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ACCOUNTING BY HOLDERS OF CRYPTO ASSETS

According to a crypto research agency CREBACO, Indian crypto investments by October, 2021 had increased to over US $10 billion, with 105 million Indians, i.e., approximately 7.90% of India’s total population, owning cryptocurrency. Currently, numerous cryptocurrencies, crypto coins and crypto tokens are in circulation. Some cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are also used as an alternative to money, though its main use is as investment in an asset class. At the time of writing, over 12,000 different cryptocurrencies, crypto coins and crypto tokens were traded or listed on various crypto exchanges across the globe.

This article discusses the accounting by holders of crypto assets under Ind AS. A question arises that if crypto assets are not legal tenders, then would they fulfil the definition of asset in the first place. In accordance with the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS issued by the ICAI ‘An asset is a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events. An economic resource is a right that has the potential to produce economic benefits.’ The crypto assets are capable of producing economic benefits because they can be sold at a price and the economic benefits can be realised. Therefore, they would meet the definition of an asset under the Conceptual Framework.

The IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) in its Agenda decision titled Holdings of Cryptocurrencies in June, 2019 defined a cryptocurrency as a crypto asset with all of the following characteristics: ‘(a) a digital or virtual currency recorded on a distributed ledger that uses cryptography for security, (b) not issued by a jurisdictional authority or other party, and (c) does not give rise to a contract between the holder and another party’. Bitcoin, for example, would meet this definition. Cryptocurrencies represent a subset of crypto assets. The terms and applications of the crypto assets vary widely and could change over time. The terms and conditions and the purpose for which they are held by the holders will determine the accounting consequences.

Some crypto assets entitle the holder to an underlying good or service from an identifiable counter-party. For example, some crypto assets entitle the holder to a fixed weight of gold from a custodian bank. In those cases, the holder can obtain economic benefits by redeeming the crypto asset for the underlying. While not money as such, these crypto assets share many characteristics with representative money. Other crypto assets (e.g., Bitcoin) do not entitle the holder to an underlying good or service and have no identifiable counter-party. The holder of such a crypto asset has to find a willing buyer who will accept the crypto asset in exchange for cash, goods or services to realise any economic benefits from the crypto asset.

An entity can directly hold its crypto assets in its own ‘wallet’ or may hold it indirectly. For example, an entity holding an economic interest in crypto assets in the shared wallet of a crypto asset exchange may have an indirect holding of the crypto assets through a claim on the exchange. In this case, in addition to the underlying crypto asset volatility, the holder would also be exposed to counter-party performance risk (i.e., the possibility that the exchange is not holding sufficient crypto assets to cover all customer claims). The holder would need to analyse carefully, among other things, its claim on the crypto exchange to evaluate the nature of the assets held to determine the appropriate accounting treatment.

CAN CRYPTOCURRENCY OR CRYPTO ASSET BE CLASSIFIED AS CASH?
Ind AS 32 indicates that cash represents the medium of exchange and is, therefore, the basis on which all transactions are measured and recognised in the financial statements. The description of cash in Ind AS 32 suggests that cash is expected to be used as a medium of exchange (i.e., used in exchange for goods or services) and as the monetary unit in pricing goods or services to such an extent that it would be the basis on which all transactions are measured and recognised in financial statements (i.e., it could act as the functional currency of an entity). Currently, it is unlikely that any crypto asset would be considered a suitable basis for measuring and recognising all the items in an entity’s financial statements.

At present, crypto assets are not used as a medium of exchange except for Bitcoins to a very limited extent; however, the acceptance of a crypto asset by a merchant is not mandated in most jurisdictions. While some governments are reported to be considering issuing their own crypto assets or supporting a crypto asset issued by another party, at the time of writing El Salvador is the only country that has passed legislation that treats Bitcoin as legal tender (alongside US dollars).

The price of crypto assets is highly volatile when compared to a basket of fiat currencies. Hence, no major Governments or economic actors have stored their wealth in crypto assets. Crypto assets continue to remain a speculative investment. If, in the future, a crypto asset attains such a high level of acceptance and stability that it exhibits the characteristics of cash, a holder would need to consider whether that crypto asset represents a medium of exchange and unit of account to such an extent that it could act as the basis on which the holder recognises and measures all transactions in its financial statements (i.e., it could act as the functional currency of an entity). In 2019, the IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) confirmed that crypto assets currently do not meet the definition of cash equivalents because they are generally, among other things, not convertible to known amounts of cash, nor are they subject to an insignificant risk of change in value.

CAN CRYPTO ASSETS QUALIFY AS FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS?
Ind AS 32 defines a financial instrument as any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. The first part of the definition of a financial instrument requires the existence of a contract or contractual relationship between parties. A contract is defined by Ind AS 32 as an agreement between two or more parties that has clear economic consequences which the parties have little, if any, discretion to avoid, usually because the agreement is enforceable by law.

Crypto assets generally do not entitle the holder to underlying goods, services or financial instruments and have no identifiable counter-party and consequently would not meet the definition of a contract and qualify as a financial instrument. For example, the individual parties involved in the Bitcoin blockchain do not have a contractual relationship with any other participant in the Bitcoin blockchain. That is, by virtue of owning a Bitcoin, the holder does not have an enforceable claim on Bitcoin miners, exchanges, holders, or any other party. Such holders need to find a willing buyer to realise economic benefits from holding their Bitcoin.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS EQUITY INSTRUMENT?
Ind AS defines an equity instrument as any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all its liabilities. Although the value of a crypto asset may correlate to the popularity of an underlying platform on which it is used, that, by itself, does not represent a contractual right to a residual interest in the net assets of the platform. Therefore, a crypto asset will not qualify as an equity instrument.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS A DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENT?
Ind AS 109 defines a derivative as a financial instrument or other contract within the scope of Ind AS 109 with all three of the following characteristics:
* Its value changes in response to the change in an ‘underlying’ that is not specific to a party to the contract;
* It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors;
* It is settled at a future date.

Crypto assets that are not contractual themselves could still be the subject of a contract, for example, a binding agreement to buy Bitcoin from a certain counter-party would constitute a contract, even though the Bitcoin itself does not represent a contractual relationship. Therefore, agreements entered ‘off the chain’ to buy or sell crypto assets would qualify as contracts.

Some contractual rights to buy or sell non-financial items that can be settled net in cash, or for which the non-financial items are readily convertible to cash, are accounted for as if they were financial instruments (i.e., a derivative). A contractual right to buy or sell crypto assets (e.g., a Bitcoin forward entered with an investment bank) could be a derivative even if the crypto asset itself is not a financial instrument, provided the crypto asset is readily convertible to cash or the contract can be settled net in cash. This is like the accounting for commodity contracts that are held in a trading business model (e.g., forward silver contracts may fall within the scope of Ind AS 109, although silver itself is not a financial instrument).

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS INVENTORY?
Although it is often assumed to be the case, Ind AS 102 does not require inventory to be tangible. The standard defines inventory as an asset:
* Held for sale in the ordinary course of business;
* In the process of production for such sale; or
* In the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in the production process or in the rendering of services.

In practice, crypto assets are generally not used in the production of inventory and, thus, would not be considered materials and supplies to be consumed in the production process. Therefore, to this extent crypto assets do not qualify as an item of inventory.

Crypto assets could also be held for sale in the ordinary course of business, for example, by a commodity broker-trader, in which case it would qualify as an item of inventory. Whether crypto assets are held for sale in the ordinary course of business would depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the holder. Normally, Ind AS 102 requires measurement at the lower of cost and net realisable value. However, commodity broker-traders who acquire and sell crypto assets principally to generate profit from fluctuations in price or broker-traders’ margin have the choice to measure their crypto asset inventories at fair value less costs to sell with any change in fair value less costs to sell being recognised in profit or loss in the period of the change.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS INTANGIBLE ASSETS?
Ind AS 38 defines an asset as ‘a resource controlled by an entity as a result of past events; and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’. Ind AS 38 describes four essential features of an intangible asset:
Control – Control is the power to obtain the future economic benefits of an item while restricting the access of others to those benefits. Control is normally evidenced by legal rights, but Ind AS 38 is clear that they are not required where the entity is able to control access to the economic benefits in another way. Ind AS 38 notes that, in the absence of legal rights, the existence of exchange transactions for similar non-contractual items can provide evidence that the entity is nonetheless able to control the future economic benefits expected.
Future economic benefits – Many crypto assets do not provide a contractual right to economic benefits. Instead, economic benefits are likely to result from a future sale, to a willing buyer, or by exchanging the crypto asset for goods or services.
Lacks physical substance – As crypto assets are digital representations, they are by nature without physical substance.
Identifiable – In order to be identifiable, an intangible asset needs to be separable (capable of being sold or transferred separately from the holder) or result from contractual or other legal rights. As most crypto assets can be freely transferred to a willing buyer, they would generally be considered separable.

Crypto assets generally meet the relatively wide definition of an intangible asset as they are identifiable, lack physical substance, are controlled by the holder, and give rise to future economic benefits for the holder. The IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) confirmed in 2019 that crypto assets would generally qualify as an intangible asset, subject to consideration of detailed facts and circumstances.

CONCLUSION
The accounting of cryptocurrency by holders in most cases would qualify as an intangible asset. However, given the numerous versions of cryptocurrency and other innovations, such as an exchange traded fund of crypto, the accounting conclusion may not be fairly straight forward. One will have to carefully analyse the features and the terms and conditions of the crypto to determine the accounting conclusion. Besides, the accounting would be different for a trader of crypto as against an investor in crypto.

TAXABILITY OF CORPUS DONATIONS RECEIVED BY AN UNREGISTERED TRUST

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 2(24)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 defines income to include voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes. Till Assessment Year 1988-89, this included the phrase ‘not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust’, which was omitted with effect from the A.Y. 1989-90. Section 11(1)(d) of the Act, which was inserted with effect from A.Y. 1989-90, provides for exemption in respect of voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution. However, this exemption applies only when the recipient trust or institution is registered with the income-tax authorities under section 12A or 12AA, as applicable up to 31st March, 2021, or section 12AB as applicable thereafter.

The issue has arisen as to whether such voluntary contributions (referred to as ‘corpus donations’) received by an unregistered trust, not registered u/s 12A or 12AA or 12AB, can be regarded as income taxable in its hands on the ground that it does not qualify for the exemption u/s 11, or in the alternative whether such donations can be regarded as the capital receipt not falling within the scope of income at all.

Several Benches of the Tribunal have taken a view, post-amendment, that a voluntary contribution received by an unregistered trust with a specific direction that it shall form part of its corpus, is a capital receipt and therefore not chargeable to tax at all. As against this, recently, the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal took a view that such a corpus donation would fall within the ambit of income of the trust and hence is includible in its total income.

SHRI SHANKAR BHAGWAN ESTATE’S CASE
The issue had first come up for consideration before the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Shankar Bhagwan Estate vs. ITO (1997) 61 ITD 196.

In this case, two religious endowments were effectuated vide two deeds of endowment dated 30th October, 1989 and 19th June, 1990, respectively, in favour of Shree Ganeshji Maharaj and Shri Shankar Bhagwan by Smt. Krishna Kejriwal. The debutter properties, i.e., estates were christened as ‘Shree Ganeshji Maharaj Estate’ and ‘Shree Shankar Bhagwan Estate’. She constituted herself as the Shebait in respect of the deity. The estates were not registered u/s 12AA as charitable / religious institutions. The returns of income of the two estates for the A.Y. 1991-92 were filed declaring paltry income excluding the donations / gifts received towards the corpus of the estates.

During the course of the assessment proceedings, it was observed from the balance sheet that gifts were received by the estates from various persons. The assessees claimed that the said amounts were received towards the corpus of the endowments and, therefore, could not be taxed. Though the A.O. accepted the fact that the declarations filed by the donors indicated that they have sent moneys through cheques as their contributions to the corpus of the endowments, he held that the receipts were taxable u/s 2(24)(iia). Accordingly, the assessment was made taking the status of the assessees as a private religious trust, as against the status of an individual as claimed by the assessees, and taxing the income of the estates u/s 164, including the amounts received as corpus donations. He also held that the deities should have been consecrated before the endowments for them to be valid in law.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that the provisions of section 2(24)(iia) did not authorise the assessment of the corpus gifts. However, the CIT(A) endorsed the view taken by the A.O. and upheld the assessment of the corpus gifts as income.

Upon further appeal, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee by holding as under –

‘So far as section 2(24)(iia) is concerned, this section has to be read in the context of the introduction of the present section 12. It is significant that section 2(24)(iia) was inserted with effect from 1st April, 1973 simultaneously with the present section 12, both of which were introduced from the said date by the Finance Act, 1972. Section 12 makes it clear by the words appearing in parenthesis that contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution shall not be considered as income of the trust. The Board’s Circular No. 108 dated 20th March, 1973 is extracted at page 1277 of Vol. I of Sampat Iyengar’s Law of Income-tax, 9th Edn. in which the interrelation between section 12 and section 2(24)(iia) has been brought out. Gifts made with clear directions that they shall form part of the corpus of the religious endowment can never be considered as income. In the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust vs. CIT [1988] 172 ITR 373 it was held by the Bombay High Court that even ignoring the amendment to section 12, which means that even before the words appearing in parenthesis in the present section 12, it cannot be held that voluntary contributions specifically received towards the corpus of the trust may be brought to tax. The aforesaid decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case CIT vs. Trustees of Kasturbai Scindia Commission Trust [1991] 189 ITR 5. The position after the amendment is a fortiori. In the present cases, the A.O. on evidence has accepted the fact that all the donations have been received towards the corpus of the endowments. In view of this clear finding, it is not possible to hold that they are to be assessed as income of the assessees. We, therefore, hold that the assessment of the corpus donations cannot be supported.’

The Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee that the voluntary contributions received towards the corpus could not be brought to tax. In deciding the appeal, the Bench also held that the status of the endowments should be ‘individual’ and it was not necessary that the deities should have been consecrated before the endowments, or that the temple should have been constructed prior to the endowments.

Apart from this case, in the following cases a similar view has been taken by the Tribunal that the corpus donation received by an unregistered trust is a capital receipt and not chargeable to tax –

• ITO vs. Smt. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust

  •  For A.Y. 2003-04 – ITA No. 3866/Del/2007, dated 30th January, 2009
  •  For A.Y. 2004-05 – ITA No. 5082/Del/2010, dated 19th January, 2011

ITO vs. Chime Gatsal Ling Monastery [ITA No. 216 to 219 (Chd) of 2012, dated 28th October, 2014]
• ITO vs. Gaudiya Granth Anuved Trust [2014] 48 taxmann.com 348 (Agra-Trib)
• Pentafour Software Employees Welfare Foundation vs. Asstt. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 751 & 752 (Mds) of 2007]
• ITO vs. Hosanna Ministries [2020] 119 taxmann.com 379 (Visakh-Trib)
• Indian Society of Anaesthesiologists vs. ITO (2014) 47 taxmann.com 183 (Chen-Trib)
• J.B. Education Society vs. ACIT [2015] 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd-Trib)
• ITO vs. Vokkaligara Sangha (2015) 44 CCH 509 (Bang–Trib)
• Bank of India Retired Employees Medical Assistance Trust vs. ITO [2018] 96 taxmann.com 277 (Mum-Trib)
• Chandraprabhu Jain Swetamber Mandir vs. ACIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 245 (Mum-Trib)
• ITO vs. Serum Institute of India Research Foundation [2018] 90 taxmann.com 229 (Pune-Trib)

VEERAVEL TRUST’S CASE
Recently, the issue again came up for consideration before the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Veeravel Trust vs. ITO [2021] 129 taxmann.com 358.

In this case, the assessee was a public charitable and religious trust registered under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It was not registered under the Income-tax Act. It had filed its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15, declaring Nil total income. The return of income filed by the assessee had been processed by the CPC, Bengaluru u/s 143(1) and the total income was determined at Rs. 55,82,600 by making additions of donations received amounting to Rs. 55,82,600.

The assessee trust filed an appeal against the intimation issued u/s 143(1) before the CIT(A) and contended that while processing the return u/s 143(1), only prima facie adjustments could be made and no addition could be made for corpus donations. The assessee further contended that corpus donations received by any trust or institution were excluded from the income derived from property held under the trust u/s 11(1)(d) and hence, even though the trust was not registered u/s 12AA, corpus donations could not be included in the income of the trust.

The CIT(A) rejected the contentions of the assessee and held that the condition precedent for claiming exemption u/s 11 was registration of the trust u/s 12AA and hence, in the absence of such registration, exemption claimed towards corpus donations could not be allowed. The CIT(A) relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corpn. vs. Dy. CIT [2008] 297 ITR 1.

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee trust filed a further appeal before the Tribunal and contended that the donations under consideration were received for the specific purpose of construction of building and the said donations have been used for construction of building. Therefore, when donations have been received for specific purpose and such donations have been utilised for the purpose for which they were received, they were capital receipts by nature and did not fall within the scope of income.

The assessee relied upon the following decisions in support of its contentions –

(i) Shree Jain Swetamber Deharshar Upshraya Trust vs. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 264 (Mum) of 2016, dated 15th March, 2017]
(ii) ITO vs. Serum Institute of India Research Foundation [2018] 90 taxmann.com 229 (Pune)
(iii) Bank of India Retired Employees Medical Assistance Trust vs. ITO (Exemption) [2018] 96 taxmann.com 277 (Mum)
(iv) Chandraprabhu Jain Swetamber Mandir vs. Asstt. CIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 245 (Mum)

The Revenue reiterated its stand that in the absence of registration of the trust u/s 12AA, no exemption could be given to it for the corpus donations.

The Tribunal referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and observed that the definition of income u/s 2(24) included voluntary contributions received by any trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purpose; that the provisions of sections 11, 12A and 12AA dealt with taxation of trust or institution and the income of any trust or institution was exempt from tax on compliance with certain conditions; the provisions of section 11(1)(d) excluded voluntary contributions received by a trust, with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution which was subject to the provisions of section 12A, which stated that the provisions of sections 11 and 12 shall not apply in relation to income of any trust or institution, unless such trust or institution fulfilled certain conditions.

The Tribunal held that as per the said section 12A, one of the conditions for claiming benefit of exemption under sections 11 and 12 was registration of the trust as per sub-section (aa) of section 12A; that on a conjoint reading of the provisions, it was very clear that the income of any trust, including voluntary contributions received with a specific direction, was not includible in the total income of the trust, only if such trust was registered u/s 12A / 12AA and the registration was a condition precedent for claiming exemption u/s 11, including for voluntary contributions.

The Tribunal also took support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) wherein it was held that registration u/s 12A was a condition precedent for availing benefit under sections 11 and 12. Insofar as various case laws relied upon by the assessee were concerned, the Tribunal found that none of the Benches of the Tribunal had considered the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) while deciding the issue before them. In this view of the matter, it was held that corpus donations with a specific direction that they form part of the corpus received by the trust which was not registered under sections 12A / 12AA was its income and includible in its total income.

OBSERVATIONS
The issue under consideration is whether the voluntary contribution received by a trust with a specific direction that it shall form part of its corpus can be considered as the ‘income’ of the trust, is a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax, and whether the answer to this question would differ depending upon whether or not the trust was registered with the income-tax authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act.

Sub-clause (iia) was inserted in section 2(24) defining the term ‘income’ by the Finance Act, 1972 with effect from 1st April, 1973. It included the voluntary contribution received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes within the scope of the term ‘income’ with effect from 1st April, 1973. Therefore, firstly, what was the position about taxability of such voluntary contribution prior to that needs to be examined.

The Supreme Court had dealt with this issue of taxability of an ordinary voluntary contribution for the period prior to 1st April, 1973 in the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust [1998] 233 ITR 53 (SC) and it was held that –

Undoubtedly by a subsequent amendment in 1972 to the definition of income under section 2(24), voluntary contributions, not being contributions towards the corpus of such a trust, are included in the definition of ‘income’ of such a religious or charitable trust. Section 12 as amended in 1972 also expressly provides that any voluntary contribution received by a trust for religious or charitable purposes, not being contribution towards the corpus of the trust, shall, for the purpose of section 11, be deemed to be income derived from property held by the trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes. This, however, does not necessarily imply that prior to the amendment of 1972, a voluntary contribution which was not towards the corpus of the receiving trust, was not income of the receiving trust. Even prior to the amendment of 1972, any income received by a religious or charitable trust in the form of a voluntary contribution would be income of the trust, unless such contribution was expressly made towards the corpus of the trust’s fund.

Thus, even prior to the insertion of sub-clause (iia) in the definition of income in section 2(24), the ordinary voluntary contribution received by a religious or charitable trust was regarded as income chargeable to tax and, therefore, no substantial change had occurred due to its specific inclusion in the definition of the term income. At the same time, the position was different as far as a voluntary contribution received towards the corpus was concerned. The settled view was that it was a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The following are some of the cases in which such a view was taken by different High Courts as referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust (Supra) –
• Sri Dwarkadheesh Charitable Trust vs. ITO [1975] 98 ITR 557 (All)
• CIT vs. Vanchi Trust [1981] 127 ITR 227 (Ker)
• CIT vs. Eternal Science of Man’s Society [1981] 128 ITR 456 (Del)
• Sukhdeo Charity Estate vs. CIT [1984] 149 ITR 470 (Raj)
• CIT vs. Shri Billeswara Charitable Trust [1984] 145 ITR 29 (Mad)

The objective of inserting sub-clause (iia) treating voluntary contributions received by a religious or charitable trust specifically as its income in section 2(24) was not to unsettle this position of law as held by the Courts as explained above. Only ordinary voluntary contributions other than those which were received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were brought within the definition of ‘income’, perhaps by way of clarification and removal of doubts. The sub-clause (iia) as it was inserted with effect from 1st April, 1973 is reproduced below –

‘(iia) voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly or partly for such purposes not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution’

Thus, the voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were expressly kept outside the ambit of the term ‘income’ and they continued to be treated as capital receipts not chargeable to tax. This position in law has been expressly confirmed by the Supreme Court in the above quoted paragraph, duly underlined for emphasis, when the Court clearly stated that the said section 2(24)(iia) covered donations not being the contributions towards corpus.

In such a scenario, a question may arise as to what was the purpose of making such an amendment in the Act to include the voluntary contributions (other than corpus donations) within the definition of ‘income’? The answer to this question is available in Circular No. 108 dated 20th March, 1973 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 1973 (as referred in the case of Shri Shankar Bhagwan Estate Supra). The relevant extract from this Circular is reproduced below –

The effect of the modifications at (1) and (2) above would be as follows:
(i) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by private religious trusts will no longer be exempt from income-tax.
(ii) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by a trust for charitable purposes or a charitable institution created or established after 31st March, 1962 (i.e., after the commencement of the Income-tax Act, 1961) will not qualify for exemption from tax if the trust or institution is created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste.
(iii) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by a trust created partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established partly for such purposes will no longer be exempt from income-tax.
(iv) Where the voluntary contributions are received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly for such purposes, such contributions will qualify for exemption from income-tax only if the conditions specified in section 11 regarding application of income or accumulation thereof are satisfied and no part of the income enures and no part of the income or property of the trust or institution is applied for the benefit of persons specified in section 13(3), e.g., author of the trust, founder of the institution, a person who has made substantial contribution to the trust or institution, the relatives of such author, founder, person, etc. In other words, income by way of voluntary contributions will ordinarily qualify for exemption from income-tax only to the extent it is applied to the purposes of the trust during the relevant accounting year or within next three months following. Such charitable or religious trusts will, however, be able to accumulate income from voluntary contributions for future application to charitable or religious purposes for a maximum period up to ten years, without forfeiting exemption from tax, if they comply with certain procedural requirements laid down in section 11 in this behalf. These requirements are that (1) the trust or institution should give notice to the Income-tax Officer, specifying the purpose for which the income is to be accumulated and the period for which the accumulation is proposed to be made, and (2) the income so accumulated should be invested in Government or other approved securities or deposited in post office savings banks, scheduled banks, co-operative banks or approved financial institutions.

Thus, it can be seen from the Circular that the objective of the amendment made with effect from 1st April, 1973 was to make the trust or institution liable to tax on the voluntary contributions received in certain cases like where it has not been applied for the objects of the trust, it has been received by a private religious trust, or it has been received by a trust created for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste and to make the charitable and religious trusts to apply the contributions only on the objects of the trust and to apply for the accumulation thereof where it has not been so utilised before the year-end. In other words, the intention is expressed to regulate voluntary contributions of an ordinary nature.

This position under the law continued till 1st April, 1989 and the issue deliberated in this article could never have arisen till then as the Act itself had provided expressly that the voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus would not be regarded as ‘income’ and, hence, not chargeable to tax. The issue under consideration arose when the law was amended with effect from 1st April, 1989. The Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 deleted the words ‘not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution’ from sub-clause (iia) of section 2(24) with effect from 1st April, 1989.

The Revenue authorities read sub-clause (iia) as amended with effect from 1st April, 1989, in contrast to the erstwhile sub-clause (iia), to hold that even the voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust would be considered as income chargeable to tax subject to the provisions dealing with exemptions upon satisfaction of several conditions, including that of registration of the trust with the income-tax authority.

The aforesaid interpretation of the Revenue is on the basis of the Circular No. 516 dated 15th June, 1988, Circular No. 545 dated 24th September, 1989, Circular No. 549 dated 31st October, 1989 and Circular No. 551 dated 23rd January, 1990 explaining the provisions of the Direct Tax (Amendment) Act, 1987 [as amended by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989]. The relevant extract dealing with the amendment to section 2(24)(iia) is reproduced below –

4.3 Under the old provisions of sub-clause (iia) of clause (24) of section 2 any voluntary contribution received by a charitable or religious trust or institution with a specific direction that it shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution was not included in the income of such trust or institution. Since this provision was being widely used for tax avoidance by giving donations to a trust in the form of corpus donations so as to keep this amount out of the regulatory provisions of sections 11 to 13, the Amending Act, 1987 amended the said sub-clause (iia) of clause (24) of section 2 to secure that all donations received by a charitable or religious trust or institution, including corpus donations, were treated as income of such trust or institution.

Analysing the impact of the amendment, the eminent jurist Mr. Nani Palkhivala, in his commentary Law and Practice of Income Tax page 156 of the 11th edition, has commented:

‘This, however, does not mean that such capital contributions are now taxable as income. Sometimes express exclusion is by way of abundant caution, due to the over-anxiety of the draftsman to make the position clear beyond doubt. But in such a case, the later omission of such express exclusion does not necessarily involve a change in the legal position. Section 12 still provides that voluntary contributions specifically made to the corpus of a charitable trust are not deemed to be income, and the same exclusion must be read as implicit in section 2(24)(ii-a). It would be truly absurd to expect a charitable trust to disburse as income any amount in breach of the donor’s specific direction to hold it as corpus; such breach in many cases would involve depriving charity of the benefit of acquiring a lasting asset intended by the donor. Under this sub-clause, only voluntary contributions received by such institutions as are specified therein are taxable as income. A voluntary contribution received by an institution not covered in this sub-clause is not taxable as income.’

Further, in the commentary on section 12(1), page 688 of the same edition, it is stated:

‘The correct legal position is as under:
(i) All contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust are capital receipts in the hands of the trust. They are not income either under the general law or under section 2(24)(ii-a).
(ii) Section 2(24)(ii-a) deems revenue contributions to be income of the trust. It thereby prevents the trust from claiming exemption under general law on the ground that such contributions stand on the same footing as gifts and are therefore not taxable.
(iii) Section 12 goes one step further and deems such revenue contributions to be income derived from property held under trust. It thereby makes applicable to such contributions all the conditions and restrictions under sections 11 and 13 for claiming exemption.
(iv) Section 11(1)(d) specifically grants exemption to capital contributions to make the fact of non-taxability clear beyond doubt. But it proceeds on the erroneous assumption that such contributions are of income nature – income in the form of voluntary contributions. This assumption should be disregarded.’

This supports the argument that corpus donations are capital receipts, which are not in the nature of income at all.

Taking a view as is canvassed by the Revenue would tantamount to interpreting a law in a manner that holds that where an exemption has been expressly provided for any income, then it needs to be presumed that in the absence of the specific provision the income is taxable otherwise; such a view also means that any receipt that is not expressly and specifically exempted is always taxable; that a deletion of an express admission of the exemption, as is the case under consideration, would automatically lead to its taxation irrespective of the position in law that such receipt even before introduction of the express provision for exempting it was never taxable. In this regard, a reference may be made to the decision in the case of CIT vs. Shaw Wallace 6 ITC 178 (PC) wherein it was held as under –

‘15. Some reliance has been placed in argument upon section 4(3)(v) which appears to suggest that the word “income” in this Act may have a wider significance than would ordinarily be attributed to it. The sub-section says that the Act “shall not apply to the following classes of income,” and in the category that follows, Clause (v) runs:
Any capital sum received in commutation of the whole or a portion of a pension, or in the nature of consolidated compensation for death or injuries, or in payment of any insurance policy, or as the accumulated balance at the credit of a subscriber to any such Provident Fund.
16. Their Lordships do not think that any of these sums, apart from their exemption, could be regarded in any scheme of taxation of income, and they think that the clause must be due to the over-anxiety of the draftsman to make this clear beyond possibility of doubt. They cannot construe it as enlarging the word “income” so as to include receipts of any kind, which are not specially exempted. They do not think that the clause is of any assistance to the appellant.’

Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in the case of International Instruments (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [1982] 133 ITR 283 held that a receipt which is not an income does not become income, for the years before its inclusion, just because it is later on included as one of the items exempted from income-tax. Thus, it was held that merely because the exemption has been provided it cannot be presumed that it would necessarily be taxable otherwise. Similarly, merely because the voluntary contributions which were capital in nature otherwise were specifically excluded from the definition of income, it cannot be presumed that they were otherwise falling within the definition of income. The Courts in several cases had already held that such voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they should be forming part of the corpus are receipt of capital nature and not income chargeable to tax. In view of this, the omission of a specific exclusion, w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, provided to it from the definition of income till the date, should not be considered as sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term ‘income’ so as to make it chargeable to tax from the date of the amendment.

All the decisions cited above, wherein a favourable view has been taken, have been rendered for the A.Ys. beginning from 1st April, 1989 onwards post amendment in sub-clause (iia) of section 2(24). Reliance was placed by the Revenue, in these cases, on the amended definition of income provided in section 2(24)(iia) and yet the Tribunals took a view that the corpus donations did not fall within the scope of term ‘income’ as they were capital receipts and, hence, the fact that the exemption otherwise provided in section 11(1)(d) was not available due to non-registration, though argued, was not considered to be relevant at all.

In the case of Smt. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust, the matter pertaining to A.Y. 2003-04 had travelled to the Delhi High Court and the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed by the High Court (ITA 927/2009, order dated 23rd September, 2009), by taking a view that the donations received towards the corpus of the trust would be capital receipt and not revenue receipt chargeable to tax. The further appeal of the Revenue before the Supreme Court has also been dismissed by an order dated 17th September, 2018, though on account of low tax effect. Therefore, the view as adopted in these cases should be preferred, irrespective of the amendment made with effect from 1st April, 1989.

The Chennai Bench of the Tribunal has disagreed with the decisions of the other Benches taking a favourable view which were cited before it, on the ground that the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) had not been considered therein. Nothing could have turned otherwise even if the Tribunal, in favourably deciding those cases, had examined the relevance of the Supreme Court decision. On a bare reading of the decision, it is clear that the facts in the said case related to an issue whether the corporation in question was a local authority or not and, of course, also whether an assessee claiming exemption u/s 11 should have been registered under the Income-tax Act or not. The Court was pleased to hold that an assessee should be registered for it being eligible to claim the exemption of income u/s 11. The issue in that case was not related to exemption for the corpus donation at all and the Court was never asked whether such a donation was exempted or not because of non-registration of the corporation under the Act in that regard.

With utmost respect, one fails to understand how this important fact was not comprehended by the Chennai Bench. The Bench was seriously mistaken in applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision which has no application to the facts of the case before it. The issue in the case before the Bench was whether receipt of a corpus donation was a capital receipt or not which was not liable to tax in respect of such a receipt, not due to application of section 11, but on application of the general law of taxation which cannot tax a receipt that is not in the nature of income. Veeravel Trust may explore the possibility of filing a Miscellaneous Application seeking rectification of the order.

The issue under consideration here and the issue that was before the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation were distinguished by the Bengaluru Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vokkaligara Sangha (Supra) as follows –

‘5.3.6 Before looking into the facts of the case, we notice that Revenue has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation & Another vs. DCIT reported in 297 ITR 1 (SC). According to the aforesaid decision, registration under section 12AA of the Act is mandatory for availing the benefits under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. However, the question that arises for our consideration in the case on hand is not the benefit under sections 11 and 12 of the Act, but rather whether voluntary contributions are income at all. Thus, with due respects, the aforesaid decision, in our view, would not be of any help to Revenue in the case on hand.’

The Chennai Bench, with due respect, has looked at the issue from the perspective of exemption u/s 11(1)(d). Had it been called upon to specifically adjudicate the issue as to whether the corpus donation was an income at all in the first place, and not an exemption u/s 11, the view could have been different.

Further, if a view is taken that the corpus donations received by a religious or charitable trust would be regarded as income under sub-clause (iia), then it will result in a scenario whereunder treatment of corpus donations would differ depending upon the type of entity which is receiving such corpus donations. If they are received by a religious or charitable trust or institution then it would be regarded as income, but if they are received by any other entity then it would not fall under sub-clause (iia) so as to treat it as income, subject, of course, to the other provisions of the Act.

In the case of CIT vs. S.R.M.T. Staff Association [1996] 221 ITR 234 (AP), the High Court held that only when the voluntary contributions were received by the entities referred to in sub-clause (iia), such receipts would fall within the definition of income and the receipts by entities other than the specified trusts and associations would not be liable to tax on application of sub-clause (iia). In the case of Pentafour Software Employees Welfare Foundation (Supra), a case where the assessee was a company incorporated u/s 25 of the Companies Act, the Madras High Court in the context of the taxability or otherwise of the corpus donations, held that the receipt was not taxable, more so where it was received by a company. An interpretation which results in an illogical conclusion should be avoided.

Reference can also be made to the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2017 wherein, while explaining the rationale of inserting Explanation 2 to section 11(1), it was mentioned that a corpus donation is not considered as income of the recipient trust. The relevant extract from the Memorandum is reproduced below –

‘However, donation given by these exempt entities to another exempt entity, with specific direction that it shall form part of corpus, is though considered application of income in the hands of donor trust but is not considered as income of the recipient trust. Trusts, thus, engage in giving corpus donations without actual applications.’

The issue may arise as to why a specific exemption is provided to such corpus donations under section 11(1)(d) which applies only when the trust or institution receiving such donations satisfies all the applicable conditions, including that of registration with the income-tax authorities. In this regard, as explained by Mr. Palkhivala in the commentary referred to above, this specific exemption should be regarded as having been provided out of abundant caution though not warranted, as such corpus donations could not have been regarded as income in the first place.

The Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1st April, 2022 requires that such voluntary contributions are invested or deposited in one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpuses. In our view, the amendment stipulates a condition for those who are seeking an exemption u/s 11 of the Act but for those who hold that the receipt of the corpus donation at the threshold itself is not taxable in view of the receipt being of a capital nature, need not be impressed by the amendment; a non-taxable receipt cannot be taxed for non-compliance of a condition not intended to apply to a capital receipt.

In any case, if there exist divergent views on the issue as to whether or not a particular receipt can be regarded as income, then a view in favour of the assessee needs to be preferred.

It may be noted that in one of the above-referred decisions (Serum Institute of India Research Foundation), the Department had made an argument that such corpus donations received by an unregistered trust be brought to tax u/s 56(2). The Tribunal, however, decided the matter in favour of the assessee, on the ground of judicial discipline, following the earlier Tribunal and High Court decisions.

The better view is therefore that corpus donations received by a charitable or religious trust, registered or unregistered, are a capital receipt, not chargeable to income-tax at all.

An assessment order which does not comply with the mandatory procedure laid down in section 144C is non-est and an order u/s 263 revising such an order is a nullity as a non-est order cannot be a subject matter of revision u/s 263

14 Manorama Devi Jaiswal vs. ITO [TS-1054-ITAT-2021 (Kol)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th November, 2021 Sections: 144C, 263

An assessment order which does not comply with the mandatory procedure laid down in section 144C is non-est and an order u/s 263 revising such an order is a nullity as a non-est order cannot be a subject matter of revision u/s 263

FACTS
In the case of the assessee, the PCIT passed an order u/s 263 wherein he stated that since before completion of final assessment a draft assessment order should have been served on the assessee as per the mandatory provision of section 144C and which the A.O. had not complied with, therefore the assessment order passed by him on 25th September, 2017 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it challenged the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction assumed by the PCIT.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Coordinate Bench has in the case of Mohan Jute Bags Mfg. Co. vs. PCIT [ITA No. 416/Kol/2020; A.Y. 2014-15] held that ‘…the A.O.’s omission to frame draft assessment order breached the Rule of Law and consequently, his non-action to frame draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order was in contravention of the mandatory provision of law as stipulated in section 144C of the Act, consequently his action is arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power which offends Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore an action made without jurisdiction and ergo the assessment order dated 25th September, 2017 is null in the eyes of law and therefore is non-est.’

The Tribunal held that since the mandatory provision of law stipulated in section 144C was not complied with, the assessment order itself becomes a nullity in the eyes of the law and therefore is non-est. When the foundation itself for the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 does not exist, that in this case the assessment order itself is non-est, in such a scenario the PCIT could not have exercised his revisionary jurisdiction in respect of a null and void assessment order. The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the PCIT is also a nullity. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Whether loss of current year can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue which cannot be rectified u/s 154 Interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ in section 115BBD to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue

13 Rakesh Kumar Pandita vs. ACIT [TS-1002-ITAT-2021 (Del)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 Sections: 115BBD, 154

Whether loss of current year can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue which cannot be rectified u/s 154

Interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ in section 115BBD to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue

FACTS
The assessee company filed its return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 declaring a total income of Rs. 26,26,860. The return was processed u/s 143(1) and the total income was determined to be Rs. 31,51,660. In the intimation though the loss of current year adjusted was mentioned at Rs. 22,53,768, the same was not adjusted while computing the total income assessed. The assessee filed an application for rectification u/s 154.

The A.O. was of the opinion that since the assessee has declared income u/s 115BBD and calculated the tax at the special rate of 15%, the same cannot be set off against losses. He accordingly rejected the application made by the assessee u/s 154.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the question whether current year loss can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue and a debatable issue cannot be rectified u/s 154.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in the intimation the loss of the current year has been mentioned at Rs. 22,53,768 and that the assessee has returned income in respect of dividend received from a foreign company u/s 115BBD. It noted that as per sub-section (2), no deduction in respect of expenditure or allowance should be allowed to the assessee under any provision of the Act in computing its income by way of dividends referred to in sub-section (1). The interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

NOCLAR (NON-COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS) REPORTING

EMERGENCE OF NOCLAR
In the course of providing professional services to clients or carrying out professional activities for an employer, a Professional Accountant (PA) may come across an instance of Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR), or suspected NOCLAR committed, or about to be committed, by the client or the employer.

Recognising that such situations can often be difficult and stressful for the PAs, and accepting that he or she has a prima facie ethical responsibility not to turn a blind eye to the matter, NOCLAR was introduced to help and guide the PAs in dealing with such situations and in deciding how best to serve the public interest in these circumstances.

Considering the above, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) had made revisions to the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants to define their professional responsibility in relation to NOCLAR in the year 2017.

ICAI, being a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), has considered the revisions made by IESBA in the revised 12th edition of the Code of Ethics which has come into effect from 1st July, 2020 for its members. The Council of ICAI has decided that the provisions, namely, Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR) (Sections 260 and 360), contained in Volume I of the Code of Ethics, 2019, the applicability of which was deferred earlier, be made applicable and effective from 1st April, 2022.

These NOCLAR provisions, as introduced by ICAI, provide detailed guidance in assessing the implications for PAs on any actual or suspected non-compliances of laws and regulations and the possible course of action while responding to them. These provisions primarily cover the non-compliance with laws and regulations that may have an effect on:
a. the determination of material amounts and disclosures in the financial statements;
b. the compliances that may be fundamental to the entity’s business and operations, or to avoid material penalties.

Examples of laws and regulations

 
                    
Examples of other laws and regulations for consideration of PAs while evaluating NOCLAR
1) The real estate sector has remained widely unorganised till the introduction of The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (‘RERA’). Just as while discharging the duty of statutory auditor, for instance under the Companies Act, the auditor shall now be required to coordinate with the RERA professionals and also would require working knowledge of the RERA law to understand the Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR).
2) Impact due to Non-Compliance of Foreign Exchange Management Act law will also be covered in the above NOCLAR reporting.
3) Applicability of PF and ESIC laws – based on crossing prescribed number of employees / staff and compliance pertaining to the same.
4) Schedule III Disclosure and Compliance relating to relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Companies Act, 2013 have been complied for transactions of advanced or loaned or invested funds and vice versa and the transactions are not violative of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
5) In case of regulated entities, the Regulations often require direct reporting to the Regulator (RBI directions in case of banks & NBFCs).

The PA should be more alert in case of susceptible industries, such as banks, diamond companies, the IT industry, the financial sector, hazardous Industries and companies dealing in cryptocurrencies.

The broad objectives of PAs in relation to NOCLAR are:
a. to comply with the principles of integrity and professional behaviour;
b. to alert management or where appropriate Those Charged with Governance (TCWG) of the client or employer, to enable them to rectify, remediate and mitigate the consequences of the identified or suspected non-compliance or deter the commission of the non-compliance where it has not yet occurred; and
c. to take such further action as appropriate in public interest.

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
Although the purpose of introducing NOCLAR was to provide assistance to PAs, for all their professional engagements, in case there is suspected or actual non-compliance of law and regulations, ICAI has at present made it effective only on:
a. auditors doing audit assignments of listed entities; and
b. employees of listed entities.

Further, the following matters are not included in the scope of NOCLAR:
1. Matters clearly inconsequential – Whether a matter is clearly inconsequential is to be judged with respect to its nature and its impact, financial or otherwise, on the employing organisation, its stakeholders and the general public. For instance, trying to cajole a traffic officer to ignore penalties for traffic violation;
2. Personal misconduct unrelated to the business activities of the client or employer – such as a top employee getting drunk or driving under the influence of alcohol;
3. Non-compliance other than by the client or employer, or those charged with governance, management – for example, circumstances where a professional accountant has been engaged by a client for conducting a due diligence assignment on a third-party entity and the identified or suspected non-compliance has been committed by that third party.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

The ICAI, in its Code of Ethics-Revised 2019, has introduced new guidance for NOCLAR via section 360 for members in practice and section 260 for members in employment. Both these sections are further discussed in detail below:

Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations during the course of Audit Engagements of Listed Entities – SECTION 360
The professional accountants will have to get ready for higher responsibility to identify and report violations which they come across while performing their work. Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations comprises acts of omission or commission, intentional or unintentional, which are contrary to the prevailing laws or regulations committed by the client, those charged with governance of a client, management of a client or other individuals working for or under the direction of a client. When encountering such non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the accountant shall obtain an understanding of those legal or regulatory provisions and comply with them, including any requirement to report the matter to an appropriate authority and any prohibition of alerting the client, for example, pursuant to anti-money laundering legislation.

Management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, is responsible for ensuring that the client’s business activities are conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations. Usually, corporates have an internal legal, compliance / tax department and also a team of internal / external legal counsel who assist management in complying with laws and regulations and compliances applicable to the company. The company may implement various policies and procedures like monitoring legal requirements and ensuring that operating procedures are designed to meet those requirements. Once the appropriate systems of internal control are operative, it will assist in prevention and detection of non-compliance with laws and regulations. In larger entities these policies may be supplemented by assigning responsibilities to the internal audit / audit committee / compliance function. Non-compliance might result in fines, litigation or other consequences for the client, potentially materially affecting its financial statements. Importantly, such non-compliance might have wider public interest implications in terms of potentially substantial harm to investors, creditors, employees or the general public. Examples of these include the perpetration of a fraud resulting in significant financial losses to investors and breaches of environmental laws and regulations, endangering the health or safety of the employees or the public. The auditor will have to suitably change the engagement letter going forward considering the new responsibilities on management and those charged with governance pertaining to NOCLAR.

When a PA in public practice becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following points are to be considered:
a) Obtain understanding of the matter (nature of the act and the circumstances), discuss it with management and where appropriate TCWG may seek legal counsel;
b) Addressing the matter (rectify, remediate, mitigate, deter, disclose);
c) Check whether management and TCWG understand their legal or regulatory responsibilities;
d) Communication with respect to groups (for financial statement audit);
e) Determining whether further action is needed (timely response, appropriate steps taken by the entity and based on professional judgment by the PA), consulting on a confidential basis with the Institute;
f) Determine whether to disclose the matter to the appropriate authority; and
g) Documentation of the matter.

The PA might determine that disclosure to an appropriate authority is an appropriate course of action in the following scenario:
• The entity is engaged in bribery (for example, of local or foreign government officials for purposes of securing large contracts);
• The entity is regulated and the matter is of such significance as to threaten its license to operate;
• The entity is listed on a securities exchange and the matter might result in adverse consequences to the fair and orderly market in the entity’s securities or pose a systemic risk to the financial markets;
• It is likely that the entity would sell products that are harmful to public health or safety;
• The entity is promoting a scheme to its clients to assist them in evading taxes.

The documentation for compliance related to ethical standards is in addition to complying with the documentation requirements under applicable auditing standards. In relation to non-compliance or suspected non-compliance that falls within the scope of this section, the professional accountant shall document in detail how his responsibility to act in public interest has been met.

Withdrawing from the engagement and the professional relationship is not a substitute for taking other actions that might be needed to achieve the professional accountant’s objectives under this section. However, there might be limitations as to the further actions available to the accountant. In such circumstances, withdrawal might be the only available course of action. The auditor may also refer to the Implementation Guide on Resignation / Withdrawal from an Engagement to Perform Audit of Financial Statements issued by the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board.

Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations in case of Employment with Listed Entities – SECTION 260
It is the responsibility of employing organisations’ management and those charged with governance to ensure that their business activities are conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations and to identity and address any non-compliance. Non-compliance with laws and regulations comprises acts of omission or commission, intentional or unintentional, which are contrary to prevailing laws or regulations committed by the following parties:
a) The professional accountant’s employing organisation;
b) Those charged with governance of the employing organisation;
c) Management of the employing organisation; or
d) Other individuals working for or under the direction of the employing organisation.

When encountering such non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the accountant shall obtain an understanding of those legal or regulatory provisions and comply with them, including any requirement to report the matter to an appropriate authority and any prohibition on alerting the relevant party.

If organisations have established protocols and procedures regarding how non-compliance or suspected non-compliance should be raised internally, the PA shall consider them in determining how to respond on timely basis to such non-compliance. For instance, the Ethics Policy or internal whistle-blowing mechanism. The Securities and Exchange Board of India decided recently to increase the maximum reward for whistle-blowers from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 10 crores. Such protocols and procedures might allow matters to be reported anonymously through designated channels. Under CARO 2020, the auditor is required to report whether he has considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during the year by the company. The auditor should be mindful while performing the procedures under this clause and consider complaints received under the whistle-blower mechanism. The auditor should consider whether additional procedures are required to be performed under SA 240 in this regard.

When a senior PA in service becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following steps are to be taken:
a. Obtaining an understanding of the matter,
b. Addressing the matter,
c. Determining whether further action is needed,
d. Seeking advice,
e. Determining whether to disclose the matter to the appropriate authority – and the different scenarios, and
f. Documentation.

Senior professional accountants in service (SPAs) are Directors, officers or senior employees able to exert significant influence over, and make decisions regarding, the acquisition, deployment and control of the employing organisation’s human, financial, technological, physical and intangible resources.

Resigning from the employing organisation is not a substitute for taking other actions that might be needed to achieve the SPA’s objectives under this section. However, there might be limitations as to the further actions available to the accountant. In such circumstances, resignation might be the only available course of action.

When a Professional Accountant in service becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following steps are to be taken:
? Subject to established protocols and procedures, inform an immediate superior to enable the superior to take appropriate action;
? If the PA’s immediate superior appears to be involved in the matter, inform the next higher level of authority within the organisation;
? In exceptional circumstances, the PA may decide that disclosure of the matter to the appropriate authority is an appropriate course of action;
? Documentation of the matter, results of discussions, response by superior/s, course of action, the judgments made and the decisions that were taken.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN SA 250 AND NOCLAR
SA 250 requires the auditors to assess the financial implications on the financial statements in case there is a non-compliance of laws and regulations, which is equally applicable in case of NOCLAR. However, section 360 of the Code of Ethics requires the auditor to assess wider public interest implications, in case there is  NOCLAR in terms of potential harm to all the stakeholders of the company, whether financial or non-financial.

Further, SA 250 is required to be complied with by the auditors while doing the audit of entities, whether public or private, whereas NOCLAR is applicable to the audit of listed companies and to the PAs who are under employment of a listed entity.

THE BOTTOM LINE
NOCLAR would require organisations to make their compliances more robust from a financial statement disclosure perspective. If the violation is not appropriately reported, it may attract disciplinary action against the professional accountant. The reporting of NOCLAR is part of the global push towards greater accountability. Considering the various kinds of reporting involved, this might translate into more instances of whistle-blowing.  

CHANGE IS CONSTANT

It’s funny how day by day nothing changes. But when you look back, everything is different – C.S. Lewis

In this series of articles, we have covered various aspects of the ‘Digital Workplace’ and how the world is moving with technology. What had seemed impossible is becoming routine and what was routine is now changing. The world has moved on from going to the office daily to staying at home and managing work using whatever technology is available to ensure that, first and foremost, we remain safe. But with the steady re-opening of the economy, we are again changing our habits and people have started returning to the routine of the pre-pandemic era. Working at office has come a full circle now, from WFH being mainstream, and to WFO (Working from Office) once again becoming mainstream. But while most things have gone back to the pre-pandemic era, there are many things that have changed in the pre- and post-pandemic times. While the ‘Digital Workplace’ is not the ideal way of working at present, technology is constantly improving.

In this concluding article on ‘Digital Workplace’ we highlight three important points that everyone needs to consider to find the right balance between ‘Traditional Workplace’ vis a vis the ‘Digital Workplace’ and ways to prepare for the ‘Future of Digital Offices’.

1. Evaluate worker preferences carefully: Flexible office instead of a fixed and traditional way of working
Yes, the benefits of having an office and the entire team working together are unparalleled. Despite all the talk about ‘Virtual Offices’, we have still not reached a level where virtual offices can replace the existing office with people around us. There are numerous benefits of having the place to work, yet, such offices are not without their own limitations. Travelling to the
office is still the biggest challenge. In fact, the average Indian spends around 7%1 of her time daily in just travelling from home to office. Also, this number can go significantly higher when it comes to travelling in cities like Mumbai with limited public transport
facilities.

While everyone has accepted the importance of the office and travelling to it daily, no one can deny the fact that it does not hurt if employees or even promoters are not able to travel to office daily for the entire year. The existing technology supports such smaller breaks easily. For example, working from somewhere in the mountains once a year while enjoying weekends to ensure that you just don’t have to cancel your trip for a day or two’s work, or simply working while travelling, more popularly known as ‘Staycation’.

How many of you have faced a situation where a good employee has had to leave the office just because he / she has shifted to another city? While earlier it might not have been possible, today, an office can create an exemption and let a person work from home or just give some flexible working hours and WFH specially to female employees who face difficult times to work full time but have performed well in the past.

To make sure your plans align with what your team wants, find workable compromises:
* Avoid tensions that can sour your culture, have important but hard conversations with the team and conduct surveys to discover what most people prefer to do;
* Consider whether allowing your remote workers to stay at home would create a practical or financial burden;
* If remaining at home benefits employees’ mental or physical health, or their overall productivity, consider allowing them to maintain their current set-up.

Most companies have been vague about their plans or haven’t discussed them at all, which has resulted in bigger issues as many employees feel that their employers are disconnected from the reality.

2. Review consumer behaviours: Video calls over travelling
During the pandemic, consumers drastically changed their behaviour, spiking e-commerce and adapting to options like no-contact pickup and pay. As McKinsey & Company points out, this has shifted many of their long-term expectations and companies are having to account for that shift in how they operate and what they offer.

One such change was the most common realisation of 2020 amongst all of us that we do not always need to travel to the client’s place for a meeting and that it can be done with a video call. While this was good till it lasted, gradually we are moving back to the pre-pandemic era and we may see travel increasing again. However, the learnings of the year 2020 should not be wasted completely. With travelling permitted, we may prefer to visit and meet people again, but perhaps many such meetings can be replaced with video calls thanks to Zoom, Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, etc.

But consumers and your team are interconnected. When your workers are happy to buy into your vision, they work better and provide better service so that customers are happy, too. It’s a simple cycle perpetuated by good business practices. Additionally, companies that identify emerging opportunities and provide great empathy during times of change often navigate the change most successfully. So rather than shifting drastically between old and new methods, a business that will evaluate
the situation and review consumer behaviour will gain over others.

3. Capitalise on emerging and proven technologies: Soft copies of records and online documentation over physical files
Prior to Covid-19, companies were using a slew of incredible technologies to stay productive and connected. But the pandemic elevated these technologies and helped leaders understand their importance. Prior to the pandemic, the common office working trait of everyone meant the use of excessive paper and traditionally offices gave a feeling of drowning in paper! People at office love paper and hard copies from every work they do from chairing and attending meetings, to sharing and approving documents, filling forms and so on. In fact, now we use scanning and digital copies, yet paper is often used as the first resort rather than the last. Most of the old physical files which hold a lot of significance psychologically are not actually required regularly. In fact, many people never even opened a file even once during the pandemic and have learned to manage with digital data. The pandemic has helped us to fast-forward ten years into digital adoption in our businesses! Our familiarity with digital files vis a vis physical files has increased significantly.

As the pandemic is coming under control and we move through re-opening, businesses have choices about how to proceed. But how people lived and worked during the crisis will continue to have an influence on how we live and work in the years to come. There is a new, positive mentality emerging that it’s okay to use cutting-edge technology to serve customers better and create a happier, decentralised workforce. Adapting to this new way of thinking will allow you to stay ahead of the pack, but remember that every company is different and there’s no one-size-fits-all solution to anything. To create post-pandemic plans that truly lead you to success, evaluate your own situation and goals. The digital office is here to stay and offers incredible power in all kinds of industries, but how you shape it is entirely up to you.

It is time for us to start moving towards digital adoption of the working system instead of simply accepting what is the traditional system of working with paper. Though we have to agree that nothing will replace physical files and there is always going to be the risk of hacking, system crashing, non-availability of electricity or internet, but… The physical files may be used as a backup but gradually our dependency on them is reducing, so why not start transforming our old physical records into digital ones?

This move may not look that significant today but imagine the music record companies which have moved all their songs into a USB drive or uploaded them on Youtube when it was available. Keeping apace with technology is the only way to survive else we all know what happened to the likes of Kodak, Nokia, etc., all of which had a monopoly. (Kodak was sold for one dollar!)

CONCLUSION
Many things have changed over the last one and a half years, but overall we may not really feel how fast they have been changing around us and even in business on a daily basis. However, there are a lot of things which are improving for the better and as a business if we don’t adopt, we will be at a loss against other businesses who will implement automation and other technology-based features and the one that does not change will feel as if it is working with pen and paper during the time of Excel Calculation.

With this article, we wrap up the ‘Digital Workplace’ series. You can read our last three articles printed in the BCAJ as below:
(1) Digital Workplace – A Stitch In Time Saves Nine (August, 2021);
(2) Digital Workplace – When All Roads Lead To Rome (September, 2021);
(3) Digital Workplace – Finding The Right Balance (October, 2021)

MLI SERIES -ARTICLE 10 – ANTI-ABUSE RULE FOR PEs SITUATED IN THIRD JURISDICTIONS (Part 1)

The authors of the earlier articles in the MLI Series have covered various facets of the Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’) such as the background and application of the MLI and various other specific articles in the MLI relating to dual resident entities, treaty abuse, transparent entities and method of elimination of double taxation. In this two-part article, the authors attempt to analyse Article 10 of the MLI relating to the anti-abuse rule for Permanent Establishments (‘PEs’) situated in third jurisdictions and some of the intricacies related therein. The first part of this article lays down the background for the introduction of this anti-avoidance rule, the broad structure of the rule, some of the issues arising in its interpretation and the interplay of this rule with the other articles of the MLI and other anti-avoidance measures.

1. BACKGROUND
At the outset, one admits that very limited literature is available in respect of this anti-abuse rule as most discussions on the MLI, at least in the Indian context, focus on the Principal Purpose Test (‘PPT’) and the amendments to the rules relating to the constitution of a PE. However, the anti-abuse rule for PEs situated in third jurisdictions can have significant implications, especially for an Indian payer undertaking compliance u/s 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), given the amount of information required to apply this rule.

Under this rule, the Source State can deny treaty benefits to taxpayers on certain conditions being triggered. Such treaty benefits can be in the form of a lower rate of tax (as in the case of dividends, royalty, fees for technical services) or in the form of narrower scope (such as the narrower definition of royalty under the treaty or the make-available clause). Therefore, when one is undertaking compliance u/s 195, one would need to evaluate the impact of this rule.

While a detailed evaluation of the impact on India has been provided subsequently in this article, before one undertakes an analysis of the anti-abuse rule it is important to understand how the taxation works in the case of a PE in a third state, i.e., in triangular situations and the abuse of treaty provisions that this rule seeks to address.

1.1 Basic structure and taxation before application of the said rule
For the purpose of this article, let us take a base example of interest income earned by A Co, a resident of State R, from money lent to an entity in State S and such income earned is attributable to the PE (say a branch) of A Co in the State PE as it is effectively connected with the activities of the PE. A diagrammatic example of the said structure is provided below:

 

In this particular fact pattern, State S being the country of source would have a right to tax the interest. However, such right may be restricted by the application of the R-S DTAA, particularly the article dealing with interest. If the article on interest in the R-S DTAA is similar to that in the OECD Model Convention1, interest arising in State S payable to a resident of State R, who is the beneficial owner of the income, can be taxed in State S but not at a rate exceeding 15% of the gross amount of the interest.

 

1   Unless specifically
provided, the OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentary referred to in this
article is the 2017 version

Now, State PE, being the country in which the PE of A Co is constituted, will have the right to tax the income of the PE in accordance with the domestic tax laws and in the manner provided in the article dealing with business profits of the R-PE DTAA.

Further, while State PE would tax the profits of the PE, one would apply the non-discrimination article in the R-PE DTAA which generally provides that the taxation of a PE in a particular jurisdiction (State PE in this case) shall not be less favourable than that of a resident of that jurisdiction (State PE). This particular clause in the article would enable one to treat the PE as akin to a resident of State PE and therefore would be eligible to claim the foreign tax credit in State PE for taxes paid in State S2. The OECD Model is silent on whether State PE shall provide credit under domestic tax law or whether it would restrict the credit under the DTAA between State PE and State S. This issue of tax credit, not being directly related to the subject matter of this article, has not been dealt with in detail.

State R being the country of residence, would tax the income of the residence and provide credit for the taxes paid in State S as well as State PE in accordance with the R-S and the R-PE DTAAs.

1.2 Use of structure for aggressive tax planning
Many multinationals use the triangular structure to transfer assets to a jurisdiction which has a low tax rate for PEs and where the residence state provides an exemption for profits of the PE. These structures were typically common in European jurisdictions such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

A common example is of the finance branch set up by a Luxembourg entity in Switzerland3. In this fact pattern, a Luxembourg entity would set up a branch in Switzerland for providing finance to all the group entities all over the world. Given the fact that a finance branch only required movement of the funds, it was fairly easy to set up the structure wherein the funds obtained by the Luxembourg entity (A Co) would be lent to its branch in Switzerland. This finance branch would then lend funds to all the operating group entities around the world acting as the bank of the group and earning interest. Interest paid by the operating entities would be deductible in the hands of the paying entity and taxed in the country of source in accordance with the DTAA between that jurisdiction and Luxembourg. Further, the Swiss branch, constituting a PE in Switzerland, would be subject to very low taxation in accordance with the domestic tax law in Switzerland.

 

2   Refer para 67 of the OECD
Model Commentary on Article 24

3   J-P. Van West, Chapter 1:
Introduction to PE Triangular Cases and Article 29(8) of the OECD Model in The
Anti-Abuse Rule for Permanent Establishments Situated in Third States: A Legal
Analysis of Article 29(8) OECD Model (IBFD 2020), Books IBFD (accessed 16th
November, 2021)

Moreover, the Luxembourg-Swiss DTAA provides that in the case of a PE in a Contracting State, the Resident State (State R) will relieve double taxation by using the exemption method (and not the tax credit method as is generally prevalent in the Indian tax treaties), i.e., the Resident State (State R) would not tax the profits attributable to a PE in the other State. Therefore, the profits attributable to the Swiss branch of A Co would be exempt from tax in Luxembourg.

This would result in the interest being taxed in the country of source (with a deduction for the interest paid in the hands of the payer in the country of source) at a concessional treaty rate, very low tax in the country where the PE is constituted, i.e., Switzerland and no tax in the country of residence, i.e., Luxembourg by virtue of the exemption method followed in the Luxembourg-Swiss DTAA.

Like interest, one could also transfer other assets which resulted in passive income such as shares and intangible assets, resulting in a low tax incidence on the dividend and royalty income, respectively.

Let’s take the example of India, where a resident of Luxembourg invests in the shares of an Indian company through a PE situated in Switzerland. In such a scenario, India would tax the dividend at the rate of 10% due to the India-Luxembourg DTAA (as against 20% under the Act), Switzerland may tax the income attributable to the PE at a low rate and Luxembourg would not tax the income in accordance with the Luxembourg-Switzerland DTAA.

The OECD, recognising the use of PE to artificially apply lower tax rates, attempted to tackle this in the OECD Model Convention by providing further guidance on what would be considered as income effectively connected in the PE. For example, para 32 of the 2014 OECD Model Commentary on Article 10, dealing with taxation of dividends, provides,

It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of shares to permanent establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to dividend income. Apart from the fact that such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, as explained below, that the requirement that a shareholding be “effectively connected” to such a location requires more than merely recording the shareholding in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.’

Similar provisions were also provided in the Commentary on Article 11 and Article 12, dealing with interest and royalty, respectively.

However, the above provisions may not necessarily always tackle all forms of tax avoidance. Thanks to the nature of tax treaties applying only in bilateral situations, it may not apply in case of a PE constituted in a third state (State PE). Similarly, one may still achieve an overall low rate of tax by moving the functions related to the activities in the State PE. For example, in the case of a finance branch, one can consider moving the treasury team to State PE with an office, which would constitute a fixed place of business and therefore, the interest income earned from the group financing activities may still be effectively connected to the PE in the State PE.

The OECD Model recognised this limitation and para 71 of the 2014 OECD Model Commentary on Article 24 provides that a provision can be included in the bilateral treaty between the State R and the State S to provide that an enterprise can claim the benefits of the treaty only if the income obtained by the PE situated in the other State is taxed normally in the State of the PE.

1.3 BEPS Action 6
The US was one of the few countries which had provisions similar to the Article in the MLI in its tax treaties even before the OECD BEPS Project. In fact, even though the US is not a signatory to the MLI, the provisions as released by the US were used as a base for further discussion in the BEPS Project. The anti-abuse rule was covered in the OECD BEPS Action Plan 6 dealing with Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.

The objective of the anti-abuse provision is provided in para 51 of the BEPS Action 6 report, which is reproduced below,

‘It was concluded that a specific anti-abuse provision should be included in the Model Tax Convention to deal with that and similar triangular cases where income attributable to the permanent establishment in a third State is subject to low taxation.’

While the language in the MLI is similar to the suggested draft in the final report of the BEPS Action Plan 6, there are certain differences – mainly certain deletions, in the MLI, which have been discussed in detail in the second part of this article.

It is important to note that while Article 10(1) is included in the MLI as a specific anti-avoidance rule, MLI also contains a general anti-avoidance rule under Article 7 through the PPT. Further, in the Indian context, the domestic law also contains anti-avoidance provisions in the form of general anti-avoidance rules. An interplay between all three is discussed in para 3.5 below.

2. STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 1
2.1 Introduction to Article 10
The language contained in this Article refers to various terminologies that have been defined under Article 2 of the MLI [e.g., Contracting Jurisdiction (‘CJ’), Covered Tax Agreement (‘CTA’)]. Those terminologies referred to in Article 10, which have not been defined under Article 2 of the MLI, have to be interpreted as per Action 6 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’).

Article 10 of the MLI seeks to deny treaty benefits in certain circumstances.

2.2 Structure
Article 10 of the MLI is structured in six paragraphs wherein each paragraph addresses a different aspect related to the anti-abuse provision. The flow of the Article is structured in such a way that the conditions for attracting the provisions of the article are laid down first, followed by the exceptions and finally the reservation and notification which are in line with the overall scheme of the MLI.

To better understand Article 10, it would be beneficial to understand each paragraph individually. Let us proceed as per the order of the article.

Paragraph 1:
Paragraph 1 brings out the conditions for the applicability of Article 10 in certain circumstances:

‘Where:

a) an enterprise of a Contracting Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agreement derives income from the other Contracting Jurisdiction and the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction treats such income as attributable to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction; and

b) the profits attributable to that permanent establishment are exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction,

the benefits of the Covered Tax Agreement shall not apply to any item of income on which the tax in the third jurisdiction is less than 60 per cent of the tax that would be imposed in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction on that item of income if that permanent establishment were situated in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction. In such a case, any income to which the provisions of this Paragraph apply shall remain taxable according to the domestic law of the other Contracting Jurisdiction, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.’

Each underlined word is a condition for the applicability of the article and has its own significance.

An enterprise – The question as to how to interpret the term ‘an enterprise’ and what comes under the purview of the same is covered in the later part of this article.

derives income from the other Contracting Jurisdiction – This emphasises on the aspect that the income earned by the Resident State should be derived from the State S for the Article to get triggered.

income as attributable to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction – In addition to the condition as mentioned above, the income derived by the State PE from State S should be treated as attributable to the PE in State PE by State R.

exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction – This covers the point regarding the taxability of the profits attributable to the PE in the State R. It focuses on the point that Article 10 would be applicable if the profits attributable to the PE are exempt from tax in State R.

tax in the third jurisdiction is less than 60 per cent – This sentence points out the 60% test which states that the tax in the State PE is less than 60% of the tax that would be payable in the State R on that item of income if that PE was situated in the State R.

In case all the above conditions are satisfied, the benefits of the CTA between the State R and the State S shall not apply to such item of income.

The second part of paragraph 1 gives power to the State S to tax the item of income as per its domestic laws notwithstanding any other provisions of the CTA in cases where the provisions of Article 10(1) are satisfied.

Thus, it can be understood that the provisions of Article 10(1) emphasise on the denial of treaty benefits in order to prevent complete non-taxation or lower taxation of an item of income.

Paragraph 2:
Paragraph 2 states the exceptions where the provisions as set out in paragraph 1 of the Article 10 will not be applicable.

The exception covers the income derived from the State S in connection with or is incidental to active conduct of the business carried on by the PE. However, the business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own account such as activities of banking carried on by banks, insurance activities carried on by insurance enterprises and securities activities carried on by registered securities dealers will not come under the purview of paragraph 1 of the Article. The business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own account carried on by other than the above-mentioned enterprises shall come under the purview of paragraph 1 of the Article. A detailed discussion on what is considered as active conduct of business is covered in the second part of this article.

Paragraph 3:
Paragraph 3 of Article 10 provides that even if treaty relief is denied due to the trigger of the provisions of
Article 10(1), the competent authority of State S has the authority to grant the treaty relief as a response to a request by the taxpayer in the State R on the basis of justified reasons for not satisfying the requirements of Article 10(1).

In such situations, the competent authority of the State S shall consult with the competent authority of the State R before arriving at a decision.

Paragraph 4:
Paragraph 4 is the compatibility clause between paragraph 1 through paragraph 3 which mentions ‘in place of or in the absence of’.

This means that if there is an existing provision in a CTA which denies / limits treaty relief in instances of triangular cases (‘Existing Provision’), then such a provision would be modified (i.e. in place of) to the extent paragraph 1 through 3 are inconsistent with the existing provisions (subject to notification requirements analysed below).

However, if there is no existing provision then paragraph 1 through 3 would be added to the CTAs (i.e., in absence of).

Paragraph 5:
Article 10(5) covers the reservation aspect to be in line with the overall scheme of the MLI.

This reservation clause is applicable because Article 10 is not covered under minimum standard and hence the scope for reservation is wide. There are three options available to each signatory:
a) Article to not be applicable to all CTA’s in entirety, or
b) Article to not be applicable in case where the CTA already contains the provision as mentioned in paragraph 4, or
c) Article to only be applicable in case of CTA’s that already contain the provisions as mentioned under paragraph 4 (i.e., the existing provisions to be modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 10).

Paragraph 6:
Article 10(6) provides the notification mechanism to assess the impact of the reservations and position adopted by the signatories on the provisions of the CTAs.

In cases where the parties decide to go as per sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of Article 10(5), then they need to notify the depository whether each of its CTA contains the provisions as per Article 10(4) along with the article and paragraph number. In case where all contracting jurisdictions have made such a notification, then the existing provisions shall be replaced by the provisions of Article 10. In other cases, such as in the case of a notification mismatch (i.e., one signatory to the CTA does not notify the provisions of Article 10 whereas the other signatory to the same CTA notifies them), the existing provisions shall ONLY be modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 10.

India has not made any reservation. Further, India has not notified any DTAAs which have a provision similar to that in para 4 of Article 10. Therefore, the provisions of Article 10 of the MLI shall supersede the existing provisions of the DTAAs to the extent they are incompatible with the existing provisions.

2.3 Reason as to why the Source Country should not grant DTAA benefits
The main policy consideration for implementation of Article 10 of the MLI is to plug the structure wherein one can artificially reduce the overall tax simply by interposing a PE in a low-tax jurisdiction, which is a major BEPS concern.

Tax treaties allocate the taxing rights between the jurisdictions. A Source State giving up its taxing rights is a result of bilateral negotiation with the Residence State. However, if such Residence State decides to treat such income as attributable to a third state and therefore not taxing such income by virtue of another treaty of which the Source State is a not a party, would be against the intention of the countries who have negotiated the treaty in good faith.

Therefore, if State R gives up its right of taxation of income earned from State S due to the artificial imposition of a PE in a third State, Article 10 of the MLI gives the entire taxing right back to State S.

3. SOME ISSUES RELATED TO INTERPRETATION OF PARA 1 OF ARTICLE 10 OF MLI
Having analysed the broad provisions of Article 10 of the MLI, the ensuing paragraphs seek to raise (and analyse) some of the issues in relation to para 1 of Article 10.

3.1 Definition of PE – Which DTAA to Apply
While considering the situation of denial of treaty benefits laid out in the treaty between State R and State S with regard to the income earned by the PE of an entity of the State R in a State PE, there are two DTAA’s that come under this purview, namely:
i. Treaty between the State R and the State S, and
ii. Treaty between the State R and the third state (PE State).

For the purpose of referring to the definition of PE, the first question that arises is which of the two DTAAs has to be referred to? This issue arises mainly because the term ‘Permanent Establishment’ is not a general term but is a specific term which is defined in the DTAA (generally in Article 5 of the relevant DTAA).

A view could be that since the acceptability or denial of benefits under the DTAA between the State R and State S is evaluated and State S is the jurisdiction denying the treaty benefit, one should look at the DTAA between the State R and State S to determine the PE status. However, the objective of the anti-abuse provision is to target transactions wherein income is not taxed in State R due to a PE in State PE. Further, MLI 10(1) applies only if the Residence State treats the income of an enterprise derived from the Source State as attributable to the PE of a third State. This decision of Residence State is obviously on the basis of its treaty with the PE State as it is a bilateral decision. As the Source State is not a party to this decision, the treaty between Residence State and Source State cannot be applied. Therefore, a better view would be to consider the provisions of the DTAA between the State R and the third state (State PE) for the definition of PE.

It is also important to note that prior to introduction of MLI, Article 5 of the DTAA was referred to in order to establish the PE status. However, post introduction of the MLI, one would also need to evaluate the impact of Article 12 to Article 15 of the MLI which covers the PE status based on Action 7 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). This, of course, is subject to the CTA between Residence State and PE State not reserving the above articles.

3.2 Whether PE jurisdiction needs to be a signatory to MLI
Article 10 of the MLI merely provides that State S should deny benefit of the DTAA between State R and State S if certain conditions are triggered. One of the conditions is that the income is treated by Residence State as attributable to the PE of the taxpayer in State PE. Having concluded the above, that the PE definition under the DTAA between State R and State PE should be considered, it is not necessary that such DTAA is impacted by the MLI. If the DTAA between State R and State PE is impacted by the MLI, one would need to consider the modified definition of PE in such a situation.

Here, it would be important to look at Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. The same is reproduced below:

Article 34 – General Rule Regarding Third States
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.

In this particular scenario, it is clear that there is no right or obligation granted to the State PE under the DTAA between State R and State S. State PE can continue to tax the profits of the PE.

Further, by signing MLI Article 10, State S and State R should be deemed to have consented their rights and obligations under the State R-State S treaty as amended by MLI Article 10. Consequently, State PE would not be required to be a signatory to the MLI.

3.3 No taxation in country of residence
Another issue which arises is what if the country of residence does not tax the income irrespective of whether the income is attributable to a PE or not. For example, if dividend income is earned by a resident of Singapore and such income is attributable to the PE of the shareholder in a third jurisdiction, such dividend would not be taxable irrespective of whether the dividend is attributable to a PE in a third state or not.

In such a scenario, Article 10 of the MLI should not apply as the tax rate in State PE is not less than 60% of the tax rate in State R. In any case, as the Source State had given up its right of taxation even when the Residence State did not tax such income and imposing a third jurisdiction in the transaction, would not result in a reduction of taxes in the Residence State.

3.4 Interplay of Article 10 with Article 5
Article 5 of the MLI provides for the elimination of double taxation using the credit method as against the exemption method. It refers to three options for preventing double non-taxation situations arising due to the State R providing relief under the exemption method for income not taxed in the State S.

The interplay between Article 5 and Article 10 comes into play because Article 10 is applicable only in cases where the income is exempt in the State R. So, in order to determine whether or not the income is exempt in the State R, Article 5 will have to be referred to. If the DTAA between State R and State PE provides for the exemption method for elimination of double taxation, but State R has opted to apply Article 5 of the MLI, the credit method would apply and in such a situation, in the absence of exemption granted in State R, the provisions of Article 10(1) shall not apply.

India has opted for Option C under Article 5 which allows a country to apply the credit method to all its treaties where the exemption method was applicable earlier. Therefore, with respect to India only credit method will be applicable as a method to eliminate double taxation.

Given that India’s tax treaties apply the credit method for providing relief from double taxation, the situation contemplated under Article 5 may not be relevant in the Indian context.

3.5 Interplay of Article 10 with PPT / GAAR
The Principle Purpose Test (‘PPT’) rule under Article 7 is the minimum standard and applies to all DTAAs covered under MLI. A question could therefore arise as to which provision would override the other. It is pertinent to note that provisions of Article 29 of the OECD Model clearly specify that Article 29 would apply where the PPT has been met. However, Article 10 of the MLI does not lay down any preference of application of PPT or otherwise. Consequently, it could be possible to take a view that if the specific conditions of Article 10 are met, PPT rule should not apply to deny the treaty benefits.

However, a better and sensible view could be that even if the special anti-abuse provision contained in Article 10 is satisfied, the general anti-abuse provision under Article 7(1) also needs to be satisfied to avail treaty benefits. In other words, where the main purpose to set up or constitute the PE in the third state (State PE) was to obtain tax benefit, such an arrangement should be covered under the mandatory provisions of Article 7(1) of the MLI so as to deny the treaty benefits. In a case where the provisions of MLI Article 10 are applicable, the treaty benefits can be denied based on the applicability of MLI Article 10 itself. In other words, MLI article 7(1) and MLI Article 10 both can co-exist and an assessee needs to satisfy both the tests to avail treaty benefits.

Further, in a case where India is the State S, one will also have to see the applicability of GAAR provisions and its interplay with the provisions of Article 10. Typically, GAAR applies where the main purpose of the arrangement is to obtain tax benefit and the GAAR provisions can kick in to deny the treaty benefits as well. Here it is important to note that both Indian domestic law and OECD recognise that the provisions of GAAR / PPT and SAAR / MLI 10 can co-exist. FAQ 1 under Circular 7 of 2017 states that the provisions of GAAR and SAAR can co-exist and are applicable, as may be necessary, in the facts and circumstances of the case. The same has also been recognised under para 2 of the OECD commentary on Article 29.

4. CONCLUSION
In the second part of this article, the authors will attempt to analyse some practical challenges arising on account of the difference in the tax rates of the jurisdictions involved and the impact of the anti-avoidance rule on India. The second part will also cover the difference between Article 10 of the MLI and the BEPS Action Plan 6 Report on the basis of which the rule was incorporated in the MLI and Article 29 of the OECD Model.  

 

VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS – ADDING VALUE TO ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE

BACKGROUND
The recently introduced new tax reporting obligations under the three-tier documentation [that is, country-by-country report (CbCR), master file and local file] pursuant to implementation of Action 13 of the action plans on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS1) for companies having cross-border operations, requires maintenance and sharing of the transfer pricing documentation with tax authorities across the globe. While the CbCR will give tax authorities much more information on the global tax footprint of the group, the master file requires it to produce a global ‘overview’ of a multinational entity’s business including its supply chain, allocation of income and transfer pricing policies, and this may include sharing of critical and sensitive information about its business operations. The documentation required has become more robust and in sync with the actual conduct of the operations as against the contractual obligations. Hence, the existing requirement of documentation, which historically has been the cornerstone for supporting the arm’s length standard, needs to be aligned with the new reporting framework. The discrepancy between the two documentation frameworks, if not reconciled, can lead to misinterpretations and ineffective discussions between the taxpayers and tax authorities. This has led to the taxpayers relooking at the way the businesses have been conducted and requiring a much closer alignment between a company’s value chain, operating model and the tax structure.

 

1   BEPS
relates chiefly to instances where the interaction of different tax rules leads
to double non-taxation or less than single taxation. It also relates to
arrangements that achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away from the
jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take place – OECD’s
publication on ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’

In line with the above and with the advent of the new framework of documentation, the arm’s length principle (ALP) which was considered to be transaction-based and at most entity-based, has evolved from the entity approach to mapping of the position of the group entities and reconciling the profits allocated according to arm’s length with ‘value creation’. This shift is more so as ALP is seen as being vulnerable to manipulation as it lays emphasis on contractual allocations of functions, assets and risks and this results in outcomes which do not correspond to the value created through the economic activity carried out by the members of the group. Some of the instances of current ALP mismatches are given below:

(a) Benchmarking analysis currently undertaken which considers only one part of the transaction without taking into consideration the holistic analysis of the parties involved in the intercompany transaction.
(b) Commissionaire model wherein the significant people functions contribute highly to the group but draw only a cost plus or fixed return to the entity with the people function.
(c) IP structures without the people function charging royalty to the group entities by claiming to be the legal owner of intangibles while no value creation happens in the said entities.

Hence, for the sustainability of the group’s transfer pricing policy, it becomes necessary to conduct a value chain analysis in order to bridge the gap between the requirements of the existing documentation requirement and the BEPS-driven documentation.

Value chain analysis in simple terms means a systematic way of examining all the activities performed by the business and determining the sources of the competitive advantage which translate into profit for the group. In short, a value chain analysis projects the value creation story of the group by bringing out how and where the value is created and by which entities within the group. This analysis is crucial as it will assist the group to test and corroborate the alignment of the transfer pricing policies with the value creation.

The OECD in its BEPS projects has also recognised value chain analysis as being useful in determining the value drivers and the relevant factors necessary for splitting the profits to the entities creating the value. Further, Actions 8-102: 2015 Final Reports on ‘Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation’ states that the value chain analysis should consider where and how value is created in the operations by considering the following:
(a) Economically significant functions, assets and risks and the key personnel contributing to the same;
(b) The economic circumstances that add to the creation of opportunities to increase profits;
(c) The substance in the value creation and whether the same is sustainable or short-term.

Effectively conducted value chain analysis can lead to transformation in the supply chain in order to align with the value drivers. A value chain analysis thus provides companies with a means to defend their transfer pricing policies, i.e., to prove that the arm’s length price is in sync with the actual functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed.

ORIGIN AND CONCEPT OF VALUE CHAIN
The concept of ‘value chain’ was introduced by Micheal Porter in his book The Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, back in 1985. In simple terms, it refers to the chain of activities performed by a business to transform an input for a product or service into an output that is of value in the market for the customer. Such activities could range from design and development, procurement, production, marketing, logistics, distribution, to after-sales support to the final customer. These activities may be performed by a single entity or a group of entities which are based in different locations that contribute to the overall profitability of the business.

With increasing globalisation, international trade and advent of technology, the value chains of MNEs are dispersed across multiple geographies and entities which have resulted in the evolution of the concept of global value chain (‘GVC’). GVCs are organisational systems that operate across multiple nations and are highly integrated. GVCs help the MNEs to achieve enhanced productivity, efficiency and economies of scale at a global level in this dynamic business environment. Typically, a GVC would involve vertical integration of economic activities which at the same time are divided across countries, specialisation in tasks and business-related functions and reliance on the integrated networks of buyers and suppliers.

 

2   Actions
8 to 10 – Action 8 relates to TP framework for intangibles and cost
contribution agreements, Action 9 relates to TP framework for risks and
capital, and Action 10 relates to TP methods for other high-risk transactions

POST-BEPS – GUIDANCE PROVIDED ON VALUE CHAIN
BEPS is an initiative by the OECD which seeks to ensure that each country gets its fair share of taxes by setting up effective domestic and international tax systems which curb base erosion and profit shifting by multinational corporations by misusing the gaps and mismatches in the present tax systems. As a part of this project, 15 detailed Action Plans were laid down by the OECD across the themes of coherence, economic substance and transparency.

The concept of value chain analysis, though well-known, has gained more significance with the BEPS initiative. From a transfer pricing perspective, the important areas of change lie within the ‘economic substance’ and ‘transparency’ themes. The need for value chain analysis is rooted under both the said themes and is the heart of the BEPS from a transfer pricing perspective.

The OECD3 recognised that there is a need to address the issues arising due to mismatch of economic substance in corporate structures, where the income is parked in low tax jurisdictions under legal entities which lack substance, thus leading to erosion of the tax base of the other high tax jurisdictions.

Some of the guidance available emphasising on the relevance of value chain are reproduced below:

– OECD’s publication on ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ 2013 has highlighted the importance of value chain analysis:
Action 54 – Point (ii) on ‘Restoring the full effects and benefits of international standards’ states that ‘Current rules work in many cases, but they need to be adapted to prevent BEPS that results from the interactions among more than two countries and to fully account for global value chains’.

– BEPS Action Plan 8-10’s final reports, ‘Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation’ released in 2015 lays emphasis on value chain in determining the arm’s length price for transactions with related parties. This was also included in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2017 (‘TPG’), in para 1.51 – Functional analysis, which reads as under:
‘… it is important to understand how value is generated by the group as a whole, the interdependencies of the functions performed by the associated enterprises with the rest of the group, and the contribution that the associated enterprises make to that value creation. It will also be relevant to determine the legal rights and obligations of each of the parties in performing their functions…
Determining the economic significance of risk and how risk may affect the pricing of a transaction between associated enterprises is part of the broader functional analysis of how value is created by the MNE group and the activities that allow the MNE group to sustain profits, and the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction…” para 1.73

 

3   OECD
– Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

4   Action
5 relates to countering harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into
account transparency and substance

– The TPG lays emphasis on the principle of substance over form in para 1.66 which reads as under –
‘The capability to perform decision-making functions and the actual performance of such decision-making functions relating to a specific risk involve an understanding of the risk based on a relevant analysis of the information required for assessing the foreseeable downside and upside risk outcomes of such decisions and the consequences for the business of the enterprise…’

– The public discussion draft of revised guidance on Profit Splits of 20165, contained a section on value chain analysis, which emphasised the following –
• A value chain analysis can be used as a ‘tool to assist in delineating the controlled transactions, in particular in respect of the functional analysis, and thereby determining the most appropriate transfer pricing methodology.’
• A value chain analysis ‘does not, of itself, indicate that the transactional profit split is the most appropriate method, even where the value chain analysis shows that there are factors which contribute to the creation of value in multiple places, since all parties to a transaction can be expected to make some contributions to value creation’.

However, this section was eliminated from the final Guidance as it was thought that overemphasis could unduly uplift the significance of profit splits even in cases where this would not be the best method.

 

5   https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/BEPS-discussion-draft-on-the-revised-guidance-on-profit-splits.pdf

– In relation to analysis of intangibles, the TPG lays focus on identifying the factors that contribute to value creation and entities that perform economically significant functions in relation to the intangibles which are used by the MNE to create value for the business. The relevant paras are given below:

‘…In cases involving the use or transfer of intangibles, it is especially important to ground the functional analysis on an understanding of the MNE’s global business and the manner in which intangibles are used by the MNE to add or create value across the entire supply chain…’ para 6.3

‘In a transfer pricing analysis of a matter involving intangibles, it is important to identify the relevant intangibles with specificity. The functional analysis should identify the relevant intangibles at issue, the manner in which they contribute to the creation of value in the transactions under review, the important functions performed and specific risks assumed in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles and the manner in which they interact with other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value…’ para 6.12.

– BEPS Action Plan 13 on three-tier documentation requires disclosure of certain information in the master file for the MNE group such as key value drivers of
the business, details on intangibles, transfer pricing policies, contribution of the key group entities, etc., which will enable tax administrations access to global documentation leading to enhanced transparency
and thereby provide a mechanism to tackle BEPS problems.

– Both the local documentation and the CbCR could reveal the key data points in relation to the MNCs’ IP activities highlighting the low substance entities generating lower taxable income.

– Also, there are certain countries (such as China, Germany, Spain, Austria, Ecuador, South Africa, etc.) where the tax administrations lay emphasis on documentation of the VCA in the local TP documentation.

WHAT IS VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS (‘VCA’)
VCA can be said to be a blueprint of the MNE’s group operations. The analysis involves a detailed investigation into the functions, assets and risks of the MNE as a whole and thereby evaluating the contribution of each of the activities involved in the value chain to the overall value created by the group. A VCA is a deep-dive analysis of understanding where and how the economic value is created and by which parties within a multinational group.

A VCA reflects the key value drivers for an MNE’s business, sector, or line of activity and identifies the relative contributions to the value-creation process. Value driver is something that contributes to the generation of income for an MNE’s business. Value drivers could also be defined as the performance variables that will actually create the value of the business.

The value drivers may vary across different businesses, industries and sectors. It is important to note that the nature of the business or industry generally defines whether it has more of tangible or intangible value. Most of the service industry players will have greater intangible value while an asset intensive industry will have higher tangible value. For instance:
(a) For Apple, which is one of the leading companies which sells computers, mobile phones and such other electronic devices, their key value drivers would be continuous innovation, unique technology which differentiates their products from the other competitors in the market, brand, customer loyalty, geographic reach, etc.
(b) For an IT company like Infosys which is a multinational company engaged in providing services in the area of information technology, business consultancy, outsourcing and managed services, their key value drivers would be employee productivity, a skilled and trained workforce, a global delivery model, latest technology, acquisitions, etc.
(c) For a company like McDonalds which falls under the fast-food industry, the value drivers would be product quality and customer health, human capital, environment footprint, brand management, sustainable supply chain and packaging waste, etc.
(d) For a company like Paytm which is a leading digital financial services platform, the value drivers would be technology, customer experience, availability of frictionless payment options, etc.

The VCA highlights the economically significant functions performed and risks assumed by the MNE group and also by the individual entities within the group which leads to value creation for the group. Further, by understanding whether an entity is really controlling the function / risk, it becomes easier to understand whether such an entity is adequately remunerated for these activities in line with its value contribution and whether it would need to be remunerated if there is a transfer of such function or risk from that entity to any other group entity. The VCA helps in identifying the commercial or financial relations between the parties and thereby assists in accurately delineating the controlled transactions based on the actual conduct of the parties in the entire value chain. A VCA is therefore a critical and important step for the purpose of drawing conclusions from a tax and transfer pricing perspective to align the value drivers with the functions performed and risks borne by the respective entities in the global value chain.

STEPS FOR UNDERTAKING VCA
There is no ‘right’ way of conducting a value chain analysis because every business will have its own value drivers and value creation story. Further, there are various techniques that can be applied while conducting a VCA to map the activities against the value creation. We explain below some of the steps which need to be considered in performing a VCA:

Step 1: Identification of the value drivers for the business
Value drivers in principle are common for a business operating in a particular industry or sector; however, its importance will vary from business to business. These drivers can be linked to the tangible assets or intangible assets of the business that are created or used for conducting the business, the various processes / systems adopted, customer relationships developed, the skilled workforce, or even the culture of the organisation which leads to value creation. Also, not all the value drivers would draw equal weightage when their contributions in the value chain are analysed. Hence, it is important to evaluate their relative value in the entire value chain by assigning a numerical weightage to them.

Step 2: Mapping the contribution by the legal entities / territories
The next step is to determine and map the contribution to the value generated by the value drivers with the legal entities that are part of the value chain. This will involve conducting a detailed functions, asset and risk analysis for the legal entities, analysing the key tangible and intangible assets employed and the risks assumed by the entities while contributing to the value chain. The OECD guidelines provide a detailed framework on risk analysis – control and management of risks, which would play a vital role in determining their weightage in value creation. Para D.1.2.1.1 of the TPG.

Step 3: Allocate the profits to the legal entities
Based on the results of Steps 1 and 2, the overall profit of the group is calculated and then appropriately allocated to the respective legal entities in line with the weightage assigned to the relative contributions of the entities in the value chain.

Step 4: Alignment with the transfer pricing outcomes
The results of Step 3 can be compared with the existing or proposed transfer pricing for controlled transactions across the group and in alignment with the value created by each of the entities in the value chain. VCA is a corroborative analysis which would help identify the mismatches in the pricing for the individual entities by providing a holistic picture of the allocation of profit results at a group level.

We have illustrated below a case study evaluating the value chain for an MNE group:

 

In relation to the above case study:
• F Co. is the parent company of I Co., S Co. and D Co.
• F Co. is engaged in full-fledged manufacturing activities.
• I Co. and S. Co. are R&D centres of the group.
• I Co. supervises the R&D services performed by S Co.
• D Co. is a full-fledged distributor engaged in distribution of goods in the local jurisdiction.

Value chain – Analysis of the value contribution of each of the parties

Functions
of F Co.

Functions
of I Co.

Functions
of S Co.

Functions
of D Co.

• Manufacture and sale of products

• Legal owner of the IP developed by I Co. and S
Co.

• Provides funding to I Co. and S Co.

• Manages the R&D projects by hiring own
R&D workforce

• Frames its own research budgets, decides on the
termination /

• Designs and develops R&D programme under
the supervision and control of I Co.

• Performs the contract R&D services


Imports (procures) finished goods from F Co. and sells to local customers


Performs local marketing and sales functions

(continued)

 

for the R &D activities

(continued)

 

modification to the R&D projects

• Controls and supervises the R&D activities
performed by S Co.

• Takes all the relevant decisions related to
R&D of S Co.

(continued)

 

under supervision and control of I Co.

• After sales support activities

Risks
borne by F Co.

Risks
borne by I Co.

Risks
borne by S Co.

Risks
borne by D Co.

• Financial risk of failure of R&D projects

• Operates as a full-fledged manufacturer bearing
all the related risks

Responsible for key development activities and
risk management functions of I Co. and S Co. both in relation to the IP
developed through the R&D activities

Limited risks service provider – attrition risk,
foreign currency fluctuation risk, technology risk, etc.

Takes
title to the goods and bears the related risks such as market risks,
inventory risk, credit risk, foreign currency fluctuation risk, etc.

In order to perform an analysis of the value contribution of each of the entities it is essential to understand the functions performed and risks assumed by each of the entities in the value chain. From the above tabulation of the functional and risk analysis of all the entities participating in the value chain of the group, it is evident that the primary functions in the value chain are research and development, procurement, manufacturing, sales and marketing and after sales services. Various entities of the group based in different geographies are engaged in performing the said activities in relation to these functions which leads to creation of value for the group and thereby results in generating profits. The key value drivers for this business are people, technology, marketing intangible (brand), customer base, innovation through R&D, location savings, etc.

In the above case study, from a transfer pricing perspective the following are the key points for consideration:
a) F Co. being the IP owner contractually assumes the financial risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk in relation to the IP developed as a result of the R&D activities performed by I Co. and S Co. However, it does not exercise any control over these risks. Accordingly, in addition to the return on the manufacturing function, F Co. may only be entitled to a risk-free return on the funding activities.
b) I Co. is entitled to returns derived from the exploitation of the intangibles developed as a result of the R&D efforts of I Co. and S. Co., as it performs both the development and risk management functions in relation to the intangibles developed.
c) S Co. needs to be remunerated for its contract R&D services rendered to F Co. based on the function, asset and risk analysis in relation to these activities performed by F Co. In determining the remuneration for S Co., it will be critical to consider the comparability factors such as the skill sets of the employees employed for performing the R&D services, the nature of research being undertaken, etc.
d) D Co. is a full-fledged distributor and needs to be remunerated adequately for the distribution functions performed by it.

In the above case study, based on the steps for conducting the VCA (explained before the case study), the controlled transactions were accurately delineated from the value chain and the key functions performed and risks assumed by the respective group entities in the value chain have been identified and evaluated. On the basis of the evaluation of the contribution of each of the parties, the remuneration in line with the conduct has been discussed in the above section.

In practical scenarios, the value chain analysis could be more complex for large MNEs where the supply chain is fragmented across various geographies with multiple group entities involved in the value chain performing various integrated functions. Accordingly, it is necessary to follow a methodical and step-by-step process while conducting the value chain analysis which forms the basis of tax and transfer pricing analysis for the group at a global level.

Purpose of conducting a value chain analysis in the current environment
a) Supply chain analysis vis-à-vis traditional FAR analysis vis-à-vis value chain analysis

A value chain as a concept is different from a supply chain. A supply chain typically focuses on the ‘flow of goods and services’, while value chain addresses the question of what value the business has created by analysing what it is able to sell in the market and what is the cost of creating that.

Supply chain can be described as a business transformation tool which helps in minimising the costs, maximising the customer satisfaction by ensuring that the products are provided to the customers at the right time and place; whereas value chain provides the competitive advantage which ensures that the competition is taken care of by fulfilling customer satisfaction by adding value. Supply chain is only a component of the value chain.

The value chain analysis supplements the traditional functional analysis and establishes the connection on how the FAR and value drivers contribute value to the MNC. The value chain analysis strengthens the documentation as it evaluates both sides of the contracting parties and provides a justification of the arm’s length principle by highlighting the alignment of the transfer pricing policy with the actual conduct of the parties. The robust documentation will serve as back-up to defend the pricing policy during transfer pricing audits. This will also be relevant during negotiations with the APA / competent authority on the allocation of profits among the parties in the value chain as the documentation clearly highlights the robust functional profile.

b) Globalisation and decentralisation of functions, digitalisation
With the emergence of MNEs across different jurisdictions, the competitiveness of the companies is influenced by the efficiency of the supply chain and the corresponding value created by each of the functions in the value chain. Given the current dynamics, not only the supply chain but also the value chain is shifting towards becoming more sustainable, globalised and digitalised.

Digitalisation is bringing about a change by introducing new operating models and revolutionising the existing models. With this there is bound to be a change in the value drivers of the companies and a shift in the functional profile. Corresponding alignment of the pricing policy with the value creation / contribution of each entity in the value chain is going to be critical in order to ensure appropriate allocation of the profits to the entities.

 

6   In
transfer pricing cases involving intangibles, the determination of the entity
or entities within an MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the
returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial. A related
issue is which entity or entities within the group should ultimately bear the
costs, investments and other burdens associated with the Development of
intangible asset, Enhancement of the value of intangible asset, Maintenance
of intangible asset, Protection of intangible asset against infringement
and Exploitation of intangibles

c) Assessing the value in the value chain for intangibles
For the purpose of assessing the value, the strong focus is on DEMPE function6. It is important that the profit allocation is based on the functional substance-based contribution towards the DEMPE of the intangibles. The value drivers in the case of intangibles go beyond the legal definition of the intangible. In the case of intangibles, factors such as risks borne, specific market characteristics, location, business strategies and group synergies could contribute to value creation. All the entities performing functions, using assets or assuming risks for contributing to the value of the intangible, must be adequately remunerated for their contribution under the arm’s length principle.

d) Application of profit split method (PSM) for value chain analysis
The main objective of BEPS is that the transfer pricing outcomes are in sync with the economic value created. Hence, it becomes necessary to accurately delineate the actual transaction and its pricing in accordance with the most appropriate method selected to justify the arm’s length principle. The transfer pricing regulations requires selection of the most appropriate method to justify the arm’s length principle. PSM7 could be considered as the most appropriate method as it advocates alignment of profits with the relative values / contribution of the functions, assets and risks.

 

7   PSM
– is applied in cases involving transfer of unique intangibles or highly
integrated operations that cannot be evaluated on an individual basis, i.e.,
they are intrinsically linked

EFFECT OF COVID ON VALUE CHAIN AND NEED TO CONDUCT THE ANALYSIS TO ANALYSE ITS IMPACT FROM A TAX PERSPECTIVE – RISKS OF NOT CONDUCTING A VCA

The Covid-19 pandemic has hit the international trade hard thereby causing concerns of serious disruptions to the global value chains (GVCs). The pandemic has impacted the way companies conduct their operations – consequential changes to the value chains as a stop-gap arrangement or a permanent modification to how the business was undertaken.

