 – Issue 5 

The Company received government
grant to purchase a fixed asset prior to Ind AS transition date. The grant
received from the Government was deducted from the carrying amount of fixed
asset as permitted under previous GAAP, i.e. AS 12, Accounting for Government
Grants. The Company has chosen to continue with carrying value of property,
plant and equipment as per the previous GAAP as provided in paragraph D7AA of
Ind AS 101. As per Ind AS 20, Accounting for Government Grants and
Disclosure of Government Assistance
, such a grant is required to be
accounted by setting up the grant as deferred income on the date of transition
and deducting the grant in arriving at the carrying amount of the asset is not
allowed.

In this situation, whether the
Company is required to add to the carrying amount of fixed assets as per
previous GAAP and reflect the addition as deferred income in accordance with
Ind AS 20?

The ITFG opined that when the
option of deemed cost exemption under paragraph D7AA is availed for property,
plant and equipment, no further adjustments to the deemed cost of the property,
plant and equipment shall be made for transition adjustments that might arise
from the application of other Ind AS. Accordingly, once an entity avails the
exemption provided in paragraph D7AA, it will have to be carry forward the
previous GAAP carrying amounts of PPE. Consequently, the company shall
recognise the asset related government grants outstanding on the transition
date as deferred income in accordance with the requirements of Ind AS 20, with
corresponding adjustment to retained earnings.

Salient feature of the ITFG responses

The ITFG has provided conflicting
responses. In the context of accounting for the government grants and
processing fees, the ITFG opined that the impact of accounting for government
grants and processing fees should be adjusted against retained earnings.
Consequently, the previous GAAP carrying amount of fixed assets should not be
tampered with in order to comply with the requirements of D7AA. On the other
hand, the ITFG in the context of reclassification between inventory and fixed
assets, opined that the reclassification was necessary, and that such
reclassification would not result in non-compliance of D7AA.

The author also feels that too much
focus has been put on complying with the technical requirement of D7AA rather
than on the substance and the spirit of the exemption. This has led to a very
absurd interpretation. For example, in the case of fixed asset related
government grants, the grant amount was deducted from fixed assets under Indian
GAAP. However, the ITFG requires an entity to ignore the same and recreate the
deferred income on grant by adjusting the retained earnings. In subsequent
years, the deferred income would be released to the P&L account under Ind
AS. This effectively means that the government grant gets accounted twice; once
under Indian GAAP by deducting the grant amount from fixed assets and again
under Ind AS through creation of deferred income on Ind AS transition date.
Similarly the ITFGs response in the case of processing fee results in its being
treated as borrowing cost twice – once under Indian GAAP and again under Ind
AS.

Practical issue not dealt with by ITFG

Whether D7AA exemption is available
to service concession arrangements (SCA)?

Paragraph D22 of Ind AS 101
requires an operator of SCA to apply SCA accounting retrospectively. If it is
not practical to apply SCA accounting retrospectively, then the operator may
use the previous GAAP carrying amounts as the carrying amount at that date.
Assuming that there is no change in functional currency, whether in addition to
the above exemption, D7AA option is available?

One argument is that since
paragraph D22 contains specific requirements for intangible assets recognised
in accordance with the standard, the transitional provisions in D22 will apply
to intangible assets arising under the SCA. For all other intangible assets,
exemption in paragraph D7AA may be used.

The second argument is that there
is nothing in paragraph D7AA to suggest that it does not apply to SCAs. Hence,
the company can apply exemption under paragraph D7AA to all intangible assets,
i.e., SCA related intangible assets as well as all other intangible assets
covered within the scope of Ind AS 38.

The application of second view will
give rise the following additional issues:

  While the company continues the same carrying
amount as under previous GAAP, it will need to reclassify those amounts based
on requirements of Ind AS. For e.g., toll road classified as PPE under Indian
GAAP will be reclassified as intangible or financial asset, as applicable, at
the Indian GAAP carrying amount.

   Accounting for premium payable by operator to
grantor (negative grant): Companies may have followed one of the following
treatment under Indian GAAP:

    Certain companies have
created liability at undiscounted amount.

    Certain companies have
not created liability for negative grant under Indian GAAP.

In both the above cases, the
related question would be when the financial liability amount is reflected as
per Ind AS 109, whether the corresponding adjustment should be made to retained
earnings or to the intangible asset. Some may even argue that the strict
requirements of D7AA means that no adjustment is made to the financial
liability amount and consequently the corresponding adjustment is also not
made.

Conclusion

There are numerous questions around
the practical application of D7AA. These issues were not probably conceived
when D7AA was hurriedly introduced in Ind AS 101. The drafting of D7AA has
resulted in numerous unanswered questions. The ITFG has also provided
conflicting guidance on the subject. Besides some of the recommendations, for
example, in the case of processing fees and government grant accounting are
counter-intuitive and are against the spirit and intention of the exemptions.
In light of the above, the author would recommend that a broader view may be
taken on this issue, and in light of the lack of clarity arising from a not so
clear drafting of D7AA, companies may be allowed more room for different
interpretations. _

Section 195 – payments made to non-residents for rent for office outside India, advertisement in foreign journals and exhibition expenses being business profits are not taxable in India in absence of a PE in India

12.  [2016] 74
taxmann.com 191 (Delhi – Trib.)

ITO vs. Brahmos Aerospace (P.) Ltd.

A.Y.:2011-12, Date of order: 14th September, 2016

Facts

The Taxpayer had made payments to certain non-residents
(NRs). The payments pertained to rent for office outside India, advertisements
and expenses for participation in exhibition outside India. Mistakenly, the
Taxpayer had withheld tax on the said payments at minimum rates and hence
Taxpayer applied for rectification u/s. 154 of the Act. However, the AO
contended taxes were required to be withheld @ 20% and rejected rectification
application of the taxpayer. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the Taxpayer.
Against the order of CIT(A), the revenue appealed to the Tribunal.

Held

  The payments made to non-residents were in
respect of rent, advertisement and exhibition expenses. Such payments are in
the nature of business receipts of the payee and are taxable in India only if
the NR has a PE in India in terms of the relevant DTAA2 .

2   The decision does not mention DTAA of any
specific country and also does not refer to any specific Article (such as,
Article 7 read with Article 5) of any DTAA.

  Since the NR does not have PE in
India, the receipts from the Taxpayer are not chargeable to tax in India.
Consequently, the Taxpayer is not required to withhold tax on such payments.

Subsequently concluded APA which accepted that the taxpayer was not a contract manufacturer for relevant years under appeal have considerable bearing on TP dispute and can be admitted as an evidence before the Tribunal

11.  ITA Nos.
779/Mds/2014, 801 Mds/2015 & 810/Mds/2016

Lotus Footwear Enterprises Ltd (India Branch) vs. DCIT

A.Y.s: 2009-10 to 2011-12,

Date of Order: 21st September, 2016

Facts

The Taxpayer was engaged in manufacture of footwear for its
associated enterprise (AE) in BVI. For FY 2009-10 to 2011-12, assessment orders
were passed basis the directions of the DRP. Certain adjustments were made
under TP by regarding the taxpayer to be a contract manufacturer. It is not
clear as to what was the claim of the taxpayer and basis on which the TPO
concluded that the taxpayer was a contract manufacturer permitting TP
adjustment during the years under appeal.

Taxpayer appealed against the assessment orders before the
ITAT and assailed the additions made on account of transfer pricing
adjustments.

Taxpayer had signed an APA in 2016 for FY 2014-15 to 2018-19,
with a roll back for three years from FY 2011-12 to FY 2013-14.

The APA was signed on the basis that for the years covered by
APA and the three earlier years for which roll back was claimed, the business
model of the taxpayer was that of a contract manufacturer and such change was
effected only after F.Y. 2010-11 (A.Y. 2011-12) due to multiple labour strikes
in its units. It was also claimed that roll back which was applicable for
earlier 4 years including one of the years under appeal viz. F.Y. 2010-11 (A.Y.
2011-12) was not made applicable, as for the relevant year, as per the facts
which the taxpayer could furnish before APA authorities, the taxpayer was not a
contract manufacturer. Thus, for F.Y. 2010-11, APA authorities had accepted the
contention of the taxpayer that it was not a contract manufacturer as against
departmental contention that the taxpayer was a contract manufacturer.

It is in this background that taxpayer relied on APA and
claimed that its contention about it not being a contract manufacturer during
the relevant years of appeal is to be accepted.

Held

Tribunal concurred that APA should be considered while
deciding the appeal of the Taxpayer, for the following reasons:

   The APA rollback period was reduced to three
years only after considering and accepting the submissions of the Taxpayer that
it was not a contract manufacturer in FY 10-11 and the years prior to it.

   Nature of business of the Taxpayer as
determined under APA would have considerable bearing on the ALP study of the
international transactions of the Taxpayer for the FYs under consideration.

   Since the APA was concluded in May 2016, the
Taxpayer did not have the opportunity to submit it to the lower authorities.

Having regard to the above, the additional evidence was
admitted and the matter was set aside for fresh consideration.

Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – on facts, subsidiary company and its managing director (MD) constituted fixed place PE and dependent agent PE of the taxpayer in India

10.  I.T.A.No.1742/Mds/2011

Carpi Tech SA vs. ADIT

A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 24th August, 2016

Facts

Taxpayer a company resident in Switzerland, was engaged in the
business of water proofing and providing drainage systems. During the relevant
assessment year, the Taxpayer had received certain amounts for undertaking a
project for an Indian company.

The Taxpayer contended that the project was only for 40 days (i.e.,
less than six months), and it did not have ‘continuous presence’ or ‘business
connection’ or ‘permanent establishment’ in India. Therefore, receipts from
such project is not chargeable to tax in India. The Taxpayer also had an Indian
subsidiary1 (“Sub Co”).

In the course of inquiry, the AO found that the Taxpayer had also
executed a project in financial year 2004-05 and 2005-06. The duration of the
said project was 105 days. Between the two projects, the time lag was three
years.

During the intervening period, the MD of Sub Co was making efforts
to secure other projects for the Taxpayer in India. The website of the Taxpayer
mentioned office-cum-residential address of the MD for correspondence. The MD
was given a power of attorney (PoA) to undertake the activities of the Taxpayer
in India. Further Sub Co also had a PoA to represent the Taxpayer in its
projects in India.

Based on these as well as several other facts, the AO concluded
that Sub Co and its MD were dependent agents exclusively acting for the Taxpayer
and that the income was subject to tax under Article 7. The DRP upheld the
order of the AO. 

1   While the decision mentions Indian company
as a subsidiary, the facts appear to indicate that though the name of Indian
company was similar to the name of the Taxpayer, all the shares were held by
two individual shareholders one of whom was MD of the company. Thus, impliedly,
the Taxpayer did not have any shares in the Indian company.

Held

   The facts and the documents indicates that
all the actions related to the project were undertaken by or routed through Sub
Co or its MD. The MD was also holding PoA from the Taxpayer and signed all
documents on behalf of the Taxpayer.

  It is not necessary that place of business
should be exclusively available to the Taxpayer. What is required is that to
constitute a PE, business must be located at a single place for reasonable
length of time though the activity need not be permanent, endless or without
interruption. In Sutron Corporation vs. DIT [2004] 268 ITR 156 (AAR) and
in Motorola Inc vs. DCIT [2005] 95 ITD 269 (Del) (SB), residence of
country manager was held to be fixed place of business since it was used as an
office address.

   The residence of MD from where all activities
of the Taxpayer in relation to Indian project, such as participation in bids,
correspondence with customers, signing of contracts, execution of the project
and closure of the project etc. was carried on triggered a fixed place
PE for the Taxpayer in India.

   Sub Co incurred all the project-related
expenses. The Taxpayer reimbursed these expenses

   The activities of the Taxpayer and Sub Co
were intertwined and Sub Co participated in economic activities of the
Taxpayer. Sub Co was the face of the taxpayer in India and had a PoA to
represent the Taxpayer in India. Thus the premises of Sub Co also resulted in a
fixed place PE for the Taxpayer in India.

  Further the Taxpayer was relying on the skills and knowledge of the
MD. His role was critical to all the aspect of the contract through the stage
of signing to its execution.

  There was no evidence for the claim of the
Taxpayer that MD of Sub Co was independent agent because he represented other
companies. While an independent agent would be required to have objectivity in
execution of tasks of its principal, role played by MD could not be easily
separated from services of the Taxpayer. MD was acting exclusively or almost
exclusively for the Taxpayer.

   The functions performed by MD or Sub Co could
not be considered as preparatory or auxiliary in character. The Taxpayer had
not demonstrated that it had a mere passing, transient or casual presence in
India. Accordingly, Sub Co and MD constituted fixed place PE and dependent
agent PE of the Taxpayer in India.

Article 7 & 5 of India-UAE DTAA; – In absence of a specific article on Fee for technical service (FTS), income from services rendered in the normal course of business is to be classified as business income; in absence of a Permanent establishment (PE) in India, income from such services is not taxable in India

9.  [2016] 75
taxmann.com 83 (Bangalore – Trib.)

ABB FZ-LLC vs. ITO

A.Y: 2012-13, Date of Order: 28th October, 2016

Facts

The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in and resident in
UAE. The Taxpayer had entered into an agreement with an Indian company for
providing certain services. In consideration, the Taxpayer received certain
fee.

According to the Taxpayer, in absence of a specific article
on FTS in the India-UAE DTAA, income from services is to be classified as
business profit under Article 7. Further, in absence of a PE in India, the fee
is not chargeable to tax in India. The Taxpayer however, did not dispute that,
the receipt was FTS in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

AO however, contended that if a DTAA does not have any clause
for taxation of any item of income, such income is to be taxed in accordance
with the Act. Since the Act has a specific provision for taxing FTS, such
specific provision would prevail over the general provision of DTAA.
Accordingly, AO applied provisions of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and taxed
the fee as FTS. The Dispute resolution panel (DRP) confirmed the view of the
AO.

Held

   If royalty or FTS is derived from regular
business activities of the Taxpayer, it is to be regarded as business income
under the Act as well as DTAA. However, if these items of income are separately
classified, then taxation would be as applicable to that classification.

   Income is derived by the taxpayer from
providing services, which is a regular business activity, and hence such income
from such services is to be classified as business income under the DTAA.

   Absence of a specific provision in the DTAA
is not an omission but an agreement between the two contracting states not to
separately classify such income as FTS. Once the income is classified as
falling within the ambit of other article of the DTAA, thereafter, scope of
assessing such income cannot be expanded by importing classification from the
Act and taxing such income under that classification in the Act.

  Accordingly, in absence of specific Article
dealing with FTS in India-UAE DTAA, the fee received by taxpayer would be
taxable in terms of Article 7 and in absence of a PE of the Taxpayer in India,
such income is not chargeable to tax in India.

–    Reliance in this regard can be placed on the
Tribunal decision in the case of IBM India Pvt Ltd vs. DDIT (ITA Nos.489 to
498/Bang/2013),
wherein the Tribunal held that even if the payments were
not covered by Article 7, they would be covered under Article 23 (other income)

INTERNATIONAL WORKERS AND SOCIAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS – GROWING SIGNIFICANCE – AN OVERVIEW

In view of significant increase in
the mobility of cross border workers / employees in the recent years, issues
relating to social security benefits to such International Workers [IWs] have
acquired immense importance. Consequently, Social Security Agreements [SSAs],
being bilateral instruments, entered into by various countries to protect the
social security interests of such international workers has assumed lot of
significance. India is not remaining far behind in this respect. In this
article, we have attempted to give an overview of SSAs and social security
issues of International Workers.


 1.  Background

     Foreign nationals coming
for employment in India were earlier excluded from the provisions of the
Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 [EPF Act] as
their remunerations in most cases far exceeded above the statutory threshold
limit.

    On the other hand,
Indian citizens working overseas (other than countries having operational SSA
with India and fulfilling relevant conditions prescribed therein) are subjected
to all contributions to the social security fund of the country where they
work, irrespective of the time spent in another country. Often, the amount so
contributed would stand forfeited, since like the Indian Provident Fund, all
social security schemes are subject to long-term rules of withdrawal, causing
the Indian expatriate or his employer heavy losses.

    In order to create level
playing field and to pressurise other countries to enter into SSAs with India,
‘International Worker’ is introduced as a concept and they are bound to comply
with PF provisions, regardless of their remuneration break-up.

    In October 2008,
Government of India made fundamental changes in the Employees’ Provident Funds
Scheme, 1952 [EPFS] and Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 [EPS] by bringing
International Workers [IWs] under the purview of the Indian social security
regime. The Government of India had vide its notifications dated 1st
October, 2008 introduced Para 83 to the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952
and Para 43-A to the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 creating Special
provisions in respect of the International workers [Special provisions].

    In September 2010, the
Ministry of Labour and Employment [MoLE)] issued a notification further
amending the EPFS and EPS vis-à-vis the IWs. However, the notification raised a
lot of issues which required clarifications. In May 2012, the MoLE vide its
notification dated 24th May, 2012 made further amendments in the
Employees’ Provident Scheme to clarify various issues.

    An important
clarification is that IWs who are covered under an SSA that India has signed
with other countries and that are in force can withdraw their PF accumulations
immediately on cessation of employment in establishments covered under EPF Act
in India and will not have to wait till 58 years of age to get access to their
PF accumulations. Further, the definition of excluded employee (who need not
contribute to Provident Fund in India) has been expanded to cover exemption
granted under bilateral economic agreements.


 2.  Social Security

     The term ‘Social
Security’ has been explained by the International Labour Organisation as the
protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public
measures, against economic and social distress that otherwise would be caused
by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness,
maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old-age and death; the
provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with
children.

     The key social security
legislations in India with respect to employees are:

 (i)  The Employees’ Provident
Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952; (ii) The Employees’ State
Insurance Act, 1948; (iii) The Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923; (iv) The
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; and (v) The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

    The Social Security
contributions have significant importance while structuring international
assignments for employees. Any social security benefit payable in the host
country may become an added cost to the employer, especially in situations
where there are restrictions for withdrawal. It is in this context that SSAs
executed between countries come into perspective and they need to be carefully
evaluated to help reduce the financial implications. At times, secondment
arrangements are structured to ensure that the expatriate employee continues to
derive social security benefits in the home country during the period of
assignment.


 3.  Social Security Agreement

a.  Social Security Agreement

    A Social Security
Agreement is a bilateral instrument to protect the social security interests of
workers posted in another country. Being a reciprocal arrangement, it generally
provides for equality of treatment and avoidance of double
coverage/contribution.

 b.  Main provisions covered
in a SSA

     Generally a Social
Security Agreement covers 3 provisions. They are:

 a) Detachment:
Applies to employees sent on posting in another country, provided they are complying
under the social security system of the home country.

b)  Exportability of
Pension:
Provision for payment of pension benefits directly without any
reduction to the beneficiary choosing to reside in the territory of the home
country as also to a beneficiary choosing to reside in the territory of a third
country.

c)  Totalisation of
Benefits:
The period of service rendered by an employee in a foreign
country is counted for determining the “eligibility” for benefits,
but the quantum of payment is restricted to the length of service, on pro-rata
basis.

 c.  Articles forming part of
a typical SSA

    The brief description of
the Articles contained in the latest India-Australia SSA signed on 18-11-2014,
are as follows:

Sr. No.

Part / Article No.

Description of Part / Article

 

Part I

General Provisions

1.

Article 1

Definitions

2.

Article 2

Legislative Scope

3.

Article 3

Personal Scope

4.

Article 4

Equality of Treatment

5.

Article 5

Export of Benefits

 

Part II

Provisions and Coverage

6.

Article 6

Purpose and Application

7.

Article 7

Diplomats and Government Employees

8.

Article 8

Avoidance of Double Coverage

9.

Article 9

Secondment from Third States

10.

Article 10

Exceptions

11.

Article 11

Certificate of Coverage

 

Part III

Provisions relating to Australian Benefits

12.

Article 12

Residence or presence in India

13.

Article 13

Totalisation

14.

Article 14

Calculation of Australian Benefits

 

Part IV

Provisions relating to Benefits of India

15.

Article 15

Totalisation of Insurance period

16.

Article 16

Calculation of Indian Benefits

 

Part V

Miscellaneous and Administrative Provisions

17.

Article 17

Lodgement of Documents

18.

Article 18

Payment of Benefits

19.

Article 19

Exchange of information and Mutual Assistance

20.

Article 20

Administrative Arrangement

21.

Article 21

Exchange of Statistics

22.

Article 22

Resolution of Disputes

23.

Article 23

Review of Agreement

 

Part VI

Transitional and Final Provisions

24.

Article 24

Transitional Provisions

25.

Article 25

Entry into Force

26.

Article 26

Termination

 


4.  Status of various Operating Indian SSAs

 India presently has 17 operating
SSAs, the brief details of which are given below:

Sr. No.

Country

Date of Signing

Date of entry into Force

Duration of Detachment

Exportability of Pension

Totalisation 
Benefits

1 .

Belgium

03-11-06

01-09-09

60

A

A

2.

Germany

08-10-08

01-10-09

48

N/A

N/A

3.

Switzerland

03-09-09

29-01-11

72

A

N/A

4.

Denmark

17-02-10

01-05-11

60

A

A

5.

Luxembourg

30-09-09

01-06-11

60

A

A

6.

France

30-09-08

01-07-11

60

A

A

7.

Korea

19-10-10

01-11-11

60

A

A

8.

Netherlands

22-10-09

01-12-11

60

A

N/A

9.

Hungary

02-02-10

01-04-13

60

A

A

10.

Finland

12-06-12

01-08-14

60

A

A

11

Sweden

26-11-12

01-08-14

24

[Extendable for additional 24 months]

A

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

12.

Czech

09-06-10

01-09-14

60

A

A

13.

Norway

29-10-10

01-01-15

60

A

A

14.

Austria

04-02-13

01-07-15

60

A

A

15.

Canada

06-11-12

01-08-15

60

A

A

16.

Australia

18-11-14

01-01-16

60

A

A

17.

Japan

16-11-12

01-10-16

60

A

A

 (Abbreviations used:- A:
Available  NA: Not Available.)

 4.1     Administrative
Agreements

          In all cases where
India has signed SSAs except in case of SSA with Switzerland, Canada and
Hungary, Administrative arrangements have been entered into or Administrative
Agreements have also been signed, concerning the implementation of the
agreement on social security.

 4.2     SSAs with Portugal
& Quebec

        In addition to above mentioned 17 operating SSAs,
SSA with Portugal has been signed on 04-03-13 and SSA with Quebec has been
signed on 26-11-13. However, both these SSA have not been notified so far and
have, therefore, not entered into force.

4.3     SSA with Germany

          The SSA with
Germany was executed on 8th October, 2008 and came into effect on 1st October,
2009. This agreement however covered only the detachment provisions, as per
which, individuals on short term contract up to 48 months (extendable to 60
months with the prior consent of the appropriate authority) can avail
detachment from host country social security. Since this agreement did not
address exportability of pension and totalisation of contribution periods, the
Governments of India and Germany have negotiated and signed a comprehensive
social security agreement on 12th October, 2011. This agreement is
to subsume the SSA signed on 8th October 2008. However, a
notification bringing into effect the new agreement is still awaited. The new
comprehensive agreement with Germany envisages the following benefits to Indian
nationals working in Germany:

  (i)   The employees of the home country
deputed by their employers, on short-term assignments for a pre-determined
period of less than 5 years, need not remit social security contribution in the
host country. For example, in case of deputation of an Indian employee to
Germany vide a short term contract of up to five years, no social security
contribution would need to be paid under the German law by the employee
provided he continued to make social security payment in India.

 (ii)  The benefits under the
SSA shall be available even when the Indian company sends its employees to
Germany from a third country.

 (iii)  Indian workers shall
be entitled to the export the social security benefit if they relocate to India
after the completion of their service in Germany.

 (iv)  Self-employed Indians
in Germany would also be entitled to export of social security benefit on their
relocation to India.

 (v)   The period of
contribution in one contracting state will be added to the period of
contribution in the second contracting state for determining the eligibility
for social security benefits (totalisation).

4.4   Negotiations with USA
and UK

USA: USA has
entered into Totalisation Agreements i.e. SSAs with 25 countries including the
UK, South Korea, Australia, Japan and Chile etc. For almost a decade,
India and USA have had talks on the totalisation agreement, however, without
much success. India sends the highest numbers of temporary workers to the USA,
who mostly work for the tech companies.

The current social security laws in
the US, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, allow an
employee to withdraw pension on only after a minimum qualifying period i.e. 10
years while the visa regime does not ordinarily permit the employee to stay
beyond 10 years. Therefore, Indian employees who travel to USA for a period
less than 10 years forego their social security contributions when they return.
This has ended up being a significant issue on account of the large number of
Indian employees in USA.

It however seems that the due to
lack of political will, US is holding back the signing of the agreement since
it believes that India is likely to gain disproportionately from such an
agreement. However, whenever the long pending agreement between India and US is
executed and comes into force, it will benefit a large number of Indians
working in the US, with regard to social security contributions.

UK: The recent maiden visit of the
UK Prime Minister in November, 2016 gave a ray of hope to the supporters of
proposed SSA between India and UK. As the UK is one of the prime destinations
for outbound employees from India, a SSA will favourably impact the cost of
employment for employers in both countries.

 

5.    Some relevant Questions and Answers in respect of IWs and SSAs

 4.1   Who is an International
Worker?

       An IW may be an Indian worker or a foreign
national. IW means any Indian employee having worked or going to work in a foreign
country with which India has entered into a social security agreement and being
eligible to avail the benefits under social security programme of that country,
by virtue of the eligibility gained or going to gain, under the said agreement.

       An employee other
than an Indian employee, holding other than an Indian Passport, working for an
establishment in India to which the EPF Act applies, is also an IW.

 4.2   Is an Indian worker
holding Certificate of Coverage [COC], an International Worker?

      Merely holding the
COC does not make an employee an International Worker. He/she becomes IW only
after being eligible to avail the benefits under social security programme of
any country. After obtaining COC, the employee is exempted from contributing to
the social security systems of the foreign country with whom India has SSA,
hence he/she is not eligible to avail the benefits under the social security
programme of that country.

 4.3   Who is an ‘excluded
employee’ under these provisions?

 a) A detached IW contributing
to the social security programme of the home country and certified as such by a
Detachment Certificate for a specified period in terms of the bilateral SSA
signed between that country and India is an ‘excluded employee’, under relevant
provisions; or

 b) An IW, who is contributing
to a social security programme of his country of origin, either as a citizen or
resident, with whom India has entered in to a bilateral comprehensive economic
agreement containing a clause on social security prior to 1st
October, 2008, which specifically exempts natural persons of either country to
contribute to the social security fund of the host country (e.g. para 4 of
Article 9.3 of CECA between India and Singapore provides that “Natural
persons of either Party who are granted temporary entry into the territory of
the other Party shall not be required to make contributions to social security
funds in the host country).

 4.4   Who all shall become
the members of the EPFS?

 a)  Every IW, other than an
‘excluded employee’- from 1st October, 2008.

 b)  Every excluded employee,
on ceasing the status – from the date he ceases to be excluded employee.

 4.5   Which category of establishments shall take cognizance of provisions
relating to IWs?

       All such
establishments covered/coverable under the EPF Act (including those exempted
under section 17 of the Act) that employ any person falling under the category
of ‘International Worker’ shall take cognisance of relevant provisions.

 4.6   Whether PF rules will
apply to an employee if his salary is paid outside India?

       Yes, the provisions
will apply irrespective of where the salary is paid. The PF contributions are
liable to be paid on wages, DA, and Retaining Allowance, if any, payable to the
employee. Hence, if salary is payable by establishment in India contribution
shall be payable in India and other rules will also apply accordingly.

 4.7   Whether PF will be
payable only on the part of salary paid in India in case of split payroll?

      In case of split payroll
the contribution shall be paid on the total salary earned by the employee in
the establishment covered in India.

 4.8   ‘Monthly Pay’ for
calculating contributions to be paid under the EPF Act?

      The contribution
shall be calculated on the basis of monthly pay containing the following
components actually drawn during the whole month whether paid on daily, weekly,
fortnightly or monthly basis: • Basic wages • Dearness allowance (all cash
payments by whatever name called paid to an employee on account of a rise in
the cost of living) • Retaining allowance • Cash value of any food concession.

 4.9   What portion of salary
on which PF would be payable in case an individual has multiple country
responsibilities and spends part of his time outside India?

      Contribution is
payable on the total salary payable on account of the employment of the
employee employed for wages by an establishment covered in India even for
responsibility outside India.

