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(A) Double taxation avoidance — Deduction of tax at source — Effect of section 90 — Provisions of DTAA applicable wherever more beneficial to assessee — Contract between Indian company and American company — Provisions of DTAA more beneficial for purposes of deduction of tax at source — Provisions of DTAA applicable — Definition in DTAA of technical services more beneficial to assessee — Tax not deductible at source as payment to American company by way of reimbursement of employees of American company seconded to it.
(B) Deduction of tax at source — Certificate for deduction at lower rate or nil deduction — Difference between sections 195 and 197 — Application u/s 195 to be made by person making payment.

57. Flipkart Internet Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT(IT)
[2022] 448 ITR 268 (Kar.)
A.Y.: 2020-21
Date of order: 24th June, 2022
Ss. 90, 195 and 197 of ITA, 1961 and
Art.12 of India-US DTAA

(A) Double taxation avoidance — Deduction of tax at source — Effect of section 90 — Provisions of DTAA applicable wherever more beneficial to assessee — Contract between Indian company and American company — Provisions of DTAA more beneficial for purposes of deduction of tax at source — Provisions of DTAA applicable — Definition in DTAA of technical services more beneficial to assessee — Tax not deductible at source as payment to American company by way of reimbursement of employees of American company seconded to it.

(B) Deduction of tax at source — Certificate for deduction at lower rate or nil deduction — Difference between sections 195 and 197 — Application u/s 195 to be made by person making payment.

The assessee was engaged in the business of providing information technology solutions and support services for the e-commerce industry. In the course of its business, the assessee made payments in the nature of ‘pure reimbursements’ to W of USA for the A.Y. 2020-21 and requested the Department for issuance of a ‘certificate of no deduction of tax at source’. The payment of salaries to the deputed expatriate employees was made by W for administrative convenience and the assessee made reimbursements to W. With respect to such payments, the assessee applied for a certificate u/s 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. W and F of Singapore had entered into an inter-company master services agreement dated 28th May, 2019 for the secondment of employees and provision of services. In terms of the master services agreement (MSA), either of the parties or its affiliates could use the seconded employees, and the party placing the secondees would invoice the compensation and the wage cost of secondees incurred in the home country. The MSA had two distinct parts: (i) relating to the provision of services and (ii) the secondment of employees. In terms of the MSA, W seconded four employees to the assessee and entered into a ‘global assignment arrangement’ with the seconded employees, which provided that the seconded employees would work for the benefit of the assessee. In response to the invoices raised by W as regards the payments made towards salaries of the seconded employees, the assessee intended to make payments to W and in that context, made an application u/s 195(2) requesting for permission to remit the cost-to-cost reimbursements to be made without deduction of tax at source. The application was rejected.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the order of rejection and held as under:

“i) Section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides that where the Central Government has entered into an agreement with a country outside India for the purpose of granting relief of tax or for avoidance of double taxation in relation to the assessee, the provisions of the Act would apply to the extent they are more beneficial to the assessee. The Supreme Court in Engineering Analysis Centre Of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2021] 432 ITR 471 (SC) has clarified that where the provisions of the “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement” are more beneficial than the provisions of the Act, it is the Agreement that should be treated as the law that requires to be followed and applied.

ii) Section 195 of the Act deals with deduction of tax in cases where payment is to be made to a non-resident. Section 195(2) and section 197 of the Act are in the nature of safeguards for the assessee and are to be invoked to avoid consequences of a finding eventually after assessment that the payer ought to have made deduction and in such case, it would be open to treat the assessee as “an assessee-in-default” in terms of section 201 of the Act, leading to prosecution being initiated under section 276B against the payer and disallowance of expenses u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

iii) The recourse to section 195(2) was perfectly in consonance with the object of section 195. It was maintainable.

iv) Article 12(1) of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the United States of America provides for taxation of royalties and fees for included services arising in a contracting State and paid to a resident of the other contracting State. Further, article 12(2) provides that royalties and fees for included services may also be taxed in the contracting State in which they arise. “Fees for included services” is defined in article 12(4). Section 195(2) of the Act, placed an obligation on the assessee to make deduction of tax under sub-section (1) where payment of any sum chargeable under this Act was being made to a non-resident. The words “chargeable under this Act” if read in conjunction with provisions of article 12(4) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the obligation u/s. 195(2), it becomes clear that the definition of “fees for included services” under article 12(4) was more beneficial to the assessee in so far as its obligation to deduct the tax was concerned. Accordingly, article 12(4) was to be applied to determine the liability to deduct tax.

v) In terms of article 12(4)(b) for the purpose of construing fees for included services, it is necessary that the rendering of technical or consultancy services must make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes. Further, it may also consist of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. It is not a mere rendering of technical or consultancy services, but the requirement of make available in terms of article 12(4)(b) that has to be fulfilled. The master services agreement, if subjected to scrutiny as regards the aspect of secondment did not reveal the satisfaction of the requirement of “make available” which is a sine qua non for being fees for included services. The fact that the employees seconded has the requisite experience, skill or training capable of completing the services contemplated in secondment by itself was insufficient to treat it as fees for included services de hors the satisfaction of the “make available” clause. The “make available” requirement that is mandated under article 12(4) granted benefit to the assessee and accordingly, the question of falling back on the provisions of section 9 of the Act did not arise. On this score alone, the conclusion in the order of the payment for the service falling within the description u/s. 9 of the Act as “deemed income”, had to be rejected. The only order that could now be passed was of one granting “nil tax deduction at source”.”

The court clarified that the finding as regards to the deduction of tax at source u/s 195 of the Act is tentative and the question of liability of the recipient was to be decided subsequently. Accordingly, there was no question of prejudice to the Revenue at the stage of the section 195 order.

(A) Appeal to High Court — Powers of High Court — Has power to consider question of jurisdiction even if not raised before Tribunal.
(B) Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) — Concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof — Notice — Validity — Notice must clearly specify nature of offence — Notice which is vague is not valid.

56. Ganga Iron and Steel Trading Co. vs. CIT
[2022] 447 ITR 743 (Bom.)
Date of order: 22nd December, 2021
Ss. 260A and 271(1)(c) of ITA,1961

(A) Appeal to High Court — Powers of High Court — Has power to consider question of jurisdiction even if not raised before Tribunal.

(B) Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) — Concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof — Notice — Validity — Notice must clearly specify nature of offence — Notice which is vague is not valid.

Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, imposed by the AO, was upheld by the Tribunal. In the appeal before the High Court, the assessee raised the following question of jurisdiction for the first time:

“Whether the show-cause notice dated February 12, 2008 issued to the appellant without indicating that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of incorrect particulars of such income would vitiate the penalty proceedings or whether such notice as issued can be held to be valid?”

The Bombay High Court admitted the question, decided the case in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i)   An appeal u/s. 260A can be entertained by the High Court on the issue of jurisdiction even if that issue was not raised before the Appellate Tribunal.

ii)    A penal provision, even with civil consequences, must be construed strictly. And ambiguity, if any, must be resolved in the affected assessee’s favour. Assessment proceedings form the basis for the penalty proceedings, but they are not composite proceedings to draw strength from each other. Nor can each cure the other’s defect. A penalty proceeding is a corollary; nevertheless, it must stand on its own. These proceedings culminate under a different statutory scheme that remains distinct from the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings only through statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from the vice of vagueness.

iii)    In the show-cause notice dated February 12, 2008, the Assistant Commissioner was not clear as to whether there was concealment of particulars of income or whether the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Issuance of such show-cause notice without specifying whether the assessee had concealed particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars of the same had resulted in vitiating the show-cause notice. The notice was not valid.”

45. Subsidy in the nature of remission of sales tax given to promote industries is capital in nature and not chargeable to tax. Further, a subsidy under a retention pricing scheme is eligible for deduction u/s 80IB of the Act.

Tata Chemicals Ltd vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 134 (Mumbai – Trib.)
ITA No.: 2439(MUM) of 2011
A.Y.: 2003-04
Date of order: 16th February, 2022
Sections: 4, 80IB

45. Subsidy in the nature of remission of sales tax given to promote industries is capital in nature and not chargeable to tax. Further, a subsidy under a retention pricing scheme is eligible for deduction u/s 80IB of the Act.

FACTS

During the captioned A.Y. the assessee company merged with a corporate entity. The assessee did not claim a deduction u/s 80IB of the Act in the revised return pursuant to the merger but reserved the right to claim it during the assessment proceedings.

During the assessment proceedings, the AO taxed the sales tax incentive considering the same as a revenue item and held that the fertilizer subsidy was not eligible for deduction u/s 80(IB).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). However, the assessee’s appeal was dismissed on the following grounds:

  • Sales tax incentive scheme does not have a direct nexus with the activities of the industrial unit.

  • Fertilizer subsidy provided by the government as price concession was not income from the industrial undertaking and therefore not eligible for deduction u/s 80(IB).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
While deliberating on the sales tax incentive scheme, the ITAT relied on the Apex Court decision in CIT vs. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 306 ITR 392, wherein it was held that the object behind the subsidy determines the nature of the subsidy/incentive. Further, the form of granting the subsidy was immaterial. Thus, it was held that the sales tax incentive money received was capital in nature and hence not subject to tax.

On the subsidy of fertilizers, the ITAT observed that the same was under price retention scheme i.e. the Government decides the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) and pays the difference between the cost of fertilizers and the decided MRP to the assessee in the form of a subsidy. Further, it was held that the aforesaid subsidy was allowed as a deduction u/s 80IB of the Act by the Apex Court decision in CIT vs. Meghalaya Steels Ltd.38 ITR 17 (SC).

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee.

44. Amended provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act cannot be applied retrospectively.

Rajib Rathindra Saha. vs. Income-tax Officer (International Taxation)
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 216 (Mumbai – Trib.)
ITA No.: 7352 (Mum.) of 2019
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 21st February, 2022
Section: 56(2)(vii)(b)

44. Amended provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act cannot be applied retrospectively.

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, paid earnest money for the purchase of an immovable property in 2010. The assessee executed the agreement to purchase the said property on 31st March, 2013 and paid the stamp duty on 18th March, 2013. The property was actually registered on 2nd April, 2014.

In the course of assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2014-15, the AO pointed out the fact that the stamp duty valuation on the date of registration was higher than the cost of acquisition of the property. Accordingly, the said difference was bought to tax u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act, as amended vide Finance Act, 2013. The assessee requested the AO to refer the matter to the departmental valuation officer (DVO), but the same was rejected and an order was passed making an addition of the difference between the stamp duty value and the cost of acquisition.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) referred the matter to DVO and directed the AO to re-compute the income of the assessee accordingly.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The assessee submitted that the agreement of the property was executed and stamp duty was paid on 31st March, 2013 i.e. during A.Y. 2013-14.

Prior to the amendment, where any immovable property was received without consideration and the stamp duty value of which exceeded Rs. 50,000 the stamp duty value of such property would be charged to tax. The Finance Act, 2013 introduced an amendment to section 56(2)(vii)(b), according to which the difference between the stamp duty value and the consideration paid became taxable in the hands of the purchaser.

Since the said amendment to section 56(2)(vii)(b) was applicable from A.Y. 2014-15, the said provision could not be applied to the assessee. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Ranchi Bench of Tribunal in Bajrang Lal Naredi vs. ITO [IT Appeal No. 327 (Ran.) of 2018, dated 2-1-2020].

An alternate contention was raised by the assessee, wherein it was stated that the DVO has erred in valuing the property on 31st March, 2013 as against 2010, when the earnest money was paid by the assessee.

The Departmental Representative submitted that since the property was actually registered during A.Y. 2014-15, the amended provisions were applicable in the present case.

The ITAT held that the registration of the agreement was a compliance of a legal requirement under the Registration Act, 1908 and accordingly, was not relevant while deciding the date of purchase of the property.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the addition u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) on the basis that the agreement of purchase of property was executed during A.Y. 2013-14, and thus the amended section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act, being applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2014, could not be made applicable to the assessee.

Further, the actual registration of property was a procedural formality as a consequence of the execution of agreement and hence not relevant to ascertain the date of purchase of the property.

43. Where the land of the assessee was situated beyond 5 km from the nearest Municipal Corporation, as per Notification No. SO 9447, dated 6th January, 1994 issued for Chenglepet Municipality, the land was agricultural land and hence out of ambit of ‘capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(14).

Mohideen Sharif Inayathulla Sharif vs. Income-tax officer
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 345 (Chennai – Trib.)
ITA No.: 658 (Chny) of 2020
A.Y.: 2011-12
Date: 7th March, 2022
Sections: 2(14), 45

43. Where the land of the assessee was situated beyond 5 km from the nearest Municipal Corporation, as per Notification No. SO 9447, dated 6th January, 1994 issued for Chenglepet Municipality, the land was agricultural land and hence out of ambit of ‘capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(14).

FACTS

The assessee sold certain land in his village and did not offer any capital gains on the sale on the grounds that it was an agricultural land. A copy of Google maps was submitted by the assesse to establish that land was located beyond 5 km from the nearest Municipal Corporation. Further, the certificate issued by Village Administrative Officer was furnished by the assessee in support of his claim.

Reliance was also placed by the assessee on the notification No. SO 9447 dated 6th January, 1994, wherein it was stated that the distance for Chenglepet Municipality was 5 Km.

The AO contended that the definition of agricultural land was applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2014 and prior to the amendment the distance was 8 km and not 5 km from Municipal Corporation. Accordingly, long term capital gains were computed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT observed that the factual considerations with respect to the location of the land and the certificate issued by the Village Administrative Officer were undisputed.

Based on the submissions of the assesse, the ITAT concurred with the view of the assessee. The ITAT ruled that the Notification No. SO 9447, dated 6th January, 1994 issued for Chenglepet Municipality has also been accepted by the CIT(A) and accordingly, the relevant area will be 5 km and not 8 km. Moreover, the ITAT observed that the fact that the revenue records still show the impugned land as agricultural land was not rebutted by the AO.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the additions made.

42. Where the identity of the shareholders has been established, no addition could be made u/s 68 with respect to the increase in share capital and share premium.

Greensaphire Infratech (P.) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 464 (Amritsar – Trib.)
ITA No.:213 (ASR.) of 2017
A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 23rd December, 2021
Section: 68

42. Where the identity of the shareholders has been established, no addition could be made u/s 68 with respect to the increase in share capital and share premium.

FACTS

The assessee company during the year under consideration had issued shares to five individuals and two body corporates by way of share capital and share premium.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO called for certain details about the issue of share capital. The assessee furnished certain explanations with respect to the details of shares issued. Not being satisfied with the identity and genuineness of the allottees, the AO invoked section 68 of the Act and treated the issue of share capital and premium as income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The assessee submitted that the transaction was carried out through normal banking channels and the identity of subscribers to the company had been established through various documents namely, the financial statements, PANs of the allottees, the Memorandum of Association and Form No. 23AC filed by the corporate allottees and ledger confirmations from the parties.

The assessee also submitted that once the identity of parties has been established, the onus to prove the genuineness of the transaction lies with the Revenue. Reliance was placed on the ruling of the Apex Court in Pr. CIT vs. Paradise Inland Shipping (P.) Ltd. [2018] 93 taxmann.com 84.

Reliance was also placed on the ruling of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Gagandeep Infrastructure Ltd. [2017] 394 ITR 680 and the ruling in ITO vs. Arogya Bharti Health Park (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 2943 (Mum.) of 2014, dated 17th October, 2018, wherein it was held that the amendment to section 68 of the Act, vide Finance Act, 2012 was prospective in nature and applicable from A.Y. 2013-14 onwards. Accordingly, the same will not apply to the impugned A.Y. 2012-13. It was also observed in the aforesaid ruling, that no addition could be made in the hands of the assessee but addition, if any, could be made only in the hands of the allottees of such shares.
    
Further, it was submitted by the assessee that issue of shares being a capital transaction, cannot be considered as income in its hands. Reliance was placed on the following decisions in this regard:

  • G.S. Homes and Hotels (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT 387 ITR 126
  • Vodafone India Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India [2014] 368 ITR 1 (Bom.)
  • Pr. CIT vs. Apeak Infotech [2017] 397 ITR 148

The ITAT considered the above decisions and concurred with the view of the assessee company, stating that the assessee had furnished voluminous documents to establish the identity of the shareholders. Further, the ITAT held that the share capital and share premium, being transactions on ‘capital account’, cannot be considered as income of the assessee.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the addition u/s 68 of the Act.

41. Interest granted u/s 244A cannot be withdrawn by the AO in an order passed u/s 154 by holding that the proceedings resulting in refund were delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT
TS-813-ITAT-2022(Mum.)
A.Y.: 2007-08
Date of order :18th October, 2022
Section: 244A

41. Interest granted u/s 244A cannot be withdrawn by the AO in an order passed u/s 154 by holding that the proceedings resulting in refund were delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

FACTS

In the course of appellate proceedings before the Tribunal, in an appeal preferred by the assessee, the assessee raised an additional ground with regard to the amount suo moto disallowed by the assessee u/s 14A. The additional ground so raised was allowed by the Tribunal. The AO upon passing an order dated 16th May, 2016 to give effect to the order of the Tribunal, worked out the amount of refund due to be Rs. 54,52,12,250 which included interest of Rs. 21,25,91,553 which was granted from 1st April, 2007.

Subsequently, the AO passed an order u/s 154 withdrawing the interest granted u/s 244A to the extent attributable to the refund arising as a result of additional ground being raised by the assessee on the grounds that the delay in granting refund is due to assessee’s raising additional ground in respect of suo moto disallowance u/s 14A. He held that the case of the assessee is squarely covered by section 244A(2) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that the issue in appeal is covered in favour of the assessee by co-ordinate bench decision in the case of DBS Bank Ltd. vs. DDIT [(2016) 157 ITD 476 (Mum.)].

HELD

What is essential for declining interest to the assessee u/s 244A(2) is that the delay in refund must be on account of reasons attributable to the assessee, and where there is a dispute about the period for which interest is to be declined, the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner must take a call, in favour of the AO’s stand, on the same. The Tribunal observed that none of these conditions are satisfied on the facts of this case. Just because an assessee has raised a claim by way of an additional ground of appeal before the Tribunal, it does not necessarily mean that the delay is attributable to the assessee – this delayed claim could be on account of subsequent legislative or judicial developments, or on account of other factors beyond the control of the assessee. This exercise of ascertaining the reasons of delay is an inherently subjective exercise, and well beyond the limited scope of mistake apparent on record on which no two views are possible. In any case, there is no adjudication by the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner on the period to be excluded – something hotly contested by the assessee. The Tribunal held that unless that adjudication is done, the denial of interest u/s 244A cannot reach finality, and, for this reason also, it was held that the impugned order does not meet with the approval of the Tribunal.

The ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

40. Where the assessee had paid indirectly higher tax than actually liable, it shows that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the Department had no revenue loss. Since there is no revenue loss to the Department, therefore, there is no question of levying penalty on the assessee.

Bagaria Trade Impex vs. ACIT
ITA No. 310/Jp./2022
A.Y.: 2017-18
Date of order: 27th September, 2022
Section: 270A

40. Where the assessee had paid indirectly higher tax than actually liable, it shows that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the Department had no revenue loss. Since there is no revenue loss to the Department, therefore, there is no question of levying penalty on the assessee.

FACTS

The assessee firm filed its return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 95,48,815. While assessing the total income of the assessee an addition of Rs. 1,84,650 was made to the returned total income on account of interest income short declared in the return of income.

During the previous year relevant to assessment year under consideration the assessee in its return of income declared interest income of Rs. 16,61,850 (13,46,850 + 3,15,000). As per Form No. 26AS, the assessee’s interest income was Rs. 18,46,500 (14,96,500 + 3,50,000). Thus, the AO held that the assessee had declared less interest income.

In the course of assessment proceedings when this fact came to the knowledge of the assessee, the assessee vide its letter dated 31st July, 2019 stated that it is willing to pay tax on this amount and requested the AO to adjust the amount of refund due to it. It was mentioned that the assessee had, in its return of income, considered net amount of interest income instead of considering the gross amount.

The AO levied penalty u/s 270A of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the levy of penalty.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that it is undisputed fact that the amount of TDS was not claimed by the assessee and the assessee made a self-declaration of this fact. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a misrepresentation or suppression of facts on the part of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not claimed credit for TDS which appears to be a bonafide mistake as the CA of the assessee was not able to detect this fact during the audit. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had short stated its interest income by Rs. 1,84,650 and had not claimed TDS credit of Rs. 1,84,650. Tax on income short stated worked out to Rs, 57,057 while tax which remained with the Revenue amounted to Rs. 1,84,650. Considering this fact the Tribunal concluded that assessee had paid indirectly higher tax than actually liable which goes to show that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the Department had no revenue loss. The Tribunal held that since there is no revenue loss to the department, therefore, there is no question of levying penalty upon the assessee. The Tribunal held that the levy of penalty was not justified and therefore it deleted the same.

39. In case the assessee’s prayer on facts is not to be accepted, a reasonable opportunity of being heard is to be granted putting the issue to the notice of the assessee.

Surinder Kumar Malhotra vs. ITO
ITA No. 240/Chd./2020
A.Y.: 2011-12
Date of order: 9th September, 2022
Section: 54F

39. In case the assessee’s prayer on facts is not to be accepted, a reasonable opportunity of being heard is to be granted putting the issue to the notice of the assessee.

FACTS

The present appeal was filed by the assessee, for A.Y. 2011-12, being aggrieved by the order dated 11th March, 2022 passed by NFAC, Delhi acting as First Appellate Authority. The assessee was inter alia aggrieved by the CIT(A) confirming the disallowance of claim of deduction under section 54F of the Act by ignoring the applicable judicial precedents including the jurisdictional High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

The claim of the assessee was disallowed on the grounds that the sale proceeds have been applied for acquiring two separate properties. The assessee had in statement of facts pleaded that these were adjoining properties and may be treated as a single unit in terms of various decisions available.

The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on the legal issue and in para 6 of his order stated that the assessee has not argued anything further.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noticed and drew the attention of the DR to the statement of facts recorded by the CIT(A) on page 2 of the impugned order where it is claimed that two adjoining houses were purchased hence the claim was allowable. The Tribunal referred to the grounds of appeal filed before the CIT(A) and also to the statement of facts wherein it was clearly mentioned that the assessee is a senior citizen who has purchased two adjoining residential houses through two sale deeds dated 7th December, 2010 and 21st March, 2011.

The Tribunal observed that:

(i) the CIT(A) has completely ignored the facts pleaded on record;

(ii) the assessee no doubt has purchased two separate residential houses, however, it is also a fact that consistently the assessee who is a senior citizen has pleaded in writing, which is on record that these were adjoining residential houses, hence, constituted one single unit. No finding has been given by tax authorities on this claim; and

(iii) legal position on two adjoining flats constituting a single residential unit is well settled.

The Tribunal recorded its painful dissatisfaction and disappointment in the passing of the order by the authorities and set aside the order back to the file of the AO for factual verification of facts by accepting the prayer of the DR that the matter needs verification at the end of the AO. The Tribunal also directed that in case the prayer of the assessee on facts is not accepted, a reasonable opportunity of being heard be granted putting the issue to the notice of the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that – “The obdurate attitude of ignoring the written pleadings on record is most unfortunate. Unfortunately such arbitrary orders reek of a backlog of colonial mind set. It needs to be kept in mind that the Tax Authorities are acting as servants of the Government of India. Hence are expected to be live and alert to the citizens for whom and on whose behalf, the functionaries of the State act. In the blind race of showing high disposal the careless ignoring of facts pleaded causes unaccounted harm to the reputation and fairness of the Tax Administration. It erodes the trust and faith of the citizens in the fairness of the functioning of the tax administration. It not only causes harassment to the citizens but also reflects on the arbitrary functioning of the tax administration. Such a reputation and record should not be created.”

38. MA filed on the ground that the Revenue has filed an appeal u/s 260A of the Act with the Bombay High Court in the case on which reliance was placed while deciding the appeal and also in view of subsequent SC order dismissed.

DCIT vs. Cipla Ltd.
MA No. 177/Mum./2022 in
ITA No. 1219/Mum./2018
A.Y.: 2010-11
Date of order: 19th September, 2022
Section: 254

38. MA filed on the ground that the Revenue has filed an appeal u/s 260A of the Act with the Bombay High Court in the case on which reliance was placed while deciding the appeal and also in view of subsequent SC order dismissed.

FACTS

The appeal of the assessee against the order of lower authorities disallowing claim u/s 37(1) was allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 20th September, 2021 by relying on the decision of the jurisdictional bench of the Tribunal in Aristro Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT.

Subsequently, the Revenue preferred this MA before the Tribunal on the grounds that the revenue has filed an appeal against the order of the Tribunal in Aristro Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) before the Bombay High Court, which appeal is pending and also that the Supreme Court in the case of Apex Laboratories vs. DCIT LTU [135 taxmann.com 286 (SC)] has, on identical facts, upheld the disallowance u/s 37(1) of the Act.


HELD
The Tribunal noted that the sole dispute of the Revenue is that the order of Hon’ble Tribunal in Aristro Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) relied upon while deciding the appeal of the assessee was not accepted by the Revenue and further an appeal u/s 260A of the Act has been filed before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, and is pending. Also, on similar issue, The Supreme Court has passed an order in the case of Apex Laboratories (supra) on 22nd February, 2022.

The Tribunal observed that while deciding the appeal of the assessee it had relied upon an order of the co-ordinate bench in respect of allowability of sales promotion expenses.

The Tribunal held that provisions of section 254(2) are envisaged for the rectification of the mistake apparent from the record but not to review the order. If submissions made on behalf of the revenue are accepted it would amount to review of the order which is not within the purview of section 254(2) of the Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the miscellaneous application filed by the Revenue.

Ind AS 20 and Typical Government Schemes in India – Part II

[Part – I of this article published in November, 2022 BCAJ covered various aspects of Ind AS 20. In this concluding part, the author covers how certain typical Government schemes/ programs work, how they fall within the definition of “Government Assistance” and how the same should be recognized and disclosed.]

GOVERNMENT GRANTS/ ASSISTANCE
In India, due to structural issues coupled with the inefficiencies in implementing various programs on their own, the Government has recognized the need to develop multiple underdeveloped or remote locations through private participation. Additionally, to seize the opportunity in global economy/ trade, foreign investments, and earn higher foreign exchange from exports, the Government has thought it apt to promote a few activities. Consequently, governments have launched various benefits/ facilities/ schemes from time to time. These benefits/schemes have proven to be “beneficial” for the Government in terms of meeting their twin objectives, one towards fulfilling their obligation towards the public at large; and second towards achieving the long-term objective of developing remote/ under-developed regions through the creation of employment and ancillary industries with more prominent operating entities establishing their shops.  Such schemes/ benefits have also helped private sector entities get some cash/ resources from the Government or concessions to reduce the cost of their investments / working capital and cheap labour at remote locations to reduce recurring/variable costs.

In general, the schemes/ benefits/ facilities provided by the Government do not result in the actual movement of money but are like either deferral of collection of dues from entities or forgoing the dues from the entity. Deferral of dues from the entity is nothing but allowing such entities to use funds they ought to have paid for the granted deferral period and, consequently, support working capital finance by the Government. The foregoing/ deferral of dues by the Government is a transfer of resources from the Government to the entity. It is recognized as “duties/taxes foregone” while presenting budgets.

Many times, even within the commercial world, where decisions are made for the evaluation of different projects with an element of government scheme/ benefit/ facility, such entities do give cognizance to such schemes/ plans/ benefits in arriving at business decisions. This also supports the view that Government Assistance should get recognized.

Let us see how few typical Government Schemes/Programs work, how they fall within the definition of “Government Assistance” and how the same should be recognized and disclosed.


INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTRE (“IFSC”) IN GIFT CITY
The Government of India has an ambitious plan to invite global financial services companies to set up their regional centres in India and make the country one of the essential Financial Hubs globally. The activities on the same started way back in 2008, but material steps began in 2015-16 with the IFSC declaring a multi-service Special Economic Zone. Subsequently, over time and learning more about the requirements from global players in financial sectors, the law affecting the operations of IFSC kept on improving year after year. Now, we have a more structured law on the IFSC.

An operating unit/ entity in IFSC is treated differentially by treating the same (artificially) as operating/functioning “outside India” even though physically located within India. Such legislative artificial projection creates a difference between entities carrying on similar activities outside and within the IFSC. Therefore, a regulatory framework for IFSC is nothing but “an action” by the Government which, through various “exemptions”, creates a specific situation which allows units in IFSC to enjoy “certain benefits” not available to entities carrying on similar operations outside IFSC. The legislative framework is a conscious effort (intended) by the Government “to give economic benefit” to the entities investing and operating from such IFSC. Hence, IFSC squarely falls within the ambit of “Government Assistance”. However, the economic benefits are measurable and can be recognized as a benefit under the relevant Ind-AS framework, and the Standard requires careful evaluation. It will be relevant to understand that the Government has carved out “exemption” for entities operating from the IFSC against making laws not applicable as, generally, all laws are applicable across India. As the schemes have been designed as “exemptions” these further call for the considered view that the IFSC largely works as a Scheme/ Program intended to give an economic benefit. Hence, the benefit derived by the entity in terms of savings on duties or taxes, which such units ought to have paid otherwise, are clear benefits requiring recognition in financial statements. Similarly, any benefit in terms of upfront exemption vis-à-vis payment and subsequent claim of refund helps such entities in terms of working capital.

EPCG / SEZ SCHEMES

Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) or Special Economic Zone (SEZ) unit or Software Technology Park (STP) unit schemes allow certain benefits in terms of exemptions from payment of duties. All such schemes work on different principles, but the operating unit/ entity gets benefits subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions.

Both these schemes have been examined and opined by Ind AS Technical Facilitation Group (“ITFG”) of ICAI1 as qualifying Government Grants and requiring the relevant entity to recognize the same in accordance with the prescription under the Standard. The basic premise of the opinion appears to be that the legislative enactment by the Government is “action” that intends to exempt duty which such an entity (i.e. specific to the entity or group of entities qualifying requirement) ought to have paid otherwise (i.e. resulting into economic benefit to such an entity). Under EPCG, the entity which commits itself to export goods manufactured by using imported capital goods/ equipment is allowed to import such equipment without payment of customs duty. By such an exemption, the Government compensates the entity for the component of customs duty on the import of capital goods it ought to have paid but for the exemption. Even though there is requirement of certain quantum of exports to be achieved for finished goods produced from use of such assets, the exemption is granted for one of the components of the asset (i.e. import duties). In this background, in the authors view, EPCG is a grant for capital assets. It should be accounted for basis guidance provided in the Standard at Para 17 and 18 by setting up deferred revenue in the Statement of Financial Position and recognized as income in  the Statement of Profit and Loss over the asset’s life. However, a perusal of certain published results suggests that entities have opted to recognize grants to the Statement of Profit and Loss based on the satisfaction of export obligations. This is the same divergence of prescription under the Standard with Conceptual Framework for which the project has been pending since 2006. Recognition of the revenue grants on the basis of export obligation may be appropriate.


1. ITFG has provided clarification about treatment of EPCG under Ind AS 20 vide response to Issue No. 5 to ITFG Clarification Bulletin No. 11. Further, ITFG has provided clarification on SEZ/ STP programs / Schemes as qualifying and requiring accounting as “Government Grant” under Ind AS 20 vide Issue No. 3 to ITFG Clarification Bulletin No. 17.

However, recognizing the grant to Statement of Profit and Loss based on export obligation, even for capital grants, appears to be a deviation from the prescription under Paras 17 & 18 of the Standard, even though it might be in sync with the Conceptual Framework. However, with the amendment in the Standard2 allowing measurement of non-monetary grants relating to assets at nominal value, such an option if exercised, will excuse the entity from setting up deferred revenue and related complications if the nominal value is not material.

The SEZ scheme allows the eligible entity to procure goods (capital goods or inputs other than capex) without payment of taxes and duties. The eligible entity is expected to manufacture and export the goods to enjoy the exemption. In  case of manufactured goods sold within India, as per changed regulation3, duty/ taxes claimed exempted must be paid back to the Government without any interest. A different principle applies to the SEZ scheme, but the benefits still remain. Hence, ICAI’s ITFG4 has concluded that the SEZ scheme is a “Government Grant” requiring compliance with Ind AS 20. An important point to remember is the change with respect to allowing the entity to value (i.e., on measurement point) capital grant at nominal value instead of at fair value w.e.f. 1st April, 2018 and its prospective application. Due to this, unless relevant information is not provided as required, financial statements of otherwise comparable entities may not be comparable due to different entities accounting for grants received before and after 1st April, 2018 differently.


2. Para 23 of Ind AS 20 substituted vide Notification dated 20th September 2018, permitted an entity to adopt an alternative to recognise assets at nominal value instead of fair value in case of such grant pertained to non-monetary government grant.
3. Vide Finance Act, 2021, Provisions of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 have been amended which requires SEZ units to “surrender” duty exemption in respect of CVD/ ADD availed on inputs which have been used for finished goods sold in domestic market.

4. ITFG has provided clarification on SEZ/ STP programs / Schemes as qualifying and requiring accounting as “Government Grant” under Ind AS 20 vide Issue No. 3 to ITFG Clarification Bulletin No. 17.

Further, as per the Standard today, the recognition also depends on whether the grant relates to asset or revenue. In the author’s view, when the exemption is related to a capital asset, the intention is to compensate the cost of the capital asset, even if such a capital asset is intended to be used for manufacturing goods for exports. Therefore, if the exemption enjoyed by the entity is towards the cost (including duties/ taxes) related to capital asset, such benefits / grants should be accounted for as a grant related to capital asset in contrast to considering the same as related to revenue merely due to certain condition of certain obligation (i.e., export obligation).

MANUFACTURING AND OTHER OPERATIONS IN WAREHOUSE REGULATIONS (MOOWR)
The basic premise of the Customs Act,1962 is to levy duties on goods moving out of India or coming within India. However, with the passage of time, trade evolved and many new business models were introduced. Further, globally, the regulatory landscape has changed. Under the Customs Act, any goods entering India do not suffer duties till the same are within the Custom’s area. Generally, within Custom’s area no use of such goods is permitted. However, such regulations create a bottleneck in changing business models where entities set up facilities to manufacture and export. In such business models, imported items are not intended for consumption by a person residing in such country of import but are eventually expected to get exported after manufacture. To meet such challenges, the Government has to tweak customs law to make way for some “convenience” whereby duty liabilities are either deferred or foregone. Such an act of duty deferral/exemption has been achieved either through notifications or by legislative fiction by treating / creating an artificial projection of locations as a place not within India, even if located far away from the Customs port. MOOWRs is one such example.

Under MOOWR, the specified place is considered to be a “warehouse”, and any goods will be considered as “not entered India” for levy of Customs Duty even if the goods have actually moved in India from the port to such locations. This fiction was further extended recently by permitting even the use of such imported goods without triggering duty liability. Government creates all such fiction through the law which indicates that these are in the form of “Government Assistance”. Further, when such assistance becomes measurable, it should be considered as a “Grant” and accounted for/ recognized in the financial statements accordingly.

For example, under MOOWR, if an entity is not liable to pay customs duty upfront but it is deferred till such good is moved to a person in India out of such entity/ specified location, then the Government is actually allowing or accommodating the entity with a working capital facility for the time being and allowing the use of such goods/ equipment, as the case may be. Hence, ideally, such deferral should be accounted for as an interest-free loan granted by the Government on the duty deferral component.

However, quantification of the Government Grant or otherwise will require examination of each case and nature of exemption, whether on the capital asset or input and whether intended sales are domestic or export. In case an entity has significant exports,  the  scheme can be considered as “assistance” in place of a “grant” for duty deferral on inputs when exports are exempted. Otherwise, the entity would have anyways got a rebate for duties paid on inputs on exports. However, another view that is equally possible refers to the scheme as assistance, as the liability has been deferred through statutory notion from the date of importation till the actual export of goods out of the country. However, it appears that the earlier view seems more aligned with the requirements of the Standard.


MEIS/ SEIS / RoDTEP / PRODUCTION LINKED INCENTIVE SCHEMES
The Government of India announced the Production linked incentive (“PLI”) scheme for various sectors with multiple conditions. Such incentives are computed and earned on the basis of an “incremental production/ sale.” However, they have imposed additional conditions on the investments being made. Hence, accrual of such an incentive as Government Grant requires examination of multiple conditions including “reasonable assurance” of entitlement to such Grant and the creation of “deferred income” in case the entity receives the grant but cannot fulfill the obligations.

In contrast to the PLI scheme, Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (“MEIS”) / Services Exports from India Scheme (“SEIS”) / Remission of Duties and Taxes on Export Products (“RoDTEP”) are more straightforward. They can be easily identified as revenue grants. These revenue grants can be presented as net of expenses as per the option available under the Standard. However, the relevant expenses, which the grant intends to offset, might have been booked under different headings and groupings, and identification or bifurcation of the grant amount into differential components will be difficult. These grants should be accounted for under gross basis accounting, contrary to offset against relevant expenses.

STATE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES UNDER STATE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
Various State Governments, through their state industrial policies, announce various schemes for inviting industries to set up operating facilities in their states. Such policies generally have differentiated benefits based on the level of investments or job opportunities created, etc.

Some typical incentives are as under:

Stamp Duty waiver: The grant can be capital or revenue in nature depending on the waiver mentioned in the documents/ agreement or transaction.

Refund of State GST component on local sale within the state: The grant will be revenue grant.

Electricity duty exemption: The grant will a be revenue grant.

Reimbursement of a portion of capex cost: The grant will be capital grant.

Land at a concessional rate: The grant will be a capital grant.

Electrical/water line at no extra cost:  Grant can be a capital grant if otherwise entity needs to incur these costs.


CONCLUSION
The review of various published results indicates that the Standard on Government Grants has been considered as more of disclosure standard and might be true to many of such entities. However, generalising the same may not be correct as each scheme may require different treatment depending upon the facts. It is critical to understand the definition of a grant. For this, one must understand whether a particular scheme/ policy/ program / legislation really falls within the ambit of a “Government Grant” or not. Generally, recognition/ accounting and measurement of money actually received from the Government poses lesser challenge as compared to waivers or exemptions. Various Government benefits/ schemes, including the waiver of liability or obligation, need to be understood for transfer of resources from the Government to the entity or not. For the waiver of the obligation, firstly, one should examine whether there exists any obligation or not. Such an evaluation may require an entity to examine facts of the relevant scheme and applicable relevant statute. In some cases, it may also require an entity to perform comparative analysis of carrying on similar activity in different set-ups to come to a conclusion about existence of obligation or not. Once the obligation exists, then its waiver or deferral due to specific legislation or status may create “transfer of resource” from the   Government to the entity. ICAI’s ITFG has already provided guidance on SEZ/ STP and EPCG, which can be useful for entities and auditors. If an entity is availing any other scheme, then the scheme should be examined with regards to the parameters / guidance prescribed under the Standard. Further, the Standard having the prescribed differential treatment (recognition as well as measurement) for grants related to assets from grants related to revenue/ expenses, needs to look at the issue of recognition, measurement, accounting and disclosure more closely for each category of grants.

It will not be wrong to state that first of all, the nature of the grant should be identified followed by examination of fulfillment of secondary criteria required for recognition of the relevant grant, which are “reasonable assurance on meeting such conditions” and “assurance on realization of grant”.  

Considering that the Standard has prescribed differential recognition parameters (i.e., in case of grant related to asset, over life of the asset) as well as differential measurement parameters (i.e., all revenue grants at fair value as against non-monetary capital grant with option at nominal value), an entity should carry out careful and detailed examination and analysis of relevant parameters for eligibility of grant, to what it pertains (i.e. cost of asset or to compensate for some expenses or incentive to do some activity), conditions/ obligations required to fulfil to be entitled for such grant/ compensation, etc.

Separately, various schemes have conditions/requirements that are obligations that should be adequately disclosed to give the user of the Financial Statements adequate information on the nature of grant/assistance and its impact on the Financial Statements of the entity.

Apart from the schemes through which entities get monetary benefits, there are few schemes by the Government that give certain category of entities more “facility” or “convenience”. It may be a good practice to disclose such schemes or facilities or convenience as “Government Assistance” if management believes that they are material in nature as the benefit from such facilities may not be reasonably measurable and hence may not fit within definition of “Government Grant”.

Sustainability Reporting and Assurance

INTRODUCTION
Sustainability Reporting is an evolving discipline encompassing the disclosure and communication of an entity’s non-financial – environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and its overall impact. Over the last few years, more and more entities are preparing and disclosing their sustainability reports either under a mandate or voluntarily as per the reporting frameworks/standards provided by various standard-setting bodies/regulators. Sustainability reporting will only be useful if it is of sufficient quality, and the stakeholders understands and trust the framework.
India is one of the early adopters of sustainability reporting for listed entities amongst its various other global peers1. In 2012, requirement of Business Responsibility Report (BRR) containing ESG disclosures was introduced for adoption by listed entities. SEBI introduced the requirements for sustainability reporting in May 2021. The new report is called the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR), with nine principles covering both environmental and social aspects such as climate action. SEBI has mandated the Top 1,000 listed companies (by market capitalisation) to provide such disclosures from F.Y. 2022-23 onwards as part of their Annual Reports (voluntary basis for F.Y. 2021-22). The new reporting format, BRSR, aims to establish links between the financial results of a business with its ESG performance. BRSR is not merely presenting the data collected, but an approach to drive an organisation’s commitment to sustainability and demonstrate it to interested parties in a transparent manner. BRSR has evolved from the National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct principles issued by the MCA, which itself emanates from the UN Sustainable Development Goals. A company may adopt the practice of framing a new single BRSR Policy containing policies and implementation procedure for all the nine principles and its core elements.

1. Source: Background Material on Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting.

The BRSR is a notable departure from the existing BRR and a significant step towards bringing sustainability reporting at par with financial reporting. Further, companies will be able to better demonstrate their sustainability objectives, position and performance resulting into long-term value creation.
ESG and sustainability are both strategic considerations for businesses, executive teams, and investors. They both share the same goal of improving a company’s business practices to boost profits and win favour from investors, customers, and regulators – while safeguarding the environment and supporting communities.
The global discussion around ESG and sustainability reporting is evolving every day and organizations are increasingly reporting on their broader performance and impact. While climate-related information is certainly on top of minds for many stakeholders, other ESG factors i.e., social and governance are gaining prominence. Company-reported information about sustainability factors is becoming a key focus area through increased voluntary disclosures as well as through new jurisdiction-specific rules. Assurance is a key aspect in increasing trust in the quality and accuracy of sustainability information. Assurance from an independent professional coupled with enhanced standards and reporting rigor has the potential to further build trust in sustainability information. For sustainability reports to be credible, the reliability of the reports is important. Assurance on sustainability information helps enhance stakeholders confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the reported information and provides the intended users with useful data for decision making.
The objective of this article is to explain sustainability reporting and benefits of assurance on such reporting. It also covers the role of auditor when assessing the impact of climate change and corresponding disclosures in an audit of financial statements.


WHAT IS SUSTAINABILITY AND ESG REPORTING?
There is increased investors and other stakeholders focus on seeking businesses to be responsible and sustainable towards the environment and society. Therefore, the goal of sustainability reporting is to make it easier for investors, customers, employees, and other key stakeholders to understand how well companies are managing their impact on the society and the environment. Thus, reporting of a company’s performance on sustainability related factors such as socio-cultural aspects, community participation, economic sustainability, and environmental sustainability have become as vital as reporting on financial and operational performance. However, it is yet to become a regulatory enforcement for all companies in India.

The term ESG reporting is often used for communications about ESG matters through a variety of channels, including press releases, websites, social media, investor letters or presentations and submissions to rating agencies. In many cases, ESG reporting refers to a voluntary disclosure of ESG information posted on a company’s website, commonly called ESG reports, purpose-led reports, sustainability reports or CSR reports.

In a typical ESG report, a company discusses material risks and opportunities related to ESG matters and its strategies for managing those risks and opportunities. This discussion is often accompanied by quantitative metrics. For example, a company that consumes various resources, such as electricity, jet fuel and water, or creates hazardous or non-hazardous waste from its operations and business activities may discuss its impact on the environment and its plan to reduce such impact over time, often by including reduction targets over multiyear time horizons. It may also include metrics supplementing the discussion, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, energy consumption and water usage.
 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING FRAMEWORKS
There is no standard format for sustainability reporting, however, following types of frameworks2 are often used by various companies or entities:

Framework

Organisation

Audience

Description

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

United Nations

Broad set of stakeholders

SDGs comprise 17 interlinked global goals that aim to eradicate poverty
and promote sustainable prosperity, accompanied by 169 targets. Indicators
specify the information that should be used to help measure compliance toward
each target. These goals are used by companies to shape and prioritize their
business strategies and associated reporting.

GRI standards

Global Sustainability

Standards Board

Broad set of

stakeholders

These standards are the most widely used framework to create corporate
sustainability reports targeted to a broader range of stakeholders. They
consist of Universal Standards and Topic Standards. Topic Standards are
selected based on the company’s material topics.

Recommendations of the TCFD

Financial Stability

Board

Investors,

lenders and

insurers

This framework is used to create climate-related financial disclosures
and comprises disclosure recommendations structured around the core elements
of governance, strategy, risk management metrics and targets.

Integrated Reporting

Formerly International

Integrated Reporting

Council (IIRC), now Value Reporting

Foundation which has been merged with the IFRS Foundation

Integrated reporting

focuses on how the

organization creates, preserves or erodes

value.

This principles-based framework includes seven guiding principles
applied individually and collectively for the purposes of preparing and
presenting an integrated report. The framework establishes content elements,
which are categories of information required to be included in an integrated
report.

Greenhouse Gas Protocol

World Resource Institute and World Business Council on Sustainable
Development

Corporations and their customers.

This framework is focused on accurate, complete, consistent, relevant
and transparent accounting and reporting of GHG emissions by companies and
organisations.

Stakeholder Capitalism Metrics

The world Economic Forum’s International Business Council

Broad set of stakeholders

This framework includes a universal set of metrics and recommended
dislcosures intended to lead to a more comprehensive global corporate reporting
system. It divides disclosures in four pillars

(principles of governance, planet, people and prosperity) that serve as
the foundation for an ESG reporting framework.

CDSB Framework

Climate Disclosure Standards Board

Investors

This framework sets out an approach for reporting environmental and
climate change information in mainstream reports such as annual reports or
integrated reports.

SASB Standards

SASB

Investors, lenders and insurers

The SASB provides standards for 77 industries across 11 sectors. Each
standard identifies the subset of sustainability issues reasonably likely to
impact financial performance and long-term value of a typical company in an
industry.

Other proposed frameworks and standards:

  • Setting up of new Board to issue standards on sustainability-related financial disclosures. The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) has published its first two exposure drafts on IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards, namely, General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information and Climate-related Disclosures. These drafts once finalized will form a comprehensive global baseline of sustainability disclosures designed to meet the information needs of investors when assessing enterprise value. The ISSB did not propose an effective date in the drafts but plans to include one in the final standard.

  • US SEC – Proposed Rules for the Enhancement and Standardisation of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.
  • European Union Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) proposed by EFRAG.


2. CDSB, as well as VRF, which included the SASB and the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), have merged into the ISSB.
BENEFITS OF INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE
It is important to understand the benefits of independent assurance on Sustainability Reporting even if this is currently not mandatory in India and companies obtain assurance on a voluntary basis. Independent assurance can provide intended users, including boards of directors, customers, suppliers, prospective employees, and other stakeholders, with increased confidence in the reliability of ESG information, making it more likely that the data will be useful for decision-making. The management may also benefit from the feedback that comes with having an independent perspective on its sustainability reporting and associated processes. Furthermore, an assurance of such information may impact a company’s rankings and ratings on sustainability indices. It is worth noting that the assurance may benefit a company’s investors and other stakeholders, even if it is not required or stakeholders haven’t requested it. A strategic approach to sustainability issues can help organisations unlock many value creation opportunities. The other key benefits of assurance include the following:
  • Positive impact on internal practices and governance.
  • Strengthens internal awareness of sustainability risks and benefits.
  • Positive influence on branding and reputation.

  • Systems, processes, and internal controls around sustainability performance improve with each assurance engagement.

  • Credibility of information about sustainability is strengthened.
  • Improvement in positions of credit, risk, regulatory and sustainability rankings.

The IAASB has issued Non-Authoritative Guidance on Applying ISAE 3000 (Revised) to Extended External Reporting Assurance Engagements to address ten key stakeholder-identified challenges commonly encountered in applying ISAE 3000 (Revised) in sustainability assurance engagements.

The IAASB3 is currently working on a project to develop an overarching standard for assurance on sustainability reporting, that would address both limited assurance and reasonable assurance; the conduct of an assurance engagement in its entirety; and areas of sustainability assurance engagements where priority challenges have been identified, and more specificity is required.


3. Source: Assurance on Sustainability Reporting | IFAC (iaasb.org)

The two key assurance standards that are widely used for providing assurance of sustainability information are:
  • Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information – ISAE3000.
  • Accountability 1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS)

As per the IFAC study on ‘The State of Play in Sustainability Assurance’, 91 per cent of the companies reviewed report some level of sustainability information. 51 per cent of companies that report sustainability information provide some level of assurance on it. 63 per cent of these assurance engagements were conducted by Audit or Audit Affiliated Firms.

Who currently provides/obtains external assurance?
Companies do not obtain independent assurance on most of the sustainability information they disclose today. It is not mandatory, and companies obtain it on a voluntary basis. Assurance is most commonly obtained on the subject matter involving GHG emissions, safety, water usage and diversity of the workforce.
 
A company may voluntarily choose to obtain assurance over certain aspects of its ESG information for various reasons, including to respond to requests from investors and investment organizations, or meet expectations from other stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers or meet criteria of organizations that promote assurance, such as the GRI. These assurance reports are generally included in a corporate social responsibility report or posted separately on the company’s website.
Various organizations, such as engineering, consulting, and accounting firms, currently provide assurance-related services on Sustainability or ESG information.
A snapshot of assurance on ESG disclosures of 100 Indian companies with largest market capitalization as of March 2021 is as follows4:


4. IFAC publication – The State of Play in Sustainability Assurance – page 32.

Why to use a professional accountant for an assurance engagement?
The information reported by a company needs to be credible so that investors and other stakeholders can rely on it for their investment and other decisions. Many companies want to be perceived as leaders in or advocates for sustainability reporting by having their financial statement auditor provide assurance, which sends a message to the market regarding their commitment to such reporting.
Further, having the financial statement auditor perform such assurance engagements can drive efficiencies in the engagement because the auditor can use the knowledge obtained from the financial statement audit to plan the engagement. However, there is no requirement for a company to use its financial statement auditor.
The financial statement auditor is well positioned to perform the necessary work and provide this assurance. He also communicates a company’s commitment to the priorities, values and concerns that are important to the growing number of stakeholders interested in these matters.
ICAI has issued Exposure Draft on Standard on Sustainability Assurance Engagements (SSAE) 3000, Assurance Engagements on Sustainability Information, which is applicable to all assurance engagements on sustainability information. The draft defines terms such as engagement partner, firm (which is registered with the ICAI) and also provides for the characteristics of the engagement partner including he/she being a member of a firm that applies SQC 1, or other professional requirements, or requirements in law or regulation, that are at least as demanding as SQC 1. Accountants are already involved in monitoring, checking, and interpreting information relating to social, environmental, and economic impacts. The accountancy profession is quali?ed for providing external assurance, building on initiatives such as the IAASB Framework and ISAE 3000 and working with other disciplines. Other possible reasons could be as follows:
  • A professional accountant who provides assurance services has important skills that enhance the quality of those services. Professional accountants are in a position to apply sound judgement to a wide range of services, including assurance.

  • They follow well-established and widely recognised standards when conducting their work, which allows a consistent and more readily understandable approach to the work they perform. They are bound by a strict code of ethics and are subject to regular assessment by regulators. Their commitment to professional competence and due care requires them to offer high-quality services to businesses and to act in the public interest. Therefore, a sustainability report with an unmodified assurance conclusion from a professional accountant is seen as credible in the marketplace.
  • A professional accountant may be able to help in other ways to enhance business sustainability performance. If, for example, a company is just about to start measuring and managing its carbon footprint, it will need to think through the governance, control environment, process, and systems implications before starting.

STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE IN INDIA

In India, broader legislative intent in the sustainability space has been ahead of the curve. The Companies Act 2013 requires a director of a company to act in the best interests of the company, its employees, community and for the protection of the environment.
As discussed elsewhere in this article, SEBI introduced Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR) and replaced it with the existing BRR. The BRSR seeks disclosures from listed entities on their performance against nine principles. These nine principles echo the Sustainable Development Goals and cover both environment and social aspects such as climate action, responsible consumption and production, gender equality, working conditions, etc.
The ICAI has issued ED on SSAE 3000, Assurance Engagements on Sustainability Information as discussed above. ICAI has also issued SAE 3410, Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Statements to strengthen assurance frameworks for Non-Financial Information, equivalent to ISAE 3410 “Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Statements” issued by the IAASB of IFAC. SAE 3410 deals with assurance engagements to report on an entity’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) statement. The objective of an engagement under SAE 3410 is to obtain either limited or reasonable assurance, as applicable, about whether the GHG statement is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. GHG statements are assured to enhance the reliability of the emissions information reported. The standard is applicable on a voluntary basis for assurance reports covering periods ending on 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis for assurance reports covering periods ending on or after 31st March, 2024.
To strengthen sustainability reporting in the country, ICAI has also developed “Sustainability Reporting Maturity Model (SRMM) Version 1.05” with an objective to bring out a comprehensive scoring tool based on a report of the Committee on Business Responsibility Reporting constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in August 2020. BRSR scoring mechanism comprises of total 300 scores, by completing the scoring of all its three sections and nine principles. Corporates can self-evaluate their current level of maturity on the SRMM, identify areas where more focus is required and then develop a roadmap for upgrading to a higher level of maturity. SRMM would allow rating agencies and assurance providers to compare the sustainable nature of Indian companies with international companies.

5. Source: ICAI Releases Sustainability Reporting Maturity Model (SRMM) Version 1.0 | IFAC

CHALLENGES IN SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE
There is no doubt that an attention to sustainability issues can deliver better social, environmental, and financial outcomes for companies. Companies are very likely rewarded with lower costs of capital, and their focus on sustainability can improve margins and enhance brand value. In addition, the reporting itself has some very real problems which are given below:
  • Lack of mandates and auditing standards specific to the subject matter.
  • Lack of standardisation in reporting processes and controls.
  • Desire to establish a more consistent set of procedures for assessment.
  • Uncertainty over the reliability of information.

Some of these challenges can be overcome if the regulator prescribes a well-defined framework for such assurance engagements.
Role of the Statutory Auditor – Consideration of climate-related risks in an audit of financial statements
As per the recent article on Where climate change isn’t global: auditing6 “Climate was highlighted by auditors as a challenging issue in vetting some companies’ accounts — the type of thing that required complex, subjective judgments, or that might carry the risk of misstatements. But not consistently everywhere.”

6. Source:Where climate change isn’t global: auditing | Financial Times (ft.com)

The role of the auditor is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, to enable the auditor to report whether the financial statements are prepared and presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework. Understanding an entity and its environment is fundamental to planning and executing an effective risk-based audit. In developing the understanding of an entity, the auditor should include the consideration of climate-related risks and how these risks may be relevant to audits.
The climate-related risks could be more relevant in certain sectors or industries, e.g., banks and insurance, energy, transportation, materials and buildings, agriculture, food, and forestry products. For example, in case of transportation sector, with the introduction of new modes of transportation, traditional transportation assets may be impaired. There is a risk of this continuing to happen as environmental technologies are continuing to develop and evolve at a fast pace. Therefore, the auditor should consider climate-related risks for all sectors.
Many investors and stakeholders are seeking information from auditor’s reports about how climate-related risks were addressed in the audit. With this increased user focus on climate change, the auditor need to be aware of, and may face, increasing pressure for transparency about climate matters in their auditor’s reports. However, the auditor’s reports must follow the requirements of applicable auditing standards.
The auditor’s report is a key mechanism of communication to users about the audit that was performed. In addition to the audit opinion, it provides information about the auditor’s responsibilities and, when required, an understanding of the matters of most significance in their audit and how they were addressed (i.e., Key Audit Matters under SA 701, for example for an entity in the energy sector, the impairment analysis for long-lived assets may be an area of significant auditor judgment that also considers the potential impact of climate change and the transition to renewable energy sources).
In some circumstances, it may warrant inclusion of an Emphasis of Matter paragraph to draw attention to disclosures of fundamental importance to users’ understanding of the financial statements. The auditor should also determine whether the entity has appropriately disclosed relevant climate-related information in the financial statements in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework, e.g., Ind AS or Accounting Standards, when relevant before considering climate-related matters in the auditor’s report.
The auditor should also read the other information for consistency with information disclosed in the financial statements and information that may be publicly communicated to stakeholders outside the financial statements, such as management report narratives in the annual report, press releases, or investor updates. This is a requirement under ISA 720 and SA 720, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

BOTTOM LINE
The overarching importance of sustainability reporting continues to gain momentum globally with demands from various stakeholders and substantial research and developments towards a uniform set of sustainability standards. The uniformity is not achieved yet due to lack of a common language for sustainability reporting. As reporting of sustainability information becomes the trend being observed globally, the demand for independent assurance of sustainability information is anticipated to grow as entities around the globe look to enhance the integrity of their sustainability reporting. Hence, it is imperative that auditors and assurance providers understand the current landscape and continue to monitor ongoing developments. The demand for assurance on “sustainability branded” reporting continues to grow and therefore, there is an urgent need for globally accepted sustainability / ESG assurance standards that can be used by all assurance professionals. Entities may also want to begin considering how they would gather the information and whether they would need to set up new processes, systems and controls.

Secondment Conundrum: Does SC Ruling on Indirect Tax Trouble Direct Tax?

INTRODUCTION
In case of Multi-National Enterprise (MNE) Groups, it is a usual practice for a foreign parent or group entity to depute or second it’s employees to the Indian subsidiary or group company for various reasons. Such reasons, inter alia, include enabling the Indian subsidiary to provide quality services to the group entities or to enable the subsidiary to carry on its own business in a more efficient and effective manner by using the expertise of the deputationist or seconded employee. In such scenarios, the department is often found taking a stand that the salaries paid by the Indian subsidiary or group company to such deputationists or seconded employees or the reimbursement of such salary costs by it to the foreign parent or group company amounts to ‘Fees for technical Services’ payable by the Indian entity to the foreign entity. The department is also found taking a stand that the services rendered by such an employee constitutes a ‘Service PE’ in India. To counter this stand of the department, assessees adopt various defenses, which among other things, include the most common stand that the deputationist or seconded employee becomes the employee of the Indian entity during such period of deputation or secondment. In this article, the authors seek to discuss the tests laid down by Courts and Tribunals to determine the true employer in such cases.

GENERAL TESTS FOR DETERMINING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

There is a distinction between legal employment and real/economic employment. This distinction becomes even more relevant in cases of deputation/secondment. While the seconded/deputed employee may continue to remain in legal employment of the foreign entity, in so far as he would revert to the foreign entity after completion of such period of deputation/secondment, the Indian entity may be said to be the economic employer of the said employee during such period, depending on the facts and circumstances. This has been envisaged in the Commentary in Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.

The IT Act does not define the term ‘employment’. It also does not overlook the concept of economic employment, as well. Hence, the distinction between legal employment and economic employment and the principles for determination of economic employment would be relevant for the purposes of the Income-tax Act (IT Act).

We may discuss the various decisions in the context of the IT Act and other statutes which have laid down the tests to determine whether there exists an employee-employer relationship. Some of these decisions are discussed below:

  • In Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son Ltd. vs. Government of Hyderabad (1954) 25 ITR 449 (SC), it has been held that the word ‘employment’ connotes the existence of a jural relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee, that is, between the person paying and the person paid.

  • In East India Carpet Co (P) Ltd. vs. Its Employees 1970 Jab LJ 29, 31; it has been held that the term ‘employment’ involves a concept of employment under a contract of service. In DC Works Ltd vs. State of Saurashtra (1957) SCR 152 (SC), it has been held that the greater the amount of direct control exercised over the person rendering the services by the person contracting them, the stronger the grounds for holding it to be a contract for service.

  • In Silver Jubilee Tailoring House vs. Chief Inspector Of Shops And Establishments 1974 AIR 37 (SC), for drawing a distinction between a contract for service (employment) and contract of service (independent contractor), the Court has highlighted the importance of the degree of control and supervision of the employer or the person employing such services. It has been held that if an ultimate authority over the worker in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s direction, that would be sufficient. A reference may also be made to the decision in Shivnandan Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1427:AIR 1955 SC 404:(1955) 1 LLJ 688. The test of control and supervision has also been applied in the undernoted1  cases.

1. Ram Prashad vs. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 122 (SC); Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra 1957 SCR 152; CIT vs. Lakshmipati Singhania (1973) 92 ITR 598 (All).
One would notice a common thread flowing through the ratios laid down in the above decisions. The above decisions have unequivocally voiced the view that a contract of employment (service) can be said to exist where the following conditions are satisfied:

  • A person exercises supervisory control over another’s work; and

  • The former exercises the ultimate authority over the latter’s work in so far as the former gives directions to the latter specifying the manner in which the work is to be carried out and the latter is bound by such directions.

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MORGAN STANLEY’S CASE

In the case of DIT vs. Morgan Stanley & Co. [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the Court was hearing appeals filed by the assessee and the department against the ruling obtained by the assessee from the AAR. As per the facts of the case, an agreement was entered into by an Indian group entity Morgan Stanley Advantages Services Pvt. Ltd. (‘MSAS’) and the assessee (‘MSCO’), whereby the former would provide support services to the latter. Pursuant to the same, MSCO outsourced some of its’ activities to MSAS. MSCO filed an application for advance ruling. The basic question on which the ruling was obtained was as to whether MSCO could be said to have a PE in India under Article 5(1) of the Indo-US DTAA on account of services rendered by MSAS under the Service Agreement. The AAR ruled that MSCO cannot be regarded as having a fixed place of business in India within the meaning of Article 5(1). It also ruled that MSCO did not have an agency PE under Article 5(4) of the DTAA. However, it ruled that MSCO would be regarded as having a Service PE under Article 5(2)(l) of the DTAA if it were to send some of its’ employees to India as stewards or as deputationists in the employment of MSAS. Against the ruling, both the department and the assessee filed appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

In appeal, while examining whether a Service PE exists within the meaning of Article 5(2)(l) of the DTAA, the Court in paragraph 14 ruled that the said Article applies in cases where the MNE furnishes services within India and those services are furnished through its’ employees. Thus, where employees are deputed by MSCO in India for providing services to MSAS, the Court held that MSAS constitutes a Service PE. The Court has given due credence to the control and supervision exercised by MSCO on the employees deputed in India through whom it provides services in India to MSAS. Based on the same, the Court has concluded that MSAS constitutes a Service PE for MSCO in India.

Though the ratio is in the context of Service PE under the provisions of the DTAA, it is relevant for determination of the economic employer in the case of deputation. This is for the reason that a Service PE would be constituted in India where a foreign entity renders services in India through its’ employees in India. Thus, for a Service PE to be constituted, the deputationist must continue to remain the employee of the foreign entity even post such deputation.

The said test of control and supervision laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for determining whether the deputationist continues to remain the employee of the foreign entity is in line with the test discussed in the earlier segment.

Having ruled so, in paragraph 15, the Hon’ble Court went on to lay down the following propositions of law:

(i)    On deputation, the employee of MSCO, when deputed to MSAS, does not become an employee of MSAS.

(ii)    The deputationist has a lien on his employment with MSCO. As long as the lien remains with the MSCO, the said company retains control over the deputationist’s terms and employment.

(iii)    Where the activities of the multinational enterprise entail it being responsible for the work of deputationists and the employees continue to be on the payroll of the multinational enterprise or they continue to have their lien on their jobs with the multinational enterprise, a service PE can emerge.

(iv)    On request/requisition from MSAS, MSCO deputes its staff. The request comes from MSAS depending upon its requirement. Generally, occasions do arise when MSAS needs the expertise of the staff of MSCO. In such circumstances, generally, MSAS makes a request to MSCO. A deputationist under such circumstances is expected to be experienced in banking and finance. On completion of his tenure, he is repatriated to his parent job. He retains his lien when he comes to India. He lends his experience to MSAS in India as an employee of MSCO as he retains his lien and in that sense there is a service PE (MSAS) under Article 5(2)(1).

Thus, it may be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has provided the following parameters to treat a deputationist/expat as the employee of the foreign entity:

  • A deputationist shall have a lien on his employment with foreign entity;

  • The foreign entity retains control over the deputationist’s terms and employment at the time of deputation; and

  • A Service PE emerges where the activity of the foreign entity requires it to be responsible for the work of deputationists, and the deputationists continue to be on the payroll of foreign entity or have their lien on their jobs with the foreign entity.

Thus, it may be noted that while in paragraph 14, the Court emphasized only the control and supervision exercised by the foreign entity on the deputationist, in paragraph 15, it has brought out two aspects i.e., lien exercised by the deputationist on his employment with the foreign entity, and the foreign entity being responsible for the work of the deputationist. The second aspect i.e., being responsible for the work, may subsume into the test of control and supervision adumbrated in paragraph 14.

However, it is pertinent to note that while the Court has laid down the twin tests of control and supervision over the work [thus being responsible thereof] of deputationists and the exercise of lien by the deputationists as relevant tests, it has not discussed as to which of the two tests would have greater precedence over the other.

DELHI COURT DECISION IN THE CASE OF CENTRICA INDIA
The next decision which would be relevant for discussion would be the decision in the case of Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2014] 364 ITR 336 (Delhi). As per the facts of the said case, the Petitioner (CIOP), a wholly owned subsidiary of Centrica Plc, UK, had entered into Service Agreements with the latter and other foreign subsidiaries of Centrica Plc to provide locally based interface to those overseas entities and the Indian entity. To seek support during its’ initial year of operation, CIOP sought for some employees on secondment from the overseas entities. For this purpose, it entered into an agreement with the overseas entities whereby the latter seconded some employees for a fixed tenure. The employees so seconded would work under the direct control and supervision of CIOP who would bear all risks and enjoy all rewards associated with the work performed by such employees.

The issue that arose before the Court was whether the secondment of employees by the overseas entities would amount to Fees for Technical Services or Fees for Included Services within the relevant DTAAs in question, which would embody the concept of a Service PE.

In order to drive home the point that the seconded employees were under the employment of CIOP, it was argued on behalf of CIOP that the seconded employees would work under the direct supervision and direction of the board and management of CIOP. It was also argued that it was convenient for them to receive salaries overseas. An option available to such employees was to receive their salaries through India and later transfer their salaries overseas. However, to avoid the same, the employees continued to remain on the payroll of the overseas entities who would disburse the salaries. Thereafter, the petitioner would reimburse such salary costs to the overseas entities. Thus, the primacy of concept of economic employment as opposed to legal employment was argued to contend that for, all practical purposes, CIOP is the economic employer. The reasons attributed to defend this contention were that the entire direction and supervision over the seconded employees was under its control and the pay and emoluments were borne by it.

While negating the argument on behalf of the Petitioner, the Court ruled that the overseas entities rendered services through the seconded employees to CIOP. Thus, the Court ruled that even post the secondment, the employees continued to remain the employees of the overseas entities on the following grounds:

(i)    The service provided by the secondees is to be viewed in the context in which their secondment or deputation was necessitated. The overseas entities required the Indian subsidiary, CIOP, to ensure quality control and management of their vendors of outsourced activity. For this activity to be carried out, CIOP required personnel with the necessary technical knowledge and expertise in the field, and thus, the secondment agreement was signed since CIOP – as a newly formed company – did not have the necessary human resource.

(ii)    The secondees are not only providing services to CIOP, but rather also tiding CIOP through the initial period, and ensuring that going forward, the skill set of CIOP’s other employees is built and they continue these services without assistance. In essence, the secondees are imparting their technical expertise and know-how onto the other regular employees of CIOP. The activity of the secondees is thus to transfer their technical ability to ensure quality control vis-à-vis the Indian vendors, or in other words, ‘make available’ their know-how of the field to CIOP for future consumption.

(iii)    While the Court agreed that the seconded employees were under the control and supervision of CIOP, there was no purported employment relationship between CIOP and the secondees. None of the documents, including the attachment to the secondment agreements placed on record (between the secondees and CIOP) revealed that the latter can terminate the secondment arrangement; there is no entitlement or obligation, clearly spelt out, whereby CIOP has to bear the salary cost of these employees. The secondees cannot in fact sue CIOP for default in payment of their salary – no obligation is spelt out vis-à-vis the Petitioner.

(iv)    All direct costs of such seconded employee’s basic salary and other compensation, cost of participation in overseas entities’ retirement and social security plans and other benefits in accordance with its applicable policies and other costs were ultimately paid by the overseas entity. Whilst CIOP was given the right to terminate the secondment, (in its agreement with the overseas entities) the services of the secondee vis-à-vis the overseas entities – the original and subsisting employment relationship – could not be terminated. Rather, that employment relationship remained independent, and beyond the control of COIP.

(v)    The employment relationship between the secondee and the overseas organisation is at no point terminated, nor is CIOP given any authority to even modify that relationship. The attachment of the secondees to the overseas organization is not temporary or even fleeting, but rather, permanent, especially in comparison to CIOP, which is admittedly only their temporary home.

(vi)    The social security, emoluments, additional benefits, etc. provided by the overseas entity to the secondee, and more generally, its employees, still govern the secondee in its relationship with CIOP.

(vii)    Whilst CIOP may have operational control over these persons in terms of the daily work and may be responsible (in terms of the agreement) for their failures, these limited and sparse factors cannot displace the larger and established context of employment abroad.

(viii)    The Court placed reliance on the Commentary of Klaus Vogel, wherein it was noted that the situation would have been different if the employee works exclusively for the enterprise in the State of employment and was released for the period in question by the enterprise in his state of residence. The Hon’ble High Court considered that this factor was critical to determine the economic employer.

From the above, it may be noted that the High Court, with due respect, has erred in giving higher weightage to the latter of the twin tests laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra), i.e. exercise of lien by the seconded employee on its’ employment with the overseas entities. The High Court may not be correct in stating that limited and sparse factors of operational control over the secondees by CIOP in terms of their daily work and its’ responsibility for their work would not displace the larger and established context of employment abroad.

Further, while the counsels for Petitioner argued as to the concept of economic employment and relied on the degree of operational control exercised by CIOP, it appears that satisfaction of the twin conditions as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not highlighted before the High Court. Had the Petitioner highlighted the importance of the said twin conditions, the ratio laid down by the High Court may have been different.

The petitioner’s SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dismissed in Centrica India Offshore Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [SLP (C). No 22295/2014, dated 10th October, 2014. Further, a review petition filed was also dismissed in Centrica India Offshore Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [RP(C) No. 2644 of 2014 in SLP (C). No 22295/2014, dated 10th December, 2014].    

OTHER TRIBUNAL AND HIGH COURT DECISIONS
In IDS Software Solutions (India) Ltd. vs. ITO2, the ITAT held that though the service rendered by expat is technical service, the assessee was not liable to deduct tax from the amount representing reimbursement of the salary paid by IDS-USA to expat while remitting the same to IDS-USA u/s 195. The ITAT came to such conclusion based on the following grounds:

(i)    IDS-USA was the legal employer. Since the assessee-company was to reimburse the emoluments paid by IDS-USA to him, it was the assessee-company which for all practical purposes was to be looked upon as the employer of ‘S’ during the relevant period;

(ii)    The person who actually controlled the services of ‘S’ was the assessee-company. Under the secondment agreement, ‘S’ was to act in accordance with the reasonable requests, instructions and directions of the assessee-company. He would have to devote the whole of his time, attention and skills to the assessee-company. He was to report to and be responsible to the assessee-company;

(iii)    The assessee-company could remove ‘S’ before the expiration of the period of his office. The board of directors of the assessee-company regulated the powers and duties of ‘S’ by passing appropriate resolutions;

(iv)    The seconded employee is required to also act as an officer or an authorised signatory or nominee or in any other lawful personal capacity for the assessee-company, which would also be out of place in an agreement for rendering technical services; and

(v)    Therefore, it was held that seconded employee was responsible and subservient to the assessee-company, which could not be the case if the agreement was for providing technical services by IDS to the assessee-company.


2. (2009) 122 TTJ 410 (Bang); relied on in ITO vs. M/s Cerner Health Care Solutions Pvt. Ltd [I.T.(T.P.) A.No.1509/Bang/2012];  ITO vs. Ariba Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd [I.T.A. No.616(Bang.)/2011]; Caterpillar India Pvt. Ltd vs. Deputy Director of Income-tax [ITA 629/630/606/607/149/(Bang)/2010]; DCIT vs. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. [2016] 69 taxmann.com 321 (Mumbai – Trib.)

In Deputy Director of Income-tax vs. Yum! Restaurants (Asia) Pte. Ltd. [2020] 117 taxmann.com 759 (Delhi – Trib.), where, a Singapore based company, seconded its employee to an Indian concern for carrying out business operations of its’ restaurant outlets in India efficiently, the said employee worked under direct supervision and control of Indian concern, his salary cost was reimbursed to assessee on a cost-to-cost basis, the Tribunal ruled that the employee was the employee of the Indian concern during the period of secondment. The Tribunal distinguished the case on hand from the facts in the case of Centrica India (supra) on the facts of the case by observing that in the case of Centrica, the overseas entity was providing services to Indian company through seconded employees to ensure quality control and management of their vendors of outsourced activities, with the intention to provide staff with appropriate expertise and knowledge about process and practices implemented. However, a perusal of the facts before the Tribunal would reveal that during the period of secondment, the seconded employee was under the exclusive employment of the Indian entity and foreign entity did not exercise any control or lien over the employee.

In AT & T Communication Services (India) (P.) Ltd vs. DCIT [2019] 101 taxmann.com 105 (Delhi – Trib.), it was held by the Tribunal that the nature of income embedded in related payments is relevant for deciding whether or not section 195 will come into play and so long as a payment to non-resident entity is in the nature of payment consisting of income chargeable under the head ‘Salaries’, the Indian Company does not have any tax withholding applications u/s 195 of the Act. The Tribunal distinguished the case before it from Centrica India’s case (supra) and observed that seconded employees of foreign company were not taking forward the business of foreign company in India. In Centrica (Supra), the employees were seconded to Indian company to ensure that services to be rendered to the overseas entities by the Indian vendor are properly coordinated.

In DIT vs. Abbey Business Services Ltd. (2020) 122 taxmann.com 174 (Kar), the assessee was a subsidiary of ANITCO Ltd. a group company of Abbey National Plc, UK (ANP). ANP had entered into an agreement with the assessee, to outsource the provision of certain process and call centers to M/s. Msource India Pvt. Ltd. Under the agreement, Msource India Pvt. Ltd was required to provide high quality services which supports the position of ANP and its affiliates as well as to customers in UK. To facilitate outsourcing agreement between ANP and Msource India Pvt. Ltd., an agreement for secondment of staff was entered into between ANP and the assessee on 4th February, 2004. For deputation of its employees, Abbey, India had made certain payments to ANP, part of which was salary reimbursement on which tax was deducted. The question arose whether such payments amounted to fees for technical services. The Court ruled that the reimbursement of salary costs by the Appellant was not FTS as the employees in question were employees of the assessee. The Court took into consideration the aspect of control, direction and supervision exercised by the assessee. The Court also observed that the employees were required to function in accordance with the policies, rules and guidelines applicable to the employees of the assessee. The Court has distinguished the judgement in Centrica’s case (supra) on the grounds that the question of permanent establishment was not involved in the case on hand, unlike in Centrica’s case (supra). With due respect, such basis is incorrect given that even in Centrica’s case, the question for consideration was whether costs reimbursed by petitioner therein to the overseas entity was FTS/FIS within the meaning of the DTAAs in question, which was also the question before the Karnataka High Court in Abbey’s case (supra).


SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN NORTHERN OPERATING SYSTEMS (P.) LTD.’S CASE
In C.C.,C.E. & S.T. Bangalore vs. Northern Operating Systems (P.) Ltd. [2022] 61 GSTL 129 (SC), the Court was examining whether where the overseas group companies seconded their employees to the assessee in India, the same would amount to manpower recruitment and supply services liable to service tax u/s 65(68) r.w.s. 65(105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994.

From the above extracted paragraphs, it can be noted that the Honourable Supreme Court has concluded that the seconded employees were not the employees of the assessee company in India by taking into consideration the following aspects:

  • The nature of the overseas group companies’ business is providing certain specialized services (back office, IT, bank related services, inventories, etc. which can be performed by its highly trained and skilled personnel.
  • Taking advantage of the globalized economy and location savings, the Overseas group company had assigned, inter alia, certain tasks to the assessee, including back-office operations of a certain kind, in relation to its activities, or that of other group companies or entities.
  • As part of this agreement, a secondment contract is entered into, whereby the overseas company’s employee or employees, possessing the specific required skill, are deployed for the duration the task is estimated to be completed in. Thus, the employees were deployed to the assessee, on secondment in relation to the business of the overseas employer and the group.
  • Though the employee was in control of the assessee and the assessee had the power to terminate the services of the seconded employees, upon expiry of the secondment period, the employees would return to their overseas employer.
  • The Overseas employer pays them the salary. The terms of employment, even during their secondment, are in accord with the policy of the overseas company who is the employer.
  • The fact that the assessee had to ultimately bear the burden of salaries of the seconded employees was irrelevant as the seconded employees were performing the tasks in relation to the assessee’s activities and not in relation to the overseas employer.

After discussing various decisions laying down the traditional test of supervision and control, the Court has indicated that such traditional test to indicate who the employer is may not be the sole test to be applied.

The above decision, in contrast to the decisions of the twin tests laid down in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) has brought out a new perspective i.e. whose business the seconded employee is carrying on? The decision lays down the principle that where the Indian entity provides support or back-office services to the foreign entity and the seconded employees enable the company to provide such services efficiently and effectively through their expertise, the employees continue to remain in employment of the foreign entity though their functions may be under the control and supervision of the Indian entity.

The said principle appears to be in line with the facts and the ultimate ratio in Centrica’s case (supra) and also the basis on which other decisions as cited in paragraph 5 have distinguished the ratio in Centrica’s case (supra).

SUBSEQUENT DECISION IN FLIPKART’S CASE
The above decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) was considered by the Ld. Single Judge in Flipkart Internet (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2022] 139 taxmann.com 595 (Karnataka). As per the facts of the said case, the Petitioner had made pure reimbursement payments to Walmart Inc. towards payment of salaries to deputed expatriate employees. The Petitioner applied for a certificate u/s 195 for Nil deduction of tax at source which was denied by the departmental officer. In writ proceedings, the Court has observed that the seconded employees were employees of the Petitioner by making the following observations:

  • Clause 1.5 of the Master Service Agreement (MSA) defines the scope of work relating to secondment.
  • Clause 3.1 of the MSA provides that the Petitioner may terminate the services of the secondees.
  • Clause 4.2 provides that the party placing the secondees can invoice the party receiving the service, the secondment costs, expenses and incidental costs borne in the Home Country.
  • Even though Walmart Inc. has the power to decide the continuance of the services in USA of the seconded employees after the termination of their secondment in India, it would relate to a service condition post the period of secondment. What would be of significance is the relationship between the petitioner and the seconded employee.
  • The equity eligibility of the seconded employee which was a pre-existing benefit (even prior to the secondment) ought not to alter the relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the employee.
  • Further, mere payment by Walmart Inc. to the seconded employees would not alter the relationship between the petitioner and the seconded employees, as the petitioner only seeks to make payment to Walmart Inc. of its payment to the seconded employees which is stated to be by way of reimbursement.
  • The Petitioner was not merely acting as a back office for providing support service to the overseas entity, whereby the overseas entity could be treated as an employer.
  • The Petitioner issues the appointment letter, the employee reports to the petitioner and the petitioner has the power to terminate the services of the employee.

The Court also rejected the revenue’s reliance on the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) by distinguishing the case on hand from the facts in the said case, on the following grounds:

  • The Apex Court has interpreted the concept of a secondment agreement taking note of the contemporary business practice and has indicated that the traditional control test to indicate who is the employer, may not be the sole test to be applied. The Apex Court while construing a contract whereby employees were seconded to the assessee by foreign group of Companies, had upheld the demand for service tax holding that in a secondment arrangement, a secondee would continue to be employed by the original employer.

  • The Apex Court in the particular facts of the case had held that the Overseas Co., had a pool of highly skilled employees and having regard to their expertise were seconded to the assessee and upon cessation of the term of secondment would return to their overseas employees. While returning such finding on facts, the assessee was held liable to pay service tax for the period as mentioned in the show cause notice.

  • The judgment rendered was in the context of service tax and the only question for determination was as to whether supply of manpower was covered under the taxable service and was to be treated as a service provided by a Foreign Company to an Indian Company. But in the case on hand, the legal requirement requires a finding to be recorded to treat a service as ‘FIS’ which is “made available” to the Indian Company.

BASIS ON WHICH THE DECISION IN NORTHERN OPERATING’S CASE (SUPRA) CAN BE DISTINGUISHED
It is needless to state that whether the seconded or deputed employee continues to remain the employee of the foreign entity or becomes the employee of the Indian entity would depend on the facts of the case.

Though the said decision is in the context of provisions of Service Tax, the decision lays down certain important principles to determine whether or not the seconded employee remains the employee of the foreign entity even after such secondment or deputation to the Indian entity. Hence, the principles laid down thereunder would equally apply even in the context of provisions of the Income- tax Act.

While the decision in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) was rendered by a division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) is rendered by a larger bench of 3-judges. Thus, the interesting question for consideration is whether the twin tests laid down in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) are sacrosanct or have they been diluted in terms of the ratio in Northern Operating’s case (supra).

  • While the Court has referred to its’ earlier decision in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) in its’ subsequent decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra), it has not doubted the twin tests laid down thereunder or dissented from the ratio laid therein.
  • As discussed earlier, the subsequent decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) has stated that the traditional test of control and supervision for determination of the economic employer cannot be the sole test. Even in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra), the test of control and supervision was not the sole and determinative factor but was part of twin tests. Thus, on this count, the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) appears to be line with the decision in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra).
  • A fortiori, the twin tests laid down in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra), continue to hold the field even post the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) and are still relevant given that they have been laid down in the specific context of the Income-tax Act read with the relevant DTAAs.

Northern Operating’s case (supra) was rendered in the context of sections 65(68) and (105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994 dealing with ‘supply of manpower’ prior to amendment in 2012 (with effect from 1st July, 2012) and section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 defining the term ‘service’ post such amendment. Thus, on the interpretation of such provisions, the Court ruled that the service of supply of manpower was rendered by the overseas entities to the appellant therein. However, in the context of Income-tax Act read with the relevant DTAAs, it would be necessary for the department to establish that the services, if any, rendered by the overseas entity through its’ employees would amount to technical services or included services as per the provisions of the IT Act read with the relevant DTAA, before any liability can be imposed.

The Commentary on Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention recognizes the principles of real or economic employment in contradistinction to legal employment. It lays down the following tests or factors for determination of economic employment:

  • The hirer does not bear the responsibility or risk for the results produced by the employee’s work;
  • The authority to instruct the worker lies with the user;
  • The work is performed at a place which is under the control and responsibility of the user;
  •  The remuneration to the hirer is calculated on the basis of the time utilized, or there is in other ways a connection between this remuneration and wages received by the employee;
  • Tools and materials are essentially put at the employee’s disposal by the user;
  • The number and qualifications of the employees are not solely determined by the hirer.

In the Commentary by Professor Klaus Vogel on ‘Double Taxation Conventions,’ it has been observed that where an employee is sent abroad to work for a foreign enterprise as well, the foreign enterprise does not qualify as an employer merely because the employee performs services for it or because the enterprise was issuing to the employee instructions regarding his work or places or tools at his disposal. However, it has been highlighted that the situation would be different if the employee works exclusively for the enterprise in the State of employment and was released for the period in question by the enterprise in his State of residence.

The above commentaries lay down the tests to be applied to determine the economic employer, which would be relevant for the purposes of the Income-tax Act read with the DTAAs and may not be relevant for the purposes of the Service Tax Act. Hence, these commentaries were not considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Northern Operating’s case (supra). However, for the purposes of provisions of the Income-tax Act, the tests laid down in the said commentaries would be relevant. The Supreme Court in Engineering Analysis Centre Of Excellence P. Ltd. vs. CIT (2021) 432 ITR 471 chose to apply principles canvassed by OECD in the absence of contrary provisions in the domestic law.

The above commentaries would indicate while the test of control and supervision may be a relevant test, it may not be sole determinative factor, more so when the employee does not work exclusively for the Indian entity to whom he has been deputed and continues to carry on the business of the foreign entity. This is the key aspect which has also been emphasized by the Delhi High Court in Centrica’s case (supra) as highlighted earlier.