Some of the instances of disruption in the value chain are given below:
(a) Lockdowns changed the dynamics of how products were sourced. There was a sudden shift from brick-and-mortar retail chains to digital marketplaces / e-commerce platforms. Unlike historically where the physical stores, sales personnel, advertising, etc., which were value drivers in the value chain, now the value contribution of digital / ecommerce platforms has increased significantly.
(b) MNCs having centralised sourcing for their manufacturing / trading activities, faced challenges due to supply chain disruptions. Many resorted to decentralised sourcing from alternate locations / suppliers.
(c) The pandemic influenced work from home for employees which disrupted the provision of services. Example – employees responsible for performing significant DEMPE functions had to work from remote locations thereby disrupting the significance of the location base.

Both the business operations and the financial markets got disrupted due to the pandemic. For the companies that reorganised their operations to adapt to the evolving economic and business environment, the existing transfer pricing policies may no longer apply in line with the transformation of the value chain. In order to sustain their business operations, some companies moved parts of their supply chains as a result of the pandemic, thereby making existing transfer pricing policies obsolete. Due to the impact on the profitability or disruptions to cash flows, the existing transfer pricing policies may not be complied with due to the inability to compensate the entities in line with the functions they performed. Hence, it would be critical for taxpayers to evaluate whether changes in a value chain result in transfer of value or alteration of the profit potential of group entities in their jurisdiction. Thus, taxpayers need to be alert about such eventualities.

Since the pandemic has impacted the economic conditions significantly, this would have an effect on the APAs entered into covering the pandemic year onwards. Most APAs include specific assumptions about the operational and economic conditions that will affect transactions covered in the APA. Hence, it is critical to determine to what extent the changes will affect the application of existing APAs. Since the pandemic has not affected all companies equally, the individual cases of each taxpayer should be evaluated.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENCE – INDIAN AND GLOBAL
With the above detailed discussion on the concept of value chain and the need for conducting the same, let us look at how value chain analysis has gained significance from the Indian perspective. The transfer pricing provisions in India were enacted in the Income-tax Act in 2001 and since then the transfer pricing law in India has evolved with substantial developments. Though the Indian provisions do not provide detailed guidance on various transfer pricing issues, the Indian tax authorities including the dispute resolution forums and Tax Courts place reliance on international guidelines such as the OECD TP guidelines, the United Nations’ TP Manual and guidelines published by various countries while conducting TP audits and deciding on the complex issues related to transfer pricing.

India has also adopted the BEPS Action Plan 13 – three-tier documentation (country-by-country report, master file and local file) in the local regulations in 2016 with additional requirements for master file compliance, wherein it requires the MNC’s to provide the drivers of profits for the business, the transfer pricing policies and strategies in relation to intangibles and R&D facilities and the detailed functional analysis for principal entities contributing to the profits, revenue or assets of the group as per the specified threshold. Pursuant to the BEPS Action Plans released in 2015, the concept of substance over form, i.e., actual conduct of the parties vis-à-vis the legal form plays a vital role in determination of the arm’s length price for a controlled transaction. The Indian tax authorities during the course of TP investigations attempt to re-characterise the transaction to determine the arm’s length price based on the actual conduct of the parties rather than the contractual arrangements, which is in line with OECD guidelines.

Some of these case laws where emphasis is laid on the value chain analysis are summarised below:
a) In the case of L’Oreal India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-829-ITAT-2019 (Mum)-TP], the Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) referred to the Development Enhancement Maintenance Protection and Exploitation (DEMPE) framework while analysing the issue of marketing intangibles arising due to the significant incurrence of Advertising, Marketing and Promotion (AMP) expenses. The ITAT held as follows:
• the sine qua non for commencing the TP exercise is to show the existence of an international transaction and the same had not been shown to have been fulfilled in the instant case, therefore, the issue of traversing to the aspect of determining the validity of the method for determining the ALP of such transaction does not arise at all.
• The assessee had never admitted that the incurring of AMP expenses was an international transaction and had, in fact, since inception canvassed that the said expenses were incurred in the normal course of its own business and not for rendering any DEMPE functions for brand building of its AE.
• Accordingly, the ITAT held that no part of the AMP expenses incurred by the assessee are attributable to rendering of any DEMPE functions for the brands owned by the AE and deleted the adjustment proposed by the Indian Revenue Authorities with respect to the AMP expenses incurred by the assessee.
• The ITAT distinguished the decision of the High Court in the case of Sony Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. by recording the finding that the presence of AMP as a transaction was accepted by the assessee itself in case of the High Court decision, whereas in the current case the assessee had never made any such admissions.
• The ITAT further remarked that de hors any ‘understanding’ or an ‘arrangement’ or ‘action in concert’, as per which the assessee had agreed for incurring of AMP expenses for brand building of its AE, the provisions of Chapter X could not have been invoked for undertaking a TP adjustment exercise.

From the above case it is evident that the ITAT has laid emphasis on evaluation of the DEMPE functions performed by the entities in the group for determining whether incurring of AMP expenses alone leads to brand-building for the AE for which the assessee needs to be remunerated separately as an international transaction. Accordingly, a detailed value chain analysis for an MNE group which also includes analysis of the DEMPE functions in relation to the intangibles would help in strongly defending its position before the tax authorities.

b) In the case of Infogain India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-392-ITAT-2015 (Del)-TP], the Delhi ITAT upheld the application of the Profit Split Method (PSM) adopted by the assessee on the ground that the activities of the assessee and its associated enterprise were intrinsically linked and both the entities were significantly contributing to the value chain of provision of software services to the end customers. The ITAT, based on the examination of the functions performed by both the parties and weights assigned to each activity, observed that – ‘In the present case, both the parties, i.e., Infogain India (assessee) and Infogain US are making contribution. Therefore, the Profit Split Method is the most appropriate method for determination of ALP.’

c) In the Coca-Cola USA case8, the US Tax Court confirmed an adjustment made by the Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) to the income of the company. The issue under examination was that Coca Cola was not adequately compensated (i.e., with royalty) by its group entities for the use of intangibles. While deciding this issue, the IRS laid emphasis on the functions performed by the respective entities in the supply chain, risks control and allocation, DEMPE functions in relation to the intangibles, costs incurred by the different entities on the Advertising, Marketing and Promotion expenses, and contractual arrangements between the group entities. Upon in-depth analysis, the IRS proposed to benchmark the transaction in question using the Comparable Profits Method (CPM) treating unrelated bottlers as comparable parties wherein ‘Return on Assets’ (ROA) was taken as the appropriate Profit Level Indicator. The US Tax Court upheld the contentions of the IRS based on the above economic analysis conducted to derive an approximate royalty payment to Coca Cola Company by the group entities.

 

8   155
T.C. 10 Docket No. 31183-15, US Tax Court, Coca Cola Company & Subsidiaries
vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

d) In the case of Dutch taxpayer Zinc Smelters BV9, the taxpayer was engaged in the business of zinc smelting. The zinc smelting process involved conversion of zinc ore and the related raw materials into pure zinc and the same was distributed in the market. The value chain of this activity comprised of key functions, namely, procurement of raw materials, planning and scheduling of production, undertaking the production activity, planning the logistics and distribution in the market, undertaking support functions such as finance, IT, marketing, etc. Globally, the business of the group was sold, pursuant to which all the functions except the production activity were transferred to a new entity. The question was regarding the remuneration of the taxpayer post the business restructuring. The Dutch Court of Appeals agreed with the ruling of the Dutch tax authority that the key functions of sourcing raw material and thereby conversion of the ore (raw material) into finished product were critical functions in the value chain and were inter-linked. Accordingly, both the taxpayer and the new entity were performing non-routine functions. Hence, profit split was considered as the most appropriate method to determine the arm’s length remuneration for both the entities. For the purpose of profit split, the profit achieved from joint smelting activities of the taxpayer and the new entity were to be determined and then split between both the entities based on their contributions to the revenue generated.

 

9   Case
number ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2020:968  – 17/00714
Zinc Smelter B.V. vs. Dutch Tax Authority

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The taxpayer is required to appropriately report under Clause 18 of Form No. 3CEB10 any transactions arising out of or by being a part of business restructuring11 or reorganisation.

Some of the instances of business restructuring or reorganisation are as follows:
(a) Reallocation of functions, assets and risks within the group.
(b) Transfer of valuable intangibles within the group.
(c) Termination or renegotiation of the existing contractual arrangements.
(d) Shift of responsibility of specific functions from one entity to another entity within the group.

The taxpayers must maintain robust documentation such as agreements, valuation reports (if any), post-restructuring FAR analysis, etc., to substantiate the arm’s length principle. In the changing dynamics of business, it is imperative that taxpayers monitor business operations more closely for any changes.

DOCUMENTATION
As we all know, documentation forms the core of the entire transfer pricing analysis; accordingly, in a post-BEPS world it is even more critical to ensure that the MNE group has adequately documented its transfer pricing policies which are in line with the value contributions by the respective group entities in the value chain, economic functions performed and risks assumed while dealing with controlled transactions.

In order to manage the risks, the MNCs will have to ensure that the documentation is more elaborate and thorough both in the factual description of the functional profile in the value chain and in the related transfer pricing analysis. A well-documented VCA would serve as a foundation for the MNE’s tax and transfer pricing analysis and help achieve consistency across various facets of regulatory compliances.

Some of the key back-up documentation that can be maintained by an MNE group to support the VCA analysis are listed below:
a. Industry reports, management discussions, financial reports – sources to ascertain the key value drivers for business;
b. Functional interview notes / recordings with key business personnel at management level, operational division personnel, process flowcharts, asset evaluation records, organisation structure, responsibility matrix, etc. – to support the functional analysis documented as part of the VCA;
c. Contractual arrangements within the group entities which are in line with the actual conduct and substance of the parties to the arrangements;
d. Back-up documents to justify the rationale adopted by the management in assigning specific weightages to the value drivers in the value chain while determining the value contribution of the respective group entities;
e. Risk analysis assessment in light of the framework of the guidelines provided by OECD for the group entities – documents which demonstrate key decisions made by entities such as board approvals, internal email correspondences, important call minutes, etc.;
f. Documents which support the legal ownership of intangibles with the group entities such as IP registrations in certain jurisdictions, accounting of these assets in the financial reporting as per local requirements, etc.;
g. Documentary evidences to support the DEMPE functions and the value contribution of each of the entities in the value chain;
h. Analysis of the key financial ratios for the group entities such as costs incurred in production, gross level margins, net profit margins, FTE count, net worth, etc.

The above list is illustrative considering that each business would have a different value chain story and hence one would need to maintain robust back-up documentation to support its VCA for the entire MNE group.

 

10 Form
No. 3CEB is a report from an accountant to be furnished under section 92E
relating to international transactions and specified domestic transactions

11           Explanation
to Section 92B of the Income-Tax Act 1961, clarifies the expression
‘international transaction’ to include – ‘….. (e) a transaction of business
restructuring or reorganisation, entered into by an enterprise with an
associated enterprise, irrespective of the fact that it has bearing on the
profit, income, losses or assets of such enterprise at the time of the
transaction or at any future date’

CONCLUSION
In the post-BEPS era it is apparent that one will have to substantiate any tax planning with adequate substance. The profit allocated to different group entities will have to be aligned with value contributed by those entities across the value chain of the MNC. The companies are expected to be transparent with their global operational and tax payment structure in order to be compliant with the BEPS requirement. Therefore, the companies will have to improve the way they explain their operating model and tax approach to the stakeholders.

The BEPS project has changed the dynamics of the international tax landscape in an unprecedented manner. The advanced work on addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy will further change the status quo. Both globalisation and trade frictions in certain countries coupled with the severe impact of the Covid-19 pandemic have forced the MNEs to evaluate their global operations and the value chain distribution. This will create even more challenges in the transfer pricing areas which will have to be dealt with by both the MNEs and the tax administrations of the developing countries. It would be critical for the MNEs to effectively focus on their value chain to achieve the desired business and tax objectives in order to sustain themselves in this evolving business environment.

ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance recently convened a meeting on cryptocurrencies which has attracted a lot of interest as well as concern in various quarters about their investment potential and risks. The Prime Minister also cautioned that cryptocurrencies may end up in the wrong hands and urged for more international co-operation.

Cryptocurrencies have emerged as alternative currencies / investment avenues and are being considered by many as the currency of the future. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins, Ethereum and many others are being considered for a variety of purposes such as a means of exchange, a medium to access blockchain-related products and raising funds for an entity developing activities in these areas. Many large international companies such as Paypal, Tesla, Starbucks, Rakuten, Coca Cola, Burger King and Whole Foods now accept cryptocurrency transactions.

Since the last few months, the Covid-19 pandemic has catapulted the growth of contactless transactions and the growth of cryptocurrencies in India. The crypto culture is fast picking up in India. Many companies all over the world have started accepting or investing in virtual currencies. Concurrently, a new crypto-asset issuance wave has been visible in the start-up world for the purpose of fund-raising. Further, the appreciation in the value of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin price has increased more than five times at the time of writing this article as compared to the price in January, 2020) and the price volatility has attracted the interest of investors. These developments have also sparked the interest of regulators around the world.

Cryptocurrencies are not controlled or regulated by a government. Regulators around the world have been concerned about cryptocurrencies. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been concerned about investors’ protection and the anonymity of the transactions.

HOW DO CRYPTOCURRENCIES FUNCTION?
Cryptographic instruments work on the principles of cryptography, i.e., a method of protecting information and communications through the use of codes so that only those for whom the information is intended can read and process it. Crypto assets represent transferable digital illustrations that prohibit any duplication. These are based on the blockchain or distributed ledger technology that facilitates the transfer of cryptographic assets.

Cryptocurrencies are not backed by any sovereign promise as is the case with real currencies. However, digital assets are backed by something. Bitcoin, for example, is backed by the electricity that goes into validating and generating transactions on the network. Gold-backed cryptocurrencies also exist. And some are backed by US dollars.

Governments around the world (including India) have generally adopted a cautious evolution of regulatory approach towards cryptocurrencies. Some countries such as China have banned cryptocurrency, while others like El Salvador have welcomed them into the formal payments system.

It is believed that it is impossible to duplicate the transactions or involve counterfeit currency in the cryptocurrency mechanism. Many cryptocurrencies are decentralised networks based on blockchain technology; it is a list of records that is growing all the time. These are known as blocks that link and secure each type of cryptocurrency. Then there is a single network called mining in which all the funds are kept. In other words, the process by which the cryptocurrency is validated is called mining.

Transactions on public, permission-less blockchains such as the Bitcoin blockchain can be viewed by anyone. The ledger records ownership of Bitcoins and all transactions that have occurred upon it. One can track an activity to particular addresses and addresses to individuals or parties involved in the blockchain. Whenever a transfer is made, this public record is used to verify availability of funds. A new transaction is encoded into the ledger through the mining process. The ledger is virtually undisputable. These features minimise the risk of fraud or manipulation in participant-to-participant transactions on the blockchain itself. The distributed ledger technology has many possible uses that go beyond cryptocurrencies.

FINANCIAL REPORTING PERSPECTIVES
Cryptocurrencies have diverse features with a broad variety of features and bespoke nature. Further, these are emerging at rapid speed. Several new cryptocurrencies have emerged and today there is widespread talk about blockchain technology and cryptoassets.

These factors make it difficult to draw general conclusions on the accounting treatment. To determine which accounting standard applies to cryptocurrencies and assessing the related accounting issues it would be important to understand their characteristics and the intended use for which they are being held by the user. Similar types of cryptographic assets may be accounted for in a similar way.

CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACCOUNTING
Since the emergence of cryptocurrencies is a new phenomenon, there is no specific guidance from accounting standard-setters and pronouncements that deal with the accounting of such assets from the holder’s perspective. Accounting for cryptocurrencies may potentially fall in a variety of different accounting standards. One must consider the purpose of holding the cryptocurrency to determine the accounting model.

Classification
of cryptocurrencies held for own account

Rationale

Classification as cash or cash currency

• No. Since these are not legal tender and are generally not
issued or backed by any sovereign / government; cryptocurrencies do not
directly affect the prices of goods / services

Classification as financial
instrument

• No. A cryptocurrency does not give
the holder a contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset.
Also, cryptocurrencies do not come into existence as a result of a
contractual relationship. Moreover, cryptocurrencies do not provide the
holder with a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting
all of its liabilities.

 

 (continued)

 

Therefore, currently the cryptocurrencies do not meet the
definition of a financial asset

Classification as property, plant
& equipment

• No. Since cryptocurrencies are not
tangible items

Classification as inventories

• Maybe. AS 2 / Ind AS 2 do not require inventories to be in
physical form, but inventory should consist of assets that are held for sale
in the ordinary course of business. Where cryptocurrencies are for sale in
the ordinary course of business (for example, in case of entities actively
trading in cryptocurrencies), inventory classification would be appropriate;
inventories are measured at the lower of cost and net realisable value

• It must be noted that Ind AS 2 scopes out commodity broker-traders
who measure their inventories at fair value less costs to sell. When such
inventories are measured at fair value less costs to sell, changes in fair
value less costs to sell are recognised in profit or loss in the period of
the change

• On the other hand, where cryptocurrencies are held for
investment / capital appreciation purposes over an extended period, the
definition of inventory would not be met

Classification as intangible assets

• Yes. If a cryptocurrency does not
meet the definition of inventories as stated above, it is likely that the
definition of an intangible asset under AS 26 / Ind AS 38 would be met since
it is an identifiable non-monetary resource controlled by an entity as a
result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to
flow to the entity with no physical form

• Purchased intangible assets are
initially recognised at cost

• AS 26 Amortisation of
Intangibles
is based on the rebuttable presumption that the useful life
of intangibles will not exceed ten years. Under Ind AS 38, the useful life of
an intangible can be assessed as finite or indefinite. Where the useful life
is assessed as finite, such useful life is

 

 (continued)

 

determined based on management’s estimate, reviewed at least
annually. An intangible can be assessed to have an indefinite useful life if
there is no foreseeable limit over which it is expected to generate economic
benefits for the company. Ind AS 38 gives an accounting policy choice of cost
or revaluation method for intangible assets but requires the existence of an
active market if the revaluation method is to be used

DEVELOPMENT FROM INTERNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES
Internationally, the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF), an IFRS Foundation advisory forum, discussed digital currencies at a meeting in December, 2016. The debate was focused on the classification of a cryptographic asset from the holder’s perspective. Conversations have continued in various accounting standards boards, but no formal guidance has been issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).

In July, 2018, the IASB requested the IFRS Interpretations Committee to consider guidance for the accounting of transactions involving cryptocurrencies. In June, 2019, the Committee concluded that IAS 2 Inventories applies to such assets where they are held for sale in the ordinary course of business. If IAS 2 is not applicable, an entity applies IAS 38 Intangible Assets to holdings of cryptocurrencies.

The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) had put together a discussion paper on digital currencies.

On the other hand, the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) has issued an exposure draft for public comment on accounting for virtual currencies. In addition, the IASB discussed certain features of transactions involving digital currencies during its meeting in January, 2018 and will discuss in future whether to commence a research project in this area. The discussion paper concluded that, currently, digital currencies should not be considered as cash or cash equivalents since digital currency lacks broad acceptance as a means of exchange as it is not issued by a central bank. A digital currency is not a financial instrument, as defined in IAS 32, since there is no contractual relationship that results in a financial asset for one party and a financial liability for another.

A digital currency may meet the definition of intangible assets, as defined in IAS 38 or Ind AS 38, because a digital currency is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance. The discussion paper stated that it is not necessarily clear how ‘held in the ordinary course of business’ should be interpreted in the context of digital currencies more broadly. For example, it is not necessarily clear whether entities that accept digital currencies as a means of payment should be considered to hold them for sale in the ordinary course of business. IAS 2 does not apply to the measurement of inventories held by commodity broker-traders who measure their inventories at fair value less costs to sell and recognise changes in fair value less costs to sell in profit or loss in the period of the change.

FAIR VALUATION
Valuation of cryptocurrencies would be required to be determined in several situations, for example:
*In order to determine the net realisable value under AS 2 / Ind AS 2 or to determine fair value less costs to sell if the broker-trader exception is applied under Ind AS 2;
*In order to determine the revaluation amount under Ind AS 38 when classified as an intangible asset;
*For the purpose of purchase price allocation under business combination under Ind AS 103 when acquired through an acquisition.

Ind AS 113 Fair Value Measurement defines fair value as the price that would be received on selling an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. There is a three-level hierarchy for fair value determination as follows:
Level 1: quoted active market price for identical assets or liabilities;
Level 2: observable inputs other than Level 1 inputs; and
Level 3: unobservable inputs.

Many large traditional shares with an average turnover rate on the Bombay Stock Exchange or the National Stock Exchange are generally considered to be traded in an active market if there are sufficient active trading days within a given period. Data available from CoinMarketCap1 (‘CMC’) for November, 2021 shows that the top five cryptographic assets with the highest market capitalisation have high percentages of average daily turnover ratios (in certain cases up to 50%) with active daily trading. Bitcoin, for example, has a daily trading volume in excess of US $30 billion since the past few months. Looking solely at these statistics, it may be possible to conclude that certain cryptocurrencies have an active market.

Currently, for the other cryptocurrencies, it would be difficult to get a Level 1 valuation for cryptocurrencies as an active market as defined under Ind AS 113 would not be available, although there may be observable inputs that can be used to value these assets. However, the manner and speed at which the cryptocurrencies are evolving, it seems that the fair value hierarchy may keep changing between Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.

Given the complex nature of cryptocurrencies and relative lack of depth in the market, determining the valuation would not be a straightforward exercise. This is particularly so given the high volatility of prices and the large geographic market dynamics driving the prices. It may be noted that the time at which an entity determines the value of the cryptocurrencies might need careful consideration since the crypto markets may be trading 24/7. For instance,
*Is the valuation time 11:59 PM at the end of 31st March?
*How is the valuation time determined in case of foreign subsidiaries with different time zones?
*Whether the inputs underlying the valuation have been adequately reviewed / challenged given the circumstances existing at the time of closure of business hours?

Ind AS 113 requires the principal market to be determined based on the greatest volume and level of activity for the relevant item. For cryptocurrencies, while CMC includes data from several exchanges, many exchanges serve regional markets only and might not be accessible to entities / individuals in India. Ind AS 113 states that if there is no clear principal market, an entity shall determine fair value with reference to the most advantageous market within the group of active markets to which it has access with the highest activity levels. An entity need not undertake an exhaustive search of all possible markets to identify the principal market but it shall take into account all information that is reasonably available.

Another aspect to be considered for the purpose of determination of fair valuation of cryptocurrencies is whether the cryptocurrencies can be readily exchanged for a ‘real’ currency such as USD or INR. Ind AS 113 requires a Level 1 fair value input to be quoted (with) prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets / liabilities that the entity can access at the measurement date. Certain cryptocurrencies are exchanged for other cryptocurrencies rather than being exchanged for real currencies. Crypto-to-crypto exchange rates are priced based on an implicit conversion of the cryptographic asset into real currencies.

Under Ind AS 113 it can be said that an active market for a cryptocurrency would exist only when crypto-to-real currency rates are published by reliable sources. It would be difficult to classify crypto-to-crypto exchange rates as an active market (and therefore Level 1 fair value). Further, the valuation would also have to be adjusted for illiquidity factors due to the lack of a ready market and the derivation of the prices based on a crypto-to-crypto exchange rate and a secondary crypto-to-real currency exchange.

Due to the factors discussed above, most of the cryptocurrencies will not have an active market and, therefore, they will need to be valued using a valuation technique. The appropriate valuation technique should consider how a market participant would determine the fair value of the cryptocurrency being measured.

Generally, the market approach will be the most appropriate technique for cryptocurrencies. The cost approach or the income approach is likely to be rare in practice. Since cryptocurrency markets are still emerging and not very matured, inputs and information based on discrete / bilateral transactions outside an active market may have to be used. For example, in April, 2021 there was a big crash in Bitcoin prices, reportedly due to tweets about the US regulators’ decision on cracking down on financial institutions for money laundering using cryptocurrencies. Based on CMC website data at the time of writing this article, it does appear that broker quotes are not widely used in this sector as yet. The cryptocurrency market is evolving rapidly and so valuation techniques are also likely to evolve.

FINAL REMARKS
Due to the large diversity in the features of various cryptocurrencies, the pace of innovation and the regulatory developments associated with cryptocurrencies, the facts and circumstances of each individual case will differ. This makes it difficult to determine the appropriate accounting treatment and acceptable valuation technique. And given the increasing acceptance of cryptocurrencies around the world, it is a matter of time before the accounting standard-setters around the world and in India come out with standards / application guidance for cryptocurrencies.  

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS FRAUDS AND UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS

(This is the fifth article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

In the recent past regulators and other stakeholders have been increasingly concerned with the increase in frauds by companies and the perceived lack of attention by the auditors in respect thereof. This trust deficit is attempted to be bridged by CARO 2020 by significantly increasing the reporting responsibilities for auditors with regard to fraud and unreported transactions.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(xi)(a)

Frauds noticed or reported:

Enhanced Reporting

Whether any fraud by the
company or any fraud on the company has been noticed or reported during the
year; if yes, the nature and the amount involved is to be indicated

Clause 3(xi)(b)

Reporting on Frauds:

New Clause

Whether any report under
sub-section (12) of section 143 of the Companies Act has been filed by the
auditors in Form ADT-4 as prescribed under rule 13 of the Companies (Audit
and Auditors) Rules, 2014 with the Central Government

Clause 3(xi)(c)

Whistle-Blower Complaints:

New Clause

Whether the auditor has
considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during the year by the company

Clause 3(viii)

Unrecorded Transactions:

New Clause

Whether any transactions
not recorded in the books of accounts have been surrendered or disclosed as
income during the year in the tax assessments under the Income-tax Act, 1961
(43 of 1961); and if so, whether the previously unrecorded income has been
properly recorded in the books of accounts during the year

ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Frauds noticed or reported [Clause 3(xi)(a)]:
* The scope has been widened by removing the words ‘officers or employees’.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges which are discussed below in respect of the Clause where there is enhanced reporting as well as the new Clauses:

Frauds noticed or reported [Clause 3(xi)(a)]:
a) Conflict with responsibilities under SA 240:
For complying with SA 240, the auditor is primarily concerned with frauds which cause material misstatements to the financial statements, which are intentional and broadly cover misstatements from fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. This is in conflict with the CARO requirements whereby the terms ‘noticed or reported’ are very wide. Accordingly, the auditor is required to report not only the frauds noted or detected by him pursuant to the procedures performed in terms of SA 240 and reported by him u/s 143(12), but also frauds detected by the management whilst reviewing the internal controls or internal audit or whistle-blower mechanism or Audit Committee and brought to the auditor’s notice.
b) Concept of materiality: Once a fraud is noticed, it appears that it needs to be reported irrespective of the materiality involved. Whilst there is no clarity in respect thereof in the Guidance Note under this Clause, para 37 of the Guidance Note specifies that whilst reporting on matters specified in the Order, the auditor should consider the materiality in accordance with the principles enunciated in SA 320. Accordingly, the auditors should apply appropriate judgement whilst reporting under this Clause. It may be noted that even the FRRB and QRB in the course of their review reports have not been favourably inclined to the concept of taking shelter under the garb of materiality for reporting under this Clause.
c) Challenges in detection: An auditor may find it difficult to detect acts by employees or others committed with an intent to injure the interest of the company or cause wrongful gain or loss, unless these are reflected in the books of accounts; examples include receiving payoffs from vendors and tampering with QR codes during the billing and collection process. In such cases the auditors would need to corroborate their inquiries based on their knowledge of the business / industry coupled with the results of the evaluation of the internal controls, the robustness of the code of conduct and ethics policies, instances of past transgressions in respect thereof, etc.

Reporting on Frauds [Clause 3(xi)(b)]:
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Section 143(12) of Companies Act, 2013
Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, if an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as auditor, has reason to believe that an offence involving fraud is being or has been committed against the company by officers or employees of the company, he shall immediately report the matter to the Central Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed.

Rule 13 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 deals with reporting of frauds by auditor and other matters:
(1) If an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as statutory auditor has reason to believe that an offence of fraud, which involves or is expected to involve, individually an amount of rupees one crore or above, is being or has been committed against the company by its officers or employees, the auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government.

(2) The auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government as under:
(a) the auditor shall report the matter to the Board or the Audit Committee, as the case may be, immediately but not later than two days of his (acquiring) knowledge of the fraud, seeking their reply or observations within forty-five days;
(b) on receipt of such reply or observations, the auditor shall forward his report and the reply or observations of the Board or the Audit Committee along with his comments (on such reply or observations of the Board or the Audit Committee) to the Central Government within fifteen days from the date of receipt of such reply or observations;
(c) in case the auditor fails to get any reply or observations from the Board or the Audit Committee within the stipulated period of forty-five days, he shall forward his report to the Central Government along with a note containing the details of his report that was earlier forwarded to the Board or the Audit Committee for which he has not received any reply or observations;
(d) the report shall be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs in a sealed cover by Registered Post with Acknowledgement Due or by Speed Post followed by an e-mail in confirmation of the same;
(e) the report shall be on the letterhead of the auditor containing postal address, e-mail address and contact telephone number or mobile number and be signed by the auditor with his seal and shall indicate his Membership Number; and
(f) The report shall be in the form of a statement as specified in Form ADT-4.

(3) In case of a fraud involving lesser than the amount specified in sub-rule (1), the auditor shall report the matter to the Audit Committee constituted  u/s 177 or to the Board immediately but not later than two days of his knowledge of the fraud and he shall report the matter specifying the following:
(a) Nature of fraud with description;
(b) Approximate amount involved; and
(c) Parties involved.

(4) The following details of each of the frauds reported to the Audit Committee or the Board under sub-rule (3) during the year shall be disclosed in the Board’s Report:
(a) Nature of fraud with description;
(b) Approximate amount involved;
(c) Parties involved, if remedial action not taken; and
(d) Remedial actions taken.

(5) The provision of this rule shall also apply, mutatis mutandis, to a Cost Auditor and a Secretarial Auditor during the performance of his duties  u/s 148 and  u/s 204, respectively.

Form and content of Form ADT-4
a) Full details of suspected offence involving fraud (with documents in support),
b) Particulars of officers / employees who are suspected to be involved in the offence,
c) Basis on which fraud is suspected,
d) Period during which the suspected fraud has occurred,
e) Date of sending report to BOD / Audit Committee and date of reply, if any, received,
f) Whether auditor is satisfied with the reply / observations of the BOD / Audit Committee,
g) Estimated amount involved in the suspected fraud,
h) Steps taken by the company, if any, in this regard, with full details of references.

Guidance Note issued by ICAI
The ICAI has also published a Guidance Note on Reporting of Frauds u/s 143(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 to assist the auditors in discharging their responsibilities. Some of the main issues addressed by the Guidance Note are as under and which need to be kept in mind whilst discharging the responsibilities for reporting under this Clause:
* The requirement is to report only on frauds in the course of performance of duties as an auditor.
* Only frauds committed against the company by its officers or employees are required to be reported. Thus, frauds committed by vendors and outsourced service providers are not required to be reported. The requirements of SA 240 need to be kept in mind. Accordingly only frauds involving financial reporting or misappropriation of assets are covered Thus, the scope for reporting under this Clause is much narrower than under sub-clause (a) discussed earlier.
* If any frauds are detected during the course of other attest / non-attest functions like quarterly reporting and they are likely to have a material effect on the financial statements, the same would also need to be reported.
* There is no responsibility to report frauds if the same are already detected. However, in such cases the auditor should apply professional scepticism as to whether the fraud was genuinely detected through vigil / whistle-blower mechanism and review the follow-up in respect thereof. This could have an impact on reporting under sub-clause (c) discussed subsequently.
* Reporting is required only when there is sufficient reason to believe and there is sufficient knowledge (i.e., evidence) of occurrence. Mere suspicion is not sufficient.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Reporting by predecessor auditor: The requirement for reporting pertains to any report which has been filed during the financial year under audit. Accordingly, if the auditor has been appointed for the first time, he would need to consider whether the predecessor auditor has reported to the Central Government during the financial year prior to his term being concluded before the AGM. In such cases it is better that the incoming auditor seeks a specific clarification from the predecessor auditor and also obtains a management representation and makes a mention accordingly in his report.
b) Post-balance sheet events: If the auditor has identified the fraud and initiated the communication procedures outlined earlier before the year-end but has filed his report with the Central Government subsequent to year-end till the date of the report, he would need to report on the same specifically under this Clause. In such cases, he should also consider the impact on the financial statements and disclosures of Events subsequent to the balance sheet date under AS 4 and Ind AS 10, as applicable.
c) Monetarily immaterial frauds: Monetarily immaterial frauds below Rs. 1 crore have to be reported by the auditor to the Audit Committee constituted u/s 177. In cases where the Audit Committee is not required to be constituted u/s 177, then the auditor shall report monetarily immaterial frauds to the Board of Directors. In either case, a disclosure needs to be made in the Board Report as outlined earlier. Though there is no specific reporting responsibility under this Clause, it would be a good practice to make a reference to the same under this Clause.
d) Cost audit and secretarial audit: Reporting on fraud u/s 143(12) is required even by the cost auditor and the secretarial auditor of the company and it is possible that a suspected offence involving fraud may have been reported by them even before the auditor became aware of the fraud in the course of his audit procedures under SA 240. In such cases, if a suspected offence of fraud has already been reported by the cost auditor and the secretarial auditor, he need not report the same to the Audit Committee u/s 177 or the Board of Directors and thereafter, where applicable, to the Central Government, since he has not per se identified the suspected offence of fraud. It is, however, advisable that the report factually clarifies the position.

Whistle-Blower Complaints [Clause 3(xi)(c)]:
The establishment of a whistle-blower mechanism is mandatory for certain class of companies and therefore the auditor should consider the requirements prescribed in the Act and in SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (SEBI LODR Regulations) in this regard. Section 177(9) of the Act requires certain class of companies to establish a vigil mechanism for their Directors and employees to report their genuine concerns or grievances:

Requirements under Companies Act, 2013
Section 177(9) read with Rule 7 of the Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014 provides for establishment of a vigil mechanism.

(1) Every listed company and the companies belonging to the following class or classes shall establish a vigil mechanism for their Directors and employees to report their genuine concerns or grievances:
(a) the companies which accept deposits from the public;
(b) the companies which have borrowed money from banks and public financial institutions in excess of fifty crore rupees.
(2) The companies which are required to constitute an Audit Committee shall oversee the vigil mechanism through the committee and if any of the members of the committee have a conflict of interest in a given case, they should recuse themselves and the others on the committee would deal with the matter on hand.
(3) In case of other companies, the Board of Directors shall nominate a Director to play the role of an Audit Committee for the purpose of vigil mechanism to whom other Directors and employees may report their concerns.
(4) The vigil mechanism shall provide for adequate safeguards against victimisation of employees and Directors who avail of the vigil mechanism and also provide for direct access to the Chairperson of the Audit Committee or the Director nominated to play the role of Audit Committee, as the case may be, in exceptional cases.
(5) In case of repeated frivolous complaints being filed by a Director or an employee, the Audit Committee or the Director nominated to play the role of Audit Committee may take suitable action against the Director or employee concerned, including reprimand.

Requirements under SEBI LODR
Regulation 4(2)(d) of the SEBI LODR Regulations also mandates all listed entities to devise an effective whistle-blower mechanism enabling Directors, employees or any other person to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices.

Regulation 46(2)(e) of SEBI LODR Regulations requires a listed company to disseminate on its website details of establishment of its vigil mechanism / whistle-blower policy. Further, the role of the Audit Committee also includes review of the functioning of the whistle-blower mechanism.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Anonymous complaints:
The auditor needs to consider every complaint received by the company including anonymous complaints while deciding the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. The auditor should also evaluate whether such complaints are investigated and resolved by the company in an appropriate and timely manner. Further, in case of anonymous complaints he needs to exercise greater degree of professional scepticism to ascertain whether they are frivolous or motivated. Also, any other information which is available in the public domain should also be considered.
b) Companies not covered under the Regulatory Framework: The reporting requirements under this Clause do not distinguish between listed, public interest entities and other entities, including those in the SME sector where there is no regulatory requirement to establish a formal whistle-blower / vigil mechanism. In such cases the auditor needs to make specific inquiries and obtain appropriate representation which needs to be corroborated for adequacy and appropriateness based on the understanding obtained about the entity and its operating and governance environment. Finally, any information which is available in the public domain should also be considered.
c) Forensic investigations: In case a forensic audit /investigation has been initiated pursuant to a whistle-blower complaint, the auditor needs to check the reports issued and discuss the observations and conclusions with the auditor / investigation agency if required and report accordingly.
d) Outsourcing arrangements: The auditor should perform independent procedures, including getting direct confirmation for whistle-blower complaints received which are managed by a third party like an external internal audit firm.

Unrecorded Transactions [Clause 3(viii)]:
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Undisclosed income under the Income-tax Act, 1961
‘Undisclosed income’ as per section 158B includes any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or any income based on any entry in the books of accounts or other documents or transactions, where such money, bullion, jewellery, valuable article, thing, entry in the books of accounts or other document or transaction represents wholly or partly income or property which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act, or any expense, deduction or allowance claimed under this Act which is found to be false.

Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme
The Union Budget 2020 was presented by the Finance Minister on 1st February, 2020 with an underlying objective to support the Government’s target of making India a $5 trillion economy by 2025. Several policy and tax-related announcements were made with primary focus on improving the ease of living and the ease of doing business in India. One of the key proposals was introduction of a direct tax dispute resolution scheme, namely, Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme which translates to ‘From Dispute towards Trust’, i.e., trust as the basis of partnering with the taxpayers towards building the nation. The Scheme proposes to settle direct tax disputes relating to personal income tax and corporate tax between taxpayers and the tax Department. The Government of India enacted the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 (‘the Act’) on 17th March, 2020 to give effect to this Scheme.

An overview of the Scheme:
* If a taxpayer elects to take recourse under the Scheme, a proportion of the total tax along with interest and penalty needs to be paid (depending on the type of the pending dispute) for full and final settlement.
* The scheme confers immunity from prosecution, penalty and interest in respect of proceedings for which the taxpayer has opted to avail the Scheme.
* The Act also provides that the tax disputes so settled cannot be reopened in any other proceeding by the Income Tax Department or any other designated authority.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Scope: The emphasis is on the words surrendered or disclosed which implies that the company must have voluntarily admitted to the addition of such income in the income tax returns filed by the company. What constitutes voluntary admission poses several challenges especially where the company has pending tax assessments which have been decided up to a particular stage and the company chooses not to file an appeal. In such cases, the auditor needs to review the submissions and statements filed in the course of assessment to ascertain whether the additions to income were as a consequence of certain transactions not recorded in the books. This would involve use of professional judgement and consideration of the materiality factor.
b) Submissions under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme: In case the company has opted for disclosures under the said Scheme, a view can be taken that the same constitutes voluntary surrender and disclosure and hence needs to be reported under this Clause with appropriate factual disclosures.

CONCLUSION
Frauds are now an inherent part of corporate life and the auditors will have to live with them. The reporting requirements outlined above will hopefully provide them with the necessary tools to cope with them and provide greater comfort to the various stakeholders. In conclusion, life will never be cushy for the auditors and they would always be on the razor’s edge!

EQUATING EQUITY

Indian Equity markets have been on fire after the 2020 fall. They have beaten many comparable EM indices. What’s going on?

Too much money: Governments / Central banks have printed trillions of notes. And we know that most of the markets are moved by central bankers. The current oversupply is leading to inflation, asset overvaluation, poor yields and low value of money.

Yields: With too much money around, inflation is an obvious result. Real yield of interest (ten-year yield less CPI) has become negative in many countries (in the US it is -4.77, India 1.87%, China 1.41%1). Most of the EU and North America are negative, whereas EMs are positive.

Available asset classes: FDs and fixed income assets are giving sub-optimal returns. Real estate has remained stagnant. Liquid asset classes – Equities and Crypto – have been HOT. Bullion has been good but has limits. In 1981: 10 gm gold = Rs.1,800; 1 kg silver = Rs. 2,700 and the Sensex = 170 points. Come to December, 2021: 10 gm gold = Rs. 48,000 (26 times in 40 years); 100 gm silver = Rs. 67,600 (25 times in 40 years) and Sensex = 57,000 points (335 times in 40 years).

India’s time has come: India is showing a promising position – in both perception and reality. On Deepavali – Bumper Gold sales, GST collection at Rs. 1.3 lakh crores; Corporate profit to GDP ratio at decade high; Exports rise for 11 straight months; Rs. 100 billion in UPI transactions; Card spends hit Rs. 2 lakh crores; New economy companies and Unicorns showcase remarkable innovation. Positive signs include dramatic improvement in infrastructure; Government stepping out of businesses (Air India, LIC listing) and likely to stay out of the way (balance between State control and private enterprise) and stop making silly mistakes (retrospective amendments).

Participation: New demat accounts opened in F.Y.20 were 49 lakhs with the three prior-year average coming to 43 lakhs; whereas, the new demats opened for F.Y.21 were 1.42 crores.

_______________________________________
1 2nd December, 2021
IPO frenzy: It is reported that $4 billion was raised in the PayTM, Nykaa and Policybazar IPOs. But more important is that $2.2 billion was on offer for sale in IPOs by existing investors. This activity has made entrepreneurs wealthy, added market cap and allowed wider public participation.

From my personal experience, Equity has given some of the finest returns to those who are invested for decades and even more if for generations. The combination of liquidity, growth possibility and legacy aspects are matchless. The mantra of the masters has been: Buy Good (select well), Track Well (conviction of analysis and regularity) and Sit Tight (patience to hold) – all these are critical. [‘Warren is pretty good at doing nothing’ – Charlie Munger; ‘Our favourite holding period is forever’ – Warren Buffett.]

The aim obviously should be to Protect Capital – Beat Inflation – Growth in that order. With the invisible tax called inflation attacking capital, one needs an asset class that beats this monster. The goal of ‘financial independence’ makes people want to be rich before they grow old. One Indian expert I read mentioned that one will need to have 50-58 times yearly expenses to be financially independent. Both these targets are impossible to meet unless one beats inflation and gets her savings to grow fast.

However, risks cannot be disregarded and valuations sans P/E seem ridiculous if not bizarre. Many believe that market value and earnings have no correlation. A recently listed company having an annual profit of Rs. 62 crores and Rs. 1 lakh crore market cap, traded at ten times the price of ITC when ITC profits are about Rs. 35 crores per day. In a lighter vein, I thought make up wins against cigarettes!

Elon Musk once said that Tesla doesn’t make cars. It makes factories that make cars. Great businesses / governments / countries don’t focus on producing a great result. They (should) focus on building a system that makes a great result inevitable. The India of our dreams will be that which makes great results inevitable.

 
 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

MADAN LAL DHINGRA

A few months back I wrote in this column about the greatness and versatility of Lokmanya Tilak (BCAJ issue of August, 2021). It was well received by the readers. We are now in the 75th year of our Independence. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile and necessary for us to know about the real heroes of our country and get some inspiration from their life stories.

Today in our profession I find that there is a crisis of courage. Professionals are becoming ‘spineless!’ One of the reasons for this may be that we did not study the real history of valour in our country. The history we studied was written by Britishers which was obviously far from being ‘true and fair.’

Today, I intend to write about the great martyr of India, Madan Lal Dhingra, who made the highest sacrifice for the Independence of our country. Born on 18th February, 1883, he lived a heroic life for just 26 years till he went to the gallows on 17th August, 1909.

As a college student in Amritsar, he thought seriously about India’s poverty and came to the conclusion that the key solution to this plight was ‘Swaraj’ and ‘Swadeshi’. He had observed how Britishers were looting India.

Right from his college days, he took part in or led the agitations to fight against injustice. His father, who was a civil surgeon and in the service of the British Government, hated the movement for Independence. Madan Lal was rusticated from the college; he refused to apologise and went away to look for work. He took on a few odd jobs at a low level, as a clerk or even as a labourer. Everywhere, due to his protest against injustice, he was fired. He then came to Bombay. His elder brother, again a doctor, compelled him to go to London in 1906 and paid for his education in mechanical engineering.

But eventually his own family totally disowned him; so much so that when in August, 2015 he was remembered with great reverence as a martyr, his descendants refused even to participate in the function! They did not even allow converting the ancestral house into a museum. Instead, they sold it to someone else.

While in London, Madan Lal came in contact with the well-known activists for freedom, Shyamji Krishna Varma and Veer V.D. Savarkar. Madan Lal was brilliant in academics and also had other talents. However, he dedicated his life only to the cause of Independence. In England in July, 1909, he assassinated Curzon Wyllie, who was the political adviser to the Secretary of State for India. Madan Lal considered him to be responsible for many tyrannical and inhuman acts in India.

Even during the trial that led to his conviction and death sentence, he showed extraordinary courage. He made very bold statements fearlessly. His historic statement made in the court was privately admired by many British leaders, including Winston Churchill. Churchill reportedly described it as ‘the finest statement ever made in the name of independence’.

He had the courage to warn the judge after his death sentence was announced, ‘I am proud to have the honour of laying down my life for my country. But remember, we shall have our time in the days to come’. He went to the gallows smilingly and said, ‘I may be re-born of the same mother and I may re-die in the same sacred cause till the cause is successful. Vande Mataram’.

His historic statement can be a source of inspiration for all the struggles for Independence around the globe. It is worth reproducing. His statement read as follows:

‘I do not want to say anything in defence of myself, but simply to prove the justice of my deed. As for myself, no English law court has got any authority to arrest and detain me in prison, or pass sentence of death on me. That is the reason I did not have any counsel to defend me.

And I maintain that if it is patriotic in an Englishman to fight against the Germans if they were to occupy this country, it is much more justifiable and patriotic in my case to fight against the English. I hold the English people responsible for the murder of 80 millions of Indian people in the last fifty years, and they are also responsible for taking away £100,000,000 every year from India to this country. I also hold them responsible for the hanging and deportation of my patriotic countrymen, who did just the same as the English people here are advising their countrymen to do. And the Englishman who goes out to India and gets, say, £100 a month, that simply means that he passes a sentence of death on a thousand of my poor countrymen, because these thousand people could easily live on this £100, which the Englishman spends mostly on his frivolities and pleasures. Just as the Germans have no right to occupy this country, so the English people have no right to occupy India, and it is perfectly justifiable on our part to kill the Englishman who is polluting our sacred land.

I am surprised at the terrible hypocrisy, the farce, and the mockery of the English people. They pose as the champions of oppressed humanity – the peoples of the Congo and the people of Russia – when there is terrible oppression and horrible atrocities (being) committed in India; for example, the killing of two millions of people every year and the outraging of our women. In case this country is occupied by Germans, and the Englishman, not bearing to see the Germans walking with the insolence of conquerors in the streets of London, goes and kills one or two Germans, and that Englishman is held as a patriot by the people of this country, then certainly I am prepared to work for the emancipation of my Motherland. Whatever else I have to say is in the paper before the Court… I make this statement, not because I wish to plead for mercy or anything of that kind. I wish that English people should sentence me to death, for in that case the vengeance of my countrymen will be all the more keen. I put forward this statement to show the justice of my cause to the outside world, and especially to our sympathisers in America and Germany.’

Friends, as CAs we are very much concerned with ‘Independence’ and ‘True & Fair’ things. If we inculcate even one per cent of Madan Lal Dhingra’s courage, the profession and the country can regain its past glory!

Namaskaars to such real heroes of India.

Additional discount granted by the supplier, reimbursed by the principal company, is additional consideration liable for GST. Further, no credit reversal is required with respect to receipt of commercial credit notes

20. [2019-TIOL-433-AAR-GST] M/s. Santosh Distributors Date of order: 16th September, 2019

Additional discount granted by the supplier, reimbursed by the principal company, is additional consideration liable for GST. Further, no credit reversal is required with respect to receipt of commercial credit notes

FACTS

Prices of the products supplied by the applicant are determined by the supplier / principal company. The applicant is paying GST as per the invoice issued by them and is availing input tax credit on the inward invoice received from the principal company. The ruling is sought to determine whether discount provided by the principal company to their dealers through the applicant attracts any tax under the GST law. Further, whether the amount shown in the commercial credit note issued to the applicant by the principal company attracts proportionate reversal of input tax credit, and is there any tax liability under GST law on the amount received as reimbursement of discount or rebate provided by the principal company as per the written agreement?

HELD

The Authority held that the additional discount given by the supplier through the applicant which is reimbursed as a special reduced price is liable to be added to the consideration payable by the customer to the distributor / applicant to arrive at the value of supply in terms of section 15 of the Act. Further, with respect to commercial credit notes where the supplier is not eligible to reduce its original tax liability, no reversal of credit is required. Lastly, in case of reimbursement of discount, GST is applicable.

A bakery where food items are not prepared and served cannot be considered as a restaurant. The tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food sold

19. [2019-TIOL-440-AAR-GST] M/s Square One Homemade Treats Date of order: 30th September, 2019

A bakery where food items are not prepared and served cannot be considered as a restaurant. The tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food sold

FACTS

The applicant company is engaged in sale of food products such as baked items like cakes, cookies, brownies, ready-to-eat homemade packed food, ready-to-eat snacks and hot and cold beverages through dispensing machines. All food items sold are pre-packed and no cooking is done at the premises. There is a table for customers who eat food procured from the counter in the premises. The ruling is sought to know whether resale of food and bakery products falls under restaurant services. Further, whether HSN and tax rates favoured by the applicant would be correct.

RULING

The Authority held that a restaurant is a place of business where food is prepared in the premises and served based on orders received from the customer. Whereas in the present case it is a bakery where food items are sold and the tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food items in the shop. Accordingly, it was held that the bakery cannot be considered as a restaurant.

The amounts received towards interest-free refundable security deposit do not attract GST unless the same is applied towards ‘consideration’. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing such deposits will attract GST as it is covered within the definition of ‘consideration’. AAR held that providing pre-decided number of free transactions subject to certain pre-determined maximum amount is in the nature of discount and will not attract GST subject to section 15(3) of CGST Act, 2017

18. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 515 (AAR – Gujarat) Rajkot Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. Date of order: 15th May, 2019

The amounts received towards interest-free refundable security deposit do not attract GST unless the same is applied towards ‘consideration’. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing such deposits will attract GST as it is covered within the definition of ‘consideration’. AAR held that providing pre-decided number of free transactions subject to certain pre-determined maximum amount is in the nature of discount and will not attract GST subject to section 15(3) of CGST Act, 2017

FACTS

The applicant engaged in providing financial and other services and also provides service for the operation of dematerialised (Demat) accounts to various account holders as well as to persons intending to operate only their Demat accounts. The applicant sought a ruling as to whether (i) amounts received by the applicant as refundable interest-free deposit could be treated as ‘supply’ under GST? (ii) whether the amount of Rs. 2,500 being a refundable interest-free deposit, which allows the depositor some benefits, would attract GST? and

(iii)    whether the first ten free transactions subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs allowed to the Demat account holder depositing the refundable interest-free deposit would attract GST?

RULING

AAR noted that the deposit is excluded from the definition of the consideration by the proviso to section 2(31) of the CGST Act, 2017. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing the refundable interest-free deposit will be considered as consideration since it is covered in both the limbs of the definition of consideration given u/s 2(31). Further, AAR noted that the refundable interest-free deposit is in addition to the commercial considerations to cover the risk of the Demat account. The main purpose of the deposits is not only security but also the collection of capital. Therefore, AAR held that the monetary value of the act of providing a refundable interest-free deposit is the consideration for the services provided by the applicant and therefore, the services provided by the applicant can be treated as supply and chargeable to GST in the hands of the applicant.

As regards the refundable interest-free deposit of Rs. 2,500, it was held that such amount will not attract GST unless it is applied towards consideration and the monetary value of the act of providing such deposit will attract GST. Allowing free transactions was looked upon as discount and hence was held as not to attract GST subject to the fulfilment of the conditions u/s 15(3) of the CGST Act, 2017.

When the manufacturer is not obliged to supply tools / moulds in manufacturing parts and they are supplied by the customer free of cost and on a returnable basis, the value of such tools / moulds supplied by the customer not includible in the value of parts to be manufactured by manufacturer-supplier

17. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 107 (AAR – Karnataka) Tool-Comp Systems (P) Ltd. Date of order: 16th July, 2019

When the manufacturer is not obliged to supply tools / moulds in manufacturing parts and they are supplied by the customer free of cost and on a returnable basis, the value of such tools / moulds supplied by the customer not includible in the value of parts to be manufactured by manufacturer-supplier

FACTS

The applicant is a manufacturer and seller of goods. For the production of parts, the tools required are either manufactured by the appellant or supplied by the customers free of cost on a returnable basis. The tools supplied by customers on free of cost basis are classified under capital goods. The tool has a specific life and can produce only a certain volume of total production. Since the customer is supplying the tool on free of cost basis, the applicant is not charging any portion of the cost of the tool to the customer.

The applicant filed the present ruling for seeking clarification regarding the applicability of tool amortisation cost (transaction value) in the GST regime on capital goods received free on returnable basis from the recipients (customer OEM) for parts production and supply.

RULING

AAR noted that as per the contract, the customers are required to supply tools to the applicant free of cost and the applicant is not under any obligation to supply the components by using tools / moulds belonging to him. This is exactly in terms of Circular No. 47/21/2018-GST dated 8th June, 2018 and hence it does not constitute supply. However, if the contractual obligation is cast upon the component manufacturer to provide moulds / dies yet it is provided by the client OEM / FOC, then the amortised cost of the moulds / dies is required to be added to the value of the components supplied. Since this was not the case, it was held that the applicant is not required to add the value of tools supplied by its customers to the value of parts supplied by him.

Articles 8 and 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions (Article 24 of India-Singapore DTAA) are not applicable if (a) India does not have right to tax income pursuant to treaty provision, (b) income is taxed in Singapore under accrual basis. Accordingly, Article 24 is not applicable to shipping income earned by Singapore tax resident which is not taxable in India as per Article 8 of DTAA as also taxable on accrual basis in Singapore

6. [2020] 121 taxmann.com 165
(Chen.)(Trib.)
Bengal Tiger Line (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No: 11/Chny/2020 A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 6th November,
2020

 

Articles
8 and 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions
(Article 24 of India-Singapore DTAA) are not applicable if (a) India does not
have right to tax income pursuant to treaty provision, (b) income is taxed in
Singapore under accrual basis. Accordingly, Article 24 is not applicable to
shipping income earned by Singapore tax resident which is not taxable in India
as per Article 8 of DTAA as also taxable on accrual basis in Singapore

 

FACTS

The
assessee, a Singapore tax resident, was involved in the business of operation
of ships in international waters. It did not offer to tax income received from
shipping operations in India relying on Article 8 of the India-Singapore DTAA.
The A.O. denied Article 8 benefit invoking Article 24 of the India-Singapore
DTAA. In the view of the A.O., Limitation of Relief (LOR) provisions under
Article 24 apply since income from shipping operations is exempt under Singapore
tax laws.

 

The DRP
upheld the view of the A.O. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   Article 24 is applicable if
    (i) income is sourced in a Contracting State (India) and such income is exempt
    or taxed at a reduced rate by virtue of any Article under the India-Singapore
    DTAA, and (ii) income of the non-resident should be taxable on receipt basis in
    Singapore.
  •   The first condition of
    Article 24 is not satisfied as Article 8 of the India-Singapore DTAA provides
    exclusive right of taxation to Singapore. It does not provide for exemption or
    reduced rate of taxation of such income.
  •   Since India does not have
    right to tax shipping income, the satisfaction of other conditions of Article
    24, like exemption or reduced rate of tax, has no bearing on the taxability of
    shipping income.
  •   The second condition is not
    satisfied as the income of the shipping company is taxed on accrual basis in
    Singapore.
  •   Reliance was placed on the
    Singapore IRAS letter dated 17th September, 20182  wherein it was specifically stated that the
    provisions of Article 24 of the India-Singapore DTAA would not be applicable to
    shipping income.

______________________________________

2   Content
of letter is not extracted in decision

Explanation 7 to section 9(1)(i) – Small shareholder exemption introduced by this Explanation inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is retrospective in nature

5. [2020]
120 taxmann.com 325 (Del.)(Trib.)
Augustus
Capital (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA
No: 8084/Del/2018
A.Y.:
2015-16 Date
of order: 15th October, 2020

Explanation
7 to section 9(1)(i) – Small shareholder exemption introduced by this
Explanation inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is retrospective in nature

 

FACTS

The
assessee, a non-resident company, held shares in Singapore Company (SCO) which
in turn held shares in Indian company1. The assessee sold shares of
SCO to the Indian company. The Indian company withheld tax on the consideration
amount which was claimed as refund by the assessee.

 

During the
course of assessment proceedings, the assessee claimed that income is not
taxable in view of Explanation 7 to section 9(1)(i) which exempts the seller
from indirect transfer provisions if its interest in foreign company (which
derives substantial value from India) does not exceed 5%. The A.O. was of the
view that Explanation 7 inserted by Finance Act, 2015 is prospective, being
effective from 1st April, 2016 and, therefore, not applicable in the
year under consideration. The DRP upheld the view of the A.O.

 

1   Decision
does not mention total stake held by assessee in SCO. However, decision
proceeds on the basis that SCO derives substantial value from India and
aggregate stake of assessee is less than 5% in SCO

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   Explanation 5 to section
    9(1)(i) was introduced by the Finance Act of 2012 with retrospective effect
    from 1st April, 1962 to tax indirect transfers. The said provisions
    were inserted to obviate the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone
    International Holdings B.V. 341 ITR 1 (SC)
    .
  •   After the insertion of
    Explanation 5, the stakeholders were apprehensive about ambiguities surrounding
    the said Explanation and, therefore, representations were made to the
    Government of India which constituted the Shome Committee to look into the apprehensions
    / grievances of the stakeholders.
  •   On the recommendations of
    the Shome Committee, Explanations 6 and 7 were inserted by the Finance Act,
    2015. Explanations 6 and 7 have to be read with Explanation 5 to understand the
    provisions of section 9(1)(i). Since Explanation 5 has been given retrospective
    effect, Explanations 6 and 7, which further the object of the insertion of
    Explanation 5, have to be given retrospective effect.

Section 22 – Assessee is builder / developer – Rental income derived is taxable as Business Income and section 22 is not applicable – In respect of unsold flats held as stock-in-trade, Annual Lettable Value cannot be determined u/s 22 since rental income, if any, is taxable as Business Income

8. Osho Developers vs. ACIT (Mumbai) Shamim Yahya (A.M.) and Ravish Sood
(J.M.) ITA Nos. 2372 & 1860/Mum/2019
A.Ys.: 2014-15 & 2015-16 Date of order: 3rd November,
2020
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K.
Shivram and Neelam Jadhav / Uodal Raj Singh

 

Section
22 – Assessee is builder / developer – Rental income derived is taxable as
Business Income and section 22 is not applicable – In respect of unsold flats
held as stock-in-trade, Annual Lettable Value cannot be determined u/s 22 since
rental income, if any, is taxable as Business Income

 

FACTS

The
assessee firm was a builder / developer. It had filed its return of income
declaring Nil income. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the A.O.
noticed that the assessee had shown unsold flats in its closing stock.
Following the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Ansal Housing Finance and Leasing Company Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 180
, the
A.O. assessed to tax the Annual Lettable Value (ALV) of the aforesaid flats u/s
22 as Income from House Property. The assessee tried to distinguish the facts
involved in the case of Ansal. It also contended that the income on the sale of
the unsold flats was liable to be assessed as its Business Income and not as
Income from House Property, therefore, the ALV of the said flats was not
exigible to tax.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A). Relying on the judgment of
the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gundecha Builders (2019) 102
taxman.com 27
, where the Court had held that the rental income derived
from the property held as stock-in-trade was taxable as Income from House
Property, the CIT(A) found no infirmity in the A.O.’s action of assessing the
ALV of the unsold flats as Income from House Property.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal noted that in the case before the Bombay High Court, the assessee had,
in fact, let out the flats. And the issue was as to under which head of rental
income was it to be taxed, as ‘business income’ or as ‘income from house
property’. But in the present appeal filed by the assessee the flats were not
let out and there was no rental income earned by the assessee. Therefore,
according to the Tribunal the decision in the case of Gundecha Builders
would not assist the Revenue.

 

Referring
to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ansal
Housing Finance and Leasing Company Ltd.
relied on by the Revenue, the
Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court was of the view that the levy of
income tax in the case of an assessee holding house property was premised not
on whether the assessee carries on business as landlord, but on the ownership.
And on that basis, the ALV of the flats held as stock-in-trade by the assessee
was brought to tax under the head ‘house property’ by the Delhi High Court.
However, the Tribunal noted the contrary decision of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of CIT vs. Neha Builders (2008) 296 ITR 661 where it was
held that rental income derived by an assessee from the property which was held
as stock-in-trade is assessable as Business Income and cannot be assessed under
the head ‘Income from House Property’. According to the Gujarat High Court, any
income derived from the stock would be income from the business and not income
from the property.

 

In view of the
conflicting decisions of the non-jurisdictional High Courts, the Tribunal
relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of K.
Subramanian and Anr. vs. Siemens India Ltd. and Anr. (1985) 156 ITR 11

where it was held that where there are conflicting decisions of the
non-jurisdictional High Courts, the view which is in favour of the assessee
should be followed. Accordingly, the Tribunal followed the view taken by the
Gujarat High Court in the case of Neha Builders and allowed the
appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that a similar view was taken
by the SMC bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Rajendra
Godshalwar vs. ITO-21(3)(1), Mumbai [ITA No. 7470/Mum/2017, dated 31st
January, 2019]
. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the ALV of the
flats held by the assessee as part of the stock-in-trade of its business as
that of a builder and developer could not have been determined and thus brought
to tax under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

 

 

Assessee being mere trader of scrap would not be liable to collect tax at source u/s 206C when such scrap was not a result of manufacture or mechanical working of materials

14. [2020] 78 ITR (Trib.) 451
(Luck.)(Trib.)
Lala Bharat Lal & Sons vs. ITO ITA No. 14, 15 & 16/LKW/2019 A.Ys.: 2014-15 to 2016-17 Date of order: 19th February,
2020

 

Assessee
being mere trader of scrap would not be liable to collect tax at source u/s
206C when such scrap was not a result of manufacture or mechanical working of
materials

 

FACTS

The assessee was in the
business of dealing / trading in metal scrap. For the relevant assessment years
the A.O. held that the assessee was liable to collect tax at source @ 1% of the
sale amount as per the provisions of section 206C(1). The assessee contended
that the sale / trading done by him did not tantamount to sale of scrap as defined
in Explanation (b) to section 206C, as the same had not been generated from
manufacture or mechanical work. This contention was rejected by the CIT(A). The
assessee then filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

The assessee relied on the
decision of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in Navine Fluorine International Ltd.
vs. ACIT [2011] 45 SOT 86
wherein it was held that for invoking the
provisions of Explanation (b) to section 206C, it was necessary that waste and
scrap sold by the assessee should arise from the manufacturing or mechanical
working done by the assessee. Reliance was also placed on Nathulal P.
Lavti vs. ITO [2011] 48 SOT 83 (URO) (Rajkot)
.

 

On the other hand, Revenue
placed reliance on the decision of the special bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT [2013] 145 ITD 1 (Rajkot)(SB)
which held that all the traders in scrap were also liable to collect tax at
source under the provisions of section 206C.

Against the arguments of
the Revenue, the assessee relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT
vs. Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. [2016] 381 ITR 210 (Gujarat)
wherein
the plea of the Revenue to consider the decision of the special bench in case
of Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT (Supra) was dismissed. Reliance
was also placed on the decision of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Azizbhai
A. Lada vs. ITO [ITA 765/Ahd/2015]
and Dhasawal Traders vs. ITO
[2016] 161 ITD 142
wherein the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra) was considered
and relief was granted to the assessee.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it
was an undisputed fact that the assessee was not a manufacturer and was only a
dealer in scrap.

 

In the case of Navine
Fluorine International Ltd. (Supra)
, it was held that to fall under the
definition of scrap as given in the Explanation to section 206C, the term
‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ are one and it should arise from manufacture and if the
scrap is not coming out of manufacture, then the items do not fall under the
definition of scrap and thus are not liable to TCS.

 

Further, in the case of ITO
(TDS) vs. Priya Blue Industries (P) Ltd. [ITA No. 2207/ADH/2011]
, the
Tribunal had held that the words ‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ should have nexus with
manufacturing or mechanical working of materials.

 

The Tribunal relied upon
the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Priya Blue Industries
(P) Ltd. (Supra)
, which held that the expression ‘scrap’ defined in
clause (b) of the Explanation to section 206C means ‘waste’ and ‘scrap’ from manufacture
of mechanical working of materials, which is not useable as such and the
expression ‘scrap’ contained in clause (b) of the Explanation to section 206C
shows that any material which is useable as such would not fall within the
ambit of ‘scrap’.

 

Next, the Tribunal referred
to the decision in the case of Dhasawal Traders vs. ITO (Supra)
which held that when the assessee had not generated any scrap in manufacturing
activity and he was only a trader having sold products which were re-useable as
such, hence he was not supposed to collect tax at source.

 

It was also held that the
Gujarat High Court had duly considered the decision of the special bench.
Accordingly, the Tribunal, following the decision in CIT vs. Priya Blue
Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra)
held that the assessee being a trader of
scrap not involved in manufacturing activity, cannot be fastened with the
provisions of section 206C(1).

 

CIT(E) cannot pass an order denying registration u/s 12AA (without following the procedure of cancellation provided in the Act) from a particular assessment year by taking the ground that lease rental income exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs received from properties held by the trust violated provisions of section 2(15) when such registration was granted in the same order for prior assessment years

13. [2020] 77 ITR (Trib.) 407
(Cuttack)(Trib.)
Orissa Olympic Association vs. CIT(E) ITA No.: 323/CTK/2017 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 6th December,
2019

 

CIT(E)
cannot pass an order denying registration u/s 12AA (without following the
procedure of cancellation provided in the Act) from a particular assessment
year by taking the ground that lease rental income exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs
received from properties held by the trust violated provisions of section 2(15)
when such registration was granted in the same order for prior assessment years

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 since 1961.
It had made an application for registration u/s 12A in the year 1997 which was
pending disposal. On appeal against the order of assessment for A.Ys. 2002-03
to 2007-08, the Tribunal set aside the assessment pending the disposal of the
petition filed by the assessee u/s 12A by the Income-tax authority.
Accordingly, following the directions of the Tribunal, the CIT(E) called for
information from the assessee society and after considering the submissions,
rejected the application of the association. Aggrieved by this order, the
assessee approached the Tribunal which, vide order in ITA
334/CTK/2011
directed the CIT(E) to look into the matter of
registration afresh, considering the second proviso to section 2(15) as
prospective from 1st April, 2009.

 

Accordingly, after
considering the objects of the assessee, the CIT(E) passed an order stating
that the objects of the assessee were charitable in nature and the activities
were not carried out with the object to earn profits. Registration was granted
from A.Ys. 1998-99 to 2008-09. However, from A.Y. 2009-10 onwards, registration
was denied on the ground that income received by the assessee as commercial
lease rent was in the nature of trade, commerce, or business and it exceeded
Rs. 25 lakhs in all the previous years, thereby violating the provisions of
section 2(15) as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 2009. The assessee filed
an appeal against this order before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that it
was an undisputed fact that the CIT(E) had granted registration from A.Y.
1998-99 to 2008-09 after noting that the objects of the assessee were
charitable in nature and were not carried out with an object to earn profits.
It was held that the lease rent incomes received from the property held under
the trust was wholly for charitable or religious purposes and were applied for
charitable purposes, hence the same was not exempt in the hands of the
assessee. Except lease rent incomes, there was no allegation of the CIT(E) to
support that the incomes received by the assessee as commercial lease rent were
in the nature of trade or commerce or trade. It was held that the income earned
by the assessee from commercial lease rent, which was the only ground of
denying the continuance of registration from A.Y. 2009-10 was not sustainable
for denying the registration already granted.

 

It was observed that
registration was granted for limited period but was denied thereafter without
affording an opportunity to the assessee which was contrary to the mandate of
section 12AA(3) and hence denial of registration was unsustainable.

 

Reliance was placed on the
following:

 

1. Dahisar Sports Foundation vs. ITO [2017]
167 ITD 710 (Mum.)(Trib.)
wherein it was held that if the objects of
the trust are charitable, the fact that it collected certain charges or
receipts (or income) does not alter the character of the trust.

 

2. DIT (Exemptions) vs. Khar Gymkhana [2016]
385 ITR 162 (Bom. HC)
wherein it was held that where there is no change
in the nature of activities of the trust and the registration is already
granted u/s12A, then the same cannot be disqualified without examination where
receipts from commercial activities exceed Rs. 25 lakhs as per CBDT Circular
No. 21 of 2016 dated 27th May, 2016.

 

3. Mumbai Port Trust vs. DIT (Exemptions)
[IT Appeal No. 262 (Mum.) of 2012]
wherein it was held that the process
of cancellation of registration has to be done in accordance with the
provisions of sections 12AA(3) and (4) after carefully examining the
applicability of these provisions.

 

Accordingly, it was held
that once the registration is granted, then the same is required to be
continued till it is cancelled by following the procedure provided in
sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 12AA; without following such procedure, the
registration cannot be restricted and cannot be discontinued by way of
cancelling the same for a subsequent period in the same order.

 

Section 23, Rule 4 – Amount of rent, as per leave and license agreement, which is not received cannot be considered as forming part of annual value merely on the ground that the assessee has not taken legal steps to recover the rent or that the licensee has deducted tax at source thereon

12. TS-577-ITAT-2020-(Mum.) Vishwaroop Infotech Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT,
LTU A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 6th November,
2020

 

Section
23, Rule 4 – Amount of rent, as per leave and license agreement, which is not
received cannot be considered as forming part of annual value merely on the
ground that the assessee has not taken legal steps to recover the rent or that
the licensee has deducted tax at source thereon

 

FACTS

The assessee gave four
floors of its property at Vashi, Navi Mumbai on leave and license basis to
Spanco Telesystems and Solutions Ltd. Subsequently, the licensee company
informed the assessee about slump sale of its business to Spanco BPO Services
Ltd. and Spanco Respondez BPO Pvt. Ltd. and requested the assessee to
substitute the names of these new companies as licensee in its place w.e.f. 1st
April, 2008.

 

Due to financial problems
in the new companies, the new companies stopped paying rent from financial year
2010-11 relevant to assessment year 2011-12. As on 31st March, 2011,
the total outstanding dues receivable by the assessee from these two companies
amounted to Rs. 15.60 crores.

 

During the previous year
relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee did not
receive anything from the licensee and therefore did not offer the license fee
to the extent of Rs. 3,85,85,341 for taxation. The licensees had, however,
deducted TDS on this amount and had reflected this amount in the TDS statement
filed by them. While the assessee did not offer the sum of Rs. 3,85,85,341 for
taxation, it did claim credit of TDS to the extent of Rs. 38.58 lakhs.

 

Of the sum of Rs. 15.60
crores receivable by the assessee from the licensee, the assessee, after a lot
of negotiation and persuasion, managed to get Rs 10.51 crores during the
previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. Since the
assessee could not recover rent for the period under consideration, it did not
declare rental income for the assessment year under consideration.

 

The A.O. brought to tax
this sum of Rs. 3,85,85,341 on the ground that the assessee did not satisfy the
fourth condition of Rule 4, i.e., the assessee has neither furnished any
documentary evidence for instituting legal proceedings against the tenant for
recovery of outstanding rent, nor proved that the institution of legal
proceedings would be useless and that the licensees had deducted TDS on
unrealised rent which TDS is reflected in the ITS Data.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the A.O. on the
ground that the licensee has deducted TDS on unrealised rent.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging the addition of unrealised rent
receivable from the licensees. It was also contended that the assessee did not
initiate legal proceedings against the licensees because the licensees were in
possession of the premises which were worth more than Rs. 200 crores. Civil
litigation would have taken decades for the assessee during which period the
assessee would have been deprived of the possession of the premises. Civil
litigation would have also involved huge litigation and opportunity costs. It
was in these circumstances that the assessee agreed with the licensees, on 20th
November, 2011, to give up all its claims in lieu of possession
of the premises.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that
considering the fact that the assessee has to safeguard its interest and
initiating litigation against the big business house that, too, having
financial problems will be fruitless and it will be at huge cost. It is also in
the interest of the assessee if it could recover the rent, for it will be
beneficial to the assessee first. No one leaves any money unrecovered. The
reasons disclosed by the assessee to close the dispute amicably and recovering
the amount of Rs. 10.51 crores from the company, which was having a financial
problem, itself was a huge task.

 

The Tribunal held that in
its view the situation in the present case amply displays that institution of
legal proceedings would be useless and the A.O. has failed to understand the
situation and failed to appreciate the settlement reached by the assessee. The
Tribunal observed that the A.O. has also not brought on record whether the
assessee is likely to receive the rent in near future; rather, he accepted the
fact that it is irrecoverable. The Tribunal held that the rental income can be
brought to tax only when the assessee has actually received or is likely to
receive or there is certainty of receiving it in the near future. In the given
case, since the assessee has no certainty of receipt of any rent, as and when
the assessee reaches an agreement to settle the dispute it is equal to
satisfying the fourth condition of Rule 4 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

 

The Tribunal said that the
addition of rent was unjustified and directed the A.O. to delete the addition.

 

The Tribunal noticed that
the assessee has taken TDS credit to the extent of Rs. 38.58 lakhs. It held
that the A.O. can treat the amount of Rs. 38.58 lakhs as income under the head
`Income from House Property’.

 

Section 45, Rule 115 – Foreign exchange gain realised on remittance of amount received on redemption of shares, at par, in foreign subsidiary is a capital receipt not liable to tax

11. TS-580-ITAT-2020-(Del.) Havells India Ltd. vs. ACIT, LTU A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order: 10th November,
2020

 

Section
45, Rule 115 – Foreign exchange gain realised on remittance of amount received
on redemption of shares, at par, in foreign subsidiary is a capital receipt not
liable to tax

 

FACTS

During the previous year
relevant to assessment year 2008-09, the assessee invested in 3,55,22,067
shares of one of its subsidiary companies, M/s Havells Holdings Ltd., out of
which 1,54,23,053 shares were redeemed at par value in the same year. Upon remittance
of the consideration of shares redeemed the assessee realised foreign exchange
gain of Rs. 2,55,82,186.

 

Since this gain was not on
account of increase in value of the shares, as the shares were redeemed at par
value but merely on account of repatriation of proceeds received on exchange
fluctuation, the gain was treated as a capital receipt in the return of income.

 

The A.O. held that the
assessee had purchased shares in a foreign company for which purchase
consideration was remitted from India and further, on redemption, the sale /
redemption proceeds so received in foreign currency were remitted back to India
which resulted in gain which is taxable as capital gains in terms of section
45.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) which upheld the action of the A.O. The
assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal noted the undisputed fact that investment made by the assessee in the
shares of Havells Holdings Ltd. was made in Euros and redemption of such shares
was also made in Euros. It held that the actual profit or loss on sale /
redemption of such shares therefore has to necessarily be computed in Euros
and, thereafter, converted to INR for the purposes of section 45. In other
words, the cost of acquisition of shares and consideration received thereon
should necessarily be converted into Euros and the resultant gain / loss
thereon should thereafter be converted into INR at the prevailing rate. In the
present case, the net gain / loss on redemption of shares was Nil since the
shares were redeemed at par value and thereby there was no capital gain taxable u/s 45.

 

From a perusal of section
45 it can be seen that for taxation of any profits or gains arising from the
transfer of a capital asset, only gains accruing as a result of transfer of the
asset can be taxed. In the present case, there was no ‘gain’ on transfer /
redemption of the shares insofar as the shares were redeemed at par value.
Thus, there was no gain which accrued to the assessee as a result of redemption
of such shares, since the shares were redeemed at par value. The said
contention is supported by Rule 115 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which
provides the rate of exchange for conversion of income expressed in foreign
currency. Clause (f) of Explanation 2 to Rule 115(1) clearly provides that ‘in
respect of the income chargeable under the head “capital gains……”.’
rate of
exchange is to be applied. In the present case, since capital gain in GBP /
Euro was Nil, the resultant gain in Indian rupees is Nil. The exchange gain of
Rs. 2,55,82,186 was only a consequence of repatriation of the consideration
received (in Euros) in Indian rupees and cannot be construed to be part of
consideration received on redemption of shares. Thus, the applicability of
section 45 does not come into the picture in the present case.

 

The Tribunal held that the
A.O. was not right in applying section 45 for making the addition. This ground
of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Sections 50, 112 – Capital gains computed u/s 50 on transfer of buildings which were held for more than three years are taxable @ 21.63% u/s 112 and not @ 32.45%, the normal rate

10. TS-566-ITAT-2020-(Mum.) Voltas Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 6th October,
2020

 

Sections
50, 112 – Capital gains computed u/s 50 on transfer of buildings which were
held for more than three years are taxable @ 21.63% u/s 112 and not @ 32.45%,
the normal rate

 

FACTS

For the assessment year
2013-14, the assessee company in the course of an appeal before the Tribunal
raised an additional ground contending that the capital gains computed u/s 50
on sale of buildings should be taxed @ 21.63% u/s 112 instead of @ 32.45%, as
the said buildings were held for more than three years.

 

HELD

The Tribunal, after
referring to the provisions of section 50 and having noted that the Bombay High
Court in the case of CIT vs. V.S. Dempo Company Ltd. [387 ITR 354] has
observed that section 50 which is a special provision for computing the capital
gains in the case of depreciable assets, is restricted for the purposes of
section 48 or section 49 as specifically stated therein and the said fiction
created in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 50 has limited application only
in the context of the mode of computation of capital gains contained in
sections 48 and 49 and would have nothing to do with the exemption that is
provided in a totally different provision, i.e. section 54E. Section 48 deals
with the mode of computation and section 49 relates to cost with reference to
certain modes of acquisition.

 

The Tribunal also noted
that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Manali Investment [ITA No.
1658 of 2012]
has held that the assessee is entitled to set-off u/s 74
in respect of capital gains arising out of transfer of capital assets on which
depreciation has been allowed in the first year itself and which is deemed as
short-term capital gains u/s 50.

 

The Tribunal held that the
deeming fiction of section 50 is limited and cannot be extended beyond the
method of computation of gain and that the distinction between short-term and
long-term capital gain is not obliterated by this section. Following the ratio
of these decisions, the Tribunal allowed the additional ground of appeal filed
by the assessee and directed the A.O. to re-examine the detailed facts and
allow the claim.

 

FINALLY, ACCOUNTING / FINANCIAL FRAUDS ARE OFFENCES UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

Finally, SEBI has
specifically recognised accounting frauds, manipulations and siphoning off of
funds in listed companies as offences. It sounds surprising that such acts were
not yet offences under Securities Laws and that the law-makers / SEBI took so
long, actually, several decades, to do this. Indeed, there have been rulings in
the past on such cases where parties have been punished. Now, however, such
acts attract specific provisions and will be punishable in several ways – by
penalty, debarment, disgorgement, even prosecution and more (vide amendment
to SEBI PFUTP Regulations dated 19th October, 2020).

 

The new provision is
broadly – albeit clumsily – worded. It is put within a strange context
in the scheme of the regulations. One would have thought that a separate and
comprehensive set of regulations would have been made to combat corporate
frauds just as, for example, in the case of insider trading cases, regulations
that would have given proper definitions, covered specific types of accounting,
financial and other corporate frauds, specified who will be held liable and
when, etc. Instead, the new provision has been introduced in the form of an Explanation
to a provision in a set of regulations which are generally intended to deal
with frauds and the like in dealings in securities markets. Interestingly, the
intention seems to be to give retrospective effect to this provision.

 

Certain
basic questions will need to be answered. What are the specific acts that are
barred? Who are the persons to whom these provisions apply? What is the meaning
of the various terms used? What are the forms of penal and other actions that
can be imposed against those who have violated these provisions? Is there a
retrospective effect to the new provision? Let us consider all these issues in
brief.

 

SUMMARY
OF PROVISION

The new provision, framed
as an Explanation, bars acts of diversion / siphoning / misutilisation of
assets / earnings and concealment of such acts. It also bars manipulation of
financial statements / accounts that would in turn manipulate the market price.

 

The principal provision is
Regulation 4(1) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade
Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP
Regulations). Regulation 4(1) prohibits fraudulent, manipulative and unfair
practices in securities markets. The newly-inserted Explanation to it says that
the acts listed therein (of diversion, siphoning off, etc.) are deemed to be such practices and thus
also prohibited.

 

What type
of acts are barred?

The following are the acts
barred by the new provision:

 

(a) ‘any act of diversion, misutilisation or
siphoning off of assets or earnings’,

(b)        any concealment
of acts as listed in (a) above,

(c) ‘any device, scheme or artifice to manipulate
the books of accounts or financial statement of such a company that would
directly or indirectly manipulate the price of securities of that company’.

 

To which
type of entities do the bars apply?

The acts should be in
relation to those companies whose securities are listed on recognised stock
exchanges. This would cover a fairly large number of companies. The securities
may be shares or even bonds / debentures. The securities may be listed on any
of the various platforms of exchanges.

 

Who can be
punished?

The Explanation makes the
act of diversion, concealment, etc. punishable. Hence, whoever commits such
acts can be punished. Thus, this may include the company itself, its directors,
the Chief Financial Officer, etc. Any person who has committed such an act
would be subject to action.

How are
such acts punishable?

The provisions of the SEBI
Act and the PFUTP Regulations give SEBI wide powers of taking penal and other
actions where such acts are carried out. There can be a penalty of up to three
times the profits made, or Rs. 25 crores, whichever is higher. SEBI can debar
the persons from being associated with the capital markets. SEBI can order
disgorgement of the profits made through such acts. The person who has
committed such acts can also be prosecuted. There are other powers too.

 

ANALYSIS
OF THE ACTS COVERED

Acts of diversion /
misutilisation / siphoning off of the assets / earnings of the company are
barred. The terms used have not been defined. If read out of context, the term
diversion and misutilisation may have a very broad meaning. But taken in the
context of the scheme of the PFUTP Regulations and also the third term
‘siphoning’, a narrower meaning would have to be applied.

 

The act of concealment
of such diversion / misutilisation / siphoning is also barred by itself. The
word ‘concealment’ may have to be interpreted broadly and hence camouflaging
such acts in various forms ought also to be covered.

 

The third category has
three parts. There has to be a device, scheme or artifice. Such
device, etc. should be to manipulate the books of accounts or financial
statement of the company. The manipulation should be such as would directly or
indirectly manipulate the price of the securities of the company. Essentially,
the intention is to cover accounting frauds / manipulation. However, since such
acts should be such as would result in manipulation of the price of securities,
the scope of this category is narrower. A classic example would be inflating
(or even deflating) the financial performance of the company which would affect
the market price. The definition of ‘unpublished price sensitive information’
in the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations could be usefully referred to for some
guidance.

 

Taken all together,
however, the three categories cast the net wide and cover several types of corporate
/ financial frauds. There is no minimum cut-off amount and hence the provisions
can be invoked for such acts of any amount.

 

RETROSPECTIVE
EFFECT?

It appears that the
intention is to give retrospective effect to the new provision. The relevant portion
of the Explanation reads:

‘Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that
any act of… shall be and shall always be
deemed
to have been considered as manipulative, fraudulent and an
unfair trade practice in the securities market’ (emphasis supplied).

 

Thus, a quadruple effort
has been made to give the provision a retrospective effect. The amendment is in
the form of an ‘Explanation’ to denote that this is merely an elaboration of
the primary provision and not an amendment. The Explanation states that it is
introduced ‘for removal of doubts’. It is also stated to be a ‘clarification’.
It is further stated that the specified acts ‘shall always’ be said to be
manipulative, etc. Finally, it is also stated that these acts are ‘deemed’ to be
manipulative, etc.

 

While the intention thus
seems more than apparent to give retrospective effect, the question is whether
acts as specified in the Explanation that have taken place before the date of
the amendment would be deemed to be covered by the Regulations and thus treated
as fraudulent, etc.? And accordingly, whether the various punitive actions
would be imposed even on offenders who may have committed such acts in the
past?

 

Giving
retrospective effect to provisions having penal consequences is fraught with
legal difficulties. While siphoning off of funds, accounting manipulation, etc.
are abhorrent, there have to be specific legal provisions existing at the time
when such acts are committed and which prohibit them and make them punishable.
It may also be remembered that the Regulations are subordinate law notified by
SEBI and not amendments made in the SEBI Act by Parliament. Of course, the
amendments are placed before Parliament for review and for amendments to them,
if desired.

 

There is another concern.
When a fresh provision is introduced, a fair question would be that this may
mean that the existing provisions did not cover such acts. Hence, if the
retrospective effect of the provision is not granted, then there can be an
argument that the existing Regulation 4(1), which otherwise bans all forms of
manipulative and other practices, be understood as not covering such acts.

 

However, it is also
arguable that if the existing provision, before the amendment, was broad enough
to cover such acts, then there is really no retrospective effect. SEBI has in
the past taken action in several cases of accounting manipulation / frauds,
etc.

 

The Supreme Court has held
in the case of N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 178 Comp Cas 390 (SC)]
that accounting manipulation can be punished by SEBI under the relevant
provisions of the SEBI Act / the PFUTP Regulations. In this case, SEBI recorded
a finding that the accounts of the company had been manipulated by inflating
the revenues, profits, etc. The promoters had pledged their shares at the
inflated price. SEBI had debarred the directors for specified periods from the
securities markets. On appeal, the Supreme Court did a holistic reading of the
SEBI Act along with the Companies Act, 2013 and held that such acts were subject
to adverse actions under law. However, it was apparent that the general objects
of the law, the generic powers of SEBI, etc. were given a purposive
interpretation and the SEBI’s penal orders upheld. Interestingly, the Court
even observed that, ‘…in SEBI Act, there is no provision for keeping proper
books of accounts by a registered company.’
Thus, while this decision is
authoritative on the matter, it was also on facts. There was thus clearly a
need for specific provisions covering financial frauds, accounting
manipulation, etc. The new provisions do seem to fill the gap to an extent, at
least going forward.

CONCLUSION

The
amendment does serve the purpose of making a specific and focused provision on
accounting and financial frauds that harm the interests of the company and its
shareholders and also of the securities markets.

However, there is also
disappointment at many levels. It took SEBI almost 30 years to bring a specific
provision. Arguably, such frauds are as much, if not more, rampant and serious
as most other frauds including insider trading. However, while insider trading
is given a comprehensive provision with important terms defined, several
deeming provisions made, etc., financial frauds have a clumsily drafted and
clumsily placed provision, almost as a footnote. Such frauds not only deserve a
separate set of regulations but also a specific enabling provision in the SEBI
Act and a provision providing for specific punishment to the wrongdoers.

Giving the provision
retrospective effect may appear to be well intended but it may backfire if
there is large-scale action by SEBI for past acts.

Nonetheless,
finally, despite the warts and all, our Securities Laws now do have a specific provision
covering financial frauds in listed companies. One can expect to see action by
SEBI on this front in the form of investigations and punitive orders against
wrongdoers.
 

 

 

 

 

 

ARE YOU A ‘VALYA KOLI’?

The adversity which has come to us in the
form of the pandemic has also brought with it quiet and solitude. What was
otherwise difficult if not impossible for most of us, has come uninvited and
that, too, on a platter.

 

Both quiet and solitude also gave each one
of us an opportunity and the time to reflect. And that is where lies the
relevance of the question in the headline, Are you a ‘Valya Koli’?

 

For the uninitiated, let me for a moment
dwell on the character of Valya Koli. He was a dacoit born in a fisherman’s
family. He earned notoriety for being a highway robber; he used the spoils of
his thefts to support his family.

 

One day, he confronted the Rishi Narad Muni
who was passing through the area. As was his wont, Valya stopped Narad Muni so
as to loot and kill him.

 

However, he noticed the serenity on Narad
Muni’s face and could not move any further. At this juncture, Narad Muni
inquired with Valya the reason for his dacoities and killings. Valya quickly
responded that it was to support and maintain his family.

 

Hearing this, Narad Muni asked him, ‘All
that you do is a sin and you are saying that you are doing all this for your
family? Do you think your family members will share the consequences of your
sins?’

 

Though Valya was confident of an affirmative
answer, the question set him thinking. Seeing Valya think, Narad Muni said to
him, ‘I shall wait for you here. You go to your family and confirm their
response’. Valya went home to ask his family members – but he was stunned to
hear the response of his wife and children. They refused to share the
consequences of his sins. It was a moment of shock for Valya.

 

He ran to Narad Muni in a state of
repentance and falling at the feet of the Rishi asked him, ‘How do I undo my
past? I seek forgiveness.’ Narad Muni asked him to chant ‘Ram! Ram!’ which
Valya religiously did. The chanting, though difficult initially, brought about
a transformation in him and he grew in love and compassion. Valya became the
great sage Valmiki who wrote the revered Hindu text, the Ramayan.

 

Coming back to the question – Are you a
‘Valya Koli’?
Are you only working for others (other than yourself), be it
family members, friends, clients or your organisation? Are they ready to share
your burden? Are your purposes aligned with those of those for whom you work?

 

I think the pandemic and the ensuing
lockdown and the resulting time for reflection may have brought these questions
to your mind, too. These questions would have made each of us think, and think
differently.

 

Instead of philosophising further, I shall
leave you with the question, Are you a ‘Valya Koli?

 

Take an inward journey for the answers. All
the best.
 

 

DISTANCE AND MASK

While going down memory lane, I recall that
in my childhood whenever I used to travel by road with my parents I never
missed to read the words painted in bold, KEEP DISTANCE, on the
backs of trucks running ahead of us. When the car overtook a truck, I got
excited and cheered the driver. As if I had won the race. I was under the
impression that our driver would have got the permission to go ahead from the
driver of the truck!

 

At that time I did not know the reason for
the display of those words KEEP DISTANCE on the back of every
truck. Later I realised that it is for safety and to avoid a mishap if the
truck ahead of you brakes suddenly. This principle is applicable to all vehicles
running on the road. It is a part of traffic rules all over the world. So, KEEP
DISTANCE.

 

But you and I never imagined that one day
this traffic rule would be applicable between human beings. With the outburst
of the corona pandemic, the words KEEP DISTANCE started echoing in every
nook and corner of the world, with its Indian version of ‘Do gaz ki doori’.

 

However, just ‘Keep Distance’ or ‘Do gaz ki
doori’ is not enough; this traffic rule of ‘Keep Distance’ is incomplete if you
don’t mask your face. So distance without mask is not safe. The reason for this
is to keep the deadly virus away. The only route this virus gets into your body
is through the nose, the ‘Gateway of Corona’. When you cover your face, you
become ‘faceless’. Don’t take anybody at face value, meaning don’t be in
contact with anyone with an open face. He or she can be a carrier of the
‘predator’ called corona.

 

Before the mask being used in the corona
pandemic, let us recall that in some communities women are required to cover
their face; it’s called ‘Ghunghat’ or ‘Burqa’. This practice is followed
religiously in patriarchal families in rural parts of India. Even at home, a
married woman is to wear a ‘ghunghat’ to show respect to the elders in the
family. So you will find a married woman standing on the threshold of the
drawing room adjusting her ‘ghunghat’ constantly to cover her face even if she
is arguing with the elders at home. Often, a female cannot step out of her home
without covering her face. And this has been in vogue from times immemorial.

 

Interestingly, the ‘ghunghat’ has been a
source of comedy of errors in many Hindi films and serials. And then covering
the face with a ‘gamacha’ is common in the underworld. The underworld is always
a big threat to law and order of the ordinary world where you and I live. The
term ‘underworld’ covers everyone, right from ‘Chambal ke daku / Thugs’ to bank
robbers, ATM robbers [a new category] and every evil soul indulging in crime on
earth. The dominant intention of those evil souls is to hide their identity
while committing heinous crimes.

 

We also see girls and women covering their
face with an ‘Odhani’ or ‘Dupatta’ whenever they are riding a vehicle solo or
pillion-riding. Why do they follow this practice? We should not intrude into
their privacy too much. I think you understand what I mean.

 

When it comes to the mask being used now,
what we observe all around us is quite amusing. Initially, there was a lot of
talk about masks, right from the World Health Organization to heads of nation
to the Prime Minister of India, the Health Minister, epidemiologists, doctors
and ‘WhatsApp universities’. In this corona pandemic, the mask is the only
‘panacea’ to stay safe before the virus enters your body. Surprisingly, this
claim was turned down by none other than the President of the USA Donald Trump
before he was caught by the deadly virus during the Presidential election
campaign!

 

There have been a lot of discussions and
debates, particularly on electronic media, about what constitutes a proper
mask. Initially, the N95 mask was highly recommended by WHO. But it was not
affordable in India. So we see ‘desi’ versions of masks of different designs,
colours, material, layers in use. Even a simple cotton ‘gamacha’ is used as a
mask in many parts of India. In fact, it is more popular than the N95 mask.
Many people take pride in using ‘gamacha masks’ (perhaps they believe in
‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’). Go to YouTube and you will find at least a hundred
videos of ‘How to make home-made masks’ with practical instructions in sweet
voices.

 

The use of a mask is compulsory outside your
home, without mask you are liable for a penalty. The penalty varies from city
to city. So don’t become the target of the police department because some
overzealous police uses physical force, too. You may have seen those visuals on
your TV screen.

So distance and mask are inseparable to curb
the spread of the corona virus. Earlier it was social distancing, but it is all
about physical distancing at present.

 

But for corona
distance doesn’t matter; it emanated from the laboratory in Wuhan in China and
travelled to every nook and corner of the world. The health and the wealth of
the world have been destroyed by this deadly pandemic.

 

Remember, the humble ‘gamacha’ along with
‘Do gaz ki doori’ is the only vaccine available till a real vaccine comes to
the rescue of the human race.
 

 

TRANSFER PRICING – BENCHMARKING OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND DEBTORS

1.   INTRODUCTION

Benchmarking of
financial transactions is an integral part of the Transfer Pricing Regulations
of India (TPR). The Finance Act, 2012 inserted an Explanation to section 92B of
the Income-tax, Act 1961 (the ‘Act’) with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2002 dealing with the meaning of international transactions. Interestingly,
the Notes on Clauses of the Finance Bill, 2012 is silent on the intent and
purpose of inclusion of such transactions within the definition of
‘international transaction’. Clause (i)(c) of the said Explanation reads as
follows:

 

‘Explanation. –
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that –

(i) the
expression “international transaction” shall include –

(a) ….

(b) ….

(c) capital
financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or
guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance,
payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the
course of business;

(d) ….

(e) ….’

 

Since financial
transactions are peculiar between two enterprises, it is hard to find comparables
in many cases. In this article we shall deal with some of the possible options
to benchmark some of these transactions to arrive at an arm’s length pricing
and / or discuss controversies surrounding them.

 

It may be noted
that Clause 16 of the Annexure to Form 3CEB requires the reporting of
particulars in respect of the purchase or sale of marketable securities, issue
and buyback of equity shares, optionally convertible / partially convertible /
compulsorily convertible debentures / preference shares. A relevant extract of
the Clause is reproduced herein below:

 

Particulars in respect of international
transactions of purchase or sale of marketable securities, issue and buyback of
equity shares, optionally convertible / partially convertible / compulsorily
convertible debentures / preference shares:

 

Has the
assessee entered into any international transaction(s) in respect of purchase
or sale of marketable securities or issue of equity shares including
transactions specified in Explanation (i)(c) below section 92B(2)?

 

If ‘yes’, provide the following details

(i) Name and address of the associated
enterprise with whom the international transaction has been entered into

(ii) Nature of the transaction

(a) Currency in which the transaction was
undertaken

(b) Consideration charged / paid in
respect of the transaction

(c) Method used for determining the arm’s
length price [See section 92C(1)]

 

It may be noted
that the Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt.
Ltd. vs. UOI [2014] 361 ITR 531 (Bom.)
clearly stated that the issue of
shares at a premium is on capital account and gives rise to no income and,
therefore, Chapter X of the Act dealing with Transfer Pricing provisions do not
apply. (Please refer to detailed discussion in subsequent paragraphs.)

 

However, even after
the acceptance of the Bombay High Court judgment by the Government of India,
international transactions relating to marketable securities are still required
to be reported / justified in Form 3CEB. And therefore, we need to study this
aspect.

 

Of the various
financial transactions, this article focuses on Capital Investments and
Outstanding Receivables (Debtors). Other types of transactions will be covered
in due course.

2.   Benchmarking of capital
instruments under Transfer Pricing Regulations

2.1  Investments in share capital and CCDs

Cross-border
investment in capital instruments of an Associated Enterprise (AE), such as
equity shares, compulsory convertible debentures (CCDs), compulsory convertible
preference shares (CCPs) and other types of convertible instruments are covered
here.

     

Since CCDs and CCPs
are quasi-capital in nature, the same are grouped with capital
instruments. Even under FEMA, they are recognised as capital instruments.
Collectively, they are referred to as ‘Equity / Capital Instruments’ hereafter.

 

2.2. FEMA Regulations

(i)   Inbound investments – FDI or foreign
investments

Inbound investment
in India is regulated by the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments)
Rules, 2019. The said Rules define ‘Capital Instruments’ as equity shares,
debentures, preference shares and share warrants issued by an Indian company.