 4.10 Is there a minimum
period of days of stay in India which the employee can work in India without
triggering PF compliance?

        No minimum period is
prescribed. Every eligible International Worker has to be enrolled from the
first date of his employment in India.

 4.11 Is there a cap on the
salary up to which the contribution has to be made by both the employer as well
as the employee?

        No, there is no cap
on the salary on which contributions are payable by the employer as well as
employee.

 4.12 Is there a cap on the
salary up to which the employer’s share of contribution has to be diverted to
EPS?

        No, there is no cap
on the salary up to which the employer’s share of contribution has to be
diverted to EPS, 1995 and the same is payable on total salary of the employee.

 4.13 Should the eligible
employees from any country other than the countries with whom India has entered
a social security agreement contribute as International Workers?

         Yes, International
Workers from any country can be enrolled as members of EPF.

4.14 Regarding Indian
employees working abroad and contributing to the Social Security Scheme of that
country with whom India has a Social Security Agreement, are they coverable for
PF in India or treated as excluded employees?

        No, only employees
working in establishments situated and covered in India may be covered in
India.

4.15 Regarding Indian
employees working abroad and contributing to the social security scheme of a
country with which India DOES NOT have a Social Security Agreement, are they
coverable for PF in India?

       If an Indian employee
is employed in any covered establishment in India and sent abroad on posting,
he is liable to be a member in India as a domestic Indian employee, if
otherwise eligible. He is not an International Worker.

4.16 Whether foreign
nationals employed in India and being paid in foreign currency are coverable?

       Yes, foreign
nationals drawing salary in any currency and in any manner are to be covered as
IWs.

4.17 Whether foreigners
employed directly by an Indian establishment are coverable?

        Foreigners employed
directly by an Indian establishment would be coverable under the EPF Act as
IWs.

 

4.18 What is the criterion
for receiving the withdrawal benefit for services less than 10 years under EPS,
1995?

       Only those employees
covered by a SSA will be eligible for withdrawal benefit under the EPS, 1995,
who have not rendered the eligible service (i.e. 10 years) even after including
the totalisation benefit, if any, as may be provided in the said agreement. In
all other cases of IWs not covered under SSA, withdrawal benefit under the EPS,
1995 will not be available.

4.19 How long can an Indian
employee retain the status of “International Worker”?

      An Indian employee
attains the status of “International Worker” only when he becomes
eligible to avail benefits under the social security programme of other country
by virtue of the eligibility gained or going to gain, under the said agreement on
account of employment in a country with which India has signed SSA. He/she
shall remain in that status till the time he/she avails the benefits under EPF
Scheme. In other words, once an IW, always an IW.

4.20 Whether the
International Worker will earn interest even after cessation of service after
three years also in view of provisions of inoperative accounts?

      Since the provisions
of inoperative accounts are not applicable in case of international workers,
the restriction of earning interest will not apply. The international worker
shall continue to earn interest upto the age of 58 years or otherwise becomes
eligible for withdrawal.

4.21 Under what circumstances
accumulations in the Fund are payable to an International Worker?

        On retirement from
service in the establishment at any time after the attainment of 58 years. On
retirement on accounts of permanent and total incapacity for work due to bodily
or mental infirmity. A member suffering from tuberculosis or leprosy or cancer.

        In respect of a
member covered under a social security agreement entered into between the
Government of India and any other county on such grounds as may be specified in
that agreement till the time he/she avails the benefits under a social security
programme covered under that SSA.

4.22 Under what condition the
contributions received in the PF account are payable along with interest to
International Worker?

      The full amount
standing to the credit of a member’s account is payable if anyone of the
circumstances mentioned under amended Para 69 of the EPF Scheme, 1952 is
fulfilled, namely: i) on retirement from service in the establishment at any
time after 58 years of age; ii) on retirement on account of permanent and total
incapacity for work due to bodily or mental infirmity, duly certified by the
authorised medical officer; and iii) in accordance with the terms and
conditions provided in an SSA.

 4.23 Is there a cap on the
salary up to which the contribution has to be made under the EDLI Scheme, 1976
by the employer?

       Yes, the amended cap
on the salary up to which contribution has to be made under the EDLI Scheme,
1976 is Rs. 15,000.

 5.    SSA Provisions Explained – Based on India-Belgium SSA

 5.1   How it is that double
coverage is avoided after an agreement?

      When you are employed
either in India or Belgium and sent on a posting to the other contracting
Country, you and your employer would normally have to pay Social Security
Contributions/taxes to both countries for the same work. With the agreement in
place, this double coverage is eliminated and you are required to pay
Contributions/taxes to only one country, provided your posting in the other
country is for no more than 60 months.

 5.2  How does it help
employees who work or have worked in both countries to augment their
eligibility for monthly retirement, disability or survivors benefits?

 a. When you have Social
Security insurance periods in both India and Belgium, you may be eligible for
benefits from one or both countries.

b. Should you have enough
insurance periods under one country’s system, you will get a regular benefit
from that country.

c. If
you do not have enough insurance periods, the agreement may help you augment
your eligibility for a benefit by letting you add together your Social Security
insurance periods in both countries, only for the purpose of deciding your
eligibility.

d. However, each country will
pay a benefit based solely on your periods of insurance under its pension
system.

e. Although each country may
count your insurance periods in the other country, they are not actually
transferred from one country to the other.

f.  Since your insurance
periods remain on your record in the country where you earned them, they can
also be used to qualify for benefits there.

 5.3   What is a detachment
certificate?

      A detachment certificate is otherwise a
“Certificate of coverage” issued by one country (indicating the details of
coverage/membership under its social security system) that serves as proof of
exemption from Social Security contributions/taxes on the same earnings in the
other country.

 5.4   How to obtain a
Certificate of coverage?

      To seek an exemption
from coverage under the Belgian system, the employee must be working in an
establishment covered or coverable under Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation
(EPFO), the Indian Liaison agency. Both the employer as well as the employee
must jointly request a certificate of coverage, in the prescribed format, from
the jurisdictional Regional Provident Fund Commissioner of EPFO.

5.5   I am holding a
Certificate of coverage. When does the date of exemption from the other
country’s social security system start?

      The certificate of
coverage carries a provision for indicating the effective date of your
exemption (based on the information provided in your joint application) from
paying Social Security contributions/taxes in the other country. Normally, this
date shall be on or after the date you started working in the other country but
cannot be a date earlier than the date of effect of the Agreement.

 5.6 Who are all eligible
for applying for a certificate of coverage?

         There are 2
categories of employees eligible for applying for a Certificate of coverage.

a.Those already deputed on a
pre-determined short-term assignment and working in Belgium should apply for a Certificate
of coverage for the period from 1st Sept. 2009 to the date of
completion of the deputation.

b.Those to be deputed on or
after 1st Sept. 2009 should apply for a certificate of coverage for
the entire period of deputation in Belgium.

 5.7   How to ascertain
whether an employee is coverable under the Indian or Belgian Social Security
system?

 a.    
An Indian national working in Belgium

Nature of employment

Coverage under

1.  Sent on
short-term posting by an Indian employer for a period of less than 5 years

Indian system

2.  Sent on
Long-term posting by an Indian employer for a period of more than 5 years

Belgian system

3.  On local
employment by an Indian employer directly in Belgium

Belgian system

4.  On local
employment by a Non-Indian employer directly in Belgium

Belgian system

 

b.    A Belgium
national working in India

Nature of employment

Coverage under

1.   Sent
on short-term posting by a Belgian employer 
for a period of less than 5 years

Belgian system

2.  Sent on
Long-term posting by a Belgian employer for a period of more than 5 years

Indian system

3.  On local
employment by a Belgian employer directly in India

Indian system

4.  On local
employment by a Non- Belgian employer directly in India

Indian system

 

5.8   What benefits are due
to an employee covered under the Indian system administered by EPFO?

S. No.

Benefit

Nature

To whom payable

1.

Provident fund benefit (EPF

A lump sum cash benefit that gets
accrued in a member’s account by way of the contributions remitted and the
interest earned thereon.

1.  Member: on leaving
employment on superannuation or disability.

Or

2.  Survivors, if the
member is not alive.

2. 

Pension benefit (EPS)

A Monthly cash benefit paid into the
credit of the beneficiary’s bank account.

1.  Member: on leaving
employment on superannuation or disability. Or

2.  Widow/widower and
the eligible children: if the member is not alive. Or

3.  Nominee/Parents: if
the member dies without leaving any family.

 

3.

Insurance benefit (EDLI)

A lump sum cash benefit.

1.  To the survivors on
death of the member.

2.  The death should
have occurred during employment.

 


5.9   Whom does the agreement
help?

       The agreement helps the employee,
her/his family and the employer.

5.10 How does the agreement help
the employee?

 The
agreement helps at 3 stages.

a) During the period while the employee is
working;

b) At the time of claiming the benefits and

c) At the time of receiving the benefits.

        While working

a. If both the Indian and Belgian Social Security
systems cover an employee’s work, the employer along with the employee would
normally have to pay Social Security contributions to both countries for the
same work. The agreement eliminates this double coverage so that contributions
are paid to only one system.

 b.Under the agreement, an eligible Belgium
national employed in India will be covered by India, and that employee and the
employer will pay Social Security contributions only to India. If an Indian
national is employed in Belgium, she/he will be covered by Belgium, and that
employee and the employer shall pay Social Security contributions only to
Belgium.

 c.On the other hand, if an employer sends an
employee from one country to work for that employer in the other country for
five years or less, that employee will continue to be covered by her/his home
country and that she/he will be exempt from coverage in the host country. For
example, if an Indian employer sends an employee to work for that employer in
Belgium for no more than five years, the employer and the employee will
continue to pay only Indian Social Security contributions and will not have to
pay in Belgium.

When claiming the benefits

a. An employee may have contributed to the Social
Security systems in both India and Belgium but not have enough insurance
periods to be eligible for benefits in one country or the other. The agreement
makes it easier to qualify for benefits by allowing totalisation of such Social
Security contributory periods in both countries.

b. If an employee has Social Security insurance
periods in both India and Belgium, she/he may be eligible for benefits from one
or both countries. If she/he meets all the basic requirements under one
country’s system, she/he will get a regular benefit from that country. If she/he
does not meet the basic requirements, the agreement may help her/him qualify
for a benefit by allowing totalisation of insurance periods in both the
countries.

c. If she/he does not qualify for regular
benefits, she/he may be able to qualify for a partial benefit from India,
against the contributions made to India, based on totalisation of both Indian
and Belgian insurance periods.

d. Similarly, she/he may be entitled for a partial
Belgian benefit against the contributions made to Belgium, based on totalisation
of both Belgian and Indian insurance periods.

At the time of receiving the benefits

        The benefits under Indian social
security system is not payable outside India. An employee from Belgium was at a
loss being not able to get the due benefits on her/his relocation outside
India. Now, the agreement provides for making payment of benefits to the member
irrespective of whether she/he lives in India or Belgium or a third country.

5.11 Can you tell me an example how the employees
are benefited under the Agreement?

        A member who worked in India and
contributed to EPS, 1995 for 7 years is now living in Belgium after
contributing under the Belgian system for 20 years. He is more than 58 years
old.

 Entitlement

a. Without the Agreement:

        The member has less than the 10 years of
pensionable service required to qualify for member’s pension under EPS, 1995
and hence is not entitled to receive any pension benefit.

 b. With the Agreement

  Eligibility to Pension under EPS 1995 can be
claimed by totalizing the insurance periods spent under the Indian system (7
years) with the Belgian system (20 years).

  Since the total insurance period will work out
to 27 years (7+20), which is more than the required minimum eligible service of
10 years, the member becomes eligible to get pension under EPS, 1995.

  However, this totalised period shall be
considered for deciding the eligibility only and hence, the actual pension will
be sanctioned taking into account the period spent under the EPS, 1995 (7
years) as the pensionable service.

  Such a pension is payable to the member’s bank
account either in Belgium or in India.

7.    Conclusion

       India’s move to require IWs to
contribute to the Indian social security system has encouraged many countries
to negotiate and execute SSAs with India. The SSAs significantly benefit Indian
workers employed abroad, especially those on short-term contracts.

        In cases where employees are suspended
but their employment is not terminated, in the home country, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the same would trigger provisions of EPF Act and the SSAs. In
some cases, it is difficult to ascertain whether the relationship is in the
nature of employment or assignment and hence whether provisions of EPF Act and
the SSAs would be applicable.

      Application and interpretation of SSAs
and the social security law in India with respect to expatriates is still
evolving. There are open questions when it comes to secondment and deputation
arrangements, especially in light of possible tax implications.

      It is advisable that readers should
carefully examine the provisions of the SSAs before providing any structuring
and other guidance relating to mobility of IWs. _

HOME OFFICE AS PE

Background

Permanent Establishment (PE) confers taxation right
to host country to tax business profits. Once PE is constituted, business
profits are taxable at rate applicable to non-resident. Most common is the
creation of fixed place PE, Agency PE, Service PE, rules of which are designed
to cater to different forms of business. Increasingly, transactions entered
into by non-residents are scrutinised from PE perspective. Often, a foreign
enterprise appoints employees/agents in India to conduct its business. Such employees
use their home as office to work for foreign enterprise. Recently, the Chennai
Tribunal in case of Carpi Tech SA (TS-587-ITAT-ITAT-2016) held that residence
cum office of Indian director creates permanent establishment in India for
activities carried out in India for short period of time. This article proposes
to analyse some of the nuances of the decision.

Facts of the case:

–  The Taxpayer, a company resident in
Switzerland, undertook Geo Membrane waterproofing project for NHPC in India
(the NHPC project). The NHPC project lasted for less than 40 days.

–  Mr. V. Subramanian (Mr. V) is one of the
directors of the Taxpayer since its incorporation. He was designated as project
representative and/or project coordinator of the Taxpayer in India. He held a
Power of Attorney to undertake all activities on behalf of the Taxpayer.

   I Co was engaged in the same business as the
Taxpayer. Further, I Co was also given a Power of Attorney to represent the
Taxpayer in its projects in India. Additionally, Mr. V is the Managing Director
of I Co.

–    Mr. V’s residential address is also used as
office address of I Co. Further, the same address is also used as communication
address by the Taxpayer in India for all its official purposes.

   The Taxpayer was of the view that in the
absence of a PE under the India – Swiss DTAA (‘DTAA’), its income from NHPC
project was not taxable in India. Hence, it disclosed NIL income in its tax
return for the tax year under consideration.

The Tax Authority, based on the directions received
by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) in India, held that the Taxpayer created
a PE in India in terms of Article 5 of the DTAA as below:

  Fixed place PE at the residential-cum-office
address of Mr. V/ I Co

Agency PE due to functions performed by Mr. V
/ I Co on behalf of the Taxpayer

The Taxpayer filed an appeal before the Chennai
Tribunal against the DRP order.

Issue before the Tribunal

Whether income of the Taxpayer from the NHPC
project was taxable in India under provisions of the DTAA?

Key arguments of the Taxpayer

–   Duration of the NHPC project was very short
(40 days). Such duration also does not meet six months threshold to create a PE
in India. Taxpayer’s earlier projects in India were undertaken three years back
and such previous projects may not be relevant for examining PE in the current
tax year.

  Type of activities undertaken in India by Mr.
V on behalf of the Taxpayer (i.e. design, manufacture, supply and installation
of exposed PVC Geo composite Membrane) fell under installation PE provisions of
the DTAA. However, the threshold of six months is not fulfilled to create a PE.

–    Mr. V’s residential-cum-office address is
merely a mailing address. Mere existence of books of account and bank account
at Mr. V’s residence-cum-office cannot either conclusively or inferentially
point to emergence of a fixed PE.

   Mr. V is an independent
agent of the Taxpayer. He is representing other unrelated companies also in
India in the ordinary course of his business and is not exclusively working for
the Taxpayer. The POA provided to Mr. V was a specific one and it did not
provide any continuous or general authority to Mr. V to act on behalf of the
Taxpayer. Hence, it does not create an Agency PE also.

Tribunal’s ruling

Fixed
PE

   Residence-cum-office premises of Mr. V
created a fixed PE of the Taxpayer, due to the following reasons:

    Business of the Taxpayer is conducted from
the address of Mr. V.

   All correspondences related to participation
in bids, correspondence with customers, signing of contracts, execution of the
project and closure of the project etc. were initiated or routed through
the same address.

   Authority of Advance Rulings (AAR) in the
case of Sutron Corporation (268 ITR 156) supports that residence of country manager
can create a fixed PE if the same was used as an office address by taxpayer.

   Once Fixed PE test is satisfied, there is no
need to evaluate Construction PE clause under the special inclusion list.

   In any case, services rendered by the
Taxpayer were more in the nature of repair and supply of material rather than
building site, construction, installation or assembly project to fall under the
Construction PE provisions. Hence, the 182 days threshold of Construction PE
was not relevant.

   I Co also created a PE of the Taxpayer for
the following reasons:

    Activities of I Co and the Taxpayer are
interlinked such that the role played by the director as an agent of the
Taxpayer and I Co (which rendered similar services) cannot be easily separated.
Further, I Co participates in the economic activities of the Taxpayer.

    I Co and the Taxpayer were carrying out
identical nature of work in India. Their names and letter heads were also
similar.

    I Co was the face of the Taxpayer in India.
I Co held POA and was the authorised representative of the Taxpayer for the
NHPC project.

    I Co incurred all expenses in India to
execute the NHPC project which were later reimbursed by the Taxpayer. I Co
appointed vendors to render services locally and made payments to them.

Agency PE

   Mr. V was held to be acting as a dependent
agent of Taxpayer, based on the following:

    Mr. V was holding a POA on behalf of the
Taxpayer and was also the project coordinator/representative for NHPC project.

    The Taxpayer was relying on the skills and
knowledge of Mr. V. His role was critical to all the aspect of the contract
through the stage of signing to its execution.

    Mentioning Mr. V’s address on the website as
well as letterheads of the Taxpayer were indicating the fact that Mr. V was the
face of the Taxpayer in India and was representing the Taxpayer in all
practical matters.

    No evidence was provided to prove that Mr. V
was an independent agent. On the other hand, he was acting exclusively or
almost exclusively for the Taxpayer. Hence, to that an extent, the same is not
in furtherance of his ordinary course of business.

–      The role of Mr. V for the Taxpayer and I Co
was such that it cannot be separated. There existed a unison of interest to a
great extent, while as an independent agent there would be required an
objectivity in execution of the tasks of the non-resident company.

–      Activities performed by I Co and Mr. V cannot
be said to be of preparatory or auxiliary character to qualify for PE
exclusion.

   I Co represented by Mr. V or Mr. V himself
created a PE of the Taxpayer in India.

Analysis of The Tribunal decision:

In summary, the Tribunal held that Mr V. as also I Co
constituted PE in India based on following reasoning:

   Residence-cum-office premises of Mr. V
created a fixed PE of the Taxpayer on account of its usage for business purpose
of Taxpayer.

   Fixed place PE can be constituted even if its
activities in India are for 40 days.

  Once fixed place PE is constituted there is
no need to analyse Construction PE. In any case, repair and supply of material
does not fit within Construction PE.

   I Co created PE of Taxpayer on account of
similarity of activities, identical nature of work and reimbursement of all
expenditure incurred in India by I Co.

   Mr V. created agency PE as it held POA on
behalf of Taxpayer; Taxpayer relied upon the skills of Mr V; Mr V worked
exclusively or almost exclusively for Taxpayer.

Aforesaid aspects have
been analysed in the ensuing paragraphs-

Place of disposal test:

   Indian jurisprudence as also OECD Commentary
has considered satisfaction of disposal test as pre-requisite for constitution
of fixed place PE. Disposal test postulates that foreign enterprise has right
or control over premises which constitutes fixed place PE. In this case,
Tribunal has not specifically provided any positive observation on satisfaction
of disposal test. Perhaps Tribunal has presumed satisfaction of disposal test
given the dependence of Taxpayer on Mr V. and use of premises of Mr V for official
purpose/communication.

–    OECD’s revised proposal concerning the
interpretation & application of Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the
OECD Model Tax Convention (2011) stated that home office can constitute PE in
limited situations. OECD revised proposal stated that home office of employee
should not lead to an automatic conclusion of PE and would be dependent on
facts of each case. It is further stated that where a home office is used on a
regular and continuous basis for carrying on business activities for an
enterprise and it is clear from the facts and circumstances that the enterprise
has required the individual to use that location to carry on the enterprise’s
business (e.g. by not providing an office to an employee in circumstances where
the nature of the employment clearly requires an office), the home office may
be considered to be at the disposal of the enterprise.

   Incidentally, disposal test is also not dealt
with by AAR in Sutron Corporation (supra) which is relied upon by
Tribunal.

Duration
Test:

–     A fixed place PE can exists only if place of
business has certain degree of permanence. There is no standard time threshold
provided by treaty and thus duration test involves subjectivity. Much depends
upon individual facts and nature of operations of Taxpayer.

   Conventionally, it is understood that six
months’ time period should be satisfied for constitution of PE. However, there
are special situations where nature of a business of a foreign enterprise
requires it to be carried on only for a short period of time, then in such
cases a shorter period will suffice duration test.

   The Tribunal relied upon decision of Fugro (supra)
wherein PE was constituted for 91 days of work carried on in India. As against
that there are other precedents which has held that no PE is constituted in
India in following situations:

    a foreign enterprise in State S for 27 days
for one project and 68 days for another project [ABC, In re (1999) 237
ITR 798 (AAR)]

    a vessel in India for 2.5 months [DCIT
vs. Subsea Offshore Ltd, (1998) 66 ITD 296 (Mum) ]
or a sailing ship
crossing over to Indian waters for 10 days [Essar Oil Ltd vs. DCIT, (2006)
102 TTJ 614 (Mum)
]

    A foreign enterprise engaged in dredging and
which had its project office in India for 153 days [Van Oord Atlanta B. V.
vs. ADIT, (2007) 112 TTJ 229 (Kol)
]

  The performance of work under an agreement
had been accomplished by the occasional visits of the applicant’s personnel for
site visits and meetings. The nature of service was such that most of the
services were rendered outside India. The aggregate period spent in India by
the personnel was 24 days in the first year and 70 days in the next year. Two
or three employees of the applicant stayed in India for about a month [Worley
Parsons Services Pty. Ltd, In re (2009) 312 ITR 317 (AAR)]

    The assessee was engaged in the business of
telecasting cricket events. Its employees and representatives (TV crew,
programmer and engineers, other technical personnel, etc.) cumulatively stayed
in India for less than 90 days [Nimbus Sport International Pte. Ltd. vs.
DDIT, (2012) 145 TTJ 186 (Del)]

    The assessee was engaged in the activity of
supervision of plant and machinery for steel and allied plants in India. For
one project, it deputed foreign technicians to India who stayed in India for
220 days [GFA Anlagenbau Gmbh vs. DDIT, TS-383-ITAT-2014-HYD]

Interplay between fixed place PE and Construction
PE

   The Tribunal held that once fixed place PE is
constituted there is no need to analyse Construction PE. In other words, the
Tribunal held that fixed place PE overrides Construction PE.

   Aforesaid observations are not in sync with
following illustrative decisions of the Tribunal and AAR which has held that
Article 5(3) overrides article 5(1). In other words, there cannot be fixed
place PE unless time threshold specified under Construction PE is satisfied.

    GIL Mauritius Holdings Ltd. vs. ACIT
(2012) 143 TTJ 103 (Del)

    ADIT vs. Valentine Maritime (Mauritius)
Ltd. (2010) 3 taxmann.com 92 (Mum)

    Sumitomo Corporation vs. DCIT (2007) 110
TTJ 302 (Del)

    DCIT vs. Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd.
(2010) 128 TTJ 4 (Del)

   The Tribunal additionally held that repair
and supply of material does not fall within the purview of installation,
construction or assembly project. As against that OECD and UN Commentary on
Article 5 at para 17 observed that renovation involving more than maintenance
or redecoration would fall within Construction PE.

Agency PE

  The Tribunal held that Taxpayer had Agency PE
in India on account of factors like Taxpayer reliance on Mr V’ skills, granting
of POA to Mr V and exclusive service to Taxpayer.

   Mr V was dependent on the Taxpayer and he was
taxpayer’s Indian representative.

   Whilst the aforesaid may be sufficient for
creation of dependent agent but for creation of dependent agent PE following
additional condition needs to be satisfied:

              agent has and habitually
exercises in that State, an
authority to negotiate and enter into
contracts for or on behalf of the enterprise.

   The Tribunal has not dealt explicitly with
satisfaction of aforesaid conditions of authority to enter contracts by Mr V or
by ICo.

Conclusion

Decision of the Tribunal is likely to create
litigation for foreign enterprise which has a minuscule presence in India and
is dependent upon Indian agent/employee for Indian business. The Tribunal has
considered overall presence of Taxpayer in India as also surrounding circumstances
like commonality of directors; active role paid by Mr V; holding of POA;
exclusive nature of arrangement with Mr V; similarity in names of Indian
company; reimbursement of all expenditure of Indian company by Taxpayer to
reach to the conclusion that Taxpayer has PE in India.

Similar was the decision of Aramex International
Logistics Pvt Ltd (2012) 22 taxmann.com 74 (AAR) wherein AAR held that
dependence of group company in conducting business in India creates PE. In this
case, Taxpayer a Singaporean Company engaged in business of door-to-door
express shipments by air and land entered into an agreement with its Indian
subsidiary (ICO) to look after movement of packages within India, both inbound
and outbound. AAR held that where a subsidiary is created for purpose of
attending business of a group in a particular country, that subsidiary must be
taken to be a permanent establishment of that group in that particular country.

It may be noted that none of the decisions have
dealt with base conditions which are the pre-requisites for constitution of PE.
It will be interesting to see how decisions will be dealt with by higher forums
where satisfaction of fundamental conditions of PE will be tested.
 _

INTER STATE SALE VIS-À-VIS INTRA STATE SALE

Introduction

Whether transaction is Inter State
or Intra State sale is always a very delicate issue. The nature of transaction
depends upon facts of case. By now, there are number of precedents laying down
tests for deciding nature of inter-state sale. However, it still cannot be said
that it is a settled law.

Section 3(a) of the Central Sales
Tax Act (CST Act) lays down the principles to define inter-state sale.

Although, section 3(b) also
describes certain transaction to be inter-state sale but the same is not
discussed here.

Section 3(a) reads as under:

“S.3. When is a sale or purchase of
goods said to take place in the course of inter-State trade of commerce.- A
sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase-


 a. occasions the movement of goods from one
State to another; or ……………..…”

Thus, normal understanding is that
the sale which is linked with inter-state movement of goods is inter-state
sale. And it is also expected that same goods are moved, which are subject
matter of sale. 

If the goods sold and goods
actually moving are different then it is difficult to say that there is
inter-state sale in the hands of seller. However, we find contrary judgments on
the issue as discussed here under.


Inter State sale under section 3(a) –
Scenario I

State of Tamil Nadu vs. Sun Paper
Mill Ltd. & Ors. (23 VST 191)(Mad)

The facts in this case, in words of
Hon. High Court are as under:

“The assessee – first respondent is
a public limited company, which is engaged in the business of manufacture and
sale of papers. They are dealers in newsprint and assessed on the file of the
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Ambasamudram, in TNGST 802529/93-94. The
relevant assessment year is 1993-1994. The assessee has effected sales of
newsprint to the tune of Rs. 25,07,671 during the assessment year to Tvl. Kerala
Sabdam and Tvl. Kollam Muthari, Kollam and claimed those sales as inter-state
sales. But the assessing officer rejected their claim on the ground that the
newsprints sold to them were not moved to another State. They were moved only
to Sivakasi and later the said newsprints were converted into news magazine in
Pioneer Press (P) Limited, Sivakasi and then the same were moved to Kerala.
Therefore, the assessing officer assessed the said turnover under the Tamil
Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Aggrieved by that order, the assessee filed
an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT), Tirunelveli in CST
AP No. 345 of 1995. The Commissioner allowed the appeal on the ground that the
movement of goods from the State of Tamil Nadu to Kerala would certainly form
an inter-State transaction. Later, the Joint Commissioner (CT)(SMR) suo motu
revised the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and treated the
transaction as local sales.