This also appears to be the sentiment of the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra). Thus, the key takeaway from the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) and on reconciling the same with various earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including the one in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) is that supervision and control exercised by the Indian entity would by itself not be determinative. Where the Indian entity is itself under the supervision and control of the foreign entity and carries on the business of the latter, mere supervision and control exercised by the Indian entity over the seconded/deputed employees would be irrelevant. In such circumstances, the seconded employees would be enabling the Indian entity in carrying on the business of the foreign parent in a more efficient and effective manner.

Thus, an analysis would have to be made in each case whether post such secondment/deputation, the seconded/deputed employee is carrying on the business of the foreign entity or is solely serving the Indian entity to whom he has been seconded/deputed. It is only in the latter situations, coupled with the supervision and control exercised by the Indian entity, one may be able to conclude that such person is the employee of the Indian entity during such period of secondment/deputation. This proposition is in line with the Commentary on Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentary by Klaus Vogel, laying down the tests for determination of economic employer, which appear to be the distinguishing factor as taken into account by the High Court in the decision in Centrica India’ case (supra).

Thus, after such deputation/secondment, where the employee is exclusively devoted to the Indian entity and does not carry on the business of the foreign entity, he can be said to be under the economic employment of the Indian entity. In such circumstances, it would be possible for the Indian entity to distinguish its’ case from the facts in Northern Operating’s case (supra).

In CIT vs. Eli Lilly & Co. (India) P. Ltd. [2009] 312 ITR 225 (SC), the assessee company, incorporated in India, was a joint venture between M/s. Eli Lilly, Netherlands B.V. and Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. The foreign partner had seconded four expatriates to the joint venture in India. They were employees of the joint venture post such deputation or secondment. However, they continued to remain on the rolls of the foreign company. They received home salary outside India from the foreign partner. The Indian venture deducted tax on salary paid to such expats but failed to deduct tax on such home salary. In appeal, the Court held that the Indian joint venture was liable to deduct at source u/s 192 in respect of such home salary which accrued in India under the provisions of section 9(1)(ii) read with the Explanation thereto.

Thus, in the above decision, the Court has understood that the home salary is salary paid by the foreign entity on behalf of such Indian entity. It is for this reason, the Court directed the Indian entity to deduct tax at source from such payments u/s 192. The above judgement, in the specific context of provisions of the Income-tax Act would indicate that where the services are provided by the expatriate post the secondment to the Indian entity, the employee would be under the economic employment of the Indian entity despite the fact that such employees continue to be on the rolls of the foreign entity.

The decision in Eli Lilly’s case (supra) would support the proposition that even where salaries are paid by the foreign entity to the seconded/deputed employees, such employees can be said to be under the economic employment where the services are rendered to the Indian entity during the course of such secondment.

Further, the decision in Eli Lilly’s case (supra) appears to be in line with the principles laid down in the Commentary by Klaus Vogel, laying emphasis on sole employment during the period of secondment, which was considered the most important factor as per the decision in Centrica’s case (supra). This is for the reason that in the judgement in Eli Lilly’s case (supra), there is a finding of fact by the Hon’ble Court that post the deputation, no work was performed by the employees for the foreign company.

Dealing with this exclusivity theory, it may be noted that the concept of simultaneous dual employment is not alien to the Income-tax Act. It has in fact been recognized by section 192(2) of the IT Act, which recognizes that during the financial year, an assessee may be employed simultaneously under more than one employer. Further, in today’s times, with the emergence of concept of moonlighting, certain employers permit their employees to exercise a second employment in so far as such second employment does not affect the business activities of the employer.

In such scenarios, when the provisions of the IT Act recognize such dual employment, it may be possible for the seconded employee to exercise such dual employment, during such period of secondment. Thus, the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra), rendered in the specific context of the facts therein and more so in the context of provisions of Service Tax, cannot be relied on to insist on exclusivity.

With respect to fee paid to visiting doctors by hospitals, the Revenue3 is often found taking a stand that such payment amounts to salary and that tax is to be deducted by the concerned hospital u/s 192 as against section 194J. This stand is adopted despite the fact that upon any negligence by the doctor, he and not the concerned hospital would be responsible as per the Code of Ethics and the Medical Council Guidelines applicable to such doctors. Thus, in such cases, the responsibility over the work of the doctors by the hospital is overlooked by the department. The department also overlooks the factor of sole employment, given that the doctors may be visiting and providing their services to more than one hospital.

However, in the context of secondment, the revenue is seen taking a completely contradictory argument of sole employment with the Indian entity, for the purposes of determination of economic employment.


3. CIT vs. Grant Medical Foundation [2015] 375 ITR 49 (Bombay); CIT vs. Manipal Health Systems (P.) Ltd. [2015] 375 ITR 509 (Karnataka); CIT vs. Teleradiology Solutions Pvt Ltd [2016-TIOL-703-HC-KAR-IT];  ITO vs. Dr. Balabhai Nanavati Hospital [2017] 167 ITD 178 (Mumbai); Hosmat Hospital (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2016] 160 ITD 513 (Bangalore – Trib.). Note that the authors have only named a few cases herein.

Will Technology Replace Skilled Auditors?

INTRODUCTION

If data is the new oil, then a digital ecosystem is its refinery. Today, entities are using next-generation technologies more than ever, and many aspects of financial reporting and underlying processes have been digitised. As referred by the World Economic Forum, we are at the cusp of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” central to which is the development and adoption of automated technologies. The audit profession is also catching up with these technological developments. Building on the changes computers brought to the assurance profession, the use of advanced technologies is driving the evolution of the audit. As digital transformations speed ahead, auditors need to follow suit – the question is no longer ‘if’ the auditor needs to change; it’s ‘how fast?’

This article provides an overview of the automated tools and techniques in vogue, their myths, challenges and considerations while embarking on innovation strategy by audit firms.

AUTOMATED TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
Audit procedures are performed using several manual or automated tools or techniques (and a combination of both). The automated tools and techniques would broadly fall into any of the following categories:

Automation

Analytics

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Robotic Process Automation (RPA)

 

When an activity/ procedure is
performed by a tool with least human intervention. E.g., updating workpaper
with terms and conditions from a purchase agreement.

 

Evaluation of a large volume of data
to find trends and make objective decisions. E.g., margin analysis of a group
of products.

 

Teaching tools to complete tasks
requiring human intelligence. E.g., identification of unusual clauses in a
lease contract

 

Uses recorders and easy programming
language mimicking human execution of applications, usually for repetitive
tasks. E.g., auto bank reconciliation statements.

Some commonly used automated tools relate to the following:

  • General ledger analysers: These examine and analyse general ledgers through a suite of data capture and analytics tools, e.g. audit teams can look at sales invoicing activity throughout the year, the impact of credit/ debit notes and ultimately, how the invoices are settled and accordingly allow auditors to obtain a better understanding of both revenue and trade receivables. This tool uses an analytics-driven approach that enables auditors to provide better-quality, deeper insights and more client-relevant audits, as well as exercise a higher level of professional scepticism.

 

  • Anomaly detectors: These refer to a practice in which auditors detect accounting fraud by selecting samples and testing them to ensure accuracy basis their knowledge about the clients, their businesses and accounting policies. Machine learning and AI is capable of sensing anomalous entries in large databases and create visual maps of the flagged entries and the reason for their detection.

 

  • Data profiling: Data might be unstructured, i.e. not recorded as rows and columns of data, e.g. written reports and social media. Plugins of some of the automated tools simplify extraction and analysis of unstructured data to quickly generate in-depth interactive reports containing statistics and graphical representations so that auditors can make more informed decisions.

 

  • Working paper management: Working paper solutions allow team members to collaborate effectively on an engagement file in real-time, even when in different locations. Members of the audit team can work on a work paper at the same time without being concerned about different versions. These solutions also automatically roll forward the identified client data from year to year to ensure continuity and reduce workload.

 

  • Reporting considerations: These incorporate a deep understanding of the auditing standards and generate audit reports on the basis of the conclusion reached by the auditor, e.g. audit having a modified opinion is automatically aligned with the relevant requirements. Additional features can include health check functions such as the casting of financial statements, tie-out in financial statements, cross reference checks against financial statements and notes, as well as casting of the notes.

 

AUDITING IN A DIGITAL WORLD
The audit of the future would focus human interaction on high-risk transactions as opposed to highly repetitive and rules-based tasks. Interface tools could be used to automatically share information in real time with the auditor’s automated tool(s), which in turn could analyse, test and flag anomalies or issues that require the auditor’s attention. However, human insight and experience to ultimately understand the context underlying the output as well as the cause of the output would continue to be relevant. A high-level summary of how an auditor can benefit from the use of automated tools is summarised below:Planning phase

Audit planning involves establishing an overall audit strategy that sets the scope, timing and direction of the audit guiding the development of the audit plan. The audit planning phase includes the following:Materiality and scoping – RPA can be used to pull out relevant data from the financial statements of prior periods or interim financial statements and compute the materiality based on a range of benchmarks. The same techniques can be utilised to determine materiality in a continuous or real-time audit.

RPA and analytics can be applied to identify outliers or areas that have not followed the understood course of business to determine the scope and focus testing on accounts or transactions that appear to present a greater risk of misstatement.

Risk Assessment – During risk assessment, auditors normally perform variance analysis about how the current period amounts compare with the prior period amounts based on an understanding of the entity, its industry, and the current business environment. RPA can perform this activity quickly basis prior period financial statements and publicly available information.

AI can analyse board meeting/audit committee minutes to help the auditor identify additional risks, and request to provide for supporting information, as well as scheduling meetings with the relevant individuals to discuss audit matters.

Execution phase
The execution phase of an audit engagement is an intense period of activity. It broadly comprises analysing information, executing testing, making judgements, documenting work and the following:

Test of controls – The aim of tests of controls in auditing is to determine whether internal controls are sufficient to detect or prevent risks of material misstatements. Metadata3 can enhance the testing of controls by highlighting potentially higher-risk areas, for example, AI tools can analyse how many purchase invoices an individual typically approves and their usual frequency and duration, as well as the amount of time since their previous approval. If a reviewer approves a purchase invoice in 5 minutes, then depending on the complexity of the purchase and the comparability with others performing the same task, AI could highlight an outlier for testing.


3. A set of data that describes and gives information about other data.

Risk control matrix has several automated controls. BOT can be used to analyse the result against a defined rule. BOT can prepare draft report of exceptions in a predefined format. The exception report can be reviewed by the auditor and once accepted, BOT can send report for response to management. This can result in significant effort optimisation of auditor.Inventory counts – With the computer’s vision, an AI-based app can look at millions of pictures taken from cameras (whether statically mounted in a warehouse or mounted on moving drones) and identify articles. Articles that have indexing information (such as bar codes) are even easier to identify and be counted, giving the auditor the ability to obtain more coverage.

Estimates – Traditional audit techniques used to audit estimates typically include reperformance of management’s process, retrospective testing, or development of an independent estimate. An array of automation and AI techniques can be used to perform variations of these techniques e.g., warranty gets triggered in case of a failure in the products. Management may have established a model for determining the expected rate of failure of products. Using machine learning, the audit team could build an independent model to predict this likelihood based on historical product failures. The AI tool could also be trained to incorporate other relevant observable factors, such as customer profiles, point in time when product failure occurs and contractual terms. Inclusion of these factors could also enable determination of an independent warranty estimate for comparison with the entity’s estimate.

Reporting phase
After fieldwork is completed, the auditor needs to:

Prepare an audit report – Auditors normally have a repository of standard audit reports which are customised as per the facts and circumstances. A modified audit opinion might require an auditor to make varied changes to a standard audit report. An editable version of an audit report is prone to errors. An automated audit report generator helps the auditor to choose the required audit report format and instantly generate an audit report on the basis of the limited inputs from the auditor e.g., the auditor would input limited information such as name of the auditor, year-end, basis for modified opinion. The automated audit report generator ensures consistency in reporting requirements and brings efficiency in the audit process.

Prepare client communications – Standardised templates are already developed and available to the audit teams, but human effort is required to tailor them to speci?c clients. AI can extract information from the audit ?les and workpapers (e.g., auditor’s report, management representation letter, etc.).

 

MYTHS AND CHALLENGES

There are many misperceptions about automated tools. Contrary to popular belief, at present these tools are neither all-knowing nor inherently smart. Some of the myths and challenges are as follows:

Garbage in garbage out

Automated tools are only as effective as the underlying data. The accuracy of the information presented or produced by the automated tools and techniques depends on it. The old adage ‘garbage in, garbage out’ applies. The auditor would need to evaluate data integrity e.g., how to assess the reliability of data captured, whether any mid-year system change would affect the overall scope.Automated tools can give biased or bad predictions if they are trained using biased or bad data e.g., if an AI tool was trained to automatically classify documents as either ?nancial data or non-financial data, but if 90 per cent of the training documents were non-?nancial data, the tool would wrongly learn and predict most of the data as non-?nancial data.

The ‘black box’ problem

In a simple set of data, an auditor can trace and determine the cause-and-effect relationship of automated tools and techniques. When the data points become complex, tools may not be able to clearly link input factors and outcomes, and explain the cause-effect pattern. This lack of transparency or explainability creates a lack of trust in automated tools, and is perhaps the biggest challenge to the widespread adoption of some of the sophisticated automated tools.Data privacy and conndentiality

The effective use of automated tools often requires an access to large amounts of data, including conndential client data, in order to learn relevant patterns and apply them to predict or suggest an output. Not surprisingly, entities may be resistant to providing access to this high-value data and information. Auditors need to consider the risks associated with data and privacy, and design security protections commensurate with the sensitivity of the data.Not a substitute for auditors’ judgement

Automated tools fail to see the big picture e.g., the world of automated tools is restricted only to the (correct or incorrect) data to which it has access, what it has been taught and what it has been programmed to do. It does not know the nuances of the real world and can’t replace an auditor’s professional judgment. Fraud or bias can happen even when transactions processed by the automated tools seem perfectly legitimate. Auditors need to be alert to these qualitative aspects. Advanced technologies provide a wealth of information to an auditor that enables them to make a judgment. But the auditor will still be the one making that judgment.Technology is an enabler and is unmatched when it comes to identifying correlations among datasets or variables. However, it takes human insight and experience to ultimately understand the context underlying the output as well as the causation of the output relative to the inputs provided. An auditor confirms the information and determines whether it is an anomaly and, more importantly, determines what it implies or how to conclude on how appropriate the treatment of the information is. Accordingly, automated tools will not replace the need for professional judgment in auditing processes.

Widening expectation gap

These technologies have the potential to widen the expectation gap and raise the bar for the definition of an audit. With the ability to analyse a larger percentage of transactions and data, there will be an increased expectation as to what an audit achieves. 

CALL TO ACTION

Much of the growth in automated tools and techniques in some audit firms over the past few years can be put down to one factor: competition. The audit firm rotation rules have sent some of the audit firms into a technology arms race. As the technology trickles down, every audit firm, regardless of its size, needs to decide on its innovation strategy. No choice of the strategy is bad – it’s all a question of what suits a firm’s client base. Audit firms would need to balance the risks and benefits. While deciding the innovation strategy, audit firms are encouraged to:

  • Conduct an environmental scan: Firstly, look inwards. Research and analyse the firm’s current audit process to identify outdated systems that need improvements before exploring external products. This process may involve attending vendor events to learn about what new technology is available and considering how the firm can collaborate with external IT specialists.

 

  • Align with long-term strategy: Firms should identify which technology is best aligned with their strategy and consider the relevant business need, available budget and marketplace opportunities. The return on investment should be calculated, but the risk of not investing in a new technology should also be considered.

There are various options to manage the required investment, including exploring a subscription based or monthly-renewal model to manage the costs, and consider passing the costs on to clients. It can be difficult to determine which one is the best and a long-term solution. Sharing experiences with other similar firms can be mutually beneficial.

  • Formulate realistic implementation plan: A bite-sized plan should be developed so the firm can effectively manage the transition. Be strategic while identifying opportunities for automated tools and techniques. An ideal place to start is with high-benefit, low-effort opportunities. Assess the results using professional judgment, as well as any potential efficiency savings. Audit firms may determine the best option based on requirements, resources and schedule.

 

  • Adopt the Cloud: Cloud technology has become a key part of most industries. Firms with multiple offices can use the cloud to provide staff an easy way to work virtually on the same client simultaneously in different offices. The firm needs to know the service providers and where they are storing the data to track how it is being secured. There is also a need to be aware of any relevant laws and regulations, such as data protection legislation.

 

  • Identify innovation champions: Understanding who to approach in the audit firm places the firm in a better position to support tangible change and implementation of identified opportunities. The firm should identify and position a passionate team member to take the lead in implementing a new technology initiative. The technology champion will need support and guidance from the firm’s leadership to proceed with change because there may be challenges with its implementation. It may take time and effort, so patience and perseverance are prerequisites, but the benefits will far outweigh the costs.

 

  • Involve clients in technology decisions: Clients want to hear about technological developments that save time. Involving clients would create transparency and highlight a long-term vision for all involved. As the firm enhances its technology knowledge, it will further enhance trust and help introduce new permissible service offerings.

 

IN A NUTSHELL
Audit is changing at an unprecedented pace as technology continues to evolve and entities increasingly expect more. These two intersecting trends mean that auditors must continually acquire new skills and up their game to meet the rising bar on audit quality. It’s not enough to have the latest technology – auditors must be able to mine data for information that is important to clients, such as that affecting relevant risks, internal controls, and important processes, and be able to communicate it clearly. It is important to see automated tools as enablers. They will not replace the auditor; rather, they will transform the audit and the auditor’s role.

Immunity from Penalty for Under-Reporting and from Initiation of Proceedings for Prosecution – Section 270AA

BACKGROUND
With a view to introduce objectivity, clarity and certainty, the Finance Bill, 2016 proposed a levy of penalty for under-reporting of income in lieu of penalty for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. W.e.f. Assessment Year 2017-18, in respect of additions which are made to total income, penalty is leviable u/s 270A if there is under-reporting of income.

Under section 270A, penalty is levied at 50 per cent of tax for under-reporting of income and at 200 per cent of tax for under-reporting in consequence of misreporting. Of course, levy of penalty u/s 270A has to be in accordance with the provisions of section 270A.

Section 276C, providing for prosecution for wilful attempt to evade tax, etc., has been amended by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 to cover a situation where a person under-reports his income and tax on under-reported income exceeds Rs. 2,500,000.

Since, provisions of section 270A are enacted in a manner that in most cases, where there is an addition to the total income, penalty proceedings u/s 270A will certainly be initiated and barring situations covered by sub-section (6) of section 270A, penalty will also be levied. The Legislature, with a view to avoid litigation, has simultaneously introduced section 270AA to provide for grant of immunity from penalty u/s 270A and from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C and section 276CC.

IMMUNITY GRANTED BY SECTION 270AA

The Finance Act, 2016 has, w.e.f. 1st April, 2017, introduced section 270AA, which provides for immunity. The Delhi High Court in Schneider Electric South East Asia (HQ) Pte. Ltd. vs. ACIT [WP(C) 5111/2022; Order dated 28th March, 2022, has held that the avowed legislative intent of section 270AA is to encourage/incentivize a taxpayer to (i) fast-track settlement of issue, (ii) recover tax demand; and (iii) reduce protracted litigation.

Section 270AA achieves this objective by granting immunity from penalty u/s 270A and from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C and section 276CC, in case the assessee chooses not to prefer an appeal to CIT(A) against the order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or 147, as the case may be, and also pays the amount of tax along with interest within the period mentioned in the notice of demand.

Section 270AA has six sub-sections. It has not been amended since its introduction.

In this article, for brevity sake,

i) ‘immunity from imposition of penalty u/s 270A and initiation of proceedings u/s 276C or section 276CC’ is referred to as ‘IP&IPP’;

ii) an application by the assessee made u/s 270AA(1) for grant of IP&IPP is referred to as ‘application u/s 270AA’;

iii) the order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or 147, as the case may be, in which the proceedings for imposition of penalty u/s 270A are initiated and qua which immunity is sought by an assessee is referred to as ‘the relevant assessment order’;

iv) under-reporting in consequence of misreporting or under-reporting in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A is referred to as ‘misreporting’; and

v)    Income-tax Act, 1961 has been referred to as ‘Act’.


BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SECTION 270AA
An assessee may make an application, for grant of IP&IPP, to the AO, if the assessee cumulatively satisfies the following conditions –

(a)    the tax and interest payable as per the order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or section 147, as the case may be, has been paid;

(b)    such tax and interest has been paid within the period specified in such notice of demand;

(c)    no appeal against the relevant assessment order has been filed. [Sub-section (1)]

The application for grant of IP&IPP needs to be made within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the relevant assessment order has been received. The application is to be made in the prescribed form i.e. Form No. 68 and needs to be verified in the manner stated in Rule 129. [Sub-section (2)]

The AO shall grant immunity if all the conditions specified in sub-section (1) are satisfied and if the proceedings for penalty have not been initiated in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9). However, such an immunity shall be granted only after expiry of the time period for filing of appeal as mentioned in section 249(2)(b) [i.e. time for filing an appeal to the CIT(A) against the relevant assessment order] [sub-section (3)]

Within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the application is received by him, the AO shall pass an order accepting or rejecting such application. Order rejecting application shall be passed only after the assessee has been given an opportunity of being heard. [sub-section (4)]

The order made under sub-section (4) shall be final. [Sub-section (5)]

Where an order is passed under sub-section (4) accepting the application, neither an appeal to CIT(A) u/s 246A, nor the revision application u/s 264 shall be admissible against the relevant assessment order. [sub-section (6)]

SCOPE OF IMMUNITY
The immunity granted u/s 270AA is from imposition of penalty u/s 270AA and for initiation of proceedings u/s 276C or section 276CC.

Immunity granted u/s 270AA will be only for IP&IPP and not from imposition of penalty under other sections such as 271AAB, 271AAC, etc., though penalty under such other provisions may be initiated in the relevant assessment order itself.


CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 270AA
An application u/s 270AA can be made only upon cumulative satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) – see conditions mentioned at (a) to (c) in the para captioned `Brief overview of section 270AA’.

Sub-section (1) does not debar or prohibit an assessee from making an application even when penalty has been initiated for misreporting.

The application for immunity can be made only if the proceedings for imposition of penalty u/s 270A have been initiated through an order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or section 147, as the case may be, of the Act.

In a case where an assessment is made u/s 143(3) pursuant to the directions of DRP, it would still be an assessment u/s 143(3) and therefore an assessee will be entitled to make an application u/s 270AA.

In a case where search is initiated after 31st March, 2021, assessment of total income will be vide an order passed u/s 147 of the Act and therefore, it would be possible to make an application u/s 270AA in such cases.

Orders passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 254; section 143(3) r.w.s. 260;  143(3) r.w.s. 263 and 143(3) r.w.s. 264 which result in an increase in quantum of assessed income/reduction in amount of assessed loss and consequential initiation of proceedings u/s 270A, upon assessments being set aside by revisional / appellate authority as also orders passed to give effect to the directions of appellate authorities, will also qualify for making an application for grant of immunity u/s 270AA.  The following reasons may be considered to support this proposition –

i)     Sections 143, 144 and 147 are the only sections under which an assessment can be made;

ii)    Section 270AA refers to `order of assessment’ and not ‘order of regular assessment’;

iii)     The Bombay High Court has in Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd. vs. CIT [(1975) 202 ITR 375], held that “For these reasons, the impugned order of assessment passed by the ITO pursuant to the directions of the appellate authorities with a view to giving effect to the directions contained therein was an order of assessment within the meaning of section 143 or section 144 ….”

iv)    The Madras High Court in Rayon Traders (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO [(1980) 126 ITR 135] has held that “An order passed by the ITO to give effect to an appellate order would itself be an order under section 143(3).”

v)    Where the appellate authority’s order necessitates a re-computation e.g., when it holds that a particular receipt is not income from business but is a capital gain, the AO has to pass an order under this section (refers to section 143) making a proper calculation and issue a notice of demand [Law & Practice of Income-tax, 11th Edition by Arvind P. Datar; Volume II – page 2521 commentary on section 143];

vi)    The order itself mentions that it is passed u/s 143(3) though it is followed by ‘read with …..’;

vii)    Contextual interpretation requires that these orders would be regarded as ‘order of assessment u/s 143(3)’ for the purpose of section 270AA;

There can be hardly any arguments against the above stated proposition except contending that it is an order passed u/s 143(3) read with some other provision.

To avoid any litigation on this issue and to achieve the avowed object with which section 270AA is enacted, it is advisable that the matter be clarified by the Board.

An interesting issue will arise in cases where an assessment made u/s 143(3) without making any addition to returned income is sought to be revised for rectifying a mistake apparent on record after giving notice to the assessee and such rectification results in an increase in assessed income and also initiation of proceedings for levy of penalty u/s 270A. In such a case while the penalty is initiated in the course of rectification proceedings, the assessment is still u/s 143(3), and all that the order passed u/s 154 does is to change the amount of total income assessed u/s 143(3) by rectifying the mistake therein and consequently the amount of tax and interest payable will also undergo a change and a fresh notice of demand will be issued. It appears that the assessee, in such a case also, will be entitled to make an application for grant of immunity u/s 270AA if the assessee pays the amount of tax and interest as per the notice of demand issued along with order passed u/s 154 and such tax and interest is paid within the time mentioned in such notice of demand and the assessee does not prefer an appeal against the addition made via an order passed u/s 154. It is submitted that it would not be proper to deny the immunity on the ground that the proceedings for imposition of penalty have been initiated via an order which is not passed u/s 143(3) or section 147. The language of sub-section (1) is that ‘the tax and interest payable as per the order of assessment under section 143(3) has been paid within the period specified in the notice of demand’. The tax and interest payable pursuant to an order passed u/s 154 only rectifies the amount of tax and interest payable computed in the order of assessment u/s 143(3). Even going by the avowed intent of the legislature it appears that an application in such cases should be maintainable. In a case where the assessment made u/s 143(3) by making additions to returned income is sought to be rectified and against such assessment the assessee had applied for and was granted immunity, it appears that the assessee will be entitled to immunity since, as has been mentioned, order u/s 154 only amends the amount of assessed income in the assessment order passed u/s 143(3). However, if against the assessment u/s 143(3) the assessee had preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and such an assessment is rectified by passing an order u/s 154 the assessee may not qualify for making an application u/s 270AA.

The application for grant of immunity cannot be made where the proceedings for levy of penalty u/s 270A have been initiated by CIT(A) or CIT or PCIT.

Normally, the time period granted to pay the demand is thirty days. However, if the time mentioned in the notice of demand is less than thirty days, then the amount of tax and interest payable as per notice of demand will have to be paid within such shorter period as is mentioned in the notice of demand if the assessee desires to make an application for grant of IP&IPP.

If there is an apparent mistake in the calculation of the amount mentioned in the notice of demand accompanying the relevant assessment order, the assessee may choose to make an application for rectification u/s 154 of the Act. In the event that the rectification application is not disposed of before the expiry of the time period within which the application for grant of IP&IPP needs to be made, then the assessee will have to make the payment of amount demanded (though incorrect in his opinion) since pendency of rectification application cannot be taken up as a plea for making an application u/s 270AA(1) for grant of IP&IPP beyond the period mentioned in section 270AA(1).

It is not the requirement for making an application u/s 270AA that there should necessarily be some amount of tax and interest payable as per the relevant assessment order. Therefore, even in cases where the amount of demand as per the relevant assessment order is Nil (e.g. loss cases), subject to satisfaction of other conditions, an assessee can make an application u/s 270AA.

The CBDT has clarified that an immunity application by the assessee will not amount to acquiescence of the issue under consideration, for earlier years where a similar issue may have been raised and may be litigated by the assessee, and authorities will not take any adverse view in the prior year/s – Circular No. 5 of 2018, dated 16th August, 2018.


TIME WITHIN WHICH APPLICATION NEEDS TO BE MADE
The application for grant of immunity needs to be made within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the relevant assessment order is received by the assessee [Section 270A(2)].

Section 249(2)(b) provides that the time available for filing an appeal to the CIT(A), against the relevant order, if the same is appealable to CIT(A), is 30 days from the date following the date of service of notice of demand. Consequent to introduction of section 270AA, second proviso has been inserted to section 249(2)(b) to exclude the period beginning from the date on which the application u/s 270AA is made to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the assessee. Therefore, in a case where the application u/s 270AA is rejected and the assessee upon rejection of the application chooses to file an appeal to CIT(A), then the second proviso to section 249(2)(b) will come to the rescue of the assessee to exclude the period mentioned therein. However, the benefit of the second proviso will be available to the assessee only if he has filed an application u/s 270AA before the expiry of the time period for filing an appeal. In cases where the application u/s 270AA is made after the expiry of the time period of filing the appeal to CIT(A), the appeal of the assessee will be belated and the assessee will need to make an application to the CIT(A) seeking condonation of delay which application may or may not be allowed by CIT(A). This is illustrated by the following example–

Suppose, an assessee receives an assessment order passed u/s 143(3) on 10th December, 2022, wherein penalty u/s 270A has been initiated and the assessee is eligible to make an application u/s 270AA, then the assessee can make an application u/s 270AA till 31st January, 2023. The time period for filing an appeal against this assessment order is 9th January, 2023. If the assessee files his application u/s 270AA on say 2nd January, 2023 then in the event that the application of the assessee is rejected by passing an order u/s 270AA(4) on 14th February, 2023, then for computing the time period available for filing an appeal to CIT(A), the period from 2nd January, 2023 to 9th January, 2023 will need to be excluded and assessee will still have eight days from 14th February, 2023 (being the date of service of order u/s 270AA(4)) to file an appeal to the CIT(A). However, if the above fact pattern is modified only to the extent that the assessee chooses to file an application u/s 270AA on 14th January, 2023, then upon rejection of such application the assessee does not have any time available to file an appeal to the CIT(A), as there is no period which can be excluded from the time available u/s 249(2)(b). In this case, the assessee will need to make an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and will be at the mercy of CIT(A) for condoning the delay or otherwise.

Therefore, it is advisable to file an application u/s 270AA by a date such that in case the application u/s 270AA is rejected, then the assessee still has some time available to file an appeal to CIT(A).

TO WHOM IS THE APPLICATION REQUIRED TO BE MADE, FORM OF APPLICATION – PHYSICAL OR ELECTRONIC? FORM OF APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION THEREOF
The application u/s 270AA for grant of IP&IPP needs to be made to the AO [section 270AA(1)]. The application needs to be made to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) in all cases i.e. even in cases where the assessment was completed in a faceless manner u/s 143(3) r.w.s.144B.

The application u/s 270AA needs to be made in Form No. 68. The Form seeks basic details from the assessee. Form No. 68 has a declaration to be signed by the person verifying the said form. The declaration is to the effect that no appeal has been filed against the relevant assessment order and that no appeal shall be filed till the expiry of the time period mentioned in section 270AA(4) i.e. the period within which the AO is mandated to pass an order accepting or rejecting the application made by an assessee u/s 270AA.

Form No. 68 is to be filed electronically on the income-tax portal. On the portal, Form 68 is available at the tab e-File>Income Tax Forms>File Income Tax Forms>Persons not dependent on any Source of Income (source of income not relevant)>Penalties Imposable (Form 68)(Form of Application under section 270AA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961). Presently, immunity is granted by the JAO. The JAO who is holding charge of the case of the assessee can be known from the income-tax portal.

ACTION EXPECTED OF AO UPON RECEIVING THE APPLICATION
The AO, upon verification that all the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) are cumulatively satisfied and also that the penalty has not been initiated for misreporting, shall grant immunity after expiry of the period for filing an appeal u/s 249(2)(b) [Section 270A(3)]. In other words, upon a cumulative satisfaction of the conditions, granting of immunity is mandatory.

The AO is not required to obtain approval of any higher authority for granting IP&IPP.

In the case of GE Capital US Holdings Inc vs. DCIT [WP No. (C) – 1646 /2022; Order dated 28th January, 2022, the Petitioner approached the Delhi High Court to issue a writ declaring Section 270AA(3) as ultra vires the Constitution of India or suitably read it down to exclude cases wherein the AO has denied immunity without ex-facie making out a case of misreporting of income. The Court observed that in the facts of the case before it – (i) the SCN did not particularize as to on what basis it is alleged against the Petitioner that he has resorted to either under-reporting or misreporting of income; and (ii) there was no finding even in the assessment order that the Petitioner had either resorted to under-reporting or misreporting. The Court has issued notice to the Department and till the next hearing has stayed the operation of the order passed u/s 270AA(4) and directed the AO not to proceed with imposition of penalty u/s 270A.

TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AO IS REQUIRED TO PASS AN ORDER ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE FOR GRANT OF IP&IPP
While sub-section (3) casts a mandate on the AO to grant immunity upon satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the previous paragraph, sub-section (4) provides that the AO shall within a period of one month from the end of the month in which an application has been received for grant of IP&IPP, pass an order accepting or rejecting such application. Proviso to sub-section (4) provides that an order rejecting application for grant of IP&IPP shall be passed only after the assessee has been given an opportunity of being heard.

Except in cases where penalty u/s 270A has been initiated for misreporting, it is not clear as to whether there could be any other reason as well for which application for grant of IP&IPP can be rejected by the AO. This is on the assumption that the assessee has satisfied conditions precedent stated in sub-section (1) of section 270AA.

While the outer limit for passing an order accepting or rejecting an application has been provided for in section 270AA(4) namely, one month from the end of the month in which the application for grant of immunity has been received, the AO will have to ensure that such an order is passed only after expiry of the period mentioned in section 249(2)(b) for filing an appeal to CIT(A).

A question arises as to what is the purpose of sub-section (4) since sub-section (3) clearly provides that the AO shall grant IP&IPP. One way to harmoniously interpret the provisions of these two sub-sections would be that in cases where conditions mentioned in sub-section (3) are satisfied, it is mandatory for the AO to grant immunity whereas in cases where conditions mentioned in sub-section (3) are not satisfied, it is discretionary on the part of the AO to grant immunity. This would be one way to reconcile the provisions of the two sub-sections, and it would in certain cases appear that such an interpretation would advance the intention of the legislature to avoid litigation. For example, take a case where the under-reporting of income is Rs. 10.05 crore, of which Rs. 5 lakh is on account of misreporting, whereas the balance Rs. 10 crore is for under-reporting simplicitor and the assessee applies for grant of immunity by paying the amount of tax and interest within the time mentioned in the notice of demand and does not file an appeal against such an order. If one were to interpret the provisions of sub-section (3), it would appear that the AO is not under a mandate to grant immunity but sub-section (4) possibly grants him a discretion to pass an order accepting or rejecting the application for grant of IP&IPP. This view can also be supported by the fact that if the initiation of penalty for misreporting was a disqualification, it would have been mentioned as a condition precedent in sub-section (1) that penalty should not have been initiated in the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A of the Act. As on date, this view has not been tested before the judiciary. In case the AO chooses to reject the application then, of course, he will need to grant an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

Also, it appears that in a case where the assessee has made an application for grant of IP&IPP and the AO is of the view that the penalty u/s 270A has been initiated in the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A, then he may grant an opportunity to the assessee. The assessee, in response, may show cause as to how his case is not covered by the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9), in case the AO is convinced with the submissions/ contentions of the assessee, he may pass an order granting immunity. Sub-section (4) is a statutory recognition of the principle of natural justice.

The Delhi High Court in the case of Schenider Electric South East Asia (HQ) PTE Ltd. [WP No. 5111/2022 & C.M. Nos. 15165-15166/2022; Order dated 28th March, 2022] was dealing with the case of a Petitioner whose application for grant of immunity was rejected by passing an order u/s 270AA(4) on the ground that the case of the Petitioner did not fall within the scope and ambit of section 270AA. The Court observed the show cause notice initiating the penalty proceedings did not specify the limb whether “under-reporting” or “misreporting”. The Court held that in the absence of particulars as to which limb of section 270A is attracted and how the ingredients of sub-section (9) of section 270A are satisfied, the mere reference to the word “misreporting” in the assessment order to deny immunity from imposition of penalty and prosecution makes the impugned order passed u/s 270AA(4) manifestly arbitrary. The Court set aside the order passed by the AO u/s 270AA(4) and directed the AO to grant immunity to the Petitioner.

To the similar effect is the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Prem Brothers Infrastructure LLP vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre [WP No. (C) – 7092/2022; Order dated 31st May, 2022].


CONSEQUENCES OF AO NOT PASSING AN ORDER WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD MENTIONED IN SUB-SECTION (4) OF SECTION 270AA
The Delhi High Court in the case of Ultimate Infratech Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi High Court – WP (C) 6305/2022 & CM Applns. 18990-18991/2022; Order dated 20th April, 2022] was dealing with the case of an assessee who filed a Writ Petition challenging the order levying penalty u/s 270A and also sought immunity from imposition of penalty u/s 270A of the Act in respect of income assessed vide assessment order for A.Y. 2017-18. The assessment of total income was completed by reducing the returned loss. There was no demand raised on completion of the assessment. The assessee filed an application u/s 270AA for grant of IP&IPP. No order was passed, within the statutory time period, to dispose of the application filed by the assessee. Penalty was imposed on the assessee on the ground that no order granting immunity was passed by the JAO within the statutory time period. The Court observed that the statutory scheme for grant of immunity is based on satisfaction of three fundamental conditions, namely, (i) payment of tax demand, (ii) non-institution of appeal, and (iii) initiation of penalty on account of under-reporting of income and not on account of misreporting of income. The Court noted that all the conditions had been satisfied. The Court held that in a case where an assessee files an application for grant of immunity within the time period mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 270AA and the AO does not pass an order under sub-section (4) of section 270AA within the time period mentioned therein, the assessee cannot be prejudiced by the inaction of the AO in passing an order u/s 270AA within the statutory time limit, as it is settled law that no prejudice can be caused to any assessee on account of delay / default on the part of the Revenue

ORDER REJECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE FOR GRANT OF IP&IPP – WHETHER APPEALABLE?
Sub-section (5) of section 270A clearly provides that the order passed u/s 270A(4) shall be final. In other words, an order rejecting the application u/s 270AA is not appealable. The only option to the assessee who wishes to challenge the order rejecting the application u/s 270AA would be to invoke a writ jurisdiction. Since there is no alternate remedy available, the revenue will not be able to oppose the writ petition of the assessee on the ground that there is an alternate remedy which ought to be exercised instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction.

The Bombay High Court in a Writ Petition filed by Haren Textiles Private Limited, [WP No. 1100 of 2021; Order dated 8th September, 2021], was dealing with the case of an assessee who filed a revision application before PCIT against the action of the AO. The PCIT rejected the revision application filed by the assessee on the ground that sub-section (6) of section 270AA specifically prohibits revisionary proceedings u/s 264 of the Act against the order passed by the AO u/s 270AA(4) of the Act. The Bombay High Court while deciding the Writ Petition challenging this order of the PCIT, agreed with the contention made on behalf of the assessee that there is no such prohibition or bar as has been held by the PCIT.

The Court held that what is provided in sub-section (6) is that when an assessee makes an application under sub-section (1) of section 270AA and such an application has been accepted under sub-section (4) of section 270AA, the assessee cannot file an appeal u/s 246A or an application for revision u/s 264 against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 147. This, according to the Court, does not provide any bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the AO, rejecting its application made under sub-section (1) of section 270AA. The Court observed that the application before PCIT was an order of rejection passed by the ACIT of an application filed by the assessee under sub-section (1) of section 270AA seeking grant of immunity from imposition of penalty and initiation of proceedings u/s 276C of section 276CC. The Court held that the PCIT was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground that there is a bar under sub-section (6) of section 270AA in filing such application. The Court set aside the order passed by PCIT u/s 264 of the Act.

It is humbly submitted that the court, in this case, has not considered the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 270AA which provide that the order passed under sub-section (4) of section 270AA shall be final. Had the provisions of sub-section (5) been considered, probably the decision may have been otherwise.    

CONSEQUENCES OF THE AO PASSING AN ORDER DISPOSING APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE FOR GRANT OF IP&IPP
In case an order is passed accepting the application, then the assessee will get immunity from imposition of penalty u/s 270A and from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C or section 276CC. Also, against the relevant assessment order, the assessee will not be able to file either an appeal to CIT(A) or a revision application to the CIT. However, in cases where an appeal against the relevant assessment order lies to the Tribunal, the assessee will be able to challenge the relevant assessment order in an appeal to the Tribunal, notwithstanding the fact that immunity has been granted, e.g. in cases where the relevant assessment order has been passed by the AO pursuant to the directions of Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP).

However, if an order is passed u/s 270AA(4) rejecting the application of the assessee for grant of immunity, the assessee will be free to file an appeal to the CIT(A) or a revision application to CIT against the relevant assessment order.

Normally, an application u/s 270AA will be rejected on the ground that the penalty u/s 270A has been initiated in the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) thereof. In order to avoid the possibility of the revenue contending at appellate stage or while imposing penalty u/s 270A, that the position that penalty has been initiated in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A has become final by virtue of an order passed u/s 270AA(4) and the assessee has not challenged such an order, it is advisable that upon receipt of the order rejecting the application for grant of immunity, if the assessee chooses not to file a writ petition against such rejection, the assessee should write a letter to the AO placing on record the fact that he does not agree with the order of rejection and his not filing a writ petition does not mean his acquiescence to the reasons given for rejection of the application u/s 270AA.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court has in the case of Ultimate Infratech Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi High Court – WP (C) 6305/2022 & CM Applns. 18990-18991/2022; Order dated 20th April, 2022, has held that “it is only in cases where proceedings for levy of penalty have been initiated on account of alleged misreporting of income that an assessee is prohibited from applying and availing the benefit of immunity from penalty and prosecution under section 270AA.”

SOME OBSERVATIONS
i)    Immunity u/s 270AA is from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C and section 276CC. However, if before an assessee makes an application u/s 270AA, if proceedings u/s 276C or 276CC have already been initiated, then it appears that the assessee will be able to avail only immunity from penalty under section 270A.

ii)    Before making an application for grant of immunity, assessee is required to pay the entire amount of tax and interest payable as per the relevant assessment order within the period mentioned in the notice of demand. In case the application is rejected, the entire demand would stand paid and the assessee would be in an appeal before CIT(A), whereas had the assessee chosen not to apply for grant of immunity, the assessee would have, as per CBDT Circular, applied for and obtained a stay in respect of 80 per cent of the demand.

iii)    Till the date of filing an application u/s 270AA, the assessee should not have filed an appeal against the relevant assessment order. However, if the assessee has, upon receipt of the relevant assessment order, filed a revision application to CIT u/s 264, he is not disqualified from making an application. However, once an order is passed accepting the application for grant of IP&PP, then such a revision application already filed will no longer be maintainable in view of section 270AA(6).

iv)    There is no provision to withdraw the immunity once granted by passing an order u/s 270AA(4).

v)    There is no bar on assessee making an application under section 154 for rectification of the relevant assessment order even after an order is passed u/s 270AA(4) accepting the application of the assessee for grant of immunity.

CONCLUSION
Section 270AA is a salutary provision and if implemented in the spirit with which it is enacted, it would go a long way to reduce litigation and collect taxes and interest. While section 270AA grants IP&IPP, it makes the relevant assessment order not appealable in its entirety. The additions made in the relevant assessment order may be such as would attract penalty / penalties leviable under provisions other than section 270A. This may work as a disincentive to an assessee who is otherwise considering to apply for immunity and accept the additions which attract penalty u/s 270A. Also, in fairness, a provision should be made that in the event that the application u/s 270AA is rejected and the assessee chooses to file an appeal, the amount of tax and interest paid by him in excess of 20 per cent of the amount demanded will be refunded within a period of 30 days from the date of order rejecting the application for grant of immunity. This is on the premise that had the assessee not opted to make an application for immunity but directly preferred an appeal against the relevant assessment order, he would have got a stay of demand in excess of 20 per cent. It is advisable that the difficulties mentioned above and may be other difficulties which the author has not noticed be ironed out by issuing a clarification.

Sustaining and Growing in “VUCA” Times!

November 2022 was an eventful month for our profession, India, and the world. ICAI organized the 21st World Congress of Accountants (WCOA) in partnership with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), with the highest number of participants (more than 10,000) from 123 countries and set many records. The WCOA is held every four years and is popularly known as the “Olympics of the Accountancy Profession”. For the first time in 118 years, WCOA was held in India at Mumbai.

Perhaps, for the first time in the history of our profession, Indian CA firms were allowed to exhibit their services. The Congress was addressed by many luminaries from the Government, Industry and Political Leaders, Investment Advisors, and Professionals. Almost all speakers were upbeat about India. The theme of the Congress was “Building Trust Enabling Sustainability”. CAs have a major role to play in building trust and ensuring sustainability. We are partners in nation-building and conscience keepers of society. The CA profession is set to scale new heights with the increased role of CAs in policymaking not only at an enterprise level, but also at the national level.

Different stakeholders have different expectations from us as auditors. It is extremely difficult to meet everyone’s expectations and therefore there is a need for collective responsibility of governance and vigilance by all stakeholders. Often our role of audit and assurance is mixed up with that of an investigator, which needs to be clearly spelled out to all stakeholders.

SEBI has mandated a “Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report” (BRSR) for the top 1,000 listed companies (by Market Cap) from the F.Y. 2022-2023. The roots of BRSR are in corporates’ responsibility and sustainability considering Environment, Social and Governance (ESG). ESG refers to an assessment of how an organisation impacts the Planet covering various Environmental aspects; the Society covering staff, customers and the community and its own Governance. As far as the environmental aspect is concerned, the impact of climate change is a major factor. Not only the organisation’s own actions, but actions of others (e.g., the Ukraine-Russia war which has disrupted the supply chain of the world economy), government policies etc. may also impact an organisation.

Although all these aspects are non-financial in nature, they can impact the very existence of an organisation. Their link to financial performance can give a clear picture of the current status and the future of an organisation in turbulent times. Therefore, the Financial Auditors are perceived to be better placed to report on BRSR. However, this additional responsibility must be accepted carefully, as there are diverse stakeholders with conflicting expectations. Moreover, at present, globally there are multiple models, guidelines for assessing the sustainability of a business. There is a compelling need for the globally acceptable Sustainability Reporting Standards. Of course, in India, one would be guided by the standards prescribed by ICAI. In short, we are living in exciting times of challenges and rising expectations of stakeholders.

We can and shall rise to the occasion and endeavour to meet the expectations. However, increased responsibilities will call for increased efforts, capacity building and may result in significant risks in execution. While we would assess the sustainability of businesses, we also need to assess the sustainability of our organisation/firm as well, in the face of growing challenges, fast-paced changes in laws/regulations, changing business landscape, automation, and increasing risks of execution etc. The sustainability of reputation would be a major task for professional firms in the wake of conflicting expectations of clients, stakeholders and regulators.

Another important development is India getting the chair of G20 Nations for one year. Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi gave the theme of the G20 as “One Nation, One Family, One Future”. How apt is the theme when we look at the concerns voiced at the recently concluded COP27 (The 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Egypt! The UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised the need for drastic measures to reduce emissions as the world is in an emergency state right now. He remarked that the world should not cross the red line of the 1.5-degree temperature limit. He added that “We can and must win this battle for our lives”. One of the glaring examples of the serious impacts of climate change on developing nations was the recent floods in Pakistan, where almost one-third of the country was inundated. Recognising loss and damages in developing nations due to climate change, COP27 concluded with a historic decision to establish and operationalize a loss and damage fund to help and support the most vulnerable developing nations. However, unfortunately little was achieved on the front of reducing carbon emissions leading to global warming.

When we look at the current world scenario, impacted by climate changes, wars, pandemics and so on, we find that we are living in VUCA times, (i.e., Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity). Today, we are experiencing supply chain disruption, energy and food crisis, high inflation with the recession in many countries, political uncertainty and social unrest in many parts of the world.

Our profession is also passing through VUCA times. CAs belong to one of the most vulnerable classes being caught between conflicting and compelling expectations from various regulators and diverse stakeholders. We are living in uncertain times of prolonged litigations and their outcomes. We are fraught with many complex and ambiguous laws, regulations and their compliances. Thus, we need to address VUCA challenges day in and day out.

However, it is equally true that our true potential emerges during difficult times, as we challenge our limitations, beliefs and work hard to succeed. Similarly, a new world order will emerge out of this chaos, maybe new political boundaries would be drawn. A new world power will emerge at the end of all this. Clearly, India is in an advantageous position today, thanks to the pragmatic Government policies and focus on digitisation, alternative energy, innovation, and the creation of world-class infrastructure. The former Managing Director of the World Bank Group Sri Mulyani Indrawati, said that India is shining among other developing nations.

Amongst VUCA times, we CAs have a promising future ahead. Challenges would be galore as also opportunities. For this, we must reorient and reposition ourselves by developing different skill sets and mindset to cope with rapidly changing times. We need to be a VUCA of a different type, i.e., Versatile, Unwavering, Competent/Courageous, and Assiduous. Versatile in handling diverse assignments, Unwavering i.e., steadfast, or resolute in our approach, Competent in various laws providing a 360-degree assurance to stakeholders, Courageous to take a stand maintaining independence and Assiduous, i.e., diligent and hard-working in whatever we do.

Let’s contribute our might in nation-building and helping businesses to sustain and grow in VUCA times with our novel VUCA abilities!

Mahamana Vidur

In the Mahabharata, the Pandavas’ father was Pandu, who was the King. After his death, his elder brother, Dhritarashtra, became the King of Hastinapur. He was blind. Their third and youngest brother was Vidur, recognised as a very knowledgeable philosopher. He was born of a female slave

Vidur is believed to be the incarnation of ‘Yama’ – Lord of Justice, who dispenses justice after one’s death. Vidur was an ardent and favourite devotee of Shrikrishna. He was Dhritarashtra’s principal minister, but stayed like a monk outside the palace. When Krishna visited Hastinapur before the great war, he preferred to stay at Vidur’s cottage and not as Duryodhana’s guest.

The reason for remembering Vidur in today’s times is his qualities of selflessness and fearlessness and his adherence to the ‘truth’. Our profession is concerned with truth and fairness without fear or favour. In this column, I have been writing about our great freedom fighters who sacrificed everything for our country. The common quality among all of them was their courage. And today, everywhere, we find a crisis of courage.

Dhritarashtra’s sons, Kauravas, were not behaving in a just and fair manner. They were misusing their power and wrongfully denying the Pandavas their right to the throne. When finally, war became imminent, Dhritarashtra called Vidur for advice because he feared his sons would be defeated and killed in the war against the mighty Pandavas.

Vidur gave him advice in 593 shlokas (verses), known as Vidurneeti. Neeti means ethical conduct and the manner of behaviour. Three sages propounded Neeti namely, Shukra, Vidur and Chanakya. Chanakyaniti is very popular even today. In Vidurneeti, Vidur narrates principles of good behaviour for a king as well as for a lay person. It is a separate topic of study and research. We will see a few selected verses.

Vidur says – There will be many people around you who will praise you in goody-goody words. However, it is rare to have people who talk and listen to the truth, which is beneficial but not liked by you. For example, one does not like people who tell us to work hard, behave honestly or not have any addiction.

He further says there are six strategies for relationships with others – be it a person or group of persons (like political parties today), nations, and so on. Those strategies are:
(sandhi) – A pact of mutual cooperation by making available each other’s means and resources.
(Vigraha) – Conflict or war.
(Yaana) – Direct attack.    
(Aasana) – Sitting quietly on the fence.    
(Dwaidheebhava) This has two meanings. If the enemy is mightier, split his strength by creating a dispute among its people/army; or create a dilemma as to which side you are supporting; or what is your real stand.
(Sanshraya) – Take shelter with a mighty friend to protect yourself from the enemy.

He says, truth is the only stair to reach the heaven and forgiveness is the greatest virtue. Another great virtue is to help others even when you are in difficulty or you have no resources.

He advised Dhritarashtra to prevail upon his sons and give Pandavas their legitimate share. Only by doing this, he said, Dhritarashtra could save his sons. He had the courage to tell Dhritarashtra (the king and his elder brother) that he had warned him to abandon his son Duryodhana at the time of his birth itself!

Finally, Dhritrarashtra tells him something which is the reality and the plight of most of us. He says “Vidur, I accept and agree with whatever you say; but my love for Duryodhana and the temptation of kingdom do not permit me to mend my ways! I know the principles of religion but have no inclination to follow them. I also understand what is bad but have no courage to give it up!”

We CAs have many things to learn from Vidurneeti.

Namaskaars to this great thinker.

AAAR upheld the order of AAR that penal interest charged by NBFC to its borrower for default in payment of EMI would attract GST in terms of section 7(1)(a) of CGST Act, 2017 read with entry No. 5(e) of Schedule II of CGST Act, 2017

16. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 1 (AAAR-Maharashtra) Bajaj Finance Ltd. Date of order: 14th March, 2019

AAAR upheld the order of AAR that penal interest charged by NBFC to its borrower for default in payment of EMI would attract GST in terms of section 7(1)(a) of CGST Act, 2017 read with entry No. 5(e) of Schedule II of CGST Act, 2017

FACTS

The applicant NBFC charges interest to its customers / borrowers on loans granted and in case of delay in repayment of EMI, the appellant collects penal / default interest (penal interest) in terms of the agreements executed by the customers. The appellant is of the view that penal interest collected from the customer is in the nature of additional interest and, thus, not leviable to

GST. When the appellant filed an application for advance ruling, AAR ruled that penal interest charged by appellant amounts to the supply of services under serial number 5(e) of Schedule II to the CGST Act and is therefore liable to GST. Hence the appeal.

RULING

As regards appellant’s contention that penal interest is in the nature of additional interest, AAAR noted that the agreement between appellant and customer has defined separately the terms ‘Default Interest’, ‘Penal Charges’ and ‘Bounce Charges’, but they are exclusive and what the appellant recovered from his customer is only the penalty for delayed payment of EMI under the term ‘Penal Charges’. Therefore, AAAR held that the penalty recovered by the appellant does not get covered by the term ‘penal interest’ as contended by the appellant, because per se it is not interest but a penalty / penal charges. Further, AAR held that since the definition of ‘interest’ given under clause 2(zk) of Notification No. 12/2017-CTR defines interest only to mean interest in respect of any amounts of money borrowed or debt incurred but does not include any other charges in respect of the amounts of money borrowed or debt incurred, the term ‘interest’ cannot be given extended meaning to include penal charges.

AAAR observed that the substance of the transaction is that the penal charges occur on the failure of the customer to adhere to the conditions of repayment of EMI as per the agreement. Thus, it is not the nomenclature in the agreement but the nature defined in the agreement that is important, that the appellant is entitled to recover and the borrower agreed to pay it. It was noted that one of the important tests to determine whether the levy is penal in nature is to see whether it is for the non-compliance of provisions and if any criminal liability or prosecution is provided, the levy is surely penal in nature. AAR held that the said test is surely passed by the penalty / penal charges in the present case as the consequences provided in the agreement for non-compliance of it may be a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence, the penalty levied by the appellant cannot be termed as ‘additional interest’ but penal charges.

AAAR held that since there is a mutual agreement between the appellant and the borrower, it can be said that the appellant has tolerated an act or situation of default by the borrower, for which it is recovering some amount in the name of penal charges / penalty. Consequently, AAAR upheld the decision of AAR in terms of section 7(1)(a) of CGST Act, 2017 read with Entry No. 5(e) of Schedule II of CGST Act, 2017.

There is no embargo on carry forward of credit on account of Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess under the GST regime

15. [2019-TIOL-2516-HC-Mad.-GST] Sutherland Global Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assis-tant Commissioner CGST and Central Excise Date of order: 5th September, 2019

There is no embargo on carry forward of credit on account of Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess under the GST regime

FACTS

Credit pertaining to Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess was rejected from being carried forward to the GST regime on the ground that the same could be set off only against specific duties and taxes provided in explanation to section 140(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 117 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules. Since the Rule does not cover any cess, the same could not be carried forward. Therefore, the present writ petition is filed.

HELD

The High Court primarily noted that there is no notification / circular / instruction expressly stating that the credit would lapse. The provisions of sub-section

(1)    read with sub-section (8) of section 140 and the Explanation thereunder state that the assessee is entitled to the amount of CENVAT credit carried forward in the return relating to the period ending with the date preceding the appointed date and this, in the present case, includes accumulated credit on account of the cesses. Thus it is more than clear that all available credit as on the date of transition would be available to an assessee for set-off. Instructions issued by the CBEC dated 7th December, 2015 reveal a policy decision not to allow utilisation of accumulated credit of Education Cess, Secondary Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess but nowhere states that the credit has lapsed. The High Court further noted the amendment in section 28 of the amended act, 2018 to exclude cesses from the ‘eligible duties and taxes’ from retrospective effect, (and) stated, however, that the same is not yet notified.

Mere reflection of transitional credit of VAT from pre-GST regime in electronic credit ledger could not be treated as availment or utilisation unless such availment or utilisation of credit reduces tax liability, which is recoverable u/s 73(1), i.e., any portion thereof is put to use so as to become recoverable

14. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 377 (Patna) Commercial Steel Engineering Corporation vs. State of Bihar

Date of order: 27th June, 2019

Mere reflection of transitional credit of VAT from pre-GST regime in electronic credit ledger could not be treated as availment or utilisation unless such availment or utilisation of credit reduces tax liability, which is recoverable u/s 73(1), i.e., any portion thereof is put to use so as to become recoverable

FACTS

The appellant, a registered dealer under VAT, filed an application in terms of section 143 of CGST Act, 2017 to take credit of surplus value-added tax and entry tax of Rs. 42.73 lakhs and to carry forward the same in its electronic ledger in the GST regime. The competent authority passed an order by invoking section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 rejecting the appellant’s application on the ground that it was not entitled to the availment of the credit reflected in the electronic credit ledger and such reflection of credit would amount to either availment or utilisation of the credit. The adjudicating authority also ordered recovery of this amount, holding it to be outstanding tax liability against the appellant. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court noted that Revenue’s contention is that reflection on the electronic credit ledger is a confirmation of a wrong availment even if the said credit was not utilised and it is liable for proceeding u/s 73. The Court held that the legislative intent present in the provisions of section 73 and rules 117 and 121 is eloquent, i.e. be it a charge of wrong availment or utilisation, each is a positive act and it is only when such act is substantiated that it makes the dealer concerned liable for recovery of such amount of tax. But in both the cases (i.e. ITC availed or utilised), the tax available at the credit of the dealer concerned must have been brought into use by him, thus reducing the credit balance. A plain reading of section 73 would confirm that it is only on such availment or utilisation of credit to reduce tax liability, which is recoverable u/s 73(1) read alongside the other provisions present thereunder. In fact, the position is made clearer by reading the said provision alongside sub-sections (5), (7), (8), (9) to (11).

Further, the High Court held that the legislative intent reflected from a purposeful reading of the provisions underlying section 140 alongside the provisions of section 73 and rules 117 and 121 of CGST Rules, 2017 is that even a wrongly reflected transitional credit in an electronic ledger on its own is not sufficient to draw penal proceedings until the same or any portion thereof is put to use so as to become recoverable. As regards reliance placed by Revenue on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs.

Ind- Swift Laboratories Ltd. [2011] 9 taxmann.com 282 (SC), the High Court distinguished the same by observing that in the said case such credit has been utilised by a dealer and it is in such circumstances that the Supreme Court, on the basis of the note on the adjudication done by the Settlement Commission, has recorded its opinion. The High Court therefore quashed the impugned order passed by the competent authority in purported exercise of the power vested in him u/s 73 being per se illegal and an abuse of the statutory jurisdiction.

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee company, engaged in business of construction and sale of residential and commercial building complexes, sold a building which was under construction at time of sale and incurred expenditure for completing its construction during financial year subsequent to sale of building, such expenditure was liable for deduction u/s 37(1)

17. CIT vs. Oberon Edifices & Estates (P) Ltd.; [2019] 110 taxmann.com 305 (Ker.) Date of order: 5th September, 2019 A.Y.: 2009-10

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee company, engaged in business of construction and sale of residential and commercial building complexes, sold a building which was under construction at time of sale and incurred expenditure for completing its construction during financial year subsequent to sale of building, such expenditure was liable for deduction u/s 37(1)

The assessee was a company engaged in the business of construction and sale of residential and commercial building complexes. During the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee sold a portion of the mall building being constructed by it. The construction of the building was not complete at that time. The assessee incurred expenditure during the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 for completing the construction and claimed it as deduction. The AO disallowed the same.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that in a situation where at the time of assessment the building remains incomplete, estimated future expenditure to be incurred was also considered along with the expenditure already incurred and was taken as cost relatable to the total saleable area, i.e., saleable area already built and the saleable area to be built in future, for arriving at the estimated cost of construction per square foot (sq. ft.). Therefore, the contentions of the assessee were accepted and it was held that the AO was not justified in not taking the value of building work-in-progress during the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 for working out the cost per sq. ft.

It was directed that the cost per sq. ft. would be taken as total expenditure incurred in construction, divided by the total saleable area, for the purpose of working out the profit from the sale of commercial area. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court and contended that the claim for deduction of future expenses made by the assessee could not be allowed. It contended that there was a distinction between the amount spent to pay off an actual liability and a liability that would be incurred in future which was only contingent. It was contended that the former was deductible but not the latter.

The Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘(i) The dispute raised by the Revenue is only with regard to the deduction claimed by the assessee in respect of the expenses incurred in future, that is, after the sale of the building, during the subsequent financial years, and not in respect of the expenses incurred by it during the relevant financial year. Section 37 is a residuary section for allowability of business expenditure.

(ii)    The expression “profits and gains” has to be understood in its commercial sense and there can be no computation of such profits and gains until the expenditure which is necessary for the purpose of earning the receipts is deducted therefrom –whether the expenditure is actually incurred or the liability in respect thereof has accrued even though it may have to be discharged at some future date. The profit of a trade or business is the surplus by which the receipts from the trade or business exceed the expenditure necessary for the purpose of earning those receipts. It is the meaning of the word “profits” in relation to any trade or business. Whether there be such a thing as profit or gain can only be ascertained by setting against the receipts the expenditure or obligations to which they have given rise.

(iii)    “Expenditure” is not necessarily confined to the money which has been actually paid out and it covers a liability which has accrued or which has been incurred although it may have to be discharged at a future date. However, a contingent liability which may have to be discharged in future cannot be considered as expenditure. It also covers a liability which the assessee has incurred in praesenti although it is payable in futuro.

(iv)    In order to claim deduction of business expenditure, it is not necessary that the amount has been actually paid or expended during the relevant accounting year itself and it is sufficient that the liability for payment had incurred or accrued during the relevant accounting year and the actual payment of amount or discharge of liability may occur in future and what is crucial is the accrual of liability for payment or expenditure during the relevant accounting year. But a contingent liability that may arise in future cannot be treated as expenditure. Thus, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.’

STORY OF THE GLORY

It is very nice to hear a speaker
at a conference describe ours as a ‘glorious’ profession! But what is the
reality? Here is an interesting (and frightening) true story.

 

A very big bank lent rupees one
thousand crores to a company. The bank had a ‘positive’ name. But there was a
scandal in the company. The bank had given huge advances to many such
companies. The bank went into deep trouble and the negative side of the
positive bank was exposed in the media. The bank’s high-profile CMD was
arrested. Many were put behind bars.

 

As usual, the question asked in the
public was
‘What was the auditor doing?’ As if the auditor is sitting
in the company the whole day and managing it!? It is the tradition in the
banking sector to make the auditor of the borrower a scapegoat regardless of
the person who may be at fault. The bank filed a complaint of professional
misconduct with the ICAI. Although ICAI is aware of the scandals in the banks
and the motivation behind such complaints, it has no choice but to entertain
such complaints. The reason is, it is a ‘glorious’ profession!

 

It was later revealed that the
auditor had signed the correct financial statements, made disclosures and
maintained good working papers. However, the borrower company had manipulated
the audited statements by masking certain figures and adverse observations and
qualifications. A photocopy which was not signed by the auditor was presented
to the bank for the loan. And since the bank was ‘positive’ it sanctioned the
loan of Rs. 1,000 crores. Please don’t ask stupid questions such as why did the
bank not insist on original signed statements, why it did not verify them in
the public domain, and so on. As per the banking norms, such questions are to
be asked only to small borrowers of Rs. 5 lakhs. If you want Rs. 1,000 crores,
the processing is very ‘simple’ and quick – on ‘a fast track’.

 

The poor auditor, despite doing a
fairly good job, was dragged into the investigations. Needless to say, he never
received his fees. On top of it, he has to face inquiries by CBI, SFIO, EOW,
etc., etc.

 

The poor auditor is made to visit
the investigators’ offices every day, answer the same questions, spend on his
lawyers’ fees, conveyance, humongous paperwork and what not. Everyone is
puzzled why the auditor carried out the audit properly and gave a qualified
report. Everybody feels that he could have given a clean report and shared some
Rs. 25 crores from the loan. He could have had a share in that sum!

 

And the beauty is that in the
inquiry, on some very technical grounds, the auditor may be held guilty of
professional misconduct. In other words, the auditor is the only person who
really suffers. The huge scam, the fraudulent people around, all that is irrelevant.
The reason is that ‘ours is a dignified and respectable profession’. Hence,
vulnerable.

 

Friends,
this is the common story of the ‘glory’ of our profession.

TRADING ON SELF-GENERATED RESEARCH – SEBI’S ORDERS MAKE IT ILLEGAL UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

BACKGROUND
One would think that trading in shares based on one’s own research based on publicly available information is the commonest and the most logical thing to do and cannot imaginably be held to be illegal. Of course, many also trade on the advice of others such as professionals or even friends; equally obvious now is that trading on the basis of inside information is self-evidently illegal. And so is front-running illegal. But it would seem absurd to say that if one does meticulous research from publicly available information and then trades on it, it could be held to be illegal – and invite serious consequences! But, curiously, that is precisely one of the legal conclusions that the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has drawn in at least two recent orders. To be clear, the facts as found by SEBI are peculiar. But, as a ruling in law, it does sound to be flawed. There are a couple of other similar issues in these orders which are also of concern.

The cases relate to recommendations for trading in scrips by persons (‘Hosts’) on a financial news channel and dealings by persons alleged to be closely associated with such hosts. The primary questions are three: Whether dealing by such persons (the host / persons closely associated with such host) themselves with advance knowledge of such recommendations is illegal under securities laws and hence punishable? Whether creation of momentum in the market by dealing in advance of such recommendations is illegal? The third question, which partly overlaps with the earlier two, is whether such dealings and practices are so unethical and unfair that they amount to violation of securities laws?

THE SEBI ORDERS
There are primarily two orders that SEBI has issued in this matter. The first order, an interim one, is in the case of Hemant Ghai (the host) and his relatives (order dated 13th January, 2021). This interim order and directions issued thereunder were confirmed by an order dated 2nd September, 2021.

The second order (dated 4th October, 2021), also an interim one, is in the case of Pradeep Pandya and certain members / HUFs of the Furiya family.

It may be added that these orders are / may be further contested and in any case be under further investigation / response from parties, being interim orders. Hence, the alleged findings of SEBI as discussed here are as per the SEBI orders. The focus here is to highlight the important and interesting legal issues involved and the possible ramifications of such cases.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND ORDER PASSED
Television channels (and even social media / streaming services) commonly have programmes where a host discusses and often makes recommendations to buy / sell a particular security. The recommendation is usually accompanied by a detailed presentation / graphics, etc., giving the justification for such recommendations. This recommendation may be made in an exclusive show by such a host who is associated with such channel or in general news where an ‘external expert’ is interviewed and who gives his recommendation.

As stated, there were two orders. In the first case, Hemant Ghai hosted / co-hosted various shows on news channel CNBC Awaaz. Recommendations about buying or selling a particular scrip were made on one such show. It was observed that as soon as the recommendation was made, the price of the scrip moved sharply in the direction recommended. That is to say, for example, if the recommendation was to buy a particular scrip, the price of that scrip immediately rose sharply in the market, obviously, as SEBI pointed out, because of such recommendation. Even the volumes rose very significantly on that day. The rise in price was far higher than the comparative movement in the stock index and there was no specific news from the company whose shares were recommended justifying such a rise. SEBI compared the price before and after the recommendation and noted that the rise in price (and volumes, too) was highest on the day of such recommendation. Similar findings were made by SEBI in the second order in the case of Pradeep Pandya’s show.

What was, however, found was that certain persons alleged to be associated with such hosts (‘associates’) repeatedly carried out trading to profit from such recommendation. Such persons bought (in the case of a buy recommendation) on the day before (or earlier on the same day) of the recommendation. When the price of the shares rose sharply after the recommendations, the associates sold the shares and made handsome profits.

Furthermore, such trades were carried out under the Buy-Today-Sell-Tomorrow (BTST) mechanism. This ensured that there was no need to even make payment for the purchase and take delivery.

SEBI made detailed inquiries on how the hosts and the respective associates were linked by taking into account family relations, call data records, addresses, etc. Accordingly, it held that the associates were aware in advance what recommendation was going to be made and hence traded in advance of such recommendation. When the price moved in the desired direction after the recommendations were released, the trades were reversed and profits made.

In the order in the matter of Hemant Ghai, calculations were made alleging that aggregate profits of about Rs. 2.95 crores were generated. In the case of Pradeep Pandya, similar calculations were made alleging profits of Rs. 8.39 crores.

The parties concerned were directed to impound these profits and deposit them in an escrow account. The hosts were also debarred from continuing to make any such recommendations till further orders. The parties were also debarred from dealing in securities till further orders. As stated earlier, the interim order in the matter of Hemant Ghai was confirmed after giving the parties a hearing.

INTERESTING POINTS ARISING OUT OF THE ORDERS
SEBI held, under the interim order, the parties (the hosts / associates) prima facie guilty of violation of multiple provisions of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (‘the Regulations’). It was held that they traded on the basis of advance information that was not public. It was further held that trading in such manner, particularly without intimating the public that they have carried out such trades, was an unethical / unfair practice which in the light of several rulings amounted to violation of the Regulations. It was also held, in the Pradeep Pandya case, that by trading in advance, a momentum was created which contributed to price movement which, too, was in violation of the Regulations.

SEBI held, on the basis of the preponderance of probability, that the parties were guilty. For this purpose it relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following cases: SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. [(2018) 143 CLA 15 (SC)]; and SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera [134 SCL 481 (SC)].

SEBI also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel [(2017) 141 CLA 254 (SC)] for taking a broader and contextual view of what constitute unfair trade practices under the Regulations. Accordingly, it held that the practices alleged to have been carried out by the parties were in violation of the Regulations.

A few interesting points arise. The primary issue is whether trading on material self-generated information / analysis can be a violation of the Regulations? Can it be said that to have such advance information and trading on it amounts to such violation?

It is respectfully submitted that such ruling is absurd. Persons trading in markets, particularly informed and expert persons, often collate information of a wide nature and arrive at their own conclusion. There is no duty in law to publish such self-generated analysis and conclusions in advance to the public before carrying out trading on their own account. Investing and speculation in the market would, it is submitted, come to a standstill if this was held to be a requirement. Let us compare this aspect with two other types of dealings which are now well settled to be violations – insider dealing and front-running. In case of insider dealing, a person has access to unpublished price-sensitive information about a company and he deals on the basis of such information. It does not need elaborate explanation as to why this is illegal and indeed specific regulations make such dealings illegal. In the case of front-running, persons entrusted with price-sensitive information carry out trades on their own account first and then carry out the trades of the persons who have entrusted them with such information. They, too, thus profit and now such dealings are well settled to be violations of the Regulations.

In the case of self-generated information, there can hardly be a case of having advance information illegitimately obtained on the basis of which trades were carried out and that this is violation of the Regulations. It is submitted that this finding of SEBI has no basis in law or logic and the order needs to be reconsidered on this point.

Let us take the next issue which is a bit more contentious. The parties did not disclose to the public that they had already carried out the trades in advance of the time when they made the recommendations. To begin with, SEBI has not pointed out any specific provision in law which requires them to make such declaration. Interestingly, in most of the transactions, it was not even as if the parties made trades opposite to what they recommended. In other words, it was not as if the parties were, for example, selling while recommending to the public to buy. They did sell but after having bought first and after the price rose.

It was not even the case of SEBI that the price fell sharply after the parties sold the shares. Indeed, SEBI gave data in several cases which did not show any fall and the only point which was made was that the price did not rise as much in the days after the day of the recommendations. So it was not even a case of what is commonly known as ‘pump-and-dump’, which is a well-known fraudulent practice where unscrupulous persons by various means make the price rise to artificially high levels and then offload the shares, leaving the buyers in the lurch as the price falls soon thereafter.

Moreover, SEBI has not even claimed that the recommendation was deliberately manipulative and there was no informed basis for the recommendation. Indeed, as the SEBI orders point out, often the scrips recommended were large, well-known companies.

The allegation that in the Pradeep Pandya order the parties carried out heavy trades with an intention to thereby (even without the recommendation) result in an artificial momentum in one direction and this is thus a violation of the Regulations, of course does make sense. It would indeed be a case of pump-and-dump.

CONCLUSION
It would indeed be disturbing for the public to know that hosts of TV shows buy (or sell, as the case may be) first for themselves the scrips they recommend and sell when the price rises when there is a heavy rush to buy following the recommendation. Cynics would, of course, argue that there is no free lunch and indeed their own buying the very scrips they recommend to buy is actually having faith in their own recommendations. But holding that this is illegal and hence punishable is, it is submitted, a flawed view.

The matters are under further investigation. There could be prolonged proceedings resulting in a final order which could then be appealed against at various levels. It would be interesting to see how SEBI and appellate authorities deal with the issues. A wide range of persons, formally and informally, make recommendations about scrips. The final ruling could make such persons change the manner in which they make recommendations, what disclosures they make and perhaps debar certain types of trades.

LIABILITY OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR BOUNCED CHEQUES

INTRODUCTION
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act’) is one of the few provisions which is equally well known both by lawmen and laymen. The section imposes a criminal liability in case of a dishonoured or bounced cheque. In cases where the defendant is a company, there is a tendency on the part of the plaintiff to implicate all the Directors of the company, irrespective of whether they are professional Directors / Independent / Non-Executive Directors. There have been numerous representations from chambers of commerce and professional / trade bodies to the Government that this section should be amended to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors who are not connected with the day-to-day management of the company. However, there has been no action on this front. Interestingly, the Act was amended in 2002 to provide that the provisions of section 138 would not apply to a Nominee Director appointed by the Central / State Government or by a financial corporation owned / controlled by the Central / State Government. One wonders why a similar exemption was not provided to other professional Directors.

SECTION 138 OF THE ACT
Let us pause for a moment and examine the impugned section. Section 138 provides that if any cheque is drawn by a person to another person and if the cheque is dishonoured because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s bank account, then such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and / or with a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque. Earlier, the maximum imprisonment was for one year; however, it was extended to two years by the Amendment Act of 2002.
    
In order to invoke the provisions of section 138, the following three steps are necessary:
(i) the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(ii) once the payee is informed by the bank about the dishonour of the cheque, he (the payee) must, within 30 days of such information, make a demand for the payment of the amount of the cheque by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque; and
(iii) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the said notice. Earlier, the time given to the drawer for responding to the notice was 15 days; but this was extended to 30 days by the Amendment Act of 2002.

A fourth step is specified under section 142 which provides that a complaint must be made to the Court within one month of the date from which the cause of action arises (i.e., the notice period). A rebuttable presumption is drawn by the Act that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
    
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PERSONS IN CHARGE
Section 141 provides that in case the drawer of the cheque is a company then every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible for the company’s conduct of business, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished. However, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, then he would not be liable to the punishment. The section also exempts Government Nominee Directors. Although the section speaks about a company, the explanation to the section extends the same position to a firm, any other body corporate or association of individuals.
    
In almost all cases of cheque-bouncing involving companies, firms, etc., the complainant files a case and implicates all the Directors of the company, including the Independent and Non-Executive Directors. Thus, professionals such as Chartered Accountants, lawyers, etc., who are only involved in broader policy and strategic decisions of the company, or with the Audit Committee or Shareholders’ Grievance Committee and are in no way connected with the day-to-day management of the company, are also made a party to the criminal proceedings.
    
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS
The Supreme Court has passed a landmark decision in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89. This decision is by a three-Member Larger Bench in response to a reference application made to it by a two-Member Bench of the Supreme Court. Three very important issues were placed before the Court for its consideration:
(a)  Whether while making a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act must the complaint specifically state that the persons accused were in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company?
(b) Whether merely because a person is a Director of a company would he be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary?
(c) Would the signatory of the cheque and / or the Managing Directors / Joint Managing Director always be responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and hence could be proceeded against?
    
The Court held that since the provision fastens criminal liability, the conditions have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the company, had a role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable. Persons who had nothing to do with the matter need not be roped in. A complaint must contain material to enable the Magistrate to make up his mind for issuing the process. A ground should be made out in the complaint for proceeding against the respondent. At the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the complaint, and where the allegations in the complaint or the chargesheet do not constitute an offence against a person, the complaint is liable to be dismissed.

The Supreme Court observed that there is nothing in the Act to suggest that simply by being a Director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on its behalf. It may happen that a Director may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company. He may only attend Board meetings, decide policy matters and guide the course of business of a company. The role of a Director in a company is a question of fact depending on the peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal rule that a Director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs.

A very fitting comment made by the Court was that ‘…there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it Director, Manager or Secretary.’ What is relevant is the roles assigned to the officers in a company and not the mere use of a particular designation of an officer. Thus, merely mentioning all Directors in a compliant without anything more may not be enough. The accused should be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and a person cannot be subjected to liability of criminal prosecution without it being averred in the complaint that he satisfies those requirements. It is not that all and sundry connected with a company are made liable u/s 141. A person who is in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company would naturally know why the cheque in question was issued and why it was dishonoured. Specific allegations in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case that is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.

When it came to the position of a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, the Court took a different view since these are persons in charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of its business. In respect of such persons, the onus is on them to prove their innocence, i.e., when the offence was committed they had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

The Supreme Court laid down another important principle, that the liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a company may also be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company at the relevant time. It once again reiterates that liability depends on the role he plays in the affairs of a company and not on the designation or status. If being a Director or Manager or Secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section would have said so. Instead of ‘every person’ the section would have said ‘every Director, Manager or Secretary in a Company is liable’ …etc. The Court held that the Legislature was aware that a case of criminal liability has serious consequences for the accused. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action. Thus, even a non-Director can be liable u/s 141.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court answered the queries posed to it as under:

(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint u/s 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of section 141 and has to be made in the complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) Merely being a Director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141. A Director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.
(c) The Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Holders of such positions in a company become liable u/s 141. Merely by virtue of being a Managing Director or Joint Managing Director these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, they get covered u/s 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the dishonour and will be covered u/s 141.

This very vital decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in cases such as S.K. Alagh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 (5) SCC 662; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. vs. Datar Switchgear Ltd., 2010 (10) SCC 479; GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust vs. India Infoline Limited, 2013 (4) SCC 505, etc.
    
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION
This issue was again examined recently by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya vs. M/s Gharrkul Industries Pvt. Ltd., Cr. A, No. 1206/2021, order dated 27th September, 2021. In this case, the respondent filed a complaint u/s 138 with specific averments in the complaint that all the Directors (including those who were not signatories to the bounced cheque) were involved in the day-to-day management / business affairs of the company whose cheque had bounced.

Accordingly, the trial court issued summonses against all the Directors. The Directors contended that they were only Non-Executive Directors and, hence, no complaint could lie against them. Against this argument, the respondent proved that the Form filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs showed the Directors as Executive Directors. Hence, the matter was a fit case for a trial which needed to be decided by the Court and the entire process needed to be gone through without quashing the summons at source.

The Court held that the settled principle was that for Directors who were not signatories / not MDs, it was clear that it was necessary to aver in the complaint filed u/s 138 that at the relevant time when the offence was committed the Directors were in charge and were actually responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

The Court further held that this averment assumed more importance because it was the basic and essential averment which persuaded the Magistrate to issue a process against the Director. If this basic averment was missing, the Magistrate was legally justified in not issuing a process. In the case on hand, the Court observed that the complainant had specifically averred that all the Directors were in charge. Further, the MCA Forms also demonstrated the same. Hence, this was an issue on which a trial is appropriate and the complaint cannot be quashed at source.

EPILOGUE
Although this is a judgment under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has several far-reaching consequences and its ratio descendi can be applied under various other statutes which affix a vicarious criminal liability on Directors in respect of offences committed by a company.
    
One can only hope that taking a cue from this epoch-making Supreme Court judgment, the Government would amend the Negotiable Instruments Act to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors. In fact, such an amendment is also welcome in other similar statutes prescribing a criminal liability on the Directors.

SAFE HARBOUR RULES – AN OVERVIEW (Part 1)

Over the years, Safe Harbour Rules in the context of Transfer Pricing have assumed significance. In this two-part article, we deal with Safe Harbour Rules under Transfer Pricing Regulations In Part 1 of this article, we focus on giving an overview of the Safe Harbour Rules, including background, objective and various other important aspects relating to them

1. BACKGROUND
Determination of Arm’s Length Price [ALP] is often time-consuming, burdensome and costly if an Associated Enterprise [AE] provides a range of intra-group services. It may impose a heavy administrative burden on taxpayers and tax administrations that can be intensified by both complex rules and resulting compliance requirements in respect of Transfer Pricing [TP]. Further, in recent times we have seen a substantial increase in litigation on transfer pricing issues, especially in developing countries like India. This has led to consideration of Safe Harbour(s) [SH] in the services sector like KPO services, Contract R&D services, ITES, certain low value-adding services, etc., along with the manufacture and export of core and non-core auto components (which is not a service) in the TP arena to provide certainty for the taxpayers and tax administrators. As per the amended Indian SH rules, low value-adding intra-group services have also been added in the eligible international transactions. SH rules have generally been applied to smaller taxpayers and / or less complex transactions. They are generally evaluated favourably by both tax administrations and taxpayers, which indicates that the benefits of SH outweigh the related concerns when such rules are carefully targeted and prescribed and when efforts are made to avoid the problems that could arise from poorly designed SH regimes.

A substantial number of cases in litigation on transfer pricing issues in India are in respect of selection of comparables while determining the ALP. An SH may significantly ease the compliance burden, reduce compliance costs for eligible taxpayers in determining and documenting appropriate conditions for qualifying controlled transactions and eliminating the need to undertake benchmarking exercises and selection of comparables which may be questioned by the tax authorities. It will also provide certainty to the taxpayers by ensuring that the price charged or paid on qualifying transactions will be accepted by the tax administrations with a limited audit or even without an audit, increase the level of compliance by small taxpayers and enable the tax authorities to use their resources to concentrate on TP review in which the tax revenue at stake is more significant.

2. OBJECTIVES OF SAFE HARBOUR
The importance of SH in TP has increased because of the following reasons:
a) Globalisation of markets and firms,
b) Development of powerful IT and efficient communication systems leading to increasing amounts of intercompany transactions,
c) Tax disputes on account of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,
d) Complex regulatory compliances,
e) Documentation requirements, complexity in application, deadlines, stringent penalties in case of non-compliance, burden of audit and various other factors to be taken care of by the taxpayer,
f) Resource constraints of tax authorities and assessment of risk by them in order to focus their limited resources on large and significant cases.

SH has been introduced with the objective of assisting the tax authorities as well as reducing the compliance burden on the taxpayers. It has also been designed to reduce the amount of litigations in cases where there is a difference of opinion between the tax authorities and the taxpayers and also to provide certainty.

3. SAFE HARBOURS AS PER OECD TP GUIDELINES
As per the OECD, SH are expected to be most appropriate when they are directed at taxpayers and / or transactions which involve low TP risks and when they are adopted on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as against unilateral SH which may have a negative impact on the tax revenues of the country implementing them, as well as on the tax revenues of the countries whose AEs engage in controlled transactions with taxpayers electing a SH. A bilateral or multilateral SH would involve multiple countries agreeing on a fixed set of SH, thereby enabling the taxpayer to select and implement the SH without undertaking a risk of transfer pricing adjustment in all such jurisdictions.

Some of the difficulties that arise in applying the ALP may be avoided by providing circumstances in which eligible taxpayers may elect to follow a simple set of prescribed TP rules in connection with clearly and carefully defined transactions, or may be exempted from the application of the general TP rules. In the former case, prices established under such rules would be automatically accepted by the tax administrations that have expressly adopted such rules. These elective provisions are often referred to as ‘safe harbours’.

4. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF SAFE HARBOUR
4.1 OECD TP Guidelines
As per OECD TP Guidelines 2017, an SH in a TP regime is a provision that applies to a defined category of taxpayers or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations which are otherwise imposed by a country’s general TP rules. An SH provides simpler obligations in place of those under the general TP regime. Often, eligible taxpayers complying with the SH provisions will be relieved from burdensome compliance obligations, including some or all associated TP documentation requirements.