 

‘FDI’ or
‘Foreign Direct Investment’ means investment through equity instruments by a
person resident outside India in an unlisted Indian company; or in ten per cent
or more of the post-issue paid-up equity capital on a fully-diluted basis of a
listed Indian company;

‘foreign
investment’ means any investment made by a person resident outside India on a
repatriable basis in equity instruments of an Indian company or to the capital
of an LLP;’

 

The NDI Rules define Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) as any investment
made by a person resident outside India through equity instruments where such
investment is less than 10% of the post-issue paid-up share capital on a
fully-diluted basis of a listed Indian company, or less than 10% of the paid-up value of each series of equity
instruments of a listed Indian company.

 

Since cross-border
investment of 26% or more in an entity would trigger the TPR [section 92
A(2)(a)], investments under FPI would not be subjected to benchmarking under
TPR. However, FDI and Foreign Investments in India would be required to be
benchmarked under TPR.

 

(ii)  Pricing guidelines for inbound investments

Rule 21 of the NDI
Rules provides pricing or valuation guidelines for FDI / foreign investments as
follows:

(a) For issue of equity instruments by a company to
a non-resident or transfer of shares from a resident person to a non-resident
person, it shall not be less than the price worked out as
follows:

For listed
securities
? the price at which a preferential allotment of shares can be made
under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Guidelines, as
applicable, in case of a listed Indian company, or in case of a company going
through a delisting process as per the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2009;

For unlisted
securities
? the valuation of
equity instruments done as per any internationally-accepted pricing methodology
for valuation on an arm’s length basis duly certified by a Chartered
Accountant or a merchant banker registered with SEBI or a practising Cost
Accountant.

 

(b) For transfer of equity instruments from a
non-resident person to a person resident in India,it shall not exceed the
price worked out as mentioned in (a) above
. The emphasis is on valuation as
per the provisions of the relevant SEBI guidelines and provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013 wherever applicable.

 

The interesting
point here is that the pricing guidelines under NDI rules emphasise on the
valuation of equity instruments based on an arm’s length principle.

 

The Rule provides
the guiding principle as ‘the person resident outside India is not
guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of making such investment or
agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the time of exit.’

 

(c)  In case of swap of equity
instruments, irrespective of the amount, valuation involved in the swap
arrangement shall have to be made by a merchant banker registered with SEBI or
an investment banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory
authority in the host country.

 

(d) Where shares in an Indian company are issued to
a person resident outside India in compliance with the provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013, by way of subscription to Memorandum of Association,
such investments shall be made at face value subject to entry route and
sectoral caps.

 

(e) In case of share warrants, their pricing and
the price or conversion formula shall be determined upfront, provided that
these pricing guidelines shall not be applicable for investment in equity
instruments by a person resident outside India on a non-repatriation basis.

(iii) Outbound investments      

Valuation norms for
outbound investments are as follows:

 

In case of partial
/ full acquisition of an existing foreign company where the investment is more
than USD five million, share valuation of the company has to be done by a
Category I merchant banker registered with SEBI or an investment banker /
merchant banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory
authority in the host country, and in all other cases by a Chartered Accountant
/ Certified Public Accountant.

 

However, in the
case of investment by acquisition of shares where the consideration is to be
paid fully or partly by issue of the Indian party’s shares (swap of shares),
irrespective of the amount, the valuation will have to be done by a Category I
merchant banker registered with SEBI or an investment banker/ merchant banker
outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory authority in the host
country.

 

In case of
additional overseas direct investments by the Indian party in its JV / WOS,
whether at premium or discount or face value, the concept of valuation, as
indicated above, shall be applicable.

 

As far as the
actual pricing is concerned, one must follow the guidelines mentioned at
paragraph (ii)(b) above, i.e., the transaction price should not exceed the
valuation arrived at by the valuer concerned.

 

2.3. Benchmarking of equity
instruments under transfer pricing

From the above discussion it is clear that for any cross-border capital
investments one has to follow the pricing guidelines under FEMA. However, as
mentioned in the NDI Rules, the valuation of equity / capital instruments must
be at arm’s length. Thus, the person valuing such investments has to bear in
mind the principles of arm’s length.

 

One more aspect that one has to bear in mind while doing valuation is to
use the internationally accepted pricing methodology. Pricing of an equity /
capital instrument is a subjective exercise and would depend upon a number of
assumptions and projections as to the future growth, cash flow, investments by
the company, etc. Therefore, the traditional methods of benchmarking as
prescribed in the TPR may not be appropriate for benchmarking investments in
equity / capital instruments.

2.4. Whether investments in
equity instruments require Benchmarking under TPR?

In this connection,
it would be interesting to examine the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case
of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India(Supra).

     

Brief facts of the
case are as follows:

VISPL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a non-resident company, Vodafone
Tele-Services (India) Holdings Limited (the holding company). VISPL required
funds for its telecommunication services project in India from its holding
company during the financial year 2008-09, i.e., A.Y. 2009-10. On 21st
August, 2008, VISPL issued 2,89,224 equity shares of the face value of Rs. 10
each at a premium of Rs. 8,509 per share to its holding company. This resulted
in VISPL receiving a total consideration of Rs. 246.38 crores from its holding
company on issue of shares between August and November, 2008. The fair market
value of the issue of equity shares at Rs. 8,519 per share was determined by
VISPL in accordance with the methodology prescribed by the Government of India
under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947. However, according to the A.O.
and the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO), VISPL ought to have valued each equity
share at Rs. 53,775 (based on Net Asset Value), as against the aforesaid
valuation done under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947 at Rs. 8,519, and
on that basis the shortfall in premium to the extent of Rs. 45,256 per share
resulted in a total shortfall of Rs. 1,308.91 crores. Both the A.O. and the TPO
on application of the Transfer Pricing provisions in Chapter X of the Act held
that this amount of Rs. 1,308.91 crores is income. Further, as a consequence of
the above, this amount of Rs. 1,308.91 crores is required to be treated as a
deemed loan given by VISPL to its holding company and periodical interest
thereon is to be charged to tax as interest income of Rs. 88.35 crores in the
financial year 2008-09, i.e., A.Y. 2009-10.

 

The Bombay High
Court,while ruling on the petition filed by VISPL, among other things observed
as follows:

‘(i)   The tax can be charged only on income and in
the absence of any income arising, the issue of applying the measure of arm’s
length pricing to transactional value / consideration itself does not arise.

(ii)   If it’s income which is chargeable to tax,
under the normal provisions of the Act, then alone Chapter X of the Act could
be invoked. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act brings / charges to tax total income of
the previous year. This would take us to the meaning of the word income under
the Act as defined in section 2(24) of the Act. The amount received on issue of
shares is admittedly a capital account transaction not separately brought
within the definition of income, except in cases covered by section 56(2)(viib)
of the Act. Thus, such capital account cannot be brought to tax as already
discussed herein above while considering the challenge to the grounds as
mentioned in impugned order.

(iii)  The issue of shares at a premium is on capital
account and gives rise to no income. The submission on behalf of the Revenue
that the shortfall in the ALP as computed for the purposes of Chapter X of the
Act is misplaced. The ALP is meant to determine the real value of the
transaction entered into between AEs. It is a re-computation exercise to be
carried out only when income arises in case of an international transaction
between AEs. It does not warrant re-computation of a consideration received /
given on capital account.’

     

In an interesting
development thereafter, on 28th January, 2015, the Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, issued a press release through the Press
Information Bureau accepting the order of the Bombay High Court. Relevant
excerpts of the said press release are as follows:

 

‘Based on the
opinion of Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (International Taxation),
Chairperson (CBDT) and the Attorney-General of India, the Cabinet decided to:

i.)   accept the order of the High Court of Bombay
in WP No. 871 of 2014, dated 10th October, 2014 and not to file SLP
against it before the Supreme Court of India;

ii.)   accept orders of Courts / IT AT / DRP in cases
of other taxpayers where similar transfer pricing adjustments have been made
and the Courts / IT AT / DRP have decided /decide in favour of the taxpayer.

The Cabinet
decision will bring greater clarity and predictability for taxpayers as well as
tax authorities, thereby facilitating tax compliance and reducing litigation on
similar issues. This will also set at rest the uncertainty prevailing in the
minds of foreign investors and taxpayers in respect of possible transfer pricing
adjustments in India on transactions related to issuance of shares and thereby
improve the investment climate in the country. The Cabinet came to this view as
this is a transaction on the capital account and there is no income to be
chargeable to tax. So, applying any pricing formula is irrelevant.’

 

CBDT has also
issued Instruction No. 2/2015 dated 29th January, 2015 clarifying
that premium on shares issued was on account of capital account transaction and
does not give rise to income. The Board’s instruction is reproduced as follows:

‘Subject
Acceptance of the Order of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of
Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd.-reg.

In reference to
the above cited subject, I am directed to draw your attention to the decision
of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd.
for AY 2009-10 (WP No. 871/2014), wherein the Court has held,
inter alia, that the premium on share issue was on account of a
capital account transaction and does not give rise to income and, hence, not
liable to transfer pricing adjustment.

2. lt is hereby informed that the Board has
accepted the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the above-mentioned writ
petition. In view of the acceptance of the above judgment, it is directed that the
ratio decidendi of
the judgment must be adhered to by the field officers in all cases where this
issue is involved. This may also be brought to the notice of the ITAT, DRPs and
CslT(Appeals).’

 

The above decision
has been referred to in the following decisions:

 

On different facts,
the Supreme Court in case of G.S. Homes and Hotels P. Ltd. vs. DCIT
[Civil Appeal Nos. 7379-7380 of 2016 dated 9th August, 2016]

ruled that ‘we modify the order of the High Court by holding that the amount
(Rs. 45,84,000) on account of share capital received from the various
shareholders ought not to have been treated as business income.’ Thus, the Apex
Court reversed the order of the Karnataka High Court.

 

In ITO vs. Singhal General Traders Private Limited [ITA No.
4197/Mum/2017 (A.Y. 2012-13) dated 24th February, 2020]
,
following the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of VSIPL
(Supra) and the Apex Court in the case of G.S. Homes and
Hotels Ltd. (Supra)
,
the Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) of
treating the receipt of share capital / premium as capital in nature and that
it cannot be brought to tax u/s 68 of the Act.

 

In light of the above discussion, the question arises, is it necessary to
benchmark the transactions of investments in capital / equity instruments? As
Form 3CEB still carries the reporting requirement, it is advisable to report
such transactions. One can use the valuation report to benchmark the
transaction under the category of ‘any other method’. This is out of abundant
precaution to avoid litigation. Ideally, the Form 3CEB should be amended to
bring it on par with the CBDT’s Instruction 2/2015 dated 29th
January, 2015 and the Government’s intention expressed through the press
release dated 28th January, 2015.

 

3.   Benchmarking of
outstanding receivables (debtors)

Debtors are
recorded in the books in respect of outstanding receivables for the exports
made to an AE. The underlying export transactions would have been benchmarked
in the relevant period and, therefore, is there any need to benchmark the
receivables arising out of the same transaction?

     

As mentioned in paragraph 1, the Explanation to section 92B dealing with
the meaning of international transactions was inserted, inter alia, to
include ‘receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business
with retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2002. Therefore, apparently even the receivables need to be reported and
benchmarked.

 

 

However, recently
in the case of Bharti Airtel Services Ltd. vs. DCIT, the Delhi
ITAT [ITA No. 161/Del/2017 (A.Y. 2011-12) dated 6th October,
2020]
ruled that outstanding debtors beyond an agreed period is a
separate international transaction of providing funds to its associated
enterprise for which the assessee must have been compensated at an arm’s
length. In the instant case there was a service agreement between Bharti Airtel
Services Ltd. and its overseas AE for payment of invoices within 15 days of
their receipt. However, the same remained outstanding beyond the stipulated
time of 15 days. The working capital adjustment was denied to the assessee in
the absence of any reliable data and therefore the same was not taken into
account while determining the arm’s length price of the international transaction
of provision of the services. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal held that outstanding debtors beyond an agreed period is a separate
international transaction of providing funds to its associated enterprise for
which the assessee must have been compensated in the form of interest at LIBOR
+ 300 BPS as held by CIT(A).

 

In this context the
Tribunal held as under:

‘9. Coming to the various decisions relied upon by
the learned authorised representative, we find that they are on different
facts. The decision of the honourable Delhi High Court in ITA number 765/2016
dated 24th April, 2017 in case of Kusum Healthcare Private Limited
(Supra), para number eight clearly shows that assessee has undertaken working
capital adjustment for the comparable companies selected in its transfer
pricing report which has not been disputed by the learned transfer pricing
officer and therefore the differential impact of working capital of the
assessee
vis-à-vis
is comparable had already been factored in pricing profitability and therefore
the honourable High Court held that adjustment proposed by the learned TPO
deleted by the ITAT is proper. In the present case there is no working capital
adjustment made by the assessee as well as granted by the learned TPO. The
facts in the present case are distinguishable. Further, same are the facts in
case of Bechtel India where working capital adjustment was already granted. In
case of
91 taxmann.com 443 Motherson Sumi Infotech and Design Limited non-charging
of interest was due to business and commercial reasons and no interest was also
charged against outstanding beyond a specified period from non-related parties.
No such commercial or business reasons were shown before us. The facts of the
other decisions cited before us are also distinguishable. Therefore, reliance
on them is rejected.’

 

From the above
ruling it is clear that one must ensure the receipt of outstandings within a
stipulated time, else it would call for transfer pricing adjustment.

 

Benchmarking

Once it is
established that the receivables are beyond due date, the benchmarking has to
be done as if it is a loan transaction. Such a transaction needs to be
benchmarked using the Libor rate of the same currency in which the export
invoice is raised.

 

3.1. FEMA provisions for
receipt of outstanding receivables

It may be noted
that the time limit for realisation of export proceeds is the same for export
of goods as well as services.

 

The normal time
limit for realisation of exports is nine months from the date of exports.
However, it was extended to 15 months for exports made up to 31st
July, 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic [RBI/2019-20/206 A.P. (DIR Series)
Circular No. 27, dated 1st April, 2020].

 

Thus, ideally,
parties can provide mutual time limit for settlement of export invoices within
the overall time limit prescribed by RBI under FEMA.

 

4.   CONCLUSION

Benchmarking of financial transactions is an important aspect of
transfer pricing practice in India. Not much judicial / administrative guidance
is available for the two types of financial transactions referred to in this
article.

 

However,
detailed jurisprudence and guidance is available for benchmarking of financial
transactions in the nature of loans and guarantees. Readers may refer to the detailed articles published in the  May, 2014 and June, 2014 issues of the BCAJ dealing with benchmarking of
loans and guarantees, respectively.

[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ Bench, Chennai, dated 20th April, 2017 made in ITA Nos. 1871/Mds/2016, 2759/Mds/2016 and 1870/Mds/2016; A.Ys. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009] Reassessment – Reopening beyond four years – Original assessment 143(3) – TDS not deducted – Auditor responsibility vis-a-vis audit report – failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment

4. Pr. CIT vs. M/s Bharathi Constructions Pr. CIT vs. M/s URC Construction (P) Ltd. [Tax Case (Appeal) Nos. 772 to 774 of 2017;
Date of order: 11th September, 2020]
(Madras High Court)

 

[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ Bench,
Chennai, dated 20th April, 2017 made in ITA Nos. 1871/Mds/2016,
2759/Mds/2016 and 1870/Mds/2016; A.Ys. 2007-2008 and 2008-2009]

 

Reassessment – Reopening beyond four years
– Original assessment 143(3) – TDS not deducted – Auditor responsibility vis-a-vis
audit report – failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly
all material facts necessary for assessment

 

The Revenue stated
that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully
the machine hire charges on which TDS u/s 194-I was required to be done by the
assessee company which utilised the plants and equipment of the contractors
during the construction works carried out by it; therefore on such payment of
rent made by the assessee to such contractors for use of such plant and
equipment, TDS u/s 194-I was required to be done by the assessee. In the absence
of the same, the amounts in question paid to the contractors were liable to be
added back as income of the assessee u/s 40(a)(ia). An audit objection was also
raised for those A.Ys. by the Audit Team of the Department and in the
subsequent A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, the assessee himself deducted tax at
source on such machine hire charges u/s 194-I and deposited the same; in the
year 2015, the Assessing Authority had ‘reason to believe’ that for A.Ys.
2007-2008 and 2008-2009 it was liable to reopen and reassessment was required
to be done for those A.Ys.

 

The appeals
preferred by the assessee were dismissed by the CIT(Appeals) but in the appeal
before the Tribunal the assessee succeeded when it held that reassessment was
bad in law as the notice u/s 147/148 was issued after the expiry of four years
after the relevant assessment year and there was no failure on the part of the
assessee; therefore, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked by the
Authority concerned and the reassessment order was set aside.

 

The assessee
submitted that during the course of the original assessment proceedings itself
it had made true and full disclosure of the tax deducted and amount paid by it
to various contractors vide letter dated 7th December, 2009,
filed before the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-I, Erode through the
Chartered Accountant M. Chinnayan & Associates, and in reply to the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax for the Audit Objection, the said Chartered Accountant,
vide its communication for the A.Y. 2007-2008, it was contended before
the Assessing Authority that such amounts paid to the contractors did not
amount to payment of rentals as there was no lease agreement, and therefore
section 194-I could not apply to such payments. He further submitted that the
Assessing Authority had disallowed a part of the said amounts towards machine
hire charges u/s 40a(ia) and the Tax Deducted at Source during the course of
the original assessment proceedings itself and therefore there was no reason
for the Assessing Authority to reopen the original assessment order on a mere
‘change of opinion’ subsequently in the year 2015 and the reassessment
proceedings could not be undertaken. In particular, attention was drawn to the
order sheet entry drawn on 30th December, 2009 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, the Assessing Authority.

 

The Court held that
no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal filed by the
Revenue as the law is well settled in this regard and unless, as a matter of
fact, the Revenue Authority can establish a failure on the part of the assessee
to truly and fully disclose the relevant materials during the course of the
original assessment proceedings, the reassessment proceedings, on mere change
of opinion, cannot be initiated, much less beyond the period of four years
after the expiry of the assessment years in terms of the first proviso
to section 147 of the Act.

 

In the present
case, the machine hire charges paid by the assessee to various contractors or
sub-contractors were fully disclosed not only in the Books of Accounts and
Audit Reports furnished by the Tax Auditor, but by way of replies to the notice
issued by the Assessing Authority, particularly vide letter dated 7th
December, 2009 of the assessee during the course of the original assessment
proceedings, and it was also contended while replying to the audit objection
that the payments, having been made as machine hire charges, do not amount to
rentals and thereby do not attract section 194-I. But despite that the
Assessing Authority appears to have made additions to the extent of Rs.
44,45,185 in A.Y. 2007-2008 u/s 40(a)(ia) in case of one of the assessees,
viz., URC Construction (Private) Limited.

 

The facts in both the assessees’ cases are said to be almost similar and
they were represented by the same Chartered Accountant, M/s Chinnayan &
Associates, Erode.

 

Thus, there is no
failure on the part of the assessee to truly and fully disclose the relevant
materials before the Assessing Authority during the course of the original
assessment proceedings. Therefore, the extended period of limitation beyond
four years after the end of the relevant assessment years cannot be invoked for
the reassessment proceedings under sections 147/148 in view of the first proviso
to section 147.

 

However, the Court
disagreed with the observations made by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its
order to the extent where the Tribunal has stated that if there is negligence
or omission on the part of the auditor to disclose correct facts in the Audit
Report prepared u/s 44AB, the assessee cannot be faulted.

 

The Court opined
that even if the relevant facts are not placed before the auditors by the
assessee himself, they may qualify their Audit Report u/s 44AB. If the
Auditor’s Report does not specifically disclose any relevant facts, or if there
is any omission or non-disclosure, it has to be attributed to the assessee only
rather than to the Auditor.
The observations made in paragraph 11 of the
order are not sustainable though they do not affect the conclusion that has
been arrived at on the basis of the other facts placed, that there was really a
disclosure of full and complete facts by the assessee before the Assessing
Authority during the course of the original assessment proceedings itself u/s
143(3); and therefore, even if anything is not highlighted in the Audit Report,
the assessee has shown that this aspect, viz., non-deduction of TDS on the
machine hire charges attracting section 194-I was very much discussed by the
Assessing Authority during the original assessment proceedings.

 

Therefore, on a
mere change of opinion, the Assessing Authority could not have invoked the
reassessment proceedings u/s 147/148 beyond the period of four years after the
end of the relevant A.Ys.

 

Thus, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

 

[ITAT, Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 20th March, 2008 in ITA Nos. 1179/Mds/2007, 1180/Mds/2007 and 1181/Mds/2007; Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 18th May, 2009 in ITA No. 998/Mds/2008 for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and 2005-2006, respectively] Letting of immovable property – Business asset – Rental income – ‘Income from Business’ or ‘Income from House Property’

3.  M/s PSTS Heavy Lift and Shift Ltd. vs. The
Dy. CIT Company Circle – V(2) Chennai
M/s CeeDeeYes IT
Parks Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Asst. CIT Company Circle I(3) [Tax Case Appeal
Nos. 2193 to 2195 of 2008 & 979 of 2009; Date of order: 30th
January, 2020]
(Madras High Court)

 

[ITAT, Chennai ‘B’
Bench, dated 20th March, 2008 in ITA Nos. 1179/Mds/2007,
1180/Mds/2007 and 1181/Mds/2007; Chennai ‘B’ Bench, dated 18th May,
2009 in ITA No. 998/Mds/2008 for the A.Ys. 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and
2005-2006, respectively]

Letting of
immovable property – Business asset – Rental income – ‘Income from Business’ or
‘Income from House Property’

 

There were two
different appeals before High Court for different A.Ys. In both cases the
substantial question of law raised was as under:

 

Whether the
income earned by the assessees during the A.Ys. in question from letting out of
their warehouses or property to lessees is taxable under the head ‘Income from
Business’ or ‘Income from House Property’?

 

M/s PSTS Heavy Lift and Shift Limited
For the A.Y. 1999-2000, the Assessing Authority held that the assessee owned
two warehouses situated near SIPCOT, Tuticorin with a total land area of 3.09
acres and built-up area of approximately 32,000 sq.ft. each. The assessee
earned income of Rs. 21.12 lakhs during A.Y. 
2000-2001 by letting out the warehouses to two companies, M/s W.
Hogewoning Dried Flower Limited and M/s Ramesh Flowers Limited, and out of the
total rental income of Rs. 21.12 lakhs it claimed depreciation of Rs. 6.02
lakhs on the said business asset in the form of warehouses. The assessee
claimed that warehousing was included in the main objects of the company’s
Memorandum of Association and not only warehouses were utilised for storing
their clients’ cargo, but other areas were used to park their equipment such as
trucks, cranes, etc., and amenities like handling equipment like pulleys,
grabs, weighing machines were fixed in the corners and such facilities were
also provided to the clients. The assessee claimed it to be business income and
said such income ought to be taxed as ‘Income from Business’. But the Assessing
Authority as well as the Appellate Authority held that the said income would be
taxable under the head ‘Income from House Property’. The Assessing Authority
also inter alia relied upon the judgment in the case of CIT vs.
Indian Warehousing Industries Limited [258 ITR 93].

 

M/s CeeDeeYes IT Parks Pvt. Ltd. – As
per the assessment order passed in the said case, the assessee company was
incorporated to carry out the business of providing infrastructure amenities
and work space for IT companies; it constructed the property in question and
let it out to one such IT company, M/s Cognizant Technology Solutions India
Ltd. The assessee claimed the rental income to be taxable as its ‘Business
Income’ and not as ‘Income from House Property’, but the Assessing Authority as
well as the Appellate Authorities held against the assessee and held such
income to be ‘Income from House Property’.

 

The assessee
contended that it will depend upon the facts of each case and if earning of
rental income by letting out of a business asset or the properties of the
assessee is the sole business of the assessee, then the income from such
rentals or lease money cannot be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’ but can
be taxed only as ‘Income from Business’. He submitted that the Assessing
Authorities below, in order to deny deductions or depreciation and other
expenditure incurred by the assessee to earn such business income, deliberately
held that such rental income was taxable under the head ‘Income from House
Property’ so that only limited deductions under that head of ‘Income from House
Property’ could be allowed to the assessee and a higher taxable income could be
brought to tax.

 

The assessee relied
upon the following case laws:

(a) Chennai Properties Investments Limited
vs. CIT [(2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC)];

(b)        Rayala Corporation Private Limited
vs. Asst. CIT [(2013) 386 ITR 500 (SC)];
and

(c) Raj Dadarkar & Associates vs. Asst.
CIT [(2017) 394 ITR 592 (SC)].

 

The Revenue, apart
from relying on the Tribunal decision, also submitted that as far as the
separate income earned by the assessee from the amenities provided to the
clients in the warehouses or the property of the assessee was concerned, such
portion of income deserved to be taxed under the head ‘Income from Other
Sources’ u/s 56 and not as ‘Income from Business’.

 

But the High Court
observed that the Tribunal as well as the authorities below were under the
misconceived notion that income from letting out of property, which was the
business asset of the assessee company and the sole and exclusive business of
the assessee, was to earn income out of such house property in the form of
business asset, was still taxable only as ‘Income from House Property’. Such
misconception emanated from the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Chennai
Properties and Investment Pvt. Ltd. [(2004) 266 ITR 685]
, which was
reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Properties Investments
Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Supra)
, wherein it is held that
where the assessee is a company whose main object of business is to acquire
properties and to let out those properties, the rental income received was
taxable as ‘Income from Business’ and not ‘Income from House Property’,
following the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme
Court in Sultans Brothers (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1964)
51 ITR 353 (SC)];
therein, it was held that each case has to be looked
at from the businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was
doing of a business or the exploitation of the property by the owner.

 

The said decision
subsequently was followed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Rayala
Corporation (Supra)
and Raj Dadarkar & Associates (Supra).

 

The Court further
observed that once the property in question is used as a business asset and the
exclusive business of the assessee company or firm is to earn income by way of
rental or lease money, then such rental income can be treated only as the
‘Business Income’ of the assessee and not as ‘Income from House Property’. The
heads of income are divided in six heads, including ‘Income from House
Property’, which defines the specific source of earning such income. The income
from house property is intended to be taxed under that head mainly if such
income is earned out of idle property, which could earn the rental income from
the lessees. But where the income from the same property in the form of lease
rentals is the main source of business of the assessee, which has its business
exclusively or substantially in the form of earning of rentals only from the
business assets in the form of such landed properties, then the more
appropriate head of income applicable in such cases would be ‘Income from
Business’.

 

A bare perusal of
the scheme of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would reveal that while computing the
taxable income under the Head ‘Income from Business or Profession’, the various
deductions, including the actual expenditure incurred and notional deductions
like depreciation, etc., are allowed vis-a-vis incentives in the form of
deductions under Chapter VIA. But the deductions under the Head ‘Income from
House Property’ are restricted to those specified in section 24 of the Act,
like 1/6th of the annual income towards repairs and maintenance to
be undertaken by landlords, interest on capital employed to construct the
property, etc. Therefore, in all cases such income from property cannot be
taxed only under the head ‘Income from House Property’. It will depend upon the
facts of each case and where such income is earned by the assessee by way of
utilisation of its business assets in the form of property in question or as an
idle property which could yield rental income for its user, from the lessees.
In the earlier provisions of income from house properties, even the notional
income under the head ‘Income from House Property’ was taxable in the case of
self-occupied properties by landlords, is a pointer towards that.

 

The Court observed
that in both the present cases it is not even in dispute that the exclusive and
main source of income of the assessee was only the rentals and lease money
received from the lessees; the Assessing Authority took a different and
contrary view mainly to deny the claim of depreciation out of such business
income in the form of rentals without assigning any proper and cogent reason.
Merely because the lease income or rental income earned from the lessees could
be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’, ignoring the fact that such rentals
were the only source of ‘Business Income’ of the assessee, the authorities
below have fallen into the error in holding that the income was taxable under
the head ‘Income from House Property’. The said application of the head of
income by the authorities below was not only against the facts and evidence
available on record, but also against common sense.

 

The amended
definition u/s 22 now defines ‘Income from House Property’ as the annual value
of property as determined u/s 23 consisting of buildings or lands appurtenant
thereto of which the assessee is the owner, other than such portions of such
property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession
carried on by him, the profits of which are chargeable to income tax, shall be
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Thus,
even the amended definition intends to tax the notional income of the
self-occupied portion of the property to run the assessee’s own business
therein as business income. Therefore, the other rental income earned from
letting out of the property, which is the business of the assessee itself,
cannot be taxed as ‘Income from House Property’.

 

The Court also observed that the heads of income, as defined in section
14 do not exist in silos or in watertight compartments under the scheme of tax
and, thus, these heads of income, as noted above, are fields and heads of
sources of income depending upon the nature of business of the assessee. Therefore,
in cases where the earning of the rental income is the exclusive or predominant
business of the assessee, the income earned by way of lease money or rentals by
letting out of the property cannot be taxed under the head ‘Income from House
Property’ but can only be taxed under the head ‘Income from Business income’.

 

In view of the
aforesaid, both the assessees in the present case carry on the business of
earning rental income as per the memoranda of association only and the fact is
that they were not carrying on any other business; therefore, the appeals of
both the assessees were allowed. The question of law framed above was answered
in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue.

 

Settlement of cases – Section 245D – Powers of Settlement Commission – Difference between sub-sections (2C) and (4) of section 245D – Procedure under sub-section (2C) summary – Issues raised in application for settlement, requiring adjudication – Application cannot be rejected under sub-section (2C) of section 245D

23. Dy.
CIT (International Taxation) vs. Hitachi Power Europe GMBH
[2020] 428 ITR 208 (Mad.) Date of order: 4th September,
2020
A.Ys.: 2015-16 to 2018-19

 

Settlement of cases – Section 245D – Powers
of Settlement Commission – Difference between sub-sections (2C) and (4) of
section 245D – Procedure under sub-section (2C) summary – Issues raised in
application for settlement, requiring adjudication – Application cannot be
rejected under sub-section (2C) of section 245D

 

An application for
settlement of the case was rejected u/s 245D(2C). On a writ petition
challenging the order, a Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court set aside
the rejection order. On appeal by the Revenue, the Division Bench upheld the
decision of the Single Judge Bench and held as under:

 

‘i)    It is important to take note of the
legislative intent and scope of power vested with the Settlement Commission
under sub-section (2C) and sub-section (4) of section 245D. The power to be
exercised by the Commission under sub-section (2C) of section 245D is within a
period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the report of the
Commissioner. The marked distinction with regard to the exercise of power of
the Settlement Commission at the sub-section (2C) stage and sub-section (4)
stage is amply clear from the wording in the statute. The Commission can
declare an application to be invalid at the sub-section (2C) stage. Such
invalidation cannot be by a long-drawn reasoning akin to a decision to be taken
at the stage of section 245D(4). This is so because sub-section (4) of section
245D gives ample power to the Commission to examine the records, the report of
the Commissioner received under sub-section (2B) or sub-section (3) or the
provisions of sub-section (1), as they stood immediately before their
amendments by the Finance Act, 2007. However, if on the material the Settlement
Commission arrived at a conclusion prima facie that there was no true
and full disclosure, it had the right to declare the application invalid.

 

ii)    There were four issues which the assessee
wanted settled by the Commission; the first among the issues was with regard to
the income earned from offshore supply of goods. The Commission was largely
guided by the report of the Commissioner, who reported that the composite
contracts for offshore and onshore services were artificially bifurcated. The
Settlement Commission held that the contention of the assessee that it was
separate and that this was done by the NTPC was held to be not fully true. In
other words, the Settlement Commission had accepted the fact that the contracts
were bifurcated by the NTPC, the entity which invited the tender, but the
Commission stated that the bifurcation done by the NTPC was only for financial
reasons.

 

iii)   The question was whether such a finding could
lead to an application being declared as invalid u/s 245D(2C) on the ground
that the assessee had failed to make full and true disclosure of income. This
issue could not have been decided without adjudication. In order to decide
whether a contract was a composite contract or separate contracts, a deeper
probe into the factual scenario as well as the legal position was required. If
such was the fact situation in the case on hand, the application of the
assessee could not have been declared invalid on account of failure to fully
and truly disclose its income. Thus, what was required to be done by the
Commission was to allow the application to be proceeded with u/s 245D(2C) and
take up the matter for consideration u/s 245D(4) and take a decision after
adjudicating the claim.

 

iv)   The issues which were
requested to be settled by the assessee before the Commission, qua the
report of the Commissioner, could not obviously be an issue for a prima
facie
decision at the sub-section (2C) stage. The rejection of the
application for settlement of case was not justified.

 

v)   Decision of the Single Judge Bench affirmed.

 

Revision – Condition precedent – Sections 54F, 263 – Assessment order should be erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue – Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F – Assessee purchasing three units in same building out of consideration received on account of joint development – A.O. allowing exemption taking one of plausible views based on inquiry of claim and law prevalent – Revision to withdraw exemption – Tribunal holding Commissioner failed to record finding that order of assessment erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue – Tribunal order not erroneous

22. Principal CIT vs. Minal Nayan Shah [2020] 428 ITR 23 (Guj.) Date of order: 1st September,
2020
A.Y.: 2014-15

 

Revision – Condition precedent – Sections
54F, 263 – Assessment order should be erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue –
Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F – Assessee purchasing three units in same
building out of consideration received on account of joint development – A.O.
allowing exemption taking one of plausible views based on inquiry of claim and
law prevalent – Revision to withdraw exemption – Tribunal holding Commissioner
failed to record finding that order of assessment erroneous and prejudicial to
Revenue – Tribunal order not erroneous

 

The assessee, with
the co-owner of a piece of land, entered into a development agreement and
received consideration for the land. The assessee disclosed long-term capital
gains and claimed exemption under sections 54F and 54EC. The return filed by
the assessee was accepted and an order u/s 143(3) was passed. Thereafter, the
Principal Commissioner in proceedings u/s 263 found that the assessee had
purchased the entire block of the residential project which comprised three
independent units on different floors with different entrances and kitchens,
and directed the A.O. to pass a fresh order in respect of the claim of the
assessee u/s 54F.

 

The Tribunal found
that the three units were located on different floors of the same structure and
were purchased by the assessee by a common deed of conveyance. The Tribunal
held that the two prerequisites that the order was erroneous and prejudicial to
the interests of the Revenue, that an erroneous order did not necessarily mean
an order with which the Principal Commissioner was unable to agree when there
were two plausible views on the issue and one legally plausible view was
adopted by the A.O. The Tribunal quashed the revision order passed by the
Principal Commissioner u/s 263.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i)    It is an essential condition for the
exercise of power u/s 263 that the Commissioner must find an error in the
assessment order of the A.O. prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue and
the conclusion of the Commissioner that the order is erroneous and prejudicial
to the Revenue must be based on materials and contentions raised by the
assessee on an opportunity of hearing being afforded to the assessee.

 

ii)    On the facts the order of the Tribunal
quashing the revisional order passed by the Principal Commissioner u/s 263 was
not erroneous. The findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal was that one of
the requisite conditions for the exercise of power u/s 263 the Commissioner
should consider the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests
of the Revenue was not satisfied and in arriving at such conclusion the
Tribunal had assigned cogent reasons. No question of law arose.’

Reassessment – Death of assessee – Validity of notice of reassessment – Sections 147, 148, 159, 292BB – Notice issued to deceased person is not valid – Not a defect curable by section 292BB – Representative assessee – Legal representative – Scope of section 159 – No legal requirement that legal representatives should report death of assessee to income-tax department

21. Savita Kapila vs. ACIT [2020] 426 ITR 502 (Del.) Date of order: 16th July, 2020 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Reassessment – Death of assessee – Validity
of notice of reassessment – Sections 147, 148, 159, 292BB – Notice issued to
deceased person is not valid – Not a defect curable by section 292BB –
Representative assessee – Legal representative – Scope of section 159 – No
legal requirement that legal representatives should report death of assessee to
income-tax department

 

The assessee,
‘MPK’, expired on 21st December, 2018. A notice dated 31st
March, 2019 u/s 148 was issued in his name. The notice could not be served on
‘MPK’. Nor was it served on his legal representatives. An assessment order was
passed in the name of one of his legal representatives on 27th
December, 2019.

 

The Delhi High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the legal representative to challenge
the notice and the order and held as under:

 

‘i)    The issuance of a notice u/s 148 is the
foundation for reopening of an assessment. Consequently, the sine qua
non
for acquiring jurisdiction to reopen an assessment is that such notice
should be issued in the name of the correct person. This requirement of issuing
notice to the correct person and not to a dead person is not merely a
procedural requirement but a condition precedent to the notice being valid in
law.

 

ii)    Section 159 applies to a situation where
proceedings are initiated or are pending against the assessee when he is alive,
and after his death the legal representative steps into the shoes of the
deceased-assessee. There is no statutory requirement imposing an obligation
upon the legal heirs to intimate the death of the assessee.

 

iii)   Issuance of notice upon a dead person and
non-service of notice does not come under the ambit of mistake, defect or
omission. Consequently, section 292B does not apply. Section 292BB is
applicable to an assessee and not to the legal representatives.

 

iv)   The notice dated 31st March, 2019
u/s 148 was issued to the deceased-assessee after the date of his death, 21st
December, 2018, and thus inevitably the notice could never have been served
upon him. Consequently, the jurisdictional requirement u/s 148 of service of
notice was not fulfilled.

 

v)   No notice u/s 148 was ever issued to the
petitioner during the period of limitation and proceedings were transferred to
the permanent account number of the petitioner, who happened to be one of the
four legal heirs of the deceased-assessee by letter dated 27th
December, 2019. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction qua the
petitioner for the relevant assessment year was beyond the period prescribed
and, consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner were barred by
limitation in accordance with section 149(1)(b)’.

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Section 276C(2) – Delay in payment of tax – Admission of liability in return and subsequent payment of tax – Criminal proceedings quashed

20. Bejan
Singh Eye Hospital Pvt. Ltd. vs. I.T. Department
[2020] 428 ITR 206 (Mad.) Date of order: 12th March, 2020 A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2015-16

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt
to evade tax – Section 276C(2) – Delay in payment of tax – Admission of
liability in return and subsequent payment of tax – Criminal proceedings
quashed

 

The assessees filed
their returns of income in time for the A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2015-16 and admitted
their liability. There was delay in remittance of the tax for which they were
prosecuted u/s 276C(2) on the ground of wilful evasion of tax.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘The assessees had
since cleared the dues and as on date no tax dues were payable in respect of
the years in question. Inasmuch as the liability had been admitted in the
counter-affidavit and inasmuch as the tax had been subsequently paid,
continuance of the criminal prosecution would only amount to an abuse of legal
process. The criminal proceedings were to be quashed.’

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Sections 132, 153A, 276C(2), 276CC – Ingredients of offence – Failure to furnish returns and pay self-assessment tax as required in notice – Delayed payment of tax pursuant to coercive steps cannot be construed as an attempt to evade tax – Only act closely connected with intended crime can be construed as an act in attempt of intended offence – Presumption would not establish ingredients of offence – Prosecution quashed

19. Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. IT Department
[2020] 428 ITR 89 (Kar.) Date of order: 14th June, 2019 A.Ys.: 2010-11 & 2011-12

 

Offences and prosecution – Wilful attempt
to evade tax – Sections 132, 153A, 276C(2), 276CC – Ingredients of offence –
Failure to furnish returns and pay self-assessment tax as required in notice –
Delayed payment of tax pursuant to coercive steps cannot be construed as an
attempt to evade tax – Only act closely connected with intended crime can be
construed as an act in attempt of intended offence – Presumption would not
establish ingredients of offence – Prosecution quashed

 

The assessee, a co-operative society, did not comply with the notice issued
u/s 153A by the A.O. to file returns of income for the A.Ys. 2006-07 to
2011-12. Thereafter, the A.O. issued a notice for prosecution u/s 276CC. The
assessee filed returns of income for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 but failed
to pay the self-assessment tax along with the returns u/s 140A. In the
meanwhile, the property owned by the assessee was attached u/s 281B but the
attachment was lifted on condition that the sale proceeds of the attached
property would be directly remitted to the Department. The assessee issued a
cheque towards self-assessment tax due for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 with
instructions at the back of the cheque that the ‘cheque to be presented at the
time of registration of the property’ but the cheque was not encashed. The Department
initiated criminal prosecution u/s 276C(2) against the assessee, its secretary
and ex-vice-president on the ground of wilful and deliberate attempt to evade
tax.

 

The assessee filed
petitions u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the
criminal action. The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition and held as
under:

 

‘i)    The gist of the offence u/s 276C(2) is the
wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable
under the Act. What is made punishable under this section is an “attempt to
evade tax, penalty or interest” and not the actual evasion of tax. “Attempt” is
nowhere defined in the Act or in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In legal echelons
“attempt” is understood as a “movement towards the commission of the intended
crime”. It is doing “something in the direction of commission of offence”.
Therefore, in order to render the accused guilty of “attempt to evade tax” it
must be shown that he has done some positive act with an intention to evade
tax.

 

ii)    The conduct of the assessee in making the
payments in terms of the returns filed, though delayed and after coercive steps
were taken by the Department, did not lead to the inference that the payments
were made in an attempt to evade tax. The delayed payments, under the
provisions of the Act, might call for imposition of penalty or interest, but
could not be construed as an attempt to evade tax so as to entail prosecution
u/s 276C(2).

 

iii)   Even if the only circumstance relied on by
the Department in support of the charge levelled against the assessee, its
secretary and ex-vice-president, that though the assessee had filed its
returns, it had failed to pay the self-assessment tax along with the returns
was accepted as true, it did not constitute an offence u/s 276C(2). Therefore,
the prosecution initiated against the assessee, its secretary and
ex-vice-president was illegal and amounted to abuse of process of court and was
to be quashed.

 

iv)   The act of filing the returns was not
connected with evasion of tax and by itself could not be construed as an
attempt to evade tax. Rather, the filing of returns suggested that the assessee
had voluntarily declared its intention to pay the tax. It was only an act which
was closely connected with the intended crime that could be construed as an act
in attempt of the intended offence.’

 

Company – Book profits – Capital gains – Sections 45, 48, 115JB – Computation of book profits u/s 115JB – Scope of section 115JB – Indexed cost of acquisition to be taken into account in calculating capital gains

18. Best Trading and Agencies Ltd. vs. Dy.
CIT
[2020] 428 ITR 52 (Kar.) Date of order: 26th August, 2020 A.Ys.: 2005-06 & 2006-07

 

Company – Book profits – Capital gains –
Sections 45, 48, 115JB – Computation of book profits u/s 115JB – Scope of
section 115JB – Indexed cost of acquisition to be taken into account in
calculating capital gains

 

The assessee
company was utilised as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for restructuring of
‘K’. Under an arrangement approved by the court, the surplus on
non-manufacturing and liquid assets including real estate had been transferred
to the SPV for disbursement of the liabilities. In the relevant years the A.O.
invoked the provisions of section 115JB and assessed the assessee on book
profits without giving the benefit of indexation on the cost of the capital
asset sold during the year.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 115JB deals with computation of book
profits of companies. By virtue of sub-section (5) of section 115JB, the
application of other provisions of the Act is open, except if specifically
barred by the section itself. The indexed cost of acquisition is a claim
allowed by section 48 to arrive at the income taxable as capital gains. The
difference between the sale consideration and the indexed cost of acquisition represents
the actual cost of the assessee, which is taxable u/s 45 at the rates provided
u/s 112. There is no provision in the Act to prevent the assessee from claiming
the indexed cost of acquisition on the sale of the asset in a case where the
assessee is subjected to section 115JB.

 

ii)    Since the indexed cost of acquisition was
subjected to tax under a specific provision, viz., section 112, the provisions
of section 115JB which is a general provision, could not be made applicable to
the case of the assessee. Also, considering the profits on sale of land without
giving the benefit of indexed cost of acquisition results in taxing the income
other than actual or real income. In other words, a mere book-keeping entry
cannot be treated as income. The assessee had to be given the benefit of
indexed cost of acquisition.’

Capital gains – Assessability – Slump sale – Section 2(42C) – Assets transferred to subsidiary company in accordance with scheme u/s 394 of the Companies Act – Assessee allotted shares – Scheme approved by High Court – No slump sale for purposes of capital gains tax

17. Areva T&D India Ltd. vs. CIT [2020] 428 ITR 1 (Mad.) Date of order: 8th September,
2020
A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Capital gains – Assessability – Slump sale
– Section 2(42C) – Assets transferred to subsidiary company in accordance with
scheme u/s 394 of the Companies Act – Assessee allotted shares – Scheme
approved by High Court – No slump sale for purposes of capital gains tax

 

The assessee filed
its return for the A.Y. 2006-07. During the course of scrutiny assessment, a
questionnaire was issued to the assessee calling for certain clarifications.
The assessee stated that it had transferred its non-transmission and
distribution business to its subsidiary company. The assessee further stated
that the transfer of the non-transmission and distribution business was by way
of a scheme of arrangement under sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act,
1956 and could not be considered a ‘sale of business’ and that any transfer of
an undertaking otherwise than as a result of a sale would not qualify as a
slump sale and thus, the provisions of section 50B could not be applied to its
case. The A.O. held that the assessee had agreed that the transfer of the non-transmission
and distribution business to its subsidiary was a transfer in terms of the
provisions of section 50B and that the assessee had approached the relevant
bond-issuing authorities for the purpose of section 54EC in order to claim
deduction on it. Thus, the A.O. concluded that the assessee itself having
agreed that the transfer fell under the provisions of section 50B, the claim of
the assessee that it should not be regarded as transfer could not be accepted.

 

This was confirmed
by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

 

The Madras High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    The fundamental legal principle is that
there is no estoppel in taxation law. An alternative plea can be raised
and it can even be a plea which is contradictory to the earlier plea.

 

ii)    Section 2(42C) defines the
expression “slump sale” to mean the transfer of one or more undertakings as a
result of sale for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to
the individual assets and liabilities in such sale. Admittedly, the word “sale”
is not defined under the Act. Therefore, necessarily one has to rely upon the
definitions in the other statutes which define the word “sale”. Section 54 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the word “sale” to mean a transfer
of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised. The word “price” is not defined either under the Income-tax Act, 1961
or under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but is defined u/s 2(10) of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1930 to mean money consideration for the sale of goods.
Therefore, to bring the transaction within the definition of section 2(42C) as
a slump sale there should be a transfer of an undertaking as a result of the
sale for lump sum consideration. The sale should be by way of transfer of
ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised and the price should be money consideration. If no monetary
consideration is involved in the transaction, it would not be possible for the
Revenue to bring the transaction done by the assessee within the definition of
the term “slump sale” as defined u/s 2(42C). Section 118 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 defines the term “exchange” by stating that when two persons
mutually transfer the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another,
neither thing nor both things being money only, the transaction is called an
“exchange”.

iii)   The assessee was non-suited primarily on the
ground that it had accepted the transfer to be a sale falling within the
provisions of section 50B and approached the bond-issuing authorities for
investment in certain bonds in terms of section 54EC to avoid payment of
capital gains tax. The A.O., the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had committed
a fundamental error in shutting out the contention raised by the assessee
solely on the ground that the assessee approached the bond-issuing authorities
for availing of the benefit u/s 54EC. In the assessee’s case, all the relevant
facts were available even before the A.O. while the scrutiny assessment was in
progress. Therefore, there was no estoppel on the part of the assessee
to pursue its claim.

 

iv)   The Tribunal had committed a factual mistake
in referring to a valuation report not concerning the transaction, which was
the subject matter of assessment. The explanation given by the assessee was
satisfactory because the net asset value of the non-transmission and
distribution business was determined at Rs. 31.30 crores as on 31st
December, 2005. But the parties agreed to have a joint valuation by using a
combination of three methods, namely, (a) price earnings capitalisation, (b)
net assets, and (c) market values reflected in actual dealings on the stock
exchanges during the relevant period. After following such a procedure, the
fair value was computed at Rs. 41.3 crores and this had been clearly set down
in the statement filed u/s 393 of the Companies Act before the High Court. In
the scheme of arrangement there was no monetary consideration, which was passed
on from the transferee-company to the assessee but there was only allotment of
shares. There was no suggestion on behalf of the Revenue of bad faith on the
part of the assessee-company nor was it alleged that a particular form of the
transaction was adopted as a cloak to conceal a different transaction. The mere
use of the expression “consideration for transfer” was not sufficient to
describe the transaction as a sale. The transfer, pursuant to approval of a
scheme of arrangement, was not a contractual transfer, but a statutorily
approved transfer and could not be brought within the definition of the word
“sale”.’

 

HINDU LAW – A MIXED BAG OF ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Law has always been a
very fascinating subject. The fact that it is both codified in some respects
and uncodified in others makes it all the more interesting. The Supreme Court
in the case of M. Arumugam vs. Ammaniammal, CA No. 8642/2009 order dated
8th January, 2020
had occasion to consider a mixed bag of
issues under Hindu Law. Some of the observations made by the Court are very
interesting and have a profound impact on the interpretation of Hindu Law. Let
us understand this decision in more detail and also analyse its implications.

 

FACTUAL MATRIX

The facts of this case are
quite detailed but are relevant to better appreciate the decision. There was a
Hindu male, his wife, two sons and three daughters. He also had an HUF in which
he (the karta) and his two sons were coparceners. The HUF had certain
property. This was prior to the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 (the Act) and hence the daughters were not coparceners. The karta
died intestate. Accordingly, by virtue of the Act, his share in the HUF was to
be succeeded to by his legal heirs in accordance with the Act, i.e., equally
amongst the six surviving family members. On his death, a Release Deed was
executed in respect of the HUF amongst the two sons, the mother and the
daughters in which the mother and the daughters relinquished all their rights
in the father’s HUF to the two sons. As one of the daughters (the respondent in
this case) was a minor, her mother executed the deed as her natural guardian
for and on her behalf. Similarly, as one of the sons was a minor, the elder son
(the appellant in this case) executed this deed as his guardian.

 

After
nine years, a Deed of HUF Partition was executed between the two sons in which
the husband of the respondent (who was now a major) acted as a witness.
Thereafter, the two sons were in possession of the erstwhile HUF property in
their own individual, independent capacities. When they sought to sell this
property, the respondent objected to the sale on the grounds that when the
release deed was executed she was a minor and her mother had no authority to
sign it on her behalf. She also contended that she was, in fact, not even aware
of the release deed. Hence, the same was void ab initio and all
subsequent transactions and agreements were also void. Accordingly, she
filed a suit to set aside the transactions.

 

The trial court dismissed
the suit holding that the mother acted as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter and no steps were taken by the respondent on attaining majority to get
the release deed set aside within the period of limitation of three years. She
then filed an appeal before the Madras High Court which came to the conclusion
that the property in the hands of the legal heirs of the father after his death
was Joint HUF property and the mother could not have acted as the guardian of
the minor. It held that the eldest son on demise of the father became the karta
of the HUF and also the guardian for the share of the minors within the family.
Hence, he could not have executed such a release deed in his favour. It was,
therefore, held that the release deed was void ab initio. Consequently,
the eldest son filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

 

It is in the background of
these facts that we can understand the ratio of the Apex Court on
various issues.

 

WHO CAN BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN?

The Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the law relating to minority and guardianship
of Hindus and the powers and duties of the guardians. It overrides any
uncodified Hindu custom, tradition or usage in respect of the minority and
guardianship of Hindus. Under this Act, a guardian means a person who has the
care of the minor or of his property, or both. Further, the term also includes
a natural guardian. The term ‘Natural Guardian’ is of great significance since
most of the provisions of this Act deal with the rights and duties of a natural
guardian and hence it becomes necessary to understand the meaning of this term.
If the minor is a boy or an unmarried girl, then the father and after him the
mother automatically becomes the natural guardian. The natural guardian of a
Hindu minor has the power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and
proper for the minor’s benefit or for the realisation, protection or the
benefit of the minor’s estate. The most important restriction placed by the Act
on the natural guardian relates to his immovable property. A natural guardian
cannot without the prior permission of a Court enter into any disposal /
mortgage / lease exceeding five years of his immovable property.

 

This Act also has a caveat.
It states that a guardian cannot be appointed for the minor’s undivided
interest in a joint HUF property if the property is under the management of an
adult member of the family. Since the interest in an HUF property is not
separate or divisible from the rest of the shares, it is not possible to
segregate the interest of one member from another. The Supreme Court set aside
this provision in Arumugam’s case (Supra) stating that in that
case they were dealing with a situation where all the family members decided to
dissolve the Hindu Undivided Family assuming there was one in existence. Hence,
the exemption had no application.

 

As regards the plea that
the mother cannot act as the natural guardian and the karta of the HUF
would play both roles, the Apex Court observed that a karta is the
manager of the joint family property. He was not the guardian of the minor
members of the joint family. What the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
provided was that the natural guardian of a minor Hindu shall be his guardian
for all intents and purposes except so far as the undivided interest of the
minor in the joint family property was concerned. This meant that the natural
guardian could not dispose of the share of the minor in the joint family
property. The reason for this was that the karta of the joint family
property was the manager of the property. However, this principle would not
apply
when a family settlement was taking place between the members of the
joint family. When such a dissolution took place and some of the members
relinquished their share in favour of the karta, it was obvious that the
karta could not also act as the guardian of that minor whose share was
being relinquished in his own (i.e., the karta’s) favour. There would be
an apparent conflict of interest. In such an eventuality, it would be
the mother alone who would be the natural guardian. Accordingly, there was
nothing wrong in the mother acting as the natural guardian of the minor
daughter.

 

CHALLENGE BY MINOR ON ATTAINING MAJORITY

Section 8 of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act further provides that any disposal and / or
alienation of a minor’s immovable property by her natural guardian in
contravention of the Act is voidable at the instance of the minor. The Supreme
Court held that this meant that the release deed at best became a voidable
document which in terms of section 8 of the Act should have been challenged
within three years of the daughter attaining majority. Since she had failed to
do so, she could not now challenge the same. Thus, the period of limitation of
three years to challenge the document had expired.

 

Whether
property is joint or self-acquired

The next issue to be
decided by the Supreme Court was that in respect of the interest in the
coparcenary property which was succeeded by the legal heirs, whether it
continued to be HUF property or did it become the self-acquired property of
each heir? The Supreme Court referred to several decisions such as Guruprasad
Khandappa Magdum vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, (1978) 3 SCC 383; CWT vs.
Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567
; Appropriate Authority IT vs. M.
Arifulla (2002) 10 SCC 342
, etc. to hold that property devolving upon
legal heirs under intestate succession from a Hindu male is the individual
property of the person who inherits the same. It is not HUF property in the
recipient’s hands.

 

The Court also considered
section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act which clearly lays down that any Hindu
can dispose of his share in an HUF by means of a Will. It held that the
Explanation to section 30 clearly provided that the interest of a male Hindu in
a Mitakshara coparcenary is property capable of being disposed of by him
by a Will. This meant that the law-makers intended that for all purposes the
interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary was to be virtually
like his self-acquired property.

 

Manner of
owning the property

In this case, on the death
of the father and execution of the subsequent release deed, the two sons ended
up owning the property jointly. The Court referred to section 19 of the Act
which provides that when two or more heirs succeed together to the property of
an intestate, they shall take the property per capita and as tenants in common
and not as joint tenants.

 

It may be useful to explain
the meaning of these two terms. Although both may appear similar, but in law
there is a vast difference between the two. Succession to property would be
determined depending upon how a property has been acquired. A Joint Tenancy has
certain distinguishing features, such as unity of title, interest and
possession. Each co-owner has an undefined right and interest in property
acquired as joint tenants. Thus, no co-owner can say what is his or her share.
One other important feature of a joint tenancy is that after the death of one
of the joint tenants, the property passes by survivorship to the other joint
tenant and not by succession to the heirs of the deceased co-owner. For
example, X, Y and Z own a building as joint tenants. Z dies. His undivided
share passes on to X and Y. Tenancy in common is the opposite of joint tenancy
since the shares are specified and each co-owner in a tenancy in common can
state what share he owns in a property. On the death of a co-owner, his share
passes by succession to his heirs / beneficiaries under the Will and not to the
surviving co-owners. If a Will bequeaths a property to two beneficiaries in the
ratio of 60:40, then they are treated as tenants in common.

 

The Supreme Court concluded
that section 19 clearly indicated that the property was not to be treated as a
joint family property though it may be held jointly by the legal heirs as
tenants in common till the property is divided, apportioned or dealt with in a
family settlement.

 

Notional
partition on demise of coparcener

The Supreme Court held that
under the Act, on the death of a coparcener a notional partition of the HUF
takes place. This proposition may be elaborated for the benefit of all that
when a coparcener dies, there would be a notional partition of his HUF just
before his death to determine his share in the HUF which is bequeathed by his
Will. Accordingly, on the date prior to the coparcener’s demise, one needs to
work out the number of coparceners and determine each one’s share on that date.
Thus, if there are ten coparceners just before his death, then each would have
a notional 1/10th share.

 

CONCLUSION

The
Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Madras High Court and upheld the
validity of the release deed. It also held that a mother would be the natural
guardian of the minor. This decision has elaborated on various important issues
relating to Hindu Law. It is an extremely unfortunate situation where for every
key feature of Hindu Law the Supreme Court needs to intervene. Should not the
entire Hindu Law be overhauled and codified in greater detail till such time as
India has a Uniform Civil Code?
 

 

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54(1) – Sale of capital asset and acquisition of ‘a residential house’ – Meaning of ‘a residential house’ in section 54(1) – Includes the plural – Purchase of two residential properties – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption – Amendment substituting ‘a’ by ‘one’ – Applies prospectively

16. Arun K. Thiagarajan vs. CIT(A) [2020] 427 ITR 190 (Kar.) Date of order: 18th June, 2020 A.Y.: 2003-04

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54(1) – Sale
of capital asset and acquisition of ‘a residential house’ – Meaning of ‘a
residential house’ in section 54(1) – Includes the plural – Purchase of two
residential properties – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption – Amendment
substituting ‘a’ by ‘one’ – Applies prospectively

 

For the A.Y.
2003-04, the assessee declared long-term capital gains from sale of a house
property. Against this, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s 54 in respect of
two house properties purchased in different locations. The A.O. restricted the
deduction to acquisition of one residential building and accordingly allowed
deduction in respect of the higher value of investment in respect of such
property.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    To give a definite meaning to the expression
“a residential house”, the provisions of section 54(1) were amended with effect
from 25th April, 2015 by substituting the word “a residential house”
with the word “one residential house”. The amendment specifically applied only
prospectively with effect from the A.Y. 2015-16. The subsequent amendment of
section 54(1) fortifies the need felt by the Legislature to give a definite
meaning to the expression “a residential house”, which was interpreted as
plural by various courts taking into account the context in which the
expression was used.

ii)    The assessee was entitled to the benefit of
exemption u/s 54(1). The courts had interpreted the expression “a residential
house” and the interpretation that it included the plural was binding.

 

iii)   The substantial question of law framed by
this court is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In
the result, the orders passed by the A.O., the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal insofar as they deprive the
assessee of the benefit of exemption u/s 54(1) are hereby quashed and the
assessee is held entitled to benefit of exemption u/s 54(1).’

EPIC SPEECH ON ‘BABUCRACY’

Some
speeches are so good that they not only deserve praise but also recollection
and analysis. Shri Nitin Gadkari’s address at the inauguration of the NHAI
building in Delhi on 26th October, 2020 was one such rare display of
unhesitating candour and clarity. The Minister articulated ‘all’ that is
undesirable in the Babucracy of our country. Coming from someone who is
within the system and works closely with this class, it accentuates and
authenticates certain aspects of some people in sarkar.

Normally,
an inauguration event would have called for a celebratory and congratulatory
tone. But the talk was everything but that. This editorial is dedicated to
paraphrasing some key points:

Feeling
ashamed
:
The Minister expressed a sense of shame and said he was incapable of giving Abhinandan
(joyful regard) when he sees the functioning of the NHAI (the budget allocated
in the F.Y. 2019-20 is Rs. 1.12 lakh crores).

Facts: The
project was started in 2008 and the tender awarded in 2011. The project saw two
governments and eight NHAI Chairmen before being completed! He pointed out that
the Delhi-Mumbai highway project worth Rs. 80,000 to Rs. 100,000 crores, will
take 3.5 years to complete, while this one cost Rs. 250 crores and yet took so
long! Sarcastically, he requested an internal ‘research paper’ to show how
decisions do not get taken for years and how hurdles are created to obstruct
things from happening.

Name
and shame:

He mentioned the designations of Chairman, DGM and GM and sarcastically
requested putting up the photographs of those whose indecision took 11 long
years for a project (as small as this one) to be completed.

Usual
escape route (or excuse route):
He predicted that a ‘record will
be created’ to blame the contractor because he went to the NCLT to justify the
long delay.

Deformed
mentality:

It wasn’t just indecision, but while remaining indecisive creating even further
complications instead of getting the work done – this was the attitude (or
attribute!) of such people and they remained stuck at the NHAI for years. He
didn’t doubt their integrity, but their way of thinking was like that of a VishKanya.

Tradition
of CGM and GM:
He called this convention of hierarchy nikammi
(trashy, despicable and useless) and naalaayak (worthless).

Bad
raw material:
The ‘basic raw material’ (those hired) was bad. We
are not able to hire from IITs and IIMs, while those who are incapable of
working even in a state government are made CGMs and GMs and promoted at NHAI.

Holding
accountable:
While fingers were pointed at contractors,
engineers, designers and action was also taken, but not against the RO, CGM,
GM, PD and such internal functionaries. Even Members of the NHAI depend on the
GM and CGM and do not know what is going on. GMs do not inform the Members of
even emergency matters. Although the organisation has credibility in the
market, it did not know about its own performance bottlenecks. Akaryaksham
(incapable to act), bhrashta (corrupt) and nikkama (useless)
people are still powerful and act arbitrarily in NHAI.

Waste
of money:

Cost overruns and futile court cases which when lost award compensation to
contractors and jack up the costs many fold. He even gave examples.

Committees:
Committees in NHAI rake up negativity, inaction and complicate matters. They
are non-performing assets.

Equal
treatment:

We treat everyone equally (pun intended), give eight out of ten to those who
are not fit for working in the government. We treat donkeys and horses alike.

Reform: The
system that is inefficient, inactive, negative, maker of indecisive committees
and holding up work should be demolished. In spite of several reports on
reforms, no initiative is taken for implementing them.

He
ended by saying that organisations must be TRANSPARENT, TIME-BOUND,
RESULT-ORIENTED, QUALITATIVE, CORRUPTION-FREE and SMART.

Well, he stated
all that needs to be cured! If this part of Babucracy changes, India
will transform. Faster!

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

 

 

REFUND OF TAX ON INPUT SERVICES UNDER INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE – WHETHER ELIGIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Goods & Services Tax, often touted as ‘One Nation, One Tax’, in
practice consists of many State-specific contradictions due to conflicting
advance rulings. Further, in the case of writ matters we are witnessing
conflicting High Court rulings as well. One such controversy that has come to
the fore pertains to refund of unutilised input tax credit (ITC) under inverted
duty structure in view of two conflicting decisions:

i)   VKC
Footsteps India Private Limited vs. Union of India & others –
2020-VIL-340-Guj.

ii) Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV vs. Union of India & others – 2020-VIL-459-Mad.

 

In this article, we have analysed the relevant provisions under the
Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 and rules framed thereunder on this
particular topic, the interpretation giving rise to the current issue and the
judicial perspective on it. Of course, the matter will reach finality only
after a Supreme Court decision on the issue.

 

BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 deals with the provisions relating to
refunds. While section 54(3) provides for refund of any unutilised input tax
credit (ITC), the first proviso thereof restricts the right to claim
such refund only in the case of zero-rated supplies made without payment of
tax, or where the accumulation of credit is on account of the rate of tax on
inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than
nil-rated or fully exempt supplies). The relevant provisions are reproduced for
reference:

 

(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (10), a registered person
may claim refund of any unutilised input tax credit at the end of any tax
period:

Provided that no refund of unutilised input tax credit shall be allowed
in cases other than —

(i) zero
rated supplies made without payment of tax;

(ii)        where
the credit has accumulated on account of rate of tax on inputs being higher
than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than nil rated or fully exempt
supplies), except supplies of goods or services or both as may be notified by
the Government on the recommendations of the Council.

 

The procedure for determining the refund due in case of Inverted Duty
Structure is provided for u/r 89(5) of the CGST Rules, 2017 which provides that
the amount of refund shall be granted as per the following formula:

 

Turnover of Inverted Duty Structure
of goods and services                                 * 
Net ITC
________________________

Adjusted
Total Turnover                     

The term ‘Net ITC’ referred to in the above formula is defined to mean
ITC availed on inputs during the relevant period other than ITC availed for
which refund is claimed u/r 89(4A) or 89(4B) or both. The same is an amended
definition notified vide Notification No. 21/2018 – CT dated 18th
April, 2018 and given retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017 vide
Notification No. 26/2018 – CT dated 13th June, 2018. The pre-amended
definition of ‘Net ITC’ gave the meaning assigned to it in Rule 89(4) which
covered ITC availed on inputs and input services during the relevant period
other than the ITC availed for which refund is claimed under sub-rules (4A) or
(4B) or both.

 

UNDERSTANDING THE DISPUTE

GST works on the principle of value addition, i.e., tax paid on ‘inputs’
is available as credit to be used to discharge the tax payable on ‘output’. In
other words, what goes IN, goes OUT. On a plain reading, this principle also
appears to be applicable for application of section 54(3) (first proviso
referred above) as well as Rule 89(5). This is because though the proviso
uses the term ‘inputs’, it finds in its company the term ‘output supplies’. The
proviso does not restrict the output supply to be only that of goods. In
other words, if output supply, liable to tax at a lower rate, can be of either
goods or services, the same principle should be applied in the context of
inward supplies also, i.e., it can be both goods as well as services. If this
is not done, the very purpose of the provision becomes redundant.

 

Let us understand this with the help of a live example. Diamonds are
taxed at a lower rate under GST, generally 0.25% or 3% depending on their
characteristics. On the other hand, the expenses to be incurred by a person
engaged in the supply of diamonds are all taxable at 18%. For example, rental
services, grading services, security services, etc., all attract tax at 18%.
Unless the above interpretation is applied, all suppliers engaged in supply of
diamonds would never get covered under the scope of ‘inverted duty structure’
and would therefore always end up with an unutilised ITC which would never get
utilised since the tax on output supplies would perennially be lower and there
would be ITC on account of purchase of diamonds itself which would be sufficient
for utilisation against the tax payable on output supplies.

 

Therefore, while interpreting the proviso to section 54(3), the
following questions need consideration:

(i) Whether the term ‘inputs’
referred to in the proviso has to be interpreted as defined u/s 2(59) of
the CGST Act, 2017 which would render the provision non-workable, or should it
be read in context?

(ii)        Does the principle of Noscitur
a Sociis
apply to this matter and can section 54(3) be liberally
interpreted?

 

Here are a few judicial precedents relevant to the current dispute and
also to the above questions:

 

(a) CIT vs. Bharti Cellular Limited [(2009) 319 ITR 319 (Del.)]

This decision was in the context of what constitutes technical services
for the purpose of section 194J. In this case, the Court, relying on the
decision of Stonecraft Enterprises vs. CIT [(1999) 3 SCC 343] held
as under:

 

19. From this decision, it is apparent that the Supreme Court employed
the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis and held that the word minerals took colour from
the words mineral oil which preceded it and the word ores which succeeded it. A
somewhat similar situation has arisen in the present appeals where the word
technical is preceded by the word managerial and succeeded by the word
consultancy. Therefore, the word technical has to take colour from the word
managerial and consultancy and the three words taken together are intended to
apply to those services which involve a human element.

 

This concludes our discussion on the applicability of the principle of noscitur
a sociis
.

 

(b) Southern Motors vs. State of Karnataka [2017 (368) ELT 3 (SC)]

34.       As
would be overwhelmingly pellucid (clear) from the hereinabove, though words in
a statute must, to start with, be extended their ordinary meanings, but if the
literal construction thereof results in an anomaly or absurdity, the courts
must seek to find out the underlying intention of the Legislature and, in the
said pursuit, can within permissible limits strain the language so as to avoid
such unintended mischief.

 

(c)        Commissioner of
Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018 (361) ELT 577 (SC)]

Regard must be had to the clear meaning of
words and matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification,
equity or intendment having no place in interpretation of a tax statute – if
words are ambiguous in a taxing statute (not exemption clause) and open to two
interpretations, benefit of interpretation is given to the subject.

 

The above discussion indicates that the term ‘inputs’ referred to in
clause (ii) to the first proviso of section 54(3) is to be given a wider
import and not to be restricted to the definition of inputs provided u/s 2(59)
of the CGST Act, 2017. Therefore, the important question that arises is what is
the cause for the current litigation? The dispute stems from Rule 89(5)
prescribed to lay down the methodology to determine the amount eligible for
refund claim under the 2nd clause of the 1st proviso
of section 54(3) and the manner in which the term ‘Net ITC’ has been defined
therein to mean ITC availed on inputs during
the relevant period other than ITC availed for which refund is claimed u/r
89(4A) or 89(4B) or both.

 

By interpreting clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3)
r/w/r 89(5) literally, the Revenue authorities have been denying the refund of
unutilised ITC due to inverted duty structure to the extent the accumulation is
on account of input services. In fact, in a few such cases, the taxpayers had
opted for advance ruling on the subject and the Authority for Advance Ruling
has also agreed with the Revenue’s view. Some relevant rulings include the
ruling by the Maharashtra Authority in the case of Daewoo TPL JV [2019
(27) GSTL 446 (AAR – GST)]
and Commissioner (Appeals) in
Sanganeriya Spinning Mills Limited [2020 (40) GSTL 358 (Comm. Appeals – GST –
Raj)].

 

VKC FOOTSTEPS: BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

In the case of VKC Footsteps, they were faced with a similar challenge
where their refund claim was rejected to the extent it pertained to input
services and therefore they had challenged the validity of Rule 89(5)
restricting the claim of ITC only to the extent it pertained to inputs and not
input services / capital goods.

 

VKC Footsteps made their case before the Gujarat High Court on the
following grounds:

i)   GST is a value-added tax where
the tax is borne by the end customer and businesses do not have to bear the
burden of the said tax as they are eligible to claim credit of taxes paid by
them on their inward supplies.

ii)  That even before the
introduction of GST, the Government was aware of a situation where there could
have prevailed an inverted duty structure and the associated problem of credit
accumulation thereon and to overcome this particular anomaly clause (ii) to the
first proviso of section 54(3) was included in the statute.

iii) Section 54(3) specifically
provided for refund of unutilised ITC. There is no restriction u/s 54(3)
restricting the claim of refund to inputs only.

iv) Rule 89(5) has restricted the scope
of operation of the clause by excluding the credit of taxes paid on input
services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ for determining the amount eligible for
refund and, in fact, deprived the taxpayer of his crystallised and vested right
of refund. For these reasons, it was argued that Rule 89(5) was ultra vires
of the provision of the Act and therefore liable to be set aside.

v)  The petitioners had also placed
reliance on the decisions in the cases of Shri Balaganesan Metals vs.
M.N. Shanmugham Shetty [(1987) 2 SCC 707]; Lucknow Development Authority vs.
M.K. Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243];
and Lohara Steel Industries
Limited vs. State of AP [(1997) 2 SCC 37].

 

The Revenue countered the above with a single argument that Rule 89(5)
was notified within the domain of powers vested with the Central Government by
virtue of section 164. It was argued that this section empowered the Centre in
the widest possible manner to make rules on the recommendations of the GST
Council for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Rule 89(5) was notified in
exercise of these powers and therefore cannot be held ultra vires as it
only provides the method of calculating the refund on account of inverted duty
structure. Revenue relied on the decision in the case of Willow-wood
Chemicals Private Limited vs. UoI [2018 (19) GSTL 228 (Guj.)].

 

After hearing both the parties, the Gujarat High Court held that Rule
89(5) was ultra vires the provisions of section 54(3) of the CGST Act,
2017 based on the following conclusions:

(A) Rule 89(5) excluding credit of
input services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ to determine the amount of eligible
refund is contrary to the provisions of section 54(3) which provides for refund
of claim of ‘any unutilised input tax credit’. The Court further held that
clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3) refers to both supply
of goods or services, and not only supply of goods as per amended Rule 89(5).

(B) Rule 89(5) does not demonstrate
the intention of the statute. Therefore, the interpretation in Circular
79/53/2018 – GST dated 31st December, 2018 was incorrect.

 

TRANSTONNELSTROY AFCONS JV: THE SAGA
CONTINUES

Around the same time, the Madras High Court also had occasion to examine
the same issue. The detailed decision in the case of Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV
reignited the controversy. The judgment records a series of
arguments put forth by the petitioner, countered by the respondents and
rejoinder submissions by both sets of parties rebutting the opposite parties’
submissions. We have attempted to summarise (pointwise) the submissions of the
parties.

 

Vires of Rule 89(5) vis-à-vis
sections 164 and 54(3) of the CGST Act, 2017

The petitioners, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Sales Tax Officer vs. K.T. Abraham [AIR 1967 SCC 1823]
contended that clauses which empower framing of rules only in respect of form
and manner of application are limited in scope. They further contended that a
general rule-making power cannot be resorted to to create disabilities not
contemplated under the CGST Act, 2017 – Kunj Behari Lal Butail vs. State
of HP [(2000) 3 SCC 40].

 

The petitioners further relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court
in the case of VKC Footsteps wherein it has held that Rule 89(5)
as amended is contrary to the provision of section 54(3).

 

In response, the respondent (Revenue) contended that wide Parliamentary
latitude is recognised and affirmed while construing tax and other economic
legislations and that Courts should adopt a hands-free approach qua economic
legislation – Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India
vs. UoI [(1989) 3 SCC 634]
and Swiss Ribbons Private Limited vs.
UoI [(2019) 4 SCC 17].

 

The respondent further contended that no restriction can be read into
the rule-making power of the Government. Section 164 is couched in extremely
wide language and the only limitation therein is that the Rules should be
applied only for fulfilling the purpose of the CGST Act – K. Damodarasamy
Naidu vs. State of TN [2000 (1) SCC 521)]
wherein the Court held that
the distinction between goods and services was valid in case of composite
contracts.

 

Entitlement to claim refund stems from
section 54 – operative part and not
proviso

On their part, the petitioners contended that the general rule for
entitlement of refund of unutilised ITC is contained in section 54(3), while
the principle merely sets out the eligible class of taxpayers who can claim the
refund. Since the entry barrier is satisfied, i.e., they are covered under the
inverted duty structure, the primary condition that the credit accumulation is
due to inverted duty structure is satisfied. The proviso does not
curtail the entitlement to refund of the entire unutilised ITC and merely sets
out the eligibility conditions for claiming such refund. This was also
reiterated during the rejoinder submissions.

 

The petitioners also stated that the use of the phrase ‘in the cases’
indicates that the proviso is intended to specify the classes of
registered persons who would be entitled to refund of unutilised ITC and not to
curtail the quantum or type of unutilised ITC in respect of which refund may be
claimed.

 

Scope of clause (ii) of first proviso
to section 54(3)

The petitioners further argued that section
54(3) is drafted in a manner to entitle a claimant for refund of full
unutilised ITC. Therefore, the provisions should be interpreted by keeping the
context in mind. The intention of Parliament was to deploy the words ‘inputs’
and ‘output supplies’ as per their meaning in common parlance. Therefore, the
definition of input u/s 2(59) should not apply since that definition applies
only when the context does not require otherwise. They further relied on the
decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1]; M. Jamal & Co. vs. UoI [(1985) 21 ELT 369];
and
Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of TN [(2002) 3 SCC 554].

In response to the above, the respondent referred to the Explanation to
section 54 wherein it has been clarified that refund shall include tax paid on
inputs / input services. On the basis of this, Revenue contended that the terms
‘inputs’ or ‘input services’ were consciously used in section 54 – CIT,
New Delhi vs. East West Import and Export (P) Limited [(1989) 1 SCC 760]
and
CST vs. Union Medical Agency [(1981) 1 SCC 51].
The Revenue further
argued that this classification of inputs, input services and capital goods is
continuing since the CENVAT regime and, therefore, even in trade parlance the
same meaning which was applied under the CENVAT regime should continue to apply
under GST.

 

The respondents further argued that if a term is defined in the statute,
the Court should first consider and apply such a definition and only in the
absence of a statutory definition can the Court consider the definition under
common parlance meaning of the term – Bakelite Hylam Limited vs. CCE,
Hyderabad [(1998) 5 SCC 621].

 

Manner of interpretation of tax statute –
Strict vs. liberal

The petitioners contended that strict interpretation of a taxing statute
applies only when interpreting a charging provision / exemption notification – Gursahai
Sehgal vs. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062]
and ITC Limited vs. CCE [(2004)
7 SCC 591].
The petitioners further contended that if section 54(3) is
not interpreted in this manner, the same would be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution as it would amount to discrimination between similarly placed
persons. They placed reliance on the decision in the case of Government
of Andhra Pradesh vs. Lakshmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720]
.

 

In response to the above contentions, the respondents argued that if it
is held that section 54(3)(ii) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution,
the correct approach would have been to strike down the provisions and not to
expand it to include the person discriminated – Jain Exports Private
Limited vs. UoI [1996 (86) ELT 478 (SC)].
The respondents further
argued that a refund provision should be treated at par with an exemption
provision and should therefore be construed strictly and any ambiguity should
be resolved in favour of the Revenue as held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Dilip Kumar & Co. The Revenue also relied on the decision
in the case of Ramnath vs. CTO [(2020) 108 CCH 0020]. And on
decisions wherein ITC has been equated with a concession and therefore the
terms and conditions associated with it should be strictly complied with – Jayam
& Co. vs. AC(CT) [(2016) 15 SCC 125]
and ALD Automotive
Private Limited vs. AC(CT) [2018-VIL-28-SC].

 

Vide their rejoinder
submission, the petitioners argued that a tax statute should not always be
construed strictly, which can be defined either as literal interpretation,
narrow interpretation, etc. Further, the decision in the case of Dilip
Kumar & Co.
was distinguishable as it dealt with interpretation of
an exemption notification which is not similar to refund. Reference was made to
the decision in the case of Ramnath equating exemptions,
incentives, rebates and other things as similar. However, refund of unutilised
ITC is not similar to exemptions, incentives or rebates.

 

The respondents vide a sur-rejoinder contended that refund
is akin to an exemption / rebate / incentive. Refund is at best a statutory
right and not a vested right and therefore can be exercised only if the statute
grants such right. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Satnam
Overseas Export vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 561].

 

Reading down of the provisions was required

The petitioners further contended that the validity of the provisions
could be upheld only by resorting to reading down the said provisions – Delhi
Transport Corporation vs. Mazdoor Congress & Others [1991 (Supplement) 1
SCC 600]
and Spences Hotel Private Limited vs. State of WB &
Others [(1991) 2 SCC 154].

 

In response, the respondents contended that reading down is intended to
provide a restricted or narrow interpretation and not for the purpose of
providing an expansive or wide interpretation. Words cannot be added to the
statute for the purpose of reading down the statute. The Revenue further
referred to decisions where it has been held that Courts cannot remake the
statute – Delhi Transport Co. (Supra) and UoI vs. Star
Television News Limited [(2015) 12 SCC 665].
The respondents further
argued that a proviso performs various functions such as curtailing,
excluding, exempting or qualifying the enacted clause and may even take the
shape of a substantive provision – S. Sundaram Pillai vs. V.R.
Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591]
and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs.
State of Maharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413].

 

During the rejoinder submission, the petitioners submitted that the
words ‘on inputs’ in Rule 89(5) should be deleted to ensure that the Rule is
not ultra vires to section 54(3). To support the contention of reading
down, the petitioners relied on the decision in the case of Lohara Steel
Industries
and D.S. Nakara vs. UoI [(1983) 1 SCC 37].
They further contended that the purpose of a proviso is to exempt,
exclude or curtail and not to expand the scope of the main provision – ICFAI
vs. Council of Chartered Accountants of India [(2007) 12 SCC 210 (ICFAI)].

 

During the sur-rejoinder submission, the respondents contended
that reading up is not permitted when resorting to the principle of reading
down – B.R. Kapur vs. State of TN [(2001) 7 SCC 231].

 

Inequalities should be mitigated – Article 38
of the Constitution

The petitioners further argued, referring to Article 38, that the
legislation should be interpreted in such a manner as to ensure that
inequalities are mitigated – Sri Srinivasa Theatre vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu [(1992) 2 SCC 643]; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of Jammu and
Kashmir [(1980) 4 SCC 1];
and UoI vs. N.S. Rathnam [(2015) 10 SCC
681].

 

The respondents contended that the classification of a registered person
into who is entitled to claim and who is not entitled to claim the refund by
differentiating based on those who procure input goods vs. those who procure
input goods and input services was legitimate. The respondents further argued
that the distinction between treatment of goods and services emanated from the
Constitution wherein goods were defined in Article 366(12) while services were
defined under Article 366(26)(A). More importantly, equity was not an issue in
the current case since there was no restriction from the claim of ITC. The
restriction applied only on claim of refund, to the extent that ITC was on
account of input service, the same continued to be a part of the taxpayers’ credit
ledger.

 

The petitioners vide a rejoinder submission contended that the
validity or invalidity of classification would depend on the frame of
reference. They further contended that there is no material difference in the
treatment of goods and services under GST law. Goods and services are treated
similarly when dealing with the four basic elements of the GST law, i.e.,
taxable event, taxable person, rate of tax and measure of tax. The only
distinction is in relation to provisions relating to determination of place of
supply, time of supply, etc. They further contended that GST was a paradigm
shift and therefore the historical segregation between goods and services
cannot be relied upon to contend that unequal treatment of goods and services
is valid. In fact, the purpose of introducing GST is to consolidate goods and
services and treat them similarly by keeping in mind that taxes are imposed on
consumption, irrespective of whether goods or services are consumed.

 

In the sur-rejoinder submission by the respondents, they
contended that the distinction between goods and services continues to apply
under GST also since the nature and characteristics of goods and services are
coherently different – Superintendent and Rememberancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal vs. Girish Kumar Navalakha [(1975) 4 SCC 754]; State of Gujarat vs.
Ambika Mills [(1975) 4 SCC 656];
and R.K. Garg vs. UoI [(1981) 4
SCC 675].

 

CONCLUSION OF THE COURT

After hearing both the parties exhaustively, the Court proceeded with an
analysis of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of VKC
Footsteps
and prima facie opined that the decision did not seem
to have considered the proviso to section 54(3) and, more significantly,
its import and implications and therefore proceeded on an independent analysis
of the relevant provisions. The Court referred to various decisions revolving
around the scope and function of a proviso relied upon by both the
parties, arrived at a conclusion that the proviso in the case of section
54(3) performed the larger function of limiting the entitlement of refund to
credit that accumulates as a result of the rate of tax on input goods being
higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. On this basis, the Court
proceeded to conclude that Rule 89(5) was intra vires. It opined that
the Gujarat High Court in VKC Footsteps had failed to take into
consideration the scope, function and impact of the proviso to section
54(3).

 

The Court also dealt with the argument on the manner of interpreting the
term ‘inputs’ used in the proviso. It concluded that the statutory
definition as well as context point in the same direction, that the word
‘inputs’ encompasses all input goods other than capital goods and excludes
input services. This conclusion was arrived at based on the following
reasoning:

  •         The definition of inputs u/s 2 excludes capital goods. If the
    common parlance meaning was applied, it would result in a conclusion that would
    be antithetical to the text.
  •         Section 54 itself refers to inputs as well as input services
    on multiple occasions. Therefore, merely because the undefined word ‘output
    supplies’ is used in the proviso, one cannot read the word ‘inputs’
    preceding it to include input service also.

 

Dealing with the issue of strict vs. liberal interpretation, the Court
concluded that the refund claims should be strictly interpreted since it was a
benefit / concession.

 

The Court also held that the classification, by virtue of which the
right to claim refund of unutilised ITC on account of input services was
curtailed, was not in violation of Article 14. Though it held that the object
of GST was to treat goods and services similarly, this is an evolutionary
process. There are various instances where goods and services are treated
differently, be it the rate of tax or provision for determination of place of
supply. However, the Court abstained from dealing with the arguments relating
to reading down since it had already held that section 54(3)(ii) was not in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

 

AUTHORS’ VIEWS

Both the decisions referred to above deal with a similar fact matrix,
are detailed and reasoned orders but bear diverse outcomes. However, there are
some aspects which still remain unaddressed and could have been considered in
the current dispute:

 

1. The Madras High Court
decisions, while concluding that section 54(3)(ii) covers only input goods and
not input services, appears to have not dealt with the key issue raised by the
petitioners, i.e., the intention of the Legislature based on which substantial
arguments were advanced by the petitioners. Even when dealing with the
arguments of applying contextual definition / understanding of the terms, the
Court has held that in interpreting a tax statute the requirement to stay true
to the statutory definition is more compelling. However, while concluding so,
the Court has not considered its own decision in the case of Firm
Foundation & Housing Private Limited vs. Principal CST, Chennai [2018 (16)
GSTL 209 (Mad.)]
wherein it has been held that there is enough
precedent available to support the view that Courts will interfere where the
basis of the impugned order is palpably erroneous and contrary to law.

 

2. The decision in the case of TCS
vs. UoI [2016 (44) STR 33 (Kar.)]
is also relevant in the current case.
This involved determination of whether or not a company would be liable to pay
tax under the category of ‘consulting engineer’ services? In this case, the
Court held that when the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and
grammatical construction leads to manifest contradiction of its apparent
purpose or to inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, construction
may be put upon that which emphasises the meaning of the words and even the
structure of the sentence.

 

3. The
Madras High Court concluded that if the interpretation of the petitioners was
accepted that the term ‘inputs’ used in section 54(3)(ii) was to be interpreted
in context with the words accompanying it, it would lead to an interpretation
that even unutilised ITC on account of capital goods would have been eligible
for refund. However, it appears that the Court has not considered the fact that
the Explanation to section 54 specifically provides that refund of unutilised
ITC shall be permitted only to the extent that it pertains to inputs / input
services.

 

4. As for the question whether
refund when provided in the legislation itself can be treated as a concession,
or it is a right which cannot be curtailed, one needs to keep in mind that
although section 17(5)(h) of the CGST Act, 2017 specifically stated that
certain ITC would be treated as blocked credits, the Orissa High Court in the
case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of GST
[2019 (25) GSTL 341 (Ori.)]
held the same ultra vires. Of
course, this matter is also currently pending before the Supreme Court, but the
bearing of the outcome of the same on the current dispute cannot be ruled out.

 

We now stand at a
juncture wherein two Hon’ble High Courts have given detailed and well-reasoned
judgments but diverse decisions on the issue of whether refund of unutilised
input tax credit, on account of input services, would be eligible or not? As a
natural corollary, the aggrieved parties will approach the Supreme Court to
settle the controversy and also lay down the principles of interpretation under
GST. The final decision of the Supreme Court in this matter will either blur
the lines of distinction between goods and services, or underline them in bold.

 

 

TAXABILITY OF INTEREST ON ENHANCED COMPENSATION OR CONSIDERATION

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 45(5) of
the Income-tax Act provides for taxability of the capital gains arising from
(i) the transfer of a capital asset by way of compulsory acquisition under any
law, or (ii) on a transfer the consideration for which was determined or
approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India, or (iii)
compensation or consideration which is enhanced or further enhanced by any
court, tribunal or other authority. Inter alia, clause (b) of section
45(5) provides for the taxability of the enhanced compensation or consideration
as awarded by a court, tribunal or other authority as deemed capital gains in
the previous year in which such enhanced compensation or consideration is
received by the assessee.

 

Section 10(37)
exempts the capital gains arising to an individual or an HUF from the transfer
of agricultural land by way of compulsory acquisition where the compensation or
consideration or the enhanced compensation or consideration is received on or
after 1st April, 2004 subject to fulfilment of other conditions as
specified therein. Further, section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
exempts the compensation received for compulsory acquisition of land under
defined circumstances (except those made u/s 46 of that Act) from the levy of
income tax. This exemption provided under the RFCTLARR Act is available
irrespective of whether the land acquired compulsorily is agricultural or
non-agricultural land.

 

In the case of land
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the person whose land has been acquired,
if aggrieved by the amount of compensation originally granted to him, may
require the matter to be referred to the Court u/s 18 of the 1894 Act for the
re-determination of the amount of the compensation. The Court may enhance the
amount of compensation payable to the claimant and also direct the authority
concerned to pay interest on the enhanced amount of compensation and also
interest for the delay caused in payment of the compensation otherwise ordered.
Section 28 of the 1894 Act empowers the Court to award interest at its
discretion on the excess amount of compensation awarded by it over the amount
originally awarded. Section 34 of that Act also provides for the liability of
the land acquisition authority concerned to pay interest, which is, however,
totally different from the interest referred to in section 28. The interest
payable u/s 34 is for the delay in paying the awarded compensation and it is
mandatorily payable.

 

A controversy had
arisen with respect to the nature of the interest received by the assessee on
the amount of enhanced compensation as per the directions of the Court in
accordance with the provisions of section 28 of the 1894 Act and the year of
taxation thereof which was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009 315 ITR 1]
by holding that the interest
granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was an accretion to the value and, hence, it was
a part of the enhanced compensation which was taxable as capital gains u/s
45(5). Subsequent to the decision, the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 inserted
clause (viii) in section 56(2) and clause (iv) in section 57 and section 145A/B
to specifically provide for taxability of interest received on compensation or
enhanced compensation as income from other sources and for deduction of 50% of
the interest amount.

 

This set of
amendments in sections 56(2), 57, 145A and later in 154B has given a rise to a
fresh controversy about the head of taxation under which the interest in
question awarded u/s 28 of the 1894 Act is taxable: whether such interest was
taxable under the head ‘capital gains’ or ‘income from other sources’ and
whether what is termed as interest under the said Act be treated differently
under the Income-tax Act.

 

The Gujarat High
Court has taken a view that the interest granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act
continues to be taxable as capital gains in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) (Supra) even after
the set of amendments to tax ‘interest’ as income from other sources. As a
corollary, tax ought not to have been deducted on that amount of interest u/s
194A. As against this, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that
interest granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act needs to be taxed as income from other
sources in view of the specific provision contained in section 56(2)(viii) in
this regard and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the exemption from
tax under provisions of section 10(37) of the Act.

 

THE MOVALIYA BHIKHUBHAI BALABHAI CASE

The issue first
came up for consideration of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO (2016) 388 ITR 343.

 

In this case, the
assessee was awarded additional compensation in respect of his land along with
the other benefits under the 1894 Act. Pursuant to this award passed by the
Reference Court, the authorities concerned inter alia determined the
amount of Rs. 20,74,157 as interest payable u/s 28 of that Act. Against this
interest, the amount of TDS to be deducted as per section 194A was also shown
in the relevant statement issued to the assessee. The assessee made an
application in Form No. 13 u/s 197(1) for issuing a certificate for Nil tax
liability. But the application was rejected on the ground that the interest
amount on the delayed payment of compensation and enhanced value of
compensation was taxable as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viii) read with
sections 57(iv) and 145A(b). The assessee approached the High Court by filing a
petition against the rejection of his application.

 

Before the High
Court, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ghanshyam (HUF) (Supra) and claimed that interest u/s 28 was,
unlike interest u/s 34 of the 1894 Act, an accretion in value and regarded as a
part of the compensation itself which was not the case with interest u/s 34.
Therefore, when the interest u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was to be treated as part
of compensation and was liable to capital gains u/s 45(5), such amount could
not be treated as income from other sources and, hence, no tax could be
deducted at source by considering the same to be interest. Reliance was also
placed on the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the cases of Jagmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana
rendered in Civil Revision No. 7740 of
2012 on 18th July, 2013
and Haryana State Industrial
Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. Savitri
rendered in Civil Revision
No. 2509 of 2012 on 29th November, 2013
, wherein it was held
that there was no requirement of deducting tax at source from the amount of
interest determined to be payable u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.

 

It was argued on
behalf of the Revenue that the A.O. was justified in rejecting the application
of the assessee in view of the specific provision contained in sub-clause
(viii) of section 56(2) providing that income by way of interest received on
compensation or on enhanced compensation referred to in clause (b) of section
145A was chargeable to income tax under the head ‘income from other sources’.
It was submitted that the interest on enhanced compensation u/s 28 of the 1894
Act being in the nature of enhanced compensation, was deemed to be the income
of the assessee in the year in which it was received as provided in section
145A and had to be taxed as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viii) as income
from other sources. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Ghanshyam (HUF), it was submitted that it was rendered prior to
the amendment in the I.T. Act whereby clause (b), which provided that interest
received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be income in the year in which it is received,
came to be inserted in section 145A of the Act and, hence, would not have any
applicability in the facts of the present case.

 

The Revenue relied
upon the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Bir Singh (HUF) ITA No. 209 of 2004 dated 27th October, 2010

which was later followed in the case of Hari Kishan vs. Union of India
[CWP No. 2290 of 2001 dated 30th January, 2014]; Manjet Singh (HUF)
Karta Manjeet Singh vs. Union of India [2016] 65 taxmann.com 160;
and
of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sharda Kochhar [2014] 49
taxmann.com 120.

 

The High Court
extensively referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam
(HUF) wherein various provisions of the 1894 Act were analysed vis-à-vis
the provisions of the Income-tax Act. On the basis of this decision, the High
Court reiterated that there was a vital difference between the interest payable
u/s 28 and the interest payable u/s 34 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 applies when
the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when the court
awards excess amount. In such cases, interest on that excess alone is payable.
Section 28 empowers the court to award interest on the excess amount of
compensation awarded by it over the amount awarded by the Collector. This award
of interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the court. It was
further held that section 28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount
which is determined by the court and it does not apply to cases of undue delay
in making award for compensation. The interest u/s 34 is only for delay in
making payment after the compensation amount is determined. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court had held that interest u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was an accretion to
compensation and formed part of the compensation and was, therefore, exigible
to tax u/s 45(5). The decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) was
followed by the Supreme Court in a later case, that of CIT vs. Govindbhai
Mamaiya [2014] 367 ITR 498
.

 

Insofar as the provisions of section 57(iv) read with section
56(2)(viii) and section 145A(b) were concerned, the High Court held that the
interest received u/s 28 of the 1894 Act would not fall within the ambit of the
expression ‘interest’ as envisaged u/s 145A(b) inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) had held that interest u/s 28 of the
1894 Act was not in the nature of interest but was an accretion to the
compensation and, therefore, formed part of the compensation. Further, a
reference was made to CBDT Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010
wherein the scope and effect of the amendment made to section 56(2) and also to
section 145A were explained. It was clarified in the said circular that undue
hardship had been caused to the taxpayers as a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in the case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 181 ITR 400
wherein it was held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation shall be taxable on accrual basis. It was to mitigate this
hardship that section 145A was amended to provide that the interest received by
an assessee on compensation or enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his
income for the year in which it was received, irrespective of the method of
accounting followed by the assessee. By relying upon this clarification, the
High Court held that the amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 was not in
connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam (HUF)
case but was brought in to mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on
account of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai
(Supra).

 

The High Court did
not agree with the view adopted by the other High Courts in the cases which
were relied upon by the Revenue as it was contrary to what had been held in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam (HUF). The High Court
held that the deduction of tax at source u/s 194A from the amount of interest
granted u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was not justified.

MAHENDER PAL NARANG’S CASE

The issue recently
came up for consideration before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the
case of Mahender Pal Narang vs. CBDT (2020) 423 ITR 13.

 

In this case, land
of the assessee was acquired during the previous years relevant to the
assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 for the compensation determined by the
acquisition authorities which was challenged by the assessee and the
corresponding enhanced compensation was received on 21st March,
2016. The assessee filed his income-tax return for the assessment year 2016-17
treating the interest received u/s 28 of the 1894 Act as income from other
sources and claimed deduction of 50% as per section 57(iv). Thereafter, the
assessee filed an application u/s 264 claiming that the interest was wrongly
offered as income from other sources, whereas the same was required to be
treated as part of the enhanced compensation under the head capital gains and
the gains were to be exempted from taxation u/s 10(37). However, the revisional
authority rejected the application. The assessee then filed a writ petition
before the High Court against the said rejection order passed u/s 264.

 

The assessee
contended before the High Court that the interest received as part of the
additional compensation was in the nature of compensation that was not taxable
u/s 10(37) and further argued that the provisions of section 10(37) have
remained unchanged, though sections 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) had been inserted by
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st April, 2010. The
amendments were brought in to remove the hardships created by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai (Supra) as explained by
Circular No. 5 of 2010. It was contended that the nature of interest u/s 28 of
the 1894 Act would remain that of compensation even after the amendments. The
assessee also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs.
Ghanshyam (HUF)
as well as of the Gujarat High Court in Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO (Supra).

 

The High Court
referred to the provisions of sections 45(5), 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv) as well as
the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF).
After dealing with them, it was held that the scheme with regard to
chargeability of interest received on compensation and enhanced compensation
had undergone a sea change with the insertion of sections 56(2)(viii) and
57(iv) in the Act. In view of the amendments, according to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court, the decision of the Apex Court in the Ghanshyam
case did not come to the rescue of the assessee to claim that interest received
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act was to be treated as compensation and to be dealt with
under ‘capital gains’. The argument raised that there was no amendment in
section 10(37) was considered to be ill-founded, on the ground that it dealt
with capital gains arising from transfer of agricultural land and it nowhere
provided as to what was to be included under the head ‘capital gains’.

 

The High Court did
not agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in the Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai
case that amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act,
2009 was not in connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam
case but to mitigate the hardship caused by the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Rama Bai case. The interpretation based on Circular No. 5
of 2010 did not influence the Punjab & Haryana High Court and it was held
that there was no scope of taking outside aid for giving such an interpretation
to newly-inserted provisions when their language was plain, simple and
unambiguous. Accordingly, it was held that the interest received on compensation
or enhanced compensation was to be treated as ‘income from other sources’ and
not under the head ‘capital gains’.