Assessee pursued the matter further
and ultimately came before Hon. Madras High Court by way of a Writ Petition.
After hearing parties, Hon. High Court ruled as under:

“After taking note of the
principles enunciated in the above Supreme Court judgments, we have to find out
whether there is movement of goods. The present case falls u/s. 3(a) of the
Act. There are two ingredients in the section, i.e., (i) it must be a sale of
goods; (ii) the sale occasions the movement of goods from one State to another.
In respect of sale, there is no dispute. We have to see here whether there is
sale occasioning the movement of goods. In the case on hand, the seller and the
buyer contemplated movement of goods from Tamil Nadu to Kerala. At the
instruction of the buyer, the goods were dispatched to Sivakasi, wherein
conversion took place and after conversion, the goods were moved to Kerala.
Because of conversion, it cannot be held that there is no movement of goods. It
is only for the purpose of section 5(3) of the Act that any goods undergoing
commercial change is relevant. It is not for the purpose of determining the
inter-state sale u/s. 3(a) of the Act.

Mere stoppage at Sivakasi and
conversion would not alter the character of the transaction. The stoppage and
conversion occurred only at the instance of the buyer at Kerala. There is no
dispute in respect of the contract. The goods were moved pursuant to the
contract. The goods dispatched to Sivakasi were not meant to be sold in the
open market. There is no restriction that the goods should be moved intact. It
is not for the Revenue to suggest that the goods must reach as it is. The
authorities, who are acting as guardian of the Revenue, must examine and
consider the transaction from the standpoint of a businessman. The yardstick is
that of a prudent businessman. Otherwise, first, the goods have to go to Kerala
and then betransported back to Sivakasi for conversion and once again after
conversion, it must go to Kerala. To avoid multiplicity of transaction, the
seller sent the goods to Sivakasi at the instance of the buyer and after conversion,
the same were sent to Kerala. There is no material available to show that the
goods are meant to be in Sivakasi. It is not the contention of the petitioner
that the goods were not moved from Tamil Nadu to Kerala. Stoppage and
conversion do not make the transaction a local sale. After applying the
principles enunciated in the judgments cited supra and also taking into
consideration the facts involved, we are of the view that the transaction
involved is only an inter-State sale.”


Inter State sale under section 3(a) –
Scenario II

Tamil Nadu Petro Products Ltd. vs.
Assistant Commissioner (CT), Fast Track Assessment Circle II, Chennai and
another’s (95 VST 118)(Mad)

The facts in this case, as narrated
by the High Court are as follows:

“2. The controversy which led to
the petitioner seeking for the clarification arose under the following
circumstances. HLL are engaged in the manufacture of detergents and they are
registered dealers on the file of the Assistant Commissioner (CT), Fast Track
Assessment Circle-II, Greams Road, Chennai, under the provisions of the TNGST
Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, (CST Act). HLL placed purchase order
dated 15.06.2000, for sale of LAB and for delivery of the same at M/s. Ultra
Marine and Pigments Limited, Ranipet, (Job Worker). The said purchase order was
raised by HLL from their Mangalore office. The job worker is required to
manufacture Acid Slurry from LAB and such product is stock transferred to the
factory of HLL at Mangalore. Therefore, the question arose as to whether the
petitioner can avail the concessional rate of tax on production of form-XVII
declaration.”

The following argument on behalf of
Revenue further clarifies the controversy:  

“5. Mr. Manokaran Sundaram, learned
Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that the
petitioner entered into a contract with HLL, Mangalore for supply of LAB; a raw
material for manufacture of detergent and as per the agreement, it had to be
supplied and delivered to their job worker at Ranipet and later after
conversion of raw material as Acid Slurry, the same would be transported to
HLL, Mangalore for further processing and manufacturing as detergents.
Referring to the purchase order dated 15.06.2000, it is submitted that it
clearly shows the dealer at Mangalore had placed the purchase order and in
pursuance to the same, the petitioner had effected sale to the dealer at
Mangalore and the transaction is clearly an interstate sale and the only
difference being delivery has been made to the job worker at Ranipet and after
completion, for onward transmission to the purchaser at Mangalore.”

After examining controversy, the
Hon. High Court held as under:

“12. Undoubtedly, the products sold
by the petitioner was not the product which was moved out of the Ranipet
factory on stock transfer to HLL Mangalore. Thus, the factory at Ranipet had
manufactured a commercially distinct product than what was sold by the
petitioner to HLL. In other words, the products sold by the petitioner was LAB,
the product which was manufactured from LAB was Acid Slurry. In my view, it
would be unnecessary to test the present transaction based on whether the
product manufacture within the State was an intermediary product for
manufacture of another product outside the state.

14. If the case on hand is tested
on the anvil of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is not in dispute
that the contract of sale with the petitioner stood completed within the State
of Tamil Nadu upon delivery of the goods at Ranipet. The movement of the goods
after undergoing a process of manufacture and after being converted into a
commercially different product is an independent transaction and the
transaction could not be treated as an interstate element.”

Thus, the transaction of sale by
seller to buyer (HLL) is held to be intra state sale.


Conclusion

It can be seen that on similar
facts, the same High Court has given different rulings. Thus, the situation
becomes very uncertain. The dealer community remains in great confusion about
the correct tax to be collected from buyer. It is felt that the latert judgment
specifies correct scope of section 3(a) of CST Act for inter-state sale. The
goods sold and moved to other State should be same goods, else it will create
an unexpected situation.

It is expected that the controversy
will get settled by the later judgment. _

ONUS OF LIABILITY TO PAY SERVICE TAX

Preliminary

Service providers often face
practical difficulties (due to financial constraints, non-recoveries from
clients etc.) in paying service tax to the Government in time resulting in
interest and other penal consequences. In such situations, issues arise as to
whether service providers can direct service tax authorities to recover tax
dues from their debtors. This aspect and related issues are discussed hereafter
with the help of a Delhi High Court ruling, special leave petition against
which has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Relevant Extracts from the Finance
Act, 1994 as amended (“Act”)

Section 68 of the Act (payment of service tax)

(1)  Every person providing
taxable service tax to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified
in section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.

(2)  Notwithstanding anything
contained in s/s. (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified
by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon
shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the
rate specified in section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall
apply to such person as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax
in relation to such service;

Provided that the Central
Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be
payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such
person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax
shall be paid by the service provider.

Section 87 of the Act (recovery of any amount due to Central
Government)

Where any amount payable by a
person to the credit of the Central Government under any of the provisions of
this Chapter or of the rules made thereunder is not paid, the Central Excise
Officer shall proceed to recover the amount by one or more of the modes
mentioned below:

(a) the Central Excise Officer
may deduct or may require any other Central Excise Officer or any officer of
customs to deduct the amount so payable from any money owing to such person
which may be under the control of the said Central Excise Officer or any
officer of customs;

(b) (i)   the Central Excise Officer may, by notice in
writing, require any other person from whom money is due or may become due to
such person, or who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of
such person, to pay to the credit of the Central Government either forthwith
upon the money becoming due or being held or at or within the time specified in
the notice, not being before the money becomes due or is held, so much of the
money as is sufficient to pay the amount due from such person or the whole of
the money when it is equal to or less than that amount;

     (ii)  every person to whom
a notice is issued under this section shall be bound to comply with such
notice, and in particular, where any such notice is issued to a post office,
banking company or an insurer, it shall not be necessary to produce any pass
book, deposit receipt, policy or any other document for the purpose of any
entry, endorsement or the like being made before payment is made,
notwithstanding any rule, practice or requirement to the contrary;

    (iii) in a case where the
person to whom a notice under this section is sent, fails to make the payment
in pursuance thereof to the Central Government, he shall be deemed to be an
assessee in default in respect of the amount specified in the notice and all
the consequences of this Chapter shall follow;

                        …………….

Delhi High Court Ruling in Delhi
Transport Corporation (DTC) vs. CST (2015) 51 GST 511 (DEL)
(2015-TIOL-961-HC-DEL-57

Facts in Brief

With the objective of augmenting
its revenue, DTC entered into contracts with seven agencies
(contractors/advertisers) providing space to such parties for display of
advertisements on bus queue shelters and time keeping booths. Two of the said
contracts contained similar stipulations including clause No 9 which reads as
under:

“It shall be
responsibility of the contractor/advertiser to pay direct to the authority and
MCD concerned the advertisement tax or any other taxes levy payable or imposed
by any authority and this amount will be in addition to the license fee quoted
above”

According to the Revenue, on the
basis of inputs received from its anti-evasion branch, DTC having engaged
itself in aforementioned contracts had failed to pay tax on services. Hence
show cause notices were issued by the revenue demanding service tax on receipts
by DTC on account of “sale of space or time for advertisement” along with
interest and penalty.

DTC submitted replies to the
effect that it is an autonomous body of government of NCT of Delhi created
under the Road Transport Act and had no intention to violate the provisions of
the taxing statutes. They further submitted that the obligation for
registration under the Service Tax Rules had escaped the notice of its accounts
department and chartered accountant/auditors and thus, the omission was neither
intentional nor deliberate. It was submitted that after the requirement had
come to its notice, DTC had taken requisite steps for registration. It further
stated that since it was obliged to provide transport services to the public at
large at subsidised rates, it was incurring losses and consequently depended on
grants from the government and for this reason it was moving the Central
Government to grant exemption. DTC further stated that in terms of the
contractual arrangement, the liability towards statutory taxes, including
service tax, was to be borne by the contractors engaged by it and that all such
contractors, except the two mentioned above, were paying the service tax
chargeable in their respect pursuant to supplementary bills raised from time to
time and further that all such remittances received were duly deposited with
the service tax department.

DTC resisted the show cause
notices also on the ground that the two contractors  had taken a stand contradictory to the
contractual terms in such regard, failing to abide by their obligation in terms
of clause 9 (as quoted earlier), in spite of directions of this Court on the
petitions u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DTC informed the
Revenue that it intended to institute contempt/execution proceedings against
the said contractors for failure to deposit the service tax in spite of
contractual obligation and the directions of the High Court. It added that the
amount of service tax to the extent realized from the contractors was deposited
with the service tax department.

The show cause notices were
confirmed upon adjudication. In reaching at conclusions, the adjudicating
authority repelled the contentions of DTC objecting to the assessment for the
extended period of five years holding that the assessee contravened the
relevant statutory provisions thereby indulging in “suppression of
material facts”. In addition to penalty u/s. 77 of the Act, penalty was
imposed u/s. 78 of the Act, declining benefit of section 80, referring in this
context to the facts that the assessee had neither applied for service tax
registration nor discharged its service tax liability even though it had been
made aware of the obligations.

Appeal before CESTAT

The order of Commissioner
(Adjudication), service tax was challenged before CESTAT. As noted by the
CESTAT in (para 5 of) the impugned order, DTC did not assail the conclusion of
the adjudicating authority as to the classification of the service nor
impeached the quantum of service tax that was confirmed. Its contentions were
restricted to the following (para 11) :

“5. … that since under
agreements with advertisers, the reciprocal obligation of the parties
covenanted that the recipient of the service would be liable for tax, the
appellant was under a bona fide belief that the liability to remit service tax
stood transferred to the recipient qua the agreements; that this was a bona
fide belief which caused the failure to file returns and remit service tax.
Therefore, the extended period of limitation invoked while issuing the first
show cause notice dated 04/01/2008 is unjustified and for the same reasons,
penalty u/s. 78 of the Act should not have been imposed, by exercising
discretion u/s. 80 of the Act.”

The appellant relied on the
Supreme Court Ruling in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited vs. Dewan Chand Ram
Saran (2012) 35 STT 664 (SC)
to urge that having entered into the contracts
in the nature mentioned above, it was a legitimate expectation that the service
tax liability would be borne by the contractors/advertisers and thus, there was
no justification for the appellant being held in default or burdened with the
penalty u/s. 78 of the Act. It was argued that in the wake of orders of this
Court on the applications of the two contractors u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, fastening the liability of service tax (in the event of it being
imposed) on such contractors, the revenue ought not to insist upon such payment
by DTC. The CESTAT, however, held that such considerations would not transfer
the substantive and legislatively mandated liability to service tax from the
appellant (the service provider) to the advertisers (the service recipients).

The CESTAT rejected the claim of
DTC as to “bona fide belief” by observing in para 13 as under:

“6. A bona fide belief
is a belief entertained by a reasonable person. The appellant is a public
authority and an instrumentality of the State and should have taken care to ascertain whether it was liable to tax in
terms of the provisions of the Act
. There is neither alleged, asserted nor
established that there is any ambiguity in the provisions of the Act, which
might justify a belief that the appellant/service provider, was not liable to
service tax. It is axiomatic that no person can harbour a “bona fide
belief” that a legislated liability could be excluded or transferred by a
contract.
The appellant was clearly and exclusively liable to service tax
on rendition of the taxable service of “sale of space or time for
advertisement”. This liability involved the non-derogable obligation to
obtain registration, file periodical ST-3 returns and remit service tax on the
consideration received during the period covered by such ST-3 returns. These
were the core and essential obligations the appellant should have complied
with. We therefore find no basis for the claim that the appellant harboured a
bona fide belief.”

Accordingly, the appeals of DTC
were dismissed by CESTAT.

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS OF
THE DELHI HIGH COURT

–   There is no dispute that services provided are taxable within the
meaning of section 65 (105) (zzzn) and that the appellant is liable to pay
service tax thereupon. We, however, do not agree with the views of CESTAT that
the service tax liability could not have been transferred by way of a contract.
The reliance of DTC on the ruling in Rashtriya Ispat case (supra) on
this score was correct and it appears that the same has not been properly
appreciated by CESTAT. Noticeably, the claim of the assessee in that case was
also founded on contractual terms similar to the one relied upon by the
appellant here. [Para 17]

   The service tax liability in Rashtriya Ispat case arose out of
contract given out for transportation of goods. The contractor engaged had
undertaken to “bear and pay all taxes, duties and other liabilities in
connection with discharge of his obligation”. The contractor had invoked
the arbitration clause for raising a dispute as to its liability to pay service
tax. The claim petition was dismissed by the arbitrator which award was
challenged by a petition u/s. 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act before a
Single Judge of Bombay High Court. The learned Judge held that insofar as the
service liability is concerned, the appellant (Rashtriya Ispat which had given
the contract was the assessee and liable to tax. The appeal preferred against
the said order on the petition was dismissed by the division bench of the High
Court. [Para 18]

   Against the backdrop of the above-noted facts in civil appeal
carried to Supreme Court, it was observed
as under:-

     “37. As far as the
submission of shifting of tax liability is concerned, as observed in para 9 of
Laghu Udyog Bharati vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 418, service tax is an
indirect tax and it is possible that it may be passed on. Therefore, an
assessee can certainly enter into a contract to shift its liability of service
tax.

 ……………

39. The provisions concerning service tax are relevant only as
between the appellant as an assessee under the statute and the tax authorities.
This statutory provision can be of no relevance to determine the rights and
liabilities between the appellant and the respondent as agreed in the contract
between two of them. There was nothing in law to prevent the appellant from
entering into an agreement with the respondent handling contractor that the
burden of any tax arising out of obligations of the respondent under the
contract would be borne by the respondent.”
[Para 19]

  The above ruling of Supreme Court in the case of Rashtriya Ispat,
however, cannot detract from the fact that in terms of the statutory provisions
it is the appellant which is to discharge the liability towards the Revenue on
account of service tax. Undoubtedly, the service tax burden can be
transferred by contractual arrangement to the other party. But, on account of
such contractual arrangement, the assessee cannot ask the Revenue to recover
the tax dues from a third party or wait for discharge of the liability by the
assessee till it has recovered the amount from its contractors.
[Para 20]

   The
directions of this Court on the two petitions u/s. 9 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act (instituted by the two contractors) would only govern the
rights and obligations arising out of the contracts entered upon by DTC with
the contractors. It may be that in terms of the said orders, DTC would be in a
position to recover the amount of service tax paid by it to the Revenue
respecting the services in question. The
fastening of liability on such account by such order on the contractors is,
thus, a matter restricted to claims of the appellant against such parties. It
would have no bearing insofar as the claim of the Revenue against the appellant
for recovery of the tax dues is concerned.
[para 21]

   We agree with the observations of CESTAT that the plea of
“bona fide belief” is devoid of substance. The appellant is a public
sector undertaking and should have been more vigilant in compliance with its
statutory obligations. It cannot take cover under the plea that contractors
engaged by it having agreed to bear the burden of taxation, there was no need
for any further action on its part. For purposes of the taxing statute, the
appellant is an assessee, and statutorily bound to not only get itself
registered but also submit the requisite returns as per the prescription of law
and rules framed thereunder. [Para 22]

For the foregoing reasons, it was
held that the imposition of service tax liability and the levy of interest
thereupon cannot be faulted. For the same reasons, the penalties imposed under
sections 76 and 77 of the Act, were upheld. However, penalty u/s. 78 of the
Act  was dropped invoking provisions of
section 80 of the Act.

SLP before the Supreme Court

   SLP against the foresaid ruling of Delhi High Court ruling was
dismissed by the Supreme Court through a short order [Ref (2016) 55 GST 763
(SC)].

Recovery of service tax by the
service providers from the service recipient – Some judicial considerations.

   Since the commercial understanding is between the service provider
and service recipient, if service recipient does not pay taxes to the service
provider, the latter is entitled to file civil suit in terms of applicable
commercial laws and obtain appropriate orders. As far as service tax department
is concerned, it should, ordinarily deal only with person liable to pay service
tax, who is an ‘assessee’ under the Act. In this regard attention is drawn to a
Court ruling in Damodar Valley Corpn. vs. CCE&ST (2014) 41 taxmann.com
58 (JHARKHAND)
, wherein the High Court set aside a direction of the
department to the service recipient to pay Service tax to the service provider,
essentially because no opportunity of hearing was given by department to the
service recipient.

   In Bhagwati Security
Services vs. UOI [2013] 31 STR 537 (All)
, it was held that that, since
service tax is an indirect tax and is a statutory liability, even if agreement
between parties is silent as to levy of service tax, service providers may
bring suit before Courts to seek collection of service tax from the service
recipient, inasmuch as service providers are merely a collecting agency who
collect service tax from recipient and pay it to Government.

   As regards recovery of levy / increase in service tax, useful
reference can be made to the ruling in Satya Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pearey
Lal Bhawan Association (2015) 39 STR 429 (DEL)
and 39 STR J173 (SC). In
the said ruling in particular, it was held that, section 64A of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1930 is also applicable for service tax. However, in a contrary
view, it was held in Multi Engg & Scientic Corp. vs. Bihar State
Electricity Board (2015) 39 STR 414 (PAT)
that liability to pay service tax
is on service provider and in absence of any agreement to the contrary,
reimbursement of service tax cannot be claimed from service recipient. Section
64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was held inapplicable to services. 

Summation

In light of foregoing discussions,
it can be reasonably summed up as under :

   Under the service tax law service provider is liable to pay
service tax, excepting in cases notified in terms of section 68 (2) of the Act
read with Notification No. 30/2012 – ST dated 20/06/2012 (as amended), in which
case the persons liable to pay service tax shall be as prescribed in Rule 2(d)
of Service Tax Rules, 1994 (Rules).

   In terms of section 65B (12) of the Act, ‘assessee’ means a person
liable to pay tax and includes his agent. Hence, in appropriate cases, agents
of service providers / persons specified in Rule 2(d) of Rules could be liable
to pay service tax.

   Being an indirect tax, service tax can be recovered by the service
provider from the service receiver, subject to commercial understanding to the
contrary.

   Though service tax burden can be transferred by contractual
agreement by a service provider to the service receiver, such consideration would
not transfer the substantive and legislatively mandated liability to service
tax from a service provider to the service recipients. Further, service
providers cannot ordinarily ask the service tax department to recover tax dues
from a third party or wait for discharge of their liability till it has
recovered the amounts from their clients.

   In appropriate cases, service providers can in terms of applicable
commercial laws seek directions / orders from the Court as regards tax amount
due to them which is not paid by their clients.

   Section 87 of the Act which in particular empowers service tax
department to recover service tax from an assessee’s debtors can be usually
invoked in extreme cases where a service provider fails to pay service tax to
the government. _

Section 28, 41(1) – In a case where assessee has filed confirmation from creditors along with PAN number, amounts payable to creditors cannot be added to income merely on the ground that the assessee could not produce creditors

11.  ITO vs. Mahesh N. Manani
ITAT  Mumbai `B’ Bench
Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (JM) and Rajesh Kumar (AM)
ITA No.: 389/Mum/2014
A.Y.: 2010-11.  Date of Order: 4th August, 2016.
Counsel for revenue / assessee: Shivaji Ghode / None

FACTS
During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that sundry liabilities at the end of the year were shown at Rs. 90,00,563 as against the previous years amount of Rs. 19,69,537.  He issued notice u/s. 133(6) of the Act, which were not returned back but there was no response received.  Therefore, assessee was asked to produce the creditors with their relevant income-tax records for verification. However, the creditors did not come before the AO. The AO added this sum of Rs.90,00,563 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) where elaborate reasoning was given for assessee not being able to produce creditors. The assessee also filed confirmatory letters from all the 8 creditors which contained complete names, addresses and even income tax particulars of the creditors. The CIT(A) remanded the matter to the AO with a direction to make enquiries/ investigation as he thinks fit to ascertain the facts of the matter.  

In the remand proceedings, the AO instead of making any enquiries asked the assessee to produce the creditors which the assessee could not do for the very reasons mentioned in the submissions filed before CIT(A). The CIT(A) observed that through the letter calling for remand report specifically directed the AO to make an enquiry, investigation as was necessary and thereafter submit a factual report, the AO did not do any enquiry at his end.  The CIT(A) allowed the appeal and held that that the assessee on his part has primarily discharged his onus cast upon him to establish the credits in his books whereas AO except harping on the point that the assessee has failed to produce them along with records has not brought any material to establish that the liabilities were fictitious.  

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The AO was not justified in rejecting the claim of the assessee mainly on the ground that assessee could not produce creditors. It is not in dispute that the assessee has filed confirmation from creditors along with PAN number.  This view is fortified by the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case CIT vs. Orissa Corporation (P.) Ltd. [159 ITR 78 (SC)].  In view of this, CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition.  

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

21. Business expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 2005-06- Capital or revenue expenditure – Assessee engaged in oil exploration – Expenses on dry dockings of rigs and vessels – is expenditure on maintenance of assets – deductible

CIT
vs. ONGC Ltd; 387 ITR 710 (Uttarakhand):

The assessee was engaged in oil exploration.
For the A. Y. 2005-06, the Assessing Officer disallowed expenditure on dry
docking of its rigs and vessels treating the same as capital expenditure. The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction. The Tribunal found that
under the Merchant Shipping Act, every floating rig and vessel has to undergo a
compulsory survey at specified intervals in order to determine whether it is
seaworthy and can withstand the safety standards laid out. Under such survey,
the structural and mechanical fitness of a floating installation is tested. The
expenses on dry docking were on account of removing the old paint and
repainting the rigs and vessels, overhauling the propellers, thrusters, gears
and electric motors, repair and replacement/upgrading of the obsolete
equipment. Such expenses were, therefore, only for maintaining and preserving
the existing assets. It was deductible.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Uttarakhand High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The expenditure on dry docking is revenue expenditure and hence
deductible.”

Part C | RBI/FEMA

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Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars

34] A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 22 dated 21st
October, 2015

Notification No. FEMA. 351/2015-RB dated
September 30, 2015
Annual Return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets
(FLA Return) – Reporting by Limited Liability
Partnerships

This circular states that Limited Liability Partnerships (LLP) in India that have received FDI and / or made overseas investment in the previous year(s) as well as in the current year, have to submit the FLA return to RBI by 15th July every year, in the prescribed format.

As LLP do not have 21 Digit CIN (Corporate Identity Number), they should enter ‘A99999AA9999LLP999999’ against CIN in the FLA Return.


35] A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated 29th October, 2015

No fresh permission/renewal of permission to
LOs of foreign law firms- Supreme Court’s directions

This circular states that, till the final disposal of the matter by the Honorable Supreme Court of India: –

1. Foreign law firms that have been granted permission prior to the date of interim order for opening Liaison Office (LO) in India are permitted to continue till the date such permission is still in force.

2. No fresh permission / renewal of permission will be granted by RBI / banks.



36] A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 24 dated 29th October, 2015

Notification No. FEMA. 353 /2015-RB dated October 6, 2015 Subscription to National Pension System by Non-Resident Indians (NRIs)

This circular permits NRI to subscribe to
National Pension System governed and administered by Pension Fund
Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA), provided
the subscriptions are made through normal banking channels or out of
funds held in their NRE / FCNR / NRO account and the person is eligible
to invest as per the
provisions of the PFRDA Act.

 There are no restrictions on repatriation of the annuity / accumulated
savings and hence, the annuity / accumulated saving will be repatriable.


37] A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 26 dated 5th November, 2015

Notification No FEMA.347/2015-RB dated July 24, 2015 Switching from Barter Trade to Normal Trade at the Indo-Myanmar Border

This circular provides that with effect from 1st December, 2015 all trade at the Indo-Myanmar border will be as per normal trade route i.e. payments can be settled in any permitted currency in addition to the Asian Clearing Union mechanism. As a result, no trade on the barter system basis will be permitted from 1st December, 2015.


38] A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 27 dated 5th November, 2015

Software Export – Filing of bulk SOFTEX-further liberalisation

Presently, software exporters with an annual turnover of at least Rs.1,000 crore or who file at least 600 SOFTEX forms annually on an all India basis, are eligible to declare all the off-site software exports in bulk in the form of a statement in excel format, to the competent authority for certification on monthly basis.

This circular has extended that facility to all software exporters. Hence, all software exporters can now file single as well as bulk SOFTEX form in excel format with the competent authority for certification in the SOFTEX form Annexed to this circular.

Software exporters are required to submit the SOFTEX form induplicate as per the revised procedure. STPI / SEZ will retain one copy and handover the duplicate copy to the exporters after due certification. Software exporters can generate SOFTEX form number (single as well as bulk) for use in off-site software exports from the website of RBI viz., www.rbi.org.in. In order to generate the SOFTEX number/s, an online application form Annexed to this circular has to be filled in.


39] A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28 dated 5th November, 2015

Risk Management & Inter-Bank Dealings: Relaxation of facilities for residents for hedging of foreign currency borrowings

Presently, residents having a long term foreign currency liability are permitted to hedge, with a bank in India, their exchange rate and/or interest rate risk exposure by undertaking a foreign currency-INR swap to move from a foreign currency liability to a rupee liability.

This circular now permits residents to enter in to FCY-INR swaps with Multilateral or International Financial Institutions (MFI / IFI) in which the Government of India is a shareholding member subject to the following terms and conditions: –

(i) Such swap transactions must be undertaken by the MFI / IFI concerned on a back-to-back basis with a bank in India.

(ii) Banks can face, for the purpose of the swap, only those Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in which Government of India is a shareholding member.

(iii) The FCY-INR swaps must have a minimum tenor of 3 years.

(iv) All other operational guidelines, terms and conditions relating to FCY-INR swaps as laid down in A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 32 dated 28th December, 2010, as amended from time to time, shall apply, mutatis mutandis.

(v) In case of default by the resident borrower on its swap obligations, the MFI / IFI concerned must bring in foreign currency funds to meet its corresponding liabilities to the counterparty bank in India.

(vi) Banks have to report the FCY-INR swaps transactions entered into with the MFI / IFI on a back-to-back basis on CCIL reporting platform.

Part D | ETHICS, GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY

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A democracy can only be as strong as its institutions. A vibrant and effective democracy needs to be underpinned by strong institutional support. Unfortunately, there has been a serious and long-term undermining of institutions crucial for India’s governance. This includes governors, C & AG, public service commissions, Lok Ayuktas, election commissioners at the state and central levels, higher civil services, police, and regulatory bodies. Each of these institutions has been deliberately undermined and weakened over the years. (From the book, “GOOD GOVERNANCE” by Madhav Godbole, page 233)


RTI Clinic in December 2015: 2nd, 3rd, 4th Saturday, i.e. 12th, 19th, and 26th, 11.00 to 13.00 hrs. at BCAS premises.

CANCEROUS CORRUPTION

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NETAS UNDER SCANNER:
Ajit Pawar & Sunil Tatkare are under investigation for massive cost escalation and occupation in Kondhane, Kalu and Balganga irrigation projects.

Chhagan Bhujbal, Pankaj and Samir Bhujbal – offence registered by a CB in the m aharashtra Sadan case.

Ramesh Kadam was arrested by CID for involvement in a Rs.300 crore corruption case.