Such a provision could, for example, allow taxpayers to establish transfer prices in a specific way, e.g., by applying a simplified TP approach provided by the tax administration. Alternatively, an SH could exempt a defined category of taxpayers or transactions from the application of all or part of the general TP rules.

4.2 UN TP Manual
The UN TP manual defines SH as follows:
‘A provision in the tax laws, regulations or guidelines stating that transactions falling within a certain range will be accepted by the tax authorities without further investigation.’

As per the UN TP Manual, a practical alternative for a tax authority is to provide taxpayers with the option of using an SH for certain low value-adding services, provided it results in an outcome that broadly complies with the ALP. The SH may be based on acceptable mark-up rates for services. Several countries provide an SH option for certain services.

4.3 Toolkit for addressing difficulties in accessing comparables data for Transfer Pricing analyses [Toolkit]
The Toolkit prepared in 2017 in the framework of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax under the responsibility of the Secretariats and staff of the four mandated organisations, namely, International Monetary Fund, OECD, United Nations and World Bank Group, explains SH as follows:

‘An SH in a TP regime is a simplification measure through a provision that applies to a defined category of taxpayers or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a country’s general TP rules. One of the merits of a well-framed SH is that it can reduce the need to find data on comparables and to perform a benchmarking study in every case.’

An SH may refer to two types of provisions:
‘Safe Harbour for TP’ – A mechanism to allow a tax administration to specify an appropriate TP method and an associated level or range of financial indicators that it considers to fulfil the requirements of the TP rules. Such an SH is applicable only in respect of a defined category of transactions.
‘TP Safe Harbour on process’ – The specification by a tax administration of a process that, when applied in respect of a defined category of transactions, is considered to produce a result that fulfils the requirements of the TP rules.

Both types of SH provide potential benefits to the tax administration and to taxpayers. In practice, SH may be appropriate in respect of a wide range of transactions, including:
* Manufacturing, especially in cases where the manufacturer does not have a right to valuable intangibles and does not assume significant risk. This is likely to include manufacturers that are in substance toll manufacturers or contract manufacturers;
* Sales and distribution entities, including sales agents, again in cases where the function does not exploit valuable intangibles or assume significant risk;
* Provision of services that do not involve the exploitation of valuable intangibles or the assumption of significant risk.

5. BENEFITS OF SAFE HARBOUR
5.1 Compliance relief
Application of the ALP may require collection and analysis of data that may be difficult or costly to obtain and / or evaluate. In certain cases, such compliance burdens may be disproportionate to the size of the taxpayer, its functions performed, and the TP risks inherent in its controlled transactions. A properly designed SH may significantly ease compliance burdens by eliminating data collection and associated documentation requirements in exchange for the taxpayer pricing qualifying transactions within the parameters set by the SH. Especially in areas where TP risks are small, and the burden of compliance and documentation is disproportionate to the TP exposure, such a trade-off may be mutually advantageous to both taxpayers and tax administrations.

5.2 Certainty
Another advantage of an SH is the certainty that the taxpayer’s transfer prices will be accepted by the tax administration, provided they have met the eligibility conditions of, and complied with, the SH provisions. The tax administration would accept, with limited or no scrutiny, transfer prices within the SH parameters. Taxpayers could be provided with relevant parameters which would provide a transfer price deemed appropriate by the tax administration for the qualifying transaction.

5.3 Administrative simplicity
An SH would result in a degree of administrative simplicity for the tax administration. Once eligibility for the SH has been established, qualifying taxpayers would require minimal examination with respect to the transfer prices of controlled transactions qualifying for the SH. This would enable tax administrations to secure tax revenues in low-risk situations with a limited commitment of administrative resources and to concentrate their efforts on the examination of more complex or higher risk transactions and taxpayers. An SH may also increase the level of compliance among small taxpayers that may otherwise believe their TP practices will escape scrutiny.

6. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
The availability of SH for a given category of taxpayers or transactions may have adverse consequences such as:
6.1 Divergence from the Arm’s Length Principle
Where an SH provides a simplified TP approach, it may not correspond in all cases with the Most Appropriate Method [MAM] applicable to the facts and circumstances of the taxpayer under the general TP provisions. SH involves a trade-off between strict compliance with the ALP and administrability. They are not customised to fit exactly the varying facts and circumstances of individual taxpayers and transactions. Any potential disadvantages to taxpayers diverging from ALP by electing SH are avoided when taxpayers have the option to either elect the SH or price transactions in accordance with the ALP. With such an approach, taxpayers that believe the SH would require them to report an amount of income that exceeds the ALP could apply the general TP rules. While such an approach can limit the divergence from ALP under an SH regime, it would also limit the administrative benefits of the SH to the tax administration.

The question of whether to opt for SH regime would actually depend on the scale of operations vis-à-vis the resultant tax impact.

Example
In the case of two assessees A & B who are engaged in the provision of Contract R&D relating to software development (where the SH Rules provide that the operating profit margin declared in relation to operating expense should not be less than 24%), the decision to opt for the SH regime may have to be considered based on the following:

Amount in crores

Sr. No.

Particulars

A

B

1.

Operating Revenue

Rs. 50

Rs. 190

2.

Operating Expense

Rs. 42

Rs. 160

3.

Operating Profit

Rs. 8

Rs. 30

4.

Operating Profit margin (3 ÷ 2)

19.05%

18.75%

5.

SH margin required

24%

24%

6.

Operating profit as per SH Rules (5 x 2)

10.08

38.40

7.

Assumed margin likely to be approved by the ITAT

22%

22%

8.

Operating profit as per assumed margin (7 x 2)

9.24

35.20

9.

Incremental cost for opting SH (6 – 8)

0.84

3.20

As we can observe from the above example, assessee A might consider opting for operating profit margin of 24% as provided in the SH Rules since the incremental cost which he might bear in India for opting for SH in exchange of having peace and certainty in a scenario where he could have got a resolution from the ITAT at, say, 22% of operating expenses, may not be quite large, being Rs. 0.84 crore approximately

However, for assessee B the situation may not warrant opting for the SH regime as the incremental costs based on the same assumptions as mentioned above could be quite significant over the years. It is, therefore, unlikely that the large captive payers would opt for such SH Rules.

Further, as the scale of operation increases and in cases where the data of comparable transactions is easily available, the determination of ALP would not be difficult, thus making the SH option less lucrative in such cases.

6.2 Risk of double taxation, double non-taxation and mutual agreement concerns
One major concern raised by an SH is that it may increase the risk of double taxation. If a tax administration sets SH parameters at levels either above or below ALP in order to increase reported profits in its country, it may induce taxpayers to modify the prices that they would otherwise have charged or paid to controlled parties in order to avoid TP scrutiny in the SH country. The concern of possible overstatement of taxable income in the country providing the SH is greater where that country imposes significant penalties for understatement of tax or failure to meet documentation requirements, with the result that there may be added incentives to ensure that the TP is accepted in that country without further review.

If the SH causes taxpayers to report income above arm’s length levels, it would work to the benefit of the tax administration providing the SH, as more taxable income would be reported by such domestic taxpayers. On the other hand, the SH may lead to less taxable income being reported in the tax jurisdiction of the foreign AE that is the other party to the transaction. The other tax administrations may then challenge prices derived from the application of an SH, with the result that the taxpayer would face the prospect of double taxation. Accordingly, any administrative benefits gained by the tax administration of the SH country would potentially be obtained at the expense of other countries, which in order to protect their own tax base would have to determine systematically whether the prices or results permitted under the SH are consistent with what would be obtained by the application of their own TP rules.

For example, let us consider Assessee A engaged in the provision of Contract R&D relating to software development to its AE in the US, where the SH provides that the operating profit margin declared in relation to operating expense should not be less than 24%. If the US considers 20% to be an appropriate ALP for payment by the US entity to Assessee A and if Assessee A opts for SH and offers a margin of 24%, such margin may not be accepted by the tax authorities in the US and may result in litigation there.

Where SH are adopted unilaterally, care should be taken in setting SH parameters to avoid double taxation, and the country adopting the SH should generally be prepared to consider modification of the SH outcome in individual cases under mutual agreement procedures to mitigate the risk of double taxation. Obviously, if an SH is not elective and if the country in question refuses to consider double tax relief, the risk of double taxation arising from the SH would be unacceptably high and inconsistent with the double tax relief provisions of treaties.

6.3 Possibility of opening avenues for tax planning
SH may also provide taxpayers with tax planning opportunities. Enterprises may have an incentive to modify their transfer prices in order to shift taxable income to other jurisdictions. This may also possibly induce tax avoidance, to the extent that artificial arrangements are entered into for the purpose of exploiting the SH provisions. For instance, if SH apply to ‘simple’ or ‘small’ transactions, taxpayers may be tempted to break transactions into parts to make them seem simple or small.

6.4 Equity and uniformity issues
SH may also raise equity and uniformity issues. By implementing an SH, one would create two distinct sets of rules in the TP area. Insufficiently precise criteria could result in similar taxpayers receiving different tax treatment: one being permitted to meet the SH rules and thus to be relieved from general TP compliance provisions, and the other being obliged to price its transactions in conformity with the general TP compliance provisions. Preferential tax treatment under SH regimes for a specific category of taxpayers could potentially entail discrimination and competitive distortions. The adoption of bilateral or multilateral SH could, in some circumstances, increase the potential of a divergence in tax treatment, not merely between different but similar taxpayers but also between similar transactions carried out by the same taxpayer with AEs in different jurisdictions.

7. EXAMPLES OF SAFE HARBOUR IN RESPECT OF INTRA-GROUP SERVICES
As per the UN TP Manual, two SH that may be used by tax authorities in respect of intra-group services are as follows:

(a) Low value services that are unconnected to an AE’s main business activity. This SH is usually available for low value-adding services. The rationale for an SH is that there may be difficulties in finding comparable transactions for low value-adding services and the administrative costs and compliance costs may be disproportionate to the tax at stake.
(b) Safe harbours for minor expenses (i.e., amounts below a defined threshold). These are for situations in which the costs of services provided or received are relatively low, so the tax authority may agree to not adjust the transfer prices provided they fall within the acceptable range. The rationale for this SH is that the cost of a tax authority making adjustments is not commensurate with the tax revenue at stake and therefore the taxpayer should not be expected to incur compliance costs to determine more precise ALP.

8. SAFE HARBOUR FOR LOW VALUE-ADDING SERVICES
Low value-adding services are services which are not part of an MNE group’s main business activities from which it derives its profits but are services that support the AE’s business operations. A determination of an AE’s low value-adding services would be based on a functional analysis of the enterprise which would provide evidence of the main business activities of an AE and the way in which it derives its profits.

Low value-adding intra-group services are services performed by one or more than one member of an MNE group on behalf of one or more other group members which:
a) Are of a supportive nature;
b) Are not part of the core business of the MNE group (i.e., not creating the profit-earning activities or contributing to economically significant activities of the MNE group);
c) Do not require the use of unique and valuable intangibles and do not lead to the creation of unique and valuable intangibles;
d) Do not involve the assumption or control of substantial or significant risk by the service provider and do not give rise to the creation of significant risk for the service provider.

Some common examples of low value-adding services for most MNE groups (i.e., provided they do not constitute the core business of the group) are human resources services, accounting services, clerical or administrative services, tax compliance services and data processing.

For an AE that is a distributor and marketer of an MNE’s products, marketing services would fail to qualify as administrative services as they are directly connected to the enterprise’s main business activity. Similarly, for an MNE whose core business is recruitment and human resources management, human resources services of a kind similar to those provided to independent customers would not qualify for the low value-adding SH despite the mention of human resources services in the section above.

9. MINOR EXPENSE SAFE HARBOUR
In the Minor Expense SH option, a tax authority agrees to refrain from making a TP adjustment if the total cost of either receiving or providing intra-group services by an AE is below a fixed threshold based on cost and a fixed profit mark-up margin is used.

The aim is to exclude from TP examinations services for which the charge is relatively minor. The rationale is that the costs of complying with the TP rules would outweigh any revenue at stake. It also considers the potential administrative savings for a tax authority by avoiding TP examinations of minor expenses. An important requirement is that the same fixed profit margin should be used for inbound and outbound intra-group services for a country. The SH provides taxpayers and tax authorities with certainty. The minor expense SH may contain the following requirements:
* A restriction on the relative value of the service expense (e.g., less than X per cent of total expenses of the AE receiving the services) or alternatively, a restriction on the absolute value of the service expense,
* A fixed profit margin,
* The requirement that the same profit margin is used in the other country,
* The documentation requirements that are expected.

An example of an SH for services is set out as follows.

For inbound intra-group services:
a) The total cost of the services provided is less than X per cent of the total deductions of the AEs in a jurisdiction for a tax year, or less than a defined absolute amount in the local currency;
b) The transfer price is a fixed profit mark-up on total costs of the services (direct and indirect expenses); and
c) Documentation is prepared to establish that the SH requirements have been satisfied.

For outbound intra-group services:
a) The cost of providing the services is not more than X per cent of the taxable income of the AE providing the services, or not more than a defined absolute amount in the local currency;
b) The transfer price charged is based on a fixed profit mark-up on the total costs of the services (direct and indirect expenses);
c) The same profit margin is used in the other country; and
d) Documentation is created to establish that these SH requirements have been satisfied.

At present there is no minor expense safe harbour rule prescribed as part of the SH regime in India.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF SAFE HARBOUR AS PER OECD TP GUIDELINES
TP compliance and administration is often complex, time-consuming and costly. Properly designed SH provisions, applied in appropriate circumstances, can help to relieve some of these burdens and provide taxpayers with greater certainty.

SH provisions may raise issues such as potentially having perverse effects on the pricing decisions of enterprises engaged in controlled transactions and a negative impact on the tax revenues of the country implementing the SH, as well as on the countries whose AEs engage in controlled transactions with taxpayers electing an SH. Further, unilateral SH may lead to the potential for double taxation or double non-taxation.

However, in cases involving smaller taxpayers or less complex transactions, the benefits of SH may outweigh the problems raised by such provisions. Making such SH elective to taxpayers can further limit the divergence from ALP. Where countries adopt SH, willingness to modify SH outcomes in mutual agreement proceedings to limit the potential risk of double taxation is advisable.

Where SH can be negotiated on a bilateral or multilateral basis, they may provide significant relief from compliance burdens and administrative complexity without creating problems of double taxation or double non-taxation. Therefore, the use of bilateral or multilateral SH under the right circumstances should be encouraged.

It should be clearly recognised that an SH, whether adopted on a unilateral or bilateral basis, is in no way binding on or precedential for countries which have not themselves adopted the SH.

For more complex and higher risk TP matters, it is unlikely that SH will provide a workable alternative to a rigorous, case-by-case application of the ALP under the provisions of these Guidelines.

11. RANGACHARY COMMITTEE – INDIAN SAFE HARBOUR COMMITTEE
The Prime Minister’s Office issued a press release on 30th July, 2012 announcing the constitution of a Committee to Review Taxation of Development Centres and the IT Sector under the Chairmanship of Mr. N. Rangachary, former Chairman, CBDT & IRDA (the Rangachary Committee), for seeking resolution of tax issues through an arm’s length exercise in the form of a review by the Committee including, inter alia, SH provisions announced but yet to be operationalised having the advantage of being a good risk mitigation measure and provide certainty to the taxpayer.

The Committee was mandated to engage in sector-wide consultations and finalise the SH provisions announced sector-by-sector. The Committee was also to suggest any necessary circulars that may need to be issued.

The Committee has submitted six reports including specific sector-wise / activity-wise reports for the following:
1) IT Sector,
2) ITES Sector,
3) Contract R&D in the IT and Pharmaceutical Sector,
4) Financial Transactions-Outbound Loans,
5) Financial Transactions-Corporate Guarantees,
6) Auto Ancillaries-Original Equipment Manufacturers.

12. OVERVIEW OF INDIAN SAFE HARBOUR
Businesses flourish only if there is certainty and SH provisions offer that certainty. These SH provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] specify that from the perspective of TP provisions, if the assessee fulfils certain defined conditions, the Tax Authorities shall accept the TP declared by the taxpayer.

SH Rules benefit assessees by allowing them to adopt a TP mark-up in the range prescribed, which would be acceptable to the Income Tax Department with benefits of compliance relief, administrative simplicity and certainty and hence would avoid protracted litigation.

After its enactment vide the Finance (No. 2) Act 2009, the first set of rules was notified on 18th September, 2013 – Rules 10TA to 10TG and Form 3CEFA (for international transactions), and Rules 10TH to 10THD and Form 3CEFB (for domestic transactions) for a period of three years, followed by a revision in 2017 in the SH Rules, which were made applicable till F.Y. 2018-19.

The CBDT vide Notification No. 25/2020 dated 20th May, 2020 extended the applicability of Rule 10TD(1) and (2A) (applicable for A.Y. 2017-18 to A.Y. 2019-20) for A.Y. 2020-21 also. Of the categories of the eligible international transactions, the category of software development, ITES and KPO appears to have been popularly opted for.

The CBDT has issued Notification No. 117/2021 dated 24th September, 2021 to extend the applicability of SH Rules under Rule 10TD of the Income-tax Rules to A.Y. 2021-22. The amended rule is deemed to come into force from 1st April, 2021.

Considering that the TP References in smaller cases has substantially reduced, it would have been good to revise these SH limits downward by around 2 per cent points to make it a more attractive option.

A comparison of the erstwhile and revised SH is given below:

Sr. No.

Eligible International
Transactions

Old SH Rules for

01-04-12 to 31-03-17

Revised SH Rules for

01-04-16 to 31-03-21

Threshold

Margin

Threshold

Margin

1

Provision of software development services and information
technology-enabled services

Up to Rs. 500 crores

Not less than 20% on total operating costs

Up to Rs. 100 crores

Not less than 17% on total operating costs

Above Rs. 500 crores

Not less than 22% on total operating costs

Above Rs. 100 crores up to
Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 18% on total operating costs

2

Provision of KPO services

NA

Not less than 25% on operating costs

Up to Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 24% and employee cost at least 60%

Not less than 21% and employee cost is 40%
or more but less than 60%

Not less than 18%, and employee cost up to 40%

3

Advancing of intra-group loans where loan is denominated in
Indian Rupees

Loan up to
Rs. 50 crores

Base rate of State Bank of India + 150 basis points

One year marginal cost of funds lending rate
of SBI as on 1st April of relevant previous year plus:

CRISIL rating between AAA to A or its equivalent

175 basis points

3

 

(continued)

 

CRISIL rating of BBB-, BBB, BBB+ or its equivalent

325 basis points

Loan above Rs. 50 crores

Base rate of State Bank of India + 300 basis points

CRISIL rating of BB to B or its equivalent

475 basis points

CRISIL rating between C & D or its equivalent

625 basis points

Credit rating is not available, and amount of loan does not exceed
Rs. 100 crores as on 31st March of relevant previous year

425 basis points

4

Advancing of intra-group loans where loan is denominated in
foreign currency

NA

NA

6 month LIBOR interest rate as on
30th September of relevant previous year plus:

CRISIL rating between AAA to A

150 basis points

CRISIL rating of BBB-, BBB, BBB+

300 basis points

CRISIL rating of BB to B

450 basis points

CRISIL rating between C & D

600 basis points

Credit rating is not available, and amount of loan does not
exceed equivalent of Rs. 100 crores as on 31st March of relevant previous
year

400 basis points

5

Providing corporate guarantee

Up to Rs. 100 crores

Not less than 2% p.a.

NA

Not less than 1% p.a. on the amount guaranteed

Above Rs. 100 crores

Not less than 1.75% p.a.

6

Provision of contract R&D services relating to software
development

NA

Not less than 30% on operating expense

Up to Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 24% on the operating expense

7

Provision of contract R&D services relating to generic
pharma drugs

NA

Not less than 29% on operating expense

Up to Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 24% on the operating expense

8

Manufacture and export of core auto components

NA

Not less than 12% on operating expense

NA

Not less than 12% on operating expense

9

Manufacture and export of non-core auto components

NA

Not less than 8.5% on operating expense

NA

Not less than 8.5% on operating expense

10

Receipt of low value-adding intra-group services (New)

NA

NA

Up to Rs. 10 crores including mark-up

– 5% mark-up; and

– Cost pooling method, exclusion of shareholders cost, duplicate
costs and reasonableness of allocation keys is certified by an accountant

A.Y. 2017-18 is the overlapping year for which the taxpayers had an option to exercise either of the two SH rules depending upon whichever was most beneficial to them.

The downward revision of SH margins in case of software development and ITES, Contract R&D and KPO in the revised SH Rules was long overdue and a welcome move. The revised margins are also closer to the margin range being concluded in the vast majority of APAs concluded in the IT-ITES space. As a result of the reduction in the margins, the expected savings of taxpayers due to avoidance of litigation is likely to outweigh the premium paid (if any) due to higher than arm’s length margins especially for small and medium taxpayers with lower cost bases.

This move also highlights the Indian Revenue’s intention to attract appropriate cases to the SH scheme and away from the APA scheme thereby covering the higher value and non-routine cases for the more complex cases that need a deeper understanding and negotiation by the Indian Revenue.

Another interesting feature of the revised SH rules is the gradation of the SH margin thresholds for the KPO sector based on the percentage of employee cost incurred rather than covering all the KPO activities under a single umbrella. The streamlining of margins prescribed for KPO on the basis of employee cost ratio may not be the best course of action but it does seek to align with the premise that a technically skilled workforce would lead to a higher employee cost and signify a higher value addition commanding a higher operating margin. The employee cost has been defined comprehensively.

The definitions of ITES and KPO are very broad and general and the revised SH rules did not modify / clarify them. Keeping in view the litigations that have occurred, detailed definitions would have been welcome as they would have set a clearer line of distinction between KPO and ITES. The applicability of SH for transactions of software development and ITES, contract R&D and KPO has been reduced to Rs. 200 crores. Hence, after F.Y. 2016-17, taxpayers having transaction values greater than Rs. 200 crores cannot opt for SH but can only opt for APAs to attain certainty.

13. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Complying with the ALP can be burdensome. Even good faith efforts to ensure compliance result in uncertainty because the Tax Authorities may analyse the transaction in a different way and come to a different conclusion. Though it is important for the Government to be diligent, and the enterprises to be honest, easing out more on compliance procedures would enable enterprises to focus more on their core activities and in turn generate more business and profits, thereby keeping the wheel of taxation turning and intact.

A fair and transparent SH regime goes a long way in plugging tax leakage and leads to significant tax certainty. Country tax administrations should carefully weigh the benefits of and concerns regarding safe harbours, making use of such provisions where they deem it appropriate.

In Part 2 of this Article, we will deal with the remaining aspects of Indian SH Rules and jurisprudence.

Reopening of assessment – Precondition to be satisfied – Reasons recorded cannot be substituted

Peninsula Land Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-1(3), Mumbai & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 2827 of 2021; Date of order: 25th October, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening of assessment – Precondition to be satisfied – Reasons recorded cannot be substituted

The petitioner challenged the notice u/s 148 dated 30th March, 2019 and the order dated 5th September, 2019 on the ground that the reasons recorded in support of the impugned notice do not indicate the manner in which the A.O. has come to the conclusion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the hands of the petitioner. It has also alleged that in the reasons for reopening, there is not even a whisper as to what was the tangible material in the hands of the A.O. which made him believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and in the notice issued four years after the assessment order, what was the material fact that was not fully and truly disclosed.

The Court observed that the law on this is well settled. To confer jurisdiction u/s 147(a), two conditions were required to be satisfied, firstly, the A.O. must have reasons to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax had escaped assessment, and secondly, he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of either omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment of that year. Both these conditions had to be satisfied before the A.O. could assume jurisdiction for issue of notice u/s 148 read with section 147(a). But under the substituted section 147 the existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words, if the A.O. has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, it is enough to confer jurisdiction upon him to reopen the assessment.

Also, the reasons for reopening of assessment tested / examined have to be stated only on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment. These reasons cannot be improved upon and / or supplemented, much less substituted by affidavit and / or oral submissions. Moreover, the reasons for reopening an assessment should be that of the A.O. alone who is issuing the notice and he cannot act merely on the dictates of any another person in issuing the notice. Moreover, the tangible material upon the basis of which the A.O. comes to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment can come to him from any source; however, the reasons for the reopening have to be only of the A.O. issuing the notice.

It is also settled law that the A.O. has no power to review an assessment which has been concluded. If a period of four years has lapsed from the end of the relevant year, the A.O. has to mention what was the tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment and that there has been a failure to fully and truly disclose material facts. After a period of four years even if the A.O. has some tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment, he cannot exercise the power to reopen unless he discloses what was the material fact which was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee.

In the reasons for issuance of notice in this case it is recorded that the return of income for the assessment year under consideration was filed on 28th September 2012, further revised return of income was filed on 28th March, 2014 and on 9th May 2015 the return of income was processed u/s 143(1) and the assessment order u/s 143(3) read with section 153A was passed by the A.O. on 30th December, 2016. The entire basis for issuance of the notice is that information was received from the Deputy Director of Income Tax, Mumbai that a search and survey action u/s 132 was carried out in the case M/s Evergreen Enterprises and based on the statement recorded of the partner of M/s Evergreen Enterprises and documentary evidences found in the search of its premises, it unearthed an undisclosed activity of money-lending and borrowing in unaccounted cash being operated at the premises of M/s Evergreen Enterprises. It is also recorded in the reasons that based on the statements recorded of the partners of M/s Evergreen Enterprises and its employees, it came to light that one of the individuals / business concerns has lent cash of Rs. 30,00,000. It is alleged that the petitioner has lent cash loan of Rs. 30,00,000 in F.Y. 2011-12 and therefore the petitioner has been indulging in lending of cash loan and hence the amount of Rs. 30,00,000 has escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147.

The Court observed that there is absolutely no mention as to how either the partners of M/s Evergreen Enterprises or its employees or one Mr. Bharat Sanghavi are connected to the petitioner. The affidavit in reply of the respondent stated that Bharat Sanghavi was an employee of the  petitioner and, therefore, the reasons have been correctly recorded and the A.O. has reason to believe that income had escaped assessment.

As noted earlier, the reasons for reopening of assessment have to be tested / examined only on the basis of the reasons recorded and those reasons cannot be improved upon and / or much less substituted by an affidavit and / or oral submission. In the reasons for the reopening, the A.O. does not state anywhere that Bharat Sanghavi was an employee of the petitioner. Further, in the reasons for reopening, the A.O. does not even disclose when the search and survey action u/s 132 was carried out in the case of M/s Evergreen Enterprises, whether it was before the assessment order dated 30th December, 2016 in the case of the petitioner was passed or afterwards. The reasons for reopening are absolutely silent as to how the search and survey action on M/s Evergreen Enterprises or the statement referred to or relied upon in the reasons have any connection with the petitioner.

In the circumstances, the Court held that the impugned notice dated 30th March, 2019 and the impugned order dated 5th September, 2019 had been issued without jurisdiction and hence were quashed and set aside.

 

Reopening notice u/s 148 – Notice issued to non-existing entity – Notice could not be corrected u/s 292B

5 Implenia Services and Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy / Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax [Writ Petition (L) No. 14088 of 2021; Date of order: 25th October, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening notice u/s 148 – Notice issued to non-existing entity – Notice could not be corrected u/s 292B

The impugned notice dated 27th March, 2021 has been issued to a non-existing entity. In the affidavit in reply, it is admitted that the notice has been issued to a non-existing entity but the respondents state that it ought to be treated as a mistake and the name in the notice could be corrected u/s 292B.

The respondents relied upon a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Skylight Hospitality LLP vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-28(1), New Delhi (2018) 405 ITR 296 (Delhi) which has been subsequently affirmed on 6th April, 2018 by a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court.

The Court observed that this cannot be a general proposition as the Apex Court has expressly stated in Skylight Hospitality LLP (Supra) that ‘in the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that the wrong name given in the notice was merely a clerical error which could be corrected under section 292B of the IT Act (emphasis supplied)’.

The Apex Court in its recent judgment on this subject in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (2019) 416 ITR 613 (SC) has considered the judgment of Skylight Hospitality and said that it has expressly mentioned that in the peculiar facts of that case the wrong name given in the notice was merely a clerical error. In Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (Supra) the Court has also observed that what weighed in the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition was the peculiar facts of that case. It has reiterated the settled position that the basis on which jurisdiction is invoked is u/s 148 and when such jurisdiction was invoked on the basis of something which was fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon the approved scheme of amalgamation, the notice is bad in law.

The High Court noted that the Apex Court in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (Supra) had observed that the basis on which jurisdiction was invoked was fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon the approved Scheme of amalgamation. Participation in the proceedings by the appellant in the circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel against law. The stand now taken in the affidavit in reply is nothing but an afterthought by the respondent after having committed a fundamental error. Therefore, the stand of the respondent that it was an error which could be corrected u/s 292B was not acceptable to this Court.

The Court followed the decision in the case of Alok Knit Exports Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax in its order dated 10th August, 2021 in WP No. 2742 of 2019.

In the circumstances, notice dated 27th March, 2021 issued u/s 148 was quashed and set aside.

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Income-tax survey – Assessment based on documents seized during survey at assessee’s premises – No incriminating material found against assessee during search of third parties – Absence of satisfactory note by A.O. that any seized document belonged to assessee – Search warrant not issued against assessee – Assessment and consequent demand notice were unsustainable

24 Sri Sai Cashews vs. CCIT [2021] 438 ITR 407 (Ori) A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 23rd August, 2021 Ss. 132, 133A, 153C and 156 of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Income-tax survey – Assessment based on documents seized during survey at assessee’s premises – No incriminating material found against assessee during search of third parties – Absence of satisfactory note by A.O. that any seized document belonged to assessee – Search warrant not issued against assessee – Assessment and consequent demand notice were unsustainable

The assessee processed cashewnuts into cashew kernel. A survey operation was conducted u/s 133A against it. The A.O. invoked the jurisdiction u/s 153C for making a block assessment for the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2016-17 as a result of searches which were conducted in the premises of two persons JR and JS u/s 132. He passed an order u/s 143(3) read with section 153C for the A.Y. 2016-17 and issued a notice of demand u/s 156.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order. The Orissa High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) In the absence of incriminating materials against the assessee having been found in the course of the search of the searched persons JR and JS, the order passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153C and the consequential demand notice issued u/s 156 were unsustainable and, therefore, set aside.

ii) The documents relied upon by the A.O. were found in the course of survey of the assessee u/s 133A and not during the search of the parties against whom the search authorisation was issued u/s 132 and search was conducted. The Department had not been able to dispute any of the factual averments. No incriminating materials concerning the assessee were found in the premises of the two persons against whom search was conducted and the absence of satisfaction note of the A.O. of the persons against whom search was conducted about any such incriminating material against the assessee, were not denied. The order only related to disallowance of expenditure u/s 140A(3) that was payable to the cultivators, expenses towards hamali, i.e., labour charges, unexplained money u/s 69A, negative cash and unaccounted stock which was not on account of the discovery of any incriminating materials found in the course of the search concerning the assessee and there was no search warrant u/s 132 against the assessee.’

LOST IN CREDIT LOSS!

Indirect tax legislations across the globe introduce input credits to eliminate tax cascading in the downstream value chain of goods / services. An idealistic VAT system envisages tax as a ‘pass-through’ so that the tax itself would not be a component of product / service pricing. Yet this idealistic VAT system has been tampered with, time and again, and one is forced to ponder over the robustness of the VAT system. Inefficiencies have crept into this system through the introduction of credit blocks in respect of motor vehicles, construction activity, etc. One such inefficiency is the reversal of input tax credit (ITC) in respect of goods lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples [section 17(5)(h)]. None of these terms has been defined under the Act and one would have to examine the general and contextual meaning of these terms. This article seeks to articulate the plausible meanings intended by the Legislature and their impact in determining the credit eligibility. The relevant clause(s) under examination has / have been extracted below:

‘16(1). Every registered person shall, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and in the manner specified in section 49, be entitled to take credit of input tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both to him which are used or intended to be used in the course of furtherance of his business and the said amount shall be credited to the electronic credit ledger of such person…..
17(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 16 and sub-section (1) of section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely: -….
(h) goods lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples, and; ….’

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF IMPORTANT TERMS
The key terms under consideration in section 17(5)(h) and their respective meanings from the Law Lexicon (5th Edition) are given below:
Lost – A thing is said to be lost when it cannot be found or when ordinary vigilance will not regain it.
Stolen – ‘To steal’ means to take by theft and ‘Intent to steal’ refers to permanently deprive and defraud another of the use and benefit of property and permanently to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person other than the true owner.
Destroyed – ‘Destroyed’ occurring in section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act has a wider connotation than mere physical destruction. It would also cover loss arising on the theft of a vehicle. The term ‘destroyed’ in section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act would not cover items partly destroyed in fire and which have been retained by the assessee. In another context, the term destroyed means to ‘demolish’, i.e., to render a thing useless for the purpose for which it was intended.
Written off – ‘Write down’ means to reduce the book value of. ‘Write off’ means to carry or remove. ‘Write-off’ also means to delete an asset from the accounts because it has been depreciated (or been written-down) so far that it no longer has any book value. It can also mean to charge the whole of the value of an asset to expenses or loss (i.e., assign it zero value on the balance sheet).
Disposed of by way of gift or free sample – Dispose means to transfer to the control or ownership of another; or transfer or alienate. ‘Gift’ means to transfer by one person to another of any existing movable property voluntarily and without consideration in money or money’s worth. ‘Sample’, both in its legal and popular acceptance,  means that which is taken out of a large quantity and is a fair representation of the ‘whole’, a part shown as a specimen. The transfer ought to be by way of gift or free sample. The entire phrase can be interpreted as ‘to transfer the control or ownership over goods either by way of love / affection or by taking out a small quantity from a larger group and such transfer being without consideration’.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The phrase ‘lost’ can be understood in the sense that the taxpayer has lost possession over the goods on account of any external incident. It represents a total annihilation of the goods and does not appear to be encompassing situations where the goods are present but there is a loss (economic and / or physical loss) which is partial in nature. This expression should be understood in contradistinction to the phrase ‘loss’ which would be wider and include partial loss of goods concerned. Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Dluge vs. Robinson1, while considering an issue relating to ‘negotiable instruments destroyed, stolen or otherwise lost’, referred to the definition of the term ‘lost’ in the Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edition) which reads as follows:

‘An article is “lost” when the owner has lost the possession or custody of it, involuntarily and by any means, but more particularly by accident or his own negligence or forgetfulness, and when he is ignorant of its whereabouts or cannot recover it by an ordinarily diligent search.’

In Sialkot Industrial Corporation vs. UOI2 the phrase ‘lost or destroyed’ was examined and it means a complete deprivation of the property involved. This decision is important as it highlights the commonality in the phrases lost, destroyed, disposition as that in which there is loss of possession over the goods:

‘10. According to the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the word “Loss” means, the act or fact of losing, failure to keep possession, deprivation, theft of property. In the same dictionary, the word “lost” is defined as meaning “not made use of, ruined or destroyed physically or morally, parted with, no longer possessed, taken away or beyond reach of attainment”. According to the Law Lexicon, Vol. 2 page 44, the word “loss” has no precise hard and fast meaning. It is a generic and comprehensive term covering different situations. Loss results when a thing is destroyed. But it is also caused when the owner has been made to part with it although the thing remains intact. In this sense, loss means and implies “a deprivation”. It is synonymous with damage resulting either in consequence of destruction, deprivation or even depreciation and when a party is dispossessed of a thing, either when it can never be recovered or when it is withheld from him, he is deemed to suffer the loss.’

The said decision was distinguished in BEML vs. CC Madras3 in the context of the Customs Act which had distinct provisions for goods lost or destroyed and those that are pilfered. In that context the Court held that goods stolen cannot be included in the phrase lost or destroyed. But this distinction does not alter the interpretation in section 17(5)(h) since they are subject to similar implications under the GST law.

In CIT vs. Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. [1978] 112 ITR 776 (SC) the word ‘destroy’ came up for consideration – Destroyed is a word in common usage, with well-defined non-technical meaning. As used in law, it does not in all cases necessarily mean complete annihilation or total destruction. But in the context and under particular circumstances the word many times has been defined as meaning totally obliterated and done away with as also made completely useless for the purpose intended – vide Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 26, page 1246.

‘We are not concerned in this case with a situation where two independent machineries which are separable have to work combined for the purpose of business. We, therefore, need not answer as to what would happen in such a case. We are concerned in this case with the part of the machinery which admittedly was inseparable and had no independent existence as machinery. The context in which the words “sold”, “discarded”, “demolished” or “destroyed” are used and for the purpose for which they are used, to our mind, clearly suggest that it is to the whole machinery that they apply and not to any part of the machinery.’

OTHER LEGAL PROVISIONS
One may recollect the contextual use of the phrase lost and / or destroyed under the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The provision read as follows:

‘21. Remission of duty – (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be that goods have been lost or destroyed by natural causes or by unavoidable accident or are claimed by the manufacturer as unfit for consumption or for marketing, at any time before removal, he may remit the duty payable on such goods, subject to such conditions as may be imposed by him by order in writing:’

Similar expressions were used in sections 22 and 23 of the Customs Act in the context of remission of Customs duty prior to clearance of goods for home consumption. The extract reads as follows:

‘SECTION 22. Abatement of duty on damaged or deteriorated goods. – (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs –
(a) that any imported goods had been damaged or had deteriorated at any time before or during the unloading of the goods in India; or
…..
(c) that any warehoused goods had been damaged at any time before clearance for home consumption on account of any accident not due to any wilful act, negligence or default of the owner, his employee or agent,
SECTION 23. Remission of duty on lost, destroyed or abandoned goods. – (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 13, where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs that any imported goods have been lost (otherwise than as a result of pilferage) or destroyed, at any time before clearance for home consumption, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall remit the duty on such goods.’

The specific use of the phrases ‘damage’ / ‘deterioration’ in company with ‘destroyed’ conveys that the Legislature has in the past assigned a distinct connotation to these phrases and the degree of damage or the condition of damage plays an important role in ascertaining whether there is destruction. It appears that only complete damage rendering the goods unusable would be considered as destruction and not otherwise.

RULE OF ‘NOSCITOR A SOCII’
While understanding the above phrase individually, the Noscitor rule of construction ought to be applied. According to the rule, where two or more words which are susceptible to analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. On application of this rule, it would be impermissible to extract a phrase and give it a meaning which is at divergence or wider in amplitude than the other phrases. They are to take colour from each other.

In the present context, the phrases ‘lost’, ‘stolen’, ‘destroyed’, ‘written off’ or ‘disposed of’ appear to have a common thread. The phrase lost and stolen is undoubtedly to be understood as a situation where the owner is deprived of the goods in its entirety. On the other end, the phrases ‘disposed of by gift or free sample’ also represents transfer of goods in its entirety to another person. Accordingly, the intermittent phrases ought to also be understood in the same sense. The phrases ‘destroyed’ and ‘written off’ should also be interpreted in the same sense. Destroyed ought to imply such destruction which completely extinguishes the goods. Partial damage or spoilage of goods which continue to have a physical existence and can be recovered or used partially should not be construed as destroyed. Moreover, write-off of goods represents a permanent write-off of goods which are not having any use to the business enterprise. Partial write-off due to technological obsolescence, etc., cannot be intended to have been included in the said enumeration.

Moreover, these are instances which are unforeseen or non-recurring in nature. If the business practice recognises foreseeable losses (such as evaporation, seasonal damage, etc.), such events may not fall within the strict construction of section 17(5)(h). Losses which arise out of business necessity, conscious efforts, budgeted / identified events, factored into product costs, etc., ought not to be considered as an unforeseen loss. Though there may be involvement of incidents of destruction of the goods, such destruction (being recognised and forecast) would not contextually adhere to the intent of the entire phrase. While one may contend that the phrases ‘disposed of by gift or free sample’ is a voluntary act, the fabric of the phrase evidently necessitates that the events have an unforeseen character inherent in them.

In Symphony Services Corp. India Pvt Ltd. vs. CC Bangalore4 the Court examined a situation where the goods have become entirely useless due to seepage of water, thereby concluding that they were destroyed goods, rejecting the contention of the Department that the said goods were ‘damaged goods’ and not ‘destroyed goods’. This decision is important for the proposition that only complete damage would fall within the expression destruction of goods and the physical condition of the same should be such that it renders them utterly unusable. It is only when such an interpretation is adopted that section 17(5)(h), in its entirety, would one be able to adhere to the Noscitor rule and ensure a consistent understanding of the phrase.

‘In respect of’
Before we move further, it is also important to study the phrase ‘in respect of’ standing at the preamble of section 17(5)(h). One understanding of this phrase is that it has a wide connotation and the Legislature intends to use this phrase in an expansive sense. The popular decision cited in this context is the case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679 where the Courts examined the scope of the arbitration clause in an agreement and held as follows:

‘(2) Expressions such as “arising out of” or “in respect of” or “in connection with” or “in relation to” or “in consequence of” or “concerning” or “relating to” the contract are of the widest amplitude and content and include even questions as to the existence, validity and effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement.’

The said interpretation was followed in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the context of section 8 of the IBC (Macquarie Bank Limited vs. Shilpi Cable Technologies Limited5) which stated that the phrase ‘in relation to’ is of wide import and consequently interpreted in an expansive sense. In Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (1988) 2 SCC 299, the Court was examining the expression ‘in relation to’ (so also ‘pertaining to’) and held that these expressions are intended to include matters of both direct and indirect significance depending on the context. The Court also stated that the expression ‘relate’ is to be understood as bringing into association or connection with and the said expression is synonymous with ‘concerning to’ and ‘pertaining to’. These are expressions of expansion and not of contraction. Similar views were echoed in other decisions in the context of Central Excise laws6. The above conclusions convey that section 17(5) should be read in its expansive sense with complete play being given to the scope of blocked credits. Accordingly, while interpreting the provisions in respect of goods which are lost, destroyed, etc., they must be applied in an expansive sense rather than a narrow sense.

But a more proximate context was considered in State of Madras vs. Swastik Tobacco Factory7 where the Court was examining the phrase ‘in respect of’ used while granting deduction of excise duty paid in respect of goods sold. While the Revenue argued that ‘in respect of’ here is synonymous with ‘on’ and narrows down the scope of the phrase to only those goods ‘on’ which excise duty was paid, the assessee argued the phrase was wide enough to cover even cases where excise duty paid on raw materials can be attributed to the finished goods. The Court rejected the argument of the assessee and held ‘in respect of’ in the context can only mean goods on which excise duty was paid and not on raw materials which are attributable to the final product. This decision narrowed down the ambit of the phrase and limited the scope of a ‘deduction provision’ to only cases having a direct significance with the subsequent events. Accordingly, the provisions of section 17(5) [more specifically clause (h)] should mandate that the ITC is denied only in respect of those goods which are lost, stolen, destroyed, etc., and not extend itself to goods contained in the finished goods after being put to use.

IDENTITY TEST OF GOODS
The above analysis takes us to the important juncture of whether there has to be a matching of the identity of goods on which credit is taken and the goods on which credit is being denied. In other words, whether a manufactured tyre which is lost, destroyed, stolen can be subjected to reversal ‘in respect of’ the ITC availed on the rubber used as raw material for manufacture of the tyre.

We should reflect back to the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which contained certain provisions on reversal of ITC on removal, loss, destruction, etc.

Rule

Situation

Reversal

Inference

3(5)

Inputs or capital goods removed as such

Complete

Prior to usage

3(5A)

Capital goods removed after use

Depreciated

Subsequent to usage

3(5B)

Input or capital goods wholly or partially
written off

Complete

Non-usage

3(5C)

Inputs on which excise duty remitted (lost
or destroyed)

Input contained in finished goods

Used and contained in a finished product on
which duty was not collected

The said rules captured the cases where the inputs were not put to the intended use of manufacture of goods. In rule 3(5), removal ‘as such’ was interpreted to apply only to cases where the goods were removed without putting them to any use. There have been multiple decisions on the specific point8 that ‘as such’ implies goods in their original condition without having been put to use. Courts have opined that alteration of the form, usage of goods into production process for a reasonably long period would not amount to removal of goods ‘as such’. This leads to the introduction of Rule 3(5A) which addresses the removal of capital goods after usage on a depreciated value. Such an interpretation appeared to be in harmony with the underlying basis for credit, i.e., use or intended for use. Importantly, the law refrained from introducing any reversal on removal of inputs contained in finished goods after the usage of such inputs. Rule 3(5B) was also introduced to address cases where goods, even though in non-usable condition, were retained in the premises and hence did not trigger removal of goods. The said rule therefore mandated reversal of credit where the write-off in the books of accounts was undertaken as a consequence of non-usage of goods. The proviso in the said rule entitled re-credit of this reversed amount the moment the same were again put back to use by the manufacturer.

Rule 3(5C) was introduced to address cases where goods were used and contained in the finished goods which were either lost or destroyed and the excise duty on the same was remitted under the Central Excise Rules. The crucial point worth noting is that these Rules distinctly provided for cases where goods on which credit was taken were ‘contained’ in the manufactured product. Until this Clause was inserted, courts have taken the view that CENVAT rules did not provide for reversal of goods used in the manufacturing process which were ultimately lost or destroyed and duty was remitted in terms of Rule 219. Even subsequent to the introduction of this Clause, Courts have held that the reversal of credit is not automatic and one has to establish remission of excise duty on such goods for reversal under 3(5C) to be triggered10.

The above interpretation rules out many cases of goods which are lost or destroyed or removed after use in production process. Even in cases where the identity of goods is altered / processed into finished products, the mere fact of inputs being contained in such lost / destroyed finished goods does not warrant a reversal unless there are specific provisions to perform the same. In summary, the identity test definitely played an important role in reversal of CENVAT credit.

In the context of GST law, the conclusion ought to remain constituted in view of legacy understanding of credit provisions and the literal wordings of section 17(5)(h). The preliminary conclusion derived on application of the Noscitor rule is further fortified when one reflects upon the background of legacy provisions.

Therefore, the wide interpretation of ‘in respect of’ may not be palatable to taxpayers and there may be an inclination to highlight the context in which this phrase is to be interpreted. They would claim that the expansive nature of section 16(1) should not be defeated by a wider interpretation of section 17(5). Goods lost, destroyed, etc., should be understood as an exception to the positive intent to allow tax credits in case of business use. Where business use has been met and the taxpayer is able to establish the necessity for use of the product in a particular manner (generally framed as commercial expediency), Revenue ought not to question the business acumen behind the use of such goods. And this is where Courts will have to also take cognizance of the ‘commercial expediency test’ while interpreting the said phrase.

The most profound appreciation of this test was stated in an Income-tax matter in S.A. Builders case11 which was examining a matter of allowability of interest for the purpose of business. The Court stated (in para 23-25 and 31) that expenses incurred out of business expediency do not limit themselves to earning profits or one’s own business. It would also include matters undertaken out of a business necessity or prudence even though it does not appear to render an immediate or a visible benefit to the said business. Most importantly, the A.O. cannot sit in judgement over the commercial expediency of a business decision [Hero Cycles (P) Limited vs. CIT12]. The said test was also expounded in J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer in the context of Cenvat / Modvat Credits under the erstwhile laws. The Supreme Court stated that credit ought to be extended to equipment in manufacture of goods if it aids any particular process and the said process is so integrally connected with the manufacturing that its absence would render the same commercially inexpedient.

The applicability of the above analysis under GST is visible with the decision of ARS Steel & Alloy International (P) Ltd. where the Madras High Court while addressing the Revenue’s contention that finished goods contained a substantially lower quantity of inputs in comparison with the raw material consumed, stated that loss of inputs which is inherent to the manufacturing process cannot be denied u/s 17(5)(h). The Court relied on the decision in Rupa & Co. Ltd. vs. CESTAT13 and observed that the phrase ‘Inputs of such finished product’ and ‘contained in finished products’ are distinct phrases and they cannot be viewed theoretically as mere semantics. It must be viewed in the context of the manufacturing process which necessarily entails loss of goods at various stages and such loss cannot be equated to loss of the inputs as such. Therefore, the legacy principle that the identity of the goods and the identity of the credit in respect of the goods for which reversal is being sought on the eventuality of being ‘lost’, ‘destroyed’, etc., u/s 17(5)(h) should be mapped and only on such identification would the reversal be permissible under law.

APPLICATION
The above analysis can now be applied to a set of cases where there has been a constant tug-of-war between the taxpayer and his Officer. The Table below has been divided into distinct instances based on events:

Stage

Event

Analysis for 17(5)(h)

Reasoning

Pre-receipt stage

In-transit normal loss – Foreseeable

Threshold conditions u/s 16(2) need to be satisfied and only
then 17(5) to be applied

Section 16(2) mandates receipt of goods but unavoidable
evaporation loss in transit may not disentitle credit. Receipt here is being
applied as ‘legal receipt’ and not merely physical receipt. Once legal
receipt is satisfied then 17(5)(h) test may not bar credit on normal loss

In-transit abnormal loss (pilferage)

Same as above

Section 16(2) may not place a bar on legal receipt, but
pilferage would be covered by section 17(5)(h) and hence inadmissible

Weighment

Short receipt recorded due to weighing scale calibration
differences

This is more a recognisable financial loss on account of
technical reasons and not in the sense understood by section 17(5)(h) which
are unforeseeable in nature

RM – store / shop floor

Spillages, residues, etc., due to handling

Quantitative loss but not complete loss

Generally attributable to mishandling or loss within tolerable
limits. May not be

(continued)

 

 

 

(continued)

 

‘lost or destroyed’ if an accepted business practice

Natural causes

Arising on account of floods, fire, etc.

Could fall within the scope based on degree – if goods can be
revived even partially may not fall within the phrase

Spoilage / Damage

Weather, season, handling, etc.

May not fall within the scope of destroyed or lost if goods in
usable condition partially

Pilferage

Stolen

Not eligible for credit

In-process

Normal loss – manufacturing activity

Business expediency

Eligible not covered in exigencies of 17(5)

Spillages, etc., physical handling

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible to the extent of foreseeable or budgeted losses (normal
loss)

In-process damage

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible to the extent of foreseeable or budgeted losses (normal
loss)

Qualitative Testing (QC)

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible on account of business expediency

FG/
Captive consumption

Pilferage

Stolen

In view of the phrase ‘in respect of’, the ingredients of the
finished goods may be susceptible to reversal though difference of opinion
would arise

Normal loss

Inherent
nature of product

Eligible based on it being a foreseeable loss

Physical handling damage

Lost
or destroyed

May be considered as ‘lost’ where unforeseeable and complete
loss of goods

CONCLUSION
This is a topic where the Courts may have to draw a balance between the purported widespread application of section 17(5) and the business wisdom of taxpayers to treat their purchases in a particular manner while doing business. In the context of clause (h), one should be cognizant of the fact that the Government’s stake is limited to the tax component on such goods, whereas the taxpayer himself is committed to the base value of goods involved and if the taxpayer has made a decision to treat the goods in a particular way and recover their costs from the value chain, that decision ought to be respected by the Government while granting tax credits. Moreover, in mathematical terms where the taxpayer has factored in and loaded such losses onto the product pricing and the enhanced sale price, the loss is factored therein and tax revenue attributable to such loss has been passed on as a value addition down the value chain. Ultimately, in the legal sense the maxim ‘Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio’ is apt here – the best interpretation is made from the context!

Search and seizure – Assessment in search cases – Validity – Assessment completed on date of search – No incriminating material found during search – Invocation of section 153A not valid – Assessment order and consequent demand notice set aside

23 Smt. Jami Nirmala vs. Principal CIT [2021] 437 ITR 573 (Ori) A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order:10th August, 2021 Ss. 132, 153A and 156 of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure – Assessment in search cases – Validity – Assessment completed on date of search – No incriminating material found during search – Invocation of section 153A not valid – Assessment order and consequent demand notice set aside

A search and seizure operation was conducted u/s 132 at the assessee’s residential premises and on a locker jointly held with another person. According to the panchanama prepared for the search and seizure, nothing was found or seized. A notice was issued to the assessee u/s 153A. The assessee requested the A.O. to treat the original return of income as the return filed in response to such notice. Thereafter, notices u/s 143(2) and 142(1) were issued. Although nothing was found during the course of the search, the order passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153A referred to the cash book found during the survey conducted two weeks prior to the date of search, and stated that during the course of the search operation it was found that the assessee company had made expenditure during the year which was paid in the mode of cash of beyond the prescribed limit of Rs. 20,000 or above in a single day to a single party. The A.O. also disallowed the payments made to the cultivators and hamalis and accordingly raised a demand u/s 156 along with interest.

The Orissa High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the order and held as under:

‘i) The assessment u/s 153A pursuant to a search u/s 132 has to be on the basis of incriminating material gathered or unearthed during the course of the search.

ii) The order passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153A was without jurisdiction. The order did not refer to any document unearthed during the course of the search conducted u/s 132. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction u/s 153A for assessment of the A.Y. 2015-16 was without legal basis. The panchanama of the search proceedings unambiguously showed that nothing incriminating was recovered in the course of the search. The assessment order and the consequential demand notice u/s 156 are set aside.’

Interest on excess refund – Law applicable – Effect of amendment of section 234D by F.A. 2012 – Section 234D applies to regular assessment – Meaning of regular assessment – Regular assessment refers to first order of assessment u/s 143, u/s 147 or u/s 153A – Order of assessment u/s 143(3) on 31st March, 2006 and order of reassessment passed on 26th December, 2008 – Section 234D not applicable – Interest could not be levied u/s 234D

22 CIT vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [2021] 438 ITR 301 (Mad) A.Y.: 2001-02; Date of order: 24th August, 2021 S. 234D of ITA, 1961

Interest on excess refund – Law applicable – Effect of amendment of section 234D by F.A. 2012 – Section 234D applies to regular assessment – Meaning of regular assessment – Regular assessment refers to first order of assessment u/s 143, u/s 147 or u/s 153A – Order of assessment u/s 143(3) on 31st March, 2006 and order of reassessment passed on 26th December, 2008 – Section 234D not applicable – Interest could not be levied u/s 234D

The appellant Revenue had raised the following three substantial questions of law for consideration:

‘1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in deleting the interest levied u/s 234D?

2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, no interest can be charged even for the period subsequent to the introduction of section 234D merely on the ground that the said section was introduced by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1st June, 2003?

3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that interest levied u/s 234D cannot be charged for the A.Y. 2001-02, especially when the assessment order was made after introduction of the said section?’

The Madras High Court held as under:

‘i) Section 234D deals with “interest on excess refund”. Explanation 1 to section 234D states that where, in relation to an assessment year, an assessment is made for the first time u/s 147 or section 153A, the assessment so made shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of section 234D of the Act. Explanation (2) was inserted for the removal of doubts and declared that the provisions of section 234D shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before 1st June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year are completed after that date. Explanations (1) and (2) were inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1st June, 2003.

ii) “Regular assessment” has been defined u/s 2(40) to mean the assessment made under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 144. Explanation (1) would stand attracted if an assessment is made for the first time u/s 147 or section 153A and the assessment, if it is done for the first time, shall be regarded as a “regular assessment” u/s 2(40).

iii) Admittedly, the assessment order dated 26th December, 2008 u/s 143(3) read with section 147 was not the first assessment, as an assessment was made u/s 143(3) dated 31st March, 2004 which fact was not disputed. Since the assessment framed u/s 143(3) read with section 147 dated 26th December, 2008, was not the assessment made for the first time, it could not be regarded as a “regular assessment” for the purposes of section 234D and, therefore, no interest could be levied on the assessee.’

Income Declaration Scheme – Failure to pay full amount of tax according to declaration – Declaration would be rendered void and non est – Part of tax already paid under scheme cannot be forfeited by Revenue authorities – Such amount must be returned to assessee

21 Pinnacle Vastunirman Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI [2021] 438 ITR 27 (Bom) A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 – Effect of S. 181 of Finance Act, 2016

Income Declaration Scheme – Failure to pay full amount of tax according to declaration – Declaration would be rendered void and non est – Part of tax already paid under scheme cannot be forfeited by Revenue authorities – Such amount must be returned to assessee

The assessee had made a declaration under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 concerning the A.Y. 2016-17. However, it could not make full payment of tax according to the declaration. Therefore, the declaration had become void and non est. The petitioner therefore applied for refund of the taxes so paid under the declaration or to give adjustment or credit of the amount so paid. The application was rejected.

The petitioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of rejection. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. This would mean there must be a law, the law must authorise the tax and the tax must be levied and collected according to the law. Sub-section (3) of section 187 of the Finance Act, 2016 which deals with the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 categorically provides that if the declarant fails to pay the tax, surcharge and penalty in respect of the declaration made u/s 183 on or before the dates specified in sub-section (1), the declaration filed by him shall be deemed never to have been made under the Scheme. This would mean that the declaration will be non est. When the scheme itself contemplates that a declaration without payment of tax is void and non est and the declaration filed by the assessee would not be acted upon [because section 187(3) says the declaration filed shall be deemed never to have been made under the Scheme], the question of retention of the tax paid under such declaration will not arise. The provisions of section 191 cannot have any application to a situation where the tax is paid but the entire amount of tax is not paid. The Scheme does not provide for the Revenue to retain the tax paid in respect of a declaration which is void and non est.

ii) The assessee was entitled to an adjustment by giving credit for the amount of Rs. 82,33,874 paid under the Income Declaration Scheme.’

Capital gains – Long-term or short-term capital asset – Period of holding – No distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying as short-term capital asset

20 CIT vs. Exim Rajathi India Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 438 ITR 19 (Mad) A.Y.: 2007-08; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 S. 2(42A) proviso of ITA, 1961

Capital gains – Long-term or short-term capital asset – Period of holding – No distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying as short-term capital asset

For the A.Y. 2007-08, the Commissioner invoking his power u/s 263 held that the order passed by the A.O. u/s 143(3) was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on the ground that the shares held by the assessee in a company, which was not a listed company when sold, should be treated as ‘short-term capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(42A) and not as ‘long-term capital asset’. Accordingly, the A.O. computed the short-term capital gains.

The Commissioner (Appeals) directed the A.O. to treat the shares as long-term capital asset, allow indexation and tax the resultant capital gains at the special rate of 20%. The Tribunal concluded that there was no distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying them as short-term capital asset under the Act and affirmed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) In terms of the definition u/s 2(42A), short-term capital asset would mean a capital asset held by an assessee for not more than 36 months immediately preceding the transfer. The provision does not make a distinction between shares in a public company, a private company, a listed company or an unlisted company. The use of the word “or” in between each of the categories is very important and such distinction needs to be borne in mind. Although “securities” as defined u/s 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 includes shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, etc., that by itself cannot have an impact to give a different interpretation to the distinction of “short-term capital asset” as defined in section 2(42A).

ii) According to the Explanatory Notes to the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, in Circular No. 1 of 2015 dated 21st January, 2015 [(2015) 371 ITR (St.) 22] issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, all shares whether listed or unlisted enjoy the benefit of shorter period of holding, and investment in shares of private limited companies enjoy long-term capital gains on transfer after 12 months.

iii) The Tribunal was right in holding that the shares and debentures not listed could be treated as a long-term capital asset u/s 2(42A) of the Act read with its proviso.’

Assessment – Duty of A.O. to consider normal and special provisions relating to assessee – Company – Computation of book profits – A.O. must take into account provisions of section 115JB

19 CIT vs. Kerala Chemicals and Proteins Ltd. [2021] 438 ITR 333 (Ker) A.Y.: 2002-03; Date of order: 19th July, 2021 S. 115JB of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Duty of A.O. to consider normal and special provisions relating to assessee – Company – Computation of book profits – A.O. must take into account provisions of section 115JB

The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of ossein, compound glue, gelatine, etc. On 31st October, 2002, it filed the Income-tax return for the A.Y. 2002-03 declaring a total loss of Rs. 3,59,10,946. The A.O., through an assessment order dated 3rd March, 2005 made u/s 143(3), computed the total income of the assessee at Rs. 2,99,81,060.

The Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

In the appeal by the Revenue, the following questions were raised:

‘1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and also in the light of section 80AB, the Tribunal is right in holding that while computing the book profit u/s 115JB the deduction u/s 80HHC is to be computed as per minimum alternate tax provisions and not as per the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact,
(i) in presuming that the A.O. has considered clause (c) of Explanation to section 115JA in the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99;
(ii) in holding that merely because proper working is not available on record, it cannot be said that the A.O., has not considered the same; and are not the approach and the conclusion based on presumptions and suppositions perverse, arbitrary and illegal?

3. (a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in directing the A.O. to reduce the net profit by the sum of Rs. 3,29,27,056 in place of Rs. 1,42,02,335 as has been done by the A.O.?
(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in directing the A.O. to allow an amount of Rs. 1,87,24,721 being the provision for excise duty written back on the “presumption” that even though the provisions of minimum alternate tax were not considered as the assessments were completed applying the normal provisions of the Act; and the A.O. has considered clause (c) of Explanation to section 115JA in the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99?’

The Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Once the return is filed by the assessee, it is the responsibility of the A.O. to compute the income of the assessee under normal provisions and special provisions. The income tax is collected on the income whichever is higher in these two methods, i. e., either normal provision or special provision.

ii) In the A.Ys. 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000, provision for disputed excise duty was made by the assessee. The assessment orders for the first two years were made referring to the normal provisions of the Act and the necessity to refer to the special provisions was not noticed by the A.O. The Tribunal, taking note of the fact that the assessee was subject to the slab rate of 30% for the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99, computed the tax under normal provisions.

iii) The Tribunal had rightly found that the fact that the proper working was not reflected in the respective assessment orders or the record could not lead to the conclusion that the A.O. had not considered the applicability of the special provision as well and that the omission on the part of the A.O. in referring to the special provisions ought not to deny the writing-back provision available under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 115JB. The denial of the benefit of writing back the provision to the assessee in these assessment years was illegal and the finding recorded by the Tribunal was valid and correct in the circumstances of this case.’

Assessment – International transactions – Section 144C mandatory – Assessment order passed without following procedure laid down in section 144C – Not a procedural irregularity – Section 292B not applicable – Order not valid

18 SHL (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 438 ITR 317 (Bom) A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 28th July, 2021 Ss. 144C and 292B of ITA, 1961

Assessment – International transactions – Section 144C mandatory – Assessment order passed without following procedure laid down in section 144C – Not a procedural irregularity – Section 292B not applicable – Order not valid

The petitioner is an Indian company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It is a part of the SHL Group, United Kingdom, and primarily a trading entity that provides SHL products (psychometric test), assessment, consultancy and training services (‘SHL Solutions’) to clients in India in various industries. The petitioner had filed the return of income on 30th March, 2018 declaring a total income of Rs. 1,01,31,750. Its case is that during the A.Y. 2017-18 it had entered into an international transaction with its associated enterprise (the ‘AE’) whereby it was granted a licence to market, distribute and deliver the SHL Solutions to clients in India from its associated enterprise, for which the petitioner made payments towards support services charges incurred by the associated enterprise. It submitted that along with the return of income filed for the said year, in view of the various international transactions with the associated enterprise, Form 3CEB was filed along with the return of income.

The petitioner’s case was selected under the computer-aided scrutiny selection (CASS) pursuant to which, on 5th September, 2018 a notice was issued u/s 143(2). Thereafter, on 6th August, 2019, a reference was made to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) by the first respondent. A notice was issued on 16th August, 2019 by the TPO and an order dated 29th January, 2021 was passed by the TPO proposing transfer pricing adjustments of Rs. 10,74,54,337 considered as Nil by the petitioner. On 10th March, 2021, the second respondent, viz., National e-Assessment Centre, Delhi requested the petitioner to provide rebuttal to the proposed adjustments to the arm’s length price made by the TPO. On 15th March, 2021, the petitioner filed a reply and on 6th April, 2021, a final assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) read with sections 143(3A) and 143(3B), determining the total income at Rs. 11,75,86,087. A notice of demand for Rs. 1,17,60,810 was also issued. A notice initiating penalty proceedings also came to be issued u/s 274 read with section 270A.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order and the notices. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Section 144C(1) is a non obstante provision, which requires its compliance irrespective of the other provisions that may be contained in the Act. The requirement u/s 144C(1) to first pass a draft assessment order and to provide a copy thereof to the assessee is a mandatory requirement which gives a substantive right to the assessee to object to any variation that is prejudicial to it. The procedure prescribed u/s 144C is a mandatory procedure and not directory. Failure to follow the procedure would be a jurisdictional error and not merely a procedural error or irregularity but a breach of a mandatory provision. Therefore, section 292B cannot save an order passed in breach of the provisions of section 144C(1), the same being an incurable illegality.

ii) The assessee was an eligible assessee and there was no dispute as to the applicability of section 144C. It was also not in dispute that the final assessment order had been passed without the draft assessment order as contemplated u/s 144C(1). The order was not valid.’

Assessment – Draft assessment order – Objections – Powers of DRP – DRP must consider merits of objections – Objections cannot be rejected for mere non-appearance of party at time of hearing

17 Sesa Sterlite Ltd. vs. DRP [2021] 438 ITR 42 (Mad) A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 29th July, 2021 S. 144C of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Draft assessment order – Objections – Powers of DRP – DRP must consider merits of objections – Objections cannot be rejected for mere non-appearance of party at time of hearing

The issue raised in this writ petition is whether the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) is competent to reject the objections on account of non-appearance of the assessee on the hearing date. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Under section 144C, on receipt of the draft order the assessee gets a right to file his objections, if any, to such variations with the DRP and the A.O. The DRP consists of three Commissioners of the Income-tax Department. They undoubtedly have certain expertise in the tax regime. Thus, adjudication before the DRP is a valuable opportunity provided both to the assessee as well as to the A.O. Either of the parties may get guidance for the purpose of completion of the assessment proceedings. Thus, the importance attached to the DRP under the Act can in no circumstances be undermined.

ii) When the Act contemplates a right to the assessee, such right must be allowed to be exercised in the manner prescribed under it. The manner in which objections are to be considered by the DRP are well defined both under the Act as well as under the Income-tax (Dispute Resolution Panel) Rules, 2009. Sub-section (6) of section 144C unambiguously states that the DRP is bound to consider the materials denoted as the case may be and issue suitable directions as it thinks fit. Therefore, the DRP has no option but to deal with objections, if any, filed by an eligible assessee on merits and, in the event of non-consideration, it is to be construed that the right conferred to an assessee has not been complied with.

iii) The language employed is “shall” both under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 144C. Therefore, the DRP has no option but to strictly follow sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 144C which are mandatory provisions as far as the DRP is concerned; sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 144C are discretionary powers. Sub-section (11) is to be linked with sub-section (2)(b)(i) and (ii) of section 144C because an opportunity is bound to be given to the assessee as well as to the A.O. Sub-section (11) is also significant with reference to the opportunities to be granted to the parties before the DRP. The DRP is a quasi-judicial authority. This being the case, the DRP is bound to pass orders as it thinks fit only on the merits and such quasi-judicial authorities are not empowered to reject the objections merely by stating that the assessee had not appeared before the DRP. The DRP is legally bound to adjudicate the objections and pass orders on the merits, even in case of the assessee or the A.O. failing to appear for personal hearing.

iv) An order passed rejecting the objections submitted by the assessee, merely on the ground that the assessee has not appeared on the hearing date, is infirm and liable to be quashed.’

Section 3(1), Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act 2015 (‘BMA’) – Relevant point of time for taxation of an undisclosed foreign asset under BMA is point of time when such asset comes to notice of Government – It is immaterial as to whether it continued to exist at time of taxation, or at the time when provisions of BMA came into existence

2 Rashesh Manhar Bhansali vs. ACIT [(2021) 132 taxmann.com 20 (Mum-Trib)] BMA Nos. 3 and 5 (Mum) of 2021 A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 2nd November, 2021

Section 3(1), Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act 2015 (‘BMA’) – Relevant point of time for taxation of an undisclosed foreign asset under BMA is point of time when such asset comes to notice of Government – It is immaterial as to whether it continued to exist at time of taxation, or at the time when provisions of BMA came into existence

FACTS
The assessee (RMB) and his wife (ARB) were Directors and shareholders in a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (‘BVI Co’). The assessee had not disclosed this information in the Return of Income (‘ROI’) filed in India.

The Investigation Wing of the Income-tax Department received information regarding two accounts held in the UBS Bank, Singapore branch by BVI Co. On further probe, including information received through exchange of information provisions under the India-Singapore DTAA, the Department found that RMB and ARB were the beneficiaries and operators of the said accounts. Further, the said accounts showed gross credit entries of US $147 million (INR 999.74 crores @ US $1 = INR 68) over a period of time (which also included intra-bank and contra entries).

The KYC documents related to these bank accounts revealed that passport copies of RMB and ARB were submitted along with handwritten instructions for operating the bank accounts. One of the bank accounts was closed in 2008 and the other one in 2011.

The chronology of investigation by the Tax Authorities is as follows.

Year

Investigation

2013 and 2014

 

Summons for investigation were sent asking for details of
foreign asset, beneficial ownership, etc.

2016

Search conducted in premises of assessee

2017

BMA proceedings initiated by A.O.

At all the above-mentioned stages, the assessee denied having any knowledge of the said foreign bank accounts. Just three days prior to the completion of the assessment, RMB admitted that these accounts were opened in his and his wife’s name by his late father by taking their signatures on papers in the past. He submitted that the credit entries in the accounts were loans taken from UBS Bank which were repaid with interest.

The A.O. rejected various explanations offered by the assessee and held that the assessee is the beneficial owner of the undisclosed foreign bank accounts and computed total income of INR 56 crores. On appeal, CIT(A) gave partial relief of US $3.2 million (roughly, INR 21.8 crores) on account of credits in respect of redemption of investments held earlier.

Being aggrieved, both parties appealed to the ITAT.

HELD1
Applicability of BMA to undisclosed assets held, and income earned, prior to the enactment of the law (i.e., 1st July, 2015)
• The two foreign bank accounts were closed in 2008 and 2011. The assessee contended that an asset which did not exist at the time when BMA came into force cannot be assessed under the said Act.
• Section 3(1) of BMA specifically provides that an undisclosed asset located outside India shall be charged to tax in the year in which it comes to the notice of the A.O.
• It is immaterial whether the asset existed at the point of time of taxation or even at the time when the provisions of BMA came into existence. The only relevant date for levying tax is when the undisclosed asset comes to the notice of the A.O.
• The assessee further contended that BMA cannot be invoked in respect of a foreign asset which was already in the knowledge of Revenue authorities (i.e., Investigation Wing of the Income-tax Department) before the said Act came into force. The assessee relied upon the CBDT Circular2 which prohibited assessees from making a one-time voluntary declaration of foreign assets in respect of which the Government has prior information on the specified date.
• The said Circular is relevant only for voluntary declaration under BMA and it cannot be relied upon for making assessments under BMA.
• For taxation under BMA what is relevant is that either such foreign income is not disclosed in the ROI filed, or that the ROI is not filed at all by the assessee in India.

Bank account is an asset under BMA
• The assessee contended that an undisclosed foreign bank account is not an asset u/s 2(11) of BMA. The assessee argued that though Black Money Rules provide for valuation of undisclosed bank accounts, section 2(11) of the BMA does not cover a foreign bank account which does not exist.
• The assessee also contended that since section 2(11) of the BMA refers only to such assets having ‘cost of acquisition’ (i.e., source of investment), a bank account cannot be treated as an undisclosed foreign asset.
• Amount receivable from the bank in respect of a bank account is an asset of the person holding that account. If the owner of a bank account can substantiate the source of investment which is duly disclosed to Revenue authorities, to that extent, the source of investment is explained and the requirements of section 2(11) can be satisfied even in respect of a bank account.

Beneficial owner of asset
• The assessee contended that section 2(11) of the  BMA defines an undisclosed asset as one in which the assessee is a ‘beneficial owner’. Since this term is not defined under the BMA, it must derive its meaning from section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 19613.
• Merely because the expression ‘beneficial owner’ is defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961, per se, it cannot as well apply to BMA. Reliance was placed on the ITAT decision in the Jitendra Mehta case4 where it was held that beneficial owner can be interpreted with reference to the dictionary meaning and the provision in other statues keeping in mind the object and purpose of the BMA. The ITAT rejected the above arguments and held the assessee to be the beneficial owner of the foreign bank accounts under the BMA.

_____________________________________________________________________
1    For ease of reference, the issue raised by the assessee is mentioned before the observations of the ITAT
2    CBDT Circular No. 13 of 2015
3    Explanation 4 to section 139(1) provides that a ‘beneficial owner’ in respect of an asset is someone who has directly / indirectly provided for consideration for the asset
4    (BMA No. 1/Del/20; order dated 6th July, 2021)

An assessee who has voluntarily surrendered the registration granted to it u/s 12A cannot be compelled, by action of or by inaction of Revenue authorities, to continue with the said registration

18 Navajbai Ratan Tata Trust vs. Pr.CIT [(2021) 88 ITR(T) 170 (Mum-Trib)] ITA No.: 7238 (Mum) of 2019 A.Y.: Nil; Date of order: 24th March, 2021

An assessee who has voluntarily surrendered the registration granted to it u/s 12A cannot be compelled, by action of or by inaction of Revenue authorities, to continue with the said registration

FACTS
The assessee, a charitable trust, was granted registration u/s 12A. The trust vide letter dated 11th March, 2015 addressed to the CIT indicated that it did not desire to continue to avail the benefits of the registration made by the trustees in 1975. The trust was called for a hearing on 20th March, 2015 on which date the trust confirmed its agreement to the cancellation / withdrawal of the registration. Returns of income filed subsequent thereto were filed without claiming exemption under sections 11 and 12.

The CIT cancelled the registration of the assessee trust, as granted u/s 12A, with effect from the date of his order, i.e., 31st October, 2019.

The assessee filed an appeal with the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT tried to ascertain the objective behind the Income-tax Department’s keenness to extend registration u/s 12A for the extended period from March, 2015 to October, 2019, when the assessee did not want it.

It then considered the relevant legislative amendments to ascertain the objective. First, it considered the amendment in section 11. By insertion of sub-section (7) in section 11 with effect from 1st April, 2015, tax exemption u/s 10(34) for ‘dividends from Indian companies’, on which dividend distribution tax was already paid by the company distributing dividends which was available to every other taxpayer, was denied to charitable trusts registered u/s 12A.

It also observed that the continuance of registration u/s 12A, even when the assessee does not want exemption u/s 11, may result in higher tax liability for a trust which has earned dividends from domestic companies otherwise eligible for exemption u/s 10(34), as in the given case. However, the ITAT also took into consideration the rationale behind the said amendment which was to ensure that the assessee does not have the benefit of choice between special provisions and general provisions. The ITAT also noted the Circular No. 1/2015 dated 21st January, 2015 explaining the above amendment. As against this, the ITAT observed the way this provision was interpreted by the tax authorities. The Revenue authorities opined that once an assessee is a registered charitable institution, irrespective of admissibility or even claim for exemption u/s 11, the exemption u/s 10(34) was inadmissible. This put the assessee at a disadvantage since the scheme of sections 11 to 13 which were intended to be an optional benefit to the charitable institutions, in the present case, became a source of an additional tax burden for the trusts in question because of the interpretation given by the Revenue.

The ITAT also noted that introduction of section 115TD would also have a bearing on the tax liability of the trust which would depend on the date of cancellation of registration.

From the above-mentioned Circular the ITAT inferred that the assessee has an inherent right to withdraw from the special dispensation of the scheme of sections 11, 12 and 13, unless such a withdrawal is found to be mala fide. It also observed that the disadvantageous tax implications on the assessee [non-application of section 10(34) and section 115TD] are only as a result of a much later legislative amendment which was not in effect even when the assessee informed the CIT of his disinclination to continue with the registration; an assessee unwilling to avail the ‘benefit’ of registration ‘obtained’ u/s 12A could not be compelled, by action of or by inaction of the Revenue authorities, to continue with the said registration.

The ITAT observed that registration u/s 12A was obtained by the assessee in 1976 and registration u/s 12A simply being a foundational requirement for exemption u/s 11 and not putting the assessee under any obligations, is in the nature of a benefit to the assessee. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahendra Mills (2000) 109 taxmann 225 / 243 ITR 56, it held that ‘a privilege cannot be a disadvantage and an option cannot become an obligation’. Thus, in the instant case, registration u/s 12A cannot be thrust upon the unwilling assessee.

It also held that wherever a public authority has a power, that public authority also has a corresponding duty to exercise that power when circumstances so warrant or justify it. Accordingly, in the instant case when the assessee communicated to the CIT of inapplicability of exemptions under sections 11 to 13, the CIT was duty-bound to pass an order in writing withdrawing the registration. In the instant case, not only was the procedure of cancellation of registration kept pending but also the proceedings conducted earlier were ignored and fresh proceedings were started after a long gap, on a standalone basis de hors the pending proceedings. This is more so considering the fact that delay in cancellation of registration has tax implications to the disadvantage of the assessee.

The ITAT thus concluded by holding that the CIT was under a duty to hold that the cancellation of registration is to take effect from the date on which the violation of the statutory requirements for grant of exemption occurred, the date on which such a violation or breach was noticed, or at least the date on which hearing in this regard was concluded. That is, the cancellation of registration was required to be effective, at the most, from 20th March, 2015, i.e., the date fixed for hearing. The inordinate delay in cancellation of registration, which is wholly attributed to the Revenue authorities, cannot be placed to the disadvantage of the assessee. Finally, it was held that the cancellation was effective from 20th March, 2015 and the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Re-opening of assessee’s case merely on basis of information from Director (Investigation) pertaining to receipt of huge amount of share premium by assessee and the opinion that the amount of share premium was not justifiable considering its lesser income during the year was unjustified

17 Future Tech IT Systems (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [(2021) 89 ITR(T) 676 (Chd-Trib)] ITA Nos. 543, 548 and 549 (Chd) of 2019 A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 22nd April, 2021

Re-opening of assessee’s case merely on basis of information from Director (Investigation) pertaining to receipt of huge amount of share premium by assessee and the opinion that the amount of share premium was not justifiable considering its lesser income during the year was unjustified

FACTS
The assessee-company filed its return of income on 20th September, 2010 declaring an income of Rs. 2,55,860 which was accepted and an assessment order was passed.

Subsequently, the A.O. received information from the Director (Intelligence & Criminal Investigation) that the assessee had received share premium of a huge amount during the year. Notice u/s 148 was issued. The assessee’s objections to the same were disposed of by the A.O. and assessment order was passed after making additions of Rs. 1,17,00,000 in respect of share premium by invoking provisions of section 68. On appeal before the CIT(A), the assessee argued that the A.O. did not mount a valid base for the reasons to come to a rational belief that the income of the appellant has escaped assessment and that there was lack of material to prove that the transaction of receipt of share application money was not genuine. The A.O. acted only on the borrowed satisfaction.

The CIT(A) observed that the A.O. noticed that the book value of the share of the company was Rs. 10 and the company had nothing in its balance sheet to attract such huge share premium. He also observed that the A.O. initiated the proceedings on the basis of specific information, so it could not be said that his action was on the basis of certain surmises and conjectures only and it could also not be said that the material in his possession could just give him reason to suspect and not reason to believe that the income had escaped assessment. Another observation made by him was that the A.O. applied his mind to the information by verifying from the assessment record that the assessee had very low income as against which it received huge share premium and hence his action is valid.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The assessee argued before the ITAT that the A.O. while issuing the notice u/s 148 doubted the share premium only and accepted the share capital received by the assessee, therefore, the initiation of the proceedings u/s 147 were based on suspicion. It was also submitted that the investor company explained the source and the assessee furnished relevant documents to the A.O. The documents furnished by the assessee proved the source of credit for share application money. Thus, according to the assessee, it had proved the identity, genuineness and the credit-worthiness of the shareholders.

The ITAT observed that an identical issue was decided by the ITAT in ITA No. 1616/Chd/2018 for the A.Y. 2010-11 vide order dated 15th June, 2020 in the case of Indo Global Techno Trade Ltd. vs. ITO. Relevant findings of the said case that were considered by the ITAT in the instant case were that mere information (without recording of any details) of the assesse receiving a high premium could not be said to be a reason to form the belief that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment. There is no dispute to the well-settled proposition that reason to believe must have a material bearing on the question of escapement of income. It does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction of the assessing authority, such reason should be held in good faith and cannot merely be a pretence. There could be no doubt that the words ‘reason to believe’ suggest that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and that the Income-tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour.

The other decision relied on by the assessee and considered by the ITAT was of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the case of D.D. Agro Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA Nos. 349 & 350/Chd/2017 order dated 7th September, 2017, wherein, on identical facts and circumstances, the A.O. recorded identical reasons to form belief for re-opening of the assessment. The Tribunal held that the A.O. assumed jurisdiction relying upon the non-specific routine information blindly without caring to first independently consider the specific facts and circumstances of the case and that the assumption of jurisdiction by the A.O. under the circumstances was wrong.

Thus, the ITAT followed the decision in Indo Global Techno Trade Ltd. vs. ITO (Supra).

The ITAT also considered the following other rulings on the issue:

• Rajshikha Enterprises (P) Ltd. vs. ITO for A.Y. 2005-06 vide order dated 23rd February, 2018 (Del ITAT);
• Pr.CIT vs. G&G Pharma India Ltd. (2016) 384 ITR 147 (Del HC);
• Pr.CIT vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P) Ltd. (2017) 395 ITR 677 (Del HC);
• Pr.CIT vs. Laxman Industrial Resources Ltd. (2017) 397 ITR 106 (Del HC); and
• Signature Hotels (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (2011) 338 ITR 51 (Del HC).

The ITAT applied the rationale of the above decisions to the facts of the instant case to conclude that the re-opening initiated by the A.O. was invalid. Thus, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee.

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct him to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. Accordingly, limited scrutiny assessment cannot be revised u/s 263 beyond the scope of scrutiny

16 Antariksh Realtors Private Limited vs. ITO [TS-1029-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 Section: 263

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct him to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. Accordingly, limited scrutiny assessment cannot be revised u/s 263 beyond the scope of scrutiny

FACTS
The assessee, a company engaged in business as a builder and developer, filed its return of income declaring a loss of Rs. 14,34,236. The case was selected under ‘limited scrutiny’ for examination of two issues, viz., (i) Low income in comparison to high loan / advances / investments in shares appearing in balance sheet; and (ii) Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) liability mismatch. The A.O. upon examining these two issues completed the assessment.

Subsequently, after reviewing the assessment order, the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax in charge of the range found that the increase in loan taken by the assessee from Rs. 8.57 crores in the preceding year to Rs. 10.42 crores in the current year was not verified by the A.O. He observed that the A.O. also did not verify the assessee’s claim that all loans and advances given are for the purpose of business, by calling for details of transactions in subsequent years along with supporting documents. He also observed that the A.O. did not verify the capitalisation of interest paid. In view of these facts, the Additional Commissioner submitted a proposal to the PCIT for exercising the powers u/s 263 to revise the assessment order.

The PCIT issued a show cause notice u/s 263. The assessee submitted that the A.O. had thoroughly inquired into the issues for which the case was selected for scrutiny. However, the PCIT was not convinced. He held that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue due to non-inquiry by the A.O. He set aside the assessment order with a direction to examine the relevant details as observed in the revision order and complete the assessment after conducting proper and necessary inquiry.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the two issues which require examination are whether the limited scrutiny for which the assessee’s case was selected encompassed examination of loans taken by the assessee and capitalisation of interest expenditure, and if it was not so, whether the assessment order can be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue for not examining the issues relating to loan taken and interest expenditure capitalised.

The Tribunal noted that the PCIT while exercising power u/s 263 has attempted to expand the scope of the limited scrutiny. It observed that the A.O. did examine both the issues for which the assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny and the A.O. had also conducted necessary inquiry on the issues for which the case was selected for scrutiny and he completed the assessment after applying his mind to the materials on record.

The A.O. being bound by CBDT Instruction No. 20/2015 dated 29th December, 2015 and CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2016 dated 14th July, 2016, could not have gone beyond the scope and ambit of limited scrutiny for which the case was selected. He had rightly restricted himself to the scope and ambit of limited scrutiny. Unless the scope of scrutiny is expanded by converting it into a complete scrutiny with the approval of the higher authority, the A.O. could not have travelled beyond his mandate. The Tribunal held that the assessment order cannot be considered to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue for not examining the loans taken by the assessee and their utilisation as well as capitalisation of interest.