 

In deciding the
issue in favour of the Revenue, the High Court chose to follow its own
decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Bir Singh (HUF) in ITA No. 209 of 2004
dated 27th October, 2010
which was later on followed in the
case of Hari Kishan vs. Union of India [CWP No. 2290 of 2001 dated 30th
January, 2014]; Manjet Singh (HUF) Karta Manjeet Singh vs. Union of India
[2016] 65 taxmann.com 160
; and the decision  of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Sharda Kochhar [2014] 49 taxmann.com 120
. The Court overlooked its
own decisions, delivered in the context of TDS, in the cases of Jagmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana
rendered in Civil Revision No. 7740 of
2012 on 18th July, 2013
and Haryana State Industrial
Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. Savitri
rendered in Civil Revision
No. 2509 of 2012 on 29th November, 2013
, wherein it was held
that there was no requirement of deducting tax at source from the amount of
interest determined to be payable u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

 

OBSERVATIONS

There can be three
different components of amount received or to be received by a person whose
land has been compulsorily acquired under any law for the time being in force:
the initial compensation which is awarded by the competent authority, the
enhanced compensation which is awarded by the court, and interest, on
compensation or the enhanced compensation which becomes payable due to the
direction of the court or due to the statutory provision of the relevant law.

 

Sub-section (5) of
section 45 is a charging provision and it creates a charge on the capital gains
on transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory
acquisition under any law, or a transfer where the consideration for which is
determined or approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India.
The relevant portion of the sub-section (5) of section 45 is reproduced below:

Notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-section (1), where the capital gain arises from the
transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory acquisition
under any law, or a transfer the consideration for which was determined or
approved by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India, and the
compensation or the consideration for such transfer is enhanced or further
enhanced by any court, Tribunal or other authority, the capital gain shall be
dealt with in the following manner, namely…

 

It can be noticed
that an accrual or a receipt which can be considered as ‘the compensation or
the consideration’ in the circumstances specified in section 45(5) gets covered
within the ambit of this provision and needs to be taxed as ‘capital gains’ in
the manner provided therein. In particular, sub-clause (b) of section 45(5)
deals with the taxability of the enhanced amount of compensation or
consideration and it provides as under:

(b) the amount
by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced or further enhanced by
the court, Tribunal or other authority shall be deemed to be income chargeable
under the head ‘Capital gains’ of the previous year in which such amount is
received by the assessee.

 

Therefore, the
whole of the amount by which the compensation or consideration is enhanced by
the court is deemed to be the income chargeable under the head capital gains
irrespective of the manner in which such enhanced amount of the compensation or
consideration has been determined or how that amount has been referred to in
the relevant governing law under which it has been determined. What is relevant
is that the compensation or the enhanced amount needs to be brought to tax
under the head ‘capital gains’ by virtue of the deeming fiction created under
the aforesaid provisions.

 

There are no
separate or specific provisions dealing with the taxability of the interest
received on compensation or enhanced compensation which is being taxed as per
the general provisions of the Act, particularly sections 56 to 59. The
confusion about the year of taxation was addressed by the Apex Court in the
case of Smt. Ramabai. A set of the specific provisions was
inserted in the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st
April, 2010 to provide that such interest shall be taxable in the year of
receipt nullifying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision. The issue of
taxation of such interest was dealt with extensively by the Supreme Court in
the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) while dealing with the taxation of
capital gains u/s 45(5). The issue before the Supreme Court was about the year
in which the enhanced compensation and interest thereon, received by the
assessee, were taxable. The assessee contended that those amounts could not be
held to have accrued to him during the year of receipt, as the entire amount
received was in dispute in appeal before the High Court, which appeal stood
filed by the State against the order of the reference Court granting enhanced
compensation; and that the amount of enhanced compensation and the interest
thereon were received by him in terms of the interim order of the High Court
against his furnishing of security to the satisfaction of the executing Court.
As against this, the Revenue pleaded that those amounts in question were
taxable in the concerned year of receipt in which they were received by relying
upon section 45(5).

 

For deciding this
issue, of the year in which the enhanced compensation as well as interest
thereon were taxable, the Supreme Court in that case, of Ghanshyam (HUF),
had to first decide as to what fell within the meaning of the term
‘compensation’ as used in section 45(5). It was for the obvious reason that if
any of the components of the receipt could not be regarded as ‘compensation’,
then such component would not be governed by the provisions of section 45(5) so
as to deem it to be income chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’. Apart
from dealing with the nature of different amounts which were awarded under
different sub-sections of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as part
of the enhanced compensation, the Supreme Court also determined the true nature
of receipt of ‘interest’ granted under two different provisions of that Act,
i.e., sections 28 and 34. These two provisions dealing with the interest to be
paid to the person whose land has been acquired are as follows:

 

28. Collector
may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation

If the sum
which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date
on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess
into Court  

34. Payment of
interest

When the amount
of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of
the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at
the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession
until it shall have been so paid or deposited.

 

The Supreme Court,
explaining the distinction between the interest that became payable under both
the above provisions of the 1894 Act held that the interest u/s 28 only was
needed to be considered as part of the compensation itself. The relevant
extracts from the Supreme Court’s decision in this regard are reproduced below:

 

Section 28
applies when the amount originally awarded has been paid or deposited and when
the Court awards excess amount. In such cases interest on that excess alone is
payable. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on the excess amount
of compensation awarded by it over the amount awarded by the Collector…

 

This award of
interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the Court. Section
28 is applicable only in respect of the excess amount, which is determined by
the Court after a reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 does
not apply to cases of undue delay in making award for compensation [See: Ram
Chand vs. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44].
In the case of Shree Vijay
Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat [1991] 1 SCC 262,
this
Court has held that interest is different from compensation.

 

To sum up,
interest is different from compensation. However, interest paid on the excess
amount under section 28 of the 1894 Act depends upon a claim by the person
whose land is acquired whereas interest under section 34 is for delay in making
payment. This vital difference needs to be kept in mind in deciding this
matter. Interest under section 28 is part of the amount of compensation whereas
interest under section 34 is only for delay in making payment after the
compensation amount is determined. Interest under section 28 is a part of
enhanced value of the land which is not the case in the matter of payment of
interest under section 34.

The issue to be
decided before us – what is the meaning of the words ‘enhanced compensation /
consideration’ in section 45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act? Will it cover ‘interest’?
These questions also bring in the concept of the year of taxability.

 

Section 28 of
the 1894 Act applies only in respect of the excess amount determined by the
Court after reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. It depends upon the
claim, unlike interest under section 34 which depends on undue delay in making
the award. It is true that ‘interest’ is not compensation. It is equally true
that section 45(5) of the 1961 Act refers to compensation. But as discussed
hereinabove, we have to go by the provisions of the 1894 Act, which awards
‘interest’ both as an accretion in the value of the lands acquired and interest
for undue delay. Interest under section 28 unlike interest under section 34 is
an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced compensation or
consideration which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894
Act.

 

Thus, though a
component of the amount received was referred to as the ‘interest’ in section
28 of the 1894 Act, such part was to be considered to be part of the
‘compensation’ insofar as section 45(5) of the Income-tax Act was concerned.
When it came to the ‘interest’ referred to in section 34 of the 1894 Act, it
was to be treated as interest simpliciter and not as the ‘compensation’
for tax purposes and such interest was to be brought to tax as per the general
provisions of the law. This was because of the Court’s understanding that
interest u/s 28 was in the nature of damages awarded for granting insufficient
compensation in the first instance. The Court held that the interest under the
latter section 34 was to make up the loss due to delay in making the payment of
the compensation, the former section 28 interest being at the discretion of the
court and the latter section 34 interest being mandatory.

 

Later, this
decision in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) was followed by the
Supreme Court in the cases of CIT vs. Govindbhai Mamaiya (2014) 367 ITR
498
and CIT vs. Chet Ram (HUF) (2018) 400 ITR 23.

 

Now the question
arises as to whether the amendments made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with
effect from 1st April, 2010 have altered the position. The relevant
amendments are narrated below:

  •     Section 145A as existing then was substituted
    whereby a sub-clause (b) was added to it to provide as under:

(b) interest
received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is
received.

  •     Sub-clause (viii) was inserted in sub-section
    (2) of section 56 to provide as under:

(viii) income by
way of interest received on compensation or on enhanced compensation referred
to in clause (b) of section 145A.

  •    Sub-clause (iv) was inserted in section 57 to
    provide as under:

(iv) in the case
of income of the nature referred to in clause (viii) of sub-section (2) of
section 56, a deduction of a sum equal to fifty per cent of such income and no
deduction shall be allowed under any other clause of this section.

 

These amendments,
in our considered opinion, will apply only if the receipt concerned, like in
section 34 of the 1894 Act, can be regarded as ‘interest’ in the first place
and not otherwise. If the amount concerned has already been considered to be a
part of the compensation and, hence, governed by section 45(5), it cannot be
recharacterised as ‘interest’ merely by relying on the aforesaid amended
provisions. The characterisation of a particular receipt either as
‘compensation’ or ‘interest’ needs to be done independent of these provisions
and one needs to apply these amended provisions only if it has been
characterised as ‘interest’. Therefore, the basis on which the interest payable
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act has been regarded as part of the compensation by the
Supreme Court still prevails and does not get overruled by the aforesaid
amendments.

 

Recently, in the
context of a motor accident claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Bombay
High Court in the case of Rupesh Rashmikant Shah vs. UOI (2019) 417 ITR
169
, after considering the amended provisions of the Income-tax Act,
has held that interest awarded under the said Act as a part of the claim did
not become chargeable to tax merely because of the provision contained in
clause (viii) of section 56(2) of the Income-tax Act. Please see BCAJ Volume
51-A Part 3, page 51 for a detailed analysis of the nature of interest
awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act and the implications of section 56(2)
r/w/s 145A/B thereon. The relevant portion from this decision is reproduced
below:

 

We, therefore, hold that the interest awarded in
the motor accident claim cases from the date of the Claim Petition till the
passing of the award or in case of Appeal, till the judgment of the High Court
in such Appeal, would not be exigible to tax, not being an income. This
position would not change on account of clause (b) of section 145A of the Act
as it stood at the relevant time amended by Finance Act, 2009 which provision
now finds place in sub-section (1) of section 145B of the Act. Neither clause
(b) of section 145A, as it stood at the relevant time, nor clause (viii) of
sub-section (2) of section 56 of the Act, make the interest chargeable to tax
whether such interest is income of the recipient or not.

 

Further, section
2(28A) defines the term ‘interest’ in a manner that includes the interest
payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. In a
case of compulsory acquisition of land, there is obviously no borrowing of
monies. Is there any debt incurred? The ‘incurring’ of the debt, if at all,
arises only on grant of the award for enhanced compensation. Before the award
for the enhanced compensation, there is really no debt that can be said to have
been incurred in favour of the person receiving compensation. In fact, till
such time as the enhanced compensation is awarded there is no certainty about
the eligibility to it, leave alone the quantum of the compensation. This is
also one of the reasons in support of the argument that the amount so awarded
u/s 28 of the 1894 Act cannot be construed as ‘interest’ even when it is
referred to as ‘interest’ therein.

 

It is important to
appreciate the objective for the introduction of the amendments in sections
56(2), 57(iv) and 145A/B which was to provide for the year in which interest
otherwise taxable is to be taxed. This objective is explained in clear terms by
Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010 issued by the CBDT for
explaining the objective behind the introduction. The relevant paragraph of the
Circular reads as under:

 

‘The existing provisions
of Income Tax Act, 1961, provide that income chargeable under the head
“Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from
other sources”, shall be computed in accordance with either cash or
mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Further the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Smt. Rama
Bai vs. CIT (1990) 84 CTR (SC) 164 : (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)
has held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation shall be taxable on accrual basis. This has caused undue hardship
to the taxpayers. With a view to mitigate the hardship, section 145A is amended
to provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation or
enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his income for the year in which it
was received, irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the
assessee.

Further, clause
(viii) is inserted in sub-section (2) of the section 56 so as to provide that
income by way of interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation
referred to in clause (b) of section 145A shall be assessed as “income
from other sources” in the year in which it is received.’

 

In the
circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of clause (viii) of section 56
and clause (iv) of section 57 and section 145A/B are not the charging sections
in respect of interest under consideration and their scope is limited to
defining the year of taxation of a receipt which is otherwise characterised as
interest.

 

The amendment as noted by the Gujarat High Court was brought about by the
Legislature to alleviate the difficulty that arose due to the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 400
wherein it was held that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced
compensation should be taxable on accrual basis in the respective years of
accrual. It was to mitigate this hardship that section 145A was amended to
provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation or enhanced
compensation shall be deemed to be his income for the year in which it was
received, irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the assessee. By
relying upon this clarification, the Gujarat High Court held that the concerned
amendments by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 were not in connection with the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Ghanshyam (HUF) case but was
brought in to mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on account of the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Rama Bai case.

 

Summing up, it is appropriate to not decide
the taxability or otherwise and also the head of taxation simply on the basis
of the nomenclature used in the relevant law under which the payment is made,
of compensation or enhanced compensation or interest, whatever the case may be.
The receipt for it to be classified as ‘interest’ or ‘compensation’ should be
tested on the touchstone of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The better
view, in our considered opinion, is the view expressed by the Gujarat High
Court that the interest received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
should be taxed as capital gains in accordance with the provisions of section
45(5), subject to the exemption provided in section 10(37), and not as
interest, and no tax at source should be deducted therefrom u/s 194A.

CARO 2020 – ENHANCED AUDITOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

BACKGROUND

The MCA in
exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (11) of section 143 of
the Companies Act, 2013 has issued Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CARO 2020’) on 25th February, 2020
which was initially applicable for audit reports relating to F.Y. 2019-2020.
However, the corona pandemic rescued the CA’s as its applicability has been
deferred to the financial years starting on or after 1st April,
2020. The legacy of such reporting by auditors dates back to 1988 when it first
started with reporting on about 24 clauses under the Manufacturing and Other
Companies (Auditors Report) Order, 1988. However, with the passage of time,
such reporting has seen many amendments; the reporting was reduced to 12
clauses in 2015 but then increased to 16 in 2016. With the changing
environment, increasing corporate scams and misstatements in financial
reporting by corporates, the authorities felt the need for the auditors of
companies to provide greater insight and information to the stakeholders and
users on specific matters relating to financial statements and business, which
has given rise to CARO 2020. The order now requires auditors to report on
various matters contained in 21 clauses and 38 sub-clauses.

 

APPLICABILITY

The applicability and exemptions
to certain classes of companies remain the same as in the predecessor CARO
2016. The non-applicability of CARO reporting to consolidated financial
statements also remains the same with only one change which requires
reporting by the auditor of the parent company of adverse comments in CARO
reports of all the companies forming part of its consolidation.

 

ANALYSIS OF
AMENDMENTS IN CARO 2020

There are mainly 30 changes
which consist of four new clauses, three clauses reintroduced
from earlier versions of CARO, 14 new sub-clauses and nine
modifications to existing clauses.
The Table below gives
details of all such clauses along with the responsibility of the auditor for
auditing and reporting in brief which is based on the guidance note issued by
ICAI.

 

 

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

1

3(i)(a)(A)
& (B)Modified and split into two
sub-clauses

(A)
Whether the company is maintaining proper records showing full particulars
including quantitative details and situation of property, plant &
equipment (PPE).

(B)
Whether the company is maintaining proper records showing full particulars
of Intangible Assets.

(i)
There is effectively no change here except for change in terminology to make
it compliant with revised Schedule III terminology (i.e., from fixed assets
to PPE and
Intangible Assets)

 

(ii)
Right of use assets (‘ROU’) as defined in Ind AS 116 – Leases, Investment
property
as per Ind AS 40 and non-current assets held for sale as per Ind
AS 105 are required to be considered for the purpose of reporting under this
clause

(Page
17 & 18 of GN)

2

3(i)(c)
Modified

Whether
title deeds of immovable properties are held in the name of the company

The
revision in the clause requires the following additional
details in cases where title deed is not in the name of the company:


Name of the person as per title deed and whether he is promoter, director,
their relative, or employee of the company


Period (range) for which the property is held by above person


Reason for not being held in the name of the company (also indicate if any
dispute)

Documents
which are generally referred to for checking the owner in case of immovable
property are registered sale deed / transfer deed / conveyance deed, etc.

 

In
case of mortgaged immovable properties, auditor may obtain confirmation from
Banks / FI with whom the
 same is mortgaged

 

 

 

 

(Page
33 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

3

3(i)(d)
New

Whether
company has revalued its PPE, ROU, Intangible Assets. If yes, whether such
revaluation is based on valuation by registered valuer. Also, auditor is required
to specify the change in amounts if it is 10% or more of net block of
respective class of PPE or Intangible Assets

It
may be noted that reporting under this clause would be limited to revaluation
model since under cost model revaluation is not permitted. Further, reporting
under this clause will cover both upward and downward revaluation under
revaluation model. Changes to ROU assets due to lease modifications under Ind
AS 116 are not considered as revaluation and hence not required to be reported

 

(Page
37 of GN)

4

3(i)(e)
New

Whether
any proceedings have been initiated or are pending against the company for
holding any benami property under The Benami Transactions
(Prohibition) Act, 1988 and rules made thereunder. If so, whether the company
has appropriately disclosed the details in Financial Statements

Following
audit procedures are mainly required for purposes of reporting under the said
clause:


Management inquiries


MRL


Review of legal and professional fees ledger


Minutes of various committee meetings

 

Following
disclosures are required to be given in financial statements with respect to benami
properties:


Nature


Carrying value


Status of proceedings


Consequential impact on financials including liability that may arise in case
proceedings are decided against the company (also, if liability is required
to be provided or shown as contingent liability)

 

The
reporting is not required if the company is the beneficial owner of the benami
property

 

(Page
40 of GN)

5

3(ii)(a)
Modified

Whether
the coverage and procedure of physical verification of
inventories by management is appropriate in the
opinion of the auditor

 

Whether
discrepancies of 10% or more were noticed in the aggregate for each
class of inventory during its physical verification and, if so, whether they
have been properly dealt with in the books of accounts

This
is reintroduced from legacy reporting

 

The
10% criterion is to be looked at from value perspective only. All
discrepancies of 10% or more in value for each class of inventory are to be
reported irrespective of materiality threshold for the company

 

 

 

(Page
45 of GN)

6

3(ii)(b)
New

Whether
during any point of time of the year the company has been sanctioned working
capital limits in excess of Rs. 5 crores in aggregate from banks or financial
institutions on the basis of security of the current assets

 

Whether
quarterly returns or statements filed by the company with such banks or
financial institutions are in agreement with the books of accounts of the
company; if not, give details

 


Sanctioned limit (fresh / renewed) is to be considered and not utilised
limits


Non-fund-based limits like LC, BG, etc., are considered as working capital


If utilised limits exceed Rs. 5 crores with sanction below Rs. 5 crores, the
same is not required to be reported


Any unsecured sanctioned limit is to be excluded from reporting


The auditor is just required to match the inventory value as reported in
quarterly returns / statements submitted to banks / FI with value as per
books of accounts and report disagreement, if any. The auditor is not
required to audit the accuracy of the inventory values reported


Quarterly returns / statements to be verified include stock statements, book
debt statements, credit monitoring arrangement reports, ageing analysis of
debtors or other receivables and other financial information to be submitted
to Banks / FI

 

(Page
50 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

7

3(iii)(a)(A)
& (B) – Modified

Whether
company has provided loans or advances in nature of loans or stood guarantee
or provided security to any other entity and, if so, indicate aggregate
amounts of transactions during the year and outstanding as at balance sheet
date for subsidiaries, JV, associates and others

Reporting
under this clause is not applicable to companies whose principal business is
to give loans

The
better way would be to disclose the requisite details in financial statements
and give reference in CARO

 

The
format of reporting is given in GN issued by ICAI on page 60

 

 

(Page
54 of GN)

8

3(iii)(e)
New

Whether
any loans or advance in nature of loans granted which have fallen due during
the year, have been renewed or extended or fresh loans granted to settle the
overdues. If so, specify aggregate amounts of such fresh / renewed loans
granted and % of such loans to total loans as at balance
sheet date.

Reporting
under this clause is not applicable to companies whose principal business is
to give loans

The
objective of reporting on this clause is to identify instances of
ever-greening of loans / advances in
nature of loans

 

The auditor should obtain list of all parties to whom
loan or advance in nature of loan has been granted and check for dues with
respect to such loans. The auditor would be required to inquire with respect
to uncleared dues on such loans, if any. If the same are renewed or extended,
it would require reporting under this clause. If they are settled through
receipt of fresh loan, the same would be visible in party’s ledger in the
form of inflow first and outflow thereafter.

Format
for reporting is specified on page 68 of GN

 

(Page
55 of GN)

9

3(iii)(f)
New

Whether
company has granted any loans or advances in nature of loans either repayable
on demand or without specifying any terms or period of repayment, if so,
specify the aggregate amount, % to total loans and aggregate loans granted to
promoters, related parties as defined in section 2(76) of Companies Act, 2013

The auditor should prepare master file containing
party-wise details of various terms and conditions of loans or advances in
nature of loans given and the same should be updated as and when required.
The parties can be tagged as promoter or related party as per definition of
2(69) or 2(76) of the Companies Act, respectively

Format for reporting is specified on page 69 of GN

 

(Page
55 of GN)

10

3(v)
Modified

In
respect of deposits accepted or amounts which are deemed to be deposits,
whether RBI directives or Companies Act sections 73 to 76 have been complied
with. If not, nature of contraventions to be stated along with compliance of
order, if any, passed by CLB / NCLT / RBI etc.

Deemed
deposits as defined under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Companies (Acceptance of
Deposits) Rules, 2014 defines deposits to include any receipt of money by way
of deposit or loan or in any other form, by a company but does not include
amounts specified therein

 

Examine
form DPT-3 filed by the company

 

(Page
75 of GN)

11

3(vii)(a)&(b)
Modified

Whether
company is regular in depositing undisputed statutory dues including
GST
and if not, the extent of arrears of outstanding dues, or if not
deposited on account of dispute, then the amounts involved and the forum
where the dispute is pending shall be mentioned

The
modification is only to the extent of reporting on GST along with other
statutory dues

 

 

(Page
84 of GN)

12

3(viii)
New

Whether
any transactions not recorded in the books of accounts have been surrendered
or disclosed as income during the year in tax assessments under the Income
Tax Act, 1961, if so, whether the previously unrecorded income has been
properly recorded in the books of accounts during the year

Reporting
is required only if the company has voluntarily disclosed in its return or
surrendered during search / seizure. Thus, if addition is made by IT
authorities and the company has disputed such additions, reporting under this
clause is not required

Review
all tax assessments completed during the year and subsequent to balance sheet
date but before signing of auditor’s report

Reporting is also required for adequate disclosure in
financial statements or impact as per AS / Ind AS after due consideration to
exceptional items, materiality, prior period errors, etc.

(Page
98 of GN)

Sr.
No.

Clause
of CARO 2020 (New / Modified / Reintroduced)

New
/ Modified Reporting requirements

Guidance
by ICAI for auditing / reporting on
new requirements

13

3(ix)(a)
Modified

Whether
the company has defaulted in repayment of loans or other borrowings or in the
payment of interest thereon to any lender, if yes, the period and
amount of default to be reported

Preference
share capital would not be considered as borrowings for reporting under this
clause

 

Whether
ICD taken would be considered as borrowings for the purpose of reporting
under this clause will require evaluation

 

(Page
101 of GN)

14

3(ix)(b)
New

Whether
company is a declared wilful defaulter by any bank or FI or other lender

Reporting
under this clause is restricted to wilful defaulter declared by banks or FI
or any other lender (irrespective of whether such bank / FI has lent to the
company) as the same are governed by RBI Master Circular RBI/2014
-15/73DBR.No.CID.BC.57/20.16.003/2014-15 dated 1st July, 2014 on
wilful defaulters

 

The
GN clarifies that such declaration should be restricted to the relevant
financial year under audit till the date of audit report

 

With
respect to wilful defaults to other lenders, the same would be reported only
if the government authority declares the company as wilful defaulter

 

Auditor
may check information on websites of credit information companies like CIBIL,
CRIF, Equifax and Experian. Auditors may also check RBI websites, CRICIL
database and information available in public domain

 

(Page
106 of GN)

15

3(ix)(d)
Reintroduced

Whether
funds raised on short-term basis have been utilised for long-term purposes,
if yes, the nature and amount to be indicated

Practical
approach to verify such a possibility is to analyse the cash flow position
containing overall sources and application of funds. Also, certain companies
do follow the Asset Liability Management department which tracks the maturity
lifecycle of different assets and liabilities

 

Review
of bank statements specifically during the period of receipt of short-term
loans / working capital loans and its application thereafter can sometimes
provide direct nexus between receipts and application

 

(Page
114 of GN)

16

3(ix)(e)
New

Whether
the company has taken any funds from an entity or person on account of or to
meet obligations of its subsidiaries, associates, or JV, if so, details thereof
with nature of such transactions and amount in each case

First
check point would be whether loans or advances are given during the year or
investments (equity or debt) are made in order to meet obligations of
subsidiaries, associates, or JV. Reporting under this clause would cover
funds taken from all entities and not restricted to banks and FIs. The
reference details could be disclosure of related party transactions

Format
for reporting is specified on page 120 of GN

 

(Page
117 of GN)

17

3(ix)(f)
New

Whether
the company has raised loans during the year on pledge of securities held in
its subsidiaries, JV, associates, if so, give details thereof and also report
if the company has defaulted in repayment of such loans

The
reporting may be cross-referenced to
reporting under 3(ix)(a)

Format
for reporting is specified on page 123-124 of GN

 

(Page
120 of GN)

18

3(xi)
– Modified

Whether
any fraud by the company or any fraud on the company has been noticed or
reported during the year, if yes, the nature and amount involved to be
indicated

The
modification has widened the reporting responsibility of the auditor by
removing the specific requirement of reporting on frauds by the officers or
employees of the company. Thus, all frauds by the company or on the company
should be reported here

The
auditor is not responsible to discover the fraud. His responsibility is
limited to reporting on frauds if he has noticed any during the course of his
audit or if management has identified and reported

Auditor
should review minutes of meetings of various committees, internal auditors
report, etc., to identify if frauds were discussed or reported. Additionally,
the auditor will also have to obtain written representations from management
while reporting under this clause

Reporting
under this clause will not relieve the auditor from complying with section
143(12) of the Companies Act which is specifically covered by new clause
3(xi)(b) as given below

 

(Page
138 of GN)

19

3(xi)(b)
– New

Whether
any report is filed under 143(12) by the auditors in Form ADT-4 as prescribed
in Rule 13 of the Companies (Audit & Auditors) Rules, 2014 with the
Central Government

The
objective of reporting under this clause is to check and report on the
compliance of section 143(12) in terms of reporting of frauds noticed by the
auditors in the company committed by officers or employees of the company to
the Central Government in Form ADT-4 after seeking comments from board /
audit committee (if the amount of fraud exceeds Rs. 1 crore)

 

The
reporting liability under 143(12) also lies with the company secretary
performing secretarial audit, cost accountant doing cost audit and thus
statutory auditor is required to report under this clause reporting by
aforesaid professionals on frauds noticed by them during their audits

 

(Page
144 of GN)

20

3(xi)(c)
– New

Whether
the auditor has considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during
the year by the company

The
objective of reporting under this clause is to make the auditor confirm that
he has gone through all whistle-blower complaints and performed / planned his
audit procedure accordingly, thereby addressing financial statements
presentation or disclosure-related concerns raised by whistle-blowers

 

Check
whether requirement of whistle-blower mechanism is mandated by law [SEBI LODR
and section 177(9) of the Companies Act]

 

If
the same is not mandated by law, the auditor may ask from the management all
the whistle-blower complaints received and action taken on the same

 

(Page
147 of GN)

21

3(xiv)(a)
– Reintroduced

Whether
the company has an internal audit system commensurate with the size and
nature of its business

The
auditor should evaluate the internal audit function / system like size of
internal audit team, the scope covered in the internal audit, internal audit
structure, professional compatibility of the team performing internal audits,
reporting responsibility, independence, etc., to comment on the above clause

 

(Page
161 of GN)

22

3(xiv)(b)
– New

Whether
the reports of the Internal Auditors for the period under audit were
considered by the statutory auditor

The
objective of reporting under this clause is just to obtain confirmation from
the statutory auditor that he has gone through the internal audit reports and
considered implications of its observations on the financial statements, if
any. Reporting under this clause will require the auditor to coordinate
closely with the Internal Auditor so that he considers the work done by the
Internal Auditor for his audit purposes, compliance with SA 610 (Revised);
‘Using the Work of Internal Auditors’, is mandatory for the statutory auditor

 

(Page
167 of GN)

23

3(xvi)(b)
– New

Whether
the company has conducted any non-banking finance or housing finance
activities without valid Certificate of Registration (CoR) from RBI

The
auditor is required to first identify whether the company is engaged in
non-banking financial or housing financial activities. If yes, the auditor
should discuss with management with regards to registration requirements of
RBI for such companies and report accordingly

 

(Page
181 of GN)

24

3(xvi)(c)
– New

Whether
the company is Core Investment Company (CIC) as defined by RBI regulations
and whether it continues to fulfil the criteria of CIC. If the company is
exempted or unregistered CIC, whether it continues to fulfil the exemption
criteria

The
auditor is required to identify whether the activities carried on by the
company, assets composition as at previous year-end, etc., satisfy the
conditions for it to be considered as CIC

 

He
should also go through RBI Master Direction – Core Investment Companies
(Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 which are applicable to all CIC

 

(Page
183 of GN)

25

3(xvi)(d)
– New

Whether
the group has more than one CIC as part of the group, if yes, indicate number
of CIC’s which are part of the group

Companies
in the group are defined in Core Investment Companies (Reserve Bank)
Directions

 

(Page
187 of GN)

26

3(xvii)
– Reintroduced

Whether
the company has incurred cash losses in the financial year and in the
immediately preceding financial year, if so, state the amount of cash losses

The
term cash loss is not defined in the Act, accounting standards and Ind AS.
Thus, for accounting standards compliant companies it can be calculated by
making adjustments of transactions of non-cash nature like depreciation,
impairment, etc., to profit / loss after tax figure

 

Similarly,
for Ind AS companies, profit / loss (excluding OCI) can be adjusted for
non-cash transactions like depreciation, lease amortisation or impairment.
Further, cash profits / cash losses realised and recognised in OCI (not
reclassified to P&L) should be adjusted to above profit / loss to arrive
at cash profit / loss for the company

 

Adjustments
like deferred tax, foreign exchange gain / loss and fair value changes should
also be given effect to since they are non-cash in nature

 

(Page
189 of GN)

27

3(xviii)
– New

Whether
there has been any resignation of the statutory auditors during the year, if
so, whether the auditor has taken into consideration the issues, objections
or concerns raised by the outgoing auditors

The
reporting on this clause is applicable where a new auditor is appointed
during the year to fill a casual vacancy under 140(2) of the Act

 

The
incoming auditor who is required to report on this clause should take into
account the following before reporting on this clause,

•ICAI
code of ethics


Reasons stated by the outgoing auditor in Form ADT-3 filed with ROC in
compliance with 140(2) read with Rule 8


Implementation guide by ICAI on resignation / withdrawal from engagement to
perform audit of financial statements


Compliance with SEBI Circular applicable for auditors of listed companies

 

(Page
191 of GN)

28

3(xix)
– New

On
the basis of the financial ratios, ageing and expected dates of realisation
of financial assets and payments of financial liabilities, other information
accompanying the financial statements, the auditor’s knowledge of the board
of directors and management plans, whether the auditor is of the opinion that
no material uncertainty exists as on the date of audit report that company is
capable of meeting its liabilities existing as at balance sheet date as and
when they fall due within period of one year from balance sheet date


Prepare list of liabilities with due dates falling within next one year


Check payments subsequent to balance sheet date till the date of issuing
auditors report


Obtain plan from management indicating realisable value of assets and
payments of liabilities


Ratios to be considered are current ratio, acid-test ratio, cash ratio, asset
turnover ratio, inventory turnover ratios, accounts receivable ratio, etc.


Other details which should be obtained from management post-balance sheet
date are MIS, cash flow projections, etc.

 

Adverse
reporting under this clause should have similar reporting in the main report
regarding going concern as specified in SA 570

 

(Page
196 of GN)

29

3(xx)(a)
– New

Whether
in respect of other than ongoing projects, the company has transferred
unspent amount to a fund specified in schedule VII of the Companies Act
within a period of six months of expiry of the F.Y. in compliance with 135(5)
of the Companies Ac.

The
auditor should ask the management to prepare a project-wise report on amounts
spent during the year and considered under CSR activities

 

(Page
204 of GN)

 

Clause
(a) requires unspent amount not relating to any ongoing project to be
transferred to specified fund as per schedule VII of the Act and Clause (b)
requires unspent amount relating to ongoing projects to be transferred to
special bank account opened for CSR activities

 

(Page
209 of GN)

30

3(xx)(b)
– New

Whether
any amount remaining unspent under 135(5) of the Companies Act, pursuant to
any ongoing project has been transferred to special account in compliance
with 135(6) of the Companies Act

 

 

CONCLUSION

The additional reporting
requirements would require additional details from the management and thus it
is very important that an auditor should have a dialogue with the management
immediately for the latter to gear up. It is also important for the auditor to
understand the process followed by the management for collection and processing
of the required information and its control environment which will give him
comfort while complying with the reporting requirements. Lastly, it is
important for the auditor to take suitable management representations wherever
accuracy and completeness of information provided by the management cannot be
confirmed by the auditor to safeguard his position. The auditor would have to
factor in additional time for reporting and the documentation will have to be
robust and fool-proof for future reference and as a safeguard against the
enhanced reporting responsibility. Lastly, reporting under CARO 2020 will no
longer remain a tick-in-the-box procedure or boilerplate reporting.
 

 

 

VALUE ADDITION IN INTERNAL AUDIT

BACKGROUND

If one looks for a common definition of ‘value add’, it is the
difference between the price of a product or service and the cost of producing
it. The price is determined by what customers are willing to pay based on their
perceived value. Value is added or created in different ways.

 

Historically, Internal Audit is treated as a ‘cost centre’ rather than a
‘value-added process’. That’s because the definition of ‘value add’ can vary
from one firm / audit department to another. Mostly, it means improving the
business rather than just looking at compliance with policies and procedures.
But what is ‘value add’ to one practitioner may be different to another practitioner
of internal audit. So how does one establish what is ‘value add’? This will be
different in every case and also for each organisation. It has become common
for most practitioners to claim that they deliver ‘value-added’ internal audit
services, and for most stakeholders to speak of availing of ‘value-added’
internal audit services. The question, therefore, is ‘how does an internal
auditor or internal audit team / department add value’ in a particular
assignment or to the organisation?

 

Broadly speaking, adding value would be based on the competencies and
personal qualities of the internal auditor and what is being delivered.

 

James Roth, who has done significant work in this area and published
papers and written books on the subject, in his paper How Do Internal
Auditors Add Value
identified four factors that can help internal
auditors determine what will add value to their organisation –

1. A deep knowledge of the
organisation, including its culture, key players and competitive environment.

2. The courage to innovate in ways
stakeholders don’t expect and may not think they want.

3. A broad knowledge of those
practices that the profession, in general, considers value added.

4. The creativity to adapt
innovations to the organisation in ways that yield surprising results and
exceed stakeholders’ expectations.

 

Based on our experience in conducting internal audits in a number of
organisations in India and abroad and speaking to a number of Chief Audit
Executives, including 14 top CAEs in the country being interviewed and a book Best
Practices by Leading Chief Audit Executives – Making a Difference
published
with respect to best practices in their respective departments, we are giving
here a few key practices which would go a long way in providing ‘value add’ to
organisations. The internal auditor would then be welcomed and respected by the
top management and treated as a trusted business adviser.

 

IMPROVING CONTROLS OR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE FOR THE ORGANISATION

Normally, internal audit would include examination of financial and
operational information and evaluation of internal controls of significant
processes (ICFR / ICoFR). In terms of presentation to management and the Audit
Committee, the internal auditor would be presenting the risks and controls
evaluated for significant processes and non-conformance thereof with an action
plan to mitigate the non-conformance.

 

The question arises whether in practice the
stakeholders would be happy to get an assurance on controls alone or would they
value improving performance for the organisation. Improving performance would
mean measurable revenue growth or cost savings due to the work carried out by
the internal audit service provider. This is always a point of debate, whether
an internal audit work should be gauged by the cost savings and / or revenue
growth due to work directly carried out by them. From numerous interviews with
CAEs and our practical work in the field with organisations, it is clear that
improving performance is considered a ‘value add’ by stakeholders and is much
appreciated and valued. This does not mean that the internal audit would not be
evaluating internal controls but would mean focus on improving performance to
enhance the value of the internal audit service being delivered.

 

Consider the following cases:

Improving performance –
cost savings in procurement (a pharmaceutical company case)

A medium-sized pharmaceutical company with a yearly turnover of around
Rs. 1,200 crores is facing tough times due to the current pandemic as its
revenue has fallen by 35%. The outsourced partner of the internal audit firm is
approached by the management and helps constitute a team consisting of two
senior procurement officials, a cost accountant, one senior production official
and a senior internal auditor who has been working with the firm and deputed to
this client and having experience in the company processes; together, they go
through all major procurement items to identify areas for cost savings /
rationalisation.

 

A number of questions are raised with the aim of cost savings:

(i)         Are we buying from
authorised vendors, for example, bearings?

(ii)        What would be the
profit margins of vendors from whom we buy imported material – could we work
with them to reduce the cost of procurement of such material?

(iii) Could we substitute some materials being procured to reduce costs
without affecting quality?

(iv) Who are the vendors supplying to our competitors and what material
is being sourced by them? Are their procurement costs cheaper or is their
quality better?

(v)        Could we reduce our EOQ
without affecting costs and our production schedule – improve the working
capital and thereby reduce costs?

 

The team made a presentation on the progress to the top management every
fortnight. In an exercise over two and a half months, by analysing data,
raising the right questions and working on a number of parameters, the team was
able to effectively save Rs. 22 crores in procurement costs without compromising
on quality or service parameters. This was considered as a ‘value add’ for the
team, and especially for the partner of the outsourced chartered accountant
firm.

 

This may be considered as a special assignment but the point being made
is ‘what do the organisation / stakeholders require and is it being delivered
by the internal auditor / internal audit firm?’ In this particular case, the
internal audit was considered ‘value add’ and it would be welcomed and
respected by the stakeholders.

 

Improving performance –
mid-review of expansion project (an engineering company case)

In a new project expansion being executed by a large engineering
organisation, the internal auditor requested that the management allow his team
to carry out a mid-review of the project. Since the internal audit firm was
associated with the organisation for the last few years, the management liked
the idea of a mid-review as the costs for implementing the expansion were quite
high.

 

The internal audit team conducted the review – the estimates, project
plan including time and cost estimates, current time and cost incurred (all
purchase orders for materials and services, materials and services received to
date, consumption, all payments made, etc.), statutory compliances with respect
to procurement and site work, sanctions with respect to bank loans and current
utilisation (including all foreign loans and hedging).

 

The internal audit team highlighted a likely delay in procurement that
could lead to the overall project being delayed, higher costs in a few
procurement areas where similar work carried out in earlier years had been
executed at lower costs, and lapses in statutory compliances. This resulted in
the project being brought back on track in terms of time and cost. The
inspection schedule for outsourced fabricated items was increased, meetings
with vendors commissioning the project were handled at a higher level and some
re-negotiation on the procurement items was undertaken. Statutory compliances
were all competed.

 

Again, this was a value addition because of an independent review by the
internal auditor. Had this been done at the end, it would only have been a
post-mortem and provided ‘learnings’ for the future. In this case, the review
actually resulted in improving performance by having the project being executed
in time with minimal time and little cost overrun.

 

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH OTHER FUNCTIONS

It is important for the internal auditor to forge an alliance with other
functions in the organisation rather than work in isolation. There are other
functions like HSE – Health, Safety & Environment, Risk Management, Legal
& Compliance, Quality, IS or Information Security. All these are also
support functions providing much-needed assurance and governance support to line
functions.

 

Why does the internal audit function have to ‘reinvent’ the wheel? A
strategic alliance with other assurance functions would enable the internal
auditor to

i)   Benefit from work already
being carried out by other function/s and avoid repetition

ii) Have better understanding of
the risks and controls of the process under review

iii)        Make the internal audit
review comprehensive, building and learning from the work carried out by other
functions

iv)        Collaborate to jointly
carry out a review of the technical areas where the other assurance functions
would have better understanding of the process under review.

 

Consider the case where the internal auditor carrying out the review of
the production process first contacted the management representative for ISO
9000 Quality Standard and had a look at the number of non-conformities and
corrective action-taken reports of various issues highlighted by the ISO
auditor for the production process during the entire year.

 

THE INTERNAL AUDIT PROCESS – TRANSPARENCY AND
COMMUNICATION

The entire process from communicating objectives, field work – obtaining
data, analysing data, etc. and communicating final results should be a
transparent exercise. The internal auditor has to be working with auditees /
process owners throughout the life cycle of the internal audit project. There
is nothing to hide as the objectives for the auditee / process owner and the
internal auditor are the same.

 

To bring transparency in the process it will be necessary to communicate
continuously with the auditee team regarding

(a) what are the objectives

(b) what data is required

(c)        what will be achieved at
the end

(d) how can performance of the business be improved due to the internal
audit exercise being carried out for the process under review

(e) what deviations / bottlenecks are being found which can be improved
upon

(f)        what further data or
expert advice is required to form an opinion on the process under review.

 

These are just some aspects of the process but the idea is to
continuously communicate as if the internal auditor and the auditee / process
owner are working together on the project to improve the performance of the
business.

 

Except when the internal auditor suspects
that there are integrity issues which need to be separately reported and / or
investigated, there has to be complete transparency and the working of the
internal auditor needs to be integrated with that of the auditee / process team
under review.

 

An effective internal audit is the sum total
of a proactive auditor and a participative auditee.
This
will be possible only when the auditor is experienced in business process, and
is also competent, skilled, professional and transparent in his approach. This
would enable the internal auditor to have a participative auditee (it will also
depend on the maturity of the organisation and its culture) which, in turn,
would lead to an effective internal audit.

 

NEGOTIATING THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDIT

It is very important for an internal auditor to negotiate the role of
internal audit.
The idea is to work with management in the journey for business
improvement in terms of better technology for business, technological
upgradation, cost savings and other aspects of governance. For this, the internal
auditor has to negotiate his role and grab the opportunities which come his
way.

 

Let us consider the following cases:

(1) The internal auditor requests the management of a large
geographically-spread organisation to put up an exhibit at the annual event to
showcase the role and capabilities of the internal audit function. The
management was taken aback with this request but was pleasantly surprised with
the exhibit and it was much appreciated.

(2) A CAE feels the need to carry out an
energy audit throughout the organisation at its 22 plants in India. He inducts
an engineer with energy audit knowledge and helps with energy audit in many
plants, leading to tremendous savings in coal and improved efficiency in steam
generation.

(3) An internal audit function hires an
engineer with knowledge of transport trailers / trucks and ensures that a
technical audit is done for each trailer / truck in the organisation’s
transportation business segment where the organisation owned a fleet of trucks
/ trailers. This results in tremendous savings due to increase in the life of
tyres and less consumption of diesel and other consumables, etc.

(4) A mid-sized organisation wants to implement a new ERP and the
internal auditor gives one senior team member who has been with the
organisation for many years and has deep knowledge of the processes as the
internal ‘Project Manager’ for the project. The project is successful with most
requirements built into the new ERP to ease availability of data and
decision-making for the process owners.

 

TECHNOLOGY UPGRADATION AND EDUCATION / AWARENESS TO
BUSINESS

One clear area for ‘value addition’ by internal audit is continuous
education and awareness to process owners whenever the internal auditor engages
with others in the organisation. There would be a number of ways this could
happen – promote benchmarking, make others aware of compliances, speak about
best practices in other parts of the organisation, bring good / best practices
from other non-competing organisations to the process under review.

 

Technology is a great enabler for making available data for
decision-making in the way business is carried out and the internal auditor can
help make changes by spreading awareness for adoption of technology by the
organisation.

(I) An internal auditor worked as
a consultant to bring awareness about technology to Legal and Compliance and to
make the entire process of compliance totally automated with alerts for action
to be taken by the process owners for various compliances and breaches being
brought up in real time.

(II) Similarly, in another instance
they worked with Corporate Communications and Investor Relations in a public
listed organisation to install a system to get a feed from social media about
the company’s reputation / news on a real-time basis.

(III)      Another example is an
internal auditor informing the management of a major hotel property and helping
install software which tracks information on day rates for guests with
competing properties and on popular hotel booking sites. Based on this runs an
algorithm to optimise the day rate for walk-in guests being offered. This
helped in increasing the revenue for the property.

 

CONCLUSION

Each and every practice given above for ‘value addition’ by internal
audit cannot be considered in a silo as a separate ‘to do’ but would overlap
with other practices.

 

It is now time to think afresh and work differently. The internal
auditor should be working with business, forging an alliance with other
processes / functions to improve performance, including productivity, for the
organisation and to bring new thought and innovation to every aspect of
business. There is need for the internal auditor to negotiate his role in the
organisation and be a part of the top management team.

 

Business disruption is leading to change which, in turn, is leading to
opportunity for the internal auditor as the process of internal audit is not
limited to any particular process or area unlike many other processes /
functions in the organisation.

 

STATEMENT RECORDED UNDER PMLA AND OTHER LAWS: WHETHER ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

In a recent
decision of the Supreme Court (Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Cr.
Appeal No. 152/2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)
, the
captioned question was examined in connection with the statement recorded under
the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the
NDPS Act). The Supreme Court held that the officers who are invested with powers
u/s 53 of this Act are police officers and therefore a statement recorded u/s
67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
offence under the NDPS Act.

 

Section 53 of the
NDPS Act empowers the Central Government to invest any officer of the
Department of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any
other department of the Central Government, including para-military forces, or
armed forces, or any class of such officers with the powers of an officer-in-charge
of a police station for investigation of offences under the NDPS Act.

 

The prohibition
that a statement recorded u/s 67 of the Act cannot be used as a confessional
statement has its roots in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence
Act) which provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved
against a person accused of an offence.

 

It is section 53 of
the NDPS Act which distinguishes it from the provisions in other laws perceived
as comparable as regards issue of summons, power to call for information,
enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, etc. If such
comparable provision in other laws (such as, FEMA, PMLA, Customs Act) does not
have wording similar to that of section 53 of the NDPS Act, it would not be
proper to apply the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tofan
Singh (Supra)
to say that the statement recorded by an officer under
such other laws is not admissible as evidence.

 

The purpose of
this article is to analyse the correct legal position to find the answer to the
question whether a statement recorded under PMLA is admissible as evidence.

 

The relevant
aspects of the subject-matter have been reviewed as follows.

 

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF PMLA, CrPC AND EVIDENCE ACT

Section 50(3) of
the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) specifies the
following obligations of the persons summoned:

(a)        To attend in person or through authorised
agents,

(b)        To state the truth with respect to the
subject for which they are examined or they make statements,

(c)        To produce such documents as may be
required.

 

Section 164(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) provides that before
recording any confession, the Magistrate is required to explain to the person
making the statement that he is not bound to make such confession and that if
he does so, it may be used as evidence against him. It further provides that
the Magistrate shall not record the confession unless, upon questioning the
person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

 

The ban in section 25 of the Evidence Act (i.e., no confession made to a
police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence) is
an absolute ban. However, there is no ban on the confession made to any
authority who is not a police officer except when such confession is made while the accused is in police custody.

 

WARNING U/S 164 OF CrPC – RAISON D’ETRE

Section 50(3) of
the PMLA, among others, enjoins upon the person summoned the obligation ‘to
state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined or makes
statement
’. In respect of such obligation of the person summoned, a crucial
question that needs to be addressed is whether the warning u/s 164 of the CrPC
needs to be administered to the person before he makes the statement.

This question has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in various decisions. After a detailed
review, the Supreme Court has laid down important propositions in this matter
and also explained the need and raison d’etre underlying the
administering of such a warning. These propositions may be reviewed as follows.

 

(i)   Section 30 of the Evidence Act does not
limit itself to a confession made to a Magistrate and, therefore, there is no
bar to its application to the statement so recorded. The person who makes the
statement is not excused from speaking the truth on the premise that such a
statement could be used against him. Such requirement is included in the
provision for the purpose of enabling the officer to elicit the truth from the
person being interrogated. There is no involvement of the Magistrate at that
stage1.

(ii)   Warning a person that making a false statement
is an offence cannot be construed to mean exertion of pressure to extract the
statement2.

(iii) Statements
made before the officers are not confessions recorded by the Magistrate u/s 164
of the CrPC. Such statements are not made subject to the safeguard under which
confessions are recorded by a Magistrate. Therefore, it is all the more
necessary to scrutinise such statements to ascertain whether the same were made
under threat from some authority. If such scrutiny reveals that the statements
were voluntary, the same may be received against the maker of the statement in
the same manner as a confession3.

 

PERSON MAKING A STATEMENT – NOT A COMPELLED WITNESS

During the
examination of an accused, an important issue that arises is whether an
accused person can be compelled to be a witness against himself. In this
connection, reference may be made to Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India
which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
However, to invoke such a Constitutional right
guaranteed under Article 20(3) against testimonial compulsion, the following
aspects must be examined4.

 

i)             
Whether a formal accusation has
been made against the person claiming such Constitutional guarantee. At the
stage when an authority issues notice to collect information, there is no
accusation against the person from whom the information is sought. The
information is collected to ascertain whether a formal accusation can be made
against the person. This is decided only after the information is collected and
examined. It is only when a show cause notice is issued that it can be said
that a formal accusation has been made against the person5;

_________________________________________________________________________

        
1      Asst. Coll. C. Ex.
Rajamundry vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

       
2      C. Sampath Kumar
vs. Enforcement Officer [1997] 8 SCC 358

                
3      Haroon Haji Abdulla
vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1968 SC 832


               
4      See: Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs.
Manek [1961] 1 SCR 417

ii) Whether the offence committed by such a person
would result in his prosecution;

iii)         What is the nature of the accusation and
the probable consequence of such an accusation?

iv)         To ascertain whether the statement is
covered within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person must be an accused at
the time when
he made the statement. Therefore, the fact that he became
an accused after making the statement is irrelevant6.

 

OFFICER RECORDING STATEMENT – WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER

In respect of the
statement recorded u/s 50 of the PMLA, the crucial issue which requires
consideration is whether the officer who records such a statement is a police
officer for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Section 25
provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against
a person accused of any offence. The provisions perceived as comparable to
section 50 of the PMLA are also found in the following statutes:

(1) Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999.

(2) Customs Act,
1962.

(3) Central Excise
Act, 1944.

(4) NDPS Act, 1985.

 

Accordingly, the
decisions of courts in respect of such apparently comparable sections in other
laws may provide a useful reference. The language of the relevant provisions in
the abovementioned laws must be carefully examined and compared with that of
section 50 of the PMLA before relying on the decisions based on the
corresponding provision in the other laws. In this context, some important
propositions laid down by the Courts are reviewed as follows:

 

(A)  
The crucial test to ascertain
whether an officer recording a statement under a Special Act (such as PMLA) is
a police officer is to check whether such officer is vested with all
powers exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC qua
investigation of offences under the CrPC Such powers include the power to
initiate prosecution by submitting a report or chargesheet u/s 173 of the CrPC.
It is not sufficient to show that such officer exercises some or many
powers of a police officer conducting investigation under the CrPC. If he does
not exercise all such powers, such officer would not be regarded
as a police officer7.

___________________________________________

5   Bhagwandas Goenka vs. Union of India: AIR
1963 SC 26

6   State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad [1962] 3
SCR 10

 

 

(B)  An officer under the Customs
Act, 1962
is empowered to check smuggling of goods, ascertain contravention
of provisions of the Customs Act, to adjudicate on such contravention, realise
customs duty and for non-payment of duty on confiscated smuggled goods and
impose penalty. The Customs Officer does not have power to submit a report to
the Magistrate u/s 173 of the CrPC because he cannot investigate an offence
triable by a Magistrate. He can only file a complaint before the Magistrate.

 

It is, thus,
evident that the officer recording a statement under the Customs Act does not
exercise all such powers. Accordingly, a Customs Officer is not a
police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Consequently, the statements made before a Customs Officer by a person against
whom such officer makes an inquiry are not covered by the said section and are,
therefore, admissible in evidence8.

 

(C)  While investigating offences under the PMLA,
the Director and other officers do not have all powers
exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station under the CrPC. For
example, they do not have the power to submit a report u/s 173 of the CrPC.
Hence, the officers recording a statement u/s 50 of the PMLA are not ‘police
officers’. Accordingly, they are not hit by the prohibition in section 25 of
the Evidence Act. Consequently, a statement recorded before such officers is
admissible as evidence9.

 

(D) On similar grounds, it has been held that an
officer functioning under FERA (having similar powers as under FEMA) cannot be
considered a police officer10.

 

(E)  In a recent decision11 concerning
the provisions of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court examined important aspects
such as fundamental rights and the NDPS Act, confessions u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act, provisions contained in the NDPS Act, the scope of section 67 of the NDPS
Act (power to call for information, etc.) and whether an officer designated u/s
53 of the NDPS Act (power to invest officers of certain departments with powers
of officer-in-charge of a police station) can be said to be a police officer.
After such examination, the Supreme Court held as follows:

____________________________________________________________

7   Balkishan vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981
SC 379

8   State of Punjab vs. Barkatram: AIR 1962 SC
276; Rameshchandra Mehta vs. State of WB: AIR 1970 SC 940; Veera Ibrahim vs.
State of Maharashtra [1976] 2 SCC 302; Percy Rustomji Basta vs. State of
Maharashtra [1971] 1 SCC 847

9   Virbhadra Singh vs. ED (MANU/DEL/1813/2015)
(Del. HC)

10  P.S. Barkathali vs. DoE AIR 1981 Ker 81; also
see Emperor vs. Nanoo [1926] 28 Bom LR 1196; 51 Bom 78 (FB)

11    Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 decided on 29th October, 2020)

 

  • the officers who are invested
    with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are ‘police officers’ within the meaning of
    section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement
    made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence
    Act and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the
    NDPS Act;
  •   a statement recorded u/s 67
    of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an
    offence under the NDPS Act.

 

SUPREME
COURT SOUNDS A NOTE OF CAUTION REGARDING EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF STATEMENT
RECORDED BY THE OFFICER

The raison
d’etre
for section 25 of the Evidence Act (that the statement recorded by a
police officer is not admissible as evidence) is to avoid the risk of the
allegation that such a statement was obtained under coercion and torture.

 

In the preceding heading, the aspects, such as whether the officer
recording the statement under a particular statute is a police officer and
whether such statement is admissible as evidence as examined by Courts, have
been reviewed in detail in connection with various statutes.

 

The Supreme Court has sounded a note of
caution in respect of the statement made by a person to an officer who is not a
police officer, and which is accordingly not hit by the ban u/s 25 of the Evidence
Act. Such statement must be scrutinised by the Court to ascertain whether the
same was voluntary or whether it was obtained by inducement, threat or promise
in terms of the tests laid down in section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such
statement is impaired on the touchstone of such tests, the same would be
inadmissible12.

________________________________________________________

12  Asst. Coll. of C. Ex. Rajamundry vs. Duncan
Agro Industries Ltd. [2000] 120 ELT 280 (SC)

 

CORPORATE LAW IN INDIA – PROMOTING EASE OF DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT DILUTING STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

The sheer size
of corporates combined with the volatile stock markets has made corporate
performance the barometer of a country’s economic sentiment, and India is no
exception to this. In the last three decades, continuous measures to deregulate
the corporate sector were driven by the desire to attract investments to
accelerate economic growth. This was interrupted by new regulatory measures
introduced to prevent corporate scandals that erupted periodically from
recurrence. Seen through this lens, it appears that deregulation, which now
goes by the phrase promoting ‘Ease of Doing Business’ and protecting
stakeholders’ interests are contradictory as evidenced by the periodic swings
in the regulatory environment from promoting Ease of Doing Business to
protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and back.

 

This article
seeks to examine the validity of a perceived conflict between promoting Ease of
Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders’ Interests and explores potential
avenues to reconcile the two by taking a historical view. It is structured in
four parts:

 

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the pre-corporate era;

Promoting
business and protecting stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era;

Indian
regulatory initiatives in the 21st century;
and

Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with Protecting Stakeholders’ interests in the corporate
world.

 

Part 1: Promoting Business and Protecting
Stakeholders’ Interests in the pre-corporate era

Despite
appearing contradictory, in the transport sector the progress in braking technology
was a key prerequisite for quicker and faster transport of goods and people.
Likewise, protecting stakeholders’ interest is a prerequisite to promote
economic activity in a society. This can be seen in the evolution of the three
key commercial concepts that boosted economic growth, namely, (i) Recognition
of private property, (ii) Use of commercial lending and borrowing, and (iii)
Advent of corporate entities for conducting business.

 

Table 1: Commercial concepts that promoted
economic activity

 

Key commercial
concept

Promoting economic activity

Protecting stakeholders’
interest

Benefit
derived

Private property as distinct
from personal property

Ownership without possession led
to rental agreements increasing the use of assets

Defining theft and robbery, with
stringent penal action for defaulters, thereby protecting the owners’
interest

Development of agriculture and
trade then, and protection of intellectual properties now to fuel economic
growth

Commercial lending and borrowing
for interest

Defined norms for recording of
loan of goods or money to enforce promises made

Penalty for defaulting borrower:
bonded labour, debtors’ prison and 
disqualification from political and 
commercial activities to protect lenders’ interest

Credit sales and asset creation
using borrowed funds to fuel accelerated economic growth

Limited liability companies with
transferable shares

Liquidity to shareholders
without disrupting the business that enabled a larger number of investors to
collaborate

Reporting transparency,
regulation of related party transactions and insider trading to ensure fair
value for shareholders who wanted to exit by selling their shares at any
point in time

Creation of large multi-national
companies and ability to undertake economic activities with long gestation
period

 

 

The first
impetus to economic growth came with private property. Recognition of private
property resulted in ownership without possession by penalising theft and
robbery which can negate the owners’ rights. This enabled individuals to
undertake economic activities on a larger scale and with a longer gestation
period by assuring them that the rewards of their labour will be secured for
their own benefits. It resulted in human societies shifting from hunting and
gathering to agriculture where there is a time lag of a few days to weeks or
months between ploughing and harvesting of crops, which promoted production in
excess of consumption required by the individuals or their families. At a later
stage, this protection against theft and robbery promoted trade by assuring
travelling merchants the safety of their goods when they moved it from place of
production to places of consumption.

 

In the digital
economy of the 21st century, as the nature of assets changed, recognition
of private property is visible in the clamour for protection of Intellectual
Property (IP) that comes from technology companies and Startups who invest
their efforts in creating it. As a result, economies that protected IPs like
the USA and Europe have had accelerated economic growth and other economies
have since emulated them by enacting enforceable IP laws to promote local IP
creation.

 

The second impetus to economic growth came
from the use of credit for commercial activities which pulled in future demand
into the present time. For long periods in human history, lending and borrowing
were in the realm of social activity, where an individual or a household in
short supply would borrow their daily necessities from their neighbours. In the
social realm, the quantity borrowed and the quantity returned were the same. As
the goods borrowed changed from items of daily necessities to seeds for farming
and goods / money for trade, the concept of interest emerged. The borrowers
induced the lenders to part with their valuables by promising them a share of
their gains. Being a voluntary act motivated by profit, the lenders wanted an
assurance that the borrowers would honour their promise.

 

Given the
substantial benefits that accrue to the society, in the early stages regulators
created deterrents like bonded labour and imprisonment for the defaulting
borrowers. In later stages it took the form of enacting insolvency and
bankruptcy laws like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that India enacted in
2016 which empowers lenders to enforce the promise made by the borrowers by
taking control of their assets.

 

Progress in enacting and enforcing the
Intellectual Property laws and enabling quick recovery of loans shows the
primary role played by private property and commercial lending in accelerating
economic activity. This rule of law is a primary prerequisite for economic
development and growth. At the next level, economic activity can be further
accelerated by ensuring good governance which has two components – political
governance and corporate governance, which is reflected in the social and moral
ethos of society even though its roots can be traced back to regulatory
enactments.

 

Part 2: Promoting business and protecting
stakeholders’ interests in the corporate era

By combining the three concepts of joint
ownership, limited liability and transferability of shares in one commercial
entity, which is the joint stock companies, the foundation was laid for rapid
and sustained economic progress. This new entity enabled collaboration among
large numbers of investors to undertake projects of longer gestation periods,
which would have been unimaginable without joint stock companies. This boon,
however, is not without reservations as it comes with significant drawbacks
that are visible in the periodic corporate scandals that have erupted across
the globe due to misuse of the limited liability provision combined with the
separation of ownership from operational controls.

 

Corporate scandals seen in the last five
centuries can be traced to one of these three elements – (a) indiscreet use of
corporate assets, (b) diversion of corporate assets for personal use, or (c)
misuse of corporate business information for personal gains. These concerns are
not new and were expressed when the first company was created. However, these
concerns were overlooked as the economic benefit from these companies was
substantial. The very first joint stock company was formed in the year 1553 in
London to find a trade route to China through the North Seas, although it ended
up finding a profitable trade opportunity with Russia. It sought to address
these concerns by prescribing three basic qualifications of ‘sad, discreet and
honest’ for their directors who held operational control of the company. While
discreet and honest are self-explanatory, the word ‘sad’ is derived from the
word ‘sated or satisfied’, to denote a satisfied individual who would take care
of the interest of minority shareholders and other stakeholders without
diluting it for his own personal interests.

 

Table
2: Major regulatory initiatives in corporate law

 

Year

Regulatory initiative

Trigger

Protection to stakeholders

1856

The
Limited Liability Companies Act, England

Need
for larger investments in manufacturing facilities due to the industrial
revolution using steam power that required collaboration by a larger number
of investors

Brought
in the concept of ‘perfect publicity’. This phrase was used for transparent
reporting at that time, to protect minority shareholders and other
stakeholders

1890s

Concept
of private limited companies introduced in England

Excessive
regulations for incorporating companies mandated due to the outrage triggered
by the Solomon vs. Solomon case where the promoter as debenture holder was
repaid ahead of unsecured creditors, who remained unpaid

A
private company had legal restrictions placed on the method of fund-raising
and free transfer of shares to prevent investors who are not connected with
promoters from participation

1932

Securities
Exchange Commission, USA

Need
for capital infusion to revive the US economy that shrank by more than a
quarter, i.e. 27%, following the 1929 stock market crash

Insider
trading was defined as illegal to encourage retail investors to invest,
thereby reviving the economy

1961

Outcome
of the case of Cady Roberts & Co., USA

Rampant
misuse of information by outsiders with inside information

Brought
‘outsiders’ with insider information under regulatory purview to protect
retail and institutional investors

1992

Cadbury
Committee, England

Corporate
scandals of BCCI, Poly Peck, Coloroll plc and Maxwell where promoters misused
their position for personal benefit

Advocated
the concept of independent directors on corporate boards and audit committees
to protect retail shareholders & institutional investors

 

The last five centuries of corporate history
have not come up with any new concepts to redress the concerns of minority
shareholders and stakeholders but has only seen refinement and fine-tuning in
implementing the three qualities of ‘sad, discreet and honest’ that were
defined in the year 1553. Thus, we have seen movement from

 

  Sad or Satisfied Directors to Independent
Directors who are entrusted with the job of protecting minority shareholders
and other stakeholders,

  Discreet to fair disclosures to prevent
benefits accruing to individuals with inside information by regulating insider
trading, and

  Honest to Related Party Transactions at arm’s
length pricing to prevent individuals with control from misusing their powers
for their personal benefit in transactions with the company.

 

While these concepts are clear in principle
to protect stakeholders’ interests, it is in their implementation that
challenges arise. Despite the refinements made in the last five centuries, the
outcome is not as desired. As a result, we see a constant battle between
promoting Ease of Doing Business and protecting Stakeholders Interest, as seen
from the regulatory developments in India over the last two decades.

 

Part 3: Indian regulatory scene in the 21st century

The statutory endorsement of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992, the entity that was set up in 1988,
is a key element in the economic liberalisation process of the Indian economy.
Modelled on the SEC in the USA, it replaced the Controller of Capital Issues as
the regulator of new issues for raising funds from the public by companies.
Moving from a formula-based pricing to a market-based pricing mechanism, SEBI
led the movement to promote and enforce good corporate governance in India as
it seeks to protect stock market investors by preventing corporate scandals.
Following the path set by SEC, SEBI too embraced the principle of empowering
investors by providing them with the information required to make informed and
educated decisions. Hence, since its inception SEBI has mandated and nudged
companies to provide additional information or mandated more frequent
information sharing as the means to achieve better quality corporate
governance.

 

Table
3:
Key Indian regulator initiatives in the 21st
century

 

Year

Initiative

Trigger

Major recommendations

2000

Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate
Governance

To make Indian stock markets attractive as a destination
for capital inflows among the emerging markets by promoting good corporate
governance

25 practices for promoting good corporate governance,
of which 19 practices ‘are absolutely essential, clearly defined and could be
enforced by amending existing laws’ and classified as mandatory; the balance
six are listed as non-mandatory or recommended voluntary practices.
Implemented as Clause 49 of the listing agreement

2003

Narayanamurthy Committee on Corporate Governance

Stocktake of corporate governance practices in India
in the backdrop of corporate scandals in the USA

Strengthened the audit committee by defining members’
qualification roles, which included approval of related party transactions.
Also recommended real time disclosures of information important to investors
to prevent / reduce insider trading

2013

Companies Act, 2013

Satyam, Sahara and Saradha scams coming up in close
succession

Highly procedural systems outlined for companies
accepting public deposits and excluded interested shareholders from
participating in approving related party transactions. Both these measures
were significantly diluted after protests by promoters against the additional
burden placed on them

2017

Kotak Committee Report

Desire for higher quality of corporate governance to
bridge the valuation gap between performance of privately-owned companies and
publicly-owned companies, and public sector banks trading below their book
value and at a discount to private banks

Numerous practices aimed at reducing the gap between
the spirit of law and its practice in the corporate world regarding
independent directors, audit committees, related party transactions and
regulating insider trading, all with the intent of promoting higher quality
of corporate governance

2020

Covid-19 relaxations

Diluted requirements in many areas to enable
continuity of business during the country-wide lockdown period

In most cases, deferred the timeline for reporting,
reduced frequency of board meetings and permitted resolutions to be
considered in video / audio meetings that were in normal times banned

 

In the last two
decades, strengthening corporate governance or protecting stakeholder interests
has resulted in the prescription of multiple rules and procedures which
include, among others, to define an independent director, the minimum role of
the audit committee, elaborate systems for approving related party transactions
and complex processes for preventing insider trading to the detriment of other
investors. While these measures are well intended, historically they have not
served the purpose of preventing corporate scandals leading to erosion of
corporate shareholder value. Further, in the face of economic downturn or stock
market collapse, to stimulate economic activity many of the stringent controls
and systems mandated are diluted, despite knowing the adverse impact on
stakeholder interests.

 

Part 4: Reconciling
Ease of Doing Business with protecting Stakeholder Interests

Ease of Doing Business is associated with
nil or reduced regulatory costs, efforts and time required to take and
implement any decision. On the other hand, protecting stakeholder interests
involves placing restraints on certain decisions or specifying some
pre-conditions for it. The key challenge in reconciling Ease of Doing Business
with protecting stakeholder interests is in designing restraints on actions
that protect stakeholder interests without translating into additional costs,
efforts or time required to complete the actions.

 

In achieving such a reconciliation,
technology, especially electronic messaging and e-voting should be liberally
used to convert representative democracy, as manifest in decision-making by the
board of directors, to participatory democracy of shareholder decision-making.
Further, in this digital era of cashless economy and compulsory
de-materialisation of shares mandated for all public companies, use of
electronic records should be prescribed for record-keeping by companies.

 

A brief analysis of the restraints that are
in place to protect stakeholder interests in the corporate law as it exists
today is listed here along with the changes proposed for protecting stakeholder
interest while at the same time promoting Ease of Doing Business.

 

Certification
of company’s reports:
Certain reports that are
prepared by the company and shared with stakeholders are required to be
certified by specified professionals or professional agencies to assure
stakeholders of their veracity and fairness. These are reports like:

 

  •    Annual Accounts by statutory
    auditors,
  •    Corporate Governance report
    by practising company secretaries,
  •    Statutory compliances
    certificates by practising company secretaries, and
  •    Mandatory credit rating for
    issuing debt instruments.

 

Despite many instances where independent
professionals have failed in providing the required assurance, third party
certification is an effective means of assurance to all stakeholders. Measures
like limiting an auditor’s tenure through rotation, preventing the auditors
from providing consulting or advisory services that can dilute their
independence seek to prevent, if not reduce, the instances of failure. In this
regard, the initiative in the UK of getting the auditors to separate their
consulting business from audit firms needs to be closely watched to determine
its effectiveness for India to adopt the same.

 

Presence of
independent directors:
The concept of independent
directors was introduced in the corporate board rooms to protect the interests
of minority shareholders and other stakeholders from misuse of executive powers
by the promoters and executive management. This was especially the case with
respect to their role in approving related party transactions and staffing the
audit committees to prevent misreporting.

 

As seen in the last few decades, the role of
independent directors in preventing corporate scandals has had mixed results.
In a few cases, independent directors were ineffective and in a few other
instances, they have resigned at the first sign of trouble when their presence
was most needed.

 

Given this ineffectiveness, it is worth
considering whether all related party transactions should be put up for
approval of the shareholders. With the exemption for small value transactions
in place, defined with reference to the size of the company or an absolute
value, whichever is lower, for all other transactions shareholder approval
through e-voting should be considered as a cost-effective and efficient system,
with the Board’s role restricted to ensuring that accurate and adequate information
is provided to the shareholders for their decision-making. Given the dominance
of promoters in the ownership of companies, on specific issues like related
party transactions voting by majority of non-promoter shareholders present and
voting should be considered.

 

Pre-approval from a designated authority –
the regulatory cost and effort increases at higher levels of the hierarchy and
diminishes as the levels decrease. Further, the cost is related to the number
of occasions where the approval is sought to be obtained or the specified
intervals within which these meetings should be held. Different levels at which
approvals are required in the descending order of hierarchy and costs involved
are listed below:

 

From MCA for unlisted companies and / or SEBI
in case of listed companies,

From shareholders in a duly convened
meeting or postal ballot,

From the Board in a duly conveyed
meeting,

From the Board through a circular
resolution.

 

In certain exceptional cases like mergers or
demergers, approval from stakeholders like creditors and lenders is mandated to
ensure their interests are protected in restructuring the entity on which they
took their exposure, as its underlying value could change.

 

In the 19th century, proxy was an
effective means introduced to permit shareholders who were unable to attend
meetings in person. Given the technological advancement in the 21st
century, e-voting could be mandated for companies of all sizes to enable larger
participation of shareholders in decision-making. Over time, as shareholders
get used to e-voting, the proxy system can be dispensed with.

 

Further, the one-time Covid-19 relaxation
provided for conducting shareholder meetings in electronic mode be converted
into a permanent provision in the Act to enable greater shareholder
participation.

 

Providing advance notice – The regulatory specification that translates to time involved in
taking a decision based on the minimum time prescribed for undertaking an
activity.

Illustrations:

Shareholder meetings – 21 days’ advance
notice, plus, based on convention, 2 days’ postal time considered for delivery,

Board meetings – 7 days’ advance notice for
convening board meeting.

 

Given the widespread use of emails for
communication, combined with the need for investors to have PAN and / or
Aadhaar cards as part of their KYC, the time for providing advance notice can
be reduced to seven days in case of both board meetings and shareholder
meetings, thereby enabling faster decision-making. The current provision for
holding shareholder meetings at shorter notice requires consent from 95% of the
members. In companies with lesser number of members, inability to contact even
one or two shareholders to get their consent will render this provision
ineffective.

 

Filing of
returns with public authorities (MCA / Stock Exchanges):
The regulatory requirements specifying filing multiple returns with
the public authorities can be classified into two broad categories:

Event-based returns – Returns that are required to be filed only on the occurrence of
certain activities / transactions such as appointment or resignation of
directors, fund-raising;

Calendar-based returns: – Returns that are to be filed at periodic intervals reporting the
activity that occurred during that period, including filing of nil return or
reiteration of the status as on a given date such as annual filing of KYC form
for directors or half-yearly filing of MSME form;

Ease of
Doing Business
– Can
be promoted by reducing the cost and time for regulatory compliance by ensuring
event-based return filings to public authorities like MCA and SEBI are only for actions that require their prior
approval.
For all other returns that only notify actions already taken,
these returns be clubbed into a quarterly or annual return to be filed, thereby
reducing the compliance burden.

 

Maintenance
of internal records as evidence:
This includes
maintenance of registers for certain activities and minutes of shareholder and
board meetings that are required as evidence for future records or use in case
of disputes.

 

Initially encourage and subsequently mandate
companies to maintain all internal minutes and registers in electronic records
that are tamperproof, with audit trails for entries made; these can be retained
for long periods of time. Provision can also be made for stakeholders concerned
to have 24/7×365 days access to these records. This concept is in line with the
requirements for all public companies to have their shares in dematerialised
form. In the medium to long run, this will ensure elimination of disputes
related to incorrect records or absence of records.

 

The Covid-19 pandemic in March, 2020 by
imposing significant restrictions on the normal way of life has provided an
opening for digital technology to change our lives forever. In the governance
and compliance field, while exemptions are being provided on a transactional
basis, can we use this opportunity to make a transformational change in protecting
stakeholder value and at the same time promote Ease of Doing Business by
embracing technology?

INTEGRATED REPORTING – A PARADIGM SHIFT IN REPORTING

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years there has been a paradigm shift in how the
performance of a company is viewed – it is no longer viewed only by how much
profits the company made, how much did it pay shareholders, or how much taxes
did it pay to the government. At business and investor forums, companies are
increasingly being asked questions like ‘Is the company following sustainable
practices?’ ‘Is it following the best ethical practices?’ ‘Is there gender
equality?’ ‘Is it employing child labour?’ ‘What is it doing about climate
change?’

 

At the UN Climate Action Summit in 2019 a
young activist 17 years of age, Greta Thunberg from Sweden (who on 20th September,
2019 led the largest climate strike in history), gave a devastating speech
questioning why world leaders are not considering climate change and are
‘stealing the future’ from the next generation. She said: ‘You have stolen
my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I’m one of the lucky
ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing.
We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is
money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!’

 

Welcome to the brand new world of Integrated
Reporting.

 

WHAT IS INTEGRATED
REPORTING?

Beyond the traditional financial reporting,
there is a growing interest in reporting other matters and this has drawn the
attention of not only activists and companies (mainly goaded by activists), but
also regulators and governments. Various stakeholders have started realising
the need to have a fundamental change in reporting wherein the focus is not
only the financial capital but also on demonstrating the value created by the
company while operating within its social, economic and environmental system.

 

The intended change requires in-depth
understanding of all the building blocks of the value creation process of
business, to enable corporates to develop a reporting model which gives an
insightful picture of its performance and is considered sufficient to assess
the quality and sustainability of their performance.

 

Integrated Reporting is the process founded
on integrated thinking that results in a periodic integrated report by an
organisation about value creation over time and related communication to
stakeholders regarding aspects of value creation.

 

The evolution of Integrated Reporting can be
depicted as under:

 

 

The accumulation of all the above reporting
aspects of an organisation would culminate in what is called an ‘Integrated
Report’.

 

An Integrated Report, besides the financial,
regulatory information and management commentary, also contains reports on
sustainability and the environment to give users and the society a 360-degree
view of the overall impact which a company can have on the society.

 

As can be seen from the above, Chartered
Accountants as well as other professionals in the finance and related fields
who till now considered ‘financial reporting’ as their main job, will now
understand and get involved in much more ‘reporting’, especially since many of
these ‘reports’ would, sooner than later, need independent assertion or
attestations.

 

GLOBAL FOOTPRINTS OF
INTEGRATED REPORTING

International Integrated Reporting Council

Founded in August, 2010, the International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is a global coalition of regulators,
investors, companies, standard setters, the accounting profession, academia and
NGOs. The coalition promotes communication about value creation as the next
step in the evolution of corporate reporting.

 

The purpose of IIRC is to promote prosperity
for all and to protect our planet. Its mission is to establish integrated
reporting and thinking within mainstream business practice as the norm in the
public and private sectors. The vision that IIRC has is of a world in which
capital allocation and corporate behaviour are aligned to the wider goals of
financial stability and sustainable development through the cycle of integrated
reporting and thinking.

 

IIRC has issued the International Integrated
Reporting Framework (referred to as the <IR> Framework) to accelerate the
adoption of integrated reporting across the world. The framework applies
principles and concepts that are focused on bringing greater cohesion and
efficiency to the reporting process and adopting ‘integrated thinking’ as a way
of breaking down internal silos and reducing duplication. It improves the quality
of information available to providers of financial capital to enable a more
efficient and productive allocation of capital. Its focus on value creation,
and the capital used by business to create value over time contributes towards
a more financially stable global economy. The <IR> Framework was released
following extensive consultation and testing by businesses and investors in all
regions of the world, including the 140 businesses and investors from 26
countries that participated in the IIRC Pilot Programme. The purpose of the
Framework is to establish Guiding Principles and Content Elements that govern
the overall content of an integrated report, and to explain the fundamental
concepts that underpin them.

 

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED REPORT <IR>

As per IIRC, the Integrated Report <IR>
should provide insight into the company’s strategy and how it relates to the
company’s ability to create value in the short, medium and long term and to its
use of and effects on capital. It should depict the combination,
inter-relatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the
company’s ability to create value over time. Further, it should provide insight
into the nature and quality of the company’s relationships with its key
stakeholders, including how and to what extent the company understands, takes
into account and responds to their legitimate needs and interests. The report
also provides truthful information about the company, whether the same is
positive or negative. The information in the report should be presented:

(a)        On
a basis that is consistent over time;

(b)        In
a way that enables comparison with other organisations to the extent it is
material to the company’s own ability to create value over time.

 

SIX CAPITALS OF INTEGRATED
REPORTING <IR>

 

 

1. Financial Capital:

This describes the pool of funds that is
available to the organisation for use in the production of goods or provision
of services. It can be obtained through financing, such as debt, equity or
grants, or generated through operations or investments.

 

2. Manufactured Capital:

It is seen as human-created,
production-oriented with equipment and tools. It can be available to the
organisation for use in the production of goods or the provision of services,
including buildings, equipment and infrastructure (such as roads, ports,
bridges and waste and water treatment plants).

 

3. Natural Capital:

The company needs to present its activities
which had positive or negative impact on the natural resources. It is basically
an input to the production of goods or the provision of services. It can
include water, land, minerals, forests, biodiversity, ecosystems, etc.

 

4. Human Capital (carrier is the
individual):

This deals with people’s skills and
experience, their capacity and motivations to innovate, including their:

  •         Alignment with and support of the
    organisation’s governance framework and ethical values such as its recognition
    of human rights;
  •         Ability to understand and implement an
    organisation’s strategy;
  •         Loyalties and motivations for improving
    processes, goods and services, including their ability to lead and to
    collaborate.

 

5. Social
Capital:

This deals with institutions and
relationships established within and between each community, group of
stakeholders and other networks to enhance individual and collective
well-being. It would include common values and behaviours, key relationships,
the trust and loyalty that an organisation has developed and strives to build
and protect with customers, suppliers and business partners.

 

6. Intellectual
Capital:

This discusses a key element to a company’s
future earning potential, with a tight link and contingency between investment
in research and development, innovation, human resources and external
relationships. This can be a company’s competitive advantage.

 

RECENT GLOBAL INITIATIVES

In September, 2020 the following five
framework and standard-setting institutions came together to show a commitment
to work towards a Comprehensive Corporate Reporting System:

(i)         Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI)

(ii)        Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB)

(iii)       CDP
Global

(iv) Climate Disclosure Standard Board (CDSB)

(v)        International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC).

 

GRI, SASB, CDP and CDSB set the frameworks / standards for
sustainability disclosure, including climate-related reporting, along with the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) recommendations. IIRC
provides the integrated reporting framework that connects sustainability
disclosure to reporting on financial and other capitals.

 

The intent of this collaboration is to
provide:

(a)        Joint
market guidance on how the frameworks and standards can be applied in a
complementary and additive way,

(b)        Joint
vision of how these elements could complement financial generally accepted
accounting principles (Financial GAAP) and serve as a natural starting point
for progress towards a more coherent, comprehensive corporate reporting system,

(c)        Joint
commitment to drive towards this goal, through an ongoing programme of deeper
collaboration between the five institutions and stated willingness to engage
closely with other interested stakeholders.

 

In September, 2020 the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation published a consultation paper
on sustainability reporting inviting comments by 31st December, 2020
on:

(I)        Assess
the current situation;

(II)       Examine
the options – i.e., maintain the status quo, facilitate existing
initiatives, create a Sustainable Standards Board and become a standard-setter
working with existing initiatives and building upon their work;

(III)      Reducing
the level of complexity and achieving greater consistency in sustainable
reporting.

 

In October, 2020 the International Auditing and Assurance Standards
Board (IAASB) highlighted areas of focus related to consideration of
climate-related risks when conducting an audit of financial statements in
accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) by issuing a
document, ‘Consideration of Climate-Related risks in an Audit of Financial
Statements’.

 

If climate change impacts the entity, auditors need to consider whether
the financial statements appropriately reflect this in accordance with the
applicable financial reporting framework (i.e., in the context of risks of
material misstatement related to amounts and disclosures that may be affected
depending on the facts and circumstances of the entity).

 

In November, 2020, IFRS issued a document on ‘Effects of climate-related
matters on financial statements’ – companies are now required to consider
climate-related matters in applying IFRS Standards when the effect of those
matters is material in the context of the financial statements taken as a
whole. The document also contains a tabulated summary of examples illustrating
when IFRS Standards may require companies to consider the effects of
climate-related matters in applying the principles in a number of Standards.

 

Auditors also need to understand how climate-related risks relate to
their responsibilities under the professional standards and the applicable laws
and regulations. (An illustrative audit report where a Key Audit Matter on
‘Potential impact of climate change’ is given in the feature ‘From Published
Accounts’ by the same author on page 75 of this issue.)

 

The importance of Integrated Reporting <IR> can be gauged by the
fact that HRH Prince Charles in 2004 founded the Accounting for Sustainability
Project (A4S). A4S is challenging accountants to save the world by helping
companies meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. At present,
A4S has a presence across the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia
Pacific. Its Accounting Bodies Network includes 16 accounting bodies representing
2.4 million accountants in 181 countries, or nearly two-thirds of accountants
globally. Its goal is to inspire action in the global finance industry and
drive a fundamental shift towards resilient business models and a sustainable
economy.

 

‘The risks from environmental, social and economic crises are clear to
see – not just for our planet and society, but also the future resilience of
the global economy,’
said A4S executive Chairman Jessica Fries who led a session titled ‘Can
Accountants Save the World?’ at the 20th World Congress of Accountants, Sydney,
in 2018. She added, ‘Finance leadership and innovation are essential to the
changes needed to tackle these risks and to create the businesses of tomorrow.
The accountancy and finance profession are uniquely placed to create both
sustainable and commercially viable business models’.

 

INTEGRATED REPORTING
<IR> IN INDIA

In 2017, the Securities Exchange Board of
India (SEBI) had issued a circular encouraging the Top 500 companies of India
to consider the use of the Integrated Reporting <IR> framework for annual
reporting. The circular was delivered on the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) principle 16 which states that ‘there should be
full, accurate and timely disclosure of information that is material to
investors’ decisions’.

 

Since then, the companies have started their
integrated reporting journey. In 2019, it was noticed that approximately 100 of
the top 500 companies have reported on Integrated Reporting in their Annual
Reports. Further, SEBI also issued a ‘Consultation Paper on the Format for
Business Responsibility & Sustainability Reporting’ to invite the views of
various stakeholders.

 

In India, several companies included
information on emissions management, water conservation, energy reduction,
human rights and similar topics in the annual report or published / hosted the
same in a separate sustainability report. The transition from corporate social
responsibility to sustainability reporting focused on moving from philanthropic
social impact to stating the impact on natural and human capital. Moving to
Integrated Reporting <IR> would further broaden the report to be
inclusive of all material capitals, connecting them to business risks, its
related decisions and outcomes in the short, medium and long term.

 

Several leading companies in India have
already started issuing Integrated Reports and reporting on the six capitals of
Integrated Reporting listed above. These additional aspects of reporting can
result in an extra 15 to 20 pages of reporting, depending on the use of
graphics, etc. Some of the leading companies that have started issuing
Integrated Reporting are Reliance Industries Ltd., Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd., HDFC Ltd., ITC Ltd., Tata Steel Ltd., Bharti Airtel Ltd., WIPRO Ltd.,
Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. and so on. Though some disclosures in these reports are of the
‘boilerplate’ type, these would evolve in course of time to carry more
meaningful information.

 

INTEGRATED REPORTING AND
THE ICAI

In February, 2015 the ICAI constituted a
group on Integrated Reporting and in February, 2020 it constituted the
Sustainability Reporting Standards Board (SRSB), respectively. The mission of
SRSB is to take appropriate measures to increase awareness and implement
measures towards responsible business conduct; its terms of reference, inter
alia,
include developing audit guidance for Integrated Reporting and to
benchmark global best practices in Sustainability Reporting.

 

ICAI has, to encourage SEBI, also introduced
India’s first award to celebrate the business practice of Integrated Reporting,
internationally acknowledged as the emerging best practice in corporate
reporting.

 

IN CONCLUSION

A recent trend in investing is
‘Environmental, Social and Governance or ESG Investing’. ESG investing refers
to a class of investing that is also known as ‘sustainable investing’. This is
an umbrella term for investments that seek positive returns and long-term
impact on society, environment and the performance of the business. Many
investors are now not only interested in the financial outcomes of investments,
they are also interested in the impact of their investments and the role their
assets can have in promoting global issues such as climate action. Although big
in global investments, ESG funds, which imbibe environment, social
responsibility and corporate governance in their investing process, are
witnessing growing interest in the Indian mutual fund industry, too. As per
reports, there are currently three ESG schemes managing around Rs. 5,000
crores.

 

Trust in a company is achievable through transparent behaviour and is a
key success factor for the business to operate, innovate and grow. Integrated
Reporting <IR> is promoting the need to answer important questions around
long-term value creation and in a world where economic instability and
long-term sustainability threaten the welfare of society. Integrated Reporting
<IR> is not the ultimate goal. It is only the beginning to take the world
towards more sustainability, to make it a better place for the future
generations.

 

Rectification of mistakes – Section 154 of ITA, 1961 – Section 154(1A) places an embargo on power of rectification of assessment order in cases where matter had been considered and decided in appeal or revision – However, there is no embargo on power of amendment if an appeal or revision is merely pending since such pending appeal / revision does not assume character of a subjudice matter

21. Piramal Investment Opportunities
Fund vs. ACIT;
[2019]
111 taxmann.com 5 (Bom.) Date
of order: 4th September, 2019
A.Y.:
2015-16

 

Rectification of mistakes – Section 154 of ITA, 1961 –
Section 154(1A) places an embargo on power of rectification of assessment order in cases where matter had been considered
and decided in appeal or revision – However, there is no embargo on power of amendment if
an appeal or revision is merely pending since such pending appeal / revision
does not assume character of a subjudice matter

 

For the A.Y. 2015-16, the assessee had paid advance tax of Rs. 16.80
crores. In the original return, the assessee had computed total income at Rs.
65.66 crores. In the revised return the total income was computed at Nil. The
AO completed the assessment u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that
the AO did not give credit for the advance tax of Rs.16.80 crores. The assessee
also made an application u/s 154 to the AO for rectification of the mistake.
The assessee stated that by a mistake apparent on record, the credit of payment
of advance tax of Rs.16.80 crores had not been given and the assessee was
entitled to a refund. The AO rejected the rectification application stating
that the assessee did not inform that an appeal was filed on the same issue for
which rectification was sought. Since the assessee was agitating on similar
ground before the appellate authority, it was not proper on the part of the AO,
following the doctrine of judicial discipline, to adjudicate on the same issue
pending before the appellate authority; therefore, the rectification
application assumed the character of a subjudice matter.

 

Thereafter, the assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order of
the AO. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘(i)      Section 154(1A) provides
that where any matter has been considered and decided in any proceeding by way
of appeal or revision, contained in any law for the time being in force, such
order shall not be amended. Section 154(1A), thus, places an embargo on the
power of rectification in cases where the matter has been considered and
decided in appeal or revision. It is of importance that the legislature has
used the phrase “considered and decided” in the past tense.

 

(ii)      The phrase “considered
and decided” cannot be read as “pending consideration in appeal or revision”.
To do so would be adding and changing the plain language of the statute. By
modifying and adding the words in this manner, which is not permissible, the
Assistant Commissioner has divested himself of the power of amendment. In view
of the plain language of section 154, there is no embargo on the power of
amendment if an appeal or revision is merely pending.

 

(iii)      The rejection of the
rectification application on this ground was unwarranted. The appeal is still
pending. The Assistant Commissioner has failed to exercise the jurisdiction
vested in him and, thus, the impugned order will have to be set aside and the
application will have to be decided.

 

(iv)     The Writ Petition succeeds.
The impugned order is to be quashed and set aside. The rectification
application filed by the petitioner u/s 154 stands restored to the file of
Assistant Commissioner to be disposed of on its own merits.’

 

Section 9, Article 7 of India-Qatar DTAA – Non-compete fees received under an independent agreement executed after sale of shares was business income which, in absence of PE / business connection in India, was not taxable in India – Shareholding in Indian company by itself would not trigger business connection in India

12. TS-683-ITAT-2019 (Mum.) ITO vs. Mr. Prabhakar Raghavendra Rao ITA No.: 3985/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 6th November, 2019

 

Section 9, Article 7 of India-Qatar DTAA –
Non-compete fees received under an independent agreement executed after sale of
shares was business income which, in absence of PE / business connection in
India, was not taxable in India – Shareholding in Indian company by itself
would not trigger business connection in India

 

FACTS

The assessee, a
non-resident individual, was a director and shareholder in an Indian company
(ICo). During the relevant accounting year, he sold the shares of ICo and
offered the same to tax as capital gains. Subsequently, he entered into a
non-compete and non-solicitation agreement with the buyer for not carrying on
similar business in India for ten years.

 

The assessee contended that the non-compete fee received by him was in
the nature of business income. Since he did not have any business connection in
India, the fee was not taxable in India under Article 7 of the India-Qatar
DTAA.

But the AO
contended that shareholding in the Indian company had resulted in a business
connection in India. Hence, the non-compete fee received from the sale of
shares was to be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Alternatively, such fee
was part and parcel of the share sale transaction and hence was to be taxed as
capital gains.

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) ruled in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved, the AO filed an appeal
before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(i)     The assessee first transferred the shares
held in ICo. Subsequently, independent of the share transfer, he entered into a
non-compete and non-solicitation fee agreement for not carrying on similar
business in India for ten years;

(ii)     The non-compete fee was business income
since it was received for restraint from trade for a period of ten years.
Hence, it could not be considered part and parcel of the share sale
transaction;

(iii)    Business income is taxable in India only if
the assessee has a business connection or PE in India. Shareholding in an
Indian company by itself would not result in a business connection in India;

(iv)    In the absence of a business connection or PE
in India, the non-compete fee was not taxable in India.  

 

 

 

Section 167B(1) of the Act – Where foreign company is a member of an AOP and share of profits of the members is indeterminate or unknown, income of AOP is subject to maximum marginal rate applicable to foreign company

11. TS-659-ITAT-2019 (Chny.) M/s. Herve Pomerleau International CCCL
Joint Venture vs. ACIT ITA Nos.: 1008/Chny/2017, 17, 18 &
19/Chny/2019
A.Ys.: 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 &
2013-14 Date of order: 21st October, 2019

 

Section 167B(1) of the Act – Where foreign
company is a member of an AOP and share of profits of the members is
indeterminate or unknown, income of AOP is subject to maximum marginal rate
applicable to foreign company

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
consortium between an Indian and a foreign company. It was taxable as an
Association of Persons (AOP) under the Act. The consortium was set up to
execute a contract in India. While the consortium agreement and the
profit-sharing agreement were silent about the profit-sharing ratio of members,
they mentioned that profit before tax on the project would be finally
determined after completion of the project and that the foreign company would
be paid a guaranteed profit share equivalent to 2% of the contract price. The
consortium agreement further mentioned that the obligation to pay the guaranteed
amount was not on the AOP but on the Indian company.

 

The assessee
contended that it was a ‘determinate’ AOP, hence it offered income for tax at
the maximum marginal rate (MMR) applicable to an Indian company.

 

But the AO held
that the assessee was an ‘indeterminate’ AOP. Hence, its income was to be taxed
at the MMR applicable to a foreign company. Therefore, he initiated
re-assessment proceedings under the Act.

 

The CIT(A)
dismissed the appeal of the assessee who filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(a)   Admittedly, the consortium was assessed as an
AOP;

(b)   Section 167B(1) of the Act would apply if the
shares of the members of the AOP are indeterminate or unknown;

(c)   Perusal of the consortium and profit-sharing
agreements showed that the agreement was silent about the profit-sharing ratio
of its members. However, the foreign company was guaranteed 2% of the contract
price as its profit. The obligation to pay the guaranteed amount was not on the
AOP but on the Indian company;

(d)   The term ‘share of net profit’ implies a
‘share in the net profits’ which is an interest in the profits as profits,
which implies a participation in profits and losses;

(e)   In the facts of the case, the foreign company
was entitled to 2% of the project cost regardless of whether the AOP made
profits or losses. Thus, the minimum guarantee was a charge against the profits
of the AOP but not a share in the profits of the AOP. Therefore, the share of
the members in the profit of the AOP could not be said to be determinate or known;

(f)    Accordingly, the AOP was subject to section
167B(1) of the Act. Consequently, its income was subject to tax at the MMR
applicable to foreign companies.

Section 195 – As services of copyediting, indexing and proofreading do not qualify as FTS, tax could not be withheld u/s 195 of the Act

10. TS-640-ITAT-2019 (Chny.) DCIT vs. M/s Integra Software Services Pvt.
Ltd. ITA No.: 2189/Chny/2017
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 11th October, 2019

 

Section 195 – As services of copyediting,
indexing and proofreading do not qualify as FTS, tax could not be withheld u/s
195 of the Act

 

FACTS

The assessee was
engaged in the business of undertaking editorial services, multilingual
typesetting and data conversion. The assessee outsourced language translation
to various vendors in the USA, the UK, Germany and Spain and made certain
payments to them without withholding tax, on the ground that such services were
not in nature of FTS.

 

However, the AO
concluded that such payments were subject to withholding and, consequently,
disallowed payments made u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) concluded that payments made to tax residents of
the USA and the UK did not make available technology to the assessee and hence
they were not FIS under the India-USA DTAA and the India-UK DTAA. Thus, tax was
not required to be withheld from such payments. He, however, held that payments
made to the tax residents of Germany and Spain were in the nature of FTS and in
the absence of ‘make available’ condition in the relevant DTAAs, it was subject
to withholding of tax.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

Copyediting, indexing and proofreading services only require knowledge
of language and not expertise in the subject matter of the text. Hence such
services could not be considered as technical services. Reliance in this regard
was placed on the decision of the Chennai Tribunal in Cosmic Global Ltd.
vs. ACIT (2014) 34 ITR (Trib.) 114
.

 

Since the services
rendered were not technical services, payments made to NRs were not taxable in
India and were also not subject to withholding of tax under the Act.

 

Article 7 of India-Germany DTAA – In absence of common link in terms of contracts / projects, expats, nature of activities, location, or contracting parties, income from activities in India, though similar to activities of PE, could not be attributed to PE by invoking Force of Attraction rule

9. TS-630-ITAT-2019 (Del.) M/s Lahmeyer International vs. ACIT ITA No.: 4960/Del/2004 A.Y.: 2001-02 Date of order: 9th October, 2019

 

Article 7 of India-Germany DTAA – In
absence of common link in terms of contracts / projects, expats, nature of
activities, location, or contracting parties, income from activities in India,
though similar to activities of PE, could not be attributed to PE by invoking
Force of Attraction rule

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
company incorporated in, and tax resident of, Germany. It was engaged in the
business of engineering consulting. During the relevant assessment year the
assessee rendered consultancy services in relation to ten power projects in
India and received Fees for Technical Services (FTS).

 

According to the
assessee, only one of the projects constituted a PE in India. Hence, on FTS
received from that project the assessee paid tax u/s 115A of the Act @ 20% on
gross basis; on the other projects it paid tax @ 10% under Article 12 of the
India-Germany DTAA.

 

The AO observed
that the contracts were artificially split by the assessee to avoid tax and,
applying the force of attraction (FOA) rule, concluded that the entire income
was attributable to PE and chargeable to tax @ 20%.

 

After the CIT(A)
upheld the order of the AO, the aggrieved assessee filed an appeal before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

(1)    FOA rule under India-Germany DTAA provides
that profits derived from business activities which are of the same kind as
those effected through a PE can be attributed to the PE, if the following
conditions are satisfied cumulatively:

(a) The transaction
was resorted to in order to avoid tax in PE state;

(b)    In some way, PE is involved in such
transaction;

 

(2)    Considering the following factors, the
Tribunal held that the FOA rule could not be applied as PE was not involved in
other projects:

(i)     All the projects undertaken by the assessee
were independent contracts with unrelated parties and the scope of work,
liabilities and risk involved in each of the contracts was independent of each
other;

(ii)     Specific sets of activities were performed
under each project as per the terms of the contracts and such activities were
not interlinked with each other;

(iii)    The projects were carried out using different
teams at a given point of time;

(iv)    RBI regulations stipulated a separate project
office for each project. Funds of each project could be used only for the
specific project for which approval was granted and could not be used for any
other project;

(v)    Each project had a different location. The
work was carried out either from the project site of the client or from the
head office outside India. This demonstrates that owing to the different
geographical location where each project was executed in India, there was no
possibility of the PE to play a part or be involved in the other projects in
India.