CAN YOU BELIEVE?
For the project Balganga dam at Pen Taluka, Raigad, the initial cost estimated by CIDCO was Rs.353.9 crore, contract was awarded in 2009 for Rs.414 crore and cost revised within six months to Rs.1,600 crore

In the closely-watched proceedings of the a CB since CM Devendra Fadnavis gave his nod for the open inquiry, many eyebrows had been raised, when Pawar Jr. and Tatkare were exempted from appearing before the bureau. the a CB had sent a questionnaire to the duo to secure information on the Balganga, Kondhane and Kalu projects. the cost of Kondhane increased from Rs.56 crore to Rs.614 crore, that of the Kalu jumped from Rs. 382 crore to Rs.700 crore and of the Balganga from r s. 414 crore to Rs.1,600 crore

Following the ToI expose and an application filed by thane-based RTI activist Praveen Wategaonkar on 20th August, 2014, the a CB had sought permission for the open inquiry. It was sanctioned on 12th December, 2014

CORRUPTION IN DEFENCE DEALS:
Defence procurement corruption in India has been assessed to be “high”, with a large mass of its procurements shrouded in secrecy with low levels of accountability.

As per the Global Defence Anti-Corruption Index, India’s Military spending has increased by 147% in the last decade. Accessing the Indian experience, the Index said the Indian Army was found to be illegally running golf courses on government land while Air Force officials used defence land for unauthorised use, such as building of shopping malls and cinema halls. it also says that India’s Defence institutions have been found to be involved in exploitation of natural resources. Citing an example, the report said awards for contracts by Reflex, the paramilitary force in northeast i ndia, were essentially bought through personnel for kickbacks amounting to 35% of the tender cost.

GOVT. UNSPARING IN PUNISHING THE CORRUPT: PM MODI:
Asserting that his government is unsparing in punishing the corrupt, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said 45 senior officers have either been removed or faced pension cuts for “unsatisfactory performance and delivery in public service”. He said the focus of his government was on providing system-based and policy-driven governance.

“A governance structure is sensitive, transparent and accountable,” he said. Speaking at the Sixth Global Focal Point Conference on Asset Recovery, being hosted by the CBI, the Prime Minister said corruption is one of the “principle challenges” for governments across the world in transforming the lives of the poor and marginalised.

“We in India are currently in a crucial phase of nation building. Our mission is to build a prosperous India. An India where our farmers are capable, our workers satisfied, our women empowered and our youth self- reliant.”
“This is not an impossible mission. However, to achieve this objective, it is essential to fight relentlessly against corruption,” he said.

CORRUPTION-FREE’ DIWALI:
In an unprecedented development, Maharashtra was “corruption-free” at least for a week between 9th and 15th November. The anti-corruption bureau ( ACB) was unable to trap a single public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act during the period. By comparison, during the corresponding week in Diwali 2014, it had recorded nine cases. The joy was short-lived, though, for as soon as the new week began, on Monday and Tuesday, five public servants were caught red-handed while accepting bribes ranging from Rs.1,000 to Rs.5,000.

Canteen services are eligible input service for availment of CENVAT credit even if there is no statutory requirement of provision of food to workers in the factory

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41. 2015 (40) STR 265 (Tri. – Del.) Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur-I.

Canteen services are eligible input service for availment of CENVAT credit even if there is no statutory requirement of provision of food to workers in the factory

Facts

CENVAT credit on outdoor catering services relating to provision of food to less than 250 factory employees is disallowed. The Larger Bench’s decision in the case of CCE vs. GTC Industries Ltd. 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB) is not followed on the ground that the assessee was not under a statutory obligation (more than 250 workers) to provide canteen services and therefore, CENVAT credit is denied.

Held

On perusal of the Larger Bench decision in the case of GTC Industries Ltd. (supra), the following points were observed: Though the number of workers was one of the criteria for eligibility of CENVAT credit, distinction cannot be made on the basis of reasoning adopted by the Larger Bench. What has to be seen is the ratio of law and if it is applicable, CENVAT credit is allowable. In the said case, outdoor catering service is held to be eligible input service irrespective of the fact that subsidised food was provided or not or whether the cost of the food was given by the worker or by the factory. Following the decision in the case of GTC Industries Ltd. (supra) and also Karnataka High Court’s decisions in the case of CCE, Bangalore vs. Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. 2011 (23) STR 444 (Kar) and CCE vs. ACE Designers Ltd. (Kar) 2012 (26) STR 193 (Kar) and appellant’s own case Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. CCE 2013 (287) ELT 70 (Tri.- Del.), the appeal is allowed.

Waiver from penalty u/s. 80 shall be available if levy on service was subject to dispute and retrospective amendments are made to the provisions of law.

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40. 2015 (40) STR 280 (Tri.–Ahmd.) Sethi Tools Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE. CUS & ST. Vadodara-II.

Waiver from penalty u/s. 80 shall be available if levy on service was subject to dispute and retrospective amendments are made to the provisions of law.

Facts

Section 80(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribed nonlevy of penalty for failure to pay service tax payable on renting of immovable property as on 6th March, 2012 subject to payment of tax and interest within 6 months from enactment of Finance Bill, 2012. The appellant paid service tax belatedly but before introduction of the said section 80(2). Penalty was imposed as section 80(2) was not in existence during the period under consideration. The Appellant relied on the case Camex Reality Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Ahmedabad 2014 (36) STR 444 (Tri.-Ahmd), and prayed for waiver of penalty.

Held

Assessee who had already paid taxes before introduction of section 80 (2) of the Finance Act, 1994 cannot be put to a disadvantage vis-à-vis taxpayer making delayed payment on the same service at a later date. In any case, chargeability of such service was in dispute. Therefore, there was a reasonable cause for non-payment of tax which shall get covered u/s. 80 even before introduction of section 80(2) of the Act.

Intention of Rule 6(1A) of STR is to grant adjustment of excess service tax paid in advance towards forthcoming tax liability. Non furnishing of intimation for advance payment is merely a procedural lapse and denial of adjustment on this ground is not justified.

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39. 2015 (40) STR 247 (Tri. –Mumbai) Garima Associates vs. CC & CE, Chandrapur.

Intention of Rule 6(1A) of STR is to grant adjustment of excess service tax paid in advance towards forthcoming tax liability. Non furnishing of intimation for advance payment is merely a procedural lapse and denial of adjustment on this ground is not justified.

Facts

Rule 6(4A) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 as it stood then allowed adjustment for excess payment of service tax upto Rs.1,00,000/-. The appellant submitted that it was a case of advance payment of service tax covered under Rule 6(1A) of the said Rules wherein no such limit was prescribed. However, the department argued that it is covered under Rule 6(4A) of the said Rules as it was reflected so in the ST-3 return and therefore, due to procedural lapse of not furnishing requisite intimation within 15 days to jurisdictional Superintendent of Central Excise, the adjustment is denied.

Held

Excess payment is nothing but advance payment. Such excess payment and adjustment thereof is reflected in service tax returns. On scrutiny of the returns, these facts were evident. Therefore, it can be said that the appellant complied with the conditions prescribed under Rule 6(1A) of the Service Tax Rules though not scrupulously. Mere non-observance of procedure cannot be the sole reason for denial of adjustment. Intention of Rule 6(1A) is to grant adjustment of excess service tax paid in advance towards forthcoming tax liability. Denial of such adjustment would unjustly enrich Government with excess amount which cannot be the intention of law. It is no longer res integra that service tax cannot be recovered twice in respect of the same service and therefore the adjustment is allowed. [Note: It is to be noted that Rule 6(4A) of the Service Tax Rules has been amended and with effect from 1st April, 2012, there is no limit for the amount of adjustment of excess service tax paid].

Service tax is not leviable on marketing of mutual funds and bonds. The decision by Andhra Pradesh High Court has set aside CBEC circular dated 05/11/2003 clarifying that these services are Business Auxiliary Services.

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38. 2015 (40) STR 187(Tri-Del.) Comm. of Service Tax Delhi vs. ABN Amro Bank.

Service tax is not leviable on marketing of mutual funds and bonds. The decision by Andhra Pradesh High Court has set aside CBEC circular dated 05/11/2003 clarifying that these services are Business Auxiliary Services.

Facts

The appellant was engaged in business of marketing mutual fund units and were also selling bonds issued by banking and non-banking companies. The first appellate authority on the basis of the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgement in case of Karvy Securities vs. Union of India 2006 (2) STR 481 granted relief. Revenue challenged the decision before the Tribunal citing the CBEC circular dated 05/11/2003 providing that the said activity is taxable.

Held

The Tribunal upheld the order and held that services are not taxable as CBEC circular dated 05/11/2013 was struck down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Karvy Securities (supra).

Recovery u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 can be resorted to only after an amount is adjudicated to be due to the Central Government.

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37. [2015-TIOL-2451-HC-AHM-ST] Gopala Builders vs. Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence.

Recovery u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 can be resorted to only after an amount is adjudicated to be due to the Central Government.

Facts

Search operations were carried out at the Appellant’s premises. Several irregularities were noticed in the payment of service tax. Additional amounts were paid in the course of investigation. Subsequently notices were issued u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 to their debtors with a direction that monies payable to the Appellant be deposited in the Government treasury. Thereafter a Show Cause Notice was issued. Since notices were issued to their debtors for an amount determined unilaterally without issuance of Show Cause Notice, the present writ is filed.

Held

The Hon’ble High Court relying on the decision of the Uttarakhand High Court in the case of R.V. Man Power Solution vs. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise [2014-69-VST-528] held that recovery u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 can be resorted to only after an amount is adjudicated to be due to the Central Government. Therefore, such drastic measures adopted

Service tax paid wrongly can be claimed as CENVAT credit.

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Facts

The Assessee, a manufacturer, wrongly paid service tax on a non-taxable service and claimed CENVAT credit to that extent. The department argued that if tax was paid wrongly or in excess, the only course open was to claim refund and not to make use of CENVAT credit. The Tribunal ordered in favour of the Assessee and the department is in appeal.

Held

The High Court held that if the assessee had paid the tax that he was not liable to pay and is entitled to certain credits, the availing of the said benefit cannot be termed as illegal and accordingly dismissed the revenue appeal.

Services of restaurants, hotels, inns, guest houses or clubs with air conditioning facility are liable to service tax and Parliament is competent to levy it.

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35. 2015 (40) STR 51 (Kar) Ballal Auto Agency vs. Union of India.

Services of restaurants, hotels, inns, guest houses or clubs with air conditioning facility are liable to service tax and Parliament is competent to levy it.

Facts

The appellant is engaged in business of running hotels and restaurants. They are registered under Karnataka VAT Act, 2003 and paid regular VAT on the said transactions. It was contended that the said transaction is covered under Article 366(29A) and therefore no service tax would be leviable as it is beyond the powers of the Parliament and the State Government is authorised to tax this transaction. Further, the Parliament has no legislative competence to amend the Finance Act, 1994 to include restaurant services in taxable services. The Respondent argued that service tax is leviable under entry 97, which deals with matters not enumerated in List II and III, which derives its power from Article 248.

Held

The High Court confirmed the legislative competence of Union by placing relevance on “aspects theory” whereby the same transaction can have two taxable events of different nature. Under this theory, the taxes are imposed by two different statutes for two different reasons. Therefore, in transactions of composite nature like restaurant service, both legislatures have power to tax it and not solely the State Government. Relying also on Bombay High Court’s decision in case of India Hotel and Restaurants Association, it is held that service tax is leviable on such transaction.

The main objective of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is to ensure that CENVAT credit is not availed in respect of inputs or input services used in or in relation to exempted goods or for exempted services. Rule 6(3) (ii) of the said Rules providing for payment of 5% on exempted services does not apply automatically, if the assessee fails to opt either of the options with respect to reversal of CENVAT credit.

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42. 2015 (40) STR 381(Tri. – Mumbai) Mercedes Benz India (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-I.

The main objective of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is to ensure that CENVAT credit is not availed in respect of inputs or input services used in or in relation to exempted goods or for exempted services. Rule 6(3) (ii) of the said Rules providing for payment of 5% on exempted services does not apply automatically, if the assessee fails to opt either of the options with respect to reversal of CENVAT credit.

Facts

The appellant is engaged in manufacturing activities as well as trading activities (considered as exempt service with effect from 1st April, 2011). In March, 2012, the appellant filed an intimation with respect to their reversal of CENVAT credit along with interest on common input services under Rule 6(3A)(b) of CENVAT Credit Rules for Financial Year 2011-2012. The appellant neither maintained separate records for receipt and consumption of common input services nor availed CENVAT credit only to the extent of taxable activities. The Department denied availment of such option in view of non-observance of conditions of Rule 6(3A) read with Rule 6(3)(ii) on the grounds that intimation for availment of option under Rule 6(3A) was not conveyed giving respective particulars and the amount was not determined and paid provisionally every month. Consequently, huge demand equivalent to 5% of value of exempted services i.e. trading turnover along with interest and penalty was raised in terms of Rule 6(3) (i) of CENVAT Credit Rules. The demand was confirmed on the sole ground of non-observance of conditions provided under the said Rule 6(3A). Since there was no condition of intimation at the beginning of financial year, the appellant stated that they had legally opted to reverse CENVAT credit vide Rule 6(3A). Further, it was contended that manufacturer has to mention the date from which such option is exercised or proposed to be exercised. Therefore, the intention to grant benefit of such option was at the discretion of assessee. The intimation could be filed even after exercising such option. Further, the amount to be paid every month was on provisional basis and the final amount of reversal of CENVAT credit has to be made only before 30th June of next year. Therefore, none of the conditions were violated. Though intimation was not provided in the prescribed format, all the requisite information, directly or indirectly, were either furnished or available with the department. In any case, there was no provision in law that if the procedure as provided under Rule 6(3A) was not followed, automatically Rule 6(3) (i) would apply in such cases. Reliance was placed on the decision of the same Jurisdictional Commissioner in the case of Tata Technologies Ltd., wherein on identical facts, demand was dropped and no appeal was made thereafter.

Held

There are 3 options available to the appellants vide Rule 6(3) of the Rules for reversal of CENVAT credit of common input services used in manufacturing as well as exempted services i.e. trading of goods and they were free to choose any option. Department cannot insist upon the appellants to follow one particular option. The foremost condition of payment of amount vide a formula was fulfilled though belatedly with interest. More or less all the particulars were intimated to department vide returns and letters, though not vide intimation in prescribed format. Though there is no time limit for filing intimation, the appellant should file intimation before exercising the option. Nonetheless, it can be considered a procedural lapse. F.Y. 2011-12 was the initial period for trading being condoned as exempted service. Admittedly, Rule 6(3)(i) of the Rules does not apply automatically if the assessee does not opt for any option available under the said Rules, Rule 6 is not enacted to extract illegal amount from the assessee. Its main objective is to ensure that CENVAT credit is not availed in respect of inputs or input services used in or in relation to exempted goods or for exempted services. The demand was accordingly quashed.

If service receiver has paid service tax to service provider, CENVAT credit can be availed by service receiver even prior to registration obtained by service provider.

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43. 2015 (40) STR 288 (Tri. –Bang) Adecco Flexione Workforce Solutions Ltd. vs. CCE, Bangalore – LTU.

If service receiver has paid service tax to service provider, CENVAT credit can be availed by service receiver even prior to registration obtained by service provider.

Facts

CENVAT credit is denied on the ground that the service provider had taken registration subsequent to availment of CENVAT credit by service receiver.Therefore, the CENVAT credit would not be available to service receiver. Accordingly, CENVAT credit of trivial amount was denied in absence of registration number on invoices.

Held

If the assessee has paid service tax to service provider, CENVAT credit is available to service receiver without finding whether service tax paid by him to service provider stands deposited in the Government treasury. Verification of the fact of payment of service tax by service provider is impossible and impractical at service receiver’s end. Even if the revenue is of the view that service tax collected by service provider is not deposited by him, remedy is available with the department to take appropriate action against service provider and not service receiver. In the present case, the revenue did not even verify the fact of non-payment by service provider. Therefore, it was held that the appellant had rightly availed CENVAT credit.

Welcome move on Bankruptcy Code – But why not have a US Chapter 11-equivalent in the bankruptcy code?

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The draft new bankruptcy code displayed on the website of the finance ministry is a welcome move. However, it lacks provisions equivalent to those of Chapter 11 of the u S bankruptcy law, which allow a voluntary appeal by a debtor to be given a chance for a turnaround that the bankruptcy court can grant, if the court finds it feasible, regardless of the creditors’ verdict.

The proposed law calls for a new breed of professionals in i ndia, who, it imagines, will be better placed to run a troubled company than its failed managers. Corporate salvage as in Satyam was done by professional managers, not any specialised cadre of insolvency professionals. i t is not obvious that every company will gain by the failed management being booted out and replaced with professional managers.

A key provision is a limited window of opportunity: 180/270 days, failing which the company is liquidated. This makes eminent sense as an indefinite respite, allowed now in i ndian laws, leads to misuse. t he draft Bill sets a clear process to identify financial distress early on and prescribes swift resolution. a majority of 75% of voting share of the financial creditors must approve the plan.

The final decision to accept or reject the insolvency resolution plan rests with the adjudicating authority: d ebt r ecovery t ribunals for individuals and unlimited liability partnership firms, and the National Company Law t ribunal for companies and limited liabilities. t he Bill allows only individuals to financially start afresh, but expeditious order of discharge to creditors will also facilitate fresh start for companies.

The national Company Law tribunal, that will replace the BIFR , will speed up winding up companies and ease the burden on high courts. t he government should remove the legal hurdles in the way of operationalisation of the tribunal, and set up benches fast. a functional legal system is an imperative necessity for the bankruptcy code to work. t he courts should not accept every petition challenging the order of an appellate authority, and make its ruling redundant.

Smart gadgets ke side effects mean they need constant updates – Tech-22 conundrum

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In a world where handheld smart devices are ubiquitous and life without them is unimaginable, one is wont to overlook the health-related side effects of such technology. Smartphones, tablets and e-readers increasingly come with bluer and brighter screens that impact the body’s ability to produce sleep inducing hormones. i n other words, if you are one of those people who surf on their smart devices late into the night, unable to get a wink of sleep, you may have your favourite toy to blame. But fear not 21st century insomniacs, help is at hand. a ll that one needs to get a good night’s sleep is for a ‘bed mode’ to be built into your smart devices.

This would simply involve making sure that smartphones and tablets shift from blue and green light emissions to yellow and red. t his in turn would ensure that one’s body is able to produce the natural amount of melatonin to bring on the sweet release of sleep. But isn’t technology supposed to make our lives easier rather than raise anxiety about health issues? too much typing on your smartphone can give you text claw. excessive exposure to Wi-Fi through devices such as laptops can lower men’s chances of becoming fathers. and social media addiction can actually make you more lonely and sad.

That said, it’s ridiculous to suggest that the tech genie be put back into the bottle. The solution to tech side- effects may be more tech. With concepts such as internet of t hings, our lives and physical surroundings are set to get increasingly wired. move over, smartphone – we could soon be living in houses that are fully automated, from smart bathroom showers to beds that hook into our sleeping patterns to maximise quality of life. however, such tech needs to be safe, necessitating constant evolution of smart devices. a nd that’s the t ech-22 situation we face.

Tax Consequences of Interest Payments on Perpetual Debt

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A debt which does not contain a contractual obligation to pay to the holder of the instrument both the principal and interest amount is known as perpetual debt. That does not mean that the issuer will not redeem the debt or pay interest on it. Generally, the instrument will contain an economic compulsion so that the issuer will be compelled to redeem the debt and pay interest, such as step up of interest rates on the instrument, liquidation of the issuer company, dividend blocker, etc. In accordance with Ind AS 32, such a debt is not a liability but is classified as an equity instrument. The interest paid on such a debt is treated as a distribution to equity holders.

Interestingly, from the Income-tax Act perspective, certain tax advisors argue that perpetual bonds are issued as bonds and hence result in a debtor-creditor relationship. Merely classifying them as ‘equity’ in the financial statements and showing interest payments in a manner similar to dividend to equity holders should not deprive the company of claiming these interest payments for tax deduction. This article assumes that interest payments on perpetual bonds are deductible under the Income-tax Act.

Query
Under Ind AS 12 Income Taxes, should the tax deduction on interest payments be recognised in profit or loss, or directly in equity of the issuer company?

View 1
Paragraph 35 of Ind AS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation requires that distributions to holders of an equity instrument and transaction costs of equity transactions should be recognised directly in equity. Consequently, the interest payments on, and the costs of issuing, financial instruments themselves are recognised directly in equity. Paragraph 57 of Ind AS 12 requires that presentation of income tax consequences should be consistent with the presentation of the transactions and events themselves that give rise to those income tax consequences.

View 2
Paragraph 52B of Ind AS 12 provides more guidance on the presentation of the income tax consequences of dividends, which requires those income tax consequences to be recognised in profit or loss.

The following example deals with the measurement of current and deferred tax assets and liabilities for an entity in a jurisdiction where income taxes are payable at a higher rate on undistributed profits (50%) with an amount being refundable when profits are distributed. The tax rate on distributed profits is 35%. At the end of the reporting period, 31st December 20X1, the entity does not recognise a liability for dividends proposed or declared after the reporting period. As a result, no dividends are recognised in the year 20X1. Taxable income for 20X1 is Rs. 100,000. The net taxable temporary difference for the year 20X1 is Rs.40,000.

The entity recognises a current tax liability and a current income tax expense of Rs.50,000. No asset is recognised for the amount potentially recoverable as a result of future dividends. The entity also recognises a deferred tax liability and deferred tax expense of Rs.20,000 (Rs. 40,000 at 50%) representing the income taxes that the entity will pay when it recovers or settles the carrying amounts of its assets and liabilities based on the tax rate applicable to undistributed profits.

Subsequently, on 15th March 20X2, the entity recognises dividends of Rs.10,000 from previous operating profits as a liability. On 15th March 20X2, the entity recognises the recovery of income taxes of Rs.1,500 (15% of the dividends recognised as a liability) as a current tax asset and as a reduction of current income tax expense for 20X2.

Author’s View

View 1 is the preferred view. With respect to income tax consequences of interest payments on financial instruments that are classified as equity, it is important to understand whether those income tax consequences are linked to past transactions or events that were recognised in profit or loss. This is because, in accordance with paragraph 52B of Ind AS 12, the rationale for the accounting requirement in example above is because income tax consequences of dividends are more directly linked to past transactions or events than to distributions to owners.

Income tax consequences arising from interest payments on financial instruments that are classified as equity would not be linked to past transactions or events that were recognised in profit or loss, because:

(a) these interest payments that trigger a tax deduction could be made, irrespective of the existence of retained earnings; and
(b) income tax consequences arising from these interest payments cannot be associated with anything other than the interest payments themselves, because it is these interest payments that create a tax deduction.

Consequently, View 2 is not preferred. However, a plain technical reading of Ind AS 12 does allow the recognition of the tax credit in the P&L account. Without the amendment of Ind AS 12, View 2 should also be acceptable. The view selected should be applied consistently.

Appellate Tribunal – Natural Justice – Relying on post hearing decision, not permissible – Central Excise Act, 1944 Section 35C.

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Garden Silk Mills Ltd. vs. UOI [2015 (323) ELT 717 (Guj.)(HC)]

The Commissioner, Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Surat-I, by his Order dated 28.9.2012, disallowed certain Cenvat Credits claimed by the petitioner company.
The said decision was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, at Ahmedabad. The
matter was heard on 26.08.2014, however, the same was decided by order dated 27.11.2014. By the said order, the Tribunal remanded the matter on the basis of its own
decision dated 27.10. 2014 with regard to other group of appeals.

The petitioners, submitted that, though, the matter was heard on 26.8.2014, the decision has been rendered after about three months. The petitioner was not aware about
the order dated 27.10.2014 passed by the Tribunal itself which has been relied at the time of remanding the matter. He could submit that the case of the petitioner is different than the case decided by the Tribunal on 27/10/2014. The petitioner had no opportunity to make any submission with regard to the decision relied on by the Tribunal and, therefore, it is a breach of principle of natural justice.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it is an undisputed fact that the appeal preferred by the petitioner was finally heard on 26.8.2014 and the same is decided on 27.11.2014. If the impugned judgment and order is perused, it emerges that the Tribunal has relied upon its own decision dated 27.10.2014. It is equally true that the petitioner had no opportunity to plead their case before the Tribunal whether his case was covered as per the Tribunal’s decision dated 27.7.2014 or not. Therefore, the Appellate Tribunal ought to have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before deciding the matter when the Tribunal had relied on its subsequent decision. Hence, the Court directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

[2015] 62 taxmann.com 318 (Hyderabad – Trib.) St. Jude Medical India (P) Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 18-9-2015

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Section 92C, the Act – TPO cannot reject method consistently adopted by the taxpayer in past years for determination of ALP (which was not disputed by the tax authority) and apply another method without providing detailed reasons.

Facts
The taxpayer was engaged in the business of trading of medical devices. It had entered into international transactions with its AE for purchase of certain medical devices from its AE. The taxpayer was selling these devices in India to non-related parties. In its TP study, for determination of the ALP the taxpayer had adopted RPM and had adopted 4 companies as comparable companies.

According to the TPO RPM could be applied only where: the products were closely comparable; and where enterprise purchases a property or services from AE and then resells the same to unrelated enterprises. Further, one should ascertain the functions performed by the tested party before it resold the property or the services and also the cost incurred for performing these functions. Therefore, the TPO considered TNMM as more appropriate method in case of the taxpayer and proceeded to determine ALP accordingly.

Held
The taxpayer had been purchasing medical devices from its AEs even in the earlier years. This is evident from order of Tribunal in earlier year where tax authority has not disputed the method adopted by the taxpayer during its TP study.

Hence, there is no reason to dispute the same method during the relevant year. the order of the TPO merely reproduces the parameters to be taken into consideration for adopting the RPM for comparability analysis, but does not give detailed reasoning as to why the said method is not applicable.

Further, the TPO has not brought on record any evidence to support why the products sold by the comparable companies are not similar to the products sold by the taxpayer.

If the TPO desires to reject the method consistently being followed by the taxpayer and desires to adopt a different method, he is required to give his reasoning which he failed to provide in the present case.

Accordingly, the issue was remanded to the TPO for determination of the most appropriate method for determination of the ALP with directions that if he finds the RPM as the most appropriate method, then he shall also take into consideration the comparable companies selected by the taxpayer in addition to the companies selected by him for determination of the ALP.

Hindu Succession – Hindu female dying intestate – Her step son falls in category of heirs of husband – Hindu Succession Act 1956. Section 15(10)(b).

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S. A. Ramalingam vs. Elumalai AIR 2015 Madras 235

The suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff for declaration of his right, title and interest in respect of and recovery of the suit items, which admittedly belonged to one Sampoornammal, who was none other than the stepmother of the plaintiff.

The facts that Sampoornammal, who was the senior wife of Ramasamy Padaiyachi, was the original owner of the property and during the subsistence of the first marriage, Ramasamy Padaiyachi married one Rajammal as his second wife. Rajammal gave birth to the plaintiff through Ramasamy Padaiyachi. Shri Ramasamy Padaiyachi predeceased the senior and junior wives and the senior and junior wives also died thereafter and after their death, the defendant (son of one of the paternal uncles of Sampoornammal – senior wife) has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties.

The dispute in respect of the suit items arose between the plaintiff/step-son of  Sampoornammal and the defendant,.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the relationship between the parties was not disputed. The plaintiff being the step son of the owner falls in the category of the heir of the husband as referred to in clause (b) of section 15(1) and will come as legal heir of female dying intestate.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision reported in (1987) 2 SCC 547 (Lachman Singh vs. Kirpa Singh and others) has categorically laid down that the in the case of a female Hindu dying intestate, a step son, that is, the son of her husband by his another wife falls in the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in clause (b) of section 15(1) and will come in as her heir. That being the legal position, both the courts below by relying on the law so laid down by the Apex court, rightly held that the plaintiff being step son of Sampoornammal, under clause 15(1) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act, was entitled to succeed to her property, in the absence of other legal heirs and the denial of his right, title and interest by the defendant insofar as the suit items are concerned, is hence legally not sustainable. When the plaintiff is held to be entitled to the suit items, the possession of the suit items by the defendant without any right would amount to trespass and encroachment. Though the defendant sought to set up title on the strength of release deed executed by the plaintiff’s mother for her herself and on behalf of the plaintiff, who was the erstwhile minor son, the same for want of any right to do so by Rajammal and for want of registration was held to be not valid a document. When release deed is held to be invalid, the question of taking steps to set aside the same for the purpose of establishing the right of the plaintiff did not at all arise.