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct the A.O. to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. For this proposition the Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Su-Raj Diamond Dealers Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT, ITA No. 3098/Mum/2019; order dated 27th November, 2019.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law

15 Alfa Laval Lund AB vs. CIT (IT/TP) [TS-1024-ITAT-2021 (Pune)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 2nd November, 2021 Section: 263

The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law

FACTS
The assessee, a foreign company, filed its return of income declaring Nil total income. The assessment of its total income was completed on 27th March, 2015, again assessing Nil total income. Subsequently, the CIT received a proposal from the A.O. for revision based on which the CIT carried out a revision by observing that the assessee had entered into an agreement on 1st October, 2011 with its related concern in India for supply of software licenses and IT support services. The amount of service fee received from the Indian entity, collected on the basis of number of users, was claimed as not chargeable to tax in India within the meaning of Article 12 of the India-Sweden Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The CIT opined that the receipt from the Indian entity was in the nature of ‘Royalty’ and not ‘Fees for Technical Services’. After issuing a show cause notice and considering the reply of the assessee, the CIT set aside the order passed by the A.O. and remitted the matter to the A.O. for treating the amount received from the Indian entity as ‘Royalty’ chargeable to tax u/s 9(1)(vi).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the order of the CIT mentioned that ‘A proposal for revision under section 263 of the IT Act, 1961 was received from DCIT(IT)-1, Pune through the Jt. CIT(IT), Pune vide letter No. Pn/Jt.CIT(IT)/263/2016-17/61 dated 23rd May,. 2016’. It observed that the edifice of the revision in the present case has been laid on the bedrock of receipt of the proposal from the A.O.

The Tribunal having noted the provisions of section 263(1) held that the process of revision u/s 263 is initiated only when the CIT calls for and examines the record of any proceeding under the Act and considers that any order passed by the A.O. is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The twin conditions are sine qua non for the exercise of power under this section. The use of the word ‘and’ between the expression ‘call for and examine the record…’ and the expression ‘if he considers that any order… is erroneous…’ abundantly demonstrates that both these conditions must be cumulatively fulfilled by the CIT and in the same order, that is, the first followed by the second. The kicking point is the CIT calling for and examining the record of the proceedings leading him to consider that the assessment order is erroneous, etc. The consideration that the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue should flow from and be the consequence of his examination of the record of the proceedings. If such a consideration is not preceded by the examination of the record of the proceedings under the Act, the condition for revision does not get magnetised.

The Tribunal held that it is trite that a power which vests exclusively in one authority can’t be invoked or caused to be invoked by another, either directly or indirectly. The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law. If the A.O., after passing an assessment order finds something amiss in it to the detriment of the Revenue, he has ample power to either reassess the earlier assessment in terms of section 147 or carry out rectification u/s 154. He can’t usurp the power of the CIT and recommend a revision. No overlapping of powers of the authorities under the Act can be permitted.

As revision proceedings in this case triggered with the A.O. sending a proposal to the CIT and then the latter passing an order u/s 263 on the basis of such a proposal, the Tribunal held that it became a case of jurisdiction defect resulting in vitiating the impugned order.

The Tribunal quashed the impugned order on this legal issue itself.

REVENUE RECOGNITION FOR COMPANIES OPERATING IN E-COMMERCE, GAMING AND FINTECH SECTORS

Compiler’s Note: In recent weeks, companies engaged in e-commerce, gaming and fintech have come out with IPOs or are in the process of doing so. These companies operate on very different business models without any ‘brick and mortar’ assets. Given below are the Revenue Recognition policies for a few such companies (from the annual reports where available, or offer documents filed with SEBI).

ONE97 COMMUNICATIONS LTD. (PAYTM)
Revenue Recognition
Revenue is measured based on the consideration specified in a contract with a customer net of variable consideration, e.g., discounts, volume rebates, any payments made to a customer (unless the payment is for a distinct good or service received from the customer) and excludes amounts collected on behalf of third parties. The Company recognises revenue when it transfers control over a product or service to a customer. Revenue is only recognised to the extent that it is highly probable that a significant reversal will not occur.

The Company provides incentives to its users in various forms including cashbacks. Incentives which are consideration payable to the customer that are not in exchange for a distinct good or service are generally recognised as a reduction of revenue.

Where the Company acts as an agent for selling goods or services, only the commission income is included within revenue. The specific revenue recognition criteria described below must also be met before revenue is recognised. Typically, the Company has a right to payment before or at the point that services are delivered. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability. The amount of consideration does not contain a significant financing component as payment terms are less than one year.

Sale of services
Revenue from services is recognised when the control in services is transferred as per the terms of the agreement with the customer, i.e., as and when services are rendered. Revenues are disclosed net of the Goods and Services Tax charged on such services. In terms of the contract, excess of revenue over the billed at the year-end is carried in the balance sheet as unbilled revenue under other financial assets where the amount is recoverable from the customer without any future performance obligation. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability.

Commission
The Company facilitates recharge of talk time, bill payments and availability of bus tickets and earns commission for the respective services. Commission income is recognised when the control in services is transferred to the customer when the services have been provided by the Company.

Service fees from merchants
The Company earns service fee from merchants and recognises such revenue when the control in services have been transferred by the Company, i.e., as and when services have been provided by the Company. Such service fee is generally determined as a percentage of transaction value executed by the merchants. The amounts received by the Company pending settlement are disclosed as payable to the merchants under contract liabilities.

Other operating revenue
Where the Company is contractually entitled to receive claims / compensation in case of non-discharge of obligations by customers, such claims / compensations are measured at amount receivable from such customers and are recognised as other operating revenue when there is a reasonable certainty that the Company will be able to realise the said amounts.

Interest income
For all debt instruments measured either at amortised cost or at fair value through other comprehensive income, interest income is recorded using the effective interest rate (EIR). EIR is the rate that exactly discounts the estimated future cash payments or receipts over the expected life of the financial instrument or a shorter period, where appropriate, to the gross carrying amount of the financial asset or to the amortised cost of a financial liability. When calculating the effective interest rate, the Company estimates the expected cash flows by considering all the contractual terms of the financial instrument but does not consider the expected credit losses. Interest income is included in finance income in the statement of profit and loss.

ZOMATO LTD.
Revenue recognition
The Group generates revenue from online food delivery transactions, advertisements, subscriptions, sale of traded goods and other platform services.

Revenue is recognised to depict the transfer of control of promised goods or services to customers upon the satisfaction of performance obligation under the contract in an amount that reflects the consideration to which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods or services. Consideration includes goods or services contributed by the customer, as non-cash consideration, over which the Group has control.

Where performance obligation is satisfied over time, the Group recognises revenue over the contract period. Where performance obligation is satisfied at a point in time, the Group recognises revenue when customer obtains control of promised goods and services in the contract.

Revenue is recognised net of any taxes collected from customers, which are remitted to governmental authorities.

Revenue from platform services and transactions
The Group through its platform allows transactions between the consumers and restaurant partners enlisted with the platform. These could be for food orders placed online on the platform by the consumer or through a consumer availing offers from restaurant partners upon a visit to the restaurant. The Group earns commission income on such transactions from the restaurant partners upon completion of the transaction.

The Group is merely a technology platform provider where delivery partners are able to provide their delivery services to the restaurant partners and the consumers. For the platform provided by the Group to the delivery partners, the Group may charge a platform fee from the delivery partners. Up to 28th October, 2019, for orders where the Group was responsible for delivery, the delivery charges were recognised on the completion of the order’s delivery.

In cases where the Group undertakes to run the business for an independent third party, income is recognised on completion of service in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Advertisement revenue
Advertisement revenue is derived principally from the sale of online advertisements which is usually run over a contracted period of time. The revenue from advertisements is thus recognised over this contract period as the performance obligation is met over the contract period. There are some contracts where in addition to the contract period, the Group assures certain ‘clicks’ (which are generated each time viewers on our platform click through the advertiser’s advertisement on the platform) to the advertisers. In these cases, the revenue is recognised when both the conditions of time period and number of clicks assured are met.

Subscription revenue
Revenues from subscription contracts are recognised over the subscription period on systematic basis in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into with the customer.

Sign-up revenue
The Group receives a sign-up amount from its restaurant partners and delivery partners. These are recognised on receipt or over a period of time in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into with such relevant partner.

Delivery facilitation services
The Group is merely a technology platform provider for delivery partners to provide their delivery services to the restaurant partners / consumers and not providing or taking responsibility of the said services. For the service provided by the Group to the delivery partners, the Group may charge a platform fee from the delivery partners.

Sale of traded goods
Revenue is recognised to depict the transfer of control of promised goods to merchants upon the satisfaction of performance obligation under the contract in an amount that reflects the consideration to which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods. Consideration includes goods contributed by the customer, as non-cash consideration, over which the Group has control.

The amount of consideration disclosed as revenue is net of variable considerations like incentives or other items offered to the customers.

Incentives
The Group provides various types of incentives to transacting consumers to promote the transactions on our platform.

Since the Group identified the transacting consumers as one of our customers for delivery services when the Group is responsible for the delivery services, the incentives offered to transacting consumers are considered as payment to customers and recorded as reduction of revenue on a transaction by transaction basis. The amount of incentive in excess of the delivery fee collected from the transacting consumers is recorded as advertisement and sales promotion expenses.

When incentives are provided to transacting consumers where the Group is not responsible for delivery, the transacting consumers are not considered customers of the Group and such incentives are recorded as advertisement and sales promotion expenses.

Interest
Interest income is recognised using the effective interest method. Interest income is included under the head ‘other income’ in the consolidated statement of profit and loss.

NAZARA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
Revenue recognition
Revenue arises mainly from income from services, other operating income, other income and dividends.

To determine whether the Company should recognise revenues, the Company follows a 5-step process:
a.    identifying the contract, or contracts, with a customer,
b.    identifying the performance obligations in each contract,
c.    determining the transaction price,
d.    allocating the transaction price to the performance obligations in each contract,
e.    recognising revenue when, or as, we satisfy performance obligations by transferring the promised goods or services.

Revenue from operations
Revenue from subscription / download of games / other contents is recognised when a promise in a customer contract (performance obligation) has been satisfied, usually over the period of subscription. The amount of revenue to be recognised (transaction price) is based on the consideration expected to be received in exchange for services, net of credit notes, discounts, etc. If a contract contains more than one performance obligation, the transaction price is allocated to each performance obligation based on their relative standalone selling price.

Revenue from advertising services, including performance-based advertising, is recognised after the underlying performance obligations have been satisfied, usually in the period in which advertisements are displayed.

Revenue is reported on a gross or net basis based on management’s assessment of whether the Company is acting as a principal or agent in the transaction. The determination of whether the Company acts as a principal or an agent in a transaction is based on an evaluation of whether the good or service are controlled prior to transfer to the customer.

Revenue is measured at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, considering contractually defined terms of payment, and excluding variable considerations such as volume or cash discounts and taxes or duties collected on behalf of the Government.

Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Company and the revenue can be reliably measured, regardless of when the payment is being made.

A contract liability is an entity’s obligation to transfer goods or services to a customer for which the entity has received consideration (or the amount is due) from the customer and presented as ‘Deferred revenue’. Advance payments received from customers for which no services have been rendered are presented as ‘Advance from customers’.

Unbilled revenues are classified as a financial asset where the right to consideration is unconditional upon passage of time.

Other operating revenue
Other operating revenue mainly consists of Technology Platform / Digital Marketing / Administrative & Business Supporting / Recharge services to subsidiaries and is recognised in the period in which services are rendered.

Revenue is measured at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, taking into account contractually defined terms of payment and excluding taxes or duties collected on behalf of the Government.

Other income
Interest income is recorded using the effective interest rate (‘EIR’) method. EIR is the rate that exactly discounts the estimated future cash payments or receipts over the expected life of the financial instrument or over a shorter period, where appropriate, to the gross carrying amount of the financial asset or to the amortised cost of the financial liability. Interest income is included under the head ‘finance income’ in the statement of profit and loss account.

Dividends
Dividend income is recognised when the Company’s right to receive dividend is established by the reporting date. The right to receive dividend is generally established when shareholders approve the dividend.

PB FINTECH LTD. (POLICYBAZAR)
Revenue is measured based on the consideration specified in a contract with a customer. The Company recognises revenue as follows:

Sale of services
The Company earns revenue from services as described below:
1) Online marketing and consulting services – includes bulk e-mailers, advertisement banners on its website and credit score advisory services;
2) Marketing support services – includes road-show services;
3) Commission on online aggregation or financial products – includes commission earned for sale of financial products based on the leads generated from its designated website;
4) IT Support Services – includes services related to IT applications and solutions.

Revenue from above services (other than IT Support Services) is recognised at a point in time when the related services are rendered as per the terms of the agreement with the customer. Revenue from IT Support Services is recognised over time. Revenues are disclosed net of the Goods and Service Tax charged on such services. In terms of the contract, excess of revenue over the billed at the year-end is carried in the balance sheet as unbilled trade receivables as the amount is recoverable from the customer without any future performance obligation. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability, if any.

Revenue from above services is recognised in the accounting period in which the services are rendered. When there is uncertainty as to measurement or ultimate collectability, revenue recognition is postponed until such uncertainty is resolved.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) fees
Income from IPR fees is recognised on an accrual basis in accordance with the substance of the relevant agreements. [Refer Note 29.]

API HOLDINGS LIMITED (PHARMEASY)
Revenue Recognition
Sale of pharmaceutical and related products:
The Group derives revenue primarily from sale of pharmaceutical and related products and rendering of pharmacy support services, business support services, lab test-related services, commission from lab services and technology platform services. Revenue is recognised upon transfer of control of promised products or services to customers in an amount that reflects the consideration the Group expects to receive in exchange for those products or services. Amounts disclosed as revenue are net of trade allowances, rebates and Goods and Services Tax (GST), amounts collected on behalf of third parties and includes reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses, with corresponding expenses included in cost of revenues.

Revenue from the rendering of services and sale of pharmaceutical and related products is recognised when the Group satisfies its performance obligations to its customers as below:

Revenue from sale of pharmaceutical and related products is recognised at the point in time when control of the asset is transferred to the customer, generally on delivery of the products. In determining the transaction price for rendering of services, the Group considers the effect of variable consideration, existence of a significant financing component, non-cash consideration, and consideration payable to the customers, if any. Revenue is recognised net of trade and cash discounts. The Group collects Goods and Services Tax (GST) on behalf of the Government and, therefore, it is not an economic benefit flowing to the Group. Hence, it is excluded from revenue.

Revenue from rendering services
Revenue from pharmacy support services, business support services, lab test services, technology platform services and commission from lab services are recognised as and when services are rendered as per terms of agreement, i.e., at the point in time. The Group collects Goods and Services Tax (GST) on behalf of the Government and, therefore, it is not an economic benefit flowing to the Group. Hence, it is excluded from revenue. In determining the transaction price for rendering of services, the Group considers the effect of variable consideration, existence of a significant financing component, non-cash consideration, and consideration payable to the customers, if any. Revenue is recognised net of trade and cash discounts.

VERANDAH LEARNING SOLUTIONS LTD.
Revenue Recognition
Operating revenue:
Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Company and the revenue can be reliably measured. The Company derives its revenue from Edutech services (online and offline) by providing comprehensive learning programmes.

A. Online revenue:
Revenue from sale of online courses is recognised based on satisfaction of performance obligations as below:
i) Supply of books is recognised when control of the goods is transferred to the customer at an amount
that reflects the consideration entitled as per the contract / understanding in exchange for the goods or services.
ii) Supply of online content is recognised upfront upon access being provided for the uploaded content to the learners.
iii) Supply of hosting service is recognised over the period of license of access provided to the learners at an amount that reflects the consideration entitled as per the contract / understanding in exchange for such services.

B. Offline revenue:
Revenue from offline courses are recognised as revenue on a pro rata based on actual classes conducted by the educators. The Company does not assume any post-performance obligation after the completion of classes. Revenue received for classes to be conducted subsequent to the year-end is considered as Deferred revenue which is included in other current liabilities.

C. Revenue from delivery partner:
License fee is recognised at a point in time upon transfer of the license to customers.

Other operating revenue
Shipping revenue is recognised at the time of delivery to end customers. Shipping revenue received towards deliveries subsequent to the year-end is considered as Deferred revenue which is included in other current liabilities.

ACCOUNTING BY HOLDERS OF CRYPTO ASSETS

According to a crypto research agency CREBACO, Indian crypto investments by October, 2021 had increased to over US $10 billion, with 105 million Indians, i.e., approximately 7.90% of India’s total population, owning cryptocurrency. Currently, numerous cryptocurrencies, crypto coins and crypto tokens are in circulation. Some cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are also used as an alternative to money, though its main use is as investment in an asset class. At the time of writing, over 12,000 different cryptocurrencies, crypto coins and crypto tokens were traded or listed on various crypto exchanges across the globe.

This article discusses the accounting by holders of crypto assets under Ind AS. A question arises that if crypto assets are not legal tenders, then would they fulfil the definition of asset in the first place. In accordance with the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS issued by the ICAI ‘An asset is a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events. An economic resource is a right that has the potential to produce economic benefits.’ The crypto assets are capable of producing economic benefits because they can be sold at a price and the economic benefits can be realised. Therefore, they would meet the definition of an asset under the Conceptual Framework.

The IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) in its Agenda decision titled Holdings of Cryptocurrencies in June, 2019 defined a cryptocurrency as a crypto asset with all of the following characteristics: ‘(a) a digital or virtual currency recorded on a distributed ledger that uses cryptography for security, (b) not issued by a jurisdictional authority or other party, and (c) does not give rise to a contract between the holder and another party’. Bitcoin, for example, would meet this definition. Cryptocurrencies represent a subset of crypto assets. The terms and applications of the crypto assets vary widely and could change over time. The terms and conditions and the purpose for which they are held by the holders will determine the accounting consequences.

Some crypto assets entitle the holder to an underlying good or service from an identifiable counter-party. For example, some crypto assets entitle the holder to a fixed weight of gold from a custodian bank. In those cases, the holder can obtain economic benefits by redeeming the crypto asset for the underlying. While not money as such, these crypto assets share many characteristics with representative money. Other crypto assets (e.g., Bitcoin) do not entitle the holder to an underlying good or service and have no identifiable counter-party. The holder of such a crypto asset has to find a willing buyer who will accept the crypto asset in exchange for cash, goods or services to realise any economic benefits from the crypto asset.

An entity can directly hold its crypto assets in its own ‘wallet’ or may hold it indirectly. For example, an entity holding an economic interest in crypto assets in the shared wallet of a crypto asset exchange may have an indirect holding of the crypto assets through a claim on the exchange. In this case, in addition to the underlying crypto asset volatility, the holder would also be exposed to counter-party performance risk (i.e., the possibility that the exchange is not holding sufficient crypto assets to cover all customer claims). The holder would need to analyse carefully, among other things, its claim on the crypto exchange to evaluate the nature of the assets held to determine the appropriate accounting treatment.

CAN CRYPTOCURRENCY OR CRYPTO ASSET BE CLASSIFIED AS CASH?
Ind AS 32 indicates that cash represents the medium of exchange and is, therefore, the basis on which all transactions are measured and recognised in the financial statements. The description of cash in Ind AS 32 suggests that cash is expected to be used as a medium of exchange (i.e., used in exchange for goods or services) and as the monetary unit in pricing goods or services to such an extent that it would be the basis on which all transactions are measured and recognised in financial statements (i.e., it could act as the functional currency of an entity). Currently, it is unlikely that any crypto asset would be considered a suitable basis for measuring and recognising all the items in an entity’s financial statements.

At present, crypto assets are not used as a medium of exchange except for Bitcoins to a very limited extent; however, the acceptance of a crypto asset by a merchant is not mandated in most jurisdictions. While some governments are reported to be considering issuing their own crypto assets or supporting a crypto asset issued by another party, at the time of writing El Salvador is the only country that has passed legislation that treats Bitcoin as legal tender (alongside US dollars).

The price of crypto assets is highly volatile when compared to a basket of fiat currencies. Hence, no major Governments or economic actors have stored their wealth in crypto assets. Crypto assets continue to remain a speculative investment. If, in the future, a crypto asset attains such a high level of acceptance and stability that it exhibits the characteristics of cash, a holder would need to consider whether that crypto asset represents a medium of exchange and unit of account to such an extent that it could act as the basis on which the holder recognises and measures all transactions in its financial statements (i.e., it could act as the functional currency of an entity). In 2019, the IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) confirmed that crypto assets currently do not meet the definition of cash equivalents because they are generally, among other things, not convertible to known amounts of cash, nor are they subject to an insignificant risk of change in value.

CAN CRYPTO ASSETS QUALIFY AS FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS?
Ind AS 32 defines a financial instrument as any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. The first part of the definition of a financial instrument requires the existence of a contract or contractual relationship between parties. A contract is defined by Ind AS 32 as an agreement between two or more parties that has clear economic consequences which the parties have little, if any, discretion to avoid, usually because the agreement is enforceable by law.

Crypto assets generally do not entitle the holder to underlying goods, services or financial instruments and have no identifiable counter-party and consequently would not meet the definition of a contract and qualify as a financial instrument. For example, the individual parties involved in the Bitcoin blockchain do not have a contractual relationship with any other participant in the Bitcoin blockchain. That is, by virtue of owning a Bitcoin, the holder does not have an enforceable claim on Bitcoin miners, exchanges, holders, or any other party. Such holders need to find a willing buyer to realise economic benefits from holding their Bitcoin.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS EQUITY INSTRUMENT?
Ind AS defines an equity instrument as any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all its liabilities. Although the value of a crypto asset may correlate to the popularity of an underlying platform on which it is used, that, by itself, does not represent a contractual right to a residual interest in the net assets of the platform. Therefore, a crypto asset will not qualify as an equity instrument.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS A DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENT?
Ind AS 109 defines a derivative as a financial instrument or other contract within the scope of Ind AS 109 with all three of the following characteristics:
* Its value changes in response to the change in an ‘underlying’ that is not specific to a party to the contract;
* It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors;
* It is settled at a future date.

Crypto assets that are not contractual themselves could still be the subject of a contract, for example, a binding agreement to buy Bitcoin from a certain counter-party would constitute a contract, even though the Bitcoin itself does not represent a contractual relationship. Therefore, agreements entered ‘off the chain’ to buy or sell crypto assets would qualify as contracts.

Some contractual rights to buy or sell non-financial items that can be settled net in cash, or for which the non-financial items are readily convertible to cash, are accounted for as if they were financial instruments (i.e., a derivative). A contractual right to buy or sell crypto assets (e.g., a Bitcoin forward entered with an investment bank) could be a derivative even if the crypto asset itself is not a financial instrument, provided the crypto asset is readily convertible to cash or the contract can be settled net in cash. This is like the accounting for commodity contracts that are held in a trading business model (e.g., forward silver contracts may fall within the scope of Ind AS 109, although silver itself is not a financial instrument).

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS INVENTORY?
Although it is often assumed to be the case, Ind AS 102 does not require inventory to be tangible. The standard defines inventory as an asset:
* Held for sale in the ordinary course of business;
* In the process of production for such sale; or
* In the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in the production process or in the rendering of services.

In practice, crypto assets are generally not used in the production of inventory and, thus, would not be considered materials and supplies to be consumed in the production process. Therefore, to this extent crypto assets do not qualify as an item of inventory.

Crypto assets could also be held for sale in the ordinary course of business, for example, by a commodity broker-trader, in which case it would qualify as an item of inventory. Whether crypto assets are held for sale in the ordinary course of business would depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the holder. Normally, Ind AS 102 requires measurement at the lower of cost and net realisable value. However, commodity broker-traders who acquire and sell crypto assets principally to generate profit from fluctuations in price or broker-traders’ margin have the choice to measure their crypto asset inventories at fair value less costs to sell with any change in fair value less costs to sell being recognised in profit or loss in the period of the change.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS INTANGIBLE ASSETS?
Ind AS 38 defines an asset as ‘a resource controlled by an entity as a result of past events; and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’. Ind AS 38 describes four essential features of an intangible asset:
Control – Control is the power to obtain the future economic benefits of an item while restricting the access of others to those benefits. Control is normally evidenced by legal rights, but Ind AS 38 is clear that they are not required where the entity is able to control access to the economic benefits in another way. Ind AS 38 notes that, in the absence of legal rights, the existence of exchange transactions for similar non-contractual items can provide evidence that the entity is nonetheless able to control the future economic benefits expected.
Future economic benefits – Many crypto assets do not provide a contractual right to economic benefits. Instead, economic benefits are likely to result from a future sale, to a willing buyer, or by exchanging the crypto asset for goods or services.
Lacks physical substance – As crypto assets are digital representations, they are by nature without physical substance.
Identifiable – In order to be identifiable, an intangible asset needs to be separable (capable of being sold or transferred separately from the holder) or result from contractual or other legal rights. As most crypto assets can be freely transferred to a willing buyer, they would generally be considered separable.

Crypto assets generally meet the relatively wide definition of an intangible asset as they are identifiable, lack physical substance, are controlled by the holder, and give rise to future economic benefits for the holder. The IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) confirmed in 2019 that crypto assets would generally qualify as an intangible asset, subject to consideration of detailed facts and circumstances.

CONCLUSION
The accounting of cryptocurrency by holders in most cases would qualify as an intangible asset. However, given the numerous versions of cryptocurrency and other innovations, such as an exchange traded fund of crypto, the accounting conclusion may not be fairly straight forward. One will have to carefully analyse the features and the terms and conditions of the crypto to determine the accounting conclusion. Besides, the accounting would be different for a trader of crypto as against an investor in crypto.

TAXABILITY OF CORPUS DONATIONS RECEIVED BY AN UNREGISTERED TRUST

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 2(24)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 defines income to include voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes. Till Assessment Year 1988-89, this included the phrase ‘not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust’, which was omitted with effect from the A.Y. 1989-90. Section 11(1)(d) of the Act, which was inserted with effect from A.Y. 1989-90, provides for exemption in respect of voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution. However, this exemption applies only when the recipient trust or institution is registered with the income-tax authorities under section 12A or 12AA, as applicable up to 31st March, 2021, or section 12AB as applicable thereafter.

The issue has arisen as to whether such voluntary contributions (referred to as ‘corpus donations’) received by an unregistered trust, not registered u/s 12A or 12AA or 12AB, can be regarded as income taxable in its hands on the ground that it does not qualify for the exemption u/s 11, or in the alternative whether such donations can be regarded as the capital receipt not falling within the scope of income at all.

Several Benches of the Tribunal have taken a view, post-amendment, that a voluntary contribution received by an unregistered trust with a specific direction that it shall form part of its corpus, is a capital receipt and therefore not chargeable to tax at all. As against this, recently, the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal took a view that such a corpus donation would fall within the ambit of income of the trust and hence is includible in its total income.

SHRI SHANKAR BHAGWAN ESTATE’S CASE
The issue had first come up for consideration before the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Shankar Bhagwan Estate vs. ITO (1997) 61 ITD 196.

In this case, two religious endowments were effectuated vide two deeds of endowment dated 30th October, 1989 and 19th June, 1990, respectively, in favour of Shree Ganeshji Maharaj and Shri Shankar Bhagwan by Smt. Krishna Kejriwal. The debutter properties, i.e., estates were christened as ‘Shree Ganeshji Maharaj Estate’ and ‘Shree Shankar Bhagwan Estate’. She constituted herself as the Shebait in respect of the deity. The estates were not registered u/s 12AA as charitable / religious institutions. The returns of income of the two estates for the A.Y. 1991-92 were filed declaring paltry income excluding the donations / gifts received towards the corpus of the estates.

During the course of the assessment proceedings, it was observed from the balance sheet that gifts were received by the estates from various persons. The assessees claimed that the said amounts were received towards the corpus of the endowments and, therefore, could not be taxed. Though the A.O. accepted the fact that the declarations filed by the donors indicated that they have sent moneys through cheques as their contributions to the corpus of the endowments, he held that the receipts were taxable u/s 2(24)(iia). Accordingly, the assessment was made taking the status of the assessees as a private religious trust, as against the status of an individual as claimed by the assessees, and taxing the income of the estates u/s 164, including the amounts received as corpus donations. He also held that the deities should have been consecrated before the endowments for them to be valid in law.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that the provisions of section 2(24)(iia) did not authorise the assessment of the corpus gifts. However, the CIT(A) endorsed the view taken by the A.O. and upheld the assessment of the corpus gifts as income.

Upon further appeal, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee by holding as under –

‘So far as section 2(24)(iia) is concerned, this section has to be read in the context of the introduction of the present section 12. It is significant that section 2(24)(iia) was inserted with effect from 1st April, 1973 simultaneously with the present section 12, both of which were introduced from the said date by the Finance Act, 1972. Section 12 makes it clear by the words appearing in parenthesis that contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution shall not be considered as income of the trust. The Board’s Circular No. 108 dated 20th March, 1973 is extracted at page 1277 of Vol. I of Sampat Iyengar’s Law of Income-tax, 9th Edn. in which the interrelation between section 12 and section 2(24)(iia) has been brought out. Gifts made with clear directions that they shall form part of the corpus of the religious endowment can never be considered as income. In the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust vs. CIT [1988] 172 ITR 373 it was held by the Bombay High Court that even ignoring the amendment to section 12, which means that even before the words appearing in parenthesis in the present section 12, it cannot be held that voluntary contributions specifically received towards the corpus of the trust may be brought to tax. The aforesaid decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case CIT vs. Trustees of Kasturbai Scindia Commission Trust [1991] 189 ITR 5. The position after the amendment is a fortiori. In the present cases, the A.O. on evidence has accepted the fact that all the donations have been received towards the corpus of the endowments. In view of this clear finding, it is not possible to hold that they are to be assessed as income of the assessees. We, therefore, hold that the assessment of the corpus donations cannot be supported.’

The Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee that the voluntary contributions received towards the corpus could not be brought to tax. In deciding the appeal, the Bench also held that the status of the endowments should be ‘individual’ and it was not necessary that the deities should have been consecrated before the endowments, or that the temple should have been constructed prior to the endowments.

Apart from this case, in the following cases a similar view has been taken by the Tribunal that the corpus donation received by an unregistered trust is a capital receipt and not chargeable to tax –

• ITO vs. Smt. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust

  •  For A.Y. 2003-04 – ITA No. 3866/Del/2007, dated 30th January, 2009
  •  For A.Y. 2004-05 – ITA No. 5082/Del/2010, dated 19th January, 2011

ITO vs. Chime Gatsal Ling Monastery [ITA No. 216 to 219 (Chd) of 2012, dated 28th October, 2014]
• ITO vs. Gaudiya Granth Anuved Trust [2014] 48 taxmann.com 348 (Agra-Trib)
• Pentafour Software Employees Welfare Foundation vs. Asstt. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 751 & 752 (Mds) of 2007]
• ITO vs. Hosanna Ministries [2020] 119 taxmann.com 379 (Visakh-Trib)
• Indian Society of Anaesthesiologists vs. ITO (2014) 47 taxmann.com 183 (Chen-Trib)
• J.B. Education Society vs. ACIT [2015] 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd-Trib)
• ITO vs. Vokkaligara Sangha (2015) 44 CCH 509 (Bang–Trib)
• Bank of India Retired Employees Medical Assistance Trust vs. ITO [2018] 96 taxmann.com 277 (Mum-Trib)
• Chandraprabhu Jain Swetamber Mandir vs. ACIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 245 (Mum-Trib)
• ITO vs. Serum Institute of India Research Foundation [2018] 90 taxmann.com 229 (Pune-Trib)

VEERAVEL TRUST’S CASE
Recently, the issue again came up for consideration before the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Veeravel Trust vs. ITO [2021] 129 taxmann.com 358.

In this case, the assessee was a public charitable and religious trust registered under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It was not registered under the Income-tax Act. It had filed its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15, declaring Nil total income. The return of income filed by the assessee had been processed by the CPC, Bengaluru u/s 143(1) and the total income was determined at Rs. 55,82,600 by making additions of donations received amounting to Rs. 55,82,600.

The assessee trust filed an appeal against the intimation issued u/s 143(1) before the CIT(A) and contended that while processing the return u/s 143(1), only prima facie adjustments could be made and no addition could be made for corpus donations. The assessee further contended that corpus donations received by any trust or institution were excluded from the income derived from property held under the trust u/s 11(1)(d) and hence, even though the trust was not registered u/s 12AA, corpus donations could not be included in the income of the trust.

The CIT(A) rejected the contentions of the assessee and held that the condition precedent for claiming exemption u/s 11 was registration of the trust u/s 12AA and hence, in the absence of such registration, exemption claimed towards corpus donations could not be allowed. The CIT(A) relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corpn. vs. Dy. CIT [2008] 297 ITR 1.

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee trust filed a further appeal before the Tribunal and contended that the donations under consideration were received for the specific purpose of construction of building and the said donations have been used for construction of building. Therefore, when donations have been received for specific purpose and such donations have been utilised for the purpose for which they were received, they were capital receipts by nature and did not fall within the scope of income.

The assessee relied upon the following decisions in support of its contentions –

(i) Shree Jain Swetamber Deharshar Upshraya Trust vs. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 264 (Mum) of 2016, dated 15th March, 2017]
(ii) ITO vs. Serum Institute of India Research Foundation [2018] 90 taxmann.com 229 (Pune)
(iii) Bank of India Retired Employees Medical Assistance Trust vs. ITO (Exemption) [2018] 96 taxmann.com 277 (Mum)
(iv) Chandraprabhu Jain Swetamber Mandir vs. Asstt. CIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 245 (Mum)

The Revenue reiterated its stand that in the absence of registration of the trust u/s 12AA, no exemption could be given to it for the corpus donations.

The Tribunal referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and observed that the definition of income u/s 2(24) included voluntary contributions received by any trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purpose; that the provisions of sections 11, 12A and 12AA dealt with taxation of trust or institution and the income of any trust or institution was exempt from tax on compliance with certain conditions; the provisions of section 11(1)(d) excluded voluntary contributions received by a trust, with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution which was subject to the provisions of section 12A, which stated that the provisions of sections 11 and 12 shall not apply in relation to income of any trust or institution, unless such trust or institution fulfilled certain conditions.

The Tribunal held that as per the said section 12A, one of the conditions for claiming benefit of exemption under sections 11 and 12 was registration of the trust as per sub-section (aa) of section 12A; that on a conjoint reading of the provisions, it was very clear that the income of any trust, including voluntary contributions received with a specific direction, was not includible in the total income of the trust, only if such trust was registered u/s 12A / 12AA and the registration was a condition precedent for claiming exemption u/s 11, including for voluntary contributions.

The Tribunal also took support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) wherein it was held that registration u/s 12A was a condition precedent for availing benefit under sections 11 and 12. Insofar as various case laws relied upon by the assessee were concerned, the Tribunal found that none of the Benches of the Tribunal had considered the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) while deciding the issue before them. In this view of the matter, it was held that corpus donations with a specific direction that they form part of the corpus received by the trust which was not registered under sections 12A / 12AA was its income and includible in its total income.

OBSERVATIONS
The issue under consideration is whether the voluntary contribution received by a trust with a specific direction that it shall form part of its corpus can be considered as the ‘income’ of the trust, is a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax, and whether the answer to this question would differ depending upon whether or not the trust was registered with the income-tax authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act.

Sub-clause (iia) was inserted in section 2(24) defining the term ‘income’ by the Finance Act, 1972 with effect from 1st April, 1973. It included the voluntary contribution received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes within the scope of the term ‘income’ with effect from 1st April, 1973. Therefore, firstly, what was the position about taxability of such voluntary contribution prior to that needs to be examined.

The Supreme Court had dealt with this issue of taxability of an ordinary voluntary contribution for the period prior to 1st April, 1973 in the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust [1998] 233 ITR 53 (SC) and it was held that –

Undoubtedly by a subsequent amendment in 1972 to the definition of income under section 2(24), voluntary contributions, not being contributions towards the corpus of such a trust, are included in the definition of ‘income’ of such a religious or charitable trust. Section 12 as amended in 1972 also expressly provides that any voluntary contribution received by a trust for religious or charitable purposes, not being contribution towards the corpus of the trust, shall, for the purpose of section 11, be deemed to be income derived from property held by the trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes. This, however, does not necessarily imply that prior to the amendment of 1972, a voluntary contribution which was not towards the corpus of the receiving trust, was not income of the receiving trust. Even prior to the amendment of 1972, any income received by a religious or charitable trust in the form of a voluntary contribution would be income of the trust, unless such contribution was expressly made towards the corpus of the trust’s fund.

Thus, even prior to the insertion of sub-clause (iia) in the definition of income in section 2(24), the ordinary voluntary contribution received by a religious or charitable trust was regarded as income chargeable to tax and, therefore, no substantial change had occurred due to its specific inclusion in the definition of the term income. At the same time, the position was different as far as a voluntary contribution received towards the corpus was concerned. The settled view was that it was a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The following are some of the cases in which such a view was taken by different High Courts as referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust (Supra) –
• Sri Dwarkadheesh Charitable Trust vs. ITO [1975] 98 ITR 557 (All)
• CIT vs. Vanchi Trust [1981] 127 ITR 227 (Ker)
• CIT vs. Eternal Science of Man’s Society [1981] 128 ITR 456 (Del)
• Sukhdeo Charity Estate vs. CIT [1984] 149 ITR 470 (Raj)
• CIT vs. Shri Billeswara Charitable Trust [1984] 145 ITR 29 (Mad)

The objective of inserting sub-clause (iia) treating voluntary contributions received by a religious or charitable trust specifically as its income in section 2(24) was not to unsettle this position of law as held by the Courts as explained above. Only ordinary voluntary contributions other than those which were received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were brought within the definition of ‘income’, perhaps by way of clarification and removal of doubts. The sub-clause (iia) as it was inserted with effect from 1st April, 1973 is reproduced below –

‘(iia) voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly or partly for such purposes not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution’

Thus, the voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were expressly kept outside the ambit of the term ‘income’ and they continued to be treated as capital receipts not chargeable to tax. This position in law has been expressly confirmed by the Supreme Court in the above quoted paragraph, duly underlined for emphasis, when the Court clearly stated that the said section 2(24)(iia) covered donations not being the contributions towards corpus.

In such a scenario, a question may arise as to what was the purpose of making such an amendment in the Act to include the voluntary contributions (other than corpus donations) within the definition of ‘income’? The answer to this question is available in Circular No. 108 dated 20th March, 1973 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 1973 (as referred in the case of Shri Shankar Bhagwan Estate Supra). The relevant extract from this Circular is reproduced below –

The effect of the modifications at (1) and (2) above would be as follows:
(i) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by private religious trusts will no longer be exempt from income-tax.
(ii) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by a trust for charitable purposes or a charitable institution created or established after 31st March, 1962 (i.e., after the commencement of the Income-tax Act, 1961) will not qualify for exemption from tax if the trust or institution is created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste.
(iii) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by a trust created partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established partly for such purposes will no longer be exempt from income-tax.
(iv) Where the voluntary contributions are received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly for such purposes, such contributions will qualify for exemption from income-tax only if the conditions specified in section 11 regarding application of income or accumulation thereof are satisfied and no part of the income enures and no part of the income or property of the trust or institution is applied for the benefit of persons specified in section 13(3), e.g., author of the trust, founder of the institution, a person who has made substantial contribution to the trust or institution, the relatives of such author, founder, person, etc. In other words, income by way of voluntary contributions will ordinarily qualify for exemption from income-tax only to the extent it is applied to the purposes of the trust during the relevant accounting year or within next three months following. Such charitable or religious trusts will, however, be able to accumulate income from voluntary contributions for future application to charitable or religious purposes for a maximum period up to ten years, without forfeiting exemption from tax, if they comply with certain procedural requirements laid down in section 11 in this behalf. These requirements are that (1) the trust or institution should give notice to the Income-tax Officer, specifying the purpose for which the income is to be accumulated and the period for which the accumulation is proposed to be made, and (2) the income so accumulated should be invested in Government or other approved securities or deposited in post office savings banks, scheduled banks, co-operative banks or approved financial institutions.

Thus, it can be seen from the Circular that the objective of the amendment made with effect from 1st April, 1973 was to make the trust or institution liable to tax on the voluntary contributions received in certain cases like where it has not been applied for the objects of the trust, it has been received by a private religious trust, or it has been received by a trust created for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste and to make the charitable and religious trusts to apply the contributions only on the objects of the trust and to apply for the accumulation thereof where it has not been so utilised before the year-end. In other words, the intention is expressed to regulate voluntary contributions of an ordinary nature.

This position under the law continued till 1st April, 1989 and the issue deliberated in this article could never have arisen till then as the Act itself had provided expressly that the voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus would not be regarded as ‘income’ and, hence, not chargeable to tax. The issue under consideration arose when the law was amended with effect from 1st April, 1989. The Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 deleted the words ‘not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution’ from sub-clause (iia) of section 2(24) with effect from 1st April, 1989.

The Revenue authorities read sub-clause (iia) as amended with effect from 1st April, 1989, in contrast to the erstwhile sub-clause (iia), to hold that even the voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust would be considered as income chargeable to tax subject to the provisions dealing with exemptions upon satisfaction of several conditions, including that of registration of the trust with the income-tax authority.

The aforesaid interpretation of the Revenue is on the basis of the Circular No. 516 dated 15th June, 1988, Circular No. 545 dated 24th September, 1989, Circular No. 549 dated 31st October, 1989 and Circular No. 551 dated 23rd January, 1990 explaining the provisions of the Direct Tax (Amendment) Act, 1987 [as amended by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989]. The relevant extract dealing with the amendment to section 2(24)(iia) is reproduced below –

4.3 Under the old provisions of sub-clause (iia) of clause (24) of section 2 any voluntary contribution received by a charitable or religious trust or institution with a specific direction that it shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution was not included in the income of such trust or institution. Since this provision was being widely used for tax avoidance by giving donations to a trust in the form of corpus donations so as to keep this amount out of the regulatory provisions of sections 11 to 13, the Amending Act, 1987 amended the said sub-clause (iia) of clause (24) of section 2 to secure that all donations received by a charitable or religious trust or institution, including corpus donations, were treated as income of such trust or institution.

Analysing the impact of the amendment, the eminent jurist Mr. Nani Palkhivala, in his commentary Law and Practice of Income Tax page 156 of the 11th edition, has commented:

‘This, however, does not mean that such capital contributions are now taxable as income. Sometimes express exclusion is by way of abundant caution, due to the over-anxiety of the draftsman to make the position clear beyond doubt. But in such a case, the later omission of such express exclusion does not necessarily involve a change in the legal position. Section 12 still provides that voluntary contributions specifically made to the corpus of a charitable trust are not deemed to be income, and the same exclusion must be read as implicit in section 2(24)(ii-a). It would be truly absurd to expect a charitable trust to disburse as income any amount in breach of the donor’s specific direction to hold it as corpus; such breach in many cases would involve depriving charity of the benefit of acquiring a lasting asset intended by the donor. Under this sub-clause, only voluntary contributions received by such institutions as are specified therein are taxable as income. A voluntary contribution received by an institution not covered in this sub-clause is not taxable as income.’

Further, in the commentary on section 12(1), page 688 of the same edition, it is stated:

‘The correct legal position is as under:
(i) All contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust are capital receipts in the hands of the trust. They are not income either under the general law or under section 2(24)(ii-a).
(ii) Section 2(24)(ii-a) deems revenue contributions to be income of the trust. It thereby prevents the trust from claiming exemption under general law on the ground that such contributions stand on the same footing as gifts and are therefore not taxable.
(iii) Section 12 goes one step further and deems such revenue contributions to be income derived from property held under trust. It thereby makes applicable to such contributions all the conditions and restrictions under sections 11 and 13 for claiming exemption.
(iv) Section 11(1)(d) specifically grants exemption to capital contributions to make the fact of non-taxability clear beyond doubt. But it proceeds on the erroneous assumption that such contributions are of income nature – income in the form of voluntary contributions. This assumption should be disregarded.’

This supports the argument that corpus donations are capital receipts, which are not in the nature of income at all.

Taking a view as is canvassed by the Revenue would tantamount to interpreting a law in a manner that holds that where an exemption has been expressly provided for any income, then it needs to be presumed that in the absence of the specific provision the income is taxable otherwise; such a view also means that any receipt that is not expressly and specifically exempted is always taxable; that a deletion of an express admission of the exemption, as is the case under consideration, would automatically lead to its taxation irrespective of the position in law that such receipt even before introduction of the express provision for exempting it was never taxable. In this regard, a reference may be made to the decision in the case of CIT vs. Shaw Wallace 6 ITC 178 (PC) wherein it was held as under –

‘15. Some reliance has been placed in argument upon section 4(3)(v) which appears to suggest that the word “income” in this Act may have a wider significance than would ordinarily be attributed to it. The sub-section says that the Act “shall not apply to the following classes of income,” and in the category that follows, Clause (v) runs:
Any capital sum received in commutation of the whole or a portion of a pension, or in the nature of consolidated compensation for death or injuries, or in payment of any insurance policy, or as the accumulated balance at the credit of a subscriber to any such Provident Fund.
16. Their Lordships do not think that any of these sums, apart from their exemption, could be regarded in any scheme of taxation of income, and they think that the clause must be due to the over-anxiety of the draftsman to make this clear beyond possibility of doubt. They cannot construe it as enlarging the word “income” so as to include receipts of any kind, which are not specially exempted. They do not think that the clause is of any assistance to the appellant.’

Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in the case of International Instruments (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [1982] 133 ITR 283 held that a receipt which is not an income does not become income, for the years before its inclusion, just because it is later on included as one of the items exempted from income-tax. Thus, it was held that merely because the exemption has been provided it cannot be presumed that it would necessarily be taxable otherwise. Similarly, merely because the voluntary contributions which were capital in nature otherwise were specifically excluded from the definition of income, it cannot be presumed that they were otherwise falling within the definition of income. The Courts in several cases had already held that such voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they should be forming part of the corpus are receipt of capital nature and not income chargeable to tax. In view of this, the omission of a specific exclusion, w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, provided to it from the definition of income till the date, should not be considered as sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term ‘income’ so as to make it chargeable to tax from the date of the amendment.

All the decisions cited above, wherein a favourable view has been taken, have been rendered for the A.Ys. beginning from 1st April, 1989 onwards post amendment in sub-clause (iia) of section 2(24). Reliance was placed by the Revenue, in these cases, on the amended definition of income provided in section 2(24)(iia) and yet the Tribunals took a view that the corpus donations did not fall within the scope of term ‘income’ as they were capital receipts and, hence, the fact that the exemption otherwise provided in section 11(1)(d) was not available due to non-registration, though argued, was not considered to be relevant at all.

In the case of Smt. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust, the matter pertaining to A.Y. 2003-04 had travelled to the Delhi High Court and the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed by the High Court (ITA 927/2009, order dated 23rd September, 2009), by taking a view that the donations received towards the corpus of the trust would be capital receipt and not revenue receipt chargeable to tax. The further appeal of the Revenue before the Supreme Court has also been dismissed by an order dated 17th September, 2018, though on account of low tax effect. Therefore, the view as adopted in these cases should be preferred, irrespective of the amendment made with effect from 1st April, 1989.

The Chennai Bench of the Tribunal has disagreed with the decisions of the other Benches taking a favourable view which were cited before it, on the ground that the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) had not been considered therein. Nothing could have turned otherwise even if the Tribunal, in favourably deciding those cases, had examined the relevance of the Supreme Court decision. On a bare reading of the decision, it is clear that the facts in the said case related to an issue whether the corporation in question was a local authority or not and, of course, also whether an assessee claiming exemption u/s 11 should have been registered under the Income-tax Act or not. The Court was pleased to hold that an assessee should be registered for it being eligible to claim the exemption of income u/s 11. The issue in that case was not related to exemption for the corpus donation at all and the Court was never asked whether such a donation was exempted or not because of non-registration of the corporation under the Act in that regard.

With utmost respect, one fails to understand how this important fact was not comprehended by the Chennai Bench. The Bench was seriously mistaken in applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision which has no application to the facts of the case before it. The issue in the case before the Bench was whether receipt of a corpus donation was a capital receipt or not which was not liable to tax in respect of such a receipt, not due to application of section 11, but on application of the general law of taxation which cannot tax a receipt that is not in the nature of income. Veeravel Trust may explore the possibility of filing a Miscellaneous Application seeking rectification of the order.

The issue under consideration here and the issue that was before the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation were distinguished by the Bengaluru Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vokkaligara Sangha (Supra) as follows –

‘5.3.6 Before looking into the facts of the case, we notice that Revenue has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation & Another vs. DCIT reported in 297 ITR 1 (SC). According to the aforesaid decision, registration under section 12AA of the Act is mandatory for availing the benefits under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. However, the question that arises for our consideration in the case on hand is not the benefit under sections 11 and 12 of the Act, but rather whether voluntary contributions are income at all. Thus, with due respects, the aforesaid decision, in our view, would not be of any help to Revenue in the case on hand.’

The Chennai Bench, with due respect, has looked at the issue from the perspective of exemption u/s 11(1)(d). Had it been called upon to specifically adjudicate the issue as to whether the corpus donation was an income at all in the first place, and not an exemption u/s 11, the view could have been different.

Further, if a view is taken that the corpus donations received by a religious or charitable trust would be regarded as income under sub-clause (iia), then it will result in a scenario whereunder treatment of corpus donations would differ depending upon the type of entity which is receiving such corpus donations. If they are received by a religious or charitable trust or institution then it would be regarded as income, but if they are received by any other entity then it would not fall under sub-clause (iia) so as to treat it as income, subject, of course, to the other provisions of the Act.

In the case of CIT vs. S.R.M.T. Staff Association [1996] 221 ITR 234 (AP), the High Court held that only when the voluntary contributions were received by the entities referred to in sub-clause (iia), such receipts would fall within the definition of income and the receipts by entities other than the specified trusts and associations would not be liable to tax on application of sub-clause (iia). In the case of Pentafour Software Employees Welfare Foundation (Supra), a case where the assessee was a company incorporated u/s 25 of the Companies Act, the Madras High Court in the context of the taxability or otherwise of the corpus donations, held that the receipt was not taxable, more so where it was received by a company. An interpretation which results in an illogical conclusion should be avoided.

Reference can also be made to the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2017 wherein, while explaining the rationale of inserting Explanation 2 to section 11(1), it was mentioned that a corpus donation is not considered as income of the recipient trust. The relevant extract from the Memorandum is reproduced below –

‘However, donation given by these exempt entities to another exempt entity, with specific direction that it shall form part of corpus, is though considered application of income in the hands of donor trust but is not considered as income of the recipient trust. Trusts, thus, engage in giving corpus donations without actual applications.’

The issue may arise as to why a specific exemption is provided to such corpus donations under section 11(1)(d) which applies only when the trust or institution receiving such donations satisfies all the applicable conditions, including that of registration with the income-tax authorities. In this regard, as explained by Mr. Palkhivala in the commentary referred to above, this specific exemption should be regarded as having been provided out of abundant caution though not warranted, as such corpus donations could not have been regarded as income in the first place.

The Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1st April, 2022 requires that such voluntary contributions are invested or deposited in one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpuses. In our view, the amendment stipulates a condition for those who are seeking an exemption u/s 11 of the Act but for those who hold that the receipt of the corpus donation at the threshold itself is not taxable in view of the receipt being of a capital nature, need not be impressed by the amendment; a non-taxable receipt cannot be taxed for non-compliance of a condition not intended to apply to a capital receipt.

In any case, if there exist divergent views on the issue as to whether or not a particular receipt can be regarded as income, then a view in favour of the assessee needs to be preferred.

It may be noted that in one of the above-referred decisions (Serum Institute of India Research Foundation), the Department had made an argument that such corpus donations received by an unregistered trust be brought to tax u/s 56(2). The Tribunal, however, decided the matter in favour of the assessee, on the ground of judicial discipline, following the earlier Tribunal and High Court decisions.

The better view is therefore that corpus donations received by a charitable or religious trust, registered or unregistered, are a capital receipt, not chargeable to income-tax at all.

An assessment order which does not comply with the mandatory procedure laid down in section 144C is non-est and an order u/s 263 revising such an order is a nullity as a non-est order cannot be a subject matter of revision u/s 263

14 Manorama Devi Jaiswal vs. ITO [TS-1054-ITAT-2021 (Kol)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th November, 2021 Sections: 144C, 263

An assessment order which does not comply with the mandatory procedure laid down in section 144C is non-est and an order u/s 263 revising such an order is a nullity as a non-est order cannot be a subject matter of revision u/s 263

FACTS
In the case of the assessee, the PCIT passed an order u/s 263 wherein he stated that since before completion of final assessment a draft assessment order should have been served on the assessee as per the mandatory provision of section 144C and which the A.O. had not complied with, therefore the assessment order passed by him on 25th September, 2017 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it challenged the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction assumed by the PCIT.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Coordinate Bench has in the case of Mohan Jute Bags Mfg. Co. vs. PCIT [ITA No. 416/Kol/2020; A.Y. 2014-15] held that ‘…the A.O.’s omission to frame draft assessment order breached the Rule of Law and consequently, his non-action to frame draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order was in contravention of the mandatory provision of law as stipulated in section 144C of the Act, consequently his action is arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power which offends Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore an action made without jurisdiction and ergo the assessment order dated 25th September, 2017 is null in the eyes of law and therefore is non-est.’

The Tribunal held that since the mandatory provision of law stipulated in section 144C was not complied with, the assessment order itself becomes a nullity in the eyes of the law and therefore is non-est. When the foundation itself for the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 does not exist, that in this case the assessment order itself is non-est, in such a scenario the PCIT could not have exercised his revisionary jurisdiction in respect of a null and void assessment order. The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the PCIT is also a nullity. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Whether loss of current year can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue which cannot be rectified u/s 154 Interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ in section 115BBD to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue

13 Rakesh Kumar Pandita vs. ACIT [TS-1002-ITAT-2021 (Del)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 Sections: 115BBD, 154

Whether loss of current year can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue which cannot be rectified u/s 154

Interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ in section 115BBD to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue

FACTS
The assessee company filed its return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 declaring a total income of Rs. 26,26,860. The return was processed u/s 143(1) and the total income was determined to be Rs. 31,51,660. In the intimation though the loss of current year adjusted was mentioned at Rs. 22,53,768, the same was not adjusted while computing the total income assessed. The assessee filed an application for rectification u/s 154.

The A.O. was of the opinion that since the assessee has declared income u/s 115BBD and calculated the tax at the special rate of 15%, the same cannot be set off against losses. He accordingly rejected the application made by the assessee u/s 154.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the question whether current year loss can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue and a debatable issue cannot be rectified u/s 154.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in the intimation the loss of the current year has been mentioned at Rs. 22,53,768 and that the assessee has returned income in respect of dividend received from a foreign company u/s 115BBD. It noted that as per sub-section (2), no deduction in respect of expenditure or allowance should be allowed to the assessee under any provision of the Act in computing its income by way of dividends referred to in sub-section (1). The interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

NOCLAR (NON-COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS) REPORTING

EMERGENCE OF NOCLAR
In the course of providing professional services to clients or carrying out professional activities for an employer, a Professional Accountant (PA) may come across an instance of Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR), or suspected NOCLAR committed, or about to be committed, by the client or the employer.

Recognising that such situations can often be difficult and stressful for the PAs, and accepting that he or she has a prima facie ethical responsibility not to turn a blind eye to the matter, NOCLAR was introduced to help and guide the PAs in dealing with such situations and in deciding how best to serve the public interest in these circumstances.

Considering the above, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) had made revisions to the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants to define their professional responsibility in relation to NOCLAR in the year 2017.

ICAI, being a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), has considered the revisions made by IESBA in the revised 12th edition of the Code of Ethics which has come into effect from 1st July, 2020 for its members. The Council of ICAI has decided that the provisions, namely, Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR) (Sections 260 and 360), contained in Volume I of the Code of Ethics, 2019, the applicability of which was deferred earlier, be made applicable and effective from 1st April, 2022.

These NOCLAR provisions, as introduced by ICAI, provide detailed guidance in assessing the implications for PAs on any actual or suspected non-compliances of laws and regulations and the possible course of action while responding to them. These provisions primarily cover the non-compliance with laws and regulations that may have an effect on:
a. the determination of material amounts and disclosures in the financial statements;
b. the compliances that may be fundamental to the entity’s business and operations, or to avoid material penalties.

Examples of laws and regulations

 
                    
Examples of other laws and regulations for consideration of PAs while evaluating NOCLAR
1) The real estate sector has remained widely unorganised till the introduction of The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (‘RERA’). Just as while discharging the duty of statutory auditor, for instance under the Companies Act, the auditor shall now be required to coordinate with the RERA professionals and also would require working knowledge of the RERA law to understand the Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR).
2) Impact due to Non-Compliance of Foreign Exchange Management Act law will also be covered in the above NOCLAR reporting.
3) Applicability of PF and ESIC laws – based on crossing prescribed number of employees / staff and compliance pertaining to the same.
4) Schedule III Disclosure and Compliance relating to relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Companies Act, 2013 have been complied for transactions of advanced or loaned or invested funds and vice versa and the transactions are not violative of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
5) In case of regulated entities, the Regulations often require direct reporting to the Regulator (RBI directions in case of banks & NBFCs).

The PA should be more alert in case of susceptible industries, such as banks, diamond companies, the IT industry, the financial sector, hazardous Industries and companies dealing in cryptocurrencies.

The broad objectives of PAs in relation to NOCLAR are:
a. to comply with the principles of integrity and professional behaviour;
b. to alert management or where appropriate Those Charged with Governance (TCWG) of the client or employer, to enable them to rectify, remediate and mitigate the consequences of the identified or suspected non-compliance or deter the commission of the non-compliance where it has not yet occurred; and
c. to take such further action as appropriate in public interest.

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
Although the purpose of introducing NOCLAR was to provide assistance to PAs, for all their professional engagements, in case there is suspected or actual non-compliance of law and regulations, ICAI has at present made it effective only on:
a. auditors doing audit assignments of listed entities; and
b. employees of listed entities.

Further, the following matters are not included in the scope of NOCLAR:
1. Matters clearly inconsequential – Whether a matter is clearly inconsequential is to be judged with respect to its nature and its impact, financial or otherwise, on the employing organisation, its stakeholders and the general public. For instance, trying to cajole a traffic officer to ignore penalties for traffic violation;
2. Personal misconduct unrelated to the business activities of the client or employer – such as a top employee getting drunk or driving under the influence of alcohol;
3. Non-compliance other than by the client or employer, or those charged with governance, management – for example, circumstances where a professional accountant has been engaged by a client for conducting a due diligence assignment on a third-party entity and the identified or suspected non-compliance has been committed by that third party.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

The ICAI, in its Code of Ethics-Revised 2019, has introduced new guidance for NOCLAR via section 360 for members in practice and section 260 for members in employment. Both these sections are further discussed in detail below:

Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations during the course of Audit Engagements of Listed Entities – SECTION 360
The professional accountants will have to get ready for higher responsibility to identify and report violations which they come across while performing their work. Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations comprises acts of omission or commission, intentional or unintentional, which are contrary to the prevailing laws or regulations committed by the client, those charged with governance of a client, management of a client or other individuals working for or under the direction of a client. When encountering such non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the accountant shall obtain an understanding of those legal or regulatory provisions and comply with them, including any requirement to report the matter to an appropriate authority and any prohibition of alerting the client, for example, pursuant to anti-money laundering legislation.

Management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, is responsible for ensuring that the client’s business activities are conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations. Usually, corporates have an internal legal, compliance / tax department and also a team of internal / external legal counsel who assist management in complying with laws and regulations and compliances applicable to the company. The company may implement various policies and procedures like monitoring legal requirements and ensuring that operating procedures are designed to meet those requirements. Once the appropriate systems of internal control are operative, it will assist in prevention and detection of non-compliance with laws and regulations. In larger entities these policies may be supplemented by assigning responsibilities to the internal audit / audit committee / compliance function. Non-compliance might result in fines, litigation or other consequences for the client, potentially materially affecting its financial statements. Importantly, such non-compliance might have wider public interest implications in terms of potentially substantial harm to investors, creditors, employees or the general public. Examples of these include the perpetration of a fraud resulting in significant financial losses to investors and breaches of environmental laws and regulations, endangering the health or safety of the employees or the public. The auditor will have to suitably change the engagement letter going forward considering the new responsibilities on management and those charged with governance pertaining to NOCLAR.

When a PA in public practice becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following points are to be considered:
a) Obtain understanding of the matter (nature of the act and the circumstances), discuss it with management and where appropriate TCWG may seek legal counsel;
b) Addressing the matter (rectify, remediate, mitigate, deter, disclose);
c) Check whether management and TCWG understand their legal or regulatory responsibilities;
d) Communication with respect to groups (for financial statement audit);
e) Determining whether further action is needed (timely response, appropriate steps taken by the entity and based on professional judgment by the PA), consulting on a confidential basis with the Institute;
f) Determine whether to disclose the matter to the appropriate authority; and
g) Documentation of the matter.

The PA might determine that disclosure to an appropriate authority is an appropriate course of action in the following scenario:
• The entity is engaged in bribery (for example, of local or foreign government officials for purposes of securing large contracts);
• The entity is regulated and the matter is of such significance as to threaten its license to operate;
• The entity is listed on a securities exchange and the matter might result in adverse consequences to the fair and orderly market in the entity’s securities or pose a systemic risk to the financial markets;
• It is likely that the entity would sell products that are harmful to public health or safety;
• The entity is promoting a scheme to its clients to assist them in evading taxes.

The documentation for compliance related to ethical standards is in addition to complying with the documentation requirements under applicable auditing standards. In relation to non-compliance or suspected non-compliance that falls within the scope of this section, the professional accountant shall document in detail how his responsibility to act in public interest has been met.

Withdrawing from the engagement and the professional relationship is not a substitute for taking other actions that might be needed to achieve the professional accountant’s objectives under this section. However, there might be limitations as to the further actions available to the accountant. In such circumstances, withdrawal might be the only available course of action. The auditor may also refer to the Implementation Guide on Resignation / Withdrawal from an Engagement to Perform Audit of Financial Statements issued by the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board.

Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations in case of Employment with Listed Entities – SECTION 260
It is the responsibility of employing organisations’ management and those charged with governance to ensure that their business activities are conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations and to identity and address any non-compliance. Non-compliance with laws and regulations comprises acts of omission or commission, intentional or unintentional, which are contrary to prevailing laws or regulations committed by the following parties:
a) The professional accountant’s employing organisation;
b) Those charged with governance of the employing organisation;
c) Management of the employing organisation; or
d) Other individuals working for or under the direction of the employing organisation.

When encountering such non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the accountant shall obtain an understanding of those legal or regulatory provisions and comply with them, including any requirement to report the matter to an appropriate authority and any prohibition on alerting the relevant party.

If organisations have established protocols and procedures regarding how non-compliance or suspected non-compliance should be raised internally, the PA shall consider them in determining how to respond on timely basis to such non-compliance. For instance, the Ethics Policy or internal whistle-blowing mechanism. The Securities and Exchange Board of India decided recently to increase the maximum reward for whistle-blowers from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 10 crores. Such protocols and procedures might allow matters to be reported anonymously through designated channels. Under CARO 2020, the auditor is required to report whether he has considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during the year by the company. The auditor should be mindful while performing the procedures under this clause and consider complaints received under the whistle-blower mechanism. The auditor should consider whether additional procedures are required to be performed under SA 240 in this regard.

When a senior PA in service becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following steps are to be taken:
a. Obtaining an understanding of the matter,
b. Addressing the matter,
c. Determining whether further action is needed,
d. Seeking advice,
e. Determining whether to disclose the matter to the appropriate authority – and the different scenarios, and
f. Documentation.

Senior professional accountants in service (SPAs) are Directors, officers or senior employees able to exert significant influence over, and make decisions regarding, the acquisition, deployment and control of the employing organisation’s human, financial, technological, physical and intangible resources.

Resigning from the employing organisation is not a substitute for taking other actions that might be needed to achieve the SPA’s objectives under this section. However, there might be limitations as to the further actions available to the accountant. In such circumstances, resignation might be the only available course of action.

When a Professional Accountant in service becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following steps are to be taken:
? Subject to established protocols and procedures, inform an immediate superior to enable the superior to take appropriate action;
? If the PA’s immediate superior appears to be involved in the matter, inform the next higher level of authority within the organisation;
? In exceptional circumstances, the PA may decide that disclosure of the matter to the appropriate authority is an appropriate course of action;
? Documentation of the matter, results of discussions, response by superior/s, course of action, the judgments made and the decisions that were taken.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN SA 250 AND NOCLAR
SA 250 requires the auditors to assess the financial implications on the financial statements in case there is a non-compliance of laws and regulations, which is equally applicable in case of NOCLAR. However, section 360 of the Code of Ethics requires the auditor to assess wider public interest implications, in case there is  NOCLAR in terms of potential harm to all the stakeholders of the company, whether financial or non-financial.

Further, SA 250 is required to be complied with by the auditors while doing the audit of entities, whether public or private, whereas NOCLAR is applicable to the audit of listed companies and to the PAs who are under employment of a listed entity.

THE BOTTOM LINE
NOCLAR would require organisations to make their compliances more robust from a financial statement disclosure perspective. If the violation is not appropriately reported, it may attract disciplinary action against the professional accountant. The reporting of NOCLAR is part of the global push towards greater accountability. Considering the various kinds of reporting involved, this might translate into more instances of whistle-blowing.  

CHANGE IS CONSTANT

It’s funny how day by day nothing changes. But when you look back, everything is different – C.S. Lewis

In this series of articles, we have covered various aspects of the ‘Digital Workplace’ and how the world is moving with technology. What had seemed impossible is becoming routine and what was routine is now changing. The world has moved on from going to the office daily to staying at home and managing work using whatever technology is available to ensure that, first and foremost, we remain safe. But with the steady re-opening of the economy, we are again changing our habits and people have started returning to the routine of the pre-pandemic era. Working at office has come a full circle now, from WFH being mainstream, and to WFO (Working from Office) once again becoming mainstream. But while most things have gone back to the pre-pandemic era, there are many things that have changed in the pre- and post-pandemic times. While the ‘Digital Workplace’ is not the ideal way of working at present, technology is constantly improving.

In this concluding article on ‘Digital Workplace’ we highlight three important points that everyone needs to consider to find the right balance between ‘Traditional Workplace’ vis a vis the ‘Digital Workplace’ and ways to prepare for the ‘Future of Digital Offices’.

1. Evaluate worker preferences carefully: Flexible office instead of a fixed and traditional way of working
Yes, the benefits of having an office and the entire team working together are unparalleled. Despite all the talk about ‘Virtual Offices’, we have still not reached a level where virtual offices can replace the existing office with people around us. There are numerous benefits of having the place to work, yet, such offices are not without their own limitations. Travelling to the
office is still the biggest challenge. In fact, the average Indian spends around 7%1 of her time daily in just travelling from home to office. Also, this number can go significantly higher when it comes to travelling in cities like Mumbai with limited public transport
facilities.

While everyone has accepted the importance of the office and travelling to it daily, no one can deny the fact that it does not hurt if employees or even promoters are not able to travel to office daily for the entire year. The existing technology supports such smaller breaks easily. For example, working from somewhere in the mountains once a year while enjoying weekends to ensure that you just don’t have to cancel your trip for a day or two’s work, or simply working while travelling, more popularly known as ‘Staycation’.

How many of you have faced a situation where a good employee has had to leave the office just because he / she has shifted to another city? While earlier it might not have been possible, today, an office can create an exemption and let a person work from home or just give some flexible working hours and WFH specially to female employees who face difficult times to work full time but have performed well in the past.

To make sure your plans align with what your team wants, find workable compromises:
* Avoid tensions that can sour your culture, have important but hard conversations with the team and conduct surveys to discover what most people prefer to do;
* Consider whether allowing your remote workers to stay at home would create a practical or financial burden;
* If remaining at home benefits employees’ mental or physical health, or their overall productivity, consider allowing them to maintain their current set-up.

Most companies have been vague about their plans or haven’t discussed them at all, which has resulted in bigger issues as many employees feel that their employers are disconnected from the reality.

2. Review consumer behaviours: Video calls over travelling
During the pandemic, consumers drastically changed their behaviour, spiking e-commerce and adapting to options like no-contact pickup and pay. As McKinsey & Company points out, this has shifted many of their long-term expectations and companies are having to account for that shift in how they operate and what they offer.

One such change was the most common realisation of 2020 amongst all of us that we do not always need to travel to the client’s place for a meeting and that it can be done with a video call. While this was good till it lasted, gradually we are moving back to the pre-pandemic era and we may see travel increasing again. However, the learnings of the year 2020 should not be wasted completely. With travelling permitted, we may prefer to visit and meet people again, but perhaps many such meetings can be replaced with video calls thanks to Zoom, Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, etc.

But consumers and your team are interconnected. When your workers are happy to buy into your vision, they work better and provide better service so that customers are happy, too. It’s a simple cycle perpetuated by good business practices. Additionally, companies that identify emerging opportunities and provide great empathy during times of change often navigate the change most successfully. So rather than shifting drastically between old and new methods, a business that will evaluate
the situation and review consumer behaviour will gain over others.

3. Capitalise on emerging and proven technologies: Soft copies of records and online documentation over physical files
Prior to Covid-19, companies were using a slew of incredible technologies to stay productive and connected. But the pandemic elevated these technologies and helped leaders understand their importance. Prior to the pandemic, the common office working trait of everyone meant the use of excessive paper and traditionally offices gave a feeling of drowning in paper! People at office love paper and hard copies from every work they do from chairing and attending meetings, to sharing and approving documents, filling forms and so on. In fact, now we use scanning and digital copies, yet paper is often used as the first resort rather than the last. Most of the old physical files which hold a lot of significance psychologically are not actually required regularly. In fact, many people never even opened a file even once during the pandemic and have learned to manage with digital data. The pandemic has helped us to fast-forward ten years into digital adoption in our businesses! Our familiarity with digital files vis a vis physical files has increased significantly.

As the pandemic is coming under control and we move through re-opening, businesses have choices about how to proceed. But how people lived and worked during the crisis will continue to have an influence on how we live and work in the years to come. There is a new, positive mentality emerging that it’s okay to use cutting-edge technology to serve customers better and create a happier, decentralised workforce. Adapting to this new way of thinking will allow you to stay ahead of the pack, but remember that every company is different and there’s no one-size-fits-all solution to anything. To create post-pandemic plans that truly lead you to success, evaluate your own situation and goals. The digital office is here to stay and offers incredible power in all kinds of industries, but how you shape it is entirely up to you.

It is time for us to start moving towards digital adoption of the working system instead of simply accepting what is the traditional system of working with paper. Though we have to agree that nothing will replace physical files and there is always going to be the risk of hacking, system crashing, non-availability of electricity or internet, but… The physical files may be used as a backup but gradually our dependency on them is reducing, so why not start transforming our old physical records into digital ones?

This move may not look that significant today but imagine the music record companies which have moved all their songs into a USB drive or uploaded them on Youtube when it was available. Keeping apace with technology is the only way to survive else we all know what happened to the likes of Kodak, Nokia, etc., all of which had a monopoly. (Kodak was sold for one dollar!)

CONCLUSION
Many things have changed over the last one and a half years, but overall we may not really feel how fast they have been changing around us and even in business on a daily basis. However, there are a lot of things which are improving for the better and as a business if we don’t adopt, we will be at a loss against other businesses who will implement automation and other technology-based features and the one that does not change will feel as if it is working with pen and paper during the time of Excel Calculation.

With this article, we wrap up the ‘Digital Workplace’ series. You can read our last three articles printed in the BCAJ as below:
(1) Digital Workplace – A Stitch In Time Saves Nine (August, 2021);
(2) Digital Workplace – When All Roads Lead To Rome (September, 2021);
(3) Digital Workplace – Finding The Right Balance (October, 2021)

MLI SERIES -ARTICLE 10 – ANTI-ABUSE RULE FOR PEs SITUATED IN THIRD JURISDICTIONS (Part 1)

The authors of the earlier articles in the MLI Series have covered various facets of the Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’) such as the background and application of the MLI and various other specific articles in the MLI relating to dual resident entities, treaty abuse, transparent entities and method of elimination of double taxation. In this two-part article, the authors attempt to analyse Article 10 of the MLI relating to the anti-abuse rule for Permanent Establishments (‘PEs’) situated in third jurisdictions and some of the intricacies related therein. The first part of this article lays down the background for the introduction of this anti-avoidance rule, the broad structure of the rule, some of the issues arising in its interpretation and the interplay of this rule with the other articles of the MLI and other anti-avoidance measures.

1. BACKGROUND
At the outset, one admits that very limited literature is available in respect of this anti-abuse rule as most discussions on the MLI, at least in the Indian context, focus on the Principal Purpose Test (‘PPT’) and the amendments to the rules relating to the constitution of a PE. However, the anti-abuse rule for PEs situated in third jurisdictions can have significant implications, especially for an Indian payer undertaking compliance u/s 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), given the amount of information required to apply this rule.

Under this rule, the Source State can deny treaty benefits to taxpayers on certain conditions being triggered. Such treaty benefits can be in the form of a lower rate of tax (as in the case of dividends, royalty, fees for technical services) or in the form of narrower scope (such as the narrower definition of royalty under the treaty or the make-available clause). Therefore, when one is undertaking compliance u/s 195, one would need to evaluate the impact of this rule.

While a detailed evaluation of the impact on India has been provided subsequently in this article, before one undertakes an analysis of the anti-abuse rule it is important to understand how the taxation works in the case of a PE in a third state, i.e., in triangular situations and the abuse of treaty provisions that this rule seeks to address.

1.1 Basic structure and taxation before application of the said rule
For the purpose of this article, let us take a base example of interest income earned by A Co, a resident of State R, from money lent to an entity in State S and such income earned is attributable to the PE (say a branch) of A Co in the State PE as it is effectively connected with the activities of the PE. A diagrammatic example of the said structure is provided below:

 

In this particular fact pattern, State S being the country of source would have a right to tax the interest. However, such right may be restricted by the application of the R-S DTAA, particularly the article dealing with interest. If the article on interest in the R-S DTAA is similar to that in the OECD Model Convention1, interest arising in State S payable to a resident of State R, who is the beneficial owner of the income, can be taxed in State S but not at a rate exceeding 15% of the gross amount of the interest.

 

1   Unless specifically
provided, the OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentary referred to in this
article is the 2017 version

Now, State PE, being the country in which the PE of A Co is constituted, will have the right to tax the income of the PE in accordance with the domestic tax laws and in the manner provided in the article dealing with business profits of the R-PE DTAA.

Further, while State PE would tax the profits of the PE, one would apply the non-discrimination article in the R-PE DTAA which generally provides that the taxation of a PE in a particular jurisdiction (State PE in this case) shall not be less favourable than that of a resident of that jurisdiction (State PE). This particular clause in the article would enable one to treat the PE as akin to a resident of State PE and therefore would be eligible to claim the foreign tax credit in State PE for taxes paid in State S2. The OECD Model is silent on whether State PE shall provide credit under domestic tax law or whether it would restrict the credit under the DTAA between State PE and State S. This issue of tax credit, not being directly related to the subject matter of this article, has not been dealt with in detail.

State R being the country of residence, would tax the income of the residence and provide credit for the taxes paid in State S as well as State PE in accordance with the R-S and the R-PE DTAAs.

1.2 Use of structure for aggressive tax planning
Many multinationals use the triangular structure to transfer assets to a jurisdiction which has a low tax rate for PEs and where the residence state provides an exemption for profits of the PE. These structures were typically common in European jurisdictions such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

A common example is of the finance branch set up by a Luxembourg entity in Switzerland3. In this fact pattern, a Luxembourg entity would set up a branch in Switzerland for providing finance to all the group entities all over the world. Given the fact that a finance branch only required movement of the funds, it was fairly easy to set up the structure wherein the funds obtained by the Luxembourg entity (A Co) would be lent to its branch in Switzerland. This finance branch would then lend funds to all the operating group entities around the world acting as the bank of the group and earning interest. Interest paid by the operating entities would be deductible in the hands of the paying entity and taxed in the country of source in accordance with the DTAA between that jurisdiction and Luxembourg. Further, the Swiss branch, constituting a PE in Switzerland, would be subject to very low taxation in accordance with the domestic tax law in Switzerland.

 

2   Refer para 67 of the OECD
Model Commentary on Article 24

3   J-P. Van West, Chapter 1:
Introduction to PE Triangular Cases and Article 29(8) of the OECD Model in The
Anti-Abuse Rule for Permanent Establishments Situated in Third States: A Legal
Analysis of Article 29(8) OECD Model (IBFD 2020), Books IBFD (accessed 16th
November, 2021)

Moreover, the Luxembourg-Swiss DTAA provides that in the case of a PE in a Contracting State, the Resident State (State R) will relieve double taxation by using the exemption method (and not the tax credit method as is generally prevalent in the Indian tax treaties), i.e., the Resident State (State R) would not tax the profits attributable to a PE in the other State. Therefore, the profits attributable to the Swiss branch of A Co would be exempt from tax in Luxembourg.

This would result in the interest being taxed in the country of source (with a deduction for the interest paid in the hands of the payer in the country of source) at a concessional treaty rate, very low tax in the country where the PE is constituted, i.e., Switzerland and no tax in the country of residence, i.e., Luxembourg by virtue of the exemption method followed in the Luxembourg-Swiss DTAA.

Like interest, one could also transfer other assets which resulted in passive income such as shares and intangible assets, resulting in a low tax incidence on the dividend and royalty income, respectively.

Let’s take the example of India, where a resident of Luxembourg invests in the shares of an Indian company through a PE situated in Switzerland. In such a scenario, India would tax the dividend at the rate of 10% due to the India-Luxembourg DTAA (as against 20% under the Act), Switzerland may tax the income attributable to the PE at a low rate and Luxembourg would not tax the income in accordance with the Luxembourg-Switzerland DTAA.

The OECD, recognising the use of PE to artificially apply lower tax rates, attempted to tackle this in the OECD Model Convention by providing further guidance on what would be considered as income effectively connected in the PE. For example, para 32 of the 2014 OECD Model Commentary on Article 10, dealing with taxation of dividends, provides,

It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of shares to permanent establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to dividend income. Apart from the fact that such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, as explained below, that the requirement that a shareholding be “effectively connected” to such a location requires more than merely recording the shareholding in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.’

Similar provisions were also provided in the Commentary on Article 11 and Article 12, dealing with interest and royalty, respectively.

However, the above provisions may not necessarily always tackle all forms of tax avoidance. Thanks to the nature of tax treaties applying only in bilateral situations, it may not apply in case of a PE constituted in a third state (State PE). Similarly, one may still achieve an overall low rate of tax by moving the functions related to the activities in the State PE. For example, in the case of a finance branch, one can consider moving the treasury team to State PE with an office, which would constitute a fixed place of business and therefore, the interest income earned from the group financing activities may still be effectively connected to the PE in the State PE.

The OECD Model recognised this limitation and para 71 of the 2014 OECD Model Commentary on Article 24 provides that a provision can be included in the bilateral treaty between the State R and the State S to provide that an enterprise can claim the benefits of the treaty only if the income obtained by the PE situated in the other State is taxed normally in the State of the PE.

1.3 BEPS Action 6
The US was one of the few countries which had provisions similar to the Article in the MLI in its tax treaties even before the OECD BEPS Project. In fact, even though the US is not a signatory to the MLI, the provisions as released by the US were used as a base for further discussion in the BEPS Project. The anti-abuse rule was covered in the OECD BEPS Action Plan 6 dealing with Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.

The objective of the anti-abuse provision is provided in para 51 of the BEPS Action 6 report, which is reproduced below,

‘It was concluded that a specific anti-abuse provision should be included in the Model Tax Convention to deal with that and similar triangular cases where income attributable to the permanent establishment in a third State is subject to low taxation.’

While the language in the MLI is similar to the suggested draft in the final report of the BEPS Action Plan 6, there are certain differences – mainly certain deletions, in the MLI, which have been discussed in detail in the second part of this article.

It is important to note that while Article 10(1) is included in the MLI as a specific anti-avoidance rule, MLI also contains a general anti-avoidance rule under Article 7 through the PPT. Further, in the Indian context, the domestic law also contains anti-avoidance provisions in the form of general anti-avoidance rules. An interplay between all three is discussed in para 3.5 below.

2. STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 1
2.1 Introduction to Article 10
The language contained in this Article refers to various terminologies that have been defined under Article 2 of the MLI [e.g., Contracting Jurisdiction (‘CJ’), Covered Tax Agreement (‘CTA’)]. Those terminologies referred to in Article 10, which have not been defined under Article 2 of the MLI, have to be interpreted as per Action 6 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’).

Article 10 of the MLI seeks to deny treaty benefits in certain circumstances.

2.2 Structure
Article 10 of the MLI is structured in six paragraphs wherein each paragraph addresses a different aspect related to the anti-abuse provision. The flow of the Article is structured in such a way that the conditions for attracting the provisions of the article are laid down first, followed by the exceptions and finally the reservation and notification which are in line with the overall scheme of the MLI.

To better understand Article 10, it would be beneficial to understand each paragraph individually. Let us proceed as per the order of the article.

Paragraph 1:
Paragraph 1 brings out the conditions for the applicability of Article 10 in certain circumstances:

‘Where:

a) an enterprise of a Contracting Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agreement derives income from the other Contracting Jurisdiction and the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction treats such income as attributable to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction; and

b) the profits attributable to that permanent establishment are exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction,

the benefits of the Covered Tax Agreement shall not apply to any item of income on which the tax in the third jurisdiction is less than 60 per cent of the tax that would be imposed in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction on that item of income if that permanent establishment were situated in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction. In such a case, any income to which the provisions of this Paragraph apply shall remain taxable according to the domestic law of the other Contracting Jurisdiction, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.’

Each underlined word is a condition for the applicability of the article and has its own significance.

An enterprise – The question as to how to interpret the term ‘an enterprise’ and what comes under the purview of the same is covered in the later part of this article.

derives income from the other Contracting Jurisdiction – This emphasises on the aspect that the income earned by the Resident State should be derived from the State S for the Article to get triggered.

income as attributable to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction – In addition to the condition as mentioned above, the income derived by the State PE from State S should be treated as attributable to the PE in State PE by State R.

exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction – This covers the point regarding the taxability of the profits attributable to the PE in the State R. It focuses on the point that Article 10 would be applicable if the profits attributable to the PE are exempt from tax in State R.

tax in the third jurisdiction is less than 60 per cent – This sentence points out the 60% test which states that the tax in the State PE is less than 60% of the tax that would be payable in the State R on that item of income if that PE was situated in the State R.

In case all the above conditions are satisfied, the benefits of the CTA between the State R and the State S shall not apply to such item of income.

The second part of paragraph 1 gives power to the State S to tax the item of income as per its domestic laws notwithstanding any other provisions of the CTA in cases where the provisions of Article 10(1) are satisfied.

Thus, it can be understood that the provisions of Article 10(1) emphasise on the denial of treaty benefits in order to prevent complete non-taxation or lower taxation of an item of income.

Paragraph 2:
Paragraph 2 states the exceptions where the provisions as set out in paragraph 1 of the Article 10 will not be applicable.

The exception covers the income derived from the State S in connection with or is incidental to active conduct of the business carried on by the PE. However, the business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own account such as activities of banking carried on by banks, insurance activities carried on by insurance enterprises and securities activities carried on by registered securities dealers will not come under the purview of paragraph 1 of the Article. The business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own account carried on by other than the above-mentioned enterprises shall come under the purview of paragraph 1 of the Article. A detailed discussion on what is considered as active conduct of business is covered in the second part of this article.

Paragraph 3:
Paragraph 3 of Article 10 provides that even if treaty relief is denied due to the trigger of the provisions of
Article 10(1), the competent authority of State S has the authority to grant the treaty relief as a response to a request by the taxpayer in the State R on the basis of justified reasons for not satisfying the requirements of Article 10(1).

In such situations, the competent authority of the State S shall consult with the competent authority of the State R before arriving at a decision.

Paragraph 4:
Paragraph 4 is the compatibility clause between paragraph 1 through paragraph 3 which mentions ‘in place of or in the absence of’.

This means that if there is an existing provision in a CTA which denies / limits treaty relief in instances of triangular cases (‘Existing Provision’), then such a provision would be modified (i.e. in place of) to the extent paragraph 1 through 3 are inconsistent with the existing provisions (subject to notification requirements analysed below).

However, if there is no existing provision then paragraph 1 through 3 would be added to the CTAs (i.e., in absence of).

Paragraph 5:
Article 10(5) covers the reservation aspect to be in line with the overall scheme of the MLI.

This reservation clause is applicable because Article 10 is not covered under minimum standard and hence the scope for reservation is wide. There are three options available to each signatory:
a) Article to not be applicable to all CTA’s in entirety, or
b) Article to not be applicable in case where the CTA already contains the provision as mentioned in paragraph 4, or
c) Article to only be applicable in case of CTA’s that already contain the provisions as mentioned under paragraph 4 (i.e., the existing provisions to be modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 10).

Paragraph 6:
Article 10(6) provides the notification mechanism to assess the impact of the reservations and position adopted by the signatories on the provisions of the CTAs.