 

(3)    For applying the FOA rule there should be
some common link to every contract / project, such as common expats, common
nature of contract / project, common location, common contracting parties, etc.
Such commonality was absent in the case of the assessee. Hence, the FOA rule
could not be applied.

 

(4)    Accordingly, the FTS received by the assessee
under other contracts could not be attributed to a PE in India. Hence, such FTS
was taxable @ 10%.

Section 271(1)(c) – AO initiated penalty proceedings on being satisfied that inaccurate particulars of income were furnished but levied penalty on the grounds of furnishing ‘inaccurate particulars’ as well as ‘concealment’ – Order passed by AO held void

7.  Fairdeal Tradelink Company vs. ITO Members:
Vikas Awasthy (J.M.) and G.
Manjunatha (A.M.) ITA No.:
3445/Mum/2016
A.Y.:
2011-12 Date of
order: 5th November, 2019
Counsel
for Assessee / Revenue:  R.C. Jain and
Ajay D. Baga / Samatha Mullamudi

 

Section
271(1)(c) – AO initiated penalty proceedings on being satisfied that inaccurate
particulars of income were furnished but levied penalty on the grounds of
furnishing ‘inaccurate particulars’ as well as ‘concealment’ – Order passed by
AO held void

 

FACTS

In the assessment proceedings, STT on
speculative transactions was disallowed by the AO. Penalty proceedings u/s
271(1)(c) were initiated for filing inaccurate particulars of income.

 

However, while levying the penalty, the AO
mentioned both the charges of section 271(1)(c), i.e., furnishing of
‘inaccurate particulars of income’ as well as ‘concealment’. The assessee
challenged the penalty on the ground that a penalty can only be levied on the
grounds for which the proceedings were initiated.

 

HELD

On a perusal of
the records of the proceedings, the Tribunal noted that the AO, at the time of
recording satisfaction, had mentioned only about furnishing ‘inaccurate
particulars’ as the reason for initiation of penalty proceedings. However, at
the time of levy of penalty, he mentioned both the charges of section 271(1)(c)
of the Act, i.e., furnishing ‘inaccurate particulars’ and ‘concealment’.

 

According to the Tribunal, this reflected
the ambiguity in the mind of the AO with regard to levying penalty. Relying on
the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Samson
Perinchery (392 ITR 04)
, the Tribunal held that the order passed u/s
271(1)(c) suffered legal infirmity and hence was void.

 

Section 147 / 154 – AO cannot take recourse to explanation 3 to section 147 while invoking section 154 after the conclusion of proceedings u/s 147

6.  JDC Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. Commissioner of
Income-tax
Members: G.S.
Pannu (V.P.) and K. Narasimha Chary (J.M.) ITA No.:
5886/Del/2015
A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order:
11th October, 2019
Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Sanat Kapoor / Sanjog Kapoor

Section 147 / 154 – AO cannot take recourse
to explanation 3 to section 147 while invoking section 154 after the conclusion
of proceedings u/s 147

 

FACTS

For the assessment year 2007-08, the
assessee filed his return of income declaring a total income of Rs. 65.33 lakhs
and the same was processed u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the AO reopened the
proceedings u/s 148 claiming escapement of income on account of purchase of
foreign exchange to the tune of Rs. 4.78 lakhs and made an addition thereof.
Later, on a perusal of the assessment records, he found that the assessee had
shown closing stock in the profit and loss account at Rs. 2.97 crores, whereas
in the schedule the same was shown as Rs. 3.32 crores, leaving a difference of
Rs. 34.54 lakhs. He, therefore, issued a notice u/s 154/155.

 

The assessee explained the reason for the
discrepancy and also submitted that the scope of section 154 does not permit
anything more than the rectification of the mistake that is apparent from the
record and that, insofar as the proceedings u/s 147 are concerned, there was no
mistake in the assessment order.

 

However, the AO as well as the CIT(A) did
not agree with the assessee’s contention. According to the CIT(A), explanation
3 to section 147 empowers the AO to assess or re-assess the income which had
escaped assessment and which comes to the notice of the AO subsequently in the
course of proceedings u/s 147.

 

The issue before
the Tribunal was whether the AO could take recourse to explanation 3 to section
147 to make the above addition after the conclusion of proceedings u/s 147.

 

HELD

According to the
Tribunal, had the AO re-assessed the issue relating to the closing stock in the
proceedings u/s 147, the assessee could not have objected to the AO’s action.
However, in the entire proceedings u/s 147 there was not even a whisper about
the closing stock. In such an event, the Tribunal found it difficult to accept
the argument of the Revenue that even after conclusion of the proceedings u/s
147, the AO can take recourse to explanation 3 to section 147 to make the
addition.

 

According to the Tribunal, if the argument
of the Revenue that u/s 154 the AO is empowered to deal with the escapement of
income in respect of which the reasons were not recorded even after the
assessment reopened u/s 147 is completed, then it would empower the AO to go on
making one addition after another by taking shelter of explanation 3 to section
147 endlessly. Such a course is not permissible. The power that is available to
the AO under explanation 3 to section 147 is not available to him u/s 154 after
the conclusion of the proceedings u/s 147.

Section 80-IB(10) – Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) cannot be denied even if the return of income is filed beyond the due date u/s 139(1) owing to bona fide reasons

10. [2019] 72
ITR 402 (Trib.) (Chand.)
Himuda vs. ACIT ITA Nos.: 480,
481 & 972/Chd/2012
A.Ys.: 2006-07,
2007-08 & 2009-10 Date of order:
10th May, 2019

 

Section
80-IB(10) – Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) cannot be denied even if the return of
income is filed beyond the due date u/s 139(1) owing to bona fide
reasons

 

FACTS

The assessee
filed his return of income beyond the due date u/s 139(1). Later, he filed
revised return claiming deduction u/s 80-IB(10). The AO rejected this claim for
the reason that the original return had been filed beyond the due date
specified u/s 139(1). The Commissioner (Appeals) also confirmed the action. The
assessee therefore appealed to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The first factual observation made by the
Tribunal was that the delay in filing return of income was on account of the
local audit department and an eligible deduction cannot be denied due to
technical default owing to such bona fide reason.

 

Based on a
harmonious reading of sections 139(1), 139(5) and 80AC, the Tribunal considered
various decisions available on the issue:

(i)        DHIR
Global Industrial Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No. 2317/Del/2010 for A.Y. 2006-07;

(ii)        Unitech
Ltd. in ITA No. 1014/Del/2012 for A.Y. 2008-09;

(iii)       Venkataiya
in ITA No. 984/Hyd/2011;

(iv)       Hansa
Dalkoti in ITA No. 3352/Del/2011;

(v)        SAM
Global Securities in ITA No. 1760/Del/2009;

(vi)       Symbosis
Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No. 501/Chd/2017;

(vii)     Venkateshwara Wires Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No.
53/Jai/2018.

 

The Tribunal applied the ratio of the above decisions to the
facts of the case and allowed the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s 80-IB,
primarily on the basis of the following three judgements:

 

(a) National
Thermal Power Company Ltd. vs. CIT 229 ITR 383;

(b) Ahmedabad
Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1993) 199 ITR 351 (FB);

(c) CIT vs.
Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 349 ITR 336 (Bom.).

 

In all these
decisions, the courts have held that the appellate authorities have
jurisdiction to deal not merely with any additional ground which became
available on account of change of circumstances or law, but also with
additional grounds which were available when the return was filed.

In National
Thermal Power Company (Supra)
, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal
is not prevented from considering questions of law arising in assessment which
were not raised earlier; the Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine a question of
law which arises from the facts as found by the authorities below and having a
bearing on the tax liability of the assessee.

 

Besides, the
full bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the cases of Ahmedabad
Electricity Company Ltd. vs. CIT
and Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd.
vs. CIT (1993) 199 ITR 351
observed that either at the stage of CIT(A)
or the Tribunal, the authorities can consider the proceedings before them and
the material on record for the purpose of determining the correct tax
liability. Besides, there was nothing in section 254 or section 251 which would
indicate that the appellate authorities are confined to considering only the
objections raised before them, or allowed to be raised before them, either by
the assessee or by the Department as the case may be. The Tribunal has
jurisdiction to permit additional grounds to be raised before it even though
these might not have arisen from any order of a lower appellate authority so
long as these grounds were in respect of the subject matter of the tax
proceedings. Similar ratio was held by the Bombay High Court in CIT
vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (Supra).

 

The Tribunal
further observed that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Goetze
(India) Limited vs. CIT (2006) 287 ITR 323
, relating to the restriction
of making the claim through a revised return was limited to the powers of the
assessing authority only and not the appellate authority.

 

An assessee cannot be burdened with the
taxes which he otherwise is not liable to pay under the law.

 

Section 148 – Issue of notice u/s 148 is a foundation for reopening of assessment and to be sent in the name of living person – Where notice is issued in the name of deceased person, the deceased person could not participate in assessment proceedings and even provisions of section 292BB could not save such invalid notice

9. [2019] 72
ITR 389 (Trib.) (Chand.)
S/Sh. Balbir
Singh & Navpreet Singh vs. ITO ITA Nos.: 657
& 658/CHD/2016
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order:
13th May, 2019

 

Section 148 –
Issue of notice u/s 148 is a foundation for reopening of assessment and to be
sent in the name of living person – Where notice is issued in the name of
deceased person, the deceased person could not participate in assessment
proceedings and even provisions of section 292BB could not save such invalid
notice

 

FACTS

The assessment
for A.Y. 2008-09 of the deceased assessee Balbir Singh was reopened u/s 147 of
the Act by way of issuance of a notice in his name only.

 

Considering the
manner of service of the notice and the name in which it was issued, the legal
heir contested the validity of the reopening before the Commissioner (Appeals).
However, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the action taken by the AO as to
the reopening as well as on merits.

 

Aggrieved, the
legal heir of the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that for valid reopening of a case, notice u/s 148 should be issued in
the name of the correct person. The notice has to be responded to and hence it
is a requirement that it should be sent in the name of a living person. This view
was based on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Sumit Balkrishna
Gupta vs. ACIT in Writ Petition No. 3569 of 2018, order dated 15th February,
2019
, wherein it was held that the issue of a notice u/s 148 of the Act
is the foundation for reopening of assessment.

 

It also relied
on another decision of the Delhi High Court in Rajender Kumar Sehgal vs.
ITO [2019] 101 taxmann.com 233 (Delhi)
wherein it was held that where
the notice seeking to reopen assessment was issued in the name of a deceased
assessee, since she could not have participated in reassessment proceedings,
provisions of section 292BB were not applicable to the case and as a
consequence the reassessment proceedings deserved to be quashed.

 

On the argument
of the learned D.R. that the legal heir of the assessee ought to have informed
the AO of the fact of the assessee’s death, the Tribunal said this contention
had no force because the notice was not served through registered post / or by
regular mode of service but was allegedly served through a substituted mode of
service, i.e., by affixation of the same at the door of the house of the
assessee and the report of service through affixation had not been witnessed by
any person.

 

The Tribunal
remarked, ‘It is not believable that the Revenue officials had visited the
house of the assessee and they could not get the information about the death of
the assessee despite affixation of the notice which is also required to be
witnessed by some independent / respectable (sic) of the village.’

 

The Tribunal
also found that even otherwise, the notice was never served at the address at
which the assessee was actually residing before death, which address was
available in a document with the Income Tax Officer.

 

Based on these
factual and legal grounds, the notice u/s 148 was held to be invalid.

Section 41(1) r.w.s. 28(iv) – Where assessee assigned its loan obligation to a third party by making a payment in terms of present value of future liability, surplus resulting from assignment of loan was not cessation or extinguishment of liability as loan was to be repaid by third party –The same could not be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee

8. [2019] 201
TTJ (Mum.) 1009
Cable
Corporation of India Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA Nos.:
7417/Mum/2010 & 7369/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2000-01 Date of order:
30th April, 2019

 

Section 41(1)
r.w.s. 28(iv) – Where assessee assigned its loan obligation to a third party by
making a payment in terms of present value of future liability, surplus
resulting from assignment of loan was not cessation or extinguishment of
liability as loan was to be repaid by third party –The same could not be
brought to tax in the hands of the assessee

 

FACTS

The assessee
company was engaged in the business of manufacturing and sales of cables.
During the year the assessee borrowed interest-free loan of Rs. 12 crores from
a company, MPPL, which was to be repaid over a period of 100 years. The said
loan was utilised for the purchase of shares by the assessee and not for its
line of activity / business. Thereafter, a tripartite agreement was entered
into between the assessee, MPPL and CPPL under which the obligation of repaying
the above-mentioned loan of Rs. 12 crores was assigned to CPPL at a discounted
present value of Rs. 0.36 crores. The resultant difference of Rs. 11.64 crores
was credited by the assessee to the profit and loss account as ‘gain on
assignment of loan obligation’ under the head income from other sources.
However, while computing the taxable income, the assessee reduced the said
amount from the taxable income on the ground that the same constituted a
capital receipt in the hands of the assessee and was not taxable.

 

The AO observed that the lender, MPPL, had
accepted the arrangement of assignment of loan to CPPL and CPPL had started
paying the instalments to MPPL as per the said tripartite agreement. Thus, the
liability of the assessee was ceased / extinguished; as such, the provisions of
section 41(1) were applicable to this case. He further observed that the
assessee during the course of his business borrowed funds to the tune of Rs. 12
crores and assigned the same to CPPL for Rs. 0.36 crores, thus the resultant
benefit of Rs. 11.6 crores by cessation of liability was a trading surplus and
had to be taxed. The AO further observed that the assessee himself had credited
Rs. 11.64 crores to the profit and loss account as gain on assignment of loan
under the head income from other sources. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
upheld the AO’s order.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
held that the assessee was in the line of manufacturing and trading of cables
and not the purchase and sale of shares and securities. It was apparent from
the facts that the loan was utilised for the purpose of purchase of shares
which was not a trading activity of the assessee. The liability of the loan of
Rs. 12 crores to be discharged over a period of 100 years was assigned to the
third party, viz., CPPL, by making a payment of Rs. 0.36 crores in terms of the
present value of the future liability and the surplus resulting from the
assignment of the loan liability was credited to the profit and loss account
under the head income from other sources; but while computing the total income,
the said income was reduced from the income on the ground that the surplus of
Rs. 11.64 crores represented capital receipt and, therefore, was not taxable.
It was true that both companies, MPPL and CPPL, were amalgamated with the
assessee later on with all consequences. So the issue was whether the surplus
Rs. 11.64 crores resulting from the assignment of loan to CPPL under the said
tripartite agreement between the assessee, MPPL and CPPL was a revenue receipt
liable to tax or a capital receipt as has been claimed by the assessee.

 

The purchase of
shares by the assessee was a non-trading transaction and was of capital nature.
The surplus resulting from the assignment of loan as referred to above was not
resulting from trading operation and therefore was not to be treated as revenue
receipt. The provisions of section 41(1) were not applicable to the said
surplus as its basic conditions were not fulfilled. In other words, the
assessee had not claimed it as deduction in the profit and loss account in the
earlier or in the current year. In order to bring an allowance or deduction
within the ambit of section 41(1), it was necessary that a deduction /
allowance was granted to the assessee.

 

In the instant
case, the loan was utilised for purchasing shares which was a capital asset in
the business of the assessee and the surplus resulting from assignment of loan
was a capital receipt not liable to be taxed either u/s 28(iv) or u/s 41(1).
Accordingly, the surplus arising from assignment of loan was not covered by the
provisions of section 41(1) and consequently could not be brought to tax either
u/s 28(iv) or u/s 41(1). Further, the surplus had resulted from the assignment
of liability as the assessee had entered into a tripartite agreement under
which the loan was to be repaid by the third party in consideration of payment
of net present value (NPV) of future liability. Thus, the surplus resulting
from assignment of loan at present value of future liability was not cessation
or extinguishment of liability as the loan was to be repaid by the third party
and, therefore, could not be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee.
Therefore, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was set aside and the AO was
directed to delete the addition of Rs. 11.64 crores.

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54F of ITA, 1961 – Agreement to sell land in August, 2010 and earnest money received – Sale deed executed in July, 2012 – Purchase of residential house in April, 2010 – Assessee entitled to benefit u/s 54F

20. Kishorbhai
Harjibhai Patel vs. ITO;
[2019]
417 ITR 547 (Guj.) Date
of order: 8th July, 2019

A.Y.:
2013-14

 

Capital
gains – Exemption u/s 54F of ITA, 1961 – Agreement to sell land in August, 2010
and earnest money received – Sale deed executed in July, 2012 – Purchase of
residential house in April, 2010 – Assessee entitled to benefit u/s 54F

 

The
assessee entered into an agreement to sell agricultural land at Rs. 4 crores on
13th August, 2010. An amount of Rs. 10 lakhs towards the earnest
money was received by the assessee as part of the agreement. On 15th
October, 2011, possession of the land was handed over by the assessee to the
purchasers of the land. On 3rd July, 2012 the sale deed came to be
executed by the assessee in favour of the purchaser of the land. The assessee
had purchased a new residential house in April, 2010 and claimed exemption u/s
54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO denied the exemption on the ground that
the transfer of the land took place on 3rd July, 2012 and the
purchase of the residential house on 22nd April, 2010, thus it was beyond
the period of one year as required u/s 54F.

 

The
Tribunal upheld the decision of the AO.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘(i)      The Act gives a precise definition to the
term “transfer”. Section 2(47)(ii) of the Act talks about extinguishment of
rights. The Supreme Court, in Sanjeev Lal vs. CIT (2014) 365 ITYR 389
(SC)
is very clear that an agreement to sell would extinguish the
rights and this would amount to transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of
the Act. This definition of transfer given in the Act is only for the purpose
of the income-tax.

 

(ii)      The assessee had purchased the new
residential house in April, 2010. The agreement to sell which had been executed
on 13th April, 2010 (and) could be considered as the date on
which the property, i.e., the agricultural land had been transferred. Hence,
the assessee was entitled to the benefit u/s 54F.’

Charitable purpose – Exemption u/s 11 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee entitled to allocate domain names providing basic services of domain name registration charging annual subscription fees and connectivity charges – Activity in nature of general public utility – Fees charged towards membership and connectivity charges – Incidental to main objects of assessee – Assessee entitled to exemption

19.  CIT vs. National Internet Exchange of India; [2019]
417 ITR 436 (Del.) Date
of order: 9th January, 2018
A.Y.:
2009-10

 

Charitable
purpose – Exemption u/s 11 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee entitled to allocate domain
names providing basic services of domain name registration charging annual
subscription fees and connectivity charges – Activity in nature of general
public utility – Fees charged towards membership and connectivity charges –
Incidental to main objects of assessee – Assessee entitled to exemption

 

The
assessee was granted registration u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 from the
A.Y. 2004-05. The assessee was engaged in general public utility services. He
was the only nationally designated entity entitled to allocate domain names to
its applicants who sought it in India. It was also an affiliate national body
of the Internet Corporation for assigned names and numbers and authorised to
assign ‘.in’ registration and domain names according to the Central
Government’s letter dated 20th November, 2004. It provided basic
services by way of domain name registration for which it charged subscription
fee on annual basis and also collected connectivity charges.

 

The AO was
of the opinion that the subscription fee and the fee charged by the assessee
towards various services provided by it were in the nature of commercial
activity and fell outside the charitable objects for which it was established
and denied exemption u/s 11 of the Act.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had been incorporated
without any profit motive, that the nature of services provided by the assessee
were of general public utility and that the services provided were towards
membership and connectivity charges which were only incidental to the main
objects of the assessee. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals).

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

‘(i)      The assessee had been incorporated without
any profit motive. The services provided by the assessee were of general public
utility and were towards membership and connectivity charges and were
incidental to its main objects. The assessee (though not a statutory body)
carried on regulatory work.

 

(ii)      Both the appellate authorities had
concluded that the assessee’s objects were charitable and that it provided
basic services by way of domain name registration for which it charged
subscription fee on an annual basis and also collected connectivity charges. No
question of law arose.’

 

Charitable institution – Registration u/s 12AA of ITA, 1961 – Cancellation of registration – No finding that activities of charitable institution were not genuine or that they were not carried out in accordance with its objects – Mere resolution of governing body to benefit followers of a particular religion – Cancellation of registration not justified

18. St.
Michaels Educational Association vs. CIT;
[2019]
417 ITR 469 (Patna) Date
of order: 13th August, 2019

 

Charitable institution – Registration u/s 12AA of ITA,
1961 – Cancellation of registration – No finding that activities of charitable
institution were not genuine or that they were not carried out in accordance
with its objects – Mere resolution of governing body to benefit followers of a
particular religion – Cancellation of registration not justified

 

The
assessee was an educational institution running a high school and was granted
registration u/s 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in April, 1985. In August,
2011 the Commissioner issued a show-cause notice proposing to cancel
registration and cancelled the registration exercising powers u/s 12AA(3) of
the Act.

 

The
Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner cancelling the registration.

 

But the
Patna High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘(i)      A plain reading of the enabling power vested
in the Commissioner in section 12AA(3) would confirm that it is only in two
circumstances that such power can be exercised by the Principal Commissioner or
the Commissioner:

(a) if the
activities of such trust or institution are not found to be genuine; or (b) the
activities of such trust or institution are not being carried out in accordance
with the objects of the trust or institution. Where a statute provides an act
to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner alone and every
other mode of discharge is clearly forbidden.

(ii)      The ground for cancellation of
registration is that in some of the subsequent governing body meetings some
resolutions were passed for the benefit of the Christian community. The order
of cancellation has been passed by the Commissioner without recording any
satisfaction, either on the issue of the activities of the school being not
genuine or that they were not being carried out in accordance with the objects
for which the institution had been set up. The order of cancellation of the
registration was not valid.’

 

Business expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – Prior period expenses – Assessment of income of prior period – Prior period expenses deductible – No need to demonstrate that expenses relate to income

16. Principal
CIT vs. Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd.;
[2019]
417 ITR 373 (Guj.) Date
of order: 24th June, 2019
A.Y.:
2006-07

 

Business expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – Prior
period expenses – Assessment of income of prior period – Prior period expenses
deductible – No need to demonstrate that expenses relate to income

 

For the
A.Y. 2006-07, the AO found that the assessee had credited Rs. 3,39,534 as net
prior period income, i.e., prior period income of Rs. 46,50,648 minus prior
period expenses of Rs. 43,11,114. The AO took the view that ‘prior period
income’ was taxable, but the ‘prior period expenses’ were not allowable. Thus,
he made an addition of Rs. 46,50,648 as prior period income and denied the
set-off of the prior period expenses on the basis that a different set of rules
applied to such income and expenses.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the addition and held that prior period expenses
cannot be adjusted against the prior period income in the absence of any
correlation or nexus. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that
once the assessee offers the prior period income, then the expenditure incurred
under the different heads should be given set-off against that income and only
the net income should be added.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

‘(i)      The only requirement u/s 37 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 is that the expenses should be incurred for the purposes
of the business or profession. There is no need to demonstrate that a certain
expense relates to a particular income in order to claim such expense.

 

(ii)      Once prior period income is held to be
taxable, prior period expenditure also should be allowed to be set off and the
assessee is not obliged in law to indicate any direct or indirect nexus between
the prior period income and prior period expenditure.’

 

DEMERGER TRANSACTION UNDER Ind AS

QUERY

  •      A has control over its100%
    subsidiary B.
  •      There are 5 investors
    (shareholders – X, X1, X2, X3 and X4) in A. No investor controls or jointly
    controls or has significant influence on A.
  •      A, B and all the investors in
    A follow Ind AS. All the investors measure their investment in A at FVTPL. A’s
    accounting policy is to measure investments in subsidiary and associates at
    cost in separate financial statements.
  •      Due to certain regulatory
    issues, A should not be controlling B.
  •      Consequently, B issues its
    shares to the investors in A without any consideration, which will reduce A’s
    shareholding in B to 40%. Accordingly, B becomes A’s associate.
  •      The number of shares which A
    held in B, pre and post the transaction has not changed, as shares have been
    distributed by B directly to the shareholders of A. However, A’s holding in B
    is reduced to 40%.
  •      Investor X, one of the 5
    investors, is holding 100 shares in A at fair value of INR 200. Investor X
    continues to hold 100 shares and has received shares of B for no consideration.
  •      All investors are treated
    equal in proportion to their shareholding.
  •      The decision to undertake the
    above transaction had the unanimous approval of the board of directors of B.

 

Pre- and post-restructuring shareholding pattern is depicted in the
diagram below:

How shall A, B and investor X account for this transaction in their Ind
AS separate financial statement (SFS)?

RESPONSE

Accounting
in SFS of investor X

View 1 – There is no change in X’s situation except that now X is directly
holding in B instead of through A. Consequently, X will simply split the fair
value of its holding in A into A’s share and B’s share on relative fair value
basis. Under this view, there is no P&L impact.

 

To support
this view, one may draw an analogy from ITFG 20 issue 4. In that fact pattern,
there is transfer of a business division from an associate to fellow associate.
ITFG concluded that there is no ‘exchange’ of investments. Investor continues
to hold the same number and proportion of equity shares in A Limited
(Transferor associate) after the demerger as it did before the demerger.
Therefore, applying this principle, the ‘cost’ of the new shares received in B
is represented by the amount derecognised by X Limited in respect of its
investment in A Limited. The accounting is presented below, with assumed
figures. However, one should be mindful that in ITFG’s case, investment is
carried at cost, whereas in the given case these investments are carried at
fair value. Consequently, if the fair value of shares in A pre-transaction is
less than the aggregate fair value of shares in A and B post-transaction, this
accounting may result in subsequent gains to investor X, which needs to be
recognised in the P&L.

 

In X’s SFS

Particulars

Dr. (INR)

Cr. (INR)

Investment in A (relative fair value)

Investment in B (relative fair value)

To investment in A (pre-receipt of B’s share)

80

120

 

 

200

 

 

View 2 – X is having investment in financial instrument, which are carried at
FVTPL. Post the transaction, X shall fair value its investment in A and B; if
there is any gain due to unlocking of value or other factors, gain should be
recognised in P&L immediately.

In X’s SFS

Particulars

Dr. (INR)

Cr. (INR)

Investment in B(@ fair value)      Dr

To Investment in A (change in fair value)

To gain on exchange – P&L (if any)

140

 

110

30

 

 

Note: Fair value of
investment in B and change in fair value of investment in A are hypothetical
and for illustrative purposes only. The gain of INR 30 reflects unlocking of
value in the hands of investors.

 

Accounting
in the SFS of A

View 1 – The number of shares which A held in B pre and post the transaction
has not changed. As the cost of investment for holding the same number of
shares has not changed and A has not received or distributed any shares, the
investments will continue to be recorded at the same cost, even though the
investment is now an associate. However, A will test the investment for
impairment as per Ind AS 36 and record the impairment charge to P&L, if
any. Analogy can be drawn from transactions wherein subsidiary issues shares to
outside unrelated shareholders and thereby the parent loses control and that investment
becomes as associate. In such a case, the common practice in SFS of parent is
that the investment continues to be recorded at cost (subject to impairment).

 

  •    Additionally, at the ultimate
    shareholders level per se nothing has changed. Therefore, it cannot be
    inferred that any dividend has been distributed to the shareholders by A. The
    decision is taken by the ultimate shareholders, and A does nothing substantial.
    At best, A is merely a pass through; that, too, indirectly rather than
    directly. Consequently, A is neither receiving any dividends nor distributing
    any dividends. However, due to the dilution, its investment in B will be tested
    for impairment.

 

  •    To support View 1, there can be
    multiple ways of looking at this transaction:

   A is giving up the value of its
underlying investment in subsidiary B to its shareholders. A has not declared
and is not obliged to distribute any dividends (hence Ind AS 10 Appendix A Distribution
of Non-cash Assets to Owners
does not apply). Neither is there a demerger
from A’s perspective. Consequently, A’s Investment in B will be credited at
fair value, book value, or brought to its post impaired value, with the
corresponding impact taken to equity.

   This is merely a restructuring
arrangement where the subsidiary is now split between A and the ultimate
shareholders. There are no dividends received or paid. The decision of
splitting the shares is taken by ultimate shareholders, rather than A. A does
nothing. Consequently, A’s investment in B will be only tested for impairment.

 

In View 1, there is no credit to the P&L in the SFS of A.

 

View 2 – A
has not declared and is not obliged to distribute any dividends, but there is
an indirect distribution by A to its shareholders. In the absence of any
specific guidance to this unique fact pattern, and based on Ind AS 8
Paragraph10, A may draw analogy from Appendix A to Ind AS 10. Accordingly,
applying the guidance on distribution of non-cash assets to the owners, A shall
create a dividend payable liability out of its reserves, and then record the
distribution of non-cash asset (indirect receipt of shares of B) in its books
at fair value of the assets distributed, and the difference between dividend
payable (at fair value) and the investment in B (at proportionate cost of
deemed dilution) would be recorded as a gain in the P&L.

In SFS of A

Particulars

Dr. (INR)

Cr. (INR)

On creation of dividend
payable
liability at fair value

Equity Dr

To Dividend Payable

 

 

1000

 

 

 

1000

On distribution of dividend

Dividend payable (@ fair
value)

To Investment in B

(@Proportionate Cost)

To P&L (Gain) [Balancing
figure]

 

1000

 

 

900

 

100

 

Note: Fair value of dividend
payable and proportionate value of investment in B are hypothetical and for
illustrative purposes only.

 

Accounting
in the SFS of B

From B’s perspective, additional shares are being issued to ultimate
shareholders for which no consideration is received. Consequently, B will
credit share capital and debit equity. Essentially, the debit and credit is
reflected within the equity caption and there is no P&L impact.

 

CONCLUSION

Had A
directly distributed its investment in B to its shareholders, so that its
shareholding in B is reduced to 40%, the application of Ind AS 10 Appendix A
would result in View 2 only, from the perspective of SFS of A. However, in the
absence of any specific guidance under Ind AS with respect to SFS, the author
believes that different views have emerged. Moreover, it is unfair that a
restructuring transaction to comply with regulations should result in a P&L
gain. The ITFG may provide necessary clarifications.
 

 

TAXATION OF GIFTS MADE TO NON-RESIDENTS

The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 has inserted
section 9(1)(viii) in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) regarding deemed
accrual in India of gift of money by a person resident in India to a
non-resident. In this article we discuss and explain the said provision in
detail.

 

INTRODUCTION

Taxation of gifts in India has a very long
and chequered history. Ideally, taxes are levied on income, either on its
accrual or receipt. However, with the object of expanding the tax base, the
Indian tax laws have evolved the concept of ‘deemed income’. Deemed income is a
taxable income where the law deems certain kinds of incomes to have accrued to
an assessee in India.

 

Similarly, the legislation in India uses the
concept of deemed income to tax gifts. The Gift Tax Act, 1958 was introduced
with effect from 1st April, 1958 and subsequently amended in the
year 1987. It was repealed w.e.f. 1st October, 1998. Till that date
(1st October, 1998), all gifts (including gifts to relatives)
barring a few exceptions were chargeable to gift tax in the hands of the donor.
The gifts were taxed at a flat rate of about 30% then, with a basic exemption limit
of Rs. 30,000.

 

With the
abolition of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 w.e.f. 1st October, 1998, gifts
were not only used for wealth and income distribution amongst family members /
HUFs, but also for conversion of money. With no gift tax and exemption from chargeability
under the Income-tax Act, gifts virtually remained untaxed until a donee-based
tax was introduced by inserting a deeming provision in clause (v) of section
56(2) by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1st April, 2005 to provide
that any sum of money received by an assessee, being an individual or HUF,
exceeding Rs. 25,000 would be deemed to be income under the head ‘Income from
other sources’. Certain exceptions, like receipt of a gift from a relative or
on the occasion of marriage, etc., were provided.

 

The Act was amended w.e.f. 1st
April, 2007 and a new clause (vi) was inserted with an enhanced limit of Rs.
50,000. Another new clause (vii) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009
w.e.f. 1st October, 2009 to further include under the deeming provision
regarding receipt of immovable property without consideration.

 

When the Act was amended vide Finance Act,
2010 w.e.f. 1st June, 2010, a new clause (viia) was inserted to also
tax (under the deeming provision) a receipt by a firm or company (not being a
company in which public are substantially interested) of shares of a company
(not being a company in which public are substantially interested) without
consideration or at less than fair market value.

 

Via the Finance Act, 2013, and w.e.f. 1st
April, 2013, another new clause (viib) was inserted for taxing premium on the
issue of shares in excess of the fair market value of such shares.

 

Yet another important amendment was made
vide the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 suppressing all the
deeming provisions except clause (viib) and a new clause (x) was inserted.

 

At present, clause (viib) and clause (x) of
section 56(2) are in force and deem certain issue of shares or receipt of money
or property as income.

 

SECTION 56(2)(X) AND OTHER RELATED PROVISIONS

Section 56(2) provides that the incomes
specified therein shall be chargeable to income tax under the head ‘Income from
other sources’.

 

Section 56(2)(x) provides that w.e.f. 1st
April, 2017, subject to certain exemptions mentioned in the proviso thereto,
the following receipts by any person are taxable:

(a) any sum of money without consideration,
the aggregate value of which exceeds Rs. 50,000;

(b) any immovable property received without
consideration or for inadequate consideration as specified therein; and

(c) any specified property other than
immovable property (i.e., shares and securities, jewellery, archaeological
collections, drawings, paintings, sculptures, any work of art or bullion)
without consideration or for inadequate consideration, as specified therein.

 

It is important to note that the term
‘consideration’ is not defined under the Act and therefore it must have the
meaning assigned to it in section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

 

The proviso to
section 56(2)(x) provides for exemption in certain genuine circumstances such
as receipt of any sum of money or any property from any relative, or on the
occasion of a marriage, or under a Will or inheritance, or in contemplation of
death, or between a holding company and its wholly-owned Indian subsidiary, or
between a subsidiary and its 100% Indian holding company, etc.

 

Section
2(24)(xviia) provides that any sum of money or value of property referred to in
section 56(2)(x) is regarded as income.

 

Section 5(2) provides that non-residents are
taxable in India in respect of income which accrues or arises in India, or is
deemed to accrue or arise in India, or is received in India, or is deemed to be
received in India.

 

SECTION 9(1)(VIII)

The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 inserted
section 9(1)(viii) w.e.f. A.Y. 2020-21 to provide that any sum of money
referred to in section 2(24)(xviia) arising outside India [which in turn refers
to section 56(2)(x)], paid on or after 5th July, 2019 by a person
resident in India to a non-resident, not being a company, or to a foreign
company, shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

 

Section 9(1)(viii) creates a deeming fiction
whereby ‘income arising outside India’ is deemed to ‘accrue or arise in India’.

 

Prior to the insertion of section
9(1)(viii), there was no provision in the Act which covered the gift of a sum
of money given to a non-resident outside India by a person resident in India if
it did not accrue or arise in India. Such gifts therefore escaped tax in India.
In order to avoid such non-taxation, section 9(1)(viii) was inserted.

 

Section 9
provides that certain incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. The
fiction embodied in the section operates only to shift the locale of accrual of
income.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in GVK
Industries vs. Income Tax Officer (2015) 231 Taxman 18 (SC)
while
adjudicating the issue pertaining to section 9(1)(vii) explored the ‘Source
Rule’ principle and laid down in the context of the situs of taxation,
that the Source State Taxation (SST) confers primacy and precedence to tax a
particular income on the foothold that the source of such receipt / income is
located therein and such principle is widely accepted in international tax
laws. The guiding principle emanating therefrom is that the country where the
source of income is situated possesses legitimate right to tax such source, as
inherently wealth is physically or economically generated from the country
possessing such an attribute.

 

Section 9(1)(viii) deems income arising
outside India to accrue or arise in India on fulfilment of certain conditions
embedded therein, i.e. (a) there is a sum of money (not any property) which is
paid on or after 5th July, 2019; (b) by a person resident in India
to a non-resident, not being a company or to a foreign company; and (c) such
payment of sum of money is referred to as income in section 2(24)(xviia) [which
in turn refers to section 56(2)(x)].

 

Section 9(1)(viii) being a deeming
provision, it has to be construed strictly and its scope cannot be expanded by
giving purposive interpretation beyond its language. The section will not
apply to payment by a non-resident to another non-resident.

 

It is to be noted that any sum of money paid
as gift by a person resident in India to a non-resident during the period 1st
April, 2019 to 4th July, 2019 shall not be treated as income deemed
to accrue or arise in India.

 

Exclusion of gift of property situated
in India:

Section 9(1)(viii) as proposed in the
Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2019 had covered income ‘…arising any sum of money
paid, or any property situate in India transferred…

 

However, section 9(1)(viii) as enacted reads
as ‘income arising outside India, being any sum of money referred to in
sub-clause (xviia) of clause (24) of section 2, paid…’

 

For example, if a non-resident receives a
gift of a work of art situated outside India from a person resident in India,
then such gift is not covered within the ambit of section 9(1)(viii).

 

Thus, as compared to the proposed
section, the finally enacted section refers to only ‘sum of money’ and
therefore gift of property situated in India is not covered by section
9(1)(viii)
. It appears that the exclusion of the
property situated in India from the finally enacted section 9(1)(viii) could be
for the reason that such gift of property could be subjected to tax in India
under the existing provisions of section 5(2) where any income received or
deemed to be received in India by a non-resident or on his behalf is subject to
tax in India.

 

Non-application to receipts of gifts
by relatives and other items mentioned in proviso to section 56(2)(x):

As mentioned above, section 9(1)(viii) deems
any sum of money referred to in section 2(24)(xviia) to be income accruing or
arising in India, subject to fulfilment of conditions mentioned therein.

 

Section 2(24)(xviia) in turn refers to sum
of money referred in section 56(2)(x) and regards as income only final
computation u/s 56(2)(x) after considering exclusion of certain transactions
like gifts given to relatives or gift given on the occasion of marriage of the
individual, etc., as mentioned in the proviso to section 56(2)(x).

 

Thus, for example, if there is a gift of US$
10,000 from A who is a person resident in India, to his son S who is a resident
of USA, as per the provision of section 56(2)(x) read with Explanation
(e)(i)(E) of section 56(2)(vii), the same will not be treated as income u/s
9(1)(viii).

 

Therefore,
the insertion of section 9(1)(viii) does not change the position of non-taxability
of receipt of gift from relatives or on the occasion of the marriage of the
individual, etc. Similarly, the threshold limit of Rs. 50,000 mentioned in
section 56(2)(x) would continue to apply and such gift of money up to Rs.
50,000 in a financial year cannot be treated as income u/s 9(1)(viii).

 

It is important
to keep in mind that section 5 broadly narrates the scope of total income.
Section 9 provides that certain incomes mentioned therein shall be deemed to
accrue or arise in India. However, total income under the provisions of the Act
has to be computed as per the other provisions of the Act, and while doing so
benefits of the exemptions / deduction would have to be taken into account.

 

In this connection, the relevant portion of
the Explanatory Memorandum provides that ‘However, the existing provisions
for exempting gifts as provided in proviso to clause (x) of sub-section (2) of
section 56 will continue to apply for such gifts deemed to accrue or arise in
India.’

The Explanatory Memorandum, thus, clearly
provides for application of exemptions provided in proviso to section 56(2)(x).

 

Income arising outside India:

Section
9(1)(viii) uses the expression ‘income arising outside India’ and, keeping in
mind the judicial interpretation of the meaning of the term ‘arise’ or
‘arising’ (which generally means to come into existence), the income has to
come into existence outside India, i.e. the gift of money from a person
resident in India to a non-resident has to be received outside India by the
non-resident.

 

PERSON RESIDENT IN INDIA AND NON-RESIDENT

Person resident in India:

The expression ‘person resident in India’
has been used in section 9(1)(viii). The term ‘person’ has been defined in
section 2(31) of the Act and it includes individuals, HUFs, companies, firms,
LLPs, Association of Persons, etc.

 

The term ‘resident in India’ is used in
section 6 which contains the rules regarding determination of residence of
individuals, companies, etc.

 

It would be very important to minutely
examine the residential status as per the provisions of section 6 to determine
whether a person is resident in India as per the various criteria mentioned
therein, particularly in case of NRIs, expats, foreign companies, overseas
branches of Indian entities, for proper application of section 9(1)(viii).

 

Non-resident:

Section 2(30) of the Act defines the term
‘non-resident’ and provides that ‘non-resident’ means a person who is not a
‘resident’ and for the purposes of sections 92, 93 and 268 includes a person
who is not ordinarily resident within the meaning of clause (6) of section 6.

 

Therefore, for the purposes of section
9(1)(viii), a not ordinarily resident is not a ‘non-resident’.

 

It is to be noted that residential status
has to be determined as per provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not as
per FEMA.

 

Obligation to deduct tax at source:

Section 195 of the Act provides that any
person responsible for paying to a non-resident any sum chargeable to tax under
the provisions of the Act is obliged to deduct tax at source at the rates in
force. Accordingly, provisions of section 195 would be applicable in respect of
gift of any sum of money by a person resident in India to a non-resident, which
is chargeable to tax u/s 9(1)(viii) and the resident Indian gifting money to a
non-resident shall be responsible to withhold tax at source and deposit the
same in the government treasury within seven days from the end of the month in
which the tax is withheld.

 

The person resident in India shall be
required to obtain tax deduction account number (TAN) from the Indian tax
department, file withholding tax e-statements and issue the tax withholding
certificate to the non-resident. In case of a delay in deposit of withholding
tax / file e-statement / issue certificate, the resident would be subject to
interest / penalties / fines as prescribed under the Act.

 

Applicability of the provisions of
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA):

Section 90(2) of the Act provides that where
the Central Government has entered into a DTAA for granting relief of tax or,
as the case may be, avoidance of double taxation, then, in relation to the
assessee to whom such DTAA applies, the provisions of the Act shall apply to
the extent they are more beneficial to that assessee.

 

Therefore, the relief, if any, under a DTAA
would be available with respect to income chargeable to tax u/s 56(2)(viii).

 

The Explanatory Memorandum clarifies that
‘in a treaty situation, the relevant article of applicable DTAA shall continue
to apply for such gifts as well.’

 

A DTAA distributes taxing rights between the
two contracting states in respect of various specific categories of income
dealt therein. ‘Article 21, Other Income’, of both the OECD Model Convention
and the UN Model Convention, deals with those items of income the taxing rights
in respect of which are not distributed by the other Articles of a DTAA.

 

Therefore, if the recipient of the gift
is a resident of a country with which India has entered into a DTAA, then the
beneficial provisions of the relevant DTAA will govern the taxability of the
income referred to in section 9(1)(viii).

 

Article 21 of the OECD Model Convention,
2017 reads as follows:

Article 21, Other Income:

(i)   Items of income of a resident of a contracting
state, wherever arising, not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this
Convention, shall be taxable only in that state;

(ii)   The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply
to income, other than income from immovable property as defined in paragraph 2
of Article 6, if the recipient of such income, being a resident of a
contracting state, carries on business in the other contracting state through a
permanent establishment situated therein and the right or property in
respect of which the income is paid is effectively connected with such permanent
establishment. In such case, the provisions of Article 7 shall apply
.

 

Similarly, Article
21 of the UN Model Convention, 2017 reads as follows:

Article 21,
Other Income:

(1) Items of income
of a resident of a contracting state, wherever arising, not dealt with in the
foregoing Articles of this Convention shall be taxable only in that State;

(2) The provisions
of paragraph 1 shall not apply to income, other than income from immovable
property as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 6, if the recipient of such
income, being a resident of a contracting state, carries on business in the
other contracting state through a permanent establishment situated therein, or
performs in that other state independent personal services from a fixed base
situated therein, and the right or property in respect of which the income is
paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base.
In such a case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be,
shall apply;

(3) Notwithstanding
the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, items of income of a resident of a
contracting state not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Convention
and arising in the other contracting
state may also be taxed in that other state.

 

On a comparison of the abovementioned Article 21 of the OECD and UN
Model Conventions, it is observed that Article 21(1) of the OECD Model
Convention provides taxing rights of other income to only a country of
residence.

 

However, Article 21
of the UN Model contains an additional para 3 which gives taxing rights of
other income to the source country also, if the relevant income ‘arises’ in a
contracting state.

 

DTAAs do not define
the term ‘arise’ or ‘arising’ and therefore in view of Article 3(2) of the
Model Conventions, the term not defined in a DTAA shall have the meaning that
it has at that time under the law of the state applying the DTAA.

 

India has currently
signed DTAAs with 94 countries. India’s DTAAs are based on both the OECD as
well as the UN Models. The distribution of taxation rights of other income /
income not expressly mentioned under Articles, corresponding to Article 21 of
the Model Conventions, in the Indian DTAAs can be categorised as under:

 

Sr. No.

Category

No. of countries

Remarks

1.

Exclusive right of taxation to residence state

5

Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Philippines,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

2.

Exclusive right of taxation to residence state with limited
right to source state to tax income from lotteries, horse races, etc.

36

Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Jordan, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Portuguese Republic, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovenia, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taipei, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Uganda

3.

Source state permitted to tax other income

45

Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Columbia, Slovak
Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Oman,
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Sri Lanka, South Africa,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United Mexican States, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia

4.

In both the states, as per laws in force in each state

4

Bangladesh, Italy, Singapore, United Arab Republic (Egypt)

5.

Exclusive right to source state

1

Namibia

6.

No other income article

3

Greece, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Netherlands

 

Interestingly, in some of the DTAAs that
India has signed with countries where a large Indian diaspora is present, like
the US, Canada, UK, Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, etc., the taxation right
vests with India (as a source country). It is important that provisions of the
article relating to other income is analysed in detail to evaluate if any tax
is to be paid in the context of such gifts under the applicable DTAA.

 

In cases of countries covered in Sr. Nos.
1 and 2, due to exemption under the respective DTAAs, India would still not be
able to tax income u/s 9(1)(viii) arising to the residents of those countries.

 

IMPLICATIONS UNDER FEMA

Besides tax
laws, one should also evaluate the implications, if any, under the FEMA
regulations for gifts from a person resident in India to a non-resident. Thus,
one must act with caution to ensure compliance with law and mitigate
unnecessary disputes and litigation at a later date.

 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The stated objective of section 9(1)(viii)
has been to plug the loophole for taxation of gifts of money from a person
resident in India to a non-resident. As the taxability is in the hands of the
non-resident donee, there would be a need for the donee / recipient to obtain
PAN and file an income tax return in India where there is a taxable income
(along with the gift amount that exceeds Rs. 2,50,000 in case of an
individual).

 

In conclusion, this is a welcome provision
providing certainty in the taxability of gifts to non-residents by a person
resident in India.  

 

 

IS IT FAIR TO INTERVENE WITH SEAMLESS FLOW OF INPUT CREDIT – RULE 36(4) OF CGST RULES?

BACKGROUND

GST has been rolled out in
India with one of its main features being bringing about a seamless flow of
input tax credit (ITC) across goods and services.

 

Provisions
of the Act related to ITC:
The same are covered under
Chapter V of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act (CGST Act) and section 16
provides the criteria for eligibility and conditions for claiming the ITC which
are reproduced below:

 

‘(i)   he is in possession of a tax invoice or debit
note issued by a supplier registered under this Act, or such other tax-paying
documents as may be prescribed;

(ii)   he has received the goods or services, or both;

(iii)   subject to the provisions of section 41, the
tax charged in respect of such supply has been actually paid to the government,
either in cash or through utilisation of input tax credit admissible in respect
of the said supply; and

(iv) he has furnished the return u/s 39.’

 

Section 16 of the Act
entitles any registered person to claim ITC in respect of inward supply of
goods and services which are used or intended to be used in the course of business or
furtherance of business. Section 49 provides the manner in which ITC is to be
claimed. Section 49(2) provides that ITC as self-assessed in the return
of a registered person shall be credited to his electronic credit ledger in
accordance with section 41.

 

Further,
section 41(1) provides that every registered person shall, subject to such
restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, be entitled to take credit of
ITC as self-assessed in the returns and such amount shall be credited on
provisional basis to his electronic credit ledger.

 

Section 42 provides for
matching, reversal and reclaiming of ITC by matching details of ITC furnished
in GSTR-2 with GSTR-1 of suppliers. It lays down the procedure for
communication of missed invoices with a facility for rectification of GSTR-1.

Due to technical limitations,
the process of filing GSTR-2 and 3 was suspended by the GST Council in its 22nd
and 23rd meetings. In the interim, the taxpayer was permitted to
avail ITC upon fulfilling the remaining conditions specified u/s 16, viz. valid
documents, actual receipt of supply, etc.

 

ISSUE

New Rule
36(4) inserted vide Notification No. 49/2019 with effect from 9th
October, 2019

The above-mentioned rule
relates to availment of input credit and was inserted in the CGST Rules
(reproduced below):

 

‘(4) Input
tax credit to be availed by a registered person in respect of invoices or debit
notes, the details of which have not been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section
(1) of section 37, shall not exceed by 20 percent of the eligible credit
available in respect of invoices or debit notes the details of which have been
uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37.’

 

As per the said rule, a
recipient of supply will be permitted to avail ITC only to the extent of valid
invoices uploaded by suppliers u/s 37(1) plus 20% thereof. In effect, the said
sub-rule provides restriction in availment of ITC in respect of invoices or debit notes, the details of which have not been uploaded
by the suppliers in accordance with section 37(1).

 

To clarify doubts, Circular
No. 123/42/2019-GST was issued on 11th November, 2019. It clarified
that the computation of the credit available as per the rule is required to be
done on a monthly basis, while computing the liability for the month and filing
GSTR-3B.

 

It was also clarified that
for the purpose of computation the auto-populate GSTR-2A as available on the
due date of filling of Form GSTR-1 should be considered and the balance credit
not appearing in the GSTR-2A can be claimed in succeeding months provided the
same appears in GSTR-2A

.

UNFAIRNESS

The registered persons who
have to file GSTR returns (GSTR-1) on a quarterly basis still need to make payment of taxes on monthly basis through Form GSTR-3B. GST, being a value-added
tax (VAT), a registered person is required to pay tax on his outward supplies after
taking credit of taxes paid on inward supplies. Thus, tax is payable on margin.
But the newly-inserted Rule requires the assessee to pay tax on outward
supplies and the ITC will be granted later on the basis of information uploaded
by the suppliers through their GSTR-1, which will be reflected in GSTR-2A.
Those who are filing GSTR-1 on quarterly basis, say for the months October, November
and December, 2019, the taxpayers will not have any credit and they will have
to make double payment of tax, i.e. once they have paid to the supplier and again they have to deposit with the government through GSTR-3B of
October, November and December, 2019. Although credit is not denied but it is
being postponed for three months. This is a huge drain on working capital for
all the taxpayers and more particularly on small and medium-sized businesses.

 

In the case of the SMEs and
MSMEs filing quarterly GSTR-1, the recipient would not be in a position to
claim ITC in respect of inward supply from them till return in GSTR-1 is filed
by them, although they are paying tax regularly every month. These enterprises
apprehend that because of this rule customers will prefer not to buy from them
and it will impact their existence and survival.

 

GSTR-2A is dynamic in
nature and is akin to moving the goalpost given the direct linkage to the
GSTR-1 filed by the supplier. The amount of ITC claimed vs. the amount reflected
in the ever-changing 2A with the books of accounts would result in a never-ending spiral of reconciliations.

 

GST returns are prone to
human error such as wrong punching of GSTIN, taxable amount, etc. for which the
amendment is required to be made in the following month’s GSTR-1 return. In
such cases, even if the claimant dealer has availed credit to the extent of the
amount reflected in the 2A on the due date of filing, a subsequent amendment by
the supplier can have severe consequences, even though the procedure was
followed correctly.

 

The Rule and the
clarification are silent on how they will operate vis-à-vis the invoices
pertaining to periods prior to October, 2019 which were uploaded by the
suppliers prior to October, 2019 but ITC on which is claimed post-October,
2019, and also vis-a-vis invoices between the 1st and the 8th
of October, 2019.

 

SOLUTION

Let the principle of
substance over form be followed. Let the GST return process be fully
implemented with all modules effective so that genuine credit is not denied.
Till then, Rule 36(4) be postponed and allow seamless credit flow.

 

CONCLUSION

IS IT FAIR?
In legal, commercial and compliance perspective

The present rules in
respect of ITC and furnishing details thereof in the return are not changed so
far. It is proposed to change new return provisions as contained in section 43A
from 1st April, 2020. The newly-inserted provisions of section 43A
provide for restriction of ITC maximum up to 20%. This provision is not yet put
into force and is proposed to be brought in from 1st  April, 2020.

 

Is it fair
on the part of the government to provide for restriction of ITC by 20% by
inserting sub-rule (4) in Rule 36?

 

As per law, currently there
is no requirement nor is there any facility to match invoices to claim ITC. So,
denying and restricting ITC by rule is contrary to the provisions of the Act,
particularly sections 38, 41 and 42.

 

GST law is stabilising, the
continuous tinkering with procedural aspects time and again creates confusion
and results in destabilisation.

 

Primarily, as per the new
section, ITC is available only for the entries appearing in GSTR-2A. For no
fault of genuine taxpayers, the ITC would be denied if it does not appear in GSTR-2A
which is out of his control and despite all valid documents on his records.

 

The government has not
appreciated the fact that a vast majority of the populace still has limited
access to technology and internet which are crucial for compliance. They are heavily
dependent on their consultants who are constantly battling with the frequent
changes in the compliance process; would they be able to cope with the
additional burden of matching credits?

 

Today businesses are
bleeding or working on paper-thin margins due to economic factors. How do they
survive if genuine credits are denied due to systemic issues?

How could ITC ever be
presumptive? What is the logic / basis of the 20% benchmark? Is it really
seamless flow of credit?

 

IS IT
FAIR? In broader perspective

India
recently moved to the 63rd ranking from 77th among 190
nations in the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ with a target to reach the
50th rank by 2020. Is it fair on the part of the law makers
to make frequent changes in the rules and compliances, small and sometimes
irrelevant, that cause a lot of stress to the business and professional
community, with escalating cost of compliances? Are we really on track to move
up to the 50th rank in ease of doing business?

IBC OR RERA? AND THE WINNER IS…!

INTRODUCTION

The Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the IBC’ or ‘the Code’) has probably seen the maximum
amount of litigation of all statutes that a three-year-old enactment can
witness. In addition to the disputes at the NCLT and the NCLAT level, the
Supreme Court has also delivered several landmark and innovative judgements
under the IBC. The Code deals with the insolvency resolution of stressed
corporate debtors and, where resolution is not possible, then their
liquidation. The government has also been very proactive in amending the Act to
take care of deficiencies, changing circumstances and situations.

 

It is interesting to note
that the maximum cases under the IBC have been from the real estate sector. As
of 30th June, 2019, 421 real estate cases were referred to the NCLT
under the IBC; of these, in 164 cases companies have been ordered to be
liquidated and 257 cases are still on. It is a well-known fact that most real
estate projects, especially those in the residential sector, are reeling under
debt stress. This has led to incomplete projects, prolonged delays in handing
over possession, etc. Aggrieved home buyers tried to avail the remedy of
seeking relief under the Code. There were several decisions which held that
home buyers could drag a realtor to proceedings under the Code.

 

Ultimately, the Code was
amended in 2018 to expressly provide that home buyers were financial creditors
under the Code and could trigger the Code. This was done by adding an
Explanation to section 5(8)(f) of the Code in the definition financial debt
– ‘any amount raised from an allottee under a real estate project shall be
deemed to be an amount having the commercial effect of a borrowing.’

 

It further provided that
representatives of home buyers could be appointed on the Committee of
Creditors. Thus, the 2018 Amendment empowered home buyers to a great extent.

Another remedy available to
home buyers was to seek relief under the provisions of the Real Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016
or RERA. Yet another remedy
available is to approach the consumer forums under the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986
since various judgements have held that a flat buyer is also a
consumer under that Act.

 

However, an interesting
issue which arises is whether these three Acts are at conflict with one
another? And in the event of a conflict, which Act would prevail? This
interesting issue was before the Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban Land
& Infrastructure Ltd. vs. UOI, [2019] 108 taxmann.com 147 (SC).
Let
us dissect this judgement and some developments which have taken place pursuant
to the same.

 

PIONEER’S CASE

Challenge:
The real estate developers challenged the 2018 Amendment to the IBC on the
grounds that it was constitutionally invalid. Further, since there was a
specific enactment, RERA, which dealt with real estate, the IBC, which was a
general statute, could not override the same. Further, RERA also contained a non-obstante
clause and hence it must be given priority over the IBC.

 

Twin
non-obstante clauses:
The IBC contains a non-obstante
clause in section 238 which provides that it overrides all other laws in force.
RERA also has a similar provision in section 89 but it also has section 88; and
section 88 provides that RERA shall be in addition to, and not in derogation
of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.

 

The Supreme Court negated
all pleas of the developers and upheld the supremacy of the IBC. It held that
the non-obstante clause of RERA came into force on 1st May,
2016 as opposed to the non-obstante clause of the Code which came into
force on 1st December, 2016. IBC had no provision similar to section
88 of RERA. It was clear that Parliament was aware of RERA when it amended the
Code in 2018. The fact that RERA was in addition to and not in derogation of
the provisions of any other law for the time being in force also made it clear
that the remedies under RERA to allottees were intended to be additional and
not exclusive remedies. The Code as amended, was later in point of time than
RERA, and must be given precedence over RERA, given section 88 of RERA.

 

Further, the Code and RERA
operated in completely different spheres. The Code dealt with a proceeding in
rem in which the focus is the rehabilitation of the corporate debtor by
taking over its management. On the other hand, RERA protects the interests of
the individual investor in real estate projects by requiring the promoter to
strictly adhere to its provisions. The object of RERA was to see that real
estate projects came to fruition within the stated period and that allottees
were not left in the lurch and were finally able to realise their dream of a
home, or be paid compensation if such dream was shattered, or at least get back
monies that they had advanced towards the project with interest. Given the
different spheres within which these two enactments operated, different
parallel remedies were given to allottees.

 

Wrong classification plea: Another challenge was that home buyers being classified as financial
creditors and not operational creditors, was constitutionally invalid. The
Court set aside this plea also. It held that real estate developers were a
unique case where the developer who was the supplier of the flat is the debtor
inasmuch as the home buyer / allottee funds his own apartment by paying amounts
in advance to the developer for construction. Another vital difference between
operational debt and allottees is that an operational creditor has no interest
in the corporate debtor, unlike the case of an allottee of a real estate
project who is vitally concerned with the financial health of the corporate
debtor. Further, in such an event no compensation, nor refund together with
interest, which is the other option, will be recoverable from the corporate
debtor. One other important distinction is that in an operational debt there is
no consideration for the time value of money – the consideration of the debt is
the goods or services that are either sold or availed of from the operational
creditor. Payments made in advance for goods and services are not made to fund
the manufacture of such goods or the provision of such services. In real estate
projects, money is raised from the flat allottee as instalments for flat
purchase. What is predominant, insofar as the real estate developer is
concerned, is the fact that such instalment payments are used as a means of
finance qua the real estate project.

It is
these fundamental differences between the real estate developer and the
supplier of goods and services that the legislature has focused upon and
included real estate developers as financial debtors. Hence, the Supreme Court
held it was clear that there cannot be said to be any infraction of equal
protection of the laws. Thus, even though flat allottees were unsecured
creditors, they were placed on the same pedestal as financial creditors like
banks and institutions. It held that the definition of the term ‘financial
debt’ u/s 5(8)(f) of the Code (‘any amount raised under other transaction,
including any forward sale or purchase agreement, having the commercial effect
of a borrowing’
) would subsume within it amounts raised under transactions
which, however, are not necessarily loan transactions so long as they have the
commercial effect of a borrowing. It is not necessary that the transaction must
culminate in money being given back to the lender. The expression ‘borrow’ was
wide enough to include an advance given by the home buyers to a real estate
developer for ‘temporary use’, i.e. for use in the construction project so long
as it was intended by the agreement to give ‘something equivalent’ to the money
to the home buyers. That something was the flat in question.

 

Defeats
value maximisation:
The Court also negated the
argument that classifying allottees as financial creditors was directly
contrary to the object of the Code in maximising the value of assets and
putting the corporate debtor back on its feet. It held that if the management
of the corporate debtor was strong and stable, nothing debarred it from
offering a resolution plan which may well be accepted by the Committee of Creditors.
It was wrong to assume that the moment the insolvency resolution process
started, liquidation would ensue. If the real estate project was otherwise
viable, bids from others would be accepted and the best of these would then
work in order to maximise the value of the assets of the corporate debtor.

 

Retrospective
nature:
The Court held that this Amendment [insertion of Explanation to
section 5(8)(f) of the Code] was clarificatory in nature, and this was also made clear by the
Insolvency Committee Report which expressly used the word ‘clarify’, indicating
that the Insolvency Law Committee also thought that since there were differing
judgements and doubts raised on whether home buyers would or would not be
classified as financial creditors u/s 5(8)(f), it was best to set these doubts
at rest by explicitly stating that they would be so covered by adding an
Explanation to section 5(8)(f). Therefore, the Court held that home buyers were
included in the main provision, i.e. section 5(8)(f) with effect from the
inception of the Code, the Explanation being added in 2018 merely to clarify
doubts that had arisen.

 

Defence for developers: The Court also laid down the defence available to developers against
initiation of proceedings under the Code. The developer may point out that the
allottee himself was a defaulter and would, therefore, on a reading of the flat
agreement and the applicable RERA Rules and Regulations, not be entitled to any
relief including payment of compensation and / or refund, entailing a dismissal
of the said application. Under section 65 of the Code, the real estate
developer may also point out that the insolvency resolution process has been
invoked fraudulently, with malicious intent, or for any purpose other than the
resolution of insolvency. The Court gave instances of a speculative investor
and not a person who was genuinely interested in purchasing a flat / apartment.
Such persons could not claim relief. Developers may also point out that in a
falling real estate market, the allottee did not want to go ahead with its
obligation to take possession of the flat / apartment under RERA and, hence,
wanted to jump ship and really get back, by way of this coercive measure, the
monies already paid by it. Hence, there were enough safeguards available to
developers against false triggering of the Code.

 

Parallel
remedies:
The Supreme Court held that another parallel
remedy is available and is recognised by RERA itself in the proviso to section
71(1), by which an allottee may continue with an application already filed
before the Consumer Protection Forum, he being given the choice to withdraw
such complaint and file an application before the adjudicating officer under
RERA.

 

Supremacy:
It therefore held that even by a process of harmonious construction, RERA and
the Code must be held to co-exist and, in the event of a clash, RERA must give
way to the Code. RERA, therefore, cannot be held to be a special statute which,
in the case of a conflict, would override the general statute, viz. the
Code.

 

SOME SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS

The NCLT Delhi applied the
above Pioneer case in Sunil Handa vs. Today Homes Noida
India Ltd. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 517 (NCLT – New Delhi
). In this case,
home buyers stated that as per the flat agreement, the possession of the flat
had to be handed over latest by the year 2016. Despite having received almost
90% of the purchase value of the flats, the corporate debtor had till date
neither handed over the possession of the said units nor refunded the amount
paid by the financial creditors. Hence, they applied for corporate insolvency
resolution under the Code. The NCLT applied the decision in the Pioneer
case and held that in the event of a conflict between RERA and IBC, the IBC
would prevail. Hence, the petition was admitted.

 

Again, in Rachna
Singh vs. Umang Realtech (P) Ltd. LSI-598-NCLT-2019 (PB)
, the NCLT
Principal Bench took the same view and upheld insolvency proceedings against
the realtor.

 

However, a very interesting
decision was delivered in the case of Nandkishore Harikishan Attal vs.
Marvel Landmarks Pvt. Ltd. [LSI-617-NCLT-2019 (Mum.)]
.

 

In this case, the NCLT
observed that the intention of the petitioner was only to extract more
compensation from the realtor. He did not take steps for taking possession of
the flat by clearing his pending dues in spite of repeated reminders. Thus, the
defence laid down in the Pioneer case would come to the
developer’s rescue. The NCLT held that the petitioner was a speculative
investor who had purchased flats in a booming real estate market and now wanted
to escape his liability when the real estate market was facing bad times. It
held that ‘the Flat is ready for possession but the petitioner is adamant on
taking refund… The intention of the petitioner is only to extract more
compensation from the corporate debtor rather than the resolution of the
corporate debtor…’.

 

A very telling observation
by the NCLT was that ‘where hundreds of flat buyers are involved, when
compensation of this magnitude is acceded as demanded or CIRP is ordered, we
are afraid that it may lead to utter chaos in the real estate market in the
country and it will affect the real estate sector wholly and a situation may
arise that no investor will be forthcoming to invest in real estate sector.
This is not a case where many of the home buyers are duped or the corporate
debtor / developer had collected the money and done nothing.’

 

RERA in a
bind:
Press reports indicate that RERA authorities across India are now
in a fix as to how they should approach all cases given the Supreme Court’s
decision in Pioneer. They fear that RERA’s authority would now be
diluted given the supremacy of IBC. What would happen if proceedings were
pending under RERA and one of the homebuyers moved a petition under the IBC?
Thus, even one flat buyer could stall RERA proceedings. Accordingly, the RERA
officials have approached the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs for clarity on this aspect.

 

In one
of the complaints before the MahaRERA in the case of Majestic Towers Flat
Owners Association vs. HDIL, Complaint No. CC006000000079415
a
complaint was pending before the MahaRERA. The developer contended that it has
been admitted for corporate insolvency resolution under the CIRP and, hence, a
moratorium u/s 14 of the Code applied to all pending legal proceedings.
Accordingly, the MahaRERA disposed of the complaint by stating that though the
complainant was entitled to reliefs under the provisions of RERA, the said
relief could not be granted at this juncture due to the pending IBC resolution
process. Of course, if the IBC resolution process ultimately does not survive,
then the proceedings under the RERA could be revived since the moratorium is
only for the duration of the process. More such cases would be seen in the
coming months as a fallout of the Pioneer decision.

 

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

While the 2018 Amendment to
the IBC and the SC’s decision in Pioneer were meant to protect
home buyers, it also means that a single buyer (with a default of only Rs. 1
lakh) can drag a realtor to insolvency resolution, stall all proceedings under
RERA and thereby hold up all other flat buyers who could run into hundreds or
even thousands. Even if those other buyers do not wish to be a party, the
developer would have to endure the entire process under the IBC. This is a very
dangerous situation and one which the law-makers seem to be taking cognisance
of. Press reports indicate that the government is planning to amend the Code to
stipulate that the number of homebuyers required to file an insolvency case
must be at least 100, or they must collectively account for a minimum of 5% of
the outstanding debt of the realty developer, whichever is lower. However, they
will continue to enjoy the status of financial creditors. The planned amendment
is expected to be applicable only prospectively and will have no bearing on
those real estate cases that have already been admitted by the NCLT. The
government is also said to be mulling increasing the default limit to Rs. 10
lakhs.

 

CONCLUSION

Time and again the Supreme
Court has come to the rescue of the IBC by stating that it comes up trumps
against all other statutes – the Income-tax Act, RERA, labour laws, etc. While
it is a law meant to speed up recoveries and unclog the debt resolution system
in India, probably the time has come to consider whether it could actually
cause more harm than good. The proposals being considered by the government should
be implemented urgently. The real estate sector is already in a mess and needs
urgent salvation.
 

 

THE OTHER SIDE

Every issue has three sides. One yours, one mine and the third, the
true one.

 

A common man ordinarily has single-track thinking. He knows things
only partially and believes that he has understood everything.

 

He forms a view based on his perception and sticks to that view. He
refuses to even imagine that there could be another side to a coin. Thus, he
develops a set pattern of thinking.

 

This is very dangerous for a professional. A chartered accountant,
for example, is expected to have the maturity to visualise different
situations, something beyond what is apparent on the face of it – be it a
transaction or be it a document.

 

It should at least occur to his mind that the reality may be
radically different from what is visible. This is true not only in assurance
function, but also in every aspect of our profession.

 

Especially in litigation, this kind of maturity is a must. One
should always be prepared for a counter-argument. Even in warfare, they develop
a strategy by artificially creating an ‘enemy group’ – just to ensure that
their strategy or plan becomes fool-proof.

 

Similarly, before arguing a complicated case in a court of law, a
good counsel always plays the role of a ‘devil’s’ advocate so that the likely
arguments coming from the opposite side are anticipated and taken care of.

Sometimes, such situations arise in real life and one is left
non-plussed. Occasionally, they also create some terrific humour.

 

Pandit Ramandas was a renowned classical singer. He always attracted
a jam-packed audience to his mehfils (concerts). They used to listen to
him in pin-drop silence and remained spellbound once he started singing. Even
the slightest disturbance would upset the Panditji as well as the audience.

 

Once, a concert was arranged in a small town where the hall was
neither ‘posh’ nor ‘modern’. It was a mediocre venue. On the first floor, near
the balcony, there was a carpenter doing some repair work.

 

As usual the concert started a little late – as per Indian Standard
Time (or Indian stretchable time)! Panditji adjusted his instruments and the
mike system and started singing.

 

The audience was all ears, waiting in anticipation. He started with
saa….aaa’, in his melodious voice. Alas! Just then, the carpenter hit a
nail with his hammer!

 

Panditji paused for a while. As soon as he resumed, the hammer hit
home once again. Panditji looked up and stopped singing. The audience was
irritated and started cursing the carpenter.

 

But the carpenter shouted from the top, ‘Panditji, aap ka chalne
dijiye, mujhe koi taqlif nahi ho rahi hai’
! (Panditji, you please continue.
It is not disturbing me!)
 

 

Section 115JAA r.w.s. 263 – Amalgamated company is entitled to claim set-off of MAT credit of the amalgamating company

7.  [2019]
111 taxmann.com 10 (Trib.) (Mum.)
Ambuja Cements Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No.: 3643/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 5th September,
2019

 

Section 115JAA r.w.s. 263 – Amalgamated
company is entitled to claim set-off of MAT credit of the amalgamating company

 

FACTS

The assessee, engaged in the manufacture and
sale of cement, filed its return of income wherein a MAT credit of Rs. 20.12
crores was claimed. The AO, while completing the assessment, allowed MAT credit
of only Rs 6.99 crores instead of Rs 20.12 crores as claimed in the return of
income.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) on several grounds, one of which was that MAT credit was
short-granted. The CIT(A) directed the AO to grant MAT credit in accordance
with law. The AO passed an order giving effect to the order of CIT(A) wherein
he allowed MAT credit of Rs. 20.12 crores to the assessee.

 

The CIT was of
the opinion that the MAT credit allowed by the AO is excessive as the MAT
credit allowed includes Rs. 6.99 crores being MAT credit of ACEL, a company
which was amalgamated into the assessee company. She, accordingly, exercised
her powers u/s 263 of the Act and directed the AO not to grant MAT credit of
Rs. 6.99 crores because according to her the amalgamated company is not
entitled to MAT credit of the amalgamating company.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that there is no
restriction with regard to allowance of MAT credit of an amalgamating company
in the hands of the amalgamated company. According to the Tribunal, a plain
reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that MAT credit is allowed to be
carried forward for a specific period.

 

In the case of Skol Breweries Ltd.,
the Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, while deciding an identical issue, has held that
carried forward MAT credit of the amalgamating company can be claimed by the
amalgamated company. A similar view has been expressed by the Tribunal,
Ahmedabad Bench, in Adani Gas Ltd.. If we consider the issue in
the light of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions, there
cannot be two views that the assessee is entitled to claim carried-forward MAT
credit of the amalgamating company Ambuja Cement Eastern Ltd. (ACEL).

 

The Tribunal also observed that while
completing the assessment in case of the amalgamating company ACEL in the A.Y.
2006-07, the AO has also concluded that carried-forward MAT credit of ACEL
would be available in the hands of the present assessee.

 

Keeping in view the assessment order passed
in case of the amalgamating company as well as the decisions referred to above,
the Tribunal held that the principle which emerges is that the carried-forward
MAT credit of the amalgamating company can be claimed by the amalgamated
company. Viewed in this perspective, the decision of the AO in allowing set-off
of carried forward MAT credit of Rs. 6,99,46,873 in the hands of the assessee
cannot be considered to be erroneous. Therefore, one of the conditions of
section 263 of the Act is not satisfied. That being the case, the exercise of
power u/s 263 of the Act to revise such an order is invalid.

 

The Tribunal quashed the impugned order
passed by the CIT.

 

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee
was allowed.

PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE VIS-À-VIS ASSESSMENT UNDER MVAT/CST ACTS

INTRODUCTION

Assessment under taxation laws is considered to be
a quasi-judicial process. The Department authorities are expected to act in a
just and fair manner, including compliance with the principles of natural
justice.

 

Not calling records lying with department

There are a number of instances where the
investigation authorities may visit the place of business of an assessee.
Through such a visit, the Department may acquire possession of full / part
records of the assessee. The assessing authorities subsequently initiate
assessment proceedings. And the burden is on the assessee to produce records.
But strangely, no action is taken to call for the records lying with the
investigation authorities!

 

Often, adverse orders are passed based on reports
received from investigation authorities, or based on (their) own assumptions
without going into the actual records with the authorities.

 

Judgement of the Bombay High Court in the case of Insta Exhibitions Pvt. Ltd. (Writ Petition No. 6751
of 2019 dated 8th August, 2019)

One such case came before the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court recently. The facts narrated by the Court are as under:

 

‘3. The
grievance of the Petitioner is that both the impugned orders dated 14th
March, 2019 have been passed in breach of principles of natural justice
inasmuch as no sufficient opportunity to present their case was given to the
Petitioner. In particular, it is pointed out that the Petitioner had received a
notice for personal hearing from the Assessing Officer for the hearing
scheduled on 11th March, 2019. On that date, i.e. 11th
March, 2019, the Petitioner’s representative attended the office of the
Assessing Officer and filed a letter seeking an adjournment of eight days and
the respondents were requested to make available to the Petitioner its own
documents relevant for the assessment relating to financial year 2014-2015,
which were with the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Investigation Branch,
Bhayander (evidence in the form of receipt was also enclosed with the
Petitioner’s letter dated 11th March, 2019). The impugned orders do
record that the Petitioner’s representative was present at the hearing and the
filing of letter dated 11th March, 2019. It is submitted that the
assessment were (sic) finalised without giving the Petitioner the
documents in the possession of the Revenue. Thus, the Petitioner did not have
an opportunity to establish its case before the authority.’

 

The respondents opposed the writ petition on
grounds of alternative remedy and also on the ground that the submission of the
assessee is otherwise considered.

 

However, the Bombay High Court did not approve of
the action of the Department authorities and observed as under:

 

‘5. It is an undisputed position that the
Petitioner’s documents relating to the period 2014-2015 and necessary for the
Petitioner’s assessment, in particular to support its claim for branch transfer
and exhibition activity, were in the possession of the Department with effect
from 18th April, 2017. In spite of the Petitioner’s seeking copies
of the same, the same were not granted by the Assessing Officer as he did not
call for the necessary proceedings and papers from the Assistant Commissioner
of Sales Tax, Investigation Branch, Bhayander, who was in possession of the
papers relating to the assessment year 2014-15. In these circumstances, it was
impossible for the Petitioner to establish its claim for branch transfer as
also the exhibition activity as the documents relevant, according to the
Petitioner, in support of its aforesaid two claims, were amongst the documents
which were in the possession of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Investigation Branch, Bhayander. This non-giving of documents certainly
handicapped the Petitioner in the assessment proceedings. This certainly
amounts to a breach of principles of natural justice.

 

6. In the above view, there
is a flaw in the decision-making process which goes to the root of the matter.
Therefore, we set aside the impugned orders dated 14th March, 2019
passed under the MVAT Act and the CST Act. We restore the Petitioner’s
assessment proceedings to respondent No. 3 – Deputy Commissioner of State Tax –
for fresh consideration of the assessment for the period 2014-15 after
furnishing to the Petitioner all the documents relating to the assessment year
2014-15 which are in possession of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Investigation Branch, Bhayander, since 18th April, 2017.’

 

Thus, the Hon’ble High Court has remanded the
assessment for fresh orders after providing a proper opportunity to the
petitioner.

 

CONCLUSION

Compliance with the principles of natural justice
is a very important part of assessment. Non-compliance results in invalid
orders. However, the assessee is also required to be alert about his rights. It
is necessary that the issue about the requirement of following the principles
of natural justice is raised in due course. If not, then non-compliance will be
fatal to the validity of the orders passed. The above judgement will be useful
for reference in future proceedings.
 

 

 

NEW RULES FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: HASTY, SLIPSHOD AND BURDENSOME

The new rules notified on 22nd October, 2019 by the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs under the Companies Act, 2013 require independent
directors to pass a test to demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency in
certain areas for board-level functioning in corporates. They need to score at
least 60% marks to qualify. They also need to enrol their names in a database
maintained for the purpose. The intention appears to be that companies should
choose independent directors from this databank. The above are the principal
requirements notified by the new rules.

 

BACKGROUND

It may be recalled that the Companies Act, 2013 requires listed
companies and certain large-sized public companies (in terms of specified net
worth, etc.) to have at least one-third of their boards peopled by independent
directors. SEBI has made similar requirements but with some differences (its
requirements apply to listed companies and provide for a higher proportion of
independent directors).

 

QUALITIES OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

The qualities that make a person an ‘independent’ director have been
laid down in great detail in the law. However, these focus largely on their
independence from the company and its promoters but do not prescribe any
minimum knowledge, educational qualifications, etc., except when they are a
part of the Audit Committee. They occupy a high position in a company and are
expected to provide well-informed inputs on matters of governance, strategy and
so on to the company and its management. They are also expected to keep a
watchful eye on the finances, accounts and performance of the company by
exercising their skill and diligence. A failure on their part can be harmful to
the company and to themselves, too, since they may face liability and penal
action in many forms.

 

Against this background, the new requirement of minimum knowledge is
surely welcome. A designated institute (the Indian Institute of Corporate
Affairs) will publish the study material for directors to prepare for the test.
It will also conduct the prescribed test.

 

Often, independent directors have a background of law, accountancy,
etc., but there are also many directors chosen for their experience in a
relevant industry, for their technical knowledge and administrative expertise.
But such persons may not have knowledge and experience about how companies are
governed. It is possible that they may not even have rudimentary knowledge of
accounting. Such basic knowledge, duly confirmed by a test which they have to
pass, would help them and the company as well. This is particularly so since
the obligations placed on them are fairly comprehensive.

 

When do the new rules come into force?

The new rules come into force from 1st December, 2019 and are
spread over several notifications, one of which introduces a full set of rules,
another modifies an existing one and yet another notifies the institute that shall
oversee the teaching and the test. Three months’ time has been given to
independent directors to enrol their names in the databank and a period of one
year from enrolment to pass the test. Companies are required to ensure
compliance with this requirement and an independent director is also required
to confirm he is compliant in the filings made by him.

 

Who will administer the tests and maintain databank?

The new rules may be an attempt to provide a basic level of financial
and regulatory literacy. The institute notified (the Indian Institute of
Corporate Affairs) has to serve several functions. It has to release
educational material for independent directors that they can use to prepare for
the exams. It is also required to conduct the online test for them. (The scope
of the test covers areas such as company law, securities law, basic
accountancy, etc.) Apart from the qualifying exam, the institute is required to
conduct an optional advanced test for those who wish to take it.

 

The Institute is also required to maintain a databank of independent
directors containing detailed information of each such person. Companies
seeking to appoint independent directors can access such information on payment
of a fee to the institute. Interestingly, the institute is required to report daily
to the government all the additions, changes and removals from the databank.
This makes one wonder why would the government want to monitor this databank so
closely and so frequently.

 

To whom do these new requirements apply?

The requirement of enrolling in the database and passing the qualifying
test applies to existing as well as new independent directors. Existing
independent directors are given some time to enrol themselves in the database
and thereafter pass the qualifying test. New independent directors will have to
first enrol in the database.

 

Are any persons exempted from the requirements?

A person who has acted as an independent director or key managerial
personnel for at least ten years in a listed company or a public company with
at least Rs. 10 crores of paid-up capital, is exempted from the requirement of
passing the test. However, he would still have to enrol in the database.

 

Independent directors required to enrol in the database

Independent directors are required to enrol by providing the required
information and payment of a fee. Existing independent directors are required
to do this within three months, i.e., by 1st March, 2020. A person
seeking appointment as an independent director is required to enrol before
being appointed. He is required to pass the prescribed test with at least 60%
marks within one year of enrolment. The enrolment can be for one year, five
years or for a lifetime. The test has to be passed only once in a lifetime.
Directors, presumably, will update the knowledge of rapidly changing laws on
their own.

 

Companies are required to ensure and report compliance with these
requirements.

 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW REQUIREMENTS

These new requirements will ensure that a person may be a top lawyer or
a chartered accountant with decades of experience, or a senior bureaucrat, or a
professor of a reputed college, yet he will have to pass this test with at
least 60% marks. Except for persons with ten years’ experience as specified
earlier, there is no exception provided.

 

GREY AREAS IN THE REQUIREMENTS

The law has some gaps and is ambiguous at a few places. Section 150 of
the Companies Act, 2013 pursuant to which these new requirements were
introduced was really for the maintenance of a database of independent
directors. This would help a company to search for such a director from the
database if it so chose. It did not make it mandatory that such a director must
be chosen from this database.

 

It is not clear whether existing directors will vacate their office if
they do not pass the test or if they do not enrol in the database. Will the
appointment of an independent director whose name does not appear in the
register be invalid, or will this be merely a violation of law? A similar
question can be raised for a person who has not passed the test with the
minimum percentage of marks. The intention appears to be that such persons
cannot be appointed; and in respect of existing independent directors, they may
have to vacate their office. However, this is not stated clearly in so many
words. Similarly, the wording of the law is ambiguous on whether a company has
to select an independent director only from the database. The purpose of the
database may get defeated if a company can appoint someone not enrolled, but
this is not specifically and clearly laid down.

 

BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF THE NEW REQUIREMENTS

The new requirements can be praised to the extent that independent
directors will now be required to have minimum relevant knowledge to do justice
to their roles. On the other hand, thanks to the constant tweaking of
requirements, the number of independent directors required is ever increasing.
Their obligations and potential liabilities are also enormous and continue to
increase. Their remuneration, however, is not guaranteed and can often be very
nominal with minimal sitting fees. The new requirements are not expected to be
costly. Even the fees payable to the institute for the enrolment are required
to be ‘reasonable’. It could be argued that the effort and the costs would pay
off in terms of knowledge. Nevertheless, no attempt has been made to increase
the powers of independent directors or ensure that they have at least such
minimum remuneration that makes doing their jobs worthwhile.

 

An independent director today, individually or even collectively, has
very few powers. He is often provided with some minimal information as
statutorily required for board meetings. Some directors can of course attempt
to use their personal and moral force to get their queries answered during
board meetings and sometimes in between, but success is not frequent. If he is
not happy, the eventual recourse he has is to resign. He may go public but he
risks legal action since usually he may not have adequate information and
documentation to back his claims. There is no institutional or legal process he
can take advantage of to express his views (preferably anonymously) and see that
wrongs are corrected. Independent directors may also often be treated with
contempt by managements and as an unavoidable nuisance. I would not be
surprised if the allegations (as yet unsubstantiated) in the Infosys case where
two independent directors are said to have been referred to as ‘madrasis’ and a
lady director as a ‘diva’ are true. Thus, neither from the remuneration point
of view, nor from the personal satisfaction point of view, is the office of
independent director worthwhile.

 

HASTY IMPLEMENTATION?

Then there is the issue regarding the fast-track implementation of these
provisions. As of now, even the institute and database or even the educational
material / test system does not seem to be fully ready for the new
requirements. While some time has been given for the transition, this would
still make it difficult for many to comply.

 

CONCLUSION

If the new rules are taken literally and narrowly, it is possible that
many independent directors would become disqualified and some may vacate their
office. Clearly, some clarification and relaxation both in terms of time and
requirements is needed. Generally, the office of independent directors also
needs a holistic relook, lest most of the cream of the crop quietly leave the
scene being underpaid, underpowered, under-respected and over-obligated.
 

 

 

 

 

 

SECTION 115BAA AND 115BAB – AN ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman presented her maiden Budget in the
backdrop of a significant economic slowdown which is now threatening to turn
into a recession. The Budget and the Finance Act passed thereafter did not
reduce the tax rates which many expected. In fact, the surcharge on individuals
was increased significantly, reversing the trend of a gradual reduction in
taxes in earlier Budgets. The increase was criticised and it was felt that the
high level of taxes would have a negative impact on the investment climate in
the country. Responding to the situation, the government issued the Taxation
Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 which seeks to give relief to corporates and a
fillip to the economy.

 

This article analyses the various issues in the two principal provisions
in the Ordinance. In writing this article I am using inputs from Bhadresh
Doshi, my professional colleague who spoke on the topic on the BCAS
platform a few days ago.

 

As I write this article, the Ordinance has been converted into a Bill. I
have considered the amendments made in the Bill while placing it before
Parliament. However, during its passage in Parliament, the said Bill may
further be amended. The article therefore should be read with this caveat.

 

SECTION 115BAA

The new provision 115BAA(1) provides that

(a) notwithstanding anything contained in the other provisions of the
Income-tax Act

(b)        income tax payable by

(c)        a domestic company

(d)       for A.Y. 2020-21 onwards

(e)        shall at the option of
the company

(f)        be computed at the rate
of 22% if conditions set out in sub-section (2) are satisfied

 

The proviso to this sub-section stipulates that in the event the company
opting for the lower rate violates any condition prescribed in sub-section (2),
the option shall become invalid for that previous year in which the condition
is violated and the provisions of the Act shall apply as if the option had not
been exercised for that year as well as subsequent years.

 

Sub-section (2) provides the following conditions:

(i)         the income of the
company is computed without deductions under sections 10AA, 32(1)(iia), 32AD,
33AB, 33ABA, 35(1)(ii)/(iia)/(iii), 35(2AA)/(2AB), 35CCC, 35CCD or any
deductions in respect of incomes set out in Part C of Chapter VIA other than a
deduction u/s 80JJAA;

(ii)        the company shall not
claim a set-off of any loss or depreciation carried forward from earlier
assessment years, if such loss or depreciation is attributable to the
provisions enumerated above;

(iii)       the company shall not
be entitled to set-off of any deemed unabsorbed loss or depreciation carried
forward by virtue of an amalgamation or demerger in terms of section 72A;

(iv) company shall claim depreciation u/s 32(1).

 

Sub-section (3) provides that the loss referred to in sub-section (2)
shall be treated as having been given effect to. The proviso, however, provides
that there would be an adjustment to the block of assets to the extent of the
depreciation that has remained unabsorbed for the years prior to assessment
year 2020-21.

 

Sub-section (4) provides that if the option is exercised by a company
having a unit in the International Financial Services Centre as referred to in
sub-section (1A) of section 80LA, the conditions contained in sub-section (2)
shall be modified to the extent that the deduction u/s 80LA shall be available
to such unit subject to compliance with the conditions contained in that
section.

 

Sub-section (5) provides that the section shall apply only if an option
is exercised by the company in the prescribed manner on or before the due date
specified under sub-section (1) of section 139 for any assessment year from
2020-21 onwards. The sub-section further provides that the option once
exercised cannot be withdrawn for the said year or future years.

The proviso provides that if an option exercised u/s 115BAB becomes
invalid on account of certain violations of the conditions set out in that
section, such a person may exercise the option under this section.

 

ANALYSIS

The new section grants an option to domestic companies to choose a lower
rate of tax @ 22% plus the applicable surcharge and cess and forgo the
deductions enumerated. It is fairly clear from the section that claim in an
anterior year attributable to the specified deductions which could not be
allowed on account of insufficiency of income cannot be set off in the year in
which an option under the section is exercised or future years.

 

The issue that may arise in this context is that except for the claim
u/s 35(1)(iv), the law does not contemplate a segregation of the business loss
into loss attributable to different sections. In fact, it is only in regard to
the loss arising on account of a capital expenditure u/s 35(1)(iv) that a
priority of set-off of losses is contemplated in section 72(2). Therefore, if
one is to give effect to section 115BAA(2), then the assessee company would
have to compute a breakup of a business loss which has been carried forward,
between various provisions to which it is attributable. Without such a
bifurcation the provision attributing loss to the enumerated deductions cannot
be given effect to. Even as far as depreciation is concerned, depreciation is
computed under sections 32(1)(i) and (iia). It is the aggregate of such depreciation
which is claimed as an allowance and a reduction from the written down value
(w.d.v.) of the block of assets. There is no specific provision requiring a
bifurcation between the two.

 

A harmonious interpretation would be that a company exercising the option
for the applicability of this section would have to give a breakup of the said
loss, attributing losses to the deductions referred to above and such
attribution would bind the Department, as the provisions for set-off do not
provide for an order of priority between general business loss and loss
attributable to the enumerated deductions.

 

The proviso
to sub-section (3) seeks to mitigate the double jeopardy to a person seeking to
exercise the option of the lower rate, namely, that set-off of unabsorbed
depreciation will not be allowed as well as the w.d.v. of the block would also
stand reduced. The proviso provides that if there is a depreciation allowance
in respect of a block of assets which has not been given full effect to, a
corresponding adjustment shall be made to the w.d.v. of the block. To
illustrate, if Rs. 1 lakh is unabsorbed depreciation in respect of a block of
assets for assessment year 2019-20, for computing the depreciation for the
block for assessment year 2020-21 the w.d.v. of the block shall stand increased
to that extent.

 

SECTION 115BAB

This section seeks to grant a substantial relief in terms of a reduced
tax rate to domestic manufacturing companies. The section provides that

(1)  a domestic company, subject
to conditions prescribed, would at its option be charged at a tax rate of 15%
from assessment year 2020-21 onwards;

(2)   it is, however, provided
that income which is neither derived from nor incidental to manufacturing or
production, and income in the nature of short-term capital gains arising from
transfer of non-depreciable assets, will be taxed at 22%. In regard to such
income, no deduction of expenditure would be allowed in computing it;

(3)   the income in excess of the
arm’s length price determined u/s 115BAB(6) will be taxed at 30%;

(4)     the conditions are:

 

(a)        the company is set up
and registered on or after 1st October, 2019 and commences
manufacture or production on or before the 31st day of March, 2023;

(b)        it is not formed by
splitting up or the reconstruction of a business already in existence (except
for re-establishment contemplated u/s 33B);

(c)        it does not use any
machinery or plant previously used for any purpose (except imported machinery
subject to certain conditions). Other than imported machinery, the condition
will be treated as having been fulfilled if the value of previously used
machinery or part thereof does not exceed 20% of the total value of machinery;

(d)       it does not use any
building previously used as a hotel or convention centre in respect of which a
deduction u/s 80-ID has been claimed and allowed;

(e)        the company is not
engaged in any business other than the business of manufacture or production of
any article or thing and research in relation to or distribution of such
article or thing manufactured or produced by it;

(f)        the explanation to
section 115BAB(2)(b) excludes development of computer software, mining,
conversion of multiple blocks or similar items into slabs, bottling of gas into
cylinders, printing of books or production of cinematograph film from the
definition of manufacture or production. The Central Government has also been
empowered to notify any other business in the list of excluded categories;

(g)        income of the company is
computed without  deductions under
sections 10AA, 32(1)(iia), 32AD, 33AB, 33ABA, 35(1)(ii)/(iia)/(iii),
35(2AA)/(2AB), 35CCC, 35CCD or any deductions in respect of incomes set out in
Part C of Chapter VIA other than a deduction u/s 80JJAA;

(h)        the company shall not be
entitled to set-off of any deemed unabsorbed loss or depreciation carried
forward by virtue of an amalgamation or demerger in terms of section 72A;

(i)         company shall claim
depreciation u/s 32(1).

 

Sub-section (3) provides that the loss referred to in sub-section (2)
shall be treated as having been given effect to.

 

Sub-section (4) empowers the CBDT, with the approval of the Central
Government, to remove any difficulty by prescribing guidelines in regard to the
fulfilment of the conditions regarding use of previously-used plant and
machinery or buildings, or the restrictive conditions in regard to the nature
of business.

 

Sub-section (5) provides that the guidelines issued shall be laid before
each House of Parliament and they shall bind the company as well as all income
tax authorities subordinate to the CBDT.

 

Sub-section (6) provides that if, in the opinion of the assessing
officer, on account of close connection between the company and another person,
the business is so arranged that it produces to the company more than ordinary
profits, he shall compute for the purposes of this section such profits as may
be reasonably deemed to have been derived from such business.

 

The proviso to the sub-section provides that if the aforesaid
arrangement involves a specified domestic transaction (SDT) as defined in
section 92BA, the profits from such transaction shall be determined having
regard to the arm’s length price as defined in section 92F.

 

The second proviso provides that the profits in excess of the arm’s
length price shall be deemed to be the income of the person.

 

Sub-section (7) provides that the section shall apply only if an option
is exercised by the company in the prescribed manner on or before the due date
specified under sub-section (1) of section 139 for any assessment year from
2020-21 onwards. The sub-section further provides that the option once
exercised cannot be withdrawn for the said year or future years.

 

The explanation to the section states that the expression ‘unabsorbed
depreciation’ shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 72A(7) for the
purposes of section 115BAB and 115BAA.

 

ANALYSIS

Unlike the provisions of section 115BAA, the provisions of this section
give rise to a number of issues, many of them arising on account of lacunae in
drafting which may be taken care of when the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill
becomes an Act. These are as under:

 

The threshold condition of eligibility is that the company is set up and
registered on or after 1st October, 2019 and commences manufacture
or production on or before the 31st day of March, 2023. It is not
clear as to whether the eligibility for the lower rate would be available to
the company after it is set up but before it commences manufacture or
production.

 

It needs to be pointed out that the situs of manufacturing unit
is not relevant. Therefore, manufacture outside India would also be entitled to
the lower rate of tax. Considering the tax cost in the country of manufacture,
this may not turn out to be tax effective, but such a situation is
theoretically possible.

 

If a company fails to meet the condition of commencement of manufacture
or production, the grant of the lower rate of tax would amount to a mistake
apparent from record amenable to a rectification u/s 154.

 

It is possible that in the interregnum between the setting up and
commencement of manufacture or production, the company may earn some income.
This is proposed to be taxed at 22% if it is not derived from or incidental to
manufacture or production. The term ‘incidental’ is likely to create some
controversy. While the higher rate of tax for such other income can be
understood, the condition that no deduction or expenditure would be allowed in
computing such income appears to be unjust. To illustrate, a company demolishes
an existing structure and disposes of the debris as scrap. The debris is
purchased by a person to whom it has to be transported and the company bears
the transport cost. On a literal interpretation of the section a deduction of
such expenditure will not be allowed. This aspect needs to be dealt with during
the passage of the Bill into an Act, or a suitable clarification needs to be
issued by
the CBDT.

 

Section 115ABA(2)(a)(i): This provides that the company is not formed by
splitting up or reconstruction of a business already in existence. As to what
constitutes splitting up or reconstruction of a business is already judicially
explained [Refer: Textile Machinery vs. CIT 107 ITR 195 (SC)].
There are several other decisions explaining the meaning of these terms. The
difference between this provision and all other incentive provisions is that in
those provisions (sections 80-I, 80-IA) this phrase was used in the context of
the business of an ’undertaking’. In this case the phrase is used in the
context of an assessee, namely, a domestic company. Therefore, an issue may
arise as to whether, after its formation, if a company acquires a business of
an existing entity (without acquiring its plant and machinery), the conditions
of this section would be vitiated. The words used are similar to those in other
incentive provisions, namely, ‘is not formed’. It therefore appears that a
subsequent acquisition of a business may not render a company ineligible for
claiming the lower rate of tax.

 

Section 115ABA(2)(a)(ii): This prescribes that the company does not ‘use’
any machinery or plant previously used for any purpose. While the explanation
grants some relaxation in regard to imported machinery, this condition is
extremely onerous. This is because hitherto the words used were ‘transferred to
a new business of machinery or plant’. Therefore, the undertaking had to be
entitled to some dominion and control over the old machinery for the condition
to be attracted. The provision as it is worded now will disentitle the company
to the relief if any old machinery is used. To illustrate, a company decides to
construct its own factory and the plant and machinery in the said factory is of
the value of Rs. 5 crores. During the course of construction, the company hires
for use a crane (which obviously has been used earlier), of the value of Rs. 2
crores. It would have, on a literal reading of the section, contravened one of
the eligibility conditions. It must be remembered that the condition is not
even connected with the business of manufacture but is attracted by ‘use’ of
the machinery by a company for any purpose.

 

Admittedly, this may not be the intention, but this condition needs to
be relaxed or amended to ensure that an overzealous tax authority does not deny
the rightful lower rate to a company which is otherwise eligible.

 

Section 115ABA(2)(a)(iii): This clause prescribes a condition that is even
more onerous. The company is not entitled to ‘use’ any building previously used
as a hotel or convention centre, in respect of which a deduction u/s 80-ID is
claimed. Here again the test is merely ‘user’ without there being any dominion
or control of the company over the building. Further, it is virtually
impossible for a company to ascertain whether the building in respect of which
it has obtained a right of temporary user has hitherto been used as a hotel or
convention centre, and whether deduction u/s 80-ID has been claimed by the
owner / assessee. To illustrate, a company decides to hold a one-month
exhibition of its manufactured goods and for that purpose obtains on leave and
licence 5,000 sq. ft. area in a commercial building. It holds its exhibition
and it later transpires that the said area was hitherto used as a convention
centre. On a literal reading of the section, the company would lose benefit of
the lower rate of tax. Clarity on this issue is required by way of issue of a
CBDT circular.