Part C | Information On & Around

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Attack on RTI activist in Latur:

The entire episode of this attack was recorded on cell and the video was circulated widely. When on my cell, I went through it for nearly 40 minutes. Tears flowed from my eyes. What inhuman activities by Shiv-Sena workers. (If any one desires to view the video, call me on 9821096052, I shall forward it).A Right to Information (RTI ) activist from Latur, Mr. M B, was brutally beaten and his face blackened allegedly by Shiv Sena activists on the premises of a college in the district in front of over 2,000 students, teachers, staff and onlookers. The activist had sought information through RTI queries, about unauthorised construction activity.Sena youth wing president Mr A.T said that those responsible for thrashing Mr. M B had been dismissed by the party. “Heard of the unfortunate incident in Latur. The party strongly condemns the disgraceful act. Those involved have been moved from the party,” he tweeted.

Senior member of the institution which runs the college, Mr. S B, has been arrested and the police have launched a manhunt for around 25 Sena activists.

Mr. M B told TOI , “A group of people with saffron scarves waiting in an SUV with a Shiv Sena emblem assaulted me. They dragged me into their car where they beat me, snatched my phone, and brought me to Shahu junior college campus. They kicked and showered blows on me while some assaulted me with belts and iron rods. They poured wangan lubricant on me.”

District Police Chief D C told TOI that they have photos of the incident and are trying to zero in on the culprits based on the pictures.

RTI activist receives 32kg of ‘replies’:

An RTI activist, who was denied information by panchayat officials for his queries under the Right to Information Act, finally received 32 kilos of papers as replies after waiting for eight months.

Mr. D J had requested information on the expenditure and details of work sanctioned by the executive officer of Vellalore town panchayat for a period of six months from August 2014 to February 2015.

He finally received the reply, costing the government more than Rs.11,000. As per the courier slip, courier charges alone were Rs.1,130 and the weight of the bundle was 32 kilos. “The panchayat officials told me they spent over Rs.9,000 just on photo copies,” he said.

3 RTI Activists sad story:

Three RTI activists were arrested in the last week of September on the charge of running an extortion racket targeting builders. The Mulund police said that Mr. L S, Mr. P C and Mr. A M had demanded Rs.2 lakh from a developer for not filing complaints with various government departments.

The developer, Mr. S G, had planned to refurbish an old house with the help of his relative. In January, Mr. L S allegedly met him and sought Rs.1 lakh for not blocking the repairs by filing a complaint with the local BMC ward office.According to the First information report (FIR), Gharat paid Rs.50,000. But a few months later, Mr. P C again approached Mr. S G and demanded Rs.1 lakh. The developer paid Rs.10,000.

Earlier this month, Mhaske allegedly tried to extract more money by saying that Mr. L S and Mr. P C were part of this group.

This time, Mr. S G alerted the Mulund police, who arrested the three men. Cops sought their remand for seven days, saying they wanted to find out if the trio was part of a bigger extortion ring that targeted builders. The court granted the request.

Mr. L S and Mr. P C have two previous criminal cases pending against them.

Part B | RTI Act, 2005

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Maharashtra Chief Information Commissioner Mr. Ratnakar Gaikwad has said:

Ten years after the Act was enacted, Gaikwad said the public authorities still do not think it necessary to put out all information, though section 4 of the RTI Act requires it. On the performance of information commissioners in Maharashtra, Gaikwad said there were two aspects:

Quantitative and qualitative. “In the last decade, around 44 lakh RTI queries were received across the state and 99% disposed of. Of the 1.54 lakh queries that have gone into appeal, 1.2 lakh have been disposed of. As on September 30, around 30,000 are pending,” he said.

The state information commissioner also wants a provision to be introduced in the Act to punish those who use it for blackmail. “Such persons must be blacklisted,” he said, adding that there must be a limit on the number of RTIs a person can file before the same PIO in a month.

Part A | Decision of CIC

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Whether PIO can file a Writ against order of the appellate authority – CIC:

The petitioner is the Public Information Officer, Syndicate Bank Regional Office at Mugulrajapuram, Vijayawada, under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short ‘the Act’).

The AP High Court held:
This court is of the opinion that the Writ Petition, filed by the Public Information Officer, is not maintainable because even though he is an employee, he is designated as Public Information Officer, who is charged with the duty of dealing with the requests of persons seeking information and render reasonable assistance to such persons. U/s. 7 of the Act, the Public Information Officer shall dispose of the requests received by him either by providing information on payment of the prescribed fee or by rejecting the request for any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9 of the Act. A person, who does not receive a decision within the time specified under sub-section 1 of section 7 of the Act or is aggrieved by the decision of the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, is entitled to file an appeal to such Officer, who is senior in rank of the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer. A second appeal against such decision shall lie to the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission as the case may be.

The scheme of the Act, discussed above would reveal that every Public Information Officer nominated as such under the Act has a dual role to play viz. as an officer of the Public Authority and also the Public Information Officer. While such Officer is loyal to his employer while acting in his role as the Officer, he acts as a quasijudicial authority while disposing of the request made for furnishing information. His orders are subject to further appeals. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the Public Information Officer cannot don the role of the Officer of the Public Authority in relation to the orders passed by the appellate authorities against the orders passed by him. If his order is reversed by the appellate authority, he cannot be treated as aggrieved party giving rise to a cause of action for him to question such Orders. It is only either the public authority, against whom the directions are given, or any other party, who feels aggrieved by such directions, that can question the orders passed by the appellate authorities. As such, the Public Information Officer, who filed this Writ Petition, is wholly incompetent to question the order of the appellate authority and the Writ Petition filed by him is not maintainable.

Even on merits, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the information sought for by respondent No. 2 does not fall within the exempted category u/s. 8 (1) (h) of the Act because that information, which respondent No. 2 has sought, relates to pending proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. However, what is exempted u/s. 8 (1) (h) is information, which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of respondent of offenders. It is not the pleaded case of the Bank that any investigation or apprehension or prosecution of respondent No. 2 will be impeded by furnishing information sought for by him. Even if the information relates to a pending dispute before a Court or Tribunal, that would not fall u/s. 8 (1) (h) of the Act.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed.

[PIO, Syndicate Bank, Regional Office, Mugulrajapuram, Vijaywada vs. Central Information Commission: Writ Petition No. 28785 of 2011 before the Hon’ble Sri Justice C V. Nagarjuna Reddy]

States abusing law – Time to reform colonial-era sedition law to prevent misuse

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The Tamil Nadu police arrested the folk singer S. Kovan on charges of sedition. The 52-year old Mr. Kovan had recorded hard-hitting songs pointing a finger at the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, J. Jayalalithaa – and her government, of the all India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham or AIADMK – of profiting from the sale of liquor in the state’s chain of alcohol shops under the Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation, or TASMAC. There are about 6,800 state-run alcohol shops in Tamil Nadu, and TASMAC earned just under Rs. 24,000 crore a year in 2013-14. Mr. Kovan, an outspoken Dalit rights activist, has sympathised with other hot-button issues before the prohibition movement, but his songs on alcohol attacking Ms. Jayalalithaa have touched a particular nerve, with his supporters saying they have been seen over 400,000 times on You Tube. it is, however, entirely questionable as to whether they constitute sedition.

Proviso to section 3 and section 37(1) – Business is set-up on recruitment of employees and all expenditure incurred thereafter are allowable as business expenditure.

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5. Reliance Gems & Jewels Ltd. vs. DCIT
ITAT “D” Bench, Mumbai
Before N.K. Billaiya (A M) and Amarjit Singh (J. M.)
I.T.A. No.3855/Mum/2013
A. Y. : 2008-09. Date of Order: 28.10.2015
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: F.V. Irani / Vivek Anand Ojha

Proviso to section 3 and section 37(1) – Business is set-up on recruitment of employees and all expenditure incurred thereafter are allowable as business expenditure.

FACTS

The assessee is in the business of trading and merchandising of diamonds and gold jewelleries. Return for the year was filed disclosing loss of Rs. 87.26 lakh. On perusal of the annual account, the Assessing Officer found that the assessee had not started its business therefore the entire expenditures were disallowed. The assessee carried the matter before the CIT(A) who upheld the order of the AO. Before the Tribunal, the assessee placed before it the details of employee-wise salaries alongwith job description and details of tax deducted at source as well as the details regarding other expenses. The assessee further submitted that the setting up of business is different from commencement of business and the expenditures are allowable on setting up of business. It also relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Omniglobe Information Tech India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (Income Tax appeal No. 257 of 2012). The Revenue strongly relied on the orders of the lower authorities and contended that the decision relied upon by the assessee relates to service industries and therefore same cannot be applied on the facts of the assessee’s case.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had recruited the employees for the purpose of its business. According to the Tribunal, the type of business the assessee was engaged in, require persons who have expertise in understanding the jewellery, and without such recruitment, it would not be possible to commence the business. It also referred to the proviso to section 3 of the Act, which defines the term “previous year” in relation to a newly setup business (and not with reference to the commencement of business), thus as contended by the assessee, the setting up of business was more relevant than the date of commencement of business.

Therefore, relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Omniglobe Information Tech India Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal held that the recruitment of employees was indicative that business was set up by the assessee. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 10A – Unless the initial years claim is withdrawn, subsequent years claim cannot be denied.

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4. ACIT vs. Sitara Diamond Pvt. Ltd.
ITAT Mumbai `E’ Bench
Before N. K. Billaiya (AM) and Ram Lal Negi (JM)
ITA Nos. 4422/Mum/2012 and 6727/Mum/2011
A. Y.s: 2006-07 and 2007-08.  
Date of Order: 2.09. 2015.
Counsel for revenue / assessee: S. K. Mahapatra / Nitesh Joshi

Section 10A – Unless the initial years claim is withdrawn, subsequent years claim cannot be denied.

FACTS

Deduction u/s. 10A was first made by the assessee in assessment year 2005-06, which was allowed by the order dated 10.12.2008 passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. For the assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08, the Assessing Officer (AO) denied claim for deduction u/s. 10A. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the claim of the assessee on merits. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was argued that while the CIT(A) has allowed the appeal on merits, the Revenue could not withdraw the claim of deduction since unless the initial years claim is withdrawn, subsequent years claim cannot be denied.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay has considered such issue in the case of CIT vs. Paul Brothers 216 ITR 548 wherein the Hon’ble High Court has held that “unless deductions allowed for the assessment year 1980-81 on the same grounds were withdrawn, they could not be denied for the subsequent years”. This decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay was followed by the Hon’ble high Court in the case of CIT vs. Western Outdoor Interactive Pvt. Ltd. 349 ITR 309 wherein the Hon’ble High Court has held that “where a benefit of deduction is available for a particular number of years on satisfaction of certain conditions under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, then unless relief granted for the first assessment year in which the claim was made and accepted is withdrawn or set aside, the Incometax Officer cannot withdraw the relief for subsequent years. More particularly so, when the Revenue has not even suggested that there was any change in the facts warranting a different view for subsequent years.”

Following the ratio laid down by the High Court, the Tribunal declined to interfere with the order of CIT(A). The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

Section 88E – STT paid on speculation loss has to be considered if after setting off the speculation loss against speculation gain there is positive income which has been included in the computation of total income.

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3. Sanjay Mohanlal Mota (HUF) vs. ITO
ITAT Mumbai `E’ Bench
Before N. K. Billaiya (AM) and Ram Lal Negi (JM)
ITA No. 2988/Mum/2013
A. Y. : 2007-08.                                    
Date of Order: 3. 09. 2015.
Counsel for assessee / revenue : Jitendra Singh / S. K. Mahapatra

Section 88E – STT paid on speculation loss has to be considered if after setting off the speculation loss against speculation gain there is positive income which has been included in the computation of total income.

FACTS

The assessee was trading in shares and stocks and
also derived dividend income, interest income and rent which were
assessed under the head Income from Other Sources. While assessing the
total income, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the loss in
respect of speculative transaction, though assessed, was carried forward
and did not form part of total income. He asked the assessee to show
cause why proportionate STT of Rs.1,79,722 should not be treated as STT
relating to speculative transactions and therefore, why this amount
should not be reduced from the total STT paid. The assessee filed a
detailed reply where it contended that when speculation income is taxed
there is no reason its claim should not be allowed when there is a
speculation loss. It was also contended that there is no provision for
bifurcating STT paid on each type of transaction. The AO rejected the
contentions of the assessee and disallowed the proportionate claim of
STT of Rs.1,79,722. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, by the order
passed by CIT(A), the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

A
perusal of the section 88E shows that the total income of the assessee
should include income chargeable under the head `profits and gains of
business or profession’ which arises from taxable securities
transactions. If this condition is fulfilled, then the assessee is
entitled to a deduction from the amount of income-tax on such income of
an amount equal to STT paid by him. Since the speculation loss is set
off against the speculation gain and thereafter if any positive income
remains that positive income is taken in the computation of total
income. Even the STT paid on speculation loss has to be considered while
giving effect to it. The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the
AO with a direction to examine whether there is any positive income
remaining after giving set off to the speculation loss. The AO was
directed to allow the claim if positive income is found under this head
after giving reasonable and sufficient opportunity of being heard to the
assessee. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed for statistical
purposes.

Sections 22, 56 – Rent received for renting of terrace for installation of mobile antennas is chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’. It is wholly irrelevant as to whether the antenna is part of the building or land appurtenant thereto. As long as the space which has been rented out is part of the building the rent is required to be treated as `income from house property’.

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11. [2015] 168 TTJ (Trib) 502 (Del)
Manpreet Singh vs. ITO
ITA No. 3976/Del/2013
Assessment Year: 2009-10.                   
Date of Order: 6.01.2015

Sections 22, 56 – Rent received for renting of terrace for installation of mobile antennas is chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’. It is wholly irrelevant as to whether the antenna is part of the building or land appurtenant thereto. As long as the space which has been rented out is part of the building the rent is required to be treated as `income from house property’.

FACTS

In the return of income filed by the assessee, an individual, amounts aggregating to Rs.2,91,723 received from Bharati Airtel and Idea Cellular Limited towards renting out its terrace for use by these companies for installing mobile antennas were offered for taxation under the head `Income from House Property’. The assessee had claimed deduction @ 30% u/s. 24(a) of the Act. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) considered this sum of Rs.2,91,723 to be chargeable to tax under the head `Income from Other Sources’. He denied deduction of Rs.87,516 claimed u/s. 24(a) and added back this sum to the total income. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO by relying on the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Mukherjee Estate (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT 161 CTR 470 (Cal). Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that under the terms of the leave and license agreement entered into by the assessee rent was for use of “roof and terrace” area (not more than 900 sq. ft. in case of Bharti Airtel and not more than 800 sq. ft. in case of Idea Cellular Ltd.). The installations mentioned in the leave and license agreement, which were permitted, were to be done by the companies. The obligation of the assessee did not exceed beyond permitting use of space for such installations. There was no dispute on the fact that the assessee was the owner of the property. The CIT(A) upheld the taxability under the head `income from other sources’ and thus rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 24(a) on the basis of his understanding of the law laid down by the Calcutta High Court. The Tribunal held that the reliance of CIT(A) on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mukerjee Estates (P) Ltd. was misplaced since in that case the Tribunal had given a categorical finding that the assessee had let out the hoardings and the assessee had failed to substantiate whether the roof was let out or the hoarding was let out. Undisputedly, the assessee was the owner of the property. Rent was for space to host the antennas and not for the antennas. The Tribunal held that since rent is for the space, terrace and roof space in this case, and which space is certainly a part of the building, the rent can only be taxed as `income from house property’. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 271E – Order passed u/s. 271E levying penalty for violation of provisions of section 269T was required to be passed within six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings were initiated.

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15. [2015] 43 ITR (Trib) 683 (Del)
ITO vs. JKD Capital and Finlease Ltd.
ITA No. 5443/Del/2013
A. Y. : 2005-06.                       
Date of Order: 27.03.2015

Section 271E – Order passed u/s. 271E levying penalty for violation of provisions of section 269T was required to be passed within six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings were initiated.

FACTS

The assessment of total income was completed vide order dated 28th December, 2007 passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. In the assessment order, the Assessing Officer (AO) initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271E of the Act. The assessee preferred an appeal against the order dated 28th December, 2007. Upon dismissal of the appeal by CIT(A), the AO referred the matter regarding penalty under section 271E to the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax who issued a show cause notice on 12th March, 2012.

Order levying penalty u/s. 271E was passed on 20th March, 2012. Aggrieved by the order levying penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal on the ground that the penalty order was time barred. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the stand taken by the CIT(A) in holding that the impugned penalty order is time barred on the ground that section 275(1)(c) of the Act will apply in the cases of penalty for violation of section 269SS, has been approved by the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 433 (Del). The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court had made a mention of the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hissaria bros. [2007] 291 ITR 244 (Raj.) expressing a similar view. It noted the following observations of the Delhi High Court:

“We are, therefore, of the opinion that since penalty proceedings for default in not having transactions through the bank as required under sections 269SS and 269T are not related to the assessment proceeding but are independent of it, therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising out of the assessment proceedings or other proceedings during which the penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E may have been initiated has no relevance for sustaining or not sustaining the penalty proceedings and, therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 275 cannot be attracted to such proceedings. If that were not so clause (c) of section 275(1) would be redundant because otherwise as a matter of fact every penalty proceeding is usually initiated when during some proceedings such default is noticed, though the final fact finding in this proceeding may not have any bearing on the issues relating to establishing default, e.g. penalty for not deducting tax at source while making payment to employees, or contractor, or for that matter not making payment through cheque or demand draft where it is so required to be made. Either of the contingencies does not affect the computation of taxable income and levy of correct tax on chargeable income; if clause (a) was to be invoked, no necessity of clause (c) would arise.”

The Tribunal, following the ratio of the decision of the jurisdictional High Court, held that the penalty order was barred by limitation as the penalty order was passed beyond six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings were initiated in the month of December 2007 and the penalty order was thus required to be passed before 30th June, 2008, the penalty order was in fact passed on 20th March, 2012. The date on which the CIT(A) has passed order in the quantum proceedings had no relevance as it did not have any bearing on the issue of penalty.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

Depreciation – Carrying on of business – Set-off of unabsorbed depreciation of previous years – Section 32(2) and 41(2) – A. Y. 2002-03 – Where once amount realised by assessee by sale of building, plant and machinery was treated as income arising out of profits and gains from business by virtue of section 41(2) notwithstanding fact that assessee was not carrying on any business during relevant assessment year, provision contained in section 32(2) would become applicable and, consequently, set-

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Karnataka Trade Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT; [2015] 62 taxmann.com 239 (Karn)

The appellant is a Public Limited Company manufacturing cement in a factory situated at Mathodu village, Hosadurga Taluk. In the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2002- 03, the assessee had not carried on any business. In the relevant year the assessee had received amounts on sale of building, plant and machinery and as a result an amount of Rs. 34,01,644/- was treated as income from business u/s. 41(2). However, the assessee’s claim for set off of the brought forward unabsorbed depreciation was rejected. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“In computing the income from business, the provisions of Section 32 as well as Section 41 of the Act would be applicable. Therefore, once the amount realized by the assessee by sale of building, plant and machinery is treated as income arising out of the profits and gains from the business by virtue of Section 41(2) of the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the assessee was not carrying on any business during the relevant assessment year, the provision contained in Section 32(2) become applicable and consequently, the setoff has to be given for unabsorbed depreciation allowances of previous year brought forward in terms of that provision.”

Loss – Carry forward and set off – Section 79 – A. Y. 2002-03 – During the relevant assessment year holding company of assessee reduced its shareholding from the 51% to 6% by transferring its 45% shares to another 100% subsidiary company – 51% of voting rights remained with the holding company – The revenue not justified in refusing to allow carry forward and set-off of business losses

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CIT vs. AMCO Power Systems Ltd.; [2015] 62 taxmann. com 350 (Karn)

In the A. Y. 2002-03, 51% of the shares of the assessee were held by the holding company. In the relevant year the holding company transferred 45% shares to another 100% subsidiary company. In the relevant year, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for set off of the carried forward loss relying on section 79, on the ground that the voting power of the holding company is reduced from 51% to 6%. The Tribunal held that the voting power of the holding company has remained at 51% and allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The expression ”not less than 51% of voting power…”used in Section 79 indicates that only voting power is relevant and not the shareholding pattern. Despite transfer of shares, the holding-company still holds effective control over the assessee-company. The objective of Section 79 is to prevent misuse of losses carry forward by the new owner. Therefore, losses could be carry forward and setoff even if there is change in shareholding since effective control over the assessee company is unchanged.”

Revision – Section 263 – A. Y. 2007-08 – Assessee consistently following project completion method – Revision on the ground that other method is preferable – Revision not valid

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CIT vs. Aditya Builders.; 378 ITR 75 (Bom):

The Assessee was engaged in construction of commercial and residential premises. For the A. Y. 2007- 08, the Assessing Officer accepted the project completion method followed by the assessee and completed the assessment u/s. 143(3). Exercising the powers u/s. 263 of the Act, the Commissioner set aside the assessment and directed to recomputed the income of the asessee applying the percentage completion method. The Tribunal held that the assessee had been consistently following project completion method over the years. Moreover, the issue relating to the appropriate method of accounting is a debatable issue and, thus, the Commissioner would have no jurisdiction u/s. 263 to direct application of one particular method of accounting in preference to another. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee had chosen the project completion method of accounting and had been consistently following it over the years. The Revenue could not reject the method because, according to the Commissioner, another method was preferable. Thus, no fault could be found with the order of the Tribunal.”

Charitable trust – Exemption u/s. 11(2) – A. Y. 2005-06 – Accumulation of income – Three purposes given covered by fourteen objects of trust – More than one purpose specified in Form 10 and details about plan of such expenditure not given – Not sufficient to deny exemption

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DIT(E) vs. Envisions; 278 ITR 483 (Karn):

The assessee, a registered charitable trust, collected donations of Rs.32,47,909/- and incurred incidental expenses of Rs.7,527/-. For the A. Y. 2005-06, it claimed the remaining amount as accumulation u/s. 11(2). In Form 10, 3 purposes were given out of the 14 objects of the Trust. The Assessing Officer disallowed the accumulation holding that the purpose stated was vague and thus the benefit of section 11(2) was denied. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assesee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he objects of the trust, as given in the trust deed, were 14 in number. The three purposes for which accumulation was prayed for and mentioned in Form 10 by the assessee were undisputedly covered by the objects of the trust. As such, it could not be disputed that the purpose mentioned by the assessee while claiming the benefit, was for achieving the objects of the trust.

ii) M erely because more than one purpose had been specified and details about the plan of such expenditure had not been given would not be sufficient to deny the benefit u/s. 11(2) to the assessee. As long as the objects of the trust are charitable in character and as long as the purpose or purposes mentioned in Form 10 are for achieving the objects of the trust, merely because of nonfurnishing of the details, as to how the amount was proposed to be spent in future, the assessee could not be denied the exemption as was admissible u/s. 11(2) of the Act.”

Charitable trust – Exemption u/s. 11 – A. Y. 2008- 09 – Hospital – Application of income to objects and for purposes of trust – Charity Commissioner giving directions from time to time – Amounts charged or surcharges levied on bills given to indore patients – To be treated as income from activities of trust – Entitled to exemption u/s. 11

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DIT(Exemp) vs. Jaslok Hospital and Research Centre; 378 ITR 230 (Bom):

The assessee is a charitable trust running a hospital. For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee declared total income at Nil claiming exemption u/s. 11. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee levied surcharge of 20% on the bills given to the patients and recovered 25% of the fees paid to honrary doctors. The Assessing Officer treated these amounts as corpus donations and denied exemption u/s. 11. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal concurred with its earlier order in relation to exemption. Despite the directions of the Charity Commissioner, the Revenue could not insist that the amount charged or surcharges levied should not be treated as income from the activities of the trust. The authorities under the Income-tax Act are supposed to scrutinize the papers and related documents of the trust or the assessee so as to bring the income to tax and in accordance with the Income-tax Act.

ii) In such circumstances, the concurrent finding did not in any manner indicate that the directions issued by the Charity Commissioner are incapable of being complied with or liable to be ignored. The directions issued did not change the character of the receipts. The appeal does not raise any substantial question of law.”

CENVAT credit of construction services and lease rental service can be availed against payment of duty or manufacture of final product for period prior to amendment of definition of input service under Rule 2(l).

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34. 2015 (40) STR 41 (P & H) Commissioner of C. Ex. Delhi III vs. Bellsonica Auto Companies India Pvt Ltd

CENVAT credit of construction services and lease rental service can be availed against payment of duty or manufacture of final product for period prior to amendment of definition of input service under Rule 2(l).

Facts

The Respondent had taken land on lease on which it had constructed the factory for manufacturing metal components. Respondent accumulated the credit of service tax paid on lease rent for land as well as on erection, commissioning and installation engineer’s services. The department contended that credit of the said services cannot be availed as the words “directly or indirectly” and “in or in relation to” in the “input service” definition, should be interpreted strictly. It was also contended that the lease rental service has no nexus with manufacturing of metal components. The respondent’s contention is that it is covered under both ‘includes part’ and ‘means part’ of the definition of “input service” as defined under Rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The said rule specifically includes services in relation to setting up of factory. Further the amended input service definition (effective from April 01, 2011) specifically excluded the service related to construction and therefore prior to the said date, the same was eligible as the amendment was not retrospective in nature.

Held

The High Court held that service used for setting up immovable property is connected with manufacturing activity and therefore the CENVAT credit is allowed.

The adjudicating authority has to follow the order of Larger Bench unless the factual situation of the case calls for different interpretation of law.

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33. 2015 (40) STR 26 (Ker) Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India.

The adjudicating authority has to follow the order of Larger Bench unless the factual situation of the case calls for different interpretation of law.

Facts

The Appellant is engaged in providing service on behalf of Western Union, a company having its operation outside India. A similar issue arose earlier, which was settled by Larger Bench of the Tribunal in case of Muthoot Finance Ltd vs. Commissioner of C. Ex, Chandigarh, 2013(29) STR (257) (Tri-Delhi) in Appellant’s favour. It was contended that the department should follow the order of the Tribunal before raising demand against them when the facts of the case were similar. However, no cognisance was taken of the said order and demand was confirmed.

Held

The High Court observed that no distinction on facts is made in the Order-In-Original. Therefore, it is held that the order already passed by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal is binding on adjudicating authority to follow unless the factual situation calls for different interpretation. Accordingly, quashing the demand, the department was directed to consider matter afresh.

Service tax is leviable on all lease rent whether of short tenure or of more than 90 years. The service provided by assesse is not sovereign service and no statutory fees are levied on the same, thus it is a taxable service.

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32. 2015 (40) STR 95 (All.) Greater Noida Industrial Dev. Authority vs. Comm. Of C., C. Ex.

Service tax is leviable on all lease rent whether of short tenure or of more than 90 years. The service provided by assesse is not sovereign service and no statutory fees are levied on the same, thus it is a taxable service.

Facts

The appellant took plots on long term lease for construction of commercial and business premises. The Tribunal held against the Appellant holding that the nature of lease, whether short term or perpetuity, did not make any difference to meaning of expression “leasing of immovable property” and also, the Act did not make any difference between a juristic person and an individual and therefore, the leasing of land was liable for service tax irrespective of the tenure. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed.

Held

The High Court upheld the Tribunal decision and confirmed that leasing of land for business/commercial purpose was taxable event and such amount charged was leviable under service tax under “leasing/renting of immovable property”.

VAT on Service Tax collected separately

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Under MVAT Act, 2002, the tax is payable on ‘sale price’. The term ‘sale price’ is defined in section 2(25) of the MVAT Act, 2002 as under;

“(25) “sale price” means the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made including any sum charged for anything done by the seller in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof, other than the cost of insurance for transit or of installation, when such cost is separately charged.

Explanation I — The amount of duties levied or leviable on goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) or the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) or the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bom. 25 of 1949), shall be deemed to be part of the sale price of such goods, whether such duties are paid or payable by or on behalf of, the seller or the purchaser or any other person. Explanation IA: Sale price shall not include the amount of service tax levied or leviable under the Finance Act, 1994 and collected separately from the purchaser. (w.e.f.1.4.2015),

Explanation II — Sale price shall not include tax paid or payable to a 16[seller] in respect of such sale.

Explanation III — Sale price shall include the amount received by the seller by way of deposit, whether refundable or not, which has been received whether by way of a separate agreement or not, in connection with or incidental or ancillary to, the said sale of goods;

Thus, the amount received from the buyer is considered as sale price. In addition, the statutory levies like Excise etc. are also deemed to be part of sale price .