In cases where the parties decide to go as per sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of Article 10(5), then they need to notify the depository whether each of its CTA contains the provisions as per Article 10(4) along with the article and paragraph number. In case where all contracting jurisdictions have made such a notification, then the existing provisions shall be replaced by the provisions of Article 10. In other cases, such as in the case of a notification mismatch (i.e., one signatory to the CTA does not notify the provisions of Article 10 whereas the other signatory to the same CTA notifies them), the existing provisions shall ONLY be modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 10.

India has not made any reservation. Further, India has not notified any DTAAs which have a provision similar to that in para 4 of Article 10. Therefore, the provisions of Article 10 of the MLI shall supersede the existing provisions of the DTAAs to the extent they are incompatible with the existing provisions.

2.3 Reason as to why the Source Country should not grant DTAA benefits
The main policy consideration for implementation of Article 10 of the MLI is to plug the structure wherein one can artificially reduce the overall tax simply by interposing a PE in a low-tax jurisdiction, which is a major BEPS concern.

Tax treaties allocate the taxing rights between the jurisdictions. A Source State giving up its taxing rights is a result of bilateral negotiation with the Residence State. However, if such Residence State decides to treat such income as attributable to a third state and therefore not taxing such income by virtue of another treaty of which the Source State is a not a party, would be against the intention of the countries who have negotiated the treaty in good faith.

Therefore, if State R gives up its right of taxation of income earned from State S due to the artificial imposition of a PE in a third State, Article 10 of the MLI gives the entire taxing right back to State S.

3. SOME ISSUES RELATED TO INTERPRETATION OF PARA 1 OF ARTICLE 10 OF MLI
Having analysed the broad provisions of Article 10 of the MLI, the ensuing paragraphs seek to raise (and analyse) some of the issues in relation to para 1 of Article 10.

3.1 Definition of PE – Which DTAA to Apply
While considering the situation of denial of treaty benefits laid out in the treaty between State R and State S with regard to the income earned by the PE of an entity of the State R in a State PE, there are two DTAA’s that come under this purview, namely:
i. Treaty between the State R and the State S, and
ii. Treaty between the State R and the third state (PE State).

For the purpose of referring to the definition of PE, the first question that arises is which of the two DTAAs has to be referred to? This issue arises mainly because the term ‘Permanent Establishment’ is not a general term but is a specific term which is defined in the DTAA (generally in Article 5 of the relevant DTAA).

A view could be that since the acceptability or denial of benefits under the DTAA between the State R and State S is evaluated and State S is the jurisdiction denying the treaty benefit, one should look at the DTAA between the State R and State S to determine the PE status. However, the objective of the anti-abuse provision is to target transactions wherein income is not taxed in State R due to a PE in State PE. Further, MLI 10(1) applies only if the Residence State treats the income of an enterprise derived from the Source State as attributable to the PE of a third State. This decision of Residence State is obviously on the basis of its treaty with the PE State as it is a bilateral decision. As the Source State is not a party to this decision, the treaty between Residence State and Source State cannot be applied. Therefore, a better view would be to consider the provisions of the DTAA between the State R and the third state (State PE) for the definition of PE.

It is also important to note that prior to introduction of MLI, Article 5 of the DTAA was referred to in order to establish the PE status. However, post introduction of the MLI, one would also need to evaluate the impact of Article 12 to Article 15 of the MLI which covers the PE status based on Action 7 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). This, of course, is subject to the CTA between Residence State and PE State not reserving the above articles.

3.2 Whether PE jurisdiction needs to be a signatory to MLI
Article 10 of the MLI merely provides that State S should deny benefit of the DTAA between State R and State S if certain conditions are triggered. One of the conditions is that the income is treated by Residence State as attributable to the PE of the taxpayer in State PE. Having concluded the above, that the PE definition under the DTAA between State R and State PE should be considered, it is not necessary that such DTAA is impacted by the MLI. If the DTAA between State R and State PE is impacted by the MLI, one would need to consider the modified definition of PE in such a situation.

Here, it would be important to look at Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. The same is reproduced below:

Article 34 – General Rule Regarding Third States
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.

In this particular scenario, it is clear that there is no right or obligation granted to the State PE under the DTAA between State R and State S. State PE can continue to tax the profits of the PE.

Further, by signing MLI Article 10, State S and State R should be deemed to have consented their rights and obligations under the State R-State S treaty as amended by MLI Article 10. Consequently, State PE would not be required to be a signatory to the MLI.

3.3 No taxation in country of residence
Another issue which arises is what if the country of residence does not tax the income irrespective of whether the income is attributable to a PE or not. For example, if dividend income is earned by a resident of Singapore and such income is attributable to the PE of the shareholder in a third jurisdiction, such dividend would not be taxable irrespective of whether the dividend is attributable to a PE in a third state or not.

In such a scenario, Article 10 of the MLI should not apply as the tax rate in State PE is not less than 60% of the tax rate in State R. In any case, as the Source State had given up its right of taxation even when the Residence State did not tax such income and imposing a third jurisdiction in the transaction, would not result in a reduction of taxes in the Residence State.

3.4 Interplay of Article 10 with Article 5
Article 5 of the MLI provides for the elimination of double taxation using the credit method as against the exemption method. It refers to three options for preventing double non-taxation situations arising due to the State R providing relief under the exemption method for income not taxed in the State S.

The interplay between Article 5 and Article 10 comes into play because Article 10 is applicable only in cases where the income is exempt in the State R. So, in order to determine whether or not the income is exempt in the State R, Article 5 will have to be referred to. If the DTAA between State R and State PE provides for the exemption method for elimination of double taxation, but State R has opted to apply Article 5 of the MLI, the credit method would apply and in such a situation, in the absence of exemption granted in State R, the provisions of Article 10(1) shall not apply.

India has opted for Option C under Article 5 which allows a country to apply the credit method to all its treaties where the exemption method was applicable earlier. Therefore, with respect to India only credit method will be applicable as a method to eliminate double taxation.

Given that India’s tax treaties apply the credit method for providing relief from double taxation, the situation contemplated under Article 5 may not be relevant in the Indian context.

3.5 Interplay of Article 10 with PPT / GAAR
The Principle Purpose Test (‘PPT’) rule under Article 7 is the minimum standard and applies to all DTAAs covered under MLI. A question could therefore arise as to which provision would override the other. It is pertinent to note that provisions of Article 29 of the OECD Model clearly specify that Article 29 would apply where the PPT has been met. However, Article 10 of the MLI does not lay down any preference of application of PPT or otherwise. Consequently, it could be possible to take a view that if the specific conditions of Article 10 are met, PPT rule should not apply to deny the treaty benefits.

However, a better and sensible view could be that even if the special anti-abuse provision contained in Article 10 is satisfied, the general anti-abuse provision under Article 7(1) also needs to be satisfied to avail treaty benefits. In other words, where the main purpose to set up or constitute the PE in the third state (State PE) was to obtain tax benefit, such an arrangement should be covered under the mandatory provisions of Article 7(1) of the MLI so as to deny the treaty benefits. In a case where the provisions of MLI Article 10 are applicable, the treaty benefits can be denied based on the applicability of MLI Article 10 itself. In other words, MLI article 7(1) and MLI Article 10 both can co-exist and an assessee needs to satisfy both the tests to avail treaty benefits.

Further, in a case where India is the State S, one will also have to see the applicability of GAAR provisions and its interplay with the provisions of Article 10. Typically, GAAR applies where the main purpose of the arrangement is to obtain tax benefit and the GAAR provisions can kick in to deny the treaty benefits as well. Here it is important to note that both Indian domestic law and OECD recognise that the provisions of GAAR / PPT and SAAR / MLI 10 can co-exist. FAQ 1 under Circular 7 of 2017 states that the provisions of GAAR and SAAR can co-exist and are applicable, as may be necessary, in the facts and circumstances of the case. The same has also been recognised under para 2 of the OECD commentary on Article 29.

4. CONCLUSION
In the second part of this article, the authors will attempt to analyse some practical challenges arising on account of the difference in the tax rates of the jurisdictions involved and the impact of the anti-avoidance rule on India. The second part will also cover the difference between Article 10 of the MLI and the BEPS Action Plan 6 Report on the basis of which the rule was incorporated in the MLI and Article 29 of the OECD Model.  

 

VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS – ADDING VALUE TO ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE

BACKGROUND
The recently introduced new tax reporting obligations under the three-tier documentation [that is, country-by-country report (CbCR), master file and local file] pursuant to implementation of Action 13 of the action plans on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS1) for companies having cross-border operations, requires maintenance and sharing of the transfer pricing documentation with tax authorities across the globe. While the CbCR will give tax authorities much more information on the global tax footprint of the group, the master file requires it to produce a global ‘overview’ of a multinational entity’s business including its supply chain, allocation of income and transfer pricing policies, and this may include sharing of critical and sensitive information about its business operations. The documentation required has become more robust and in sync with the actual conduct of the operations as against the contractual obligations. Hence, the existing requirement of documentation, which historically has been the cornerstone for supporting the arm’s length standard, needs to be aligned with the new reporting framework. The discrepancy between the two documentation frameworks, if not reconciled, can lead to misinterpretations and ineffective discussions between the taxpayers and tax authorities. This has led to the taxpayers relooking at the way the businesses have been conducted and requiring a much closer alignment between a company’s value chain, operating model and the tax structure.

 

1   BEPS
relates chiefly to instances where the interaction of different tax rules leads
to double non-taxation or less than single taxation. It also relates to
arrangements that achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away from the
jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take place – OECD’s
publication on ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’

In line with the above and with the advent of the new framework of documentation, the arm’s length principle (ALP) which was considered to be transaction-based and at most entity-based, has evolved from the entity approach to mapping of the position of the group entities and reconciling the profits allocated according to arm’s length with ‘value creation’. This shift is more so as ALP is seen as being vulnerable to manipulation as it lays emphasis on contractual allocations of functions, assets and risks and this results in outcomes which do not correspond to the value created through the economic activity carried out by the members of the group. Some of the instances of current ALP mismatches are given below:

(a) Benchmarking analysis currently undertaken which considers only one part of the transaction without taking into consideration the holistic analysis of the parties involved in the intercompany transaction.
(b) Commissionaire model wherein the significant people functions contribute highly to the group but draw only a cost plus or fixed return to the entity with the people function.
(c) IP structures without the people function charging royalty to the group entities by claiming to be the legal owner of intangibles while no value creation happens in the said entities.

Hence, for the sustainability of the group’s transfer pricing policy, it becomes necessary to conduct a value chain analysis in order to bridge the gap between the requirements of the existing documentation requirement and the BEPS-driven documentation.

Value chain analysis in simple terms means a systematic way of examining all the activities performed by the business and determining the sources of the competitive advantage which translate into profit for the group. In short, a value chain analysis projects the value creation story of the group by bringing out how and where the value is created and by which entities within the group. This analysis is crucial as it will assist the group to test and corroborate the alignment of the transfer pricing policies with the value creation.

The OECD in its BEPS projects has also recognised value chain analysis as being useful in determining the value drivers and the relevant factors necessary for splitting the profits to the entities creating the value. Further, Actions 8-102: 2015 Final Reports on ‘Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation’ states that the value chain analysis should consider where and how value is created in the operations by considering the following:
(a) Economically significant functions, assets and risks and the key personnel contributing to the same;
(b) The economic circumstances that add to the creation of opportunities to increase profits;
(c) The substance in the value creation and whether the same is sustainable or short-term.

Effectively conducted value chain analysis can lead to transformation in the supply chain in order to align with the value drivers. A value chain analysis thus provides companies with a means to defend their transfer pricing policies, i.e., to prove that the arm’s length price is in sync with the actual functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed.

ORIGIN AND CONCEPT OF VALUE CHAIN
The concept of ‘value chain’ was introduced by Micheal Porter in his book The Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, back in 1985. In simple terms, it refers to the chain of activities performed by a business to transform an input for a product or service into an output that is of value in the market for the customer. Such activities could range from design and development, procurement, production, marketing, logistics, distribution, to after-sales support to the final customer. These activities may be performed by a single entity or a group of entities which are based in different locations that contribute to the overall profitability of the business.

With increasing globalisation, international trade and advent of technology, the value chains of MNEs are dispersed across multiple geographies and entities which have resulted in the evolution of the concept of global value chain (‘GVC’). GVCs are organisational systems that operate across multiple nations and are highly integrated. GVCs help the MNEs to achieve enhanced productivity, efficiency and economies of scale at a global level in this dynamic business environment. Typically, a GVC would involve vertical integration of economic activities which at the same time are divided across countries, specialisation in tasks and business-related functions and reliance on the integrated networks of buyers and suppliers.

 

2   Actions
8 to 10 – Action 8 relates to TP framework for intangibles and cost
contribution agreements, Action 9 relates to TP framework for risks and
capital, and Action 10 relates to TP methods for other high-risk transactions

POST-BEPS – GUIDANCE PROVIDED ON VALUE CHAIN
BEPS is an initiative by the OECD which seeks to ensure that each country gets its fair share of taxes by setting up effective domestic and international tax systems which curb base erosion and profit shifting by multinational corporations by misusing the gaps and mismatches in the present tax systems. As a part of this project, 15 detailed Action Plans were laid down by the OECD across the themes of coherence, economic substance and transparency.

The concept of value chain analysis, though well-known, has gained more significance with the BEPS initiative. From a transfer pricing perspective, the important areas of change lie within the ‘economic substance’ and ‘transparency’ themes. The need for value chain analysis is rooted under both the said themes and is the heart of the BEPS from a transfer pricing perspective.

The OECD3 recognised that there is a need to address the issues arising due to mismatch of economic substance in corporate structures, where the income is parked in low tax jurisdictions under legal entities which lack substance, thus leading to erosion of the tax base of the other high tax jurisdictions.

Some of the guidance available emphasising on the relevance of value chain are reproduced below:

– OECD’s publication on ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ 2013 has highlighted the importance of value chain analysis:
Action 54 – Point (ii) on ‘Restoring the full effects and benefits of international standards’ states that ‘Current rules work in many cases, but they need to be adapted to prevent BEPS that results from the interactions among more than two countries and to fully account for global value chains’.

– BEPS Action Plan 8-10’s final reports, ‘Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation’ released in 2015 lays emphasis on value chain in determining the arm’s length price for transactions with related parties. This was also included in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2017 (‘TPG’), in para 1.51 – Functional analysis, which reads as under:
‘… it is important to understand how value is generated by the group as a whole, the interdependencies of the functions performed by the associated enterprises with the rest of the group, and the contribution that the associated enterprises make to that value creation. It will also be relevant to determine the legal rights and obligations of each of the parties in performing their functions…
Determining the economic significance of risk and how risk may affect the pricing of a transaction between associated enterprises is part of the broader functional analysis of how value is created by the MNE group and the activities that allow the MNE group to sustain profits, and the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction…” para 1.73

 

3   OECD
– Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

4   Action
5 relates to countering harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into
account transparency and substance

– The TPG lays emphasis on the principle of substance over form in para 1.66 which reads as under –
‘The capability to perform decision-making functions and the actual performance of such decision-making functions relating to a specific risk involve an understanding of the risk based on a relevant analysis of the information required for assessing the foreseeable downside and upside risk outcomes of such decisions and the consequences for the business of the enterprise…’

– The public discussion draft of revised guidance on Profit Splits of 20165, contained a section on value chain analysis, which emphasised the following –
• A value chain analysis can be used as a ‘tool to assist in delineating the controlled transactions, in particular in respect of the functional analysis, and thereby determining the most appropriate transfer pricing methodology.’
• A value chain analysis ‘does not, of itself, indicate that the transactional profit split is the most appropriate method, even where the value chain analysis shows that there are factors which contribute to the creation of value in multiple places, since all parties to a transaction can be expected to make some contributions to value creation’.

However, this section was eliminated from the final Guidance as it was thought that overemphasis could unduly uplift the significance of profit splits even in cases where this would not be the best method.

 

5   https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/BEPS-discussion-draft-on-the-revised-guidance-on-profit-splits.pdf

– In relation to analysis of intangibles, the TPG lays focus on identifying the factors that contribute to value creation and entities that perform economically significant functions in relation to the intangibles which are used by the MNE to create value for the business. The relevant paras are given below:

‘…In cases involving the use or transfer of intangibles, it is especially important to ground the functional analysis on an understanding of the MNE’s global business and the manner in which intangibles are used by the MNE to add or create value across the entire supply chain…’ para 6.3

‘In a transfer pricing analysis of a matter involving intangibles, it is important to identify the relevant intangibles with specificity. The functional analysis should identify the relevant intangibles at issue, the manner in which they contribute to the creation of value in the transactions under review, the important functions performed and specific risks assumed in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles and the manner in which they interact with other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value…’ para 6.12.

– BEPS Action Plan 13 on three-tier documentation requires disclosure of certain information in the master file for the MNE group such as key value drivers of
the business, details on intangibles, transfer pricing policies, contribution of the key group entities, etc., which will enable tax administrations access to global documentation leading to enhanced transparency
and thereby provide a mechanism to tackle BEPS problems.

– Both the local documentation and the CbCR could reveal the key data points in relation to the MNCs’ IP activities highlighting the low substance entities generating lower taxable income.

– Also, there are certain countries (such as China, Germany, Spain, Austria, Ecuador, South Africa, etc.) where the tax administrations lay emphasis on documentation of the VCA in the local TP documentation.

WHAT IS VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS (‘VCA’)
VCA can be said to be a blueprint of the MNE’s group operations. The analysis involves a detailed investigation into the functions, assets and risks of the MNE as a whole and thereby evaluating the contribution of each of the activities involved in the value chain to the overall value created by the group. A VCA is a deep-dive analysis of understanding where and how the economic value is created and by which parties within a multinational group.

A VCA reflects the key value drivers for an MNE’s business, sector, or line of activity and identifies the relative contributions to the value-creation process. Value driver is something that contributes to the generation of income for an MNE’s business. Value drivers could also be defined as the performance variables that will actually create the value of the business.

The value drivers may vary across different businesses, industries and sectors. It is important to note that the nature of the business or industry generally defines whether it has more of tangible or intangible value. Most of the service industry players will have greater intangible value while an asset intensive industry will have higher tangible value. For instance:
(a) For Apple, which is one of the leading companies which sells computers, mobile phones and such other electronic devices, their key value drivers would be continuous innovation, unique technology which differentiates their products from the other competitors in the market, brand, customer loyalty, geographic reach, etc.
(b) For an IT company like Infosys which is a multinational company engaged in providing services in the area of information technology, business consultancy, outsourcing and managed services, their key value drivers would be employee productivity, a skilled and trained workforce, a global delivery model, latest technology, acquisitions, etc.
(c) For a company like McDonalds which falls under the fast-food industry, the value drivers would be product quality and customer health, human capital, environment footprint, brand management, sustainable supply chain and packaging waste, etc.
(d) For a company like Paytm which is a leading digital financial services platform, the value drivers would be technology, customer experience, availability of frictionless payment options, etc.

The VCA highlights the economically significant functions performed and risks assumed by the MNE group and also by the individual entities within the group which leads to value creation for the group. Further, by understanding whether an entity is really controlling the function / risk, it becomes easier to understand whether such an entity is adequately remunerated for these activities in line with its value contribution and whether it would need to be remunerated if there is a transfer of such function or risk from that entity to any other group entity. The VCA helps in identifying the commercial or financial relations between the parties and thereby assists in accurately delineating the controlled transactions based on the actual conduct of the parties in the entire value chain. A VCA is therefore a critical and important step for the purpose of drawing conclusions from a tax and transfer pricing perspective to align the value drivers with the functions performed and risks borne by the respective entities in the global value chain.

STEPS FOR UNDERTAKING VCA
There is no ‘right’ way of conducting a value chain analysis because every business will have its own value drivers and value creation story. Further, there are various techniques that can be applied while conducting a VCA to map the activities against the value creation. We explain below some of the steps which need to be considered in performing a VCA:

Step 1: Identification of the value drivers for the business
Value drivers in principle are common for a business operating in a particular industry or sector; however, its importance will vary from business to business. These drivers can be linked to the tangible assets or intangible assets of the business that are created or used for conducting the business, the various processes / systems adopted, customer relationships developed, the skilled workforce, or even the culture of the organisation which leads to value creation. Also, not all the value drivers would draw equal weightage when their contributions in the value chain are analysed. Hence, it is important to evaluate their relative value in the entire value chain by assigning a numerical weightage to them.

Step 2: Mapping the contribution by the legal entities / territories
The next step is to determine and map the contribution to the value generated by the value drivers with the legal entities that are part of the value chain. This will involve conducting a detailed functions, asset and risk analysis for the legal entities, analysing the key tangible and intangible assets employed and the risks assumed by the entities while contributing to the value chain. The OECD guidelines provide a detailed framework on risk analysis – control and management of risks, which would play a vital role in determining their weightage in value creation. Para D.1.2.1.1 of the TPG.

Step 3: Allocate the profits to the legal entities
Based on the results of Steps 1 and 2, the overall profit of the group is calculated and then appropriately allocated to the respective legal entities in line with the weightage assigned to the relative contributions of the entities in the value chain.

Step 4: Alignment with the transfer pricing outcomes
The results of Step 3 can be compared with the existing or proposed transfer pricing for controlled transactions across the group and in alignment with the value created by each of the entities in the value chain. VCA is a corroborative analysis which would help identify the mismatches in the pricing for the individual entities by providing a holistic picture of the allocation of profit results at a group level.

We have illustrated below a case study evaluating the value chain for an MNE group:

 

In relation to the above case study:
• F Co. is the parent company of I Co., S Co. and D Co.
• F Co. is engaged in full-fledged manufacturing activities.
• I Co. and S. Co. are R&D centres of the group.
• I Co. supervises the R&D services performed by S Co.
• D Co. is a full-fledged distributor engaged in distribution of goods in the local jurisdiction.

Value chain – Analysis of the value contribution of each of the parties

Functions
of F Co.

Functions
of I Co.

Functions
of S Co.

Functions
of D Co.

• Manufacture and sale of products

• Legal owner of the IP developed by I Co. and S
Co.

• Provides funding to I Co. and S Co.

• Manages the R&D projects by hiring own
R&D workforce

• Frames its own research budgets, decides on the
termination /

• Designs and develops R&D programme under
the supervision and control of I Co.

• Performs the contract R&D services


Imports (procures) finished goods from F Co. and sells to local customers


Performs local marketing and sales functions

(continued)

 

for the R &D activities

(continued)

 

modification to the R&D projects

• Controls and supervises the R&D activities
performed by S Co.

• Takes all the relevant decisions related to
R&D of S Co.

(continued)

 

under supervision and control of I Co.

• After sales support activities

Risks
borne by F Co.

Risks
borne by I Co.

Risks
borne by S Co.

Risks
borne by D Co.

• Financial risk of failure of R&D projects

• Operates as a full-fledged manufacturer bearing
all the related risks

Responsible for key development activities and
risk management functions of I Co. and S Co. both in relation to the IP
developed through the R&D activities

Limited risks service provider – attrition risk,
foreign currency fluctuation risk, technology risk, etc.

Takes
title to the goods and bears the related risks such as market risks,
inventory risk, credit risk, foreign currency fluctuation risk, etc.

In order to perform an analysis of the value contribution of each of the entities it is essential to understand the functions performed and risks assumed by each of the entities in the value chain. From the above tabulation of the functional and risk analysis of all the entities participating in the value chain of the group, it is evident that the primary functions in the value chain are research and development, procurement, manufacturing, sales and marketing and after sales services. Various entities of the group based in different geographies are engaged in performing the said activities in relation to these functions which leads to creation of value for the group and thereby results in generating profits. The key value drivers for this business are people, technology, marketing intangible (brand), customer base, innovation through R&D, location savings, etc.

In the above case study, from a transfer pricing perspective the following are the key points for consideration:
a) F Co. being the IP owner contractually assumes the financial risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk in relation to the IP developed as a result of the R&D activities performed by I Co. and S Co. However, it does not exercise any control over these risks. Accordingly, in addition to the return on the manufacturing function, F Co. may only be entitled to a risk-free return on the funding activities.
b) I Co. is entitled to returns derived from the exploitation of the intangibles developed as a result of the R&D efforts of I Co. and S. Co., as it performs both the development and risk management functions in relation to the intangibles developed.
c) S Co. needs to be remunerated for its contract R&D services rendered to F Co. based on the function, asset and risk analysis in relation to these activities performed by F Co. In determining the remuneration for S Co., it will be critical to consider the comparability factors such as the skill sets of the employees employed for performing the R&D services, the nature of research being undertaken, etc.
d) D Co. is a full-fledged distributor and needs to be remunerated adequately for the distribution functions performed by it.

In the above case study, based on the steps for conducting the VCA (explained before the case study), the controlled transactions were accurately delineated from the value chain and the key functions performed and risks assumed by the respective group entities in the value chain have been identified and evaluated. On the basis of the evaluation of the contribution of each of the parties, the remuneration in line with the conduct has been discussed in the above section.

In practical scenarios, the value chain analysis could be more complex for large MNEs where the supply chain is fragmented across various geographies with multiple group entities involved in the value chain performing various integrated functions. Accordingly, it is necessary to follow a methodical and step-by-step process while conducting the value chain analysis which forms the basis of tax and transfer pricing analysis for the group at a global level.

Purpose of conducting a value chain analysis in the current environment
a) Supply chain analysis vis-à-vis traditional FAR analysis vis-à-vis value chain analysis

A value chain as a concept is different from a supply chain. A supply chain typically focuses on the ‘flow of goods and services’, while value chain addresses the question of what value the business has created by analysing what it is able to sell in the market and what is the cost of creating that.

Supply chain can be described as a business transformation tool which helps in minimising the costs, maximising the customer satisfaction by ensuring that the products are provided to the customers at the right time and place; whereas value chain provides the competitive advantage which ensures that the competition is taken care of by fulfilling customer satisfaction by adding value. Supply chain is only a component of the value chain.

The value chain analysis supplements the traditional functional analysis and establishes the connection on how the FAR and value drivers contribute value to the MNC. The value chain analysis strengthens the documentation as it evaluates both sides of the contracting parties and provides a justification of the arm’s length principle by highlighting the alignment of the transfer pricing policy with the actual conduct of the parties. The robust documentation will serve as back-up to defend the pricing policy during transfer pricing audits. This will also be relevant during negotiations with the APA / competent authority on the allocation of profits among the parties in the value chain as the documentation clearly highlights the robust functional profile.

b) Globalisation and decentralisation of functions, digitalisation
With the emergence of MNEs across different jurisdictions, the competitiveness of the companies is influenced by the efficiency of the supply chain and the corresponding value created by each of the functions in the value chain. Given the current dynamics, not only the supply chain but also the value chain is shifting towards becoming more sustainable, globalised and digitalised.

Digitalisation is bringing about a change by introducing new operating models and revolutionising the existing models. With this there is bound to be a change in the value drivers of the companies and a shift in the functional profile. Corresponding alignment of the pricing policy with the value creation / contribution of each entity in the value chain is going to be critical in order to ensure appropriate allocation of the profits to the entities.

 

6   In
transfer pricing cases involving intangibles, the determination of the entity
or entities within an MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the
returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial. A related
issue is which entity or entities within the group should ultimately bear the
costs, investments and other burdens associated with the Development of
intangible asset, Enhancement of the value of intangible asset, Maintenance
of intangible asset, Protection of intangible asset against infringement
and Exploitation of intangibles

c) Assessing the value in the value chain for intangibles
For the purpose of assessing the value, the strong focus is on DEMPE function6. It is important that the profit allocation is based on the functional substance-based contribution towards the DEMPE of the intangibles. The value drivers in the case of intangibles go beyond the legal definition of the intangible. In the case of intangibles, factors such as risks borne, specific market characteristics, location, business strategies and group synergies could contribute to value creation. All the entities performing functions, using assets or assuming risks for contributing to the value of the intangible, must be adequately remunerated for their contribution under the arm’s length principle.

d) Application of profit split method (PSM) for value chain analysis
The main objective of BEPS is that the transfer pricing outcomes are in sync with the economic value created. Hence, it becomes necessary to accurately delineate the actual transaction and its pricing in accordance with the most appropriate method selected to justify the arm’s length principle. The transfer pricing regulations requires selection of the most appropriate method to justify the arm’s length principle. PSM7 could be considered as the most appropriate method as it advocates alignment of profits with the relative values / contribution of the functions, assets and risks.

 

7   PSM
– is applied in cases involving transfer of unique intangibles or highly
integrated operations that cannot be evaluated on an individual basis, i.e.,
they are intrinsically linked

EFFECT OF COVID ON VALUE CHAIN AND NEED TO CONDUCT THE ANALYSIS TO ANALYSE ITS IMPACT FROM A TAX PERSPECTIVE – RISKS OF NOT CONDUCTING A VCA

The Covid-19 pandemic has hit the international trade hard thereby causing concerns of serious disruptions to the global value chains (GVCs). The pandemic has impacted the way companies conduct their operations – consequential changes to the value chains as a stop-gap arrangement or a permanent modification to how the business was undertaken.

Some of the instances of disruption in the value chain are given below:
(a) Lockdowns changed the dynamics of how products were sourced. There was a sudden shift from brick-and-mortar retail chains to digital marketplaces / e-commerce platforms. Unlike historically where the physical stores, sales personnel, advertising, etc., which were value drivers in the value chain, now the value contribution of digital / ecommerce platforms has increased significantly.
(b) MNCs having centralised sourcing for their manufacturing / trading activities, faced challenges due to supply chain disruptions. Many resorted to decentralised sourcing from alternate locations / suppliers.
(c) The pandemic influenced work from home for employees which disrupted the provision of services. Example – employees responsible for performing significant DEMPE functions had to work from remote locations thereby disrupting the significance of the location base.

Both the business operations and the financial markets got disrupted due to the pandemic. For the companies that reorganised their operations to adapt to the evolving economic and business environment, the existing transfer pricing policies may no longer apply in line with the transformation of the value chain. In order to sustain their business operations, some companies moved parts of their supply chains as a result of the pandemic, thereby making existing transfer pricing policies obsolete. Due to the impact on the profitability or disruptions to cash flows, the existing transfer pricing policies may not be complied with due to the inability to compensate the entities in line with the functions they performed. Hence, it would be critical for taxpayers to evaluate whether changes in a value chain result in transfer of value or alteration of the profit potential of group entities in their jurisdiction. Thus, taxpayers need to be alert about such eventualities.

Since the pandemic has impacted the economic conditions significantly, this would have an effect on the APAs entered into covering the pandemic year onwards. Most APAs include specific assumptions about the operational and economic conditions that will affect transactions covered in the APA. Hence, it is critical to determine to what extent the changes will affect the application of existing APAs. Since the pandemic has not affected all companies equally, the individual cases of each taxpayer should be evaluated.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENCE – INDIAN AND GLOBAL
With the above detailed discussion on the concept of value chain and the need for conducting the same, let us look at how value chain analysis has gained significance from the Indian perspective. The transfer pricing provisions in India were enacted in the Income-tax Act in 2001 and since then the transfer pricing law in India has evolved with substantial developments. Though the Indian provisions do not provide detailed guidance on various transfer pricing issues, the Indian tax authorities including the dispute resolution forums and Tax Courts place reliance on international guidelines such as the OECD TP guidelines, the United Nations’ TP Manual and guidelines published by various countries while conducting TP audits and deciding on the complex issues related to transfer pricing.

India has also adopted the BEPS Action Plan 13 – three-tier documentation (country-by-country report, master file and local file) in the local regulations in 2016 with additional requirements for master file compliance, wherein it requires the MNC’s to provide the drivers of profits for the business, the transfer pricing policies and strategies in relation to intangibles and R&D facilities and the detailed functional analysis for principal entities contributing to the profits, revenue or assets of the group as per the specified threshold. Pursuant to the BEPS Action Plans released in 2015, the concept of substance over form, i.e., actual conduct of the parties vis-à-vis the legal form plays a vital role in determination of the arm’s length price for a controlled transaction. The Indian tax authorities during the course of TP investigations attempt to re-characterise the transaction to determine the arm’s length price based on the actual conduct of the parties rather than the contractual arrangements, which is in line with OECD guidelines.

Some of these case laws where emphasis is laid on the value chain analysis are summarised below:
a) In the case of L’Oreal India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-829-ITAT-2019 (Mum)-TP], the Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) referred to the Development Enhancement Maintenance Protection and Exploitation (DEMPE) framework while analysing the issue of marketing intangibles arising due to the significant incurrence of Advertising, Marketing and Promotion (AMP) expenses. The ITAT held as follows:
• the sine qua non for commencing the TP exercise is to show the existence of an international transaction and the same had not been shown to have been fulfilled in the instant case, therefore, the issue of traversing to the aspect of determining the validity of the method for determining the ALP of such transaction does not arise at all.
• The assessee had never admitted that the incurring of AMP expenses was an international transaction and had, in fact, since inception canvassed that the said expenses were incurred in the normal course of its own business and not for rendering any DEMPE functions for brand building of its AE.
• Accordingly, the ITAT held that no part of the AMP expenses incurred by the assessee are attributable to rendering of any DEMPE functions for the brands owned by the AE and deleted the adjustment proposed by the Indian Revenue Authorities with respect to the AMP expenses incurred by the assessee.
• The ITAT distinguished the decision of the High Court in the case of Sony Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. by recording the finding that the presence of AMP as a transaction was accepted by the assessee itself in case of the High Court decision, whereas in the current case the assessee had never made any such admissions.
• The ITAT further remarked that de hors any ‘understanding’ or an ‘arrangement’ or ‘action in concert’, as per which the assessee had agreed for incurring of AMP expenses for brand building of its AE, the provisions of Chapter X could not have been invoked for undertaking a TP adjustment exercise.

From the above case it is evident that the ITAT has laid emphasis on evaluation of the DEMPE functions performed by the entities in the group for determining whether incurring of AMP expenses alone leads to brand-building for the AE for which the assessee needs to be remunerated separately as an international transaction. Accordingly, a detailed value chain analysis for an MNE group which also includes analysis of the DEMPE functions in relation to the intangibles would help in strongly defending its position before the tax authorities.

b) In the case of Infogain India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-392-ITAT-2015 (Del)-TP], the Delhi ITAT upheld the application of the Profit Split Method (PSM) adopted by the assessee on the ground that the activities of the assessee and its associated enterprise were intrinsically linked and both the entities were significantly contributing to the value chain of provision of software services to the end customers. The ITAT, based on the examination of the functions performed by both the parties and weights assigned to each activity, observed that – ‘In the present case, both the parties, i.e., Infogain India (assessee) and Infogain US are making contribution. Therefore, the Profit Split Method is the most appropriate method for determination of ALP.’

c) In the Coca-Cola USA case8, the US Tax Court confirmed an adjustment made by the Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) to the income of the company. The issue under examination was that Coca Cola was not adequately compensated (i.e., with royalty) by its group entities for the use of intangibles. While deciding this issue, the IRS laid emphasis on the functions performed by the respective entities in the supply chain, risks control and allocation, DEMPE functions in relation to the intangibles, costs incurred by the different entities on the Advertising, Marketing and Promotion expenses, and contractual arrangements between the group entities. Upon in-depth analysis, the IRS proposed to benchmark the transaction in question using the Comparable Profits Method (CPM) treating unrelated bottlers as comparable parties wherein ‘Return on Assets’ (ROA) was taken as the appropriate Profit Level Indicator. The US Tax Court upheld the contentions of the IRS based on the above economic analysis conducted to derive an approximate royalty payment to Coca Cola Company by the group entities.

 

8   155
T.C. 10 Docket No. 31183-15, US Tax Court, Coca Cola Company & Subsidiaries
vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

d) In the case of Dutch taxpayer Zinc Smelters BV9, the taxpayer was engaged in the business of zinc smelting. The zinc smelting process involved conversion of zinc ore and the related raw materials into pure zinc and the same was distributed in the market. The value chain of this activity comprised of key functions, namely, procurement of raw materials, planning and scheduling of production, undertaking the production activity, planning the logistics and distribution in the market, undertaking support functions such as finance, IT, marketing, etc. Globally, the business of the group was sold, pursuant to which all the functions except the production activity were transferred to a new entity. The question was regarding the remuneration of the taxpayer post the business restructuring. The Dutch Court of Appeals agreed with the ruling of the Dutch tax authority that the key functions of sourcing raw material and thereby conversion of the ore (raw material) into finished product were critical functions in the value chain and were inter-linked. Accordingly, both the taxpayer and the new entity were performing non-routine functions. Hence, profit split was considered as the most appropriate method to determine the arm’s length remuneration for both the entities. For the purpose of profit split, the profit achieved from joint smelting activities of the taxpayer and the new entity were to be determined and then split between both the entities based on their contributions to the revenue generated.

 

9   Case
number ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2020:968  – 17/00714
Zinc Smelter B.V. vs. Dutch Tax Authority

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The taxpayer is required to appropriately report under Clause 18 of Form No. 3CEB10 any transactions arising out of or by being a part of business restructuring11 or reorganisation.

Some of the instances of business restructuring or reorganisation are as follows:
(a) Reallocation of functions, assets and risks within the group.
(b) Transfer of valuable intangibles within the group.
(c) Termination or renegotiation of the existing contractual arrangements.
(d) Shift of responsibility of specific functions from one entity to another entity within the group.

The taxpayers must maintain robust documentation such as agreements, valuation reports (if any), post-restructuring FAR analysis, etc., to substantiate the arm’s length principle. In the changing dynamics of business, it is imperative that taxpayers monitor business operations more closely for any changes.

DOCUMENTATION
As we all know, documentation forms the core of the entire transfer pricing analysis; accordingly, in a post-BEPS world it is even more critical to ensure that the MNE group has adequately documented its transfer pricing policies which are in line with the value contributions by the respective group entities in the value chain, economic functions performed and risks assumed while dealing with controlled transactions.

In order to manage the risks, the MNCs will have to ensure that the documentation is more elaborate and thorough both in the factual description of the functional profile in the value chain and in the related transfer pricing analysis. A well-documented VCA would serve as a foundation for the MNE’s tax and transfer pricing analysis and help achieve consistency across various facets of regulatory compliances.

Some of the key back-up documentation that can be maintained by an MNE group to support the VCA analysis are listed below:
a. Industry reports, management discussions, financial reports – sources to ascertain the key value drivers for business;
b. Functional interview notes / recordings with key business personnel at management level, operational division personnel, process flowcharts, asset evaluation records, organisation structure, responsibility matrix, etc. – to support the functional analysis documented as part of the VCA;
c. Contractual arrangements within the group entities which are in line with the actual conduct and substance of the parties to the arrangements;
d. Back-up documents to justify the rationale adopted by the management in assigning specific weightages to the value drivers in the value chain while determining the value contribution of the respective group entities;
e. Risk analysis assessment in light of the framework of the guidelines provided by OECD for the group entities – documents which demonstrate key decisions made by entities such as board approvals, internal email correspondences, important call minutes, etc.;
f. Documents which support the legal ownership of intangibles with the group entities such as IP registrations in certain jurisdictions, accounting of these assets in the financial reporting as per local requirements, etc.;
g. Documentary evidences to support the DEMPE functions and the value contribution of each of the entities in the value chain;
h. Analysis of the key financial ratios for the group entities such as costs incurred in production, gross level margins, net profit margins, FTE count, net worth, etc.

The above list is illustrative considering that each business would have a different value chain story and hence one would need to maintain robust back-up documentation to support its VCA for the entire MNE group.

 

10 Form
No. 3CEB is a report from an accountant to be furnished under section 92E
relating to international transactions and specified domestic transactions

11           Explanation
to Section 92B of the Income-Tax Act 1961, clarifies the expression
‘international transaction’ to include – ‘….. (e) a transaction of business
restructuring or reorganisation, entered into by an enterprise with an
associated enterprise, irrespective of the fact that it has bearing on the
profit, income, losses or assets of such enterprise at the time of the
transaction or at any future date’

CONCLUSION
In the post-BEPS era it is apparent that one will have to substantiate any tax planning with adequate substance. The profit allocated to different group entities will have to be aligned with value contributed by those entities across the value chain of the MNC. The companies are expected to be transparent with their global operational and tax payment structure in order to be compliant with the BEPS requirement. Therefore, the companies will have to improve the way they explain their operating model and tax approach to the stakeholders.

The BEPS project has changed the dynamics of the international tax landscape in an unprecedented manner. The advanced work on addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy will further change the status quo. Both globalisation and trade frictions in certain countries coupled with the severe impact of the Covid-19 pandemic have forced the MNEs to evaluate their global operations and the value chain distribution. This will create even more challenges in the transfer pricing areas which will have to be dealt with by both the MNEs and the tax administrations of the developing countries. It would be critical for the MNEs to effectively focus on their value chain to achieve the desired business and tax objectives in order to sustain themselves in this evolving business environment.

ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance recently convened a meeting on cryptocurrencies which has attracted a lot of interest as well as concern in various quarters about their investment potential and risks. The Prime Minister also cautioned that cryptocurrencies may end up in the wrong hands and urged for more international co-operation.

Cryptocurrencies have emerged as alternative currencies / investment avenues and are being considered by many as the currency of the future. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins, Ethereum and many others are being considered for a variety of purposes such as a means of exchange, a medium to access blockchain-related products and raising funds for an entity developing activities in these areas. Many large international companies such as Paypal, Tesla, Starbucks, Rakuten, Coca Cola, Burger King and Whole Foods now accept cryptocurrency transactions.

Since the last few months, the Covid-19 pandemic has catapulted the growth of contactless transactions and the growth of cryptocurrencies in India. The crypto culture is fast picking up in India. Many companies all over the world have started accepting or investing in virtual currencies. Concurrently, a new crypto-asset issuance wave has been visible in the start-up world for the purpose of fund-raising. Further, the appreciation in the value of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin price has increased more than five times at the time of writing this article as compared to the price in January, 2020) and the price volatility has attracted the interest of investors. These developments have also sparked the interest of regulators around the world.

Cryptocurrencies are not controlled or regulated by a government. Regulators around the world have been concerned about cryptocurrencies. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been concerned about investors’ protection and the anonymity of the transactions.

HOW DO CRYPTOCURRENCIES FUNCTION?
Cryptographic instruments work on the principles of cryptography, i.e., a method of protecting information and communications through the use of codes so that only those for whom the information is intended can read and process it. Crypto assets represent transferable digital illustrations that prohibit any duplication. These are based on the blockchain or distributed ledger technology that facilitates the transfer of cryptographic assets.

Cryptocurrencies are not backed by any sovereign promise as is the case with real currencies. However, digital assets are backed by something. Bitcoin, for example, is backed by the electricity that goes into validating and generating transactions on the network. Gold-backed cryptocurrencies also exist. And some are backed by US dollars.

Governments around the world (including India) have generally adopted a cautious evolution of regulatory approach towards cryptocurrencies. Some countries such as China have banned cryptocurrency, while others like El Salvador have welcomed them into the formal payments system.

It is believed that it is impossible to duplicate the transactions or involve counterfeit currency in the cryptocurrency mechanism. Many cryptocurrencies are decentralised networks based on blockchain technology; it is a list of records that is growing all the time. These are known as blocks that link and secure each type of cryptocurrency. Then there is a single network called mining in which all the funds are kept. In other words, the process by which the cryptocurrency is validated is called mining.

Transactions on public, permission-less blockchains such as the Bitcoin blockchain can be viewed by anyone. The ledger records ownership of Bitcoins and all transactions that have occurred upon it. One can track an activity to particular addresses and addresses to individuals or parties involved in the blockchain. Whenever a transfer is made, this public record is used to verify availability of funds. A new transaction is encoded into the ledger through the mining process. The ledger is virtually undisputable. These features minimise the risk of fraud or manipulation in participant-to-participant transactions on the blockchain itself. The distributed ledger technology has many possible uses that go beyond cryptocurrencies.

FINANCIAL REPORTING PERSPECTIVES
Cryptocurrencies have diverse features with a broad variety of features and bespoke nature. Further, these are emerging at rapid speed. Several new cryptocurrencies have emerged and today there is widespread talk about blockchain technology and cryptoassets.

These factors make it difficult to draw general conclusions on the accounting treatment. To determine which accounting standard applies to cryptocurrencies and assessing the related accounting issues it would be important to understand their characteristics and the intended use for which they are being held by the user. Similar types of cryptographic assets may be accounted for in a similar way.

CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACCOUNTING
Since the emergence of cryptocurrencies is a new phenomenon, there is no specific guidance from accounting standard-setters and pronouncements that deal with the accounting of such assets from the holder’s perspective. Accounting for cryptocurrencies may potentially fall in a variety of different accounting standards. One must consider the purpose of holding the cryptocurrency to determine the accounting model.

Classification
of cryptocurrencies held for own account

Rationale

Classification as cash or cash currency

• No. Since these are not legal tender and are generally not
issued or backed by any sovereign / government; cryptocurrencies do not
directly affect the prices of goods / services

Classification as financial
instrument

• No. A cryptocurrency does not give
the holder a contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset.
Also, cryptocurrencies do not come into existence as a result of a
contractual relationship. Moreover, cryptocurrencies do not provide the
holder with a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting
all of its liabilities.

 

 (continued)

 

Therefore, currently the cryptocurrencies do not meet the
definition of a financial asset

Classification as property, plant
& equipment

• No. Since cryptocurrencies are not
tangible items

Classification as inventories

• Maybe. AS 2 / Ind AS 2 do not require inventories to be in
physical form, but inventory should consist of assets that are held for sale
in the ordinary course of business. Where cryptocurrencies are for sale in
the ordinary course of business (for example, in case of entities actively
trading in cryptocurrencies), inventory classification would be appropriate;
inventories are measured at the lower of cost and net realisable value

• It must be noted that Ind AS 2 scopes out commodity broker-traders
who measure their inventories at fair value less costs to sell. When such
inventories are measured at fair value less costs to sell, changes in fair
value less costs to sell are recognised in profit or loss in the period of
the change

• On the other hand, where cryptocurrencies are held for
investment / capital appreciation purposes over an extended period, the
definition of inventory would not be met

Classification as intangible assets

• Yes. If a cryptocurrency does not
meet the definition of inventories as stated above, it is likely that the
definition of an intangible asset under AS 26 / Ind AS 38 would be met since
it is an identifiable non-monetary resource controlled by an entity as a
result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to
flow to the entity with no physical form

• Purchased intangible assets are
initially recognised at cost

• AS 26 Amortisation of
Intangibles
is based on the rebuttable presumption that the useful life
of intangibles will not exceed ten years. Under Ind AS 38, the useful life of
an intangible can be assessed as finite or indefinite. Where the useful life
is assessed as finite, such useful life is

 

 (continued)

 

determined based on management’s estimate, reviewed at least
annually. An intangible can be assessed to have an indefinite useful life if
there is no foreseeable limit over which it is expected to generate economic
benefits for the company. Ind AS 38 gives an accounting policy choice of cost
or revaluation method for intangible assets but requires the existence of an
active market if the revaluation method is to be used

DEVELOPMENT FROM INTERNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES
Internationally, the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF), an IFRS Foundation advisory forum, discussed digital currencies at a meeting in December, 2016. The debate was focused on the classification of a cryptographic asset from the holder’s perspective. Conversations have continued in various accounting standards boards, but no formal guidance has been issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).

In July, 2018, the IASB requested the IFRS Interpretations Committee to consider guidance for the accounting of transactions involving cryptocurrencies. In June, 2019, the Committee concluded that IAS 2 Inventories applies to such assets where they are held for sale in the ordinary course of business. If IAS 2 is not applicable, an entity applies IAS 38 Intangible Assets to holdings of cryptocurrencies.

The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) had put together a discussion paper on digital currencies.

On the other hand, the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) has issued an exposure draft for public comment on accounting for virtual currencies. In addition, the IASB discussed certain features of transactions involving digital currencies during its meeting in January, 2018 and will discuss in future whether to commence a research project in this area. The discussion paper concluded that, currently, digital currencies should not be considered as cash or cash equivalents since digital currency lacks broad acceptance as a means of exchange as it is not issued by a central bank. A digital currency is not a financial instrument, as defined in IAS 32, since there is no contractual relationship that results in a financial asset for one party and a financial liability for another.

A digital currency may meet the definition of intangible assets, as defined in IAS 38 or Ind AS 38, because a digital currency is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance. The discussion paper stated that it is not necessarily clear how ‘held in the ordinary course of business’ should be interpreted in the context of digital currencies more broadly. For example, it is not necessarily clear whether entities that accept digital currencies as a means of payment should be considered to hold them for sale in the ordinary course of business. IAS 2 does not apply to the measurement of inventories held by commodity broker-traders who measure their inventories at fair value less costs to sell and recognise changes in fair value less costs to sell in profit or loss in the period of the change.

FAIR VALUATION
Valuation of cryptocurrencies would be required to be determined in several situations, for example:
*In order to determine the net realisable value under AS 2 / Ind AS 2 or to determine fair value less costs to sell if the broker-trader exception is applied under Ind AS 2;
*In order to determine the revaluation amount under Ind AS 38 when classified as an intangible asset;
*For the purpose of purchase price allocation under business combination under Ind AS 103 when acquired through an acquisition.

Ind AS 113 Fair Value Measurement defines fair value as the price that would be received on selling an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. There is a three-level hierarchy for fair value determination as follows:
Level 1: quoted active market price for identical assets or liabilities;
Level 2: observable inputs other than Level 1 inputs; and
Level 3: unobservable inputs.

Many large traditional shares with an average turnover rate on the Bombay Stock Exchange or the National Stock Exchange are generally considered to be traded in an active market if there are sufficient active trading days within a given period. Data available from CoinMarketCap1 (‘CMC’) for November, 2021 shows that the top five cryptographic assets with the highest market capitalisation have high percentages of average daily turnover ratios (in certain cases up to 50%) with active daily trading. Bitcoin, for example, has a daily trading volume in excess of US $30 billion since the past few months. Looking solely at these statistics, it may be possible to conclude that certain cryptocurrencies have an active market.

Currently, for the other cryptocurrencies, it would be difficult to get a Level 1 valuation for cryptocurrencies as an active market as defined under Ind AS 113 would not be available, although there may be observable inputs that can be used to value these assets. However, the manner and speed at which the cryptocurrencies are evolving, it seems that the fair value hierarchy may keep changing between Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.

Given the complex nature of cryptocurrencies and relative lack of depth in the market, determining the valuation would not be a straightforward exercise. This is particularly so given the high volatility of prices and the large geographic market dynamics driving the prices. It may be noted that the time at which an entity determines the value of the cryptocurrencies might need careful consideration since the crypto markets may be trading 24/7. For instance,
*Is the valuation time 11:59 PM at the end of 31st March?
*How is the valuation time determined in case of foreign subsidiaries with different time zones?
*Whether the inputs underlying the valuation have been adequately reviewed / challenged given the circumstances existing at the time of closure of business hours?

Ind AS 113 requires the principal market to be determined based on the greatest volume and level of activity for the relevant item. For cryptocurrencies, while CMC includes data from several exchanges, many exchanges serve regional markets only and might not be accessible to entities / individuals in India. Ind AS 113 states that if there is no clear principal market, an entity shall determine fair value with reference to the most advantageous market within the group of active markets to which it has access with the highest activity levels. An entity need not undertake an exhaustive search of all possible markets to identify the principal market but it shall take into account all information that is reasonably available.

Another aspect to be considered for the purpose of determination of fair valuation of cryptocurrencies is whether the cryptocurrencies can be readily exchanged for a ‘real’ currency such as USD or INR. Ind AS 113 requires a Level 1 fair value input to be quoted (with) prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets / liabilities that the entity can access at the measurement date. Certain cryptocurrencies are exchanged for other cryptocurrencies rather than being exchanged for real currencies. Crypto-to-crypto exchange rates are priced based on an implicit conversion of the cryptographic asset into real currencies.

Under Ind AS 113 it can be said that an active market for a cryptocurrency would exist only when crypto-to-real currency rates are published by reliable sources. It would be difficult to classify crypto-to-crypto exchange rates as an active market (and therefore Level 1 fair value). Further, the valuation would also have to be adjusted for illiquidity factors due to the lack of a ready market and the derivation of the prices based on a crypto-to-crypto exchange rate and a secondary crypto-to-real currency exchange.

Due to the factors discussed above, most of the cryptocurrencies will not have an active market and, therefore, they will need to be valued using a valuation technique. The appropriate valuation technique should consider how a market participant would determine the fair value of the cryptocurrency being measured.

Generally, the market approach will be the most appropriate technique for cryptocurrencies. The cost approach or the income approach is likely to be rare in practice. Since cryptocurrency markets are still emerging and not very matured, inputs and information based on discrete / bilateral transactions outside an active market may have to be used. For example, in April, 2021 there was a big crash in Bitcoin prices, reportedly due to tweets about the US regulators’ decision on cracking down on financial institutions for money laundering using cryptocurrencies. Based on CMC website data at the time of writing this article, it does appear that broker quotes are not widely used in this sector as yet. The cryptocurrency market is evolving rapidly and so valuation techniques are also likely to evolve.

FINAL REMARKS
Due to the large diversity in the features of various cryptocurrencies, the pace of innovation and the regulatory developments associated with cryptocurrencies, the facts and circumstances of each individual case will differ. This makes it difficult to determine the appropriate accounting treatment and acceptable valuation technique. And given the increasing acceptance of cryptocurrencies around the world, it is a matter of time before the accounting standard-setters around the world and in India come out with standards / application guidance for cryptocurrencies.  

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS FRAUDS AND UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS

(This is the fifth article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

In the recent past regulators and other stakeholders have been increasingly concerned with the increase in frauds by companies and the perceived lack of attention by the auditors in respect thereof. This trust deficit is attempted to be bridged by CARO 2020 by significantly increasing the reporting responsibilities for auditors with regard to fraud and unreported transactions.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(xi)(a)

Frauds noticed or reported:

Enhanced Reporting

Whether any fraud by the
company or any fraud on the company has been noticed or reported during the
year; if yes, the nature and the amount involved is to be indicated

Clause 3(xi)(b)

Reporting on Frauds:

New Clause

Whether any report under
sub-section (12) of section 143 of the Companies Act has been filed by the
auditors in Form ADT-4 as prescribed under rule 13 of the Companies (Audit
and Auditors) Rules, 2014 with the Central Government

Clause 3(xi)(c)

Whistle-Blower Complaints:

New Clause

Whether the auditor has
considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during the year by the company

Clause 3(viii)

Unrecorded Transactions:

New Clause

Whether any transactions
not recorded in the books of accounts have been surrendered or disclosed as
income during the year in the tax assessments under the Income-tax Act, 1961
(43 of 1961); and if so, whether the previously unrecorded income has been
properly recorded in the books of accounts during the year

ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Frauds noticed or reported [Clause 3(xi)(a)]:
* The scope has been widened by removing the words ‘officers or employees’.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges which are discussed below in respect of the Clause where there is enhanced reporting as well as the new Clauses:

Frauds noticed or reported [Clause 3(xi)(a)]:
a) Conflict with responsibilities under SA 240:
For complying with SA 240, the auditor is primarily concerned with frauds which cause material misstatements to the financial statements, which are intentional and broadly cover misstatements from fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. This is in conflict with the CARO requirements whereby the terms ‘noticed or reported’ are very wide. Accordingly, the auditor is required to report not only the frauds noted or detected by him pursuant to the procedures performed in terms of SA 240 and reported by him u/s 143(12), but also frauds detected by the management whilst reviewing the internal controls or internal audit or whistle-blower mechanism or Audit Committee and brought to the auditor’s notice.
b) Concept of materiality: Once a fraud is noticed, it appears that it needs to be reported irrespective of the materiality involved. Whilst there is no clarity in respect thereof in the Guidance Note under this Clause, para 37 of the Guidance Note specifies that whilst reporting on matters specified in the Order, the auditor should consider the materiality in accordance with the principles enunciated in SA 320. Accordingly, the auditors should apply appropriate judgement whilst reporting under this Clause. It may be noted that even the FRRB and QRB in the course of their review reports have not been favourably inclined to the concept of taking shelter under the garb of materiality for reporting under this Clause.
c) Challenges in detection: An auditor may find it difficult to detect acts by employees or others committed with an intent to injure the interest of the company or cause wrongful gain or loss, unless these are reflected in the books of accounts; examples include receiving payoffs from vendors and tampering with QR codes during the billing and collection process. In such cases the auditors would need to corroborate their inquiries based on their knowledge of the business / industry coupled with the results of the evaluation of the internal controls, the robustness of the code of conduct and ethics policies, instances of past transgressions in respect thereof, etc.

Reporting on Frauds [Clause 3(xi)(b)]:
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Section 143(12) of Companies Act, 2013
Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, if an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as auditor, has reason to believe that an offence involving fraud is being or has been committed against the company by officers or employees of the company, he shall immediately report the matter to the Central Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed.

Rule 13 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 deals with reporting of frauds by auditor and other matters:
(1) If an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as statutory auditor has reason to believe that an offence of fraud, which involves or is expected to involve, individually an amount of rupees one crore or above, is being or has been committed against the company by its officers or employees, the auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government.

(2) The auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government as under:
(a) the auditor shall report the matter to the Board or the Audit Committee, as the case may be, immediately but not later than two days of his (acquiring) knowledge of the fraud, seeking their reply or observations within forty-five days;
(b) on receipt of such reply or observations, the auditor shall forward his report and the reply or observations of the Board or the Audit Committee along with his comments (on such reply or observations of the Board or the Audit Committee) to the Central Government within fifteen days from the date of receipt of such reply or observations;
(c) in case the auditor fails to get any reply or observations from the Board or the Audit Committee within the stipulated period of forty-five days, he shall forward his report to the Central Government along with a note containing the details of his report that was earlier forwarded to the Board or the Audit Committee for which he has not received any reply or observations;
(d) the report shall be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs in a sealed cover by Registered Post with Acknowledgement Due or by Speed Post followed by an e-mail in confirmation of the same;
(e) the report shall be on the letterhead of the auditor containing postal address, e-mail address and contact telephone number or mobile number and be signed by the auditor with his seal and shall indicate his Membership Number; and
(f) The report shall be in the form of a statement as specified in Form ADT-4.

(3) In case of a fraud involving lesser than the amount specified in sub-rule (1), the auditor shall report the matter to the Audit Committee constituted  u/s 177 or to the Board immediately but not later than two days of his knowledge of the fraud and he shall report the matter specifying the following:
(a) Nature of fraud with description;
(b) Approximate amount involved; and
(c) Parties involved.

(4) The following details of each of the frauds reported to the Audit Committee or the Board under sub-rule (3) during the year shall be disclosed in the Board’s Report:
(a) Nature of fraud with description;
(b) Approximate amount involved;
(c) Parties involved, if remedial action not taken; and
(d) Remedial actions taken.

(5) The provision of this rule shall also apply, mutatis mutandis, to a Cost Auditor and a Secretarial Auditor during the performance of his duties  u/s 148 and  u/s 204, respectively.

Form and content of Form ADT-4
a) Full details of suspected offence involving fraud (with documents in support),
b) Particulars of officers / employees who are suspected to be involved in the offence,
c) Basis on which fraud is suspected,
d) Period during which the suspected fraud has occurred,
e) Date of sending report to BOD / Audit Committee and date of reply, if any, received,
f) Whether auditor is satisfied with the reply / observations of the BOD / Audit Committee,
g) Estimated amount involved in the suspected fraud,
h) Steps taken by the company, if any, in this regard, with full details of references.

Guidance Note issued by ICAI
The ICAI has also published a Guidance Note on Reporting of Frauds u/s 143(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 to assist the auditors in discharging their responsibilities. Some of the main issues addressed by the Guidance Note are as under and which need to be kept in mind whilst discharging the responsibilities for reporting under this Clause:
* The requirement is to report only on frauds in the course of performance of duties as an auditor.
* Only frauds committed against the company by its officers or employees are required to be reported. Thus, frauds committed by vendors and outsourced service providers are not required to be reported. The requirements of SA 240 need to be kept in mind. Accordingly only frauds involving financial reporting or misappropriation of assets are covered Thus, the scope for reporting under this Clause is much narrower than under sub-clause (a) discussed earlier.
* If any frauds are detected during the course of other attest / non-attest functions like quarterly reporting and they are likely to have a material effect on the financial statements, the same would also need to be reported.
* There is no responsibility to report frauds if the same are already detected. However, in such cases the auditor should apply professional scepticism as to whether the fraud was genuinely detected through vigil / whistle-blower mechanism and review the follow-up in respect thereof. This could have an impact on reporting under sub-clause (c) discussed subsequently.
* Reporting is required only when there is sufficient reason to believe and there is sufficient knowledge (i.e., evidence) of occurrence. Mere suspicion is not sufficient.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Reporting by predecessor auditor: The requirement for reporting pertains to any report which has been filed during the financial year under audit. Accordingly, if the auditor has been appointed for the first time, he would need to consider whether the predecessor auditor has reported to the Central Government during the financial year prior to his term being concluded before the AGM. In such cases it is better that the incoming auditor seeks a specific clarification from the predecessor auditor and also obtains a management representation and makes a mention accordingly in his report.
b) Post-balance sheet events: If the auditor has identified the fraud and initiated the communication procedures outlined earlier before the year-end but has filed his report with the Central Government subsequent to year-end till the date of the report, he would need to report on the same specifically under this Clause. In such cases, he should also consider the impact on the financial statements and disclosures of Events subsequent to the balance sheet date under AS 4 and Ind AS 10, as applicable.
c) Monetarily immaterial frauds: Monetarily immaterial frauds below Rs. 1 crore have to be reported by the auditor to the Audit Committee constituted u/s 177. In cases where the Audit Committee is not required to be constituted u/s 177, then the auditor shall report monetarily immaterial frauds to the Board of Directors. In either case, a disclosure needs to be made in the Board Report as outlined earlier. Though there is no specific reporting responsibility under this Clause, it would be a good practice to make a reference to the same under this Clause.
d) Cost audit and secretarial audit: Reporting on fraud u/s 143(12) is required even by the cost auditor and the secretarial auditor of the company and it is possible that a suspected offence involving fraud may have been reported by them even before the auditor became aware of the fraud in the course of his audit procedures under SA 240. In such cases, if a suspected offence of fraud has already been reported by the cost auditor and the secretarial auditor, he need not report the same to the Audit Committee u/s 177 or the Board of Directors and thereafter, where applicable, to the Central Government, since he has not per se identified the suspected offence of fraud. It is, however, advisable that the report factually clarifies the position.

Whistle-Blower Complaints [Clause 3(xi)(c)]:
The establishment of a whistle-blower mechanism is mandatory for certain class of companies and therefore the auditor should consider the requirements prescribed in the Act and in SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (SEBI LODR Regulations) in this regard. Section 177(9) of the Act requires certain class of companies to establish a vigil mechanism for their Directors and employees to report their genuine concerns or grievances:

Requirements under Companies Act, 2013
Section 177(9) read with Rule 7 of the Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014 provides for establishment of a vigil mechanism.

(1) Every listed company and the companies belonging to the following class or classes shall establish a vigil mechanism for their Directors and employees to report their genuine concerns or grievances:
(a) the companies which accept deposits from the public;
(b) the companies which have borrowed money from banks and public financial institutions in excess of fifty crore rupees.
(2) The companies which are required to constitute an Audit Committee shall oversee the vigil mechanism through the committee and if any of the members of the committee have a conflict of interest in a given case, they should recuse themselves and the others on the committee would deal with the matter on hand.
(3) In case of other companies, the Board of Directors shall nominate a Director to play the role of an Audit Committee for the purpose of vigil mechanism to whom other Directors and employees may report their concerns.
(4) The vigil mechanism shall provide for adequate safeguards against victimisation of employees and Directors who avail of the vigil mechanism and also provide for direct access to the Chairperson of the Audit Committee or the Director nominated to play the role of Audit Committee, as the case may be, in exceptional cases.
(5) In case of repeated frivolous complaints being filed by a Director or an employee, the Audit Committee or the Director nominated to play the role of Audit Committee may take suitable action against the Director or employee concerned, including reprimand.

Requirements under SEBI LODR
Regulation 4(2)(d) of the SEBI LODR Regulations also mandates all listed entities to devise an effective whistle-blower mechanism enabling Directors, employees or any other person to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices.

Regulation 46(2)(e) of SEBI LODR Regulations requires a listed company to disseminate on its website details of establishment of its vigil mechanism / whistle-blower policy. Further, the role of the Audit Committee also includes review of the functioning of the whistle-blower mechanism.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Anonymous complaints:
The auditor needs to consider every complaint received by the company including anonymous complaints while deciding the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. The auditor should also evaluate whether such complaints are investigated and resolved by the company in an appropriate and timely manner. Further, in case of anonymous complaints he needs to exercise greater degree of professional scepticism to ascertain whether they are frivolous or motivated. Also, any other information which is available in the public domain should also be considered.
b) Companies not covered under the Regulatory Framework: The reporting requirements under this Clause do not distinguish between listed, public interest entities and other entities, including those in the SME sector where there is no regulatory requirement to establish a formal whistle-blower / vigil mechanism. In such cases the auditor needs to make specific inquiries and obtain appropriate representation which needs to be corroborated for adequacy and appropriateness based on the understanding obtained about the entity and its operating and governance environment. Finally, any information which is available in the public domain should also be considered.
c) Forensic investigations: In case a forensic audit /investigation has been initiated pursuant to a whistle-blower complaint, the auditor needs to check the reports issued and discuss the observations and conclusions with the auditor / investigation agency if required and report accordingly.
d) Outsourcing arrangements: The auditor should perform independent procedures, including getting direct confirmation for whistle-blower complaints received which are managed by a third party like an external internal audit firm.

Unrecorded Transactions [Clause 3(viii)]:
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Undisclosed income under the Income-tax Act, 1961
‘Undisclosed income’ as per section 158B includes any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or any income based on any entry in the books of accounts or other documents or transactions, where such money, bullion, jewellery, valuable article, thing, entry in the books of accounts or other document or transaction represents wholly or partly income or property which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act, or any expense, deduction or allowance claimed under this Act which is found to be false.

Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme
The Union Budget 2020 was presented by the Finance Minister on 1st February, 2020 with an underlying objective to support the Government’s target of making India a $5 trillion economy by 2025. Several policy and tax-related announcements were made with primary focus on improving the ease of living and the ease of doing business in India. One of the key proposals was introduction of a direct tax dispute resolution scheme, namely, Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme which translates to ‘From Dispute towards Trust’, i.e., trust as the basis of partnering with the taxpayers towards building the nation. The Scheme proposes to settle direct tax disputes relating to personal income tax and corporate tax between taxpayers and the tax Department. The Government of India enacted the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 (‘the Act’) on 17th March, 2020 to give effect to this Scheme.

An overview of the Scheme:
* If a taxpayer elects to take recourse under the Scheme, a proportion of the total tax along with interest and penalty needs to be paid (depending on the type of the pending dispute) for full and final settlement.
* The scheme confers immunity from prosecution, penalty and interest in respect of proceedings for which the taxpayer has opted to avail the Scheme.
* The Act also provides that the tax disputes so settled cannot be reopened in any other proceeding by the Income Tax Department or any other designated authority.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Scope: The emphasis is on the words surrendered or disclosed which implies that the company must have voluntarily admitted to the addition of such income in the income tax returns filed by the company. What constitutes voluntary admission poses several challenges especially where the company has pending tax assessments which have been decided up to a particular stage and the company chooses not to file an appeal. In such cases, the auditor needs to review the submissions and statements filed in the course of assessment to ascertain whether the additions to income were as a consequence of certain transactions not recorded in the books. This would involve use of professional judgement and consideration of the materiality factor.
b) Submissions under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme: In case the company has opted for disclosures under the said Scheme, a view can be taken that the same constitutes voluntary surrender and disclosure and hence needs to be reported under this Clause with appropriate factual disclosures.

CONCLUSION
Frauds are now an inherent part of corporate life and the auditors will have to live with them. The reporting requirements outlined above will hopefully provide them with the necessary tools to cope with them and provide greater comfort to the various stakeholders. In conclusion, life will never be cushy for the auditors and they would always be on the razor’s edge!

EQUATING EQUITY

Indian Equity markets have been on fire after the 2020 fall. They have beaten many comparable EM indices. What’s going on?

Too much money: Governments / Central banks have printed trillions of notes. And we know that most of the markets are moved by central bankers. The current oversupply is leading to inflation, asset overvaluation, poor yields and low value of money.

Yields: With too much money around, inflation is an obvious result. Real yield of interest (ten-year yield less CPI) has become negative in many countries (in the US it is -4.77, India 1.87%, China 1.41%1). Most of the EU and North America are negative, whereas EMs are positive.

Available asset classes: FDs and fixed income assets are giving sub-optimal returns. Real estate has remained stagnant. Liquid asset classes – Equities and Crypto – have been HOT. Bullion has been good but has limits. In 1981: 10 gm gold = Rs.1,800; 1 kg silver = Rs. 2,700 and the Sensex = 170 points. Come to December, 2021: 10 gm gold = Rs. 48,000 (26 times in 40 years); 100 gm silver = Rs. 67,600 (25 times in 40 years) and Sensex = 57,000 points (335 times in 40 years).

India’s time has come: India is showing a promising position – in both perception and reality. On Deepavali – Bumper Gold sales, GST collection at Rs. 1.3 lakh crores; Corporate profit to GDP ratio at decade high; Exports rise for 11 straight months; Rs. 100 billion in UPI transactions; Card spends hit Rs. 2 lakh crores; New economy companies and Unicorns showcase remarkable innovation. Positive signs include dramatic improvement in infrastructure; Government stepping out of businesses (Air India, LIC listing) and likely to stay out of the way (balance between State control and private enterprise) and stop making silly mistakes (retrospective amendments).

Participation: New demat accounts opened in F.Y.20 were 49 lakhs with the three prior-year average coming to 43 lakhs; whereas, the new demats opened for F.Y.21 were 1.42 crores.

_______________________________________
1 2nd December, 2021
IPO frenzy: It is reported that $4 billion was raised in the PayTM, Nykaa and Policybazar IPOs. But more important is that $2.2 billion was on offer for sale in IPOs by existing investors. This activity has made entrepreneurs wealthy, added market cap and allowed wider public participation.

From my personal experience, Equity has given some of the finest returns to those who are invested for decades and even more if for generations. The combination of liquidity, growth possibility and legacy aspects are matchless. The mantra of the masters has been: Buy Good (select well), Track Well (conviction of analysis and regularity) and Sit Tight (patience to hold) – all these are critical. [‘Warren is pretty good at doing nothing’ – Charlie Munger; ‘Our favourite holding period is forever’ – Warren Buffett.]

The aim obviously should be to Protect Capital – Beat Inflation – Growth in that order. With the invisible tax called inflation attacking capital, one needs an asset class that beats this monster. The goal of ‘financial independence’ makes people want to be rich before they grow old. One Indian expert I read mentioned that one will need to have 50-58 times yearly expenses to be financially independent. Both these targets are impossible to meet unless one beats inflation and gets her savings to grow fast.

However, risks cannot be disregarded and valuations sans P/E seem ridiculous if not bizarre. Many believe that market value and earnings have no correlation. A recently listed company having an annual profit of Rs. 62 crores and Rs. 1 lakh crore market cap, traded at ten times the price of ITC when ITC profits are about Rs. 35 crores per day. In a lighter vein, I thought make up wins against cigarettes!

Elon Musk once said that Tesla doesn’t make cars. It makes factories that make cars. Great businesses / governments / countries don’t focus on producing a great result. They (should) focus on building a system that makes a great result inevitable. The India of our dreams will be that which makes great results inevitable.

 
 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

MADAN LAL DHINGRA

A few months back I wrote in this column about the greatness and versatility of Lokmanya Tilak (BCAJ issue of August, 2021). It was well received by the readers. We are now in the 75th year of our Independence. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile and necessary for us to know about the real heroes of our country and get some inspiration from their life stories.

Today in our profession I find that there is a crisis of courage. Professionals are becoming ‘spineless!’ One of the reasons for this may be that we did not study the real history of valour in our country. The history we studied was written by Britishers which was obviously far from being ‘true and fair.’

Today, I intend to write about the great martyr of India, Madan Lal Dhingra, who made the highest sacrifice for the Independence of our country. Born on 18th February, 1883, he lived a heroic life for just 26 years till he went to the gallows on 17th August, 1909.

As a college student in Amritsar, he thought seriously about India’s poverty and came to the conclusion that the key solution to this plight was ‘Swaraj’ and ‘Swadeshi’. He had observed how Britishers were looting India.

Right from his college days, he took part in or led the agitations to fight against injustice. His father, who was a civil surgeon and in the service of the British Government, hated the movement for Independence. Madan Lal was rusticated from the college; he refused to apologise and went away to look for work. He took on a few odd jobs at a low level, as a clerk or even as a labourer. Everywhere, due to his protest against injustice, he was fired. He then came to Bombay. His elder brother, again a doctor, compelled him to go to London in 1906 and paid for his education in mechanical engineering.

But eventually his own family totally disowned him; so much so that when in August, 2015 he was remembered with great reverence as a martyr, his descendants refused even to participate in the function! They did not even allow converting the ancestral house into a museum. Instead, they sold it to someone else.

While in London, Madan Lal came in contact with the well-known activists for freedom, Shyamji Krishna Varma and Veer V.D. Savarkar. Madan Lal was brilliant in academics and also had other talents. However, he dedicated his life only to the cause of Independence. In England in July, 1909, he assassinated Curzon Wyllie, who was the political adviser to the Secretary of State for India. Madan Lal considered him to be responsible for many tyrannical and inhuman acts in India.

Even during the trial that led to his conviction and death sentence, he showed extraordinary courage. He made very bold statements fearlessly. His historic statement made in the court was privately admired by many British leaders, including Winston Churchill. Churchill reportedly described it as ‘the finest statement ever made in the name of independence’.

He had the courage to warn the judge after his death sentence was announced, ‘I am proud to have the honour of laying down my life for my country. But remember, we shall have our time in the days to come’. He went to the gallows smilingly and said, ‘I may be re-born of the same mother and I may re-die in the same sacred cause till the cause is successful. Vande Mataram’.

His historic statement can be a source of inspiration for all the struggles for Independence around the globe. It is worth reproducing. His statement read as follows:

‘I do not want to say anything in defence of myself, but simply to prove the justice of my deed. As for myself, no English law court has got any authority to arrest and detain me in prison, or pass sentence of death on me. That is the reason I did not have any counsel to defend me.

And I maintain that if it is patriotic in an Englishman to fight against the Germans if they were to occupy this country, it is much more justifiable and patriotic in my case to fight against the English. I hold the English people responsible for the murder of 80 millions of Indian people in the last fifty years, and they are also responsible for taking away £100,000,000 every year from India to this country. I also hold them responsible for the hanging and deportation of my patriotic countrymen, who did just the same as the English people here are advising their countrymen to do. And the Englishman who goes out to India and gets, say, £100 a month, that simply means that he passes a sentence of death on a thousand of my poor countrymen, because these thousand people could easily live on this £100, which the Englishman spends mostly on his frivolities and pleasures. Just as the Germans have no right to occupy this country, so the English people have no right to occupy India, and it is perfectly justifiable on our part to kill the Englishman who is polluting our sacred land.

I am surprised at the terrible hypocrisy, the farce, and the mockery of the English people. They pose as the champions of oppressed humanity – the peoples of the Congo and the people of Russia – when there is terrible oppression and horrible atrocities (being) committed in India; for example, the killing of two millions of people every year and the outraging of our women. In case this country is occupied by Germans, and the Englishman, not bearing to see the Germans walking with the insolence of conquerors in the streets of London, goes and kills one or two Germans, and that Englishman is held as a patriot by the people of this country, then certainly I am prepared to work for the emancipation of my Motherland. Whatever else I have to say is in the paper before the Court… I make this statement, not because I wish to plead for mercy or anything of that kind. I wish that English people should sentence me to death, for in that case the vengeance of my countrymen will be all the more keen. I put forward this statement to show the justice of my cause to the outside world, and especially to our sympathisers in America and Germany.’

Friends, as CAs we are very much concerned with ‘Independence’ and ‘True & Fair’ things. If we inculcate even one per cent of Madan Lal Dhingra’s courage, the profession and the country can regain its past glory!

Namaskaars to such real heroes of India.

Additional discount granted by the supplier, reimbursed by the principal company, is additional consideration liable for GST. Further, no credit reversal is required with respect to receipt of commercial credit notes

20. [2019-TIOL-433-AAR-GST] M/s. Santosh Distributors Date of order: 16th September, 2019

Additional discount granted by the supplier, reimbursed by the principal company, is additional consideration liable for GST. Further, no credit reversal is required with respect to receipt of commercial credit notes

FACTS

Prices of the products supplied by the applicant are determined by the supplier / principal company. The applicant is paying GST as per the invoice issued by them and is availing input tax credit on the inward invoice received from the principal company. The ruling is sought to determine whether discount provided by the principal company to their dealers through the applicant attracts any tax under the GST law. Further, whether the amount shown in the commercial credit note issued to the applicant by the principal company attracts proportionate reversal of input tax credit, and is there any tax liability under GST law on the amount received as reimbursement of discount or rebate provided by the principal company as per the written agreement?

HELD

The Authority held that the additional discount given by the supplier through the applicant which is reimbursed as a special reduced price is liable to be added to the consideration payable by the customer to the distributor / applicant to arrive at the value of supply in terms of section 15 of the Act. Further, with respect to commercial credit notes where the supplier is not eligible to reduce its original tax liability, no reversal of credit is required. Lastly, in case of reimbursement of discount, GST is applicable.

A bakery where food items are not prepared and served cannot be considered as a restaurant. The tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food sold

19. [2019-TIOL-440-AAR-GST] M/s Square One Homemade Treats Date of order: 30th September, 2019

A bakery where food items are not prepared and served cannot be considered as a restaurant. The tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food sold

FACTS

The applicant company is engaged in sale of food products such as baked items like cakes, cookies, brownies, ready-to-eat homemade packed food, ready-to-eat snacks and hot and cold beverages through dispensing machines. All food items sold are pre-packed and no cooking is done at the premises. There is a table for customers who eat food procured from the counter in the premises. The ruling is sought to know whether resale of food and bakery products falls under restaurant services. Further, whether HSN and tax rates favoured by the applicant would be correct.

RULING

The Authority held that a restaurant is a place of business where food is prepared in the premises and served based on orders received from the customer. Whereas in the present case it is a bakery where food items are sold and the tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food items in the shop. Accordingly, it was held that the bakery cannot be considered as a restaurant.

The amounts received towards interest-free refundable security deposit do not attract GST unless the same is applied towards ‘consideration’. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing such deposits will attract GST as it is covered within the definition of ‘consideration’. AAR held that providing pre-decided number of free transactions subject to certain pre-determined maximum amount is in the nature of discount and will not attract GST subject to section 15(3) of CGST Act, 2017

18. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 515 (AAR – Gujarat) Rajkot Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. Date of order: 15th May, 2019

The amounts received towards interest-free refundable security deposit do not attract GST unless the same is applied towards ‘consideration’. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing such deposits will attract GST as it is covered within the definition of ‘consideration’. AAR held that providing pre-decided number of free transactions subject to certain pre-determined maximum amount is in the nature of discount and will not attract GST subject to section 15(3) of CGST Act, 2017

FACTS

The applicant engaged in providing financial and other services and also provides service for the operation of dematerialised (Demat) accounts to various account holders as well as to persons intending to operate only their Demat accounts. The applicant sought a ruling as to whether (i) amounts received by the applicant as refundable interest-free deposit could be treated as ‘supply’ under GST? (ii) whether the amount of Rs. 2,500 being a refundable interest-free deposit, which allows the depositor some benefits, would attract GST? and

(iii)    whether the first ten free transactions subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs allowed to the Demat account holder depositing the refundable interest-free deposit would attract GST?

RULING

AAR noted that the deposit is excluded from the definition of the consideration by the proviso to section 2(31) of the CGST Act, 2017. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing the refundable interest-free deposit will be considered as consideration since it is covered in both the limbs of the definition of consideration given u/s 2(31). Further, AAR noted that the refundable interest-free deposit is in addition to the commercial considerations to cover the risk of the Demat account. The main purpose of the deposits is not only security but also the collection of capital. Therefore, AAR held that the monetary value of the act of providing a refundable interest-free deposit is the consideration for the services provided by the applicant and therefore, the services provided by the applicant can be treated as supply and chargeable to GST in the hands of the applicant.

As regards the refundable interest-free deposit of Rs. 2,500, it was held that such amount will not attract GST unless it is applied towards consideration and the monetary value of the act of providing such deposit will attract GST. Allowing free transactions was looked upon as discount and hence was held as not to attract GST subject to the fulfilment of the conditions u/s 15(3) of the CGST Act, 2017.

When the manufacturer is not obliged to supply tools / moulds in manufacturing parts and they are supplied by the customer free of cost and on a returnable basis, the value of such tools / moulds supplied by the customer not includible in the value of parts to be manufactured by manufacturer-supplier

17. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 107 (AAR – Karnataka) Tool-Comp Systems (P) Ltd. Date of order: 16th July, 2019

When the manufacturer is not obliged to supply tools / moulds in manufacturing parts and they are supplied by the customer free of cost and on a returnable basis, the value of such tools / moulds supplied by the customer not includible in the value of parts to be manufactured by manufacturer-supplier

FACTS

The applicant is a manufacturer and seller of goods. For the production of parts, the tools required are either manufactured by the appellant or supplied by the customers free of cost on a returnable basis. The tools supplied by customers on free of cost basis are classified under capital goods. The tool has a specific life and can produce only a certain volume of total production. Since the customer is supplying the tool on free of cost basis, the applicant is not charging any portion of the cost of the tool to the customer.

The applicant filed the present ruling for seeking clarification regarding the applicability of tool amortisation cost (transaction value) in the GST regime on capital goods received free on returnable basis from the recipients (customer OEM) for parts production and supply.

RULING

AAR noted that as per the contract, the customers are required to supply tools to the applicant free of cost and the applicant is not under any obligation to supply the components by using tools / moulds belonging to him. This is exactly in terms of Circular No. 47/21/2018-GST dated 8th June, 2018 and hence it does not constitute supply. However, if the contractual obligation is cast upon the component manufacturer to provide moulds / dies yet it is provided by the client OEM / FOC, then the amortised cost of the moulds / dies is required to be added to the value of the components supplied. Since this was not the case, it was held that the applicant is not required to add the value of tools supplied by its customers to the value of parts supplied by him.

Articles 8 and 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions (Article 24 of India-Singapore DTAA) are not applicable if (a) India does not have right to tax income pursuant to treaty provision, (b) income is taxed in Singapore under accrual basis. Accordingly, Article 24 is not applicable to shipping income earned by Singapore tax resident which is not taxable in India as per Article 8 of DTAA as also taxable on accrual basis in Singapore

6. [2020] 121 taxmann.com 165
(Chen.)(Trib.)
Bengal Tiger Line (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No: 11/Chny/2020 A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 6th November,
2020

 

Articles
8 and 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions
(Article 24 of India-Singapore DTAA) are not applicable if (a) India does not
have right to tax income pursuant to treaty provision, (b) income is taxed in
Singapore under accrual basis. Accordingly, Article 24 is not applicable to
shipping income earned by Singapore tax resident which is not taxable in India
as per Article 8 of DTAA as also taxable on accrual basis in Singapore

 

FACTS

The
assessee, a Singapore tax resident, was involved in the business of operation
of ships in international waters. It did not offer to tax income received from
shipping operations in India relying on Article 8 of the India-Singapore DTAA.
The A.O. denied Article 8 benefit invoking Article 24 of the India-Singapore
DTAA. In the view of the A.O., Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions under
Article 24 apply since income from shipping operations is exempt under Singapore
tax laws.

 

The DRP
upheld the view of the A.O. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   Article 24 is applicable if
    (i) income is sourced in a Contracting State (India) and such income is exempt
    or taxed at a reduced rate by virtue of any Article under the India-Singapore
    DTAA, and (ii) income of the non-resident should be taxable on receipt basis in
    Singapore.
  •   The first condition of
    Article 24 is not satisfied as Article 8 of the India-Singapore DTAA provides
    exclusive right of taxation to Singapore. It does not provide for exemption or
    reduced rate of taxation of such income.
  •   Since India does not have
    right to tax shipping income, the satisfaction of other conditions of Article
    24, like exemption or reduced rate of tax, has no bearing on the taxability of
    shipping income.
  •   The second condition is not
    satisfied as the income of the shipping company is taxed on accrual basis in
    Singapore.
  •   Reliance was placed on the
    Singapore IRAS letter dated 17th September, 20182  wherein it was specifically stated that the
    provisions of Article 24 of the India-Singapore DTAA would not be applicable to
    shipping income.