 

Section
115BAB(2)(b):
The
last condition, which is distinct from the conditions prescribed in 115BAA, is
in regard to restricting the eligibility to those companies whose business is
of manufacture or production of articles and things, research in relation to
such goods as well as distribution thereof. The term manufacture is defined in
the Act in section 2(29B). The same is as follows: [(29BA) ‘manufacture’, with
its grammatical variations, means a change in a non-living physical object or
article or thing:

(a)
resulting in transformation of the object or article or thing into a new and
distinct object or article or thing having a different name, character and use;
or

(b) bringing
into existence of a new and distinct object or article or thing with a
different chemical composition or integral structure.]

 

These two terms have been judicially interpreted and are distinct from
each other, though the common man uses them interchangeably. Reference may be
made to the decisions of the Apex Court in CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja 204 ITR
412 (SC); CIT vs. Oracle Software India Ltd. 320 ITR 546(SC)
. The term
production is a wider term, while the term manufacture must ensure that there
is change in the form and substance of an article at least commercially. While
introducing the Bill, development of software in any form, mining and certain
other activities which could have fallen into the realm of manufacture or
production have been specifically excluded. Companies engaged in such business
will therefore not be entitled to the lower rate. It is also provided that the
Central Government is empowered to notify further businesses which will not be
entitled to the lower rate. It is hoped that any notification will be
prospective in nature, because if a company is registered and it incurs a cost
in setting up a manufacturing facility, a subsequent notification denying it
the lower rate will be unfair.

 

The
conditions prescribed in section 115BAB(2)(c) are identical to those of section
115BAA and the analysis in regard thereto will apply with equal force to this
section as well.

 

Sub-section (6) seeks to limit the operation of the section to income
which is derived from the business of the company computed at arm’s length. The
proviso further provides that if the arrangement between the company and the
related person (associated enterprise), involves a specified domestic
transaction, then the profits from the transaction will be computed based on
the arm’s length price as defined in 92F(ii).

 

Like in the case of section 115BAA, sub-section (7) provides that, in
order to avail of the benefit of the section, the company must exercise the
option on or before the due date prescribed in section 139, and once exercised
the option cannot be subsequently withdrawn for that or any previous year.

 

The explanation provides that the term ‘unabsorbed depreciation’ will
have the meaning assigned to it in clause (b) of sub-section (7) of section
72A. It is therefore clear that the denial of unabsorbed depreciation in
computing income will be restricted to such depreciation that is deemed to be
unabsorbed on account of an amalgamation or demerger. This appears to be in
keeping with the intent of the lawmakers.

 

CONCLUSION

Both the sections are clear on intent but seem to suffer from lacunae in
drafting, particularly in the case of section 115BAB. Let us hope that these
creases are ironed out before the Bill becomes an Act or if that does not
happen, then the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) issues circular/s
clarifying the legislative intent.

 

THE ART OF UNDERSTANDING & MANAGING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS – AN INTERNAL AUDITOR’S PERSPECTIVE

Internal Audit (IA) must recognise that it
exists to serve the needs of diverse stakeholder groups, that their
expectations are constantly evolving and may not be necessarily aligned.
Internal auditors, whether in-house or outsourced – irrespective of the size of
the organisation – who invest in managing the expectations of their various
stakeholders are more likely to create an IA function that remains successful
and relevant in the long term. Those who lose sight of this are at greater risk
of long-term failure.

 

THE STAKEHOLDERS

For IA, the stakeholders comprise:

(i)     The Audit Committee (AC) and the Board of
Directors (Board), to whom IA is supposed to report directly and functionally;

(ii)     The CEO (or head of the enterprise), to
whom IA usually reports administratively;

(iii)    The CFO, who is primarily responsible for the
internal control environment and who, therefore, may be IA’s perpetual ally;

(iv)    Other business heads of the organisation
(auditees);

(v)    Internal audit team (whether forming part of
the in-house team or members of professional services firms engaged on a
co-sourced basis);

(vi)    Statutory auditors and regulators;

(vii)   Other board committees and heads of support
functions, especially administration and HR; and

(viii) Professional network.

 

In well-established organisations, there
will also be potential collaborators such as the CIO (Chief Information
Officer), the CRO (Chief Risk Officer) and the Compliance Head who can jointly
drive the common governance agenda with the AC / Board and within the
organisation. Incidentally, the CIO can be the best catalyst and support for IA
as technology initiatives gain momentum to increase the effectiveness of IA.

 

IA needs to identify the key stakeholders
and categorise them in terms of influence and needs, craft engagement
strategies for each and build and maintain an effective working relationship
with them.

 

UNDERSTANDING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS

IA provides value to the organisation and
its stakeholders when it delivers objective and relevant assurance, and
contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, risk management
and control processes. To achieve this, the IA plan should reflect the issues
that are important to the stakeholders; it should address the challenges and
risks that stand in the way of the strategic and other key objectives of the
organisation. IA must invest sufficient time in talking to stakeholders to
identify and assess priorities. It should involve them in drafting the IA plan
and solicit inputs. Knowing what’s important to stakeholders is the
cornerstone of managing their expectations.

 

Keep your ear to the ground to ensure that
IA is in tune with current concerns and has a flexible plan. If need be, it
should review and update the plan at the half-year point or even quarterly if
circumstances so dictate. Design a process that brings information together;
share it within the IA team to ensure that the team is aware of the main
business drivers
and risks; analyse it and make planning decisions
based on key risks and issues.

 

One of the most important aspects to think
about is the approach, frequency and content of communications for each
stakeholder so that it is easy and encourages them to get involved. Besides,
consider the balance and benefits of formal and informal protocol. Ensure that
the stakeholders understand your needs, relevance and the value of IA to the
organisation.

 

There are several key areas of IA work that
require good stakeholder understanding:

(a) The IA Charter, which defines its mission, role
and scope, should be a living document that helps to sustain IA’s value to the
organisation. The Charter must be up to date, clear, easily understood and
reflect the focus of IA. Stakeholders need to be aware of it and it could, for
example, be a key document on the IA intranet.

(b)        More and more internal auditors are
providing ratings at an engagement and overall level. IA should work with the
AC Chair and senior managers to devise a way of expressing ratings that help
them to understand where the business stands in relation to achieving its
objectives. Some ACs prefer narrative statements, others ‘traffic light’
systems or gradings. There is no right or wrong way of doing this. It does mean
talking through options, agreeing to a suitable format and applying it on a
consistent basis.

(c) Stakeholder feedback on individual engagements
and at the overall service level are important components to continuously
assessing the effectiveness of the service and how well it is providing value
to the organisation.

 

MANAGING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS – OVERVIEW

Having understood
the stakeholder expectations:

1.   Assess key stakeholder expectations, identify
gaps and implement a comprehensive strategy for improvement;

2.   Deploy quality resources for planning and
execution;

3.   Leverage technology to the full;

4.   Deploy a strategy for business knowledge
acquisition;

5.   Streamline IA processes and operations to
enhance value;

6.   Coordinate and collaborate with other risk,
control and compliance functions. In many organisations, some of these roles
are with IA or there may be an overlap. It is not unusual to find board members
looking at IA when issues of risk, control and compliance come up for review.

 

KEYS TO SUCCESS – HIGH-LEVEL INTER-PERSONAL SKILLS

Good oral, written
communications and presentation skills topped with soft skills will hold you
and your team in good stead.

 

Strong
collaboration with stakeholders calls for highly capable communicators who are
good not only at oral and written communications, but also good listeners who
are highly perceptive of body language and unspoken words. My experience over
the years is that there is scope for improvement for IA in effective
communication with stakeholders.

 

IA needs to
remember to communicate what is and what is not being audited and why. ACs need
clarity on this point. Further, the rule of sequence of observation, root
cause, risk and suggested mitigation presented objectively and with clarity
will reinforce your effectiveness.

 

And if you see a problem beyond your scope, either do something to fix
it, or bring it to the attention of those who can fix it. You will then be
perceived as a valuable partner to your stakeholders. Do not hesitate to
solicit feedback from stakeholders; ask them to identify areas for you to
improve.

 

To stay
relevant, always

*    Know your stakeholders’ expectations;

*    Set the right tone and culture for your team
– never stop short of demanding quality, agility and integrity;

*    Build
exceptional teams that deliver high-value assurance and advisory services to
the organisation / client.

 

STRIKING A BALANCE

To achieve the
right balance, IA may employ some of these approaches:

(i)   Engage stakeholders as a business leader, not
a technical auditor –

Assess the IA
team’s level of business acumen and, if necessary, develop a plan to spend time
and effort with those in the organisation who can help you think more like a
business leader and understand the risks related to its strategies and
businesses and the internal and external inter-dependencies. And align these
with functional knowledge of IA.

(ii) Coordinate with the second line of defence –

Understand clearly
the work done by functions in the second line of defence. Collaborate as much
as possible with these functions, work towards common views of risks and
compliance where possible. Once the rigour of their work is tested, IA may rely
on assurance work done by these functions.

(iii)        Balance competing demands –

Develop strong
relationships with stakeholders, including auditees at all levels. However,
stay grounded in your professional obligations and be firm when the situation
demands.

 

IA may also involve
itself in conducting proactive fraud audits to identify potentially fraudulent
acts; participating in fraud investigations under the direction of fraud
investigation professionals; and conducting post-investigation fraud audits to
identify control breakdowns and establish financial loss. Above all, just
watch for complacency!

    

Recent stakeholder
surveys suggest that whilst IA is keeping up with changes in business and is
communicating well with management and the Board by focussing on critical
areas, IA needs to demonstrate its capability for value-add. This is
best done by moving beyond its comfort zone to help organisations bring an IA
perspective to strategic initiatives and changes – digitalisation,
cyber-security, Internet-of-things and more. It needs to proactively flag
the new and emerging risks
that organisations need to understand and
manage.

    

To successfully
manage auditees’ expectations, IA should become familiar with the most common
issues relating to their expectations. To understand them, find some time to
have one-on-one casual and unscripted conversations as often as possible. You
need to realise that stakeholders are not IA subject matter experts. They may
not understand the IA jargon or theory as well as you do. Take some time to
understand them and educate them when you know for sure that there are gaps in
their knowledge that should be filled. Keep it simple when communicating
with auditee stakeholders; in fact, use their language in your conversations
and you will instantly strike a chord!

    

Working with
stakeholders is a two-way process. Talking to and working with them is
fundamental to IA. It enables internal auditors to explain the value of IA
while getting to know stakeholder expectations. Regular face-to-face
meetings enable internal auditors to highlight the function’s role in good
governance and explain the value of the independent and objective assurance.

Stakeholders, on the other hand, have an opportunity to talk about IA
performance and flag risks or issues they would like to see in the IA plan.

 

Regular contact is
therefore beneficial to everyone, but it can be difficult to organise. Plan
ahead, especially as other assurance providers may be competing for your
stakeholders’ attention.

 

MANAGING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS

Let us now look at
how IA can manage its key stakeholders:

 

AC / Board,
CEO

  •     With the AC Chair as well
    as with the CEO, agree on the audit plan after presenting your draft and
    soliciting guidance to modify the same. That establishes your agreement that
    captures the stakeholder expectations. Thereafter, remain proactive; seek
    periodic meetings when you can share progress as also any challenges that could
    impede audit execution. Avoid surprises with all stakeholders, especially the
    AC Chair and the CEO. Reset expectations if necessary or seek support that may
    mitigate challenges.
  •     Talk to your stakeholders, particularly your
    AC Chair and CEO, perhaps also the CFO, and find out what they expect from IA.
    This not only includes the focus of the IA plan but also IA processes, such as
    expressing opinions, reporting styles, performance monitoring and quality
    assessment.
  •     Set up separate ‘audit
    planning days’ with the AC Chair / members outside the formal meeting schedule.
    Prepare monthly / quarterly activity reports or regular briefings for AC
    members requesting feedback. This might include a balanced scorecard or
    dashboard to show progress on a number of important activities. Meet informally
    or call your AC Chair between meetings. Meet the AC Chair before each meeting.
  •     AC Chair and CEOs often use
    IA as an informal sounding board with whom they can discuss risks and explore
    practical responses.

    

Auditees

  •     Organise formal, one-to-one
    internal audit planning discussions with business heads and heads of support
    functions.
  •     Find time for follow-up
    reviews with managers to understand changing risk profiles.
  •     Schedule informal, short
    ‘catch-up’ meetings or phone calls with managers to keep up with changes and
    developments in the organisation.

 

Your
collaborators

  •     Establish regular meetings
    with the CFO and risk management teams to maintain awareness of risk events and
    issues.
  •     Keep in touch with other
    assurance providers to share information.
  •     Collaborate with the
    compliance head and the IT head – both of them can be valuable supporters in
    your initiatives. IA can also work on creating a common resource pool with this
    set of collaborators.

 

Your team

  •     Arrange monthly team
    meetings for sharing experience during execution.
  •     Organise training for
    functional and soft skills. Hold ‘audit workshops’, for example, where the CEO,
    CFO or a business head may meet with a section of the audit team to discuss
    significant risks and issues.
  •     Recognise good performers.
    Ensure variety for team and focus on their development and rotation.
    Demonstrate how IA can be a pipeline for talent that is already groomed in
    process discipline.
  •     An annual two-day offsite for
    the IA team is ideal for brainstorming, introspection, assimilation of feedback
    and team-building. Try and get an external expert to address the team. The IA
    team is more often in the field and less often in office – life can be tough,
    so be sensitive to their hectic schedules and extend support to them.

 

External
stakeholders

  •     Schedule planning and
    update meetings with external stakeholders, e.g., external audit. It is
    necessary to share the audit plan and solicit inputs from the statutory
    auditors. Have at least quarterly meetings to exchange notes with them.
  •     Periodically engage with a
    professional network, which is a good source for sharing new initiatives,
    knowledge-sharing and also trying joint initiatives.
  •     Be a part of professional
    networking groups and occasionally host such meetings in your office. That also
    helps your team to get external exposure.

 

Over the years,
there is a reluctant acceptance that IA does not enjoy as much influence as it
could have enjoyed. There is a feeling that IA is not positioned properly
within the organisation to have the maximum possible impact. And often, IA is
reduced to a compliance function, unable to focus on the opportunities and
risks.

 

Often, IA teams do not have the right skills and capabilities to
undertake the kinds of activities to be relevant and impactful within the
organisation. In response to this challenge, more CAEs plan to use alternative
resourcing models in the coming three to five years to gain the kinds of skills
they need. Co-sourcing, for instance, is a popular option that helps access
specialised skills. Additional alternative resourcing models such as guest
auditor programmes and rotation programmes are also gaining acceptance.

 

Though many IA
teams are embracing analytics to drive deeper insight and provide greater
foresight, others are barely scratching the surface. CAEs are now attempting to
deploy advanced analytics and predictive tools that leading internal audit departments
are using to provide greater value, to provide deeper insight, and to provide
foresight to their stakeholders. Use of workflow-based audit planning and
execution software is helping IA in enhanced delivery.

 

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
PLAN

Here are some
simple ideas that might form part of a Stakeholder Engagement Plan or a
component part of IA strategy:

(a) Develop an induction programme for new AC
members and business leaders / senior managers.

(b)        Organise separate management meetings and
earmark sessions during AC meetings to provide updates and relevant
information. This could include changes in legislation, regulation, risk
management and IA profession and how this might impact the organisation and
audit execution.

(c) Develop an intranet site that contains useful
and relevant information and ensure that it is kept up to date.

(d)        Prepare and circulate a brief note
containing information about IA activities. Use this channel to introduce your
team to a larger audience. Update this periodically to include highlights of
the achievements of IA during the year.

(e) Prepare short guides relating to the IA
process, IA involvement in projects such as systems implementation or new
business set-up, IA role with regard to risk management, etc. Auditees love to
see documented audit processes and terms of engagement with IA, including
service level agreements for flow of information, responses and action-taken
reports.

(f) Schedule periodic meetings with key
stakeholders, even when there is no direct engagement activity in their area,
to stay alive to business changes and the potential for new and emerging risks
that might call for a revision of the engagement plan.

(g)        Offer to second team
members for support or, better still, introduce the concept of guest auditor
for operational audits.

 

With support from
management, IA must help the organisation realise that there is one goal with
one common interest and that there is one team, not two, and each performs its
role in a different way – that would contribute significantly to harmonising
the work performance, increase effectiveness of IA and achieve stakeholders’
satisfaction.

 

DO STAKEHOLDERS MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF INTERNAL AUDIT?

The question, how
IA can meet the expectations of stakeholders has often been discussed and
debated. Various questionnaires are used to measure the satisfaction of
stakeholders with the performance of IA and its role in achieving the
objectives of the organisation, improving its operations and enhancing the
control and risk management practices.

 

There is also a
need to address the subject from the other party’s perspective with the same
degree of interest – how can stakeholders meet the expectations of IA and be
supportive of IA? While it is the responsibility of the management to ensure
that IA is well accepted in the organisation, IA is well advised to take a
proactive approach and build bridges with various stakeholders through fair and
effective communication and finding opportunities to demonstrate the
contribution of IA on a regular, ongoing basis.

 

CONCLUSION

The frequent discussions about how IA meets the expectations of
stakeholders may perhaps give a wrong impression about internal audit in
comparison with other functions within the organisation. In some organisations,
IA is criticised for impacting the morale of business teams by raising
objections and concerns. In others, particularly those experiencing
cost-control measures, IA is often called upon to justify the reasons for its
existence and the importance of its work. These misconceptions can best be
erased by sustained investment in managing stakeholder expectations and
focusing on value-addition across the various areas addressed by Internal Auditors.

 

Though IA may not
be the most glamorous corporate activity, without it, many organisations would
fall foul of their numerous regulatory and compliance obligations. Indeed, IA
helps companies to establish and maintain solid cultures of compliance up and
down the corporate structure. Historically, IA has focused primarily on just
financial and compliance areas. More and more organisations are beginning to
see the strategic and operational benefits of utilising IA from an enterprise
risk angle. Compliance with ever-increasing regulations obviously remains a
core focus for IA teams; however, increases in social media usage as well as
the recent explosion in cybercrime and developments in the technological space
are posing more issues for internal auditors to address.

 

As IA encapsulates
a variety of business areas, boards, senior executives and auditors are
becoming increasingly aware of how companies can leverage IA as a strategic
business adviser, but it is up to companies to find the right balance. Happy
stakeholders will support IA adequately to ensure that the right resources are
available and influence the organisation culture to look at IA as a
collaborator.

 

Good business leaders should anticipate what their customers will
want in the days to come. Good IAs need to be alert to what their stakeholders
will expect from them, especially when there is so much turbulence in the
corporate world. Are you ready? 

 

SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS AND PROVISO TO SECTION 2(15)

ISSUE FOR
CONSIDERATION

A charitable
organisation is entitled to exemption from tax under sections 11 and 12 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of income derived from property held under
trust for charitable purposes. The term ‘charitable purpose’ is defined in
section 2(15) as under:

 

‘“charitable purpose”
includes relief of the poor, education, yoga, medical relief, preservation of
environment (including watersheds, forests and wildlife) and preservation of
monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest, and the
advancement of any other object of general public utility:

 

Provided that
the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a
charitable purpose, if it involves the carrying on of any activity in the
nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service
in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other
consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention,
of the income from such activity, unless –

 

(a)   such activity is undertaken in the course of
actual carrying out of such advancement of any other object of general public
utility; and

 

(b)   the aggregate receipts from such activity or
activities during the previous year do not exceed twenty per cent of the total
receipts, of the trust or institution undertaking such activity or activities,
of that previous year;’

 

For the purposes of
income tax exemption, promotion of sports and games is regarded as a charitable
activity, as clarified by the CBDT vide its Circular No. 395 dated 14th
September, 1984. Many sports associations conduct tournaments where sizeable
revenues are generated from sale of tickets, sale of broadcasting and
telecasting rights, sponsorship, advertising rights, etc. resulting in earning
of a large surplus by such associations.

The issue has
arisen before the appellate authorities as to whether such sports associations
can be regarded as carrying on an activity in the nature of trade, commerce or
business and whether their activities of conducting tournaments cease to be
charitable activities by virtue of the proviso to section 2(15), leading to
consequent loss of exemption under sections 11 and 12. While the Jaipur,
Chennai, Ahmedabad and Ranchi Benches of the Tribunal have held that such
activity does not result in a loss of exemption, the Chandigarh Bench has
recently taken a contrary view, holding that the association loses its
exemption for the year due to such activity.

 

THE RAJASTHAN
CRICKET ASSOCIATION CASE

The issue came up
before the Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal in Rajasthan Cricket Association
vs. Addl. CIT, 164 ITD 212.

 

In this case, the
assessee was an association registered under the Rajasthan Sports
(Registration, Recognition and Regulation of Association) Act, 2005. It was
formed with the objective of promotion of the sport of cricket within the state
of Rajasthan. The main object of the association was to control, supervise,
regulate, or encourage the game of cricket in the areas under the jurisdiction
of the association on a ‘no profit-no loss’ basis. It was granted registration
u/s 12A. The assessee had filed its return claiming exemption u/s 11 for the
assessment year 2009-10.

 

During the course
of assessment proceedings, the AO observed that the assessee had earned
substantial income in the shape of subsidy from the Board of Control for
Cricket in India (BCCI), advertisement income, membership fees, etc. and
concluded that since the assessee was earning huge surplus, the same was not in
the nature of charitable purpose and was rather in the nature of business. The
AO, therefore, denied exemption u/s 11, computing the total income of the
association at Rs. 4,07,58,510, considering the same as an AOP. The
Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the AO confirming the denial of exemption
u/s 11.

 

It was argued
before the Tribunal on behalf of the assessee that:

(i)    the term ‘any activity in the nature of
trade, commerce or business’ was not defined and thus the same had to be
understood in common parlance and, accordingly, the expression ‘trade, commerce
or business’ has to be understood as a regular and systematic activity carried
on with the primary motive to earn profit, whereas the assessee never acted as
a professional advertiser, TV producer, etc.;

(ii)   no matches of any game other than cricket or
no other events were organised to attract an audience, only cricket matches
were being organised, whether the same resulted in profit or loss. Further, not
all the cricket matches attracted an audience – the surplus had been earned
only from one cricket match;

(iii)   the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Tamil
Nadu Cricket Association, 360 ITR 633
had held that volume should not
be the sole consideration to decide the activity of the society – rather, the
nature of activity vis-a-vis the predominant object was to be seen;

(iv) being registered under the Rajasthan Sports
(Registration, Recognition and Regulation of Association) Act, 2005, the
assessee was authorised as well as well-equipped for organising all the cricket
matches taking place in the state of Rajasthan.

(v)   all the payments in the shape of sponsorship,
advertisements, TV rights, etc. were received directly by BCCI which had later
shared such receipts with the assessee. Further, BCCI had delegated the task of
the organisation of matches to state associations and, in turn, state
associations were paid some funds for promotion and expansion of their
charitable activities;

 

(vi) a major benefit of organising the matches was
that the local teams, being trained by RCA, got an opportunity to learn from
the experience of coaches of international calibre assisting them during
practice matches and by witnessing the matches played by international players,
by spending time with them, etc. Ultimately, organising such matches resulted
in promotion of the sport of cricket and the surplus generated, if any, was purely
incidental in nature;

(vii) the assessee had been organising matches even
in the remote areas of Rajasthan where there few spectators and the assessee
association had to essentially incur losses in organising such matches;

(viii)  the surplus was the result of subsidies only
and not from the conducting of tournaments on a commercial basis. The subsidies
were a form of financial aid granted for promoting a specific cause, which was
ultimately for the overall benefit of a section of the public, but never for
the benefit of an individual organisation. The subsidy received was utilised in
the promotion and development of the sport of cricket in the state at each
level, i.e., from mofussil areas to big cities like Jaipur;

(ix) the renting of premises was done wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of cricket and no other activity of whatsoever
nature had been carried out, and neither was it engaged in the systematic
activity as a hotelier;

(x)   RCA was run by a committee which consisted of
members from different walks of life – such members were not professional
managers or businessmen. The agreement with the players was only to control and
monitor their activities, to ensure that the same was in accordance with the
objects;

 

(xi) The RCA was providing technical and financial
support to all the DCAs (District Cricket Associations), i.e., providing
equipments, nets, balls, etc. without any consideration. RCA was getting only
nominal affiliation fee from them and had provided grants of a substantial
amount to the DCAs;

(xii) RCA was organising various matches of national
level tournaments like Ranji Trophy, Irani Trophy, Duleep Trophy, Maharana
Bhagwat Singh Trophy, Salim Durrani Trophy, Laxman Singh Dungarpur Trophy,
Suryaveer Singh Trophy, matches for under-14s, u-15s, u-19s, u-22s, etc.,
without having any surplus. Rather, they were organised for the development of
the game of cricket at the national level and to identify the players who could
represent the country at the international level;

(xiii)  RCA was spending a large amount on the
training and coaching camps for which no fee was charged from the participants;

(xiv)  the assessee had organised several
championships in various interior towns and smaller cities of Rajasthan in
order to provide an opportunity and to create a competitive environment for the
talented youth, without any profit motive and with the sole intention to
promote the game of cricket;

(xv)       the surplus, if any, generated by the
assessee was merely incidental to the main object, i.e., promotion of the sport
of cricket and in no way by running the ‘business of cricket’.

 

Reliance was placed
on behalf of the assessee on the following decisions:

(a)   the Delhi High Court in the case of Institute
of Chartered Accountants of India vs. Director-General of Income Tax
(Exemptions) 358 ITR 91;

(b)   the Madras High Court in the case of Tamil
Nadu Cricket Association vs. DIT(E) 360 ITR 633
;

(c)   the Delhi bench of the ITAT in Delhi
& District Cricket Association vs. DIT (Exemptions) 69 SOT 101 (URO);
and

(d)   the Delhi bench of the ITAT in the case of DDIT
vs. All India Football Federation 43 ITR(T) 656.

 

On behalf of the
Revenue, it was argued that:

(1)   the entire argument of the assessee revolved
around the theory that grant of registration u/s 12A automatically entitled it
for exemption u/s 11. The case laws cited by the assessee in the case of the T.N.
Cricket Association
and DDCA, etc., were in the context
of section 12A and were inapplicable;

(2)   the domain of registration u/s 12AA and
eligibility for exemption u/s 11 were totally independent and different. At the
time of registration, CIT was not empowered to look into the provisions of
section 2(15); these were required to be examined only by the AO at the time of
assessment;

(3)   once the first proviso to section 2(15) got
attracted, the assessee lost the benefit of exemption as per the provisions of
section 13(8) – therefore, the only question to be decided was whether the
assessee was engaged in commercial activity for a fee or other consideration;

(4)   the nature of receipt in the hands of the
assessee was by way of sharing of sponsorship and media rights with BCCI, as
well as match revenue for conducting various cricket matches. The assessee had earned
surplus of 75% out of the receipts in the shape of advertisement, canteen and
tickets, which amounted to super-normal profit. Therefore, the income of the
assessee from ‘subsidy’ was nothing but a percentage of the fee gathered from
the public for matches and a percentage of advertisement receipts while
conducting matches;

 

(5)   the nature of receipts in the hands of the
assessee certainly fell under ‘Trade & Commerce’ as understood in common
parlance. Once the receipts were commercial in nature and such receipts
exceeded the threshold of
Rs. 10 lakhs as the proviso then provided (both conditions satisfied in the
assessee’s case), the assessee would be hit by the proviso to section 2(15);

(6)   and once the proviso to 2(15) was attracted,
the assessee ceased to be a charitable organisation irrespective of whether it
was registered u/s 12A. Grant of registration u/s 12A did not preclude the AO
from examining the case of the assessee in the light of the said proviso and if
he found that the assessee was hit by the proviso, then the assessee ceased to
be a charitable organisation;

(7)   the receipts of ICAI were basically from
members (and not the public as in the case of the assessee) and did not exploit
any commercial / advertisement / TV rights as in the case of the assessee. One
test of the commercialism of receipt was whether receipts were at market rates
and were open to subscription by the general public as opposed to a select few
members;

(8)   and once the provisos to 2(15) were attracted,
the assessee lost the benefit of exemption u/s 11 as per section 13(8) and the
entire income became taxable.

 

The Tribunal noted
that the Revenue had not doubted that the assessee had conducted cricket
matches; the only suspicion with regard to the activity was that during the
One-Day International match played between India and Pakistan there was huge
surplus and the assessee had rented out rooms belonging to the association at a
very high rate. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, it could be inferred that
the AO was swayed by the volume of receipts. It noted that these identical
facts were also before the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Tamil
Nadu Cricket Association vs. DIT (Exemptions) 360 ITR 633
, wherein the
Court opined that from the volume of receipts an inference could not be drawn
that an activity was commercial and that those considerations were not germane
in considering the question whether the activities were genuine or carried on
in accordance with the objects of the association.

 

Further, it was not
in dispute that the TV subsidy, sale on advertisements, surplus from the ODI
between India and Pakistan, income from the RCA Cricket Academy were all
related to the conduct of cricket matches by the association. Without the
conduct of matches, such income could not have been derived. Therefore, the
incomes were related to the incidental activity of the association which
incomes could not accrue without the game of cricket.

 

The Tribunal, while
examining the facts from the perspective of volume of receipts and constant
increase in surplus, referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Commissioner
of Sales Tax vs. Sai Publication Fund [2002] 258 ITR 70
, for holding
that where the activity was not independent of the main activity of the assessee,
in that event, such ancillary activity would not fall within the term
‘business’.

It added that the
objection of the AO was that the other activities overshadowed the main
activity, based upon the receipts of the assessee from the other activity. It,
however, noted that all those activities were dependent upon the conduct of the
match. Referring to various High Court decisions, the Tribunal was of the view
that the AO was swayed by the figures and the volume of receipts. It noted that
such receipts were intermittent and not regular and also were dependent on the
conduct of cricket matches. It was not the other way round, that the cricket
matches were dependent upon such activities. According to the Tribunal, the
facts demonstrated that the assessee had been predominantly engaged in the
activity of promoting cricket matches. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the
AO was not justified in declining the exemption.

 

A similar view has
also been taken by the Tribunal in the cases of Tamil Nadu Cricket
Association vs. DDIT(E) 42 ITR(T) 546 (Chen.); DCIT(E) vs. Tamil Nadu Cricket
Association 58 ITR(T) 431 (Chen.); Gujarat Cricket Association vs. JCIT(E) 101
taxmann.com 453 (Ahd.); Jharkhand State Cricket Association vs. DCIT(E) (Ran.);
Chhattisgarh State Cricket Sangh vs. DDIT(E) 177 ITD 393 (Rai.);
and DDIT(E)
vs. All India Football Federation 43 ITR(T) 656 (Del).

 

THE PUNJAB CRICKET ASSOCIATION CASE

The issue again
came up before the Chandigarh Tribunal in the case of the Punjab Cricket
Association vs. ACIT 109 taxmann.com 219.

 

In this case, the
assessee cricket association was a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. It was also registered u/s 12A of the Income Tax Act.
It filed its return of income claiming exemption u/s 11 for the assessment year
2010-11.

 

The AO observed
that the income of the assessee was inclusive of an amount of Rs. 8,10,43,200
from IPL­subvention from BCCI and Rs. 6,41,100 as service charges for IPL
(Net). The AO observed that the IPL event was a highly commercial event and the
assessee had generated income from the same by hosting matches of Punjab
franchisee ‘Kings XI, Punjab’ during the Indian Premier League through TV
rights subsidy, service charges from IPL and IPL-subvention, etc. Similarly,
the assessee had earned income from the facilities of swimming pool, banquet
hall, PCA chamber, etc., by hosting these facilities for the purpose of
recreation or one-time booking for parties, functions, etc., which activities
were commercial in nature, as the assessee was charging fees for providing the
facilities to its members. The assessee had also received income from M/s
Silver Services who provided catering services to Punjab Cricket Club and its
restaurant, which again was a commercial activity, as the assessee was earning
income from running of the restaurant which was not related to the aims and
objectives of the society. According to the AO, the activities of the assessee
were not for charitable purposes, and therefore, in view of the proviso to
section 2(15), he disallowed the claim of exemption u/s 11.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) dismissed the appeal of the assessee observing that:

(a)   it could not be disputed that the Indian
Premier League was a highly commercialised event in which huge revenue was
generated through TV rights, gate-money collection, merchandising and other
promotions;

(b)   the franchises had been sold to corporates
and individuals and in this process, the appellant had received a huge income
of Rs. 8,10,43,200 for IPL-subvention from BCCI, service charges (Net) of Rs.
6,41,100 and reimbursement of Rs. 1,86,64,990 from BCCI;

(c)   the argument of the appellant that all the
tickets of the IPL matches were sold by the BCCI or the franchisee team, and
the IPL players were sold in public auction for a huge amount, was all done by
the BCCI and the appellant had no role in conducting these matches, could not
be accepted, as huge revenue was generated in this commercial activity and
whether it was done by BCCI or by the appellant, the share of the income so generated
had been passed on to the appellant;

(d)   the Chennai Tribunal’s decision in the case
of Tamil Nadu Cricket Association (Supra) did not apply to the
appellant’s case as in that case the assessee had received funds from BCCI for
meeting the expenditure as the host, while in the case of the appellant it was
not only the reimbursement of expenses but over and above that a huge amount
had been passed on to the appellant;

(e)   the activity generating the income, whether
undertaken by BCCI or by the appellant, was purely a business activity of which
the appellant was a beneficiary.

 

It was argued before the Tribunal on behalf of the assessee that:

  •     the assessee was not involved in any manner
    in organising or commercially exploiting the IPL matches. The commercial
    exploitation, if any, was done by the BCCI;
  •     the only activity on the part of the
    assessee was the renting out of its stadium to BCCI for holding of IPL matches;
  •     ‘T-20’ or IPL was also a
    form of popular cricket. Since the main object of the assessee was the
    promotion of the game of cricket, considering the popularity of the IPL
    matches, the renting out of the stadium for the purpose of holding of IPL
    matches by the BCCI for a short period of 30 days in a year was an activity
    towards advancement of the objects of the assessee, of promotion of the game;
  •     in lieu of providing the
    stadium, the assessee got rental income for a short period and renting out the
    stadium was not a regular business of the assessee;
  •     the grant received from the
    BCCI during the year under consideration in the form of share of TV subsidy of
    Rs. 18,00,76,452 and IPL subvention of Rs. 8,10,43,200 was part of the largesse
    distributed by BCCI to its member associations at its discretion for promotion
    of the sport of cricket;

 

  •     BCCI was not obliged to
    distribute the earnings generated by it to state cricket associations and no
    such association could claim, as an integral right, any share in the earnings
    of BCCI;
  •     even if a member state
    association did not provide any assistance in holding of the IPL matches, or
    when the IPL match was not hosted or organised at the stadium of an
    association, yet the member cricket association got a grant out of the TV
    subsidy. However, if a match was staged or hosted at the ground of an
    association, the amount of subsidy was increased;
  •     whatever had been received
    from the BCCI on account of IPL subvention was a voluntary, unilateral donation
    given by BCCI to various cricket associations, including the assessee, to be
    expended for the charitable objects of promotion of the game of cricket and not
    in lieu of carrying out any activity for conducting of IPL;
  •     the assessee had no locus
    with respect to the promotion and conduct of IPL, except for the limited extent
    of providing its stadium and other allied services for holding of the matches.
    The question whether the conduct of IPL was a commercial activity or not might
    be relevant from BCCI’s standpoint, but not to the case of the assessee;
  •     the assessee’s income,
    including grants received from BCCI, was applied for attainment of the objects
    of the assessee society, i.e., mainly for promotion of the game of cricket;

 

  •     the assessee was running a
    regional coaching centre wherein gaming equipment / material was also provided
    such as cricket balls, cricket nets, etc. The assessee also distributed grants
    to the district cricket associations attached to it for the purpose of laying
    and maintenance of grounds, purchase of equipment, etc., as well as for holding
    of matches and for the purpose of promoting the game of cricket;
  •     the assessee conducted
    various tournaments for the member district cricket associations. On the basis
    of the inter-district tournaments, players were selected for the Punjab team
    who underwent training at various coaching camps and thereafter the teams were
    selected to participle in the national tournaments for different age groups. In
    addition, financial assistance had also been provided to the ex-Punjab players
    in the shape of monthly grants;
  •     the assessee was also
    maintaining an international cricket stadium, which gave needed practice and
    exposure to the cricketers. Even other sports facilities like swimming pool,
    billiards, lawn tennis, etc., were provided to the members as well as to the
    cricketers, which activities were also towards the achievement of the objects
    of the assessee society;
  •     the assessee had been
    spending substantial amounts towards development of the game at the grassroots
    level and also for the development and promotion of the game by holding
    international matches;
  •     the assessee was only
    conducting activities in pursuance of the objects, i.e., the promotion of the
    game of cricket in India and that merely because some revenue had been
    generated in pursuance of such activities, the same was not hit by the proviso
    to section 2(15);

 

  •     the Supreme Court had held
    in CIT vs. Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. 83 ITR 377 that
    ‘business’ refers to real, substantial, organised course of activity for
    earning profits, as ‘profit motive’ is an essential requisite for conducting
    business;
  •     Delhi High Court in India
    Trade Promotion Organization vs. DIT(E) 371 ITR 333
    , reading down the
    scope of the proviso to section 2(15), had held that an assessee could be said
    to be engaged in business, trade or commerce only where earning of profit was
    the predominant motive, purpose and object of the assessee and that mere
    surplus from incidental or ancillary activities did not disentitle claim of
    exemption u/s 11;
  •     Punjab & Haryana High
    Court in the cases of The Tribune Trust vs. CIT & CIT (Exemptions)
    vs. Improvement Trust, Moga 390 ITR 547
    had approved the predominant
    object theory, i.e. if the predominant motive or act of the trust was to
    achieve its charitable objects, then merely because some incidental income was
    being generated that would not disentitle the trust to claim exemption u/s 11
    r.w.s. 2(15);
  •     all the incidental income /
    surplus so earned by the assessee in the course of advancement of its object of
    promotion of the game of cricket had been ploughed back for charitable
    purposes;
  •       profit-making was not the
    motive of the assessee and the only object was to promote the game of cricket.

 

It was argued on
behalf of the Revenue that:

(1)   in the annual report of BCCI, the concept of
IPL was described as merger of sport and business – the various IPL-related
activities described in the report indicated that the entire IPL show was a
huge money-spinner and had been rightly termed as ‘cricketainment’ by the BCCI;

(2)   the 38th Report of the Standing
Committee on Finance, dealing with Tax Assessment / Exemptions and related
matters concerning IPL / BCCI, mentioned that the income derived from media
rights and sponsorships was shared with the franchisees as envisaged in the
franchise agreement. The franchisees had to pay the BCCI an annual fee which
BCCI distributed to the associations as subvention. The report highlighted the
commercial character of IPL, which established that no charitable activity was
being promoted in organising the commercial venture called BCCI-IPL;

(3)   the Justice Lodha Committee, set up by the
Supreme Court, highlighted the unhealthy practices of match-fixing and betting.
Its report highlighted the indisputable fact that there was absolutely no
charitable work which was undertaken by the BCCI or its constituents while
organising the cricket, especially IPL, where the entire spectacle of
‘cricketainment’ was a glamorous money-spinner;

(4)   the Justice Mudgal IPL Probe Committee, set up
by the Supreme Court, highlighted the allegation of match / spot-fixing against
players. It further found that the measures undertaken by the BCCI in combating
sporting fraud were ineffective and insufficient. The facts demonstrated that
no charitable activity was undertaken in various matches conducted by BCCI-IPL.
The report highlighted the commercial character of the venture sans any
trace of charitable activity;

 

(5)   the Bombay High Court, in the case of Lalit
Kumar Modi vs. Special Director in WP No. 2803 of 2015
, observed that
if the IPL had resulted in all being acquainted and familiar with phrases such
as ‘betting’, ‘fixing of matches’, then the RBI and the Central Government
should at least consider whether holding such tournaments served the interest
of a budding cricketer, the sport and the game itself;

(6)   the tripartite agreement / stadium agreement
proved that the assessee was intrinsically and intimately involved in
organising the commercial extravaganza of the IPL. It required the PCA to
provide all the necessary co-operation and support to the BCCI-IPL and the
franchisee. It mandated the PCA to provide adequate, sufficiently skilled and
trained personnel to BCCI-IPL at its own cost. The PCA was duty-bound to ensure
that TV production took place at the stadium according to the requirements of
TV producers. It required PCA to erect and install all the desired facilities,
structures and equipment required in connection with the exploitation of media
rights at its own cost. It was to use its best endeavour to make areas
surrounding the stadium available for exploitation of the commercial rights.
The PCA agreed to assist the BCCI-IPL with local trading standard department,
police, private security arrangements, with a view to minimising or eliminating
certain exigencies pertaining to matches, advertising / promotions,
unauthorised sale of tickets, etc. All costs of such services were to be borne
by the PCA;

(7)   the above clauses amply demonstrated that the
PCA, being the federal constituent and full member of BCCI, had taken various
steps / initiatives at its own cost to ensure that the BCCI-mandated IPL
matches were organised smoothly and were a huge commercial success;

(8)   no claim was made on behalf of the assessee
that the BCCI-IPL matches were charitable activities;

(9)   a perusal of the case laws cited on behalf of
the assessee revealed that the Hon’ble Courts therein were not presented with
public documents / Standing Committee Reports / facts wherefrom judicial notice
could be taken as per the Evidence Act.

 

Summons was issued
to the BCCI by the Tribunal for determination of the character of the amounts
paid by it to the assessee. BCCI clarified that there were two types of
payments made by it – reimbursements of expenditure which the state
associations had to incur for conduct of matches, and a share in the media
rights income earned by the BCCI. The claim of the BCCI was that these payments
were application of income for the purpose of computation of income u/s 11.
Since the tax authorities were denying BCCI the exemption u/s 11, strictly in
the alternative and without prejudice to its contention that the entire sum was
allowable as an application, BCCI had contended that the payments were
allowable as a deduction u/s 37(1).

 

The Tribunal observed that a perusal of the accounts of the BCCI revealed
that it had booked the above payments to the state associations as expenditure
out of the gross receipts. The BCCI had taken a clear and strong stand before
the tax authorities, including appellate authorities, that the payment to the
state associations was not at all an appropriation of profits. The Tribunal
noted certain appellate submissions made by the BCCI in its own case, which
seemed to indicate that it was organising the matches jointly with the state
associations.

 

In response to the
above observations, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that:

(a)   the primary plea / stand of the BCCI is that
the payments / grants made by it to the state associations is application of
income, hence it is only a voluntary grant given by the BCCI to the state
associations, including the assessee, for the purpose of the promotion of the
game of cricket, hence it cannot be treated as income of the assessee from IPL
matches;

(b)   the alternate stand of the BCCI that the
payments to the state associations be treated as expenditure in the hands of
the BCCI was opposite and mutually destructive to the primary stand of the BCCI
and thus could not be made the basis to decide the nature of receipts from BCCI
in the hands of the assessee;

(c)   the Revenue authorities, even otherwise, have
consistently rejected the aforesaid alternate contention of the BCCI and the
entire receipts from the IPL had been taxed in the hands of the BCCI;

(d)   if the BCCI was treated as an Association of
Persons (AOP) as per the plea of the Revenue, still, once the entire income
from IPL had been taxed in the hands of an AOP, further payment by BCCI to its
member associations could not be taxed as it would amount to double taxation of
the same amount.

 

The corresponding
submissions of the Revenue were:

(A)   the Punjab Cricket Association was absolutely
involved in the commercial venture of IPL;

(B)   BCCI had stated that it did not have the
infrastructure and the resources to conduct the matches by itself and was
dependent on the state associations to conduct them;

(C)   according to BCCI, the income from media
rights was dependent on the efforts of the state associations in conducting the
matches from which the media rights accrued;

(D) as per the BCCI, the state
associations were entitled by virtue of established practice to 70% of the
media rights fee. It was in expectation of the revenue that the various state
associations took an active part and co-operated in the conduct of the matches.
The payment was therefore made only with a view to earn income from the media
rights;

(E)   it was clear that the transaction between the
BCCI and the PCA was purely commercial in nature and the income / receipts
received by the PCA were in lieu of its services rendered to BCCI;

(F)   the share of revenue from BCCI out of sale of
media rights was not a grant – the various payments made by the BCCI ensured
that the state associations were ever ready with their stadia and other
infrastructure to ensure smooth execution of IPL matches.

 

On the basis of the
arguments, the Tribunal observed that the status of the BCCI was of an
Association of Persons (AOP) of which the state associations, including the
assessee, were members. It noted that the BCCI, in its consistent plea before
the tax authorities had claimed that the payments made to the state
associations were under an arrangement of sharing of revenues with them. BCCI
had pleaded that it had just acted as a facilitator for the sale of media
rights collectively on behalf of the state associations for the purpose of
maximising the profits, for which it retained 30% of the profits and the
remaining 70% belonged to the state associations. According to the Tribunal,
when the payer, i.e., BCCI, had not recognised the payments made by it to the
state associations as voluntary grant or donation, rather, the BCCI had
stressed that the payments had been made to the state associations under an
arrangement arrived at with them for sharing of the revenues from international
matches and the IPL, then the payee (the recipient associations) could not
claim the receipts as voluntary grants or donations at discretion from the
BCCI.

 

The Tribunal,
however, noted that the legal status as of that date was that BCCI was being
treated by the tax authorities as an AOP and the payments made to the state
associations as distribution of profits. The BCCI payments to the state
associations, including the appellant, having already been taxed in the hands
of BCCI, could not be taxed again in the hands of the member of the AOP, i.e.,
the state association, as it would amount to double taxation of the same
amount.

 

Further, it
observed that the state associations in their individual capacity were pleading
that the IPL might be the commercial venture of their constituent and apex
body, the BCCI, but that they were not involved in the conduct of the IPL.
However, these associations had collectively formed the apex association named
BCCI, got it registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act and
thereby collectively engaged in the operation and conduct of the IPL through
their representatives in the name of BCCI. As per the Tribunal, PCA was
individually taking a totally opposite stand to the stand it had taken
collectively with other associations under the umbrella named as BCCI.

 

The Tribunal
observed that it was settled law that what could not be done directly, that
could not be done indirectly, too. If an institution claiming charitable status
being constituted for the advancement of other objects of public utility as per
the provisions of law was barred from involving in any commerce or business, it
could not do so indirectly also by forming a partnership firm or an AOP or a
society with some other persons and indulge in commercial activity. Any
contrary construction of such provisions of law in this respect would defeat
the very purpose of its enactment.

 

According to the
Tribunal, the assessee was a full member of BCCI, which was an AOP, which had
been held to be actively involved in a large-scale commercial venture by way of
organising IPL matches, and therefore the assessee could be said to have been
involved in a commercial venture as a member of the BCCI, irrespective of the
fact whether it received any payment from the BCCI or not, or whether such
receipts were applied for the objects of the assessee or not. However, once the
income was taxed in the hands of the AOP, the receipt of share of the income of
the AOP could not be taxed in the hands of the member of the AOP. For the sake
of ease of taxation, the AOP had been recognised as a separate entity; however,
actually, its status could not be held to be entirely distinct and separate
from its members and that was why the receipt of a share by a member from the
income of its AOP would not constitute taxable income in the hands of the
member.

 

The Tribunal
observed that even otherwise, PCA was involved in commercial activity in a
systemic and regular manner not only by offering its stadium and other services
for conduct of IPL matches, but by active involvement in the conduct of matches
and exploiting their rights commercially in an arrangement arrived at with the
BCCI. According to the Tribunal, there was no denial or rebuttal by the
appellant to the contention that the IPL was purely a large-scale commercial
venture involving huge stakes, hefty investments by the franchisees, auction of
players for huge amounts, exploiting to the maximum the popularity of the game
and the love and craze of the people of India for cricket matches. From a
reading of the tripartite agreement, the Tribunal was of the view that it
showed that the assessee was systematically involved in the conduct of IPL
matches and not just offering its stadium on rent to BCCI for the conduct of
the matches.

 

The Tribunal
further accepted the Department’s argument that the BCCI, which was constituted
of the assessee and other state associations, had acted in monopolising its
control over cricket and had also adopted a restrictive trade practice by not
allowing the other associations, who may pose competition to the BCCI, to hold
and conduct cricket matches for the sole purpose of controlling and exclusively
earning huge revenue by way of exploiting the popularity of cricket. PCA, being
a constituent member of the BCCI, had also adopted the same method and rules of
the BCCI for maintaining its monopoly and complete domain over the cricket in
the ‘area under its control’. Such an act of exclusion of others could not be
said to be purely towards the promotion of the game, rather, it was an act
towards the depression and regression of the game. Hence the claim of the
assessee that its activity was entirely and purely for the promotion of the
game was not accepted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also did not accept the
assessee’s argument that the payment to it by the BCCI was a grant, holding
that it was a payment in an arrangement of sharing of revenue from commercial
exploitation of cricket and infrastructure thereof.

 

The Tribunal took
the view that the commercial exploitation of the popularity of cricket and its
infrastructure by the assessee was not incidental but was, inter alia,
one of the main activities of the assessee. It relied upon certain observations
of the Supreme Court in the case of Addl. CIT vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth
Manufacturers’ Association 121 ITR 1
, to point out that there was a
differentiation between ‘if some surplus has been left out of incidental
commercial activity’
and ‘the activity is done for the generation of
surplus
’ – the former would be charitable, the latter would not be
charitable. The Tribunal was of the view that despite having the object of
promotion of sports, the fact that the activity of the assessee was also
directed for generation of profits on commercial lines would exclude it from
the scope of charitable activity.

 

Even if it was
assumed that the commercial exploitation of cricket and infrastructure was
incidental to the main purpose of promotion of cricket, even then, in view of
the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Chandigarh
Lawn Tennis Association vs. ITO 95 taxmann.com 308
, as the income from
the incidental business activity was more than Rs. 10 lakhs [as the proviso to
section 2(15) then provided], the proviso to section 2(15) would apply,
resulting in loss of exemption.

Therefore, the
Tribunal held that the case of the assessee would not fall within the scope of
‘charitable purpose’ as defined in section 2(15), as the commercial
exploitation of the popularity of the game and the property / infrastructure held
by the assessee was not incidental to the main object but was apparently and inter
alia
one of the primary motives of the assessee. Hence the assessee was not
entitled to exemption u/s 11.

 

The Tribunal
further noted that PCA had amended its objects to add the following object: ‘To
carry out any other activity which may seem to the PCA capable of being
conveniently carried on in connection with the above, or calculated directly or
indirectly to enhance the value or render profitable or generate better income
/ revenue, from any of the properties, assets and rights of the PCA;

 

According to the
Tribunal, the amendment revealed that the assessee’s activities inter alia
were also directed for generation and augmentation of revenue by way of
exploitation of its rights and properties, and with the amended objects it
could exploit the infrastructure so created for commercial purposes which
supported the view taken by the Tribunal.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The Chandigarh
Tribunal seems to have gone into the various facts in far greater detail than
the Jaipur, Chennai, Ahmedabad and Ranchi Benches, having examined the stand
taken by the BCCI, in its accounts and before the tax authorities, as well as
examined the reports of various committees set up by the Supreme Court to look
into match-fixing and the management of the affairs of BCCI. It rightly
highlighted the observations of the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk Cloth
Manufacturers Association (Supra),
where it observed:

 

‘Take, for
example, a case where a trust or institution is established for promotion of
sports without setting out any specific mode by which this purpose is intended
to be achieved. Now obviously promotion of sports can be achieved by organising
cricket matches on free admission or no-profit-no-loss basis and equally it can
be achieved by organising cricket matches with the predominant object of
earning profit. Can it be said in such a case that the purpose of the trust or
institution does not involve the carrying on of an activity for profit, because
promotion of sports can be done without engaging in an activity for profit. If
this interpretation were correct, it would be the easiest thing for a trust or
institution not to mention in its constitution as to how the purpose for which
it is established shall be carried out and
then engage itself in an activity for profit in the course of actually carrying
out of such purpose and thereby avoid liability to tax. That would be too
narrow an interpretation which would defeat the object of introducing the words
“not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit”. We cannot
accept such a construction which emasculates these last concluding words and
renders them meaningless and ineffectual.

 

The Tribunal
incorrectly interpreted this to apply to the facts of the assessee’s case,
since the Tribunal was of the view that the assessee was organising cricket
matches with a view to earn profit.

 

Besides holding
that PCA was carrying on a business activity of assisting BCCI in the conduct
of matches, one of the basis of the Chandigarh Tribunal decision was that since
BCCI was carrying on a commercial activity every member of BCCI (an AOP) should
also be regarded as carrying on a commercial activity through BCCI, which would
attract the proviso to section 2(15). In so doing, it seems to have ignored the
fact that under tax laws an AOP and its members are regarded as separate
entities and the activities carried on by each need to be evaluated independently.
For instance, if a charitable organisation invests in a mutual fund and its
share of income from the mutual fund is considered for taxation in the hands of
the charitable organisation, does it necessarily follow that the charitable
organisation is carrying on the business of purchase and sale of shares and
securities just because the mutual fund is doing so?

 

Secondly, the
Chandigarh Tribunal relied on the BCCI’s alternative contention that the
payments to the state associations should be treated as expenditure incurred by
it, ignoring BCCI’s main contention that it was a division of surplus amongst
the member associations. A division of surplus cannot be regarded as an income
from exploitation of assets, nor can it be regarded as a compensation for services
rendered.

 

Thirdly, the Tribunal relied on the then prevalent income tax appeal
status of BCCI, ignoring the fact that the appeals had not yet attained
finality; the conclusions in the appeals were therefore only a view of the
interim appellate authorities which may undergo a change on attaining finality.
Placing absolute reliance on such ratios of appeals of BCCI not yet finally
concluded, for deciding the case of PCA, was therefore not necessarily the
right approach.

The Chandigarh
Tribunal also seems to have taken the view that generating better returns from
use of properties, assets or rights amounts to commercialisation, vitiating the
charitable nature. That does not seem to be justified, as every person or
organisation, even though they may not carry on business, may seek to maximise
their income from assets. Can a charitable organisation be regarded as carrying
on business just because it invests in a bank which offers higher interest than
its existing bank? Would it amount to business if it lets out premises owned by
it to a person who offers to pay higher rent, rather than to an existing tenant
paying lower rent? Seeking maximisation of return from assets cannot be the
basis for determination of whether business is being carried on or not.

 

Can it be said that
merely because PCA was assisting BCCI in conducting the IPL matches at its
stadium it was engaged in a business activity? Such assistance may not
necessarily be from a profit-earning motive. It could be actuated by the motive
of popularising the game of cricket amongst the public, or by the desire to
ensure better utilisation of its stadium and to earn rent from its use. This
would not amount to carrying on of a business activity.

 

The question which
would really determine the matter is as to the nature of the amounts paid by
BCCI out of the telecast rights. Were such payments for the support provided by
the associations, for marketing of telecast rights by BCCI on behalf of the
state associations, a distribution of surplus by BCCI, or a grant by BCCI to
support the state associations?

 

If one examines the
submissions made by BCCI to the Tribunal in response to the summons issued to
it, it had clarified that payments towards participation subsidy, match and
staging subsidies were in the nature of reimbursements of expenditure which the
state associations have to incur for conduct of matches. This indicates that
the state associations incur the expenditure for the matches on behalf of BCCI,
which expenditure is reimbursed by BCCI. This indicates that the activity of
conduct of the tournament was that of BCCI.

 

In respect of the
second category of payments in regard to a share in the media rights income
earned by the BCCI, BCCI had clarified that these payments were application of
income for the purpose of computation of income u/s 11. Either donations /
grants or expenses incurred, both could qualify as application of income. In
the submissions to the Commissioner (Appeals) in its own case, BCCI had
clarified that such TV subvention represents payment of 70% of revenue from the
sale of media rights to state associations. These payments were made out of the
gross revenue from the media rights and not out of the surplus and were
therefore not a distribution of profit. Even if there were to be losses in any
year, TV subvention and subsidy would be payable to the state associations.

In its appeal
submissions, BCCI has stated that the state association is entitled to the
ticket revenue and ground sponsorship revenue. Expenses on account of security
for players and spectators, temporary stands, operation of floodlights, score
boards, management of crowds, insurance for the match, electricity charges,
catering, etc. are met by the state associations. On the other hand,
expenditure on transportation of players and other match officials, boarding
and lodging, expenses on food for players and officials, tour fee, match fee,
etc., are met by BCCI and the revenues from sponsorship belong to BCCI.

 

The submissions by
BCCI, in its appeal, further clarified that for a Test series or ODI series
conducted in multiple centres and organised by BCCI and multiple state
associations, it was found that if each state association were to negotiate the
sale of rights to events in its centre, its negotiating strength would be low.
It was, therefore, agreed that BCCI would negotiate the sale of media rights
for the entire country to optimise the income under this head. It was further
decided that out of the receipts from the sale of media rights, 70% of the
gross revenue, less production cost, would belong to the state associations.
Every year, BCCI has paid out 70% of its receipts from media rights (less
production cost) to the state associations. This amount has been utilised by
the respective associations to build infrastructure and promote cricket, making
the game more popular, nurturing and encouraging cricket talent and leading to
higher revenues from media rights.

 

From the above, it
is clear that while the conduct of matches may be physically done by the state
associations, it was BCCI which was responsible for the commercial aspects of
the IPL, such as sale of sponsorship rights, media rights, etc. BCCI pays 70%
of such revenues to the state associations for having permitted it to market
such rights. The state associations are conducting the matches as a part of
their object of promoting and popularising cricket. The conduct of matches was
quite distinct from marketing the rights to sponsor or telecast those matches.
Can the state associations be regarded as having carried on a commercial
activity, if they have granted the right to market such sponsorship and media
rights to the BCCI, with the consideration being a percentage of the revenues
earned by BCCI from such marketing?

 

A mere passive
receipt of income (though recurring and linked to gross revenues) for giving up
a valuable right may perhaps not constitute a business activity. An analogy can
be drawn from a situation where a business is given on lease to another entity
for running (or conducting). If such a lease is for a long period, various
Courts have taken the view that since the intention is not to carry on business
by the lessor, such lease rentals are not taxable as business profits of the
lessor. The mere fact that the lease rentals may be linked to the gross revenues
of the business carried on by the lessee would not change the character of the
income. It is only the lessee who is carrying on business and not the lessor.
On a similar basis, the carrying on of the business of marketing of rights by
BCCI would not change the character of matches conducted by the state
associations from a charitable activity carried on in furtherance of their
objects to a business activity, even if the state associations are entitled to
a certain part of the revenues for having given up the right to market such
rights.

 

In today’s times,
when watching of sport is a popular pastime resulting in large revenues for the
organisers, a mere seeking of maximising the revenue-earning potential of the
matches, in order to raise funds for furtherance of the cause of the sport,
cannot be said primarily to be the conduct of a business. The mere fact of the
quantum being large cannot change the character of an activity from a
charitable activity to a business activity, unless a clear profit-earning
motive to the exclusion of charity is established. This is particularly so when
all these state associations have been actively involved in encouraging sport
at the grassroots level in cities as well as smaller towns.

 

In a series of
decisions, the Supreme Court, the Madras, Gujarat and Bombay High Courts and
various benches of the Tribunal have held that the section 12A registration of
the state associations could not be cancelled merely on account of the fact
that they have conducted IPL matches. These decisions are:

 

DIT(E) vs.
Tamil Nadu Cricket Association 231 Taxman 225 (SC);

DIT(E) vs.
Gujarat Cricket Association R/Tax Appeal 268 of 2012 dated 27th
September, 2019 (Guj.);

Pr. CIT(E)
vs. Maharashtra Cricket Association 407 ITR 9 (Bom.);

Tamil Nadu
Cricket Association vs. DIT(E) 360 ITR 633 (Mad.);

Saurashtra
Cricket Association vs. CIT 148 ITD 58 (Rajkot ITAT);

Delhi &
District Cricket Association vs. DIT(E) 38 ITR(T) 326 (Del. ITAT);

Punjab
Cricket Association vs. CIT 157 ITD 227 (Chd. ITAT).

 

While most of these
decisions have been decided on the technical ground that applicability of the
proviso to section 2(15) cannot result in cancellation of registration u/s
12AA(3), in some of these decisions there has been a finding that the activity
of the conduct of the matches by the state associations is a charitable
activity in accordance with its objects.

 

Recently, in an
elaborate judgment of over 200 pages, the Gujarat High Court, hearing appeals
filed against the Tribunal orders in the case of Gujarat Cricket
Association (Supra), Baroda Cricket Association
and Saurashtra
Cricket Association,
in a series of appeals heard together (R/Tax
268 of 2012, 152 of 2019, 317 to 321 of 2019, 374 and 375 of 2019, 358 to 360
of 2019, 333 to 340 of 2019, 675 of 2019, and 123 of 2014, by its order dated
27th September, 2019)
, has decided the matter in favour of
the state associations. It noted from the resolution passed by BCCI that the
grants given by it were in the nature of corpus donations to the state
associations. After analysing the concept of ‘charitable purpose’, the
insertion of the proviso to section 2(15) and various case laws on the subject
of charity, the High Court held:

 

(i)    In carrying on the charitable activities,
certain surplus may ensue. However, earning of surplus, itself, should not be
construed as if the assessee existed for profit. The word ‘profit’ means that
the owners of the entity have a right to withdraw the surplus for any purpose,
including a personal purpose.

 

(ii)   It is not in dispute that the three
associations have not distributed any profits outside the organisation. The profits,
if any, are ploughed back into the very activities of promotion and development
of the sport of cricket and, therefore, the assessees cannot be termed to be
carrying out commercial activities in the nature of trade, commerce or
business.

 

(iii)   It is not correct to say
that as the assessees received a share of income from the BCCI, their
activities could be said to be the activities of the BCCI. Undoubtedly, the
activities of the BCCI are commercial in nature. The activities of the BCCI are
in the form of exhibition of sports and earning profit out of it. However, if
the associations host any international match once in a year or two at the
behest of the BCCI, then the income of the associations
from the sale of tickets, etc., in such
circumstances would not portray their character as being of a commercial
nature.

 

(iv) The state cricket associations
and the BCCI are distinct taxable units and must be treated as such. It would
not be correct to say that a member body can be held liable for taxation on
account of the activities of the apex body.

 

(v)   Irrespective of the nature of
the activities of the BCCI (commercial or charitable), what is pertinent for
the purpose of determining the nature of the activities of the assessees is the
object and the activities of the assessees and not that of the BCCI. The nature
of the activities of the assessee cannot take its colour from the nature of the
activities of the donor.

The Gujarat High
Court has, therefore, squarely addressed all the points made by the Chandigarh
Tribunal while deciding the issue. It has emphatically held that the conduct of
the matches did not amount to carrying on of a business, particularly if the
surplus was merely on account of one or two matches. Further, the nature of
activity of BCCI cannot determine the nature of activity of the state
associations.

 

Therefore, as discussed in detail by
the Gujarat High Court, the better view seems to be that of the Jaipur,
Chennai, Ahmedabad, Delhi and Ranchi Benches of the Tribunal. But, given the
high stakes involved for the Revenue, it is highly likely that the matter will
continue to be agitated in the courts, until the issue is finally settled by
the Supreme Court.

 

RECORDS AND THEIR MAINTENANCE

Indirect tax being a transaction-based impost, it relies heavily on
transaction-level documentation for its implementation. The new millennium has
already completed a ‘graduation’ in statutory record maintenance – from preset
formats to content-based requirements. GST is a step in the same direction with
the added advantage of digitisation. This article lists some of the
documentation requirements under GST.

 

Persons liable to maintain records:

(a)        A person who is
registered (or liable to register) is required to maintain books of accounts
and records; distinct persons (such as branches, regional offices, etc.) of
such registered entities are required to maintain separate books of accounts
pertaining to their operations;

(b)        Certain designated
persons seeking registration for specific transactions (such as a deductor of
tax u/s 51; an e-commerce operator operating as a collector u/s 52; an input
service distributor) are required to maintain records for the purposes for
which they are designated;

(c)        The owner of a place of
storage of goods (such as a warehouse, godown, etc.) and transporters / C&F
agents are also required to maintain records of consignor, consignee and
specified details of goods. This requirement is placed even though the person
concerned does not have any ownership over the goods and their movement.
Independent enrolment forms have been prescribed (in Form ENR-01/02) for this
purpose. It is perceived that this provision is applicable only to person/s who
have possessory rights over the goods and should not be made applicable in
cases where the owner of the place of storage has merely leased out the
premises for storage without any control over the storage of goods.

(d)        Casual taxable person /
non-resident taxable person doing business temporarily in a state / country is
required to maintain books of accounts for its operational period in that state
/ country;

(e)        Agent (typically,
representative agent) is required to maintain accounts in respect of the
movement, inventory and tax paid on goods of each principal with the statement
of accounts of the principal;

(f) Reporting agencies (such as
state governments, registrars / sub-registrars, stock exchanges, the Goods and
Services Tax Network, electricity boards, etc.) are required to maintain and
report details of information specifically required to be reported in the
information return under GST;

(g)        A GST practitioner is
required to maintain records of the statements / returns being filed on behalf
of the registered persons.

 

List of records (section 35):

Section 35 of the CGST / SGST Acts provides for the maintenance of the
following records by registered persons at each place of business, e.g. each
stockyard would need to maintain a separate stock account of goods:

(i)     Production or manufacture
of goods,

(ii)    Inward and outward supply
of goods / services,

(iii)   Stock of goods,

(iv)   Input tax credit availed,

(v)    Output tax payable and paid,

(vi)   Any other requirement
specified.

 

In special circumstances, the Commissioner may on application prescribe
waiver over maintenance of specific documents, where the trade practice
warrants such waiver on account of difficulty in maintenance. Since this is a
discretionary power, the Commissioner can prescribe a conditional waiver (such
as subject to alternative document, etc.), too. Such records are required to be
audited by a chartered / cost accountant and submitted with the annual return
for the relevant year.

 

Specified Contents (Rule 56):

In addition to the above, the rules prescribe maintenance of the
following details:

 

(1) Stock registers should contain
quantitative details of:

(a) raw
material consumption,

(b)   details
of goods imported and exported,

(c)    production,
scrap / wastage, generation of by-products, loss / pilferage, gift / samples,
etc.

     Costing
records with standard conversion ratios can be maintained, especially in case
of standardised goods;

(2)  Transactions attracting
reverse charge with details of the inward supplies;

(3)  Register of prescribed
documents, i.e., tax invoice, debit / credit notes, receipts / payment / refund
vouchers, bills of supply and delivery challans;

(4)  Details of advance receipts,
payments and their adjustments.

 

Statutorily prescribed documents:

Tax invoices / debit notes / credit notes / e-way bills / receipt
vouchers etc. have been prescribed with their contents. These documents are not
permitted to be revised except where specified in the statute (such as issuance
of a revised invoice with attestation of the GSTIN number for a new registrant).

 

Tax invoices – These are required to be issued for
any taxable supply in accordance with the timings specified in section 31. It
not only proves supply of goods or services, but is also an essential document
for the recipient to avail Input Tax Credit. There are approximately 17
requirements and the said document is required to be issued in triplicate for
supply of goods and in duplicate for supply of services. Banking and insurance
companies have special instructions / waivers. An invoice document can be
signed with a digital signature of the supplier or its authorised
representative. An electronic invoice issued in terms of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 does not require a signature or digital signature. Persons
with a turnover above Rs. 1.5 crores and up to Rs. 5 crores and those above Rs.
5 crores should quote four-digit HSNs as against the eight-digit HSN in the
customs tariff.

 

Receipt / refund vouchers and payment
vouchers
– These
documents are issued when there is flow of funds between the contracting
parties. This is a new prescription in comparison to the erstwhile laws and
aimed at documenting events occurring before the time of supply. Receipt
voucher is issued for any advance, refund vouchers are issued on refund of any
advance prior to issuance of tax invoice. Payment vouchers are issued by
recipients of supplies who are liable to tax under reverse charge provisions
signifying the date of payment and an affirmation to the supplier that he / she
would be making the payment under reverse charge provisions.

 

Debit / credit notes – Any upward / downward adjustment in
valuation after issuance of tax invoices can be undertaken only through debit /
credit notes. In the context of GST, these can only be issued in specific cases
u/s 34. But the section does not preclude any entity to issue debit / credit
notes in other circumstances in order to settle or adjust inter-party accounts.
In addition to the details specified in the tax invoice, the debit note and
credit note will also contain reference to the original invoice against which
it is being issued.

 

Bill of supply – This document is issued in case of an
exempt supply. In case where a taxpayer is making taxable and exempted supplies
(such as retailers), an invoice-cum-bill of supply can be issued containing the
required details.

 

Delivery challan – This document is required where
movement of goods takes place other than by way of supply, for job work, the
supply of liquid gas and other prescribed scenarios. It is also issued in case
of supply where the movement of goods takes place under completely /
semi-knocked-down condition in batches or lots. This should also be issued in
triplicate with the original document moving along with the goods in movement.

 

Business specific requirements:

(a)        Works contractors are
required to maintain details of receipt of goods / services and their
utilisation in respect of each works contract separately along with the other
details specified above. With effect from 1st April, 2019,
developers are required to maintain project-wise details of inputs, RCM and
books of accounts under the recently-issued real estate scheme;

(b)        While the principal is
principally liable to maintain records of its goods at job worker location, the
job worker is also required to maintain specific records in respect of each
principal’s goods, their consumption / output and their inward / outward
movement; and

(c)        Persons under the
composition scheme are required to maintain books of accounts and records with
specific waivers on the input tax credit front.

 

Electronic records – Rule 57:

Section 4 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 states that
maintenance of records in electronic form would meet statutory requirements
provided that the records should not be capable of being erased, effaced or
over-written and equipped with an audit trail, i.e., any amendment or deletion
of an incorrect entry should be under due authorisation and traceable with a
log of details. The electronic records [section 2(t) states that any data,
record or image or sound stored, received or sent in electronic form is an
electronic record] should be authenticated by means of digital signatures by
authorised agents of the registered person. The GST law also contains
provisions to this effect. Many accounting packages may not meet the
requirement of having an audit trail of data captured in the software and may
be staring at an unintended violation. Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 prescribed that an electronic record duly authenticated as per the IT Act
would serve as a documentary evidence in any proceeding and shall be admissible
in any proceedings without any further proof or production of the original
document.

 

Not only should the registered person maintain records of the respective
principal place and additional places, but should also take necessary steps for
recovery in case of data corruption or disaster recovery by maintaining
suitable back-ups of such records. In view of this specific prescription,
officers may be empowered to perform best judgement assessments even in cases
where records are irretrievable due to natural causes / accidents, etc., on
ground of non-maintenance of appropriate data recovery mechanisms.

 

Rule 56(15) requires electronic records to be authenticated with an
electronic signature. Interestingly, the IT Act considers an ‘electronic
signature’ secure and reliable only if the signature was created under the
exclusive control of the signatory and no other person. MSME managements
habitually handing over signatures to others for operational convenience are
finding this requirement to be an uphill task and an unknown risk.

 

Location / accessibility:

Records are required to be maintained at the principal place of business
specified for each state in which the registered person operates. In case of
additional places of business, location-specific records are required to be
maintained at the respective locations. In peculiar cases of un-manned
structures such as IT infrastructure, windmills, etc., constituting the place
of business, identification / sufficiency and accessibility of records would
become challenging. The documents should be readily accessible to the proper
officer and the taxpayer is duty-bound to assist the officer with all the
security systems in order to facilitate their verification.

 

Sufficiency in documentation:

GST places the onus on the taxpayer / Revenue to establish the presence
of a fact while invoking the provisions. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays
down principles when evidence is sufficient to prove a fact, its probable
existence or non-existence. Under the Act, documentary evidences are segregated
into primary and secondary evidences and their implications as evidence have
been set out. In tax laws, the first resort to establish a fact is usually the
documentation maintained by the person. Normal accounting set-ups do not meet
all requirements prescribed in GST and information has to be sourced from the
operational set-up of the organisation. Some instances in the context of GST
are explained below:

 

(i) Time of
supply / raising tax invoice
– One of the parameters used to ascertain the time of supply of
services is provision / completion of the service. Services are intangible in
nature and contracting parties usually do not document their start and end
point. An assessee operating under long-duration / phased contracts should
document milestones either with counter party (such as service completion
certificate, warranty certificates, etc.) or external certificates. This would
also assist the taxpayer to claim refund in case of excess payment arising on
cessation of contracts. The tax invoice should, apart from the mere description
of the service, also report the start and end date of the assignment with the
end deliverable in this time frame.

 

(ii) Input
tax credit claim

Section 16(1)/(2) requires that the taxpayer establish use / intent to use and
receipt of services for establishing its right of input tax. The primary onus
is on the taxpayer for establishing this fact and once this is established it
would be the Revenue’s turn to establish this fact from records. Rule 57(13)
requires even service providers to establish utilisation of input services.
This becomes challenging and the authors’ view is that mere payment or debit in
the accounts of the assessee may not be sufficient to discharge the primary
onus. While there is no prescriptive list and it is highly fact-specific, the
taxpayer would have to establish the delivery of a service by the service
provider and its acceptance by the recipient, e.g. a company can furnish the
copy of the signed auditor’s report as proof of receipt of an audit service, an
IT company can furnish the repair and service report, etc. The recipient should
stamp the vendor tax invoice (electronic / physical) and map the same with
service completion report of the vendor’s counter signature to establish this
fact at a later date.

 

(iii) Possession of invoice vs. GTR-2A matching – Input tax credits are permissible on
the basis of invoices of the supplier. Vendors are also mandated to upload the
details of the invoices on the GST portal which can be matched by the recipient
at his / her end. Can this facility in the portal which has been designed to
act as a self-policing system for the Revenue also assist the taxpayer to
contend that the presence of the details on the portal is itself a recognised
invoice and a sufficient substitute to the requirement of possessing of the
original invoices? While one may argue that 2A reports do not capture all
details of an invoice (for testing eligibility, etc.), this is certainly a
plausible defence which taxpayers can resort to. Taxpayers can certainly
establish receipt of service by other collateral documents (such as contracts,
email trails, etc.) and these should ideally meet the requirements of officers
insisting on production of original invoices. The CBEC circular in the context
of refund has waived the requirement of submission of input invoices for
invoices appearing in the GTR-2A statement on the portal (No. 59/33/2018-GST,
dated 4th September, 2018).

 

(iv) Inventory in manufacturing and service
set-ups

Manufacturers and service providers are required to maintain the stock of
consumption of goods. While the prescription is to maintain details of
consumption, it is advisable to map this with the costing records (standard
consumption ratios, etc.), bill of materials, shop floor registers, etc., in
order to produce the same before authorities in case of any allegation of
excessive wastage / clandestine removal, etc. The factory records should
contain the entire trail of consumption of raw materials right from the store
inwards up to the finished goods section. Batch records of inputs and their
journey to the particular batch of final products would be essential where raw
materials and finished goods do not have stable pricing. This also assists in computation
of any input tax reversal in case of ascertaining the input tax credit
component on destruction of goods such as by fire, etc. Service sector (without
a strong ERP) would face the challenge of establishing the consumption of
goods, especially where the unit of measurement of billing is different from
the UOM of the materials indented into the stock. In ‘Bill to Ship to
Movement’, the intermediate supplier should prove that the goods have been
received by the ‘end buyer’ in the transaction chain.

 

(v)        Valuation
under prescriptive rules, i.e., fair market value, rejection, cost plus, etc.
– Valuation rules require to first
ascertain fair market value / open market value, non-monetary components, etc.
in case of fixing the taxable value. These values can be documented from market
databases, stock exchange details, regulatory publications, etc. Pricing of
like comparable transactions can be sought from third-party quotations;
purchase orders may be obtained and documented as a justification of the
valuation. In case cost-plus pricing is sought to be resorted to, documentation
of the rejections of other methodology and computation of costs through costing
records becomes essential.

 

(vi) Identification of inputs / input services /
capital and their usage in exclusive / common category
– Rules 42/43 require tax credits to be
categorised in three baskets. The classification is driven by the end use of
the particular input. While the inventory records may record the issuance of
inputs to the particular goods / services, the end use of input services and
their exclusiveness to a particular class of supply (taxable, exempt,
zero-rated) should be documented through cost centres, project costing
documentations, etc.

 

(vii) Proving against unjust enrichment /
profiteering
– Section
49(9) presumes that taxes paid by a person have been passed on to the recipient
of goods / services. Any claim of refund by such person would have to overcome
this burden of proof. As per the learning from erstwhile laws, one should
maintain affidavits, declarations from counter parties, price comparisons for
pre- and post the change in tax rates, costing / accounting records,
identification of end consumer, certifications, etc. for establishing against
unjust enrichment / profiteering.

 

(viii) Change in rate of goods / services and
cut-off date records: exemption to taxable vice-versa
– In case of change in tax status for
goods / services, documentation over the criteria of supply of goods /
services, payment and invoicing should be maintained for all open transactions
on the said cut-off date. Apart from this, input tax credits of inputs in stock
or contained in unfinished / finished goods for availment / reversal should
also be maintained.

 

(ix) Maintenance of pre-GST documentation – Transitional provisions specify
certain conditions to be prevalent on 1st July, 2017 for availing benefits under the GST law. Moreover,
the status of certain unfinished transactions on this date (incomplete
services, partially billed services, advances, etc.) should have been
documented. For example, a dealer availing transition credit of stock available
from purchase prior to 1st July, 2017 should be in a position to map
the stock in hand to the invoice which should be within one year from the date
of introduction of GST.

 

(x)        Presence
/ absence of an intra-branch / registration activates
– This is certainly a problem whose
solution is ‘elusive’ for all taxpayers having multi-locational presence. No
one, including the government administration, has a clue about this Pandora’s
Box. In a de-clustered environment, companies have started documenting internal
roles and responsibilities of offices and sharing of resources through
time-sheets and building invisible walls within the organisations. These are
passed at board meetings and maintained as per company records for future
production before officers. In clustered environments where the entire set-up
works so cohesively and partitions are impossible to be even envisioned and
documented, companies need to take a conservative approach and discharge the
taxes to protect themselves against any future cash loss.

 

(xi) Refund provisions require specific details – Refund procedures require certain
endorsements and proofs such as FIRCs / BIRCs for meeting the sanction
conditions. Currently, banks have refused to issue FIRCs on receipt of foreign
inward remittances citing a FEDAI circular. Some banks are issuing the same
only if a specific application has been made by the account holder. Being a
statutory requirement, as a last resort one should pursue this matter with the
banker and obtain alternative declarations which contain all the requirements
of the FIRC and make necessary submissions.

 

Other regulatory laws:

The Companies Act,
the Income-tax Act, banking / insurance regulation laws, etc. are also
governing organisations in record maintenance and GST requirements can be met
with the assistance of reports under other laws. Entities would of course have
to apply the more stringent provision in order to harmonise requirements across
laws. For example, the Companies Act requires that the books of accounts of the
company should be kept at the registered office except where the Board of
Directors adopts an alternative location with due information to the Registrar
of Companies. This conflict between GST and the Companies Act can be resolved
by the Board adopting a resolution to maintain accounts at distinct locations
to comply with GST laws. In any case, mere access to electronic records at a
particular location is also sufficient compliance with GST requirements in
terms of section 35 of the Act. The Companies Act also requires reporting the
Internet Service Provider credentials where details are maintained on a cloud
platform. The Income-tax Act requires maintenance of transfer pricing
documentation and this could serve as a ground for corroborating the valuation
approach of the taxpayer. Labour laws may require an establishment level
reporting of employees which may serve as deciding the salary costs of a
distinct person under GST. One would have to approach documentation with an
open mind to extract as much information as possible from available statutory reports rather than reinventing the
wheel and duplication of records.

 

Time limit for retention of records (section 36):

The prescribed records are required to be maintained for a minimum
period of six years from the due date of furnishing the annual return for the
relevant year. In case of any pending legal proceedings as at the end of six
years, the relevant documents pertaining to the subject-matter of dispute are
to be maintained for one year after the final disposal of the proceedings. With
the annual return due dates being extended to 31st December, 2019,
the due date of assessments and retention of records are also being extended
for the taxpayers concerned.

 

Implications for non-maintenance of records:

Non-maintenance of
records invites penalty u/s 122 to the extent of Rs. 10,000 or 100% of the tax
evasion, apart from the penalty imposable for non-payment of tax dues. Such
failure would invite best judgement assessment based on other data such as
electricity records, 2A reports, e-way bills, paper slips, past history, etc.
For the first time, the statute has introduced a fiction that non-accountal of
goods or services from records (shortage of goods on physical verification,
numerical variances, storage at unregistered places [rule 56(60)] etc.), would
invite show cause proceedings for recovery of tax on such goods. However, this
presumption is rebuttable with credible evidence, including the fact of
destruction, loss or otherwise of goods.

 

As one implements the
requirements, the trichotomy of materiality, practicality and technicality
would stare the taxpayer in the face. The dividing line of segregating
documents which are mandatory and those which are ancillary is very thin and
difficult for a taxpayer to decide upon. Law has prescribed the minimum
criteria and it is in the taxpayer’s own interest to implement the law and
maintain additional documents to substantiate his claims under the Act. It
takes less time to do things right than explain why you did it wrong – Henry
Wadsworth.

 

With
increased self-reporting over digital formats, there is also a high expectation
for the government to gear up its Information Technology capabilities. In a
bi-polar administration, it is very essential that the administration
streamline its documentation demands by avoiding parallel requests consuming
unnecessary time and economic resources. Governments should appreciate that
‘Compliance’ is just a subset of ‘Governance’ and not the other way round.

 

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

A recent notification mandates those who have been
independent directors (IDs) for not more than ten years to undergo a
proficiency test. We are told that India is the only country to start the
practice of proficiency tests.

Those desirous of appointment as IDs have to apply
online to include their names in a databank. Increase in the size of a
‘databank’ is good news, when many ‘commercial banks’ are kept afloat with
infusion of taxpayer money. One would hope that such tests will bring to the
databanks, and eventually to the Boards, IDs who will strengthen the
functioning of commercial banks.

Education is generally a welcome step when it is
in the field of one’s operation. Refreshing knowledge and remaining current is
imperative in the times of change and uncertainty.

The Indian education system historically and
chiefly focuses on technical aspects with little emphasis on the eventual
functionality of that knowledge. Knowledge without a clear and direct link to
practical use is futile. I remember a top tech company CEO speaking about how
they hire only seven of 100 engineers interviewed, as the rest were
unemployable in spite of being educated.

The directors’ proficiency tests cover three
specific areas, which are necessary without doubt, but not sufficient. The
areas specified are securities laws, accounting and company law. In addition,
there is a general residual category, ‘other areas necessary or relevant for
functioning as IDs’.

With so much happening in the area of corporate
governance, the role of the Board must be understood well. An institution like
SEBI could institute, on a periodic basis, studies on practices, processes,
challenges for IDs in the Indian context. Such empirical studies could aim to
bring clarity on attributes necessary for an ID in the Indian context.

An ID requires technical competence to even be
‘literate’ enough to decipher and ask questions to the management, and much
more to carry out the function of superintendence, direction and control. Obviously,
the curriculum and tests must match up to equip the ID for the role.

Experience and integrity top all other
qualifications. How to see through data, how to peel through layers by
questioning, how to get to the bottom of things, and how to look for
‘invisibles’ that are not in the routine reports, are some skills that come
from experience. Integrity related aspects include what it is to be
independent, how to see conflict of interest in related party transactions,
distinction between propriety and legal prescription. And then there are even
finer aspects such as the ability to see years ahead. These are attributes that
cannot be taught.

Two challenges before IDs are conflict of interest
and timely availability of reliable information. If the tests could build
capabilities in some of the above-mentioned areas, they would strengthen the
institution of the ID.

Tests may also be the beginning of systematic
regulation of IDs on the lines of other professions. Hearing about an
institute, marks, etc. indicates that eventually there could be CPE too.
Perhaps, ID resignations, like auditor resignations, will be questioned and
regulated.

Reports indicate that in 2018, 606 IDs resigned
(270 without citing any reasons) and 412 IDs have resigned between January and
22nd July, 2019 (107 without citing any reason). The gap between Liabilities
– Duties – Compensation
remains a concern. Independence itself has not been
free from controversy, especially in promoter-controlled companies. Many laws
do not make a distinction between an ID and other directors. If the proficiency
test had questions related to statutory, civil, criminal and personal
liabilities, the outflow of IDs from Boards could be rapid in the times to
come.

After all, directors are meant to bring wisdom, counsel
and values, and bat for a strong sustainable foundation of a company. They are
there to look out for and speak up for the interests of non-promoter
shareholders. Let me end with a story I am reminded of while attending a Board
meeting as a young auditor. During the general discussions that often took
place around the fixed agenda, one of the Directors shared a story from a Board
meeting in which the legendary JRD Tata was present. When JRD found that many
dividend warrants were not encashed, he said they should be sent again, as they
used to be sent by post in those days. Management said that they had done what
was necessary as per law, and shareholders could come and claim their dividend.
JRD did not relent, and ultimately prevailed upon the company to do what was
right, and not just what was legally correct.

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

M/s Lokhandwala Construction Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT-9(2); Date of order: 29th April, 2016; [ITA. No. 4403/Mum/2013; A.Y.: 2007-08; Bench: Mum. ITAT] Section 271(1)(c): Penalty – Inaccurate particulars of income – Method of accounting – Project completion method – Dispute is on the year of allowability of claim – Levy of penalty not justified

8.  CIT vs. M/s
Lokhandwala Construction Industries Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 992 of
2017]
Date of order: 17th September, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 

M/s Lokhandwala Construction Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs.
DCIT-9(2); Date of order: 29th April, 2016; [ITA. No. 4403/Mum/2013; A.Y.:
2007-08; Bench: Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 271(1)(c): Penalty – Inaccurate particulars of
income – Method of accounting – Project completion method – Dispute is on the
year of allowability of claim – Levy of penalty not justified

 

The
assessee is in the activity of building and construction. In filing the return
of income for the A.Y. 2007-2008, the assessee followed the Project Completion
Method. The AO by his assessment order dated 24th December, 2009,
disallowed the expenditure claimed towards advertisement and sales promotion on
the ground that the expenses would be claimed only in the year the project is
completed and income offered to tax. In penalty proceedings, the AO held that
the assessee was guilty of filing inaccurate particulars of income within the
meaning of section 271(1)(c) of the Act and levied penalty. The assessee filed
an appeal before the CIT(A) who dismissed the same.

 

Being
aggrieved by the order, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal held that the claim was disallowed in the instant year on the ground
that such advertisement / sales promotion expenses should be allowed in the
year in which the sale of flats was undertaken in respect of which such
expenses were incurred. Pertinently, in A.Ys. 2009-10 and 2010-11 such expenses
were allowed following the methodology devised by the AO in the instant
assessment year. The aforesaid factual matrix goes to amply demonstrate that
the difference between the assessee and the Revenue does not hinge on
allowability or genuineness of expenditure but merely on the year of
allowability. In fact, the methodology devised by the AO in the A.Y. 2006-07
for the first time only seeks to postpone the allowability of expenses but does
not reflect any disagreement on the merit of the expenses claimed.

 

In the
years starting from A.Y. 1990-91 and up to 2005-06, the claim for deduction of
expenses has been allowed in the manner claimed by the assessee following the
‘project completion’ method of accounting. Therefore, if in a subsequent period
the AO re-visits an accepted position and makes a disallowance, the same would
not be construed as a deliberate attempt by the assessee to furnish inaccurate
particulars of income or concealment of particulars of his income. Therefore,
where the difference between the assessee and the Revenue is merely on account
of difference in the year of allowability of claim, and in the absence of any
finding or doubt with regard to the genuineness of the expenses claimed, the
penal provisions of section 271(1)(c) of the Act are not attracted. The penalty
levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act deserves to be deleted.

 

Being
aggrieved by the order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The
Court observed that the AO adopted a methodology to postpone allowability of
claim for deduction of expenses in the year in which the income is offered to
tax. The question, therefore, is whether making such a claim on the basis of
accepted practice would amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income
within the meaning of section 271(1)(c) of the Act. In the case of CIT
vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 322 ITR 158
, the Supreme
Court observes that a mere making of a claim, which is not sustainable in law,
by itself will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the
income. Therefore, mere making of a claim which is disallowed in quantum
proceedings cannot by itself be a ground to impose penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the
Act. The fact was that the assessee was following the above method since
1990-1991 till the subject assessment year and there was no dispute in respect
thereof save for the A.Y. 2006-07 and the subject assessment year. This fact
itself would militate against imposition of any penalty upon the assessee on
the ground of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Accordingly, the
Revenue appeal was dismissed.
 

 

 

Section 147: Reassessment – Notice issued after four years – Original assessment u/s 143(3) – Reopening is based on change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be not valid

7.  Sutra Ventures
Private Limited vs. The Union of India and others [Writ Petition No. 2386 of
2019]
Date of order: 9th October, 2019 (Bombay High Court)

 

Section 147: Reassessment – Notice issued after four
years – Original assessment u/s 143(3) – Reopening is based on change of
opinion – Reassessment was held to be not valid

 

The
assessee is a company engaged in the business of providing marketing support
services and consultancy in sports. For the A.Y. 2012-13, it filed a return of
income declaring total income of Rs. 6,44,390. The AO issued a notice for
scrutiny assessment. The assessee company replied to the queries; the scrutiny
proceedings were concluded and the assessment order was passed on 13th
March, 2015; the AO accepted the return of income filed by the assessee without
making any disallowance or additions.

 

After
the scrutiny assessment for the A.Y. 2012-13 was concluded, the Income Tax
Department conducted audit and certain objections were raised regarding purchases.
The assessee company filed its reply to the audit objections, submitting its
explanations. On 28th March, 2019 the assessee company received a
notice from the AO u/s 147 of the Act on the ground that there was reason to
believe that income chargeable to tax for the A.Y. 2012-13 had escaped
assessment. The AO provided the reasons to which the assessee company filed
objections. The objections raised by the assessee company were rejected by the
AO.

 

Being
aggrieved by the order of the AO, the assessee filed a Writ Petition before the
High Court. The Court held that in this case assessment is sought to be
reopened after a period of four years. The significance of the period of four
years is that if the assessment is sought to be reopened after a period of four
years from the end of the relevant assessment year, then as per section 147 of
the Act an additional requirement is necessary, that is, there should be
failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose material facts.
The reason of reopening was that the assessee company, in the profit and loss
account has shown sale of services at Rs. 1,87,56,347 under the head revenue
from operations and an amount of Rs. 20,46,260 was debited as purchase of
traded goods / stock-in-trade. The AO had opined that the goods were neither
shown as sales nor as closing stock because of which the income had escaped
assessment because of the omission on the part of the assessee.

 

The
Court observed that the assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of the reasons
given by the AO is entirely unfounded and unjustified. In the original
assessment the petitioner was called upon to produce documents in connection
with the A.Y. 2012-13, namely, acknowledgment of return, balance sheet, profit
and loss account, tax audit report, etc. The petitioner was also called upon to
submit the return of income of the directors along with other documents such as
shareholding pattern, bank account details, etc. The assessment order dated 13th
March, 2015 pursuant to the production of profit and loss account and other
documents referred to these documents. In the assessment order dated 13th
March, 2015 it is stated that the assessee company produced all the material
that was called for and it remained present through its chartered accountant to
submit the documents. The total income of the assessee company was computed
with reference to the profit and loss account. Therefore, the profit and loss
account was called for, was submitted by the assessee and was scrutinised.

 

Thus,
it cannot be said that there was any failure on the part of the assessee
company to produce all the material particulars. After considering the entire
material the assessment order was passed. The AO is now seeking to proceed on a
mere change of opinion. All these factors and the need for jurisdictional
requirement were brought to the notice of the AO by the assessee company. Yet,
the AO ignored the same and proceeded to dismiss the objections and reiterated
his decision to reopen the assessment. In these circumstances, the impugned
notice and the impugned order issued / passed by the AO were quashed and set
aside.

The Janalaxmi Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. The Pr. CIT-1; date of order: 20th May, 2016; [ITA No. 1955/PN/2014; A.Y.: 2010-11; Bench: ‘B’ Pune ITAT] Section 263: Revision – Assessee filed detailed reply to the query raised by AO in respect of interest on NPA – Revision not possible if the AO had taken a view after due consideration of assessee’s submissions

6.  The Pr. CIT-1
vs. The Janalaxmi Co-operative Bank Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 683 of 2017]
Date of order: 26th August, 2019 (Bombay High Court)

 

The Janalaxmi Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. The Pr. CIT-1;
date of order: 20th May, 2016; [ITA No. 1955/PN/2014; A.Y.: 2010-11;
Bench: ‘B’ Pune ITAT]

 

Section 263: Revision – Assessee filed detailed reply to
the query raised by AO in respect of interest on NPA – Revision not possible if
the AO had taken a view after due consideration of assessee’s submissions

 

The
assessee is a co-operative society engaged in the banking business. It filed
its return of income for the A.Y. 2010-11 declaring Nil income. During the
course of scrutiny assessment, the AO issued a questionnaire to the assessee
who replied to the same. One of the queries was with respect to interest on
non-performing assets, Rs. 2,64,59,614, debited to profit and loss account. The
AO was satisfied with the reply of the assessee and did not make any addition
with regard to the interest on NPAs.

 

However,
the CIT issued a notice u/s 263 of the Act on the ground that no proper inquiry
/ verification was carried out by the AO in respect of interest expenses and
the NPAs claimed by the assessee. The CIT held that any provision towards any
unascertained liability is not an allowable deduction under the provisions of
the Act, therefore, the entire provision towards interest expenditure,
amounting to Rs. 2,64,59,614, needs to be disallowed. The CIT vide the impugned
order set aside the assessment order and directed the AO to pass fresh orders
after conducting proper inquiries / verification on the aforementioned issue.

 

Being
aggrieved by the order, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
assessee submitted that the issue relating to interest arising on NPAs has been
settled by the Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank vs. CIT [154 CTR 88
(SC)].
The Bombay High Court had also, in the case of Deogiri
Nagari Sahakari Bank Ltd. in Income Tax Appeal No. 53 of 2014
on 22nd
January, 2015, decided the issue in favour of the assessee. The assessee
further submitted that the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, in the case of
similarly situated other assessees vide common order dated 4th
February, 2016, has deleted the addition made on account of interest accrued on
NPAs.

 

The
Tribunal held that a perusal of the submissions made by the assessee before
ACIT shows that during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee has
given detailed reply to the query raised by the AO in respect of interest on
the NPAs. Therefore, once the issue has been considered by the AO in scrutiny
assessment proceedings, provisions of section 263 of the Act cannot be invoked
unless two conditions are satisfied, that is, (i) the assessment order is erroneous;
and (ii) it is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. In the present case the
reason/s given by CIT to hold that the assessment order is erroneous is not
tenable.

 

Being
aggrieved by the order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court
held that during the regular assessment proceedings leading to the assessment
order, specific queries with respect to interest for NPAs / sticky loans being
chargeable to tax were raised and the assessee had given detailed replies to
them. The AO, on consideration, did not make any addition with regard to it in
the return, i.e., on account of interest on sticky loans. In CIT vs. Fine
Jewellery (India) Ltd., 372 ITR 303
rendered in the context of section
263 of the Act, it was held that once inquiries are made during the assessment
proceedings and the assessee has responded to the queries, then non-mentioning
of the same in the assessment order would not lead to the conclusion that the
AO had not inquired into this aspect. In the result, the appeal of the Revenue
was dismissed.

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Sections 132, 132(4) and 153C of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Amendment permitting notice where seized material pertained to assessee as against existing law that required Department to show that seized material belonged to assessee – Amendment applies prospectively – Where search took place prior to date of amendment, Department to prove seized documents belonged to assessee – Statement of search party containing information relating to assessee no document belonging to assessee – AO wrongly assumed jurisdiction u/s 153C

23. Principal
CIT vs. Dreamcity Buildwell P. Ltd.;
[2019]
417 ITR 617 (Del.) Date
of order: 9th August, 2019
A.Y.:
2005-06

 

Search
and seizure – Assessment of third person – Sections 132, 132(4) and 153C of
ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Amendment permitting notice where seized
material pertained to assessee as against existing law that required Department
to show that seized material belonged to assessee – Amendment applies
prospectively – Where search took place prior to date of amendment, Department
to prove seized documents belonged to assessee – Statement of search party
containing information relating to assessee no document belonging to assessee –
AO wrongly assumed jurisdiction u/s 153C

 

For the
A.Y. 2005-06 the Tribunal set aside the assessment order passed by the AO u/s
153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the assumption of jurisdiction
u/s 153C by the AO was not proper. The Tribunal found that two of the documents
referred to, viz., the licence issued to the assessee by the Director, Town and
Country Planning, and the permission granted to the assessee by him for
transferring the licence could not be said to be documents that constituted
incriminating evidence revealing any escapement of income.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

‘(i)      Search and the issuance of notice u/s 153C
pertained to the period prior to 1st June, 2015 and section 153C as
it stood at that relevant time applied. The change brought about prospectively
w.e.f. 1st June, 2015 by the amended section 153C(1) did not apply.
Therefore, the onus was on the Department to show that the incriminating material
or documents recovered at the time of search belonged to the assessee. It was
not enough for the Department to show that the documents either pertained to
the assessee or contained information that related to the assessee.

 

(ii)      The Department had relied on three
documents to justify the assumption of jurisdiction u/s 153C against the
assessee. Two of them, viz., the licence issued to the assessee by the
Director, Town and Country Planning, and the letter issued by him permitting
the assessee to transfer such licence, had no relevance for the purpose of
determining escapement of income of the assessee for the A.Y. 2005-06.
Consequently, even if those two documents could be said to have belonged to the
assessee, they were not documents on the basis of which jurisdiction could be
assumed by the A O u/s 153C.