What is the amount received from buyer? It has numerous interpretations. In the present controversy, the issue is about Service Tax collected separately, wherever, it is applicable. For example, in case of works contract, there is composite contract for supply of goods and services. Under such circumstances, the dealer may be liable to pay VAT on the supply part and Service Tax on labour portion. On the applicable labour portion, the dealer may collect Service Tax as inclusive in price i.e. without showing Service Tax separately or, on other hand, the dealer may charge Service Tax separately in the invoice.

In case, Service Tax is charged as inclusive (subject to facts of each case) it can be said that there is not much debate about ‘sale price’ and the whole amount of sale price without exclusion of Service Tax will be considered as sale price for levy of VAT .

However, the controversy arises when the Service Tax is collected separately in the invoices.

A possible argument is that the Service Tax is a tax allowed or to be collected from the customers under the provisions of Service Tax and hence it is an amount collected for and on behalf and to be paid to the Central Government. Therefore, it can be argued that it does not form part of the money of the dealer, it is a separate collection.

Recent judgment and amendment

In fact, in case of Sujata Printers (VAT A.No.18 of 2013 dt. 9.3.2015), Hon’ble MSST (Maharashtra Tribunal) has already held that the Service Tax collected separately does not form part of sale price. Further, there is amendment dated 18.4.2015 in the definition of ‘sale price’ by which Service Tax collected separately is excluded from the amount of sale price, shown above by Explanation 1A.

After above judgment and above referred amendment, there is circular from the Commissioner of Sales Tax, bearing no. 6T of 2015 dated 14.5.2015 in which the implications of above judgment and amendment are explained. It is stated in the Circular that the judgment will remain operative from 1.4.2005 till 31.3.2015. From 1.4.2015 the situation will be covered by the amendment. The net effect is that on Service Tax collected separately, no VAT will be applicable.

Controversy regarding Service Tax in case of Composition Schemes

In the above circular, the learned Commissioner of Sales Tax has made distinction between the works contracts. The Commissioner of Sales Tax has stated that the above exclusion of Service Tax collected separately will apply in case where the liability on works contract or other transactions is discharged under regular method like, in case of works contract, if the liability is discharged under rule 58 of MVAT Rules. However, in relation to discharging of tax under composition schemes, it is specifically mentioned that the above exclusion will not apply. In other words, the circular interprets that in case the liability is discharged under composition scheme than even if Service Tax is collected separately, it will be considered as part of contract price and on such whole amount (including Service Tax), the composition will be payable. It appears that the Commissioner of Sales Tax has kept in mind that under composition schemes, the dealer has to forgo its legal claim and has to abide by the terms of the composition scheme. Therefore, the assessing authorities are levying VAT on Service Tax collected separately, where the contractors discharge their tax liability under works contract composition scheme.

Recent judgment of the Hon’ble Tribunal

However, now the legal position has become absolute clear. The issue has been resolved by the Hon’ble Tribunal vide its judgment in case of Technocraft Engineers (VAT SA No.237 of 2014 dt.3.11.2015). In this case, the issue was same. VAT was levied on the Service Tax collected separately on the works contract and the dealer was discharging liability under composition scheme. The Hon’ble Tribunal has referred to arguments from both the sides. There was also earlier judgment in the 0case of Nikhil Comforts (SA No.30 of 2010 dated 31.3.2012) in which a contrary view was taken.

However, in this judgment, the Hon’ble Tribunal has held that no VAT can be levied on Service Tax collected separately, even if the tax is discharged under composition scheme. The reasoning of learned Tribunal is noted as under; “(iii) In the impugned matter, assessment order for the year was passed on 26/12/2012, for the interior designing the appellant had received total amount of Rs.4,35,43,472/- on which 8% composition amount was charged and with interest u/s. 30(2) and 30(3) of the MVAT Act total demand was raised at Rs.27,10,949/- Appellant challenged the said order on the ground of incorrect determination of turnover, levy of tax on service tax and set-off claim and on interest. The First Appellate Authority confirmed the levy of tax on service tax amount saying that, it is part of contract price but he allowed other grounds. Hence, VAT payable amount is changed from Rs.27,10,949/- to Rs.2,24,831/- with part payment made in appeal, the appellant got refund of Rs.1,82,109/- on which no interest u/s. 52 of the MVAT Act was calculated. In total consideration, the service charges amount will become the part of total receipt by the Contractor but service tax amount on service charges will not become part of total receipt, because appellant contractor wants to pay the said amount to the Central Excise Department. Although, the definition of sale price is later on amended with effect from 01/04/2015, and the separate Explanation IA is added clarifying that, service tax levied and collected separately shall not be included in sale price. It is the revenue’s contention that, the said amendment is not retrospective, and it has effect from 01/04/2015. So, upto 31/03/2015 total receipt should be considered including service tax. However, we made it clear that, in the definition of sale price u/s. 2(25) service tax was not incorporated as deemed sale price. In the instant case, sale means a valuable consideration of the goods involved in the works contract, the consideration must be received by the contractor. Even though he had collected service tax separately he has to deposit it with the Central Government. Therefore, it will not become part of his receipt. The revenue had cited most of the case laws on agreement for composition.

Appellant is not denying that, he had not agreed for composition. He is ready to pay 8% tax on the valuable consideration received by him which he can utilise in his business, and the tax amount against service charges incurred by him, he cannot keep with him as consideration for receipt of works contract. In total contract receipt, the sale price of the goods, service charges shown etc. are includible. In Sub–clause (a) and (b) of sub–section (3) of section 42, the wording is used “equal to 5% , of total contract value of the works contract in case of construction contract and 8% of total contract value of work contract of any other case.” Here, the meaning of total contract value is to be determined appropriately. By way of allotment of any works if assesse is receiving some amount against the property transferred in the goods and against the labour charges utilised in the said work, it will become a contract value. The various taxes levied separately, and those are to be deposited with the Govt. authorities will not constitute the total receipt against the said contract value hence element of service tax will not be a part of sale prices before amendment also. One can understand total expenses required to be paid for any particular work in which amount of taxes are also to be in total turnover but when a turnover for levy of tax is to be taken into consideration, the element shown separately in sale invoice It may be against sales tax VAT tax and service tax which cannot be included.” Thus, the Hon’ble Tribunal has put to rest all controversy in this regard. Most of the dealers (contractors) have not collected VAT on Service Tax collected separately and hence the above judgment will be a big relief.

Conclusion

To avoid future litigation, it is expected that the department will bring out one more circular to accept the above judgment. The finality to the subject is important, so that dealers can predict their liability correctly and a controversy is avoided.

MANDATORY PRE-DEPOSIT UNDER SECtION 35F

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Background Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act) was amended by the Finance Act (No.2) 2014 with effect from 6th August, 2014 whereby prior to filing an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) or Appellate Tribunal, an amount of 7.5% duty or penalty in dispute in case of first appeal and a further amount of 10% of the duty or penalty in dispute is required to be paid by way of mandatory pre-deposit. The amount of pre-deposit is restricted to an upper limit of Rs. 10 crore by way of a proviso in the said section. Further, by way of a second proviso, it is provided that the provision would not apply to pending stay applications and appeals filed before any appellate authority prior to 6th August, 2014. Therefore, post the said date of 6th August, 2014, various appeals filed with different jurisdictional Benches of Appellate Tribunals without payment of pre-deposit amount were either not accepted or rejected. Consequently, writ petitions were filed in various High Courts. As a result thereof, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rama Mohanrao & Co. 2015-TIOL- 511-HC-AP-CX in an interim order and the Kerala High Court in Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others 2015-TIOL-632-HC-Kerala-ST and a couple of other cases as well as the Madras High Court in Fifth Avenue Sourcing (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax 2015-TIOL-1592- HC-MAD-ST decided that amended provisions relating to mandatory pre-deposit of 7.5% of duty or penalty was not applicable to the cases wherein the cause of action had already commenced prior to the date of amendment of 6th August, 2014 and that the amendment was prospective and therefore would not affect assessment proceedings initiated prior to the amendment date.

As against these decisions, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the very same issue in Ganesh Yadav vs. UOI and Others 2015-TIOL-1490-HC-ALL-ST distinguished the above decision in Muthoot Finance Ltd. (supra) and K. Rama Mohanrao (supra) and dismissing the petitions held that in terms of express language used in the amended provisions of section 35F(1) of the Act, the constitutional challenge was not vested and all appeals filed post the amendment would be governed by the requirement of pre-deposit. Amidst the controversy, recently the Hon. Karnataka High Court also in a learned Single Judge decision has made detailed analysis and observations on the subject matter and dismissed a bunch of petitions. The said decision is summarised below:

Karnataka High Court: 2015-TIOL- 2637-HC-KAR-CX

The Hon. Karnataka High Court in various writ petitions led by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Union of India reported at 2015-TIOL-2637-HC-KAR-CX and others considered mainly the following two issues:

  • Whether section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act) as amended is a piece of substantive or procedural law prescribing mandatory pre-deposit at the time of filing an appeal, is an unreasonable condition?
  • Whether amendment made to section 35F of the Act has a retrospective operation?

The petitioner in this case also on the same issue as involved in various earlier decisions, contended that the requirement of the pre-deposit is violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India and therefore sought to declare the Circular 984/08/2014-CX and similar Circular F. No.15/ CESTAT /General/2013-14 dated 06/08/2014 issued by the CBEC as ultra vires the constitution and also sought directions to enable petitioners to file their appeals without monetary pre-deposit of 7.5% since lis or the cause of action in the case of petitioner commenced before 06/08/2014, the date of amendment.

Right to Appeal

The Hon. Bench examined section 35 and 35B of the Act providing for Appellate remedy before Commissioner (Appeals) and Appellate Tribunal respectively and also examined section 35F and the amendment made therein effected from 6th August, 2014 as regards mandatory monetary pre-deposit and noted and analysed the concept Right of Appeal as the petitioners claimed that it was adversely affected by the impugned amendment. For this, the Hon. Bench found it expedient to primarily distinguish between substantive law and procedural law and rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard while considering the principles of statutory interpretation. Relying heavily on the ratio of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others 2002-TIOL-363-SC-CT, the petitioners claimed that the cause of action in their cases commenced prior to the date of amendment viz. 06/08/2014 and therefore their right to be heard before the Tribunal without the mandatory pre-deposit was not destroyed and denial of such right affected their vested right to file appeal. The Revenue contended that all that was done by the amendment was prescribing the conditions of pre-deposit to file the appeal. This had no nexus with the right to file the appeal as a mere condition of mandatory deposit is provided of 7.5% of the duty or penalty levied at the time of filing appeal and only the discretion vested in the Tribunal with regard to pre-deposit was taken away. The Court therefore decided to consider the applicability of the principles stated in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) in the present matter, however only after drawing distinction between substantive law and procedural law.

Substantive law and Procedural law

The petitioners contended that the right to appeal is a substantial right which is pre-vested in the parties on the date, the cause of action commenced. Thus, even when the conditions to file an appeal are altered, it would affect their right to file an appeal. The Court therefore examined meanings of these terms as per Black’s Law Dictionary as provided below:

“Substantive law (seb-sten-tiv). (18c) The part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties and powers of parties.

‘So far as the administration of justice is concerned with the application of remedies to violated rights, we may say that the substantive law defines the remedy and the right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of the one to the other.” John Salmond, Jurisprudence 476 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)’.

Procedural law:

The rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.- Also termed adjective law.” Further, on going through the Supreme Court rulings in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra [(1994) 4 SCC 602 and Shyam Sunder vs. Ramkumar [(2001)8 SCC 24, it was noted that if a piece of substantive law is amended, such a law would have prospective operation unless made retrospective operation by necessary intendment whereas in the case of amendment of a procedural law, the amendment is always retrospective in operation unless indicated otherwise. On noting the above, it was observed that the right to file an appeal is required to be distinguished from the procedure necessary to follow while exercising the said right to appeal. Section 35A, 35C and 35D of the Act deal with the procedures to be followed by Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal while considering the appeal filed by an aggrieved party whereas the right to file an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appellate authority is prescribed in section 35 ad 35B of the Act respectively. Therefore, the conditions to be followed for exercising the substantive right as prescribed in section 35F of the Act prescribing the pre-deposit to be made by the aggrieved party is a piece of procedural law. Further a litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right is available in procedural law. To support these observations, Hon. Court interalia, relied on The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat & Others 1975 (2) SCC 175, Sheth Nand Lal & Another vs. State of Haryana and Others 1980 (Supp) SCC 574, Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Mumbai 2002-TIOL-427-SC-CUS, Laxmi Rathan Engineering Works Limited vs. CST [AIR 1968 SC 488], Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar [(1974) 2 SCC 393], Narayan Chandra Ghosh vs. UCO Bank and Others [(2011) 4 SCC 548 and concluded that appeal is a creature of statute and there is no reason why the legislature while granting that right cannot impose conditions for exercising that right. Thus, what emerges from dicta in various cited decisions is that requirement regarding deposit of amount as condition precedent to entertainment of appeal is a means of regulating the exercise of the right of appeal and is not in the realm of right to file an appeal and thus not a piece of substantial law. The said requirement is not an onerous condition precedent for the filing of an appeal particularly when there is a cap on the pre-deposit amount where amount exceeds Rs.10 crore. Thus, the first issue is answered that the amended provisions of section 35F of the Act do not adversely affect the right of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appellate authority of the aggrieved party.

Whether the Amendment has Retrospective Application

The Finance Act 2014, which amended section 35F of the Act repealed the existing provision by way of substitution and thus when an existing provision is substituted by a fresh enactment, it is a case of express repeal. In this context, interalia relying on the decision was Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana 2004 (8) SCC 1, it was observed: “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations.”

However, in the matters of procedures, the Court cited Maxwell: “Interpretation of Statutes” 11th edition, page 216 that “No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode”.

In the backdrop of these principles, the claim of the petitioners that the amendment to section 35F of the Act was not retrospective was examined and in particular second proviso to the said section 35F was taken note of. The proviso provides that section 35F would not apply to stay applications and appeals pending before the appellate authority filed prior to the commencement of 2014 Act therefrom implying that appeals filed and pending as on 06/08/2014, the earlier provision would apply. While interpreting the said proviso, it was noted that the proviso could not be so construed or interpreted to make it otiose. By virtue of the second proviso, the intendment of the Parliament is clear and therefore to interpret otherwise than the intendment would be to render it redundant. In view thereof but for the circumstances mentioned in the proviso it was held that the main amended provision would apply. The proviso was meant to serve as a saving clause to prevent the pending stay applications from becoming infructuous on account of the amendment. Relying on a number of judicial precedents including in Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhai Nagjibhai (AIR 1966 SC 459), S. Sundaram Pillai etc. vs. R. Pattabiraman [AIR 1985 SC 582] which in turn among others relied on Govt. of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity [AIR 1979 SC 1029], conclusion was reached that the right to file an appeal granted u/s. 35 and 35B of the Act remained unaltered and therefore available to an aggrieved party even after the amendment to section 35F of the Act. Whereas these sections constitute substantive law not forming the realm of procedure, on the examination of section 35F it was found that this section is procedural in nature and the amendment of the same was found to be having a retrospective operation and particularly the second proviso. Since the real intention of the Parliament is discernible, it was held that the retrospective effect is provided in respect of pending applications before appellate authorities. However, if no appeal was filed prior to 06/08/2014, it was held that the amended section 35F would apply. The amendment thus has no bearing on the date on which the particular lis commenced. It was observed that the lis in each case would have commenced on a different date. In order to ensure the object of certainty and uniformity as to the applicability of the amendment, the Parliament enacted the second proviso. Considering the Hon. Supreme Court’s rulings on the fine distinction between substantive law and procedural law in decisions subsequent to Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra), wherein it was held that amendment made to procedural law can have retrospective operation, the decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) was distinguished. It was further noted that in the said decision, the fine distinction between substantive and procedural law and that amendment made in the procedural law could have retrospective operation did not come up for consideration in the manner decided in the later decisions and therefore observations made in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) were held as not applicable to the present bunch of petitions.

Lastly, the judgments referred above viz. of the Madras High Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Tirupur vs. Cameo Experts [(2006)147 STC 218 (Mad)], Fifth Avenue Sourcing (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax Chennai (supra), Kerala High Court in Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India (supra) and Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Rama Mohanrao & Co. vs. Union of India (interim order) (supra) were found as not applicable although they are rendered on section 35F or on similar provisions as those judgments followed the reasoning in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) which has been distinguished herein and held to be not applicable to the present cases. Writ Petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Conclusion

Although the applicability of the above may be for a limited time frame, it is to be noted that High Courts of the three States viz. Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Madras have decided that the cases wherein the lis commenced prior to 06/08/2014, the amendment was not applicable and the Tribunal was bound to entertain such appeals without mandatory predeposit whereas Allahabad High Court in M/s. Ganesh Yadav (supra) and the present decision of Karnataka High Court have held that pre-deposit requirement cannot be dispensed with except in case of appeals and stay applications already filed prior to 6th August, 2014. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the round of controversy ends with the ruling of Karnataka High Court or litigation continues on the issue before reaching finality.

Welcome GST – Part 3 GST in Singapore and Malaysia

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Singapore and Malaysia are considered as the two most important countries which have introduced fair GST law. While Singapore is under GST regime since 1994 and Malaysia has just introduced GST from 1st April 2015, there is striking similarity in the provisions.

GST in Singapore:

GST was implemented at a single rate of 3% on 1st April 1994, with an assurance that it would not be raised for at least five years. To cushion the impact of GST on Singaporean households, an offset package was also introduced. Simultaneously, corporate tax rate was cut by 3% to 27%, and the top marginal personal income tax rate was cut by 3%. The initial GST rate of 3% was among the lowest in the world. The GST rate was increased from 3% to 4% in 2003 and to 5% in 2004. Each increase was accompanied by an offset package that was designed to make the average Singaporean household overall better off. The rate was further increased to 7% with effect from 1st July 2007. At present, the rate of GST is 7% applicable to all taxable (standard rated) goods and services.

The threshold for registration is S$ 1million (one million Singapore dollars). Businesses having turnover of taxable supplies during a period of 12 months (four quarters) less than 1 million may opt for voluntary registration.

It may be noted that in Singapore, GST is a tax imposed on the importation of goods (collected by Singapore Customs) and the supplies of nearly all goods and services made in Singapore by a taxable person in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by him. The tax is administered by the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). The Tax Department has issued GST guides for various industries which provide specific information on how GST affects each sector.

‘Taxable person’ is defined as a person who is registered or is required to be registered under the GST Act. The term ‘business’ includes any: (a) Trade (for example, manufacturing, wholesale, service, retail, mechanics, carpentry); (b) Profession (for example, doctors, lawyers, accountants with their own business practice); or (c) Vocation (for example, taxi drivers, hawkers, freelance fitness instructors, freelance book-keepers, insurance agents, multi-level marketing agents). In addition, the following activities are also deemed to constitute business: (a) The provision by a club, association, society, management corporation or organisation of the facilities or advantages available to its members or subsidiary proprietors, as the case may be; and (b) The admission, for a consideration, of persons to any premises.

Taxable Turnover, for the purposes of registration, refers to the total value (excluding GST) of all taxable supplies made in Singapore. It includes the value of all standardrated and zero-rated supplies but excludes exempt supplies, out-of-scope supplies and sale of capital assets.

Zero-rated supply: Zero-rated supply refers to an export of goods from Singapore by a taxable person to a country outside Singapore or a supply of international services. GST is charged at 0% for theses supplies. However full input tax credit is available to the supplier.

Exempt Supply: Exempt supply refers to the following three broad categories of supplies, where no GST is chargeable: (a) the sale and lease of residential properties; (b) the provision of financial services; and (c) the supply of investment precious metals. A supplier of exempt supplies is not eligible for input tax credit.

Out-of-scope Supply: An out-of-scope supply is a supply which is not made in Singapore and no GST needs to be charged. For example the sale of goods from China to India, where the goods do not enter Singapore.

A registered tax payer is required to e-file quarterly returns within one month from the end of each quarter. (Facility of monthly and six monthly returns is also available to certain classes of tax payers subject to approval from the Comptroller). Extension of due date, up to one month, is granted on application in genuine cases. The tax due, as per return, is required to be deposited within the same due date as for filing of returns. Payments can be made either online or through money orders or telegraphic transfers or through A/c payee cheques drawn in favour of “Comptroller of Goods & Services Tax”. Refund due, if any, as per periodic return is granted automatically within one month/three months/six months as the case may be (unless withheld for specified reasons).

GST in Malaysia: Malaysia has adopted GST from 1st April 2015. Before that there was a system of sales tax on sale of goods (introduced from 29th February 1972) and Service Tax on supply of services (introduced from 1st March 1975). It may be noted that Excise Duty, in Malaysia, is levied on certain luxury and sin products only such as automobiles, liquor, beer and tobacco products. Sales Tax was levied under the system of single point first stage taxation at four different rates of 5, 10. 20 and 25 %0, and, Service Tax was levied at a flat rate of 5% on certain specified services. The GST has replaced both these taxes i.e. Sales Tax and Service Tax. The rate of GST is 6% on all taxable (standard rated) goods and services.

GST, in Malaysia is administered by Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD) – Goods and Services Tax Division. Persons having businesses with annual turnover of taxable supplies exceeding RM 5,00,000 (Five lakh Malaysian Ringgit) are liable to be registered under GST. ‘Persons’ include an individual, sole proprietor, partnership, company, trust, estate, society, union, club, association or any other organization including a government department or a local authority which is involved in the business of making taxable supplies in Malaysia. Application for registration has to be made in prescribed form within 30 days from the date of liability. There is a facility of voluntary registration for businesses having annual turnover less than the prescribed limit, and, there is also a facility of Group Registration whereby more than one business organisation, within the same group, can have one single registration.

Annual Turnover of ‘Taxable Supplies’, for the purposes of registration, includes all taxable supplies whether standard rated or zero rated. But excludes the value of (a) supplies outside the GST scope, (b) disposal of capital assets, (c) imported services, (d) disregarded supplies made in relation to Approved Toll Manufacturer Scheme, Warehousing Scheme and supplies made within or between the designated areas.

The GST registered person is liable to pay tax on all taxable supplies (standard rated) and can claim input tax credit of whatever amount of GST paid on the business inputs by offsetting against the output tax. Suppliers of zero rated goods and services are also entitled to claim full input tax credit. However, ITC (input Tax Credit) can be claimed only on the basis of ‘Tax Invoice’ issued by the supplier. The supplier has to issue Tax Invoice within 21 days of supply. There are provisions for Simplified Tax Iinvoice as well as self made Tax Invoice in certain circumstances.

GST returns are generally required to be filed quarterly by all GST registered persons within one month from the end of each quarter. However, there are provisions to grant permission to file returns on monthly or six monthly basis subject to certain conditions. The returns can be filed either online through internet or manual through paper returns.

Payment of taxes, as per return, has to be made within the same time limit as for filing return. Payment can be made either online or through money order or a/c payee cheques or bank drafts drawn in the name of specified authority.

Refunds, if any, as per periodic returns are granted automatically within 14 days from the date of submitting return (in case of electronic return) and within 28 days (in case of manual return).

Some Important Aspects:

There are few important aspects of GST that one needs to study, they include,

  • Transitional provisions: from existing indirect tax laws to one integrated tax without loss of input credits that is lying unutilised and also embedded in stock in trade or work – in – progress.
  • M eaning of ‘supply’ as a most important term replacing the terms, ‘sale of goods’ and ‘provision of service’.
  • Place of Supply Rules
  • Seamless flow of credit till the supply reaches to the destination
  • Point of Taxation
  • Uniform revenue neutral rate for different kind of goods and servicesExempt goods and services
  • Special kind of supplies
  • Procedural issues like registration, payment of tax, filing of returns, assessments, dispute resolution mechanism and robust network infrastructure 

In this article, attempt is made to evaluate the meaning of term supply, transitional provisions, time of supply and input tax credit mechanism in the context of Singapore and Malaysian GST law.

I. Meaning of term “Supply”:

Under Malaysian law:

  • ‘Supply’ means all forms of supply, sale, barter or exchange including import, for a consideration. Land and transfer of any right in land including tenancy rights and immovable properties are covered in GST as goods. Further, supply of goods includes any activity or transaction under hire purchase or finance lease agreement.
  • Anything which is not a supply of goods but is done for a consideration is a supply of services. “Services” mean anything done or to be done including the granting, assignment or surrender of any right or making available any facility or advantage for a consideration. This would include, license, rental, lease and right to use of the immovable properties and transfer of possession of goods without transferring the ownership.

However, the following are not regarded as supply:

  • Transfer of business undertaking as a going concern.
  • Supplies not in the course of furtherance of business.
  • Supply by any society or similar registered organisation to its members in conformity of the aims and objectives, without any payment other than subscription and where the value of supply is nominal.
  • Contribution to pension, provident or social security fund.
  • Supply of services between an insurer and insured
  • Supply of money or investment article

Under Singapore law:

‘Supply’ includes anything done for a consideration. The following shall be treated as ‘supply’ for the purposes of GST:

  • Possession transferred under an agreement
  • Treatment of process
  • Supply of utility
  • Grant assignment or surrender of any interest or right over land
  • Transfer or disposal of business assets.

The following shall not be treated as supply of goods:

  • Financial services including financial products like equity, debts equity, derivative, life insurance, annuities, commodity features, mutual fund units, exchange of currency
  • I mport of precious metal
  • Grant assignment or surrender of any interest or right over land, license to occupy such land, residential properties, land used for residential purpose or for condominium development, vacant land supplied for public or statutory authority of residential or condominium residence
  • Land or building or part thereof used principally for residential purpose.

II. Transitional provisions

A. In case of supply of goods under Malaysian/ Singapore law:

1. I f the dealer has supplied the goods (under Malaysian law) or removal of goods or made available to the purchaser (under Singapore law) before the effective date and invoice is issued or payment is received for that supply on or after effective date, the supply of goods would be covered under the existing law prior to implementation of GST and the invoice issued or payment received on or after the appointed day for those supplies shall be regarded as inclusive of Sales Tax. However, if the invoice is issued for the supply made after the appointed day, the dealer would not be required to charge GST to the extent the supply is covered by Sales Tax.

2. I f supplies are made before the appointed day and ends on or after the appointed day where the invoice is issued or the payment is received before the appointed day, the consideration for supply shall be deemed to be inclusive of GST, appointed day or effective date is the date when GST comes into force for the portion of supplies made on or after the appointed day.

3. For all goods held in stock on effective date, including the exempted goods or service, are liable to be taxed under the old law.

4. The dealer is required to file his return under the old law covering all the supplies prior to effective date and discharge the liability thereon.

5. I n a case where tax is required to be paid under GST on above supplies, refund can be claimed of the tax paid under existing law.

6. Credit notes issued for return of goods after the appointed day shall be dealt with under the existing law and refund of sales tax paid can be claimed.

7. T he person registered under the GST and in the old law will have no further liability under GST to account for tax on such goods in respect of which the last return under the old law is submitted.

8. A window of five years of zero rating is provided in case a non-taxable supply under the existing law when it becomes taxable under GST and the contract is not renewed to effectuate the tax element in the price. (This means that the existing contracts can be reworked to include GST in the price till five years and would be zero rated till such period, imposing no tax liability and still allowing imput tax credit. Really a very wholesome measure for long term infrastructure projects and government contracts which are normally of “all inclusive” nature.)

B. Exempt supplies under Singapore law –

GST would not be chargeable if the person making the supply, made after appointed day, receives a payment in respect of the supply of goods or services before the appointed day, and the supply of goods or services shall be treated as taking place before that date. However, if no such payment is received before the appointed day but the invoice for a taxable supply of goods or services is issued before that date, that supply made in post GST regime shall be treated as taking place after the appointed day and accordingly tax shall be chargeable on the supply.

C. In case of Services under Malaysian/ Singapore law:

In case of supply of services when the service is performed or payment received prior to introduction of GST, the provisions of old law would apply. In case supply is made on or after the appointed day, the service provider is not required to charge GST on supplies to the extent covered by the invoice before the appointed day or payment received.