______________________________________

2   Content
of letter is not extracted in decision

Explanation 7 to section 9(1)(i) – Small shareholder exemption introduced by this Explanation inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is retrospective in nature

5. [2020]
120 taxmann.com 325 (Del.)(Trib.)
Augustus
Capital (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA
No: 8084/Del/2018
A.Y.:
2015-16 Date
of order: 15th October, 2020

Explanation
7 to section 9(1)(i) – Small shareholder exemption introduced by this
Explanation inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is retrospective in nature

 

FACTS

The
assessee, a non-resident company, held shares in Singapore Company (SCO) which
in turn held shares in Indian company1. The assessee sold shares of
SCO to the Indian company. The Indian company withheld tax on the consideration
amount which was claimed as refund by the assessee.

 

During the
course of assessment proceedings, the assessee claimed that income is not
taxable in view of Explanation 7 to section 9(1)(i) which exempts the seller
from indirect transfer provisions if its interest in foreign company (which
derives substantial value from India) does not exceed 5%. The A.O. was of the
view that Explanation 7 inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is prospective, being
effective from 1st April, 2016 and, therefore, not applicable in the
year under consideration. The DRP upheld the view of the A.O.

 

1   Decision
does not mention total stake held by assessee in SCO. However, decision
proceeds on the basis that SCO derives substantial value from India and
aggregate stake of assessee is less than 5% in SCO

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   Explanation 5 to section
    9(1)(i) was introduced by the Finance Act of 2012 with retrospective effect
    from 1st April, 1962 to tax indirect transfers. The said provisions
    were inserted to obviate the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone
    International Holdings B.V. 341 ITR 1 (SC)
    .
  •   After the insertion of
    Explanation 5, the stakeholders were apprehensive about ambiguities surrounding
    the said Explanation and, therefore, representations were made to the
    Government of India which constituted the Shome Committee to look into the apprehensions
    / grievances of the stakeholders.
  •   On the recommendations of
    the Shome Committee, Explanations 6 and 7 were inserted by the Finance Act,
    2015. Explanations 6 and 7 have to be read with Explanation 5 to understand the
    provisions of section 9(1)(i). Since Explanation 5 has been given retrospective
    effect, Explanations 6 and 7, which further the object of the insertion of
    Explanation 5, have to be given retrospective effect.

Section 22 – Assessee is builder / developer – Rental income derived is taxable as Business Income and section 22 is not applicable – In respect of unsold flats held as stock-in-trade, Annual Lettable Value cannot be determined u/s 22 since rental income, if any, is taxable as Business Income

8. Osho Developers vs. ACIT (Mumbai) Shamim Yahya (A.M.) and Ravish Sood
(J.M.) ITA Nos. 2372 & 1860/Mum/2019
A.Ys.: 2014-15 & 2015-16 Date of order: 3rd November,
2020
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K.
Shivram and Neelam Jadhav / Uodal Raj Singh

 

Section
22 – Assessee is builder / developer – Rental income derived is taxable as
Business Income and section 22 is not applicable – In respect of unsold flats
held as stock-in-trade, Annual Lettable Value cannot be determined u/s 22 since
rental income, if any, is taxable as Business Income

 

FACTS

The
assessee firm was a builder / developer. It had filed its return of income
declaring Nil income. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the A.O.
noticed that the assessee had shown unsold flats in its closing stock.
Following the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Ansal Housing Finance and Leasing Company Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 180
, the
A.O. assessed to tax the Annual Lettable Value (ALV) of the aforesaid flats u/s
22 as Income from House Property. The assessee tried to distinguish the facts
involved in the case of Ansal. It also contended that the income on the sale of
the unsold flats was liable to be assessed as its Business Income and not as
Income from House Property, therefore, the ALV of the said flats was not
exigible to tax.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A). Relying on the judgment of
the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gundecha Builders (2019) 102
taxman.com 27
, where the Court had held that the rental income derived
from the property held as stock-in-trade was taxable as Income from House
Property, the CIT(A) found no infirmity in the A.O.’s action of assessing the
ALV of the unsold flats as Income from House Property.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal noted that in the case before the Bombay High Court, the assessee had,
in fact, let out the flats. And the issue was as to under which head of rental
income was it to be taxed, as ‘business income’ or as ‘income from house
property’. But in the present appeal filed by the assessee the flats were not
let out and there was no rental income earned by the assessee. Therefore,
according to the Tribunal the decision in the case of Gundecha Builders
would not assist the Revenue.

 

Referring
to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ansal
Housing Finance and Leasing Company Ltd.
relied on by the Revenue, the
Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court was of the view that the levy of
income tax in the case of an assessee holding house property was premised not
on whether the assessee carries on business as landlord, but on the ownership.
And on that basis, the ALV of the flats held as stock-in-trade by the assessee
was brought to tax under the head ‘house property’ by the Delhi High Court.
However, the Tribunal noted the contrary decision of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of CIT vs. Neha Builders (2008) 296 ITR 661 where it was
held that rental income derived by an assessee from the property which was held
as stock-in-trade is assessable as Business Income and cannot be assessed under
the head ‘Income from House Property’. According to the Gujarat High Court, any
income derived from the stock would be income from the business and not income
from the property.

 

In view of the
conflicting decisions of the non-jurisdictional High Courts, the Tribunal
relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of K.
Subramanian and Anr. vs. Siemens India Ltd. and Anr. (1985) 156 ITR 11

where it was held that where there are conflicting decisions of the
non-jurisdictional High Courts, the view which is in favour of the assessee
should be followed. Accordingly, the Tribunal followed the view taken by the
Gujarat High Court in the case of Neha Builders and allowed the
appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that a similar view was taken
by the SMC bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Rajendra
Godshalwar vs. ITO-21(3)(1), Mumbai [ITA No. 7470/Mum/2017, dated 31st
January, 2019]
. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the ALV of the
flats held by the assessee as part of the stock-in-trade of its business as
that of a builder and developer could not have been determined and thus brought
to tax under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

 

 

Assessee being mere trader of scrap would not be liable to collect tax at source u/s 206C when such scrap was not a result of manufacture or mechanical working of materials

14. [2020] 78 ITR (Trib.) 451
(Luck.)(Trib.)
Lala Bharat Lal & Sons vs. ITO ITA No. 14, 15 & 16/LKW/2019 A.Ys.: 2014-15 to 2016-17 Date of order: 19th February,
2020

 

Assessee
being mere trader of scrap would not be liable to collect tax at source u/s
206C when such scrap was not a result of manufacture or mechanical working of
materials

 

FACTS

The assessee was in the
business of dealing / trading in metal scrap. For the relevant assessment years
the A.O. held that the assessee was liable to collect tax at source @ 1% of the
sale amount as per the provisions of section 206C(1). The assessee contended
that the sale / trading done by him did not tantamount to sale of scrap as defined
in Explanation (b) to section 206C, as the same had not been generated from
manufacture or mechanical work. This contention was rejected by the CIT(A). The
assessee then filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

The assessee relied on the
decision of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in Navine Fluorine International Ltd.
vs. ACIT [2011] 45 SOT 86
wherein it was held that for invoking the
provisions of Explanation (b) to section 206C, it was necessary that waste and
scrap sold by the assessee should arise from the manufacturing or mechanical
working done by the assessee. Reliance was also placed on Nathulal P.
Lavti vs. ITO [2011] 48 SOT 83 (URO) (Rajkot)
.

 

On the other hand, Revenue
placed reliance on the decision of the special bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT [2013] 145 ITD 1 (Rajkot)(SB)
which held that all the traders in scrap were also liable to collect tax at
source under the provisions of section 206C.

Against the arguments of
the Revenue, the assessee relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT
vs. Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. [2016] 381 ITR 210 (Gujarat)
wherein
the plea of the Revenue to consider the decision of the special bench in case
of Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT (Supra) was dismissed. Reliance
was also placed on the decision of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Azizbhai
A. Lada vs. ITO [ITA 765/Ahd/2015]
and Dhasawal Traders vs. ITO
[2016] 161 ITD 142
wherein the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra) was considered
and relief was granted to the assessee.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it
was an undisputed fact that the assessee was not a manufacturer and was only a
dealer in scrap.

 

In the case of Navine
Fluorine International Ltd. (Supra)
, it was held that to fall under the
definition of scrap as given in the Explanation to section 206C, the term
‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ are one and it should arise from manufacture and if the
scrap is not coming out of manufacture, then the items do not fall under the
definition of scrap and thus are not liable to TCS.

 

Further, in the case of ITO
(TDS) vs. Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. [ITA No. 2207/ADH/2011]
, the
Tribunal had held that the words ‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ should have nexus with
manufacturing or mechanical working of materials.

 

The Tribunal relied upon
the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Priya Blue Industries
(P) Ltd. (Supra)
, which held that the expression ‘scrap’ defined in
clause (b) of the Explanation to section 206C means ‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ from manufacture
of mechanical working of materials, which is not useable as such and the
expression ‘scrap’ contained in clause (b) of the Explanation to section 206C
shows that any material which is useable as such would not fall within the
ambit of ‘scrap’.

 

Next, the Tribunal referred
to the decision in the case of Dhasawal Traders vs. ITO (Supra)
which held that when the assessee had not generated any scrap in manufacturing
activity and he was only a trader having sold products which were re-useable as
such, hence he was not supposed to collect tax at source.

 

It was also held that the
Gujarat High Court had duly considered the decision of the special bench.
Accordingly, the Tribunal, following the decision in CIT vs. Priya Blue
Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra)
held that the assessee being a trader of
scrap not involved in manufacturing activity, cannot be fastened with the
provisions of section 206C(1).

 

CIT(E) cannot pass an order denying registration u/s 12AA (without following the procedure of cancellation provided in the Act) from a particular assessment year by taking the ground that lease rental income exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs received from properties held by the trust violated provisions of section 2(15) when such registration was granted in the same order for prior assessment years

13. [2020] 77 ITR (Trib.) 407
(Cuttack)(Trib.)
Orissa Olympic Association vs. CIT(E) ITA No.: 323/CTK/2017 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 6th December,
2019

 

CIT(E)
cannot pass an order denying registration u/s 12AA (without following the
procedure of cancellation provided in the Act) from a particular assessment
year by taking the ground that lease rental income exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs
received from properties held by the trust violated provisions of section 2(15)
when such registration was granted in the same order for prior assessment years

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 since 1961.
It had made an application for registration u/s 12A in the year 1997 which was
pending disposal. On appeal against the order of assessment for A.Ys. 2002-03
to 2007-08, the Tribunal set aside the assessment pending the disposal of the
petition filed by the assessee u/s 12A by the Income-tax authority.
Accordingly, following the directions of the Tribunal, the CIT(E) called for
information from the assessee society and after considering the submissions,
rejected the application of the association. Aggrieved by this order, the
assessee approached the Tribunal which, vide order in ITA
334/CTK/2011
directed the CIT(E) to look into the matter of
registration afresh, considering the second proviso to section 2(15) as
prospective from 1st April, 2009.

 

Accordingly, after
considering the objects of the assessee, the CIT(E) passed an order stating
that the objects of the assessee were charitable in nature and the activities
were not carried out with the object to earn profits. Registration was granted
from A.Ys. 1998-99 to 2008-09. However, from A.Y. 2009-10 onwards, registration
was denied on the ground that income received by the assessee as commercial
lease rent was in the nature of trade, commerce, or business and it exceeded
Rs. 25 lakhs in all the previous years, thereby violating the provisions of
section 2(15) as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 2009. The assessee filed
an appeal against this order before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that it
was an undisputed fact that the CIT(E) had granted registration from A.Y.
1998-99 to 2008-09 after noting that the objects of the assessee were
charitable in nature and were not carried out with an object to earn profits.
It was held that the lease rent incomes received from the property held under
the trust was wholly for charitable or religious purposes and were applied for
charitable purposes, hence the same was not exempt in the hands of the
assessee. Except lease rent incomes, there was no allegation of the CIT(E) to
support that the incomes received by the assessee as commercial lease rent were
in the nature of trade or commerce or trade. It was held that the income earned
by the assessee from commercial lease rent, which was the only ground of
denying the continuance of registration from A.Y. 2009-10 was not sustainable
for denying the registration already granted.

 

It was observed that
registration was granted for limited period but was denied thereafter without
affording an opportunity to the assessee which was contrary to the mandate of
section 12AA(3) and hence denial of registration was unsustainable.

 

Reliance was placed on the
following:

 

1. Dahisar Sports Foundation vs. ITO [2017]
167 ITD 710 (Mum.)(Trib.)
wherein it was held that if the objects of
the trust are charitable, the fact that it collected certain charges or
receipts (or income) does not alter the character of the trust.

 

2. DIT (Exemptions) vs. Khar Gymkhana [2016]
385 ITR 162 (Bom. HC)
wherein it was held that where there is no change
in the nature of activities of the trust and the registration is already
granted u/s12A, then the same cannot be disqualified without examination where
receipts from commercial activities exceed Rs. 25 lakhs as per CBDT Circular
No. 21 of 2016 dated 27th May, 2016.

 

3. Mumbai Port Trust vs. DIT (Exemptions)
[IT Appeal No. 262 (Mum.) of 2012]
wherein it was held that the process
of cancellation of registration has to be done in accordance with the
provisions of sections 12AA(3) and (4) after carefully examining the
applicability of these provisions.

 

Accordingly, it was held
that once the registration is granted, then the same is required to be
continued till it is cancelled by following the procedure provided in
sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 12AA; without following such procedure, the
registration cannot be restricted and cannot be discontinued by way of
cancelling the same for a subsequent period in the same order.

 

Section 23, Rule 4 – Amount of rent, as per leave and license agreement, which is not received cannot be considered as forming part of annual value merely on the ground that the assessee has not taken legal steps to recover the rent or that the licensee has deducted tax at source thereon

12. TS-577-ITAT-2020-(Mum.) Vishwaroop Infotech Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT,
LTU A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 6th November,
2020

 

Section
23, Rule 4 – Amount of rent, as per leave and license agreement, which is not
received cannot be considered as forming part of annual value merely on the
ground that the assessee has not taken legal steps to recover the rent or that
the licensee has deducted tax at source thereon

 

FACTS

The assessee gave four
floors of its property at Vashi, Navi Mumbai on leave and license basis to
Spanco Telesystems and Solutions Ltd. Subsequently, the licensee company
informed the assessee about slump sale of its business to Spanco BPO Services
Ltd. and Spanco Respondez BPO Pvt. Ltd. and requested the assessee to
substitute the names of these new companies as licensee in its place w.e.f. 1st
April, 2008.

 

Due to financial problems
in the new companies, the new companies stopped paying rent from financial year
2010-11 relevant to assessment year 2011-12. As on 31st March, 2011,
the total outstanding dues receivable by the assessee from these two companies
amounted to Rs. 15.60 crores.

 

During the previous year
relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee did not
receive anything from the licensee and therefore did not offer the license fee
to the extent of Rs. 3,85,85,341 for taxation. The licensees had, however,
deducted TDS on this amount and had reflected this amount in the TDS statement
filed by them. While the assessee did not offer the sum of Rs. 3,85,85,341 for
taxation, it did claim credit of TDS to the extent of Rs. 38.58 lakhs.

 

Of the sum of Rs. 15.60
crores receivable by the assessee from the licensee, the assessee, after a lot
of negotiation and persuasion, managed to get Rs 10.51 crores during the
previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. Since the
assessee could not recover rent for the period under consideration, it did not
declare rental income for the assessment year under consideration.

 

The A.O. brought to tax
this sum of Rs. 3,85,85,341 on the ground that the assessee did not satisfy the
fourth condition of Rule 4, i.e., the assessee has neither furnished any
documentary evidence for instituting legal proceedings against the tenant for
recovery of outstanding rent, nor proved that the institution of legal
proceedings would be useless and that the licensees had deducted TDS on
unrealised rent which TDS is reflected in the ITS Data.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the A.O. on the
ground that the licensee has deducted TDS on unrealised rent.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging the addition of unrealised rent
receivable from the licensees. It was also contended that the assessee did not
initiate legal proceedings against the licensees because the licensees were in
possession of the premises which were worth more than Rs. 200 crores. Civil
litigation would have taken decades for the assessee during which period the
assessee would have been deprived of the possession of the premises. Civil
litigation would have also involved huge litigation and opportunity costs. It
was in these circumstances that the assessee agreed with the licensees, on 20th
November, 2011, to give up all its claims in lieu of possession
of the premises.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that
considering the fact that the assessee has to safeguard its interest and
initiating litigation against the big business house that, too, having
financial problems will be fruitless and it will be at huge cost. It is also in
the interest of the assessee if it could recover the rent, for it will be
beneficial to the assessee first. No one leaves any money unrecovered. The
reasons disclosed by the assessee to close the dispute amicably and recovering
the amount of Rs. 10.51 crores from the company, which was having a financial
problem, itself was a huge task.

 

The Tribunal held that in
its view the situation in the present case amply displays that institution of
legal proceedings would be useless and the A.O. has failed to understand the
situation and failed to appreciate the settlement reached by the assessee. The
Tribunal observed that the A.O. has also not brought on record whether the
assessee is likely to receive the rent in near future; rather, he accepted the
fact that it is irrecoverable. The Tribunal held that the rental income can be
brought to tax only when the assessee has actually received or is likely to
receive or there is certainty of receiving it in the near future. In the given
case, since the assessee has no certainty of receipt of any rent, as and when
the assessee reaches an agreement to settle the dispute it is equal to
satisfying the fourth condition of Rule 4 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

 

The Tribunal said that the
addition of rent was unjustified and directed the A.O. to delete the addition.

 

The Tribunal noticed that
the assessee has taken TDS credit to the extent of Rs. 38.58 lakhs. It held
that the A.O. can treat the amount of Rs. 38.58 lakhs as income under the head
`Income from House Property’.

 

Section 45, Rule 115 – Foreign exchange gain realised on remittance of amount received on redemption of shares, at par, in foreign subsidiary is a capital receipt not liable to tax

11. TS-580-ITAT-2020-(Del.) Havells India Ltd. vs. ACIT, LTU A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order: 10th November,
2020

 

Section
45, Rule 115 – Foreign exchange gain realised on remittance of amount received
on redemption of shares, at par, in foreign subsidiary is a capital receipt not
liable to tax

 

FACTS

During the previous year
relevant to assessment year 2008-09, the assessee invested in 3,55,22,067
shares of one of its subsidiary companies, M/s Havells Holdings Ltd., out of
which 1,54,23,053 shares were redeemed at par value in the same year. Upon remittance
of the consideration of shares redeemed the assessee realised foreign exchange
gain of Rs. 2,55,82,186.

 

Since this gain was not on
account of increase in value of the shares, as the shares were redeemed at par
value but merely on account of repatriation of proceeds received on exchange
fluctuation, the gain was treated as a capital receipt in the return of income.

 

The A.O. held that the
assessee had purchased shares in a foreign company for which purchase
consideration was remitted from India and further, on redemption, the sale /
redemption proceeds so received in foreign currency were remitted back to India
which resulted in gain which is taxable as capital gains in terms of section
45.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) which upheld the action of the A.O. The
assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal noted the undisputed fact that investment made by the assessee in the
shares of Havells Holdings Ltd. was made in Euros and redemption of such shares
was also made in Euros. It held that the actual profit or loss on sale /
redemption of such shares therefore has to necessarily be computed in Euros
and, thereafter, converted to INR for the purposes of section 45. In other
words, the cost of acquisition of shares and consideration received thereon
should necessarily be converted into Euros and the resultant gain / loss
thereon should thereafter be converted into INR at the prevailing rate. In the
present case, the net gain / loss on redemption of shares was Nil since the
shares were redeemed at par value and thereby there was no capital gain taxable u/s 45.

 

From a perusal of section
45 it can be seen that for taxation of any profits or gains arising from the
transfer of a capital asset, only gains accruing as a result of transfer of the
asset can be taxed. In the present case, there was no ‘gain’ on transfer /
redemption of the shares insofar as the shares were redeemed at par value.
Thus, there was no gain which accrued to the assessee as a result of redemption
of such shares, since the shares were redeemed at par value. The said
contention is supported by Rule 115 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which
provides the rate of exchange for conversion of income expressed in foreign
currency. Clause (f) of Explanation 2 to Rule 115(1) clearly provides that ‘in
respect of the income chargeable under the head “capital gains……”.’
rate of
exchange is to be applied. In the present case, since capital gain in GBP /
Euro was Nil, the resultant gain in Indian rupees is Nil. The exchange gain of
Rs. 2,55,82,186 was only a consequence of repatriation of the consideration
received (in Euros) in Indian rupees and cannot be construed to be part of
consideration received on redemption of shares. Thus, the applicability of
section 45 does not come into the picture in the present case.

 

The Tribunal held that the
A.O. was not right in applying section 45 for making the addition. This ground
of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Sections 50, 112 – Capital gains computed u/s 50 on transfer of buildings which were held for more than three years are taxable @ 21.63% u/s 112 and not @ 32.45%, the normal rate

10. TS-566-ITAT-2020-(Mum.) Voltas Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 6th October,
2020

 

Sections
50, 112 – Capital gains computed u/s 50 on transfer of buildings which were
held for more than three years are taxable @ 21.63% u/s 112 and not @ 32.45%,
the normal rate

 

FACTS

For the assessment year
2013-14, the assessee company in the course of an appeal before the Tribunal
raised an additional ground contending that the capital gains computed u/s 50
on sale of buildings should be taxed @ 21.63% u/s 112 instead of @ 32.45%, as
the said buildings were held for more than three years.

 

HELD

The Tribunal, after
referring to the provisions of section 50 and having noted that the Bombay High
Court in the case of CIT vs. V.S. Dempo Company Ltd. [387 ITR 354] has
observed that section 50 which is a special provision for computing the capital
gains in the case of depreciable assets, is restricted for the purposes of
section 48 or section 49 as specifically stated therein and the said fiction
created in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 50 has limited application only
in the context of the mode of computation of capital gains contained in
sections 48 and 49 and would have nothing to do with the exemption that is
provided in a totally different provision, i.e. section 54E. Section 48 deals
with the mode of computation and section 49 relates to cost with reference to
certain modes of acquisition.

 

The Tribunal also noted
that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Manali Investment [ITA No.
1658 of 2012]
has held that the assessee is entitled to set-off u/s 74
in respect of capital gains arising out of transfer of capital assets on which
depreciation has been allowed in the first year itself and which is deemed as
short-term capital gains u/s 50.

 

The Tribunal held that the
deeming fiction of section 50 is limited and cannot be extended beyond the
method of computation of gain and that the distinction between short-term and
long-term capital gain is not obliterated by this section. Following the ratio
of these decisions, the Tribunal allowed the additional ground of appeal filed
by the assessee and directed the A.O. to re-examine the detailed facts and
allow the claim.

 

FINALLY, ACCOUNTING / FINANCIAL FRAUDS ARE OFFENCES UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

Finally, SEBI has
specifically recognised accounting frauds, manipulations and siphoning off of
funds in listed companies as offences. It sounds surprising that such acts were
not yet offences under Securities Laws and that the law-makers / SEBI took so
long, actually, several decades, to do this. Indeed, there have been rulings in
the past on such cases where parties have been punished. Now, however, such
acts attract specific provisions and will be punishable in several ways – by
penalty, debarment, disgorgement, even prosecution and more (vide amendment
to SEBI PFUTP Regulations dated 19th October, 2020).

 

The new provision is
broadly – albeit clumsily – worded. It is put within a strange context
in the scheme of the regulations. One would have thought that a separate and
comprehensive set of regulations would have been made to combat corporate
frauds just as, for example, in the case of insider trading cases, regulations
that would have given proper definitions, covered specific types of accounting,
financial and other corporate frauds, specified who will be held liable and
when, etc. Instead, the new provision has been introduced in the form of an Explanation
to a provision in a set of regulations which are generally intended to deal
with frauds and the like in dealings in securities markets. Interestingly, the
intention seems to be to give retrospective effect to this provision.

 

Certain
basic questions will need to be answered. What are the specific acts that are
barred? Who are the persons to whom these provisions apply? What is the meaning
of the various terms used? What are the forms of penal and other actions that
can be imposed against those who have violated these provisions? Is there a
retrospective effect to the new provision? Let us consider all these issues in
brief.

 

SUMMARY
OF PROVISION

The new provision, framed
as an Explanation, bars acts of diversion / siphoning / misutilisation of
assets / earnings and concealment of such acts. It also bars manipulation of
financial statements / accounts that would in turn manipulate the market price.

 

The principal provision is
Regulation 4(1) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade
Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP
Regulations). Regulation 4(1) prohibits fraudulent, manipulative and unfair
practices in securities markets. The newly-inserted Explanation to it says that
the acts listed therein (of diversion, siphoning off, etc.) are deemed to be such practices and thus
also prohibited.

 

What type
of acts are barred?

The following are the acts
barred by the new provision:

 

(a) ‘any act of diversion, misutilisation or
siphoning off of assets or earnings’,

(b)        any concealment
of acts as listed in (a) above,

(c) ‘any device, scheme or artifice to manipulate
the books of accounts or financial statement of such a company that would
directly or indirectly manipulate the price of securities of that company’.

 

To which
type of entities do the bars apply?

The acts should be in
relation to those companies whose securities are listed on recognised stock
exchanges. This would cover a fairly large number of companies. The securities
may be shares or even bonds / debentures. The securities may be listed on any
of the various platforms of exchanges.

 

Who can be
punished?

The Explanation makes the
act of diversion, concealment, etc. punishable. Hence, whoever commits such
acts can be punished. Thus, this may include the company itself, its directors,
the Chief Financial Officer, etc. Any person who has committed such an act
would be subject to action.

How are
such acts punishable?

The provisions of the SEBI
Act and the PFUTP Regulations give SEBI wide powers of taking penal and other
actions where such acts are carried out. There can be a penalty of up to three
times the profits made, or Rs. 25 crores, whichever is higher. SEBI can debar
the persons from being associated with the capital markets. SEBI can order
disgorgement of the profits made through such acts. The person who has
committed such acts can also be prosecuted. There are other powers too.

 

ANALYSIS
OF THE ACTS COVERED

Acts of diversion /
misutilisation / siphoning off of the assets / earnings of the company are
barred. The terms used have not been defined. If read out of context, the term
diversion and misutilisation may have a very broad meaning. But taken in the
context of the scheme of the PFUTP Regulations and also the third term
‘siphoning’, a narrower meaning would have to be applied.

 

The act of concealment
of such diversion / misutilisation / siphoning is also barred by itself. The
word ‘concealment’ may have to be interpreted broadly and hence camouflaging
such acts in various forms ought also to be covered.

 

The third category has
three parts. There has to be a device, scheme or artifice. Such
device, etc. should be to manipulate the books of accounts or financial
statement of the company. The manipulation should be such as would directly or
indirectly manipulate the price of the securities of the company. Essentially,
the intention is to cover accounting frauds / manipulation. However, since such
acts should be such as would result in manipulation of the price of securities,
the scope of this category is narrower. A classic example would be inflating
(or even deflating) the financial performance of the company which would affect
the market price. The definition of ‘unpublished price sensitive information’
in the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations could be usefully referred to for some
guidance.

 

Taken all together,
however, the three categories cast the net wide and cover several types of corporate
/ financial frauds. There is no minimum cut-off amount and hence the provisions
can be invoked for such acts of any amount.

 

RETROSPECTIVE
EFFECT?

It appears that the
intention is to give retrospective effect to the new provision. The relevant portion
of the Explanation reads:

‘Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that
any act of… shall be and shall always be
deemed
to have been considered as manipulative, fraudulent and an
unfair trade practice in the securities market’ (emphasis supplied).

 

Thus, a quadruple effort
has been made to give the provision a retrospective effect. The amendment is in
the form of an ‘Explanation’ to denote that this is merely an elaboration of
the primary provision and not an amendment. The Explanation states that it is
introduced ‘for removal of doubts’. It is also stated to be a ‘clarification’.
It is further stated that the specified acts ‘shall always’ be said to be
manipulative, etc. Finally, it is also stated that these acts are ‘deemed’ to be
manipulative, etc.

 

While the intention thus
seems more than apparent to give retrospective effect, the question is whether
acts as specified in the Explanation that have taken place before the date of
the amendment would be deemed to be covered by the Regulations and thus treated
as fraudulent, etc.? And accordingly, whether the various punitive actions
would be imposed even on offenders who may have committed such acts in the
past?

 

Giving
retrospective effect to provisions having penal consequences is fraught with
legal difficulties. While siphoning off of funds, accounting manipulation, etc.
are abhorrent, there have to be specific legal provisions existing at the time
when such acts are committed and which prohibit them and make them punishable.
It may also be remembered that the Regulations are subordinate law notified by
SEBI and not amendments made in the SEBI Act by Parliament. Of course, the
amendments are placed before Parliament for review and for amendments to them,
if desired.

 

There is another concern.
When a fresh provision is introduced, a fair question would be that this may
mean that the existing provisions did not cover such acts. Hence, if the
retrospective effect of the provision is not granted, then there can be an
argument that the existing Regulation 4(1), which otherwise bans all forms of
manipulative and other practices, be understood as not covering such acts.

 

However, it is also
arguable that if the existing provision, before the amendment, was broad enough
to cover such acts, then there is really no retrospective effect. SEBI has in
the past taken action in several cases of accounting manipulation / frauds,
etc.

 

The Supreme Court has held
in the case of N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 178 Comp Cas 390 (SC)]
that accounting manipulation can be punished by SEBI under the relevant
provisions of the SEBI Act / the PFUTP Regulations. In this case, SEBI recorded
a finding that the accounts of the company had been manipulated by inflating
the revenues, profits, etc. The promoters had pledged their shares at the
inflated price. SEBI had debarred the directors for specified periods from the
securities markets. On appeal, the Supreme Court did a holistic reading of the
SEBI Act along with the Companies Act, 2013 and held that such acts were subject
to adverse actions under law. However, it was apparent that the general objects
of the law, the generic powers of SEBI, etc. were given a purposive
interpretation and the SEBI’s penal orders upheld. Interestingly, the Court
even observed that, ‘…in SEBI Act, there is no provision for keeping proper
books of accounts by a registered company.’
Thus, while this decision is
authoritative on the matter, it was also on facts. There was thus clearly a
need for specific provisions covering financial frauds, accounting
manipulation, etc. The new provisions do seem to fill the gap to an extent, at
least going forward.

CONCLUSION

The
amendment does serve the purpose of making a specific and focused provision on
accounting and financial frauds that harm the interests of the company and its
shareholders and also of the securities markets.

However, there is also
disappointment at many levels. It took SEBI almost 30 years to bring a specific
provision. Arguably, such frauds are as much, if not more, rampant and serious
as most other frauds including insider trading. However, while insider trading
is given a comprehensive provision with important terms defined, several
deeming provisions made, etc., financial frauds have a clumsily drafted and
clumsily placed provision, almost as a footnote. Such frauds not only deserve a
separate set of regulations but also a specific enabling provision in the SEBI
Act and a provision providing for specific punishment to the wrongdoers.

Giving the provision
retrospective effect may appear to be well intended but it may backfire if
there is large-scale action by SEBI for past acts.

Nonetheless,
finally, despite the warts and all, our Securities Laws now do have a specific provision
covering financial frauds in listed companies. One can expect to see action by
SEBI on this front in the form of investigations and punitive orders against
wrongdoers.
 

 

 

 

 

 

ARE YOU A ‘VALYA KOLI’?

The adversity which has come to us in the
form of the pandemic has also brought with it quiet and solitude. What was
otherwise difficult if not impossible for most of us, has come uninvited and
that, too, on a platter.

 

Both quiet and solitude also gave each one
of us an opportunity and the time to reflect. And that is where lies the
relevance of the question in the headline, Are you a ‘Valya Koli’?

 

For the uninitiated, let me for a moment
dwell on the character of Valya Koli. He was a dacoit born in a fisherman’s
family. He earned notoriety for being a highway robber; he used the spoils of
his thefts to support his family.

 

One day, he confronted the Rishi Narad Muni
who was passing through the area. As was his wont, Valya stopped Narad Muni so
as to loot and kill him.

 

However, he noticed the serenity on Narad
Muni’s face and could not move any further. At this juncture, Narad Muni
inquired with Valya the reason for his dacoities and killings. Valya quickly
responded that it was to support and maintain his family.

 

Hearing this, Narad Muni asked him, ‘All
that you do is a sin and you are saying that you are doing all this for your
family? Do you think your family members will share the consequences of your
sins?’

 

Though Valya was confident of an affirmative
answer, the question set him thinking. Seeing Valya think, Narad Muni said to
him, ‘I shall wait for you here. You go to your family and confirm their
response’. Valya went home to ask his family members – but he was stunned to
hear the response of his wife and children. They refused to share the
consequences of his sins. It was a moment of shock for Valya.

 

He ran to Narad Muni in a state of
repentance and falling at the feet of the Rishi asked him, ‘How do I undo my
past? I seek forgiveness.’ Narad Muni asked him to chant ‘Ram! Ram!’ which
Valya religiously did. The chanting, though difficult initially, brought about
a transformation in him and he grew in love and compassion. Valya became the
great sage Valmiki who wrote the revered Hindu text, the Ramayan.

 

Coming back to the question – Are you a
‘Valya Koli’?
Are you only working for others (other than yourself), be it
family members, friends, clients or your organisation? Are they ready to share
your burden? Are your purposes aligned with those of those for whom you work?

 

I think the pandemic and the ensuing
lockdown and the resulting time for reflection may have brought these questions
to your mind, too. These questions would have made each of us think, and think
differently.

 

Instead of philosophising further, I shall
leave you with the question, Are you a ‘Valya Koli?

 

Take an inward journey for the answers. All
the best.
 

 

DISTANCE AND MASK

While going down memory lane, I recall that
in my childhood whenever I used to travel by road with my parents I never
missed to read the words painted in bold, KEEP DISTANCE, on the
backs of trucks running ahead of us. When the car overtook a truck, I got
excited and cheered the driver. As if I had won the race. I was under the
impression that our driver would have got the permission to go ahead from the
driver of the truck!

 

At that time I did not know the reason for
the display of those words KEEP DISTANCE on the back of every
truck. Later I realised that it is for safety and to avoid a mishap if the
truck ahead of you brakes suddenly. This principle is applicable to all vehicles
running on the road. It is a part of traffic rules all over the world. So, KEEP
DISTANCE.

 

But you and I never imagined that one day
this traffic rule would be applicable between human beings. With the outburst
of the corona pandemic, the words KEEP DISTANCE started echoing in every
nook and corner of the world, with its Indian version of ‘Do gaz ki doori’.

 

However, just ‘Keep Distance’ or ‘Do gaz ki
doori’ is not enough; this traffic rule of ‘Keep Distance’ is incomplete if you
don’t mask your face. So distance without mask is not safe. The reason for this
is to keep the deadly virus away. The only route this virus gets into your body
is through the nose, the ‘Gateway of Corona’. When you cover your face, you
become ‘faceless’. Don’t take anybody at face value, meaning don’t be in
contact with anyone with an open face. He or she can be a carrier of the
‘predator’ called corona.

 

Before the mask being used in the corona
pandemic, let us recall that in some communities women are required to cover
their face; it’s called ‘Ghunghat’ or ‘Burqa’. This practice is followed
religiously in patriarchal families in rural parts of India. Even at home, a
married woman is to wear a ‘ghunghat’ to show respect to the elders in the
family. So you will find a married woman standing on the threshold of the
drawing room adjusting her ‘ghunghat’ constantly to cover her face even if she
is arguing with the elders at home. Often, a female cannot step out of her home
without covering her face. And this has been in vogue from times immemorial.

 

Interestingly, the ‘ghunghat’ has been a
source of comedy of errors in many Hindi films and serials. And then covering
the face with a ‘gamacha’ is common in the underworld. The underworld is always
a big threat to law and order of the ordinary world where you and I live. The
term ‘underworld’ covers everyone, right from ‘Chambal ke daku / Thugs’ to bank
robbers, ATM robbers [a new category] and every evil soul indulging in crime on
earth. The dominant intention of those evil souls is to hide their identity
while committing heinous crimes.

 

We also see girls and women covering their
face with an ‘Odhani’ or ‘Dupatta’ whenever they are riding a vehicle solo or
pillion-riding. Why do they follow this practice? We should not intrude into
their privacy too much. I think you understand what I mean.

 

When it comes to the mask being used now,
what we observe all around us is quite amusing. Initially, there was a lot of
talk about masks, right from the World Health Organization to heads of nation
to the Prime Minister of India, the Health Minister, epidemiologists, doctors
and ‘WhatsApp universities’. In this corona pandemic, the mask is the only
‘panacea’ to stay safe before the virus enters your body. Surprisingly, this
claim was turned down by none other than the President of the USA Donald Trump
before he was caught by the deadly virus during the Presidential election
campaign!

 

There have been a lot of discussions and
debates, particularly on electronic media, about what constitutes a proper
mask. Initially, the N95 mask was highly recommended by WHO. But it was not
affordable in India. So we see ‘desi’ versions of masks of different designs,
colours, material, layers in use. Even a simple cotton ‘gamacha’ is used as a
mask in many parts of India. In fact, it is more popular than the N95 mask.
Many people take pride in using ‘gamacha masks’ (perhaps they believe in
‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’). Go to YouTube and you will find at least a hundred
videos of ‘How to make home-made masks’ with practical instructions in sweet
voices.

 

The use of a mask is compulsory outside your
home, without mask you are liable for a penalty. The penalty varies from city
to city. So don’t become the target of the police department because some
overzealous police uses physical force, too. You may have seen those visuals on
your TV screen.

So distance and mask are inseparable to curb
the spread of the corona virus. Earlier it was social distancing, but it is all
about physical distancing at present.

 

But for corona
distance doesn’t matter; it emanated from the laboratory in Wuhan in China and
travelled to every nook and corner of the world. The health and the wealth of
the world have been destroyed by this deadly pandemic.

 

Remember, the humble ‘gamacha’ along with
‘Do gaz ki doori’ is the only vaccine available till a real vaccine comes to
the rescue of the human race.
 

 

TRANSFER PRICING – BENCHMARKING OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND DEBTORS

1.   INTRODUCTION

Benchmarking of
financial transactions is an integral part of the Transfer Pricing Regulations
of India (TPR). The Finance Act, 2012 inserted an Explanation to section 92B of
the Income-tax, Act 1961 (the ‘Act’) with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2002 dealing with the meaning of international transactions. Interestingly,
the Notes on Clauses of the Finance Bill, 2012 is silent on the intent and
purpose of inclusion of such transactions within the definition of
‘international transaction’. Clause (i)(c) of the said Explanation reads as
follows:

 

‘Explanation. –
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that –

(i) the
expression “international transaction” shall include –

(a) ….

(b) ….

(c) capital
financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or
guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance,
payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the
course of business;

(d) ….

(e) ….’

 

Since financial
transactions are peculiar between two enterprises, it is hard to find comparables
in many cases. In this article we shall deal with some of the possible options
to benchmark some of these transactions to arrive at an arm’s length pricing
and / or discuss controversies surrounding them.

 

It may be noted
that Clause 16 of the Annexure to Form 3CEB requires the reporting of
particulars in respect of the purchase or sale of marketable securities, issue
and buyback of equity shares, optionally convertible / partially convertible /
compulsorily convertible debentures / preference shares. A relevant extract of
the Clause is reproduced herein below:

 

Particulars in respect of international
transactions of purchase or sale of marketable securities, issue and buyback of
equity shares, optionally convertible / partially convertible / compulsorily
convertible debentures / preference shares:

 

Has the
assessee entered into any international transaction(s) in respect of purchase
or sale of marketable securities or issue of equity shares including
transactions specified in Explanation (i)(c) below section 92B(2)?

 

If ‘yes’, provide the following details

(i) Name and address of the associated
enterprise with whom the international transaction has been entered into

(ii) Nature of the transaction

(a) Currency in which the transaction was
undertaken

(b) Consideration charged / paid in
respect of the transaction

(c) Method used for determining the arm’s
length price [See section 92C(1)]

 

It may be noted
that the Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt.
Ltd. vs. UOI [2014] 361 ITR 531 (Bom.)
clearly stated that the issue of
shares at a premium is on capital account and gives rise to no income and,
therefore, Chapter X of the Act dealing with Transfer Pricing provisions do not
apply. (Please refer to detailed discussion in subsequent paragraphs.)

 

However, even after
the acceptance of the Bombay High Court judgment by the Government of India,
international transactions relating to marketable securities are still required
to be reported / justified in Form 3CEB. And therefore, we need to study this
aspect.

 

Of the various
financial transactions, this article focuses on Capital Investments and
Outstanding Receivables (Debtors). Other types of transactions will be covered
in due course.

2.   Benchmarking of capital
instruments under Transfer Pricing Regulations

2.1  Investments in share capital and CCDs

Cross-border
investment in capital instruments of an Associated Enterprise (AE), such as
equity shares, compulsory convertible debentures (CCDs), compulsory convertible
preference shares (CCPs) and other types of convertible instruments are covered
here.

     

Since CCDs and CCPs
are quasi-capital in nature, the same are grouped with capital
instruments. Even under FEMA, they are recognised as capital instruments.
Collectively, they are referred to as ‘Equity / Capital Instruments’ hereafter.

 

2.2. FEMA Regulations

(i)   Inbound investments – FDI or foreign
investments

Inbound investment
in India is regulated by the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments)
Rules, 2019. The said Rules define ‘Capital Instruments’ as equity shares,
debentures, preference shares and share warrants issued by an Indian company.

 

‘FDI’ or
‘Foreign Direct Investment’ means investment through equity instruments by a
person resident outside India in an unlisted Indian company; or in ten per cent
or more of the post-issue paid-up equity capital on a fully-diluted basis of a
listed Indian company;

‘foreign
investment’ means any investment made by a person resident outside India on a
repatriable basis in equity instruments of an Indian company or to the capital
of an LLP;’

 

The NDI Rules define Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) as any investment
made by a person resident outside India through equity instruments where such
investment is less than 10% of the post-issue paid-up share capital on a
fully-diluted basis of a listed Indian company, or less than 10% of the paid-up value of each series of equity
instruments of a listed Indian company.

 

Since cross-border
investment of 26% or more in an entity would trigger the TPR [section 92
A(2)(a)], investments under FPI would not be subjected to benchmarking under
TPR. However, FDI and Foreign Investments in India would be required to be
benchmarked under TPR.

 

(ii)  Pricing guidelines for inbound investments

Rule 21 of the NDI
Rules provides pricing or valuation guidelines for FDI / foreign investments as
follows:

(a) For issue of equity instruments by a company to
a non-resident or transfer of shares from a resident person to a non-resident
person, it shall not be less than the price worked out as
follows:

For listed
securities
? the price at which a preferential allotment of shares can be made
under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Guidelines, as
applicable, in case of a listed Indian company, or in case of a company going
through a delisting process as per the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2009;

For unlisted
securities
? the valuation of
equity instruments done as per any internationally-accepted pricing methodology
for valuation on an arm’s length basis duly certified by a Chartered
Accountant or a merchant banker registered with SEBI or a practising Cost
Accountant.

 

(b) For transfer of equity instruments from a
non-resident person to a person resident in India,it shall not exceed the
price worked out as mentioned in (a) above
. The emphasis is on valuation as
per the provisions of the relevant SEBI guidelines and provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013 wherever applicable.

 

The interesting
point here is that the pricing guidelines under NDI rules emphasise on the
valuation of equity instruments based on an arm’s length principle.

 

The Rule provides
the guiding principle as ‘the person resident outside India is not
guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of making such investment or
agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the time of exit.’

 

(c)  In case of swap of equity
instruments, irrespective of the amount, valuation involved in the swap
arrangement shall have to be made by a merchant banker registered with SEBI or
an investment banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory
authority in the host country.

 

(d) Where shares in an Indian company are issued to
a person resident outside India in compliance with the provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013, by way of subscription to Memorandum of Association,
such investments shall be made at face value subject to entry route and
sectoral caps.

 

(e) In case of share warrants, their pricing and
the price or conversion formula shall be determined upfront, provided that
these pricing guidelines shall not be applicable for investment in equity
instruments by a person resident outside India on a non-repatriation basis.

(iii) Outbound investments      

Valuation norms for
outbound investments are as follows:

 

In case of partial
/ full acquisition of an existing foreign company where the investment is more
than USD five million, share valuation of the company has to be done by a
Category I merchant banker registered with SEBI or an investment banker /
merchant banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory
authority in the host country, and in all other cases by a Chartered Accountant
/ Certified Public Accountant.

 

However, in the
case of investment by acquisition of shares where the consideration is to be
paid fully or partly by issue of the Indian party’s shares (swap of shares),
irrespective of the amount, the valuation will have to be done by a Category I
merchant banker registered with SEBI or an investment banker/ merchant banker
outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory authority in the host
country.

 

In case of
additional overseas direct investments by the Indian party in its JV / WOS,
whether at premium or discount or face value, the concept of valuation, as
indicated above, shall be applicable.

 

As far as the
actual pricing is concerned, one must follow the guidelines mentioned at
paragraph (ii)(b) above, i.e., the transaction price should not exceed the
valuation arrived at by the valuer concerned.

 

2.3. Benchmarking of equity
instruments under transfer pricing

From the above discussion it is clear that for any cross-border capital
investments one has to follow the pricing guidelines under FEMA. However, as
mentioned in the NDI Rules, the valuation of equity / capital instruments must
be at arm’s length. Thus, the person valuing such investments has to bear in
mind the principles of arm’s length.

 

One more aspect that one has to bear in mind while doing valuation is to
use the internationally accepted pricing methodology. Pricing of an equity /
capital instrument is a subjective exercise and would depend upon a number of
assumptions and projections as to the future growth, cash flow, investments by
the company, etc. Therefore, the traditional methods of benchmarking as
prescribed in the TPR may not be appropriate for benchmarking investments in
equity / capital instruments.

2.4. Whether investments in
equity instruments require Benchmarking under TPR?

In this connection,
it would be interesting to examine the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case
of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India(Supra).

     

Brief facts of the
case are as follows:

VISPL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a non-resident company, Vodafone
Tele-Services (India) Holdings Limited (the holding company). VISPL required
funds for its telecommunication services project in India from its holding
company during the financial year 2008-09, i.e., A.Y. 2009-10. On 21st
August, 2008, VISPL issued 2,89,224 equity shares of the face value of Rs. 10
each at a premium of Rs. 8,509 per share to its holding company. This resulted
in VISPL receiving a total consideration of Rs. 246.38 crores from its holding
company on issue of shares between August and November, 2008. The fair market
value of the issue of equity shares at Rs. 8,519 per share was determined by
VISPL in accordance with the methodology prescribed by the Government of India
under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947. However, according to the A.O.
and the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO), VISPL ought to have valued each equity
share at Rs. 53,775 (based on Net Asset Value), as against the aforesaid
valuation done under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947 at Rs. 8,519, and
on that basis the shortfall in premium to the extent of Rs. 45,256 per share
resulted in a total shortfall of Rs. 1,308.91 crores. Both the A.O. and the TPO
on application of the Transfer Pricing provisions in Chapter X of the Act held
that this amount of Rs. 1,308.91 crores is income. Further, as a consequence of
the above, this amount of Rs. 1,308.91 crores is required to be treated as a
deemed loan given by VISPL to its holding company and periodical interest
thereon is to be charged to tax as interest income of Rs. 88.35 crores in the
financial year 2008-09, i.e., A.Y. 2009-10.

 

The Bombay High
Court,while ruling on the petition filed by VISPL, among other things observed
as follows:

‘(i)   The tax can be charged only on income and in
the absence of any income arising, the issue of applying the measure of arm’s
length pricing to transactional value / consideration itself does not arise.

(ii)   If it’s income which is chargeable to tax,
under the normal provisions of the Act, then alone Chapter X of the Act could
be invoked. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act brings / charges to tax total income of
the previous year. This would take us to the meaning of the word income under
the Act as defined in section 2(24) of the Act. The amount received on issue of
shares is admittedly a capital account transaction not separately brought
within the definition of income, except in cases covered by section 56(2)(viib)
of the Act. Thus, such capital account cannot be brought to tax as already
discussed herein above while considering the challenge to the grounds as
mentioned in impugned order.

(iii)  The issue of shares at a premium is on capital
account and gives rise to no income. The submission on behalf of the Revenue
that the shortfall in the ALP as computed for the purposes of Chapter X of the
Act is misplaced. The ALP is meant to determine the real value of the
transaction entered into between AEs. It is a re-computation exercise to be
carried out only when income arises in case of an international transaction
between AEs. It does not warrant re-computation of a consideration received /
given on capital account.’

     

In an interesting
development thereafter, on 28th January, 2015, the Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, issued a press release through the Press
Information Bureau accepting the order of the Bombay High Court. Relevant
excerpts of the said press release are as follows:

 

‘Based on the
opinion of Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (International Taxation),
Chairperson (CBDT) and the Attorney-General of India, the Cabinet decided to:

i.)   accept the order of the High Court of Bombay
in WP No. 871 of 2014, dated 10th October, 2014 and not to file SLP
against it before the Supreme Court of India;

ii.)   accept orders of Courts / IT AT / DRP in cases
of other taxpayers where similar transfer pricing adjustments have been made
and the Courts / IT AT / DRP have decided /decide in favour of the taxpayer.

The Cabinet
decision will bring greater clarity and predictability for taxpayers as well as
tax authorities, thereby facilitating tax compliance and reducing litigation on
similar issues. This will also set at rest the uncertainty prevailing in the
minds of foreign investors and taxpayers in respect of possible transfer pricing
adjustments in India on transactions related to issuance of shares and thereby
improve the investment climate in the country. The Cabinet came to this view as
this is a transaction on the capital account and there is no income to be
chargeable to tax. So, applying any pricing formula is irrelevant.’

 

CBDT has also
issued Instruction No. 2/2015 dated 29th January, 2015 clarifying
that premium on shares issued was on account of capital account transaction and
does not give rise to income. The Board’s instruction is reproduced as follows:

‘Subject
Acceptance of the Order of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of
Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd.-reg.

In reference to
the above cited subject, I am directed to draw your attention to the decision
of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd.
for AY 2009-10 (WP No. 871/2014), wherein the Court has held,
inter alia, that the premium on share issue was on account of a
capital account transaction and does not give rise to income and, hence, not
liable to transfer pricing adjustment.

2. lt is hereby informed that the Board has
accepted the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the above-mentioned writ
petition. In view of the acceptance of the above judgment, it is directed that the
ratio decidendi of
the judgment must be adhered to by the field officers in all cases where this
issue is involved. This may also be brought to the notice of the ITAT, DRPs and
CslT(Appeals).’

 

The above decision
has been referred to in the following decisions:

 

On different facts,
the Supreme Court in case of G.S. Homes and Hotels P. Ltd. vs. DCIT
[Civil Appeal Nos. 7379-7380 of 2016 dated 9th August, 2016]

ruled that ‘we modify the order of the High Court by holding that the amount
(Rs. 45,84,000) on account of share capital received from the various
shareholders ought not to have been treated as business income.’ Thus, the Apex
Court reversed the order of the Karnataka High Court.

 

In ITO vs. Singhal General Traders Private Limited [ITA No.
4197/Mum/2017 (A.Y. 2012-13) dated 24th February, 2020]
,
following the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of VSIPL
(Supra) and the Apex Court in the case of G.S. Homes and
Hotels Ltd. (Supra)
,
the Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) of
treating the receipt of share capital / premium as capital in nature and that
it cannot be brought to tax u/s 68 of the Act.

 

In light of the above discussion, the question arises, is it necessary to
benchmark the transactions of investments in capital / equity instruments? As
Form 3CEB still carries the reporting requirement, it is advisable to report
such transactions. One can use the valuation report to benchmark the
transaction under the category of ‘any other method’. This is out of abundant
precaution to avoid litigation. Ideally, the Form 3CEB should be amended to
bring it on par with the CBDT’s Instruction 2/2015 dated 29th
January, 2015 and the Government’s intention expressed through the press
release dated 28th January, 2015.

 

3.   Benchmarking of
outstanding receivables (debtors)

Debtors are
recorded in the books in respect of outstanding receivables for the exports
made to an AE. The underlying export transactions would have been benchmarked
in the relevant period and, therefore, is there any need to benchmark the
receivables arising out of the same transaction?

     

As mentioned in paragraph 1, the Explanation to section 92B dealing with
the meaning of international transactions was inserted, inter alia, to
include ‘receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business
with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2002. Therefore, apparently even the receivables need to be reported and
benchmarked.

 

 

However, recently
in the case of Bharti Airtel Services Ltd. vs. DCIT, the Delhi
ITAT [ITA No. 161/Del/2017 (A.Y. 2011-12) dated 6th October,
2020]
ruled that outstanding debtors beyond an agreed period is a
separate international transaction of providing funds to its associated
enterprise for which the assessee must have been compensated at an arm’s
length. In the instant case there was a service agreement between Bharti Airtel
Services Ltd. and its overseas AE for payment of invoices within 15 days of
their receipt. However, the same remained outstanding beyond the stipulated
time of 15 days. The working capital adjustment was denied to the assessee in
the absence of any reliable data and therefore the same was not taken into
account while determining the arm’s length price of the international transaction
of provision of the services. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal held that outstanding debtors beyond an agreed period is a separate
international transaction of providing funds to its associated enterprise for
which the assessee must have been compensated in the form of interest at LIBOR
+ 300 BPS as held by CIT(A).

 

In this context the
Tribunal held as under:

‘9. Coming to the various decisions relied upon by
the learned authorised representative, we find that they are on different
facts. The decision of the honourable Delhi High Court in ITA number 765/2016
dated 24th April, 2017 in case of Kusum Healthcare Private Limited
(Supra), para number eight clearly shows that assessee has undertaken working
capital adjustment for the comparable companies selected in its transfer
pricing report which has not been disputed by the learned transfer pricing
officer and therefore the differential impact of working capital of the
assessee
vis-à-vis
is comparable had already been factored in pricing profitability and therefore
the honourable High Court held that adjustment proposed by the learned TPO
deleted by the ITAT is proper. In the present case there is no working capital
adjustment made by the assessee as well as granted by the learned TPO. The
facts in the present case are distinguishable. Further, same are the facts in
case of Bechtel India where working capital adjustment was already granted. In
case of
91 taxmann.com 443 Motherson Sumi Infotech and Design Limited non-charging
of interest was due to business and commercial reasons and no interest was also
charged against outstanding beyond a specified period from non-related parties.
No such commercial or business reasons were shown before us. The facts of the
other decisions cited before us are also distinguishable. Therefore, reliance
on them is rejected.’

 

From the above
ruling it is clear that one must ensure the receipt of outstandings within a
stipulated time, else it would call for transfer pricing adjustment.

 

Benchmarking

Once it is
established that the receivables are beyond due date, the benchmarking has to
be done as if it is a loan transaction. Such a transaction needs to be
benchmarked using the Libor rate of the same currency in which the export
invoice is raised.

 

3.1. FEMA provisions for
receipt of outstanding receivables

It may be noted
that the time limit for realisation of export proceeds is the same for export
of goods as well as services.

 

The normal time
limit for realisation of exports is nine months from the date of exports.
However, it was extended to 15 months for exports made up to 31st
July, 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic [RBI/2019-20/206 A.P. (DIR Series)
Circular No. 27, dated 1st April, 2020].

 

Thus, ideally,
parties can provide mutual time limit for settlement of export invoices within
the overall time limit prescribed by RBI under FEMA.

 

4.   CONCLUSION

Benchmarking of financial transactions is an important aspect of
transfer pricing practice in India. Not much judicial / administrative guidance
is available for the two types of financial transactions referred to in this
article.

 

However,
detailed jurisprudence and guidance is available for benchmarking of financial
transactions in the nature of loans and guarantees. Readers may refer to the detailed articles published in the  May, 2014 and June, 2014 issues of the BCAJ dealing with benchmarking of
loans and guarantees, respectively.

[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ Bench, Chennai, dated 20th April, 2017 made in ITA Nos. 1871/Mds/2016, 2759/Mds/2016 and 1870/Mds/2016; A.Ys. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009] Reassessment – Reopening beyond four years – Original assessment 143(3) – TDS not deducted – Auditor responsibility vis-a-vis audit report – failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment

4. Pr. CIT vs. M/s Bharathi Constructions Pr. CIT vs. M/s URC Construction (P) Ltd. [Tax Case (Appeal) Nos. 772 to 774 of 2017;
Date of order: 11th September, 2020]
(Madras High Court)

 

[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ Bench,
Chennai, dated 20th April, 2017 made in ITA Nos. 1871/Mds/2016,
2759/Mds/2016 and 1870/Mds/2016; A.Ys. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009]

 

Reassessment – Reopening beyond four years
– Original assessment 143(3) – TDS not deducted – Auditor responsibility vis-a-vis
audit report – failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly
all material facts necessary for assessment

 

The Revenue stated
that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully
the machine hire charges on which TDS u/s 194-I was required to be done by the
assessee company which utilised the plants and equipment of the contractors
during the construction works carried out by it; therefore on such payment of
rent made by the assessee to such contractors for use of such plant and
equipment, TDS u/s 194-I was required to be done by the assessee. In the absence
of the same, the amounts in question paid to the contractors were liable to be
added back as income of the assessee u/s 40(a)(ia). An audit objection was also
raised for those A.Ys. by the Audit Team of the Department and in the
subsequent A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, the assessee himself deducted tax at
source on such machine hire charges u/s 194-I and deposited the same; in the
year 2015, the Assessing Authority had ‘reason to believe’ that for A.Ys.
2007-2008 and 2008-2009 it was liable to reopen and reassessment was required
to be done for those A.Ys.

 

The appeals
preferred by the assessee were dismissed by the CIT(Appeals) but in the appeal
before the Tribunal the assessee succeeded when it held that reassessment was
bad in law as the notice u/s 147/148 was issued after the expiry of four years
after the relevant assessment year and there was no failure on the part of the
assessee; therefore, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked by the
Authority concerned and the reassessment order was set aside.

 

The assessee
submitted that during the course of the original assessment proceedings itself
it had made true and full disclosure of the tax deducted and amount paid by it
to various contractors vide letter dated 7th December, 2009,
filed before the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-I, Erode through the
Chartered Accountant M. Chinnayan & Associates, and in reply to the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax for the Audit Objection, the said Chartered Accountant,
vide its communication for the A.Y. 2007-2008, it was contended before
the Assessing Authority that such amounts paid to the contractors did not
amount to payment of rentals as there was no lease agreement, and therefore
section 194-I could not apply to such payments. He further submitted that the
Assessing Authority had disallowed a part of the said amounts towards machine
hire charges u/s 40a(ia) and the Tax Deducted at Source during the course of
the original assessment proceedings itself and therefore there was no reason
for the Assessing Authority to reopen the original assessment order on a mere
‘change of opinion’ subsequently in the year 2015 and the reassessment
proceedings could not be undertaken. In particular, attention was drawn to the
order sheet entry drawn on 30th December, 2009 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, the Assessing Authority.

 

The Court held that
no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal filed by the
Revenue as the law is well settled in this regard and unless, as a matter of
fact, the Revenue Authority can establish a failure on the part of the assessee
to truly and fully disclose the relevant materials during the course of the
original assessment proceedings, the reassessment proceedings, on mere change
of opinion, cannot be initiated, much less beyond the period of four years
after the expiry of the assessment years in terms of the first proviso
to section 147 of the Act.

 

In the present
case, the machine hire charges paid by the assessee to various contractors or
sub-contractors were fully disclosed not only in the Books of Accounts and
Audit Reports furnished by the Tax Auditor, but by way of replies to the notice
issued by the Assessing Authority, particularly vide letter dated 7th
December, 2009 of the assessee during the course of the original assessment
proceedings, and it was also contended while replying to the audit objection
that the payments, having been made as machine hire charges, do not amount to
rentals and thereby do not attract section 194-I. But despite that the
Assessing Authority appears to have made additions to the extent of Rs.
44,45,185 in A.Y. 2007-2008 u/s 40(a)(ia) in case of one of the assessees,
viz., URC Construction (Private) Limited.

 

The facts in both the assessees’ cases are said to be almost similar and
they were represented by the same Chartered Accountant, M/s Chinnayan &
Associates, Erode.

 

Thus, there is no
failure on the part of the assessee to truly and fully disclose the relevant
materials before the Assessing Authority during the course of the original
assessment proceedings. Therefore, the extended period of limitation beyond
four years after the end of the relevant assessment years cannot be invoked for
the reassessment proceedings under sections 147/148 in view of the first proviso
to section 147.

 

However, the Court
disagreed with the observations made by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its
order to the extent where the Tribunal has stated that if there is negligence
or omission on the part of the auditor to disclose correct facts in the Audit
Report prepared u/s 44AB, the assessee cannot be faulted.

 

The Court opined
that even if the relevant facts are not placed before the auditors by the
assessee himself, they may qualify their Audit Report u/s 44AB. If the
Auditor’s Report does not specifically disclose any relevant facts, or if there
is any omission or non-disclosure, it has to be attributed to the assessee only
rather than to the Auditor.
The observations made in paragraph 11 of the
order are not sustainable though they do not affect the conclusion that has
been arrived at on the basis of the other facts placed, that there was really a
disclosure of full and complete facts by the assessee before the Assessing
Authority during the course of the original assessment proceedings itself u/s
143(3); and therefore, even if anything is not highlighted in the Audit Report,
the assessee has shown that this aspect, viz., non-deduction of TDS on the
machine hire charges attracting section 194-I was very much discussed by the
Assessing Authority during the original assessment proceedings.

 

Therefore, on a
mere change of opinion, the Assessing Authority could not have invoked the
reassessment proceedings u/s 147/148 beyond the period of four years after the
end of the relevant A.Ys.

 

Thus, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

 

[ITAT, Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 20th March, 2008 in ITA Nos. 1179/Mds/2007, 1180/Mds/2007 and 1181/Mds/2007; Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 18th May, 2009 in ITA No. 998/Mds/2008 for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and 2005-2006, respectively] Letting of immovable property – Business asset – Rental income – ‘Income from Business’ or ‘Income from House Property’

3.  M/s PSTS Heavy Lift and Shift Ltd. vs. The
Dy. CIT Company Circle – V(2) Chennai
M/s CeeDeeYes IT
Parks Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Asst. CIT Company Circle I(3) [Tax Case Appeal
Nos. 2193 to 2195 of 2008 & 979 of 2009; Date of order: 30th
January, 2020]
(Madras High Court)

 

[ITAT, Chennai ‘B’
Bench, dated 20th March, 2008 in ITA Nos. 1179/Mds/2007,
1180/Mds/2007 and 1181/Mds/2007; Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 18th May,
2009 in ITA No. 998/Mds/2008 for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and
2005-2006, respectively]

Letting of
immovable property – Business asset – Rental income – ‘Income from Business’ or
‘Income from House Property’

 

There were two
different appeals before High Court for different A.Ys. In both cases the
substantial question of law raised was as under:

 

Whether the
income earned by the assessees during the A.Ys. in question from letting out of
their warehouses or property to lessees is taxable under the head ‘Income from
Business’ or ‘Income from House Property’?

 

M/s PSTS Heavy Lift and Shift Limited
For the A.Y. 1999-2000, the Assessing Authority held that the assessee owned
two warehouses situated near SIPCOT, Tuticorin with a total land area of 3.09
acres and built-up area of approximately 32,000 sq.ft. each. The assessee
earned income of Rs. 21.12 lakhs during A.Y. 
2000-2001 by letting out the warehouses to two companies, M/s W.
Hogewoning Dried Flower Limited and M/s Ramesh Flowers Limited, and out of the
total rental income of Rs. 21.12 lakhs it claimed depreciation of Rs. 6.02
lakhs on the said business asset in the form of warehouses. The assessee
claimed that warehousing was included in the main objects of the company’s
Memorandum of Association and not only warehouses were utilised for storing
their clients’ cargo, but other areas were used to park their equipment such as
trucks, cranes, etc., and amenities like handling equipment like pulleys,
grabs, weighing machines were fixed in the corners and such facilities were
also provided to the clients. The assessee claimed it to be business income and
said such income ought to be taxed as ‘Income from Business’. But the Assessing
Authority as well as the Appellate Authority held that the said income would be
taxable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. The Assessing Authority
also inter alia relied upon the judgment in the case of CIT vs.
Indian Warehousing Industries Limited [258 ITR 93].

 

M/s CeeDeeYes IT Parks Pvt. Ltd. – As
per the assessment order passed in the said case, the assessee company was
incorporated to carry out the business of providing infrastructure amenities
and work space for IT companies; it constructed the property in question and
let it out to one such IT company, M/s Cognizant Technology Solutions India
Ltd. The assessee claimed the rental income to be taxable as its ‘Business
Income’ and not as ‘Income from House Property’, but the Assessing Authority as
well as the Appellate Authorities held against the assessee and held such
income to be ‘Income from House Property’.

 

The assessee
contended that it will depend upon the facts of each case and if earning of
rental income by letting out of a business asset or the properties of the
assessee is the sole business of the assessee, then the income from such
rentals or lease money cannot be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’ but can
be taxed only as ‘Income from Business’. He submitted that the Assessing
Authorities below, in order to deny deductions or depreciation and other
expenditure incurred by the assessee to earn such business income, deliberately
held that such rental income was taxable under the head ‘Income from House
Property’ so that only limited deductions under that head of ‘Income from House
Property’ could be allowed to the assessee and a higher taxable income could be
brought to tax.

 

The assessee relied
upon the following case laws:

(a) Chennai Properties Investments Limited
vs. CIT [(2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC)];

(b)        Rayala Corporation Private Limited
vs. Asst. CIT [(2013) 386 ITR 500 (SC)];
and

(c) Raj Dadarkar & Associates vs. Asst.
CIT [(2017) 394 ITR 592 (SC)].

 

The Revenue, apart
from relying on the Tribunal decision, also submitted that as far as the
separate income earned by the assessee from the amenities provided to the
clients in the warehouses or the property of the assessee was concerned, such
portion of income deserved to be taxed under the head ‘Income from Other
Sources’ u/s 56 and not as ‘Income from Business’.

 

But the High Court
observed that the Tribunal as well as the authorities below were under the
misconceived notion that income from letting out of property, which was the
business asset of the assessee company and the sole and exclusive business of
the assessee, was to earn income out of such house property in the form of
business asset, was still taxable only as ‘Income from House Property’. Such
misconception emanated from the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Chennai
Properties and Investment Pvt. Ltd. [(2004) 266 ITR 685]
, which was
reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Properties Investments
Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Supra)
, wherein it is held that
where the assessee is a company whose main object of business is to acquire
properties and to let out those properties, the rental income received was
taxable as ‘Income from Business’ and not ‘Income from House Property’,
following the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme
Court in Sultans Brothers (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1964)
51 ITR 353 (SC)];
therein, it was held that each case has to be looked
at from the businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was
doing of a business or the exploitation of the property by the owner.

 

The said decision
subsequently was followed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Rayala
Corporation (Supra)
and Raj Dadarkar & Associates (Supra).

 

The Court further
observed that once the property in question is used as a business asset and the
exclusive business of the assessee company or firm is to earn income by way of
rental or lease money, then such rental income can be treated only as the
‘Business Income’ of the assessee and not as ‘Income from House Property’. The
heads of income are divided in six heads, including ‘Income from House
Property’, which defines the specific source of earning such income. The income
from house property is intended to be taxed under that head mainly if such
income is earned out of idle property, which could earn the rental income from
the lessees. But where the income from the same property in the form of lease
rentals is the main source of business of the assessee, which has its business
exclusively or substantially in the form of earning of rentals only from the
business assets in the form of such landed properties, then the more
appropriate head of income applicable in such cases would be ‘Income from
Business’.

 

A bare perusal of
the scheme of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would reveal that while computing the
taxable income under the Head ‘Income from Business or Profession’, the various
deductions, including the actual expenditure incurred and notional deductions
like depreciation, etc., are allowed vis-a-vis incentives in the form of
deductions under Chapter VIA. But the deductions under the Head ‘Income from
House Property’ are restricted to those specified in section 24 of the Act,
like 1/6th of the annual income towards repairs and maintenance to
be undertaken by landlords, interest on capital employed to construct the
property, etc. Therefore, in all cases such income from property cannot be
taxed only under the head ‘Income from House Property’. It will depend upon the
facts of each case and where such income is earned by the assessee by way of
utilisation of its business assets in the form of property in question or as an
idle property which could yield rental income for its user, from the lessees.
In the earlier provisions of income from house properties, even the notional
income under the head ‘Income from House Property’ was taxable in the case of
self-occupied properties by landlords, is a pointer towards that.

 

The Court observed
that in both the present cases it is not even in dispute that the exclusive and
main source of income of the assessee was only the rentals and lease money
received from the lessees; the Assessing Authority took a different and
contrary view mainly to deny the claim of depreciation out of such business
income in the form of rentals without assigning any proper and cogent reason.
Merely because the lease income or rental income earned from the lessees could
be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’, ignoring the fact that such rentals
were the only source of ‘Business Income’ of the assessee, the authorities
below have fallen into the error in holding that the income was taxable under
the head ‘Income from House Property’. The said application of the head of
income by the authorities below was not only against the facts and evidence
available on record, but also against common sense.

 

The amended
definition u/s 22 now defines ‘Income from House Property’ as the annual value
of property as determined u/s 23 consisting of buildings or lands appurtenant
thereto of which the assessee is the owner, other than such portions of such
property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession
carried on by him, the profits of which are chargeable to income tax, shall be
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Thus,
even the amended definition intends to tax the notional income of the
self-occupied portion of the property to run the assessee’s own business
therein as business income. Therefore, the other rental income earned from
letting out of the property, which is the business of the assessee itself,
cannot be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’.

 

The Court also observed that the heads of income, as defined in section
14 do not exist in silos or in watertight compartments under the scheme of tax
and, thus, these heads of income, as noted above, are fields and heads of
sources of income depending upon the nature of business of the assessee. Therefore,
in cases where the earning of the rental income is the exclusive or predominant
business of the assessee, the income earned by way of lease money or rentals by
letting out of the property cannot be taxed under the head ‘Income from House
Property’ but can only be taxed under the head ‘Income from Business income’.

 

In view of the
aforesaid, both the assessees in the present case carry on the business of
earning rental income as per the memoranda of association only and the fact is
that they were not carrying on any other business; therefore, the appeals of
both the assessees were allowed. The question of law framed above was answered
in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue.

 

Settlement of cases – Section 245D – Powers of Settlement Commission – Difference between sub-sections (2C) and (4) of section 245D – Procedure under sub-section (2C) summary – Issues raised in application for settlement, requiring adjudication – Application cannot be rejected under sub-section (2C) of section 245D

23. Dy.
CIT (International Taxation) vs. Hitachi Power Europe GMBH
[2020] 428 ITR 208 (Mad.) Date of order: 4th September,
2020
A.Ys.: 2015-16 to 2018-19

 

Settlement of cases – Section 245D – Powers
of Settlement Commission – Difference between sub-sections (2C) and (4) of
section 245D – Procedure under sub-section (2C) summary – Issues raised in
application for settlement, requiring adjudication – Application cannot be
rejected under sub-section (2C) of section 245D

 

An application for
settlement of the case was rejected u/s 245D(2C). On a writ petition
challenging the order, a Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court set aside
the rejection order. On appeal by the Revenue, the Division Bench upheld the
decision of the Single Judge Bench and held as under:

 

‘i)    It is important to take note of the
legislative intent and scope of power vested with the Settlement Commission
under sub-section (2C) and sub-section (4) of section 245D. The power to be
exercised by the Commission under sub-section (2C) of section 245D is within a
period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the report of the
Commissioner. The marked distinction with regard to the exercise of power of
the Settlement Commission at the sub-section (2C) stage and sub-section (4)
stage is amply clear from the wording in the statute. The Commission can
declare an application to be invalid at the sub-section (2C) stage. Such
invalidation cannot be by a long-drawn reasoning akin to a decision to be taken
at the stage of section 245D(4). This is so because sub-section (4) of section
245D gives ample power to the Commission to examine the records, the report of
the Commissioner received under sub-section (2B) or sub-section (3) or the
provisions of sub-section (1), as they stood immediately before their
amendments by the Finance Act, 2007. However, if on the material the Settlement
Commission arrived at a conclusion prima facie that there was no true
and full disclosure, it had the right to declare the application invalid.

 

ii)    There were four issues which the assessee
wanted settled by the Commission; the first among the issues was with regard to
the income earned from offshore supply of goods. The Commission was largely
guided by the report of the Commissioner, who reported that the composite
contracts for offshore and onshore services were artificially bifurcated. The
Settlement Commission held that the contention of the assessee that it was
separate and that this was done by the NTPC was held to be not fully true. In
other words, the Settlement Commission had accepted the fact that the contracts
were bifurcated by the NTPC, the entity which invited the tender, but the
Commission stated that the bifurcation done by the NTPC was only for financial
reasons.

 

iii)   The question was whether such a finding could
lead to an application being declared as invalid u/s 245D(2C) on the ground
that the assessee had failed to make full and true disclosure of income. This
issue could not have been decided without adjudication. In order to decide
whether a contract was a composite contract or separate contracts, a deeper
probe into the factual scenario as well as the legal position was required. If
such was the fact situation in the case on hand, the application of the
assessee could not have been declared invalid on account of failure to fully
and truly disclose its income. Thus, what was required to be done by the
Commission was to allow the application to be proceeded with u/s 245D(2C) and
take up the matter for consideration u/s 245D(4) and take a decision after
adjudicating the claim.

 

iv)   The issues which were
requested to be settled by the assessee before the Commission, qua the
report of the Commissioner, could not obviously be an issue for a prima
facie
decision at the sub-section (2C) stage. The rejection of the
application for settlement of case was not justified.

 

v)   Decision of the Single Judge Bench affirmed.

 

Revision – Condition precedent – Sections 54F, 263 – Assessment order should be erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue – Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F – Assessee purchasing three units in same building out of consideration received on account of joint development – A.O. allowing exemption taking one of plausible views based on inquiry of claim and law prevalent – Revision to withdraw exemption – Tribunal holding Commissioner failed to record finding that order of assessment erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue – Tribunal order not erroneous

22. Principal CIT vs. Minal Nayan Shah [2020] 428 ITR 23 (Guj.) Date of order: 1st September,
2020
A.Y.: 2014-15

 

Revision – Condition precedent – Sections
54F, 263 – Assessment order should be erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue –
Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F – Assessee purchasing three units in same
building out of consideration received on account of joint development – A.O.
allowing exemption taking one of plausible views based on inquiry of claim and
law prevalent – Revision to withdraw exemption – Tribunal holding Commissioner
failed to record finding that order of assessment erroneous and prejudicial to
Revenue – Tribunal order not erroneous

 

The assessee, with
the co-owner of a piece of land, entered into a development agreement and
received consideration for the land. The assessee disclosed long-term capital
gains and claimed exemption under sections 54F and 54EC. The return filed by
the assessee was accepted and an order u/s 143(3) was passed. Thereafter, the
Principal Commissioner in proceedings u/s 263 found that the assessee had
purchased the entire block of the residential project which comprised three
independent units on different floors with different entrances and kitchens,
and directed the A.O. to pass a fresh order in respect of the claim of the
assessee u/s 54F.

 

The Tribunal found
that the three units were located on different floors of the same structure and
were purchased by the assessee by a common deed of conveyance. The Tribunal
held that the two prerequisites that the order was erroneous and prejudicial to
the interests of the Revenue, that an erroneous order did not necessarily mean
an order with which the Principal Commissioner was unable to agree when there
were two plausible views on the issue and one legally plausible view was
adopted by the A.O. The Tribunal quashed the revision order passed by the
Principal Commissioner u/s 263.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i)    It is an essential condition for the
exercise of power u/s 263 that the Commissioner must find an error in the
assessment order of the A.O. prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue and
the conclusion of the Commissioner that the order is erroneous and prejudicial
to the Revenue must be based on materials and contentions raised by the
assessee on an opportunity of hearing being afforded to the assessee.

 

ii)    On the facts the order of the Tribunal
quashing the revisional order passed by the Principal Commissioner u/s 263 was
not erroneous. The findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal was that one of
the requisite conditions for the exercise of power u/s 263 the Commissioner
should consider the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests
of the Revenue was not satisfied and in arriving at such conclusion the
Tribunal had assigned cogent reasons. No question of law arose.’

Reassessment – Death of assessee – Validity of notice of reassessment – Sections 147, 148, 159, 292BB – Notice issued to deceased person is not valid – Not a defect curable by section 292BB – Representative assessee – Legal representative – Scope of section 159 – No legal requirement that legal representatives should report death of assessee to income-tax department

21. Savita Kapila vs. ACIT [2020] 426 ITR 502 (Del.) Date of order: 16th July, 2020 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Reassessment – Death of assessee – Validity
of notice of reassessment – Sections 147, 148, 159, 292BB – Notice issued to
deceased person is not valid – Not a defect curable by section 292BB –
Representative assessee – Legal representative – Scope of section 159 – No
legal requirement that legal representatives should report death of assessee to
income-tax department

 

The assessee,
‘MPK’, expired on 21st December, 2018. A notice dated 31st
March, 2019 u/s 148 was issued in his name. The notice could not be served on
‘MPK’. Nor was it served on his legal representatives. An assessment order was
passed in the name of one of his legal representatives on 27th
December, 2019.

 

The Delhi High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the legal representative to challenge
the notice and the order and held as under:

 

‘i)    The issuance of a notice u/s 148 is the
foundation for reopening of an assessment. Consequently, the sine qua
non
for acquiring jurisdiction to reopen an assessment is that such notice
should be issued in the name of the correct person. This requirement of issuing
notice to the correct person and not to a dead person is not merely a
procedural requirement but a condition precedent to the notice being valid in
law.

 

ii)    Section 159 applies to a situation where
proceedings are initiated or are pending against the assessee when he is alive,
and after his death the legal representative steps into the shoes of the
deceased-assessee. There is no statutory requirement imposing an obligation
upon the legal heirs to intimate the death of the assessee.

 

iii)   Issuance of notice upon a dead person and
non-service of notice does not come under the ambit of mistake, defect or
omission. Consequently, section 292B does not apply. Section 292BB is
applicable to an assessee and not to the legal representatives.

 

iv)   The notice dated 31st March, 2019
u/s 148 was issued to the deceased-assessee after the date of his death, 21st
December, 2018, and thus inevitably the notice could never have been served
upon him. Consequently, the jurisdictional requirement u/s 148 of service of
notice was not fulfilled.

 

v)   No notice u/s 148 was ever issued to the
petitioner during the period of limitation and proceedings were transferred to
the permanent account number of the petitioner, who happened to be one of the
four legal heirs of the deceased-assessee by letter dated 27th
December, 2019. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction qua the
petitioner for the relevant assessment year was beyond the period prescribed
and, consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner were barred by
limitation in accordance with section 149(1)(b)’.

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Section 276C(2) – Delay in payment of tax – Admission of liability in return and subsequent payment of tax – Criminal proceedings quashed

20. Bejan
Singh Eye Hospital Pvt. Ltd. vs. I.T. Department
[2020] 428 ITR 206 (Mad.) Date of order: 12th March, 2020 A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2015-16

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt
to evade tax – Section 276C(2) – Delay in payment of tax – Admission of
liability in return and subsequent payment of tax – Criminal proceedings
quashed

 

The assessees filed
their returns of income in time for the A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2015-16 and admitted
their liability. There was delay in remittance of the tax for which they were
prosecuted u/s 276C(2) on the ground of wilful evasion of tax.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘The assessees had
since cleared the dues and as on date no tax dues were payable in respect of
the years in question. Inasmuch as the liability had been admitted in the
counter-affidavit and inasmuch as the tax had been subsequently paid,
continuance of the criminal prosecution would only amount to an abuse of legal
process. The criminal proceedings were to be quashed.’

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Sections 132, 153A, 276C(2), 276CC – Ingredients of offence – Failure to furnish returns and pay self-assessment tax as required in notice – Delayed payment of tax pursuant to coercive steps cannot be construed as an attempt to evade tax – Only act closely connected with intended crime can be construed as an act in attempt of intended offence – Presumption would not establish ingredients of offence – Prosecution quashed

19. Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. IT Department
[2020] 428 ITR 89 (Kar.) Date of order: 14th June, 2019 A.Ys.: 2010-11 & 2011-12

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt
to evade tax – Sections 132, 153A, 276C(2), 276CC – Ingredients of offence –
Failure to furnish returns and pay self-assessment tax as required in notice –
Delayed payment of tax pursuant to coercive steps cannot be construed as an
attempt to evade tax – Only act closely connected with intended crime can be
construed as an act in attempt of intended offence – Presumption would not
establish ingredients of offence – Prosecution quashed

 

The assessee, a co-operative society, did not comply with the notice issued
u/s 153A by the A.O. to file returns of income for the A.Ys. 2006-07 to
2011-12. Thereafter, the A.O. issued a notice for prosecution u/s 276CC. The
assessee filed returns of income for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 but failed
to pay the self-assessment tax along with the returns u/s 140A. In the
meanwhile, the property owned by the assessee was attached u/s 281B but the
attachment was lifted on condition that the sale proceeds of the attached
property would be directly remitted to the Department. The assessee issued a
cheque towards self-assessment tax due for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 with
instructions at the back of the cheque that the ‘cheque to be presented at the
time of registration of the property’ but the cheque was not encashed. The Department
initiated criminal prosecution u/s 276C(2) against the assessee, its secretary
and ex-vice-president on the ground of wilful and deliberate attempt to evade
tax.

 

The assessee filed
petitions u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the
criminal action. The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition and held as
under:

 

‘i)    The gist of the offence u/s 276C(2) is the
wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable
under the Act. What is made punishable under this section is an “attempt to
evade tax, penalty or interest” and not the actual evasion of tax. “Attempt” is
nowhere defined in the Act or in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In legal echelons
“attempt” is understood as a “movement towards the commission of the intended
crime”. It is doing “something in the direction of commission of offence”.
Therefore, in order to render the accused guilty of “attempt to evade tax” it
must be shown that he has done some positive act with an intention to evade
tax.

 

ii)    The conduct of the assessee in making the
payments in terms of the returns filed, though delayed and after coercive steps
were taken by the Department, did not lead to the inference that the payments
were made in an attempt to evade tax. The delayed payments, under the
provisions of the Act, might call for imposition of penalty or interest, but
could not be construed as an attempt to evade tax so as to entail prosecution
u/s 276C(2).

 

iii)   Even if the only circumstance relied on by
the Department in support of the charge levelled against the assessee, its
secretary and ex-vice-president, that though the assessee had filed its
returns, it had failed to pay the self-assessment tax along with the returns
was accepted as true, it did not constitute an offence u/s 276C(2). Therefore,
the prosecution initiated against the assessee, its secretary and
ex-vice-president was illegal and amounted to abuse of process of court and was
to be quashed.

 

iv)   The act of filing the returns was not
connected with evasion of tax and by itself could not be construed as an
attempt to evade tax. Rather, the filing of returns suggested that the assessee
had voluntarily declared its intention to pay the tax. It was only an act which
was closely connected with the intended crime that could be construed as an act
in attempt of the intended offence.’

 

Company – Book profits – Capital gains – Sections 45, 48, 115JB – Computation of book profits u/s 115JB – Scope of section 115JB – Indexed cost of acquisition to be taken into account in calculating capital gains

18. Best Trading and Agencies Ltd. vs. Dy.
CIT
[2020] 428 ITR 52 (Kar.) Date of order: 26th August, 2020 A.Ys.: 2005-06 & 2006-07

 

Company – Book profits – Capital gains –
Sections 45, 48, 115JB – Computation of book profits u/s 115JB – Scope of
section 115JB – Indexed cost of acquisition to be taken into account in
calculating capital gains

 

The assessee
company was utilised as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for restructuring of
‘K’. Under an arrangement approved by the court, the surplus on
non-manufacturing and liquid assets including real estate had been transferred
to the SPV for disbursement of the liabilities. In the relevant years the A.O.
invoked the provisions of section 115JB and assessed the assessee on book
profits without giving the benefit of indexation on the cost of the capital
asset sold during the year.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 115JB deals with computation of book
profits of companies. By virtue of sub-section (5) of section 115JB, the
application of other provisions of the Act is open, except if specifically
barred by the section itself. The indexed cost of acquisition is a claim
allowed by section 48 to arrive at the income taxable as capital gains. The
difference between the sale consideration and the indexed cost of acquisition represents
the actual cost of the assessee, which is taxable u/s 45 at the rates provided
u/s 112. There is no provision in the Act to prevent the assessee from claiming
the indexed cost of acquisition on the sale of the asset in a case where the
assessee is subjected to section 115JB.

 

ii)    Since the indexed cost of acquisition was
subjected to tax under a specific provision, viz., section 112, the provisions
of section 115JB which is a general provision, could not be made applicable to
the case of the assessee. Also, considering the profits on sale of land without
giving the benefit of indexed cost of acquisition results in taxing the income
other than actual or real income. In other words, a mere book-keeping entry
cannot be treated as income. The assessee had to be given the benefit of
indexed cost of acquisition.’