(iii)      The third document, the statement made by
the search party during the search and survey proceedings, was not a document
that “belonged” to the assessee. While it contained information that “related”
to the assessee, it could not be said to be a document that “belonged” to the
assessee. Therefore, the jurisdictional requirement of section 153C as it stood
at the relevant time was not met. No question of law arose.’

Revision – Section 264 of ITA, 1961 – Belated application – Merely because assessee filed application belatedly, revision application could not be rejected without considering cause of delay

 22. Aadil
Ashfaque & Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Principal CIT;
[2019]
111 taxmann.com 29 (Mad.) Date
of order: 24th September, 2019
A.Y.:
2007-08

 

Revision
– Section 264 of ITA, 1961 – Belated application – Merely because assessee
filed application belatedly, revision application could not be rejected without
considering cause of delay

The
petitioner filed e-return on 29th October, 2007. Due to inadvertence
and by a mistake committed by an employee of the petitioner company, both the
gross total income and the total income were shown as Rs. 2.74 crores, instead
of total income being Rs. 56.91 lakh. Therefore, the petitioner filed its
revised return on 26th July, 2010 altering only the figures in gross
total income and total income without making any changes with respect to the
other columns and with income computation. While doing so, after five years of
filing the revised return, the petitioner company received a communication
dated 7th August, 2015 stating that there is outstanding tax demand
for the A.Y. 2007-08 of Rs. 87.26 lakhs. The petitioner was not aware of the
intimation issued u/s 143(1) till it was received by him on 23rd
September, 2015.

 

The
petitioner approached the first respondent and filed an application u/s 264 on
6th October, 2015. The same was rejected by the impugned order for
the reason that it was filed beyond the period of limitation.

 

The
assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘(i)      The petitioner claims that gross total
income shown in the original return filed on 29th October, 2007 as
Rs. 2.74 crores is a factual mistake; and, on the other hand, it is only a sum
of Rs. 56.91 lakh as the sum to be reflected as gross total income in all the
places. In order to rectify such mistake, it is seen that the petitioner has
filed a revised return on 26th July, 2010. By that time, it seems
that the intimation under section 143(1) raising the demand was issued on 20th
October, 2008 itself.

 

(ii)      According to the petitioner, they are not
aware of such intimation. On the other hand, it is contended by the Revenue
that such intimation was readily available in the e-filing portal of the
petitioner. No doubt, the petitioner has approached the first respondent and
filed application u/s. 264 to set right the dispute. However, the fact remains
that such application was filed on 6th October, 2015 with delay. The
first respondent has specifically pointed out that the petitioner has not filed
any application to condone the delay, specifically indicating the reasons for
such delay. It is also seen that the first respondent has chosen to reject the
application only on the ground that it was filed belatedly. Therefore, the ends
of justice would be met if the matter is remitted back to the first respondent
Commissioner for reconsidering the matter afresh if the petitioner is in a
position to satisfy the first respondent that the delay in filing such
application u/s 264 was neither wilful nor intentional.’

ARBITRATION AWARD VS. EXCHANGE CONTROL LAW

Introduction


Indian
corporates and Foreign Investors in India anxiously awaited the Delhi High
Court’s verdict in the case of NTT Docomo Inc. vs. Tata Sons Ltd. This
decision was going to decide upon the fate of enforceability of foreign
arbitral awards in India. The Delhi High Court delivered its landmark decision
on 28th April 2017 reported in (2017) 142 SCL 252 (Del) and
upheld the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards. While doing so, it also
threadbare analysed whether the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 would be
an impediment to such enforcement?


Factual Matrix


To better
understand this case, it would be necessary to make a deep dive into the
important facts before the matter travelled to the Delhi High Court. NTT Docomo
of Japan invested in Tata Teleservices Ltd (“TTSL”). A
Shareholders’Agreement was executed amongst Docomo, TTSL and Tata Sons Ltd (“Tata”),
the promoter of TTSL. Under this Agreement, Docomo was provided with certain
exit options in respect of its foreign direct investment. One of the Clauses
provided that if Tata was unable to find a buyer to purchase the shares of
Docomo, then it shall acquire these shares. Further, Tata had an obligation to
indemnify and reimburse Docomo for the difference between the actual sale price
and the higher of (i) the fair value of these shares as on 31st
March, 2014 or (ii) 50% of the investment price of Docomo. Accordingly, Docomo
was provided with a downside protection of 50% of its investment.
As luck
would have it, Tata was unable to obtain a buyer at this price and hence,
Docomo issued a Notice asking Tata to acquire the shares at Rs. 58.45 per
share, i.e., the minimum price stipulated in the Agreement. Tata Sons disputed
this Notice by stating that under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”),
i.e., the exchange control laws of India, it can purchase shares from a
non-resident only at a price which is equal to the fair value of the investee
company. Accordingly, Tata could buy the shares only at Rs. 23.44 per share and
it approached the Reserve Bank of India (“the RBI”) for its
approval to buy the shares at Rs. 58.45 per share. Initially, the RBI felt that
this was not an assured return, which was prohibited under the FEMA but it was
in the nature of downside protection. This was a fair agreement and hence, Tata
should be allowed to honour their commitment. Further, the larger issue was of
fair commitment in Foreign Direct Investment contracts and keeping in view,
Japan’s strategic relationship with India, the contract should be fulfilled.
This was a very unique stand taken by the RBI. However, the RBI approached the
Finance Ministry, Government of India on this issue. The Finance Ministry
rejected Tata’s plea and held that an individual case cannot become an
exception to the FEMA Regulations. Consequently, the RBI wrote to Tata
rejecting permission to buy the shares at a price higher than the fair
valuation of TTSL. The guiding principle was that a foreign investor could not
be guaranteed any assured exit price. This became an issue of dispute between
the parties and the matter reached arbitration before the Arbitral Tribunal,
London.


Arbitration Award


The Arbitral Tribunal gave an Award in favour of Docomo after
considering the Agreement and India’s exchange control laws. It held that the
Agreement was drafted after considering the FEMA since a simple put option was
not permissible. The Agreement did not qualify the Tata obligation to provide
downside protection by making it subject to the FEMA Regulations. It held that
Tata had clearly failed in its obligation to find a buyer and the FEMA
Regulations did not excuse non-performance. Further, the RBI’s refusal of
special permission did not render Tata’s performance impossible. Accordingly,
it awarded damages to Docomo along with all costs of arbitration. It however,
expressed no view on the question whether or not special permission of the RBI
was required before Tata could perform its obligation to pay damages in
satisfaction of the Award.


Armed with
this Award, Docomo moved the Delhi High Court seeking an enforcement and
execution of the foreign Award. The RBI filed an intervention application in
this suit opposing the payment by Tata. Subsequently, Tata and Docomo filed
consent terms under which Tata agreed to pay the damages claimed by Docomo,
subject to a ruling on the objections raised by the RBI. Further, it was
decided to obtain permission of the Competition Commission of India and a
Withholding Tax Certificate from the Income-tax authorities before remitting
the funds. In lieu of the same, Docomo agreed to suspend all proceedings
against Tata wherever they were launched and give up all claims against
Tata.   


RBI’s Plea


The RBI
contended that for the Award to hold that the FEMA Regulations need not be
looked into, was illegal and contrary to the public policy of India. Since the
RBI had rejected the permission to pay Rs. 38 per share, the matter had
achieved a finality. Payment of an assured return was contrary to the
fundamental policy of the nation.


High Court’s Verdict


At the
outset, the Delhi High Court dealt with whether the RBI could have a locus
standi
to the Award and held that any entity which is not a party to the
Award cannot intervene in enforcement proceedings. Even though the Award dealt
with the FEMA provisions in detail that ipsofacto did not give a right
to the RBI to intervene.


The Court
held that there was no statutory requirement that where the enforcement of an
arbitral Award resulted in remitting money to an non-Indian entity outside
India, RBI has to necessarily be heard on the validity of the Award. The mere
fact that a statutory body’s power and jurisdiction might be discussed in an
adjudication order or an Award will not confer locus standi on such body
or entity to intervene in those proceedings.In the absence of a provision that
expressly provides for it, the question of permitting RBI to intervene in such
proceedings to oppose enforcement did not arise.


The Court
held that the Award was very clear that what was awarded to Docomo were damages
and not the price of the shares. It was not open to RBI to re-characterise the
nature of the payment in terms of the Award. RBI has not placed before the
Court any requirement for any permission of RBI having to be obtained for
Docomo to receive the money as damages in terms of the Award.


The Court
held that it was unable to find anything in the consent terms which could be
said to be contrary to any provision of Indian law much less opposed to public
policy. The issue of an Indian entity honouring its commitment under a contract
with a foreign entity which was not entered into under any duress or coercion
will have a bearing on its goodwill and reputation in the international arena.
It would indubitably have an impact on the foreign direct investment inflows
and the strategic relationship between the countries where the parties to a
contract are located. These too were factors that had to be kept in view when
examining whether the enforcement of the Award would be consistent with the
public policy of India.


The
Arbitral Tribunal had clearly held that the sum awarded was towards damages and
not sale of shares. Hence, the question of obtaining the special permission of
the RBI did not arise. If the Court allowed enforcement of the Award, then the
RBI would be as much bound by the verdict as would the parties to the Award. It
further observed that the RBI had at no stage contended that the Shareholders’
Agreement was void or illegal. The damages were more of a downside
protection and not an assured return on investment.
Hence, the FEMA
Regulations freely permitted remittance outside India. The RBI could not
recharacterise the payment from damages to sale consideration more so when Tata
had not objected to it. The Court laid down a very important principle which
is that the FEMA contained no absolute prohibition on contractual obligations.

It even upheld the consent terms and held that there was nothing contrary to
public policy.


Finally,
it concluded by dismissing the plea of the RBI and upholding the enforceability
of the Award in India as if it was a decree of the Delhi High Court. In the
meanwhile, the parties have obtained the permission of the Competition
Commission of India to make the payment. Whether the RBI will challenge this
decision is something which time will tell.


Unitech City Cruz Case


A similar issue was dealt with by the Delhi High Court in an earlier
case of Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings vs. Unitech Ltd, (2017) 80
taxmann.com 180 (Del).
This too dealt with the enforceability of a
foreign arbitration Award in respect of a Shareholders’ Agreement gone sour. It
held that under the FEMA, all foreign account transactions are permissible
subject to any reasonable restriction which the Government may impose in
consultation with the RBI. It is now permissible to not only compound
irregularities but also seek ex post facto permission. Thus, it held
that the question of declining enforcement of a foreign award on the ground of
any regulatory compliance or violation of a provision of FEMA would not be
warranted. It held that enforcement of a foreign award cannot be denied if it
merely contravenes the law of India. The Court held that the contention that
enforcement of the Award against the Indian party must be refused on the ground
that it violates any provision of the FEMA, cannot be accepted; but, any
remittance of the money recovered from the Indian party under the Award would
necessarily require compliance of regulatory provisions and/or permissions.
Another important question addressed by the Court was whether it was now open
for Unitech to raise a plea that the foreign investment made was violative of
the provisions of FEMA and Indian Law.


The Court
observed that Unitech had itself given unambiguous representations and
warranties in the Shareholders’ Agreement that the transaction was valid and
binding and enforceable and that the same did not require any approval from any
authority. It had further stated that all applicable laws were complied. Now
Unitech was contending that FEMA provisions do not permit such a transaction
without the RBI permission. The Court held that reneging on such express
commitments would be patently unjust and unfair and hence, not permissible. It
held that the Agreement was subject to Indian laws and Unitech had full
opportunity to challenge the validity before the Arbitral Tribunal but it having
failed to do so, theCourt found no reason to entertain such contentions to
resist enforcement of the Award. It is learnt that Unitech has challenged this
judgment. 


Interestingly,
in this case, the Court held that the remittance under the Award was subject to
the FEMA Regulations but in the latter case of Docomo it held that no special
permission of the RBI was needed for remittance under the Award!


Takeaways


As long as
an award is towards damages, there should not be any challenge in its
enforceability even if it involves foreign remittances. No special permission
of the RBI is needed for the same. One wonders whether the Court’s verdict
would have been the same had the Agreement been drafted differently? It was a
decision on the interpretation of a specific clause and hence, in future
foreign investors could insist on wordings similar to the ones used in the
Tata-Docomo Agreement. What is also interesting are the observations of the
Delhi High Court in Unitech’s case where it has bound the Indian party by the
representations made at the time of receiving the foreign investment. Following
these decisions, some Indian corporates have started settling arbitration
proceedings and paid the disputed amounts to foreign investors. For instance,
in October, GMR Infrastructure settled an ongoing arbitration with its foreign
private equity investors by acquiring their preference shares for a
consideration of cash + kind.


Clearly,
India has a long way to go towards full capital convertibility of the Indian
Rupee. In fact, whether or not it should has been the matter of great debate.
However, a disconnect between the Arbitration Law and the FEMA Regulations /
the RBI may act as a great dampener to the foreign investment climate in the
country. These two decisions of the Delhi High Court would act as a booster
shot for foreign investors. Considering that the Government has abolished the
Foreign Investment Promotion Board / FIPB, the nodal investment authority,
maybe it is high time for the RBI to amend its Regulations to make them more in
sync with commercial contracts.


The
Indian judicial system is clearly overburdened resulting in corporates
resorting to arbitration as a dispute resolution forum. In such a scenario, an
environment which facilitates the enforceability of foreign awards would help
improve India’s ease of doing business rankings. It would be desirable if we
have a clear policy devoid of confusion and ambiguity.
 

 

IS IT FAIR TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF SBO UNDER THE SECTION THROUGH SBO RULES, 2018?

BACKGROUND


Section 90
was enacted by the Companies Act, 2013. It was recast totally by the
Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017. The amended section was made effective from 13th
June 2018. MCA has further notified Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners)
Rules, 20l8 on 13th June 2018. These rules (herein after referred as
SBO) cast various responsibilities on the Companies, Shareholders (for that
matter members too) and beneficial owners in shares.


PROBLEM


Section
90(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 (as amended), provides that declaration is to
be filed by every Individual, who acting alone or together, or through
one or more persons or trust, including a trust and persons resident outside
India, holds beneficial interests, of not less than twenty-five per cent or
such other percentage as may be prescribed
, in shares of a company or the
right to exercise, or the actual exercising of significant influence or control
as defined in clause (27) of section 2, over the company shall make a
declaration to the company
. The Central Government may however, prescribe
class/es of persons who shall not be required to make declaration. (delegated
legislation).


However,
explanation appended below the applicable rules (The Companies (Significant
Beneficial Owners) Rules, 2018) clearly exceeds an authority granted to the
rule makers because through an explanation what is sought to be done is expansion
of the scope of Significant Beneficial Owner so as to bring even persons other
than individuals within the scope.


UNFAIRNESS


1.  The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016 contained
provisions which proposed to delegate the Central Government the power to
prescribe, by way of rules, the details with regard to – certain time-limits,
contents and manner of issuing/filing of certain forms including abridged
forms, amount of fees to be paid and other similar items of subordinated
legislation. A Memorandum Regarding Delegated Legislation (MRDL) explaining
such delegation is attached to the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016.


The
relevant extract of the Memorandum (so far as it relates to SBO is reproduced hereunder):


Clause 22,
inter alia, empowered Central Government to prescribe u/s. 90 of the
Act—

……


(c) class
or classes of persons which shall not be required to make declaration
under proviso to s/s.(1)


(d) Other
details which may be included in the register of interest declared by
individual in s/s. (2)
,

…………


2.  Thus above delegation presupposes that rules
framed will include

  • class or classes of
    persons which shall not be required to make a declaration

Present
rules do not contain any such provision as to which persons shall not make the
declaration.


3.  Besides next requirement w.r.t., to rules also
presupposes that declaration is to be given by an individual where as
present rules have cast a responsibility on various entities including
Company, Firm and Trust.


4.  Rule 2(1) (e) of The Companies (Significant
Beneficial Owners) Rules, 2018 reads as under:


(e)
“significant beneficial owner” means an individual referred to in
sub-section (1) of section 90 (holding ultimate beneficial interest of not less
than ten per cent) read with sub-section (10) of section 89, but whose name is
not entered in the register of members of a company as the holder of such
shares, and the term ‘significant beneficial ownership’ shall be construed
accordingly


5.  However, explanation appended below above
mentioned rule clearly exceeds an authority granted to the rule makers because
through this explanation what is sought to be done is expansion of the scope of
Significant Beneficial Owner so as to bring even persons other than
individuals within the scope.
The said explanation reads as under:


Explanation
l. – For the purpose of this clause, the significant beneficial ownership, in
case of persons other than individuals or natural persons, shall be determined
as under:


The explanation thereafter covers Company, Firm and Trust.


This
clearly exceeds the rule making powers of the subordinate legislation.


6.  Let us now see briefly what subordinate
legislation is and what principles are required to be observed by subordinate/
delegated legislation:


The need
and importance of subordinate legislation has been underlined by the Supreme
Court in the Gwalior Rayon Mills Mfg. (Wing.) Co. Ltd. vs. Asstt.
Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others**
thus:

……….


Nature of subordinate legislation    


‘Subordinateness’,
in subordinate legislation is not merely suggestive of the level of the
authority making it but also of the nature of the legislation itself. Delegated
legislation under such delegated powers is ancillary and cannot, by its very
nature, replace or modify the parent law nor can it lay down details akin to
substantive law. There are instances where pieces of subordinate legislation
which tended to replace or modify the provisions of the basic law or attempted
to lay down new law by themselves had been struck down as ultra vires.[1]


7.  It is a well settled principle
that a rule, regulation or bylaw must not be ultra vires, that is to
say, if a power exists by statute to make rules, regulations, bylaws, forms,
etc., that power must be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the statute which confers the power, for a rule, etc., if ultra vires,
will be held incapable of being enforced.
 


CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE


Let us now
revert to the provision of section 90(1) which clearly provided that
declaration is to be filed by an Individual.


The word
‘individual’ makes it clear that the section cannot apply unless the holder of
shares or significant influence/control is a natural person (human being) and
not an artificial person such as a company or firm or trust as is envisaged in
the explanation to Rule 2(e) of SBO.


The term
individual is not defined in Companies Act, 2013 but the term is defined in
various dictionaries and definition of Individual by Merriam- Webster defines Individual as “a
particular being or thing as distinguished from a class, species, or
collection”


Even
definition of Person u/s. 2(31) of Income Tax Act, 1961 reads as under:


“person”
includes- (i) an individual, ………..


Thus,
individual is a subset of a person and has narrow meaning as compared to Person
which includes other incorporated and non incorporated entities.


SOLUTION


The
explanation in Rule 2(e) , which is contradictory to the provisions of the
section 90(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 has cast an onerous responsibility on
entities such as Companies, Firms and Trusts to make a declaration under SBO
even though the parent section did not put such responsibility and as such is prima
facie ultra vires
.


It is therefore essential that
either parent section is amended or Rule is in synchronisation to the section.


 

 



[1] The Committee on Subordinate Legislation of Rajya Sabha.

SEBI ORDER ON ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL FRAUD – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ROLE OF AUDITOR ETC., UNDER QUESTION AGAIN

Background
and summary of SEBI order


SEBI
has passed an interim order in case of Fortis Healthcare Limited (Order number
WTM/GM/IVD/68/2018-19 dated 17th October, 2018). It has recorded
preliminary findings of accounting and financial frauds whereby, inter alia,
about Rs. 400 crore of company funds that were lent to related parties and
which are now lost.
 


The manner of carrying out
such alleged fraud as described in the SEBI order makes an interesting reading.
It makes allegations of false accounting entries, use of allegedly intermediary
entities to make related party transactions without necessary approvals or
disclosures, etc. This raises obvious and grave implications of role and
liability of the Board, the Audit Committee, the auditors, the Chief Financial
Officer, the independent directors, etc.


SEBI has passed interim
directions against specified promoter entities ordering, inter alia,
return of monies with interest. It has given them a post-order opportunity of
hearing and also initiated detailed investigation.
 


While there have been other
transactions over which concerns have been raised in the order, the loans of
about Rs. 400 crore to promoters or promoter owned entities could be focussed
on here. There is a complex background to these loans but, essentially, it
appears that Fortis granted loans aggregating to about Rs. 400 crore (final
balance) eventually to three companies through its wholly owned subsidiary.
These three companies were not ‘related parties’ when such loans were first
granted but later on, the SEBI order says, became promoter owned entities.
However, the interesting aspect was that an attempt was made not to show the
amount of such loans as receivable at the end of every quarter. Instead,
circular bank transactions were made for repayment and giving back of such
loans. Thus, on the last day of each quarter, such loans were shown to have
repaid and then paid back on the next day. Thus, as at the end of each quarter,
for several consecutive quarters, the loans did not appear as outstanding.


Even this, the SEBI order
alleges, was false/fake. It was not even as if the loans were first repaid and
then lent again. There was back-dating of entries. The borrowers were first
paid the monies which were then used that money to repay the original loans.
Even these transactions really took place after the end of the quarter. But the
accounting records were made to show as if the repayment of loans happened on
the last day of the quarter.


This continued for nearly
two long years – repeated over several quarters – till it so happened that even
this token repayment/relending could not be made. The auditors of the company
apparently refused to sign off on the accounts for that quarter. This matter
was reported in media and SEBI promptly initiated action. It called the
auditors for discussion and carried out a preliminary examination of the
details. The preliminary finding was that the amount of about Rs. 400 crore had
actually reached the promoters/promoter controlled entities through the three
companies. These amounts were partly used to repay borrowings of the promoters
and partly retained by a promoter controlled entity. It also appears that this
amount has been lost and provided for as a loss.


Based on these preliminary
findings, SEBI has passed an ad interim order issuing several
directions. It has asked the company to recover these monies. It has asked the
specified promoters and certain entities controlled by them not to transfer any
assets till such amounts are repaid. It has also asked specified persons not to
be associated with the company.


It has also initiated a
much more detailed investigation into the affairs of the company in this
matter. It has also given a post-order opportunity of hearing to the parties.
In particular, SEBI has also stated that it will be looking into the role of all
parties including the auditors in this matter. I would also expect that,
considering the preliminary findings, questions may also be raised on the role
of the Audit Committee, Chief Financial Officer, etc.


Other questions have also
arisen. While, apparently, the three companies to whom loans were given were
not ‘related parties’ as on the date of grant of such loans, such companies
served merely as a conduit to pass on the amounts to the promoter entities.
Further, even these three companies, owing to some restructuring, became
related parties. The compliance of requirements of approval of related party
transactions for such loans or for the disclosure of such transactions and
balances were allegedly not made.


SEBI thus made preliminary
findings of violations of multiple provisions of law. And accordingly, has
passed interim directions and will investigate the matter further and pass
final orders, if any.


Let us discuss in more
detail what could be the implications.


Analysis
of the case in terms of implications assuming the facts stated are true


Let us assume that the
facts stated in the Order are true. It is also to be noted that this is a
preliminary ex-parte order. The parties accused of the violations have yet to
present their case. Even SEBI is yet to make a detailed investigation. But yet,
it would be worth examining what are the implications at least on the
hypothetical basis that all these facts and findings as stated therein are
true. What then would be the specific violations of law, who can be held liable
and what would be the punishment? The following paragraphs make an attempt to
do this.


Nature
of transactions and implications under various laws


Essentially, the
transactions related to loans given and, apparently, that too on interest rates
that sound to be reasonable. On the face of it, such transactions would not be
irregular or illegal. However, as seen earlier, there are some unique features
of the present case. The loans were given to certain parties who promptly
handed over the monies to certain related parties. SEBI alleges that the
intermediary entities were used only to hand over the funds to the related
parties and thus the transactions were related party transactions.


Related party transactions
require disclosure that they are so, disclosure of the related parties, etc.,
who are source of such relation and, importantly, certain approvals by the
Audit Committee, shareholders, etc.


According to SEBI, these
‘repayment’ and ‘relending’ transactions at the end of each quarter were effectively
sham. In view of this, then, these were accounting irregularities, false
disclosures and even fraud. These too would result in serious implications
under the Act and Regulations. The consequences, as we will see later, can be
in several forms ranging from debarment to prosecution.


However, let us see who can
be said to be liable if such frauds, wrongful disclosures, non-compliances,
etc., have taken place.


Liability
of the Executive Directors


Transactions of such size
and nature can be expected to have been initiated by Executive Directors (i.e.
the Managing/Wholetime Directors). Unless this presumption can be rebutted,
primary blame may fall on them. It would be also their duty to inform the
various other persons involved such as Audit Committee, Board, etc., of the
real nature of the transactions. Thus, the primary liability and action for
non-compliance may fall on them first.


Liability
of CFO


The Chief Financial Officer
(“CFO”), being in charge of accounts and finance, is the other person who too
could be expected to know – or at least inquire into – the real nature of such
large transactions. This is more so considering that there were entries of
repayment on last day of each quarter and relending on the next day that SEBI
found as sham transactions.


Here again, unless the CFO
rebuts and shows he was not at all aware or involved, he would again be the
first group of persons against whom proceedings could be initiated.


Liability
of internal/statutory auditors


The nature of transactions
and the manner in which they are carried out could validly raise a concern that
the auditors should have been able to detect that there is something seriously
irregular here. Here, again, unless they are able to rebut this presumption,
they could face action.


Liability
of Audit Committee


The Audit Committee can be
expected to go into matters of accounts and audit in more detail than the Board
but less than the executive directors, internal/statutory auditors and the CFO.
They are expected to examine the accounts and matters of compliance more
critically. However, they are to an extent, also subject to what is presented
to them by such executives and auditors. Unless they can show that they had
critically examined the accounts and also they were not informed of anything
irregular in the transactions, they may be subject to action.


Liability of Board and independent directors


Primarily, it can be argued
that the Board and independent directors would examine what is placed before
it. If the accounts, on the face of it, do not show anything irregular, that no
information is passed to them about irregularity in the transactions and that
they have been otherwise diligent, they may not be liable for such defaults.


Liability
of others including Company Secretary


The authorities may examine
the facts and critically examine the role of the Company Secretary and other
executives to ascertain whether they could have been aware of the transactions
and even be involved in the violations. If there is a positive finding, they
too may be subject to various adverse actions.


Implications
of the violations


The findings, as presented
and if assumed to be found to be finally true, indicate violation of multiple
provisions of the Act/Regulations. The accounts are not truly/fairly stated.
There are false statements made in accounts. The provisions relating to related
party transactions including obtaining of approvals, making of disclosures,
etc., have not been complied with. The transactions are in the nature of fraud
and thus may result in serious action under the Act/Regulations.


The authorities including
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and SEBI would have several powers to take various
adverse actions against the guilty persons. They can debar the auditors,
directors, CFO, etc., from acting as such to listed companies and other persons
associated with capital markets. They can pass orders of penalty and even
disgorgement of fees earned. They can initiate prosecution. The parties may be
required to ensure that the monies are repaid (or they pay the monies
themselves) with interest.


New
powers proposed by SEBI


As has been discussed
earlier in this column, SEBI has recently proposed amendments of several of the
Regulations whereby it has sought powers directly on Chartered
Accountants/auditors, valuers, Company Secretaries, etc. The amendments
provided for specific role of care and other duties by such persons and empower
SEBI to take action directly on such persons if they are found wanting in
performance of such duties. Representations have been made against these
amendments for various reasons including for encroachment powers of other
authorities, making such powers too wide, etc.


However, cases such as
these could make the argument of SEBI even stronger that it needs such powers
to be able to punish errant persons involved so as to restore the credibility
of capital markets.


Conclusion


Such cases are rightly
cause of worry whether the system is strong enough to prevent such things from
happening or at least catch such violations well in time. Further, the
detection and punishment too has to be swift and strong so as to act as
deterrent to others from doing such things.


In the present case, if the
findings are indeed finally held to be true, there has been no prevention and
no timely detection. It appears that the monies may have been lost at least for
now. It will have to be seen whether the action of SEBI is swift and effective
to recover the monies and also punish the perpetrators so as also to act as
deterrent for others.
  

 

 

SCOPE OF GST AUDIT

Audit is the
flavour of the season and finance/ accounting professionals are busy addressing
this statutory requirement under various laws. The GST council and the
Government of India have recently notified the GST Annual Return (in Form 9)
and the GST Annual Certification (in Form 9C) for tax payers in respect of
transactions pertaining to the financial year 2017-18. This is an annual
consolidation exercise of all monthly reports of GST. We have detailed our
thoughts on the scoping of GST Annual certification/ audit under the GST laws.
One should reserve their conclusion on whether Form 9C is an ‘audit report’ or
‘certificate’ until the end of this article.


GOVERNMENT’S THOUGHT PROCESS


The Indian economy
has progressively evolved from an appraisal system to a self-assessment system.
Business houses are required to self-assess the correct taxes due to the
Government exchequer and report the same in statutory returns on a periodical
basis. The parallel to this liberalisation was the requirement of maintenance
of comprehensive, robust and reliable records for verification and examination
by the tax administration at a later stage. The Government(s) approached
independent statutory bodies having professional expertise on the subject
matter to assist them in verification of the accounting records of the
taxpayers. It is this thought process that lead to the emergence of statutorily
prescribed audits with specific reporting requirements giving the Government
assurance over the accounting records for them to effectively discharge their
administrative duties.


AUDIT VS. CERTIFICATION


While audit report
and certificates are part of attest functions of an auditor, there is a
conceptual difference between an ‘audit’ and ‘a certificate’. As per ‘Guidance
Note on Audit Report and Certificates for special purposes’ issued by ICAI, the
difference between a certificate and report has been provided as under:

  • “A Certificate is a
    written confirmation of the accuracy of facts stated there in and does not
    involve any estimate or the opinion”;
  • “A Report, on the other
    hand, is a formal statement usually made after an enquiry, examination or
    review of specified matters under report and includes the reporting auditor’s
    opinion thereon”.


The reader of a
certificate believes that the document gives him/ her reasonable assurance over
the accuracy of specific facts stated therein. A certificate is normally
expected to entail a higher level of assurance compared to an opinion or report
– a true and correct view. An audit report is more generic and gives an overall
opinion
that the reported statements are true and fair (in some cases true
and correct). It must be noted that due to inherent limitation of audit
procedures, an absolute assurance is impossible to provide and in spite of the
words report and certificates being used interchangeably, a professional should
clarify to the users of his services that only a reasonable assurance or
limited assurance can be provided by him.


RECORD MAINTENANCE UNDER GST LAW


Section 35 places a
requirement of maintaining accounts, documents and records. The law places an
obligation on every registered person to maintain separate accounts for each
registration despite the person maintaining accounts at an India level. At
every registration level, the tax payer should maintain a true and correct
account of specified particulars such as production or manufacture of goods;
inward and outward supply of goods or services or both; stock of goods; input
tax credit availed; output tax payable and paid; and other additional documents
mentioned in the rules. Rule 56(1) prescribes maintenance of goods imported/
exported, supplies attracting reverse charge liability and other statutory
documents (such as tax invoices, bill of supply, delivery challans, credit
notes, debit notes, receipt vouchers, payment vouchers and refund vouchers).
Succeeding clauses place requirements on the taxpayer (including service
providers) to maintain inventory records at a quantitative level; account of
advances received, paid and adjustments made thereto; output/ input tax,
details of suppliers and registered and/or large unregistered customers, etc.


Strictly
speaking, section 35 does not require the assessee to maintain independent
state level accounting ledgers/ GLs.
The section
limits its scope only to maintenance of specified records (which need not be an
accounting ledger) giving the required details enlisted therein at the
registration level in electronic or in physical form. The taxpayer should be in
a position to provide the details as envisioned in section 35 and its
sub-ordinate rule. This could be understood by a simple example of a company
maintaining a bank ledger for pan India operations. Section 35 does not expect
the taxpayer to maintain a separate bank ledger for each registration, but it
certainly expects that the taxpayer to be in a position to derive the state
level advances/ vendor payments from this consolidated bank ledger when
required. Section 35 is not a prescription of list of ledgers for each registered
person, but a specific list of records relevant for the law.
 


GST REPORTING REQUIREMENTS


Section 35(5) read
with section 44(2) of the CGST Act and the corresponding Rule 80(3) of the CGST
Rules relates to audit. Section 35(5) places three reporting requirements:

  • Submission of copy of
    audited accounts;
  • Submit a reconciliation
    statement in terms of section 44(2); and
  • Submit any other prescribed
    document


Section 44(2)
requires the taxpayer to submit an annual return (in Form 9), audited annual
accounts and a reconciliation statement. Rule 80(3) prescribes the turnover
threshold (currently 2 crore) beyond which tax payers are required to get their
accounts audited in terms of section 35(5) and furnish a copy thereof along
with a reconciliation statement ‘duly certified’.


An important link
between section 35(1) and 35(5) to be noted here is that though section 35(5)
prescribes audit of the accounts of the assessee, section 35(1) does not specify
the accounting parameters under which this exercise is to be conducted. As
stated in the earlier paragraph, section 35 does not provide for maintaining
accounting ledgers at the state level and hence consciously refrained from
providing the accounting parameters (unlike the Income tax law). The law has
limited itself to specific details for its information requirement. Thus, audit
under any governing statute, or in its absence, an audit based on generally
accepted accounting principles, is considered acceptable under the said
section. The law has thus prescribed mere filing of copy of audited annual
accounts as a requirement u/s. 35(5).


Section 35(5) and
44(2) give rise to two scenarios – first being cases where accounts are not
audited under any other law in which case an audit is required to be conducted
under GAAP; and second being cases where accounts are audited under other
statutes and such accounts would be acceptable under GST. A separate obligation
of maintaining GST specific books of accounts has not been prescribed. In both
scenarios, the audited accounts should be accompanied with the reconciliation
statement duly certified u/s. 44(2).


APPLICABILITY OF GST AUDIT AND ANNUAL RETURN


Annual Return: Every registered person irrespective of the turnover threshold
would be required to file an annual return. The said return in Form 9
consolidates the category wise turnovers, tax liabilities and input tax credit
availment/ reversal as reported in the relevant GST returns. It also captures
transactions/amendments, which spill across financial years. A recent document
issued by GSTN convey that Form 9 would be pre-filled by GSTN in an editable
format. The taxpayer would have to review the data and file the same. Aggregate
of the turnover; output tax and input tax credit details as declared in the GST
returns and consolidated in Form 9 would flow into Form 9C for the purpose of
reconciliation by the auditor.


GST
Certification:
Every registered person whose
turnover exceeds the prescribed limit is required to file annual audited
accounts and reconciliation statement. An entity having registration in more
than one State / UT is considered as a distinct persons in every State in terms
of section 25 of the CGST/SGST Act. Distinct persons are required to maintain
separate records and get their records audited under the GST Laws. There seems
to be no ambiguity that Form 9 and 9C need to be filed and reported at the
registration level.


However, there
exists some confusion on whether the turnover limit needs to be tested
independently at each GSTIN level or at the entity level. This confusion arises
primarily on account of the wordings adopted in section 35(5) vis-à-vis Rule
80(3). While section 35(5) uses the term ‘turnover’, Rule 80(3) uses the phrase
‘aggregate turnover’. Aggregate turnover is defined to include the PAN based
turnover and the term turnover is not defined. The closest meaning of turnover
would be expressed by the definition of ‘turnover in a state’ which restricts
itself only to the turnover at a particular GSTIN. Thus on one hand, the section
refers to turnover in a state and Rule 80(3) refers to aggregate turnover i.e.
entity level turnover. A simple resolution of this conflict would be to place
larger emphasis on Rule 80(3) as the powers of prescription have been delegated
and one would have to view the prescription only as per the delegate
legislation. Section 35(5) does not in anyway narrow down the scope of Rule
80(3) by using the phrase ‘turnover’. It merely directs one to refer to the
expression of turnover as laid down by the delegated legislation for the
purpose of deciding applicability. There are several viewpoints that affirm
this stand and it would be fairly reasonable to take the view that audit at
each location should be performed irrespective of the state level turnover as
long as the aggregate limits have been crossed.


While the above
explanation conveys that thresholds are to be tested at the entity level and
applied to all registrations under an umbrella, it would be interesting to
examine the other side of the argument for a better debate:

  • Registered persons u/s. 25
    also includes distinct persons and the provisions should apply independently to
    each distinct person. If the law expects a separate audit report for each
    GSTIN, it seems unnatural that this one turnover parameter is singled out to be
    tested at the entity level.
  • Deeming fiction of distinct
    persons under GST law should be given its full effect unless the law conveys a
    contrary meaning and the law has not specifically conveyed any contrary
    meaning. Since the deeming fiction has stretched itself to treat a branch as
    distinct from its head office, the turnover of the head office cannot be then
    included for the purpose of assessing the branch compliance.
  • Though CGST Act is a
    national legislation, it has state specific coverage like its better half (i.e.
    SGST Act) and should be understood qua the specific registration and not qua
    the legal entity as a whole. Hence turnover in section 44(2) should be
    understood as per the of definition ‘turnover in a state’, else turnover would
    be left undefined/ unexplained in law. The term ‘aggregate turnover’ in Rule
    80(3) being a sub-ordinate legislation should be understood within the confines
    of section 44(2) to mean aggregation of all supplies under a particular GSTIN
    and not at the entity level.


The author believes
that former view is a more sustainable view and the latter view is only a
possible defence plea in any penal proceeding.


SCOPE OF GST AUDIT


Section 35(5) does
not lay down the parameters of its audit requirement. Though the statute
defines ‘audit’ u/s. 2(13), it appears the definition is a misfit for 35(5).
The said definition seems relevant only for the purpose of special audits
required and directed by the Commissioner u/s. 66. The definition reads as
follows:


‘audit means
examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by
the registered person under this Act or rules made thereunder or under any
other law for the time being in force to verify the correctness of the
turnover declared, taxes paid, refund claimed and input tax credit availed, and
to assess his compliance
with the provisions of this Act or rules made
thereunder’


The above
underlined portion of the definition places a stringent task over the auditor
to verify correctness of all declarations of the taxpayer and make a
comprehensive assessment of compliance of the GST law. The requirement is so
elaborate that the auditor would be required to apply all provisions (including
rules, notifications, etc) to every transaction of the taxpayer, take a view in
areas of ambiguity and provide a report on the compliance/ non-compliance of
the provisions of the Act. Section 35(5) seems to be on a different footing
altogether. It refers to performance of audit of accounts (NOT records, returns
or statutory documents) and submission of the copy of the same, which is
completely different from the definition u/s. 2(13). It therefore seems that
the said definition has limited relevance. It applies to cases where a special
audit is directed by the Commissioner on the ground that the books of accounts
and records warrant an examination by a professional.


If one also reads
9C (discussed in detail later), it does not incorporate any section level
report or overall compliance of provisions of the Act. In fact there is a clear
absence of a section reference or the term ‘compliance’ in the entire form.
This leads to the only inference that audit should be understood in general
parlance and not in terms of section 2(13). As a consequence, one can conclude
that the scope of the audit is undefined and respective governing statutes
would be the basis of any audit of accounts u/s. 35(5). This seems logical
since section 35(1) itself stays away from prescribing maintenance of general
books of accounts. In cases where audit is not governed under any statute,
section 35(5) merely directs conduct of audit of accounts as per generally
accepted accounting principles and standards on auditing. An auditor should
apply the procedures given in the Standards on Auditing, specifically obtaining
representation and clarify the terms of engagement in writing with the auditee.


SCOPE OF GST RECONCILIATION STATEMENT


The scope of
reconciliation statement and its certification are not very well defined under
the GST law. Section 44(2) does give some limited indication on the scope of
the reconciliation statement, which reads as under:


‘a
reconciliation statement, reconciling the value of supplies declared in the
return furnished for the financial year with the audited annual financial
statement,
and such other particulars as may prescribed’


The above extract
of section 44(2) conveys that the reconciliation statement is a number
crunching document aimed to bridge the gap between the accounts and returns.
Revenue figures as per accounts are present on one end (‘accounting end’) and
the GST return figures are present on the other (‘return end’). The statement
requires the assessee to provide an explanation to timing/ permanent variances
between these two ends. The framework of Form 9C also echoes of it being a
reconciliation and not an ‘opinion statement’ of the auditor and depends on the
reliance upon the data provided by the client that forms the basis of such
reconciliation. 


OVERALL STRUCTURE OF FORM 9C


Let’s reverse
engineer Form 9C to affirm this understanding !!!. Form 9C contains two parts:
Part A contains details of reconciliation between accounting figures with the
Annual return figures. Part B provides the format and content of the
certificate to be obtained by assessee.


The salient
features of Part A of 9C can be categorised under four broad heads as follows
(clause wise analysis may be discussed in a separate article):


Table 5 – 8 –
Outward Supply (Turnover Reconciliation):
The
net of taxation of GST extends beyond the operating income of a taxpayer. The
objective of this section is to reconcile the operating revenue as reported in
the profit and loss account with the total turnover leviable to GST and
reported in GST returns. The said section then provides a drill down of this
total turnover to the taxable turnover. Any unreconciled difference arising due
to inability to reconcile or other reasons would be reported here.


Table 9 &
11 Output Tax Liability (Tax Reconciliation):

Output tax liability of a taxpayer is calculated on the taxable turnover of the
assesse. However, there could be inconsistencies between the tax payable and
the tax reported in accounts due to either excess collection or otherwise. This
section requires reporting of differences between Tax GLs in accounts vs. the
numbers reported in the electronic liability ledger. The instructions do not
place an obligation on the auditor to verify legality of the rates applied.


Table 12–16
Net Input Tax Credit (Credit Reconciliation):
This
section reconciles net ITC availed as per accounts with that reported in
GSTR-3B. ITC under GST is permitted to spill over FYs and the reconciliation
table bridges this timing gap between accounts and GST returns. There could be
certain unreconciled differences such as:- ITC availed in A/C but not availed
in GST returns, lapsed credits, ineligible credits in A/C but claimed in GSTR 9
etc. The table expects the auditor to report the flow of numbers starting from
the accounts to the GST returns. This part also contains an expense head wise
classification based on accounting heads for statistical and analytical
purposes by the tax administration.


Auditors
Recommendation Of Liability Due To Non-Reconciliation


This section
provides the auditors recommendations of tax liability due to
non-reconciliation. The recommendation is limited only to items arising out of
“non” reconciliation and not on account of legal view points. The auditor can
rely on the tax positions taken by the assessee and need not report the same if
the auditee has a contrary view to the same. Difference in view points would
not be points of qualification in the Auditor’s concluding statement.


Part-A seems to limit itself to a reconciliation exercise at various
levels with the audited accounts. There is no provision which requires the
auditor to provide his/her opinion on the compliance with the sections of the
laws (e.g job work, time or place of supply, etc).


Part B of Form
9C
is the Certification statement which has been
divided into two parts:-


(I) Where reconciliation
statement is certified by the person who has audited the accounts-
As the title suggests, auditors takes twin responsibilities of
statutory audit (either under the Income tax law, sector specific laws or the
GST law1) and GST reconciliation statement and would furnish its
report in Part-I. In this report, the auditor reports on three aspects:


(a) that statutory
records under GST Act are maintained;


(b) that financial
statements are in agreement with accounts maintained; and


(c) that particulars
mentioned in 9C are true and correct.


It must be noted
that Part I is not an audit report even-though it is issued by the same
auditor. The auditor performing the audit would still have to issue a separate
audit report as per relevant professional guidelines certifying that the
financial statements/ accounts are in accordance with GAAP and giving a true
and fair view. In this part, the auditor reaffirms that audit has been
conducted by him and the audit provides assurance that the audited books of accounts
agree with the financial statements.


In cases where the
Mr A (Partner of ABC firm) audits under the Companies Act, 2013, Mr X (Partner
of the same firm) performs audit under the Income tax Act, 1961), and Mr Z
(Partner of the same firm) performs certification under the GST law, Mr A may
have to follow Part-I of the certification statement as it is part of the firm
which conducted the statutory audit.


(II) Where
accounts are already audited under any law (Such as Companies Act 2013, Income
Tax Act 1961, Banking Regulation Act 1949, Insurance Act 1938, Electricity Act
2003)
. This part applies in cases where a
person places reliance on the work of another auditor who has conducted audit
under another statute. The professional believes that statutory audit conducted
under the respective statutes gives him/ her reasonable assurance that the
figures reported in the financial statements are correct. Therefore, the
auditor only reports on two aspects


(a) that statutory
records under GST Act are maintained;


(b) that
particulars mentioned in 9C are true and correct.

_____________________________________________

1   For eg. An individual earning commercial
rental in excess of 2 crore and reporting the same under ‘income from house
property’ would not be subject to maintenance of books of accounts / tax audit
under the income tax.  Such individual
would have to get his accounts audited in view of section 35(5) and then
proceed to obtaining the certification over the reconciliation statement.


It appears that
Part B of Form 9C has used audited accounts as the starting point and sought a
certification from the auditor on the particulars mentioned in the
reconciliation statement to reach the numbers at the return end. When the
starting point is unaudited, section 35(5) places an onus on the assessee to
get the accounts audited (based on generally accepted accounting principles)
and perform the reconciliation pursuant to the audit exercise. The audit
process has limited significance only to give assurance to the user of the
reconciliation statement that the accounting end of the reconciliation
statement is also reliable.


To reiterate, the
pressing conclusion is that the focus of Form 9C is to certify the particulars
required to bridge the mathematical gap between accounting revenue vs. GST
outward turnover, input credit as per accounts vs. input credit as per GST
returns and tax liability as per accounts vs. tax liability as reported in GST
returns. This objective becomes effective only when:


a)  The accounts are reliable and are consolidated
into the financial statements.


b)  This accounting number is bridged with the GST
number in the return.


The first objective
is fulfilled by placing reliance on the audit report issued by the statutory
auditor that financial statements are a true and fair representation of the
books of accounts maintained by the assessee. The second objective is met by a
reporting certain particulars in Part I of 9C. To summarise 9C Part II is a
limited purpose certificate reporting the correctness of the particulars
contained in 9C only.


COMPARATIVE WITH INCOME TAX REQUIREMENTS


Audit reports/
certificates are not germane to tax laws. Income tax has also traditionally
required an income tax audit u/s. 44AB and also chartered accountant
certificates under various sections (such as 115JB, 88HHE, etc). Section 44AB
permitted assessee to have its accounts audited under the Income tax law or any
other law applicable to the assessee and in addition furnish a report in the
prescribed form (in Form 3CD) verifying the particulars mentioned therein. The
audit report in Form 3CD presently contains 44 clauses placing onus on the
auditor to verify compliance of specific sections and reporting particulars
relevant to each section under the respective clause. Each clause requires the
auditor to apply legal provisions/ tax positions, circulars, etc and give an
accurate report of the eligibility and quantum of deduction claimed by the tax
payer (such as whether assessee has claimed any capital expenditure, compliance
of TDS compliance, claim of specific deductions, etc). Yet, it is also settled
that the auditor’s view on a particular section is not binding on the tax payer
and the tax payer was free to take a contrary stand in its income tax return.
One the other hand, section 115JB required a certificate from the chartered
accountant reporting compliance of computation of book profits under the said
section in terms of the list of clauses u/s. 115JB (in Form 29B).


It appears that
Form 9C is not an audit activity rather a certification of accuracy of
particulars. If a comparative is drawn with Form 3CB/3CD and certification
exercise u/s. 115JB, Form 9C appears to be number oriented certification
exercise rather than compliance oriented exercise such as Form 3CD/29B.
Therefore it would be incorrect to term Form 9C as an ‘audit’ exercise and
rather appropriate to term it as a ‘certification’.
 

 

 

 

 

KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IND AS 116 AND CURRENT IND AS

Ind AS 116
will apply from accounting periods commencing on or after 1st April,
2019 for all companies that apply Ind AS; once the same is notified by the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs.


The following is a summary of the
key differences
between Ind AS 116 and current Ind AS

 

Ind AS 116          1st April 2019

Current Ind AS

Definition of a lease

A lease is a contract, or part of a contract, that conveys the
right to control the use of an underlying asset for a period of time in
exchange for consideration.  To
determine if the right to control has been transferred to the customer, an
entity shall assesses whether, throughout 
the period of use, the customer has the right to obtain substantially
all of the economic benefits from use 
of the identified asset and the right to direct the  use of the identified asset.

Ind AS 17 defines a lease as an agreement whereby the lessor
conveys to the lessee, in return for a payment or series of payments, the
right to use an asset for an agreed period of time. Furthermore, Appendix C
of Ind AS 17 Determining whether an Arrangement contains a Lease, it
is not necessary for an arrangement to convey the right to control the use of
an asset to be in scope of Ind AS 17.

Recognition exemptions

 

 

Short term leases-lessees

Lessees can elect, by class of underlying asset to which the
right of use, relates, to apply a method similar to Ind AS 17 operating lease
accounting, to leases with a  lease
term of 12 months or less and without a purchase option

Not applicable

Leases of low value assets- lessees

Lessees can elect, on a lease-by-lease basis, to apply a method
similar to Ind AS 17 operating lease accounting, to leases of low-value
assets (e.g., tablets and personal computers, small items of office furniture
and telephones).

Not applicable

Classification

 

 

Lease classification-lessees

Lessees apply a single recognition and measurement approach for
all leases, with options not to recognise right-of-use assets and lease
liabilities for short-term leases and leases of low-value assets.

Lessees apply a dual recognition and measurement approach for
all leases. Lessees classify a lease as a finance lease if it transfers
substantially all the risks and rewards incidental to ownership. Otherwise a
lease is classified as an operating lease.

Measurement

 

 

Lease payments included in the initial measurement-lessees

At the commencement date, lessees (except short-term leases and
leases of low-value assets) measure the lease liability at the present value
of the lease payments to be made over the lease term. Lease payments include:

a. Fixed payments (including in-substance fixed payments), less
any lease incentives receivable

b. Variable lease payments that depend on an index or a rate,
initially measured using the index or rate at the commencement date

c. Amounts expected to be payable by the lessee under residual
value guarantees

d. The exercise price of a purchase option if the lessee is
reasonably certain to exercise that option

At the commencement of the lease term, lessees recognise finance
leases as assets and liabilities in their statements of financial position at
amounts equal to the fair value of the leased property or, if lower, the
present value of the minimum lease payments, each determined at the inception
of the lease. Minimum lease payments are the payments over the lease term
that the lessee is or can be required to make, excluding contingent rent,
costs for services and taxes to be paid by and reimbursed to the lessor,
together with, for a lessee, any amounts guaranteed by the lessee or by a
party related to the lessee.  Variable
lease payments are not part of the lease liability.

 

e. Payments of penalties for terminating the lease, if the lease
term reflects the lessee exercising an option to terminate the lease

The cost of the right-of-use asset comprises:

a. The lease liability

b. Lease payments made at or before the commencement date, less
any lease incentives received

c. Initial direct costs

d. Asset retirement obligations, unless those costs are incurred
to produce inventories

No assets and liabilities are recognised for the initial
measurement of operating leases.

Reassessment of lease liability-lessees

After the commencement date, lessees shall remeasure the lease
liability when there is a lease modification (i.e., a change in the scope of
a lease, or the consideration for a lease that was not part of the original
terms and conditions of the lease) that is not accounted for as a separate
contract.

Lessees are also required to remeasure lease payments upon a
change in any of the following:

  The lease term

• The assessment of whether the lessee is reasonably certain to
exercise an option to purchase the underlying asset

• The amounts expected to be payable under residual value
guarantees

• Future lease payments resulting from a change in an index or
rate


Not dealt with by current Ind AS

Lease modifications

 

 

Lease modifications to an operating lease-lessors

Lessors account for a modification to an operating lease as a
new lease from the effective date of the modification, considering any
prepaid or accrued lease payments relating to the original lease as part of
the lease payments for the new lease.

Not dealt with by current Ind AS

Lease modifications which do not result in new separate
leases-lessees and lessors

Lessees:

a) Allocate the consideration in the modified contract

b) Determine the lease term of the modified lease

c) Remeasure the lease liability by discounting the revised
lease payments using a revised discount rate with a corresponding adjustment
to right-of-use asset

In addition, lessees recognise in profit or loss any gain or
loss relating to the partial or full termination of the lease.

Lessors:

If a lease would have been an operating lease, had the
modification been in effect at the inception date, lessors in a finance
lease:

i.  Account for the
modification as a new lease

ii.  Measure the carrying
amount of the underlying asset as the net investment in the lease immediately
before the effective date of the modification.

Otherwise the modification is accounted for in accordance with
Ind AS  109 Financial Instruments.

Not dealt with by current Ind AS

Presentation and disclosure

 

 

Presentation-lessees

Statement of financial position-present right-of-use assets
separately from other assets. If a lessee does not present right-of-use
assets separately in the statement of financial position, the lessee is
required to include right-of-use assets within the same line item as that
within which the corresponding underlying assets would be presented if they
were owned and disclose which line items in the statement of financial
position include those right-of-use assets.

Lease liabilities are also presented separately from other
liabilities. If the lessee does not present lease liabilities separately in
the statement of financial position, the lessee is required to disclose which
line items in the statement of financial position include those liabilities.

Statement of profit or loss-present interest expense on the
lease liability separately from the depreciation charge for the right-of-use
asset. Interest expense on the lease liability is a component of finance
costs, which paragraph 82(b) of Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial
Statements
requires to be presented separately in the statement of profit
or loss.

Cash flow statement – classify cash payments for the principal
portion of the lease liability within financing activities; cash payments for
the interest portion of the lease liability applying the requirements in Ind
AS 7 for interest paid – as operating cash flow or cash flow resulting from
financing activities (depending on entity’s policy); and short-term lease
payments, payments for leases of low-value assets and variable lease payments
not included in the measurement of the lease liability within operating
activities.

Presentation in the statement of financial position- not dealt
with by current Ind AS

 

Statement of profit or loss-operating lease expense is presented
as a single item

 

Cash flow statement- for operating leases, cash payments are
included within operating activities

Disclosure-lessees and lessors

Detailed disclosures including the format of disclosure, are
required under Ind AS 116. In addition, qualitative and quantitative
information about leasing activities is required in order to meet the
disclosure objective.

Quantitative and qualitative disclosures are required, but
generally fewer disclosures are required than under Ind AS 116.

Sale
and leaseback transactions

 

 

Sale and leaseback transactions determining whether a sale has
occurred

Seller-lessees and buyer-lessors apply the requirements in Ind
AS  115 to determine whether a sale has
occurred in a sale and leaseback transaction.

Ind AS 17 focuses on whether the leaseback is an operating or
finance lease and does not explicitly require the transfer of the asset to
meet the requirements for a sale in accordance with Ind AS 18 for
seller-lessees and buyer-lessors.

Sale and leaseback transactions accounting by seller-lessees

The seller-lessee measures the right-of-use asset arising from
the leaseback at the proportion of the previous carrying amount of the asset
that relates to the right-of-use retained by the seller-lessee and recognises
only the amount of any gain or loss that relates to the rights transferred to
the buyer-lessor.

If a sale and leaseback transaction results in a finance lease,
any excess of sales proceeds over the carrying amount are deferred and
amortised over the lease term.

 

If a sale and leaseback transaction results in an operating
lease, and it is clear that the transaction is established at fair value, any
profit or loss is recognised immediately.

Sale and leaseback transactions-accounting by seller-lessees for
transactions not at fair value

If the fair value of the consideration for the sale of an asset
does not equal the fair value of the asset, or if the payments for the lease
are not at market rates, an entity is required to measure the sale proceeds
at fair value with an adjustment either as a prepayment of lease payments
(any below market terms) or additional financing (any above market terms) as
appropriate.

If a sale and leaseback transaction results in an operating
lease and the sale price is

• Below fair value – any profit or loss is recognised
immediately except that, if the loss is compensated for by future lease
payments at below market price, it is deferred and amortised in proportion to
the lease payments over the period for which the asset is expected to be used

• Above fair value – the excess over fair value is deferred and
amortised over the period for which the asset is expected to be used

Business 
Combinations

 

 

Business combinations – acquiree is a lessee – initial
measurement

The acquirer is not required to recognise right-of-use assets
and lease liabilities for leases with a remaining lease term less than 12
months from the acquisition date, or leases for which the underlying asset is
of low value.

The acquirer measures the right-of-use asset at the same amount
as the lease liability, adjusted to reflect favourable or unfavourable terms
of the lease, relative to market terms.

There is no exemption for leases with a remaining lease term
less than 12 months from the acquisition date, or leases for which the
underlying asset is of low value.

 

An intangible asset is recognised if terms of operating lease
are favourable relative to market terms and a liability is recognised if
terms are unfavourable relative to market terms.

 

An intangible asset may be associated with an operating lease,
which may be evidenced by market participants’ willingness to pay a price for
the lease even if it is at market terms.

 

 

 

 

AMOUNTS NOT DEDUCTIBLE U/S. 40(a)(ii) AND TAX

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION


Section 40(a)  provides for a list of expenses that are not
deductible in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains
of business or profession”, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 30 to 38
of the Act in case of any assesse. Vide clause (ii), any sum paid on account of
any rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession
of, or otherwise on the basis of any such profits or gains is disallowable.
Explanations 1 & 2 of the said clause, 
provide that any tax eligible for relief u/s. 90, 90A and 91 shall be deemed
to be the rate or tax. Likewise, any sum paid on account of wealth-tax is also
disallowable vide clause (iia) of section 40 (a).


The term ‘tax’ is defined by section 2(43) of the Act to mean income-tax
chargeable under the provisions of the Act. The courts often have been asked to
examine the true meaning of the term “tax” and to determine whether any of the
following are includible in the meaning of the term tax.

  • Education cess including secondary and higher
    education cess.
  • Interest on late payment of tax deducted at
    source.
  • Foreign taxes i.e. taxes on foreign
    income.                                                               


The Tribunals and the Courts  at
times have delivered  conflicting
decisions on each of the above issues. The short issue which however is sought
to be examined here is about the deductibility of the payment of the education
cess, in computing the profits and gains of business or profession.


SESA GOA LTD’S CASE


The issue arose in the case of Sesa Goa Ltd vs. JCIT, 38 taxmann.com
(Panaji), 60 SOT 121
,  for assessment
year 2009-10. In that case, the assessee company had claimed a deduction of an
amount of Rs.19.72 crore towards payment of education cess, which amount was
disallowed by the AO and the disallowance was confirmed by the CIT (Appeals) by
applying provisions of section 40(a)(ii) of
the Act.


On appeal to the Tribunal, it was contended that the education cess was
paid for providing finance for quality education and therefore should be
considered to have been paid and incurred for the purposes of business. It was
further explained that cess was not listed for disallowance under the
provisions of clause (ii) of section 40 of the Act. In reply, it was contended
by the Revenue that the education cess formed an integral part of the direct
tax collection and the payment thereof was clearly covered for the disallowance
under the aforesaid clause of section 40(a) of the Act.


On hearing the rival submissions and on due consideration of the
parties, the Tribunal held that the education cess was collected as a part of
the income tax and the provisions of the respective clauses of section 40(a)
were applicable and the assessee was not entitled for the deduction of the
amount paid towards education cess.


According to the Tribunal, the payment of the education cess could not
be treated as a “fee” but should be treated as a “tax” for the reason that the
payment of fees was meant for getting certain benefits or services, while tax
was imposed by the Government and was levied without promising in return any
benefit or service to the assessee.


The Tribunal held that such payment could not be said to be an
expenditure incurred wholly and 
exclusively for the purpose of the business. An appeal filed by the
assessee against the order of the Tribunal in this case has been admitted by
the High Court and is pending for hearing.


CHAMBAL FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICALS’ CASE


The issue again came up for
consideration of the Jaipur bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs.
Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.
, for assessment year 2009-10, in
ITA No.412/JP/2013
. In that case, the assessee had challenged the action of
the CIT (Appeals)  in confirming the
action of disallowance of education cess of Rs.3.05 crore, by the AO, u/s. 40
(a) (ii). The AO had also held that such cess was not an allowable expenditure
u/s. 37. The Tribunal noted that the same issue, in the assessee’s own case,
was adjudicated by a co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal vide an order dated
28.10.2016 passed in ITA No.s 459 and 558/JP/2012.


In the said appeals, it was contended by the assessee that the
legislature, where desired  had provided
that the payment of cess was not deductible, by specifically including the same
in the language of the provisions; it was explained that there was no intention
to disallow the payment of education cess in computing the income. The Tribunal
observed that the basic character of the education cess was that of a tax which
was levied on the profits or gains of the business and given that such a tax
was liable for disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ii), the payment of education cess was
not eligible for deduction. The Tribunal, in the later case under
consideration, following the above mentioned orders, decided the appeal against
the assessee by confirming the disallowance made by the AO.


On further appeal by the assessee to the high court in the case of Chambal  Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. vs. JCIT in
D.B ITA No. 52 of 2018 decided by an order dt. 31.07.2018
, the assessee,
relying on the decision in the case of Jaipuria Samla Amalgamated Collieries  Limited vs. CIT , 82 ITR 580 (SC)
contended  that the term tax did not
include cess. Attention of the court was invited to  circular No. 91 of 1967, bearing number
91/58/64–ITJ(19) dated 18.05.1967 to contend that the CBDT vide that circular
had clarified that the cess was not specifically included in section 40(a)(ii)
for disallowance and that no disallowance of education cess was possible. 


The following submissions made before the lower authorities by the
assessee were taken note of by the court;

  • On a plain reading of the above provision of
    section 40(a) (ii), it was  evident that
    a sum paid of any rate or tax was expressly disallowed only where : (i) the
    rate was levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession, and
    (ii)  the rate or tax was assessed at a
    proportion of or otherwise on the basis of any such profits or gains. It was
    evident that nowhere in the said section, it had been mentioned that education
    cess was not allowable. Education cess was neither levied on the profits or
    gains of any business or profession nor assessed at a proportion of, or
    otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains.
  • In CBDT Circular No. 91/58/66 ITJ (19), dated
    May 18, 1967 it has been clarified that the effect of the omission of the word
    “cess” from section 40(a)(ii) was that only taxes paid were to be disallowed in
    the assessment for the years 1962-63 onwards. Thus, as per the said circular,
    Education cess could not be disallowed; there could not be a contradiction, as
    the circulars bind the tax authorities.
  • That education cess could not be treated at
    par with any “rate” or “tax” within the meaning of section 40(a)(ii) especially
    when the same was only a “cess” as seen from the speech of the  Finance Minister .


The Revenue  placed reliance on
the decision in the case of Smithkline & French (India)  Ltd. vs. CIT, 219 ITR 581 (SC) wherein it
was held that ‘surtax’ was levied on business profits of the company and was
therefore, disallowable u/s. 40(a)(ii) of the Act. It was also contended
relying on the decision in the case of SRD Nutrients Private Limited  vs. CCE AIR 2017 SC 5299 that ‘education
cess’ was in the nature of surcharge, which the assessee was required to pay
along with the basic excise duty. 


The following submissions made before the lower authorities by the
Revenue were taken note of by the court;

  • The purpose of introducing the cess was
    to  levy and collect, in accordance with
    the provisions of the relevant chapter, 
    as surcharge for purposes of Union, a cess to be called the Education
    Cess, to fulfill the commitment of the Government to provide and finance
    universalised quality basic education. It was clear that the said cess was
    introduced as a surcharge, which was admittedly not deductible.
  • The 
    provision was  wide enough to
    cover any sum paid on account of any rate or tax on the profits or assessed at
    a proportion of such profits. Education cess being calculated at a proportion
    (2% or 1%) to Income Tax, which in turn, was in proportion to profits of
    business, would certainly qualify as a sum assessed at a proportion to such
    profits.
  • If education cess was considered deductible,
    then by the same logic Income-Tax or any surcharge would also became
    deductible, which would be an absurd proportion.
  • If Education cess were to be deductible, then
    it would not be possible to compute it, e.g. If profit is Rs. 100, Income Tax
    was Rs. 30 and Education Cess was Rs. 0.90 and if education cess were to be
    deductible from profit, such profit (after such deduction) would become Rs.
    99.1 (100-0.9) which would again necessitate re-computation of Income-Tax. The
    vicious circle of such re-computation would continue, which was why the
    legislature, in its wisdom, had not allowed deductibility of amounts calculated
    at a proportion of profits.
  • The mechanism of recovery of unpaid Education
    cess and the penal provision for non payment being the same as that for  income tax, indicated that unpaid cess was
    treated as unpaid tax and was visited with all consequences of non-payment of
    demand. There was no separate machinery in the Act for recovery of unpaid cess
    and imposition of interest and penalty in case of default in payment of unpaid
    cess. This indicated that cess is a part of tax and all recovery mechanisms and
    consequences pertaining to recovery of tax apply to recovery of cess also
    without explicit mention of the word “cess” in the foregoing
    provisions. Hence, drawing a parallel, no explicit mention of “cess”
    was required in section 40a(ii) for making disallowance thereof.


On due consideration of the submissions by the parties, the Rajasthan
high court allowed the appeal of the assesse and ordered the deletion of the
disallowance of the education cess by holding in paragraph 5 that ;


“On the third issue in appeal no.52/2018, in view
of the circular of CBDT where word “Cess” is deleted, in our
considered opinion, the tribunal has committed an error in not accepting the
contention of the assessee. Apart from the Supreme Court decision referred that
assessment year is independent and word Cess has been rightly interpreted by
the Supreme Court that the Cess is not tax in that view of the matter, we are
of the considered opinion that the view taken by the tribunal on issue no.3 is
required to be reversed and the said issue is answered in favour of the
assessee.”


The High Court directed the AO to allow the claim of the assesse for
deduction of the cess in computing the profits and gains of business.


OBSERVATIONS


The issue, under the controversy, 
is all about deciding whether the education cess levied under the
Finance Act with effect from financial year 2004-05 is disallowable under
clause (ii) of section 40(a) of the Income tax Act.


The Education Cess, secondary and higher,  has been levied since financial year 2004-05
by the respective Finance Acts. The Finance Minister, while presenting the
Finance (No.2) Bill, 2004, 268 ITR (st.) 1, had explained the objective and the
purpose behind the levy of cess in the following words. “Education 22.
In my scheme of things, no issue enjoys a higher priority than providing basic
education to all children. I propose to levy a cess of 2 per cent. The new cess
will yield about Rs. 4000- 5000 crores in a full year. The whole of the amount
collected as cess will be earmarked for education, which will naturally include
providing a nutritious cooked midday meal. If primary education and the
nutritious cooked meals scheme can work hand-in-hand, I believe there will be a
new dawn for the poor children of India.”


The cess  is levied and collected
at a specified percentage of the Income tax i.e. otherwise payable on the total
income, including the profits or gains of any business or any profession. It is
deposited in a separate account to be known as ‘Prarambhik Shiksha Kosh’ which
deposits are used for this specific purpose of meeting the educational needs of
the citizens of India. The power to levy income tax as also cess is derived by
the parliament under Article 270 of the Constitution of India. The term ‘tax’
is defined by section 2 (43) of the Income tax Act and in the context, means,
the income tax chargeable under the provision of the Act. With effect from
financial year, 2018-19, this cess includes collection for health also and is
now know as the Health & Education Cess.


A provision similar to section 40(a)(ii), is not contained in section 58
for disallowance of tax payable on the income computed under the head  Income from 
Other Sources. Explanation 1 of section 115JB(2) provides that the
amount of income tax paid or payable and the provision therefore should be
added to the profit, as shown in the Statement of Profit and Loss, in computing
the book profit that is liable for the MAT. 
Explanation 2 specifically provide, vide clauses (iv) and (v), that the
income tax shall include education cess levied by the Central Acts. No such
extension of the meaning of the term ‘tax’, used in section 40(a)(ii), has been
provided for or clarified for including the education cess, in its scope for
disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ii) of the Act.


Section 10(4) of the Income tax Act, 1922 provided for a similar
disallowance in computing the income from the specified sources. The said
section in clear words provided that the income tax and “cess” were to be
disallowed in computing the income. Section 40(a)(ii) which is the successor of
section 10(4) of 1922 Act, has chosen to not include the term “cess” in its
fold specifically, there by indicating that the cess would not be subjected to
disallowance, unless the term “tax”, used therein, by itself includes a cess.


Importantly a circular issued by the CBDT, in the year 1967,
specifically clarified for the purpose of section 40(a)(ii), that the term
“tax” did not include in its scope any cess and the exclusion of ‘cess’ in
section 40(a)(ii) of the Act of 1961, in contrast to section10(4) of the Act of
1922, was for a significant reason.  In
short, the said circular bearing number 91/58/64–ITJ(19) dated 18.05.1967
clarified that a cess was not disallowable u/s. 40(a)(ii) of the Income tax Act
of 1961. The relevant part of the circular reads as;


CIRCULAR F. NO. 91/58/66-ITJ(19) DT. 18TH
MAY, 1967 Interpretation of provision of s.40(a)(ii) of IT Act,
1961-Clarification regarding 18/05/1967 . BUSINESS EXPENDITURE SECTION
40(a)(ii),


1. Recently a case has come to the notice of the
Board where the ITO has disallowed the ‘cess’ paid by the assessee on the ground
that there has been no material change in the provisions of s.10(4) of the old
Act and s.40(a)(ii) of the new Act.


2. The view of the ITO is not correct. Clause
40(a)(ii) of the IT Bill, 1961 as introduced in the Parliament stood as under:
“(ii) any sum paid on account of any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or
gains of any business or profession or assessed at a proportion of, or
otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains”. When the matter came up
before the Select Committee, it was decided to omit the word ‘cess’ from the
clause. The effect of the omission of the word ‘cess’ is that only taxes paid
are to be disallowed in the assessments for the year 1962-63 and onwards.


3. The Board desire that the changed position may
please be brought to the notice of all the ITOs so that further litigation on
this account may be avoided.


Under the Constitution of India, the collected tax is to be used for the
general purpose of running and administration of the country, while the cess is
collected for a specified purpose.  In
that sense, the cess is usually held to be in the nature of a fee and not a
tax.  The education cess as noted
earlier, is levied for a specific purpose of promoting education in India;  importantly the cess is not calculated as a
tax, at the specified rate on the income of an assessee,  it is rather calculated as a percentage
of  such tax, so determined on income, by
applying the specified rate to the tax, so computed. 


The Supreme court in the case of Dewan Chand Builders &
Contractors vs. UOI
[CA Nos. 1830 to 1832 of 2008, dated 18-11-2011], held
that a cess levied under the BOCW Welfare Cess Act was a fee, not a tax,
collected for a specified   purpose. It
was not a part of the consolidated fund and was to be used for the specified
purpose of promoting the security of the workers. Similarly, the Apex court in
the cases of Kesoram Industries Ltd. 262 ITR 721(SC)– held that a cess
when levied for the specific purpose was a fee and not a tax.


The Mumbai bench of the Tribunal, in an unreported decision in the case
of Kalimata Investment Co. Ltd., ITA No. 4508/N/2010 dated 19.05.2012,  held that the term ”tax” used in section
40(a)(ii) included education cess, levied w.e.f. financial year 2004-05,  and that a cess was an additional sur-charge
and was therefore disallowable in computing the income of an assessee. An
appeal filed against the decision is admitted by the High Court and is pending
for hearing.       


The related issue, of  education
cess being an expenditure incurred wholly or 
exclusively for the purpose of business or profession, was also
addressed  by the Rajasthan high court in
the case of Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) by holding
that the payment of education cess was for the purpose of business, by
referring to the objective behind its levy and the purpose for which it is
collected by the Government, and was allowable as a deduction u/s. 37 of the
Act.


In a different context, a cess may also be a tax and not only a
fee.  Entry 49, List 2 of the Government
of India Act which uses the expression “cesses” was examined by the  Supreme Court in the case of Kunwar Ram
Nath vs. Municipal Board AIR 1983 SC 1930
to hold that such a cess levied
under Entry 53 of List 2 of the Constitution of India was a “tax”. In the case
of Shinde Brothers vs. Deputy Commissioner, Raichur, AIR 1967 SC 1512,  it was held that a ‘cess’ meant a ‘tax’ and
was generally imposed for meeting some special administrative expenses, like
health cess, education cess, road cess, etc.


For the
reason noted above and in particular on accounts of the circular No. 91 of
1967 (supra)
and the provisions of section 2(43) and section115JB, the
expenditure on education cess is not disallowable u/s. 40(a)(ii) of the Act,
unless the Government is able to establish that the education cess is also a
tax chargeable under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Presently the
education cess is levied under sub-sections (12) & (13) of  section 2 of the Finance Act, 2018. The
decisions of the tribunal had not taken in to 
consideration circular 91 of 1967 in deciding the issue against the
assessee; had the same been brought to the attention of the Tribunal, the
decision could have been different.

 

Section 45: Capital gains-Transfer-Capital gains are levied in the year in which the possession of the asset and all other rights are transferred and not in the year in which the title of the asset gets transferred. [Section 2(47), Transfer of Property Act, 1953]

9. 
Pr.CIT-25 vs.  Talwalkars Fitness
Club [ Income tax Appeal no 589 of 2016
Dated: 29th October, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 

Talwalkars Fitness Club vs. ACIT-21(2);
dated 27/05/2015 ; ITA. No 7246/Mum/2014, Bench: E ;  AY 2008-09  
Mum.  ITAT ]


Section 45: Capital gains-Transfer-Capital
gains are levied in the year in which the possession of the asset and all other
rights are transferred and not in the year in which the title of the asset gets
transferred. [Section 2(47), Transfer of Property Act, 1953]


During the assessment
proceedings, the A.O noticed that the assessee had disposed of two premises
each measuring 1635 sq. ft. for a total consideration of Rs.4,40,00,000/- by
way of two separate agreements to sale. The AO observed that the assessee had not
offered capital gains arising out on such sale. On being asked to explain, the
assessee submitted that though the agreements to sale were executed during the
financial year relevant to assessment year 2011-12, however, the actual sale
took place in the subsequent year and the capital gains were accordingly
offered in subsequent assessment year 2012-13, which had been accepted by the
department also. The assessee further explained that the assessee had not
parted with the possession of the property in question during the year under
consideration.


The AO, however, did not
agree with the contentions of the assessee. He observed that the property was
transferred by way of two registered sale agreements both executed on
14.02.2011 i.e. during the year under consideration. The said agreements were
duly registered with the stamp duty authorities. The sale agreement in question
was not revokable. The handing over of the possession of the property on a
future date was a mere formality. He therefore held that the transfer of the
property took place on the date of agreement and thus the capital gains were
liable to be assessed during the year under consideration.


In appeal, the Ld. CIT(A),
while referring to the wording of the some of the clauses of the agreement dated
14.02.11, upheld the findings of the AO that the capital gains arising from the
sale of the said property would be liable to be assessed in the A.Y. 2011-12.


Aggrieved by the order of
the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee filed appeal before ITAT. The Tribunal held that
the assessee has taken us through the different clauses of the agreement dated
14.02.11. He has submitted that though, the reference to the parties in the
agreement has been given as vendors and purchasers, however, it was an
agreement to sell and not the sale deed itself. As per the separate agreements,
each of the property had been agreed to be sold for a consideration of
Rs.2,20,00,000/. Only a token amount of Rs.20,00,000/- was received as advance.
However, the balance consideration was agreed to be paid by 26.05.11. The
possession of the property was not handed over to the prospective purchasers.
The sale transaction was deferred for a future date on the payment of balance
consideration of the amount of Rs.2 crore and therafter the possession was to
be handed over to the prospective purchasers.


The assessee continued to
enjoy the possession of the property even after the execution of the agreement
and was liable to handover the possession on receipt of the balance
consideration amount. It was also 
observed that the advance received by the assessee of Rs.20 lakh was
less than the 10% of the total consideration amount settled. The assessee was
not under obligation to handover the possession of the property till the
receipt of the balance consideration of the amount. The assessee was liable to
pay the due taxes on the property and was also liable for any type of loss or
damage to the property till it was handed over to the prospective purchaser
after receipt of balance sale consideration. The sale transaction was completed
on 16.06.11 and till then the assessee continued to be the owner in possession
of the property. The assessee has already offered the due taxes in the
subsequent year relevant to the financial year in which the sale deed was completed
and the possession was handed over by the assessee to the purchasers, which has
also been accepted by the department. Hence, there was no justification on the
part of the AO to tax the assessee for short term capital gains for the year
under consideration. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is hereby
allowed.


Aggrieved
by the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed appeal before High Court. The Court
held  that the Tribunal applied the
correct legal principles and construed the clauses in the agreement, otherwise
than as understood by the A.O and the Commissioner. Such findings of fact can
never be termed as perverse for they are in consonance with the materials
produced before the Tribunal. Accordingly Revenue appeal was dismissed
.

 

Section 22: Income from house property vis a vis Income from business – Real estate developer – main object not acquiring and holding properties – Rental income is held to be assessable as Income from house property. [Section 28(i)] Section 80IB(10) : Housing projects – stilt parking is part & parcel of the housing project – Eligible to deduction

8. CIT-24 vs.  Gundecha Builders [ Income tax Appeal no 347
of 2016
Dated: 31st July, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 

[ACIT-24(3) vs. Gundecha Builders; dated
19/02/2014 ; ITA. No 4475/Mum/2011, Bench G, 
Mumbai.  ITAT ]


Section 22: Income from house property vis a vis
Income from business – Real estate developer – main object  not acquiring and holding properties – Rental
income is held to be assessable as Income from house property. [Section 28(i)]


Section 80IB(10) : Housing projects – stilt
parking is part & parcel of the housing project – Eligible to deduction


The assessee is engaged in
the business of developing real estate projects. During the previous year the
assessee has claimed lease income of Rs.30.18 lakh under the head income from
house property. The same was not accepted
by  the 
A.O  who  held 
it  to  be 
business  income. Consequently,
the deduction available on the account of repair and maintenance could not be
availed of by the assessee.


Being aggrieved, the
assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the rental income
received by the assessee has to be classified as income from house property.
Thus, 30% deduction on account of repairs and maintenance be allowed.


Being aggrieved with the
CIT(A) order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal holds
that the dispute stands squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court
in Sambhu Investment (P)Ltd. vs. CIT (2003) 263 ITR 143(SC), wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that when main intention of letting out the
property or any portion thereof is to earn rental income, the income is to be
assessed as income from house property and where the intention is to exploit
the immovable property by way of complex commercial activities, the income
should be assessee as income from business. Applying this proposition to the
facts of the instant case, it was held 
that the assessee has let out the property to earn the rental income.
Accordingly, the lease income was taxable as income from house property.


Before High Court the
Revenue points out that after the above decision the issue now stands concluded
in favour of the revenue by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chennai
Properties and Investments Limited, Chennai vs. CIT (2015) 14 SCC 793
and Rayala
Corporation Private Limited vs. ACIT (2016)15 SCC 201.


The Court observed  that the assessee is in the business of
development of real estate projects and letting of property is not the business
of the assessee. In both the decisions relied upon by Revenue Chennai Properties
(supra)
and Rayala Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court on facts
found that the appellant was in the business of letting out its property on
lease and earning rent there from. Clearly it is not so in this case. Further,
the decision of this Court in CIT vs. Sane & Doshi Enterprises (2015) 377
ITR 165
wherein on identical facts this Court has taken a view that rental
income received from unsold portion of the property constructed by real estate
developer is assessable to tax as income from house property. Accordingly,
Revenue Appeal is dismissed.


As regard second issue is
concerned, the AO has disallowed assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) in
regards to parking space. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim after find
that parking is part & parcel of the housing project that is the first and
foremost requirement of the residents of the residential units. Therefore, it
cannot be said that sale proceeds of stilt parking is outside the purview of
section 80IB(10) of the Act. The parking’s are in built and approved in the
residential structure of the residential building and no such separate
approvals are taken. The principle decided by the Hon’ble Spl. Bench of ITAT
(Pune) in the case of Brahma Associates vs. JCIT also supports the case
of the appellant that if some part of the flat is used for commercial purpose,
the correct character of housing project is not vitiated, AO has not brought on
record that which part of expenditure claimed to have been incurred for parking
is bogus. Hence, the A.O was directed to allow deduction to the appellant u/s.
80IB(10) on sale proceeds of stilt parking .The Tribunal upheld the finding of
the CIT(A)


Being aggrieved with the
ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The court held that
this issue stands concluded against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee
by virtue of the orders of this Court in respect of AYs  2006-07 and 2007-08 decided in CIT vs.
Gundecha Builders (ITXA Nos.2253 of 2011 and 1513 of 2012
order dated 7th
March, 2013). Accordingly, Revenue Appeal was dismissed.


 

Section 28(iv) : Remission or cessation of trading liability – Loan waiver cannot be assessed as cessation of liability, if the assessee has not claimed any deduction and section 28(iv) does not apply if the receipts are in the nature of cash or money [ Section 41(1) ]

7. The Pr. CIT-1 vs.  M/s Graviss Hospitality Ltd [Income tax Appeal no 431 of 2016 Dated: 21st August, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 

[ACIT-1(1)  vs. 
Graviss Hospitality Ltd;     dated
17/06/2015 ;  ITA. No 6211/Mum/2011,
Bench: G , AY: 2008-09  Mumbai  ITAT ]


Section 28(iv) : Remission or cessation of
trading liability – Loan waiver cannot be assessed as cessation of liability,
if the assessee has not claimed any deduction and section 28(iv) does not apply
if the receipts are in the nature of cash or money [ Section 41(1) ]


The assessee company was
allowed rebate on loan liability of Rs.3,05,10,355/- from Inter Continental
Hospital  and SC Hotels & Resorts
India Pvt. Ltd. The entire rebate on loans was credited to the P& L account
under the head ‘other income’ and the same was offered for tax.


During the assessment
proceedings, the assessee furnished the details and rebate on loan to the AO
and submitted that out of total rebate allowed, an amount of Rs.2,10,73,487/-
related to principal amount of loan waived by SC Hotels & Resorts India
Pvt. Ltd. The assessee submitted before the AO that the receipt of loan from
SCH was on capital account and therefore the waiver of the principal amount was
also on capital account. The assessee submitted that the waiver of loan on
principal amount inadvertently remained to be excluded from total income and
the same was wrongly offered for tax and therefore the same was required to be
deducted from the total income.


The AO, however, did not
accept the contention of the assessee and disallowed the same observing that
the assessee was required to file a revised return of income in this respect.
He relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Goetze
(India) Ltd. vs. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 323 (SC)
.


In appeal, the ld. CIT(A),
observed that the waiver of loan was required to be treated as capital receipt
and was not taxable income. He, while relying upon the decision of the Tribunal
in the case of “CIT vs. Chicago Pneumatics Ltd.” [2007] 15 SOT 252 (Mumbai)
held that if the assessee was entitled to a claim the same it should be allowed
to the assessee. He therefore directed the AO to treat the same as capital
receipt.


Being aggrieved with the
order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed the Appeal before ITAT. The Tribunal
held that the waiver was not in respect of any benefit in kind or of any
perquisite. The waiver was of the principle loan amount in cash. The assessee
had not claimed any deduction in respect of loss, expenditure or trading
liability in relation to the loan amount. The waiver was of the principle
amount of loan for capital asset. He, thereafter, relying upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court, in the case of “Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd. vs. CIT” 261 ITR 501
, held that the waiver of the loan amount
was a capital receipt not taxable as business income of the assessee. Further
relied on the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of ‘Pruthvi Brokers
& Shareholders Pvt. Ltd
.’ and 
held that even if a claim is not made before the AO it can be made
before the appellate authorities. The jurisdiction of the appellate authorities
to entertain such a claim is not barred.


The Hon’ble High Court
observed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd. (2018) 404 ITR 1
held that on a plain reading of section 28 (iv) of
the Act, it appears that for the applicability of the said provision, the
income which can be taxed shall arise from the business or profession. Also, in
order to invoke this provision, the benefit which is received has to be in some
other form rather than in the shape of money. If that is because of the
remission loan liability, then, this section would not be attracted.  Accordingly, Revenue appeal was dismissed.

Sections 92C and 144C – Transfer pricing – Computation of arm’s length price (Reasoned order) – Order passed by DRP u/s. 144C (5) must contain discussion of facts and independent findings on those facts by DRP – Mere extraction of rival contentions will not satisfy requirement of consideration

30. Renault Nissan Automotive India (P.)
Ltd. vs. Secretary; [2018] 99 taxmann.com 4 (Mad):
Date of order: 28th
September, 2018
  A. Y. 2013-14


Sections 92C and 144C – Transfer pricing –
Computation of arm’s length price (Reasoned order) – Order passed by DRP u/s.
144C (5) must contain discussion of facts and independent findings on those
facts by DRP – Mere extraction of rival contentions will not satisfy
requirement of consideration


The assessee filed return
of income by computing arm’s length price of international transactions. The
TPO rejected economic adjustments claimed by the assessee and proposed certain
transfer pricing adjustments. Based on order of the TPO, the Assessing Officer
passed draft assessment order. The assessee filed objections before the DRP
u/s. 144C objecting additions made by the TPO. The DRP passed impugned order
accepting conclusion arrived at by the TPO.


Madras High Court allowed
the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of the order
of the DRP and held as under:


“i)    Perusal of the impugned order of the first respondent would
clearly indicate that apart from extracting each objection raised by the
petitioner and the relevant portion of the order passed by the Transfer Pricing
Officer dealing with such objection, the first respondent has not further
discussed anything on the said objection in detail as to how the objections
raised by the petitioner cannot be sustained or as to how the findings rendered
by the Transfer Pricing Officer on such issue have to be accepted.


ii)    It is seen from section 144C that the assessees shall file their
objections if any, to such variation made in the draft order of assessment
within 30 days to the Dispute Resolution Panel and the Assessing Officer as
contemplated u/s. 144C(2). Sub-section (5) of section 144C contemplates that
the Dispute Resolution Panel shall issue such directions as it thinks fit for
the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment.
But such directions referred to in sub-section (5) shall be issued by the
Dispute Resolution Panel only after considering the following as provided under
sub-section (6), viz., (a) draft order; (b) objection filed by the assessee;
(c) evidence furnished by the assessee; (d) report, if any, of the Assessing
Officer, Valuation Officer or Transfer pricing Officer or any other authority;
(e) records relating to the draft order; (f) evidence collected by or cause to
be collected by, it; and (g) result of any enquiry made by or caused to be made
by it. Sub-section (7) of section 144C further contemplates that the Dispute
Resolution Panel may make such further enquiry as it thinks fit or cause any
further enquiry to be made by any Income tax authority before issuing any
directions. Perusal of the procedure contemplated under sub-section (6) and
sub-section (7), thus, would clearly indicate that issuance of such directions
as contemplated under sub-section (5), cannot be made mechanically or as an
empty formality and on the other hand, it has to be done only after considering
the above-stated materials. Therefore, the consideration of the above materials
by the Dispute Resolution Panel must be apparent on the face of the order and
such exercise would be evident only when the order contains the discussion of
facts and independent findings on those facts, by the Dispute Resolution Panel.
Certainly mere extraction of the rival contentions will not satisfy the
requirement of consideration. In the absence of any such independent reasoning
and finding, it should be construed that the Dispute Resolution Panel has not
exercised its power and issued directions by following the mandatory
requirements contemplated u/s. 144C(6) and (7). In this case, it is found that
the Dispute Resolution Panel had failed to do such exercise. Thus, it is
evident that the first respondent has passed a cryptic order, which in other
words, can be called as an order passed with non-application of mind.


iii)    Therefore, the matter has to go back to the first respondent for
consideration of the objections raised by the assessee in detail and to pass a
fresh order on merits and in accordance with law with reasons and independent
findings.”

Section 132 – Search and seizure – Block assessment – Declaration by assessee – Effect of section 132(4) – Declaration after search has no evidentiary value – Additions cannot be made on basis of such declaration

29. CIT vs. Shankarlal Bhagwatiprasad
Jalan; 407 ITR 152 (Bom):
Date of order: 18th July,
2017

B. P. 1988-89 to 1998-99


Section 132 – Search and seizure – Block
assessment – Declaration by assessee – Effect of section 132(4) – Declaration
after search has no evidentiary value – Additions cannot be made on basis of
such declaration


In the case of the
assessee, there was a search and seizure operation u/s. 132 of the Act, between
27/11/1997 and 04/12/1997. On 31/12/1997, the asessee filed a declaration under
the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997 declaring undisclosed income of
Rs. 1.20 crore. However, the assessee did not deposit the tax required to be
deposited before 31/03/1998 resulting in the rejection of declaration under the
Scheme. Thereafter by a letter dated 15/01/1998, the assessee addressed a
communication to the Assistant Director (Investigation) and offered a sum of
Rs. 80 lakh as an undisclosed income to tax. But on 23/11/1998, the assessee
filed a return of income declaring undisclosed income for the block period at
Rs. 55 lakh. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 65 lakh on the basis
of the declaration under the Scheme and determined the undisclosed income for
the block period at Rs. 1.20 crore.


The Commissioner (Appeals)
deleted the addition. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that communication dated
15/01/1998 to the Assistant Director (Investigation) disclosing income of Rs.
80 lakh could not be considered to be a statement u/s. 132(4) of the Act. This
was confirmed by the Tribunal.


On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:


“i)    A bare reading of section 132 (4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
indicates that an authorised officer is entitled to examine a person on oath
during the course of search and any statement made during such examination by
such person (the person being examined on oath) would have evidentiary value
u/s. 132(4).


ii)    The Tribunal was justified in law in deciding that the letter
dated 15/01/1998 of the assessee addressed to the Assistant Director about the
disclosure of Rs. 80 lakhs as income had no evidentiary value as stated u/s.
132(4). The Tribunal was justified in law in accepting the assessee’s claim of
sale of goods on various dates while deleting the addition of Rs. 65 lakhs.


iii)    The Tribunal was correct in law in deciding that the source of
the entire purchases had been explained as out of the initial capital of Rs. 31
lakhs by cash and sale proceeds of the purchased stock of timber.”

 

Sections 160, 161, 162 and 163 – Representative assessee – Non-resident – Agent – Conditions precedent for treating person as agent of non-resident – Transfer of shares in foreign country by non-resident company – No evidence that assessee was party to transfer – Notice seeking to treat assessee as agent of non-resident – Not valid

28. WABCO India Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT
(International Taxation); 407 ITR 317 (Mad):
Date of order: 1st August,
2018 A. Y. 2014-15


Sections 160, 161, 162 and 163 –
Representative assessee – Non-resident – Agent – Conditions precedent for
treating person as agent of non-resident – Transfer of shares in foreign
country by non-resident company – No evidence that assessee was party to
transfer – Notice seeking to treat assessee as agent of non-resident – Not
valid


The appellant assessee was
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in the year 1962, and was engaged
in the business of designing, manufacturing and marketing conventional braking
products, advance braking systems and other related air assisted products and
systems. The company was duly listed in the stock exchange and its shares were
transferable. In 2012-13, 75% of the shares of the Appellant were held by CD
and the balance 25% were held by public. In 2013-14, there was a share transfer
agreement between CD and WABCO, Singapore, in terms whereof CD transferred its
shareholding to WABCO, Singapore. The sale consideration of 1,42,25,684 shares
amounted to Rs. 29,84,97,852 Euros equivalent to Rs. 2347,23,78,600/-, for
which capital gains in the hands of CD was Rs. 2156,98,34,163/-. CD was
assessed and a draft assessment order was served on CD on 31/12/2017 in respect
of tax liability of Rs. 4,29,39,66,823/-, subject to CD availing of the option
to challenge the draft assessment order before the Dispute Resolution panel.
The Draft assessment order was finalised and a final assessment order issued
u/s. 143(3) read with section 144C of the Act. On 09/01/2018 the Department
issued a show-cause notice u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Act, to the Appellant assesee
whereby it was alleged that the capital gains had arisen directly as a result
of consideration received by CD from the Appellant and the Appellant was
proposed to be held as agent u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Act, in the event of any
demand against CD in the assessment proceedings for the A. Y. 2014-15. A writ
petition against the notice was dismissed by the Single Judge.


The Division Bench of the
Madras High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Appellant assessee and held
as under:


“i)    Harmonious reading of section 160 to 163 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 would show that: (i) in order to become liable as a representative
assessee, a person must be situated such as to fall within the definition of a
representative assessee;

(ii) the income must be such as is taxable u/s. 9;


(iii) the income must be such in respect of which such a person can be treated
as a representative assesee;


(iv) the representative assessee has a statutory
right to withhold sums towards a potential tax liability;


(v) since the
liability of a representative assessee is limited to the profit, there can be
multiple representative assessees in respect of a single non-resident
assessee-each being taxed on the profits and gains relatable to such representative
assessee..


ii)    The question was whether the show-cause notice was at all without
jurisdiction, whether the respondent wrongly assumed jurisdiction by
erroneously deciding jurisdictional facts, whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellant at all had any liability in respect of
the capital gains in question, and whether the appellant could be said to be an
agent u/s. 163(1)(c). The High Court had jurisdiction to consider the question
in writ proceedings.


iii)    No case was made out by the Department that in respect of
transfer of shares to a third party, that too outside India, the Indian company
could be taxed when the Indian company had no role in the transfer. Merely
because those shares related to the Indian company, that would not make the
Indian company an agent qua deemed capital gains purportedly earned by the
foreign company.


v)    The notice was not valid. The judgment and order under appeal is
set aside and consequently, the impugned show-cause notice is also set aside.”

SUCCESSION PLANNING VIA PRIVATE TRUSTS – AN OVERVIEW

Family-run
businesses continue to be the norm rather than the exception in India; with
most progressing fast on the path to globalisation, succession planning has
never been as important as it is today. Succession planning is not only a means
to safeguard from potential inheritance tax, but also a method to ensure that
legacies remain alive and keep up with changing times with minimum conflict or
impact on business.

 

Succession
planning can be a complex exercise in India. Families are often large with
multiple factions involved in the business, making deliberations around
succession planning prolonged and difficult. The slew of regulations around tax
and other regulatory matters, in addition to personal laws, do not ease
matters.

 

Despite these
factors, it is imperative to plan for succession. A look back at the history of
corporate India reveals the immense disruption due to improper or absent
succession planning. Familial ties have been irreparably damaged, wealth
accumulated over generations has been squandered, protracted and endless
litigation between family members has taken up significant time and effort,
draining valuable resources that could have been put to better use, and most
importantly, once-leading business houses have taken a huge hit to their
finances, glory and reputations.

 

Use and limitation of wills

While a Will
remains the most oft-used mechanism for passing down wealth through generations,
it has its limitations. The chances of a Will being challenged, tying up the
family in litigation for years to come, are high. In addition, it is not
possible to keep ownership or control of assets in a common pool in a Will,
leading to fragmentation of family wealth. Since assets under a Will are
transferred only on the demise of the owner, they were subject to estate duty
under the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (ED Act), which was abolished in 1985. Although
estate duty is currently not on the statute, there have been apprehensions of
its reintroduction. While one cannot predict the provisions thereof, a
reasonable assumption is that passing of property on the death of the owner
would be subject to any such tax.

 

Such
limitations and other concerns, such as ring-fencing assets from legal issues
and setting family protocols, has led India Inc. to once again seriously
consider succession planning through a private Trust set up for the benefit of
family members.

 

Private trusts

As the name
suggests, a Trust means faith/confidence reposed in someone who acts in a
fiduciary capacity for someone else. Essentially, a Trust is a legal
arrangement in which a person’s property or funds are entrusted to a third
party to handle that property or funds on behalf of a beneficiary.

 

While oral
Trusts that were self-regulated have been part of Indian society since time
immemorial, the law relating to private Trusts was codified in 1882, as the
Indian Trust Act, 1882 (the Trust Act). The Trust Act is applicable to the
whole of India, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. The provisions of the Trust Act should not affect the rules of
Mohammedan law with regard to waqf, or the mutual relations of the
members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law.
The provisions of the Trust Act are also not applicable to public or private
religious or charitable endowments.

 

A private
Trust is effective for succession planning as the settlor can see its
implementation during his lifetime, enabling corrective action to be taken in a
timely manner. A Trust demonstrates family cohesiveness to the world and
provides effective joint control of family wealth through the Trust deed. Thus,
a Trust provides united control and effective participation of all members in
the decision-making process, leading to mitigation of disputes and legal
battles. It can also ease the path for separation within the family, making it
a smooth and defined process.

A Trust, as a
means of succession planning, is easy to operate and not heavily regulated. The
statutory formalities to be complied with are minimal. The Trust Act is an
enabling Act and does not contain regulatory provisions. Thus, a Trust provides
all types of flexibility. It allows the necessary distribution, accumulates
balance and allows ultimate succession, even separation, as planned. As against
being regulated by laws, a Trust is governed and regulated by the Trust deed.

 

Information
on private Trusts is not publicly available, unless such Trusts have been
registered, providing much- sought-after privacy.

 

Therefore, for several generations, private Trusts
have been a popular means of succession planning, and the spectre of
inheritance tax has only given a boost to its use.

 

A. Basic structure

The basic
structure of a private Trust is as follows:

 

 

Apart from
the settlor, Trustees and beneficiaries, who are the key players in any Trust,
there may also be a protector and an advisory board. The protector is
essentially a person appointed under the Trust deed, who guides the Trustees in
the proper exercise of their administrative and dispositive powers, while
ensuring that the wishes of the settlor are fulfilled and the Trust continues
to serve the purpose for which it was intended. An advisory board is a body
constituted under a Trust deed to provide non-binding advice to the Trustees,
often used more as a sounding board.

 

B. Trust deed

A private
Trust is usually governed by a Trust deed. A Trust deed, as an instrument, is
similar to an agreement and contains clauses similar to an agreement between
two parties, in this case, the settlor and Trustee, however, which would have
implications for the beneficiaries. Therefore, like any other agreement, a
Trust deed usually provides for rules in relation to each of the three parties
and is a complete code by itself for operating the relationship within them.

 

A Trust deed
would—apart from information regarding the relevant parties and Trust
property—also cover aspects such as:

u    Rights, powers (and restrictions
thereon), duties, liabilities and disabilities of Trustees, including the
procedure for their appointment, removal, resignation or replacement and
minimum/maximum number of Trustees

u    Rights, obligations and
disabilities of beneficiaries, including the powers and procedure for addition
and/or removal of beneficiaries, including the person who would be entitled to
exercise such powers

u    Terms of extinguishment of
the Trust

u    Alternative dispute
resolution, etc.