D. In case of goods or services not subject to sales tax or service tax but subject to GST Malaysia:

In such a case, the GST liability would be as follows:

  • If such supplies are made before 1st April 2015 where the invoice is issued or payment is received on or after 1st April 2015, the consideration for the supplies is not subject to GST.
  • If such supplies are made before 1st April 2015 and ends on or after 1st April 2015 (spanning 1st April 2015) where the invoice is issued or payment is received on or after 1st April 2015, the portion of supplies made on or after 1st April 2015 is subject to GST.
  • If such supplies are made on or after 1st April 2015 where the invoice is issued or payment is made before 1st April 2015, the consideration for the supplies is deemed as inclusive of GST.
  • If such supplies are made before 1st April 2015 and ends on or after 1st April 2015 (spanning 1st April 2015) where the invoice is issued or payment is received before 1st April 2015, the consideration for the supplies is deemed as inclusive of GST for the portion of supplies made on or after 1st April 2015.

E. Transitional provision as regards to input tax credit Singapore:

In case of dealer having accumulated credit prior to GST regime, the same is allowed to be carried forward to the extent the credit attributable to the taxable supplies made in post GST regime. Special relief is granted to allow businesses to claim GST incurred before GST regime in first return form. This would also apply to a dealer who is partially exempt if he makes both exempt and taxable supplies. In case where input tax cannot be directly indentified with income in the making of either taxable or exempt supplies, the input tax known as residual input tax is required to be apportioned. Taxable supplies would include zero-rated supplies. In case of capital goods, the same is allowed subject to certain exceptions on period based proportions.

Malaysia: A registered person is entitled to a special refund of sales tax of taxable goods (subject to certain percentage of the value of goods) held on hand on (stock) appointed day for making a taxable supply provided the goods were taxable under the sales tax law and the sales tax has been charged and paid by the claimant dealer. A special refund shall not be granted when,

a) goods have been capitalised
b) have been used partially or incorporated into some other goods
c) held for hire d) good held for use other than in business
e) goods not held for sale or exchange
f) where a claim of drawback of sales tax paid is made on subsequent export after the appointed day
g) on such goods on which the claimant is allowed to claim the deduction of service tax under the relevant rules

Where the claim for special refund is made, the goods shall be deemed to have been given credit for the input tax the unpaid taxes be off-setted against the special refund.

(No such provision exists in Singapore)

III. I nput Tax Credit Mechanism :
A. Singapore/Malaysia (conditions for grant of input credit)

  • The business has to be GST registered
  • The goods or services must have been supplied or imported by the business which must be supported by import permits which show the business as importer of goods
  • For local purchase the input tax claim must be supported by tax invoices addressed to the business
  • The goods or services are used or will be used for the furtherance of the business within the country or export which would be regarded as taxable supplies if made in the exporting country
  • The input tax claim is not otherwise disallowable as per specific exclusions.

 It is not necessary to match the input tax claim with output tax charged in the same accounting period, meaning that input tax can be claimed even before supply of goods or service is actually made.

Supply of goods without consideration for a community project may be treated as a supply made in the course or furtherance of the business. Any asset acquired which is taxable may be treated as attributable to the business’s taxable supply and any input tax incurred for any supply made for a community project by the business is claimable. (Above provision exists only in Malaysia)

B. Input tax claim on tripartite arrangement

  • When a taxable person makes taxable supplies of goods or services to a recipient who is a registered person, the recipient is able to claim input tax for an acquisition he makes in the course of his business. However, in a tripartite arrangement, the recipient is not the person who makes the payment for the supply.
  • For a supply made to a third party, there must be a binding agreement or a link between the supplier and the person who makes payment for the supply. Any agreement which does not bind the parties does not amount to a supply unless there is a supply of goods or services between the parties. The person who has an agreement with a supplier for a supply is the recipient of that supply (even if that supply is provided to a third party). The documentation (terms of the contract) is the logical starting point in determining the supplies that have been made.
  • In this regard, the person who makes payment will be entitled to claim input tax on the acquisition of the goods since it is a taxable supply made by the supplier to the person who makes the payment of the supply. (Above provision exists only in Malaysia)

C. Time Limit to claim input tax credit

If input tax is not claimed in the taxable period in which he is supposed to claim, then such input tax can be claimed within six years after the date of the supply to or importation by the taxable person.

D. Refund of Input Tax

A refund will be made to the claimant if the amount of input tax is more than the amount of output tax. Any refund of input tax credit may be offset against unpaid GST, excise duty, import and export duties.

Time When Refund is Made

A registered person can claim refund of input tax in the GST return furnished to the concerned authority. If the amount of input tax exceeds the amount of output tax, the balance will be refunded. The refund of input tax will be made within 14 working days after the return to which the refund relates is received for online submission and 28 working days after the return to which the refund relates is received for manual submission. (Malaysia)

E. Bad Debt relief

Bad debt is amount owed that cannot be collected and all reasonable efforts to collect it have been done. A person is entitled for a bad debt relief subject to the following conditions:
(a) GST is already paid;
(b) The person has not received any payment or part payment within 6 months (12 months in case of Singapore GST) from date of supply or debtor has become insolvent (bankrupt, wound up or receivership) before that period has elapsed; and
(c) Sufficient efforts have been made to recover the debt.

If the person has not received any payment in respect of the taxable supply, he can make a deduction or claim for the whole of the tax paid. However, if he has received part of the payment he can deduct or claim on pro-rata basis of the receipt. In the event where the bad debt relief is granted but subsequently the payment is received by the claimant he is required to repay the amount.

F. Input Tax credit in relation to registration

Credit pertaining to pre-incorporation is not allowed. Input credit on services prior to registration is also not eligible. However, in case of capital goods, the registered person is entitled to claim input tax credit on the goods he holds at the time of registration. Input tax on any asset held on hand (stock) can be claimed on book value within 6 years from the date of registration irrespective of date when the asset is acquired. In case of land and building, input tax can be claimed in on open market value of the asset or the book value whichever is lower. Where a person registers on a date later than the date he becomes liable to be registered, he is entitled to claim input tax incurred on, a) goods held on hand at the time he is liable to be registered; and b) goods or services used in making taxable supplies during the period he became liable to be registered.

IV. Time of supply:

Malaysia:

For goods:
a) when the goods are removed; or
b) when the goods are made available to the person to whom the goods are supplied if the goods are not to be removed.
c) I n the case of supply of goods sent, taken on approval, sale or returned, the time of supply is when it becomes certain that a taxable supply has taken place or twelve months after the removal whichever is the earlier.

For Services:

For services, the time of supply is treated as taken place at the time when the services are performed.

Singapore

The time of supply is based on the earliest of the events:
a) Issuance of invoice
b) Receipt of payment
c) Removal of goods or making it available to the customer.

In case of services, the time of performance In any case, the business is required to issue a tax invoice within 30 days from the time of supply. If the supply is before GST registration date, GST cannot be charged to the customers.

Conclusion: It can be seen that the Malaysian GST, being the latest one, has been carefully crafted, as the law which is lucid with examples and appropriate guidance notes, leaves almost no room for ambiguity and litigation. It even has the provisions for refund of excess claim of input credit if not utilised within six years which is seamlessly granted within a short time of Fourteen days as provided in the law. The term ‘supply’ invokes the liability only in case of consideration. The transitional provisions ushering from exempt to taxable regime are also drafted in a fair manner. In case of exempt product or services becoming taxable under GST, a window of five years for re-working of contract is granted and zero rating is provided for intervening period allowing input tax credits. Provisions are made for allowance of tax credit when the supply results into a bad debt. Input credit is allowed in case of asset acquired for a community project which is regarded in the course of furtherance of business. Tax on import of goods and service is available as input tax credit. The Malaysian GST has more or less adopted the Singaporean model which is taxpayer friendly. The rate of tax in both the countries is minimum in the world, however still GST is blamed in Malaysia as inflationary. India should take a clue from the GST regime in both these countries in drafting its GST legislation.

Representation of cases before Authority for Advance Ruling- Instruction F.No.225/261/2015/ITA.II dated 28.10.2015 ( copy available on www.bcasonline.org)

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Representation of cases before Authority for Advance Ruling- Instruction F.No.225/261/2015/ITA.II dated 28.10.2015 ( copy available on www.bcasonline.org)

‘Tolerance Range’ For Transfer Pricing Cases For AY 2015-16

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Notification No. 86 /2015/F. No. 500/1/2014-APA-II dated 29.10.15

Where the variation between the arm’s length price determined u/s. 92C and the price at which the international transaction or specified domestic transaction has actually been undertaken does not exceed one percent of the latter in respect of wholesale trading and three percent of the latter in all other cases, the price at which the international transaction or specified domestic transaction has actually been undertaken shall be deemed to be the arm’s length price for Assessment Year 2015-2016.

The CBDT has instructed all CCITs to strictly follow the time limit of six months as specified in sec. 12AA(2) of the Act for passing an order granting or refusing registration and to take suitable administrative action against those officers not adhering to the time limit – Instruction No. 16 of 2015 dated 06.11.2015

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The CBDT has instructed all CCITs to strictly follow the time limit of six months as specified in sec. 12AA(2) of the Act for passing an order granting or refusing registration and to take suitable administrative action against those officers not adhering to the time limit – Instruction No. 16 of 2015 dated 06.11.2015 (copy available on www.bcasonline.org)

CBDT has issued an internal instruction to constitute local committees to deal with taxpayers grievances from high pitched scrutiny assessment – Instruction No. 17/2015 dated 9.11.15 ( copy available on www. bcasonline.org)

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CBDT has issued an internal instruction to constitute local committees to deal with taxpayers grievances from high pitched scrutiny assessment – Instruction No. 17/2015 dated 9.11.15 ( copy available on www. bcasonline.org)

Charitable and religious trust – Anonymous donations – Special rate of tax – Section 115BBC – A. Y. 2009-10 – Exception – Religious trust – Overall activities of trust to be seen – Charitable activity part of religious activity – Assessee is a public religious trust – Special rate not attracted

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CIT vs. Bhagwan Shree Laxmi Narayandham Trust; 378 ITR 222 (Del): 280 CTR 335 (Del):

The assessee was a public religious trust. For the A. Y. 2009-10 the assessee had received anonymus donations to the extent of Rs. 27,25,306/-. The Assessing Officer applied the provisions of section 115BBC of the Incometax Act, 1961 and levied tax at the special rate. The Tribunal held that the Revenue had incorrectly applied section 115BBC to the facts of the assessee’s case.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) T he question of receipt of anonymus donations could not be addressed within the narrow scope of the specific wordings of some of the clauses of the trust deed but in the overall context of the actual activities in which the trust was involved in including imparting spiritual education to persons of all casts and religions, organizing samagams, distribution of free medicine and cloths to the needy and destitute, provision of free ambulance service for needy and destitute patients and so on.

ii) What can constitute religious activity in the context of Hindu religion need not be confined to the activities incidental to a place of worship like a temple. A Hindu religious institution like the assessee is also engaged in charitable activities which were very much part of the religious activity. In carrying on charitable activities along with organizing of spiritual lectures, the assessee by no means ceased to be religious institution. The activities described by the assessee as having been undertaken by it during the assessment year in question could be included in the broad conspectus of Hindu religious activity when viewed in the context of objects of the trust and its activities in general.

iii) Thus, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that for the purpose of section 115BBC(2)(a) anonymus donations received by the assessee would qualify for deduction and it can not be included in its assessable income.”

Capital gain – Short term capital gain or business income – A. Y. 2008-09 – Purchase and sale of shares – Entire investment in shares consistently treated as investment in shares and not stock-intrade – Transactions not of high volume – Own funds used for the purposes of investment in shares – Transactions delivery based – Income to be treated as short term capital gains and not business income

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CIT vs. Smt. Datta Mahendra Shah (Bom)

In the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee claimed Rs. 9.25 crores as short term capital gain. The Assessing Officer held that it was business income. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that the assessee had been an investor in shares and had consistently treated her entire investment in shares as investment and not stock-intrade. The assessee was dealing in 35 scrips, involving 59 transactions for the entire year could not be considered for high volume so as to be classified as trading income. The assesee had not borrowed any funds but had used her own funds. He held the income to be treated as shortterm capital gains. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) T he Commissioner (Appeals) considered all the facts including the stand taken by the Revenue as found in the Assessing Officer’s order. On examination of all the facts he came to the conclusion that the activities carried out by the assesee could not be classified under the head “business income” but more appropriately as claimed by the assessee under the head “shortterm capital gains”. This was particularly so on application of the CBDT circular.

(ii) In view of the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal no substantial question of law would arise.”

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) – A. Y. 2009- 10 – Payment made by the assessee law firm to the Indian branch of the International Fiscal Association towards the cost of constructing one of its meeting halls on the understanding that the hall would be named after the assessee firm was deductible as business expenditure

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CIT vs. Vaish Associates; 280 CTR 605 (Del): The assessee, a law firm, had agreed to contribute Rs. 50 lakh to the Indian branch of the International Fiscal Association (IFA) on progressive basis towards the cost of constructing one of its meeting halls on the understanding that the hall would be named after the asessee firm. In the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee had paid Rs. 19 lakh and the same was claimed as business expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. However, he allowed 50% deduction u/s. 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal allowed the full claim u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal has accepted the explanation of the assessee that the IFA is a professional body and a non-profit organization engaged in the study of international tax laws and policies. It, inter alia, undertakes research, holds conferences and publishes materials for the use of its members. Mr. Ajay Vora, one of the partners of the assessee firm, was also a member of the executive body of the IFA.

ii) T he contribution made by the assessee to the IFA was held to be for inter alia creating greater awareness of the assessee firm’s activities and therefore an expenditure incurred for the purposes of the profession of the assessee. It was accordingly held to be allowable as a deduction u/s. 37(1) of the Act.”

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 14A – A. Y. 2007-08 – Disallowance u/s. 14A is not automatic upon claim to exemption – AO’s satisfaction that voluntary disallowance made by assessee unreasonable and unsatisfactory is necessary – In the absence of such satisfaction the disallowance cannot be justified

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CIT vs. I. P. Support Services India (P) Ltd.; 378 ITR 240 (Del):

In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee had earned dividend income which was exempt. The Assessing Officer asked the assessee to furnish an explanation why the expenses relevant to the earning of dividend should not be disallowed u/s. 14A. The assessee submitted that as no expenses had been incurred for earning dividend income, this was not a case for making any disallowance. The assessing Officer held that the invocation of section 14A is automatic and comes into operation, without any exception. He disallowed an amount of Rs. 33,35,986/- u/s. 14A read with rule 8D and added the amount to the total income. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that no interest expenditure was incurred and that the investments were done by using administrative machinery of PMS, who did not charge any fees. He deleted the addition. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer had indeed proceeded on the erroneous premise that the invocation of section 14A is automatic and comes into operation as soon as the dividend income is claimed as exempt. The recording of satisfaction as to why the voluntary disallowance made by the assessee was unreasonable or unsatisfactory, is a mandatory requirement of the law.

ii) N o substantial question of law arises. The appeal is dismissed.”

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 14A – A. Y. 2007-08 – Higher disallowance under rule 8D agreed before AO – Assessee could not be bound by such offer – Tribunal justified in reducing the amount of disallowance

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CIT vs. Everest Kanto Cylinders Ltd.; 378 ITR 57 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee and the Assessing Officer worked out the amount disallowable u/s. 14A read with rule 8D at Rs.20,27.896/- Before the Tribunal the assessee pointed out that the disallowance is on a higher side and claimed that a reasonable amount should be disallowed. The Tribunal restricted the disallowance to Rs. 1 lakh.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal had gone into the factual aspects in great detail and interpreted the law as it stood on the relevant date. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal restricting the disallowance to Rs. 1 lakh u/s. 14A was justified.”

Housing Project – Special Deduction – Law before 1st April, 2002 – There was no limit fixed in section 80-IB(10) regarding built-up area to be used for commercial purpose in a housing project and it could be constructed to the extent provided in local laws under which local authority gives sanction to the housing project.

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CIT vs. Veena Developers [SLP (c) No.22450 of 2011 dated 30-4-2015]

The assessees had undertaken construction projects which were approved by the municipal authorities/local authorities as housing projects. On that basis, they claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act.

However, the income tax authorities rejected the claim of deduction on the ground that the projects were not “housing project” inasmuch as some commercial activity was also undertaken in those projects. This contention of the Revenue was not accepted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court. The High Court interpreted the expression “housing project” by giving grammatical meaning thereto as housing project is not defined under the Income-tax Act insofar as the aforesaid provision is concerned. The High Court held that since sub-section (10) of section 80-IB very categorically mentioned that such a project which is undertaken as housing project is approved by a local authority, once the project is approved by the local authority it is to be treated as the housing project. The High Court had made observations in the context of Development Control Regulations (hereinafter referred to as ‘DCRs’ in short) under which the local authority sanctions the housing projects and noted that in these DCRs itself, an element of commercial activity is provided but the total project is still treated as housing project. The Supreme Court noted that on the basis of this discussion, after modifying some of the directions given by the ITAT , the conclusions arrived at by the High Court were as follows:-

a) Upto 31/3/2005 (subject to fulfilled other conditions), deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) is allowable to housing projects approved by the local authority having residential units with commercial user to the extent permitted under DC Rules/Regulations framed by the respective local authority.

b) I n such a case, where the commercial user permitted by the local authority is within the limits prescribed under the DC Rules/Regulation, the deduction u/s. 80- IB(10) upto 31/3/2005 would be allowable irrespective of the fact that the project is approved as ‘housing project’ or ‘residential plus commercial’.

c) I n the absence of any provision under the Income-tax Act, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that upto 31/3/2015 deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) would be allowable to the projects approved by the local authority having residential building with commercial user upto 10% of the total built-up area of the plot.

d) Since deductions u/s. 80-IB(10) is on the profits derived from the housing projects approved by the local authority as a whole, the Tribunal was not justified in restricting section 80-IB(10) deduction only to a part of the project. However, in the present case, since the assessee has accepted the decision of the Tribunal in allowing section 80-IB(10) deduction to a part of the project, the findings of the Tribunal in that behalf were not disturbed.

e) Clause (d) inserted to section 80IB(10) with effect from 1/4/2005 was prospective and not retrospective and hence could not be applied for the period prior to 1/4/2005.

The Supreme Court agreed with the aforesaid answers given by the High Court to the various issues. The Supreme Court however, clarified that in so far as answer at para (a) was concerned, it would mean those projects which were approved by the local authorities as housing projects with commercial element therein.

There was much debate on the answer given in para (b) above before the Supreme Court. It was argued by learned senior counsel, for the Revenue that a project which was cleared as “residential plus commercial” project could not be treated as housing project and therefore, this direction was contrary to the provisions of section 80-IB(10) of the Act. However, according to the Supreme Court reading the direction in its entirety and particularlly the first sentence thereof, the commercial user which was permitted was in the residential units and that too, as per DCR.

The Supreme Court clarified that direction (b) was to be read in the context where the project was predominantly housing/residential project but the commercial activity in the residential units was permitted.

Housing Project – Special Deduction- Section 80IB(10) – Change of Law with effect from 1st April, 2005 – Cannot be applied to those projects which were sanctioned and commenced prior to 1st April, 2005 and completed by the stipulated date though such stipulated date is after 1st April, 2005.

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CIT vs. Sarkar Builders (2015) 375 ITR 392(SC)

The question of law that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was formulated by it as under:

“Whether section 80-IB(10)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, applies to a housing project approved before March 31, 2005, but completed on or after April 1, 2005”?

The Supreme Court observed that sub-section (10) of section 80IB stipulates certain conditions which are to be satisfied in order to avail of the benefit of the said provision. Further, the benefit is available to those undertakings which are developing and building “housing projects” approved by a local authority. Thus, this section is applicable in respect of housing projects and not commercial projects. At the same time, it is a fact that even in the housing projects, there would be some are for commercial purposes as certain shops and commercial establishments area needed even in a housing project.

That has been judicially recognised while interpreting the provision that existing before 1st April, 2005 in CIT vs. Veena Developers [SLP (c) No.22450/2011 dated 30-4- 2015], and there was no limit fixed in section 80-IB(10) regarding the built-up area to be used for commercial purpose in the said housing project. The extent to which such commercial area could be constructed was as per the local laws under which local authority gave the sanction to the housing project. However, vide clause (d), which was inserted by the aforesaid amendment and made effective from 1st April, 2005, it was stipulated that the built-up area of the shops and other commercial establishments in the housing projects would not exceed 5 % of the aggregate built-up area of the housing project or 2,000 square feet, whichever is less (there is a further amendment whereby 5 % is reduced to 3 % and instead of the words “2,000 square feet, whichever is less” the words “5,000 square feet, whichever is higher” have been substituted). According to the Supreme Court, the question, thus, that required for consideration was as to whether in respect of those housing projects which finished on or after 1st April, 2005, though sanctioned and started much earlier, the aforesaid stipulation contained to clause (d) also has to be satisfied. The Supreme Court noted that all the High Courts have held that since this amendment is prospective and has come into effect from 1st April, 2005, this condition would not apply to those housing projects which had been sanctioned and stared earlier even if they finished after 1st April, 2005.

The Supreme Court noted that with effect from 1st April, 2001, section 80-IB(10) stipulated that any housing project approved by the local authority before 31st March, 2001, was entitled to a deduction of 100 % of the profits derived in any previous year relevant to any assessment year from such housing project, provided—(i) the construction/ development of the said housing project commenced on after 1st October, 1998, and was completed before 31st March, 2003; (ii) the housing project was on a size of a plot of land which had a minimum area of one acre; and (iii) each individual residential unit had a maximum built-up area of 1,000 square feet, where such housing project was situated within the cities of Delhi or Mumbai or within 25 kms. from municipal limits of these cities, and a maximum built-up area of 1,500 square feet at any other place. Therefore, for the first time, a stipulation was added with reference to the date of approval, namely, that approval had to be accorded to the housing project by the local authority before 31st March, 2001. Before this amendment, there was no date prescribed for the approval being granted by the local authority to the housing project. Prior to this amendment, as long as the development/ construction commenced on or after 1st October, 1998, and was completed before 31st March, 2001, the assessee was entitled to the deduction. Also by this amendment, the date of completion was changed from 31st March, 2001, to 31st March, 2003. Everything else remained untouched.

Thereafter, by the Finance Act, 2003, further amendments were made to section 80-IB(10). The only changes that were brought about were that with effect from 1st April, 2002: (i) the housing project had to be approved before 31st March, 2005; and (ii) there was no time limit prescribed for completion of the said project. Though these changes were brought about by the Finance Act, 2003, the Legislature thought it fit tht these changes be deemed to have been brought into effect from 1st April, 2002. All the remaining provisions of section 80-IB(10) remained unchanged.

Thereafter, significant amendment, with which the Supreme Court was directly concerned, was carried out by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, with effect from 1st April, 2005. The Legislature made substantial changes in subsection (10). Several new conditions were incorporated for the first time, including the condition mentioned in clause (d). This condition/restriction was not on the statute book earlier when all these projects were sanctioned. Another important amendment was made by this Act to sub-section (14) of section 80-IB with effect from 1st April, 2005, and for the first time under clause (a) thereof the words “built-up area” were defined.

Prior to the insertion of section 80-IB(14)(a), in many of the rules and regulations of the local authority approving the housing project “built-up area” did not include projections and balconies. Probably, taking advantage of this fact, builders provided large balconies and projections making the residential units far bigger than as stipulated in section 80-IB(10), and yet claimed the deduction under the said provision. To plug this lacuna, clause (a) was inserted in section 80-IB(14) defining the words “built-up area” to mean the inner measurements of the residential unit at the floor level, including the projections and balconies, as increased by the thickness of the walls but did not include the common areas shared with other residential units.

According to the Supreme Court, the only way to resolve the issue was to hold that clause (d) is to be treated as inextricably linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and an assessee cannot be called upon to comply with the said condition when it is not in contemplation either of the assessee or even the Legislature, when the housing project was accorded approval by the local authorities.

The Supreme Court held that by way of an amendment in the form of clause (d), an attempt is made to restrict the size of the said shops and/or commercial establishments. Therefore, by necessary implication, the said provision has to be read prospectively and not retrospectively. As is clear from the amendment, this provision came into effect only from the day the provision was substituted. Therefore, it cannot be applied to those projects which were sanctioned and commenced prior to 1st April, 2005, and completed by the stipulated date, though such stipulated date is after 1st April, 2005. According to the Supreme Court, these aspects were dealt with by various High Courts elaborately and convincingly in their judgments and had taken a correct view that the assesses were entitled to the benefit of section 80-IB(10). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue.

Surtax – Exemption – Agreements with foreign companies for services or facilities for supply of ship, aircraft, machinery and plant to be used in connection with the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils – Chargeable profits are liable to tax under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 – Exemption vide Notification No.GSR 370(E) dated 31-3-1983 u/s. 24AA not available.

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Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 377 ITR 117(SC)

Section 24AA of the Surtax Act, vests in the Central Government the power to make exemption, reduction in rate or other modification in respect of surtax in favour of any class of foreign companies which are specified in s/s. (2), in regard to the whole or any part of the chargeable profits liable to tax under the Surtax Act. Sub-section (2) of section 24AA refers to two categories of foreign companies. The first is foreign companies with whom the Central Government has entered into agreements for association or participation, including participation by any authorised person, in any business consisting of the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils. The second category of foreign companies mentioned in s/s. (2) is foreign companies that may be providing services or facilities or supplying any ship, aircraft, machinery or plant in connection with any business of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils carried on by the Central Government or any authorised person. Specifically the section states that mineral oils will include petroleum and natural gas.

The exemption notification bearing No. G. S. R. 307(E), dated 31st March, 1983, specifically grants exemption in respect of surtax in favour of foreign companies with whom the Central Government has entered into agreements for association or participation of that Government or any authorised person in the business of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils.

The ONGC had executed agreements with different foreign companies for services or facilities or for supply of ship, aircraft, machinery and plant, as may be, all of which were to be used in connection with the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils. Such agreements did not contemplate a direct association or participation of the ONGC in the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils but involved the taking of services and facilities or use of plant or machinery which is connected with the business of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils.

In the above situation, the primary authority took the view that the agreements executed by the ONGC with the foreign companies being for services to be rendered and such agreements not being for association or participation in the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils, would not be covered by the exemption notification in question which by its very language granted exemption only to foreign companies with whom there were agreements for participation by the Central Government or the person authorised in the business of prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils. The agreements in question, according to assessing authority, were, therefore “service agreements” and, hence, covered by sub-section (2)(b) of section 24AA of the Surtax Act and were, accordingly, beyond the purview of the exemption modification.

The said view was reversed by the learned Appellate Commissioner and upheld by the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the appeal u/s. 260A of the Act, the High Court of Uttarakhand overturned the view taken by the Appellate Commissioner and the learned Tribunal.

The Supreme Court held that section 24AA of the Surtax Act vests power in the Central Government, inter-alia, to grant exemption to foreign companies with whom agreements have been executed by the Central Government for association or participation in the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils and also to foreign companies who are providing support services or facilities or making available plant and machinery in connection with the business of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils in which the Central Government or an authorised person is associated. In other words, the power to grant exemption is two-fold and covers agreements directly associated with the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils or contracts facilitating or making available services in connection with such a business. There is nothing in the provisions of the Act which could have debarred the Central Government from granting exemptions to both categories of foreign companies mentioned above or to confine the grant of exemption to any one or a specified category of foreign companies. The Notification No. G. S. R. 307(E), dated 31st March, 1983, however grants exemption only to foreign companies with whom the Central Government had executed agreements for direct association or participation by the Central Government or the person authorised by it (ONGC) in the prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oils. In other words, the exemption notification confines or restricts the scope of the exemption to only one category of foreign companies which has been specifically enumerated in sub-section (2)(a) of section 24AA of the Surtax Act. The Second category of foreign companies that may be providing services as enumerated in sub-section (2)(b) of section 24AA is specifically omitted in the exemption notification. The power u/s. 24AA of the Surtax Act, is wide enough to include even this category of foreign companies. The omission of this particular category of foreign companies in the exemption notification, notwithstanding the wide amplitude and availability of the power u/s. 24AA, clearly reflects a conscious decision on the part of the Central Government to confine the scope of the exemption notification to only those foreign companies that are enumerated in and covered by sub-section 2(a) of section 24AA of the Surtax Act.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the High Court and dismissed the appeals.

Non-Resident – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils – Presumptive Tax – If the works or services mentioned under a particular agreement was directly associated or inextricably connected with prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils, payments made under such agreement to a non-resident/foreign company would be chargeable to tax under the provisions of section 44BB and not section 44D of the Act.