Capital gains – Assessability – Slump sale – Section 2(42C) – Assets transferred to subsidiary company in accordance with scheme u/s 394 of the Companies Act – Assessee allotted shares – Scheme approved by High Court – No slump sale for purposes of capital gains tax

17. Areva T&D India Ltd. vs. CIT [2020] 428 ITR 1 (Mad.) Date of order: 8th September,
2020
A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Capital gains – Assessability – Slump sale
– Section 2(42C) – Assets transferred to subsidiary company in accordance with
scheme u/s 394 of the Companies Act – Assessee allotted shares – Scheme
approved by High Court – No slump sale for purposes of capital gains tax

 

The assessee filed
its return for the A.Y. 2006-07. During the course of scrutiny assessment, a
questionnaire was issued to the assessee calling for certain clarifications.
The assessee stated that it had transferred its non-transmission and
distribution business to its subsidiary company. The assessee further stated
that the transfer of the non-transmission and distribution business was by way
of a scheme of arrangement under sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act,
1956 and could not be considered a ‘sale of business’ and that any transfer of
an undertaking otherwise than as a result of a sale would not qualify as a
slump sale and thus, the provisions of section 50B could not be applied to its
case. The A.O. held that the assessee had agreed that the transfer of the non-transmission
and distribution business to its subsidiary was a transfer in terms of the
provisions of section 50B and that the assessee had approached the relevant
bond-issuing authorities for the purpose of section 54EC in order to claim
deduction on it. Thus, the A.O. concluded that the assessee itself having
agreed that the transfer fell under the provisions of section 50B, the claim of
the assessee that it should not be regarded as transfer could not be accepted.

 

This was confirmed
by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    The fundamental legal principle is that
there is no estoppel in taxation law. An alternative plea can be raised
and it can even be a plea which is contradictory to the earlier plea.

 

ii)    Section 2(42C) defines the
expression “slump sale” to mean the transfer of one or more undertakings as a
result of sale for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to
the individual assets and liabilities in such sale. Admittedly, the word “sale”
is not defined under the Act. Therefore, necessarily one has to rely upon the
definitions in the other statutes which define the word “sale”. Section 54 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the word “sale” to mean a transfer
of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised. The word “price” is not defined either under the Income-tax Act, 1961
or under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but is defined u/s 2(10) of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1930 to mean money consideration for the sale of goods.
Therefore, to bring the transaction within the definition of section 2(42C) as
a slump sale there should be a transfer of an undertaking as a result of the
sale for lump sum consideration. The sale should be by way of transfer of
ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised and the price should be money consideration. If no monetary
consideration is involved in the transaction, it would not be possible for the
Revenue to bring the transaction done by the assessee within the definition of
the term “slump sale” as defined u/s 2(42C). Section 118 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 defines the term “exchange” by stating that when two persons
mutually transfer the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another,
neither thing nor both things being money only, the transaction is called an
“exchange”.

iii)   The assessee was non-suited primarily on the
ground that it had accepted the transfer to be a sale falling within the
provisions of section 50B and approached the bond-issuing authorities for
investment in certain bonds in terms of section 54EC to avoid payment of
capital gains tax. The A.O., the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had committed
a fundamental error in shutting out the contention raised by the assessee
solely on the ground that the assessee approached the bond-issuing authorities
for availing of the benefit u/s 54EC. In the assessee’s case, all the relevant
facts were available even before the A.O. while the scrutiny assessment was in
progress. Therefore, there was no estoppel on the part of the assessee
to pursue its claim.

 

iv)   The Tribunal had committed a factual mistake
in referring to a valuation report not concerning the transaction, which was
the subject matter of assessment. The explanation given by the assessee was
satisfactory because the net asset value of the non-transmission and
distribution business was determined at Rs. 31.30 crores as on 31st
December, 2005. But the parties agreed to have a joint valuation by using a
combination of three methods, namely, (a) price earnings capitalisation, (b)
net assets, and (c) market values reflected in actual dealings on the stock
exchanges during the relevant period. After following such a procedure, the
fair value was computed at Rs. 41.3 crores and this had been clearly set down
in the statement filed u/s 393 of the Companies Act before the High Court. In
the scheme of arrangement there was no monetary consideration, which was passed
on from the transferee-company to the assessee but there was only allotment of
shares. There was no suggestion on behalf of the Revenue of bad faith on the
part of the assessee-company nor was it alleged that a particular form of the
transaction was adopted as a cloak to conceal a different transaction. The mere
use of the expression “consideration for transfer” was not sufficient to
describe the transaction as a sale. The transfer, pursuant to approval of a
scheme of arrangement, was not a contractual transfer, but a statutorily
approved transfer and could not be brought within the definition of the word
“sale”.’

 

HINDU LAW – A MIXED BAG OF ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Law has always been a
very fascinating subject. The fact that it is both codified in some respects
and uncodified in others makes it all the more interesting. The Supreme Court
in the case of M. Arumugam vs. Ammaniammal, CA No. 8642/2009 order dated
8th January, 2020
had occasion to consider a mixed bag of
issues under Hindu Law. Some of the observations made by the Court are very
interesting and have a profound impact on the interpretation of Hindu Law. Let
us understand this decision in more detail and also analyse its implications.

 

FACTUAL MATRIX

The facts of this case are
quite detailed but are relevant to better appreciate the decision. There was a
Hindu male, his wife, two sons and three daughters. He also had an HUF in which
he (the karta) and his two sons were coparceners. The HUF had certain
property. This was prior to the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 (the Act) and hence the daughters were not coparceners. The karta
died intestate. Accordingly, by virtue of the Act, his share in the HUF was to
be succeeded to by his legal heirs in accordance with the Act, i.e., equally
amongst the six surviving family members. On his death, a Release Deed was
executed in respect of the HUF amongst the two sons, the mother and the
daughters in which the mother and the daughters relinquished all their rights
in the father’s HUF to the two sons. As one of the daughters (the respondent in
this case) was a minor, her mother executed the deed as her natural guardian
for and on her behalf. Similarly, as one of the sons was a minor, the elder son
(the appellant in this case) executed this deed as his guardian.

 

After
nine years, a Deed of HUF Partition was executed between the two sons in which
the husband of the respondent (who was now a major) acted as a witness.
Thereafter, the two sons were in possession of the erstwhile HUF property in
their own individual, independent capacities. When they sought to sell this
property, the respondent objected to the sale on the grounds that when the
release deed was executed she was a minor and her mother had no authority to
sign it on her behalf. She also contended that she was, in fact, not even aware
of the release deed. Hence, the same was void ab initio and all
subsequent transactions and agreements were also void. Accordingly, she
filed a suit to set aside the transactions.

 

The trial court dismissed
the suit holding that the mother acted as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter and no steps were taken by the respondent on attaining majority to get
the release deed set aside within the period of limitation of three years. She
then filed an appeal before the Madras High Court which came to the conclusion
that the property in the hands of the legal heirs of the father after his death
was Joint HUF property and the mother could not have acted as the guardian of
the minor. It held that the eldest son on demise of the father became the karta
of the HUF and also the guardian for the share of the minors within the family.
Hence, he could not have executed such a release deed in his favour. It was,
therefore, held that the release deed was void ab initio. Consequently,
the eldest son filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

 

It is in the background of
these facts that we can understand the ratio of the Apex Court on
various issues.

 

WHO CAN BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN?

The Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the law relating to minority and guardianship
of Hindus and the powers and duties of the guardians. It overrides any
uncodified Hindu custom, tradition or usage in respect of the minority and
guardianship of Hindus. Under this Act, a guardian means a person who has the
care of the minor or of his property, or both. Further, the term also includes
a natural guardian. The term ‘Natural Guardian’ is of great significance since
most of the provisions of this Act deal with the rights and duties of a natural
guardian and hence it becomes necessary to understand the meaning of this term.
If the minor is a boy or an unmarried girl, then the father and after him the
mother automatically becomes the natural guardian. The natural guardian of a
Hindu minor has the power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and
proper for the minor’s benefit or for the realisation, protection or the
benefit of the minor’s estate. The most important restriction placed by the Act
on the natural guardian relates to his immovable property. A natural guardian
cannot without the prior permission of a Court enter into any disposal /
mortgage / lease exceeding five years of his immovable property.

 

This Act also has a caveat.
It states that a guardian cannot be appointed for the minor’s undivided
interest in a joint HUF property if the property is under the management of an
adult member of the family. Since the interest in an HUF property is not
separate or divisible from the rest of the shares, it is not possible to
segregate the interest of one member from another. The Supreme Court set aside
this provision in Arumugam’s case (Supra) stating that in that
case they were dealing with a situation where all the family members decided to
dissolve the Hindu Undivided Family assuming there was one in existence. Hence,
the exemption had no application.

 

As regards the plea that
the mother cannot act as the natural guardian and the karta of the HUF
would play both roles, the Apex Court observed that a karta is the
manager of the joint family property. He was not the guardian of the minor
members of the joint family. What the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
provided was that the natural guardian of a minor Hindu shall be his guardian
for all intents and purposes except so far as the undivided interest of the
minor in the joint family property was concerned. This meant that the natural
guardian could not dispose of the share of the minor in the joint family
property. The reason for this was that the karta of the joint family
property was the manager of the property. However, this principle would not
apply
when a family settlement was taking place between the members of the
joint family. When such a dissolution took place and some of the members
relinquished their share in favour of the karta, it was obvious that the
karta could not also act as the guardian of that minor whose share was
being relinquished in his own (i.e., the karta’s) favour. There would be
an apparent conflict of interest. In such an eventuality, it would be
the mother alone who would be the natural guardian. Accordingly, there was
nothing wrong in the mother acting as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter.

 

CHALLENGE BY MINOR ON ATTAINING MAJORITY

Section 8 of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act further provides that any disposal and / or
alienation of a minor’s immovable property by her natural guardian in
contravention of the Act is voidable at the instance of the minor. The Supreme
Court held that this meant that the release deed at best became a voidable
document which in terms of section 8 of the Act should have been challenged
within three years of the daughter attaining majority. Since she had failed to
do so, she could not now challenge the same. Thus, the period of limitation of
three years to challenge the document had expired.

 

Whether
property is joint or self-acquired

The next issue to be
decided by the Supreme Court was that in respect of the interest in the
coparcenary property which was succeeded by the legal heirs, whether it
continued to be HUF property or did it become the self-acquired property of
each heir? The Supreme Court referred to several decisions such as Guruprasad
Khandappa Magdum vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, (1978) 3 SCC 383; CWT vs.
Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567
; Appropriate Authority IT vs. M.
Arifulla (2002) 10 SCC 342
, etc. to hold that property devolving upon
legal heirs under intestate succession from a Hindu male is the individual
property of the person who inherits the same. It is not HUF property in the
recipient’s hands.

 

The Court also considered
section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act which clearly lays down that any Hindu
can dispose of his share in an HUF by means of a Will. It held that the
Explanation to section 30 clearly provided that the interest of a male Hindu in
a Mitakshara coparcenary is property capable of being disposed of by him
by a Will. This meant that the law-makers intended that for all purposes the
interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary was to be virtually
like his self-acquired property.

 

Manner of
owning the property

In this case, on the death
of the father and execution of the subsequent release deed, the two sons ended
up owning the property jointly. The Court referred to section 19 of the Act
which provides that when two or more heirs succeed together to the property of
an intestate, they shall take the property per capita and as tenants in common
and not as joint tenants.

 

It may be useful to explain
the meaning of these two terms. Although both may appear similar, but in law
there is a vast difference between the two. Succession to property would be
determined depending upon how a property has been acquired. A Joint Tenancy has
certain distinguishing features, such as unity of title, interest and
possession. Each co-owner has an undefined right and interest in property
acquired as joint tenants. Thus, no co-owner can say what is his or her share.
One other important feature of a joint tenancy is that after the death of one
of the joint tenants, the property passes by survivorship to the other joint
tenant and not by succession to the heirs of the deceased co-owner. For
example, X, Y and Z own a building as joint tenants. Z dies. His undivided
share passes on to X and Y. Tenancy in common is the opposite of joint tenancy
since the shares are specified and each co-owner in a tenancy in common can
state what share he owns in a property. On the death of a co-owner, his share
passes by succession to his heirs / beneficiaries under the Will and not to the
surviving co-owners. If a Will bequeaths a property to two beneficiaries in the
ratio of 60:40, then they are treated as tenants in common.

 

The Supreme Court concluded
that section 19 clearly indicated that the property was not to be treated as a
joint family property though it may be held jointly by the legal heirs as
tenants in common till the property is divided, apportioned or dealt with in a
family settlement.

 

Notional
partition on demise of coparcener

The Supreme Court held that
under the Act, on the death of a coparcener a notional partition of the HUF
takes place. This proposition may be elaborated for the benefit of all that
when a coparcener dies, there would be a notional partition of his HUF just
before his death to determine his share in the HUF which is bequeathed by his
Will. Accordingly, on the date prior to the coparcener’s demise, one needs to
work out the number of coparceners and determine each one’s share on that date.
Thus, if there are ten coparceners just before his death, then each would have
a notional 1/10th share.

 

CONCLUSION

The
Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Madras High Court and upheld the
validity of the release deed. It also held that a mother would be the natural
guardian of the minor. This decision has elaborated on various important issues
relating to Hindu Law. It is an extremely unfortunate situation where for every
key feature of Hindu Law the Supreme Court needs to intervene. Should not the
entire Hindu Law be overhauled and codified in greater detail till such time as
India has a Uniform Civil Code?
 

 

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54(1) – Sale of capital asset and acquisition of ‘a residential house’ – Meaning of ‘a residential house’ in section 54(1) – Includes the plural – Purchase of two residential properties – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption – Amendment substituting ‘a’ by ‘one’ – Applies prospectively

16. Arun K. Thiagarajan vs. CIT(A) [2020] 427 ITR 190 (Kar.) Date of order: 18th June, 2020 A.Y.: 2003-04

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54(1) – Sale
of capital asset and acquisition of ‘a residential house’ – Meaning of ‘a
residential house’ in section 54(1) – Includes the plural – Purchase of two
residential properties – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption – Amendment
substituting ‘a’ by ‘one’ – Applies prospectively

 

For the A.Y.
2003-04, the assessee declared long-term capital gains from sale of a house
property. Against this, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s 54 in respect of
two house properties purchased in different locations. The A.O. restricted the
deduction to acquisition of one residential building and accordingly allowed
deduction in respect of the higher value of investment in respect of such
property.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    To give a definite meaning to the expression
“a residential house”, the provisions of section 54(1) were amended with effect
from 25th April, 2015 by substituting the word “a residential house”
with the word “one residential house”. The amendment specifically applied only
prospectively with effect from the A.Y. 2015-16. The subsequent amendment of
section 54(1) fortifies the need felt by the Legislature to give a definite
meaning to the expression “a residential house”, which was interpreted as
plural by various courts taking into account the context in which the
expression was used.

ii)    The assessee was entitled to the benefit of
exemption u/s 54(1). The courts had interpreted the expression “a residential
house” and the interpretation that it included the plural was binding.

 

iii)   The substantial question of law framed by
this court is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In
the result, the orders passed by the A.O., the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal insofar as they deprive the
assessee of the benefit of exemption u/s 54(1) are hereby quashed and the
assessee is held entitled to benefit of exemption u/s 54(1).’

EPIC SPEECH ON ‘BABUCRACY’

Some
speeches are so good that they not only deserve praise but also recollection
and analysis. Shri Nitin Gadkari’s address at the inauguration of the NHAI
building in Delhi on 26th October, 2020 was one such rare display of
unhesitating candour and clarity. The Minister articulated ‘all’ that is
undesirable in the Babucracy of our country. Coming from someone who is
within the system and works closely with this class, it accentuates and
authenticates certain aspects of some people in sarkar.

Normally,
an inauguration event would have called for a celebratory and congratulatory
tone. But the talk was everything but that. This editorial is dedicated to
paraphrasing some key points:

Feeling
ashamed
:
The Minister expressed a sense of shame and said he was incapable of giving Abhinandan
(joyful regard) when he sees the functioning of the NHAI (the budget allocated
in the F.Y. 2019-20 is Rs. 1.12 lakh crores).

Facts: The
project was started in 2008 and the tender awarded in 2011. The project saw two
governments and eight NHAI Chairmen before being completed! He pointed out that
the Delhi-Mumbai highway project worth Rs. 80,000 to Rs. 100,000 crores, will
take 3.5 years to complete, while this one cost Rs. 250 crores and yet took so
long! Sarcastically, he requested an internal ‘research paper’ to show how
decisions do not get taken for years and how hurdles are created to obstruct
things from happening.

Name
and shame:

He mentioned the designations of Chairman, DGM and GM and sarcastically
requested putting up the photographs of those whose indecision took 11 long
years for a project (as small as this one) to be completed.

Usual
escape route (or excuse route):
He predicted that a ‘record will
be created’ to blame the contractor because he went to the NCLT to justify the
long delay.

Deformed
mentality:

It wasn’t just indecision, but while remaining indecisive creating even further
complications instead of getting the work done – this was the attitude (or
attribute!) of such people and they remained stuck at the NHAI for years. He
didn’t doubt their integrity, but their way of thinking was like that of a VishKanya.

Tradition
of CGM and GM:
He called this convention of hierarchy nikammi
(trashy, despicable and useless) and naalaayak (worthless).

Bad
raw material:
The ‘basic raw material’ (those hired) was bad. We
are not able to hire from IITs and IIMs, while those who are incapable of
working even in a state government are made CGMs and GMs and promoted at NHAI.

Holding
accountable:
While fingers were pointed at contractors,
engineers, designers and action was also taken, but not against the RO, CGM,
GM, PD and such internal functionaries. Even Members of the NHAI depend on the
GM and CGM and do not know what is going on. GMs do not inform the Members of
even emergency matters. Although the organisation has credibility in the
market, it did not know about its own performance bottlenecks. Akaryaksham
(incapable to act), bhrashta (corrupt) and nikkama (useless)
people are still powerful and act arbitrarily in NHAI.

Waste
of money:

Cost overruns and futile court cases which when lost award compensation to
contractors and jack up the costs many fold. He even gave examples.

Committees:
Committees in NHAI rake up negativity, inaction and complicate matters. They
are non-performing assets.

Equal
treatment:

We treat everyone equally (pun intended), give eight out of ten to those who
are not fit for working in the government. We treat donkeys and horses alike.

Reform: The
system that is inefficient, inactive, negative, maker of indecisive committees
and holding up work should be demolished. In spite of several reports on
reforms, no initiative is taken for implementing them.

He
ended by saying that organisations must be TRANSPARENT, TIME-BOUND,
RESULT-ORIENTED, QUALITATIVE, CORRUPTION-FREE and SMART.

Well, he stated
all that needs to be cured! If this part of Babucracy changes, India
will transform. Faster!

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

 

 

REFUND OF TAX ON INPUT SERVICES UNDER INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE – WHETHER ELIGIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Goods & Services Tax, often touted as ‘One Nation, One Tax’, in
practice consists of many State-specific contradictions due to conflicting
advance rulings. Further, in the case of writ matters we are witnessing
conflicting High Court rulings as well. One such controversy that has come to
the fore pertains to refund of unutilised input tax credit (ITC) under inverted
duty structure in view of two conflicting decisions:

i)   VKC
Footsteps India Private Limited vs. Union of India & others –
2020-VIL-340-Guj.

ii) Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV vs. Union of India & others – 2020-VIL-459-Mad.

 

In this article, we have analysed the relevant provisions under the
Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 and rules framed thereunder on this
particular topic, the interpretation giving rise to the current issue and the
judicial perspective on it. Of course, the matter will reach finality only
after a Supreme Court decision on the issue.

 

BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 deals with the provisions relating to
refunds. While section 54(3) provides for refund of any unutilised input tax
credit (ITC), the first proviso thereof restricts the right to claim
such refund only in the case of zero-rated supplies made without payment of
tax, or where the accumulation of credit is on account of the rate of tax on
inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than
nil-rated or fully exempt supplies). The relevant provisions are reproduced for
reference:

 

(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (10), a registered person
may claim refund of any unutilised input tax credit at the end of any tax
period:

Provided that no refund of unutilised input tax credit shall be allowed
in cases other than —

(i) zero
rated supplies made without payment of tax;

(ii)        where
the credit has accumulated on account of rate of tax on inputs being higher
than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than nil rated or fully exempt
supplies), except supplies of goods or services or both as may be notified by
the Government on the recommendations of the Council.

 

The procedure for determining the refund due in case of Inverted Duty
Structure is provided for u/r 89(5) of the CGST Rules, 2017 which provides that
the amount of refund shall be granted as per the following formula:

 

Turnover of Inverted Duty Structure
of goods and services                                 * 
Net ITC
________________________

Adjusted
Total Turnover                     

The term ‘Net ITC’ referred to in the above formula is defined to mean
ITC availed on inputs during the relevant period other than ITC availed for
which refund is claimed u/r 89(4A) or 89(4B) or both. The same is an amended
definition notified vide Notification No. 21/2018 – CT dated 18th
April, 2018 and given retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017 vide
Notification No. 26/2018 – CT dated 13th June, 2018. The pre-amended
definition of ‘Net ITC’ gave the meaning assigned to it in Rule 89(4) which
covered ITC availed on inputs and input services during the relevant period
other than the ITC availed for which refund is claimed under sub-rules (4A) or
(4B) or both.

 

UNDERSTANDING THE DISPUTE

GST works on the principle of value addition, i.e., tax paid on ‘inputs’
is available as credit to be used to discharge the tax payable on ‘output’. In
other words, what goes IN, goes OUT. On a plain reading, this principle also
appears to be applicable for application of section 54(3) (first proviso
referred above) as well as Rule 89(5). This is because though the proviso
uses the term ‘inputs’, it finds in its company the term ‘output supplies’. The
proviso does not restrict the output supply to be only that of goods. In
other words, if output supply, liable to tax at a lower rate, can be of either
goods or services, the same principle should be applied in the context of
inward supplies also, i.e., it can be both goods as well as services. If this
is not done, the very purpose of the provision becomes redundant.

 

Let us understand this with the help of a live example. Diamonds are
taxed at a lower rate under GST, generally 0.25% or 3% depending on their
characteristics. On the other hand, the expenses to be incurred by a person
engaged in the supply of diamonds are all taxable at 18%. For example, rental
services, grading services, security services, etc., all attract tax at 18%.
Unless the above interpretation is applied, all suppliers engaged in supply of
diamonds would never get covered under the scope of ‘inverted duty structure’
and would therefore always end up with an unutilised ITC which would never get
utilised since the tax on output supplies would perennially be lower and there
would be ITC on account of purchase of diamonds itself which would be sufficient
for utilisation against the tax payable on output supplies.

 

Therefore, while interpreting the proviso to section 54(3), the
following questions need consideration:

(i) Whether the term ‘inputs’
referred to in the proviso has to be interpreted as defined u/s 2(59) of
the CGST Act, 2017 which would render the provision non-workable, or should it
be read in context?

(ii)        Does the principle of Noscitur
a Sociis
apply to this matter and can section 54(3) be liberally
interpreted?

 

Here are a few judicial precedents relevant to the current dispute and
also to the above questions:

 

(a) CIT vs. Bharti Cellular Limited [(2009) 319 ITR 319 (Del.)]

This decision was in the context of what constitutes technical services
for the purpose of section 194J. In this case, the Court, relying on the
decision of Stonecraft Enterprises vs. CIT [(1999) 3 SCC 343] held
as under:

 

19. From this decision, it is apparent that the Supreme Court employed
the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis and held that the word minerals took colour from
the words mineral oil which preceded it and the word ores which succeeded it. A
somewhat similar situation has arisen in the present appeals where the word
technical is preceded by the word managerial and succeeded by the word
consultancy. Therefore, the word technical has to take colour from the word
managerial and consultancy and the three words taken together are intended to
apply to those services which involve a human element.

 

This concludes our discussion on the applicability of the principle of noscitur
a sociis
.

 

(b) Southern Motors vs. State of Karnataka [2017 (368) ELT 3 (SC)]

34.       As
would be overwhelmingly pellucid (clear) from the hereinabove, though words in
a statute must, to start with, be extended their ordinary meanings, but if the
literal construction thereof results in an anomaly or absurdity, the courts
must seek to find out the underlying intention of the Legislature and, in the
said pursuit, can within permissible limits strain the language so as to avoid
such unintended mischief.

 

(c)        Commissioner of
Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018 (361) ELT 577 (SC)]

Regard must be had to the clear meaning of
words and matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification,
equity or intendment having no place in interpretation of a tax statute – if
words are ambiguous in a taxing statute (not exemption clause) and open to two
interpretations, benefit of interpretation is given to the subject.

 

The above discussion indicates that the term ‘inputs’ referred to in
clause (ii) to the first proviso of section 54(3) is to be given a wider
import and not to be restricted to the definition of inputs provided u/s 2(59)
of the CGST Act, 2017. Therefore, the important question that arises is what is
the cause for the current litigation? The dispute stems from Rule 89(5)
prescribed to lay down the methodology to determine the amount eligible for
refund claim under the 2nd clause of the 1st proviso
of section 54(3) and the manner in which the term ‘Net ITC’ has been defined
therein to mean ITC availed on inputs during
the relevant period other than ITC availed for which refund is claimed u/r
89(4A) or 89(4B) or both.

 

By interpreting clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3)
r/w/r 89(5) literally, the Revenue authorities have been denying the refund of
unutilised ITC due to inverted duty structure to the extent the accumulation is
on account of input services. In fact, in a few such cases, the taxpayers had
opted for advance ruling on the subject and the Authority for Advance Ruling
has also agreed with the Revenue’s view. Some relevant rulings include the
ruling by the Maharashtra Authority in the case of Daewoo TPL JV [2019
(27) GSTL 446 (AAR – GST)]
and Commissioner (Appeals) in
Sanganeriya Spinning Mills Limited [2020 (40) GSTL 358 (Comm. Appeals – GST –
Raj)].

 

VKC FOOTSTEPS: BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

In the case of VKC Footsteps, they were faced with a similar challenge
where their refund claim was rejected to the extent it pertained to input
services and therefore they had challenged the validity of Rule 89(5)
restricting the claim of ITC only to the extent it pertained to inputs and not
input services / capital goods.

 

VKC Footsteps made their case before the Gujarat High Court on the
following grounds:

i)   GST is a value-added tax where
the tax is borne by the end customer and businesses do not have to bear the
burden of the said tax as they are eligible to claim credit of taxes paid by
them on their inward supplies.

ii)  That even before the
introduction of GST, the Government was aware of a situation where there could
have prevailed an inverted duty structure and the associated problem of credit
accumulation thereon and to overcome this particular anomaly clause (ii) to the
first proviso of section 54(3) was included in the statute.

iii) Section 54(3) specifically
provided for refund of unutilised ITC. There is no restriction u/s 54(3)
restricting the claim of refund to inputs only.

iv) Rule 89(5) has restricted the scope
of operation of the clause by excluding the credit of taxes paid on input
services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ for determining the amount eligible for
refund and, in fact, deprived the taxpayer of his crystallised and vested right
of refund. For these reasons, it was argued that Rule 89(5) was ultra vires
of the provision of the Act and therefore liable to be set aside.

v)  The petitioners had also placed
reliance on the decisions in the cases of Shri Balaganesan Metals vs.
M.N. Shanmugham Shetty [(1987) 2 SCC 707]; Lucknow Development Authority vs.
M.K. Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243];
and Lohara Steel Industries
Limited vs. State of AP [(1997) 2 SCC 37].

 

The Revenue countered the above with a single argument that Rule 89(5)
was notified within the domain of powers vested with the Central Government by
virtue of section 164. It was argued that this section empowered the Centre in
the widest possible manner to make rules on the recommendations of the GST
Council for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Rule 89(5) was notified in
exercise of these powers and therefore cannot be held ultra vires as it
only provides the method of calculating the refund on account of inverted duty
structure. Revenue relied on the decision in the case of Willow-wood
Chemicals Private Limited vs. UoI [2018 (19) GSTL 228 (Guj.)].

 

After hearing both the parties, the Gujarat High Court held that Rule
89(5) was ultra vires the provisions of section 54(3) of the CGST Act,
2017 based on the following conclusions:

(A) Rule 89(5) excluding credit of
input services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ to determine the amount of eligible
refund is contrary to the provisions of section 54(3) which provides for refund
of claim of ‘any unutilised input tax credit’. The Court further held that
clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3) refers to both supply
of goods or services, and not only supply of goods as per amended Rule 89(5).

(B) Rule 89(5) does not demonstrate
the intention of the statute. Therefore, the interpretation in Circular
79/53/2018 – GST dated 31st December, 2018 was incorrect.

 

TRANSTONNELSTROY AFCONS JV: THE SAGA
CONTINUES

Around the same time, the Madras High Court also had occasion to examine
the same issue. The detailed decision in the case of Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV
reignited the controversy. The judgment records a series of
arguments put forth by the petitioner, countered by the respondents and
rejoinder submissions by both sets of parties rebutting the opposite parties’
submissions. We have attempted to summarise (pointwise) the submissions of the
parties.

 

Vires of Rule 89(5) vis-à-vis
sections 164 and 54(3) of the CGST Act, 2017

The petitioners, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Sales Tax Officer vs. K.T. Abraham [AIR 1967 SCC 1823]
contended that clauses which empower framing of rules only in respect of form
and manner of application are limited in scope. They further contended that a
general rule-making power cannot be resorted to to create disabilities not
contemplated under the CGST Act, 2017 – Kunj Behari Lal Butail vs. State
of HP [(2000) 3 SCC 40].

 

The petitioners further relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court
in the case of VKC Footsteps wherein it has held that Rule 89(5)
as amended is contrary to the provision of section 54(3).

 

In response, the respondent (Revenue) contended that wide Parliamentary
latitude is recognised and affirmed while construing tax and other economic
legislations and that Courts should adopt a hands-free approach qua economic
legislation – Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India
vs. UoI [(1989) 3 SCC 634]
and Swiss Ribbons Private Limited vs.
UoI [(2019) 4 SCC 17].

 

The respondent further contended that no restriction can be read into
the rule-making power of the Government. Section 164 is couched in extremely
wide language and the only limitation therein is that the Rules should be
applied only for fulfilling the purpose of the CGST Act – K. Damodarasamy
Naidu vs. State of TN [2000 (1) SCC 521)]
wherein the Court held that
the distinction between goods and services was valid in case of composite
contracts.

 

Entitlement to claim refund stems from
section 54 – operative part and not
proviso

On their part, the petitioners contended that the general rule for
entitlement of refund of unutilised ITC is contained in section 54(3), while
the principle merely sets out the eligible class of taxpayers who can claim the
refund. Since the entry barrier is satisfied, i.e., they are covered under the
inverted duty structure, the primary condition that the credit accumulation is
due to inverted duty structure is satisfied. The proviso does not
curtail the entitlement to refund of the entire unutilised ITC and merely sets
out the eligibility conditions for claiming such refund. This was also
reiterated during the rejoinder submissions.

 

The petitioners also stated that the use of the phrase ‘in the cases’
indicates that the proviso is intended to specify the classes of
registered persons who would be entitled to refund of unutilised ITC and not to
curtail the quantum or type of unutilised ITC in respect of which refund may be
claimed.

 

Scope of clause (ii) of first proviso
to section 54(3)

The petitioners further argued that section
54(3) is drafted in a manner to entitle a claimant for refund of full
unutilised ITC. Therefore, the provisions should be interpreted by keeping the
context in mind. The intention of Parliament was to deploy the words ‘inputs’
and ‘output supplies’ as per their meaning in common parlance. Therefore, the
definition of input u/s 2(59) should not apply since that definition applies
only when the context does not require otherwise. They further relied on the
decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1]; M. Jamal & Co. vs. UoI [(1985) 21 ELT 369];
and
Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of TN [(2002) 3 SCC 554].

In response to the above, the respondent referred to the Explanation to
section 54 wherein it has been clarified that refund shall include tax paid on
inputs / input services. On the basis of this, Revenue contended that the terms
‘inputs’ or ‘input services’ were consciously used in section 54 – CIT,
New Delhi vs. East West Import and Export (P) Limited [(1989) 1 SCC 760]
and
CST vs. Union Medical Agency [(1981) 1 SCC 51].
The Revenue further
argued that this classification of inputs, input services and capital goods is
continuing since the CENVAT regime and, therefore, even in trade parlance the
same meaning which was applied under the CENVAT regime should continue to apply
under GST.

 

The respondents further argued that if a term is defined in the statute,
the Court should first consider and apply such a definition and only in the
absence of a statutory definition can the Court consider the definition under
common parlance meaning of the term – Bakelite Hylam Limited vs. CCE,
Hyderabad [(1998) 5 SCC 621].

 

Manner of interpretation of tax statute –
Strict vs. liberal

The petitioners contended that strict interpretation of a taxing statute
applies only when interpreting a charging provision / exemption notification – Gursahai
Sehgal vs. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062]
and ITC Limited vs. CCE [(2004)
7 SCC 591].
The petitioners further contended that if section 54(3) is
not interpreted in this manner, the same would be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution as it would amount to discrimination between similarly placed
persons. They placed reliance on the decision in the case of Government
of Andhra Pradesh vs. Lakshmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720]
.

 

In response to the above contentions, the respondents argued that if it
is held that section 54(3)(ii) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution,
the correct approach would have been to strike down the provisions and not to
expand it to include the person discriminated – Jain Exports Private
Limited vs. UoI [1996 (86) ELT 478 (SC)].
The respondents further
argued that a refund provision should be treated at par with an exemption
provision and should therefore be construed strictly and any ambiguity should
be resolved in favour of the Revenue as held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Dilip Kumar & Co. The Revenue also relied on the decision
in the case of Ramnath vs. CTO [(2020) 108 CCH 0020]. And on
decisions wherein ITC has been equated with a concession and therefore the
terms and conditions associated with it should be strictly complied with – Jayam
& Co. vs. AC(CT) [(2016) 15 SCC 125]
and ALD Automotive
Private Limited vs. AC(CT) [2018-VIL-28-SC].

 

Vide their rejoinder
submission, the petitioners argued that a tax statute should not always be
construed strictly, which can be defined either as literal interpretation,
narrow interpretation, etc. Further, the decision in the case of Dilip
Kumar & Co.
was distinguishable as it dealt with interpretation of
an exemption notification which is not similar to refund. Reference was made to
the decision in the case of Ramnath equating exemptions,
incentives, rebates and other things as similar. However, refund of unutilised
ITC is not similar to exemptions, incentives or rebates.

 

The respondents vide a sur-rejoinder contended that refund
is akin to an exemption / rebate / incentive. Refund is at best a statutory
right and not a vested right and therefore can be exercised only if the statute
grants such right. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Satnam
Overseas Export vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 561].

 

Reading down of the provisions was required

The petitioners further contended that the validity of the provisions
could be upheld only by resorting to reading down the said provisions – Delhi
Transport Corporation vs. Mazdoor Congress & Others [1991 (Supplement) 1
SCC 600]
and Spences Hotel Private Limited vs. State of WB &
Others [(1991) 2 SCC 154].

 

In response, the respondents contended that reading down is intended to
provide a restricted or narrow interpretation and not for the purpose of
providing an expansive or wide interpretation. Words cannot be added to the
statute for the purpose of reading down the statute. The Revenue further
referred to decisions where it has been held that Courts cannot remake the
statute – Delhi Transport Co. (Supra) and UoI vs. Star
Television News Limited [(2015) 12 SCC 665].
The respondents further
argued that a proviso performs various functions such as curtailing,
excluding, exempting or qualifying the enacted clause and may even take the
shape of a substantive provision – S. Sundaram Pillai vs. V.R.
Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591]
and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs.
State of Maharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413].

 

During the rejoinder submission, the petitioners submitted that the
words ‘on inputs’ in Rule 89(5) should be deleted to ensure that the Rule is
not ultra vires to section 54(3). To support the contention of reading
down, the petitioners relied on the decision in the case of Lohara Steel
Industries
and D.S. Nakara vs. UoI [(1983) 1 SCC 37].
They further contended that the purpose of a proviso is to exempt,
exclude or curtail and not to expand the scope of the main provision – ICFAI
vs. Council of Chartered Accountants of India [(2007) 12 SCC 210 (ICFAI)].

 

During the sur-rejoinder submission, the respondents contended
that reading up is not permitted when resorting to the principle of reading
down – B.R. Kapur vs. State of TN [(2001) 7 SCC 231].

 

Inequalities should be mitigated – Article 38
of the Constitution

The petitioners further argued, referring to Article 38, that the
legislation should be interpreted in such a manner as to ensure that
inequalities are mitigated – Sri Srinivasa Theatre vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu [(1992) 2 SCC 643]; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of Jammu and
Kashmir [(1980) 4 SCC 1];
and UoI vs. N.S. Rathnam [(2015) 10 SCC
681].

 

The respondents contended that the classification of a registered person
into who is entitled to claim and who is not entitled to claim the refund by
differentiating based on those who procure input goods vs. those who procure
input goods and input services was legitimate. The respondents further argued
that the distinction between treatment of goods and services emanated from the
Constitution wherein goods were defined in Article 366(12) while services were
defined under Article 366(26)(A). More importantly, equity was not an issue in
the current case since there was no restriction from the claim of ITC. The
restriction applied only on claim of refund, to the extent that ITC was on
account of input service, the same continued to be a part of the taxpayers’ credit
ledger.

 

The petitioners vide a rejoinder submission contended that the
validity or invalidity of classification would depend on the frame of
reference. They further contended that there is no material difference in the
treatment of goods and services under GST law. Goods and services are treated
similarly when dealing with the four basic elements of the GST law, i.e.,
taxable event, taxable person, rate of tax and measure of tax. The only
distinction is in relation to provisions relating to determination of place of
supply, time of supply, etc. They further contended that GST was a paradigm
shift and therefore the historical segregation between goods and services
cannot be relied upon to contend that unequal treatment of goods and services
is valid. In fact, the purpose of introducing GST is to consolidate goods and
services and treat them similarly by keeping in mind that taxes are imposed on
consumption, irrespective of whether goods or services are consumed.

 

In the sur-rejoinder submission by the respondents, they
contended that the distinction between goods and services continues to apply
under GST also since the nature and characteristics of goods and services are
coherently different – Superintendent and Rememberancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal vs. Girish Kumar Navalakha [(1975) 4 SCC 754]; State of Gujarat vs.
Ambika Mills [(1975) 4 SCC 656];
and R.K. Garg vs. UoI [(1981) 4
SCC 675].

 

CONCLUSION OF THE COURT

After hearing both the parties exhaustively, the Court proceeded with an
analysis of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of VKC
Footsteps
and prima facie opined that the decision did not seem
to have considered the proviso to section 54(3) and, more significantly,
its import and implications and therefore proceeded on an independent analysis
of the relevant provisions. The Court referred to various decisions revolving
around the scope and function of a proviso relied upon by both the
parties, arrived at a conclusion that the proviso in the case of section
54(3) performed the larger function of limiting the entitlement of refund to
credit that accumulates as a result of the rate of tax on input goods being
higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. On this basis, the Court
proceeded to conclude that Rule 89(5) was intra vires. It opined that
the Gujarat High Court in VKC Footsteps had failed to take into
consideration the scope, function and impact of the proviso to section
54(3).

 

The Court also dealt with the argument on the manner of interpreting the
term ‘inputs’ used in the proviso. It concluded that the statutory
definition as well as context point in the same direction, that the word
‘inputs’ encompasses all input goods other than capital goods and excludes
input services. This conclusion was arrived at based on the following
reasoning:

  •         The definition of inputs u/s 2 excludes capital goods. If the
    common parlance meaning was applied, it would result in a conclusion that would
    be antithetical to the text.
  •         Section 54 itself refers to inputs as well as input services
    on multiple occasions. Therefore, merely because the undefined word ‘output
    supplies’ is used in the proviso, one cannot read the word ‘inputs’
    preceding it to include input service also.

 

Dealing with the issue of strict vs. liberal interpretation, the Court
concluded that the refund claims should be strictly interpreted since it was a
benefit / concession.

 

The Court also held that the classification, by virtue of which the
right to claim refund of unutilised ITC on account of input services was
curtailed, was not in violation of Article 14. Though it held that the object
of GST was to treat goods and services similarly, this is an evolutionary
process. There are various instances where goods and services are treated
differently, be it the rate of tax or provision for determination of place of
supply. However, the Court abstained from dealing with the arguments relating
to reading down since it had already held that section 54(3)(ii) was not in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

 

AUTHORS’ VIEWS

Both the decisions referred to above deal with a similar fact matrix,
are detailed and reasoned orders but bear diverse outcomes. However, there are
some aspects which still remain unaddressed and could have been considered in
the current dispute:

 

1. The Madras High Court
decisions, while concluding that section 54(3)(ii) covers only input goods and
not input services, appears to have not dealt with the key issue raised by the
petitioners, i.e., the intention of the Legislature based on which substantial
arguments were advanced by the petitioners. Even when dealing with the
arguments of applying contextual definition / understanding of the terms, the
Court has held that in interpreting a tax statute the requirement to stay true
to the statutory definition is more compelling. However, while concluding so,
the Court has not considered its own decision in the case of Firm
Foundation & Housing Private Limited vs. Principal CST, Chennai [2018 (16)
GSTL 209 (Mad.)]
wherein it has been held that there is enough
precedent available to support the view that Courts will interfere where the
basis of the impugned order is palpably erroneous and contrary to law.

 

2. The decision in the case of TCS
vs. UoI [2016 (44) STR 33 (Kar.)]
is also relevant in the current case.
This involved determination of whether or not a company would be liable to pay
tax under the category of ‘consulting engineer’ services? In this case, the
Court held that when the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and
grammatical construction leads to manifest contradiction of its apparent
purpose or to inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, construction
may be put upon that which emphasises the meaning of the words and even the
structure of the sentence.

 

3. The
Madras High Court concluded that if the interpretation of the petitioners was
accepted that the term ‘inputs’ used in section 54(3)(ii) was to be interpreted
in context with the words accompanying it, it would lead to an interpretation
that even unutilised ITC on account of capital goods would have been eligible
for refund. However, it appears that the Court has not considered the fact that
the Explanation to section 54 specifically provides that refund of unutilised
ITC shall be permitted only to the extent that it pertains to inputs / input
services.

 

4. As for the question whether
refund when provided in the legislation itself can be treated as a concession,
or it is a right which cannot be curtailed, one needs to keep in mind that
although section 17(5)(h) of the CGST Act, 2017 specifically stated that
certain ITC would be treated as blocked credits, the Orissa High Court in the
case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of GST
[2019 (25) GSTL 341 (Ori.)]
held the same ultra vires. Of
course, this matter is also currently pending before the Supreme Court, but the
bearing of the outcome of the same on the current dispute cannot be ruled out.

 

We now stand at a
juncture wherein two Hon’ble High Courts have given detailed and well-reasoned
judgments but diverse decisions on the issue of whether refund of unutilised
input tax credit, on account of input services, would be eligible or not? As a
natural corollary, the aggrieved parties will approach the Supreme Court to
settle the controversy and also lay down the principles of interpretation under
GST. The final decision of the Supreme Court in this matter will either blur
the lines of distinction between goods and services, or underline them in bold.

 

 

TAXABILITY OF INTEREST ON ENHANCED COMPENSATION OR CONSIDERATION

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 45(5) of
the Income-tax Act provides for taxability of the capital gains arising from
(i) the transfer of a capital asset by way of compulsory acquisition under any
law, or (ii) on a transfer the consideration for which was determined or
approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India, or (iii)
compensation or consideration which is enhanced or further enhanced by any
court, tribunal or other authority. Inter alia, clause (b) of section
45(5) provides for the taxability of the enhanced compensation or consideration
as awarded by a court, tribunal or other authority as deemed capital gains in
the previous year in which such enhanced compensation or consideration is
received by the assessee.

 

Section 10(37)
exempts the capital gains arising to an individual or an HUF from the transfer
of agricultural land by way of compulsory acquisition where the compensation or
consideration or the enhanced compensation or consideration is received on or
after 1st April, 2004 subject to fulfilment of other conditions as
specified therein. Further, section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
exempts the compensation received for compulsory acquisition of land under
defined circumstances (except those made u/s 46 of that Act) from the levy of
income tax. This exemption provided under the RFCTLARR Act is available
irrespective of whether the land acquired compulsorily is agricultural or
non-agricultural land.

 

In the case of land
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the person whose land has been acquired,
if aggrieved by the amount of compensation originally granted to him, may
require the matter to be referred to the Court u/s 18 of the 1894 Act for the
re-determination of the amount of the compensation. The Court may enhance the
amount of compensation payable to the claimant and also direct the authority
concerned to pay interest on the enhanced amount of compensation and also
interest for the delay caused in payment of the compensation otherwise ordered.
Section 28 of the 1894 Act empowers the Court to award interest at its
discretion on the excess amount of compensation awarded by it over the amount
originally awarded. Section 34 of that Act also provides for the liability of
the land acquisition authority concerned to pay interest, which is, however,
totally different from the interest referred to in section 28. The interest
payable u/s 34 is for the delay in paying the awarded compensation and it is
mandatorily payable.

 

A controversy had
arisen with respect to the nature of the interest received by the assessee on
the amount of enhanced compensation as per the directions of the Court in
accordance with the provisions of section 28 of the 1894 Act and the year of
taxation thereof which was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009 315 ITR 1]
by holding that the interest
granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was an accretion to the value and, hence, it was
a part of the enhanced compensation which was taxable as capital gains u/s
45(5). Subsequent to the decision, the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 inserted
clause (viii) in section 56(2) and clause (iv) in section 57 and section 145A/B
to specifically provide for taxability of interest received on compensation or
enhanced compensation as income from other sources and for deduction of 50% of
the interest amount.

 

This set of
amendments in sections 56(2), 57, 145A and later in 154B has given a rise to a
fresh controversy about the head of taxation under which the interest in
question awarded u/s 28 of the 1894 Act is taxable: whether such interest was
taxable under the head ‘capital gains’ or ‘income from other sources’ and
whether what is termed as interest under the said Act be treated differently
under the Income-tax Act.

 

The Gujarat High
Court has taken a view that the interest granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act
continues to be taxable as capital gains in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (Supra) even after
the set of amendments to tax ‘interest’ as income from other sources. As a
corollary, tax ought not to have been deducted on that amount of interest u/s
194A. As against this, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that
interest granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act needs to be taxed as income from other
sources in view of the specific provision contained in section 56(2)(viii) in
this regard and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the exemption from
tax under provisions of section 10(37) of the Act.

 

THE MOVALIYA BHIKHUBHAI BALABHAI CASE

The issue first
came up for consideration of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO (2016) 388 ITR 343.

 

In this case, the
assessee was awarded additional compensation in respect of his land along with
the other benefits under the 1894 Act. Pursuant to this award passed by the
Reference Court, the authorities concerned inter alia determined the
amount of Rs. 20,74,157 as interest payable u/s 28 of that Act. Against this
interest, the amount of TDS to be deducted as per section 194A was also shown
in the relevant statement issued to the assessee. The assessee made an
application in Form No. 13 u/s 197(1) for issuing a certificate for Nil tax
liability. But the application was rejected on the ground that the interest
amount on the delayed payment of compensation and enhanced value of
compensation was taxable as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viii) read with
sections 57(iv) and 145A(b). The assessee approached the High Court by filing a
petition against the rejection of his application.

 

Before the High
Court, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ghanshyam (HUF) (Supra) and claimed that interest u/s 28 was,
unlike interest u/s 34 of the 1894 Act, an accretion in value and regarded as a
part of the compensation itself which was not the case with interest u/s 34.
Therefore, when the interest u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was to be treated as part
of compensation and was liable to capital gains u/s 45(5), such amount could
not be treated as income from other sources and, hence, no tax could be
deducted at source by considering the same to be interest. Reliance was also
placed on the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the cases of Jagmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana
rendered in Civil Revision No. 7740 of
2012 on 18th July, 2013
and Haryana State Industrial
Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. Savitri
rendered in Civil Revision
No. 2509 of 2012 on 29th November, 2013
, wherein it was held
that there was no requirement of deducting tax at source from the amount of
interest determined to be payable u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.

 

It was argued on
behalf of the Revenue that the A.O. was justified in rejecting the application
of the assessee in view of the specific provision contained in sub-clause
(viii) of section 56(2) providing that income by way of interest received on
compensation or on enhanced compensation referred to in clause (b) of section
145A was chargeable to income tax under the head ‘income from other sources’.
It was submitted that the interest on enhanced compensation u/s 28 of the 1894
Act being in the nature of enhanced compensation, was deemed to be the income
of the assessee in the year in which it was received as provided in section
145A and had to be taxed as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viii) as income
from other sources. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Ghanshyam (HUF), it was submitted that it was rendered prior to
the amendment in the I.T. Act whereby clause (b), which provided that interest
received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be income in the year in which it is received,
came to be inserted in section 145A of the Act and, hence, would not have any
applicability in the facts of the present case.

 

The Revenue relied
upon the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Bir Singh (HUF) ITA No. 209 of 2004 dated 27th October, 2010

which was later followed in the case of Hari Kishan vs. Union of India
[CWP No. 2290 of 2001 dated 30th January, 2014]; Manjet Singh (HUF)
Karta Manjeet Singh vs. Union of India [2016] 65 taxmann.com 160;
and
of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sharda Kochhar [2014] 49
taxmann.com 120.

 

The High Court
extensively referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam
(HUF) wherein various provisions of the 1894 Act were analysed vis-à-vis
the provisions of the Income-tax Act. On the basis of this decision, the High
Court reiterated that there was a vital difference between the interest payable
u/s 28 and the interest payable u/s 34 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 applies when
the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when the court
awards excess amount. In such cases, interest on that excess alone is payable.
Section 28 empowers the court to award interest on the excess amount of
compensation awarded by it over the amount awarded by the Collector. This award
of interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the court. It was
further held that section 28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount
which is determined by the court and it does not apply to cases of undue delay
in making award for compensation. The interest u/s 34 is only for delay in
making payment after the compensation amount is determined. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court had held that interest u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was an accretion to
compensation and formed part of the compensation and was, therefore, exigible
to tax u/s 45(5). The decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) was
followed by the Supreme Court in a later case, that of CIT vs. Govindbhai
Mamaiya [2014] 367 ITR 498
.

 

Insofar as the provisions of section 57(iv) read with section
56(2)(viii) and section 145A(b) were concerned, the High Court held that the
interest received u/s 28 of the 1894 Act would not fall within the ambit of the
expression ‘interest’ as envisaged u/s 145A(b) inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) had held that interest u/s 28 of the
1894 Act was not in the nature of interest but was an accretion to the
compensation and, therefore, formed part of the compensation. Further, a
reference was made to CBDT Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010
wherein the scope and effect of the amendment made to section 56(2) and also to
section 145A were explained. It was clarified in the said circular that undue
hardship had been caused to the taxpayers as a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in the case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 181 ITR 400
wherein it was held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation shall be taxable on accrual basis. It was to mitigate this
hardship that section 145A was amended to provide that the interest received by
an assessee on compensation or enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his
income for the year in which it was received, irrespective of the method of
accounting followed by the assessee. By relying upon this clarification, the
High Court held that the amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 was not in
connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam (HUF)
case but was brought in to mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on
account of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai
(Supra).

 

The High Court did
not agree with the view adopted by the other High Courts in the cases which
were relied upon by the Revenue as it was contrary to what had been held in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam (HUF). The High Court
held that the deduction of tax at source u/s 194A from the amount of interest
granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was not justified.

MAHENDER PAL NARANG’S CASE

The issue recently
came up for consideration before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the
case of Mahender Pal Narang vs. CBDT (2020) 423 ITR 13.

 

In this case, land
of the assessee was acquired during the previous years relevant to the
assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 for the compensation determined by the
acquisition authorities which was challenged by the assessee and the
corresponding enhanced compensation was received on 21st March,
2016. The assessee filed his income-tax return for the assessment year 2016-17
treating the interest received u/s 28 of the 1894 Act as income from other
sources and claimed deduction of 50% as per section 57(iv). Thereafter, the
assessee filed an application u/s 264 claiming that the interest was wrongly
offered as income from other sources, whereas the same was required to be
treated as part of the enhanced compensation under the head capital gains and
the gains were to be exempted from taxation u/s 10(37). However, the revisional
authority rejected the application. The assessee then filed a writ petition
before the High Court against the said rejection order passed u/s 264.

 

The assessee
contended before the High Court that the interest received as part of the
additional compensation was in the nature of compensation that was not taxable
u/s 10(37) and further argued that the provisions of section 10(37) have
remained unchanged, though sections 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) had been inserted by
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st April, 2010. The
amendments were brought in to remove the hardships created by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai (Supra) as explained by
Circular No. 5 of 2010. It was contended that the nature of interest u/s 28 of
the 1894 Act would remain that of compensation even after the amendments. The
assessee also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs.
Ghanshyam (HUF)
as well as of the Gujarat High Court in Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO (Supra).

 

The High Court
referred to the provisions of sections 45(5), 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) as well as
the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF).
After dealing with them, it was held that the scheme with regard to
chargeability of interest received on compensation and enhanced compensation
had undergone a sea change with the insertion of sections 56(2)(viii) and
57(iv) in the Act. In view of the amendments, according to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court, the decision of the Apex Court in the Ghanshyam
case did not come to the rescue of the assessee to claim that interest received
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was to be treated as compensation and to be dealt with
under ‘capital gains’. The argument raised that there was no amendment in
section 10(37) was considered to be ill-founded, on the ground that it dealt
with capital gains arising from transfer of agricultural land and it nowhere
provided as to what was to be included under the head ‘capital gains’.

 

The High Court did
not agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in the Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai
case that amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act,
2009 was not in connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam
case but to mitigate the hardship caused by the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Rama Bai case. The interpretation based on Circular No. 5
of 2010 did not influence the Punjab & Haryana High Court and it was held
that there was no scope of taking outside aid for giving such an interpretation
to newly-inserted provisions when their language was plain, simple and
unambiguous. Accordingly, it was held that the interest received on compensation
or enhanced compensation was to be treated as ‘income from other sources’ and
not under the head ‘capital gains’.

 

In deciding the
issue in favour of the Revenue, the High Court chose to follow its own
decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Bir Singh (HUF) in ITA No. 209 of 2004
dated 27th October, 2010
which was later on followed in the
case of Hari Kishan vs. Union of India [CWP No. 2290 of 2001 dated 30th
January, 2014]; Manjet Singh (HUF) Karta Manjeet Singh vs. Union of India
[2016] 65 taxmann.com 160
; and the decision  of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Sharda Kochhar [2014] 49 taxmann.com 120
. The Court overlooked its
own decisions, delivered in the context of TDS, in the cases of Jagmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana
rendered in Civil Revision No. 7740 of
2012 on 18th July, 2013
and Haryana State Industrial
Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. Savitri
rendered in Civil Revision
No. 2509 of 2012 on 29th November, 2013
, wherein it was held
that there was no requirement of deducting tax at source from the amount of
interest determined to be payable u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

 

OBSERVATIONS

There can be three
different components of amount received or to be received by a person whose
land has been compulsorily acquired under any law for the time being in force:
the initial compensation which is awarded by the competent authority, the
enhanced compensation which is awarded by the court, and interest, on
compensation or the enhanced compensation which becomes payable due to the
direction of the court or due to the statutory provision of the relevant law.

 

Sub-section (5) of
section 45 is a charging provision and it creates a charge on the capital gains
on transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory
acquisition under any law, or a transfer where the consideration for which is
determined or approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India.
The relevant portion of the sub-section (5) of section 45 is reproduced below:

Notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-section (1), where the capital gain arises from the
transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory acquisition
under any law, or a transfer the consideration for which was determined or
approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India, and the
compensation or the consideration for such transfer is enhanced or further
enhanced by any court, Tribunal or other authority, the capital gain shall be
dealt with in the following manner, namely…

 

It can be noticed
that an accrual or a receipt which can be considered as ‘the compensation or
the consideration’ in the circumstances specified in section 45(5) gets covered
within the ambit of this provision and needs to be taxed as ‘capital gains’ in
the manner provided therein. In particular, sub-clause (b) of section 45(5)
deals with the taxability of the enhanced amount of compensation or
consideration and it provides as under:

(b) the amount
by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced or further enhanced by
the court, Tribunal or other authority shall be deemed to be income chargeable
under the head ‘Capital gains’ of the previous year in which such amount is
received by the assessee.

 

Therefore, the
whole of the amount by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced by
the court is deemed to be the income chargeable under the head capital gains
irrespective of the manner in which such enhanced amount of the compensation or
consideration has been determined or how that amount has been referred to in
the relevant governing law under which it has been determined. What is relevant
is that the compensation or the enhanced amount needs to be brought to tax
under the head ‘capital gains’ by virtue of the deeming fiction created under
the aforesaid provisions.

 

There are no
separate or specific provisions dealing with the taxability of the interest
received on compensation or enhanced compensation which is being taxed as per
the general provisions of the Act, particularly sections 56 to 59. The
confusion about the year of taxation was addressed by the Apex Court in the
case of Smt. Ramabai. A set of the specific provisions was
inserted in the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st
April, 2010 to provide that such interest shall be taxable in the year of
receipt nullifying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision. The issue of
taxation of such interest was dealt with extensively by the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) while dealing with the taxation of
capital gains u/s 45(5). The issue before the Supreme Court was about the year
in which the enhanced compensation and interest thereon, received by the
assessee, were taxable. The assessee contended that those amounts could not be
held to have accrued to him during the year of receipt, as the entire amount
received was in dispute in appeal before the High Court, which appeal stood
filed by the State against the order of the reference Court granting enhanced
compensation; and that the amount of enhanced compensation and the interest
thereon were received by him in terms of the interim order of the High Court
against his furnishing of security to the satisfaction of the executing Court.
As against this, the Revenue pleaded that those amounts in question were
taxable in the concerned year of receipt in which they were received by relying
upon section 45(5).

 

For deciding this
issue, of the year in which the enhanced compensation as well as interest
thereon were taxable, the Supreme Court in that case, of Ghanshyam (HUF),
had to first decide as to what fell within the meaning of the term
‘compensation’ as used in section 45(5). It was for the obvious reason that if
any of the components of the receipt could not be regarded as ‘compensation’,
then such component would not be governed by the provisions of section 45(5) so
as to deem it to be income chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’. Apart
from dealing with the nature of different amounts which were awarded under
different sub-sections of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as part
of the enhanced compensation, the Supreme Court also determined the true nature
of receipt of ‘interest’ granted under two different provisions of that Act,
i.e., sections 28 and 34. These two provisions dealing with the interest to be
paid to the person whose land has been acquired are as follows:

 

28. Collector
may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation

If the sum
which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date
on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess
into Court  

34. Payment of
interest

When the amount
of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of
the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at
the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession
until it shall have been so paid or deposited.

 

The Supreme Court,
explaining the distinction between the interest that became payable under both
the above provisions of the 1894 Act held that the interest u/s 28 only was
needed to be considered as part of the compensation itself. The relevant
extracts from the Supreme Court’s decision in this regard are reproduced below:

 

Section 28
applies when the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when
the Court awards excess amount. In such cases interest on that excess alone is
payable. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on the excess amount
of compensation awarded by it over the amount awarded by the Collector…

 

This award of
interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the Court. Section
28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount, which is determined by
the Court after a reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 does
not apply to cases of undue delay in making award for compensation [See: Ram
Chand vs. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44].
In the case of Shree Vijay
Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat [1991] 1 SCC 262,
this
Court has held that interest is different from compensation.

 

To sum up,
interest is different from compensation. However, interest paid on the excess
amount under section 28 of the 1894 Act depends upon a claim by the person
whose land is acquired whereas interest under section 34 is for delay in making
payment. This vital difference needs to be kept in mind in deciding this
matter. Interest under section 28 is part of the amount of compensation whereas
interest under section 34 is only for delay in making payment after the
compensation amount is determined. Interest under section 28 is a part of
enhanced value of the land which is not the case in the matter of payment of
interest under section 34.

The issue to be
decided before us – what is the meaning of the words ‘enhanced compensation /
consideration’ in section 45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act? Will it cover ‘interest’?
These questions also bring in the concept of the year of taxability.

 

Section 28 of
the 1894 Act applies only in respect of the excess amount determined by the
Court after reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. It depends upon the
claim, unlike interest under section 34 which depends on undue delay in making
the award. It is true that ‘interest’ is not compensation. It is equally true
that section 45(5) of the 1961 Act refers to compensation. But as discussed
hereinabove, we have to go by the provisions of the 1894 Act, which awards
‘interest’ both as an accretion in the value of the lands acquired and interest
for undue delay. Interest under section 28 unlike interest under section 34 is
an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced compensation or
consideration which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894
Act.

 

Thus, though a
component of the amount received was referred to as the ‘interest’ in section
28 of the 1894 Act, such part was to be considered to be part of the
‘compensation’ insofar as section 45(5) of the Income-tax Act was concerned.
When it came to the ‘interest’ referred to in section 34 of the 1894 Act, it
was to be treated as interest simpliciter and not as the ‘compensation’
for tax purposes and such interest was to be brought to tax as per the general
provisions of the law. This was because of the Court’s understanding that
interest u/s 28 was in the nature of damages awarded for granting insufficient
compensation in the first instance. The Court held that the interest under the
latter section 34 was to make up the loss due to delay in making the payment of
the compensation, the former section 28 interest being at the discretion of the
court and the latter section 34 interest being mandatory.

 

Later, this
decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) was followed by the
Supreme Court in the cases of CIT vs. Govindbhai Mamaiya (2014) 367 ITR
498
and CIT vs. Chet Ram (HUF) (2018) 400 ITR 23.

 

Now the question
arises as to whether the amendments made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with
effect from 1st April, 2010 have altered the position. The relevant
amendments are narrated below:

  •     Section 145A as existing then was substituted
    whereby a sub-clause (b) was added to it to provide as under:

(b) interest
received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is
received.

  •     Sub-clause (viii) was inserted in sub-section
    (2) of section 56 to provide as under:

(viii) income by
way of interest received on compensation or on enhanced compensation referred
to in clause (b) of section 145A.

  •    Sub-clause (iv) was inserted in section 57 to
    provide as under:

(iv) in the case
of income of the nature referred to in clause (viii) of sub-section (2) of
section 56, a deduction of a sum equal to fifty per cent of such income and no
deduction shall be allowed under any other clause of this section.

 

These amendments,
in our considered opinion, will apply only if the receipt concerned, like in
section 34 of the 1894 Act, can be regarded as ‘interest’ in the first place
and not otherwise. If the amount concerned has already been considered to be a
part of the compensation and, hence, governed by section 45(5), it cannot be
recharacterised as ‘interest’ merely by relying on the aforesaid amended
provisions. The characterisation of a particular receipt either as
‘compensation’ or ‘interest’ needs to be done independent of these provisions
and one needs to apply these amended provisions only if it has been
characterised as ‘interest’. Therefore, the basis on which the interest payable
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act has been regarded as part of the compensation by the
Supreme Court still prevails and does not get overruled by the aforesaid
amendments.

 

Recently, in the
context of a motor accident claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Bombay
High Court in the case of Rupesh Rashmikant Shah vs. UOI (2019) 417 ITR
169
, after considering the amended provisions of the Income-tax Act,
has held that interest awarded under the said Act as a part of the claim did
not become chargeable to tax merely because of the provision contained in
clause (viii) of section 56(2) of the Income-tax Act. Please see BCAJ Volume
51-A Part 3, page 51 for a detailed analysis of the nature of interest
awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act and the implications of section 56(2)
r/w/s 145A/B thereon. The relevant portion from this decision is reproduced
below:

 

We, therefore, hold that the interest awarded in
the motor accident claim cases from the date of the Claim Petition till the
passing of the award or in case of Appeal, till the judgment of the High Court
in such Appeal, would not be exigible to tax, not being an income. This
position would not change on account of clause (b) of section 145A of the Act
as it stood at the relevant time amended by Finance Act, 2009 which provision
now finds place in sub-section (1) of section 145B of the Act. Neither clause
(b) of section 145A, as it stood at the relevant time, nor clause (viii) of
sub-section (2) of section 56 of the Act, make the interest chargeable to tax
whether such interest is income of the recipient or not.

 

Further, section
2(28A) defines the term ‘interest’ in a manner that includes the interest
payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. In a
case of compulsory acquisition of land, there is obviously no borrowing of
monies. Is there any debt incurred? The ‘incurring’ of the debt, if at all,
arises only on grant of the award for enhanced compensation. Before the award
for the enhanced compensation, there is really no debt that can be said to have
been incurred in favour of the person receiving compensation. In fact, till
such time as the enhanced compensation is awarded there is no certainty about
the eligibility to it, leave alone the quantum of the compensation. This is
also one of the reasons in support of the argument that the amount so awarded
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act cannot be construed as ‘interest’ even when it is
referred to as ‘interest’ therein.

 

It is important to
appreciate the objective for the introduction of the amendments in sections
56(2), 57(iv) and 145A/B which was to provide for the year in which interest
otherwise taxable is to be taxed. This objective is explained in clear terms by
Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010 issued by the CBDT for
explaining the objective behind the introduction. The relevant paragraph of the
Circular reads as under:

 

‘The existing provisions
of Income Tax Act, 1961, provide that income chargeable under the head
“Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from
other sources”, shall be computed in accordance with either cash or
mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Further the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Smt. Rama
Bai vs. CIT (1990) 84 CTR (SC) 164 : (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)
has held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation shall be taxable on accrual basis. This has caused undue hardship
to the taxpayers. With a view to mitigate the hardship, section 145A is amended
to provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation or
enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his income for the year in which it
was received, irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the
assessee.

Further, clause
(viii) is inserted in sub-section (2) of the section 56 so as to provide that
income by way of interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation
referred to in clause (b) of section 145A shall be assessed as “income
from other sources” in the year in which it is received.’

 

In the
circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of clause (viii) of section 56
and clause (iv) of section 57 and section 145A/B are not the charging sections
in respect of interest under consideration and their scope is limited to
defining the year of taxation of a receipt which is otherwise characterised as
interest.

 

The amendment as noted by the Gujarat High Court was brought about by the
Legislature to alleviate the difficulty that arose due to the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 400
wherein it was held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation should be taxable on accrual basis in the respective years of
accrual. It was to mitigate this hardship that section 145A was amended to
provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation or enhanced
compensation shall be deemed to be his income for the year in which it was
received, irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the assessee. By
relying upon this clarification, the Gujarat High Court held that the concerned
amendments by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 were not in connection with the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam (HUF) case but was
brought in to mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on account of the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Rama Bai case.

 

Summing up, it is appropriate to not decide
the taxability or otherwise and also the head of taxation simply on the basis
of the nomenclature used in the relevant law under which the payment is made,
of compensation or enhanced compensation or interest, whatever the case may be.
The receipt for it to be classified as ‘interest’ or ‘compensation’ should be
tested on the touchstone of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The better
view, in our considered opinion, is the view expressed by the Gujarat High
Court that the interest received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
should be taxed as capital gains in accordance with the provisions of section
45(5), subject to the exemption provided in section 10(37), and not as
interest, and no tax at source should be deducted therefrom u/s 194A.

CARO 2020 – ENHANCED AUDITOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

BACKGROUND

The MCA in
exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (11) of section 143 of
the Companies Act, 2013 has issued Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CARO 2020’) on 25th February, 2020
which was initially applicable for audit reports relating to F.Y. 2019-2020.
However, the corona pandemic rescued the CA’s as its applicability has been
deferred to the financial years starting on or after 1st April,
2020. The legacy of such reporting by auditors dates back to 1988 when it first
started with reporting on about 24 clauses under the Manufacturing and Other
Companies (Auditors Report) Order, 1988. However, with the passage of time,
such reporting has seen many amendments; the reporting was reduced to 12
clauses in 2015 but then increased to 16 in 2016. With the changing
environment, increasing corporate scams and misstatements in financial
reporting by corporates, the authorities felt the need for the auditors of
companies to provide greater insight and information to the stakeholders and
users on specific matters relating to financial statements and business, which
has given rise to CARO 2020. The order now requires auditors to report on
various matters contained in 21 clauses and 38 sub-clauses.

 

APPLICABILITY

The applicability and exemptions
to certain classes of companies remain the same as in the predecessor CARO
2016. The non-applicability of CARO reporting to consolidated financial
statements also remains the same with only one change which requires
reporting by the auditor of the parent company of adverse comments in CARO
reports of all the companies forming part of its consolidation.

 

ANALYSIS OF
AMENDMENTS IN CARO 2020

There are mainly 30 changes
which consist of four new clauses, three clauses reintroduced
from earlier versions of CARO, 14 new sub-clauses and nine
modifications to existing clauses.
The Table below gives
details of all such clauses along with the responsibility of the auditor for
auditing and reporting in brief which is based on the guidance note issued by
ICAI.

 

 

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

1

3(i)(a)(A)
& (B)Modified and split into two
sub-clauses

(A)
Whether the company is maintaining proper records showing full particulars
including quantitative details and situation of property, plant &
equipment (PPE).

(B)
Whether the company is maintaining proper records showing full particulars
of Intangible Assets.

(i)
There is effectively no change here except for change in terminology to make
it compliant with revised Schedule III terminology (i.e., from fixed assets
to PPE and
Intangible Assets)

 

(ii)
Right of use assets (‘ROU’) as defined in Ind AS 116 – Leases, Investment
property
as per Ind AS 40 and non-current assets held for sale as per Ind
AS 105 are required to be considered for the purpose of reporting under this
clause

(Page
17 & 18 of GN)

2

3(i)(c)
Modified

Whether
title deeds of immovable properties are held in the name of the company

The
revision in the clause requires the following additional
details in cases where title deed is not in the name of the company:


Name of the person as per title deed and whether he is promoter, director,
their relative, or employee of the company


Period (range) for which the property is held by above person


Reason for not being held in the name of the company (also indicate if any
dispute)

Documents
which are generally referred to for checking the owner in case of immovable
property are registered sale deed / transfer deed / conveyance deed, etc.

 

In
case of mortgaged immovable properties, auditor may obtain confirmation from
Banks / FI with whom the
 same is mortgaged

 

 

 

 

(Page
33 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

3

3(i)(d)
New

Whether
company has revalued its PPE, ROU, Intangible Assets. If yes, whether such
revaluation is based on valuation by registered valuer. Also, auditor is required
to specify the change in amounts if it is 10% or more of net block of
respective class of PPE or Intangible Assets

It
may be noted that reporting under this clause would be limited to revaluation
model since under cost model revaluation is not permitted. Further, reporting
under this clause will cover both upward and downward revaluation under
revaluation model. Changes to ROU assets due to lease modifications under Ind
AS 116 are not considered as revaluation and hence not required to be reported

 

(Page
37 of GN)

4

3(i)(e)
New

Whether
any proceedings have been initiated or are pending against the company for
holding any benami property under The Benami Transactions
(Prohibition) Act, 1988 and rules made thereunder. If so, whether the company
has appropriately disclosed the details in Financial Statements

Following
audit procedures are mainly required for purposes of reporting under the said
clause:


Management inquiries


MRL


Review of legal and professional fees ledger


Minutes of various committee meetings

 

Following
disclosures are required to be given in financial statements with respect to benami
properties:


Nature


Carrying value


Status of proceedings


Consequential impact on financials including liability that may arise in case
proceedings are decided against the company (also, if liability is required
to be provided or shown as contingent liability)

 

The
reporting is not required if the company is the beneficial owner of the benami
property

 

(Page
40 of GN)

5

3(ii)(a)
Modified

Whether
the coverage and procedure of physical verification of
inventories by management is appropriate in the
opinion of the auditor

 

Whether
discrepancies of 10% or more were noticed in the aggregate for each
class of inventory during its physical verification and, if so, whether they
have been properly dealt with in the books of accounts

This
is reintroduced from legacy reporting

 

The
10% criterion is to be looked at from value perspective only. All
discrepancies of 10% or more in value for each class of inventory are to be
reported irrespective of materiality threshold for the company

 

 

 

(Page
45 of GN)

6

3(ii)(b)
New

Whether
during any point of time of the year the company has been sanctioned working
capital limits in excess of Rs. 5 crores in aggregate from banks or financial
institutions on the basis of security of the current assets

 

Whether
quarterly returns or statements filed by the company with such banks or
financial institutions are in agreement with the books of accounts of the
company; if not, give details

 


Sanctioned limit (fresh / renewed) is to be considered and not utilised
limits


Non-fund-based limits like LC, BG, etc., are considered as working capital


If utilised limits exceed Rs. 5 crores with sanction below Rs. 5 crores, the
same is not required to be reported


Any unsecured sanctioned limit is to be excluded from reporting


The auditor is just required to match the inventory value as reported in
quarterly returns / statements submitted to banks / FI with value as per
books of accounts and report disagreement, if any. The auditor is not
required to audit the accuracy of the inventory values reported


Quarterly returns / statements to be verified include stock statements, book
debt statements, credit monitoring arrangement reports, ageing analysis of
debtors or other receivables and other financial information to be submitted
to Banks / FI

 

(Page
50 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

7

3(iii)(a)(A)
& (B) – Modified

Whether
company has provided loans or advances in nature of loans or stood guarantee
or provided security to any other entity and, if so, indicate aggregate
amounts of transactions during the year and outstanding as at balance sheet
date for subsidiaries, JV, associates and others

Reporting
under this clause is not applicable to companies whose principal business is
to give loans

The
better way would be to disclose the requisite details in financial statements
and give reference in CARO

 

The
format of reporting is given in GN issued by ICAI on page 60

 

 

(Page
54 of GN)

8

3(iii)(e)
New

Whether
any loans or advance in nature of loans granted which have fallen due during
the year, have been renewed or extended or fresh loans granted to settle the
overdues. If so, specify aggregate amounts of such fresh / renewed loans
granted and % of such loans to total loans as at balance
sheet date.

Reporting
under this clause is not applicable to companies whose principal business is
to give loans

The
objective of reporting on this clause is to identify instances of
ever-greening of loans / advances in
nature of loans

 

The auditor should obtain list of all parties to whom
loan or advance in nature of loan has been granted and check for dues with
respect to such loans. The auditor would be required to inquire with respect
to uncleared dues on such loans, if any. If the same are renewed or extended,
it would require reporting under this clause. If they are settled through
receipt of fresh loan, the same would be visible in party’s ledger in the
form of inflow first and outflow thereafter.

Format
for reporting is specified on page 68 of GN

 

(Page
55 of GN)

9

3(iii)(f)
New

Whether
company has granted any loans or advances in nature of loans either repayable
on demand or without specifying any terms or period of repayment, if so,
specify the aggregate amount, % to total loans and aggregate loans granted to
promoters, related parties as defined in section 2(76) of Companies Act, 2013

The auditor should prepare master file containing
party-wise details of various terms and conditions of loans or advances in
nature of loans given and the same should be updated as and when required.
The parties can be tagged as promoter or related party as per definition of
2(69) or 2(76) of the Companies Act, respectively

Format for reporting is specified on page 69 of GN

 

(Page
55 of GN)

10

3(v)
Modified

In
respect of deposits accepted or amounts which are deemed to be deposits,
whether RBI directives or Companies Act sections 73 to 76 have been complied
with. If not, nature of contraventions to be stated along with compliance of
order, if any, passed by CLB / NCLT / RBI etc.

Deemed
deposits as defined under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Companies (Acceptance of
Deposits) Rules, 2014 defines deposits to include any receipt of money by way
of deposit or loan or in any other form, by a company but does not include
amounts specified therein

 

Examine
form DPT-3 filed by the company

 

(Page
75 of GN)

11

3(vii)(a)&(b)
Modified

Whether
company is regular in depositing undisputed statutory dues including
GST
and if not, the extent of arrears of outstanding dues, or if not
deposited on account of dispute, then the amounts involved and the forum
where the dispute is pending shall be mentioned

The
modification is only to the extent of reporting on GST along with other
statutory dues

 

 

(Page
84 of GN)

12

3(viii)
New

Whether
any transactions not recorded in the books of accounts have been surrendered
or disclosed as income during the year in tax assessments under the Income
Tax Act, 1961, if so, whether the previously unrecorded income has been
properly recorded in the books of accounts during the year

Reporting
is required only if the company has voluntarily disclosed in its return or
surrendered during search / seizure. Thus, if addition is made by IT
authorities and the company has disputed such additions, reporting under this
clause is not required

Review
all tax assessments completed during the year and subsequent to balance sheet
date but before signing of auditor’s report

Reporting is also required for adequate disclosure in
financial statements or impact as per AS / Ind AS after due consideration to
exceptional items, materiality, prior period errors, etc.

(Page
98 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

13

3(ix)(a)
Modified

Whether
the company has defaulted in repayment of loans or other borrowings or in the
payment of interest thereon to any lender, if yes, the period and
amount of default to be reported

Preference
share capital would not be considered as borrowings for reporting under this
clause

 

Whether
ICD taken would be considered as borrowings for the purpose of reporting
under this clause will require evaluation

 

(Page
101 of GN)

14

3(ix)(b)
New

Whether
company is a declared wilful defaulter by any bank or FI or other lender

Reporting
under this clause is restricted to wilful defaulter declared by banks or FI
or any other lender (irrespective of whether such bank / FI has lent to the
company) as the same are governed by RBI Master Circular RBI/2014
-15/73DBR.No.CID.BC.57/20.16.003/2014-15 dated 1st July, 2014 on
wilful defaulters

 

The
GN clarifies that such declaration should be restricted to the relevant
financial year under audit till the date of audit report

 

With
respect to wilful defaults to other lenders, the same would be reported only
if the government authority declares the company as wilful defaulter

 

Auditor
may check information on websites of credit information companies like CIBIL,
CRIF, Equifax and Experian. Auditors may also check RBI websites, CRICIL
database and information available in public domain

 

(Page
106 of GN)

15

3(ix)(d)
Reintroduced

Whether
funds raised on short-term basis have been utilised for long-term purposes,
if yes, the nature and amount to be indicated

Practical
approach to verify such a possibility is to analyse the cash flow position
containing overall sources and application of funds. Also, certain companies
do follow the Asset Liability Management department which tracks the maturity
lifecycle of different assets and liabilities

 

Review
of bank statements specifically during the period of receipt of short-term
loans / working capital loans and its application thereafter can sometimes
provide direct nexus between receipts and application

 

(Page
114 of GN)

16

3(ix)(e)
New

Whether
the company has taken any funds from an entity or person on account of or to
meet obligations of its subsidiaries, associates, or JV, if so, details thereof
with nature of such transactions and amount in each case

First
check point would be whether loans or advances are given during the year or
investments (equity or debt) are made in order to meet obligations of
subsidiaries, associates, or JV. Reporting under this clause would cover
funds taken from all entities and not restricted to banks and FIs. The
reference details could be disclosure of related party transactions

Format
for reporting is specified on page 120 of GN

 

(Page
117 of GN)

17

3(ix)(f)
New

Whether
the company has raised loans during the year on pledge of securities held in
its subsidiaries, JV, associates, if so, give details thereof and also report
if the company has defaulted in repayment of such loans

The
reporting may be cross-referenced to
reporting under 3(ix)(a)

Format
for reporting is specified on page 123-124 of GN

 

(Page
120 of GN)

18

3(xi)
– Modified

Whether
any fraud by the company or any fraud on the company has been noticed or
reported during the year, if yes, the nature and amount involved to be
indicated

The
modification has widened the reporting responsibility of the auditor by
removing the specific requirement of reporting on frauds by the officers or
employees of the company. Thus, all frauds by the company or on the company
should be reported here

The
auditor is not responsible to discover the fraud. His responsibility is
limited to reporting on frauds if he has noticed any during the course of his
audit or if management has identified and reported

Auditor
should review minutes of meetings of various committees, internal auditors
report, etc., to identify if frauds were discussed or reported. Additionally,
the auditor will also have to obtain written representations from management
while reporting under this clause

Reporting
under this clause will not relieve the auditor from complying with section
143(12) of the Companies Act which is specifically covered by new clause
3(xi)(b) as given below

 

(Page
138 of GN)

19

3(xi)(b)
– New

Whether
any report is filed under 143(12) by the auditors in Form ADT-4 as prescribed
in Rule 13 of the Companies (Audit & Auditors) Rules, 2014 with the
Central Government

The
objective of reporting under this clause is to check and report on the
compliance of section 143(12) in terms of reporting of frauds noticed by the
auditors in the company committed by officers or employees of the company to
the Central Government in Form ADT-4 after seeking comments from board /
audit committee (if the amount of fraud exceeds Rs. 1 crore)

 

The
reporting liability under 143(12) also lies with the company secretary
performing secretarial audit, cost accountant doing cost audit and thus
statutory auditor is required to report under this clause reporting by
aforesaid professionals on frauds noticed by them during their audits

 

(Page
144 of GN)

20

3(xi)(c)
– New

Whether
the auditor has considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during
the year by the company

The
objective of reporting under this clause is to make the auditor confirm that
he has gone through all whistle-blower complaints and performed / planned his
audit procedure accordingly, thereby addressing financial statements
presentation or disclosure-related concerns raised by whistle-blowers

 

Check
whether requirement of whistle-blower mechanism is mandated by law [SEBI LODR
and section 177(9) of the Companies Act]

 

If
the same is not mandated by law, the auditor may ask from the management all
the whistle-blower complaints received and action taken on the same

 

(Page
147 of GN)

21

3(xiv)(a)
– Reintroduced

Whether
the company has an internal audit system commensurate with the size and
nature of its business

The
auditor should evaluate the internal audit function / system like size of
internal audit team, the scope covered in the internal audit, internal audit
structure, professional compatibility of the team performing internal audits,
reporting responsibility, independence, etc., to comment on the above clause

 

(Page
161 of GN)

22

3(xiv)(b)
– New

Whether
the reports of the Internal Auditors for the period under audit were
considered by the statutory auditor

The
objective of reporting under this clause is just to obtain confirmation from
the statutory auditor that he has gone through the internal audit reports and
considered implications of its observations on the financial statements, if
any. Reporting under this clause will require the auditor to coordinate
closely with the Internal Auditor so that he considers the work done by the
Internal Auditor for his audit purposes, compliance with SA 610 (Revised);
‘Using the Work of Internal Auditors’, is mandatory for the statutory auditor

 

(Page
167 of GN)

23

3(xvi)(b)
– New

Whether
the company has conducted any non-banking finance or housing finance
activities without valid Certificate of Registration (CoR) from RBI

The
auditor is required to first identify whether the company is engaged in
non-banking financial or housing financial activities. If yes, the auditor
should discuss with management with regards to registration requirements of
RBI for such companies and report accordingly

 

(Page
181 of GN)

24

3(xvi)(c)
– New

Whether
the company is Core Investment Company (CIC) as defined by RBI regulations
and whether it continues to fulfil the criteria of CIC. If the company is
exempted or unregistered CIC, whether it continues to fulfil the exemption
criteria

The
auditor is required to identify whether the activities carried on by the
company, assets composition as at previous year-end, etc., satisfy the
conditions for it to be considered as CIC

 

He
should also go through RBI Master Direction – Core Investment Companies
(Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 which are applicable to all CIC

 

(Page
183 of GN)

25

3(xvi)(d)
– New

Whether
the group has more than one CIC as part of the group, if yes, indicate number
of CIC’s which are part of the group

Companies
in the group are defined in Core Investment Companies (Reserve Bank)
Directions

 

(Page
187 of GN)

26

3(xvii)
– Reintroduced

Whether
the company has incurred cash losses in the financial year and in the
immediately preceding financial year, if so, state the amount of cash losses

The
term cash loss is not defined in the Act, accounting standards and Ind AS.
Thus, for accounting standards compliant companies it can be calculated by
making adjustments of transactions of non-cash nature like depreciation,
impairment, etc., to profit / loss after tax figure

 

Similarly,
for Ind AS companies, profit / loss (excluding OCI) can be adjusted for
non-cash transactions like depreciation, lease amortisation or impairment.
Further, cash profits / cash losses realised and recognised in OCI (not
reclassified to P&L) should be adjusted to above profit / loss to arrive
at cash profit / loss for the company

 

Adjustments
like deferred tax, foreign exchange gain / loss and fair value changes should
also be given effect to since they are non-cash in nature

 

(Page
189 of GN)

27

3(xviii)
– New

Whether
there has been any resignation of the statutory auditors during the year, if
so, whether the auditor has taken into consideration the issues, objections
or concerns raised by the outgoing auditors

The
reporting on this clause is applicable where a new auditor is appointed
during the year to fill a casual vacancy under 140(2) of the Act

 

The
incoming auditor who is required to report on this clause should take into
account the following before reporting on this clause,

•ICAI
code of ethics


Reasons stated by the outgoing auditor in Form ADT-3 filed with ROC in
compliance with 140(2) read with Rule 8


Implementation guide by ICAI on resignation / withdrawal from engagement to
perform audit of financial statements


Compliance with SEBI Circular applicable for auditors of listed companies

 

(Page
191 of GN)

28

3(xix)
– New

On
the basis of the financial ratios, ageing and expected dates of realisation
of financial assets and payments of financial liabilities, other information
accompanying the financial statements, the auditor’s knowledge of the board
of directors and management plans, whether the auditor is of the opinion that
no material uncertainty exists as on the date of audit report that company is
capable of meeting its liabilities existing as at balance sheet date as and
when they fall due within period of one year from balance sheet date


Prepare list of liabilities with due dates falling within next one year


Check payments subsequent to balance sheet date till the date of issuing
auditors report


Obtain plan from management indicating realisable value of assets and
payments of liabilities


Ratios to be considered are current ratio, acid-test ratio, cash ratio, asset
turnover ratio, inventory turnover ratios, accounts receivable ratio, etc.