 

It is
preferable that a Trust deed is in simple language and contains clear
instructions, including the process and provisions for amendment thereof.

 

C. Type of private
trust

Usually, when
property is settled into a private Trust for the purpose of succession
planning, it is done through an irrevocable transfer, i.e., the settlor does
not retain or reserve the power to reassume the Trust property/income or to
transfer it back to himself. Thus, once the assets are settled in an
irrevocable Trust, the property no longer belongs to the settlor or the
transferor, i.e., it belongs to the Trust. Since the settlor has no right left
in the Trust property, this typically provides adequate protection to the
assets against claims by creditors, or in case of a divorce, etc. Under the
erstwhile ED Act, if the settlor reserved any right for himself, including
becoming a beneficiary in the Trust, such property may be considered to be
passing only on the death of settlor, resulting in a levy of estate duty. This
is another reason why irrevocable Trusts are typically used for succession
planning, unless some special extenuating circumstances exist.

 

Based on the
distribution pattern adopted by a private Trust, it may be classified as either
a specific (also called determinate) or a discretionary Trust. If the Trust
deed provides a list of beneficiaries specifying their beneficial interest, it
would be a specific Trust. On the other hand, if the Trust deed does not
specify any beneficiary’s share, but empowers someone (usually the Trustees) to
determine such share, it is considered as a discretionary/ indeterminate Trust.
Such discretion may be absolute or qualified.

 

Under the ED
Act, in case of a specific Trust, since the interest of each beneficiary was
identified, the same was considered as passing to others on the death of such
beneficiary, and therefore, subject to estate duty.

 

However, as
no interest was identified in case of a discretionary Trust (based on the
decision of the Trustees, each beneficiary’s share could be anywhere from 0% to
100%), no estate duty was levied upon the death of any beneficiary, as no
property was considered to be passed, making it a commonly used mechanism.

 

Often—and
depending on the requirements—a combination of specific and determinate Trusts
(in either case irrevocable) may be used for succession planning and planning
around the potential levy of estate duty.

 

D. Key aspects of
taxation of a private trust

In general,
moving to a Trust structure is neutral from the point of view of taxation,
i.e., neither a tax advantage nor an additional tax burden is imposed by the
Income-tax Act, 1961 (IT Act).

 

1.  Settlement of a
Trust

Taxation of the settlor

Section
47(iii) contains a specific exemption for any capital gains that may be
considered to arise to the settlor on transfer of capital to an irrevocable
Trust. Therefore, the settlor should not be liable to any tax on settlement of
the irrevocable Trust.

 

Taxation of beneficiaries

Section
56(2)(x), which was introduced by the Finance Act, 2017, provides for taxation
of the value of the property in the hands of the recipient of such property, if
received for nil or inadequate consideration. Certain exceptions, including for
receipt of property by a Trust created for the benefit of relatives of the
transferor of the property have been carved out from the purview of these
provisions.


Thus, when assets are settled into a Trust, assuming the beneficiaries are
considered as “relatives” of the settlor within the definition prescribed for
this purpose under the IT Act, no tax implications would arise u/s. 56(2)(x) of
the IT Act. It is important to note the following aspects:

u    Fundamentally, for
determining taxability u/s. 56(2)(x), the definition of relative is to be
tested in relation to the recipient of the property. However, the exception for
Trusts requires the relationship to be tested with reference to the
giver/settlor. This could give different results, such as in the context of
uncle and nephew/niece, and therefore, should be examined closely.

u    The argument may be that
the provisions of section 56(2)(x) ought not to apply in context of Trusts set
up for beneficiaries who do not fall within such definition of “relatives,”
including corporate beneficiaries, notwithstanding that there is no specific
exception carved out; however, its applicability cannot be ruled out. Hence,
adequate care is necessary in such cases, e.g., separate Trusts may be set up
for relatives and non-relatives.

 

Taxation of Trustees

The
provisions of the aforesaid section 56(2)(x) ought not to apply to the Trustees,
as a Trustee receives the property with an obligation to hold it for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. This obligation taken over should be good and
sufficient consideration for receipt of properties by the Trustees, and
therefore, the receipt of property cannot be said to be without/for inadequate
consideration.

 

2.  Income earned by
a Trust

Broadly, a
specific Trust’s tax is determined as an aggregate of the tax liability of each
of its beneficiaries on their respective shares (unless the Trust earns
business income). A discretionary Trust, on the other hand, is generally taxed
at the maximum marginal rate applicable to the type of income earned by the
Trust.The additional tax on dividends earned from domestic companies (as
provided u/s. 115BBDA[1])
would also apply.

 

Once taxed,
the income should not be taxed once again when distributed to the
beneficiaries.

 

3.  Distribution
of assets/termination of a Trust

There are no
specific provisions under the ITA dealing with dissolution of Trust/taxability
on distribution of assets of the Trust.

 

Since a Trust
holds property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, when the properties are
distributed/handed over to the beneficiaries, it should not result in any
income taxable under the ITA for them.

 

Since the Trust does not receive any consideration
at the time of distribution, no capital gain implications ought to arise.

 

In the past,
tax authorities have attempted to treat a Trust as an AOP, and apply the
provisions of section 45(4)[2]
of the IT Act on dissolution of a Trust. However, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court[3]
has held that Trustees cannot be taxable as an AOP, and therefore, the
provisions of section 45(4) are not applicable.

 

Hence, the
distribution to the beneficiaries at the time of termination of the Trust or
otherwise ought not to result in any tax liability.

 

E. Implications
under other regulations

Depending on the kind of property settled into a
Trust, implications under various other provisions may also arise:

 

1.  Shares of a
listed company

It is
increasingly popular to settle business assets, in the form of shares of listed
companies into a Trust. A family may decide to put part or all of their holding
into a single Trust or multiple Trusts, depending on their specific needs.The
key consideration is whether this triggers any implications under the
regulations framed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’),
notably the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations,
2011 (Takeover Code).

 

Under the
Takeover Code, if there is a substantial change in shareholding/voting rights
(direct or indirect) or change in control of a listed company, the public
shareholders are supposed to get an equal opportunity to exit from the company
on the best terms possible through an open offer. Certain exceptions have been
carved out, whereby, upon compliance with certain conditions, the open offer
obligations would not be applicable[4].

There are arguments
that may be taken as to why the Takeover Code ought not to have an implication,
especially since there is no change in control. However, in the absence of
specific exemptions, especially in the context of transfer to a newly set-up
Trust or a Trust, which does not already own shares in the listed company for
at least three years, as a matter of precaution, several families approached
SEBI for seeking a specific exemption. SEBI has, subject to certain conditions
or circumstances being met, generally approved such transfers to a Trust,
albeit with safeguards built in.

 

In December
2017, SEBI released a circular highlighting the guidelines that would need to
be adhered to while seeking exemption for settling shares of a listed company
into a Trust, which broadly mirrors the principles applied by SEBI in its
earlier orders.

 

2.  Immoveable
property

Immoveable
properties in which family members are residing or those acquired for
investment purposes may also be transferred to a Trust. However, typically, stamp
duty would be levied on any such settlement of immoveable property, which
becomes a major deterrent. Often, residential property is gifted to individual
members, since in states such as Maharashtra, the stamp duty on gifts to
specified relatives is minimal; such exception is not available for transfer to
a Trust even if the beneficiaries are such specified relatives.

 

As there is no stamp duty on assets transferred
through a Will, it becomes a more commonly used means of migrating large
immovable properties held by individuals. However, this could lead to a
potential estate duty liability, as it would only pass on on the demise of the
owner. Thus, apart from the concerns around the ownership of the property or
any friction between family members, the trade-off between immediate stamp duty
outflow and potential future estate duty outflow would need to be considered.

 

In case
properties are not held directly by individuals but through entities, the
ownership of the entity itself may be transferred to the Trust. In such case,
stamp duty implications, if any, are likely to be significantly lower than that
which would have arisen on transfer of the immovable property itself.

 

Family wealth may include intangible rights in the
properties, such as development or tenancy rights, which are not transferable
without the approval of landlord/owner of the property. Depending on how such
rights are held and whether such approval is forthcoming, a decision may need
to be taken if they ought to be settled into the Trust.

 

3.  Assets located
overseas

Increasingly,
many families hold assets overseas, be it in the form of shares (strategic or
portfolio investments) or immoveable property. For any such assets to be
transferred to a Trust, or if any of the family members are non-residents, not
only would the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 need to
be considered, but also the laws of the country where the assets are located.

 

4.  Business assets

In the
current environment, considering the size of business and other factors, it is
usually not possible or advisable to carry on business from a Trust. Therefore,
it is inevitable that the business is continued or transferred to a company or
other entity.

 

If the
business is carried on through a company, whether wholly owned by the family or
not, the securities in such company will be transferred to a Trust. In case the
business is housed in non-company entities (such as a partnership firm or
Limited Liability Partnership firm), it may be necessary to make the Trust
(through its Trustees) a partner in such an entity. However, it would be
advisable that in case a partnership firm is conducting the business, a
separate Trust is set up to ring-fence and protect other properties, since
partnership firms have unlimited liability for its partners.

 

F. Examples of trust
structures

Depending on
the requirements, a Trust structure may be set up in multiple ways. No
one-size-fits-all approach would work.

 

If it is a
nuclear family, setting up a single Trust may suffice. On the other hand,
multiple factions within the family would require multiple Trusts to be set up.
For example, a family of two brothers owned their business in a company. Their
father created the business, and with his wife (the mother), owned 100% shares
in the company. The parents settled their entire holding in the company to a
master Trust, wherein they were the Trustees, thereby retaining control with
them. The beneficiaries were two separate Trusts (often referred to as baby or
sub-Trusts) set up for each of their sons and their respective families. This
is depicted here as a base structure:

Another
variation could be with multiple master Trusts. In this example, a family of
father and two sons owned two businesses. They decided to have:

u    Two master Trusts for
holding the two businesses through existing companies

u    One master Trust for owning
other assets

u    Three baby Trusts for each
segment of the family

 

 

Clearly, the
facts of each case, combined with the requirements of all stakeholders will
need to be considered while establishing any Trust structure.

 

G. Migration

Any
succession plan would fail unless it is implemented properly, through
appropriate migration of assets to the structure. Not all assets would be
directly owned by the settlor, which can easily be settled into the Trust. In
some cases, they may be owned by companies, partnership firms, LLP, even Hindu
Undivided Families. In such case, the existing structure would first need to be
unwound before the properties are introduced into the Trust.

 

To do so,
especially to unwind a structure, various methods may be used, e.g.:

u    Settlement into a Trust

u    Gift of assets

u    Sale of
assets/business/shares

u    Family
arrangement/settlement

u    Primary infusion

u    Mergers/demergers

 

Any migration
strategy would typically be a combination of the above. Each of the above modes
of transfers could have implications under various statutes, which would need
to be examined closely, e.g.:

u    Income tax

u    Stamp duty

u    SEBI

u    FEMA

u    Laws of foreign
jurisdictions

 

Further, one
would also need to consider the potential levy of inheritance tax/estate duty,
and plan appropriately, considering that there is no law in place currently,
not even in draft form; one can only draw an analogy from the erstwhile ED Act
or even from laws of foreign countries.

 

To conclude

Succession
planning through the use of Trusts has been in use in India since several
generations and is not a new concept. However, with the various complications
of business, the multitude of laws that today surround any kind of action, the
glare that any business house comes under, and the uncertainty surrounding the
reintroduction of inheritance tax, makes it an exciting subject. The intent is
to capture a flavour of Trust structures; however, various nuances would need
to be considered before embarking on such a journey.

 

 



[1] Section 115BBDA
provides that if an assessee earns dividend income from a domestic company
[which is otherwise exempt u/s. 10(34)] in excess of INR 10 lakhs during a
financial year, the assessee shall be subject to an additional tax at the rate
of 10% on the dividend income earned in excess of Rs. 10 lakhs. The same is
applicable to all assessees other than the three specifically
exempted
categories, none of which are a private trust.

[2] U/s. 45(4), the
distribution of assets by, inter alia, an AOP would be charged to tax as
capital gains, by taking the fair market value of the assets as the full value
of the consideration.

[3]L.R. Patel Family Trust vs. Income Tax Officer [2003] 129 Taxman 720
(Bombay).

[4] For example, if the trust is named as a promoter in the last three
years’ shareholding pattern of a listed entity, exemption may be claimed for
transferring shares by another promoter to such trust.

TAXATION ASPECTS OF SUCCESSION

In the process of making a ‘living’, we
often forget to ‘live’. We start realising this fact, only when the time is
near for ‘leaving’. We then start the exercise of ‘leaving’ all that we have
gathered, for the benefit of our kith and kin such that there is least tax
leakage and they inherit maximum possible of what we ‘leave’ at the time of
‘leaving’ which we ourselves did not enjoy while we were ‘living’.

 

This takes us into the area of tax planning
for succession. This was more prevalent in the days India had estate duty law,
which got abolished in 1986 on the ground that the yield from the estate duty
was much lower than the cost of administering that law. This was despite the
fact that the maximum marginal rate of estate duty was as high as 85%! There
is, however, a fear that the draconian law may get resurrected on some pretext
or the other in the near future. While it is bad news for each one of us, it is
also good news for some of us who are engaged in tax practice!!

 

But before moving into that unknown terrain,
let us have a look at the basic aspects of taxation of the income and the
estate of a deceased.

 

Section 159

When a person dies, the assessment of his
income pertaining to the period prior to his death would be pending. Courts
held in the past that an assessment cannot be made on a dead person and, if so
made, would be a nullity in the eyes of law[1].
At the same time, however, it would be unjustifiable to say that upon death of
a person, the tax department cannot collect taxes on the income that he had
earned prior to death and in respect of which assessments are pending, or even
filing of the return may be pending for the last one or two assessment year(s).
In order to overcome this conundrum, section 159 was inserted in the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (“the Act”) to enable assessment of income of a person who was alive
during the relevant financial year but had died before filing the return of
income or before the income was assessed.

 

This section provides that when a person
dies, his legal representatives shall be liable to pay any tax or other sum
which the deceased would have been liable to pay if he had not died “in the
like manner and to the same extent” as the deceased. Thus, there would be
separate assessments of income in the hands of the legal representative which
he has earned in his personal capacity and that which the deceased had earned
prior to his death. The two cannot be assessed as part of the same return of
income of the legal representative. Consequently, therefore, arrears of tax of
deceased cannot be adjusted against refund due to the legal representative in his
individual capacity[2].
A legal representative is deemed to be an assessee for the purposes of the Act
by virtue of section 159(3). The liability of the representative assessee,
however, is limited to the extent to which the estate is capable of meeting the
liability and it does not extend to the personal assets of the legal
representative[3].
If, however, the legal representative has disposed of any assets of the estate
or creates charge thereon, then he may become personally liable. In such cases
also, the liability will be limited to the extent of the value of the assets
disposed of or charged[4].
A legal representative gets assessed in the PAN of the deceased, but in a
representative capacity.

 

Section 168

While the above provision deals with
taxation of income of the deceased in respect of the period prior to the date
of death, questions arise as regards taxing of the income that the estate of
the deceased earns after the date of death but prior to the date of
distribution of the assets of the deceased amongst the legatees. Section 168
deals with this income. This section essentially provides that the income of
the estate of a deceased person shall be chargeable to tax in the hands of the
executor to the estate of the deceased. The executor shall be assessed in
respect of the income of the estate separately from his personal income. Thus,
there would be a separate PAN required for filing the return of the executor.
Executor shall be so chargeable to tax u/s. 168 upto the date of completion of
distribution of the estate in accordance with the will of the deceased. If the
estate is partially distributed in a given year, then, the income from the
assets so distributed gets excluded from the income of the estate and gets
included in the income of the legatee. Legatee is chargeable to tax on income
after the date of distribution[5].
Even if the executor is the sole beneficiary, it does not necessarily follow
that he receives the income in latter capacity. The executor retains his dual
capacity and hence, he must be assessed as an Executor till the administration
of the estate is not completed except to the extent of the estate applied to
his personal benefit in the course of administration of the estate[6].

 

This section applies only in case of
testamentary succession, i.e. when the deceased has left behind a Will. In
cases of intestate succession, the income from the assets earned after the date
of death becomes assessable in the hands of the legal heirs as
“tenants-in-common” till the assets of the deceased are distributed by metes
and bounds[7].

 

The section provides that the executor is
assessable in the status of “individual”. If, however, there are more executors
than one, then, the assessment will be as if the executors were an AOP.
However, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held, in the case of CIT vs.
G. B. J. Seth and Anr (1982) 133 ITR 192 (MP)
, that though the
assessment is on the executor or executors, for all practical purposes it is
the assessment of the deceased. The Court has held that the status of AOP is for
statistical purposes and that notwithstanding the status of the assesse being
an AOP, the executors were entitled to claim set-off on account of the balance
of brought forward losses incurred by the deceased prior to his death.

 

Inheritance – extent of
tax exposure

A transfer of a
capital asset under a gift or a will is not regarded as “transfer” for the
purposes of capital gains. Referring to this clause, the learned author, Arvind
P. Datar, in his treatise, “Kanga and Palkhivala’s The Law and Practice of
Income-tax”, Tenth Edn., on page 1206
, has said that “However, these
clauses expressly grant exemption where none is needed
”. Indeed, wealth
transmitted under a Will is not a ‘transfer’ but a ‘transmission’. Also, there
is no consideration for the same.

 

Hence, the question of capital gains tax can
never arise. The section does not deal with transfer under intestate succession,
it refers only to a transfer under a will. Yet, for the reasons aforesaid,
there can be no capital gains on such transmission.

 

For the recipient, amounts or property
received by way of inheritance is a capital receipt and not “income”.
Ordinarily, therefore, such receipt is not chargeable to tax. Section 56(2)(x),
however, charges to tax money or value of certain properties received by a
person without consideration or for inadequate consideration. Proviso thereto
exempts, inter alia, money or property received “under a will or by way
of inheritance”. There is thus no tax in the hands of the recipient under this
section.

 

In an interesting decision of the Mumbai
Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in the case of Purvez A.
Poonawalla [ITA No. 6476/Mum/2009 for AY 2006-07],
it was held that sum
received by the taxpayer from the legal heir of a deceased in consideration of
the taxpayer giving up his right to contest the Will of the deceased is not
chargeable to tax under the then prevailing section 56(2)(vii), which
corresponds to present section 56(2)(x) in principle.

 

Section 49 provides that when a capital
asset becomes the property of an assessee, inter alia, under a Will
[section. 49(1)(ii)] or inheritance [section 49(1)(iii)(a)], the cost of
acquisition of the asset shall be the cost to the previous owner.
Correspondingly, section 2(42A) provides (in clause (i)(b) of Explanation 1)
that in computing the period of holding the asset by an assessee who had
acquired the property under a will or inheritance, the period of holding by the
previous owner shall be counted. The asset will qualify as a long-term capital
asset or a short term capital asset accordingly. 

 

Expenses incurred in connection with
obtaining probate are held to be not allowable expenses in an early decision of
the Privy Council in the case of P.C. Mullick vs. CIT (6 ITR 206)(PC).

 

Leaving a ‘Will’ – pros
and cons

‘Will’ is a document by which a person
directs his or her estate to be distributed upon his death. It is also termed
as “testament”. Organising succession through a ‘Will’ is certainly a preferred
option as compared to leaving no such written document from the point of view
of certainty. A Will becomes operative upon the death of the testator and
hence, unlike a gift given during the life time, the person is in full
ownership and control of his wealth till the time of his death. Wealth
inherited under a will is not subject to stamp duty. A Will can be amended at
any time during the lifetime of the testator.

 

While these are the pros of writing a
‘Will’, in today’s day and age, one encounters some challenges in
implementation of wills in the form of some claimants emerging from the blue
and throwing spanner in the works to scuttle smooth and easy succession of the
estate. Besides, under a Will simpliciter, it is not possible to segregate the
economic interest of the legatee from controlling interest in a particular
asset. Say, for example, the testator desires to give the benefit of the income
from the shares held by him in a company that he controls to his son, but is
not desirous of handing over control of such shares to him as such control
gives him voting power qua the company. In such a case, simply writing a Will
in favour of the son for bequeathing the shares will not solve the problem.
Finally, the fear of estate duty that we talked about earlier looms large and
if property worth significant value is transmitted under a Will, and if on the
date of death, estate duty law is resurrected, then there would be a sure liability
to estate duty.

 

Planning succession
through trusts

The above cons of a ‘Will’ bring to table
the option of planning succession by creation of trusts. A trust is a structure
involving three persons, namely, a Settlor (or author); a Trustee; and a Beneficiary.
The settlor is the creator of a trust who settles his asset into the trust and
hands it over to the trustee (who becomes the legal owner) to be held for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Thus, the segregation of controlling interest and
beneficial interest happens whereby the control remains with the trustee while
the economic interest travels to the beneficiary.

 

A trust structure may get created during the
lifetime of the testator or may be incorporated in the will so as to create a
trust under the Will. However, creating the trust under a Will may not address
the issue of the Will being challenged by some claimant. It also does not
address the issue of attracting estate duty on death, if such duty is
re-introduced. So, a trust created during the lifetime of the deceased would be
a preferred option from that point of view.

 

When a person creates a trust, he divests
himself of the property which, upon creation of the trust, vests in the
trustee. Hence, at the time of his death, he is no more the owner of that
property and consequently is not liable to estate duty, if such duty becomes
applicable. He can appoint a third party as a trustee or he may himself be a
trustee during his lifetime. He may plan a successor to the trustee as part of
the trust deed itself. If he continues to be sole or one of the trustees, he
retains control over the assets settled in the trust, but in a different
capacity, namely, as a trustee of the named beneficiary. The trustee carries an
obligation to hold the property for and on behalf of the beneficiary and hence
he does not own economic interest in the property so held by him and thereby
such property so held by him as trustee has no economic value. In absence of
any value, there can be no estate duty exposure even if he is himself the
trustee.

 

Care, however, will have to be taken while
choosing the beneficiaries in as much as section 56 of the Indian Trusts Act,
1882 empowers a beneficiary who is competent to contract to require the trustee
to transfer the property to him at any time if he is the sole beneficiary
without waiting for the period mentioned in the trust deed. If there are more
than one beneficiaries, they can so compel the trustee if all of them are of
the same mind. It may therefore be better to have in the list of beneficiaries
a minor and he gets absolute interest in the trust only on his attaining
majority. It may also be better to plant a person as one of the beneficiaries
who enjoys complete confidence of the settlor so that the wishes of the settlor
are not vitiated by the ‘not so matured’ beneficiaries coming together. It
would also be advisable that the trust be a discretionary trust rather than a
specific trust so that none of the beneficiaries have any identified interest
in the trust property.

 

Specific Trust vs.
Discretionary Trust

A Specific Trust is a trust where the
beneficiaries are all known and their shares in the income and assets of the
trust are defined by the settlor in the trust deed. On the other hand, if
either the beneficiaries are not identified or their shares are not defined by
the settlor, the trust would be a discretionary trust. The distribution of
assets and income is left to the discretion of the trustee. A beneficiary of a
discretionary trust does not have any identified interest in the income. He
only has a hope of receiving something if the trustee so decides.  

 

Taxation of income of a specific trust is
governed by section 161 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (“the Act”) while the
rules for taxation of a discretionary trusts are contained in section 164 of
the Act. For tax purposes, a trustee or the trustees is a “representative
assessee”. Trustee of a specific trust is taxed “in the like manner and to the
same extent” as the beneficiaries. In other words, theoretically, there can be
as many assessments on the trustees as the number of beneficiaries. However,
there is only one assessment, but the income is computed as if the shares of
the beneficiaries are taxed. Section 166 provides an option to the assessing
officer to either tax the trustee or the beneficiaries separately on their
shares of income from a specific trust. In practice, we often find it simpler
that the beneficiaries of specific trusts offer their respective share of
income from a specific trust in their respective returns of income and get
assessed.

 

On the other
hand, trustees of a discretionary trust are taxed at the trust level in view of
the provisions of section 164. This section provides that the income of a
discretionary trust is taxable at maximum marginal rate. Only in cases where
all the beneficiaries are persons having income below taxable limits, then the
trust may be taxed at the slab rates applicable to an AOP. Also, a testamentary
trust, i.e. trust created through a will, enjoys this exception provided it is
the only trust so created under the will. If a discretionary trust has business
income, then such trust (barring a testamentary trust) is taxed at maximum
marginal rates. In cases where the income of a discretionary trust is
distributed by the trustees to the beneficiaries during the year in which is
earned, then, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs.
Kamalini Khatau (1994) (209 ITR 101) (SC)
,
the beneficiaries can be
taxed directly on such income instead of the trustees being taxed.

 

Status in which a trust is generally assessable
is as an “individual” and not as an AOP. It is only in cases where the
beneficiaries have come together voluntarily to form a trust, then, they may be
assessed as an AOP[8].
Such would never be the case where a settlor settles a trust for the beneficiaries
as part of his succession planning.

 

Revocable vs.
Irrevocable Trusts

Trust may be revocable or irrevocable. It is
revocable when the settlor retains with himself the right to revoke the trust
after having created it. In substance, therefore, he remains to be the
effective owner of the property settled. It is irrevocable if he retains no
right to revoke it once it is created by him.

 

Sections 61 and 63 of the Act deal with
taxation of revocable trusts. Section 63, by a fiction of law, deems certain
instances where the trust shall be deemed to be revocable. These cases are
where the trust contains any provisions for re-transfer directly or indirectly
of the part or the whole of the income or assets of the trust to the transferor
or it gives right to the transferor to re-assume power directly or indirectly
over part or whole of the income or assets of the trust. Tax implication of
such revocable or deemed revocable trusts is that the income that arises to the
trust by virtue of such revocable or deemed revocable transfer is taxable in
the hands of the transferor and not in the hands of the trust or the
beneficiaries. Thus, in cases where the settlor is himself a beneficiary, such
trusts are deemed to be revocable trusts even though the trust deed may say
that the trust is irrevocable. In such cases, the income of the trust that
arise by virtue of the assets transferred to the trust by the settlor who is
also the beneficiary (or one of the beneficiaries), becomes taxable in the
hands of the settlor and not in the hands of the trustee or the other
beneficiaries, if any.

 

Creation of a trust –
application of section 56(2)(x)

As noted earlier, section 56(2)(x) charges
to tax money or value of certain properties received by a person without
consideration or for inadequate consideration. Having regard to the legal
position that when a trustee of a trust receives any property from a settlor,
he receives it with an obligation to hold it for the benefit of the beneficiary
and not for his absolute enjoyment. The obligation so cast on the trustee can
be viewed as the consideration and an adequate consideration for his receiving
legal ownership of the property. In this view of the matter, receipt by a
trustee of a trust of an asset settled by the settlor in trust for another
beneficiary cannot give rise to a taxable event in the hands of the trustee.
But that does not seem to be the way the law makers seem to view this. In the
proviso to section 56(2)(x), the law provides a clause granting exemption from
this taxing provision in respect of any sum of money or any property received
“from an individual by a trust created or established solely for the benefit of
relative of the individual”. Now, is this exemption inserted out of abundant
caution or is it an exemption to relieve the trusts created for relatives from
the rigours of this section is a vexed question. If I am right in the view
expressed earlier, receipt by a trustee can never be subjected to this tax
since his obligation is an adequate consideration. However, another view of the
matter is that but for this exemption, even trusts created for relatives would
be subjected to the rigours of this taxing provision.

 

Be that as it may. While one is planning his
affairs, one may have to go by the conservative interpretation that but for the
exemption, every trust would be chargeable to tax under this provision.
Consequently, this provision may have to be kept in view while making the
succession plans. It may be stated here that the amounts received under a Will
or by way of inheritance are exempt from the purview of section 56(2)(x) and
hence, if there is a testamentary trust (i.e. a trust created through a Will),
then, this section will not be applicable in any case, whether all the
beneficiaries of the trust are relatives of the testator or not. If one ignores
a possibility of resurrection of estate duty law, then, this seems to be an
efficient mode of planning succession so as to achieve the objective of
segregating the control of the assets from the economic benefits thereof and
pass on only the economic benefits to the legatees and not the control over the
asset which can be retained with the desired trustee or trustees.

 

The way forward

If you have crossed fifty, and if you are not enjoying
life, i.e. Not lavishly spending the wealth you have created, prepare a ‘will’,
whether you have a ‘will’ to give away everything or not, because it is his
‘will’ that will ultimately prevail and if the affairs are not well planned,
the ‘will’ of the devil will ruin the empire created by you in future. If you
are just worried about the tax on your estate, then, forget everything, start
spending your every rupee, enjoy life. Remember that punch line from the film “Anand”
– “jab tak zinda hoon, tab tak mara nahin. Aur jab mar gaya, to saala mei hi
nahin
”.

 

 



[1] Ellis C Reid vs.
CIT (1930) 5 ITC 100 (Bom), CIT vs. Amarchand N Shroff (1963) 48 ITR 59 (SC).

[2] Hasmukhlal vs. ITO
251 ITR 511 (MP)

[3] See section 159(6).
Also see: Union of India vs. Sarojini Rajah (Mrs) 97 ITR 37 (Mad.)

[4] See section 159(4))

[5] CIT vs. Ghosh
(Mrs.) 159 ITR 124 (Cal)

[6] CIT vs. Bakshi
Sampuran Singh (1982) 133 ITR 650 (P&H).

[7] CIT vs. P.
Dhanlakshmi and Ors (1995) 215 ITR 662 (Mad).

[8] See CIT vs. Shri
Krishna Bhandar Trust (1993) 201 ITR 989 (Cal); CWT vs.Trustees of HEH Nizam’s
Family Trust (1977) 108 ITR 555 (SC); CIT vs. Marsons Beneficiary Trust (1991)
188 ITR 224 (Bom); CIT vs. SAE Head Office Monthly Paid Employees Welfare Trust
(2004) 271 ITR 159 (Del).

SUCCESSION FOR MOHAMMEDANS, PARSIS AND CHRISTIANS

A.  SUCCESSION: MEANING, KINDS AND THE APPLICABLE
LAWS IN INDIA

The law of succession is the law governing the
transmission of property vested in a person at the time of his/her1
death to some other person or persons. Generally, succession can broadly be
divided into “intestate” and “Testate/Testamentary” succession.


Intestate succession is when a person leaves behind no Will (or to the extent
of that part of the estate of the deceased not covered under the Will of the
deceased) and the estate of the deceased is distributed among the heirs of the
deceased as per the laws applicable to the succession of the estate of the
deceased (which in India would usually depend upon the religion professed by
the deceased at the time of his death). Testamentary succession is when the
deceased leaves behind a Will and his estate is distributed as per his wishes
as expressed in his Will.

 

In matters
relating to succession of property (both testate and intestate) in the case of
Christians and Parsis in India, the provisions of the Indian Succession Act
1925 (“Succession Act”) would apply. However, in the case of Mohammedans,
Mohammedan personal law would apply to both testate as well as intestate
succession, except under certain circumstances which are dealt with below.

 

B. SUCCESSION FOR
MOHAMMEDANS

Mohammedans are broadly divided into two sects,
namely, the Sunnis and Shias. The Sunnis are divided into four sub-sects,
namely, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafeis and the Hanbalis. Shias are
divided into 3 sects namely, Athna-Asharias, Ismailyas and Zaidyas. The
principles of intestate succession differ for Hanafis (Sunnis) and Shias. As
most Sunnis are Hanafis, the presumption is that a Sunni is governed by Hanafi
law. However, Khojas who are a sect of Ismailyas are, in certain matters
relating to testate succession, governed by Hindu law (by virtue of custom).

_________________________________________

1.  In
this Article, a reference to the masculine gender shall include the feminine
gender, except as otherwise stated.

 

In India, as
per section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 (“Shariat Act”), matters relating to
succession and inheritance of a Mohammedan, are governed by Mohammedan Personal
Law (as applicable to the sect of Mohammedans to which the deceased belongs),
except;

 

I)     in respect of certain sects of Mohammedans
viz. Khoja Muslims, in the case of testate succession where such
sect followed a different custom from Mohammedan personal law then in such
cases customary law would apply, (except where the concerned Mohammedan makes a
declaration before the prescribed authority that he/she would like to be
governed by Mohammedan personal law in such matters as contemplated u/s. 3 of
the Shariat Act); and

II)    where a Mohammedan is married under the
provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, in which case the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 becomes applicable to such person and his issues in all
matters of succession (that is both testate and intestate succession).

 

The
principles of Mohammedan law remain mostly uncodified and thus there exists no
statute or legislation that governs succession for Mohammedans. Courts in India
apply the principles of Mohammedan law [(which are derived from 4 sources, viz,
the Koran, the Sunna (tradition), Ijmaa (consensus of opinion) and Qiyas
(analogical deduction)] to deal with matters of succession with respect to the
Mohammedans in India.

 

1. Testamentary
Succession: –

The following
basic rules and principles should be borne in mind in respect of testamentary
succession of Mohammedans, based on Mohammedan personal law read with customary
law (as applicable to Khoja Muslims) and relevant Sections of the Succession
Act.

(i) Subject
to the below, every Mohammedan of sound mind and not a minor may dispose of his
property by Will.

(ii) A
Mohammedan cannot dispose of by Will more than one-third of what remains of his
property after his funeral expenses and debts are paid unless his heirs consent
to the bequest in excess of one-third of his property.

(iii) A Khoja
Mohammedan may dispose of the whole of his property by Will. The making and
revocation of Khoja Wills and validity of trusts and waqfs created
thereby are governed by Mohammedan law, but apart from trusts and waqfs,
the construction of a Khoja Will is governed by Hindu Law.

(iv) In the
case of Sunni Muslims, while a bequest to a stranger (i.e. a person who is not
an heir) to the extent of one-third of his property is permissible, any bequest
to an heir is not valid unless the other heirs of the Testator consent to such
bequest, even if the bequest is within this permissible limit of one-third. The
consent of the other heirs to such bequest must be given after the death of the
Testator.

(v) In the
case of Shia Muslims however, a bequest may be made to a stranger and/or to an
heir (even without the consent of the other heirs) so long as it does not
exceed one-third of the estate of the Testator. However, if it exceeds one-third
of the Testator’s property, it is not valid unless the other heirs consent to
this, which consent may be given either before or after the death of the
Testator.

(vi) A
bequest to a person not yet in existence at the Testator’s death is void, but a
bequest may be made to a child in the womb, provided he is born within six
months from the date of the Will.

(vii)
Succession to the property of a Mohammedan whose marriage is solemnised under
the Special Marriage Act and also of the issue of such marriage, shall be
regulated by the provisions of the Succession Act and accordingly, there would
be no restriction on him bequeathing more than 1/3rd of his property
to any person and the consent of his heirs would not be required, even to
bequeath more than one-third of the property.

(viii) No
writing is required to make a valid Will and no particular form is necessary.
Even a verbal declaration is a Will. The intention of the Testator to make a
Will must be clear and explicit and form is immaterial.

(ix) A
Mohammedan Will may, after due proof, be admitted in evidence even though no
probate has been obtained.

 

2. Intestate
Succession: –

Distributions on intestacy as per Hanafi Law:

As per Hanafi Law there are three classes
of heirs, namely:

(i)
“Sharers”- being those who are entitled to a prescribed share of the
inheritance as per Mohammedan law

(ii)
“Residuaries” being those who take no prescribed share, but succeed to the
residue after the claims of the Sharers are satisfied

(iii)
“Distant Kindred” are all those relations by blood who are neither Sharers nor
Residuaries

 

The first
step in the distribution of the estate of a deceased Mohammedan (governed by
Hanafi law), after payment of his funeral expenses, debts, and legacies, is to
allot the respective shares to such of the relations as belong to the class of
Sharers who are entitled to a share.

 

The next step
is to divide the residue (if any) among such of the Residuaries as are entitled
to the residue. If there are no Sharers, the Residuaries will succeed to the whole
inheritance.

 

If there are
neither Sharers nor Residuaries, the inheritance will be divided among such of
the distant kindred as are entitled to succeed thereto. The distant kindred are
not entitled to succeed so long as there is any heir belonging to the class of
Sharers or Residuaries. But there is one exception to the above rule where the
distant kindred will inherit with a Sharer, and that is where the wife or
husband of the deceased is the sole Sharer and there are no other
Sharers or Residuaries.

 

The question
as to which of the relations belonging to the class of Sharers, Residuaries, or
distant kindred, are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased and the
share which such relation will receive will depend upon the relationship of the
Sharer or Residuary with the deceased and the other surviving relations2.

 

Distributions
on intestacy as per Shia Law:

As per Shia
law, heirs are divided into two groups, namely (1) heirs by consanguinity, that
is, blood relation, and (2) heirs by marriage, that is, husband and wife.

 

Heirs by
consanguinity are divided into three classes, and each class is subdivided into
two sections. These classes are respectively composed as follows: –

 

(i)    (a) Parents (b) children and other lineal
descendants h.l.s3.

(ii)   (a) Grandparents h.h.s4 (true5
as well as false6), (b) brothers and sisters and their descendants
h.l.s.

________________________________________________________

2. See Mullas Principles
of Mohammedan Law (page [66(A and 74A)] Edn 20 for more details on the exact
share of each relation)

3. How low soever

4.  How high soever

5.  Male ancestor between
whom and the deceased no female intervenes

6.  Male ancestor between
whom and the deceased a female intervenes

 

(iii)   (a) Paternal, and (b) maternal, uncles and
aunts, of the deceased and of his parents and grandparents h.h.s and their
descendants h.l.s.

 

Amongst these
three classes of heirs, the heirs of the first (if living) exclude the heirs of
the second and third from inheritance, and similarly the second excludes the
third. But the heirs of the two sections of each class succeed together, the
nearer degree in each section excluding the more remote in that section.

 

Husband or
wife is never excluded from succession, but inherits together with the nearest
heirs by consanguinity, the husband taking 1/4 (when there is a lineal
descendant) or 1/2 (when there is no such descendant) and the wife taking 1/8
(when there is a lineal descendant) or 1/4 (when there is no such descendant).7

 

C. SUCCESSION IN THE
CASE OF INDIAN CHRISTIANS AND PARSIS

The
Succession Act defines an “Indian Christian” to mean a native of India who is,
or in good faith claims to be, of unmixed Asiatic descent and who professes any
form of the Christian religion8. However, the term “Parsi” is not
defined under the Succession Act. The Bombay High Court has, however, held that
the word “Parsi” as used in the Succession Act includes not only the
Parsi Zoroastrians of India but also the Zoroastrians of Iran.

 

The
Succession Act applies to Parsis and Indian Christians for both testate and
intestate succession. In the case of testate succession, the same rules apply
to both Parsis and Indian Christians. However, the rules differ in the case of
intestate succession.

 

1. Intestate
Succession for Indian Christians: –

Devolution
of property of Christians in the case of intestacy: –

In the case of Christians, the property of an
intestate devolves upon his/her heirs, in the order and according to rules laid
down under Chapter II, part V of the Succession Act. Some of the salient
principles of devolution are set out below-

________________________________

7.  See Mullas Principles of
Mohammedan Law (page [112] Edn 20 for more details on the exact share of each
relation)

8.  Section 2(d) of the
Act.

 

 

(i)    If the deceased has left lineal descendants
i.e. one or more children, or remote issue, the widow’s share is 1/3rd
and the remaining 2/3rd devolves upon the lineal descendants. In
case the deceased has left no lineal descendants but only a father, mother,
other kindred etc., the widow gets one half and the other half goes to the
kindred. But if there is no kindred, the widow gets the whole estate. [Note:
the rights of a widow in respect of her husband’s property are similar to those
of the surviving husband in respect of the property of his wife.
]

(ii)   Where the intestate has left no widow, his
property shall go entirely to his lineal descendants and in the absence of
lineal descendants, to those who are kindred to him (not being lineal
descendants) in proportions laid down in sections 41 to 48 of the Succession
Act.

(iii)   Though the Indian law does not otherwise
expressly recognise adoption by Christians, the courts have held that an
adopted child is deemed to have all the rights of succession that are available
to a natural-born child9.(iv)            A
posthumous child has the same rights as if he was actually born at the time of
the death of the intestate.

 

1.1. The rules for
distribution of Intestate’s property with some examples: –

Distribution
where there are lineal descendants:

Sections 37
to 40 of the Succession Act lay down the rules of distribution of the property
of an intestate (after deducting the share of a widow, if the intestate has
left a widow), where the intestate had died leaving lineal descendants and the
rules of distribution are as under:

_____________________________________

9. Joyce Pushapalath
Karkada Alias vs. Shameela Nina Ravindra Shiri (Regular First Appeal No. 849 of
2010)

 

 

 

1.

If only a child or
children and no more lineal
descendants

Property belongs to
the surviving child or equally divided amongst the surviving children

(s.37)

2.

If there are no
children, but only a grandchild or grandchildren

Property belongs to
the surviving grandchild or equally divided amongst the surviving
grandchildren

(s.38)

3

If there are only
great-grandchildren or other remote lineal descendants all in the same degree
only

Property belongs to
the surviving great-grandchildren or other
remote lineal descendants,
equally, for both males and females.

(s.39)

4.

If the intestate
leaves lineal descendants not all in same degree of kindred to him, and those
through whom the more remote are descended are dead

Property is divided
in such a number of equal shares as may correspond with the number of the
lineal descendants of the intestate who either stood in the nearest degree of
kindred or of the like degree of kindred to him, died before him, leaving
lineal descendants who survived him. For example; A had three children, J, M
and H; J died, leaving four children, and M died leaving one, and H alone
survived the father. On the death of A, intestate, one-third is allotted to
H, one-third to John’s four children, and the remaining third to M’s one
child.

(s.40)

 

 

Distribution where there are no lineal
descendants:

Sections 42 to 48 of the Succession Act lay
down the rules of distribution of the property of an intestate, where the
intestate had died without leaving children or remoter lineal descendants and
the rules of distribution are as under in order of priority:

 

1.

Widow (1/2)

Father (1/2) (even
if there are other kindred)

(s.42)

2

Widow (1/2)

Mother, Brothers and
Sisters (1/2) equally

(s.43)

3.

Widow (1/2)

Mother, Brothers,
Sisters and Children of any deceased Brother or Sister (1/2) equally per
stirpes.

(s.44)

4.

Widow (1/2)

Mother and Children
of Brothers and Sisters (1/2) equally per stirpes

(s.45)

5.

Widow (1/2)

Mother (1/2)

(s.46)

6.

Widow (1/2)

Brothers and Sisters
and Children of predeceased Brothers and Sisters 1/2 equally per stirpes

(s.47)

7.

Widow (1/2)

Remote kindred 1/2
(in the nearest degree)

(s.48)

 

 

2. Succession for
Parsis: –

 

2.1 Intestate
Succession: –

Parsis
are governed by the rules for Parsi intestates which are laid down under Part V
Chapter III of the Act. A Parsi intestate’s property is distributed among his
heirs in accordance with sections 51-56 of the Act. General principles
relating to intestate succession:

 

2.2 No share for a
lineal descendant of an Intestate who dies before the Intestate

If a child or
remoter issue of a Parsi intestate has predeceased him, the share of such child
shall not be taken into consideration, provided such predeceased child has left
neither;

 

(i) a widow
or widower; nor

 

(ii) a child
or children or remoter issue; nor

 

(iii) a widow
of any lineal descendant of such predeceased child. If a predeceased child of a
Parsi intestate leaves behind surviving any of the above mentioned relatives,
then such a child’s share shall be counted in making the division as provided
in section 53. If a predeceased child or remoter lineal descendant of a Parsi
intestate leaves a widow or widower and a child or children, then if such
predeceased child is a son, his widow and children will take the share of such
predeceased son. If such predeceased son leaves a widow or a widow of a lineal
descendant, but no lineal descendant, then the share of such predeceased son
shall be distributed as provided u/s. 53(a) proviso.

 

Further, if
such predeceased child is a daughter, her widower shall not be entitled to
anything u/s. 53(b), but such daughter’s share shall be distributed amongst her
children equally and if she has died without leaving lineal descendant, her
share is not counted at all.

 

No share is
given to a widow or widower of any relative of an intestate who has married
again in the lifetime of the intestate. However, the exception to this rule
would be the mother and paternal grandmother of the intestate and they would
get a share even if they have remarried in the lifetime of the intestate.

 

2.3
Rules for division of the Intestate’s property:

Sections 51 to 56 lay down the rules of division of the property of
an intestate Parsi and the rules of distribution are as under:

1

Son

Widow

Daughter

Equal shares

(s.51)

 

No widow

Son

Daughter

Equal shares

.

Father/Mother or
both and widow

Son

Daughter

Widow, son and
daughter get equal and each parent gets half the share of each child.

2

If intestate dies
leaving a deceased son

 

Widow and children
take shares as if he had died immediately after the intestate’s death

(s.53)

 

If intestate dies
leaving a deceased daughter

The share of the daughter
is divided equally among her children

 

 

If any child of such
deceased child has also died

Then his/her share
shall also be divided in like manner in accordance with the rules applicable
to the predeceased son or daughter

 

Remoter lineal descendant
has died

Provisions set out
in the box immediately above shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
division of any share to which he or she would be entitled to

3

intestate dies
without lineal descendants and leaving a widow or widower but no widow or
widower of any lineal descendants

Widow or widower
(1/2)

And residue as
below*

(s.54)

 

intestate dies
leaving a widow or widower and also widow or widower of lineal descendants

Widow or widower
(1/3)

Widow or widower of
lineal descendant (1/3)

Residue as below*

 

intestate dies
without leaving a widow or widower but leaves one widow or widower of a
lineal descendant

The widow or widower
of the lineal descendant (1/3)

Residue as below*

 

intestate dies
without leaving a widow or widower but leaves more than one widow or widower
of lineal descendants

The widows or
widowers of the lineal descendants together (2/3) in equal shares

Residue as below *

 

*Residue after
division as above

Residue amongst
relatives in Schedule II

Part I

 

If no relatives entitled
to residue

Whole shall be
distributed in proportion to the shares specified among the persons entitled
to receive shares under this section.

4

Neither lineal
descendants nor a widow or widower, nor a widow or widower of any lineal
descendant

The next-of-kin, in
order set forth in Part II of Schedule II (where the next-of-kin standing
first are given priority to those standing second) shall be entitled to
succeed to the whole of the property of the intestate.

(s.55)

5

No relative entitled
to succeed under the other provisions of Chapter 3 of Part V, of which a
Parsi has died intestate

Property shall be
equally divided among those of the intestate’s relatives who are in the
nearest degree of kindred to him.

(s.56)

 

D. SUCCESSION
PRINCIPLES COMMON FOR CHRISTIANS AND PARSIS

 

1. Rights of an
illegitimate child

Christian and
Parsi law do not recognise children born out of wedlock and deal only with
legitimate marriages (Raj Kumar Sharma vs. Rajinder Nath Diwan AIR 1987 Del
323
). Thus, the relationship under various sections under the Succession
Act relating to the Christian and Parsi succession, is the relationship flowing
from a lawful wedlock.

 

1.1 Difference between
Christian and Parsi succession laws and succession laws of other religions:

The law for
Christians and Parsis does not make any distinction between relations through
the father or the mother. In cases where the paternal and maternal sides are
equally related to the intestate, all such relations shall be entitled to
succeed and will take equal share among themselves10.


Further there is no difference when it comes to full-blood/half-blood/uterine
relations; and a posthumous child is treated as a child who was present when
the intestate died, so long as the child has been born alive and was in the
womb when the intestate died11.

 

2. Testamentary
Succession (applicable to both Christians and Parsis)

 

2.1 Wills and Codicils


2.1.1
Persons capable of making Wills: Every person of sound mind not being a
minor may dispose of his property by Will12. Thus, a married woman,
or other persons who are deaf, dumb or blind are not thereby incapacitated from
making a Will if they are able to know what they do by it. Thus, the only
people who cannot make Wills are people who are in an improper state of mind
due to intoxication, illness, etc.

 

2.1.2 Testamentary
Guardian:

A father has been given the right to appoint by Will, a guardian or guardians
for his child during minority.

___________________________________

10.            Section 27
of the Act

11.            Section 27
of the Act

12.            Section 59
of the Act

 

2.1.3 Revocation
of Will by Testator’s marriage:
All kinds of wills stand revoked by marriage which takes place
after the making of the Will13.

________________________________

13.            Section 69

 

2.1.4 Privileged and Unprivileged Wills: Wills that fulfil the essential
conditions laid down u/s. 63 of the Succession Act are called Unprivileged
Wills and Wills executed u/s. 66 of the Succession Act are called Privileged
Wills.

 

As per section 63 of
the Succession Act inter alia states that every Will must be signed by
the person making the Will (“Testator”) or his mark must be affixed thereto or
signed by a person as directed by the Testator and in the presence of the
Testator. The Will must also be signed by at least two witnesses, each of whom
has seen Testator sign the Will or affix his mark or seen some other person
sign the Will in the presence of the Testator.

 

A Privileged Will
made u/s. 66 of the Succession Act is one which is made by a soldier employed
in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, or by an airman so employed or
engaged, or by mariner being at sea and such Wills can be either in writing or
oral. A Privileged Will need not be signed by the Testator, nor attested in any
way. In case of unprivileged wills, the mode of making, and rules for executing
privileged Wills shall be in accordance with Section 66 of the Act and many
requirements such as attestation or signature of the Testator are not required
in such special Wills.

 

2.1.5  Bequests to religious and
charitable causes:
Section 118 of the Succession Act (which applies to Christians but
not Parsis) which provides that no man having a nephew or niece or any nearer
relative shall have power to bequeath any property to religious or charitable
uses, except by a Will executed not less than twelve months before his death,
and deposited within six months from its execution in some place provided by
law for the safe custody of the Wills of living persons, was struck down as
being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and therefore Christians and
Parsis can leave their property to charity without being bound by the above
condition.14

 

2.2 Probate: –

 

2.2.1 Parsis: In case of
a Parsi dying after the commencement of the Act, a probate is necessary if the
will in question is made or the property bequeathed under the will is situated
within the “ordinary original civil jurisdiction” of Calcutta, Madras and
Bombay and where such wills are made outside those limits in so far as they
relate to immovable property situated within those limits15.

 

2.2.2 Christians: It is not
mandatory for a Christian to obtain probate of his Will16.

 

To
conclude,
it may be noted that the laws of
succession differ drastically depending upon the personal law by which the
deceased person is governed at the time of his death. The religion which a
person purports to profess at the time of his/her death (or is known to have
last followed) would determine the personal law applicable to the succession of
the deceased person’s property. Therefore, it is essential to know and
understand the personal laws applicable to the person making a Will or planning
the succession of his estate. Further, in some cases, the law has evolved
through judicial precedents and therefore apart from the letter of the law
spelt out in the statute, it would be advisable to acquaint oneself with
judicial precedents, to ascertain the present position.

_______________________________

14.            Section 213
(2)

15.            Section 213
(2)

16. Section 213 (2)

 

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

Background

Prior to the codification of Hindu Law which
was started in 1955, Hindu Law was based on customs, traditions and
inscriptions in ancient texts and also on judicial decisions interpreting the
same. There were two schools of law, viz., Mitakshara and Dayabhaga.
While Dayabhaga school prevailed in Bengal, Mitakshara school
prevailed in the other parts of India. The Bengal school differed from Mitakshara
school in two main particulars, viz., the law of inheritance and joint family
system.

 

The rules relating to succession under the
uncodified customary and traditional Hindu Law were quite confusing and led to
different interpretations by courts. Moreover, enactments by several states and
by some princely states added to the problems. The rules regarding succession
were codified for the first time by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”)
which came into effect from 17th June 1956. Under the Act, the word
“Hindu” has been used in a very wide context and includes a Buddhist, a Jain or
a Sikh by religion. The Act gives clarity and effects of basic and fundamental
change on the law of succession. The main scheme of the Act is to clearly lay
down rules of intestate succession to males and females and establish complete
equality between male and female with regard to property rights. Moreover, the
old notion of what was known as ‘limited estate’ or ‘limited ownership’ of
women was abolished and the right of a female over property owned by her was
declared absolute.

 

With a view to give clarity, the Act has
been given an overriding effect over any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu
law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before
commencement of the Act as also over any other law in force immediately before
commencement of the Act so far as inconsistent with any of the provisions of
the Act. After passing of the Act, the rules regarding succession are governed
by the provisions of the Act replacing the provisions which were applicable
under the uncodified Hindu law.

 

There are two modes of succession, one is
intestate succession (when the testator dies without leaving a Will) and the
other is testate succession (when the testator leaves a Will). The Act only
applies when a Hindu male or female dies without a Will. But testate or
testamentary succession will be governed by the testamentary document/s, left
by
the testator.

 

Wills or rules relating to testamentary succession

This article being mainly for the chartered
accountants readers it is proposed to limit its scope to only give basic understanding
of testamentary documents without going into various complexities.

 

The basic testamentary document for
testamentary succession is a Will. Jarman in his treatise on Wills defines a
Will as ‘an instrument by which a person makes disposition of his property to
take effect after his demise and which is in its own nature ambulatory and
revocable during his life’. A declaration by a testator that his Will is
irrevocable is inoperative. A covenant not to revoke a Will cannot be
specifically enforced.

 

While the Act does not cover testamentary
disposition, the same is governed under the provisions of the Indian Succession
Act, 1925 and u/s. 57 thereof many of its provisions apply to Wills made by any
Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain. The term ‘Will’ has been defined in section 2(h)
of the Indian Succession Act to mean ‘the legal declaration of the intention of
a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into
effect after his death’. It is not necessary that any technical words or particular
form is used in a Will, but only that the wording be such that the intentions
of the testator can be known therefrom.

 

(Section 73 of the Indian Succession Act) A ‘codicil’ is a supplement by which a testator alters or adds to
his Will. Section 2(b) of the Indian Succession Act defines the term ‘codicil’
to mean ‘an instrument made in relation to a Will and explaining, altering or
adding to its dispositions and shall be deemed to form part of the Will’.
Therefore, a Will is the aggregate of a person’s testamentary intentions so far
as they are manifested in writing duly executed according to law and includes a
codicil.

 

There is no specific form or legal
requirement about a Will nor is it required to be on stamp paper. The only
legal requirement is that it should be properly witnessed by not less than two
witnesses as explained in detail hereafter.

 

Every person of sound mind not being a minor
may dispose of his property by a Will. A married woman may dispose by Will any
property which she could alienate by her own act during her life. Persons who
are deaf or dumb or blind can make their Wills if they are able to know what
they do by it. It may be interesting to note that even a person who is
ordinarily insane may make a Will during interval in which he is of sound mind.
A father may by Will appoint a guardian for his child during minority. A Will
or any part of it obtained by fraud, coercion or importunity is void. If a
bequest is made in favour of someone based on deception or fraud, only that bequest
becomes void and not the whole Will.

 

When a person wants to execute his/her Will,
one of the normal questions which is raised is whether it is necessary to
register the Will. A Will need not be compulsorily registered. There is no rule
of law or of evidence which requires a doctor to be kept present when a Will is
executed (See Madhukar vs. Tarabai (2002) 2SCC 85).

 

However, if a Will is to be registered, the
Registrar as a matter of procedure requires production of a doctor’s
certificate to the effect that the testator is in a sound state of mind and
physically fit to make his/her Will. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
there was nothing in law which requires the registration of a Will and as Wills
are in a majority of cases not registered, to draw any inference against the
genuineness of the Will on the ground of non-registration would be wholly
unwarranted (See Ishwardeo vs. Kamta Devi AIR(1954) SC 280). In case of Purnima
Devi vs. Khagendra Narayan Deb AIR(1962) SC 567
, the Supreme Court has
observed that if a Will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may,
having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. But the mere fact
that a Will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all
suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence
of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a
close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that
it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting
execution was a Will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its
execution and signed it in token thereof, the registration will dispel the
doubt as to the genuineness of the Will.

 

The Supreme Court in Venkatachala Iyengar
vs. Trimmajamma AIR (1959) SC 443
held that as in the case of proof of
other documents so in the case of proof of Wills it would be idle to expect
proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual
test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. Though in the
same case, the Supreme Court further held that being the non-availability of
the person who signed it there is one important factor which distinguishes a
Will from other documents and observed that in case of a Will other factors
like surrounding circumstances including existence of suspicious circumstances,
if any, should be clearly explained and dispelled by the propounder.

 

Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
requires that a Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom
has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or receive from the
testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark. Each witness is
required to sign the Will in presence of the testator. Under law it is not
necessary that the attesting witnesses should know the contents of the Will.

 

A person can change or revoke his Will as
often as he likes. Ultimately it is the last Will which prevails over earlier
Wills. Even a registered Will can be revoked by a subsequent unregistered Will.
Moreover, it may be noted that u/s. 69 of the Indian Succession Act, a Will
stands revoked by the marriage of the maker and in such a case it will be
necessary for the testator to make a fresh Will.

 

It is open for a testator to give or
bequeath any property to an executor and such bequest is valid. If a legacy is
bequeathed to a person who is named as an executor of the Will, he shall not
take the legacy unless he proves the Will or otherwise manifests an intention
to act. However, care should be taken to ensure that no bequest is made to a
person who is an attesting witness or spouse of such person as in such a case
while validity of the Will is not affected, such bequest shall be void.

 

The ancient rule of a share in HUF going by
survivorship does not now apply. A coparcener in a HUF can bequeath his
undivided share in HUF by way of Will.

It may be noted that any bequest in favour
of a person not in existence at Testator’s death subject to a prior bequest
contained in the Will or a bequest in breach of rule against perpetuity is
void. A bequest will be in breach of rule against perpetuity if it provides for
vesting of a thing bequeathed to be delayed beyond the lifetime of one or more
persons living at the Testator’s death and minority of a person who shall be in
existence at the expiration of that period and to whom the thing is bequested
on attaining majority.

 

These days it
is normal to use the facility of nomination for ownership flats in co-operative
housing societies, depository/demat accounts, mutual funds, shares, bank
accounts, etc. Once a person dies, the nominee gets a right on the asset.
However, it has been held by courts and the legal position is that although the
nominee has easy access to the asset and can get it transferred to his/her name,
the nominee holds it only as a trustee and ultimately the asset would go to the
legal heirs of the deceased under the testamentary succession or as per
applicable rules of the intestate succession, as the case may be.

 

Although the Indian Succession Act also
applies to testamentary succession of Parsis and Christians, Mohammedans are
governed by their own law and there are several restrictions in their making a
Will.

 

Tips for drafting

It is known that some chartered accountants
have been drafting legal documents and that such practice is not restricted to
just simple documents like deeds of partnership or deeds of retirement but now
extends to drafting ownership of flat, sale/purchase transactions and even
Wills and Trusts. For the benefit of such chartered accountant friends who
venture to draft Wills, the following tips may be helpful:-

 


(1)   As mentioned above, there is no specific form
or legal requirement about the Will. However, it is advisable to use clear and
unambiguous language and where names of beneficiaries are to be given, it would
be advisable to give full names, preferably with relationship with the
Testator. Again where any asset is subject matter of the Will, the item should
be clearly indentifiable and proper details of the asset should be given.


(2)   Any obliteration, interlineation or
alteration should be avoided and in case of any such alteration, the same
should be executed by the Testator and the witnesses in like manner as required
for the execution of the Will.


(3)   Care should be taken to ensure that the
attesting witness is one who or whose spouse is not getting any benefit or
bequest under the Will as otherwise the bequest will be void.


(4)   Wills containing bequest of any property to
religious or charitable uses have certain restrictions and need to be avoided.


(5)   Apart from specific bequests and legacies, a
Will should also provide for what happens to the rest and residue of the estate
of the Testator as otherwise whatever is not specifically included would
devolve as per rules of intestate succession i.e. as if there is no Will.


(6)   It is normal to appoint some family elders as
executors possibly out of respect. However, it is suggested that the executors
selected by the testator ought to be persons who are easily available and accessible
and who are able to coordinate and co-operate with each other. Preferably, the
executors should be people who have interest in the estate as beneficiary/ies.


(7)   In case of a Testator who has acquired
citizenship of any other country, the draftsman should keep the applicable laws
of that country in mind before preparing any Will. For instance, Sharia Law
applies to persons who have acquired citizenship in any Middle East country,
and some special provisions will have to be added depending on the local
lawyer’s advice to take care of the legal requirement of each country to make a
valid and effective Will based on the personal law (e.g. Hindu Law) applicable
to the individual. In the same way, foreign domicile of the Testator who holds
Indian citizenship may also need advice from local lawyers.


(8)   While drafting a Will for a person who is
resident in Goa it should be noted that Goa residents are still governed by
Portuguese Law. Therefore, a Will is likely to be challenged if it is not in
conformity with the provisions of the local law.


(9) So far as the Will is in simple form,
any educated person can draft the same. However, if it is proposed to provide
for any complicated provisions for succession planning or any kind of tax
planning by way of Trusts, it will be advisable to leave the drafting to a
competent lawyer. The reason for this piece of advice is to ensure that the
Will does not contain any provision which would in law be void.

SUCCESSION OF PROPERTY OF HINDUS

1.  INTRODUCTION

The Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, was enacted on 17.06.1956 to amend and codify the law
relating to intestate succession among Hindus. It extends to the whole of India
except the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It brought about changes in the law of
succession among Hindus and gave rights which were till then unknown in
relation to women’s property. However, it did not interfere with the special
rights of those who are members of Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary except
to provide rules for devolution of the interest of a deceased male in certain
cases. The Act lays down a uniform and comprehensive system of inheritance and
applies, inter alia, to persons governed by the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga
schools. The Act applies to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains or Sikhs. In the case of a
testamentary disposition, this Act does not apply and the succession of the
deceased is governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1925.  Section 6 of the Act deals with the
devolution of interest of a male Hindu in coparcenary property and recognises
the rule of devolution by survivorship among the members of the coparcenary. To
remove the gender discrimination, the amending act of 2005 has given equal
rights to the daughter as that of the son in the Hindu Mitakshara
Coparcenary property. The daughter has been made a coparcener, with right to
partition. Sections 8 – 13 contains general rules of succession in the case of
males and section 14 made property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
property. Sections 15 – 16 enact general rules of succession in the case of
females. Section 17 – 30 deal with general provisions with testamentary
succession. It is a self-contained code and has overriding effect and makes
fundamental and radical changes.

 

2. COPARCENARY / HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY
PROPERTY AND DEVOLUTION OF INTEREST

Mitakshara, which is prevelant in large number of states except West Bengal,
recognises two modes of devolution of property, namely, survivorship and
succession. The rule of survivorship applied to joint family (coparcenary)
property; the rules of succession apply to property held in absolute severalty.
Dayabhaga recognises only one mode of devolution, namely, succession. It
does not recognise the rule of survivorship even in the case of joint family
property. The reason is that while every member of a Mitakshara
coparcenary has only an undivided interest in the joint property, a member of a
Dayabhaga joint family holds his share in quasi-severalty, so that it
passes on his death to his heirs, as if he was absolutely seized thereof, and
not to the surviving coparceners as under the Mitakshara law. The
essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara law is unity of ownership.
The ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of coparceners.
According to the true notion of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara
law, no individual member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can
predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he, that particular member,
has a definite share, that is, one-third or one-fourth. His interest is a
fluctuating interest, capable of being enlarged by deaths in the family, and
liable to be diminished by births in the family. It is only on a partition that
he becomes entitled to a definite share. No female could be a coparcener under Mitakshara
law. Share of wife is not as her husband’s coparcener, but is entitled to equal
share where there is a partition between her husband and her children.

 

2.1. Where a Hindu dies after 09.09.2005, his
interest in the property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession
and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a
partition had taken place. A notional partition and division has been
introduced. Upon such notional partition, the property would be notionally
divided amongst the heirs of the deceased coparcener, the daughter taking equal
share with son, the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter
being allotted to the surviving child of such heirs. To put a stop to escape
the consequences, it has been specified that partition before 20.12.2004 made
by registered partition deed or affected by a decree of court, alone would be
treated as valid.

 

2.2. The Supreme Court in Gurupad Magdum vs. H.
K. Magdum – AIR 1978 SC 1239 : (1981) 129-ITR-440 (S.C.)
. observed : “What
is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place
between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. That
assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having
been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the shares of the deceased in
the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain
the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the
statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must
permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the
heirs, through all its stages…. All the consequences which flow from a real
partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the
heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another
and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the
lifetime of the deceased”.
On reading the said judgment the Supreme Court
does not say that the fiction and notional partition must bring about total
disruption of the joint family, or that the coparcenary ceases to exist even if
the deceased was survived by two coparceners. It is submitted that the notional
partition need not result in total disruption of the joint family. Nor would it
result in the cessation of coparcenary. In Shyama Devi (Smt.) and Ors. vs.
Manju Shukla (Mrs.) and Anr. (1994) 6 SCC 342
followed the judgment in Magdums
case (supra). The Hon’ble Court went on to state that Explanation 1
contains a formula for determining the share of the deceased on the date of his
death by the law effecting a partition immediately before a male Hindu’s death
took place.

 

2.3. In State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham
Rao, AIR 1985 SC 716 : (1987) 163-ITR-31 (SC)
, the Supreme Court carefully
considered the above decision in Gurupad’s case and pointed out that Gurupad’s
case has to be treated as authority (only) for the position that when a female
member who inherits an interest in joint family property u/s. 6 of the Act,
files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family,
she would be entitled to both the interest she has inherited and the share
which would have been notionally allotted to her as stated in Explanation 1 to
section 6 of the Act. It was also pointed out that a legal fiction should no
doubt ordinarily be carried to its logical end to carry out the purposes for
which it is enacted, but it cannot be carried beyond that. There is no doubt
that the right of a female heir to the interest inherited by her in the family
property, gets fixed on the date of the death of a male member u/s. 6 of the
Act, but she cannot be treated as having ceased to be a member of the family
without her  volition as otherwise it
will lead to strange results which could not have been in the contemplation of
Parliament when it enacted that provision. It was also pointed out in this
later decision of the Supreme Court that the decision in Gurupad’s case has to
be treated as an authority (only) for Explanation 1 to section 6 of the Act.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Rani vs. Chief Settlement
Commissioner, Delhi – AIR 1984 SC 1234
say the explanation speaks of share
in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the
property had taken place. Considering these words used in the explanation, it
is clear that such property must be available for computation of share and
interest.  In my view, not in automatic
partition under the Income-tax law.

 

2.4. In a recent judgment the Apex
Court in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh – AIR 2016 S.C. 1169, considered both
the above cases and held (i) Interest of the deceased will devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members subject to an exception that such
interest can be disposed of by him u/s. 30 by Will or other testamentary
succession; (ii) A partition is effected by operation of law immediately before
his death, wherein all the coparceners and the male Hindu’s widow get a share
in the joint family property; (iii) On the application of section 8 such
property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship; (iv) On a
conjoint reading of sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family
property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of
intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the
hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property
as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. While coming to the above
proposition the Hon’ble Court observed in para 13 “In State  of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao
Deshmukh and Ors., (1985) 3 S.C.R. 358 : (AIR 1985 SC 716), this Court
distinguished the judgment in Magdum’s (AIR 1978 SC 1239) case in answering a
completely different question that was raised before it. The question raised
before the Court in that case was as to whether a female Hindu, who inherits a
share of the joint family property on the death of her husband, ceases to be a
member of the family thereafter. This Court held that as there was a partition
by operation of law on application of explanation 1 of Section 6, and as such
partition was not a voluntary act by the female Hindu, the female Hindu does
not cease to be a member of the joint family upon such partition being
effected.

2.4.1.    In my humble opinion the
last proposition as to “the joint family property ceases to be joint family
property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it” needs
clarification, reconsideration and review. If so, the joint family property
would become extinct in all cases where section 6 applies and the sons of the
last recipient would not get any share and the recipient’s property would have
character of individual property. To illustrate ‘A’ has coparcenary property;
the family consists of ‘A’ father, ‘ H‘ wife, ‘B’, ‘C’ sons and ‘D’ daughter.
‘B’ & ‘C’ are married and have sons ‘G’ & ‘H’ and wives, ‘N’ & ‘M’
respectively. They are living together and carrying on family business – on
death of ‘A’ his interest would devolve and there would be notional partition
of the family. The share received by ‘B’ and ‘C’ respectively would become
their individual property governed by section 8 and not section 6, resulting in
extinguishment of share and interest of ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘N’ and ‘M’ and debarring
them to inherit ancestral property.

 

2.4.2.    Though the members live
and want to continue to live jointly and do not want to exercise the volition
of living separate, separation would be thrusted upon them, with extinction of
family property. Section 171 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which requires
division by meets and bounds and an application u/s. 171(2) on there being
total or partial partition, would become iotise and non-existent. ‘G’ &
‘H’, who have share and interest in coparcenary/ancestral property would lose and
‘B’ & ‘C’ would gain. Considering from all angles, the share received on
notional partition by ‘B’ and ‘C’ would have the character of H.U.F. property
and the share received by each would be for and on behalf of himself, his wife
and son.

 

2.4.3.    Many old judgments of the Apex Court like Gowli
Buddana vs. C.I.T. (1966) 60-ITR- (SC) 293; N. V. Narendra Nath vs. C.W.T.
(1969) 74-ITR-190 (S.C.)
holding that : “When a coparcener having a wife
and two minor daughters and no son receives his share of joint family
properties on partition, such property, in the hands of the coparcener, belongs
to the Hindu undivided family of himself, his wife and minor daughters and
cannot be assessed as his individual property for the purposes of wealth-tax”
  C. Krishna Prasad vs. C.I.T. (1974)
97-ITR-493 (S.C.). Surjit Lal Chhabra vs. C.I.T. (1975) 101-ITR-776 (S.C.);
Controller of Estate Duty vs. Alladi Kupuswamy (1977) 108-ITR-439 (S.C.) and
Pushpa Devi vs. C.I.T. (1977) 109-ITR-730 (S.C.)
needs be considered,
discussed and deliberated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court escaped (sic) the above
cases, which are of material substance and direct on the point at issue.

2.5. An unfounded controversy has been created by
the two-judge judgment in Uttam’s case (supra) after distinguishing the
three-judge judgment in Narayan Rao Sham Rao (supra). In my analysis
better view is in Narayan Rao Sham Rao case and later judgment in Kaloomal
Tapeshwari Prasad (H.U.F.) (1982) 133-ITR-690 (S.C.)
where it has been held
that mere severance of status under Hindu Law would not be sufficient to
establish partition and there must be division of property by meets and bounds
coupled with application after voluntary separation. Case of Uttam (supra) is
on its own facts and completely distinguishable on facts and under the
Income-tax Act. Otherwise also judgement in Narayan Rao Sham Rao (supra)
is by three judges, whereas in case of Uttam (supra) by two judges. For
purposes of income-tax assessment judicial precedent would be the case of Kaloomal
Tapeshwari Prasad (supra)
. At best such observations in Uttam’s case
(supra)
would be obiter dicta and inapplicable as a judicial
precedent.

 

2.6. Recently on 02.07.2018 the Supreme Court in Shyam
Narayan Prasad vs. Krishna Prasad – AIR 2018 S.C. 3152
observed in para 12
: “It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu from his
father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property.
The essential feature of ancestral property, according to Mitakshara Law, is
that the sons, grandsons, and great grand-sons of the person who inherits it,
acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at the moment of
their birth. The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral
property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. After partition, the
property in the hands of the son will continue to be the ancestral property and
the natural or adopted son of that son will take interest in it and is entitled
to it by survivorship”.
It referred to C. Krishna Prasad Case (supra); M.
Yogendra and Ors. vs. Leelamma N. and Ors, 2009 (15) SCC 184; Rohit Chauhan vs.
Surinder Singh and Ors. AIR 2013 S.C. 3525
etc. Thus it can be said that
Uttam’s case would be completely distinguishable and inapplicable.

 

2.7. Eliminating gender discrimination, putting a
daughter on same pedestal as that of a son, making her as a coparcener as that
of son and with equal rights and obligations is a right step after 50 long
years towards women empowerment and equality. Son and daughter are born out of
the same womb, why should there be preferential treatment to son dehorse
the daughter? Now a daughter would get her interest in coparcenary property of
her father as also share on partition of family of her husband, being a wife.
Double share is laudable. Now she can be sole coparcener. A doubt is raised as
to whether a daughter i.e. a female can be Karta/Manager of her father’s
family? In my humble submission, she being a coparcener, if is possessed of the
property and manages it, she can be a Manager and perform her duties. It is a
misnomer that, only the eldest son can be a Karta / Manager. In the family of
His Late Highness Maharana Bhagwat Singh of Mewar, the honourable Rajasthan
High Court accepted younger son Shreeji Shri Arvind Singh of Mewar as a Manager
instead of Shri Mahendra Singh of Mewar. However, she cannot be a Karta/Manager
of her husband’s family. It shows a daughter remains as daughter married or
unmarried, until her last and also Karta of her father’s family in appropriate
eventuality. It is noticed that some persons persuade the sisters and
pressurise them to release their interest in their favour, which is unethical
and needs to be eschewed and criticised. Women’s rightful gain must go in their
kitty.

 

3.     SUCCESSION OF PROPERTY OF MALE HINDU

The property of a
male Hindu dying intestate i.e. without a Will, shall devolve upon his heirs as
specified in class I of the Schedule; if none, then upon the heirs specified in
Class II of the Schedule and in the absence of the said heirs, then upon the
agnates of the deceased and lastly if there is no agnate, then upon the
cognates. Heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule shall take simultaneously
and equally. The property is distributed as per rules in section 10. All widows
together would take one share; sons and daughters and mother each shall take
one share and the heirs of each predeceased son or each predeceased daughter
shall take between them one share. Heirs specified in any one entry as in Class
II of the Schedule would have equal share. Agnates and Cognates shall receive
as per section 12 with computation of degress as specified in section 13.
Property possessed or acquired by a female Hindu would be held by her as a full
owner, with all powers to transfer, gift, encumber or bequeath.

 

3.1. The Supreme Court after considering preamble
and its over-riding effect on Hindu Law observed in C.W.T. vs. Chander Sen
and Others – AIR 1986 S.C. 1753 : (1986) 161-ITR-370 (S.C.)
, it is not
possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and
does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say
that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by section 8
he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. It also stated it would be
difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu u/s. 8 of the
Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-à-vis his own son. This view
has been followed in C.I.T. vs. P. L. Karuppan Chettair (1992) 197-ITR-646
(S.C.)
.

 

 

4.     WOMEN’S PROPERTY

Under the ancient
Hindu Law in operation prior to the coming into force of this Act, a woman’s
ownership of property was hedged in by certain delimitations on her right of
disposal by acts inter vivos and also on her testamentary power in
respect of that property. Absolute power of alienation was not regarded, in
case of a female owner, as a necessary concomitant of the right to hold and
enjoy property and it was only in case of property acquired by her from
particular sources that she had full dominion over it. Section 14 provides that
any property whether movable or immovable or agricultural acquired by
inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or by gift
from any person, at or before or after marriage or by her own skill or
exertion, or by purchase or stridhan or in any other manner whatsoever
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement
of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not a limited
owner. The said section is not violative of article 14 or 15(i) of the
Constitution and is capable of implementation as held in Pratap Singh vs.
Union of India – AIR 1985 S.C. 1694
.

 

4.1. If a male dies leaving only a widow, she would
be sole owner, but if two widows, each would share equally. Once a widow
succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires absolute right over the
same under this section, she would not be divested of that absolute right on
her remarriage. Property received, acquired or possessed by a female Hindu
would be her individual property. Share received from her father’s coparcenary
u/s. 6 of the Act on partition between her husband and son, would be of the
character of an individual property. She has right to give away by testamentary
succession. In case of her intestacy, succession would be in accordance with
section 15 of the Act. It is a right step towards women’s empowernment and
eliminates gender vice. Now there is no distinction between a man and a woman.

 

5.     SUCCESSION OF PROPERTY OF A FEMALE HINDU

The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve as mandated
in section 15 and in accordance with the rules set out in section 16. Firstly,
upon the sons, daughters, children of pre-deceased son or daughter and the
husband. Secondly, on the heirs of the husband; thirdly, upon the mother and
father of the female; fourthly, upon the heirs of the father, and lastly, upon
the heirs of the mother. However, any property inherited by a female from her
father or mother shall devolve upon the heirs of her father, if in the absence
of any son or daughter or children of any pre-deceased son or daughter or their
children only.

 

Secondly any property inherited by a female from her husband or from her
father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter or children
of any pre-deceased son or daughter, upon the heirs of the husband. These
exceptions are on property inherited from father, mother, husband or
father-in-law and not from others or her self-acquired property. Object is to
revert back to the heirs of the same from whom acquired. The order of
succession and manner of distribution amongst heirs of a female Hindu are:
Firstly among the heirs specified hereinbefore in one entry simultaneously in
preference to any succeeding entry; Secondly in case of pre-deceased son or
daughter to his/her deceased son or daughter living at the relevant time. Other
rules would apply.

 

6.     GENERAL PROVISIONS

Heirs related to
full blood shall be preferred as against half blood. When two or more heirs
succeed together, they would receive per capita and not per stirpes and as
tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. A child in womb at the time of
death of deceased, shall have same right to inherit as a born child.

 

In case of
simultaneous deaths, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that
the younger survived the elder. Preferential right to acquire property by the
heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule, shall vest in other heirs, if a
heir proposes to transfer his share at the consideration mutually settled or
decided by the Court. If a person commits murder or abates in the crime he
would dis-inherit the property of person murdered. It is based upon principles
of justice, equity and good conscience. Converts to any other religion and his/her
descendants are disqualified and would not inherit. He/she shall be deemed as
died before the deceased. Any disease, defect or deformity would not disqualify
from succession. If there is none to succeed, the property of the deceased
shall devolve on the Government along with obligations and liabilities.



7.     TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

‘Will’ as defined
u/s. 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act means “the legal declaration of the
intention of a Testator with respect of his property which he desires to be carried
into effect after his death”. A Will comes into effect after the death of the
Testator and is revocable during the life-time of the testator. Every person of
sound mind not being a minor can dispose of his property by Will. The testator
is at liberty to bequeath the disposable property to any person, he likes.
There is no restriction that a Will has to be made in favour of legal heirs,
relatives, close friends, etc. A Will or codicil need not be stamped or
registered though it deals with vast immovable properties. A Will can be on a
sheet of paper. It need not be on a stamp or Government paper. However, to
generate confidence, it is advisable to execute on a stamp of any denomination.
It is advisable to get each sheet of the Will signed in the aforesaid manner
from the testator and to put photo of the testator.  Attestation should be as per section 63 of
the Indian Succession Act.  However, it
is desirable to get it Notarised or registered under the Indian Registration
Act.

 

A Hindu male or
female can bequeath individual property as well as share in the coparcenary
property by way of a Will. Manifold benefits are inherent by making a Will.
However, it has been noticed that very negligible few tax payers are taking
advantage of the medium of Will. It can be a tool for further reducing the
nominal rate of tax and expanding units of assessments with manifold advantages
to regulate the members of family and relatives. Its importance need not be
emphasised but is well known. It is highly desirable that every person makes a
Will to avoid and avert litigation amongst legal heirs and representatives and
in order to reduce the rate of tax in the hands of relatives and would-be
children, grand-children, daughters and sons-in-law and to create Hindu
undivided family, to add more units. Such persons could be surely reminded :
“Have you executed your Will, if so, please see that it is in a safe place and
do inform your spouse about it. If not, please fix up the earliest appointment
with the ever-friendly lawyer next door! All the ladies should ask their
husbands that there is a proper Will duly executed by them and insist on seeing
it and also to ensure that the (wife) is the sole beneficiary under that Will.
One should advice to act expeditiously. Liability of tax after death of an
individual can be better managed through a Will. It is high time to explore the
multi-fold benefits of a WILL.

 

8.     CONCLUSION

Old Hindu Law and
outdated customs stand deleted, codified in succession and inheritance with
overriding effect given to the enacted provisions. A child in the womb has been
conferred birthright in property. Gender discrimination between son and
daughter eliminated, bestowing share and interest in coparcenary property to
make females self-sufficient and financially strong. Right of testamentary
succession granted in share in coparcenary property, Will has become a strong
tool to choose beneficiaries, avoid stamp duty and family disputes. One can
better manage tax with sound planning. A female can throw her individual
property in common hotch-potch or impress with the character of H.U.F. property
being a coparcener. She can be even Karta of father’s family, but not of
husband’s family. Male predominance stands curtailed. Rule of primogeniture
stands abolished. View expressed in Uttam’s case would be distinguishable on
facts and under income-tax Act. Correct view is in Narayan Rao Sham Rao
(supra)
and Shyam Narayan Prasad (supra).

 

 

ENTRY TAX ON GOODS IMPORTED FROM OUT OF INDIA

Introduction


A burning issue prevailed
about levy of Entry tax on goods imported from out of India.


The State tax on Entry of
Goods into Local Areas is levied by State Governments by enacting respective
State Acts. The Act is enabled by Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII of
Constitution of India.


Different State Governments
have enacted such Acts including Maharashtra. The Act generally provides for
levy of entry tax on goods, which entered into the State from outside the State
for consumption, use or sale therein. The question for consideration herein is
what is the meaning of words ‘from outside the State’?    


Controversy


There were contradictory
judgments about scope of ‘outside the State’.


In case of Fr.
William Fernandez vs. State of Kerala (115 STC 591) (Ker)
, the Hon.
Kerala High Court held that the scope of entry of goods from outside the State
will be restricted to goods brought from outside State but from place within
India. In other words, when the goods are imported from out of India there is
no intention to levy Entry Tax by State Act. The judgment was based on overall
scheme of Constitution that imported goods are immune from levy of State tax
and that the State Governments are intending to tax goods coming from other
States and not from out of India.


There are contrary
judgments from other High Courts also like in Reliance Industries Ltd.
vs. State of Orissa (16 VST 85) (Ori)
, the Orissa High Court justified
levy of Entry Tax even on goods imported from out of India.


The above controversy
ultimately came before the Hon. Supreme Court.


The
Supreme Court has given its judgment in case of State of Kerala vs. Fr.
William Fernandez (54 GSTR 21)(SC)
.


The main issues raised for
non-levy of goods imported from outside India are rejected by the Hon. Supreme
Court. The main principles observed by the Hon. Supreme Court can be noted as
under: –


(i) The law provides for
entry into local area from “any place” outside State “Any Place” has wide
extent and need not be restricted to place within India.


(ii) Entry 52 permits tax
on entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale and has nothing
to do with origin of goods.      


(iii)
When the charging section is clear, provisions cannot be read narrowly to mean
that the imported goods coming from outside country are excluded from charge of
entry tax.


(iv) Even in some State
Entry Tax Acts, specific words are used to include goods imported from outside
the country, and that is by abandon caution thus cannot affect scope in other
State Acts.


(v) The entries in Schedule
VII are regarding field of legislation and not only power of legislation.


(vi) There is no over
powering between State and Union in respect of entries in the field of
Legislation.


(vii) There cannot be said
any intrude of State power into Union power, by levying entry tax on goods
imported from outside India.


(viii) Restriction by
Article 286 on levy of tax on sale/purchase covered by section 5 of CST Act as
sale in course of import/export cannot be brought in, while interpreting Entry
52 in List II.


(ix) The custom duty provisions
also do not hit levy of entry tax as entry tax is levied after import is over.
Import continues till goods are cleared for home consumption. Once so cleared,
they are part of common mass and hence eligible to tax by States.


(x) Though in the concept of
valuation, custom duty is not included in State Entry Tax Act, it is
inconsequential for deciding validity of law.


(xi) Even if, name suggests
levy by local authorities, State is empowered to levy such tax.


(xii)  Other grounds about validity like user of tax
collection etc., were rejected, as they have nothing to do with validity of
levy.


Thus, holding as above the
Hon. Supreme Court upheld entry tax on goods imported from outside India.
 


Some relevant observations
of the Hon. Supreme Court are as under:
 


“58. The plain and literal construction when
put to section 3 read with section 2(d) clearly means that goods entering into
local area from any place outside the State are to be charged with entry tax.
Foreign territory would be a place which is not only outside the local area but
also outside the State. The writ petitions are trying to introduce words of
limitation in the definition clause. The interpretation which is sought to be
put up is that both the phrases be read as:


(1)  “from any place outside that local area but
within that State”;


(2)  any place outside the State but within
India.


59. It is well known rule of statutory
interpretation that be process of interpretation the provision cannot be
rewritten nor any word can be introduced. The expression ‘any place’ the words
‘outside the State’ is also indicative of wide extent. The words ‘any place’
cannot be limited to a place within the territory of India when no such
indication is discernible from the provisions of the Act.

 

60. The entry tax legislations are referable to
entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 52 also
provided a legislative field, namely, ‘taxes on the entries of goods into a
local area for consumption, use or sale therein’. Legislation is thus concerned
only with entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale. The
origin of goods has no relevance with regard to chargeability of entry tax…”


Further:


“75. The distribution of power between Union and
States is done in a mutually exclusive manner as is reflected by precise and
clear field of legislation as allocated under different list under the Seventh
Schedule. No assumption of any overlapping between a subject allocated to Union
and State arises. When the field of legislation falls in one or other in Union
or State Lists, the legislation falling under the State entry has always been
upheld.”


The Hon.
Supreme Court also observed as under: –


“83. As
noted above, although, Nine Judges Constitution Bench had left the question
open of validity of entry tax on goods imported from countries outside the
territories of India, the two Hon’ble Judges, i.e. Justice R. Banumathi and
Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud while delivering separate judgment have considered
the leviability of entry tax on imported goods in detail. Both Hon’ble Judges
have held that there is no clash/overlap between entry levied by the State
under Entry 52 of List II and the custom duty levied by the Union under Entry
83 List I. We have also arrived at the same conclusion in view of the foregoing
discussions. We thus hold that entry tax legislations do not intrude in the
legislative field reserved for Parliament under Entry 41 and under Entry 83 of
List I.


The State Legislature is fully competent to impose tax on the entry of
goods into a local area for consumption, sale and use. We thus repel the
submission of petitioner that entry tax legislation of the State encroaches in
the Parliament’s field.”


Conclusion


The law
about levy of Entry tax has now become clear. The interpretation on many
Legislative aspects by
the Hon. Supreme Court will be useful for guidance in future.

 

Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) – as consideration received for rendering on call advisory services in the nature of troubleshooting, isolating problem and diagnosing related trouble and repair services remotely, without any on-site support, did not satisfy make available condition under DTAA, it was not taxable in India.

13. [2018] 98
taxmann.com 458 (Delhi) Ciena Communications India (P.) Ltd vs. ACIT Date of
Order: 27th September, 2018 A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2014-15

 

Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) – as
consideration received for rendering on call advisory services in the nature of
troubleshooting, isolating problem and diagnosing related trouble and repair
services remotely, without any on-site support, did not satisfy make available
condition under DTAA, it was not taxable in India.

 

Facts

 

Taxpayer, an
Indian company, was engaged in the business of providing Annual Maintenance
Contract (‘AMC’) services and installation, commissioning services for
equipment supplied by its associated enterprises (“AEs”) to customers in India.

 

In relation to
such services, Taxpayer entered into an agreement with its US AE. In terms of
the agreement, the US AE was required to provide remote on-call support
services and emergency technical support services to facilitate Taxpayer in the
maintenance and repair of the equipment supplied to the customers in India.
These services were rendered by the US AE remotely from outside India. In some
cases, the equipment supplied to the customers in India was also shipped to the
US by the Taxpayer for undertaking repairs by the US AE.

 

Taxpayer
contended that the services rendered by US AE did not make available any
technical knowledge or skill. Further, as the services were rendered outside
India, there was no PE of the US AE in India and hence the payment made to US
AE was not taxable in India. 

 

However, AO held that the services rendered by non-resident AE made
available technical knowledge, experience or skill and hence qualified as FTS
under the India US DTAA. 

 

Therefore, the
Taxpayer appealed before the CIT(A) which upheld AO’s order. Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

·        
            Article
12 of India-USA DTAA provides that payment made for technical services
qualifies as fee for included services (FIS), if such services make available
technical knowledge and skill to the recipient of service, such that the
service recipient is enabled to use such knowledge/skill on its own.

·        
            Services
provided by AE to Taxpayer involved provision of assistance in troubleshooting,
isolating the problem and diagnosing related trouble and alarms and equipment
repair services. These services were provided remotely outside India and no
on-site support services were rendered in India. Although, the technical
knowledge or skill was used by the US AE for rendering of the services, it did
not make available any technical knowledge or skill to the Taxpayer.

·        
            Thus,
the amount paid by Taxpayer to the US AE did not qualify as FIS and hence, it
was not taxable in India as per Article 12 of India US DTAA.  

 

 

 

Article 5(1) & 5(2)(g) of India-Mauritius DTAA; – Ownership over oil or gas well is not a precondition for constitution of exploration PE under Article 5(2)(g) of India- Mauritius DTAA.

12.
TS-633-ITAT-2018 (Delhi) GIL Mauritius Holdings Ltd. vs. DDIT Date of Order: 22nd
October, 2018 A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Article 5(1)
& 5(2)(g) of India-Mauritius DTAA; – Ownership over oil or gas well is not
a precondition for constitution of exploration PE under Article 5(2)(g) of
India- Mauritius DTAA.

 

Facts

 

The Taxpayer
was a company incorporated in Mauritius. During the year under consideration,
Taxpayer entered into a subcontracting arrangement for rendering certain
services in relation to oil and gas project in India under two separate
contracts with two Indian companies (ICo 1 and ICo 2). For executing the work
under the respective contracts, Taxpayer was required to establish a dedicated
project team headed by a project manager for proper execution of the subcontracted
work in India. It had also deployed certain vessels in India.

 

While the two
contracts were entered into on 1st November 2004 and 15th
September 2004 respectively, the Taxpayer considered the date of entry of
vessel in India (viz. 1st February 2005 and 1st December
2004 respectively) as the date of commencement of the contract and contended
that the duration of the two contracts was 109 days and 136 days respectively.
Hence, presence of such duration did not result in a PE in India.

 

The AO however,
held that the vessel used by the taxpayer for carrying on its activities in
India constituted a fixed place of business under Article 5(1) of the DTAA.
Hence, income from subcontracting was taxable in India.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer filed an appeal before the CIT(A) who noted that Taxpayer activities
were in relation to a project dealing with transportation of mineral oils, and
hence, such activities would create a PE under Article 5(1) as also under
Article 5(2)(g)2 of the DTAA. (Both Article 5(1) and 5(2)(g) do not
provide for a time threshold for creation of a PE). Aggrieved, the Taxpayer
appealed before the Tribunal. 

 

Held

 

Computation of
duration of the contract:

  •             As
    per the subcontracting agreement, subcontractor was required to commence the
    work on the ‘effective date’ or such other date as may be mutually agreed
    between the parties. On failure of Taxpayer to furnish information about
    the effective date, the date of entering into the contract was held to be
    the date of commencement of the contract.
  •             Further,
    it was held that the date of entry of the vessel into India cannot be
    taken to be date of commencement of the work for the following reasons:

           
           The scope of work under the
main contract when coupled with the scope of work under the sub-contract did
not support the commencement of work necessarily from the date of entry of
vessel into India.

          
            The terms of subcontractor
agreement required not only the vessels to be mobilised in India but also
mobilisation of several key persons, equipment materials tools etc. Also, the
contract stated that the commencement of contract shall be from the date the
agreement is signed.

           
           The date of demobilisation of
the vessel was taken as the end date of the contract. Thus, duration of both
contracts was calculated as 201 days and 212 days respectively after taking
into account period from the date of signing the contract till the date of
demobilisation of the vessel in India.

__________________________________

2  Article
5(2)(g) deems a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of
extraction of natural resources as a fixed place PE

 

Applicability
of Article 5(2)(i)

 

           Since the duration of both the
separate contracts was less than the threshold period of 9 months Taxpayer did
not create a PE under Article 5(2)(i) of the DTAA. 

 

Applicability
of Article 5(2)(g)

  •             For
    determination of an exploration PE under Article 5(2)(g) of
    India-Mauritius DTAA, the only requirement is that there should be a fixed
    place in the form of oil rig/ gas well/quarry at the disposal of the
    Taxpayer through which it carries on its business. It is incorrect to say
    that the Taxpayer should be owner of the oil or gas well for evaluating if
    it has a PE under Article 5(2)(g).
  •             Article
    5(2) (including Article 5(2)(g) refers to various places which could be
    included within the scope of PE, without attaching any condition that they
    should be owned by the taxpayer. The only condition is that the business
    of the taxpayer should be carried on through that place.
  •             Since
    nothing was brought on record to show that the project site was at the
    disposal of the Taxpayer, and whether its business was carried on from
    such project site, it cannot be held that Taxpayer had a PE under Article
    5(2)(g) of the DTAA.

 

Article 5 & Article 12 of India-South Africa DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – Payment for rendering line production services did not qualify as FTS/ royalty under the Act as well as the DTAA.

11. (2018) 98
taxmann.com 227 (Mum) Endemol South Africa (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. DCIT Date of
Order: 3rd October, 2018 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Article 5 & Article 12 of India-South Africa DTAA; Explanation 2 to
section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – Payment for rendering line production services
did not qualify as FTS/ royalty under the Act as well as the DTAA. 

 

Facts

 

The Taxpayer, a
company incorporated in South Africa, entered into an agreement with an Indian
Company (“ICo”) to carry out Line Production Services1. Under the
said agreement, the Taxpayer was required to provide certain administrative
services for facilitating and coordinating filming of episodes of television
series by ICo at various locations in South Africa.

 

The Taxpayer filed its return of income declaring nil income on the
contention that the fees received for rendering the aforesaid services was not
in the nature of FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act and accordingly, it was not
taxable in India.

 

However, the AO
was of the view that the role of the Taxpayer was not that of a mere
facilitator and the amount received was for the use of copyright as well as for
rendering the managerial and technical services to ICo and hence it qualified
as royalty and Fee for Technical services (FTS) under the Act as well as the
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer filed an objection before the DRP. On perusal of the
terms of agreement, DRP held that the Taxpayer was engaged in the co-production
of the television series in South Africa by providing the technical inputs and
technical manpower to ICo. Thus, the fees received by the Taxpayer was for
rendering managerial and technical services which qualified as FTS under the
Act as well as the DTAA. Further, the DRP also held that the Taxpayer had
assigned all its copyrights in the television series to ICo. Thus, the payments
received by Taxpayer also qualified as royalty under the Act as well as Article
12 of DTAA.

______________________________________

1.   Line production services which were provided
by the Taxpayer included services like (i) arranging for crew and support
personnel, as may be requisitioned; (ii) props and other set production
materials; (iii) safety, security and transportation; and (iv) filming and
other equipment, as may be requisitioned.

 

Aggrieved, the
Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

 

Whether line
production services can be characterised as services of a managerial, technical
or consultancy nature for FTS:

·        
            Under
the line production agreement, Taxpayer rendered various coordination/
facilitation services to ICo in producing the television series, such as
arranging of all production facilities; providing a line producer, production
staff, local crew for providing stunt services, provision of transportation
necessary for stunts/ production of the show; arranging for a director, staff,
art department and production staff to set up and film the series; providing
for all required paper work and declaration regarding fair treatment meted out
to animals, insects etc.

·        
            For the
following reasons, it was held that various coordination/facilitation services
rendered by the Taxpayer did not qualify as FTS:

        

   
           •        Managerial
Services
– The term managerial services, ordinarily means handling
management and its affairs. As per the concise oxford dictionary, the term
managerial services mean rendering of services which involves controlling,
directing, managing or administering a business or part of a business or any
other thing. Since the services rendered by the Taxpayer were administrative
services (such as making logistic arrangements etc), it would not tantamount to
provision of any managerial or management functional services to ICo. It,
therefore, would not fall within the realm of the term ‘managerial services’.

       

   
           •        Technical
Services
– The term ‘technical services’ takes within its sweep services
which would require the expertise in technology or special skill or knowledge
relating to the field of technology. As the administrative services, viz.
arranging for logistics etc., by the Taxpayer neither involved use of any
technical skill or technical knowledge, nor any application of technical
expertise on its part while rendering such services, it could not be treated as
technical services.

             
  

                
      Consultancy Services– The
term consultancy services, in common parlance, means provision of advice or
advisory services by a professional requiring specialised qualification,
knowledge, expertise. Such services are more dependent on skill, intellect and
individual characteristics of the person rendering it. As the services rendered
by the Taxpayer did not involve provision of any advice or consultancy to ICo,
the same could not be brought within the ambit of “consultancy services”.

·        
            Since
the aforesaid services were purely administrative in nature, the consideration
received by the Taxpayer for rendering them could not be brought within the
sweep of the definition of “FTS” either under the Act or under DTAA.
Reliance was also placed on the ITAT decision in case of Yashraj Films Pvt.
Ltd. vs. ITO (IT) (2012) 231 ITR (T) 125 (Mum.)
wherein on similar and
overlapping facts, the Tribunal had observed that as the services rendered by
the non-resident service providers for making logistic arrangements were in the
nature of commercial services, the same could not be treated as managerial, technical
or consultancy services within the meaning given in Explanation 2 to section
9(1)(vii) of the Act.

 

Whether the
consideration can be characterised as royalty income:

·        
            In sum
and substance, the agreement entered by the Taxpayer was for rendering of line
production services by the Taxpayer to ICo in order to facilitate and enable
ICo to produce the television series and not for grant of any licensing rights
in the television programme.

·        
            Further,
as ICo had commissioned the work to Taxpayer under the contract of service, ICo
qualified as the first owner of the work produced by the Taxpayer under the
South Africa Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978. Hence, it was incorrect to suggest
that there was an assignment of copyright by the Taxpayer in favour of ICo.

  •             Even
    it was accepted that the consideration received by the Taxpayer was for
    ‘transfer’ of the copyright to ICo, such amount would not qualify as
    royalty as it did not involve use of or transfer of right to use a
    copyright.