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Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 376 ITR 306 (SC)

The appellant – ONGC and a non-resident/foreign company one M/s. Foramer France had entered into an agreement by which the non-resident company had agreed to make available supervisory staff and personnel having experience and expertise for operation and management of drilling rigs Sagar Jyoti and Sagar Pragati for the assessment year 1985-86 and the drilling rig Sagar Ratna for the assessment year 1986-87.

The appellant – ONGC has been assessed in a representative capacity on behalf of the foreign company with whom it had executed agreements for services to be rendered by such company in connection with prospecting extraction or production of mineral oils by ONGC. The primary/assessing authority took the view that the assessments should be made u/s. 44D of the Act and not section 44BB of the Act. The Appellate Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal disagreed with the views of the assessing authorities leading to the institution of appeal before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The High Court overturned the view taken by the Appellate Commissioner and the Tribunal and held the payments made to be liable for assessment u/s. 44D of the Act.

The High Court took the view that under the agreement, payment to M/s. Foramer France was required to be made at the rate of 3,450 $ per day and that the contract clearly contemplated rendering of technical services by personnel of the non-resident company as the contract did not mention that the personnel of the non-resident company were also carrying out the work of drilling of wells and as the company had received fees for rendering service, the payments made were liable to be taxed under the provisions of section 44D of the Act.

Aggrieved, the ONGC has filed appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that a careful reading of the provisions of the Act goes to show that u/s. 44BB(1) in the case of a non-resident providing services or facilities in connection with or supplying plant and machinery used or to be used in prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils the profit and gains from such business chargeable to tax is to be calculated at a sum equal to 10 per cent of the aggregate of the amounts paid or payable to such non-resident assessee as mentioned in s/s. (2). On the other hand, section 44D contemplates that if the income of a foreign company with which the Government or an Indian concern had an agreement executed before 1st April, 1976, or on any date thereafter but before April, 2003 the computation of income would be made as contemplated under the aforesaid section 44D. Explanation (a) to section 44D, however, specifies that “fees for technical services” as mentioned in section 44D would have the same meaning as in Explanation 2 to clause (vii) of section 9(1). The said Explanation, defines “fees for technical services” to mean consideration for rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services. However, the later part of the Explanation excludes from consideration for the purposes of the expression, i.e., “fees for technical services” any payment received for construction, assembly, mining or like project undertaken by the recipient or consideration which would be chargeable under the head “Salaries”. Fees for technical services, therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid Explanation would not include payments made in connection with a mining project.

The Supreme Court noted that the Income-tax Act does not define the expressions “mines” or “minerals”. The said expressions however were found defined and explained in the Mines Act, 1952, and the Oil Fields (Development and Regulations) Act, 1948. The Supreme Court having regard to the said definition and to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, held that drilling operations for the purpose of production of petroleum would clearly amount to a mining activity or a mining operation. Viewed thus, it was the proximity of the works contemplated under an agreement, executed with a non-resident assessee or a foreign company, with mining activity or a mining operation that would be crucial for the determination of the question whether the payments made under such an agreement to the non-resident assessee or the foreign company is to be assessed u/s. 44BB or section 44D of the Act. The Supreme Court noted that the Central Board of Direct Taxes had accepted the said test and had in fact issued a Circular as far back as 22nd October, 1990, to the effect that mining operations and the expressions “mining projects” or “like projects” occurring in Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Act would cover rendering of service like imparting of training and carrying out drilling operations for exploration of and extraction of oil and natural gas and, hence, payments made under such agreement to a non-resident/foreign company would be chargeable to tax under the provisions of section 44BB and not section 44D of the Act.

According to the Supreme Court, it was not possible to take any other view if the works or services mentioned under a particular agreement was directly associated or inextricably connected with prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils. Keeping in mind the above provisions and looking into each of the contracts involved in the group of cases before it, it found that the pith and substance of each of the contracts/agreements was inextricably connected with prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oil. The dominant purpose of each of such agreement was for prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils though there would be certain ancillary works contemplated thereunder. The Supreme Court therefore held that the payments made by ONGC and received by the non-resident assessees or foreign companies under the said contracts was more appropriately assessable under the provisions of section 44BB and not section 44D of the Act.

Capital Gains – Exemption u/s. 54G – Transfer of Unit from Urban Area to Non-Urban Area – Advances paid for the purpose of purchase and/or acquisition of the assets would certainly amount to utilisation by the assessee of the capital gains made by him for the purpose of purchasing and/ or acquiring the aforesaid assets.

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Fire Boards (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [2015] 376 ITR 596 (SC)

The assessee, a private limited company, had an industrial unit at Majiwada, Thane, which was notified urban area as per notification dated 22nd September, 1967 issued u/s. 280Y(d) for the purpose of Chapter XXII-B. With a view to shift its industrial undertaking from an urban area to a non-urban area at Kurukumbh Village, Pune District, Maharashtra, it sold its land, building and plant and machinery situated at Majiwada, Thane to Shree Vardhman Trust for a consideration of Rs.1,20,00,000, and after deducting an amount of Rs.11,62,956, had earned a capital gain of Rs.1,08,33,044. Since it intended to shift its industrial undertaking from an urban area to a non-urban area, out of the capital gain so earned, the appellant paid by way of advances, various amounts to different persons for purchase of land, plant and machinery, construction of factory building, etc. Such advances amounted to Rs.1,11,42,973 in the year 1991-92. The appellant claimed exemption u/s. 54G of the Income-tax Act on the entire capital gain earned from the sale proceeds of its erstwhile industrial undertaking situated in Thane in view of the advances so made being more than the capital gain made by it. Section 54G was introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from assessment year 1988-89.

The Assessing Officer imposed a tax on capital gains, refusing to grant exemption to the appellant u/s. 54G. According to the Assessing Officer, non-urban area had not been notified by the Central Government and therefore the plea of shifting the non-urban area could not be accepted. Further, it could not be said that giving advance to different concerns meant utilisation of money for acquiring the assets. Hence, failure to deposit the capital gain in the Capital Gains Deposit Account by the assessee the claim could not be allowed.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal however, allowed the assessee’s appeal stating that even an agreement to purchase is good enough and that the Explanation to section 54G being declaratory in nature would be retrospective.

The High Court reversed the judgment of the Incometax Appellate Tribunal and held that as the notification declaring Thane to be an urban area stood repealed with the repeal of the section under which it was made, the appellant did not satisfy the basic condition necessary to attract section 54G, namely, that a transfer had to be made from an urban area to a non-urban area. Further, the expression “purchase” in section 54G could not be equated with the expression “towards purchase” and, therefore, admittedly as land, plant and machinery had not been purchased in the assessment year in question, the exemption contained in section 54G had to be denied.

The Supreme Court held that on a conjoint reading of the Budget Speech, Notes on clauses and Memorandum Explaining the Finance Bill of 1987, it was clear that the idea of omitting section 280ZA and introducing on the same date section 54G was to do away with the tax credit certificate scheme together with the prior approval required by the Board and to substitute the repealed provision with the new scheme contained in section 54G. It was true that section 280Y(d) was only omitted by the Finance Act, 1990, and was not omitted together with section 280ZA. However, this would make no material difference inasmuch as section 280Y(d) was a definition section defining ‘urban area” for the purpose of section 280ZA only and for no other purposes. It was clear that once section 280ZA was omitted from the statute book, section 280Y(d) had no independent existence and would for all practical purposes also be “dead”. Quite apart from this, section 54G(1) by its Explanation introduced the very definition contained in section 280Y(d) in the same terms. Obviously, both provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously and it was clear that the Explanation to section 54G(1) repealed by implication section 280Y(d). Further, from a reading of the Notes on Clauses and the Memorandum of the Finance Bill, 1990, it was clear that section 280Y(d) which was omitted with effect from 1st April 1, 1990, was so omitted because it had become “redundant”. It was redundant because it had no independent existence, apart from providing a definition of “urban area” for the purpose of section 280ZA which had been omitted with effect from the very date that section 54G was inserted, namely, 1st April, 1988.

The Supreme Court further held that the idea of section 24 of the General Clauses Act is, as its marginal note shows, to continue uninterrupted subordinate legislation that may be made under a Central Act that is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification. It being clear in the present case that section 280ZA which was repealed by omission and re-enacted with modification in section 54G, the notification declaring Thane to be an urban area dated 22nd September, 1967, would continue under and for the purposes of section 54G. It was clear, therefore, that the impugned judgment in not referring to section 24 of the General Clauses Act at all had thus fallen into error.

The Supreme Court for all the aforesaid reasons was therefore, of the view that on omission of section 280ZA and its re-enactment with modification in section 54G, section 24 of the General Clauses Act would apply, and the notification of 1967, declaring Thane to be an urban area, would be continued under and for the purposes of section 54G. The Supreme Court held that a reading of section 54G makes it clear that the assessee is given a window of three years after the date on which transfer has taken place to “purchase” new machinery or plant or “acquire” building or land. The High Court had completely missed the window of three years given to the assessee to purchase or acquire machinery and building or land. This is why the expression used in section 54G(2) is “which is not utilised by him for all or any of the purposes aforesaid.” According to the Supreme Court, it was clear that for the assessment year in question all that was required for the assessee to avail of the exemption contained in the section was to “utilize” the amount of capital gains for purchase and acquisition of new machinery or plant and building or land. It was undisputed that the entire amount claimed in the assessment year in question had been so “utilized” for purchase and/or acquisition of new machinery or plant and land or building. If the High Court was right, the assessee had to purchase and/or acquire machinery, plant, land and building within the same assessment year in which the transfer takes place. Further, the High Court missed the key words “not utilized” in sub-section (2) which would show that it was enough that the capital gain made by the assessee should only be “utilized” by him in the assessment year in question for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, that is towards purchase and acquisition of plant and machinery, and land and building. Advances paid for the purpose of purchase and/or acquisition of the aforesaid assets would certainly amount to utilisation by the assessee of the capital gains made by him for the purpose of purchasing and/or acquiring the aforesaid assets.

Power of High Court to Review – High Courts being courts of record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the power of review would inherent in them and section 260A(7) does not purport in any manner to curtail or restrict the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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CIT vs. Meghalaya Steels Ltd. [2015] 377 ITR 112 (SC)

In the first judgment of the High Court dated 16th September, 2010, various points on the merits were gone into, inter alia, as to whether deductions to be made u/s. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were allowable on facts and whether transport subsidies were or were not available together with other incentive. Ultimately, the High Court after stating in paragraph 2 that two substantial questions of law arose u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act went on to answer the two questions. The first question so framed was answered in the negative, that is in favour of the Revenue, and against the assessee. However, the second question was answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee, and against Revenue, and the appeal was disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Against the aforesaid judgment dated 16th September, 2010, a Review Petition was filed by the assessee before the very Division Bench. In a long judgement dated 8th April, 2013, the Division Bench recalled its earlier order dated 16th September, 2010 for the reason that there was an omission to formulate the substantial questions of law. Before the Supreme Court Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue, assailed the aforesaid judgment dated 8th April, 2013, stating that it was factually incorrect that no substantial question of law have been framed and that such questions were to be found in the very beginning of the judgment dated 16th September, 2010, itself. He further argued, referring to section 260A(7), that only those provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be looked into for the purposes of section 260A as were relevant to the disposal of appeals, and since the review provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure were not so referred to, the High Court would have no jurisdiction u/s. 260A to review such judgment.

The Supreme Court noted that by the review order dated 8th April, 2013, the Division Bench felt that it should not have gone into the matter at all given the fact that on an earlier occasion, before 16th September, 2010, it had reserved the judgment on whether substantial questions of law in fact exist at all or not. This being the case, in a lengthy order the Division Bench has thought it fit to recall its own earlier judgment.

The Supreme Court in such circumstances was not inclined to interfere with the judgment in view of what had been recorded in the impugned judgment dated 8th April, 2013. The Supreme Court further held that High Courts being courts of record under article 215 of the Constitution of India, the power of review would in fact be inherent in them. Also on reading of section 260A(7), it was clear that the said section did not purport in any manner to curtail or restrict the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 260A(7) only states that all the provisions that would apply qua appeals in the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to appeals u/s. 260A. That does not in any manner suggest either that the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are necessarily excluded or that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is in any manner affected.

Wealth Tax – Valuation of Asset – “Price that asset would fetch in market” – Valuation of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit could only be valued at the amount of maximum compensation under the Ceiling Act.

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S. N. Wadiyar (Decd. Through L. R.) vs. CWT [2015] 378 ITR 9 (SC)

The appellant was assessed to wealth-tax under the Act for the assessment years 1977-78 to 1986-87. The valuation of the property which was the subject matter of wealth-tax under the Act was the urban land appurtenant to the Bangalore Palace (hereinafter referred to as “the property”). The total extent of the property was 554 acres or 1837365.36 sq. mtrs. It comprised of residential units, non-residential units and land appurtenant thereto, roads and masonry structures along the contour and the vacant land. The vacant land measured 11,66,377.34 sq.mtrs. The aforesaid property was the private property of the late Sri Jaychamarajendra Wodeyar, the former ruler of the princely State of Mysore. He died on 23rd September, 1974. After the death of Sri Jaychamarajendra Wodeyar, his son Sri Srikantadatta Wodeyar, the assessee applied to the Settlement Commission to get the dispute settled with regard to valuation of property and lands appurtenant thereto for the assessment years 1967-68 to 1976-77.

The application of the assessee before the Settlement Commission for the assessment years 1967-68 to 1976- 77 was disposed of on 29th September, 1988 laying down norms for valuation of the property. The Wealthtax Officer adopted the value as per the Settlement Commission for the assessment years 1976-77, 1977- 78 and 1978-79 at Rs.13.18 crore (for both land and buildings). For the assessment year 1979-80, since there was no report of the Valuation Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) worked out the value of the property at Rs.19.96 crore for the assessment year 1979- 80, which was adopted by the Wealth-tax Officer for the assessment year 1980-81 as well. For the assessment years 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84, the Wealth-tax Officer fixed the value of land and building at Rs.18.78 crore, Rs.29.85 crore and Rs.29.85 crore, respectively. For the assessment year 1984-85, the Wealth-tax Officer took the value at Rs.31.22 crore on the basis of the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) for earlier years.

The orders of the Wealth-tax Officer passed under the Act fixing the value of the land for different assessment years for the purpose of the Act was challenged by the assessee before the Commissioner (Appeals). In these appeals, the contention of the assessee was that the value of the property was covered by the Ceiling Act for which maximum compensation that could be received by the assessee was only Rs.2 lakh. The appeals filed for the assessment years, namely, 1980-81, 1982-83 and 1983- 84 were disposed of by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) by a common order dated 9th January, 1990, in which he made slight modifications to value adopted for the assessment year 1981-82 and confirmed the valuation of the Wealth-tax Officer for the assessment years 1982-83 and 1983-84. However, in respect of appeals relating to the assessment years 1977-78 to 1980-81, the Commissioner (Appeals) passed the orders dated 31st July, 1990, accepting that the urban land appurtenant to the property be valued at Rs.2,00,000. Similar orders came to be passed by the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals) for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86 also. Against these orders of the Commissioner (Appeals), both the assessee as well as the Revenue/ Department went up in appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, Bangalore.

The issue before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was only with regard to the valuation of vacant land attached to the property since the assessee had accepted the valuation in regard to residential and non-residential structures within the said property area and appurtenant land thereto.

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, passed the order directing the vacant land be valued at Rs.2 lakh for each year from the assessment years 1977-78 to 1985-86. Its reasoning was that the competent authority under the Ceiling Act had passed an order determining that the vacant land was in excess of the ceiling limit, and had ordered that action be taken to acquire the excess land under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1901. And under the Land Ceiling Act, an embargo was placed on the assessee to sell the subject land and exercise full rights. The assessee was only eligible to maximum compensation of Rs.2 lakh under the Ceiling Act. Hence, given these facts and circumstances the subject land could only be valued at Rs.2 lakh for wealthtax purposes on the valuation date for the assessment years 1977-78 to 1985-86.

Against the order of the Tribunal, the Commissioner of Wealth-tax sought reference before the Karnataka High Court in respect of the assessment years, namely, 1977-78 to 1985-86 arising out of the consolidated order of the Tribunal.

The High Court, vide the impugned order dated 13th June, 2005 holding that although the prohibition and restriction contained in the Ceiling Act had the effect of decreasing the value of the property, still the value of the land cannot be the maximum compensation that is payable under the provision of the Ceiling Act. Thus, the question referred had been answered against the assessee.

The Supreme Court observed that the valuation of the asset in question has to be in the manner provided u/s. 7 of the Act. Such a valuation has to be on the valuation date which has reference to the last day of the previous year as defined u/s. 3 of the Income-tax Act, if an assessment was to be made under that Act for that year. In other words, it is 31st March, immediately preceding the assessment year. The valuation arrived at as on that date of the asset is the valuation on which wealth-tax is assessable. It is clear from the reading of section 7 of the Act that the Assessing Officers has to keep hypothetical situation in mind, namely, if the asset in question is to be sold in the open market, what price it would fetch. The Assessing Officer has to form an opinion about the estimation of such a price that is likely to be received if the property were to be sold. There is no actual sale and only a hypothetical situation of a sale is to be contemplated by the Assessing Officers. The tax officer has to form an opinion about the estimated price if the asset were to be sold in the assumed market and the estimated price would be the one which an assumed wiling purchaser would pay for it. On these reckoning, the asset has to be valued in the ordinary way.

The Supreme Court noted that the effect of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in the context of instant appeals was that the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit was not acquired by the State Government as notification u/s. 10(1) of the Ceiling Act had not been issued. However, the process had started as the assessee had filed statement in the prescribed form as per the provisions of section 6(1) of the Ceiling Act and the competent authority had also prepared a draft statement u/s. 8 which was duly served upon the assessee. The fact remained that so long as the Act was operative, by virtue of section 3 the assessee was not entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. Order was also passed to the effect that the maximum compensation payable was Rs.2 lakh.

The Supreme Court held that the Assessing Officer took into consideration the price which the property would have fetched on the valuation date, i.e., the market price, as if it was not under the rigours of the Ceiling Act. Such estimation of the price which the asset would have fetched if sold in the open market on the valuation date(s), would clearly be wrong even on the analogy/rationale given by the High Court as it accepted that restrictions and prohibitions under the Ceiling Act would have depressing effect on the value of the asset. Therefore, the valuation as done by the Assessing Officer could not have been accepted. The Supreme Court observed that it was not oblivious of those categories of buyers who may buy “disputed properties” by taking risks with the hope that legal proceedings may ultimately be decided in favour of the assessee and in such a eventuality they were going to get much higher value. However, as stated above, hypothetical presumptions of such sales are to be discarded as one has to keep in mind the conduct of a reasonable person and “ordinary way” of the presumptuous sale.

The Supreme Court held that when such a presumed buyer is not going to offer more than Rs.2 lakh, the obvious answer is that the estimated price which such asset would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date(s) would not be more than Rs.2 lakh. The Supreme Court having held so pointed out one aspect which was missed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal as well while deciding the case in favour of the assessee. The compensation of Rs.2 lakh was in respect of only the “excess land” which was covered by sections 3 and 4 of the Ceiling Act. The Supreme Court held that the total vacant land for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act is not only excess land but other part of the land which would have remained with the assessee in any case. Therefore, the valuation of the excess land, which was the subject matter of the Ceiling Act, would be Rs.2 lakh. To that market value of the remaining land would have to be added for the purpose of arriving at the valuation for payment of wealth-tax. 

Appellate Tribunal – Difference of Opinion between Members of Bench on factual matters – Advice to Tribunal – Disagreement and dissent to be avoided by meaningful discussion and continuous dialogue.

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Commissioner of Customs (II) vs. Nitin Aminchand Shah 2015 (323) ELT 466 (Bom.)

In the initial order passed on 6-8-2013 by the CESTAT, there was difference of opinion between the Member (Judicial) and the Member (Technical). The Member (Judicial) was of the opinion that for the reasons indicated by him, the appeals of the assessee deserved to be allowed. Whereas the Member (Technical) passed a separate order upholding the Department’s stand, but yet remanded the case to the Commissioner for ascertaining the value of the impugned goods by constituting a Panel in accordance with the Departmental instructions.

On account of this difference of opinion, the matter was referred by the President, CESTAT to a Third Member. In the meanwhile, the importers filed rectification of mistake applications pointing out the alleged mistake in the initial order of the Tribunal dated 6-8-2013. As was expected, even when these applications for rectification were placed before the same Bench, the Members thereof differed. The applications were admitted by the Member (Judicial) whereas the Member (Technical) recorded a separate order. That separate order of the Member (Technical) did not conclude the applications for rectification of mistake. Thereafter, the rectification applications were finally decided on 8-12-2014 but recording a dissent and difference of opinion between the two Members.

Then, this difference of opinion was also marked and referred to the same Third Member who was to resolve the disagreement in the initial order dated 6-8-2013.

The Hon’ble Court observed that this was one more instance where the Members of the Bench have differed and recorded dissenting opinions. By consent of both sides, the appeals decided by the initial order dated 6-8-2013 were restored to the file of the CESTAT for being decided afresh in accordance with law. The Hon’ble Court further advised that the Tribunal should bear in mind the caution administered by the Court in case of the Starto Electro Equipments Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI 2015 (318) ELT 55
(Bom) and all such decisions rendered prior thereto. Why should there be a difference of opinion on factual matters? By some meaningful discussion, continuous dialogue and by not demonstrating unnecessary haste, disagreements and dissents can be avoided.

Swachh Bharat cess exemplifies how the Indian tax payer is taken for granted – Roll it back

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These are taxing times. Finance minister Arun Jaitley’s fiscal policy
this year has been characterised by a combination of higher tax rates,
removal of tax exemptions and a new tax. So successful has j aitley’s
strategy of enhancing the tax burden been that indirect taxes this
financial year have grown almost twice as fast as his original target in
an economy with muted demand. j aitley often promises foreign investors
a stable and rational tax regime. h e should consider extending the
same courtesy to i ndian tax payers.

India has an annual budget intended to raise revenues for carrying out basic public welfare functions such as education, health and sanitation. i f these have to be funded through additional cesses and surcharges, that raises the question whether normal budgetary revenues are being frittered away on sops to vested interests – exemplifying maximum government, minimum governance. t here has been a constant increase in collections through different kinds of cess and surcharge. t heir collections exceeded r s. 1 trillion in 2013-14, or 13.14% of gross tax revenue. A cess today is levied on an extraordinarily wide range of activities, from salt to “cine workers”.

The rationale for every additional cess gets more and more unconvincing – we need to cease taxation by stealth. a mong the problems with the Swachh Bharat cess is that it runs counter to the spirit of cooperative federalism as revenue raised through a cess or surcharge is excluded from the pool that is split between Centre and states. C a G has pointed out that there is inadequate transparency and incomplete reporting in government accounts of the manner in which the money is spent. Jaitley’s fiscal policy is also an example of schizophrenia in i ndia’s economic policymaking. t he government constantly urges r B i to cut interest rates to stimulate demand but also follows a tax policy which limits demand.

Given that it imposes an additional burden, a levy should need a powerful reason. a clean energy cess imposed specifically on dirty fossil fuels and ploughed back specifically into clean energy projects makes sense, as it improves our environment. But a cess to carry out a basic function such as sanitation is an example of taking people for granted. i t must be rolled back.
Indians provide the lion’s share of India’s savings and investment. t hey deserve the same consideration as foreign investors.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 43 (Bangalore – Trib.) Food World Supermarkets Ltd vs. DDIT A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 28-10-2015

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Section 9(1)(vii), the Act – reimbursement made for salaries of secondees was FTS since they were performing services based on their technical knowledge; matter remanded to examine the issue whether secondment constitutes service PE under the Act and consequently, is subject to section 44DA of the Act

Facts
The taxpayer was an Indian company engaged in the business of ownership and operation of supermarket chain in India. Taxpayer was in need of personnel to assist with its operations in India. For this purpose, it entered into a Secondment agreement with a Hong Kong based company (“HKCo”), which was engaged in identical business as that of the Taxpayer. Accordingly, HKCo deputed its five employees (“secondees”) to the taxpayer. As per the agreement, HKCo was to pay the salary to the secondees and the taxpayer was to reimburse the same to HKCo. The taxpayer withheld tax from the salary of the secondees u/s. 192 and paid the same to the Government. The taxpayer did not withhold tax from the reimbursement amount paid to HKCo.

According to the AO, the reimbursement amount was FTS and hence, the taxpayer was required to withhold tax therefrom. Concluding that there was no master-servant relationship between the taxpayer and the secondees, CIT upheld the order of the AO.

Held
Payment in nature of FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act

It was evident from the agreement and the qualifications of the secondees that they were high level managers/ executives which showed that they were deputed for their expertise and managerial skills in the field.

The agreement was entered into between the taxpayer and HKCo and the secondees were not parties to the agreement. Further, secondees were assigned by HKCo and there was no contract of employment between the taxpayer and the secondees. Their deputation was for a short period and their employment with HKCo continued during the deputation period. Neither the taxpayer nor the secondees had any enforceable right or obligation against each other, including claim for salary. Thus, the secondees were performing their duties for and on behalf of HKCo.

Since the secondees were rendering managerial services requiring high expertise to the taxpayer as part of their duty to HKCo, the payment for such services was in the nature of FTS as defined in explanation 2 to section 9(1) (vii) of the Act.

In Centrica India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT 364 ITR 336 (Delhi)2, the High Court, considering an identical issue in the context of definition of FTS in Article 13(4) of India-UK DTAA which includes the expression “payments of any kind of any person in consideration for the rendering of any technical or consultancy services (including the provision of services of a technical or other personnel)”, held that as the secondees were required to draw from their technical knowledge, their services fell within the scope of the term technical or consultancy services.

In case of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, it is irrelevant whether the payment has any element or not. Accordingly, the gross payment is chargeable to tax.

Service PE
There is no tax treaty between India and Hong Kong. Also, there is no concept of a service PE under the Act.

While analysing the definition of PE u/s. 92F(iii) of the Act, in Morgan Stanley and Co Inc.3, the Supreme Court observed that the intention of the Parliament in adopting an inclusive definition of PE covers the service PE, agency PE, software PE, construction PE, etc.

Relying on the said decision, the taxpayer has raised alternative plea that deputation of secondees would constitute service PE and hence, the amount should be chargeable to tax as per the provision of section 44DA of the Act. Since this plea has been raised by the taxpayer for the first time before the Tribunal and since there is no tax treaty between India and Hong Kong, the concept of service PE requires proper examination of all the relevant facts and provisions on the point whether deputation of secondees constitutes service PE in India or not. Accordingly, the issue was remanded to the AO for adjudication.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 11 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) ADIT vs. Adani Enterprise Ltd A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 2-9-2015

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Sections 5, 9, the Act – since funds raised by issue of FCCBs were utilised for investment in foreign subsidiary carrying on business outside India, interest paid to bond holders was covered under exclusion in section 9(1) (v)(b) of the Act

Facts
The taxpayer had raised funds from certain nonresident investors by issuing FCCBs to them. The funds were invested in a company which was incorporated outside and which was carrying on business outside India. The taxpayer remitted interest to the bond holders without withholding tax on the ground that interest was neither received by non-resident bond holders in India nor had it accrued in India. Even if it was deemed to have accrued in India, the same was eligible for source rule exclusion as the borrowed funds were utilised for the purpose of earning income from source outside India.

According to the AO, the interest accrued or arose to non-resident bond holders in India. Consequently, the income was primarily subject to section 5(2). Accordingly, resorting to section 9 was not permissible. Therefore, the AO held that the income was chargeable to tax under section 5(2) and exclusion u/s. 9(l)(v)(b) was not relevant.

Held
Identical issue was considered in case of the taxpayer in earlier year. The Tribunal had observed that funds raised by issue of FCCBs were invested in foreign subsidiary which was involved in financing of businesses abroad.

The term “business” is wide enough to include investment in subsidiaries or joint ventures which are further involved in business or commerce. Therefore, the AO’s observation that the taxpayer was not earning out of business carried on outside India was not correct. Exclusion clause will not have any purpose unless the income is covered within the provision to which exclusion clause applies. Hence, the presence of exclusion in section 9(1)(v)(b) proves that the income is falling within the ambit of deeming provision. Thus, it cannot be accepted that the same income can also fall within the ambit of income which has accrued and arisen in India.

Since nothing contrary was brought on record in the relevant tax year, following the order of the Tribunal in case of the taxpayer, interest earned by non-resident bond holders was not chargeable to tax in India.