Other details which should be obtained from management post-balance sheet
date are MIS, cash flow projections, etc.

 

Adverse
reporting under this clause should have similar reporting in the main report
regarding going concern as specified in SA 570

 

(Page
196 of GN)

29

3(xx)(a)
– New

Whether
in respect of other than ongoing projects, the company has transferred
unspent amount to a fund specified in schedule VII of the Companies Act
within a period of six months of expiry of the F.Y. in compliance with 135(5)
of the Companies Ac.

The
auditor should ask the management to prepare a project-wise report on amounts
spent during the year and considered under CSR activities

 

(Page
204 of GN)

 

Clause
(a) requires unspent amount not relating to any ongoing project to be
transferred to specified fund as per schedule VII of the Act and Clause (b)
requires unspent amount relating to ongoing projects to be transferred to
special bank account opened for CSR activities

 

(Page
209 of GN)

30

3(xx)(b)
– New

Whether
any amount remaining unspent under 135(5) of the Companies Act, pursuant to
any ongoing project has been transferred to special account in compliance
with 135(6) of the Companies Act

 

 

CONCLUSION

The additional reporting
requirements would require additional details from the management and thus it
is very important that an auditor should have a dialogue with the management
immediately for the latter to gear up. It is also important for the auditor to
understand the process followed by the management for collection and processing
of the required information and its control environment which will give him
comfort while complying with the reporting requirements. Lastly, it is
important for the auditor to take suitable management representations wherever
accuracy and completeness of information provided by the management cannot be
confirmed by the auditor to safeguard his position. The auditor would have to
factor in additional time for reporting and the documentation will have to be
robust and fool-proof for future reference and as a safeguard against the
enhanced reporting responsibility. Lastly, reporting under CARO 2020 will no
longer remain a tick-in-the-box procedure or boilerplate reporting.
 

 

 

VALUE ADDITION IN INTERNAL AUDIT

BACKGROUND

If one looks for a common definition of ‘value add’, it is the
difference between the price of a product or service and the cost of producing
it. The price is determined by what customers are willing to pay based on their
perceived value. Value is added or created in different ways.

 

Historically, Internal Audit is treated as a ‘cost centre’ rather than a
‘value-added process’. That’s because the definition of ‘value add’ can vary
from one firm / audit department to another. Mostly, it means improving the
business rather than just looking at compliance with policies and procedures.
But what is ‘value add’ to one practitioner may be different to another practitioner
of internal audit. So how does one establish what is ‘value add’? This will be
different in every case and also for each organisation. It has become common
for most practitioners to claim that they deliver ‘value-added’ internal audit
services, and for most stakeholders to speak of availing of ‘value-added’
internal audit services. The question, therefore, is ‘how does an internal
auditor or internal audit team / department add value’ in a particular
assignment or to the organisation?

 

Broadly speaking, adding value would be based on the competencies and
personal qualities of the internal auditor and what is being delivered.

 

James Roth, who has done significant work in this area and published
papers and written books on the subject, in his paper How Do Internal
Auditors Add Value
identified four factors that can help internal
auditors determine what will add value to their organisation –

1. A deep knowledge of the
organisation, including its culture, key players and competitive environment.

2. The courage to innovate in ways
stakeholders don’t expect and may not think they want.

3. A broad knowledge of those
practices that the profession, in general, considers value added.

4. The creativity to adapt
innovations to the organisation in ways that yield surprising results and
exceed stakeholders’ expectations.

 

Based on our experience in conducting internal audits in a number of
organisations in India and abroad and speaking to a number of Chief Audit
Executives, including 14 top CAEs in the country being interviewed and a book Best
Practices by Leading Chief Audit Executives – Making a Difference
published
with respect to best practices in their respective departments, we are giving
here a few key practices which would go a long way in providing ‘value add’ to
organisations. The internal auditor would then be welcomed and respected by the
top management and treated as a trusted business adviser.

 

IMPROVING CONTROLS OR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE FOR THE ORGANISATION

Normally, internal audit would include examination of financial and
operational information and evaluation of internal controls of significant
processes (ICFR / ICoFR). In terms of presentation to management and the Audit
Committee, the internal auditor would be presenting the risks and controls
evaluated for significant processes and non-conformance thereof with an action
plan to mitigate the non-conformance.

 

The question arises whether in practice the
stakeholders would be happy to get an assurance on controls alone or would they
value improving performance for the organisation. Improving performance would
mean measurable revenue growth or cost savings due to the work carried out by
the internal audit service provider. This is always a point of debate, whether
an internal audit work should be gauged by the cost savings and / or revenue
growth due to work directly carried out by them. From numerous interviews with
CAEs and our practical work in the field with organisations, it is clear that
improving performance is considered a ‘value add’ by stakeholders and is much
appreciated and valued. This does not mean that the internal audit would not be
evaluating internal controls but would mean focus on improving performance to
enhance the value of the internal audit service being delivered.

 

Consider the following cases:

Improving performance –
cost savings in procurement (a pharmaceutical company case)

A medium-sized pharmaceutical company with a yearly turnover of around
Rs. 1,200 crores is facing tough times due to the current pandemic as its
revenue has fallen by 35%. The outsourced partner of the internal audit firm is
approached by the management and helps constitute a team consisting of two
senior procurement officials, a cost accountant, one senior production official
and a senior internal auditor who has been working with the firm and deputed to
this client and having experience in the company processes; together, they go
through all major procurement items to identify areas for cost savings /
rationalisation.

 

A number of questions are raised with the aim of cost savings:

(i)         Are we buying from
authorised vendors, for example, bearings?

(ii)        What would be the
profit margins of vendors from whom we buy imported material – could we work
with them to reduce the cost of procurement of such material?

(iii) Could we substitute some materials being procured to reduce costs
without affecting quality?

(iv) Who are the vendors supplying to our competitors and what material
is being sourced by them? Are their procurement costs cheaper or is their
quality better?

(v)        Could we reduce our EOQ
without affecting costs and our production schedule – improve the working
capital and thereby reduce costs?

 

The team made a presentation on the progress to the top management every
fortnight. In an exercise over two and a half months, by analysing data,
raising the right questions and working on a number of parameters, the team was
able to effectively save Rs. 22 crores in procurement costs without compromising
on quality or service parameters. This was considered as a ‘value add’ for the
team, and especially for the partner of the outsourced chartered accountant
firm.

 

This may be considered as a special assignment but the point being made
is ‘what do the organisation / stakeholders require and is it being delivered
by the internal auditor / internal audit firm?’ In this particular case, the
internal audit was considered ‘value add’ and it would be welcomed and
respected by the stakeholders.

 

Improving performance –
mid-review of expansion project (an engineering company case)

In a new project expansion being executed by a large engineering
organisation, the internal auditor requested that the management allow his team
to carry out a mid-review of the project. Since the internal audit firm was
associated with the organisation for the last few years, the management liked
the idea of a mid-review as the costs for implementing the expansion were quite
high.

 

The internal audit team conducted the review – the estimates, project
plan including time and cost estimates, current time and cost incurred (all
purchase orders for materials and services, materials and services received to
date, consumption, all payments made, etc.), statutory compliances with respect
to procurement and site work, sanctions with respect to bank loans and current
utilisation (including all foreign loans and hedging).

 

The internal audit team highlighted a likely delay in procurement that
could lead to the overall project being delayed, higher costs in a few
procurement areas where similar work carried out in earlier years had been
executed at lower costs, and lapses in statutory compliances. This resulted in
the project being brought back on track in terms of time and cost. The
inspection schedule for outsourced fabricated items was increased, meetings
with vendors commissioning the project were handled at a higher level and some
re-negotiation on the procurement items was undertaken. Statutory compliances
were all competed.

 

Again, this was a value addition because of an independent review by the
internal auditor. Had this been done at the end, it would only have been a
post-mortem and provided ‘learnings’ for the future. In this case, the review
actually resulted in improving performance by having the project being executed
in time with minimal time and little cost overrun.

 

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH OTHER FUNCTIONS

It is important for the internal auditor to forge an alliance with other
functions in the organisation rather than work in isolation. There are other
functions like HSE – Health, Safety & Environment, Risk Management, Legal
& Compliance, Quality, IS or Information Security. All these are also
support functions providing much-needed assurance and governance support to line
functions.

 

Why does the internal audit function have to ‘reinvent’ the wheel? A
strategic alliance with other assurance functions would enable the internal
auditor to

i)   Benefit from work already
being carried out by other function/s and avoid repetition

ii) Have better understanding of
the risks and controls of the process under review

iii)        Make the internal audit
review comprehensive, building and learning from the work carried out by other
functions

iv)        Collaborate to jointly
carry out a review of the technical areas where the other assurance functions
would have better understanding of the process under review.

 

Consider the case where the internal auditor carrying out the review of
the production process first contacted the management representative for ISO
9000 Quality Standard and had a look at the number of non-conformities and
corrective action-taken reports of various issues highlighted by the ISO
auditor for the production process during the entire year.

 

THE INTERNAL AUDIT PROCESS – TRANSPARENCY AND
COMMUNICATION

The entire process from communicating objectives, field work – obtaining
data, analysing data, etc. and communicating final results should be a
transparent exercise. The internal auditor has to be working with auditees /
process owners throughout the life cycle of the internal audit project. There
is nothing to hide as the objectives for the auditee / process owner and the
internal auditor are the same.

 

To bring transparency in the process it will be necessary to communicate
continuously with the auditee team regarding

(a) what are the objectives

(b) what data is required

(c)        what will be achieved at
the end

(d) how can performance of the business be improved due to the internal
audit exercise being carried out for the process under review

(e) what deviations / bottlenecks are being found which can be improved
upon

(f)        what further data or
expert advice is required to form an opinion on the process under review.

 

These are just some aspects of the process but the idea is to
continuously communicate as if the internal auditor and the auditee / process
owner are working together on the project to improve the performance of the
business.

 

Except when the internal auditor suspects
that there are integrity issues which need to be separately reported and / or
investigated, there has to be complete transparency and the working of the
internal auditor needs to be integrated with that of the auditee / process team
under review.

 

An effective internal audit is the sum total
of a proactive auditor and a participative auditee.
This
will be possible only when the auditor is experienced in business process, and
is also competent, skilled, professional and transparent in his approach. This
would enable the internal auditor to have a participative auditee (it will also
depend on the maturity of the organisation and its culture) which, in turn,
would lead to an effective internal audit.

 

NEGOTIATING THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDIT

It is very important for an internal auditor to negotiate the role of
internal audit.
The idea is to work with management in the journey for business
improvement in terms of better technology for business, technological
upgradation, cost savings and other aspects of governance. For this, the internal
auditor has to negotiate his role and grab the opportunities which come his
way.

 

Let us consider the following cases:

(1) The internal auditor requests the management of a large
geographically-spread organisation to put up an exhibit at the annual event to
showcase the role and capabilities of the internal audit function. The
management was taken aback with this request but was pleasantly surprised with
the exhibit and it was much appreciated.

(2) A CAE feels the need to carry out an
energy audit throughout the organisation at its 22 plants in India. He inducts
an engineer with energy audit knowledge and helps with energy audit in many
plants, leading to tremendous savings in coal and improved efficiency in steam
generation.

(3) An internal audit function hires an
engineer with knowledge of transport trailers / trucks and ensures that a
technical audit is done for each trailer / truck in the organisation’s
transportation business segment where the organisation owned a fleet of trucks
/ trailers. This results in tremendous savings due to increase in the life of
tyres and less consumption of diesel and other consumables, etc.

(4) A mid-sized organisation wants to implement a new ERP and the
internal auditor gives one senior team member who has been with the
organisation for many years and has deep knowledge of the processes as the
internal ‘Project Manager’ for the project. The project is successful with most
requirements built into the new ERP to ease availability of data and
decision-making for the process owners.

 

TECHNOLOGY UPGRADATION AND EDUCATION / AWARENESS TO
BUSINESS

One clear area for ‘value addition’ by internal audit is continuous
education and awareness to process owners whenever the internal auditor engages
with others in the organisation. There would be a number of ways this could
happen – promote benchmarking, make others aware of compliances, speak about
best practices in other parts of the organisation, bring good / best practices
from other non-competing organisations to the process under review.

 

Technology is a great enabler for making available data for
decision-making in the way business is carried out and the internal auditor can
help make changes by spreading awareness for adoption of technology by the
organisation.

(I) An internal auditor worked as
a consultant to bring awareness about technology to Legal and Compliance and to
make the entire process of compliance totally automated with alerts for action
to be taken by the process owners for various compliances and breaches being
brought up in real time.

(II) Similarly, in another instance
they worked with Corporate Communications and Investor Relations in a public
listed organisation to install a system to get a feed from social media about
the company’s reputation / news on a real-time basis.

(III)      Another example is an
internal auditor informing the management of a major hotel property and helping
install software which tracks information on day rates for guests with
competing properties and on popular hotel booking sites. Based on this runs an
algorithm to optimise the day rate for walk-in guests being offered. This
helped in increasing the revenue for the property.

 

CONCLUSION

Each and every practice given above for ‘value addition’ by internal
audit cannot be considered in a silo as a separate ‘to do’ but would overlap
with other practices.

 

It is now time to think afresh and work differently. The internal
auditor should be working with business, forging an alliance with other
processes / functions to improve performance, including productivity, for the
organisation and to bring new thought and innovation to every aspect of
business. There is need for the internal auditor to negotiate his role in the
organisation and be a part of the top management team.

 

Business disruption is leading to change which, in turn, is leading to
opportunity for the internal auditor as the process of internal audit is not
limited to any particular process or area unlike many other processes /
functions in the organisation.

 

STATEMENT RECORDED UNDER PMLA AND OTHER LAWS: WHETHER ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

In a recent
decision of the Supreme Court (Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Cr.
Appeal No. 152/2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)
, the
captioned question was examined in connection with the statement recorded under
the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the
NDPS Act). The Supreme Court held that the officers who are invested with powers
u/s 53 of this Act are police officers and therefore a statement recorded u/s
67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
offence under the NDPS Act.

 

Section 53 of the
NDPS Act empowers the Central Government to invest any officer of the
Department of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any
other department of the Central Government, including para-military forces, or
armed forces, or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer-in-charge
of a police station for investigation of offences under the NDPS Act.

 

The prohibition
that a statement recorded u/s 67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional
statement has its roots in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence
Act) which provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved
against a person accused of an offence.

 

It is section 53 of
the NDPS Act which distinguishes it from the provisions in other laws perceived
as comparable as regards issue of summons, power to call for information,
enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, etc. If such
comparable provision in other laws (such as, FEMA, PMLA, Customs Act) does not
have wording similar to that of section 53 of the NDPS Act, it would not be
proper to apply the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tofan
Singh (Supra)
to say that the statement recorded by an officer under
such other laws is not admissible as evidence.

 

The purpose of
this article is to analyse the correct legal position to find the answer to the
question whether a statement recorded under PMLA is admissible as evidence.

 

The relevant
aspects of the subject-matter have been reviewed as follows.

 

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF PMLA, CrPC AND EVIDENCE ACT

Section 50(3) of
the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) specifies the
following obligations of the persons summoned:

(a)        To attend in person or through authorised
agents,

(b)        To state the truth with respect to the
subject for which they are examined or they make statements,

(c)        To produce such documents as may be
required.

 

Section 164(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) provides that before
recording any confession, the Magistrate is required to explain to the person
making the statement that he is not bound to make such confession and that if
he does so, it may be used as evidence against him. It further provides that
the Magistrate shall not record the confession unless, upon questioning the
person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

 

The ban in section 25 of the Evidence Act (i.e., no confession made to a
police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence) is
an absolute ban. However, there is no ban on the confession made to any
authority who is not a police officer except when such confession is made while the accused is in police custody.

 

WARNING U/S 164 OF CrPC – RAISON D’ETRE

Section 50(3) of
the PMLA, among others, enjoins upon the person summoned the obligation ‘to
state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined or makes
statement
’. In respect of such obligation of the person summoned, a crucial
question that needs to be addressed is whether the warning u/s 164 of the CrPC
needs to be administered to the person before he makes the statement.

This question has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in various decisions. After a detailed
review, the Supreme Court has laid down important propositions in this matter
and also explained the need and raison d’etre underlying the
administering of such a warning. These propositions may be reviewed as follows.

 

(i)   Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not
limit itself to a confession made to a Magistrate and, therefore, there is no
bar to its application to the statement so recorded. The person who makes the
statement is not excused from speaking the truth on the premise that such a
statement could be used against him. Such requirement is included in the
provision for the purpose of enabling the officer to elicit the truth from the
person being interrogated. There is no involvement of the Magistrate at that
stage1.

(ii)   Warning a person that making a false statement
is an offence cannot be construed to mean exertion of pressure to extract the
statement2.

(iii) Statements
made before the officers are not confessions recorded by the Magistrate u/s 164
of the CrPC. Such statements are not made subject to the safeguard under which
confessions are recorded by a Magistrate. Therefore, it is all the more
necessary to scrutinise such statements to ascertain whether the same were made
under threat from some authority. If such scrutiny reveals that the statements
were voluntary, the same may be received against the maker of the statement in
the same manner as a confession3.

 

PERSON MAKING A STATEMENT – NOT A COMPELLED WITNESS

During the
examination of an accused, an important issue that arises is whether an
accused person can be compelled to be a witness against himself. In this
connection, reference may be made to Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India
which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
However, to invoke such a Constitutional right
guaranteed under Article 20(3) against testimonial compulsion, the following
aspects must be examined4.

 

i)             
Whether a formal accusation has
been made against the person claiming such Constitutional guarantee. At the
stage when an authority issues notice to collect information, there is no
accusation against the person from whom the information is sought. The
information is collected to ascertain whether a formal accusation can be made
against the person. This is decided only after the information is collected and
examined. It is only when a show cause notice is issued that it can be said
that a formal accusation has been made against the person5;

_________________________________________________________________________

        
1      Asst. Coll. C. Ex.
Rajamundry vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

       
2      C. Sampath Kumar
vs. Enforcement Officer [1997] 8 SCC 358

                
3      Haroon Haji Abdulla
vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1968 SC 832


               
4      See: Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs.
Manek [1961] 1 SCR 417

ii) Whether the offence committed by such a person
would result in his prosecution;

iii)         What is the nature of the accusation and
the probable consequence of such an accusation?

iv)         To ascertain whether the statement is
covered within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person must be an accused at
the time when
he made the statement. Therefore, the fact that he became
an accused after making the statement is irrelevant6.

 

OFFICER RECORDING STATEMENT – WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER

In respect of the
statement recorded u/s 50 of the PMLA, the crucial issue which requires
consideration is whether the officer who records such a statement is a police
officer for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Section 25
provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against
a person accused of any offence. The provisions perceived as comparable to
section 50 of the PMLA are also found in the following statutes:

(1) Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999.

(2) Customs Act,
1962.

(3) Central Excise
Act, 1944.

(4) NDPS Act, 1985.

 

Accordingly, the
decisions of courts in respect of such apparently comparable sections in other
laws may provide a useful reference. The language of the relevant provisions in
the abovementioned laws must be carefully examined and compared with that of
section 50 of the PMLA before relying on the decisions based on the
corresponding provision in the other laws. In this context, some important
propositions laid down by the Courts are reviewed as follows:

 

(A)  
The crucial test to ascertain
whether an officer recording a statement under a Special Act (such as PMLA) is
a police officer is to check whether such officer is vested with all
powers exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC qua
investigation of offences under the CrPC Such powers include the power to
initiate prosecution by submitting a report or chargesheet u/s 173 of the CrPC.
It is not sufficient to show that such officer exercises some or many
powers of a police officer conducting investigation under the CrPC. If he does
not exercise all such powers, such officer would not be regarded
as a police officer7.

___________________________________________

5   Bhagwandas Goenka vs. Union of India: AIR
1963 SC 26

6   State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad [1962] 3
SCR 10

 

 

(B)  An officer under the Customs
Act, 1962
is empowered to check smuggling of goods, ascertain contravention
of provisions of the Customs Act, to adjudicate on such contravention, realise
customs duty and for non-payment of duty on confiscated smuggled goods and
impose penalty. The Customs Officer does not have power to submit a report to
the Magistrate u/s 173 of the CrPC because he cannot investigate an offence
triable by a Magistrate. He can only file a complaint before the Magistrate.

 

It is, thus,
evident that the officer recording a statement under the Customs Act does not
exercise all such powers. Accordingly, a Customs Officer is not a
police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Consequently, the statements made before a Customs Officer by a person against
whom such officer makes an inquiry are not covered by the said section and are,
therefore, admissible in evidence8.

 

(C)  While investigating offences under the PMLA,
the Director and other officers do not have all powers
exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC. For
example, they do not have the power to submit a report u/s 173 of the CrPC.
Hence, the officers recording a statement u/s 50 of the PMLA are not ‘police
officers’. Accordingly, they are not hit by the prohibition in section 25 of
the Evidence Act. Consequently, a statement recorded before such officers is
admissible as evidence9.

 

(D) On similar grounds, it has been held that an
officer functioning under FERA (having similar powers as under FEMA) cannot be
considered a police officer10.

 

(E)  In a recent decision11 concerning
the provisions of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court examined important aspects
such as fundamental rights and the NDPS Act, confessions u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act, provisions contained in the NDPS Act, the scope of section 67 of the NDPS
Act (power to call for information, etc.) and whether an officer designated u/s
53 of the NDPS Act (power to invest officers of certain departments with powers
of officer-in-charge of a police station) can be said to be a police officer.
After such examination, the Supreme Court held as follows:

____________________________________________________________

7   Balkishan vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981
SC 379

8   State of Punjab vs. Barkatram: AIR 1962 SC
276; Rameshchandra Mehta vs. State of WB: AIR 1970 SC 940; Veera Ibrahim vs.
State of Maharashtra [1976] 2 SCC 302; Percy Rustomji Basta vs. State of
Maharashtra [1971] 1 SCC 847

9   Virbhadra Singh vs. ED (MANU/DEL/1813/2015)
(Del. HC)

10  P.S. Barkathali vs. DoE AIR 1981 Ker 81; also
see Emperor vs. Nanoo [1926] 28 Bom LR 1196; 51 Bom 78 (FB)

11    Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)

 

  • the officers who are invested
    with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are ‘police officers’ within the meaning of
    section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement
    made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence
    Act and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the
    NDPS Act;
  •   a statement recorded u/s 67
    of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
    offence under the NDPS Act.

 

SUPREME
COURT SOUNDS A NOTE OF CAUTION REGARDING EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF STATEMENT
RECORDED BY THE OFFICER

The raison
d’etre
for section 25 of the Evidence Act (that the statement recorded by a
police officer is not admissible as evidence) is to avoid the risk of the
allegation that such a statement was obtained under coercion and torture.

 

In the preceding heading, the aspects, such as whether the officer
recording the statement under a particular statute is a police officer and
whether such statement is admissible as evidence as examined by Courts, have
been reviewed in detail in connection with various statutes.

 

The Supreme Court has sounded a note of
caution in respect of the statement made by a person to an officer who is not a
police officer, and which is accordingly not hit by the ban u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act. Such statement must be scrutinised by the Court to ascertain whether the
same was voluntary or whether it was obtained by inducement, threat or promise
in terms of the tests laid down in section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such
statement is impaired on the touchstone of such tests, the same would be
inadmissible12.

________________________________________________________

12  Asst. Coll. of C. Ex. Rajamundry vs. Duncan
Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

 

CORPORATE LAW IN INDIA – PROMOTING EASE OF DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT DILUTING STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

The sheer size
of corporates combined with the volatile stock markets has made corporate
performance the barometer of a country’s economic sentiment, and India is no
exception to this. In the last three decades, continuous measures to deregulate
the corporate sector were driven by the desire to attract investments to
accelerate economic growth. This was interrupted by new regulatory measures
introduced to prevent corporate scandals that erupted periodically from
recurrence. Seen through this lens, it appears that deregulation, which now
goes by the phrase promoting ‘Ease of Doing Business’ and protecting
stakeholders’ interests are contradictory as evidenced by the periodic swings
in the regulatory environment from promoting Ease of Doing Business to
protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and back.

 

This article
seeks to examine the validity of a perceived conflict between promoting Ease of
Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and explores potential
avenues to reconcile the two by taking a historical view. It is structured in
four parts:

 

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the pre-corporate era;

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era;

Indian
regulatory initiatives in the 21st century;
and

Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with Protecting Stakeholders’ interests in the corporate
world.

 

Part 1: Promoting Business and Protecting
Stakeholders’ Interests in the pre-corporate era

Despite
appearing contradictory, in the transport sector the progress in braking technology
was a key prerequisite for quicker and faster transport of goods and people.
Likewise, protecting stakeholders’ interest is a prerequisite to promote
economic activity in a society. This can be seen in the evolution of the three
key commercial concepts that boosted economic growth, namely, (i) Recognition
of private property, (ii) Use of commercial lending and borrowing, and (iii)
Advent of corporate entities for conducting business.

 

Table 1: Commercial concepts that promoted
economic activity

 

Key commercial
concept

Promoting economic activity

Protecting stakeholders’
interest

Benefit
derived

Private property as distinct
from personal property

Ownership without possession led
to rental agreements increasing the use of assets

Defining theft and robbery, with
stringent penal action for defaulters, thereby protecting the owners’
interest

Development of agriculture and
trade then, and protection of intellectual properties now to fuel economic
growth

Commercial lending and borrowing
for interest

Defined norms for recording of
loan of goods or money to enforce promises made

Penalty for defaulting borrower:
bonded labour, debtors’ prison and 
disqualification from political and 
commercial activities to protect lenders’ interest

Credit sales and asset creation
using borrowed funds to fuel accelerated economic growth

Limited liability companies with
transferable shares

Liquidity to shareholders
without disrupting the business that enabled a larger number of investors to
collaborate

Reporting transparency,
regulation of related party transactions and insider trading to ensure fair
value for shareholders who wanted to exit by selling their shares at any
point in time

Creation of large multi-national
companies and ability to undertake economic activities with long gestation
period

 

 

The first
impetus to economic growth came with private property. Recognition of private
property resulted in ownership without possession by penalising theft and
robbery which can negate the owners’ rights. This enabled individuals to
undertake economic activities on a larger scale and with a longer gestation
period by assuring them that the rewards of their labour will be secured for
their own benefits. It resulted in human societies shifting from hunting and
gathering to agriculture where there is a time lag of a few days to weeks or
months between ploughing and harvesting of crops, which promoted production in
excess of consumption required by the individuals or their families. At a later
stage, this protection against theft and robbery promoted trade by assuring
travelling merchants the safety of their goods when they moved it from place of
production to places of consumption.

 

In the digital
economy of the 21st century, as the nature of assets changed, recognition
of private property is visible in the clamour for protection of Intellectual
Property (IP) that comes from technology companies and Startups who invest
their efforts in creating it. As a result, economies that protected IPs like
the USA and Europe have had accelerated economic growth and other economies
have since emulated them by enacting enforceable IP laws to promote local IP
creation.

 

The second impetus to economic growth came
from the use of credit for commercial activities which pulled in future demand
into the present time. For long periods in human history, lending and borrowing
were in the realm of social activity, where an individual or a household in
short supply would borrow their daily necessities from their neighbours. In the
social realm, the quantity borrowed and the quantity returned were the same. As
the goods borrowed changed from items of daily necessities to seeds for farming
and goods / money for trade, the concept of interest emerged. The borrowers
induced the lenders to part with their valuables by promising them a share of
their gains. Being a voluntary act motivated by profit, the lenders wanted an
assurance that the borrowers would honour their promise.

 

Given the
substantial benefits that accrue to the society, in the early stages regulators
created deterrents like bonded labour and imprisonment for the defaulting
borrowers. In later stages it took the form of enacting insolvency and
bankruptcy laws like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that India enacted in
2016 which empowers lenders to enforce the promise made by the borrowers by
taking control of their assets.

 

Progress in enacting and enforcing the
Intellectual Property laws and enabling quick recovery of loans shows the
primary role played by private property and commercial lending in accelerating
economic activity. This rule of law is a primary prerequisite for economic
development and growth. At the next level, economic activity can be further
accelerated by ensuring good governance which has two components – political
governance and corporate governance, which is reflected in the social and moral
ethos of society even though its roots can be traced back to regulatory
enactments.

 

Part 2: Promoting business and protecting
stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era

By combining the three concepts of joint
ownership, limited liability and transferability of shares in one commercial
entity, which is the joint stock companies, the foundation was laid for rapid
and sustained economic progress. This new entity enabled collaboration among
large numbers of investors to undertake projects of longer gestation periods,
which would have been unimaginable without joint stock companies. This boon,
however, is not without reservations as it comes with significant drawbacks
that are visible in the periodic corporate scandals that have erupted across
the globe due to misuse of the limited liability provision combined with the
separation of ownership from operational controls.

 

Corporate scandals seen in the last five
centuries can be traced to one of these three elements – (a) indiscreet use of
corporate assets, (b) diversion of corporate assets for personal use, or (c)
misuse of corporate business information for personal gains. These concerns are
not new and were expressed when the first company was created. However, these
concerns were overlooked as the economic benefit from these companies was
substantial. The very first joint stock company was formed in the year 1553 in
London to find a trade route to China through the North Seas, although it ended
up finding a profitable trade opportunity with Russia. It sought to address
these concerns by prescribing three basic qualifications of ‘sad, discreet and
honest’ for their directors who held operational control of the company. While
discreet and honest are self-explanatory, the word ‘sad’ is derived from the
word ‘sated or satisfied’, to denote a satisfied individual who would take care
of the interest of minority shareholders and other stakeholders without
diluting it for his own personal interests.

 

Table
2: Major regulatory initiatives in corporate law

 

Year

Regulatory initiative

Trigger

Protection to stakeholders

1856

The
Limited Liability Companies Act, England

Need
for larger investments in manufacturing facilities due to the industrial
revolution using steam power that required collaboration by a larger number
of investors

Brought
in the concept of ‘perfect publicity’. This phrase was used for transparent
reporting at that time, to protect minority shareholders and other
stakeholders

1890s

Concept
of private limited companies introduced in England

Excessive
regulations for incorporating companies mandated due to the outrage triggered
by the Solomon vs. Solomon case where the promoter as debenture holder was
repaid ahead of unsecured creditors, who remained unpaid

A
private company had legal restrictions placed on the method of fund-raising
and free transfer of shares to prevent investors who are not connected with
promoters from participation

1932

Securities
Exchange Commission, USA

Need
for capital infusion to revive the US economy that shrank by more than a
quarter, i.e. 27%, following the 1929 stock market crash

Insider
trading was defined as illegal to encourage retail investors to invest,
thereby reviving the economy

1961

Outcome
of the case of Cady Roberts & Co., USA

Rampant
misuse of information by outsiders with inside information

Brought
‘outsiders’ with insider information under regulatory purview to protect
retail and institutional investors

1992

Cadbury
Committee, England

Corporate
scandals of BCCI, Poly Peck, Coloroll plc and Maxwell where promoters misused
their position for personal benefit

Advocated
the concept of independent directors on corporate boards and audit committees
to protect retail shareholders & institutional investors

 

The last five centuries of corporate history
have not come up with any new concepts to redress the concerns of minority
shareholders and stakeholders but has only seen refinement and fine-tuning in
implementing the three qualities of ‘sad, discreet and honest’ that were
defined in the year 1553. Thus, we have seen movement from

 

  Sad or Satisfied Directors to Independent
Directors who are entrusted with the job of protecting minority shareholders
and other stakeholders,

  Discreet to fair disclosures to prevent
benefits accruing to individuals with inside information by regulating insider
trading, and

  Honest to Related Party Transactions at arm’s
length pricing to prevent individuals with control from misusing their powers
for their personal benefit in transactions with the company.

 

While these concepts are clear in principle
to protect stakeholders’ interests, it is in their implementation that
challenges arise. Despite the refinements made in the last five centuries, the
outcome is not as desired. As a result, we see a constant battle between
promoting Ease of Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders Interest, as seen
from the regulatory developments in India over the last two decades.

 

Part 3: Indian regulatory scene in the 21st century

The statutory endorsement of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992, the entity that was set up in 1988,
is a key element in the economic liberalisation process of the Indian economy.
Modelled on the SEC in the USA, it replaced the Controller of Capital Issues as
the regulator of new issues for raising funds from the public by companies.
Moving from a formula-based pricing to a market-based pricing mechanism, SEBI
led the movement to promote and enforce good corporate governance in India as
it seeks to protect stock market investors by preventing corporate scandals.
Following the path set by SEC, SEBI too embraced the principle of empowering
investors by providing them with the information required to make informed and
educated decisions. Hence, since its inception SEBI has mandated and nudged
companies to provide additional information or mandated more frequent
information sharing as the means to achieve better quality corporate
governance.

 

Table
3:
Key Indian regulator initiatives in the 21st
century

 

Year

Initiative

Trigger

Major recommendations

2000

Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate
Governance

To make Indian stock markets attractive as a destination
for capital inflows among the emerging markets by promoting good corporate
governance

25 practices for promoting good corporate governance,
of which 19 practices ‘are absolutely essential, clearly defined and could be
enforced by amending existing laws’ and classified as mandatory; the balance
six are listed as non-mandatory or recommended voluntary practices.
Implemented as Clause 49 of the listing agreement

2003

Narayanamurthy Committee on Corporate Governance

Stocktake of corporate governance practices in India
in the backdrop of corporate scandals in the USA

Strengthened the audit committee by defining members’
qualification roles, which included approval of related party transactions.
Also recommended real time disclosures of information important to investors
to prevent / reduce insider trading

2013

Companies Act, 2013

Satyam, Sahara and Saradha scams coming up in close
succession

Highly procedural systems outlined for companies
accepting public deposits and excluded interested shareholders from
participating in approving related party transactions. Both these measures
were significantly diluted after protests by promoters against the additional
burden placed on them

2017

Kotak Committee Report

Desire for higher quality of corporate governance to
bridge the valuation gap between performance of privately-owned companies and
publicly-owned companies, and public sector banks trading below their book
value and at a discount to private banks

Numerous practices aimed at reducing the gap between
the spirit of law and its practice in the corporate world regarding
independent directors, audit committees, related party transactions and
regulating insider trading, all with the intent of promoting higher quality
of corporate governance

2020

Covid-19 relaxations

Diluted requirements in many areas to enable
continuity of business during the country-wide lockdown period

In most cases, deferred the timeline for reporting,
reduced frequency of board meetings and permitted resolutions to be
considered in video / audio meetings that were in normal times banned

 

In the last two
decades, strengthening corporate governance or protecting stakeholder interests
has resulted in the prescription of multiple rules and procedures which
include, among others, to define an independent director, the minimum role of
the audit committee, elaborate systems for approving related party transactions
and complex processes for preventing insider trading to the detriment of other
investors. While these measures are well intended, historically they have not
served the purpose of preventing corporate scandals leading to erosion of
corporate shareholder value. Further, in the face of economic downturn or stock
market collapse, to stimulate economic activity many of the stringent controls
and systems mandated are diluted, despite knowing the adverse impact on
stakeholder interests.

 

Part 4: Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with protecting Stakeholder Interests

Ease of Doing Business is associated with
nil or reduced regulatory costs, efforts and time required to take and
implement any decision. On the other hand, protecting stakeholder interests
involves placing restraints on certain decisions or specifying some
pre-conditions for it. The key challenge in reconciling Ease of Doing Business
with protecting stakeholder interests is in designing restraints on actions
that protect stakeholder interests without translating into additional costs,
efforts or time required to complete the actions.

 

In achieving such a reconciliation,
technology, especially electronic messaging and e-voting should be liberally
used to convert representative democracy, as manifest in decision-making by the
board of directors, to participatory democracy of shareholder decision-making.
Further, in this digital era of cashless economy and compulsory
de-materialisation of shares mandated for all public companies, use of
electronic records should be prescribed for record-keeping by companies.

 

A brief analysis of the restraints that are
in place to protect stakeholder interests in the corporate law as it exists
today is listed here along with the changes proposed for protecting stakeholder
interest while at the same time promoting Ease of Doing Business.

 

Certification
of company’s reports:
Certain reports that are
prepared by the company and shared with stakeholders are required to be
certified by specified professionals or professional agencies to assure
stakeholders of their veracity and fairness. These are reports like:

 

  •    Annual Accounts by statutory
    auditors,
  •    Corporate Governance report
    by practising company secretaries,
  •    Statutory compliances
    certificates by practising company secretaries, and
  •    Mandatory credit rating for
    issuing debt instruments.

 

Despite many instances where independent
professionals have failed in providing the required assurance, third party
certification is an effective means of assurance to all stakeholders. Measures
like limiting an auditor’s tenure through rotation, preventing the auditors
from providing consulting or advisory services that can dilute their
independence seek to prevent, if not reduce, the instances of failure. In this
regard, the initiative in the UK of getting the auditors to separate their
consulting business from audit firms needs to be closely watched to determine
its effectiveness for India to adopt the same.

 

Presence of
independent directors:
The concept of independent
directors was introduced in the corporate board rooms to protect the interests
of minority shareholders and other stakeholders from misuse of executive powers
by the promoters and executive management. This was especially the case with
respect to their role in approving related party transactions and staffing the
audit committees to prevent misreporting.

 

As seen in the last few decades, the role of
independent directors in preventing corporate scandals has had mixed results.
In a few cases, independent directors were ineffective and in a few other
instances, they have resigned at the first sign of trouble when their presence
was most needed.

 

Given this ineffectiveness, it is worth
considering whether all related party transactions should be put up for
approval of the shareholders. With the exemption for small value transactions
in place, defined with reference to the size of the company or an absolute
value, whichever is lower, for all other transactions shareholder approval
through e-voting should be considered as a cost-effective and efficient system,
with the Board’s role restricted to ensuring that accurate and adequate information
is provided to the shareholders for their decision-making. Given the dominance
of promoters in the ownership of companies, on specific issues like related
party transactions voting by majority of non-promoter shareholders present and
voting should be considered.

 

Pre-approval from a designated authority –
the regulatory cost and effort increases at higher levels of the hierarchy and
diminishes as the levels decrease. Further, the cost is related to the number
of occasions where the approval is sought to be obtained or the specified
intervals within which these meetings should be held. Different levels at which
approvals are required in the descending order of hierarchy and costs involved
are listed below:

 

From MCA for unlisted companies and / or SEBI
in case of listed companies,

From shareholders in a duly convened
meeting or postal ballot,

From the Board in a duly conveyed
meeting,

From the Board through a circular
resolution.

 

In certain exceptional cases like mergers or
demergers, approval from stakeholders like creditors and lenders is mandated to
ensure their interests are protected in restructuring the entity on which they
took their exposure, as its underlying value could change.

 

In the 19th century, proxy was an
effective means introduced to permit shareholders who were unable to attend
meetings in person. Given the technological advancement in the 21st
century, e-voting could be mandated for companies of all sizes to enable larger
participation of shareholders in decision-making. Over time, as shareholders
get used to e-voting, the proxy system can be dispensed with.

 

Further, the one-time Covid-19 relaxation
provided for conducting shareholder meetings in electronic mode be converted
into a permanent provision in the Act to enable greater shareholder
participation.

 

Providing advance notice – The regulatory specification that translates to time involved in
taking a decision based on the minimum time prescribed for undertaking an
activity.

Illustrations:

Shareholder meetings – 21 days’ advance
notice, plus, based on convention, 2 days’ postal time considered for delivery,

Board meetings – 7 days’ advance notice for
convening board meeting.

 

Given the widespread use of emails for
communication, combined with the need for investors to have PAN and / or
Aadhaar cards as part of their KYC, the time for providing advance notice can
be reduced to seven days in case of both board meetings and shareholder
meetings, thereby enabling faster decision-making. The current provision for
holding shareholder meetings at shorter notice requires consent from 95% of the
members. In companies with lesser number of members, inability to contact even
one or two shareholders to get their consent will render this provision
ineffective.

 

Filing of
returns with public authorities (MCA / Stock Exchanges):
The regulatory requirements specifying filing multiple returns with
the public authorities can be classified into two broad categories:

Event-based returns – Returns that are required to be filed only on the occurrence of
certain activities / transactions such as appointment or resignation of
directors, fund-raising;

Calendar-based returns: – Returns that are to be filed at periodic intervals reporting the
activity that occurred during that period, including filing of nil return or
reiteration of the status as on a given date such as annual filing of KYC form
for directors or half-yearly filing of MSME form;

Ease of
Doing Business
– Can
be promoted by reducing the cost and time for regulatory compliance by ensuring
event-based return filings to public authorities like MCA and SEBI are only for actions that require their prior
approval.
For all other returns that only notify actions already taken,
these returns be clubbed into a quarterly or annual return to be filed, thereby
reducing the compliance burden.

 

Maintenance
of internal records as evidence:
This includes
maintenance of registers for certain activities and minutes of shareholder and
board meetings that are required as evidence for future records or use in case
of disputes.

 

Initially encourage and subsequently mandate
companies to maintain all internal minutes and registers in electronic records
that are tamperproof, with audit trails for entries made; these can be retained
for long periods of time. Provision can also be made for stakeholders concerned
to have 24/7×365 days access to these records. This concept is in line with the
requirements for all public companies to have their shares in dematerialised
form. In the medium to long run, this will ensure elimination of disputes
related to incorrect records or absence of records.

 

The Covid-19 pandemic in March, 2020 by
imposing significant restrictions on the normal way of life has provided an
opening for digital technology to change our lives forever. In the governance
and compliance field, while exemptions are being provided on a transactional
basis, can we use this opportunity to make a transformational change in protecting
stakeholder value and at the same time promote Ease of Doing Business by
embracing technology?

INTEGRATED REPORTING – A PARADIGM SHIFT IN REPORTING

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years there has been a paradigm shift in how the
performance of a company is viewed – it is no longer viewed only by how much
profits the company made, how much did it pay shareholders, or how much taxes
did it pay to the government. At business and investor forums, companies are
increasingly being asked questions like ‘Is the company following sustainable
practices?’ ‘Is it following the best ethical practices?’ ‘Is there gender
equality?’ ‘Is it employing child labour?’ ‘What is it doing about climate
change?’

 

At the UN Climate Action Summit in 2019 a
young activist 17 years of age, Greta Thunberg from Sweden (who on 20th September,
2019 led the largest climate strike in history), gave a devastating speech
questioning why world leaders are not considering climate change and are
‘stealing the future’ from the next generation. She said: ‘You have stolen
my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I’m one of the lucky
ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing.
We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is
money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!’

 

Welcome to the brand new world of Integrated
Reporting.

 

WHAT IS INTEGRATED
REPORTING?

Beyond the traditional financial reporting,
there is a growing interest in reporting other matters and this has drawn the
attention of not only activists and companies (mainly goaded by activists), but
also regulators and governments. Various stakeholders have started realising
the need to have a fundamental change in reporting wherein the focus is not
only the financial capital but also on demonstrating the value created by the
company while operating within its social, economic and environmental system.

 

The intended change requires in-depth
understanding of all the building blocks of the value creation process of
business, to enable corporates to develop a reporting model which gives an
insightful picture of its performance and is considered sufficient to assess
the quality and sustainability of their performance.

 

Integrated Reporting is the process founded
on integrated thinking that results in a periodic integrated report by an
organisation about value creation over time and related communication to
stakeholders regarding aspects of value creation.

 

The evolution of Integrated Reporting can be
depicted as under:

 

 

The accumulation of all the above reporting
aspects of an organisation would culminate in what is called an ‘Integrated
Report’.

 

An Integrated Report, besides the financial,
regulatory information and management commentary, also contains reports on
sustainability and the environment to give users and the society a 360-degree
view of the overall impact which a company can have on the society.

 

As can be seen from the above, Chartered
Accountants as well as other professionals in the finance and related fields
who till now considered ‘financial reporting’ as their main job, will now
understand and get involved in much more ‘reporting’, especially since many of
these ‘reports’ would, sooner than later, need independent assertion or
attestations.

 

GLOBAL FOOTPRINTS OF
INTEGRATED REPORTING

International Integrated Reporting Council

Founded in August, 2010, the International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is a global coalition of regulators,
investors, companies, standard setters, the accounting profession, academia and
NGOs. The coalition promotes communication about value creation as the next
step in the evolution of corporate reporting.

 

The purpose of IIRC is to promote prosperity
for all and to protect our planet. Its mission is to establish integrated
reporting and thinking within mainstream business practice as the norm in the
public and private sectors. The vision that IIRC has is of a world in which
capital allocation and corporate behaviour are aligned to the wider goals of
financial stability and sustainable development through the cycle of integrated
reporting and thinking.

 

IIRC has issued the International Integrated
Reporting Framework (referred to as the <IR> Framework) to accelerate the
adoption of integrated reporting across the world. The framework applies
principles and concepts that are focused on bringing greater cohesion and
efficiency to the reporting process and adopting ‘integrated thinking’ as a way
of breaking down internal silos and reducing duplication. It improves the quality
of information available to providers of financial capital to enable a more
efficient and productive allocation of capital. Its focus on value creation,
and the capital used by business to create value over time contributes towards
a more financially stable global economy. The <IR> Framework was released
following extensive consultation and testing by businesses and investors in all
regions of the world, including the 140 businesses and investors from 26
countries that participated in the IIRC Pilot Programme. The purpose of the
Framework is to establish Guiding Principles and Content Elements that govern
the overall content of an integrated report, and to explain the fundamental
concepts that underpin them.

 

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED REPORT <IR>

As per IIRC, the Integrated Report <IR>
should provide insight into the company’s strategy and how it relates to the
company’s ability to create value in the short, medium and long term and to its
use of and effects on capital. It should depict the combination,
inter-relatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the
company’s ability to create value over time. Further, it should provide insight
into the nature and quality of the company’s relationships with its key
stakeholders, including how and to what extent the company understands, takes
into account and responds to their legitimate needs and interests. The report
also provides truthful information about the company, whether the same is
positive or negative. The information in the report should be presented:

(a)        On
a basis that is consistent over time;

(b)        In
a way that enables comparison with other organisations to the extent it is
material to the company’s own ability to create value over time.

 

SIX CAPITALS OF INTEGRATED
REPORTING <IR>

 

 

1. Financial Capital:

This describes the pool of funds that is
available to the organisation for use in the production of goods or provision
of services. It can be obtained through financing, such as debt, equity or
grants, or generated through operations or investments.

 

2. Manufactured Capital:

It is seen as human-created,
production-oriented with equipment and tools. It can be available to the
organisation for use in the production of goods or the provision of services,
including buildings, equipment and infrastructure (such as roads, ports,
bridges and waste and water treatment plants).

 

3. Natural Capital:

The company needs to present its activities
which had positive or negative impact on the natural resources. It is basically
an input to the production of goods or the provision of services. It can
include water, land, minerals, forests, biodiversity, ecosystems, etc.

 

4. Human Capital (carrier is the
individual):

This deals with people’s skills and
experience, their capacity and motivations to innovate, including their:

  •         Alignment with and support of the
    organisation’s governance framework and ethical values such as its recognition
    of human rights;
  •         Ability to understand and implement an
    organisation’s strategy;
  •         Loyalties and motivations for improving
    processes, goods and services, including their ability to lead and to
    collaborate.

 

5. Social
Capital:

This deals with institutions and
relationships established within and between each community, group of
stakeholders and other networks to enhance individual and collective
well-being. It would include common values and behaviours, key relationships,
the trust and loyalty that an organisation has developed and strives to build
and protect with customers, suppliers and business partners.

 

6. Intellectual
Capital:

This discusses a key element to a company’s
future earning potential, with a tight link and contingency between investment
in research and development, innovation, human resources and external
relationships. This can be a company’s competitive advantage.

 

RECENT GLOBAL INITIATIVES

In September, 2020 the following five
framework and standard-setting institutions came together to show a commitment
to work towards a Comprehensive Corporate Reporting System:

(i)         Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI)

(ii)        Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB)

(iii)       CDP
Global

(iv) Climate Disclosure Standard Board (CDSB)

(v)        International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC).

 

GRI, SASB, CDP and CDSB set the frameworks / standards for
sustainability disclosure, including climate-related reporting, along with the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) recommendations. IIRC
provides the integrated reporting framework that connects sustainability
disclosure to reporting on financial and other capitals.

 

The intent of this collaboration is to
provide:

(a)        Joint
market guidance on how the frameworks and standards can be applied in a
complementary and additive way,

(b)        Joint
vision of how these elements could complement financial generally accepted
accounting principles (Financial GAAP) and serve as a natural starting point
for progress towards a more coherent, comprehensive corporate reporting system,

(c)        Joint
commitment to drive towards this goal, through an ongoing programme of deeper
collaboration between the five institutions and stated willingness to engage
closely with other interested stakeholders.

 

In September, 2020 the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation published a consultation paper
on sustainability reporting inviting comments by 31st December, 2020
on:

(I)        Assess
the current situation;

(II)       Examine
the options – i.e., maintain the status quo, facilitate existing
initiatives, create a Sustainable Standards Board and become a standard-setter
working with existing initiatives and building upon their work;

(III)      Reducing
the level of complexity and achieving greater consistency in sustainable
reporting.

 

In October, 2020 the International Auditing and Assurance Standards
Board (IAASB) highlighted areas of focus related to consideration of
climate-related risks when conducting an audit of financial statements in
accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) by issuing a
document, ‘Consideration of Climate-Related risks in an Audit of Financial
Statements’.

 

If climate change impacts the entity, auditors need to consider whether
the financial statements appropriately reflect this in accordance with the
applicable financial reporting framework (i.e., in the context of risks of
material misstatement related to amounts and disclosures that may be affected
depending on the facts and circumstances of the entity).

 

In November, 2020, IFRS issued a document on ‘Effects of climate-related
matters on financial statements’ – companies are now required to consider
climate-related matters in applying IFRS Standards when the effect of those
matters is material in the context of the financial statements taken as a
whole. The document also contains a tabulated summary of examples illustrating
when IFRS Standards may require companies to consider the effects of
climate-related matters in applying the principles in a number of Standards.

 

Auditors also need to understand how climate-related risks relate to
their responsibilities under the professional standards and the applicable laws
and regulations. (An illustrative audit report where a Key Audit Matter on
‘Potential impact of climate change’ is given in the feature ‘From Published
Accounts’ by the same author on page 75 of this issue.)

 

The importance of Integrated Reporting <IR> can be gauged by the
fact that HRH Prince Charles in 2004 founded the Accounting for Sustainability
Project (A4S). A4S is challenging accountants to save the world by helping
companies meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. At present,
A4S has a presence across the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia
Pacific. Its Accounting Bodies Network includes 16 accounting bodies representing
2.4 million accountants in 181 countries, or nearly two-thirds of accountants
globally. Its goal is to inspire action in the global finance industry and
drive a fundamental shift towards resilient business models and a sustainable
economy.

 

‘The risks from environmental, social and economic crises are clear to
see – not just for our planet and society, but also the future resilience of
the global economy,’
said A4S executive Chairman Jessica Fries who led a session titled ‘Can
Accountants Save the World?’ at the 20th World Congress of Accountants, Sydney,
in 2018. She added, ‘Finance leadership and innovation are essential to the
changes needed to tackle these risks and to create the businesses of tomorrow.
The accountancy and finance profession are uniquely placed to create both
sustainable and commercially viable business models’.

 

INTEGRATED REPORTING
<IR> IN INDIA

In 2017, the Securities Exchange Board of
India (SEBI) had issued a circular encouraging the Top 500 companies of India
to consider the use of the Integrated Reporting <IR> framework for annual
reporting. The circular was delivered on the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) principle 16 which states that ‘there should be
full, accurate and timely disclosure of information that is material to
investors’ decisions’.

 

Since then, the companies have started their
integrated reporting journey. In 2019, it was noticed that approximately 100 of
the top 500 companies have reported on Integrated Reporting in their Annual
Reports. Further, SEBI also issued a ‘Consultation Paper on the Format for
Business Responsibility & Sustainability Reporting’ to invite the views of
various stakeholders.

 

In India, several companies included
information on emissions management, water conservation, energy reduction,
human rights and similar topics in the annual report or published / hosted the
same in a separate sustainability report. The transition from corporate social
responsibility to sustainability reporting focused on moving from philanthropic
social impact to stating the impact on natural and human capital. Moving to
Integrated Reporting <IR> would further broaden the report to be
inclusive of all material capitals, connecting them to business risks, its
related decisions and outcomes in the short, medium and long term.

 

Several leading companies in India have
already started issuing Integrated Reports and reporting on the six capitals of
Integrated Reporting listed above. These additional aspects of reporting can
result in an extra 15 to 20 pages of reporting, depending on the use of
graphics, etc. Some of the leading companies that have started issuing
Integrated Reporting are Reliance Industries Ltd., Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd., HDFC Ltd., ITC Ltd., Tata Steel Ltd., Bharti Airtel Ltd., WIPRO Ltd.,
Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. and so on. Though some disclosures in these reports are of the
‘boilerplate’ type, these would evolve in course of time to carry more
meaningful information.

 

INTEGRATED REPORTING AND
THE ICAI

In February, 2015 the ICAI constituted a
group on Integrated Reporting and in February, 2020 it constituted the
Sustainability Reporting Standards Board (SRSB), respectively. The mission of
SRSB is to take appropriate measures to increase awareness and implement
measures towards responsible business conduct; its terms of reference, inter
alia,
include developing audit guidance for Integrated Reporting and to
benchmark global best practices in Sustainability Reporting.

 

ICAI has, to encourage SEBI, also introduced
India’s first award to celebrate the business practice of Integrated Reporting,
internationally acknowledged as the emerging best practice in corporate
reporting.

 

IN CONCLUSION

A recent trend in investing is
‘Environmental, Social and Governance or ESG Investing’. ESG investing refers
to a class of investing that is also known as ‘sustainable investing’. This is
an umbrella term for investments that seek positive returns and long-term
impact on society, environment and the performance of the business. Many
investors are now not only interested in the financial outcomes of investments,
they are also interested in the impact of their investments and the role their
assets can have in promoting global issues such as climate action. Although big
in global investments, ESG funds, which imbibe environment, social
responsibility and corporate governance in their investing process, are
witnessing growing interest in the Indian mutual fund industry, too. As per
reports, there are currently three ESG schemes managing around Rs. 5,000
crores.

 

Trust in a company is achievable through transparent behaviour and is a
key success factor for the business to operate, innovate and grow. Integrated
Reporting <IR> is promoting the need to answer important questions around
long-term value creation and in a world where economic instability and
long-term sustainability threaten the welfare of society. Integrated Reporting
<IR> is not the ultimate goal. It is only the beginning to take the world
towards more sustainability, to make it a better place for the future
generations.

 

Rectification of mistakes – Section 154 of ITA, 1961 – Section 154(1A) places an embargo on power of rectification of assessment order in cases where matter had been considered and decided in appeal or revision – However, there is no embargo on power of amendment if an appeal or revision is merely pending since such pending appeal / revision does not assume character of a subjudice matter

21. Piramal Investment Opportunities
Fund vs. ACIT;
[2019]
111 taxmann.com 5 (Bom.) Date
of order: 4th September, 2019
A.Y.:
2015-16

 

Rectification of mistakes – Section 154 of ITA, 1961 –
Section 154(1A) places an embargo on power of rectification of assessment order in cases where matter had been considered
and decided in appeal or revision – However, there is no embargo on power of amendment if
an appeal or revision is merely pending since such pending appeal / revision
does not assume character of a subjudice matter

 

For the A.Y. 2015-16, the assessee had paid advance tax of Rs. 16.80
crores. In the original return, the assessee had computed total income at Rs.
65.66 crores. In the revised return the total income was computed at Nil. The
AO completed the assessment u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that
the AO did not give credit for the advance tax of Rs.16.80 crores. The assessee
also made an application u/s 154 to the AO for rectification of the mistake.
The assessee stated that by a mistake apparent on record, the credit of payment
of advance tax of Rs.16.80 crores had not been given and the assessee was
entitled to a refund. The AO rejected the rectification application stating
that the assessee did not inform that an appeal was filed on the same issue for
which rectification was sought. Since the assessee was agitating on similar
ground before the appellate authority, it was not proper on the part of the AO,
following the doctrine of judicial discipline, to adjudicate on the same issue
pending before the appellate authority; therefore, the rectification
application assumed the character of a subjudice matter.

 

Thereafter, the assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order of
the AO. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘(i)      Section 154(1A) provides
that where any matter has been considered and decided in any proceeding by way
of appeal or revision, contained in any law for the time being in force, such
order shall not be amended. Section 154(1A), thus, places an embargo on the
power of rectification in cases where the matter has been considered and
decided in appeal or revision. It is of importance that the legislature has
used the phrase “considered and decided” in the past tense.

 

(ii)      The phrase “considered
and decided” cannot be read as “pending consideration in appeal or revision”.
To do so would be adding and changing the plain language of the statute. By
modifying and adding the words in this manner, which is not permissible, the
Assistant Commissioner has divested himself of the power of amendment. In view
of the plain language of section 154, there is no embargo on the power of
amendment if an appeal or revision is merely pending.

 

(iii)      The rejection of the
rectification application on this ground was unwarranted. The appeal is still
pending. The Assistant Commissioner has failed to exercise the jurisdiction
vested in him and, thus, the impugned order will have to be set aside and the
application will have to be decided.

 

(iv)     The Writ Petition succeeds.
The impugned order is to be quashed and set aside. The rectification
application filed by the petitioner u/s 154 stands restored to the file of
Assistant Commissioner to be disposed of on its own merits.’

 

Section 9, Article 7 of India-Qatar DTAA – Non-compete fees received under an independent agreement executed after sale of shares was business income which, in absence of PE / business connection in India, was not taxable in India – Shareholding in Indian company by itself would not trigger business connection in India

12. TS-683-ITAT-2019 (Mum.) ITO vs. Mr. Prabhakar Raghavendra Rao ITA No.: 3985/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 6th November, 2019

 

Section 9, Article 7 of India-Qatar DTAA –
Non-compete fees received under an independent agreement executed after sale of
shares was business income which, in absence of PE / business connection in
India, was not taxable in India – Shareholding in Indian company by itself
would not trigger business connection in India

 

FACTS

The assessee, a
non-resident individual, was a director and shareholder in an Indian company
(ICo). During the relevant accounting year, he sold the shares of ICo and
offered the same to tax as capital gains. Subsequently, he entered into a
non-compete and non-solicitation agreement with the buyer for not carrying on
similar business in India for ten years.

 

The assessee contended that the non-compete fee received by him was in
the nature of business income. Since he did not have any business connection in
India, the fee was not taxable in India under Article 7 of the India-Qatar
DTAA.

But the AO
contended that shareholding in the Indian company had resulted in a business
connection in India. Hence, the non-compete fee received from the sale of
shares was to be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Alternatively, such fee
was part and parcel of the share sale transaction and hence was to be taxed as
capital gains.

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) ruled in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved, the AO filed an appeal
before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(i)     The assessee first transferred the shares
held in ICo. Subsequently, independent of the share transfer, he entered into a
non-compete and non-solicitation fee agreement for not carrying on similar
business in India for ten years;

(ii)     The non-compete fee was business income
since it was received for restraint from trade for a period of ten years.
Hence, it could not be considered part and parcel of the share sale
transaction;

(iii)    Business income is taxable in India only if
the assessee has a business connection or PE in India. Shareholding in an
Indian company by itself would not result in a business connection in India;

(iv)    In the absence of a business connection or PE
in India, the non-compete fee was not taxable in India.  

 

 

 

Section 167B(1) of the Act – Where foreign company is a member of an AOP and share of profits of the members is indeterminate or unknown, income of AOP is subject to maximum marginal rate applicable to foreign company

11. TS-659-ITAT-2019 (Chny.) M/s. Herve Pomerleau International CCCL
Joint Venture vs. ACIT ITA Nos.: 1008/Chny/2017, 17, 18 &
19/Chny/2019
A.Ys.: 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 &
2013-14 Date of order: 21st October, 2019

 

Section 167B(1) of the Act – Where foreign
company is a member of an AOP and share of profits of the members is
indeterminate or unknown, income of AOP is subject to maximum marginal rate
applicable to foreign company

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
consortium between an Indian and a foreign company. It was taxable as an
Association of Persons (AOP) under the Act. The consortium was set up to
execute a contract in India. While the consortium agreement and the
profit-sharing agreement were silent about the profit-sharing ratio of members,
they mentioned that profit before tax on the project would be finally
determined after completion of the project and that the foreign company would
be paid a guaranteed profit share equivalent to 2% of the contract price. The
consortium agreement further mentioned that the obligation to pay the guaranteed
amount was not on the AOP but on the Indian company.

 

The assessee
contended that it was a ‘determinate’ AOP, hence it offered income for tax at
the maximum marginal rate (MMR) applicable to an Indian company.

 

But the AO held
that the assessee was an ‘indeterminate’ AOP. Hence, its income was to be taxed
at the MMR applicable to a foreign company. Therefore, he initiated
re-assessment proceedings under the Act.

 

The CIT(A)
dismissed the appeal of the assessee who filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(a)   Admittedly, the consortium was assessed as an
AOP;

(b)   Section 167B(1) of the Act would apply if the
shares of the members of the AOP are indeterminate or unknown;

(c)   Perusal of the consortium and profit-sharing
agreements showed that the agreement was silent about the profit-sharing ratio
of its members. However, the foreign company was guaranteed 2% of the contract
price as its profit. The obligation to pay the guaranteed amount was not on the
AOP but on the Indian company;

(d)   The term ‘share of net profit’ implies a
‘share in the net profits’ which is an interest in the profits as profits,
which implies a participation in profits and losses;

(e)   In the facts of the case, the foreign company
was entitled to 2% of the project cost regardless of whether the AOP made
profits or losses. Thus, the minimum guarantee was a charge against the profits
of the AOP but not a share in the profits of the AOP. Therefore, the share of
the members in the profit of the AOP could not be said to be determinate or known;

(f)    Accordingly, the AOP was subject to section
167B(1) of the Act. Consequently, its income was subject to tax at the MMR
applicable to foreign companies.

Section 195 – As services of copyediting, indexing and proofreading do not qualify as FTS, tax could not be withheld u/s 195 of the Act

10. TS-640-ITAT-2019 (Chny.) DCIT vs. M/s Integra Software Services Pvt.
Ltd. ITA No.: 2189/Chny/2017
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 11th October, 2019

 

Section 195 – As services of copyediting,
indexing and proofreading do not qualify as FTS, tax could not be withheld u/s
195 of the Act

 

FACTS

The assessee was
engaged in the business of undertaking editorial services, multilingual
typesetting and data conversion. The assessee outsourced language translation
to various vendors in the USA, the UK, Germany and Spain and made certain
payments to them without withholding tax, on the ground that such services were
not in nature of FTS.

 

However, the AO
concluded that such payments were subject to withholding and, consequently,
disallowed payments made u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) concluded that payments made to tax residents of
the USA and the UK did not make available technology to the assessee and hence
they were not FIS under the India-USA DTAA and the India-UK DTAA. Thus, tax was
not required to be withheld from such payments. He, however, held that payments
made to the tax residents of Germany and Spain were in the nature of FTS and in
the absence of ‘make available’ condition in the relevant DTAAs, it was subject
to withholding of tax.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

Copyediting, indexing and proofreading services only require knowledge
of language and not expertise in the subject matter of the text. Hence such
services could not be considered as technical services. Reliance in this regard
was placed on the decision of the Chennai Tribunal in Cosmic Global Ltd.
vs. ACIT (2014) 34 ITR (Trib.) 114
.

 

Since the services
rendered were not technical services, payments made to NRs were not taxable in
India and were also not subject to withholding of tax under the Act.

 

Article 7 of India-Germany DTAA – In absence of common link in terms of contracts / projects, expats, nature of activities, location, or contracting parties, income from activities in India, though similar to activities of PE, could not be attributed to PE by invoking Force of Attraction rule

9. TS-630-ITAT-2019 (Del.) M/s Lahmeyer International vs. ACIT ITA No.: 4960/Del/2004 A.Y.: 2001-02 Date of order: 9th October, 2019

 

Article 7 of India-Germany DTAA – In
absence of common link in terms of contracts / projects, expats, nature of
activities, location, or contracting parties, income from activities in India,
though similar to activities of PE, could not be attributed to PE by invoking
Force of Attraction rule

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
company incorporated in, and tax resident of, Germany. It was engaged in the
business of engineering consulting. During the relevant assessment year the
assessee rendered consultancy services in relation to ten power projects in
India and received Fees for Technical Services (FTS).

 

According to the
assessee, only one of the projects constituted a PE in India. Hence, on FTS
received from that project the assessee paid tax u/s 115A of the Act @ 20% on
gross basis; on the other projects it paid tax @ 10% under Article 12 of the
India-Germany DTAA.

 

The AO observed
that the contracts were artificially split by the assessee to avoid tax and,
applying the force of attraction (FOA) rule, concluded that the entire income
was attributable to PE and chargeable to tax @ 20%.

 

After the CIT(A)
upheld the order of the AO, the aggrieved assessee filed an appeal before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

(1)    FOA rule under India-Germany DTAA provides
that profits derived from business activities which are of the same kind as
those effected through a PE can be attributed to the PE, if the following
conditions are satisfied cumulatively:

(a) The transaction
was resorted to in order to avoid tax in PE state;

(b)    In some way, PE is involved in such
transaction;

 

(2)    Considering the following factors, the
Tribunal held that the FOA rule could not be applied as PE was not involved in
other projects:

(i)     All the projects undertaken by the assessee
were independent contracts with unrelated parties and the scope of work,
liabilities and risk involved in each of the contracts was independent of each
other;

(ii)     Specific sets of activities were performed
under each project as per the terms of the contracts and such activities were
not interlinked with each other;

(iii)    The projects were carried out using different
teams at a given point of time;

(iv)    RBI regulations stipulated a separate project
office for each project. Funds of each project could be used only for the
specific project for which approval was granted and could not be used for any
other project;

(v)    Each project had a different location. The
work was carried out either from the project site of the client or from the
head office outside India. This demonstrates that owing to the different
geographical location where each project was executed in India, there was no
possibility of the PE to play a part or be involved in the other projects in
India.

 

(3)    For applying the FOA rule there should be
some common link to every contract / project, such as common expats, common
nature of contract / project, common location, common contracting parties, etc.
Such commonality was absent in the case of the assessee. Hence, the FOA rule
could not be applied.

 

(4)    Accordingly, the FTS received by the assessee
under other contracts could not be attributed to a PE in India. Hence, such FTS
was taxable @ 10%.

Section 271(1)(c) – AO initiated penalty proceedings on being satisfied that inaccurate particulars of income were furnished but levied penalty on the grounds of furnishing ‘inaccurate particulars’ as well as ‘concealment’ – Order passed by AO held void

7.  Fairdeal Tradelink Company vs. ITO Members:
Vikas Awasthy (J.M.) and G.
Manjunatha (A.M.) ITA No.:
3445/Mum/2016
A.Y.:
2011-12 Date of
order: 5th November, 2019
Counsel
for Assessee / Revenue:  R.C. Jain and
Ajay D. Baga / Samatha Mullamudi

 

Section
271(1)(c) – AO initiated penalty proceedings on being satisfied that inaccurate
particulars of income were furnished but levied penalty on the grounds of
furnishing ‘inaccurate particulars’ as well as ‘concealment’ – Order passed by
AO held void

 

FACTS

In the assessment proceedings, STT on
speculative transactions was disallowed by the AO. Penalty proceedings u/s
271(1)(c) were initiated for filing inaccurate particulars of income.

 

However, while levying the penalty, the AO
mentioned both the charges of section 271(1)(c), i.e., furnishing of
‘inaccurate particulars of income’ as well as ‘concealment’. The assessee
challenged the penalty on the ground that a penalty can only be levied on the
grounds for which the proceedings were initiated.

 

HELD

On a perusal of
the records of the proceedings, the Tribunal noted that the AO, at the time of
recording satisfaction, had mentioned only about furnishing ‘inaccurate
particulars’ as the reason for initiation of penalty proceedings. However, at
the time of levy of penalty, he mentioned both the charges of section 271(1)(c)
of the Act, i.e., furnishing ‘inaccurate particulars’ and ‘concealment’.

 

According to the Tribunal, this reflected
the ambiguity in the mind of the AO with regard to levying penalty. Relying on
the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Samson
Perinchery (392 ITR 04)
, the Tribunal held that the order passed u/s
271(1)(c) suffered legal infirmity and hence was void.

 

Section 147 / 154 – AO cannot take recourse to explanation 3 to section 147 while invoking section 154 after the conclusion of proceedings u/s 147

6.  JDC Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. Commissioner of
Income-tax
Members: G.S.
Pannu (V.P.) and K. Narasimha Chary (J.M.) ITA No.:
5886/Del/2015
A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order:
11th October, 2019
Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Sanat Kapoor / Sanjog Kapoor

Section 147 / 154 – AO cannot take recourse
to explanation 3 to section 147 while invoking section 154 after the conclusion
of proceedings u/s 147

 

FACTS

For the assessment year 2007-08, the
assessee filed his return of income declaring a total income of Rs. 65.33 lakhs
and the same was processed u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the AO reopened the
proceedings u/s 148 claiming escapement of income on account of purchase of
foreign exchange to the tune of Rs. 4.78 lakhs and made an addition thereof.
Later, on a perusal of the assessment records, he found that the assessee had
shown closing stock in the profit and loss account at Rs. 2.97 crores, whereas
in the schedule the same was shown as Rs. 3.32 crores, leaving a difference of
Rs. 34.54 lakhs. He, therefore, issued a notice u/s 154/155.

 

The assessee explained the reason for the
discrepancy and also submitted that the scope of section 154 does not permit
anything more than the rectification of the mistake that is apparent from the
record and that, insofar as the proceedings u/s 147 are concerned, there was no
mistake in the assessment order.

 

However, the AO as well as the CIT(A) did
not agree with the assessee’s contention. According to the CIT(A), explanation
3 to section 147 empowers the AO to assess or re-assess the income which had
escaped assessment and which comes to the notice of the AO subsequently in the
course of proceedings u/s 147.

 

The issue before
the Tribunal was whether the AO could take recourse to explanation 3 to section
147 to make the above addition after the conclusion of proceedings u/s 147.

 

HELD

According to the
Tribunal, had the AO re-assessed the issue relating to the closing stock in the
proceedings u/s 147, the assessee could not have objected to the AO’s action.
However, in the entire proceedings u/s 147 there was not even a whisper about
the closing stock. In such an event, the Tribunal found it difficult to accept
the argument of the Revenue that even after conclusion of the proceedings u/s
147, the AO can take recourse to explanation 3 to section 147 to make the
addition.

 

According to the Tribunal, if the argument
of the Revenue that u/s 154 the AO is empowered to deal with the escapement of
income in respect of which the reasons were not recorded even after the
assessment reopened u/s 147 is completed, then it would empower the AO to go on
making one addition after another by taking shelter of explanation 3 to section
147 endlessly. Such a course is not permissible. The power that is available to
the AO under explanation 3 to section 147 is not available to him u/s 154 after
the conclusion of the proceedings u/s 147.

Section 80-IB(10) – Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) cannot be denied even if the return of income is filed beyond the due date u/s 139(1) owing to bona fide reasons

10. [2019] 72
ITR 402 (Trib.) (Chand.)
Himuda vs. ACIT ITA Nos.: 480,
481 & 972/Chd/2012
A.Ys.: 2006-07,
2007-08 & 2009-10 Date of order:
10th May, 2019

 

Section
80-IB(10) – Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) cannot be denied even if the return of
income is filed beyond the due date u/s 139(1) owing to bona fide
reasons

 

FACTS

The assessee
filed his return of income beyond the due date u/s 139(1). Later, he filed
revised return claiming deduction u/s 80-IB(10). The AO rejected this claim for
the reason that the original return had been filed beyond the due date
specified u/s 139(1). The Commissioner (Appeals) also confirmed the action. The
assessee therefore appealed to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The first factual observation made by the
Tribunal was that the delay in filing return of income was on account of the
local audit department and an eligible deduction cannot be denied due to
technical default owing to such bona fide reason.

 

Based on a
harmonious reading of sections 139(1), 139(5) and 80AC, the Tribunal considered
various decisions available on the issue:

(i)        DHIR
Global Industrial Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No. 2317/Del/2010 for A.Y. 2006-07;

(ii)        Unitech
Ltd. in ITA No. 1014/Del/2012 for A.Y. 2008-09;

(iii)       Venkataiya
in ITA No. 984/Hyd/2011;

(iv)       Hansa
Dalkoti in ITA No. 3352/Del/2011;

(v)        SAM
Global Securities in ITA No. 1760/Del/2009;

(vi)       Symbosis
Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No. 501/Chd/2017;

(vii)     Venkateshwara Wires Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No.
53/Jai/2018.

 

The Tribunal applied the ratio of the above decisions to the
facts of the case and allowed the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s 80-IB,
primarily on the basis of the following three judgements:

 

(a) National
Thermal Power Company Ltd. vs. CIT 229 ITR 383;

(b) Ahmedabad
Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1993) 199 ITR 351 (FB);

(c) CIT vs.
Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 349 ITR 336 (Bom.).

 

In all these
decisions, the courts have held that the appellate authorities have
jurisdiction to deal not merely with any additional ground which became
available on account of change of circumstances or law, but also with
additional grounds which were available when the return was filed.

In National
Thermal Power Company (Supra)
, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal
is not prevented from considering questions of law arising in assessment which
were not raised earlier; the Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine a question of
law which arises from the facts as found by the authorities below and having a
bearing on the tax liability of the assessee.

 

Besides, the
full bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the cases of Ahmedabad
Electricity Company Ltd. vs. CIT
and Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd.
vs. CIT (1993) 199 ITR 351
observed that either at the stage of CIT(A)
or the Tribunal, the authorities can consider the proceedings before them and
the material on record for the purpose of determining the correct tax
liability. Besides, there was nothing in section 254 or section 251 which would
indicate that the appellate authorities are confined to considering only the
objections raised before them, or allowed to be raised before them, either by
the assessee or by the Department as the case may be. The Tribunal has
jurisdiction to permit additional grounds to be raised before it even though
these might not have arisen from any order of a lower appellate authority so
long as these grounds were in respect of the subject matter of the tax
proceedings. Similar ratio was held by the Bombay High Court in CIT
vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (Supra).

 

The Tribunal
further observed that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Goetze
(India) Limited vs. CIT (2006) 287 ITR 323
, relating to the restriction
of making the claim through a revised return was limited to the powers of the
assessing authority only and not the appellate authority.

 

An assessee cannot be burdened with the
taxes which he otherwise is not liable to pay under the law.

 

Section 148 – Issue of notice u/s 148 is a foundation for reopening of assessment and to be sent in the name of living person – Where notice is issued in the name of deceased person, the deceased person could not participate in assessment proceedings and even provisions of section 292BB could not save such invalid notice

9. [2019] 72
ITR 389 (Trib.) (Chand.)
S/Sh. Balbir
Singh & Navpreet Singh vs. ITO ITA Nos.: 657
& 658/CHD/2016
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order:
13th May, 2019

 

Section 148 –
Issue of notice u/s 148 is a foundation for reopening of assessment and to be
sent in the name of living person – Where notice is issued in the name of
deceased person, the deceased person could not participate in assessment
proceedings and even provisions of section 292BB could not save such invalid
notice

 

FACTS

The assessment
for A.Y. 2008-09 of the deceased assessee Balbir Singh was reopened u/s 147 of
the Act by way of issuance of a notice in his name only.

 

Considering the
manner of service of the notice and the name in which it was issued, the legal
heir contested the validity of the reopening before the Commissioner (Appeals).
However, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the action taken by the AO as to
the reopening as well as on merits.

 

Aggrieved, the
legal heir of the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that for valid reopening of a case, notice u/s 148 should be issued in
the name of the correct person. The notice has to be responded to and hence it
is a requirement that it should be sent in the name of a living person. This view
was based on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Sumit Balkrishna
Gupta vs. ACIT in Writ Petition No. 3569 of 2018, order dated 15th February,
2019
, wherein it was held that the issue of a notice u/s 148 of the Act
is the foundation for reopening of assessment.

 

It also relied
on another decision of the Delhi High Court in Rajender Kumar Sehgal vs.
ITO [2019] 101 taxmann.com 233 (Delhi)
wherein it was held that where
the notice seeking to reopen assessment was issued in the name of a deceased
assessee, since she could not have participated in reassessment proceedings,
provisions of section 292BB were not applicable to the case and as a
consequence the reassessment proceedings deserved to be quashed.

 

On the argument
of the learned D.R. that the legal heir of the assessee ought to have informed
the AO of the fact of the assessee’s death, the Tribunal said this contention
had no force because the notice was not served through registered post / or by
regular mode of service but was allegedly served through a substituted mode of
service, i.e., by affixation of the same at the door of the house of the
assessee and the report of service through affixation had not been witnessed by
any person.

 

The Tribunal
remarked, ‘It is not believable that the Revenue officials had visited the
house of the assessee and they could not get the information about the death of
the assessee despite affixation of the notice which is also required to be
witnessed by some independent / respectable (sic) of the village.’

 

The Tribunal
also found that even otherwise, the notice was never served at the address at
which the assessee was actually residing before death, which address was
available in a document with the Income Tax Officer.

 

Based on these
factual and legal grounds, the notice u/s 148 was held to be invalid.

Section 41(1) r.w.s. 28(iv) – Where assessee assigned its loan obligation to a third party by making a payment in terms of present value of future liability, surplus resulting from assignment of loan was not cessation or extinguishment of liability as loan was to be repaid by third party –The same could not be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee

8. [2019] 201
TTJ (Mum.) 1009
Cable
Corporation of India Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA Nos.:
7417/Mum/2010 & 7369/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2000-01 Date of order:
30th April, 2019

 

Section 41(1)
r.w.s. 28(iv) – Where assessee assigned its loan obligation to a third party by
making a payment in terms of present value of future liability, surplus
resulting from assignment of loan was not cessation or extinguishment of
liability as loan was to be repaid by third party –The same could not be
brought to tax in the hands of the assessee

 

FACTS

The assessee
company was engaged in the business of manufacturing and sales of cables.
During the year the assessee borrowed interest-free loan of Rs. 12 crores from
a company, MPPL, which was to be repaid over a period of 100 years. The said
loan was utilised for the purchase of shares by the assessee and not for its
line of activity / business. Thereafter, a tripartite agreement was entered
into between the assessee, MPPL and CPPL under which the obligation of repaying
the above-mentioned loan of Rs. 12 crores was assigned to CPPL at a discounted
present value of Rs. 0.36 crores. The resultant difference of Rs. 11.64 crores
was credited by the assessee to the profit and loss account as ‘gain on
assignment of loan obligation’ under the head income from other sources.
However, while computing the taxable income, the assessee reduced the said
amount from the taxable income on the ground that the same constituted a
capital receipt in the hands of the assessee and was not taxable.

 

The AO observed that the lender, MPPL, had
accepted the arrangement of assignment of loan to CPPL and CPPL had started
paying the instalments to MPPL as per the said tripartite agreement. Thus, the
liability of the assessee was ceased / extinguished; as such, the provisions of
section 41(1) were applicable to this case. He further observed that the
assessee during the course of his business borrowed funds to the tune of Rs. 12
crores and assigned the same to CPPL for Rs. 0.36 crores, thus the resultant
benefit of Rs. 11.6 crores by cessation of liability was a trading surplus and
had to be taxed. The AO further observed that the assessee himself had credited
Rs. 11.64 crores to the profit and loss account as gain on assignment of loan
under the head income from other sources. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
upheld the AO’s order.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
held that the assessee was in the line of manufacturing and trading of cables
and not the purchase and sale of shares and securities. It was apparent from
the facts that the loan was utilised for the purpose of purchase of shares
which was not a trading activity of the assessee. The liability of the loan of
Rs. 12 crores to be discharged over a period of 100 years was assigned to the
third party, viz., CPPL, by making a payment of Rs. 0.36 crores in terms of the
present value of the future liability and the surplus resulting from the
assignment of the loan liability was credited to the profit and loss account
under the head income from other sources; but while computing the total income,
the said income was reduced from the income on the ground that the surplus of
Rs. 11.64 crores represented capital receipt and, therefore, was not taxable.
It was true that both companies, MPPL and CPPL, were amalgamated with the
assessee later on with all consequences. So the issue was whether the surplus
Rs. 11.64 crores resulting from the assignment of loan to CPPL under the said
tripartite agreement between the assessee, MPPL and CPPL was a revenue receipt
liable to tax or a capital receipt as has been claimed by the assessee.

 

The purchase of
shares by the assessee was a non-trading transaction and was of capital nature.
The surplus resulting from the assignment of loan as referred to above was not
resulting from trading operation and therefore was not to be treated as revenue
receipt. The provisions of section 41(1) were not applicable to the said
surplus as its basic conditions were not fulfilled. In other words, the
assessee had not claimed it as deduction in the profit and loss account in the
earlier or in the current year. In order to bring an allowance or deduction
within the ambit of section 41(1), it was necessary that a deduction /
allowance was granted to the assessee.

 

In the instant
case, the loan was utilised for purchasing shares which was a capital asset in
the business of the assessee and the surplus resulting from assignment of loan
was a capital receipt not liable to be taxed either u/s 28(iv) or u/s 41(1).
Accordingly, the surplus arising from assignment of loan was not covered by the
provisions of section 41(1) and consequently could not be brought to tax either
u/s 28(iv) or u/s 41(1). Further, the surplus had resulted from the assignment
of liability as the assessee had entered into a tripartite agreement under
which the loan was to be repaid by the third party in consideration of payment
of net present value (NPV) of future liability. Thus, the surplus resulting
from assignment of loan at present value of future liability was not cessation
or extinguishment of liability as the loan was to be repaid by the third party
and, therefore, could not be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee.
Therefore, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was set aside and the AO was
directed to delete the addition of Rs. 11.64 crores.

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F of ITA, 1961 – Agreement to sell land in August, 2010 and earnest money received – Sale deed executed in July, 2012 – Purchase of residential house in April, 2010 – Assessee entitled to benefit u/s 54F

20. Kishorbhai
Harjibhai Patel vs. ITO;
[2019]
417 ITR 547 (Guj.) Date
of order: 8th July, 2019

A.Y.:
2013-14

 

Capital
gains – Exemption u/s 54F of ITA, 1961 – Agreement to sell land in August, 2010
and earnest money received – Sale deed executed in July, 2012 – Purchase of
residential house in April, 2010 – Assessee entitled to benefit u/s 54F

 

The
assessee entered into an agreement to sell agricultural land at Rs. 4 crores on
13th August, 2010. An amount of Rs. 10 lakhs towards the earnest
money was received by the assessee as part of the agreement. On 15th
October, 2011, possession of the land was handed over by the assessee to the
purchasers of the land. On 3rd July, 2012 the sale deed came to be
executed by the assessee in favour of the purchaser of the land. The assessee
had purchased a new residential house in April, 2010 and claimed exemption u/s
54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO denied the exemption on the ground that
the transfer of the land took place on 3rd July, 2012 and the
purchase of the residential house on 22nd April, 2010, thus it was beyond
the period of one year as required u/s 54F.

 

The
Tribunal upheld the decision of the AO.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘(i)      The Act gives a precise definition to the
term “transfer”. Section 2(47)(ii) of the Act talks about extinguishment of
rights. The Supreme Court, in Sanjeev Lal vs. CIT (2014) 365 ITYR 389
(SC)
is very clear that an agreement to sell would extinguish the
rights and this would amount to transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of
the Act. This definition of transfer given in the Act is only for the purpose
of the income-tax.

 

(ii)      The assessee had purchased the new
residential house in April, 2010. The agreement to sell which had been executed
on 13th April, 2010 (and) could be considered as the date on
which the property, i.e., the agricultural land had been transferred. Hence,
the assessee was entitled to the benefit u/s 54F.’